DOCSLIB.ORG

Spiritual Exercises in Epictetus: Difficult but Justified

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Spiritual Exercises in Epictetus: Difficult but Justified Spiritual Exercises in Epictetus: Difficult but Justified by Michael Tremblay A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2016, Michael Tremblay Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to provide a new interpretation about the role played by spiritual exercises in Epictetus’ program of moral therapy, in response to Brennan (2003) who holds that they may potentially conflict with Epictetus’ intellectualism. I argue that spiritual exercises are intended to cause us to assimilate theory by causing one to form specific beliefs that are in accordance with theory. Understood this way, any sort of tension seems to resolve itself. I rely upon the work that Braicovich (2012) has done on this question, and go further, ultimately demonstrating that all three of Epictetus’ spiritual exercises can be explained coherently when understood as aiding in the assimilation of theory. I conclude by proposing that Epictetus thought of Stoics like athletes in training for whom spiritual exercises are essential to staying fit and ready to perform. ii Acknowledgements: It gives me great pleasure to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Annie Larivée, whose unique approach to philosophy, passion for teaching, and demands for excellence have both facilitated this thesis and inspired me to be a better academic and philosopher. I would like to thank my parents, Peter Tremblay and Sandy Wooley, as well as my sister, Alison Tremblay, for their constant support and enthusiasm when it comes to the writing of this thesis. It is only because of them that I have the confidence and opportunity to pursue my passion for philosophy. I would like to also thank the following people who have contributed to the process of writing this thesis: My Grandmother Peg Wooley, for her feedback on my rough drafts and our discussions about the merit of Stoicism; Patricia Pajunen for always willing to debate the specifics of Stoic theory; Timmy Grainger and Jonathan Reardon for their insightful comments about the style and substance of my drafts; Melanie White for her impeccable help with editing and her constant support for all of my endeavors; the members of class PHIL4004/5600, for allowing me to present an early version of this thesis, and for providing excellent feedback. iii Table of Contents: Abstract: ............................................................................................................................ ii Acknowledgements: ......................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents: ............................................................................................................ iv Preface: ............................................................................................................................. vi 1 Chapter: Epictetus’ Intellectualism and Psychology ............................................... 1 1.1 Introduction to Intellectualism........................................................................................ 3 1.2 Beliefs ........................................................................................................................... 10 1.3 Belief Formation ........................................................................................................... 16 1.4 Belief Modification ...................................................................................................... 20 2 Chapter: Spiritual Exercises and Intellectualism .................................................. 26 2.1 Possible Conflicts with Intellectualism ........................................................................ 26 2.2 The Irrelevance of Spiritual Exercises .......................................................................... 37 2.3 Sellers and Spiritual Exercises ..................................................................................... 41 3 Chapter: Spiritual Exercises Reimagined .............................................................. 48 3.1 Spiritual Exercises and Specific Beliefs ....................................................................... 48 3.2 Critical Assent: ............................................................................................................. 56 3.3 Repetition Exercise ....................................................................................................... 60 4 Chapter: Habituation Exercise and Questioning Exercise ................................... 70 4.1 Habituation Exercise Described ................................................................................... 70 4.2 Habituation and Specific Beliefs .................................................................................. 75 4.3 Questioning Exercise .................................................................................................... 84 4.4 Questioning Exercise and Specific Beliefs ................................................................... 90 5 Chapter: The Athlete Analogy ................................................................................. 95 iv 5.1 Specific Beliefs and Muscle ......................................................................................... 95 5.2 Impressions as Wrestling Opponents ......................................................................... 103 5.3 The Glory of Victory .................................................................................................. 107 5.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 111 Bibliography: ................................................................................................................. 112 v Preface: The aim of this thesis is to provide insight into the exact role and nature that spiritual exercises have in the philosophy of Epictetus. More specifically, it is a direct response to the paper “Stoic Moral Psychology”, within which Tad Brennan argues that Epictetus’ reliance upon repetition to modify belief is inconsistent or incompatible with the unified reasoning soul he endorses as a Stoic. To resolve this problem, I will provide an interpretation of spiritual exercises within Epictetus which does not conflict with his conception of the self as wholly rational. Brennan’s concern is that the exercises in Epictetus seem to be, at least prima facie, a non-cognitive modification strategy which is essential or necessary for the formation of correct beliefs (Moral Psychology, 2003, 278). Brennan also argues that “it is a plausible rule of thumb that what can only be altered by non-rational means is a non- rational state” (Moral Psychology, 279). Brennan’s argument is a problem because Epictetus’ reliance upon repetition would seem to force him to hold the view that beliefs are at least in part non-cognitive, which is not something a Stoic would endorse. However, Brennan is not steadfast in his view. By acknowledging that this conflict is founded from a prima facie viewpoint, and that his criticisms are plausible, but not certain, Brennan is inviting further dialogue and discussion of the issue. Other philosophers have proposed interpretations of spiritual exercises which do not conflict with intellectualism. I will look at Sellers’ (2007) and Cooper’s (2007) accounts but deem them to be insufficient. My aim is to construct an account that takes the best parts from Sellers (2007) while acknowledging the problems raised by Brennan (2003) and Cooper (2007). vi My thesis will be divided into five chapters: 1. Epictetus’ Intellectualism and Psychology 2. Spiritual Exercises and Intellectualism 3. Spiritual Exercises Reimagined 4. The Habituation Exercise and the Questioning Exercise 5. The Athlete Analogy In Chapter 1, I will outline Epictetus’ intellectualism and, using quotes from the primary text as well as secondary sources, identify what precisely this intellectualism commits him to, such as the impossibility of akrasia or weakness of will. In Chapter 2, I will focus on how spiritual exercises possibly relate to Epictetus’ intellectualism commitments. This first section will discuss Brennan’s (2003) concerns about the potential conflict between these exercises and a wholly rational conception of the mind, while the next two sections will examine Cooper’s (2007) and Sellers’ (2007) interpretations of spiritual exercises respectively. In Chapter 3, I will put forward my own original account of the purpose or role of spiritual exercises within Epictetus. I will then examine a paper by Braicovich (2012) in which he discusses a specific exercise, the Repetition Exercise, in great detail. His account of this specific exercise fits perfectly with my interpretation of spiritual exercises in general and it will lay the foundation for examining the other two exercises. In Chapter 4, I will then look at the other two spiritual exercises present in Epictetus, which I will call the Habituation Exercise and the Questioning Exercise. I will explain how they are intended to contribute towards our moral progress, and demonstrate how they fit my interpretation of spiritual exercises. vii Finally, in Chapter 5, I will discuss the analogy Epictetus makes between a philosopher and an athlete. While Epictetus is not always explicit about what he believed, I hold that this analogy shows my interpretation of spiritual exercises
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Language Logic and Reality: a Stoic Perspective (Spring 2013)
    Language Logic and Reality: A Stoic Perspective Aaron Tuor History of Lingustics WWU Spring 2013 1 Language, Logic, and Reality: A Stoic perspective Contents 1 Introduction: The Tripartite Division of Stoic Philosophy.............................3 2 Stoic Physics...................................................................................................4 3 Stoic Dialectic.................................................................................................4 3.1 A Stoic Theory of Mind: Logos and presentations..........................4 3.2 Stoic Philosophy of Language: Lekta versus linguistic forms.........6 3.3 Stoic Logic.......................................................................................7 3.3.1 Simple and Complex Axiomata........................................7 3.3.2 Truth Conditions and Sentence Connectives....................8 3.3.3 Inference Schemata and Truths of Logic..........................9 3.4 Stoic Theory of Knowledge.............................................................10 3.4.1 Truth..................................................................................10 3.4.2 Knowledge........................................................................11 4 Conclusion: Analysis of an eristic argument..................................................12 4.1 Hermogenes as the Measure of "Man is the measure."...................13 Appendix I: Truth Tables and Inference Schemata...........................................17 Appendix II: Diagram of Communication.........................................................18
    [Show full text]
  • Stoicism a School of Thought That Flourished in Greek and Roman
    Stoicism A school of thought that flourished in Greek and Roman antiquity. It was one of the loftiest and most sublime philosophies in the record of Western civilization. In urging participation in the affairs of man, Stoics have always believed that the goal of all inquiry is to provide man with a mode of conduct characterized by tranquillity of mind and certainty of moral worth. Nature and scope of Stoicism For the early Stoic philosopher, as for all the post-Aristotelian schools, knowledge and its pursuit are no longer held to be ends in themselves. The Hellenistic Age was a time of transition, and the Stoic philosopher was perhaps its most influential spokesman. A new culture was in the making. The heritage of an earlier period, with Athens as its intellectual leader, was to continue, but to undergo many changes. If, as with Socrates, to know is to know oneself, rationality as the sole means by which something outside of the self might be achieved may be said to be the hallmark of Stoic belief. As a Hellenistic philosophy, Stoicism presented an ars vitae, a way of accommodation for people to whom the human condition no longer appeared as the mirror of a universal, calm, and ordered existence. Reason alone could reveal the constancy of cosmic order and the originative source of unyielding value; thus, reason became the true model for human existence. To the Stoic, virtue is an inherent feature of the world, no less inexorable in relation to man than are the laws of nature. The Stoics believed that perception is the basis of true knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • The Combinatorics of Stoic Conjunction: Hipparchus Refuted, Chrysippus Vindicated
    Created on 10 January 2011 at 16.23 hours THECOMBINATORICSOFSTOIC CONJUNCTION:HIPPARCHUS REFUTED,CHRYSIPPUSVINDICATED SUSANNEBOBZIEN Dieser Aufsatz ist dem Andenken von Michael Frede gewid- met — einem wahren Philosophen und wahren Freund. Ohne sein grundlegendes Werk über die stoische Logik und ihre Entwicklung in der Antike wäre dieser Aufsatz nicht möglich. Introduction [Chrysippus] says that the number of conjunctions [constructible] from ten assertibles exceeds one million . Yet many mathematicians have refuted Chrysippus; among them is Hipparchus, who has demonstrated that his error in the calculation is huge, since the affirmative produces , con- joined assertibles, and the negative ,. (Plut. Stoic. repugn. –) Chrysippus says that the number of conjunctions [constructible] from only ten assertibles exceeds one million. However, Hipparchus refuted this, demonstrating that the affirmative encompasses , conjoined assert- ibles and the negative ,. (Plut. Quaest. conv. – ) Chrysippus, third head of the Stoa and one of the two greatest lo- gicians in antiquity, made his statement about the number of con- junctions in the third century . Hipparchus, famous astronomer and writer of a work in which he discussed combinatorics, flour- ished in the second half of the second century . The claims of © Susanne Bobzien This paper has profited greatly from detailed written comments by Fabio Acerbi and István Bodnár. An early version was presented at the Seminar ‘Hellenistic Science and Scholarship’ at the Radcliffe Institute, Harvard, in May , and I am grateful to the participants for their helpful remarks, in particular to Alexander Jones and the late Ian Mueller. Thanks go also to my brother Matthias Bobzien for first bringing the tree-structure method to my attention.
    [Show full text]
  • Stoic Propositional Logic: a New Reconstruction
    Stoic propositional logic: a new reconstruction David Hitchcock McMaster University [email protected] Stoic propositional logic: a new reconstruction Abstract: I reconstruct Stoic propositional logic, from the ancient testimonies, in a way somewhat different than the 10 reconstructions published before 2002, building especially on the work of Michael Frede (1974) and Suzanne Bobzien (1996, 1999). In the course of reconstructing the system, I draw attention to several of its features that are rarely remarked about, such as its punctuation-free notation, the status of the premisses of an argument as something intermediate between a set and a sequence of propositions, the incorrectness of the almost universal translation of the Greek label for the primitives of the system as indemonstrable arguments, the probable existence of an extended set of primitives which accommodates conjunctions with more than two conjuncts and disjunctions with more than two disjuncts, the basis for the system’s exclusion of redundant premisses, and the reason why the hypothetical syllogisms of Theophrastus are not derivable in the system. I argue that, though sound according to its originator’s (Chrysippus’s) conception of validity, the system as reconstructed is not complete according to that conception. It is an open problem what one needs to add to the system in order to make it Chrysippean-complete, or even whether it is possible to do so without making it Chrysippean-unsound. Key words: Stoicism, logic, history of logic, Stoic logic, Chrysippus, reconstruction, propositional logic, soundness, completeness 0. Introduction In Aristotle’s Earlier Logic (Woods 2001), John Woods finds in Aristotle’s earliest logical writings considerable grist for his ongoing sophisticated defence of classical validity against contemporary relevantist objections.
    [Show full text]
  • The Logical Investigations of Chrysippus
    19 Jonathan Barnes The Logical Investigations of Chrysippus Chrysipp (3. Jh. v. Chr.), der Dritte der stoischen Schule, war einer der bedeutend- sten Logiker der griechischen Antike. Seine vielen Bücher sind alle verloren- gegangen, und unsere heutige Kenntnis der chrysippeischen bzw. stoischen Logik rührt von verschiedenen Quellen her: elementaren Einführungen in die Logik, allge- meinen Berichten (die oft oberflächlich sind), polemischen Anspielungen, fragmen- tarisch erhaltenen Zitaten oder Bruchstücken. Unter den wichtigsten Fragmenten befindet sich eine Papyrusurkunde, deren dreizehn Spalten einen Teil von Chrysipps Logischen Untersuchungen wiedergeben. Der Papyrus ist lückenhaft und schwer zu lesen. In den letzten beiden Spalten, die relativ gut erhalten sind, kann man die Über- reste einer detaillierten Diskussion von Problemen der Logik tier Befehlssätze erkennen. Diese Problematik, an sich für die heutige Philosophie höchst interessant, ist bezeichnend für das weit- und tiefgehende Interesse der stoischen Logiker. Zudem geben die Spalten wichtige Auskünfte über die Grundlagen der chrysippei- schen Logik. In the third century BC the Stoics developed a subtle logical theory. The chief architect of the theory was Chrysippus, the third head of the School: if the gods needed logic, it was said, then they would use the logic of Chrys- ippus. There have been three giants in the history of logic: Aristotle, Chrys- ippus, Frege. Chrysippus wrote more than three hundred books on logical subjects. All are lost. Lost too are all the works
    [Show full text]
  • In Defense of Stoicism
    In Defense of Stoicism by ALEX HENDERSON* Georgetown University Abstract This article employs Cicero’s assault on Stoic philosophy inPro Murena as a point of departure to engage three critical aspects of Stoicism: indifference to worldly concerns, the sage as an ideal, and Stoic epistemology. It argues that Cicero’s analysis fails to clearly distinguish between these elements of Stoic philosophy and, therefore, presents Stoicism in a misleadingly unfavorable light. harges of bribery were brought against Lucius Licinius Murena in 62 bce. Despite entrenched opposition from the popular Cparty, Murena was able to enlist the aid of the famed orator and presiding consul Marcus Tullius Cicero. His prosecutor was the most conservative of senators—Marcus Porcius Cato, famed for his rectitude and his unbending adherence to Stoic philosophy. In order to defend Murena, who was almost certainly guilty, Cicero chose to go on the offensive and discredit his opponent by undermining Stoic philosophy in the eyes of the jury. Cicero portrays Stoicism as follows: A wise person never allows himself to be influenced… Philosophers are people who, however ugly, remain handsome; even if they are very poor, they are rich; even if they are slaves, they are kings. All sins are equal, so that every misdemeanor is a serious crime… The philosopher has no need to offer conjectures, never regrets what he has done, is never mistaken, never changes his mind.1 Cicero’s portrayal seems to argue that (1) the Stoics’ commitment to remain indifferent to worldly influence causes them to lack compassion for the circumstances of other people, (2) Stoics are too severe when * [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Katja Vogt Stoic Virtue&Happiness.Pages
    Katja Maria Vogt, katjavogt.com, Columbia University "1 The Virtues and Happiness in Stoic Ethics, for ed. Chris Bobonich, Cambridge Companion to Ancient Ethics The Virtues and Happiness in Stoic Ethics1 ! ! The Stoics hold that virtue is knowledge, and that knowledge is one: the good state of the rational soul. Unlike the rest of us, a person who is in this state of mind is happy. Today and throughout much of antiquity, Stoic ethics is compared to Platonic and Aristotelian views. The Stoics’ immediate interlocutors, however, are skeptics.2 With them the Stoics discuss how hard it is to think straight, to arrive at carefully considered views and stable insights. The skeptics regularly suspend judgment, assessing disputes as unresolved. The questions of what is good and bad and how to live appear to them difficult and deserving of extensive study.3 The Stoics largely agree with the skeptics: these questions appear to them to be in need of further investigation. The Stoic approach is to ask what a person would be like who has the answers: how she would think, feel, and act. ! A brief disclaimer. “The Stoics” as I speak of them never existed. Instead, there were individual philosophers. Stoic philosophy begins with Zeno (334/3-262/1 BCE), who spent more than twenty years in Plato’s Academy, developing his views in conversation with the then emerging Academic skepticism (Zeno was roughly 20-30 years older than 1 I am grateful to Jens Haas, Sam McVane, and Nandi Theunissen for comments. 2 On the closeness of skeptic and Stoic philosophy, cf.
    [Show full text]
  • Pierre Hadot: Stoicism As a Way of Life
    Pierre Hadot: Stoicism as a Way of Life Citation: Sharpe, Matthew 2020, Pierre Hadot: Stoicism as a Way of Life. In Lampe, Kurt and Sholtz, Janae (ed), French and Italian Stoicisms: From Sartre to Agamben, Bloomsbury Academic, London, Eng., pp.260-280. Published in its final form at https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/french-and-italian-stoicisms- 9781350082038/ This is the accepted manuscript. ©2020, Bloomsbury Publishing Reprinted with permission. Downloaded from DRO: http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30136430 DRO Deakin Research Online, Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B French and Italian Stoicisms Pierre Hadot Chapter 13 Pierre Hadot Stoicism as a Way of Life Matthew Sharpe In a series of articles and books beginning in 1972, the philologist and philosopher Pierre Hadot developed a reading of Stoicism as a philosophical way of life that has had widespread influence. Hadot’s conception of Stoicism is given its most extended expression in his magisterial 1992 study of Marcus Aurelius, La Citadelle intérieure: Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle, together with a later work, co-authored with Ilsetraut Hadot (2004), on Epictetus’ Handbook and the Neoplatonist Simplicius’ commentary on this text. Since the translation of La Citadelle intérieure (1998, henceforth cited parenthetically as IC), alongside Hadot’s cognate studies on ancient philosophy more widely in Philosophy as a Way of Life (1996c) and What is Ancient Philosophy? (2000), Hadot’s conception of Stoicism has been taken up by a range of global, internet-based “Stoic” communities, committed to proselytizing and practicing Stoicism as a manner of life.
    [Show full text]
  • Stoicism and the Art of Happiness (Teach Yourself)
    Donald Robertson is a cognitive-behavioural psychotherapist who specializes in evidence-based approaches to the treatment of anxiety, and the relationship between ancient philosophy and modern psychotherapy, particularly Stoicism and cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). He is the author of five books on philosophy and psychotherapy, including Build your Resilience (Hodder & Stoughton, 2012) in the Teach Yourself series and The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (Karnac, 2010). Donald was born in Scotland, and lived in England for many years where he ran a busy Harley Street therapy practice, before emigrating to Nova Scotia in Canada. Stoicism and the Art of Happiness Donald Robertson Acknowledgements I’d like to dedicate this book to my wife, Mandy, and to our beautiful daughter, Poppy Louise Robertson. I love you both. I’d also like to thank everyone involved with Stoic Week and the projects initiated by Professor Christopher Gill and Patrick Ussher at the University of Exeter, for their advice, support, and ideas. The Metaphor of the Tree Why, then, do you wonder that good men are shaken in order that they may grow strong? No tree becomes rooted and sturdy unless many a wind assails it. For by its very tossing it tightens its grip and plants its roots more securely; the fragile trees are those that have grown in a sunny valley. It is, therefore, to the advantage even of good men, to the end that they may be unafraid, to live constantly amidst alarms and to bear with patience the happenings which are ills to him only who ill supports them.
    [Show full text]
  • The Stoic Doctrine of 'Supreme Genera' (Categories)
    The Stoic Doctrine of 'Supreme Genera' (Categories) https://www.ontology.co/categories-stoics.htm Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: [email protected] The Stoic Doctrine of Supreme Genera (Categories) INTRODUCTION "In addition to developing the hypothetical syllogism, Stoic logic also elaborated categories, which likewise stand in contrast to Aristotelian thought. The Stoics teach that there are four categories: substance, quality, disposition, and relative disposition.(140) Rather than being horizontal, signifying aspects of an enduring substance which are accidental and which can be shorn from it without destroying its essence, the Stoic categories are vertical. They move from lesser to greater levels of concreteness. None is accidental; all must be present in a given reality if that reality is to be grasped in all its individuality. Substance denotes the materiality of a thing and is possessed by everything except the incorporeals. Quality denotes the way in which matter is organized to form an individual being. Disposition includes times, places, actions, size, and color. It describes the particular situation and attributes of the individual. All the features covered by the category of disposition, including color,(141) are regarded by the Stoics as inherent in the individual. This view harmonizes with the doctrine in Stoic physics that bodies create their own extension and their own time and space, so to speak, through their tonos and activity. Relative disposition denotes the way that an individual thing is related to other phenomena. None of the four Stoic categories can be removed from an individual being without that being ceasing to be itself.
    [Show full text]
  • The Stoics on Nature and Truth
    Durham E-Theses The stoics on nature and truth Connor, Martin J How to cite: Connor, Martin J (2000) The stoics on nature and truth, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4346/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk THE STOICS ON NATURE AND TRUTH MARTIN J CONNOR The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in any form, including Electronic and the Internet, without the author's prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately. SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 1 7 SEP 2001 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 2000 ABSTRACT THE STOICS ON NATURE AND TRUTH MARTIN CONNOR First, this thesis outlines part of the thought of some pre-Socratic thinkers, particularly Heraclitus.
    [Show full text]
  • Theory and Training in Epictetus' Program of Moral Education
    THEORY AND TRAINING IN EPICTETUS’ PROGRAM OF MORAL EDUCATION by Michael Tremblay A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy In conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada (May, 2021) Copyright ©Michael Tremblay, 2021 Abstract This dissertation examines the educational function of training, as contrasted with the study of theory, within Epictetus’ program of moral education. The motivation for this research is that there exists an apparent tension in Epictetus’ moral philosophy. According to Stoicism, knowledge is sufficient for virtue; however, many students of Stoicism have learnt that virtue is the only good, and endorsed this claim as true, and yet fail to act appropriately. Epictetus seems to resolve this problem through the introduction of applied exercises. That Epictetus requires his students to train themselves in this way seems in potential conflict with his moral psychology. In this dissertation, I resolve this tension through three contributions: (1) First, I develop an account of why Epictetus believes moral failure occurs in dedicated students of Stoicism who wish to achieve virtue. It occurs primarily because of two factors, precipitancy and weakness, which impede the progressing student of Stoicism from properly reflecting upon a situation. (2) Second, I argue for a novel explanation of the function of training in Epictetus. Epictetus tells us that training is necessary to ‘digest’ our theory. Building upon this neglected metaphor, I argue that the ‘digestion’ of theory is the process by which students move from weak commitments to general principles (i.e., virtue is the only good), which are vulnerable to instances of precipitancy or weakness, to specific actionable beliefs (i.e., I should not desire this bribe because is not an instance of virtue).
    [Show full text]