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Madness in Socratic Philosophy: Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus

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Madness in Socratic Philosophy: Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by St Andrews Research Repository MADNESS IN SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY XENOPHON, PLATO AND EPICTETU S Matthew James Shelton A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2019 Full metadata for this thesis is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this thesis: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17447 This item is protected by original copyright This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ MADNESS IN SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY XENOPHON, PLATO AND EPICTETUS Matthew James Shelton This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University of St Andrews September 2018 Candidate's declaration I, Matthew James Shelton, do hereby certify that this thesis, submitted for the degree of PhD, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. I was admitted as a research student at the University of St Andrews in September 2014. I received funding from an organisation or institution and have acknowledged the funder(s) in the full text of my thesis. Date Signature of candidate Supervisor's declaration I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date Signature of supervisor Permission for publication In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand, unless exempt by an award of an embargo as requested below, that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that this thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use and that the library has the right to migrate this thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I, Matthew James Shelton, confirm that my thesis does not contain any third-party material that requires copyright clearance. The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis: Printed copy No embargo on print copy. Electronic copy No embargo on electronic copy. Date Signature of candidate Date Signature of supervisor Underpinning Research Data or Digital Outputs Candidate's declaration I, Matthew James Shelton, hereby certify that no requirements to deposit original research data or digital outputs apply to this thesis and that, where appropriate, secondary data used have been referenced in the full text of my thesis. Date Signature of candidate ABSTRACT My central claim is that three Socratic philosophers, Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus, engage with views presented as non-philosophical in their discussions of madness, and this engagement, which has not been sufficiently treated by previous scholarship, plays a key role in each thinker’s distinct rhetorical strategy. Xenophon’s Socrates conserves a popular definition of madness in the Memorabilia, but adds his own account of what is similar to madness. Xenophon does not merely make Socrates transmit conventional views; instead, Socrates’ comparison allows Xenophon to take rhetorical advantage of popular attitudes while enlarging the apotreptic scope of madness. Socrates can use comparisons with madness to deal with a great many people, including his rivals, the natural scientists, and various interlocutors who, unlike the mad, can still benefit from his teaching. In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates employs a concept of madness which, I argue, is applied without equivocation across both of his speeches in the first part of the dialogue. Importantly, Socrates’ inclusion of rational philosophy as a kind of madness is not presented as a distortion of this concept. The connections between madness, love and philosophy are drawn from non- philosophical material, in particular poetry and comedy, and Socrates engages with a popular caricature of the philosopher as eccentric or mad. Instead of rejecting the caricature, Socrates re- evaluates philosophical madness by explaining the transformation of the philosopher’s soul. Epictetus’ view of madness is less compromising, and this is to be expected considering the Stoic doctrine that all who are unwise are mad. Like earlier Stoics, however, Epictetus recognises a surprising range of non-Stoic distinctions within madness. Although he engages with these distinctions, he does so only to undermine them and to bring his audience round to the realisation that they are mad once their own views are applied consistently with respect to Stoic teaching. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My first thanks are to my supervisor, Dr Alex Long. Without his continued advice and support, many of the thoughts expressed in this thesis would not have reached fruition. His Stoic patience combined with his Socratic knack for asking just the right questions has helped to shape my work in innumerable ways. Any shortcomings or faults are entirely my own. This research was funded in part by the Professor Ian Kidd Bequest for Classics. I am extremely grateful to the donors, and I am pleased to have included some of Professor Kidd’s work on Posidonius in my chapter on Epictetus and the Stoics. I also extend my thanks to St Leonard’s College for its support. I am indebted to generous funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa and likewise wish to thank the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust (my thanks especially to Clare Digby). I owe a debt of thanks to all those who have taken time to offer helpful feedback and advice at various points throughout this project. In no particular order, I would like to thank David Konstan, Christopher Gill, Chiara Thumiger, Melissa Lane, Tom Angier, Mary Louise Gill, Naoya Iwata, Aneurin Ellis-Evans, Katherine Van Schaik, James Zainaldin, Clive Chandler and Garrett Fagan†. Additional thanks go to Kate McLachlan, Matthew Payne, Julia Pfefferkorn, Jenny Messenger and Kieta Papier for reading and commenting on drafts. St Andrews has been an ideal place to work, not least because of my wonderful colleagues. I thank my academic mentor in the School of Classics, Stephen Halliwell, who has given me every encouragement. I am also grateful to Emma Gee who first got me thinking about the Phaedrus, and to my annual reviewers who have often given extremely helpful feedback, especially Tom Harrison, Giuseppe Pezzini, Jason König and Jon Hesk. The time I spent in the Greek Reading Group was easily my most stimulating and enjoyable at St Andrews. Many thanks to all the stalwarts of the GRG for the serious discussion and for the laughs, especially to Sarah Broadie and Peter Woodward. ii Writing a PhD can be lonely. I want to thank all my fellow PhD students in the School of Classics for keeping me sane, especially and in no specific order: Ellen MacDougal, Caroline Belanger, Matthew Payne, Jenny Messenger, Alastair Lumsden, Doug Forsyth, Jo Norton-Curry, Chloe Bray, Michael Furman, Gabriel Gabbardo, Mary Dodd, Laura Conroy, Eugenio Rallo, James Crooks, Ben Naylor, Anouk Vermeulen and Manlio Fossati. I also wish to thank the librarians at the St Andrews University Library and the administrative staff in the School of Classics. They made a lot of hard work behind the scenes seem effortless. I have been lucky to have the support of family and friends both in the United Kingdom and in South Africa. Thanks to my Cape Town friends and colleagues, especially Lena Sulik, Berenice Bentel and Jeffrey Murray. Thanks also to Vanessa Everson for restorative retreats at Curley Croft, to my Cambridge family, Alison and Daisy, for their warm hospitality, and to Justin Sulik for helping me find my feet in Scotland. I thank my parents in Cape Town, Lynette and Ian, whose encouragement and love have always helped and inspired me. I also thank my parents in Newfoundland, Peter and Joanne, whose love and generosity have always made me feel at home. Further thanks to my brothers, Jem and Naul, my step-brothers and my sister Ruth. My final thanks go to my partner and my inspiration, Elizabeth Braae. You have always had time for my rambling discussions, and you have suffered through countless drafts. Your insights and help have been simply invaluable, and your effect on this work is felt throughout. Thank you for your love and for believing in me. I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandmother, Kate Gwendoline Shelton (née Bain). iii ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviations of the names of ancient authors and the titles of their works are generally those in Hornblower, S., and Spawforth, A. (eds.) (2012) Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th edn. Oxford. The following additional abbreviations are used for ancient and modern authors and collections: Aff. Dig. Galen, De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione CMG Corpus Medicorum Graecorum DK Diels, H., and Kranz, W. (1951-2) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin. DL Diogenes Laertius EK Edelstein, L., and Kidd, I. G. (1972-99) Posidonius: Fragments. 3 vols. Cambridge. Indelli Indelli, G. (1988) Filodemo, L'ira. Naples. LS Long, A. A., and Sedley, D.
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