JOURNAL for the STUDY of Greek and LATIN

International issue no. 5 2018

JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF gREEK AND LATIN

PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF GREEK AND LATIN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

Aither is the scientific, peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Faculty of Arts at Palacký University Olomouc in association with Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences. It was established in the Department of Older Czech and European Philosophy – Institute of Philosophy in 2009. Aither publishes twice a year. Every fourth issue is international (papers appear mostly in English, but also in German and French). The journal is registered under ISSN 1803-7860. JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF GREEK AND LATIN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

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Eliška Fulínová 4 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought

Vojtěch Hladký 20 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato

Matúš Porubjak 50 Socrates as the Paradigmatic Figure of Practical Philosophy

Pavol Labuda 66 Aristotle’s Theory of Language in the Light ofPhys. I.1

Maciej Smolak 78 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics

Karel Šebela 98 Aristotle vs. Boole: A Case of the Universe of Discourse 4

abstract In Greek mythology, the Muses are not just The Muses and inspiring agents of poetical creation, but their role is first of all a cosmological one: Reflexive Nature their birth crowns the process of cosmogony, bringing the world into the manifestation. As we try to demonstrate primarily in the course of the World of Hesiod’s Theogony, the song of the Muses celebrates and thus manifests the cosmos in Archaic Greek or the world-order through its articulation by means of the musical speech. As the world enters a new domain of appearance, Thought new cosmological categories emerge. The first one being thebeauty of the cosmos: as a world-order as well as the ordered whole, Eliška Fulínová it can now manifest itself as beautiful. The Center for Theoretical Study second one being the possibility of fiction, of Charles University – Czech Academy of Sciences a delusive appearance: the complex reality Husova 4 can manifest itself in many incompatible 110 00 Prague 1 ways, partial and thus potentially misleading. Czech Republic The third one being thereflexivity of the cosmos, founded on the reflexivity of the Department of Philosophy and History of Science musical speech itself. The Muses are capable Charles University, Faculty of Science to manifest themselves, and even their own Viničná 7 manifestation. By means of their song, the 128 44 Prague 2 world becomes manifest to itself, too, and Czech Republic the complex system of divine powers gains [email protected] a reflexive character. In the closing section, we sketch briefly what happens to this reflexivity in the domain of humans. Indeed, the mortals can gain immortality through the song of the Muses, expressed by inspired poets in human voice.*1

* This study is a slightly reworked and abridged version of a Czech article of the same author (or- cid.org/0000-0001-9147-1796), Luhanová 2014.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 5 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought

The general image of the Muses Czech Classical scholar, follows in his tends to include some awareness of the footsteps when she claims: role these goddesses play in inspiring the works of literature, especially po- The idea that musical and poetic talents etry. The notion of a special divine power are divine, and art is used by gods is dedicated to this task is specific to Greek part of at least the Indo-European herit- myths: no parallels are found in the age. Only in Greece, however, do we find pantheons of other nations. The ancient a Muse who not only brings divine art Greek concept of a Muse or Muses is, and gives it to people, but also reveals however, much broader, and their most and declares that she herself and her important function is not to contribute work is part of the order of the world, to human artistic endeavours but to fulfil that it is part of its way of being.2 a certain cosmological task. This aspect of Muses was studied in detail by Walter Through a musical word, that which F. Otto,1 and Sylva Fischerová, a leading is can reveal itself and relate to itself in its manifestation. And more specifically, 1 Otto 1955. Of importance in this context are also some smaller works from the 1950s that treat the subject of Muses in a more general context of mythic manifestation and self- (1955), Die Sprache als Mythos (1958), col- revelation of being, especially Der Mythos lated in Otto 1987. und das Wort (1952–1953), Der Mythos 2 Fischerová 2006a, p. 63.

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archaic thoughts expressed in the A similar ‘ancient story’ (παλαιὸς works of inspired poets can, thanks to λόγος, τῶν παλαιῶν μῦθος) is also re- this divine gift, relate to themselves, counted by Philo of Alexandria.4 In his express themselves in speech, and version, the creator of the world, after apprehend themselves in a particular finishing the whole cosmos ὁ( σύμπας manner. Thanks to the Muses, there κόσμος), asked one of his assistants thus arises the primary ground of cos- whether there was something missing mic reflexivity that makes self-relating among the things arisen. The assistant and self-understanding possible. In the then replied: following study, we trace the cosmological aspect of this phenomenon. In doing … that everything was perfect and so, we rely especially on the treatment fully completed, but that there was of this subject presented by Hesiod in just one thing missing, namely a word his Theogony. praising it, which should not so much praise as announce (οὐκ ἐπαινέσει The World Manifests μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξαγγελεῖ) the pervasive ex- Itself in a Musical Speech cellence … because the narrations of We can take as our starting point the god’s deeds represent their fully suffi- story of the birth of the Muses, a point cient praise, since they do not need any which W.F. Otto believes to be the key to external addition as an embellishment a better understanding of the Muses and (προσθήκης οὐδεμιᾶς ἔξωθεν εἰς κόσμον their role in the world of ancient Greece. δεομένων).5 The story of their birth is attributed to Pindar and its shortened version appears Zeus liked this idea, which is why he in the writings of Aelius Aristides: begat with Mnemosyne, embodied Mem- ory, a generation of Muses, goddesses Pindar went so far that he says that in who celebrate and thereby complete the the marriage of Zeus, upon Zeus asking whole of the ordered world. the gods if they desired anything, they Where Pindar according to Aelius requested that he create for himself gods says that what the finished world needs who would honour (κατακοσμήσουσι) in for its completion is to be honoured, words and music these great deeds and Philo emphasises that it is not about all of his preparations.3 praise (ἐπαινεῖν) or adding something to what there already is. What the world

3 Aelius Aristides, Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ needs to be complete is an account, or ῥητορικῆς, 106: Πίνδαρος δὲ τοσαύτην more precisely a narration (διήγησις) ὑπερβολὴν ἐποιήσατο ὥστε ἐν Διὸς γάμῳ that would announce (ἐξαγγέλλειν), that καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτούς φησιν ἐρομένου τοῦ Διὸς εἴ του δέοιντο αἰτῆσαι ποιήσασθαί is, express and tell in words, the divine τινας αὑτῷ θεοὺς, οἵτινες τὰ μεγάλα ταῦτ’ ἔργα καὶ πᾶσάν γε δὴ τὴν ἐκείνου κατασκευὴν κατακοσμήσουσι λόγοις καὶ 4 Philo Judaeus, De plantatione, 127–130. μουσικῇ. Translation Behr 1986, p. 145. 5 Philo Judaeus, De plantatione, 127–128.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 7 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought deeds and order of the world as it already above.7 Naratio achieves this either by is. Philo points out that divine actions telling a story from the life of the divine do not require that anything be added: power celebrated by the hymn, a story as soon as they are spoken, spelled out, that captures the god’s nature, or by ap- they are their own tribute and praise. plying a diachronic genealogical per- The world thus not only exists but thanks spective, that is, by telling how the god to a musical speech also manifests itself, was born and eventually found his or her whereby musical speech does not add place in the divine order. A hymn thus anything to reality. It just makes real- expresses the reality it celebrates in two ity explicit, expressed, and apparent in distinct ways: by describing its essential what it is, even in its dynamic aspect, nature and by recounting the process that is, in capturing the events thanks to that led to its establishment. which reality acquired its definitiveness. Hesiod’s Theogony represents a cul- Manifestation thus conceived therefore mination of the hymnic form thus becomes, through the Muses, the way of defined. The monumental construction being of the world and the song of the of this work is unique, but its basic struc- Muses is a cosmogonic act because it ture is analogical to some other longer represents a constitutive culmination hymns preserved as part of the Homeric of a process it celebrates.

7 The distinction between descriptio and A Beautiful World naratio was proposed in the context of analysing the structure of hymns in Miller 1986. in Beautiful, But Possibly Similarly, Richard Janko draws a distinction Deceptive Words between a ‘myth’, i.e. a story told in the past Hymn is an ancient literary genre that tense, and ‘attributes’ in the sense of a description of properties of a divine being, re- celebrates and ‘praises’ divine realities counted in the present tense; see Janko 1981. and claims to have its origin in the Mus- This duality is also noted in the Chadwicks’ 6 monumental overview of the history of liter- es. Longer hymns articulate their con- ature; Chadwick – Chadwick 1940, p. 785. The tent in two interconnected parts: descrip- Chadwicks note that the Greek hymnic form tio, which captures the typical qualities, blends a timeless description of the kind that was in archaic world literatures usually asso- attributes, and sphere of agency of the ciated with a celebration of divinity and is god it celebrates, and naratio, the core seen as a sign of a poem’s sacred status, with a diachronic narration of stories that tends to of the story of the hymn, which explains be a form used in secular poetry, especially a particular aspect of the god described heroic epics. The traditional philological approach tends to distinguish between 1. invocatio, an invo- 6 See a collection of Homeric Hymns where cation of a divinity that includes the use of its ‘celebration’ is usually expressed by the terms name, epithets, etc., 2. pars epica, which elu- ἀείδειν or ὑμνεῖν. This collection contains cidates the nature of the powers of the god both some more extensive hymns, which fol- addressed by the poet, and finally 3.preces , low the structure described below, and short- a concluding formulation of a wish whose er hymns, akin rather to an invocation of a de- fulfilment the poet asks for. This structure is ity to which a poem is dedicated and whose found in both the short and the more exten- celebrated actions are briefly summarised in sive compositions in the Homeric Hymns. a few verses. See e.g. Versnel 1981, p. 2.

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tradition. The Theogony as a whole is cosmos,12 which indicates that it is both a hymnic praise of Zeus’s world order organising and organised. A cosmos is that takes the form of description of the not only the sum of all there is, but also cosmogonic process which led to the es- the order that makes it a meaningful tablishment of the world in its current whole.13 The whole of what there is is form. The introduction, orprooimion ,8 is then not only properly ordered but also designed as an independent hymn to the beautiful.14 The semantic roots of the Muses.9 Musical speech, which Hesiod, expression cosmos, which reach all the as poet, relates, and which expresses way to Homer, reveal that the term com- a mythical story about the origin of the bines a meaning of a purposeful order15 cosmos, not only recounts this story but with the meaning of a neat arrangement, also becomes its final act of completion. ornament, or embellishment.16 The idea Through the Muses, reality assumes the of beauty achieved by ordering, that is, shape of a word that can be uttered by by the creation of a properly ordered and a human mouth. Poets inspired by the organised whole where everything is Muses are thus not impartial, disen- in harmony with its surroundings and gaged, external observers and reporters. its context, is characteristic of Greek On the contrary, poets, in virtue of their actions, by interpreting a musical word 12 It is commonly assumed that the first to use the term cosmos to denote the whole of the through the medium of human speech, universe was Pythagoras in the 6th century become part of the order of the world BCE (DK 14 A 21). and help complete its constitution. Po- 13 For more on the history and meaning of the term , see Kahn 1994, pp. 219–231. etic speech thus makes the subject of its cosmos 14 Various pieces of evidence pointing to this depiction immediately present. aesthetic or ‘cosmetic’ use of the term cos- As soon as the world manifests itself mos are brought together by Šedina 1997, pp. 11–15. Cf. also Šedina 1995. through expression in a musical speech, 15 Often, though not exclusively, in connec- an important new aspect comes into tion with arraying the army, i.e. placing it in play, namely the beauty of the world that battle order, or in connection with adjusting thus appears. Hesiod in his prooimion the armour. For instance, in Homer, κοσμεῖν can refer to putting on one’s armour (Ilias, emphasises the beauty of the Muses and II, 873), to arraying or marshalling the troops all their works, especially their ‘splendid (Ilias, II, 474–476; III, 2–7), or even to pitch- ing a camp ( , VII, 52). Similarly, the ex- 10 Ilias voice’ (περικαλλής ὄσσα). and ‘beau- pression κοσμήτωρ λαῶν denotes a some- tiful song’ (καλή ἀοιδή).11 The world as one who organises an army (Ilias, XVI, 375; a whole, meanwhile, was already in the Odyssea, XVIII, 152). This notion of proper arrangement can, however, also apply to Archaic Period referred to by the term food (Odyssea, VII, 13) or even to well-kept vegetable beds (Odyssea, VII, 127). 16 Hera, when preparing to entrap Zeus, is deco- rating herself, whereby her toilette is de- 8 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 1–115. scribed using the term κόσμος (Ilias, XIV, 187). 9 Cf. also Fischerová 2006b. Even a nice bridle is an ‘ornament’, κόσμος, for a horse (Ilias, IV, 145). This use, where κόσμος 10 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 10. denotes an ornament or a jewel, became 11 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 22. quite common in Classical Greek.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 9 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought thought as a whole. In order for the world ordered whole of verses’ or ‘ornament to be apprehended as essentially beauti- made of poetic words’. In this way, the ful, meanwhile, it must reveal or mani- cosmos of poetic words and cosmos of fest itself: after all, ‘beauty, if indeed it reality revealed in them share the same is beauty, must be manifest’.17 essence.20 Both versions of the abovemen- The manifestation of reality in the tioned ‘ancient story’ play on the du- medium of speech does, however, bring ality of ordering and beauty inherent along yet another new element, namely in the concept of cosmos.18 According the possibility of deception. Manifes- to Aelius, the Muses are supposed to tation brings into the whole of reality ‘honor’ the world, whereby the term a plurality of perspectives: that which κατακοσμέω refers not only to beau- is can appear in various ways and in tification but also, more commonly, some contexts, it can seem different to ordering, thus hinting on the cos- from the way it is. Fictitious appearance mogenic process completed by actions thus becomes one of the ways of being of the Muses. In Philo’s version, the of reality. That is also what the Muses Muses arrive at a point where the say about themselves in the prooimion whole of the world (ὁ σύμπας κόσμος) to the Theogony when they admit that is finished. This cosmos needs no ad- their song can be both truthful and dition of external things ‘as an em- deceptive: bellishment’ (εἰς κόσμον), i.e. literally ‘to become cosmos’. It only needs to be ...we can make falsities and fallacies uttered, spelled out, to properly reveal seem true, but when we want we’re able itself in all of its beauty, in its cosmic to give truthful statements, too.21 nature. In the Archaic world, beauty is thus not an aesthetic addition. It is This statement captures a factor that a cosmological category: appearing is of key importance in understand- beautiful is the world’s way of being, ing the nature of a poetic depiction of whereby the voice in which the divine the world. Nevertheless, the speech cosmos speaks of its beautiful being are by which the goddesses characterise the Muses. Their speech is thus truly their own words is quite peculiar due ‘cosmic’ and it is no coincidence that in ancient times, one of the terms for to denote his own poem (West 1992, fr. 1, 2), and cf. also κόσμος ἀοιδῆς in a fragment 19 a poem was κόσμος ἐπέων, i.e. ‘an ascribed to Orpheus (DK 1 B 1). 20 Fischerová 2006b, p. 360. 17 Fischerová 2006a, p. 63. 21 ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν 18 Cf. also Kahn 1994, p. 220. ὁμοῖα, | ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα 19 Democritus speaks in this way about Homer’s γηρύσασθαι, Hesiodus, Theogonia, 27–28, work (DK 68 B 21), while Parmenides uses this translation Caldwell 2015. The key term here expression (with the adjective ἀπατηλός, are the pseudea; this expression can be used ‘deceptive’) to present a cosmology that was to denote anything that is not in agreement explained to him by a Goddess after she dis- with reality, i.e. both a deliberate lie and an closed the truth to him. Solon uses the term error or a made-up nonsense.

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to its self-referential form.22 That is, It seems now that in a world that is when they admit to being skilled liars, and appears through speech, the possi- we are forced to ask ourselves whether bility of existence of non-truth is very the Muses decided to reveal their true truthful. In other words, things can nature, or they are just trying to mislead appear different from the way they are, us.23 Can we and should we trust their and this potential is inherent in the way worlds? In fact, the Muses’ declaration they exist. The possibility of appearance that they can deceive cannot turn out to of things that are not is thus part of real- be false because if, in using it, the god- ity of a world whose being is completed desses really wanted to mislead us, they by its appearance in a musical speech. would only confirm the truth of their Deception turns out to be the means claim. However, the speech of the Muses of an appropriate expression of reality, is not just a logical puzzle. After all, the because even speech that communicates purpose of it is above all to spell out the deceptive content on a lower level ade- reality of the world! Let us therefore try quately discloses truth about the being and interpret their statement and its of this world. In this way, fiction that specific form within this cosmological resembles reality is not just an imperfect framework.24 imitation of truth but rather a consequence of elevating reality to a poetic 22 Cf. the amazing career of words which the state, a way of referring to its appear- Cretan thinker Epimenides allegedly said when angry with his fellow islanders, name- ance in musical speech. ly that ‘all Cretans are liars’ (the statement is Truthful and truthlike musical quoted in the , 1:12, New Testament Titus speech can thus express not only what and ascribed to Epimenides by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromateis, I, 14). Possibly the there really is but also what might be first to realise the paradoxical nature of such true. This truthlikeness, which can self-referring statements was Eubulides of Miletus in the 4th century BCE. It was he who cause us to mistakenly think that pos- included in his list of seven logical paradoxes sibility is reality or that a partial per- also the Liar Paradox, which states ‘What I am spective represents the whole, is what saying now is false’; see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, II, 108. underlies the enchanting, enthralling 23 In contrast to deception, the goddess’s pro- quality of musical speech and its abil- fessed ability to sing properly about reality ity to deceive the addressee. Deceit in did not give rise to doubts in ancient times. On the contrary, it may have been seen as an general is an integral part of the cos- integral part of abilities of goddesses who mogonic process. It is both a conse- see all there is and all there has been (Ilias, II, quence and a further cause of conflicts 485, cf. also Odyssea, VIII, 491) and in virtue of their being the daughters of Mnemosyne, the that take place between divine powers, goddess of memory (Hesiodus, Theogonia, 54, 915), which made them the chief power is treated by Pucci 1977, however he draws confronting forgetting. consequences for the nature of the logos 24 This passage became the subject of many dif- only. We are not aware of any interpretation ferent interpretations. For a brief, yet useful that pays attention to the self-referential na- overview, see Clay 1988, pp. 327ff.; for a more ture of the statement and tries to apply it in thorough overview, see Scodel 2001, pp. 115ff. the context of the reflexive being of reality The paradoxical form of the Muses’ statement that manifests itself.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 11 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought conflicts which play a constitutive role deceptive. This implies that because the in cosmogony. Be it the ruse prepared Muses do not promise to tell the truth by Gaia (the Earth) thanks to which and nothing but the truth, they can Ouranos (the Heaven) losses its posi- mediate various partial ways of under- tion in favour of Kronos,25 the trick standing reality, and thereby capture which Rhea, with the help of Gaia, uses even conflict and strife. to deceive Kronos and open the way to It seems that a fitting way of captur- Zeus,26 or the compliments Zeus uses to ing reality in its plurality, multiple lay- outwit Metis and to prevent the birth ers, and incompatibility of various ways of an offspring who would replace him of revealing itself is this polyphony of as the ruler of the world27 – all these the truthlike. A multiplicity of voices are key turning points of cosmogony. that expresses reality in its totality by And although these tricks gradually apprehending the various partial per- assume an ever more sophisticated form spectives revealed by their mutual con- (we witness a gradual shift from a vio- flict as partial, would in fact be a true lent action executed by a sharp blade speech. Listeners would be deceived only to deliberate use of coaxing and per- if they did not see through the limita- suasion), the deceit has in all cases an tions of each partial perspective, only analogical structure. The subject who is if they thought it was the whole truth.28 being tricked does not properly under- Musical speech, potentially always de- stand what is happening and what is at ceptive, thus seems more appropriate in stake: without being aware of it, he or comparison to a speech that could never she views things only from his or her lie because it reveals a deep truth about own narrow perspective. The subject the conflicted nature of reality differ- of deceit is unaware of some crucial entiated between being and appearing. factors which set the current reality 28 The insight that each and every limited, par- into a wider context whose meaning tial perspective is deceptive is a typical sub- is determined not only by past events, ject of Classical tragedy, since in a tragic con- but also, and more importantly, by cer- flict ‘truth’ is not in possession of either of the opposing parties. The nature of reality reveals tain undisclosed plans and intentions itself more adequately in the potentially con- of the deceiver. This structure can be flicting yet justifiable claims that stem from it. This is evident, for instance, in the quandary applied to interpreting the meaning faced by Orestes in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, of Muses’ declared ability to deceive. a conflict rooted in incompatible claims root- In particular, what is deceptive is any ed in the relation to a father and a relation to a mother. Already in the Archaic Period, how- partial perspective that is unaware of ever, this motif is also at the core of Homeric its partiality, and any speech that me- conflicts between gods, while in Hesiod’s diates a partial perspective is likewise writings, it is expressed for instance in the argument between Zeus and Prometheus regarding proper treatment of mortals; see 25 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 160ff. Hesiodus, Theogonia, 532–616, Opera et dies, 42–105. For more on the context, see Hesiodus, , 485ff. 26 Theogonia also Aeschylus, Prometheus vinctus and 27 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 886–900. Vandvik 1943.

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From this perspective, a musical com- on both levels that correspond to the position perceived as a revelation of the two main hymnic parts of the Theogony: being of the world in one of the facets first as the Muses’ self-relation, and then of its appearance – and therefore also as a self-relation of the totality of the the cosmological explanation provided world, which in the medium of a musical by Hesiod – seems utterly true in the word becomes apparent to itself. sense of adequately capturing the being We have already seen that the speech of a thus understood reality.29 of the Muses can relate directly to itself. In Hesiod’s hymn to the Muses, how- Reflexivity of Musical ever, the goddesses do not reflect only Speech and of the World It on the nature of their speech. Instead, Reveals through the voice of the poet they also From all of the above, it follows that mu- present a brief outline of its content and sical speech is essentially reflexive. This on top of that, they describe their own speech reveals not only the reality it ex- birth, nature, and purview of their divine presses, but through its ability to relate actions.31 This corresponds to the task the to itself, it can also disclose the nature Muses gave the poet during his initia- of this appearance, a plurality of possi- tion: in addition to praising the family of bilities of appearing that is a way of be- gods and singing about the past and the ing of reality, a plurality that completes future, they also demanded that at the the way the world is. A musical word is beginning and the end, he ought to praise thus transparent to itself: together with them.32 Such a request also constitutes what is being revealed, it manifests also itself, the sphere of manifestation as disclosed but also of the fact that it appears. such.30 This reflexivity is now present In other words, reality appears in its truth as appearing. 29 Cf. also Plato’s statement (in Plato, Respublica, 31 Form-wise, the speech of the Muses is pre- 382a ff.) according to which everything a god sented in poems in three different ways: says must be true. This explicit claim, how- Firstly, and most commonly, directly, that is, ever, is influenced by a shift in the meaning when a poet speaks of deities in a third per- of ‘truthfulness’ that took place between the son (while sometimes enlivening the story by Archaic thought and Classical philosophy. inserting direct speech); in this way, the poet This meaning shift also probably corresponds usually speaks about the Muses. Secondly, to a deep change in the understanding of re- and less commonly, Muses appear in an in- ality, so that while a Platonic god cannot but direct narrative, i.e. in a story about a story, express truth, Archaic Muses proudly declare when a poet summarises what the Muses say that they use potentially deceptive speech, (e.g. Hesiodus, Theogonia, 45–49). And final- because it adequately describes a reality that ly, we find some direct quotations of what the is inherently full of conflict and contradiction. Muses say, that is, records of what the goddesses say about themselves in first person 30 This interpretation of the Muses is defended (Hesiodus, , 25–27). This category by Walter F. Otto, especially in his study Der Theogonia may also include the cosmogonic narrative Mythos und das Wort (see note 2). He views their reflexive nature as a characteristic fea- that forms the main content of the Theogony ture of Greek myth that has to rely on musical (Hesiodus, Theogonia, 116ff.), since it is possi- speech. In the speech of the Muses, truth ap- ble that it is a direct quotation of the speech pears in such a way that the person to whom it of the Muses. is revealed is aware not only of the reality thus 32 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 34.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 13 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought an obligation on their part, namely that the world order that is being celebrated they shall disclose to the poet their own figures not only as an object but also as divine being. After all, how else would the addressee of a musical song. The to- a mortal access it? Hesiod’s poem meets tality of the world is, after all, a complex this request,33 which implies that the network of divine powers, established Muses are both the source and address- by a genealogical process where indi- ees of the hymnic celebration. Hesiod’s vidual gods function as its constitutive hymn should therefore be read also as elements.34 When, at the end of organ- a self-manifestation of the Muses in ising and arranging the world, the gods a musical speech as interpreted by human wished to hear words that would prop- verses. This formal structure of a musi- erly celebrate this order and the divine cal song indicates that the Muses can, in deeds that established it, they requested their own speech as interpreted by the a voice that would sing about them. The poet, create a mirror that reflects them. ultimate hymn that completes it all is After all, the goddesses want to hear then a cosmological song, which can praises sung to them, just like in the ‘an- capture them in their mutual relation, cient story’ recounted above, gods – who i.e. in their cosmicity. wanted the Muses to be born – wanted to Hesiod’s hymn emphasises the reflex- hear themselves honoured. ive duality especially in the case of Zeus, A self-relating musical speech can who is at the very centre of the cosmologi- also become a medium of self-relation cal paean. Zeus is the creator and guaran- for the reality it expresses, i.e. for the tor of the world order, the father of people world order and individual divine pow- and gods, the best and mightiest of them ers that constitute it, and subsequently also for humans. Thanks to this duality 34 This not does exclude the possibility that some gods help establish the order in of reflexive structure, musical speech a so-to-say negative way, for instance is not just a ‘mirror’ of the world. It is by presenting themselves as threats that need to be either newly integrated also transparent to itself and ought to or suppressed. An example of the latter be accorded the same kind of being as are the Titans who did not find a fitting the world it expresses, the world which place in Zeus’s order and were, together with Kronos, thrown into an underground finds in it its own completion. Likewise, prison; see Hesiodus, Theogonia, 729–733, 813–814). The former group, those who 33 Hesiod starts his poem with the Muses need to be reintegrated, includes mostly (Theogonia, 1) and returns to them at the the old gods who in many cases form the end, when cosmogony reaches a point when basic spatial constituents of the world, they are born (Theogonia, 915–917). The very but there is a degree of tension between end of the Theogony as it is available to us them and the new Olympic order. For in- now thus forms a smooth transition to the fol- stance, the position of the Earth (Gaia), lowing composition, the so-called Catalogue who sometimes helps Zeus as a prophet- of Women, which is nowadays usually seen ic force (Hesiodus, Theogonia, 891), while as a late addition. There is no agreement on threatening him at other times with her the verse with which the Theogony actually immense generative force (as in the birth ends: proposals range from verse 939 to 964. of Typhon, Theogonia, 820 ff.) is ambiva- For a detailed discussion of this subject, see lent in this manner. For more on this sub- West 1966, pp. 398–399; 48–49. ject, see also Bonnafé 1984, p. 211.

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all,35 the god who after defeating Kronos regulate the universe and the nature stamped on the world its current form of all divine powers who are in charge when he determined the rules by which of upholding and maintaining them.43 cosmos exists and delegated to other gods The subject of their celebration is the their spheres of power.36 Hesiod’s cosmo- whole family of immortal gods,44 that logical hymn reflects Zeus’s privileged is, not only the actually ruling genera- position also in virtue of being ‘dedi- tion of Olympians45 but also the older cated’ to him in both senses of the word: powers, be it those whose suppression Zeus’s world order is the main subject of had confirmed Zeus as the supreme the musical celebration and Zeus is the ruler (such as the Titans and giants)46 main addressee of the hymn. The Muses or the primordial gods who play the role are born at the end of the cosmogonic of cosmogonic beginnings (the Earth, process, when Zeus consolidates his po- the Sky, the Night).47 In a diachronic sition by marrying goddesses of the old genealogical narration, the Muses are generation: the Muses are daughters of ‘telling of things that are, of things in Zeus and Mnemosyne, a Titaness and future that shall be, and things that embodiment of memory.37 While they are were before, out of their mouths in born in Pieria38 and often dance on the sweet, unwearying harmony the voice hill of Helicon,39 their main seat is on the flows...’.48 The song of the Muses is pre- Olympus,40 in the immediate vicinity of sented here as a cosmological prophetic their father, in whom they originated and statement49 that should be interpreted to whom they keep returning to please through the prism of a shared founda- his mind.41 Just like the poet thus begins tion of the musical composition and the and ends his song with the Muses, so the whole of the world. The ‘unwearying song of the Muses has its beginning and harmony’ refers to the singing of the end with Zeus. paean that is at the same time the final The song of the Muses is not, how- act of cosmogenesis. This completion, ever, limited to Zeus either in its content or by being addressed to him ex- 43 πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἤθεα κεδνὰ | ἀθανά- clusively. The ‘divine voice’42 of the των κλείουσιν, Hesiodus, Theogonia, 66–67. Muses reveals the rules or customs that 44 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 44. 45 Esp. Hesiodus, Theogonia, 11–15. 46 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 16–20; 50. 35 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 47–49. 47 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 45–46; cf. also 20. 36 εὖ δὲ ἕκαστα | ἀθανάτοις διέταξε νόμους 48 εἴρουσαι τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα καὶ ἐπέφραδε τιμάς, Hesiodus, Theogonia, πρό τ’ ἐόντα, | φωνῇ ὁμηρεῦσαι, τῶν δ’ 73–74. ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδὴ, Hesiodus, Theogonia, 37 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 53–54, 915–917. 38–39, translation Caldwell 2015. 38 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 53ff. 49 Cf. for instance Ilias, I, 70, where we find 39 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 1ff. a similar formula describing the knowledge of prophet Calchas (ὃς ᾔδη τά τ› ἐόντα τά 40 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 75. τ› ἐσσόμενα πρό τ› ἐόντα). On the close re- 41 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 36–37; 51–52; 75. lation between prophets and poets, see also 42 ἄμβροτος ὄσσα, Hesiodus, Theogonia, 43. Dodds 1951, p. 217.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Eliška Fulínová 15 The Muses and Reflexive Nature of the World in Archaic Greek Thought culmination of creation, consists in the reflexivity of musical word, when the uttering and listening. In the tra- a poet translates it into a form suitable dition, there exists a topos where the for ears of mortals? Can human speech song of the Muses is an integral part of preserve the possibility of self-reflec- the feasts of gods. Hesiod, too, paints tion that is an essential characteristic of a remarkable picture where the voice of a divine speech? Such questions would the Muses fills the whole abode of the deserve a close study on their own. Let deathless, the mountain top of Olympus us just note that the possibility of self-re- resounds with a song of praise that lation is not lost in transposition into spreads around,50 and when the Muses the level of human speech, but it does move, even the black Earth, ancestor acquire some new dimensions. of all gods, hums along and reverber- Expression of the transient human ates in the rhythm of their song and existence in words of praise is above dance.51 Gods view themselves in their all one of the privileged ways in which long-desired mirror with pleasure: they a moral being can participate in the listen to a voice in which their own be- permanent being of the divine order.53 ing is completed by being disclosed to 53 According to Hesiod, gods are beings themselves. Cosmos, the world order who ‘exist forever’ (αἰεὶ ἐόντες, Hesiodus, created by gods and their relations, thus Theogonia, 105): they are born but they never pass away, thus escaping the other- becomes capable of relating to itself. wise inviolable symmetry of birth and death; this applies to the being of the world as a whole as well. The philosophical heir of this In Place of a Conclusion: conception is Plato; see Plato, Timaeus, 41a ff. Musical Songs in the Sphere of and Sedley 2010. the Mortals Monsters beings occupy a special position, since while divine, they can also be mortal Musical gifts are not altogether denied to (e.g. Gorgon Medusa, the Lernaen Hydra, the mortals, either: not only gods, but even giant Geryon, and others, see esp. Hesiodus, Theogonia 270ff. and 295ff.). The monstrous a chosen person on whom the Muses character of these beings expresses their lim- had bestowed the gift of interpreting inal position within the order. They embody divine song in human speech can hear a fading of the constitutive difference between the mortal and the deathless. Consolidation of the divine voice that reveals the being the cosmic order therefore requires their liqui- of reality. ‘Give me an oracle, Muse, and dation, a task that usually falls to one or another of the heroes, whereby heroes, themselves I shall be your prophet’, says Pindar52 products of mixed unions between gods and when commenting on the transposi- people, are similarly hybrid and liminal be- tion of divine voice into the medium of ings. Especially noteworthy example of this is Zeus’s son Heracles, who as the ‘long arm’ of human speech. What happens now with the highest of the gods ended up killing so many monsters that he was accepted into the Olympic pantheon (see Hesiodus, Theogonia, 50 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 40–42. 950–955). A fateful meeting of a monster and 51 περὶ δ’ ἴαχε γαῖα μέλαινα | ὑμνεύσαις, a hero thus paradoxically reaffirms the distinc- ἐρατὸς δὲ ποδῶν ὕπο δοῦπος ὀρώρει, tion between the mortal and immortal, since Hesiodus, Theogonia, 69–70. while the monstrous divine being dies, an off- 52 μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ’ ἐγώ, spring of a god and a mortal woman receives Race 1997, fr. 150. his share in the fully divine deathless existence.

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A poem dedicated to a celebrated hero on the outside, needed others to be fully brings ‘undying glory’ (κλέος ἄφθιτον), constituted. They became who they were keeps him alive in collective memory only in the image reflected in the eyes of and prevents his fall into the abyss of others.57 Poets could express this per- forgetting. In other words, to be cele- sonal appearance in a musical speech, brated in a poem is to gain immortal- and thus preserve it and spread it even ity.54 We had already noted that Muses after the mortal subject of a poem suc- are the daughters of Mnemosyne, i.e. cumbed to death and the non-appearance Memory. In this context, musical speech of the underworld. And as long as a mor- turns out to be a crucially important tal lives on in the poem, so does the poet, two-way link between the divine order too, who expressed the mortal’s being and human world: the word of a poet and who is well aware of his exceptional reveals and reminds mortals of the di- status. ‘So also you, O Polycrates, will vine order55 in order to help them lead have a glory of song that is unwilting, their lives in fitting harmony with it.56 as in line with the song and with my At the same time, it has the power of own glory of song,’ says Ibycos to the turning a human life into an unforget- tyrant Polycrates, whom he praises.58 In table story, thus elevating it to a level of Hesiod’s compositions, poet’s individu- non-transitory, permanent being. ality comes to the fore quite forcefully: This significantly enhances the in the Theogony, Hesiod describes how poet’s status: after all, it is poets who he became a poet and in doing so, for the turn human subjects of their stories very first time in the European tradition, into immortal heroes. This appearance he claims a poem as his own under his in the medium of poetic speech consti- own name.59 In the Word and Days, Hesiod tutes a culmination of the constitution then not only speaks about his life, but of human existence. Archaic people, based on personal experiences also whose individuality was constituted not chooses a particular addressee from his internally but by the way they appeared surroundings, namely his own brother.60

57 This characteristic of constitution of archaic 54 See Detienne 1979, p. 23. The understanding of speech as a medium through which im- individuality is convincingly demonstrated in mortality can be achieved is also shared by Vernant 1989. Plato (on poetry in particular, see e.g. Plato, 58 Page 1962, fr. 1a, 47–48. Symposium, 209d). 59 Hesiodus, Theogonia, 22. 55 Cf. for instance the introductory verse of the 60 From a different perspective, the individ- Hymn to Apollo, where instead of the com- uality of a poet in Hesiod is also treated in mon formula about the poet’s desire to cel- Griffith 1983. Griffith shows that Hesiod’s ebrate gods, we find something different, approach to authorship is not radically namely ‘I will remember and I won’t forget new: it is rooted in a much older epic tra- ...’ (Μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι, Hymnus ad dition. At the same time, he also empha- Apollinem, 1). A similar opening is found sises that the appearance of the author in also in the Hymn to Dionysus (μνήσομαι, first person is, in Hesiod’s works, always Hymnus ad Bacchum, 2). motivated by a specific purpose and 56 An excellent example of this is Hesiodus, particular context. In other words, this Opera et Dies. self-relating is not a goal in itself.

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A poet as interpreter of musical words is speaking of poets who, while disclosing therefore not quite transparent, he or she the nature of the world, left the shad- is not a mere loudspeaker whose exist- ows of anonymity and spoke about them- ence ideally should not be even noticed. selves, we are touching upon not only On the contrary: each poet interprets the one of the sources of European reflexive divine voice in his or her own, unique thinking, but perhaps also one of the way.61 In the function of an interpreter, roots of the distinctly European sense a poet has a word to say in the poem and of individuality.62 can claim his or her function proudly. And it is just possible that here, when (Translated from Czech by Anna Pilátová)

Let us also add, that against this background, the traditional question of the extent to which Hesiod enters his creations as their individual author and to what extent this is a matter of a topos and self-stylisation, seems somewhat anachronistic. After all, if individuality is indeed constituted in appearing to others through musical speech, then literary (self-)stylisation does not conceal but co-creates the poet’s ‘true’ individuality! 61 This issue is dealt with in Nancy 1982. According to Nancy, divine voice is accessible to a person only in the plurality of unique communications and this plurality is its essential feature. There are various ways in which 62 Publication of this text was made possible poets interpret the divine voice and these dif- by the GA UK project No. 341715, Kosmos ferences are part of the nature of the divine jako živá bytost v antické filosofii [Cosmos as voice as addressed to particular persons. a Living Being in Ancient Greek Philosophy].

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Behr, C. A. (1986). Publius Aelius Aristides, Fischerová, S. (2006b). “Kosmos mých The Complete Works: Orationes I–XVI slov: Srovnání Hésiodovy ‚Theogonie‘ (trans. by C. A. Behr). Leiden: Brill. a Parmenidovy básně ‚O přírodě‘”. Filosofický časopis 54, pp. 331–361. Bonnafé, A. (1984). Poésie, nature et sacré, I: Homère, Hésiode et le sentiment grec de la Griffith, M. (1983). “Personality in Hesiod”. nature, Lyon: Maison de l‘Orient. Classical Antiquity 2, pp. 37–65.

Burnet, J. (ed.) (1991–1992). Platonis Janko, R. (1981). “The Structure of the Opera, I–V. Oxford; New York; Toronto: Homeric Hymns: A Study in Genre”. Clarendon Press. Hermes 109, pp. 9–24.

Caldwell R. (transl.) (2015). Hesiod, Theogony Kahn, C. (1994). Anaximander and The & Works and Days, Indianapolis. Origins of Greek Cosmology, Indianapolis; Chadwick, H. M., Chadwick, N. K. (1940). Cambridge: Hackett. The Growth of Literature, III. Cambridge: Long, H. S. (ed.) (1964). Diogenis Laertii vitae Cambridge University Press. philosophorum, I–II. Oxford: Clarendon Clay, J. S. (1988). “What the Muses sang: Press. Theogony 1–115”. Greek, Roman and Luhanová, E. (2014). “Múzy a počátky Byzantine Studies 29, pp. 323–333. reflexivity v archaickém řeckém myšlení”. Détienne, M. (1979). Les maîtres de vérité Listy filologické 137(3–4), pp. 245–273. dans la Grèce archaïque. Paris: F. Maspero. Maehler, H. (ed.) (1975). Pindari Carmina Diels, H. – Kranz, W. (eds.) (1996). Die cum fragmentis, Leipzig: Teubner. Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: griechisch Miller, A. M. (1986). From Delos to Delphi: und deutsch. Zürich: Weidmann. A Literary Study of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, Leiden: Brill. Dodds, E. R. (1951). The Greeks and the Irrational. Los Angeles. Mühll, P. von der (ed.) (1993). Homeri Odyssea. Munich; Leipzig: Teubner. Fischerová, S. (2006a). “Devět lhoucích Múz”. In: S. Fischerová, J. Starý (eds.), Nancy, J.-L. (1982). Le Partage des voix. Původ poezie: Proměny poetické inspirace Paris: Galilée.

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Otto, W. F. (1955). Die Musen und der Vandvik E. (1943). The Prometheus of Hesiod Göttliche Ursprung des Singens und Sagens. and Aeschylus (Skrifter utgitt av det Düsseldorf: E. Diederich. Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse, 1942, No. 2), Oslo: Otto, W. F. (1987). Essais sur le mythe. Dybwad. Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress. Vernant, J.-P. (1989). L’individu, la mort, Page, D. L. (ed.) (1962). Poetae Melici Graeci. l’amour: Soi-même et l’autre en Grèce Oxford: Oxford University Press. ancienne. Paris: Gallimard.

Pucci, P. (1977). Hesiod and the Language Versnel, H. S. (1981). “Religious Mentality of Poetry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins in Ancient Prayer”. In: H. S. Versnel University Press. (ed.), Faith, Hope and Worship: Aspects of Race, W. (1997). Pindar, Nemean Odes, Religious Mentality in the Ancient World, Isthmian Odes, Fragments (ed., trans. by Leiden: Brill, pp. 1–64. W. Race). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wendland, P. (ed.) (1897). Philonis Alexandrini Harvard University Press. Opera quae supersunt, II. Berlin: De Scodel, R. (2001). “Poetic Authority and Gruyter. Oral Tradition in Hesiod and Pindar”. In: West, M. L. (ed.) (1966). Hesiod, Theogony. J. Watson (ed.), Speaking Volumes: Orality Oxford: Clarendon Press. and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill. West, M. L. (ed.) (1978). Hesiod, Works and Days. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Šedina, M. (1995). “Krásná Gorgona”. In: L. Karfíková, A. Matoušek (eds.), Posvátný West, M. L. (ed.) (1992). Iambi et Elegi Graeci, obraz a zobrazení posvátného, Praha: Česká II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. křesťanská akademie, pp. 13–38. West, M. L. (ed.) (1998–2000). Homeri Ilias, Šedina, M. (1997). Sparagmos. Praha: I–II. Munich; Leipzig: Saur. OIKOYMENH. West, M. L. (ed. and transl.) (2003). Sedley, D. (2010). “Hesiod’s ‚Theogony‘ and Homeric hymns, Homeric apocrypha, Plato’s ‚Timaeus‘”. In: G. Boys-Stones, Lives of Homer (ed., trans. by M. L. J. Haubold (eds.), Plato and Hesiod, West). Cambridge; London: Harvard Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Press.

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Transmigrating

Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato*

Vojtěch Hladký Department of Philosophy and History of Science Faculty of Science Charles University, Prague Viničná 7 128 44 Praha 2 Czech Republic abstract The article discusses the nature of transmigrating soul in the early Greek thought, most notably in the * This is an expanded and revised version of an ar- thought of Empedocles and Philolaus. ticle originally published in Czech as Hladký 2010. I would like to thank Eliška Fulínová, Jean-Claude It argues that, in general, soul was Picot, Richard Seaford, Jiří Stránský, and Tomáš conceived as a kind of subtle ‘matter’. Vítek for their invaluable comments and sugges- The turning point Plato who strive tions. This work has been supported by Charles University Research Centre program No. 204056. to guarantee soul’s immortality by For the Greek text of Empedocles and Philolaus, we connecting it with transcendent, use chiefly the classical edition by Diels and Kranz 1951–1952, from which, however, we often diverge but also immaterial Forms. This and use Wright 1995 and Huffman 1993. On the accentuates the intellectual character subject of early Greek notion of the soul in gener- of soul, and this holds also in al, one can recommend the following sources with further references: Rohde 1925, Furley 1956, Claus eschatological context, but at the 1981, Bremmer 1983, 2002, 2010, Albinus 2000, same time transforms the categories and Lorenz 2009. The subject of transmigration and afterlife in particular is treated in Long 1948, in which we tend to think about it Burkert 1995, and Drozdek 2011. until today.

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The following text traces changes arguments for and against transmigra- in the notion of transmigration (reincar- tion, and it would be an interesting phil- nation) of the soul in early Greek philos- osophical debate2 but that, too, we leave ophy. Its aim is to highlight several per- to others. In the following, what we try haps less known and less obvious facts to trace in the various ancient transmi- related to a shift in the understanding gration theories is their position within of transmigrating soul that occurs be- the overall philosophical scheme of some tween the Presocratics and Plato, who Presocratics and especially the often connects its existence with the immaterial Forms. Although it could be argued uncommonly interesting theoretical prob- that the main motivation for a theory of lem with a far-reaching general impact. transmigration is to answer the age-old 2 Christian orthodoxy, for example, had to define its position with respect to Plato’s existential question ‘what comes after philosophy whose position is at least at death?’, we leave this issue intention- first glance more logical: If souls exist ally aside.1 Similarly, one could compare eternally, they necessarily exist already before entering a body, and must therefore be reborn again and again, cf. Wallis 1 Author of this article would like to empha- 1995, pp. 100–105. It should also be noted sise that he personally has no clear view that the Christian Church had strictly pro- regarding the validity of the theory of re- hibited reincarnation at the fifth ecumen- incarnation but regards it – especially in ical council, that is, at the Second Council the context of ancient philosophy – as an of Constantinople in 553.

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rather surprising ontological status of in terms of a difference between a living the soul within these theories. person and a dead body. Usually, it is A soul which temporarily leaves its seen as something akin to the ‘life force’ original body only to subsequently enter that leaves a person who lost conscious- another is a likely subject of remarkable ness or, more usually, who is at the point debates. Such considerations, together of death and enters the Hades.4 Since with other aspects of Presocratic psy- the very beginning of Greek thought, chology, have contributed to the great it has thus been closely connected with philosophical synthesis of Plato, who afterlife. The souls which Odysseus sum- treats the issue of transmigrating souls mons from the Underworld are mere especially in his Phaedo (but also in shadows of people who had died. They the Timaeus). Though the present text retain resemblance with their previous focuses mainly on the notion of the appearance and some sort of individu- transmigrating soul in Presocratic writ- ality, but to communicate with the liv- ings, this subject also highlights the sub- ing, they first need to drink some blood. stantial divide brought about by Plato’s Human thought thus seems to be, at least teachings, especially by his theory of during life, closely linked to corporeal- ideas, transcendent Forms located ‘out- ity, which – as in the famous scene of side’ the sensible world. This break di- Odysseus’ sacrifice to the dead on his vides Presocratic and Classical philoso- way home – the souls of the deceased phy, which in many ways represent two regain for at least a fleeting moment rather different ways of understanding in the form of blood.5 Over time, there the world.3 At the same time, this subject also brings to light some of the roots of 4 Cf. e.g. Snell 1960, pp. 8–15, Bremmer 2010, pp. 12–15, Cairns 2014. Platonic understanding of the soul, an 5 Homer, Od. XI.23ff. The only excep- approach which exerted a far-reaching tion among the dead is the soul of influence for centuries to come. Teiresias, who even after death receives from Persephoneia φρένες and a νόος, Od. X.490–495. This is also why, I. The Mysterious unlike other souls, Teiresias recognises Odysseus and addresses him even be- Origins of Transmigration fore partaking of any blood, Od. XI.90–99, of Souls in Greece 139–154, 390. Even so, the souls in Hades It is well known that in the works of remember some past events on the earth and perform certain activities in Hades, Homer (app. 8th century BCE), that is, e.g., 488–491, 568–575. Some souls, mean- in the oldest written stratum of Greek while, receive their punishment, 576–600, or reward, 601–604, in the Otherworld. thought, soul (ψυχή) is best described Moreover, with the exception of Teiresias, 100–137, who retains the power of proph- 3 That is also why we in the following, we esy symbolised by the abovementioned use texts of only whose authors who are parts of the body (φρένες and νόος) even not religious thinkers but philosophers, in Hades, they no longer know what is and in whose work, a theory of transmi- happening in the world, 155–162, 492–503. gration based on rational arguments is They merely recall their previous exist- at least to some extent part of a general ence, 181–203, 405–434, 553–562, and are theoretical scheme of the world. called ‘phantoms’, εἴδωλα, which in later

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 23 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato appear in the Greek religious thinking of too little evidence to definitively decide the archaic period various notions that between the various hypotheses which take the original idea of a soul as a life had been proposed.9 What is certain force one step further, so that souls do not stay permanently in Hades, wherever and claims that at the time in question, the only such theory can be found it may be located, but rather transmi- in India, in the Upanishads, e.g. in the grate in ways determined by their pre- Brhadaranyakopanishad, whereby he vious deeds. We do not know whether adds that he managed to win Burkert over for his view as well, cf. Burkert 1997, the notion of metempsychosis was first p. 35. The main problem with this inter- developed by the mysterious Orphics,6 pretation, however, is that the origins 7 of the notion of transmigration in India by shamans, or brought into the Greek are at least as mysterious as its origins world through contact with India me- in Greece and cannot be explained by diated by the Persian Empire.8 There is a ‘diffusion model’, cf. Long 1948, p. 10, Bremmer 2002, p. 24, Obeyesekere 2002, pp. 1–18. Moreover, it is quite unclear how Greek means quite characteristically ‘im- the new idea could have passed through ages’, or σκίαι, that is, ‘shadows’. We can the entire Persian Empire without leav- thus speculate that as soon as a human ing any significant traces, only to spread soul is finally freed from its body in a fu- quite widely not only in northern Greece neral pyre, 218–222 – a procedure that but also, including in a popular version, needs to be undertaken if the soul is in southern Italy, northern Greece, Sicily, to enter Hades, Il. XXIII.62–108 – it los- and Crete. Richard Seaford informed es contact with this world. The contact me that although there are numerous can be restored once the soul is again references in Greek texts to Indian cus- infused with corporeality in the form of toms and beliefs before 326 BCE when blood, cf. Renehan 1980, p. 108, Cairns Alexander crosses the Indus, there is 2014, par. 22. not a single mention of a philosophical 6 A balanced account of the Orphic phe- or cosmological idea specified as Indian. nomenon can be found in the works of I would like to thank him for sharing with Guthrie 1952, Brisson 1995, and Parker me this conclusion from his forthcoming 1995, cf. also Burkert 1985, pp. 296–301, book on the subject. Bremmer 2002, pp. 15–24, and Edmonds 9 If one had to choose between the op- 2014. Apart from bone tablets from Olbia tions proposed above, the ‘shamanic’ dated to around 500 BCE, Orphic escha- explanation of the origins of the trans- tology is described in so-called gold migration theory is in the end more con- leaves, some of which date to as early vincing, especially in its moderate form, as the 4th century BCE and the text they i.e., when it is not interpreted as a puta- contain is probably even earlier, cf. Graf tive religious influence from Siberia (‘dif- and Johnston 2007, Janko 2016. fusion hypothesis’) but rather as a rel- 7 A ‘shamanic’ origin of the notion of trans- atively universal manifestation of ar- migration was defended especially by chaic human thought, cf. Ustinova 2009, Dodds 1951, ch. 5, following Meuli 1935, by pp. 47–51. Moreover, despite the claims Cornford 1952, ch. 6, by Burkert 1972, and of various previous anthropological re- by Vernant 2006, pp. 129, 384–385. For search, there seems to be some evidence a critical assessment, see Kahn 1969b, for reincarnation in shamanism. See, e.g., Bremmer 1983, pp. 24–53, 2002, ch. 3, and DuBois 2009, pp. 7, 44, 49, 53, 231, cf. also recently also Zhmud 2012, ch. 6, Gregory Mihai 2010, pp. 271ff, 2015, p. 123, and 2013, pp. 133–135, 177, and Lloyd 2014, Kingsley 2010, pp. 144–147, with further pp. 39–43. literature, esp. p. 145: ‘This shamanic di- 8 Kahn 1969b, 2001, p. 19, with n. 36, crit- mension of beliefs and practices related icises the notion of shamanistic ori- to rebirth is inseparably bound up with gins of the theory of transmigration the enormous importance attributed by

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is that some hints at the notion of soul it is only in later Presocratic thinkers, travelling to various places after death whose work survives in at least some (which resembles transmigration) are fragments, that we can follow more found in early fifth century poet Pindar closely how the new notions fit into (522/518 – after 446),10 and it is men- the overall scheme of the world, in tioned by some other contemporary other words, in whose philosophy we authors.11 Naturally, various forms of can reconstruct the nature and form of transmigration are found in writings of a transmigrating soul. the time and the idea has its more popular and more intellectual forms. II. Empedocles According to tradition, the earliest The extant fragments of Empedocles author who advocated a theory of im- of Acragas (app. 495–435 BCE) pose mortal soul and who could be seen as a challenge when we try to reconstruct a philosopher in a broad sense of the an overall scheme that would include word is Pherecydes of Syros (flor.544/1). both the religious passages pertain- He was an interpreter of mythological ing to transmigration and his physi- theology, author of the first Greek book cal teaching, which presupposes four in prose, and the legendary teacher of elements alternately united and torn Pythagoras, a thinker who is usually apart by Love and Strife. Yet separat- credited with introducing this theory to ing these two aspects of Empedocles’ Greece. This may well be the main reason philosophy and claiming, as scholars why the doctrine of transmigration was often used to, that they belong to two later ascribed also to Pherecydes.12 Yet distinct poems from different parts of his life, a rational youth and mystical shamans to inheriting the spirits of an- old age (or the other way around) is cestors … as well as animals…’ For a sim- as an interpretative approach quite ilar claim, see also Obeyesekere 2002, 13 esp. pp. 15–18; in the following pages, untenable today. In contrast to an Obeyesekere lists many examples of tra- inconclusive remark made by a late ditional societies where ancestors are linked to reincarnation. He does, however, criticise the theory of a shamanic or- pp. 1–13, 104–127. See also comments in igin of the concept of reincarnation, esp. Bremmer 2002, pp. 12–13. pp. 200–204, 233, 239–241. Obeyesekere 13 The views of various scholars on this issue offers in his book a broader comparative are aptly summarised by Bollack 2003, perspective, but his account of the ori- pp. 29–36, and Vítek 2006, vol. I, pp. 87–88; gins of reincarnation in both India and cf. also Trépanier 2017, pp. 130–134. Greece relies perhaps too heavily on ex- Regardless of whether Empedocles actu- ternalist and social explanations. ally wrote two distinct poems, Φυσικά and Καθαρμοί, the recent discovery of 10 Pindar, Ol. 2.56–80; fr. 133 Snell–Maehler, his previously unknown verses in papy- quoted in Plato, Meno 81b–c, cf. Long rus , which deal with 1948, pp. 29–44, and Lloyd-Jones 1985. Strasb. Gr. Inv. 1665–6 both physics and religion, seems to con- 11 See most notably Xenophanes, DK 21 B 7, firm the overall unity of his thought. For and Herodotus, Hist. II,123. the text, translation, and commentary on 12 Cf. especially fragment DK 36 B 4 by Ion the papyrus, see Martin and Primavesi of Chios and other texts in Schibli 1990, 1999, Janko 2004.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 25 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato commentator upon his philosoph- is just another way of referring to what ical predecessor Parmenides,14 in both the earlier and later Greek tradition Empedocles’ work, the presence of an calls the soul (ψυχή) with its eschato- elaborate conception of transmigra- logical implications.18 The termdaimon , tion of the soul can be proven with the most reasonable certainty. According gods. In B 115, Empedocles declares him- to his words, transmigration happens self to be one of the daimons, in B 23 and 112 he even claims to be a god, and to ‘daimons to whom life long-lasting is in B 146 he describes the apotheosis of apportioned’ (δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος prophets, poets, physicians, and rulers (whereby according to some indirect tes- λελάχασι βίοιο), meaning across their timonies he believed himself to belong various reincarnations.15 They can be to all of these categories). On the ancient Greek notion of daimon, see Burkert 1972, reborn not only as land animals, fish, pp. 179–181, Timotin 2012, and Sfameni and birds, but also as plants, which is Gasparro 2015. within Greek transmigration theories 18 In fragments attributed to Empedocles, 16 the term soul (ψυχή) appears only once in a rather exceptional notion. DK 31 B 138, trans. Wright, in the phrase On the other hand, one also ought to on the ‘drawing of life with bronze’ (χαλκῷ consider what happens to the daimons ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας), which probably describes the killing of a sacrificial animal. when Strife prevails and the whole world The term ψυχή probably refers here to again disintegrates in the four basic ele- the life force violently expelled from the animal during the sacrifice. On the other ments, from which it had been created hand, the provenance of this fragment, by Love. If everything without excep- usually ascribed to Empedocles, seems to tion consists of the four elements, then be in doubt, cf. Picot 2006. The term θυμός which appears in B 128.10 and B 137.6 in daimons, too, must inevitably perish. a similar context of violent sacrifice or This conclusion seems to be confirmed killing in general (which Empedocles reso- lutely rejects) is usually seen as denoting by the fact that during the uniting of the seat of emotions. It leaves the dead the elements, a kind of ‘long-lived gods’ body together with the soul, cf. Bremmer (θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες) was created alongside 1983, pp. 54–56, 74–75, 84. It would, however, be premature to as- other beings. They share with daimons sume that Empedocles did not believe in their longevity and are probably identi- the transmigration of a human soul, which would then have to be something other cal with them.17 It is also likely that this than a transmigrating daimon. Firstly, even the daimon appears in connection 14 Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 39.17-20, quot- with transmigration in extant fragments ing Parmenides’ fragment DK 28 B 13, only once (elsewhere, we find refer- cf. Burkert 1972, p. 284, and Bremmer ences to either Empedocles himself or to 2002, p. 13. a ‘knowing man’), and secondly, it was the theory of transmigration that motivated Empedocles, DK 31 B 115.5, trans. Wright. 15 Empedocles’ rejection of the killing of 16 Empedocles, DK 31 B 117, 129. living beings, during which a body is ‘be- 17 Empedocles, DK 31 B 21.12, 23.8, trans. reft’ of its ψυχή or θυμός. The most likely Wright. It seems that Empedocles uses conclusion thus seems to be that daimon the words δαίμων and θεός more or is just another name for a transmigrating less synonymously. In B 59.1, the former soul, which is understood primarily as term probably denotes the elements, a life force, consciousness, and the seat cf. Wright 1995, ad loc., p. 212, which are of personal identity. Such a conclusion is in B 6 identified with individual Olympic in accordance with ancient authors who

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meanwhile, is used – as was common at could perhaps imagine them as a sort of the time – in the sense of a fated determi- invisible wisps of air mixed with a fiery nation of a reincarnating being which, substance, such as aither or another fine as Empedocles claims, defiled itself by matter.21 After all, Empedocles posits killing living creatures.19 If, however, a close connection between physicality the transmigrating daimons are indeed and thought,22 though thinking does not creatures composed of the four elements, seem to be closely linked to the transmi- this interpretation results in a somewhat grating daimon or, as we are inclined to odd conclusion, namely that the daimons believe, the soul. are, just like everything else, roughly Knowledge of the foundations of speaking corporeal or ‘material’ in the the world is, in Empedocles’ view, abso- sense of being part of the world we live lutely crucial because it is the only way in and perceive with our senses.20 One of avoiding the stain left on humans by spilling the blood of living beings.23 Yet treated Empedocles’ daimons as souls, it seems that the abilities enabling such cf. Trépanier 2017, pp. 135–136. knowledge are not located primarily in 19 Cf. especially Heraclitus’ fragment DK 22 B 119, trans. Kahn, modified: ‘man’s charac- the soul. One could thus claim that a dai- ter is his fate (δαίμων)’; and Democritus’ mon determines primarily the human fragment DK 68 B 171, trans. Graham: ‘happiness (εὐδαιμονίη) does not reside fate and is not directly connected to the in herds or in gold; soul (ψυχή) is the depth of understanding. One might also dwelling-place of the guardian spirit claim that the transmigrating part of (δαίμονος)’; cf. Laks 1999, p. 252, Timotin 2012, pp. 21–24, 32–33, and Sfameni Gasparro 2015, p. 414. notably by O’Brien 1969, pp. 325–336, and Kahn 1969a, pp. 19–27; cf. also Curd 2013, 20 See also Plutarch, De def. orac. 418e ff., pp. 135–136. This hypothesis, however, is who claimed that Empedocles’ daimons are mortal, cf. Trépanier 2014, esp. p. 175, not based on any ancient sources at our with n. 7, 2017, pp. 135–139, and Curd 2013, disposal. pp. 135–136. (The conclusion that daimons 21 Trépanier 2017, pp. 143–144, based on are composed out of the four elements was a testimony of Theodoret, Graec. aff. cur. reached, independently of Trépanier, in V,18.9–10 = Empedocles, DK 31 A 85/4 Vítek: the Czech version of this article, cf. Hladký ὁ δὲ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς μῖγμα ἐξ αἰθερώδους 2010, pp. 22–23.) I do, however, disagree καὶ ἀερώδους οὐσίας, jointly with unfor- with Trépanier’s interpretation of daimons tunately poorly preserved verse DK 31 B as part of the body, see Trépanier 2017, 9.1, suggests that Empedocles thought of pp. 139–143. On the materiality of the dai- the transmigrating soul as a mixture of mons, see also Barnes 1982, pp. 495–501, aither (celestial fire) and air. Wright 1995, pp. 57–76, 271–272, Inwood 22 See especially Empedocles’ fragments 2001, pp. 55–68, Curd 2005, pp. 142–143, DK 31 B 17.14, 103, 105, 106. The term and McKirahan 2010, pp. 284–290, cf. also πράπιδες seems to refer to the ability to Gregory 2013, pp. 179–180, 183. For an acquire divine knowledge of the world, overview of an alternative interpretation, B 110 and 132, and, rather interestingly, according to which daimons are portions the ability to recall past reincarnations, of Love (or sometimes conceived of as B 129, cf. Long 1948, pp. 20–21 (but see parts of the φρὴν ἱερή from Empedocles’ fragment DK 31 B 134), see Karfík 2014, par. recently Macris, Skarsouli 2012). 25–30, and Therme 2014, par. 13–17. This 23 Empedocles, DK 31 B 2–4, 8, 9.3–5, 11–12, suggestion was first advanced by Cornford 15, 17.14, 23.9–11, 39, 112–114, 129, 136–147, 1912, pp. 224–242, then followed most cf. Curd (2005), pp. 150–154.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 27 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato a person must be closely linked to the atively certain that – in connection with principle of Love, which is responsible the ‘Pythagorean life’ based on a strict ob- for unity and harmony in the combina- servance of various religious and moral tion of the four elements.24 These are, rules – he and his followers believed however, the ultimate constituents of in transmigration.27 Somewhat better everything in the world, including the attested is the philosophy of his one hun- human soul or the daimon. We shall also dred years younger follower Philolaus see that a version of the idea of the soul (app. 470–385 BCE), who was inspired as a harmony of elements found its way by Pythagoras’ thought either directly into the thinking of the Pythagoreans. or through his disciples. According to Moreover, the fate of the soul seems to Philolaus, the soul (ψυχά) is a life force be determined by whether its behav- that does not have an especially close iour is motivated by Lover or Strife.25 These are the principles responsible author convincingly challenges later ancient reports on original Pythagoreanism, for the creation and destruction of the i.e., reports written under a strong influ- world but they are also present in liv- ence of Academic, Neopythagorean, and Neoplatonic reinterpretation of the leg- ing beings as the basic emotions which endary sage Pythagoras and his follow- determine their actions. In any case, ers. Burkert distinguishes between the however, one can conclude that if the traditional depiction of Pythagoras’ ‘shamanic lore’ and his mathematical ‘sci- daimon indeed consists of the elements ence’, accepting only the former as his- and its fate is connected to the cosmic torically possible. This, however, seems to leave some room principle of Love, then the two aspects for Pythagoras in some way engaging in of Empedocles’ legacy, i.e., religion and investigations of a mathematical kind. natural science, are not in conflict. Pythagoras (or, which is less likely, his immediate followers) could thus ascribe to some numbers a particular meaning III. Philolaus and the (tetractys, cf. Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 82 = DK 58 C 4,82), emphasise the importance Pythagoreans of mathematical harmony in the world Unfortunately, of the actual philosoph- or create a theory of a breathing uni- ical views of Pythagoras (app. 570–490 verse. The Pythagorean notion of harmony that unites contrary principles in BCE), a thinker who fascinated his con- the world may have inspired Heraclitus’ temporaries no less than his followers, fragment DK 22 B 8, 10, 51, 54, cf. also B 40, 129, see Kahn 2001, pp. 1–4, 14–17, 26 very little is known. It is, however, rel- 34–38. Huffman 2014b is rather critical of Kahn’s conclusions but even he admits 24 Empedocles, DK 31 B 23.4, 27.3, 96.4, that Pythagoras probably believed the cf. Kahn 1969a, pp. 21–25. world to be structured according to numbers. On Pythagoras and Pythagorean 25 Empedocles, DK 31 109.3, 115.14, cf. Wright tradition, see further Huffman 2014a and 1995, pp. 107, 271–272. Empedocles also Zhmud 2012. speaks about the θυμός, usually con- 27 Cf. Huffman 1999, pp. 68–70, and Huffman ceived as the seat of emotions, in the 2009, 2014b. Pythagoras’ teaching about context of ritual killing, cf. n. 18 above. the transmigration of the soul (ψυχή) is 26 The main work defining current research parodied already by Xenophanes in DK into early Pythagoreans (e.g., those before 21 B 7, see also Herodotus, Hist. IV,95–96, Plato) is still Burkert 1972, where the Aristotle, De an. I,3 407b20–23 = 58 B 39.

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connection to the mind (νόος). The soul scholars, it is difficult to reconcile is associated with sensation (αἴσθησις) this idea with localisation of the soul because the principle of both is situated in a particular part of human body or in the heart (καρδία).28 This means that with the concept of soul as a harmony.33 the soul is primarily a centre of feelings and emotions and as such, humans share philological arguments revises some old- 29 er views of earlier scholars who argued it with other animals. against this fragment’s authenticity: ‘The According to Philolaus, the cosmos greatest barrier to accepting the frag- and everything in it is harmoniously ment as authentic is the way in which the word ψυχά (soul) is used, for here it fashioned (ἁρμόχθη) from limiters clearly is, as in Plato, a comprehensive (περαίνοντα) and unlimiteds (ἄπειρα).30 term embracing all the psychological faculties. We might suppose that Philolaus The soul, therefore, like everything else, had anticipated this usage except that in must be a kind of harmony of these F 13 it is used in a much narrower sense as opposites, one placed probably in some one among many psychological faculties, and meaning something like “life”.’ sort of fine matter.31 As in other think- 33 See Philolaus, DK 44 A 23 for the soul ers belonging to Pythagorean tradition, conceived as harmony. As Huffman 1993, we find some testimonies to the effect pp. 329–330, significantly claims: ‘Thus if we focus on the most reliable evidence that for Philolaus, the soul is subject to we have for Philolaus’ view on soul, F 13 transmigration.32 According to some and Aristotle’s report about Pythagorean views on soul, it appears very likely that Philolaus thought of the soul in largely 28 See Philolaus, DK 44 B 13, which describes material terms as a group of constantly the location of various physical and men- moving elements in attunement located tal abilities in humans. Both the princi- in the heart. … But if Philolaus did put ple (ἀρχή) of the soul (ψυχά) and sensa- forth such a materialistic account of soul tion (αἴσθησις) are linked to the heart (ψυχή), how are we to reconcile this with (καρδία). Unlike, for example, the mind a Pythagorean belief in immortality of (νόος), whose principle is located in the soul as is presupposed in the doctrine head and ascribed only to humans, the of transmigration. … Some have thought soul is said to be present in all animals that Philolaus in fact might not have be- (ζῶον). lieved in immortality… This seems to me 29 Cf. Huffman 2009, pp. 22–26. a real possibility.’ The notion of soul as either physically present in the body or 30 Philolaus, DK 44 B 1, cf. B 2, A 9. On the harmony as an organising principle of the as harmony does not, however, seem to world, see B 6. Philolaus’ world seems to necessarily preclude the possibility that be mathematical in nature, and therefore soul refers to that part of the self that also knowable as such, B 3, 4. undergoes successive reincarnations, which implies also an eschatological 31 Cf. Aristotle, De an. I,4 407b27–32 = function. Huffman further develops and Philolaus, DK 44 A 23, see Huffman 1993, refines his interpretation in Huffman ad loc., pp. 328–330, 2009, pp. 29–34, and 2009, taking into account some conclu- further Aristotle, Pol. VIII,5 1340b18–19 = sions by Sedley 1995, pp. 22–26. (I did not 58 B 41. have Huffman’s important contribution 32 Of key importance here is Philolaus’ at my disposal when preparing the orig- fragment DK 44 B 14, cf. Plato, Gorg. 493a inal Czech version of this article, which and Crat. 400c, according to which ‘… on shares some conclusions with Huffman, account of certain penalties the soul cf. Hladký 2010, pp. 25–26.) For a rather (ψυχά) is yoked to the body and is bur- sceptical approach to the issue of trans- ied in it as in a tomb (ἐν σάματι)’. Huffman migration in early Pythagoreans, see 1999, ad loc., pp. 403–406, on the basis of Zhmud 2012, pp. 387–394, who, however,

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If, however, we accept that Philolaus be seen in a sunbeam.37 They are thus indeed advocated a theory of transmi- linked to light, namely as once again gration, it would follow that in his view, a kind of subtle fire carried by air. A lit- too, the soul which undergoes reincar- tle further, Aristotle argues against the nations is corporeal or ‘material’ in the conception of transmigrating soul as same sense as in Empedocles, i.e., that a harmony of (bodily) elements, a view it is part of the sensible cosmos.34 For he ascribes to both the Pythagoreans Philolaus, as for some of his contem- and Empedocles.38 Moreover, accord- poraries, it seems connected with air, ing to Aristotle’s generally accepted as- in particular with the first gulp of air sertion, Pythagoreans did not believe a newborn child breathes in.35 On the that numbers39 exist ‘outside sensible other hand, according to indications objects’: they identified them with ma- which appear in connection with the terial things. But the same should then Pythagoreans, its proper nature should analogically hold of souls since they, be aethereal or fiery.36 too, like everything else, seem to be That would fit rather well with corporeal. Aristotle also claims else- Aristotle’s testimonies in his On the where that the first thinker to posit the Soul. He claims that according to the Pythagoreans, souls are tiny particles 37 Aristotle, De an. I,2 403b28–404a20 = DK 58 Β 40, trans. Smith: ‘…the motes of matter moving in the air such as can (ξύσματα) in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through window… distinguishes too strictly between the The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems natural and religious ideas of the ear- to rest upon the same ideas; some of ly Pythagoreans, cf. also Gregory 2013, them declared the motes (ξύσματα) in pp. 131–133, 139–141. air, others what moved them, to be soul. These motes were referred to because 34 Huffman 1993, pp. 328–332, 2009, Sedley 1995, pp. 22–26. they are seen always in movement, even in a complete calm.’ See also Aristotle, 35 Philolaus, DK 44 A 27 = Anon. Lond. 18.8–29 Probl. 15 913a5ff. In the first passage, Ricciardetto, cf. Sedley 1995, pp. 24–25; this opinion of the Pythagoreans is on similar views among Presocratics, subsumed under the notion of the cf. Emmel 1918, pp. 5–10, Waszink 1954, soul proposed by Democritus (and pp. 176–178. Leucippus, DK 67 A 28/1), according to 36 See the so-called Pythagorean Notes which it is a kind of fire and warm and, (Hypomnemata), which due to their moreover, is composed of material par- eclectic nature may well contain ticles. Cf. Huffman 2004, pp. 328–329, some genuinely Presocratic ideas, 2009, pp. 22–23, Edmonds 2014, par. 38. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae VIII,26–30 = Aristotle refers to this theory when DK 58 B 1a,26–30, cf. Kahn 2001, pp. 74–75, criticising the view that soul is (self-) 79–83, Long 2013, pp. 150–154, but see motion, an idea which was among the also Laks 2013 for a contemporary dis- Pythagoreans upheld by Alcmaeon, who cussion. Hippasus of Metapontum, compared it to the motion of heavens. DK 18 A 9, also claims that soul is fiery Aristotle, De an. I,2 405a29–405b1 = ( ), but one ought to note that πυρώδη Alcmaeon, DK 24 A 12/1, cf. Hufmann he considered fire to be the main cos- 2017. mic principle, which is why he has been compared to Heraclitus, DK 18 A 7, 8, 38 Aristotle, De an. I,3–4 407b13–408a34. cf. Zhmud 2012, p. 387, 2014, pp. 94–95, 39 On the issue of numbers in Pythagoras, and Palmer 2014, p. 212. see n. 26 above.

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existence of incorporeal principles out- interlocutors in this dialogue are side the sensible world was Plato.40 Such Simmias and Cebes who used to ‘keep an introduction of another metaphysical company with Philolaus’,42 and even the level of reality must have, however, to notion which is being refuted here is very at least some extent involved the con- Philolaus-like: the soul is an invisible and cept of the soul. He is therefore the next immaterial harmony (ἁρμονία ἀόρατος thinker we ought to consider. καὶ ἀσώματος) between the elements which make up the body.43 Socrates, IV. Plato however, objects to the notion that at the Naturally, we cannot discuss in detail all moment of death, the soul must perish to- dialogues where Plato develops his notion gether with the body.44 This idea is linked of the soul and its fate after death, includ- to another objection raised against the ing transmigration. We offer therefore teaching about transmigration. It is noted only a brief overview of those passages that one cannot exclude a possibility that where he deals with the philosophical after a certain number of reincarnations conceptions of transmigrating soul pro- a soul could in the end perish. The body is posed by his predecessors. These texts can seen as a sort of a cloak (ἱμάτιον), which form a basis for a comparison, thus ena- a soul in the course of an incarnation bling us to point out where and in what creates always anew and which changes respects Plato transforms previous tra- in its other lives.45 A similar notion of dition and how these changes affect the a body being a sort of a cloak or clothing general metaphysical and cosmological background of his own philosophy into 42 Plato, Phd. 61d–e. According to a tradition, Echecrates, the man who listened which he situates his concept of the soul. to Phaedo’s description of the end of In his Phaedo, Plato (427–347 Socrates’ life, was also a student of Philolaus, cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae BCE) deals with the abovementioned VIII,46.4 = DK 14 A 10/2, and Iamblichus, Presocratics or at least some of the Vita Pyth. 251.4, 267.24 = DK 14 A 16,251.4, conceptions they proposed.41 His main DK 58 A 1. It seems, however, that Plato endorses Philolaus’ theories especially in Philebus 23c–27c, cf. Huffman 1993, 40 Aristotle, Met. I,6 987b27ff, XII,6 1080b16ff, pp. 106–107. the entire chapter I,6 of the Metaphysics 43 Cf. Huffman 1993, pp. 324–325, 330–331. deals with the origins of Plato’s theory of 44 Plato, Phd. 85e–86d. The hypothesis that the Forms as principles independent of this theory may have originated with sensible objects, see also I,8 989b29ff, Philolaus is supported by the enthusias- cf. Huffman 1993, p. 413, Palmer 2014, tic endorsement it receives from his stu- p. 216, pace Zhmud 2012, pp. 412, 439, dent Echecrates, 88d, trans. Grube: ‘...the 2014, p. 108. For more on the relevance statement that the soul is some kind of and originality of Aristotle’s presenta- harmony has a remarkable hold on me, tion of Pythagorean theories as opposed now and always, and when it was men- to later interpretations coming from the tioned it reminded me that I had myself Academy, see Burkert 1972 and Huffman previously thought so.’ Cf. Sedley 1995, 1993, cf. also Casertano 2013. pp. 10–13, 22–26. 41 For a detailed interpretation of the 45 Plato, Phd. 86e–88b. On both objections, Phaedo, see most notably Dorter 1982, see Dorter 1982, pp. 98–114, and Dixsaut Bostock 1986, and Dixsaut 1991. 1991, pp. 118–121.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 31 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato into which a person is born is also found Socrates presents his own theory of the in Empedocles.46 All of this would very Forms, which helps him prove that the well correspond to the situation we found soul brings life into the body and therein the theories of both of the previous fore cannot perish.49 For our purposes, thinkers, according to whom the soul is what is important is not the fact that ultimately corporeal or perhaps rather the validity of Socrates’ argument has composed of physical elements. In Plato’s often been challenged, but that in this Phaedo, Socrates thus claims quite signif- context, soul is once again understood icantly that we should not be afraid like mainly as a principle of life.50 On the children that when soul leaves the body, other hand, Socrates also stresses that wind will blow it apart and disperse it. soul should be seen as distinct from the Here he probably hints at an earlier idea body. Rather than being like a body, it which Aristotle attributes to the ‘so-called is the Forms to which it is ‘more akin Orphic poems’. According to his testi- and alike’, whereby the Forms are to be mony, the soul enters the body after being understood as immaterial principles of carried to it from the external world by things existing in the sensible world. the winds (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων).47 They are simple, knowable by reason, Plato’s Socrates relatively easily and indestructible, which is also why refutes the first objection, namely that the soul survives even after the body’s soul is a harmony with an immediate death. Under the influence of passions, link to the body.48 During his refutation, the soul can sometimes indeed become ‘like a body’ (σωματοείδης), which then 46 Cf. Empedocles, DK 31 B 126, trans. Wright: influences its fate after death.51 It thus ‘[Necessity] clothing [the (?)] in daimon seems that even according to Plato, the an unfamiliar garment (χιτῶνι) of flesh.’ On Empedocles as the source of this soul is not incorporeal sensu stricto. Met- image of a cloak in Phaedo, see Dixsaut aphorically speaking, one can claim that 1991, p. 359, n. 203. It seems, moreover, that Empedocles was the first author in the soul stretches between the corpo- Greece to use this metaphor of body as real world of the senses and incorpo- a clothing of the soul, cf. Treu 1954, p. 39, real Forms, whereby its relation to the Vítek 2006, vol. III, p. 550, and Edmonds 52 2014, par. 34–35. In a similar vein, Aristotle Forms is the basis of its true essence. By claims that according to the ‘so-called poems by Orpheus’, formation of the 49 Plato, Phd. 95a–107b, cf. Dorter 1982, body of a living being is similar to ‘the pp. 115–161, Bostock 1986, pp. 135–201, weaving of a net’ (τῇ τοῦ δικτύου πλοκῇ), Thein 2008, pp. 103–236. II,1 734a16–20 = 404 F De gener. animal. OF 50 Cf. also Plato, Phaedr. 245c–246a, where Bernabé = fr. 26 Kern. the soul is said to be in constant move- 47 Plato, Phd. 77d–e, Aristotle, De an. I,5 ment (ἀεικίνητος) and thus immortal 410b27–30 = OF 421/I F Bernabé = fr. 27 because it moves on its own (αὐτοκίνητος) Kern, cf. Edmonds 2014, par. 43. See also and is not moved by anything external, Pythagorean Notes (Hypomnemata) pre- cf. Karfík 2004, pp. 221–226. served by Diogenes Laertius, Vitae VIII,30 = 51 Plato, Phd. 63e–69e, 77e–84b, trans. Grube, DK 58 B 1a,30: ‘the reasons of soul are cf. Karfík 2004, esp. 79–84, Betegh 2018. winds’ (τοὺς δὲ λόγους ψυχῆς ἀνέμους). 52 This seems to be true even about the 48 Plato, Phd. 90c–95a. wicked soul that is fully absorbed by the

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postulating the existence of immaterial the Timaeus, where Plato also deals with and incorporeal Forms, Plato thus sub- some earlier Presocratic concepts. In stantially transforms the way the soul some passages in this dialogue, he seems should be conceived of and, at least in to react to Empedocles and his ideas.55 certain respect, brings it closer to being The situation is somewhat similar to an immaterial entity. Moreover, in the the Phaedo, where it is likewise implied Phaedo as well as in his other dialogues, that the soul, which is connected with Plato’s conception of transmigration is the body, is the source of its movement quite significantly linked to his famous and is neither fully corporeal nor fully doctrine of anamnesis or recollection. incorporeal.56 Of particular impor- It enables us to ‘remember’ mathemati- tance, however, is a distinction Plato cal and other rational truths which the makes at the beginning of the dialogue soul had learned when it was freed from (a parallel of which is also found in the a body. Transmigration thus plays a role Phaedo) between the sensible world, in acquisition of rational knowledge of known by perception and subject to immaterial principles.53 constant becoming and ceasing to be, Leaving aside now some further and the Forms, which the soul grasps developments of Plato’s concept of soul with the mind (νοῦς) and which are here,54 we should turn our attention to the only entities that truly exist.57 The rational part of us is said to be immortal material body. On the other hand, due to and transmigrating core of the human its position in-between two levels of reality, even the most virtuous soul cannot be soul. It is located in the head and like in detached from the matter completely. Empedocles, it is called daimon.58 As in 53 Phd. 72e, Phaedr. 249b–c, Meno 80d ff, cf. Burkert 1995, p. 118, see also Sedley the same time, soul is still seen as a uni- 1995, p. 13. tary entity, see e.g. Karfík 2005. Cf. also 54 The key passage where Plato presents his Lorenz 2009, par. 3,2. account of soul is naturally the , Republic 55 Cf. Hladký 2015, pp. 75–82. It is also worth IV 435e–442d, but its treatment falls noting that tradition links this dialogue beyond the scope of this article. Suffice with the Pythagorean Timaeus of Locri, it to say that in the , the picture Republic while Diogenes Laertius, Vitae VIII,85 = outlined above is elaborated further. The Philolaus, DK 44 A 1,85, even relates an embodied soul is divided in three parts, anecdote according to which Plato, in whereby the rational one is immortal and writing the dialogue, used Philolaus’ undergoes reincarnation, while the other book which he bought for a large sum of two, namely spirited and appetitive, are money. mortal. This picture need not, however, Plato, 34a–36e, 41b–43a, 69c–72d. substantially contradict our main expo- 56 Tim. sition; see Republic X 608c–612a, where 57 Plato, Tim. 27d–28a, 30b–c. soul is said to be simple. This claim is 58 Reason was given to us literally ‘as followed by the famous myth about Er, a daimon’, while the soul is assigned or where Plato gives an elaborate account chooses its fated daimon also in Plato’s of transmigration. This seems to indicate other dialogues (Phd. 107d6, 108b3, 113d2, that for Plato, the difference between Resp. 617e1, 620d8) but nowhere is it the soul and body is a complex issue. identified with thedaimon in this way. It Soul’s mortality or immortality depends may thus be an instance of Empedoclean on which parts we refer to and on their influence, much like the notion of ne- particular relation to the body, but at cessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) in the description

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 33 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato the abovementioned Presocratic think- exposition on the transformation of ers, it is also related to the fiery element the notion of the soul between the located in heaven.59 Analogically to the Presocratics and Plato. Phaedo, however, its fate during trans- 1. According to available evidence, migration depends on whether during Plato indeed seems to be the first thinker our lives we pay more attention to the who alongside the sensible world pos- sensible world or to the exercise in phi- tulated something independent of it, losophy, in particular to observations to wit the incorporeal Forms, know- of the regular revolutions of the heav- able by reason.61 Another author who enly bodies. The ultimate principles of could be considered in a search for the these movements, however, are known origins of distinction between the cor- through reason and, being an expres- poreal and incorporeal is Parmenides. sion of the motion of the world-soul, Indeed, in Parmenides’ work, too, the they seem to be also dependent on the immutable reality knowable by reason is immaterial Forms.60 In this particular opposed to the changeable and deceptive point, the difference from Empedocles, world of the senses. It seems, however, who links the fate of the daimon mainly that in his work, the immutable world to its previous defilement by killing, is is rather just the foundation of all of evident. the apparent, merely illusory change. Although these two realms are perceived V. Problems of Monism and known in different ways, they are and Dualism, Immanence and in fact identical.62 This seems to have Transcendence been noted by Parmenides’ immediate We are now in a position to draw some followers, who, too, interpreted this broader conclusions from the previous 61 Cf. Renehan 1980, pp. 127–132. of transmigration in Tim. 42a3–4, which 62 It is, for example, quite characteris- likewise seems to echo Empedocles, DK tic that Parmenides’ fragment DK 28 31 B 115.1; cf. Wright 1995, p. 272, Trépanier B 7/8, starting with verse 42, smooth- 2017, p. 177, n. 87. After all, even the de- ly passes from ontology to cosmology, scription of the cycle of transmigrations whereby the cosmos, taken as a whole, which follows in Tim. 90e–92c should seems to become a sort of link between be seen as a playful presentation of his Parmenides’ two worlds. And similar- theory rather than as a thoroughly seri- ly, Simplicius preserves Eudemus’ re- ous presentation. What Empedocles and marks to the effect that Parmenides’ Timaeus have in common is, for example, Being was interpreted cosmological- the fact that the stages or places souls ly as the world, cf. Simplicius, In Phys. pass through during their transmigra- 133.21–29, 142.28–143.8 = Eudemus, tion are linked to the four elements, cf. fr. 44–45 Wehrli = Parmenides, test. 37, Hladký 2015, pp. 79–82. For an overview 38 Coxon. On Eudemus’ interpretation of of Plato’s conception of the daimon, see Parmenides, further see also Simplicius, Timotin 2012, ch. 3; on the interpretation In Phys. 115.11–116.5 = Eudemus, fr. 43 of the function of the soul in the Timaeus Wehrli = Parmenides, test. 36 Coxon. in general, see Karfík 2004, pp. 149–220, (I would like to thank the late Tomáš 2005, Betegh 2018. Drvota for bringing this testimony to 59 Cf. Karfík 2004, p. 102. my attention.) For an overview of the 60 Plato, Tim. 90a–d. discussion, see Kraus 2013, pp. 467–469.

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author in a materialist way.63 Similarly, but they are still of the same nature. a transcendent world distinct from our Finally, another candidate for an incor- cosmos is quite clearly absent from the poreal entity in early Greek thought is conceptual framework of the atomists.64 Heraclitus’ Logos, according to which Moreover, Anaxagoras’ Mind (νοῦς) everything happens, the ultimate back- should not be understood as something ground of all cosmic changes.67 How- incorporeal and utterly distinct in its ever, although all things are formed nature from all other things – just dif- by it, the Logos itself exists within the ferent from them.65 Similarly, within world and is inseparably entangled with a broader context of the issue of in- it. It is therefore difficult to maintain corporeality in Presocratic thought, that it is a non-physical principle. Empedocles’ Love and Strife are like- We would like to claim that Plato’s wise clearly ‘part of the natural world’.66 postulation of the incorporeal entities, Anaxagoras’ Mind or Empedocles’ Love most notably the transcendental Forms, and Strife and their activities are thus ultimately led to a profound change in inseparable from the things in which the theory of transmigration received they take place and upon which they from previous thinkers. While in Plato’s act as forces. They shape the world from philosophy the soul does not lose its within and create more complex struc- connection with the human body and tures out of and within the elementary the world, so that even its immortal part components. As such, they are indeed is located in the head, if its immortality different from other physical things, is to be guaranteed, it must, as we have seen, also maintain its relation to the 63 Sedley 1999, pp. 113–125, cf. also Long eternal Forms. According to Empedocles 1996. and the Pythagoreans, on the other See n. 77. 64 hand, the soul is ultimately grounded in 65 In Anaxagoras’ fragment DK 59 B 12, trans. Curd, the Mind is said to be ‘the fin- corporeality, in physical existence. And est of all objects and the purest’. There though Philolaus may have understood thus seems to be no sharp distinction harmony, which was in his view the very between it and other things (see also Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras in the foundation of the soul, as something Phaedo 97b–98b, where Socrates in the incorporeal, the problem is – as seen end realises that the νοῦς, unlike the Forms, cannot function as a sufficient from the Platonic perspective – that his cause explaining the nature of the world). was a harmony of elements placed in Curd 2005, pp. 142–143, 2007, pp. 192–205, the changeable sensible world, i.e., its on the other hand, argues for Anaxagoras’ Mind being non-material, but see a dis- existence was grounded in the elements cussion in Rechenauer 2013, pp. 774–775, and subject to destruction. This is also and Inwood 2001, p. 51–52. the gist of Plato’s main objection in the 66 Curd 2013, p. 136. It seems, however, difficult to admit that Life and Strife are at Phaedo. the same time ‘physical but not material, not stuffs’, as Curd claims, commenting critically upon Renehan 1980. Cf. also 67 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 1, cf. Curd 2013, Wright 1995, pp. 32–34. pp. 114, 124.

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2. One could object to the reconstruc- If we were to ask Empedocles or tion of Empedocles’ and Pythagorean Philolaus about the nature of the trans- teaching presented here – according migrating soul and its composition, to which a soul is a transmigrating but they would quite possibly reply that at the same time necessarily corporeal it had originated from the same prin- entity – by pointing out that nothing like ciples as the rest of the world. These that is stated anywhere expressis verbis. are probably joined in the soul so as The core of problem is that we see the to form a kind of harmony which is whole issue from a different perspective not itself material but still ultimately than the Presocratics. Though perhaps grounded in and dependent on the unconsciously, we tend to identify the physical elements it holds together. soul with something incorporeal. Yet Perhaps the stuff the soul is composed where there is no difference between of it is just ‘finer’, ‘purer’, or ‘more du- the natural, sensible world and another rable’ than anything else, being most world, the Forms, it makes no sense to probably composed mostly of subtle distinguish between the corporeal and air and/or fire-aither.70 This also fits the incorporeal. Moreover, it seems that well with some eschatological concepts the worldview of some Presocratics, documented from fifth century Ath- such as Thales, Heraclitus, or even ens, according to which souls after Empedocles, and perhaps also the early death travel up to reach the aither, an Pythagoreans, was close to panpsychism, that is, the belief there is soul in 2010, and Gregory 2013; cf. Hladký everything.68 Similarly, the elements of (forthcoming). which it is composed seem to have been 70 Betegh 2006 distinguishes between a ‘journey model’ and a ‘portion model’ conceived by at least some Presocratics of the soul in early Presocratics. He also of not as inert stuff or dead matter, but shows, however, that in some cases this as alive, and sometimes even as active distinction cannot be applied strictly, 69 and this holds especially of some early and rational principles. Greek philosophers who had distinctive- ly eschatological ideas about the nature 68 See Thales, DK 11 A 22, cf. Gregory of the soul that survives the death of the 2013, pp. 65–67; Heraclitus, DK 22 B 113, body. One may also note that Heraclitus cf. B 45, cf. Kahn 1979, pp. 119, 128–129, is another author who claimed that in the 221; Empedocles, DK B 31 17.14, 103, case of the ‘best’, most exceptional indi- 110.10, cf. Trépanier 2004, pp. 31–33; the viduals, the fiery soul survives the death Pythagorean Notes (Hypomnemata) of the body, at least for some period of preserved by Diogenes Laertius, Vitae time, as argued most notably by Kahn VIII,27–28, 31–32 = DK 58 B 1a,27–28, 31–32, 1979, pp. 245–261, 327, n. 286; cf. also cf. Kahn 2001, pp. 81–82, Long 2013, Burkert 1972, pp. 362–363, with nn. 64, 66, pp. 157–158. For a history and contem- Mihai 2010, pp. 558, 565, 577, 2015, pp. 48, porary discussions of panpsychism, see 63, 154. This conception, however, re- Goff, Seager, and Allen-Hermanson 2017. sembles not a theory of transmigration 69 For Parmenides, see Long 1996, for but rather the later Stoic idea of sur- Empedocles, see Curd 2016 and Rowett vival of the ‘leading’ part of the soul, the 2016; a more general overview is giv- hēgemonikon, SVF I,522, II,811, cf. Hladký en by Lloyd 1966, pp. 232–272, Trépanier (forthcoming).

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element which is akin to it.71 Instead is why it is so difficult to find adequate of Platonic transcendence or de facto terms for a fitting description of the sit- dualism of two spheres of reality, what uation portrayed by the Presocratics. we find here is immanence or monism As noted above, distinctions such as of one world.72 Nonetheless, these no- ideal/material,73 transcendent/imma- tions are somewhat misleading since nent, or dualism/monism necessarily both pairs of concepts are mutually fail (though the last pair seems to be intertwined and can be defined only the most adequate) because the world to in relation to each other. And in the which the Presocratic soul belonged was world where Plato’s predecessors speak fully united and conceptual divisions of the soul, such distinctions make lit- of this kind cannot be properly applied tle sense. Everything was contained to it. It was a world where there was no in one cosmos and there was nothing transcendent principle to which a soul, beyond or ‘outside’ its borders (if, in- like in Plato, could relate, a principle deed, it had any). that would guarantee its existence. We When trying to define the ontolog- therefore believe that if we are to arrive ical status of a transmigrating soul in at a satisfactory understanding of the Presocratic thought, we (and other inter- Presocratic position as distinct from preters) have to come to terms with the, the Platonic one, we should admit that at a first glance, somewhat surprising these distinctions are inadequate. It is, fact that the Presocratics viewed soul as something corporeal and situated in 73 Cf. Long 1966, pp. 256–267, and Karfík 2004, the natural world just like everything par. 39, who distinguish two different interpretative approaches of scholars to else, although it undergoes regular Empedocles, a ‘mystic’ and a ‘materialist’ transmigrations. This is a point where, one. To list just a few authoritative state- consciously or not, we are profoundly ments by other scholars, Trépanier 2017, p. 135, claims that ‘most Presocratics influenced by the Platonic legacy. This are best described as default mate- rialists’. O’Brien 2006, pp. 56–57, with 71 Euripides, Hel. 1013–1016, Orest. 1086–1087, n. 19, speaks about ‘unconscious mate- Sup. 531–536, 1139–1141, fr. 839.8–14, rialism’ in connection with Empedocles, 908b.3–4, 971, 1013 Nauck, Aristophanes, and elsewhere, O’Brien 2005, p. 338, Pax 832ff., and some tomb inscriptions, maintains that the ‘Presocratic philos- CEG 10 = IG I3 1179, CEG 535, SEG XXXVIII,440, ophers have not awaken from Plato’s cf. Burkert 1972, pp. 357–363, Renehan dream [i.e. Tim. 51e6–52d1], if we are to 1980, p. 112, Egli 2003, pp. 94–114, and judge from Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Mihai 2010, 2015, pp. 106–113, with further Empedocles, none of whom appears to references. have any conception of reality that is not 72 ‘Immanence’, as employed in this con- extended in space.’ Kahn 2001, p. 82, ob- text, is very close to the somewhat serves about the doctrines contained in fashionable term frequently used in the the Pythagorean Notes (Hypomnemata): tradition of French Spinozism, while the ‘In this respect, the psychology of the term ‘monism’ has here a sense similar to Notebooks belongs to a tradition of what that used by Ernst Haeckel, an eminent we may call mystical materialism – a tra- German biologist, religious reformer, and dition that begins with the Presocratics founder of the Deutscher Monistenbund. and continues throughout antiquity.’

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 37 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato after all, well known that a similar situ- place.76 And while knowledge of intelli- ation where analogous distinctions are gible principles is thus still linked to the ill-fitting can be encountered in the case soul’s highest, rational part, knowledge of other than Presocratic thinkers. of the sensible world is mediated by the 3. While the main function of the body.77 While in archaic Greek thought, soul as a principle of life and by exten- the mind (νόος) is the thinking capacity sion also a vehicle of a personal as well that enables us to see deeper into the as moral identity remains unchanged, nature of our world,78 in Plato, attention Plato’s postulation of an independent turns to a completely different order of realm of the incorporeal Forms requires reality. We have just noted that the soul a transformation of a soul so that it can as a principle of life becomes rational relate to it. In Empedocles’ writings, through its relation to the Forms, eter- soul’s fate in the course of incarnations nal and transcendent intelligible prin- evolves mainly from contaminations due ciples. The soul thus attains a degree of to previous wrongdoings caused by its independence from the physical world. attachment to Strife, and any require- It finds itself, metaphorically speaking, ment of understanding the nature of outside it, somewhere in-between the the world is linked to eschatology only physical world of the senses and the loosely. For Philolaus, it seems that it is intelligible Forms. In virtue of its not the soul that is associated with sensation quite physical existence, it can thus at- and emotions and its principle is situ- tain knowledge of the Forms which are ated in the heart that is being reincar- found beyond the sensible world. nated.74 The emotional part of our self, which is identified with the soul and its 76 Cf. Burkert 1995, p. 118, and Obeyesekere fate after death, also naturally leads to 2002, pp. 249, 255, 276–277, 283–287. This important shift brought about by Platos’ a requirement of compassion with ani- new conception of the soul naturally mals and other living beings. Souls enter has some immediate consequences. As them during the cycle of transmigration Huffman, p. 41, claims: ‘It seems awkward and barbarous to suppose that the full and they are composed of the same ele- range of human intellectual capabilities ments as humans.75 are present in the animal but, of course, unable to express themselves.’ Plato, on the other hand, claims that 77 Kahn 1985, pp. 19–21, argues that while a soul has to strive to be as close to the some form of distinction between senso- Forms as possible, in other words, to be- ry and rational knowledge can be traced back to Parmenides and his followers come rational. From now on, the core of including the Pythagorean Philolaus, its human soul is identified with its rational more systematic form appears only lat- part, which is the part that enters the er, in Democritus, and a definitive form of the distinction was formulated by cycle of transmigration in the first Plato, cf. Democritus, DK 68 B 11, 125, 191. Huffman 1993, pp. 311, 314–315, 319, notes that a similar distinction can be found 74 See Huffman 2009. also in Philolaus, DK 44 B 13. 75 Cf. Sorabji 1993, pp. 131–132, 172–175, 78 Cf. Snell 1960, pp. 12–15, and von Fritz Huffman 2009. 1945, 1946.

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Therein lays the main difference philosophy of this thinker.79 As is well between Plato and the Presocratics known, Spinoza believed that a per- (especially those discussed above), in son belongs to two attributes among whose view the soul is always physical infinitely many that can be ascribed to and united with the world in which it a substance, to wit the ‘attribute of exten- fully belongs. Platonic dualism pos- sion’ (attributum extensionis) and ‘think- its an ontological distinction between ing’ (cogitationis).80 Although he posits the physical, sensible world and the one substance underlying all there is, in transcendent Forms and between our relation to these two attributes he does cognitive capacities that relate to these not – contrary to expectation – advocate two levels of reality. The Presocratics, a position close to a unitary monism or on the other hand, do not believe that immanence of Preplatonic thinkers. our mind relates to a reality fundamen- From the very outset, he presupposes tally different from the sensible world. a distinction between thinking and phys- In their view, the mind tries to penetrate icality, two realms which are parallel to ‘only’ some sort of deeper, more funda- one another. This separation can then be mental layer of the phenomenal world, mended only thanks to a metaphysical which as a whole, however, cannot be presupposition of unity of all attributes anything but unified and one. on the deepest ontological level of one 4. Throughout these considerations, all-encompassing substance. Spinoza it appears that Plato was exceptionally thus follows not only in the tradition successful in promoting a distinction of Cartesian dualism, which defines an between the sensible world and the intel- insurmountable distinction between res ligible Forms and any return to the ‘in- cogitans and res extensa, but even in the nocence’ of his predecessors is challeng- long tradition reaching all the way to ing in the extreme. Plato’s sharp division Plato and revitalised by his Renaissance of reality exerted enormous influence followers. in centuries to come, where a similar In Plato’s view, however, these two form of dualism is found frequently and sharply distinct levels of reality are still sometimes even in unexpected places. connected by a soul which relates partly When we leave aside Plato’s immediate to the physical world and partly to the followers, most notably Aristotle, and intelligible Forms. This makes his dual- make a huge leap forward in time, we ism somewhat less sharp,81 but despite can see that this is the case of a thinker far removed from ancient Greece, one 79 Cf. Gregory 2013, esp. pp. 13–15, 51–52, from the very beginnings of modern phi- 55–56, 66–67, 75, 203–204. For the history losophy, namely Baruch Spinoza. Quite and contemporary discussions of pantheism and panentheism, see Mander significantly for such a comparison, it 2016 and Culp 2017. has been claimed that the Presocratics 80 Baruch Spinoza, Ethica, II, scholium to and other early Greek thinkers are close prop. 7, cf. scholium to prop. 21. to pantheism, which characterises the 81 Cf. Dorter 1982, pp. 179–191.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Vojtěch Hladký 39 Transmigrating Soul Between the Presocratics and Plato all the qualifications, his conception of that a similar kind of conceptualis- the soul clearly constitutes a fatal step ation of the body and soul is not the in such a direction. It is the moment only possible one and has some impor- when the conceptual field opens within tant theoretical presuppositions at its which, it would seem, we still pursue background. our philosophical quests. A comparison with the Presocratics shows, however, (Translated from Czech by Anna Pilátová.)

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abbreviations

Editions: Translations:

Coxon, A. H. (2009). The Fragments of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Fragments and Parmenides (introd., ed., trans., com. by Testimonia, ed., trans., notes, essays A. H. Coxon). Las Vegas; Zurich; Athens: P. Curd. Toronto: University of Toronto Parmenides Publishing (edited with new Press, 2007. translations by R. McKirahan; 1st edn. Aristotle’s On the Soul, trans. J. A. Smith. 1986). The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Diels, H., Kranz W. (eds.) (1951–1952). Die J. Barnes, vol. I. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols, 6th University Press, 1984. ed. Berlin: Weidmann. The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus, Huffman, C. A. (1993). Philolaus of Croton: Fragments, ed., trans., comm. C. C. W. Pythagorean and Presocratic (ed., Taylor. Toronto; Buffalo; London: trans. by C. A. Huffman). Cambridge: University of Toronto Press. Cambridge University Press. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, ed., Wehrli, F. (ed.) (1969). Eudemos von Rhodos, trans., comm. Ch. H. Kahn. Cambridge: Fragmenta. 2nd ed. (Die Schule des Cambridge University Press, 1981. Aristoteles, VIII) Basel; Stuttgart: Plato, Phaedo, Complete Works, ed. J. M. Schwabe. Cooper, D. S. Hutchinson, trans. G. M. A. Wright, M. R. (1995). Empedocles, The Grube, Indianapolis; Cambridge: Extant Fragments (ed., trans., com. by Hackett Publishing, 1997. M. R. Wright). 2nd ed. London: Bristol Classical Press.

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Meuli, K. (1935). “Scythica”. Hermes 70, Approaches to Explaining Living Behav- pp. 121–176. iour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, Berlin: de Gruyter, p. 49–102. Mihai, A. (2010). “Soul’s Aitherial Abode according to the Poteidaia Epitaph and Palmer, J. (2014). “The Pythagoreans and Presocratic Philosophers”. Numen 57, Plato”. In: C. A. Huffman (ed.), A Histo- pp. 553–582. ry of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, pp. 204–226. Mihai, A. (2015). L’Hadès céleste: Histoire du purgatoire dans l’Antiquité. Paris: Picot, J.-C. (2004). “Les Cinq sourc- Classiques Garnier. es dont parle Empédocle”. Revue des études grecques 117, pp. 393–446; cor- Parker, R. (1995). “Early Orphism”. In: rigenda Revue des études grecques, 118, A. Powell (ed.), The Greek World, London, pp. 322–325. New York: Routledge, pp. 483–510. Picot, J.-C. (2006). “Aristote, Poétique Obeyesekere, G. (2002). Imagining Karma: 1457 b 13-14: la Métaphore d’espèce à Ethical Transformations in Amerindian, espèce”. Revue des études grecques 119, Buddhist, and Greek Rebirth. Berkeley: pp. 532–551. University of California Press. Rechenauer, G. (2013) “Anaxagoras” In: O’Brien, D. (1969). Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle. D. Bremer, H. Flashar, G. Rechenauer Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (eds.), Die Philosophie der Antike, vol. I: O’Brien, D. (2005). “Empedocles: A Synop- Frügriechische Philosophie, 2 (F. Ueber- sis”. In: G. Rechenauer (ed.), Frügriechis- weg – H. Holzhey [eds.], Grundriss ches Denken, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck der Geschichte der Philosophie), Basel: & Ruprecht, pp. 316–342. Schwabe, pp. 740–796.

O’Brien, D. (2006). “Life beyond the Stars: Renehan, R. (1980). “On the Greek Origins Aristotle, Plato and Empedocles (De Cae- of the Concepts Incorporeality and Im- lo I.9 279a11-22)”. In: R. A. H. King (ed.), materiality”. Greek, Roman and Byzantine Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Studies 21, pp. 105–138.

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Rohde, E. (1925). Psyche: The Cult of Souls Sorabji, R. (1993). Animal Minds and Human and Belief in Immortality among the An- Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate. cient Greeks (trans. by W. B. Hillis). Lon- London: Duckworth. don, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Thein, K. (2008). Vynález věcí: O Platónově Rowett, C. (2016). “Love, Sex and the Gods: hypotéze idejí [The Invention of Things: On Why Things Have Divine Names in Empe- Plato’s Hypothesis of Forms]. Praha: Filo- docles’ Poem, and Why They Come in sofia, English version forthcoming. Pairs”. Rhizomata 4, pp. 80–110. Therme, A.-L. (2014). “Des Racines empé- Schibli, H. S. (1990). Pherekydes of Syros. Ox- docléennes chez Platon? Échos critiques ford: Clarendon Press. à Empédocle dans l’élaboration platoni- Sedley, D. (1995). “The Dramatis Personae of cienne de l‘âme”. Études Platoniciennes Plato’s Phaedo”. In: T. Smiley (ed.), Philo- 11, https://etudesplatoniciennes.revues. sophical Dialogues: Plato, Hume, Wittgen- org/528, [accessed 12 November 2017]. stein: Dawes Hicks Lectures on Philosophy, Timotin, A. (2012). La Démonologie plato- Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26. nicienne: Histoire de la notion de daimōn Sedley, D. (1999). “Parmenides and Melissus”. de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciens. In: A. A. Long (ed.), The Cambridge Compan- Leiden, Boston: Brill. ion to Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 113–133. Trépanier, S. (2010). “Early Greek Theolo- Sfameni Gasparo, G. (2015). “Daimonic gy: God as Nature and Natural Gods”. Power”. In: E. Eidinow, J. Kindt (eds.), In: A. Erskine, J. N. Bremmer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Religion, Oxford, New York, NY: Oxford Transformations, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 413–427. University Press, pp. 273–317.

Snell, B. (1960). The Discovery of the Mind Trépanier, S. (2014). “From Wandering in Greek Philosophy and Literature (trans. Limbs to Limbless Gods: δαίμων as Sub- by T. G. Rosenmeyer). New York: Harper stance in Empedocles”. Apeiron 47, 2, and Rowe. pp. 172 –210.

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Trépanier, S. (2017). “From Hades to the tary]. Praha: Herrmann & Synové, 2001 Stars: Empedocles on the Cosmic Hab- (vol. I), 2006 (vol. II), 2006 (vol. III). itats of Soul”. Classical Antiquity 38, Wallis, R. T. (1995). Neoplatonism. 2nd ed. pp. 130–182. London: Bristol Classical Press. Treu, M. (1954). “Die neue ‘orphische’ Waszink, J. H. (1954). “Beseelung”. In: Real- Unterweltsbeschreibung und Vergil”. lexikon für Antike und Christentum, vol. II: Hermes 82, pp. 24–51. Bauer – Christus, Stuttgart: Hiersemann, Ustinova, Y. (2009). Caves and the Ancient pp. 176-183. Greek Mind: Descending Underground in Zhmud, L. (2012). Pythagoras and the Early the Search for Ultimate Truth. Oxford: Ox- Pythagoreans (trans. by K. Windle, R. Ire- ford University Press. land). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vernant, J.-P. (2006). Myth and Thought Zhmud, L. (2014). “Sixth-, Fifth- and among the Greeks. New York: Zone Books. Fourth-Century Pythagoreans”. In: C. A. Vítek, T. (2001, 2006). Empedoklés [Empedo- Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagorean- cles], vol. I: Studie [Study], vol. II: Zlomky ism, Cambridge: Cambridge University [Fragments], vol. III: Komentář [Commen- Press, pp. 88–111.

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Socrates as the abstract This philosophical essay aims to Paradigmatic return to the Socratic problem, ask it anew, and make an attempt to find its possible solution. In the introduction, Figure of the author briefly discusses to genesis of the Socratic problem and Practical the basic methodological problems we encounter when dealing with it. * Further on, it defines five basic sources Philosophy of information about Socrates on which the interpretation tradition is Matúš Porubjak based. Then the author outlines two Department of Philosophy and Applied Philosophy key features of Socrates’ personality, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava aligned with the vast majority of Nám. J. Herdu 2 sources: (1) Socrates’ belief that he has Slovakia no theoretical knowledge; (2) Socrates’ [email protected] predilection towards practical questions, and the practical dimension of his activity. In conclusion, the author expresses his belief that it is just this practical dimension of philosophy that has been in the ‘blind spot’ of the modern study of Socrates which paid too much attention to the search for his doctrine. The history of philosophy, however, does not only have to be the history of doctrines, but can also be the history of reflected life practices which inspire followers in their own practices * This article was written under VEGA project No. 1/0864/18. I am thankful to Anna Pomichalova while reflecting on them. The author and Miroslav Pomichal for the translation of the therefore proposes to understand the first draft of this article. My special thanks go to anonymous reviewers and to Kryštof Boháček for historical Socrates as the paradigmatic many helpful comments and suggestions. figure of practical philosophy.

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Socrates is one of the most iconic philosophical thinking remains hidden and at the same time most controver- in the works of those who wrote about sial figures of the history of philosophy him? In the 19th century this para- from the 18th century to the present day. dox resulted in the so-called Socratic On the one hand, he is the most iconic problem, first formulated by Friedrich figure because the modern tradition Schleiermacher, and later developed by accepted the influence which had been many others. The question can simply attributed to Socrates by the ancient tra- be formulated as follows: who was the dition, particularly Plato and Aristotle, historical Socrates, so as to not con- both of whom have become the ancient tradict the principles that Xenophon philosophers par excellence for modern called Socratic, and yet also inspired times. On the other hand, Socrates’ con- Plato to present him in his dialogues troversy results from the modern idea of in the way that he did?1 The aim of philosophy as a type of thought system our essay is to ask the Socratic ques- presented in the form of a text that can tion again, briefly look at the figure be critically examined. of Socrates in the context of Socratic The paradox to which this condi- literature, and make an attempt to find tion has led is obvious – what do we a possible answer. do with the ‘philosopher founder’ who did not write a single text, and whose 1 Schleiermacher (1852), p. cxlii.

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Socratic problem to the same subject, one of them must Socrates is not the only ancient philoso- be untrue. However, this does not nec- pher who wrote nothing. Among many essarily have to be the case. They may, others we mention Pythagoras, Pyrrho, for example, refer to another period of Epictetus, or Ammonius Saccas. We learn Socrates’ life, or to a different context in about them only through the accounts which Socrates addressed the particular and quotes preserved by their pupils, subject. Nor is it possible to unambigu- followers, commentators and critics. In ously assume from the consistency of order to reveal the views of a non-writ- multiple sources that they reflect the ing philosopher, these accounts need to view of the historical Socrates for the fol- be critically evaluated, and comparisons lowing reason: we cannot retroactively drawn. Our endeavour will lead to many guarantee the mutual independence of methodological problems. Why they are these resources, or their independence particularly conspicuous in Socrates is from another source used by the given owing to the fact that his name is con- authors but not preserved for us, or the tained in a relatively large number of general image of Socrates in the given genres of various texts which often offer time which did not have to correspond to very different images of Socrates. the views of Socrates himself,3 of which, This diversity is also caused by the by the way, Plato’s Socrates complains in fact that both classical and Hellenistic the Apology (18b–d). authors used to interpret a particular Eventually, similar problems asso- philosopher not as an individual his- ciated with the search for the historical torical person but rather as a represent- Socrates have prompted some interprets ative of a certain type of thinking and to believe that Socrates is a myth – a lit- behaviour which they either criticised erary fiction generated by a group of or praised from their position. Every- writers at the beginning of the 4th cen- one who tries to create a consolidated tury BC.4 Even if we reject such an picture of Socrates eventually comes across the question: ‘Do we judge our 3 Lacey (1971), pp. 367–368. conception of Socrates by what we find 4 A clear analysis of scholarly views on Socrates in the 19th and 20th centuries in the sources or do we judge the sources is given in J. Gajda-Krynicka (2006), by what we think we already know about pp. 36–49. According to her, Xenophon’s 2 version of Socrates is championed above Socrates?’ all by J. Brucker, H. Weissenborn, H. Arnim, Let us highlight some of the main H. Gomperz, A. Döring, L. Strauss, and methodological problems that accom- D. Morrison. F. Schleiermacher, J. Burnet, A. E. Taylor, C. Siegel, and H. Maier give pany the attempts to reconstruct the preference to Plato. K. Joel and D. Ross views of the historical Socrates. It lean towards Aristotle’s views. E. Zeller, G. Vlastos, W. K. C. Guthrie, U. Wilamowitz, might seem that if two sources about W. Jaeger, and A. Diés attempt to Socrates are in opposition with regard produce a synthesis. E. Duprée, out of all, sees Socrates most as a fictional character, while O. Gigon, A.–H. Chroust 2 Lacey (1971), p. 366. and E. Howald do not regard him as

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Matúš Porubjak 53 Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy extremely sceptical interpretation, we of the writings of the historian and phi- can still see that the interpretation tra- losopher Xenophon – his Memorabilia, dition essentially agrees only on two Symposium, Apology, Oeconomicus, and facts: that Socrates was sentenced to a short passus in his Anabasis (3, 1, death at the age of 70 in 399 BC, and 4–5). The third group consists of Plato’s that he never wrote anything himself.5 Dialogues in which Socrates emerges as At least, he did not write down anything the main speaker.6 philosophical, given that Plato, in his Aristotle’s writings form the fourth Phaedo (60d–61b), has Socrates say that group. Although Aristotle’s knowledge in jail he wrote the metrical version of of Socrates is only mediated, mainly Aesop’s fables and the hymn to Apollo, through Plato’s Academy, and his surviv- having been inspired by an ever-recur- ing work does not systematically address ring dream. him, his account is nevertheless valua- When looking for an image of the his- ble especially because Socrates’ name is torical Socrates, the textual tradition is usually mentioned in relation to some based on the following 5 sources of infor- philosophical problem or an attitude, mation. The first three are composed thus suggesting a possible fashion of of the texts of Socrates’ younger con- Socrates’ philosophical views. temporaries. The oldest of the sources, The last group of information sources Aristophanes, depicted Socrates in his includes a wide range of authors from comedies, above all in the Clouds, and via about the 5th century BC up to the 3rd brief referrals in the Birds and the Frogs. century AD. Among them are Socrates’ The second group of sources is composed contemporaries and pupils such as Antisthenes, Aeschines of Sphettus, a philosopher. Gajda-Krynicka (2006), Euclid of Megara, Phaedo of Elis, Simon pp. 58–60 herself joins this opinion, and ‘the Shoemaker’ of Athens, and others. at the end of her study she concludes that Socrates was not a philosopher, since he The texts of these authors have been pre- offered no philosophical doctrine. The served in either a very fragmented way, current basic sources for the study of Socratic issues are the compendiums of or we only know of them from doxogra- Vlastos (1971), Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar phers, which is regrettable, as otherwise (2006), Bussanich and Smith (2013), and most recently Stavru and Moore (2018). 6 According to Vlastos (1991), pp. 46–47, 5 All doxographic tradition agrees on (1994), p. 135 these are principally the Socrates’ lack of writing. The exception so-called earlier (elenctic) dialogues is Epictetus who attributes considerable of Plato – Apology, Charmides, Crito, writing activity to Socrates (Arrian, Epicteti dissertationes 2, 1, 32). In this Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, instance, however, we are probably Laches, Protagoras, Republic I; then the dealing with a misunderstanding caused transitional dialogues – Euthydemus, by mistaking writings on Socrates with Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno; those by Socrates; cf. Lacey (1971), p. 366, to these he adds passages from the n. 1. The problem of authorship in ancient middle period dialogues: the speech of philosophical literature is most recently Alcibiades in the Symposium (215a–222b) discussed by Škvrnda (2017b). For the and the two bibliographical passages in trial with Socrates see Kalaš (2008). the Phaedo (57a–61c, 115c–118a).

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they would most likely belong to the 18b–d, 19b–d; Xenophon Apology 14–15, most important sources of knowledge Memorabilia 1, 1, 11–16). Aristophanes’ of Socrates’ life and views. In the fifth choice of Socrates for a character in his group there are also all the later works comedy indicates at least the assumption referring to Socrates in any way. Of that Socrates had already been known to these, perhaps the most interesting texts a relatively broad audience who would are the shorter ones about Socrates, cre- associate him with ‘modern’ intellec- ated in the Roman period and during the tual extravagances (cf. Plato Apology so-called second sophistry, by authors 19b–20c). such as Diogenes Laërtius, Libanius, Aristophanes’ Socrates combines Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, two main motifs – the examination of and Dion of Prusa. Let us now take the physical universe (physis) associated a closer look at the preserved images of with non-traditional religious attitudes Socrates individually. typical of some older philosophers, and the sophist ‘both sides’ argumen- Socrates of Aristophanes tation. The Socrates of the Clouds is the The earliest text to mention Socrates is leader of a paid philosophical school the Clouds, Aristophanes’ comedy played called a ‘thinking-house’. We find him in 423 (and reworked a few years later – watching the sky from a hanging basket, cf. Nubes 518–562) when Socrates was while his pupils ‘fix their eyes so on the about 46 years old. It is the only text on ground’ to ‘seek things underground,’ Socrates written during his lifetime that with their ‘rump turned up towards the has been preserved in its entirety. The sky’ because ‘it’s taking private lessons faithfulness of Aristophanes’ image of on the stars’ (Nubes 186–194).8 Socrates is mostly categorically rejected Aristophanes’ Socrates devotes his by scholars. His partial rehabilitation time to astronomy, geography, zoology, was brought about by E. Taylor (1951), and grammatical exploration; he intro- Vander Waerdt (1994), L. Edmunds duces new deities while rejecting the (1986), A. Bowie (1993), and M. Mon- classical gods of the Greek Pantheon tuori (1981).7 as old-fashioned. At the same time he It should be noted, however, that teaches rhetoric, especially the way how Socrates’ contemporary followers took to outwit the inferior, i.e. unjust argu- the Aristophanes’ image of him seri- ment (hetton logos) over the superior, i.e. ously while opposing it (Plato Apology just argument (kreitton logos) as a means to win litigation. In the traditional 7 The last of these explores the possible history of philosophy, Aristophanes’ Anaxagoric background to Socrates’ Socrates could be characterised as views. In his recent dissertation, F. Škvrnda (2017a) gives an interesting a utilitarian eclectic, and a syncretist attempt at reconstruction of the historical Socrates on the basis of analysing the contemporary religious 8 Translation: B. B. Rogers; in Aristophanes and cultural background. I. The Loeb Classical Library, 1930.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Matúš Porubjak 55 Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy of the older natural philosophy and meaningful only to the extent that they the new ethics of the sophists, prone to are useful for everyday life (Memorabilia mysticism.9 4, 7). He has a circle of pupils whom he teaches for free. Socrates of Xenophon Xenophon’s Socrates is less ironi- The second group of sources tradition- cal in his treatment of others and more ally used in the search for the histor- ‘down to earth’ than Plato’s. The Elenctic ical Socrates includes the writings of Method (the method of counteracting Socrates’ pupil Xenophon of Athens. opponents’ opinions), characteristic of According to contemporary philosoph- the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues, is ical historiography he was more of a his- used only as a preparatory stage; after- torian and a man of letters with a weak wards he makes no qualms about voic- feel for philosophy, which leads to the ing his own views. However, these are conclusion that he was unable (unlike not presented in the form of theories. Plato) to deeply understand Socrates’ Xenophon emphasises that Socrates had philosophy. Interestingly, however, in never promised to be a teacher of virtue the 18th century, Xenophon’s image of (arete); on the contrary, he called for his Socrates was still considered to be as pupils to follow the way he himself lived reliable as (or even more so than) Plato’s (Memorabilia 1, 2, 3; 1, 2, 17) and acted and a similar attitude was held by many (Memorabilia 4, 4, 10). authors of the Hellenistic and Roman Xenophon’s Socrates is a moralist periods, too. Of the earlier advocates of in the best sense of the word, a philoso- Xenophon let us mention J. J. Brucker pher who solves practical problems, and his Historia Critica Philosophiae, finds fitting examples from life, and who followed the line of his predeces- is always willing and able to provide sors;10 the contemporary ones include useful advice to which he even uses his D. Morrison (1994), L.–A. Dorion daimonion (cf. Memorabilia 1, 1, 4). It (2006), and M. A. Flower (2017). was not by chance that many Hellenistic Xenophon’s image of Socrates is philosophers and moralists considered almost the exact opposite of that of Xenophon’s style and his presentation Aristophanes. In religious affairs, of Socrates as the ultimate example of his Socrates holds traditional views writing and living. (Memorabilia 1, 3–4; 4, 3), refuses the practices of the sophists, is not con- Socrates of Plato cerned with the theoretical examination In the 19th century, the originally posi- of the natural world (fysis), and finds tive assessment of Xenophon’s account the studies in geometry or astronomy of Socrates changed under the influence of F. Schleiermacher’s work; he consid- 9 For Socrates as a “pythagorizing mystic” ered Xenophon a statesman rather than see Škvrnda (2015). 10 Cf. Montouri (1981), p. 22; Malusa (1993), a philosopher. In his view, Xenophon’s p. 229. intention was to defend his teacher from

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criticism rather than systematically of Plato’s Socrates is the elenchos – log- interpret his views which he – unlike ical refutation of his fellow debaters’ Plato the philosopher – was unable to opinions, which he bases on exposing correctly understand.11 This attitude the contradictions in the claims they of Schleiermacher was accepted by the themselves offered. He often accents majority of contemporary scholars who his ‘ignorance’, says he has no knowl- even often radicalised them.12 edge and therefore he cannot teach any- The idea of Socrates as Plato’s great thing to anybody. He compares himself teacher, the founder of dialectics, and to a midwife in that that he himself is the father of modern philosophy was unable to give birth to thoughts, but born; an idea that would be shared, with he can help others to deliver their own greater or lesser amount of scepticism, thoughts; nevertheless, it is necessary to by most 20th century authors. Among examine whether the newborn are true the most influential works of the 20th (Theaetetus 150a–151d). century which attempt to reconstruct The mission of Plato’s Socrates is to the philosophy of the historic Socrates constantly explore himself as well as his on the basis of Plato’s dialogues is fellow citizens. He examines whether Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher they take care of both their virtue and (1991). The author G. Vlastos – in con- souls, and whether they are really wise nection with the stylometric studies when they declare themselves to be dividing Plato’s dialogues into the wise (Apology 23b, 29c–30b).14 From early, middle and late ones – earmarks the modern perspective, Plato’s picture two types of Socrates the philosopher. of Socrates comes across as the most The first one is the historical Socrates philosophical, and the majority of con-

(SocratesE – Socrates Earlier), and temporary interpreters still find it the the other one is the Socrates of Plato most credible. At the same time, the mid-

(SocratesM – Socrates Middle). However, wifery of the Platonic Socrates is a good Vlastos’ model was soon exposed to seri- justification for the diverse and original ous objections of some academics.13 views of Socrates’ followers, including If we are to compare Plato’s and Aristippus and Antisthenes, Euclid and Xenophon’s Socrates, then the former Phaedo. His constant denial of his own is more speculative and very reticent wisdom which could be transferable to in expressing his own attitudes. He is a tireless debater and an adroit thinker 14 In contrast to Xenophon and Aristotle, Plato’s Socrates admits to being interested who often casts doubt on dominant opin- in exploring physis in his youth (Phaedo ions. The typical and widely used method 96a–100a; cf. Diogenes Laërtius 2, 45; Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7, 8; Cicero Academicae Questiones 1, 4, 11 Schleiermacher (1852), p. cxxxviii. 15), or to the fact that he studied with 12 Cf. Zeller (1877), pp. 100–101. Sophists (Plato Meno 96d, Charmides 13 Nehamas (1992), Nails (1993), Kahn (1996), 163d). This caused several scholars to McPherran (2011), Vasiliou (2013), and divide Socrates’ life into two phases; Prior (2013). cf. Vander Waerdt (1994), pp. 66–75.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Matúš Porubjak 57 Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy someone else can serve as a major expla- (Metaphysica 1078b9–32). In agreement nation for his non-writing. In short, with Xenophon, Aristotle’s Socrates dis- Plato’s Socrates could be characterised regards the study of the physical uni- as a typical intellectual, ironist, sceptic, verse (Metaphysica 987b2). His Socrates and moral philosopher.15 used to ask questions and not to answer them; for he used to confess that he Socrates of Aristotle did not know. He would not refute the There is another source of information views of his opponents by putting for- on Socrates’ philosophy believed to be ward a different view and proving its credible: that of Aristotle who came to plausibility, but through questions and Athens about 30 years after Socrates’ answers he would show a contradiction death; he was familiar with not only in the claims made by the opponents Plato’s dialogues but also the dialogues themselves (Sophistici Elenchi 165b3–6, of other Socratics, as well as the period 183b7–8). of oral tradition referring to Socrates.16 Aristotle’s Socrates held the position In the body of Aristotle’s works, we find of ethical intellectualism and claimed (just) over 40 references to Socrates. that knowledge is a necessary and suffi- What is so valuable in his testimony cient condition for our conduct. For this is, inter alia, that he is clearly aware of reason, it is impossible to suffer from the differences between the historical acrasia (lack of self-control) – indeed, Socrates and the Socrates of Plato’s dia- once we learn what is good, we act logues. The reconstruction of the histori- accordingly; in other words, our poor cal Socrates based on Aristotle’s accounts decisions are exclusively a matter of our was attempted by O. Gigon (1947). How- ignorance rather than a drive of the irra- ever, most modern scholars understand tional parts of our soul (Magna Moralia Aristotle as a credible addition to Plato’s 1182a15–26; Ethica Eudemia 1216b2–9; picture of Socrates. Ethica Nicomachea 1145b23–27). From Aristotle tells that the historical a modern point of view, Aristotle’s Socrates devoted his attention to the Socrates can be characterized as a typ- moral virtues (ethikas aretas) and he ical moral philosopher, the founder of was the first one to seek their general analytical ethics, and a proponent of definitions, but unlike Plato, he never strong ethical intellectualism. regarded neither universals nor definitions as existing in separation, i.e. Socrates of Socratics he did not postulate them as Forms The fifth (and the last) group of authors describing Socrates is, as aforemen- 15 We already find this form of under- tioned, a very diverse one covering standing the character of Socratic philosophy in the so-called Second and the period from about the 5th century Third Academy, which were known by BC until the 3rd century AD. It con- their development of scepticism. 16 Cf. Guthrie (1971), pp. 38–39, Suvák (2007), sists of other Socrates’ pupils (except pp. 14–15, n. 20. Xenophon and Plato) whose works

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have been preserved only in the form Most of the ‘minor’ Socratics were of fragments as well as references and critical of the ‘metaphysical’ specula- shorter texts dedicated to Socrates and tions of the Plato and Aristotle type. created in the Roman period and during Their exploration was mainly focused on the so-called second sophistry. Mod- matters of practical ethics. As an exam- ern commentators either ignored this ple of how the ‘minor’ Socratics under- group, or viewed it very suspiciously. stood Socrates let us mention Aeschines A partial change came about as late and his Alcibiades dialogue preserved in as the end of the 20th century, espe- a fragmentary form. Socrates implies cially thanks to Giannantoni’s collec- to Alcibiades that he has no useful tion Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae knowledge to teach him. Nevertheless, (1990). Research in this field is still in he believes that if he stays with him he its initial stages. Of the works devoted can make him a better person through to it let us mention at least the second his love. Finally, having brought him part of the collection edited by Paul to acknowledge his ignorance, he gives A. Vander Waerdt (1994), and the col- him a gift of the statue of Themistocles; lections edited by Rossetti and Stavru whenever he looks at it he will remem- (2010) and by Suvák (2014). ber his own imperfection by comparing Apart from Plato and Xenophon, himself to the famous general.18 there are about 12 other authors of the so-called Socratic dialogues whom Socratic problem again we know a little better, and the list of So who was the historical Socrates and the names of all the Socratics in the what philosophical position did he hold? Giannantoni Collection exceeds 70.17 Was he Aristophanes’ sophist, utilitar- And it is exactly these Socratics and their ian eclectic, and mystic? Or Xenophon’s so-called Socratic schools (in the mod- moralist? Or Plato’s ironists and sceptic? ern tradition sometimes referred to as Or was he Aristotle’s creator of ethical ‘minor’ as opposed to the Academy and intellectualism? Or the practical ethicist the Lykeion) who may play a crucial role of Aeschines and many other Socratics? in the quest for the image of the histor- Each of these images offers a Socratic ical Socrates and assessing his impact. doctrine, or rather a certain set of phil- The influence of many of them was enor- osophical attitudes that he adopted. At mous. The laterHellenistic mainstreams the same time, each of these images has either claimed their founders to have its own relevance and is defensible. It been Socrates’ direct pupils (the Cynics seems, however, that the philosophical of Antisthenes and the Cyrenaics of thinking of these many ‘Socrateses’ is Aristippus), or they vehemently avowed themselves to Socrates’ legacy (academic 18 Fr. VI A 50–53 (Giannantoni), Suvák (2007), sceptics and stoics). p. 23. The similarly anti-theoretical philosophy of Antisthenes is most recently analysed by Suvák (2017), see 17 Cf. Clay (1994). also Zelinová (2016).

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Matúš Porubjak 59 Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy impossible to combine into a consist- claims that “a man who really has ent image of one and only Socrates. spent his life on philosophy is steadfast This has led many interprets to claim when he is about to die and optimis- that Socrates was not the author of any tic…” (63e10–64a1), hence “…those who philosophical doctrine and therefore engage with philosophy in the right way he cannot be considered a philosopher. are practicing nothing else but dying However, it resulted in a paradox – the and being dead” (64a6–8).19 Although non-writing philosopher propelled the ensuing discussion is “theoretical” many of his contemporaries and follow- and “metaphysical” in many aspects, ers into philosophical writing, teaching the end of the dialogue clearly aims at and living. practical point, as Kohen rightly notes: But if we look back once more at “Indeed, rather than using his final the authors discussed in our essay, we breath to utter some sort of profundity can discover two important features of that would followed blindly as Socrates’ Socrates’ personality. The first one is true and final teaching, Socrates instead the claim that Socrates believed that he direct his interlocutors back to the had no (theoretical) knowledge; this unresolved argument they have been claim is unambiguously corroborated having about the soul’s immortality”.20 by Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, and This is the final echo of Socrates’ claim neither is it dismissed by other Socratics. in Apology, that “the unexamined life is The only exception is Aristophanes not fit for a man to live” (38a6–7). Nei- whose Socrates is inundated with vari- ther profundity nor theory, but certain ous doctrines (which can be understood way of living (and dying) is what should as comic hyperbole). be considered most. The second feature is that of Socrates’ Another example is the Republic, dia- predilection towards practical ques- logue famous for the “Platonic” tripartite tions and the practical dimension of immortal soul, theory of the state, using his work. This feature is most evident geometry and great metaphysical allego- in Xenophon, the ‘minor’ Socratics, ries. However, closer look on dialogue and the Hellenistic tradition. Socrates shows, as Rowe suggests, that the philo- of Plato’s “early” dialogues, albeit more sophical, literary, and rhetorical style sophisticated and more sceptical, also is not so different from Plato’s “earlier” deals primarily with practical questions, one and that the Republic continues with while Plato raises no doubts of the power and importance of his activities. 19 Translation: Ch. Emlyn-Jones, W. Preddy; Moreover, practical dimension of in Plato I. The Loeb Classical Library, 2013. Socrates’ character should be clearly 20 Kohen (2011), p. 72. Kohen’s article gives identified in Plato’s “middle period” more arguments to show how the Plato’s dialogues too. Most obvious example is Socrates, especially of the Apology, Crito and Phaedo, “is carefully crafted to serve the Phaedo. At the beginning of the last as a new model for heroic behaviour that discussion with his friends, Socrates ought to be emulated” Kohen (2011), p. 46.

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those ideas that surface and dominate which they can find a worthy place”, as the so-called “Socratic” dialogues, ideas Ferrari brilliantly pointed out.24 There such as the virtue is knowledge, that is no room to go deeper in Phaedrus or a just person will harm no one and that further to other Plato’s dialogues; how- no man goes wrong willingly.21 The very ever, it is hard to find a single one where “Socratic” topics such as justice, good, a certain way of living and thinking and education are discussed throughout plays no role. the dialogue, and according to Rosen the Apart from Plato “later” dialogues, Republic “is not a treatise on politics but the most theoretical impression is a dramatic portrait of people conversing probably given by Aristotle’s Socrates, about the connection between justice although even his Socrates has no the- and the good”.22 The city-soul analogies oretical knowledge. And when Aristotle repeatedly raising a questions on human describes Socrates as the first person character and the way of living. Finally, to look for the general definitions of at the end of the Book IX, when Socrates moral virtues, he actually makes him abandons the question whether the city the founder of the part of philosophy they have been founding and discussing which he calls practical. In this case, not could exist or not, he concludes that it is even Aristophanes is an exception; in “a model up in heaven for anyone willing the Clouds, Strepsiades attends Socrates’ to look and if he sees it, found himself lessons for purely practical reasons (to on it” (592b1–3).23 We are back “down to get himself rid of debt). And although earth”, being asked to create our lives he himself fails in learning – because here and now in certain proper way. of his ineptitude and conservatism – his Another “middle” dialogue, the son does succeed, which eventually leads Phaedrus, should be profitably read as to a tragicomic end of the play. Indeed, a dialogue on education, since both rhet- Aristophanes’ Socrates can also be pri- oric and philosophy have an educational marily grasped as a (a)moral philoso- function and leads the souls to different pher dealing with practical issues. way of living. The well-known critique of writing (274c–275e) does not imply Conclusion that any written text is in fact useless; When Homer, in the second Book of “only that it should not be written (nor Iliad, invokes the sisterhood of Muses read) without awareness of the danger to reveal the names of the leaders and of writing, together with the sense that the number of ships fighting under Troy, what ultimately matters is neither writ- he says that they (the Muses) are omni- ing nor speaking but the way of life in present and omniscient, while we mortals know nothing except through kleos, 21 Rowe (2006), p. 20. and we have no real knowledge (Iliad 22 Rosen (2005), p. 2. 2, 485–486). I think these verses are 23 Translation: Ch. Emlyn-Jones, W. Preddy; in Plato VI. The Loeb Classical Library, 2013. 24 Ferrari (1987), p. 221.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Matúš Porubjak 61 Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy spot on, regarding our position on the of philosophy” when speaking about Socratic problem. Unlike Homer, how- Socrates? When in Plato’s Phaedrus ever, we have no access to Muses who Socrates is asked whether he think the would reveal the ‘truth’ about Socrates. mythological story on Boreas abduc- What has ensued after Socrates is kleos – tion of Oreithuia from Ilissus is true, he in both meanings of the word; kleos as answers that it would not be odd to him rumour or report, and kleos as fame or to doubt it and give some reasonable glory. Why should we not understand interpretation. However, then he would the legacy of Socrates as reports and need a lot of spare time to interpret all rumours left behind by Socratics, their other mythical stories and creatures. followers and critics, on the actions of But he never had time to do it for the their hero? The reports whose task is following reason: “I am still incapable to inspire (or caution) their contempo- of obeying the Delphic inscription and raries and next generations to do similar knowing myself. It strikes me as absurd acts, and follow a similar way of think- to look into matters that have nothing to ing and living. do with me as long as I’m still ignorant Such an idea does not have to be of this respect… I investigate myself absurd as long as we are aware of what rather than these things, to see whether P. Hadot points out in his Philosophy I am in fact a creature of more complex- as a Way of Life (1995): that the entire ity and savagery than Typhon, or some- Greco-Roman tradition sees philosophy thing tamer and more simple with a nat- foremost as practical in its goals, as a way urally divine and non-Typhonic nature” of life.25 I think that it is exactly this prac- (229e5–230a6).26 tical dimension of philosophy that was in Of course, this does not mean that the ‘blind spot’ of most modern study of Socrates considered mythical stories Socrates, which focused too eagerly on or reasonable interpretations worth- the search for his doctrine. less. Socratic tradition shows him open But how we should understand to discussing any topic and searching such thing as “practical dimension any reasonable explanation. But such doings cannot be properly conducted

25 The practical dimension of Socrates’ without concerning what they are for thinking is also highlighted by Jan Patočka us, how they could help us to live the (1991), who sees his philosophy in a ‘life good life. Such heritage should be recog- plan’ (p. 125), or ‘style unity of the life’ (p. 147). For the differences and similarities nized in many Socratic writings and also between Patočka’s idea of ‘care of the inspired later Hellenistic philosophies soul’ and Foucault’s idea of ‘care of the where “physics” and “logic” are worth self’ see Hladký (2010), pp. 149–154. For the difference between the care of one’s to be studied because they help us to see self and the knowledge of one’s soul see where we are placed in the world, how Hobza (2009). For the hypothesis that some of the early Greek lyricists should be considered as forerunners of practical 26 Translation: R. Waterfield; in Plato: philosophy, see Porubjak (2018). Phaedrus. Oxford University Press, 2002.

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do we perceive it, and how do we think. and doctrines, but also the history of However, final goal of such studies is reflected life practices which inspire fol- “ethics” – the way of life. No matter how lowers in their own practices as well as complex all those philosophies were and reflect on them. From this point of view, how much they differ each other, finally we could perceive Socrates’ philosophy as they were trying to answer the same the mission of a certain (philosophical) “practical” question of how to become type of life lived to inspire his contem- better friend to ourselves and to each poraries. They, afterwards, each in their other, and how to live milder, calmer, own way, initiated the entire ensuing and happier life to reach eudaimonia. tradition. Consequently, the historical Without the figure of Socrates, whoever Socrates could be interpreted as the par- he really was, such philosophical tradi- adigmatic figure of practical philosophy. tion is hard to be imagined. I leave it to the reader to decide whether Thus, the history of philosophy does the Socratic problem is cracked open by not only have to be the history of theories such an interpretation or not.

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Bussanich, J., Smith, N. D. (eds.) (2013). The Giannantoni, G. (1990). Socratis et Socratico- Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates. Lon- rum Reliquiae. 4 vol. Naples: Bibliopolis. don: Bloomsbury Academic. Gigon, O. (1947). Sokrates, sein Bild in Dich- tung und Geschichte. Bern: A. Francke. Clay, D. (1994). “The Origins of the Socrat- ic Dialogue”. In: P. A. Vander Waerdt Guthrie, W. K. C. (1971). Socrates. London: (ed.) The Socratic Movement, Ithaca and Cambridge University Press. London: Cornell University Press 1994, Hadot, P. (1995). Philosophy as a Way of Life. pp. 23–47. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Fou- Dorion, L.–A. (2006). “Xenophon’s Socrates”. cault. Basil Blackwell. In: S. Ahbel-Rappe, R. Kamtekar (eds.) Hladký, V. (2010). Změnit sám sebe. Praha: Pa- A Companion to Socrates, Oxford: Black- vel Mervart. well Publishing Ltd. 2006, pp. 93–109. Hobza, P. (2009). “Já mezi péčí o sebe a po- Edmunds, L. (1986). “Aristophanes’ Soc- znáním duše”. In: A. Havlíček, J. Jinek rates”. Proceedings of the Boston Area (eds.) Platónův dialog Alkibiadés. Praha: Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 1, OIKOYMENH. pp. 209–230. Kahn, Ch. (1994). “Aeschines on Socratic Ferrari, G. R. F. (1987). Listening to the Ci- Eros”. In: P. A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The cadas: A Study of Plato’s Phaedrus. Cam- Socratic Movement, Ithaca and London: bridge: Cambridge University Press. Cornell University Press, pp. 87–106.

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Kalaš, A. (2008). “Sokrates – vzorný občan, Nails, D. (1993). “Problems with Vlastosʼ Pla- alebo rozvracač aténskej demokracie?”. tonic Developmentalism”. Ancient Philoso- Filozofia 63(1), pp. 2–17. phy 13, pp. 273–291.

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Aristotle’s Theory of Language in the Light of Phys. I.1 abstract The main aim of my paper is to analyse Pavol Labuda Aristotle’s theory of language in the Faculty of Arts and Letters context of his Physics I.1 and via an Catholic University in Ruzomberok analysis and an interpretation of Hrabovska cesta 1 this part of his Physics I try to show 034 01 Ruzomberok that (i) the study of human language Slovakia (logos) significantly falls within the [email protected] competence of Aristotle’s physics (i.e., natural philosophy), (ii) we can find the results of such (physical) inquiry in Aristotle’s zoological writings, stated in the forms of the first principles, causes and elements of the human speech (logos) and (iii) the analogies (Phys. 184b13-14) made by Aristotle at the very end of the first chapter make better sense if we consider them in the broader context in which Aristotle recognizes language as a complex natural phenomenon we are born into and which has to be not only biologically, but also socially developed through our lives. Hence, I aim towards a more naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s views on language.

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I. Introduction of the first chapter of the first book of The general objective of my paper is to Aristotle’s Physics.3 contribute to the discussion of how we Before I start, I would like to make can reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of lan- a short illustration of my approach to guage.1 I openly aim towards a more nat- Aristotle’s theory of language. I reckon uralistic and more pragmatic reading of if Aristotle had been pushed to answer Aristotle’s views on language and I will the following question “What kind of en- try to justify my approach to this issue tity is a phoneme?” he would answered via a textual2 analysis and interpretation it something like this: a phoneme is a physiological entity, it is a psycholog- 1 The issue of Aristotle’s theory of language ical entity, it is an acoustic entity and it and the topics related to this subject is also an abstract entity. So, all these (Aristotle’s theory of meaning, Aristotle’s theory of signification), has been of systematic concern to such scholars as 3 Those interested in historical commentaries on the first book of Aristotle’s Kretzman 1974, Irwin 1982, Manetti 1993, Physics would be satisfied by a detailed Charles 1994 & 2000, Whitaker 1996, Bäck overview they can find in McMahon 2000, Modrak 2001, De Rijk 2002, Walz 1957. There have been several mod- 2006, Castagnoli & Di Lascio 2012 and ern English translations of important Joseph 2017. historical commentaries to the first of 2 In this paper, I follow C. D. C. Reeve’s book of Aristotle’s Physics published re- translation of Aristotle’s Physics pub- cently, see e.g., Themistius 2012 or John lished in 2018. Philoponus 2006.

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answers are correct. But at the same analysis and interpretation of this part time, he would add that no individual of his Physics I try to show that (i) the answer or combination of answers is study of human language (logos) sig- absolutely correct by itself. nificantly falls within the competence Why do I think so? Because in his of Aristotle’s physics (i.e., natural phi- writings Aristotle clearly and rigorously losophy), (ii) we can find the results of distinguishes several ways of method- such (physical) inquiry in Aristotle’s ological examination of the same phe- zoological writings, stated in the forms nomenon. He is aware of the fact that we of principles, causes and elements of can examine every phenomenon from human speech (logos) and (iii) the anal- various perspectives and that different ogies (184b13-14) that Aristotle presents goals lead us towards different answers. at the very end of the first chapter make With respect to this, we should not forget better sense if we consider them in the also the frequency with which Aristotle broader context in which Aristotle rec- uses the πoλλαχῶς λέγεται phrase in ognizes language as a complex phenom- his writings. The phrase clearly indi- enon we are born into and which has to cates that Aristotle always distinguishes be not only biologically, but also socially different perspective from which one developed. analyses subject matter. In any case, in his zoological writ- II. What does it take ings (HA, PA, GA) Aristotle examines to do science? What does it human language as a natural phenom- take to possess a scientific enon related to its bearers (i.e., to liv- understanding? ing beings of the human natural kind).4 Let’s start with the first paragraph. For this very reason, I decided to take “Since in all methodical inquiries in a closer look at the opening chapter of which there is knowledge—that is, sci- Aristotle’s first book of hisPhysics where entific knowledge—of things that have he sets up the basics for scientific inquiry starting-points, causes, or elements, it concerning nature and its objects.5 comes from knowledge of these (for we The specific aim of my paper is to think that we know each thing when analyse Aristotle’s theory of language we know its primary causes and pri- in the context of his Physics I.1 and via mary starting-points, all the way to its elements), it is clear that in the scien- 4 More naturalistic approach to the study tific knowledge of nature our first task of Aristotle’s views on human language can be found in Zirin 1974, Zirin 1980, must be to try to determine the start- Laspia 2018. ing-points.” (Phys. 184a10-a16). 5 For precise analysis of a method pro- The first paragraph indicates that posed by Aristotle in his first book of Physics see Bolton 1991. For complex we know something insofar as we interpretation of a method used in the know its primary causes and primary whole area of scientific inquiry about nature and its objects see e.g., Lennox starting-points, all the way to its ele- 2010. ments. To see the proper message of

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Pavol Labuda 69 Aristotle’s theory of language in the light of Phys. I.1 this paragraph one needs to know the definition made clear only by enabling broader context of Aristotle’s thinking us to recognize instances of named phe- about methodological inquiry which nomenon in a fairly, but imperfectly, could provide us with understanding reliable way. People who know hoti of some phenomena. In the Posterior but do not know dioti are not able to Analytics Aristotle claims that to know offer a real definition, which must state something is not only to know hoti the cause.9 E.g., “Thunder is a noise in (that something is the case), but also to the cloud” is only a nominal definition know dioti (why something is the case).6 which declares the usage of the word It is also well known that for Aristotle “thunder” as the correct wording for epistémé (scientific knowledge or under- noise in the cloud. But to offer a real standing) is a state of the soul that ena- definition of thunder to someone who bles its possessor to give demonstrative wants to understand the phenomenon explanations in the form of apodeixis of thundering, it is necessary to include (demonstration) which is a special sort the cause in the definition. We are ready of syllogismos (deduction) which starts to explain thundering when knowing from scientific starting-points archai( ).7 the efficient cause of that natural phe- What are those starting points? nomenon. Why does it thunder? Due to the extinguishing of fire in the clouds. III. What is necessary Therefore, thunder is a noise in a cloud for scientific explanation? caused by an extinction of fire.10 But Starting-points, causes and before we are ready to offer an explana- elements tion of something via stating the start- According to APo I.10, 76a37-b22, spe- ing-points, causes and elements we have cifically scientific starting-points are to know how they are obtained. of just three types. But those special to demonstrative science are definitions of IV. What kind of the real essences of the beings studied knowledge is needed before one by particular science.8 Real definitions can start doing science? analyse the real essence of the natural What is the natural route to knowing objects into its “elements and start- something? Let’s consider the second ing-points” (Phys. I.1, 184a23). The real paragraph: “And the natural route is essences of those objects are definable, from things that are knowable and though indemonstrable within the (nat- more perspicuous to us to things that ural) science. The real definition makes are more perspicuous and more know- intrinsically clear what the nominal able by nature, since the same things are not knowable to us as are knowable 6 See APo II.1, 89b23-35. unconditionally. That is why we must 7 For an extended analysis of archai (first principles) and its role in human knowledge see Irwin 1988. 9 See also Met. I.1, 981a28–30. 8 Reeve 2018, p. 179. 10 See APo II.10, 94a1-10.

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in this way advance from things that To return to the previous question, are less perspicuous by nature but more (what is the nature of objects that are perspicuous to us to the things that are more perspicuous to us), we can now more perspicuous by nature and more see that those objects are universals and knowable.” (Phys. 184a17-a21). they are rather confused. This means The second paragraph indicates that that such objects cannot satisfy our we do not build our scientific knowl- requirement to lay down the basic prin- edge and our ability to demonstrate it ciples of science. Therefore, I suggest out of nothing. Based on APo I and II, it following Reeves11 in distinguishing is clear that Aristotle presupposes that (i) confusing and raw starting-points we possess some kind of pre-existing or principles which we possess naturally knowledge of a non-demonstrative na- via our perceptual habits and also via ture. So, Aristotle tells us that it is very our ordinary linguistic practise from natural that when we start to make (ii) explanatory relevant starting-points a methodological inquiry, we already which we derived from the previous do possess some kind of non-demon- ones through the process of division strative and pre-existing knowledge. We (diairesis).12 ‘know’ things that are more perspicuous The role and importance that to us in a weaker sense, and we advance Aristotle ascribes to the process of di- to things that are more perspicuous by vision (diairesis) and its results can be nature. But what is the nature of objects found in APo II.13 and II.14. By diaire- that are more perspicuous to us? An an- sis we conceptually pick up those items swer to this question can be found in the (relevant attributes, causes or elements) next sentence of Aristotle’s text. which we need as the parts of the broader items – definitions and demonstrations. V. How to proceed from To divide means to pick up something that which is confused to that from previously posited item or previ- which is differentiated? ously presupposed whole. Let’s continue with the first half of the last paragraph: “The things that are in VI. How to proceed the first instance clear and perspicu- from the universals to the ous to us are rather confused. It is only particulars? later, through a division of these, that In the process of division, we divide we come to know their elements and something broader (which has been pre- starting-points. That is, why we must viously somehow grasped or postulated proceed from the universals to the par- by the operation of abstraction) into ticulars. For it is the whole that is more more (at least into two) narrower parts. knowable by perception, and the universal is a sort of whole. For the uni- 11 See Reeve 2018, pp. xiv-xlv. 12 A complex assessment of the role pre- versal embraces many things as parts.” scribed to the procedure of division by (Phys. 184a22-b10). Aristotle can be found in Falcon 1997.

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However, we recognize those parts as their mothers, only later coming to divide parts of the whole only conceptually. up each of them.” (Phys. 184a22-b10). So, our natural route is to start with Aristotle wants to be understood well, something which is broader, more uni- hence he attached analogies. He tries to versal and acquired (collected) through indicate that the route from the universal our sense-perception (and therefore not and rather confused to the particular and clearly distinguished) and to proceed precise (differentiated) is somehow sim- downwards until we reach particulars. ilar to (a) the name – account relation. There is a huge discussion about the But this is a very general analogy which meaning of the phrase καθ’ ἕκαστα in is illustrated in its turn by two specific this chapter of Aristotle’s Physics.13 How- examples – by (b) the definition of a cir- ever, to allow space for my main point, cle and by (c) the language acquisition I just confess that I follow the interpreta- analogy. tion that understands particulars as the I think it could be helpful to ask what lowest level kind of species (ideally, the these examples have in common. Beyond infimae species). The reason why I do that a doubt, all of them are about names, is that only such interpreted ultimate more precisely about the noun-kind of particulars fulfil the requirement to be names (“circle”, “fathers” “men” etc.). results of the diairesis procedure and All of them are about named objects, i.e., only such comprehended particulars can sense-perceptible entities (like a par- take part in definitions which we need ticular circle I drew on a sheet of paper to establish the demonstrative science or concrete individuals like my father in the form of apoideixis. To clarify his or the man over there). All of them in- message, Aristotle attaches three ana- clude a procedure of division (dividing logical examples which should help us to some pre-existing and confused objects comprehend what he has in mind. into their parts) and finally, all of these examples are about a process of transfor- VII. Analogy to the mation of something which is indeter- route of grasping the first minate into something which is definite principles, stating the causes and somehow basic or fundamental. and reaching the elements Let’s look at Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Let’s start with the last part of Aristotle’s Here we can find the definition of circle. text. “The same thing happens in a way A circle is “a plane figure that extends with names in relation to their account. equally from the centre”.14 I think what For a name like “circle” signifies a sort of Aristotle wants us to realize is the fol- whole in an undivided way, whereas the lowing. A name like “circle” or “father” definition divides it into its particular signifies a sort of whole in an undivided [elements]. And children at first suppose way, whereas via a process of division all men to be their fathers and all women we arrive at definitions which divide

13 See e.g., Ross 1936 (pp. 456-458) and Owens 1981. 14 Rhet. III.6, 1407b26-27.

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something formerly undifferentiated kind of naïve epistemological realist into its particulars. Hence definition who advocates a direct correspondence reveals the differentia specifica and this between our thinking and the world. makes the essential features of the object Neither is he some kind of innatist who we want to scientifically understand pre- presupposes that we somehow directly cisely comprehensible. grasp the right forms of the natural ob- Now we can turn our heads towards jects we observe. I think that the last the language acquisition analogy once analogy vividly indicates that Aristotle again. “And children at first suppose all sees the acquisition of language as a so- men to be their fathers and all women cial process in which we stabilize our their mothers, only later coming to di- “wordings”. We first learn to hear and vide up each of them.” (Phys. 184b12-14). to pronounce “wordings” in the right It seems to me that this analogy makes situations (referring to the objects suc- better sense if it is read in the context cessfully) and only through this process, of APo. II.14, where Aristotle warns sci- with the help of new “wordings”, do we entists not to confine themselves to tra- develop our ability to analyse (to differ- ditional class-names (koina onomata). entiate) our formerly muddled concepts Such a behaviour could be harmful to arrived at as the results of our direct science. If scientists limit themselves to observations, memories or experiences. attributes expressible only by common terms, they miss a chance to identify ex- VIII. Conclusion planatory, relevant distinctive features What can we gain from Aristotle’s of the natural objects they want to study Phys. I.1 for a reconstruction of his the- and understand.15 I think that ordinary ory of language? To scientifically under- words (koina onomata) signify the mud- stand nature and its objects, we need to dle of elements and principles given us grasp objects of a different character, through our experience (sense-percep- not the objects of our ordinary experi- tion, memory) and through the pro- ence. We are looking for objects which cess of epagógé. Hence, I think that for could help us explain why some natural Aristotle, the first task of the scientific phenomena occur regularly because, for approach is to analyse perceived phe- Aristotle, science is all about explaining nomena and ordinary concepts. If we what happens always or at least for the do so, we will be able to distinguish the most part. We can ask e.g., Why is it so parts of these sensory and linguistic that human beings manifest themselves muddles and we will arrive at the par- via language? To answer this question, ticular things underlying them. Only we need to start with the identification then we can securely set up the demon- of those objects which can help us to strative science. Therefore, I suggest re- understand language, namely princi- jecting the notion that Aristotle is some ples, elements and causes. Before we start our scientific inquiry, we have to 15 Cf. APo II.14, 98a13-19. realize that the objects of our everyday

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Pavol Labuda 73 Aristotle’s theory of language in the light of Phys. I.1 experience, collected via our memory as lungs, windpipe, trachea, larynx, and described by our ordinary language pharynx, tongue, lips etc.16 offer us only confused concepts (such In his De Anima Aristotle enounces as writing, speech, sound, sentences, the efficient (or moving) cause of human meaning and so on). Without further language. The efficient cause of our lan- analysis (diairesis) of our confused con- guage is our soul. Human language is cepts about language we are not ready caused by a human soul possessing the to obtain precise and theoretically-sen- faculty of reason (at least in the stage of sitive concepts that could help us to un- dynamis, which could be developed and derstand and explain human language. manifested later on). To legitimize my interpretation, If we look at Aristotle’s political writ- I should be ready to show whether there ings, namely at his Politics, we can find is such a procedure in Aristotle’s corpus. another perspective on the final cause Whether Aristotle was looking for the of human language. Aristotle proclaims principles, i.e., real definitions of nat- that “the function of language is to indi- ural objects and their attributes when cate the advantageous and the harmful, studying human language. Did he ana- and so also the just and unjust, for it lyse natural phenomena, and did he iden- is peculiar to man in comparison with tify the basic building blocks (elements = other animals that he alone has the per- material causes) of which our speech is ception of good and bad, just and unjust made, our language consists of? And and other such things.”17 One can ask finally, did Aristotle explain a state of whether assignment of such a purpose affairs via specifying some features or is not an idealistic one and whether it some objects which are responsible for is accessible to all of us. My opinion on it? My answer is yes. Aristotle did exactly this is as follows, even though the telos so. He identified theoretically-sensitive of human language is achieved in the so- objects (air, soul, reason/nous, differen- ciety spontaneously, it is not achieved by tiation, phonemes, syllables, logical con- all of us. One needs to use the language junctions etc.) which help us to under- for noble purposes. stand and explain natural phenomenon Working on the basis of the forego- of human language. ing I conclude that the phenomenon of In Aristotle’s History of animals and language could be understood only when De anima we can find a note on the mate- analysed from a variety of perspectives, rial cause of human language. Aristotle via categories of principles, cause and identifies the material cause of human elements. In Aristotle’s writings, our language with air. He claims human human language is part of our human speech is made of air, which we pro- organism, so its study certainly falls duce in our lungs, exhale by our midriff and modulate via our ‘vocal cords’. But 16 See DA II.8, 420b5-421a6 and HA IV.9, 535a29-535b2. instead of vocal cords, Aristotle enlisted 17 Pol. 1253a13-17 (Here I use the translation the whole complex of bodily organs such by Zirin 1980).

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within the competence of natural phi- (dialektos), every speech is kind of voice losophy, i.e., physics. (phóné) and every consciously produced But at the same time our language voice is kind of noise (psofos), but not also exceeds our bodies, makes itself vice versa. Aristotle ascribes voice only semi-independent (or let’s say it has an to those living beings which produce objective existence in the world) and noise via their respiratory system. This therefore it is accessible to others. For is a physiological requirement. But the that very reason, we are able to study the voice must be caused by the souls of language per se, language as a system. It animals and it must be accompanied is this perspective that Aristotle applies by phantasmata. This is a psychological when studying the parts of our language requirement.19 Next, he distinguishes (in his Poetics), the effects of our speech the speech-kind of voice and he names acts (in his Rhetoric) and the rules of our it dialektos. Dialektos is an articulated linguistically expressed reasoning in voice. So, there is a physiological require- his writings on logic (Cat., De Int., APr, ment of articulation, which in fact is APo, Top., SE). the ability of an animal to join the dis- Therefore, reconstruction of Aris- crete units of voice into more complex totle’s theory of language could be suc- units according to some rules. And as cessful only when we apply a more inte- far as these rules are concerned, there grationist approach. Only then it will be is also a social requirement for the way possible to explain how Aristotle’s views in which speech is transmitted from of language (laden by different perspec- one individual to another in the liv- tives and different goals of study) are ing community. Finally, on top of that, connected to each other. Aristotle recognized even logos which is a species-specific kind of speech attrib- Appendix: uted only to human beings and only to A terminological remark those who possess capacity of nous. But When talking about human beings I use it must be clarified that to achieve a fully the terms ‘language’ and ‘speech’ inter- developed manifestation of human lan- changeably. The reason for that is as fol- guage one has to develop it socially. lows. From Aristotle’s zoological writ- Last of all, we must not forget that for ings we can reliably extract the idea of Aristotle every linguistic assertion and logical subsumption among concepts of human language as a whole is meaning- noise, voice, speech and language.18 Hu- ful only by convention (κατὰ συνθήκην), man language (logos) is kind of speech not as an instrument.20

19 Cf. DA II.8, 420b26-32. 18 Cf. HA IV.9, 535a27-b3. 20 Cf. De Int. 17a1-2.

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abbreviations

Aristotelés DA De Anima Cat. Categories HA History of Animals De Int. De Interpretatione PA Parts of Animals APr Prior Analytics GA Generation of Animals APo Posterior Analytics Rhet. Rhetoric Top. Topics Pol. Politics SE Sophistical Refutations Phys. Physics

References

Aristotle. (2018). Physics (trans., with an In- Charles, D. (1994). “Aristotle on Names troduction and Notes by C.D.C. Reeve). and Their Signification.” In: S. Everson Indianopolis IN: Hackett Publishing (ed.), Language. Companions to Ancient Company, Inc. Thought 3, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, pp. 37-73. Bäck, A. T. (2000). Aristotle’s Theory of Predi- cation. Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill. Charles, D. (2000). Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bolton, R. (1991). “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I”. In: L. Joud- De Rijk, L. M. (2002). Aristotle. Semantics and son (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics. A Collection of Ontology. Vol. I: General Introduction. The Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1-30. Works on Logic. Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill. Castagnoli, L. & di Lascio, E. V. (2012). Falcon, A. (1997). “Aristotle Theory of Di- “Ancient Philosophy of Language”. In: vision”. In: R. R. K. Sorabji (ed.) Aristot- D. G. Fara and G. Russell (eds.), The Rout- le and After, Bulletin of the Institute of ledge companion to philosophy of language, Classical Studies. Supplementary Vol- New York: Routledge, pp. 811-826. ume 68, London, pp. 127-146.

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Irwin, T. H. (1982). “Aristotle’s Concept of Sig- Aristotle’s Science of Nature, Cambridge: nification”. In: M. Schofield and M. Nuss- Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-30. baum, Language and Logos, Cambridge: Manetti, G. (1993). Theories of the Sign in Cambridge University Press, pp. 241-266. Classical Antiquity. Bloomington: Indi- Irwin, T. H. (1988). Aristotle’s First Princi- ana University Press. ples. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McMahon, G. J. (1957) “The Prooemium to John Philoponus (2006). On Aristotle’s Phys- the Physics of Aristotle”. Laval théologique ics 1.1-3 (trans. by Catherine Osborne). et philosophique, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 9-57. London: Bloomsbury. Modrak, D. K. W. (2001). Aristotle’s Theory of Joseph, J. E. (2017). “Language in Body and Language and Meaning. Cambridge: Cam- Mind: Antiquity”. In: J. E. Joseph, Lan- bridge University Press. guage, Mind and Body. A Conceptual His- Owens, J. (1981). “The Universality of the tory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Sensible in the Aristotelian Noetic in Press, pp. 46-69. Aristotle”. In: John. R. Catan (ed.), The Kretzman, N. (1974). “Aristotle on Spo- Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, Alba- ken Sound Significant by Convention”. ny: State University of New York Press, In: J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and pp. 59-73. Its Modern Interpretations, Dordrecht: Reeve, C. D. C. (2018) Aristotle. Physics D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 3-21. (trans., with an Introduction and Notes, Laspia, P. (2018). From Biology to Linguistics: by C. D. C. Reeve). Indianopolis IN: Hack- Definition of Arthron in Aristotle’s Poetics. ett Publishing Company, Inc. UNIPA Springer Series: Springer. Ross, W. D. (1936). Aristotle. Physics (A Re- Lennox J. G. (2010). “How to study natural vised Text with Introduction and Com- bodies: Aristotle’s μέθοδος”. In: M. Le- mentary by W. D. Ross). Oxford: Claren- unissen (ed.) Explanation and Teleology in don Press.

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Themistius (2012). On Aristotle’s Phys- Whitaker, C. W. A. (1996). Aristotle’s De in- ics 1-3 (trans. by R. B. Todd). London: terpretatione: contradiction and dialectic. Bloomsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Thomas Acquinas (1963). Commentary on Zirin, R. A. (1974). “Inarticulate noises” Aristotle‘s Physics (Book I a II) (trans. In: J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and by R. J. Blackwell, R. J. Spath & W. E. Its Modern Interpretations, Dordrecht: Thirlkel). Yale: Yale University Press. D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 23-25.

Walz, M. D. (2006). “The Opening of “On Zirin, R. A. (1980). “Aristotle’s Biology of Interpretation”: Toward a More Liter- Language”. Transactions of the American al Reading”. Phronesis, Vol. 51, No. 3, Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 110, pp. 230-251. pp. 325-347.

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Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics

Maciej Smolak abstract Institute of Philosophy Abstract: In NE III.2 1112a13 Aristotle Department of Ethics raises the following question: “What Jagiellonian University is προαίρεσις?”. But προαίρεσις has Grodzka 52 different meanings and it is practically 33 332 Cracow untranslatable into modern languages, Poland as are most crucial terms of classical [email protected] Greek. In this article, the author attempts to explain what προαίρεσις is for Aristotle. The author first presents the etymology of the term προαίρεσις based upon Aristotle’s remarks in his ethical treatises and shows that the term does not reflect what προαίρεσις is for him. Second, the author outlines characteristics of the uncontrolled person and indicates, on this ground, what Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is not. Finally, the author points out that προαίρεσις in the full sense involves two elements – the orectical-deliberative element and the decisional-functional element – and sketches out their features.

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Introduction Greek2. However, it does not mean that In NE III.2 1112a13 Aristotle raises προαίρεσις cannot be understood. Thus, the following question: “What is an attempt at interpreting Aristotle’s προαίρεσις?”, whereas in EE II.10 προαίρεσις is not a completely hopeless 1225b19-20, he notes that one might task. Nonetheless, one must be careful be in doubt about the genus to which not to be tempted to replace προαίρεσις προαίρεσις belongs. But contemporary with one word or to narrow its many commentators have bigger doubts as to what προαίρεσις is. For this term has 2 It should be noted that the main Greek 1 terms are in principle untranslatable into several meanings and it is practically modern languages: ἀρετή, εὐδαιμονία, untranslatable into modern languages, ψυχή or just προαίρεσις are examples of as are most crucial terms of classical such terms. This is due to the fact that they occur in a different and temporally distant cultural reality. The practice 1 The term προαίρεσις occurs in different contexts and may mean, for example, of using a one-word equivalent for the “choice”, “decision”, “purpose”, “under- Greek notion is essentially an obstacle to taking”. On the notion of προαίρεσις becoming acquainted with semantic var- and the number of appearances of it in iability of it in different contexts. Thus, Greek writing or language, see Gauthier some commentators think that basic and Jolif (in Aristotle (1959), pp. 189-190). Greek terms should be left in transliter- See also Formichelli (2009), pp. 21-32 who ation or in Greek font and they ought to additionally presents the occurrence of be treated as tool words with different προαίρεσις in the Aristotelian Corpus. meanings, see e.g., Adkins (1972), p. 4.

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meanings down to only one3. That is why προαίρεσις of ἀκρατής is decent, it will I will not translate this term throughout be a problem to distinguish between the the paper and leave it in the original character of the uncontrolled person and version4. the character of the decent person or the This article consists of three sec- serious one. Therefore, I outline features tions. In the first section, I present the of the uncontrolled person, especially, etymology of the term προαίρεσις based of the melancholic and weak one. Next, upon Aristotle’s remarks in his ethical I consider an example of an uncontrolled treatises and show that etymological behavior that can be useful for under- comments do not reflect whatπροαίρεσις standing προαίρεσις. I try to indicate, is for Aristotle himself. on that basis, what Aristotle’s προαίρεσις In the second section, I refer to the is not. I put forward a suggestion that passage NE VII.10 1152a15-24 in which προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- Aristotle claims, among others things, ing to Aristotle, is none of the things that ἀκρατής or the uncontrolled per- included in a list of features, nor their son has a decent προαίρεσις. This raises arrangement. Hence, προαίρεσις can- a question, because he insists in another not be reduced to any of these features: place that προαίρεσις verifies human char- setting a goal nor to thoughtful under- acters better than actions (III.2 1111b6)5. taking nor to preferential choice, i.e., Thus, there is the following puzzle: If choice of one course of action rather than another, nor to deciding about proceed- 3 See e.g., Nielsen (2011), p. 385, note 6) ing with the realization of a thoughtful who suggests that προαίρεσις is a tricky term. undertaking or a preferentially chosen 4 Commentators differently translate the course of action nor to deciding about term προαίρεσις used by Aristotle in proceeding with what is chronologically Ethics. See e.g., Aquinas, Thomas (in Ar- istoteles (1949)) – electio; Irwin (in Aris- first in the sequence of steps which lead totle (1985)) – decision; Crisp (in Aristotle to reaching the set goal. At all events, (2000)) – rational choice; Dirlmeier (in Ar- προαίρεσις ought to be something more istoteles (1962)) – Entscheidung; Gauth- ier i Jolif (in Aristote (1958)) – décision; than the configuration of them, that is, if Gromska (in Arystoteles (1956)) – pos- προαίρεσις is to be understood as a better tanowienie (in English – resolution); Ken- ny (1979) – purposive choice or choice; Os- verifier of human characters than actions. twald (in Aristotle (1962)) – choice, but see In the third section, I attempt to also Glossary – choice, or moral choice; demonstrate that προαίρεσις, as inter- Sorabji (1980) – deliberative choice; Tricot (in Aristote (1959)) – choix préférentiel; preted by Aristotle, consists of two Wróblewski (in Arystoteles (1977)) – pos- elements – the orectical-deliberative tanowienie, czyli świadomy wybór (in element and the decisional-functional English – resolution, that is, conscious choice); Zanatta (in Aristoteles (2012)) – element – and I try to sketch out their scelta deliberata. features. 5 Cf. EE II.11 1228a2-3 and 1228a11; but see also 1228a15-17: “Furthermore, it is because it is not easy to discern what to verify from the deeds what sort of per- sort of προαίρεσις it is that we are forced son someone is”.

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I. The etymology of the doing what is chronologically first in the term προαίρεσις in Aristotle’s deliberated sequence of steps which lead Ethics to achieving the set goal9 – temporal as The term προαίρεσις consists of an “first in action”. adverb πρό (before) and a noun αἵρεσις However, it must be added that there (choosing or taking, seizing, grasp- is another understanding of the adverb ing with the hand). Literally, it means πρό. It is underlined by Nielsen ([2011]: “choosing one thing before another” or 408) that the preferential and temporal “taking one thing before another”. The understanding are not exhaustive. The adverb πρό, however, can be understood adverb πρό can emphasize that the agent preferentially or temporally6. picks out the act for the sake of a specific The first interpretation would sug- goal and takes the position in front of gest that προαίρεσις is a preferential it with the purpose to defend it10. Thus, choice, i.e. a choice of one thing in πρό in προαίρεσις can also accentuate preference to another or a choice of one the idea that the agent is about to pro- course of action in preference to an- tect a certain goal in order to achieve other7. Thus, προαίρεσις would require it11. What, however, does Aristotle him- a comparison of alternatives. self say about the etymology of the term In the case of the second interpreta- προαίρεσις? tion the point can be understood in two In EE II.10 1226b2-8 – after empha- ways: a] the adverb πρό can underline sizing προαίρεσις is neither belief (δόξα) the point that προαίρεσις is made on nor wanting (βούλησις)12 – Aristotle the basis of deliberation that is prior to 9 The partisan of the second temporal action8 – temporal as “before the action”; understanding of the adverb πρό is e.g., b] the adverb πρό can stresses the point Joachim (1955), pp. 100-101. that προαίρεσις means to decide about 10 “This is a use of ‘pro’ that is evident in expression such as ‘stēnai pro Trōōn’: 6 See e.g., Brown (in Aristotle (2009), p. 220) standing in front of, and hence in defense who maintains that the adverb πρό – in of, the Trojans. Latin uses ‘pro’ in a sim- προαίρεσις – means both “before” and ilar sense in expressions such as ‘pro “in preference to”. However, she suggests bono’ (an abbreviation of ‘pro bono pu- that the first meaning emphasizes what blico’, for the common good)”, Nielsen happened before the action. She says (2011), p. 408, note 39. See also Bostock that “choice is of one course of action (2000), p. 39, note 21 who insists that rather than another, but it also […] is what “‘choice-for-the-sake-of’, i.e., a choice has been decided by an earlier delibera- made with some definite end in view” fits tion (i.e. before the action)”. to Aristotle’s account of προαίρεσις. 7 The partisan of preferential understand- 11 Nielsen (ibidem), p. 408 thinks that ing of the adverb πρό is, e.g., Aquinas, Aristotle wants us to hear all three senses Thomas (1949), p. 128. of the adverb πρό in προαίρεσις. 8 The partisan of the first temporal under- 12 A few lines earlier Aristotle excludes standing of the adverb πρό is e.g., Irwin the possibility that προαίρεσις could (1999) who points out in his comment to mean appetite (ἐπιθυμία) or spirited- NE III.2 1112a15-17 that “what is decided is ness (θυμός), because both types of what has been previously deliberated (to desire are typical for animals, whereas probebouleumenon)”. προαίρεσις does not occur in animals (EE

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comes to the conclusion that προαίρεσις Aristotle poses the question whether is the result of the combination of both the object of προαίρεσις is what has these things. For they are present dur- been obtained by prior deliberation ing realization of προαίρεσις. And he (τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;; a15). The ques- underlines that it is also shown, if only tion seems rhetorical, as Aristotle adds to a certain extent (δηλοῖ δέ πως; b6), in “προαίρεσις is connected with calcula- the name itself for “προαίρεσις is choos- tion and thought – and even the name ing/taking; not simply, but one thing appears to signify that the object of before another, and this is not possible προαίρεσις is in fact choosing/taking without examination and deliberation. before another”15. Therefore,προαίρεσις is the outcome of In MM16 I.17 – after underscoring that deliberative belief”13. προαίρεσις is not the same as βούλησις In NE III.2 1112a13-17 – after un- (1189a12-13)17 – the Author states that derlining that προαίρεσις is not one προαίρεσις is as its name suggests: of the things discussed before, i.e. “Therefore, whenever wetake the better in ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις, δόξα14 – exchange for the worse – when it is a matter of choice – the term ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι’ II.10 1225b26-27). Indeed, προαίρεσις is 18 a distinct feature of human beings. And would seem to be correctly used” . probably for this reason too, Aristotle thinks that προαίρεσις can be a human true or false (see EE II.10 1225b26-1226b2 trait on the basis of which people’s char- and NE III.2 1111b12-1112a11). acters are better fixed. 15 ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. 13 ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑποσημαίνειν δ’ ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου πρὸ ἑτέρου· πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν; NE III.2, 1112a15-17. τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ 16 There are disputes as to the authentici- βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ ty of the MM. Some commentators argue προαίρεσις; EE II.10 1226b6-9. that MM is the work of Aristotle (see e.g. 14 In both Ethics Aristotle indicates certain Schleiermacher (1835), Düring (1966)). features of προαίρεσις based on the out- Others claim it is not (see e.g. Jaeger lined distinctions between προαίρεσις and (1923), Kenny (1978). Bobonich (2006) re- four other phenomena of ψυχή, namely marks that some ethical analyses in MM appetite (ἐπιθυμία), spiritedness (θυμός), differ from analogical analyses in EE and wanting (βούλησις) and belief (δόξα). By NE. And this is – in my opinion – the case juxtaposing προαίρεσις with ἐπιθυμία with etymology of προαίρεσις. For in MM the explanation is founded on the and θυμός, he concludes that προαίρεσις preposition ἀντί, while in EE and NE it is concerns the “good” or “bad”, whereas founded on the adverb πρό (see, howev- ἐπιθυμία and θυμός concern the “plea- er, note. 19). sure” or “pain”. Against the background of the distinction between προαίρεσις and 17 A few lines earlier the author of MM βούλησις, he shows that προαίρεσις has declares that προαίρεσις is not desire only to deal with things that depend on (ὄρεξις) by referring to an argument, us and are doable, whereas βούλησις may which is analogical to the argument in EE also refer to things that do not depend (see note 12). But there is a difference, for on us and are not doable. In turn, when in EE II.10 1225b25-26 ὄρεξις is the general it comes to the discrepancy between term for three types of desires, i.e., appe- προαίρεσις and δόξα, he argues that tite, spiritedness and wanting, while in προαίρεσις is classified on the basis of MM ὄρεξις refers rather to the first two. whether it is good or bad, whereas δόξα 18 ὅταν οὖν ἀντικαταλλαττώμεθα τὸ βέλ- is classified on the basis of whether it is τιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἐν αἱρέσει ὄντος,

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Etymological notes do not exclude goal. It is true that he permits situations preferential nor temporal meanings of in which a given goal can be achieved the adverb πρό19. But Aristotle clearly in many ways. Then, in such circum- emphasizes that προαίρεσις remains stances, the task of deliberation is, in close relation with calculation and first of all, to find the easiest and finest thought20. So, there are reasons to way to do so (1112b17). In this sense, assume that the adverb πρό refers pri- προαίρεσις could take the form of a pref- marily, in the case of προαίρεσις, to de- erential choice and to be a choice of one liberation (βούλευσις), that is, to prac- of several alternatives that have been tical thought which precedes an action previously considered. But it does not that ought to lead to achievement of a set follow that it must be so and thus, that goal. Indeed, the deliberation consists a preferential choice is the constitutive in discovering and developing a reliable component of προαίρεσις. There are way to the realization of the established also situations in which the established goal. However, it does not follow that goal can be achieved through only one προαίρεσις involves the consideration means. In such circumstances, the task of alternatives and choosing only one of deliberation is to consider how it will of them. come about through this means and In NE III.3, where Aristotle stud- how this one can be obtained (b17-18). ies deliberation, it is shown that it is Thus, προαίρεσις does not have to take a search which relies on finding the the form of a preferential choice. It does means needed to achieve the designated not have to be “choice of one thing in preference to another or of one course ἐνταῦθα τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δόξειεν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι; MM I.17 1189a14-17. of action in preference to another”. What 19 In MM the adverb πρό appears in I.17 is required for προαίρεσις is to perform 1189a34, where the author points out some sort of intellectual work, that is to an inseparable connection between προαίρεσις and thought: “If, then, make an investigation combined with προαίρεσις is certain desire, [that is] analysis (ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν; b20) and determined by deliberation, [that is] finally to discover εὑρεῖν( ; b19) the way acompanied with thought (Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ προαίρεσις ὄρεξίς τις βουλευτικὴ μετὰ that guarantees the accomplishment of διανοίας), the ‘voluntary’ cannot be iden- designated goal. But it is necessary to tical with ‘προαιρετόν’. For we do many things voluntarily before thinking and add that the process of seeking may be deliberating about them (ἑκόντες γὰρ successfully completed, when such a way πολλὰ πράττομεν πρὸ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι is possible at all and the discovered way καὶ βουλεύσασθαι) – for instance, we sit down and stand up, and do many other is possible for the person who was look- things like that voluntarily but without ing for it. having thought about them – whereas each action taken in accordance with Thus, the preferential interpretation προαίρεσις is in connection with thought” of the adverb πρό can be misleading. (1189a32-1189b1). For προαίρεσις does not have to include 20 On the matter of close relation between προαίρεσις and deliberation in MM, see the choice of one thing in preference note 19. to another. In this sense, the temporal

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interpretation of the adverb πρό is more reflect what it is for him. Admittedly, the promising, because πρό can stress that Greek term does not reflect the relation a thoughtful undertaking has come into between deliberation and desire in real- play in προαίρεσις and therefore, it could ized προαίρεσις. Furthermore, it does simply be taking on something after not indicate the connection between prior deliberation. However, it may well προαίρεσις and action. suggest that it is about taking on some- Let’s repeat again, Aristotle under- thing that was indicated by deliberation lines the point that προαίρεσις means as chronologically first in the sequence desire qualified by deliberation of steps which lead to the achievement (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις; 1113a11). This could of the goal laid down. suggest that προαίρεσις signifies desire The temporal interpretation of the which has gained an imprimatur of rea- adverb πρό seems to be confirmed by son23. Hence, it becomes a real desire the summary note of III.3. Aristotle to achieve a goal in accordance with an underlines that προαίρεσις is desire, algorithm elaborated in the framework determined by deliberation, for some- of deliberation. After all, wanting a goal thing that is up to us21. The statement is equivalent to wanting reliable means draws attention to the connection of to achieve it, but only those that are in προαίρεσις, βούλευσις and ὄρεξις, and our power. it is also important because of this con- I think, however, that Aristotle is nection. However, it does not follow that interested in something more. I will it is impossible to maintain the prefer- try to demonstrate that Aristotle’s ential interpretation of the adverb πρό. προαίρεσις consists of: a] setting the Rather, the point is that the application goal; b] thoughtful undertaking or of the adverb πρό is not limited to its preferential choice, where both assume preferential understanding. Thus, given deliberation about how to achieve the situations in which various alternatives designated goal but second requires of action must be considered, it may be suggested that in some contexts the pref- 23 See e.g., Charles (2011), p 204 who sug- erential understanding of the adverb gests that προαίρεσις (‘preferential choice’ in his translation) is not “a com- πρό is not wrong. bination of intellect and desire but rath- However, it must be added that er a distinctive type of state: intellectual desire or desiderative intellect”. It Aristotle introduces his etymological could be added that in EE II.10 1225b20 remarks using phrases22 that seem to Aristotle raises the following question: suggest that the explanation of the ori- “Where to locate προαίρεσις?” and he does not answer this question. In NE he gin of the term προαίρεσις does not fully does not even pose a similar question. Perhaps this is because προαίρεσις ful- fills the function of the link which merges 21 ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις the rational and irrational dimension of ; τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν EN III.3 1113a10-11. ψυχή into a harmonious whole. Thus, it 22 See δηλοῖ δέ πως; EE II.10 1226b6; ἔοικε is difficult to formulate an unambiguous [...] ὡς; NE III.2 1112a16-17; δόξειεν ἂν; MM answer to the question “Where to locate I.17 1189a17. προαίρεσις?”.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 85 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics deliberation on alternative courses of both what they are doing and for the action; c] making the decision about sake of what they are doing it – they are proceeding with a thoughtful under- not wicked; their προαίρεσις is decent. taking or preferentially chosen course of As a consequence, they are only half- action; d) proceeding with the realiza- wicked. They are not unjust either, since tion of the determined course of action, they do not draw up an action plan of that is, taking on what has been deter- their bad deeds. One type of the uncon- mined by deliberation as chronologically trolled person is not apt to abide by first in the sequence of steps that lead the results of their deliberation, while to the achievement of the designated another, the melancholic type is not goal; e] continuation of action that leads even apt to deliberate at all. So, the un- to the achievement of that goal. Thus, controlled person is like a city-state that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in the full sense passes all the indispensable decrees and ought to contain these five moments has serious laws, but it makes no use of or features. This claim can be shown them”25. through the study of προαίρεσις in the case of the uncontrolled person. Aristotle points to general features of the uncontrolled person. They act II. The uncontrolled voluntarily, because they are aware of person and προαίρεσις what they are doing and in a way for In NE VII.7 1150b19-28 Aristotle shows what goal. Thus, they are responsible two basic kinds of uncontrolled per- for their acts. Furthermore, they do bad son: the impetuous uncontrolled per- things. But they are not unjust, even son (προπετής ἀκρατής) and the weak though they do unjust things. For they one (ἀσθενής ἀκρατής). He addition- lack vicious dispositions or acquired ally distinguishes within the first type states of being able to act unjustly26. the melancholic uncontrolled person So, if they act unjustly, they will not (μελαγχολικός ἀκρατής) and the swift do it deliberately. Indeed, they are not one (ὀξύς ἀκρατής)24. When it comes to plotters27. He also maintains that they Aristotle’s interpretation of προαίρεσις, are not wicked, but only half-wicked it is NE VII.10 1152a15-20 that deserves 25 οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ’ ὡς attention: ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ “So the uncontrolled person is not like ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ’ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ’ ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· those who know and have regard for οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ their knowledge, but like those who ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. are asleep or drunk. Although they act καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται voluntarily – for they know in a way μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν; NE VII.10 1152a14-21. 24 On the matter of typology of uncontrolled persons, see e.g. Charles (2011), 26 See e.g., NE V.8 1135b24 or VII.8 1151a10-11. pp. 187-209. 27 See e.g., NE V.8 1135b20.

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(ἡμιπόνηρος; a18). We can surmise why drunk when they are doing something. they are wicked from the expression Thus, they surrender to desires of irra- “half-wicked” – their actions are bad. tional psuchē and do not follow their But why are they only half-wicked? Are selves as rational beings. As a result of they only half-wicked, because they the lack of self-control, they listen to lack vicious dispositions or acquired another aspect of themselves which does states of being able to do bad things? not fulfill, however, the function of an Possibly, but Aristotle insists that their authoritative element in the structure of προαίρεσις is decent (ἐπιεικής). a human being. Nonetheless, Aristotle In this passage προαίρεσις is, at first speaks about two different types of the glance, a general goal. That is what the uncontrolled person and the difference analogy with a state’s laws refers to. between them that can throw light on For the uncontrolled person possesses our understanding of προαίρεσις. knowledge about things they ought to The lack of self-control ἀκρασία( ) is never do in their life28. In other words, brought on by excessive desire in the it seems that in this context Aristotle case of the melancholic uncontrolled understands προαίρεσις either as a gen- person. And for this reason, they do eral policy in life reflecting the person’s not deliberate at all. In consequence, understanding of eudaimonia or as a goal they do not deliberate before acting. that leads us in pursuit of eudaimonia. Thus, it is not possible to observe dis- After all, the uncontrolled person is like sonance between the elaborated action a city-state that has serious laws, but plan and the actual course of action in makes use of none of them. Indeed, they their case. In fact, they do not take any possess knowledge – the equivalent of action plan because of their impulsive- serious laws – but they do not use it. ness. That is why they act on the spur of For they are like being in a dream or the moment29. Thus, in the matter of the melancholic uncontrolled person, when 28 See e.g., NE IX.8 where Aristotle studies an aporia as to whether one ought to love Aristotle says that the lack of self-control oneself or someone else more (πότερον is contrary to one’s προαίρεσις he prob- δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά; ably has in mind προαίρεσις as a gen- 1168a28-29.). He shows that people criticize those who love themselves most and con- eral goal. And since προαίρεσις of every demn them as “self-lover” in general (a29-30). uncontrolled person is decent, we can And he stresses that they also accuse them of doing nothing apart from what concerns their assume that a general policy of life will own good (a31-33). So, those who make a val- ue judgement in saying this, must possess knowledge that selfishness is a bad thing. But at the same time he underlines that such peo- 29 It should be noted that the swift uncon- ple or most of them do not use that knowl- trolled person is also guided by emotion edge and satisfy their appetites or non-ratio- (see e.g. NE VII.7 1150b21-22). But they are nal aspect of their psuchē at the expense different from the melancholic uncon- of others (1168b15-22). And it ought to be trolled person for they deliberate to some added that they satisfy their non-rational extent, though, as a result of an impet- aspect of their psuchē at their own ex- uous desire, they are unable to complete pense as rational beings. it. See e.g., Charles (2011), p. 194.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 87 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics be decent in the case of the melancholic practical, though they finish their delib- uncontrolled person. eration and reach the good result from The lack of self-control of the weak the point of view of some goal held fixed uncontrolled person is brought on by in mind. In other words, they do not weak desires. But they are able to delib- realize what they have planned because erate (βουλευτικός). In fact, they can of their unstable character, that is to deliberate before taking action that say, on account of their vulnerability ought to lead to realization of the des- to be affected by non-insistent πάθη. ignated goal. And they are capable of There are discrepancies between their deliberating by using a “moving back” action plan and what they actually do. strategy. They can begin the calculation Thus, the weak uncontrolled person is from the desired situation and finish it not so bad as to reach the level of inter- after they get to the initial situation. nal integrity that would confirm that Thus, they commence with the goal and they focus their life on an evil goal and move backwards through means, until strive for it deliberately32. And when they arrive at the first cause, which is Aristotle says that the lack of self-control the last in the process of discovery. As is contrary to one’s προαίρεσις he must a result, they discover the sequence of have something more in mind about steps that they are to follow, where the προαίρεσις than it was in the case of the last is the first one to take. Indeed, those melancholic uncontrolled person. Since who deliberate ought to investigate and the weak uncontrolled person deliber- to analyze as with a geometrical figure30. ates before taking action and reaches Nevertheless, they do not stand by what the conclusion, their προαίρεσις will they have deliberated as a result of their include a thoughtful undertaking or susceptibility to relatively weak affective reactions (πάθη)31. Thus, they fail to be καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ’ ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ 30 “For the person who deliberates seems ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί). It is clear, that to investigate and to analyze [...], as he Aristotle has in mind the weak uncon- would in the case of a geometrical figure” trolled person when he declares that the (ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ latter are overcome by less pathē than ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ most people. ; διάγραμμα NE III.3 1112b20-21). 32 For Aristotle, a truly bad person has a cor- 31 See e.g., NE VII.8 1151a1-5: “Among uncon- rupt character (κακός, πονηρός). They trolled people those who are excitable are characterized by an inner harmony are better than those who have [action] between rational and sensorical-orectical plan but do not stand by it. For the lat- functions of ψυχή. A sign of this harmo- ter are overcome by less affective reac- ny is a combination of character defects tion and, unlike former, are not without (ἠθικαί κακιαί), i.e. competences of ψυχή prior deliberation. For the [latter] uncon- in sensorical-orectical function, and cun- trolled person is like those who are ning (πανουργία), i.e., competence of rea- quickly drunk and after little wine, that son in practical function. In fact, persons is, after less than most people” (αὐτῶν with a corrupt character are the master δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ of evil, because they take actions based τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες on προαίρεσις and for themselves (see δέ· ὑπ’ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, e.g., NE VII.7 1150a20).

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a preferential choice, depending on the proceeding with the realization of the situation. And since προαίρεσις of every determined course of action, that is, uncontrolled person is decent, we can taking on what has been determined assume that both a general policy of life by deliberation as chronologically first and a thoughtful undertaking or prefer- in the sequence of steps that lead to ential choice will be decent in the case of the achievement of the designated goal the weak uncontrolled person. within the framework of the action plan As a consequence, προαίρεσις of developed. To show it, I will consider the melancholic uncontrolled person a certain example of behavior of the differs from προαίρεσις of the weak uncontrolled person. uncontrolled person, although both We can imagine the uncontrolled are decent: προαίρεσις of the first will person who realizes that they have an be limited to the setting of some goal obesity problem. And we can assume (which is not bad); προαίρεσις of the sec- that they deliberate before acting and ond is something more, because delib- consider possible action plans that eration is always a search for the means would help them lose weight. For exam- in light of having set down the goal. And ple, they take into account eating less since they conclude their deliberation, sweets or jogging regularly, or following they will end it with a thoughtful under- a slimming diet combined with physical taking or preferential choice. activity33. Major characteristics of the weak Let us assume that our uncontrolled uncontrolled person allow to assume person comes to the conclusion, as that προαίρεσις is the combination of a result of their own deliberation, that setting some goal and result of delib- the last possibility is the most prom- eration about how to achieve it. How- ising. They are going to change their ever, the deliberation is ended when it is eating habits and start exercising reg- completed by a thoughtful undertaking ularly. However, they know little about or preferential choice. Consequently, diets and slimming exercises. So, they we could assume that προαίρεσις of the plan to seek advice of a dietitian and to weak uncontrolled person includes such consult with a personal trainer. Thus, an undertaking or choice. they make the preferential choice of one But it can be shown, against the background of the uncontrolled per- 33 Thus, there will be a preferential choice son’s behavior, that could only apply to in the proposed example. However, it is already known that a preferential the weak one, that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις choice does not have to be an element of is not limited to a thoughtful undertak- προαίρεσις. Of course, the example could ing or preferential choice. I am going be modified, because we could assume that our uncontrolled person considers to show that προαίρεσις of the uncon- only one way to lose weight – for exam- trolled person could include making ple, a slimming diet combined with physical activity – and ends the deliberation the decision about proceeding with the with the thoughtful undertaking and not realization of an action plan or even with the preferential choice.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 89 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics course of action and decide to start the not surprising, since the uncontrolled weight loss process from what is chron- person goes against προαίρεσις (see e.g., ologically first in the sequence of steps NE VII.8 1151a7). that will lead to the achievement of the However, what type of uncontrolled goal. In consequence, they try to register person is in our example? No doubt, it in a diet counseling center. is not the melancholic one, because they Hence, we can acknowledge that our do not deliberate before acting. But is it uncontrolled person comes to the decent the weak one? It might be, though it is προαίρεσις, which is not reduced only not clear, since our uncontrolled person to the setting of the goal, that is, the makes the decision about proceeding losing weight (the goal that harmonizes with a preferentially chosen course of with the general policy in life reflecting action and even tries to take on what person’s understanding of eudaimonia). has been determined by deliberation as But their προαίρεσις also includes the chronologically first in the sequence of preferential choice, making the deci- steps that lead to the achievement of the sion about proceeding to the realization designated goal. Nonetheless, if a person of the action plan and even proceeding is not serious, there will be room for the with the realization of the determined lack of self-control, because it is caused course of action. by conflict within the desires of psuchē Let us imagine that they could not between what is good and what is pleas- register in a diet counseling because of ant (EE VII.2 1237a7-9). an objective reason – it is, for instance, But it is significant that Aristotle too late and the counseling center is attributes προαίρεσις a special role. He already closed. Thus, they put off the be- emphasizes that human characters are ginning of the weight loss process until better verified by προαίρεσις than by the next day. But the next day they do action (NE III.2 1111b6). This is why, we not keep their preferential choice and judge who someone is on the grounds do not put what they decided to do the of προαίρεσις (EE II.11 1228a2-3). But previous day into action – they do not it is hard to accept that it is possible to proceed with fulfilling the action plan say “they are the uncontrolled persons”, and do not register in a diet counseling if we only consider their προαίρεσις – center. But they abandon it not because it after all, their προαίρεσις is decent. In is beyond their power. It is rather caused fact, we will be able to recognize that by their characteristic instability – in- someone is the uncontrolled person if stead of reaching for a telephone, they we take into account not only their gen- grasp something sweet. Consequently, eral policy in life, but also their prefer- their προαίρεσις is decent, but what they ential choice or thoughtful undertaking actually do does not follow their plans and even their decision about proceed- and even their decision about proceeding with realization of designated goal ing with realization of a preferentially in line with accepted action plan. Our chosen course of action. The result is example ultimately has a gap between

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what has happened before the potential to be limited to setting a goal nor to beginning of realizing the designated a thoughtful undertaking nor to a pref- goal and the actual beginning or imple- erential choice nor to the configuration mentation of that goal. When there is of them. But it also seems to imply that no such interval, it is difficult to deter- προαίρεσις can be something more than mine what the scope of the activity of deciding about proceeding with real- προαίρεσις is. So, it is not clear whether ization of what has been thoughtfully the activity of προαίρεσις ends before undertaken or preferentially chosen. the action starts or whether it overlaps If such a view was wrong, it would be with the action. But the occurrence of questionable that human characters the interval allows us to assume that are better defined by προαίρεσις than the activity of προαίρεσις does really by action36. We would have a prob- overlap with action and it is a specific lem with distinguishing between the moment of it, at least in the sense that uncontrolled person and the decent προαίρεσις starts the action. Ultimately, person (ἐπιεικής) or the serious one Aristotle underlines the point that (σπουδαῖος), since προαίρεσις of second “προαίρεσις is the origin of action – and third person is also decent. After that from which the motion begins”34. all, Aristotle often identifies the decent But we could add that προαίρεσις is the person with serious one37. beginning to a higher degree than the moment of starting something, because III. What is προαίρεσις for προαίρεσις not only begins the action, Aristotle? but it is also responsible for its course. I have suggested, at the end of section 1, For the adverb πρό in προαίρεσις can that προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- also point out that the agents pick out ing to Aristotle, ought to consist of: the act for the sake of a specific goal and a] setting the goal; b] thoughtful under- take the position in front of it with the taking or preferential choice, where purpose of defending it, which means both assume deliberation about how to they aim to achieve the set goal to the achieve the designated goal but second best of their ability35. requires deliberation on alternative Thus, the example seems to sug- courses of action; c] making the decision gest that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is not 36 It does not have to be understood that human characters are defined solely 34 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν with reference to προαίρεσις, and the ἡ κίνησις; NE VI.2 1139a31-32. actions do not matter. Of course, they are 35 Thus, there is the question – whether the important. But the actions themselves activity of προαίρεσις extends only to the are insufficient (see e.g.,NE V.8 1135b2-8). commencement of action or does it go And there would be also a problem with on during the action and eventually ends distinction between the uncontrolled with (successful) completion of it. As person and the truly bad person (see Broadie (1991), p. 212 notes, “a prohairetic note 32) without taking into account response […] is always […] posed for pos- προαίρεσις. sible revision”. 37 See e.g., NE IX.4 1166a12-33.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 91 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics about proceeding with a thoughtful Next, I have considered an example undertaking or preferentially chosen of an uncontrolled behavior and against course of action; d) proceeding with the the background of it I have shown that realization of the determined course of Aristotle’s προαίρεσις can also include action, that is, taking on what has been making the decision about proceeding to determined by deliberation as chrono- the realization of an action plan and even logically first in the sequence of steps the attempt to take on what has been that lead to the achievement of the des- determined by deliberation as chrono- ignated goal; e] continuation of action logically first in the sequence of steps that leads to the achievement of that that lead to achieve the goal within the goal. Thus, Aristotle’s προαίρεσις can framework of the action plan developed. not be reduced to any of the moments But Aristotle attributes προαίρεσις included in points a], b], c] and d], nor a special role, because he emphasizes to their arrangement. that human characters are better veri- To show that προαίρεσις consists of fied byπροαίρεσις than by action. How- these five moments listed above, I have ever, the above-mentioned moments outlined features of the uncontrolled in points a], b], c] and d] as well as person, especially, of the melancholic the configuration of them can belong and weak one, based on the passage to a certain kind of the uncontrolled NE VII.10 1152a15-24. Aristotle under- person38. So, if προαίρεσις of ἀκρατής lines the fact that προαίρεσις of every is decent, it will be a problem to dis- uncontrolled person is decent. Since tinguish between the character of the the melancholic uncontrolled person uncontrolled person and the character does not deliberate before acting I have of the decent person or the serious one. demonstrated that προαίρεσις is limited Thus, Aristotle’sπροαίρεσις ought to be to a general policy of life in the case of something more, if it is to be understood them. But it turned out that προαίρεσις as a better verifier of human characters of the weak uncontrolled person is than actions. something more, because they deliber- According to the interpretation ate before taking action and conclude given at the end of section 2 “something it, i.e., they end deliberation with the good result. Therefore, theirπροαίρεσις 38 Of course, it is not the melancholic one, because they do not deliberate before may include a thoughtful undertaking acting. Nor it is the swift one, because or a preferential choice, depending on they do not conclude the deliberation situation. Indeed, major characteris- process. However, it remains the open question whether it is the weak one. tics of the weak uncontrolled person Anyway, the uncontrolled person, in our has allowed to assume that προαίρεσις example, tries to take on what has been determined by deliberation as chron- of the weak uncontrolled person is the ologically first in the sequence of steps combination of setting some goal and that lead to achieve the goal within the framework of the action plan developed. a thoughtful undertaking or a prefer- It may be that Aristotle’s typology of the ential choice. uncontrolled person is not complete.

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more” indicates that the activity of I can not fail to owe a debt of gratitude προαίρεσις overlaps with the action. to Petrycy, Sebastian z Pilzna (old print But the activity of it is not limited to [1608]; reprint [in:] Arystoteles [2011]: the start of the action. The uncontrolled 205-217) who translates προαίρεσις by person, in our example, tries to begin “choice or undertaking”. In my opin- the action with what is chronologically ion40, the expression is not used acci- first in the sequence of steps which lead dentally. I think he tries to demonstrate to reaching the set goal. Therefore, that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in the full προαίρεσις must be the beginning to sense consists of: 1] “undertaking” in the a higher degree than the moment of sense of the set goal41; 2] “own choice” starting something. It not only begins in the sense of the preferential choice the action, but it is also responsible for and decision about proceeding with the its course. And that is why προαίρεσις process of realization of the set goal in takes also into account the third un- accordance with accepted action plan42; derstanding of the adverb πρό, that 3] “undertaking” in the sense of starting is, “πρό” as standing in front of, and and continuation of the action that leads hence in defense of something. Indeed, to the achievement of the set goal43. Thus, προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- one can get the impression that Petrycy ing to Aristotle, must also include attempts to show that: i] Aristotle’s the continuation of action that leads προαίρεσις is a kind of the link between to reaching the set goal. Thus, I think “choice” and “undertaking”; ii] “choice” Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is constituted by

two elements: the orectical-deliberative 40 See Smolak (2018), pp. 327-348. element and the decisional-functional 41 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), p. 217) element39. and my comments with respect to that in Smolak (ibidem), pp. 344-345. 42 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), 39 I was inspired by Formichelli’s distinction pp. 208-209). Petrycy distinguishes two (2009), p. 147 to look at προαίρεσις in this kinds of “choice”: “common choice” and way. For he distinguishes dispositional “own choice”. The first is “taking some- and occurrent προαίρεσις. The first accen- thing” caused by an affective reaction. tuates the fact that we have deliberated Thus, it is not made on the basis of delib- about the specific situation we are fac- eration. The second is the immanent ing, the second underlines the fact that principle of the realization of thoughtful the deliberation is effectively realized in actions, and as a consequence it is made action at that time. Furthermore, I am in on the basis of deliberation. The person debt to other commentators. As Kenny (in who makes own choice must be auc- Aristotle (2011), p. 159) suggests, “carry- tor agendi. Indeed, προαίρεσις of such ing out a monastic vow or a New Year’s a person ought to consist of preferential resolution seems to be the closest thing choice and making the decision about in modern life to making an Aristotelian proceeding with a preferentially chosen προαίρεσις (‘choice’ in his translation)”. course of action. I present my interpreta- In turn, Price (2011), pp. 309-310 notes that tion of Petrycy’s “own choice” in Smolak προαίρεσις (‘choice’ in his translation) “is (ibidem), pp. 338-342. more than a desire: when the time is due 43 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), p. 217) it becomes an attempt, and (if all goes and my comments with respect to that in well) an action”. Smolak (ibidem), pp. 345-347.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 93 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics and undertaking” are specific aspects of undertaking or to a choice of the best Aristotle’s προαίρεσις44. But it must be course of action, and both ought to lead added that each one of “understanding” to the achievement of the designated is in a different relation to “choice” of goal. Indeed, in several places Aristotle action plan. “Undertaking” in the sense indicates that προαίρεσις is “desire of 1] is prior to it; “undertaking” in the qualified by deliberation” (βουλευτικὴ sense of 2] is after it. Thus, “undertak- ὄρεξις). ing” sets boundaries for προαίρεσις. And The decisional-functional element “choice” is made within these bound- emphasizes that auctores agendus must: aries. But the boundary of “undertak- a] make the decision about proceeding ing” in the sense of 2] is movable and with realization of what they have under- it changes jointly with carrying out the taken or chosen; b] proceed with realiza- action that aims to achieve the goal al- tion of the action plan and continue on ready laid down. this path. Thus, the decision-functional So, what are the constitutive ele- element highlights two things. ments of Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in my Firstly, it accentuates that auctores interpretation? The orectical-deliber- agendus decide about proceeding with ative element underlines the fact that realization of what they have under- προαίρεσις is either a general policy in taken or chosen after deliberation and life reflecting the person’s understand- carry out what they have decided. It is ing of eudaimonia or a goal that leads important, because it may happen that us in pursuit of eudaimonia. But it also to make a decision does not have to stresses that προαίρεσις is a thoughtful result in proceeding with action. How- undertaking or a preferential choice. ever, it can not concern the situation in Thus both are preceded by deliberation, which an action is not started, because that is, by intellectual work that con- it is impossible to take such an action at sists in searching for the best course of a given moment or it is necessary to ver- action and in discovering a reliable way ify the accepted action plan as a result to accomplish the designated goal. And of the current difficulties or new data. such an examination is founded on the It is rather about the situation in which “moving back” strategy. According to it, auctores agendus do not act, even though what is at the end of the calculated way is it is up to them and failure to take an the starting point of the process which action undermines the opportunity to leads to the achievement of that goal. achieve the goal set by them. Thus, the Hence, within the orectical-deliberative decisional aspect of the decisional-func- element of προαίρεσις, the auctores agen- tional element underlines the fact that dus set the goal and come to a thoughtful the decision is fulfilled. Secondly, it shows that προαίρεσις 44 It is confirmed by Old-Polish language begins the action and defends it in its at the turn of the XVI century, because the conjunction “or” is not limited to an course. Thus,auctores agendus carry out alternative. the action which is chronologically first

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in the sequence of steps of the adopted requires deliberation on alternative action plan and they take responsibility courses of action; c] making the deci- for the realization of it. Indeed, they sion about proceeding with a thoughtful begin the realization of the action plan undertaking or preferentially chosen and also continue to implement it. There- course of action; d) proceeding with the fore, they guard against any kind of realization of the determined course of problems that could thwart the reaching action, that is, taking on what has been the set goal. Of course, it is about prob- determined by deliberation as chrono- lems that the avoidance is up to them. logically first in the sequence of steps Thus, the functional aspect of the deci- which lead to the achievement of the des- sional-functional element underlines ignated goal; e] continuation of action the fact that the sequential phases of the that leads to the achievement of that action plan are implemented. goal. In other words, προαίρεσις also The decisional-functional element overlaps with the action and take care complements the orectical-deliberative of its course. one. Hence, it seems that Aristotle’s This interpretation is not without προαίρεσις in the full sense takes place foundation, because the points a], b], when auctores agendus carry out the c] and d] are insufficient for a full as- line of action they have planned and de- sessment of human characters based cided to realize it. If indeed προαίρεσις on προαίρεσις. For Aristotle underlines better determines human characters the fact that προαίρεσις of every uncon- than actions, then it will be questiona- trolled person is decent. Meanwhile, the ble whether this criterion of προαίρεσις above-mentioned moments in points a], will be fulfilled without the deci- b], c] and d] may belong to προαίρεσις sional-functional element. of the uncontrolled person: “setting the There are also additional advantages goal as a general policy of life” (a]) is to this interpretation of προαίρεσις. It common for all kinds of the uncontrolled includes three understandings of the person; “thoughtful undertaking or adverb πρό – that is, preferential, tempo- preferential choice” (b]) appears or can ral and as standing in front of, and hence in appear as moment of προαίρεσις in the defense of something. Moreover, it makes case of the weak uncontrolled person; that such understanding of προαίρεσις “making the decision about proceeding covers its various meanings. with a thoughtful undertaking or preferentially chosen course of action and Conclusion even trying to take on what has been As I have argued, προαίρεσις in the full determined by deliberation as chrono- sense, according to Aristotle, consists of: logically first in the sequence of steps a] setting the goal; b] thoughtful under- which lead to the achievement of the des- taking or preferential choice, where ignated goal” (c] and d]) is present in the both assume deliberation about how to examined example of the uncontrolled achieve the designated goal but second behavior. But “continuation of action that

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 95 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics leads to the achievement of the set goal “choice”, in the sense of liberum arbi- in accordance with accepted action plan” trium46, does not have to be the key com- (e]) requires the agent acts from a firm ponent of προαίρεσις. and unshakeable character (NE II.4 Furthermore, it can be added that 1105a30-33). If a person is not serious, “undertaking” means “przedsięwzięcie” there will be room for lack of self-con- in the Polish language. And it contains trol (EE VII.2 1237a7-8). Indeed, the sein itself three moments from the orec- rious person is the measure in the field tical-deliberative and decisional-func- of human affairs NE( IX.4 1166a12-13), tional elements, that is, deliberative, and thus, in terms of προαίρεσις. decisional and functional. Thus, “przed- I would also like to remind the reader sięwzięcie” is: i] determined by delib- that I have mentioned, in Introduction, eration; ii] taken on the basis of deci- that the term προαίρεσις has different sion; and iii] carried out in accordance meanings and is practically untranslat- with action plan that is determined by able into modern languages, as are most deliberation. crucial terms of classical Greek. But Besides, the term “przedsięwzię- Aristotle often uses terms drawn from cie” (przed-się-wzięcie) combines ele- common language in the treatises and ments similar to those constituting reinterprets them or assigns them tech- the προαίρεσις. For it consists of the nical meanings. That is also the case of adverb “przed” – in English “before” – προαίρεσις. Thus, if I were to be tempted which has inter alia preferential and to translate προαίρεσις, I would probably temporal meaning, i.e., in principle, use the expression proposed by Petrycy, equivalent of the adverb πρό, and of Sebastian z Pilzna, that is, “choice or the noun “wzięcie” – in English “tak- undertaking”, or I would limit myself ing” – i.e., in principle, equivalent of to using the term “undertaking” 45. For the noun αἵρεσις.

45 See e.g., Rowe (in Aristotle (2002)) who renders προαίρεσις by “undertaking” in Brodie (in Aristotle (2002), p. 262) notes in several places of NE. See e.g., I.1 1094a1-2: commentary to I.1. 1094a2, Aristotle will “Every sort of expert knowledge and give προαίρεσις a stricter meaning, that every inquiry, and similarly every action is, “decision” in the context of his theo- and undertaking (προαίρεσις; a2) seems ry of deliberate action in III.2-3. Further- to seek some good”; I.4 1095a14-16: “[...] more, in the Introduction, she points out since every sort of knowledge, and every that “as we find it (that is, προαίρεσις) in undertaking (προαίρεσις; a14), seeks the non-philosophical writings of some after some good, let us say what it is of his (that is, Aristotle’s) contemporaries that we say political expertise seeks, is usually translated by ‘undertaking’ or and what the topmost of all achievable ‘policy’” (ibidem), p. 42. goods is”; I.7 1097a20-21: “[...] in every 46 See Arendt (1978), p. 62 who claims that activity and undertaking (προαίρεσις; προαίρεσις, the faculty of choice “is the a21) it is the end” [it needs to be add- arbiter between several possibilities” ed that he uses “undertaking”, when he and “In Latin, Aristotle’s faculty of choice translates tōn praktōn hapantōn (of all is liberum arbitrium”. But it must be practical undertakings) in the next line]. recalled that it is not necessary to take But it seems that προαίρεσις is not used into account “to choose between alter- as technical term in these phrases. As natives” as a part of προαίρεσις.

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abbreviations

Aristotle NE Nicomachean Ethics EE Eudemian Ethics MM Magna Moralia

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Aristote (1958). L’ Éthique à Nicomaque (In- Aristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics (Trans- troduction et Traduction par R.A. Gauth- lation by Ch. Rowe, Philosophical Intro- ier et J.Y. Jolif). Tome I. Louvain : Publi- duction and Commentary by S. Broadie). cations Universitaires. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristote (1959). L’ Éthique à Nicomaque (Intro- Aristotle (2011). The Eudemian Ethics (Trans- duction, Traduction et Commentaire par lated with an Introduction and Notes by R.A. Gauthier et J.Y. Jolif). Tome II, par- A. Kenny). Oxford: Oxford University tie 1. Louvain : Publication Universitaires. Press.

Aristote (1959). Éthique à Nicomaque (Tra- Aristotle (1985). The Nicomachean Ethics duction avec Introduction par J. Tricot). (Translated with Commentaries and Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. Glossary by T. Irwin). Indianapolis: Aristotele (2012). Etica Eudemea (Introdu- Hackett Publishing Company. zione, traduzione e note di M. Zanatta). Aristotle (1999). The Nicomachean Ethics Milano: Rizzoli. (Translated with Introduction, Notes and Aristoteles (1960). Aristotelis Opera (ex re- Glossary by T. Irwin). 2nd edition. Indi- cognition I. Bekkeri, edition altera quam anapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. curavit O. Gigon). Berolini: De Gruyter. Aristotle (2009). The Nicomachean Ethics Aristoteles (1949). Ethicorum Aristotelis ad (Translated by D. Ross. Revised with an Nichomachum (S. Thomae Aquinatis, Introduction and Notes by L. Brown). Cura et studio). Taurini: Marietti. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Arystoteles (1977). Etyka eudemejska (prze- Joachim H.H. (1955). Aristotle: The Nicoma- kład, wstęp i przypisy, W. Wróblewski). chean Ethics (ed. D.A Rees). Oxford: Clar- Warszawa: PWN. endon Press.

Arystoteles (1956). Etyka nikomachejska Kenny A. (1978). The Aristotelian Ethics. Ox- (przekład, opracowanie i wstęp, D. Grom- ford: Clarendon Press. ska). Warszawa: PWN. Kenny A. (1979). Aristotle‘s Philosophy of Ac- Arystoteles (2011). Etyka nikomachejska tion. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. (przekład, Sebastian Petrycy z Pilzna). Nielsen K.M. (2011). “Deliberation as In- Warszawa: Hachette. quiry: Aristotle’s Aletrnative to the Pre- Bobonich Ch. (2006). „Aristotle‘s Ethical sumption of Open Alternatives”. Philo- Treatises“. In: R. Kraut (ed.), The Black- sophical Review 120(3), pp. 383-421. well Guide to Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Eth- Petrycy, Sebastian z Pilzna (1608). Ethyki ics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 12-36. Arystotelesowey, To iest Iako się każdy ma Bostock D. (2000). Aristotle’s Ethics. Oxford: na swiecie rządzić, Z Dokladem Ksiąg Dzie- Oxford University Press. sięciorga Pierwsza Częsc, W Ktorey Pięcior- go Ksiąg: Pożyteczne każdemu nie tylko do Broadie S. (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. New poczciwego na świecie życia, ale też aby czło- York: Oxford University Press. wiek każdy wiedział, ktorym sposobem ma Charles D. (2011). „Akrasia: the Rest of przychodzić do nawiętβego na świecie bło- the Story?„. In: M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson gosławieństwa y sczęścia: Przydatne są do (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Ac- każdego Rozdziału Przestrogi, które trud- tion in Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford Univer- niejsze rzeczy krótko wykładają: Przydatki sity Press, pp. 187-209. też są położone na końcu Ksiąg każdych, dla gruntownieyβego rzeczy w Księgach tknio- Düring I. (1966). Aristotelis. Heidelberg: nych wyrozumienia, częścią dla zaostrzenia Carl Winter. dowicipow buynieyβych, potrzebne Przez Formichelli M.A. (2009). Aristotle’s Theo- Doktora Sebastiana Petricego Medyka. ry of Prohairesis and Its Significance for Drukarnia Macieia Iędrzeiowczyka. Accounts of Human Action and Practical Price A.W. (2011). Virtue and Reason in Plato Reasoning. Boston College Electronic and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Thesis or Dissertation, Boston College University Libraries, http://hdl.handle. Schleiermacher F. (1835). Über die ethischen net/2345/729. Werks des Aristoteles. Berlin.

Jaeger W. (1923). Aristoteles. Grundlegung Sorabji R. (1980). Necessity, Cause and Blame. einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. Ber- Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory. Ithaca lin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. NY: Cornell University Press.

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Aristotle vs. Boole: A case

of the Universe abstract I will present a case study comparing of Discourse Aristotelian and modern predicate logic. The traditional square of opposition embodied certain relations Karel Šebela between propositions. When rewritten Faculty of Arts into the language of modern logic, the Palacky University Olomouc relations embodied in the traditional Křížkovského 12 square mostly disappear. As a matter 771 80 Olomouc of fact, some conservative versions of [email protected] predicate logic, namely sortal logic, preserve relations in the square. I will argue that the explanation of the fact is that modern logic accepts the so- called principle of wholistic reference. The principle was stated initially by Boole with respect to his concept of a so-called universe of discourse. According to the principle, each and every proposition refers to the universe of discourse as such. The difference between Aristotelian and modern logic will thus be portrayed as a difference in the concept of what are we talking about in the universal propositions.*

* “This is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 19-06839S Non-classical Interpretation of the Aristotelian Logic and Theory of Predication.”

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Introduction Aristotelian logic as part of modern Although Aristotelian logic1 is inter- extensional first-order logic lost its preted as only a minor part of canoni- essential features: the square of oppo- cal modern extensional logic, namely sition collapses and several hitherto first-order logic, there still remains valid modes of syllogism yield invalid one point deliberately neglected and patterns of inference. The reason, as it is unmentioned, this being the assumption usually claimed, is that first-order logic of nonempty terms. When Lukasiewicz does not require the nonemptiness of proved the completeness and decida- terms and in this sense is much broader bility of Aristotelian logic2, it was in than Aristotelian logic. In this article, respect to the universe of unary first-or- I would like to demonstrate that the key der predicates, but predicates which are lies not in the question of the nonempti- nonempty, i.e. which denote at least one ness of terms, but in the concept of the individual. Without this assumption, universe of discourse as the subject of our propositions. 1 By the term “Aristotelian logic”, I mean rather broadly the logic of Aristotelian tradition. It is true that some followers of Aristotelian vs. modern Aristotle changed some of his essential logic ideas, so I would like to keep the most “orthodox” line possible. The above-mentioned problem can be 2 See Lukasiewicz 1957. illustrated with the item of the square of

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opposition3. In the square, there is e.g. from A to I is invalid, so generally in FOL a relation of subalternation: the relation the inference from A to I is invalid. holds between universal (SaP, A for brevity) and corresponding particular judge- Sortal logic ment (SiP, I for brevity) (for simplicity, we Timothy Smiley has demonstrated that will consider the affirmative judgements a relatively conservative modification of only). The relation of subalternation im- FOL will ensure the validity of the essen- plies that if A judgement is true, we may tial features of Aristotelian logic, namely, immediately infer that I is also true. The the square of the opposition mentioned inference SaP/SiP is consequently a pat- above4. This modification is called sortal tern of valid inference. first-order logic (SOL). SOL is a version If these judgements are rewritten of first-order logic. The key concept of into the language of modern first-order SOL is obviously the concept of a sortal. logic, in short FOL, we will get ∀x S(x) The simplest and widely accepted inter- → P(x) for A and ∃x S(x) ∧ P(x) for I. The pretation of sortals is that they provide point is that under some conditions the a criterion for counting items of a kind, first formula, ∀x S(x) → P(x), can be as it is in Cocchiarella’s definition of true but under the same conditions the a sortal concept – “a socio-genetically second formula, ∃x S(x) ∧ P(x), is false, developed cognitive ability or capacity to so it could not be the case that we can distinguish, count and collect or classify infer the second formula from the first things”5. Typical examples of sorts are one. The above-mentioned condition is tigers, cats, tables, etc., in short, count- simply that the predicate “S” is empty, able items. i.e. nothing falls under the predicate. SOL now introduces a so-called sor- Under this condition, the antecedent of tal quantification. The key idea could the formula ∀x S(x) → P(x) is false (no be stated as follows: in a sentence e.g. x is S). The entire formula is now an all men are mortal, its canonical inter- implication and according to the defi- pretation in first-order logic tells us nition of implication in FOL, an impli- that for every object it is the case that cation with a false antecedent is true (ex if the object is S, then the object is also falso quodlibet). Formula ∃x S(x) ∧ P(x) P. This sounds somewhat odd because is also a conjunction and at least one the original sentence does not seem to of the conjuncts, namely S(x), is false. be “about” all objects. In SOL, the orig- According to the definition of conjunc- inal sentence is reformulated in a way tion in FOL, a conjunction with at least that the universal quantifier does not one false conjunct is false. In summary, quantify over all individuals, but over if the predicate S is empty, the inference the individuals which fall under S, put briefly, quantifies over all Ss. If we wish 3 A general overview of the topic may be found in Parsons, 2017. The Czech reader may consult on this issue Vlasáková, 4 See Smiley, 1962. 2015. 5 Cocchiarella, 1977, p. 441.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Karel Šebela 101 Aristotle vs. Boole: A case of the Universe of Discourse to reformulate SaP/SiP inference in SOL, In conclusion, the difference between we will get this: first-order logic and Aristotelian logic does not necessarily turn on the issue All As are B - ∀a B(a) of the emptiness of its terms. Some As are B - ∃a B(a) We will follow the idea that the key lies in the concept of the universe of This inference is valid in SOL. So, as discourse.6 George Boole was the first it was said above, a relatively conserva- who used the expression “universe of tive modification of FOL will preserve discourse” in English. It was concretely the validity of subalternation (and con- in his book The Laws of Thought (1854). sequently of the square of opposition in For Boole, “universe of discourse is in general). This fact brings us to the ques- the strictest sense the ultimate subject tion as to what is really the key difference of the discourse”7. What does this mean? between Aristotelian logic and FOL? “In every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts or of Universe of discourse the individual in his intercourse with The original idea was that the difference others, there is an assumed or expressed is in the assumption of nonempty terms limit within which the subjects of its in Aristotelian logic, because first-order operation are confined. The most unfet- logic does not require the nonemptiness tered discourse is that in which the of terms. This reason could be called words we use are understood in the wid- into doubt with some success, however, est possible application, and for them for in first-order logic the grammati- the limits of discourse are co-extensive cal subject of its formulae is always an with those of the universe itself”8. Uni- individual constant or individual varia- verse of discourse is thus the most exten- ble. First-order logic therefore requires sive class of all objects, symbolised by 1. each individual constant to denote an In Boole’s logic, any subsequent special- object in the domain of quantification— ization of the subject of the proposition which is usually understood as a set of is construed as a concept based on the “existing” objects. Individual variables concept of the universe of discourse in in first-order logic range over a domain addition to whatever else it involves, e.g. of individuals. In first-order logic there to say “Water is fluid” is equivalent to exists the requirement that the domain “Water is a fluid thing”, or “human” has of quantification should be nonempty. a logical form “entity, that is a human”. In a nutshell, any possible grammatical John Corcoran calls it the principle of subject of a first-order logical formula wholistic reference – “each and every … either denotes an object in the domain (constant) or ranges over a nonempty 6 The following passage about Boole is already contained in my article Šebela domain of individuals and therefore (2018). in a certain sense the latter logic also 7 Boole 2006, p. 30. requires the nonemptiness of its terms. 8 Boole 2006, p. 30.

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proposition refers to the universe of dis- Universe of Discourse in course as such”9. But what can be said Modern Logic about the nature of the objects, which FOL now takes the idea of the universe constitutes the universe of discourse? of discourse from Boole. In FOL, the Boole at the beginning of his 1854 book universe of discourse is simply the set of wrote that there is a dispute concerning all things one’s quantifiers range over. the meaning of the signs used as names In SOL, in contrast, the universe of dis- in the process of thinking. According to course is divided into groups, into sorts. Boole, “By some it is maintained, that Even the variables in SOL are variables they represent the conceptions of the which range over the appropriate sort mind alone; by others, that they rep- only. If we wish, however, to introduce resent things”10. In other words, Boole “classical” quantifiers, we could easily discusses the clash between idealism implement them into the theory (the tech- and realism and he himself claims that nical details are not important here). The signs represent things. This statement main difference between FOL and SOL is, in my view, a good illustration of thus lies precisely in the “nature” of the John Corcoran’s thesis that the concept universe of discourse. How does this dif- of logic as a formal ontology begins with ference influence the validity or invalidity Boole (in contrast to Aristotle’s project of the above-mentioned subalternation? of logic as formal epistemology)11. To The answer is in the problem of the refute the position that names repre- subject of proposition, simply in the task sent the conceptions of mind, means of what we are talking about in a given to refute the epistemological disputes proposition. Modern logic in general about the possibility of the human mind shares Boole’s idea, already cited, that to acknowledge objective reality. This the “universe of discourse is in the strict- observation can be reinforced by the est sense the ultimate subject of the dis- fact that Boole’s original concept pre- course”. For FOL, the subject of each and supposes only one fixed universe of every proposition is the universe of dis- discourse, but in the 1854 version the course as such, in its “most unfettered” pluralistic multi-universe framework is sense. As mentioned above, John Cor- proposed. This enlargement (or deliber- coran calls it the principle of wholistic ation) makes logic in a way independ- reference. Once again, according to the ent from epistemological limitations of principle, “each and every … proposi- knowledge, because in this framework tion refers to the universe of discourse as the given universe of discourse is a mat- such”. This idea, as it stands, sounds quite ter of choice. odd, but has become a widely accepted part of logic textbooks under the name of the Boolean interpretation of categor- 12 9 Corcoran 2004, p. 498. ical statements . In the influential book 10 Boole 2006, p. 18. 11 Corcoran 2003, p. 278n. 12 Copi 2014, p. 193.

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An Introduction to Logic and Scientific subjects but particular propositions do Method, by Cohen and Nagel, one can require it, the subalternation is blocked. read, for example, that “the proposition The price of this move is the fact that All street-cleaners are poor declares that subalternation very often seems an in its universe of discourse there are no unproblematically valid inference, as individuals who are both street-cleaners e.g. Cohen and Nagel observe: “The con- and not poor”13. Boolean interpretation clusion we have reached, that universals has a significant consequence – if the do not imply the existence of any veri- proper subject is the universe of dis- fying instances, while particulars do course, which is always nonempty, then imply it, will doubtless seem paradoxical there is no need for the grammatical to the reader”14. subject of the sentence to denote anything. Concretely, if we take the prop- Universe of Discourse in osition that All street-cleaners are poor, Aristotelian Logic it seems unproblematic to rewrite it in Can there be some analogue of this con- the language of FOL as ∀xP(x). This for- cept in Aristotelian logic? The very term mula says that all objects are poor. For is out of the discussion here, of course, this reason we need to input an ante- but terms such as “entity” or “being” are cedent into the given formula, namely a traditional part of Aristotelian vocab- the antecedent, that if any object is a ulary and can be invoked here. So, does street-cleaner, then it is poor. Thus, the the sum of all the entities in Aristotelian appropriate formula of FOL is ∀x S(x) → logic plays the same (or at least a simi- P(x). Categorical propositions can thus lar) role as the universe of discourse in become hypotheses about the universe, modern logic? The answer is no. This hypotheses with possibly empty gram- answer is also a key to the difference matical subjects. This is why the truth between the logic in the question of the of the categorical propositions in FOL validity of the square of opposition. For does not require the nonemptiness of Aristotle, in fact, the differences between its grammatical subjects. This libera- various kinds of objects are of a logical tion only holds, however, for the uni- importance. versal propositions, because particular Firstly, as John Corcoran states it, propositions are taken as existential “in his logic, Aristotle did not recognise statements about the universe, e.g. the the universal term ‘entity’ or ‘thing’”15. proposition Some street-cleaners are poor The absence of evidence, however, is is taken as affirming the existence of at not evidence of absence, so it would be least one object, which is both a street- appropriate to search for some more cleaner and poor. If universal proposi- direct support. There is in fact an indi- tions in FOL do not require, however, cation that Aristotle did not allow for the nonemptiness of its grammatical 14 Cohen and Nagel 1998, p. 42. 13 Cohen and Nagel 1998, p. 40. 15 Corcoran 2003, p. 272.

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his content words to have a universal Term negation can be traced back to extension. It is his well-known aporia Aristotle’s De Interpretatione,18 where generis argument. The original passage so-called indefinite names and verbs in Metaphysics concerns the concept of are studied. These names and verbs are being and one and is as follows: obtained (in English) by adding a prefix “But it is not possible that either such as ‘not-’, ‘un-’ or ‘non-’ to regular one or being should be a single genus of names and verbs. ‘Not-man’ and ‘not- things; for the differentiae of any genus ill’ are, for example, indefinite names. must each of them both be and be one, Aristotle observed that sentence pairs but it is not possible for the genus taken containing a name (verb) in one sen- apart from its species (any more than for tence and the corresponding indefinite the species of the genus) to be predicated name (verb) in the other are contrary, of its proper differentiae; so that if one i.e. they cannot be simultaneously true: or being is a genus, no differentia will “If it is true to say ‘It is not-white’, it either be or be one”16 is also true to say ‘it is not white’: for it Aristotle’s argument can be (for the is impossible that a thing should simul- concept of being) reconstructed as follows: taneously be white and be not-white.”19 Such pairs are not necessarily con- No genus is predicated of its differentiae. tradictory, i.e. one may be false without Being is predicated of its differentiae (or the other being true: else they would not be). “everything is equal or not equal, but Being is therefore not a genus. not everything is equal or unequal, or if it is, it is only within the sphere of that I do not want to evaluate this argu- which is receptive of equality. ”20 ment here, but I would just like to con- Hence, statements of the form ‘S is clude that this argument means that the not-P’ are not equivalent to ‘S is not P’: most natural counterpart of Boole’s con- “In establishing or refuting, it makes cept of the universe of discourse cannot some difference whether we suppose the play an analogical role in Aristotelian expressions ‘not to be this’ and ‘to be logic. If being is not a genus and genus not-this’ are identical or different in is predicated univocally, then being is meaning, e.g., ‘not to be white’ and ‘to not even a univocal concept. be not white’. For they do not mean the Generally, for Aristotelian logic it same thing, nor is ‘to be not-white’ the is an important thing that the universe negation of ‘to be white’, but ‘not to be of objects is divided and grouped into white’ [is]. ”21 parts. Some indirect evidence can be It is apparent from Met. 1055 that offered for this claim. The special case is Aristotle thinks of term negation as being 17 the concept of so-called term negation. 18 De Intepr.16a30n, 16b 11n. 16 Met. B, 998b24-27. 19 Pr.An. 51b42–52a4. 17 The following passage is taken from 20 Met.105510n. Šebela, Sedlár (2018). 21 Pr.An.51b5–10.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Karel Šebela 105 Aristotle vs. Boole: A case of the Universe of Discourse connected to the genus of a predicate — substance must be predicates of some there may be things that are neither P other subject, and nothing can be white nor not-P, but no such thing can be found which is not also other than white”. The within the genus of P. error that Aristotle has in mind here The concept of a category mistake is can be illustrated by the phrase “White additional indirect evidence.22 In Aris- is white”. Whiteness is an accident, totle, one can find a discussion of two and if we want to talk about some idea kinds of what is currently called a cat- of whiteness, “white in itself”, which egory mistake, i.e. the mistake when might be in place of the subject of the entities belonging to a particular cat- judgement, then it should be possible egory are presented as if belonging to to predicate about such a subject, for another category. In the Topics, he refers example, to be white. “Being white” is, to sentences such as “angle and knife however, an accidental predicate, i.e. are sharp”23. The one who claims that an appropriate thing may possibly not the “sharp” applies the same way to the have it. This would lead to the absurdity angle and knife would commit a category that the white color might possibly not mistake because the angle and the knife be white. This kind of category mistake are entities of different categories (here differs from the previous one because it it is quantity and substance). This kind cannot be removed by reference to the of a category mistake is, however, a kind different meanings of the word. of equivocation and can be removed In summary, for Aristotle it is the by pointing out the variety of ways in conviction that the universe is so to which we understand the sharpness of speak sorted into a different group of the angle and the knife. In addition, the a great logical importance. equivocation can be explained without reference to a category mistake, and Universe of Discourse in some equivocations cannot be explained Sortal Logic by reference to a category mistake, for What is the situation in SOL? The prop- example, if we attribute the sharpness osition All street-cleaners are poor is also to the smell and color, which are both about the universe of discourse, but in qualities. Another kind of categorical this case the universe is sorted, so we error, a proper category mistake, is in are speaking only about the appropriate the Second Analytics24. Aristotle speaks sort in the given proposition. If the sort of an essential and accidental predica- are simply street-cleaners, then we can tion, and says, with an obvious refer- rewrite in SOL as ∀s P(s). The formula ence to Plato’s doctrine of ideas, that is thus not an implication, so it is not the “predicates which do not signify a hypothesis about the universe. For the variables in SOL there is now the same 22 The following passage is taken (and translated) from my book Šebela (2015). requirement as in FOL, namely the re- 23 Top. 107a3-17. quirement that the domain of quantifi- 24 An. Post. 83a30-33. cation should be nonempty. This means,

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in the case of SOL, that sorts are always is caused by the fact that the subject of nonempty. This is the key difference, these propositions is the universe of dis- which makes subalternation in SOL course in FOL. To harmonise modern and valid. Aristotelian logic in this point we only need to sort the universe of discourse Conclusion and make the appropriate sort be the As we have seen, subalternation is a valid subject of these propositions. Needless inference in Aristotelian logic, but is to say, to sort the universe of discourse invalid in FOL. The reason for the inva- into parts is an idea which seems to be lidity is in the different logical form of very close to the Aristotelian conception universal propositions. The difference of categorisation of the world.

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abbreviations

Aristotle Met. Metaphysica An. Post. Analytica posteriora Pr. An. Analytica priora De interpr. De interpretatione Top. Topica

References

Boole, G. (2006). An Investigation of the Laws Parsons, T. (2017). The Traditional Square of of Thought. Urbana, Illinois: Project Guten- Opposition. The Stanford Encyclopedia berg. of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Zalta, N. (ed.), URL = https://plato.stan- Cocchiarella, N. (1977). Sortals, natural kinds ford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/square/. and re-dentification.Logique et Analyse 20, p. 438-474. Smiley, T. (1962). Syllogism and Quantifi- cation. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,27, Cohen, M.R., Nagel, E. (1998). An Introduc- p. 58-72. tion to Logic and Scientific Method. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd. Šebela, K. (2018). Internal Negation and Universe of Discourse: Kant and Boole. Copi, I., Copi, C., McMahon, K. (2014). In- Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities, troduction to Logic. Fourteenth edition. to appear. Harlow: Pearson Prentice Hall. Šebela, K. (2015). Variace na témata aristo- Corcoran, J. (2004). The Principle of Wholistic telské logiky. Plzeň: Západočeská univer- Reference. Manuscrito 30, p. 493–505. zita v Plzni.

Corcoran, J. (2003). Aristotle’s Prior Ana- Šebela, K., Sedlár, I. (2018). Term Negation lytics and Boole’s Laws of Thought.Histo - in First-Order Logic. Logique et Analyse, ry and Philosophy of Logic 24, p. 261-288. to appear.

Łukasiewicz, Jan L. (1957). Aristotle’s Syllogis- Vlasáková, M. (2015). Logický čtverec a otáz- tic: From the Standpoint of Modern Formal ka existence (in Czech). Filosofický časopis Logic. 2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 63, p. 77-93.

Aither, international issue no. 5 Časopis pro studium řecké a latinské filosofické tradice Journal for the Study of Greek and Latin Philosophical Traditions

Volume X, no. 20

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