CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON A RECENT STUDY *)
BY
J. MANSFELD
There can be no doubt that Dr. Graeser is a man of formidable energy and erudition and of considerable talent: although still in his thirties, he has already published several books and numerous articles in the field of ancient philosophy. In this book, too, the energy and erudition show forth at almost every page, while the talent is displayed, I would say, in the last three or four chapters of the third part, on 'ethics', and in the second appendix, on the dispute between (possibly) Theophrastus and Zeno in Philo's De aet. mund. In the first section, however, that on 'logic', something has gone very seriously wrong 1), while the second section, on 'physics', not only links up with the first but also contains several serious mistakes of its own. Since G.'s exposition, although ap- parently produced at great speed and giving the impression of a first draft rather than of a finished work, is both dense and full of technicalities, a point by point analysis, even of the first two sec- tions only, would take up more space than is available in a review article which is already swollen as it is. Hence, I shall discuss ex- amples of what I consider to be the defects of this book and proceed by indicating such points and approaches as made me feel rather uncomfortable. In his foreword (`Vorbemerkung'), G. speaks of the famous rediscovery of Stoic logic in the present century, calling this a
*) A. Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme. Berlin-New York, W. de Gruyter, 1975. XI, 224 pp. I) I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my colleague Professor L. M. de Rijk, who studied the logical section of G.'s book for purposes of his own. As a rule, both of us turned out to have noticed the same things. Prof. de Rijk permitted me to use his notes, some of which I have distin- guished by '(De R.)'. He also read the typescript of this review. 135
"Wirkungsgeschichte ganz besonderer Natur" (p. 2), mentions, in one and the same breath, Frege and Carnap-as if Carnap did not in important respects differ from Frege 2) and as if Frege's own 'Wirkungsgeschichte', viz. the independent rediscovery by others of some of Frege's discoveries, had not been rather peculiar-, contrasts or connects Chrysippus with Russell and (?) Chomsky, and then adds that what we have here are not "historische Ab- hdngigkeiten". Tradition without dependence: apparently the weakest form of actio in distans (De R.). By using the term 'Wir- kungsgeschichte', G. glosses over the real conundrum, viz. how it can be possible that a modern theory, constructed by someone who had no inkling of the ancient theory, turns out to be useful in the interpretation of this ancient theory (De R., who points out that this holds good for 'Fregean' elements in medieval logic, too). The desire to treat Stoic philosophy from a contemporary and rather logicistic angle lends a special flavour to this book; this approach, though difficult (if only in view of the complexities of contemporary philosophical thought), could have been interesting as well as rewarding if pursued in a proper way. However, as will become clear in the following pages, G.'s knowledge of contemporary philosophy apparently does not go very deep, while what he knows about it tends to seriously blur his vision. Other claims staked out in G.'s foreword (p. 5), of a more historio- graphical nature, are: ( ) a study of and commentary on Zeno's 'fragments'; but these, he states, can only be studied in the context of the later elaboration of the Stoic system by Chrysippus; and (2) "vor allem", a reconstruction of Zeno's starting-points ("An- satze" ) in the field of ontology as reactions to Plato and Aristotle - difficult, I would say, if a clear line of demarcation between Zeno and Chrysippus seems impracticable. In itself, this second topic is of great interest, though not as novel as G. apparently
2) G. refers to Frege's "Sinn" - "Bedeutung" distinction (s. below, p. 148) as being the same as Carnap's "extension" - "intension" distinction. It is worthwhile to read Carnap's discussion and criticism of Frege on this point (Meaning and Necessity, 21956, p. 118 ff.). It should also be noted that, whereas G. at p. 2 registers "Verwandtes", he at p. 15, n. 6 enlarges upon the difference between Stoic semantics and that of Frege.