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Theory and Training in Epictetus' Program of Moral Education

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Theory and Training in Epictetus' Program of Moral Education THEORY AND TRAINING IN EPICTETUS’ PROGRAM OF MORAL EDUCATION by Michael Tremblay A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy In conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada (May, 2021) Copyright ©Michael Tremblay, 2021 Abstract This dissertation examines the educational function of training, as contrasted with the study of theory, within Epictetus’ program of moral education. The motivation for this research is that there exists an apparent tension in Epictetus’ moral philosophy. According to Stoicism, knowledge is sufficient for virtue; however, many students of Stoicism have learnt that virtue is the only good, and endorsed this claim as true, and yet fail to act appropriately. Epictetus seems to resolve this problem through the introduction of applied exercises. That Epictetus requires his students to train themselves in this way seems in potential conflict with his moral psychology. In this dissertation, I resolve this tension through three contributions: (1) First, I develop an account of why Epictetus believes moral failure occurs in dedicated students of Stoicism who wish to achieve virtue. It occurs primarily because of two factors, precipitancy and weakness, which impede the progressing student of Stoicism from properly reflecting upon a situation. (2) Second, I argue for a novel explanation of the function of training in Epictetus. Epictetus tells us that training is necessary to ‘digest’ our theory. Building upon this neglected metaphor, I argue that the ‘digestion’ of theory is the process by which students move from weak commitments to general principles (i.e., virtue is the only good), which are vulnerable to instances of precipitancy or weakness, to specific actionable beliefs (i.e., I should not desire this bribe because is not an instance of virtue). (3) Lastly, I demonstrate, by way of examples, the function of Epictetus’ applied training exercises. These exercises are shown to facilitate the ‘digestion’ of theory by mitigating weakness and precipitancy. This explanation accounts both for why these exercises are considered necessary, and why they do not conflict with Epictetus’ psychological commitments. ii Acknowledgements First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Jon Miller, who welcomed me to Queen’s and provided the support, encouragement, and advice required to undertake this project. I am especially thankful to Jon for two important reminders: First, that the study of philosophy should first and foremost be done for its own inherent rewards, and second, to quote Spinoza, that all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. I would also like to thank Stephen Leighton and Daryn Lehoux for their contributions to this thesis. Both graciously offered to me their time and insight and helped to improve my understanding of Ancient philosophy and culture. I also would like to thank my thesis examiners, Brad Inwood, Elliot Paul, and Bernard Kavanaugh, for their incredibly helpful and insightful questions and comments. I want to thank all the members of the Queen’s Philosophy department more generally, including the professors, administrators, and students, who made Queen’s a wonderful place to complete a PhD, both intellectually and socially. To name a few, I am grateful for the mentorship, advice, and help provided by Christine Sypnowich, David Bakhurst and Elliot Paul, all of whom went above and beyond to offer support when I needed it. I also want to thank the Queen’s Classics Department and its Greek and Latin students and professors, particularly Tim Wright, for welcoming me and helping me to discover the absolute joy of philology, which I never expected to find but am so glad that I have. I am grateful all my teammates and coaches at the Queen’s Wrestling team and Hayabusa Academy, especially Chris and Janet. It is through training with all of you that I found the community, friendship, and reprieve from study which was required to complete this project. I want to thank my partner Mandy, who has been a pillar of support and a source of inspiration during this process, and who has taught me as much about being a serious scholar as anyone else. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, Peter and Sandy, and my sister, Alison, and my late Grandmother, Peg. This thesis would not have been possible without their unwavering support. They encouraged me each step of the way, and this thesis is as much a result of their hard work as my own. iii Table of Contents Abstract ..........................................................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... iii List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2 Epictetus’ Moral Psychology ...................................................................................................... 10 2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 10 2.2 Prohairesis ......................................................................................................................................... 13 2.3 Rationalism ........................................................................................................................................ 23 2.4 Preconceptions ................................................................................................................................... 32 2.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 38 Chapter 3 Epictetus’ Program of Moral Education ..................................................................................... 40 3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 40 3.2 Topic 1: Desire and Aversion ............................................................................................................ 45 3.3 Topic 2: Motives to Act ..................................................................................................................... 51 3.4 Topic 3: Assent .................................................................................................................................. 61 3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 66 Chapter 4 Moral Failure ............................................................................................................................... 69 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 69 4.2 First Cause of Moral Failure: Studying the Topoi incorrectly ........................................................... 71 4.3 Second Cause of Moral Failure: Weakness ....................................................................................... 81 4.4 Third Cause of Moral Failure: Precipitancy ...................................................................................... 86 4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 89 Chapter 5 The Limits of Theory .................................................................................................................. 90 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 90 5.2 The Limits of Theory ......................................................................................................................... 91 5.3 The Introduction of Training ............................................................................................................. 98 5.4 Concerns About a Reliance on Training .......................................................................................... 109 5.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 113 Chapter 6 Digesting Theory ....................................................................................................................... 115 6.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 115 6.2 Ancient Medical Conceptions of Digestion ..................................................................................... 116 6.3 Digestion in Epictetus ...................................................................................................................... 122 iv 6.4 The Nature of Digestion .................................................................................................................. 128 6.5 The Necessity of Training ..............................................................................................................
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