India- Conflicts – Brief timeline

Added to the above list, are Siachin glacier dispute (1984 beginning – 2003 ceasefire agreement), 2016- 17 Uri, Pathankot terror attacks, Balakot surginal strikes by

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 The war, also called the First War, started in October 1947 when Pakistan feared that the Maharaja of the princely state of Kashmir and would accede to India. Following partition, princely states were left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a majority Muslim population and significant fraction of Hindu population, all ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. Tribal Islamic forces with support from the army of Pakistan attacked and occupied parts of the princely state forcing the Maharaja

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

to sign the Instrument of Accession of the princely state to the Dominion of India to receive Indian military aid. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 22 April 1948. The fronts solidified gradually along what came to be known as the . A formal cease-fire was declared at 23:59 on the night of 1 January 1949. India gained control of about two-thirds of the state (, Jammu and Ladakh) whereas Pakistan gained roughly a third of Kashmir (, and Gilgit–Baltistan). The Pakistan controlled areas are collectively referred to as Pakistan administered Kashmir.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965:

This war started following Pakistan's , which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on . The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II. The hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the and USA and the subsequent issuance of the Declaration. India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared. Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 This war was unique in the way that it did not involve the issue of Kashmir, but was rather precipitated by the crisis created by the political battle brewing in erstwhile (now ) between , Leader of East Pakistan, and and , leaders of West Pakistan. This would culminate in the declaration of Independence of Bangladesh from the state system of Pakistan. Following and the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities, about 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighbouring India. India intervened in the ongoing Bangladesh liberation movement. After a large scale pre-emptive strike by Pakistan, full-scale hostilities between the two countries commenced.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi, the commander of Pakistan , signing the instrument of surrender in Dhaka on 16 Dec 1971, in the presence of India's Lt. Gen. . Pakistan attacked at several places along India's western border with Pakistan, but the successfully held their positions. The Indian Army quickly responded to the 's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 15,010 square kilometres (5,795 square miles) of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistani and sectors but gifted it back to Pakistan in the of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill). Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces following which the People's Republic of Bangladesh was created. This war saw the highest number of casualties in any of the India-Pakistan conflicts, as well as the largest number of prisoners of war since the Second World War after the surrender of more than 90,000 Pakistani military and civilians. In the words of one Pakistani author, "Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army". Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 Commonly known as the War, this conflict between the two countries was mostly limited. During early 1999, Pakistani troops infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) and occupied Indian territory mostly in the . India responded by launching a major military and diplomatic offensive to drive out the Pakistani infiltrators. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators. According to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control. Fearing large-scale escalation in military conflict, the international community, led by the United States, increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to withdraw forces from remaining Indian territory. Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further. The morale of Pakistani forces after the withdrawal declined as many units of the Northern Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties. The government refused to accept the dead bodies of many officers, an issue that provoked outrage and protests in the Northern Areas Pakistan initially did not acknowledge many of its casualties, but later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation and that Pakistan had lost the conflict. By the end of July 1999, organized hostilities in the Kargil district had ceased. The war was a major military defeat for the Pakistani Army.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Other armed engagements Apart from the aforementioned wars, there have been skirmishes between the two nations from time to time. Some have bordered on all-out war, while others were limited in scope. The countries were expected to fight each other in 1955 after warlike posturing on both sides, but full-scale war did not break out. Standing armed conflicts

• Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: An insurgency in Kashmir has been a cause for heightened tensions. India has also accused Pakistan-backed militant groups of executing several terrorist attacks across India. • : In 1984, India launched capturing all of the . Further clashes erupted in the glacial area in 1985, 1987 and 1995 as Pakistan sought, without success, to oust India from its stronghold. • Insurgency in Balochistan: An insurgency in Balochistan province of Pakistan has also caused tensions recently. Pakistan has accused India of causing the insurgency with the help of ousted Baloch leaders, militant groups and terrorist organizations like the Balochistan Liberation Army. According to Pakistani Officials these militants are trained in neighboring Afghanistan. In 2016, Pakistan alleged that an Indian spy was arrested by Pakistani forces during a counter-intelligence operation in Balochistan. Past skirmishes and standoffs

• : The largest of its kind in South Asia, it was conducted by India between November 1986 and March 1987. Pakistani mobilisation in response raised tensions and fears that it could lead to another war between the two neighbours. • 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff: The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, which India blamed on the Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e- Mohammed, prompted the 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff and brought both sides close to war • 2008 India Pakistan standoff: a stand-off between the two nations following the 2008 attacks which was defused by diplomatic efforts. Following ten coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, India's largest city, tensions heightened between the two countries since India claimed interrogation results alleging Pakistan's ISI supporting the attackers while Pakistan denied it. Pakistan placed its air force on alert and moved troops to the Indian border, voicing concerns about proactive movements of the Indian Army and the Indian government's possible plans to launch attacks on Pakistani soil.[64] The tension defused in short time and Pakistan moved its troops away from border. • India–Pakistan border skirmishes (2016–2018): On 29 September 2016, border skirmishes between India and Pakistan began following reported "surgical strikes" by India against militant launch pads across the Line of Control in Pakistani-administered Kashmir "killing a large number of terrorists". Pakistan rejected that a strike took place, stating that Indian troops had not crossed the Line of Control but had only skirmished with Pakistani troops at the border, resulting in the deaths of two Pakistani soldiers and the wounding of nine. Pakistan rejected India's reports of any other casualties. Pakistani sources reported that at least 8 Indian soldiers were killed in the exchange, and one was captured. India confirmed that one of its soldiers was in Pakistani custody, but denied that it was linked to the incident or that any of its soldiers had been killed The Indian operation was said to be in retaliation for a militant attack on the Indian army at Uri on 18 September in the Indian- administered state of Jammu and Kashmir that left 19 soldiers dead. In the succeeding days and months, India and Pakistan continued to exchange fire along the border in Kashmir, resulting in dozens of military and civilian casualties on both sides.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

• 2019 India–Pakistan standoff: On 14 February 2019, a suicide attack on convoy of India's CRPF resulted in death of at least 40 troops. The responsibility of attack was claimed by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad. 12 days later in February 2019, Indian jets crossed international border to conduct air strikes on alleged camp of JeM in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. India claimed that it killed very large number of militants belonging to JeM. Pakistan rejected to have suffered any losses. According to the sources and satellite imagery analysis, appears to caused minimal damage to the buildings concerned. The incidents escalated the tension between India and Pakistan. The following day, Indian and Pakistani air forces got locked on in an aerial engagement. Pakistan claimed to have shot down two Indian aircraft and capturing one pilot Abhinandan Varthaman. Pakistan military officials claimed that the wreckage of one Indian aircraft fell in Pakistan administered Kashmir while the other one fell in Indian administered Kashmir rumored to be a Sukhoi Su-30MKI. Meanwhile, Indian version was about loss a MiG-21 while shooting down a Pakistani F-16. The IAF also displayed remnants of an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile that they claimed could only be fired by F-16's air planes. The missiles were said to have fired against and jammed by Su-30 by IAF. Pakistan rejected the Indian claim of an F-16 shot down. It initially released three or later on displayed all four air to air missiles of MiG-21 Bison with all missile seeker heads recovered intact from the wreckage however with mid-body of one of R-73 destroyed and claimed that non-of missiles were ever fired. Following the threats of a full-scale war, Abhinandan was released within two days. The Pentagon correspondent of Foreign Policy magazine, in a report claimed that Pakistan invited the United States to physically count its F-16 planes after the incident. Two senior U.S. defense officials told Foreign Policy that U.S. personnel recently counted Pakistan's F-16s and found none missing. A Pentagon spokesman said they was not aware of any count being conducted, but the Pentagon did not put out any official statement on the matter. However, there have been no leaks countering the Foreign Policy report. India released the electronic footage of aerial engagement to re-assert its claims. Pakistani officials has rejected radar images released by India. Stand off followed with intermittent firings across the LoC. Months later on 8 October, India on its Air Force Day, flew the same Su-30MKI "Avenger 1" aircraft in a flypast that Pakistan had claimed it had shot down during the air battle on 27 February.

Nuclear weapons

The nuclear conflict between both countries is of passive strategic nature with nuclear doctrine of Pakistan stating a first strike policy, although the strike would only be initiated if and only if, the are unable to halt an invasion (as for example in 1971 war) or a nuclear strike is launched against Pakistan, whereas India has a declared policy of no first use.

• Pokhran-I (Smiling Buddha): On 18 May 1974 India detonated an 8-kiloton nuclear device at Pokhran Test Range, becoming the first nation to become nuclear capable outside the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council as well as dragging Pakistan along with it into a with the Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto swearing to reciprocate India quoting "My countrymen would prefer having a nuclear bomb even if they have to eat grass". The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan said that the test would force Pakistan to test its own nuclear bomb. • Kirana-I: In the 1980s a series of 24 different cold tests were conducted by PAEC, led by chairman under extreme secrecy. The tunnels at , , are reported to have been bored after the Chagai nuclear test sites, it is widely believed that the tunnels were constructed sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels at Kirana Hills had been bored and then sealed and this task was also undertaken by PAEC's DTD. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on the Kirana Hills site,] it was abandoned and was shifted to the . • Pokhran-II (Operation Shakti): On 11 May 1998 India detonated another five nuclear devices at Pokhran Test Range. With jubilation and large scale approval from the Indian society came International sanctions as a reaction to this test, the most vehement reaction of all coming from Pakistan. Great ire was raised in Pakistan, which issued a

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

stern statement claiming that India was instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan vowed to match India's nuclear capability with statements like: "We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent". • Chagai-I: (Youm-e-Takbir) Within half a month of Pokhran-II, on 28 May 1998 Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices to reciprocate India in the nuclear arms race. Pakistani public, like the Indian, reacted with a celebration and heightened sense of nationalism for responding to India in kind and becoming the only Muslim . The day was later given the title Youm-e-Takbir to further proclaim such. • Chagai-II: Two days later, on 30 May 1998, Pakistan detonated a sixth nuclear device completing its own series of underground tests with this being the last the two nations have carried out to date

Timeline of various agreements between India and Pakistan:

1. Indus Water Treaty 1960:

Disputes related to this include, 1. Kishanganga Hydro Electric Project (KHEP), 2. Wular Barriage, 3. Tulbul Navigation Project.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

2. :

The Tashkent Declaration was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan signed on 10 that resolved the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Peace had been achieved on 23 September by the intervention of the external powers that pushed the two nations to cease fire, afraid the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers

3. Summit:

The Simla Agreement, or Shimla Agreement, was signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 in Shimla, the capital city of the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. It followed from the Bangladesh Liberation war in 1971 that led to the independence of Bangladesh, which was

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

earlier known as East Pakistan and was part of the territory of Pakistan. India entered the war as an ally of Bangladesh which transformed the war into an Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The agreement was the result of resolve of both the countries to "put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations". It conceived the steps to be taken for further normalisation of mutual relations and it also laid down the principles that should govern their future relations 4. :

The Lahore Declaration was signed on 21 February along with a memorandum of understanding (MoU) after three rounds of talks between the Indian and Pakistani leaders. In its content, both governments asserted their commitment to the vision of peace, stability and mutual progress and their full commitment to the Simla Agreement and the UN Charter. Both governments recognised through the Lahore Declaration that the development of nuclear weapons brought added responsibility to both nations towards avoiding conflict and promoted the importance of Confidence-building measures, especially to avoid accidental and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan also decided to give each other advance notification of ballistic missile flight tests and accidental or unexplained use of nuclear weapons to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. Its important inter alia stated:

o Recognizes that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between them. o Commits both to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence. o Commits both countries to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The Lahore Declaration and the MoU incorporated a joint commitment to intensify efforts to resolve the and other dispute, to enhance bilateral dialogue and to implement nuclear safeguards and measures to prevent conflict. Both governments condemned terrorism and committed to non- interference in each other's internal affairs and the objectives of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation and promote human rights.

Agra Summit:

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

The was a historic two-day summit meeting between India and Pakistan which lasted from 14–16 July 2001. It was organized with the aim of resolving long-standing issues between India and Pakistan. At this meeting, a proposal was made to drastically reduce nuclear arsenals, and other issues involving the Kashmir dispute, and cross-border terrorism. However, the negotiations broke down and the process was collapsed so the Agra treaty was never signed Island Dispute:

Though the creek has little military value, it offers immense economic gain. Much of the region is rich in oil and gas below the sea bed, and control over the creek would have a huge bearing on the energy potential of each nation. Also, defining the boundaries would help in the determination of the maritime boundaries, which are drawn as an extension of onshore reference points. Maritime boundaries also help in determining the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. EEZs extend to 200 nautical miles (370 km) and can be subjected to commercial exploitation

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

The demarcation would also prevent the inadvertent crossing over of fishers of both nations into each other's territories. In contrast to economic reasons described by India and Pakistan, fishers of both countries get trapped in conflict and their economic rights of earning are affected. The governments of India and Pakistan regularly arrest fishers of the other nation for crossing the boundary; however, a conventional fisher may not know where the boundary starts and ends in the sea. Wind flow, waves, and turbulence that move the boat in the sea add to this unawareness. UN law advocates a minimum penalty for this offense and release of boats, but the governments of India and Pakistan catch these fishers and keep them in prisons for a long time. Their release happens through the land boundary of India and Pakistan (Wagha border), so these fishers return to their home country without their boats. Pakistan built the LBOD canal between 1987 and 1997 to collect agricultural saline water and industrial effluents generated in the area around the main . The LBOD canal discharges the saline and contaminated water into the Sir Creek for disposal to the sea without contaminating the freshwater available in the Indus River. However, the LBOD construction is in violation of the (Article IV), causing material damage (i.e. inundating the creek area exposed during the low tide) to India. Thus Pakistan has an economic interest in keeping the dispute alive and not settled as per international conventions. If India is physically holding (partially or fully) the water area of the creek, India can settle the LBOD dispute as per the arbitration procedure available in the Indus Waters Treaty.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

India's diplomatic pressure on Pakistan

➔ Isolating Pakistan is difficult to achieve as it has its own relations and all weather friends like China, Saudi Arabia. But diplomatic pressure is certainly achievable.

➔ Pakistan is put in FATF black list because of intense diplomatic pressure by India.

➔ India should change the narrative in international space. India should highlight Pakistan's internal problems and how the civilian population are suppressed there.

➔ Give military support to Iran and Afghanistan to mount pressure on Pakistan's western border

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Kartapur Corridor:

The Kartarpur Corridor is a visa-free border crossing and corridor, connecting the Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan to the border with India. The crossing allows devotees from India to visit the gurdwara in Kartarpur, 4.7 kilometres (2.9 miles) from the India–Pakistan border on the Pakistani side without a

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

visa. However Pakistani Sikhs are unable to use the border crossing, and cannot access Dera Baba Nanak on the Indian side without first obtaining an Indian visa or unless they work there.

Editorial Coverage: The Puzzle of the 1972 Shimla Summit, Or Why India Did Not Impose Its Will

Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indra Gandhi signing the Simla Agreement. Credit: Bhutto.org

Indira Gandhi’s reputation for shrewd statecraft is widely acclaimed, even by her fiercest detractors. Her quest for peacemaking was equally bold, as witnessed by India’s approach to the 1972 peace conference at Shimla. The 1972 case, however, is intriguing for what it did not reflect – India not leveraging the fruits of the 1971 war victory to produce an advantageous geopolitical settlement. After all, for the first time since Partition, India was negotiating from a position of (POWs) strength and prestige with Pakistan; 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war , including the entire military leadership in East Pakistan, had surrendered to Indian forces. India had also captured strategic locations in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles of Pakistan’s territory in Sindh and south Punjab.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Yet, historians have never adequately resolved the puzzle of why India did not impose its will as a victor. While most interpretations of India’s approach to this post-conflict phase have been polemical, the available evidence reveals that ambitious strategic objectives informed India’s negotiating behaviour. In their quest to shape the post-war order, Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.

Indian calculus

The post-1971 international and regional context had made reaching some kind of an agreement an important policy goal for Gandhi and her national security team. Having engaged in a successful war that liberated Bangladesh, policymakers sought to further buttress India’s status by also demonstrating a credible attempt at peace. Elevating India’s image, of course, had to be balanced by attaining concrete outcomes. The most desirable outcome would have been a final resolution in Kashmir around the de facto-administered position of both sides. The evidence suggests that policymakers sought to address some of the deeper roots of the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir, which was perceived as a direct manifestation of Pakistan’s national identity rather than a normal inter-state territorial impasse. P.N. Haksar, Gandhi’s leading foreign policy advisor, later wrote that India’s approach was based on “a recognition that Pakistan continued to have an unresolved crisis of its national identity”. 1971 had opened the possibility for an alternative future for Pakistan.

In a memo drafted shortly after the war, Haksar described the flux across the border: “The military- bureaucratic and feudal social order had crumbled…Pakistan of Yahya Khan had suffered political and military defeat. It is a nation in ferment seeking new identity for itself.” Having framed the adversary’s precarious internal balance, Haksar introspected on how India should “act towards the emergence of new forces in Pakistan”. Invoking lessons from the past, he argued, “At the end of the Second World War, a lesson was learnt by the victorious powers not to treat the defeated nations and impose upon them a greater humiliation than that produced by the defeat itself. India, proud of its position as a responsible country in South Asia, had to act with wisdom and foresight in its dealings with the new Pakistan”.

D.P. Dhar, another important confidante of Gandhi and the lead Indian negotiator, also appeared to endorse Haksar’s basic sentiment. In his telegram to Haksar in March 1972, Dhar noted: “The (Simla) settlement will not be between the victor and the vanquished because such a settlement has in history led to renewed and more violent conflicts. A settlement on the contrary…should be and would also be made to appear as the end of a chapter of acrimony between two estranged brothers”. But we also now know that Dhar was less enamoured with the prospect of change inside Pakistan than ensuring that India was seen to be making a credible effort at peacemaking. And, most importantly, he wanted India to extract unambiguous gains during the negotiating process. For Dhar, without a resolution of the Kashmir issue there could be “no hope of permanent peace in the subcontinent”.

In essence, there were two rival strategies at the apex level in the lead up to the Shimla talks. Dhar as the quintessential realist “sought to take full advantage of the military victory” and make Indian

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

concessions (i.e. Pakistani POWs and territorial gains) “conditional” on Pakistan’s acceptance of a final Kashmir settlement. If Pakistan rejected such an approach, his policy advice was that India should “continue a state of armed hostility short of war”. The alternative constructivist approach was embodied by Haksar, who in addition to immediate territorial goals also sought an ambitious vision for “subcontinental peace and stability” by assisting in Pakistan’s domestic transformation.

These complex images are perhaps a good proxy for Gandhi’s own attitude before the Shimla summit. The perceived opportunity to exploit the possibility for an internal transformation of Pakistan’s body politic seems to have persuaded Indian policymakers to approach the Shimla negotiations by a dual, if not competing, preference to avoid weakening the new civilian leadership in Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and, simultaneously extracting new conflict resolution norms from the same leadership.

It was this inherent tension in these dual strategic aims that arguably conditioned India’s overall posture on the eve of the Shimla summit. Interestingly, India did have some prior insights into Pakistan’s approach to the summit after the Soviet leadership’s meeting with Pakistan’s lead negotiator, . On June 27, Moscow cabled Delhi that although Ahmed had stressed that Pakistan intended to insist firmly on the old ceasefire line, “it seems to us that the Pakistani side had a reserve position on the problem of Kashmir…Ahmed made to understand, that Bhutto is ready, in principle, to consider the possibility of converting the ceasefire line into the permanent international frontier”.

The actual negotiations began on June 28, 1972 and lasted five days, with India persisting with Dhar’s approach where India’s return of the POWs and occupied territory was made part of a package settlement via a durable agreement on formally defining the frontier in Kashmir. In the opening session on June 28, Dhar made it clear that concluding a peace settlement was an “essential” prerequisite for the repatriation of the POWs. On June 29, he sought a clear framework. Any “agreed formulation should be in conformity with the existing situation” and “capable of implementation”. Dhar emphasised “the world was fast moving towards bilateralism”. Ahmed, however, offered minimal commitments and strove to retain the old UN-centric conflict resolution framework. Haksar too stressed that India and Pakistan should “solve our own problems” without “involving distant countries into our disputes”. On June 30, Dhar suffered a minor heart attack with Haksar assuming the lead for the remainder of the summit. India’s negotiating thrust, however, remained consistent.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

The Pakistani and Indian delegations posing for a group photo. Credit: Bhutto.org

Haksar now focused more directly on Kashmir. He said that India “would like to remove the endless curse of conflicts on the question of Kashmir” and “if there was no understanding, a new situation would be created which would require serious consideration”, the latter a thinly veiled threat. On July 1, in a session that included the heads of government, Gandhi noted that “the ceasefire line” in Kashmir had “no validity” and “did not keep the peace”. T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary, reiterated the core basis of a deal: “repatriation and withdrawal (of Indian forces in the West)” would “have to be part of durable peace and can take place only after durable peace has been established.” A chagrined Ahmed retorted, “We have agreed to everything except Kashmir.” Bhutto then invoked domestic pressure: “My back is to the wall; I cannot make any more concessions”. But the Indian side still gave no signs of relinquishing its core bargaining strategy of a package settlement. On the fifth day, July 2, the negotiations broke down after Ahmed rejected India’s proposals saying that Pakistan “cannot accept that the ceasefire line had ceased to exist.”

Hoping to salvage an agreement, Bhutto called directly on Gandhi. During this climactic meeting, Gandhi underscored the primary advantage of India’s Kashmir proposal – neither side was required to physically relinquish territory or exchange populations. With “feeling and apparent sincerity” Bhutto admitted that while India’s proposal was the only feasible one, a formal legally binding commitment

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

would severely weaken his domestic position and strengthen the military establishment. He could not offer more than a verbal assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir would gradually acquire, in Bhutto’s words, the “characteristics of an international border”. In contrast, India’s concession was concrete and upfront. India gave up its “package settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached”.

A hope belied

The following day Gandhi admitted to Kaul that while she did “not trust Bhutto”, she “wanted to make a gesture to the people of Pakistan with whom we have ultimately to settle this question”. This was based on a belief, mistaken as it eventually turned out, that Pakistan was on the cusp of a structural transformation after its shock defeat, and, one that India should enable rather than thwart. Gandhi told parliament in August 1972: “There is a great change in Pakistan. It may be that the Pakistanis did not want that change. But the change is there regardless of whether they desire it or not”. It is apparent that policymakers were torn between seeking immediate security gains and holding out for a more durable regional order. Such an order was predicated on the possibility of a new Pakistan that might substitute Islam with a modern secular ideology.

Proceeding from such an overall outlook, policymakers did not fully seek to leverage the fruits of victory on the battlefield to ruthlessly bend the defeated party on the bargaining table. Key strategists, particularly Haksar, believed that a modicum of Indian benevolence might facilitate Pakistan’s internal transformation at a critical turning point in the civil-military and socio-political balance in that state’s history. For Haksar, India had to avoid adding to Pakistan’s “political adventurers who play upon Indo-phobia mixed by Islamic atavism”. Haksar’s advice to Gandhi was that India had “a vested interest in seeing there is democracy in Pakistan”. But there is evidence that a realpolitik, if cynical worldview, also had apex level support through Dhar regarding India’s bargaining posture at Simla. However, it is unlikely that this belief was ever strong enough to sway Haksar’s image of reassurance and co-existence. As P.N. Dhar, another PMO advisor at the time, recalled, “The overriding consideration for India was to put an end to its adversarial relations with Pakistan and forge an instrument that would help build a structure of durable peace in the subcontinent”. Nevertheless, Indian negotiators did take their Pakistani interlocutors to the water’s edge.

Ultimately, Gandhi emerged as the swing factor between the assertive and accommodative postures in the finale at Shimla. The alternative of calling Bhutto’s bluff and walking away without any agreement was deemed too costly for Gandhi and Haksar after India’s dramatic 1971 triumph. The self-restraint underlying India’s posture was all too palpable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their lead negotiator, later remarked that despite holding “all the bargaining chips”, India’s “excessive anxiety to avoid the failure of the talks at any cost became its major handicap”. Haksar later noted, “‘Negotiating from strength’ has been made part of diplomatic coinage. But to negotiate with someone who is manifestly weak is even more difficult”.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

In more immediate geopolitical terms, India’s main gain was the conversion of the UN-endorsed 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir into a hardened Line of Control (LoC) based on the new December 17, 1971 ceasefire position. It was at the political and symbolic level where Indian policymakers could claim some success. The Shimla Agreement was an expression of the Indian framework for South Asian security, namely the norm of bilateralism. Ever since India’s fateful decision in 1948 to seek third- party mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict, policymakers had struggled to limit the interference of external actors in the Kashmir dispute. Krishna Menon’s UN interventions in 1957 were the first diplomatic expressions of seeking to disentangle India from third party involvement. In 1965, the norm of bilateralism had been implied, although ironically, at a third party venue in Tashkent under proactive Soviet diplomatic efforts. In 1972, Indian policymakers explicitly enshrined this principle at Shimla.

News Coverage: Why is Pakistan lifting its ban on Indian imports? Why did Pakistan stop the imports of cotton and sugar from India, and why has it reversed its decision? What kind of trade relations have the two countries had?

Trucks from Pakistan on their way to the LoC Trade Centre at Chakan da Bagh in , Jammu and Kashmir. Archives/Express Photo by Kamleshwar Singh

Pakistan on Wednesday decided to lift its nearly two-year ban on imports of cotton and sugar from India. India-Pakistan trade before ban Given their tumultuous relationship, trade between the neighbours has always been linked to politics. So, India’s exports to Pakistan fell around 16 per cent to $1.82 billion in 2016-17 from $2.17 billion in 2015-

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

16 after relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Uri terror attack and the Indian Army’s surgical strikes on militant launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2016. Despite continuing tensions, trade between the two countries grew marginally in subsequent years; Indian exports rose nearly 6 per cent to $1.92 billion in 2017-18, and then by around 7 per cent to $2.07 billion in 2018-19. Imports from Pakistan, though much less in volume, also increased by 7.5 per cent to $488.56 million in 2017-18 from $454.49 million in 2016-17. Growth of imports from Pakistan slowed to around $494.87 million in 2018-19 — an increase of around 1 per cent – before political relations entered a deep freeze in 2019. Major products traded Over the years, India has had a trade surplus with Pakistan, with much less imports than exports. Pakistan was among India’s top 50 trade partners in 2018-19, but was pushed out of the list in 2019-20. It had been anticipated that a trade ban between the countries would affect Pakistan more, since it relied heavily on India for key raw materials for its textiles and pharmaceuticals industries. In 2018-19, cotton ($550.33 million) and organic chemicals ($457.75 million) accounted for around half of Pakistan’s imports from India. Other major Pakistani imports from India that year included plastic ($131.19 million), tanning/dyeing extracts ($114.48 million), and nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances ($94.88 million). After the ban, imports of these five products fell drastically to $1 million to $2 million between April 2020 and January 2021, while cotton imports stopped altogether. The only increase has been in pharmaceutical products – Pakistan has so far imported around $67.26 million worth of drug products, and over $115 million worth of organic chemicals to ensure sufficient supplies of medicines during the Covid-19 pandemic. India’s major imports from Pakistan in 2018-19 were mineral fuels and oils ($131.29 million), edible fruits and nuts ($103.27 million), salt, sulphur, stone and plastering materials ($92.84 million), ores, slag and ash ($17.18 million) and raw hides and leather ($16.27 million). The country imported these products in substantially higher volumes from other countries – $25.51 billion worth of mineral fuels and oils from Saudi Arabia; $840.80 million in edible fruits and nuts from the US; $566.52 million in salt, sulphur and plastering materials from the UAE; $862.00 million in ores, slag and ash from Chile; and $83.36 million in raw hides, skin and leather from Italy.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Pakistan’s trade ban Pakistan’s decision to suspend bilateral trade with India in August 2019 was a fallout of the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, which Pakistan said were “illegal”. However, an underlying reason for suspending trade was the 200 per cent tariff imposed by New Delhi on Pakistani imports earlier that year after India revoked Pakistan’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status in the aftermath of the terrorist attack. Trade between the two countries suffered greatly – India’s exports to Pakistan dropped nearly 60.5 per cent to $816.62 million, and its imports plummeting 97 per cent to $13.97 million in 2019-20.

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com

Why the change The Pakistani decision to lift the ban on cotton imports comes in the backdrop of a shortage in raw material for Pakistan’s textile sector, which has reportedly suffered due to low domestic yields of cotton. Also, imports from countries like the US and Brazil are costlier and take longer to arrive. “A meeting was held with the Prime Minister @ImranKhanPTI escalating prices of cotton yarn were discussed,” Abdul Razak Dawood, commerce and investment adviser to the Pakistani Prime Minister, tweeted on March 29. The decision on sugar was dictated by high domestic prices. Pakistani sugar imports in the period July 2020-February 2021 zoomed to 278,733 metric tonnes from 4,358 metric tonnes in the same period in 2019-20. The increase in imports of the commodity was a measure “to stabilize the market prices”, Dawood said in a tweet on March 2. Following the meeting of the country’s Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) on Wednesday, Pakistan’s Finance Minister Hammad Azhar said sugar imports would be allowed from India, as the price of the commodity was lower in India than in Pakistan. “There has been sugar dependence between the two countries forever. Typically, what happens is, (because) they (Pakistan) produce sugar and we (India) also produce sugar, whenever they have a shortage, we have supplied their requirement and vice versa,” said Prof Nisha Taneja of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), an expert on India’s regional trade. “Even when we had a very small positive list (of goods for trade with Pakistan), agricultural commodities were always there in the list,” she said. What happens now Several experts expect Wednesday’s decisions to re-open the door for trade between India and Pakistan. This might be a good time for India to explore a reduction in its 200 per cent import duties on products that its industries can benefit from, Prof Taneja said. “We have not reduced duties on anything…at 200 per cent duty, everything becomes unviable,” she said. “I think the (Indian) industry would play a very important role in this. It is for the industry to say this is what we need and this is where duties can be brought down.”

Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com