Moscow Defense Brief Your Professional Guide Inside # 2, 2010

MiG: Back From the Brink Advertisment CONTENTS

Global Security #2 (20), 2010 The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty 2 PUBLISHER Centre for Analysis of International Relations Strategies and Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy 6 Technologies Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – CAST Director & Publisher the Political Aspects 8 Ruslan Pukhov Editor-in-Chief Mikhail Barabanov Defense Industries Advisory Editors RAC MiG: Back From the Brink 11 Konstantin Makienko Alexey Pokolyavin Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program 13 Researchers Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 16 Ruslan Aliev Sergey Denisentsev Polina Temerina Dmitry Vasiliev Arms Trade

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# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1 Global Security

The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty Mikhail Barabanov

he new US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 60 of the 111 bombers (44 B-52H’s and 16 B-2A’s) and 12 of T(START) signed on 8 April in Prague has been hailed as the the 14 Ohio-type subs count as deployed (at any given time new stage of nuclear arms reductions and a worthy successor – two of the subs are listed as undergoing maintenance), the to the 1991 START-1 agreement. A closer inspection of the United States is now considered to have 798 strategic delivery terms of the new treaty reveals, however, that the mountain vehicles. That means that only about 100 of them will have to has in fact given birth to a mouse. be cut under the new treaty. The new ceilings for the Russian and American strategic Apparently, Washington’s plan is to cut only 100 silo- nuclear forces are as follows: based Minuteman III missiles and 12 B-52H bombers (the •• 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads latter will be given non-deployed status rather than actually •• 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, including destroyed). What is more, the terms of the treaty do not even intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine- require the destruction of the silos now housing the ICBMs to launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and heavy be scrapped. Theoretically, that enables the United States to bombers stockpile all 100 Minuteman III missiles to be cut under the •• 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery new agreement with Russia. And it should not be forgotten vehicles, including ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers that although in theory those missiles are fairly aged, all and heavy bombers of them have been thoroughly upgraded in recent years. Under the new treaty, the exact structure of the nuclear Their solid-fuel engines and guidance systems have all been arsenals is left to the two governments, so long as the overall replaced, so in essence we are looking at new ICBMs that can ceilings are observed. In other words, the treaty does not set remain in service for many years to come. individual limits on the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy Once all the cuts under the new treaty have been bombers. implemented by 2020, America will still have: The counting rules, however, have been redrawn. For •• 350 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each carrying a missile delivery systems, the procedure of tallying the multiple single warhead; warheads that can be fitted onto each missile produces a result •• 14 Ohio-type subs armed with 24 Trident II SLBMs each that is quite close to the actual numbers. But for strategic (that includes the two “non-deployed” subs undergoing bombers, it was decided not to adjust the score for the number maintenance, so the total number of deployed SLBMs of warheads each plane can carry – meaning that one bomber will be 1,152); now counts as a delivery vehicle for a single warhead. •• 111 bombers (including 48 deployed ones: 32 B-52H’s At first glance, the treaty promises to cut the two and 16 B-2A’s). countries’ nuclear arsenals by a third (from 2,200 warheads That means that after all the cuts under the new treaty each) compared to the numbers agreed in the 2002 SORT the United States will still have 797 strategic delivery vehicles, treaty. This ostensible achievement is being touted as another 686 of them deployed, with a total of 1,550 warheads, as big step towards universal nuclear disarmament. tallied under the new counting rules. It is easy to see, however, that the terms of the new treaty The actual reductions Russia will have to effect in order mandate a bare minimum of actual nuclear reductions. to comply with the new treaty are even less onerous. The truth Most of the advertized cuts are in fact the product of creative is, Russia’s nuclear arsenal is already at or even below the new accounting. ceilings. At the time of the signing of the treaty, Russia had a The United States now has a total of 450 silo-based total of just 640 strategic delivery vehicles – only 571 of them Minuteman III missiles (carrying somewhere between 550 deployed. That number includes: and 800 nuclear warheads, as some of those missiles have •• 368 land-based ICBMs, namely: been fitted with three warheads each). America also has 14 •• 59 heavy silo-based R-36MUTTH (SS-18 Mod 4) and nuclear-powered Ohio-type submarines, each carrying 25 R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5) missiles; Trident II D-5 SLBMs, fitted with four warheads each – for •• 70 silo-based UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Mod 3) a total of 336 SLBMs and 1,344 warheads. Finally, it has 111 missiles; strategic bombers (93 B-52H’s and 18 B-2A’s) – each now •• 171 mobile Topol (SS-25) missiles; counts as a delivery vehicle for a single warhead. The total US •• 50 silo-based Topol-M (SS-27A) missiles; tally is therefore 897 strategic delivery vehicles. But since only •• 18 mobile Topol-M (SS-27B) missiles. 2 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty Global Security

•• 12 nuclear-armed submarines carrying a total of 196 now completely unaccounted for. The biggest beneficiary of SLBMs, including: this ploy is the Unite States. If each of the 48 deployed strategic •• 6 Project 667BDRM (Delta IV class)subs; bombers the Americans plans to keep were to be counted as a •• 4 Project 667BDR (Delta III class); carrier of 10 cruise missiles, Washington would have either •• 1 Project 941UM (Typhoon class); to cut almost all of its Minuteman III ICBMs to comply with •• 1 Project 955 (Yuri Dolgorukiy). the new ceilings, or slash the number of warheads fitted onto •• 76 deployed bombers (13 Tu-160 Blackjack and 63 Tu- the Trident II SLBMs. 95MS Bear H). In essence, the new treaty completely eliminates the Of the 12 Russian nuclear-armed subs, only eight are existing workable system of controls over strategic aviation deployed - four each of Project 667BDRMs and Project (especially considering that America can declare a large part 667BDRs. Each sub carries 16 SLBMs, for a total of 128 of its bombers as non-deployed). It enables both sides to deployed missiles. fudge the numbers of their air-launched nuclear warheads It therefore becomes evident that Russia needs no actual on a truly grand scale - to put it bluntly, America and Russia reductions to comply. If anything, it may need to bring some can now have as many of those warheads as they like. of its numbers up to the new limits, not down. Even before In order for this ruse to work, the new treaty imposes a the Prague treaty was signed, Russia’s nuclear arsenal had ceiling on the total numbers of deployed warheads (1,550), shrunk all of its own accord over the past year or so from but skirts the issue of non-deployed warheads, which are not 809 to 640 strategic delivery vehicles, following the mass subject to any limits whatsoever. In practice that allows each decommissioning of old ICBMs and nuclear-armed subs. side to have an unlimited number of warheads - so long as they That, in fact, was one of the main bones of contention are declared as non-deployed. Meanwhile, both sides can keep during the talks. Moscow insisted on lowering the ceiling 100 non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles each (including to 500-550 strategic delivery vehicles – that is how many it combat-ready strategic bombers), and now they don’t even will soon be left with, treaty or no treaty, due to the natural have to destroy the silos left after the decommissioning of attrition of its ageing nuclear arsenal. Washington naturally ICBMs. In effect, an almost unaccounted build-up of nuclear resisted the idea, and the eventual figure in the treaty of arsenals now becomes a perfectly legitimate option, making 800 strategic delivery vehicles, 700 of them deployed – is a complete farce of the arms control process. As for the total an obvious victory for the Americans, who wanted the new numbers of the actually deployed “operational” warheads, limits to match their already existing numbers. America will including the airborne weapons, they will remain quite close have neither to change the structure of its nuclear arsenal, to the ceilings imposed by the 2002 SORT treaty – at least in nor, as our calculations indicate, make any serious cuts. the case of the United States. Another obvious cop-out in the treaty is the new In Russia, the main debate during the talks on the new counting rules for nuclear warheads carried by strategic treaty focused on linking any strategic nuclear cuts with heavy bombers. Modern heavy bombers are mainly used as legally binding restrictions on America’s missile defense carriers for multiple strategic air-launched cruise missiles plans. Predictably, Russia failed to secure any concessions (ALCMs). For instance, America’s B-52H can carry up to 20 here, and had to settle for a unilateral statement on the issue AGM-86B cruise missiles, Russia’s Tu-160 can be fitted with during the signing of the treaty. But the gravity of this problem up to 12 Kh-55 (AS-15) missiles, and the Tu-95MS with up is greatly exaggerated. During the 10 years left before the to 16 Kh-55 missiles, or up to eight of Russia’s new ALCMs. treaty expires in 2020, America is unlikely to deploy an ABM America’s B-2A stealth bomber is not designed to carry system that could pose any real threat to Russia’s nuclear ALCM’s - not officially, anyway - but it has enough room in deterrence capability. And when the talks begin on the next the bay for several nuclear bombs. Neither country is facing treaty to replace the one recently signed in Prague, Russia a shortage of ALCMs: Russia has up to 1,000 of the Kh‑55 will in any case have to revise its stance based on the actual missiles, and America 588 of the AGM-86B’s, plus up to 240 situation with ABM at the time. Postponing the resolution “strategic” B61 and B83 nuclear bombs. of this issue to clear the path for the current deal therefore Under the START-1 rules, each Soviet strategic bomber seems entirely reasonable. The Russian negotiators appear counted as a delivery vehicle for eight ALCMs, and each US to have thought along similar lines, and merely used ABM bomber was deemed to carry 10 ALCMs. Strategic bombers as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in other areas. therefore accounted for a big chunk of the warheads to be The Americans, meanwhile, had painted themselves into tallied towards the overall limits. The “one bomber – one a corner by their inflexible stance on missile defense - and warhead” equation in the Prague treaty is therefore nothing in the end made very real sacrifices in the name of a rather but a ruse designed to protect a large number of warheads on abstract principle. both sides from cuts. Under the new counting system, a big One of their biggest concessions was on the issue of portion of the strategic ALCM and nuclear bomb arsenals is telemetry. America would have loved to augment its own # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3 The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty Global Security

R&D effort on missile defense by openly receiving telemetric total of 260 ICBMs carrying 626 warheads at the very most. data from the test launches of Russia’s new ballistic missiles, Plans have been unveiled to launch the development of a including the R-30 Bulava (SS-NX-32), RS-24 Yars (SS-X- new liquid-fuel ICBM with a multiple warhead – but first 29), and others. Such information would come in very useful deliveries are unlikely before 2020. for developing countermeasures against the latest Russian Meanwhile, the future of the sea-based component weapons. But Russia has managed to limit the disclosure of Russia’s nuclear deterrent is wholly dependent on the of telemetry to just five launches a year. Moscow can now struggling Bulava program and the Project 955 submarines, make the Americans use up their yearly allowance on the designed specifically to carry the new missile. The optimistic launches of old Russian missiles (fired up for training or projection is that by 2020 Russia will still have six of the testing purposes, if anyone asks) – while the telemetry from existing Project 667BDRM submarines (carrying a total the really interesting events will be kept completely secret. of 96 Sineva SLBMs), and the only existing Project 955 sub Russia has also managed to lift the restrictions on where it (the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, carrying 16 Bulava SLBMs) will have can position its mobile missiles. begun combat duty. There will also be up to four subs of Any specific terms of the new treaty are, however, quite the redesigned Project 955A class and its modifications, secondary to Russia’s main concern – namely, that the size carrying 80 Bulava missiles between them. Since two of of its arsenal is already well below the agreed new ceilings. the Project 667BDRM subs will probably be listed as non- There has been a mass decommissioning of old Soviet deployed (undergoing repairs and maintenance), Russia will missiles in recent years (especially now that the mobile likely have the capacity to deploy 160 submarine-launched Topol systems are reaching the end of their service life). missiles, carrying a total of 640 warheads. New missiles are being built, but not nearly fast enough to Russia’s strategic aviation fleet is expected to consist replace the old ones. of about 50 Tu-95MS and 16 Tu-160 bombers by 2020 – a Nominally, Russia assembles more than 30 ballistic total of 66 delivery vehicles, which the new treaty counts as missiles a year. That includes 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva (SS-N-23 66 warheads. Mod 3) SLBMs for Project 667BRDM subs, which are now All this means that under the best-case scenario Russia undergoing an upgrade program, and about a dozen land- will have no more than 490 deployed strategic delivery based Topol-M and RS-24 Yars mobile land-based ICBMs. vehicles and 1,330 deployed warheads by 2020. The dilemma The new Bulava and Yars prototypes make up the rest. At Moscow is therefore facing is whether to abandon all attempts that rate, the Russian nuclear arsenal will continue to shrink to maintain nuclear parity with the United States, despite the as the old land-based ICBMs are being decommissioned. new treaty, or revise its plans for nuclear missiles production Meanwhile, the schedule of the new Bulava SLBM program and launch a mighty effort to build an additional 210 single- continues to slip - the missile won’t be ready for combat duty warhead carriers (most likely the Topol-M’s, either mobile or before 2012. The Kremlin’s decision at the turn of the century silo-based). If Moscow were to opt for the latter scenario, and to rely predominantly on the submarine component of the ramp up new production starting from 2013, it would have to strategic nuclear deterrent is increasingly looking like a big build an additional 30 missiles a year (for a total of 50 missiles and costly mistake. A lot of time and money has already been annually). That means that the existing targets for Topol-M ploughed into the new Project 955 (Yuriy Dolgorukiy class) and Yars production will nearly triple. The problem is that submarine, even as the Bulava missile it is supposed to carry the Votkinsk missile plant, where these missiles will have to is still very much a work in progress. be assembled, will already be working flat out on the Bulava The new RS-24 Yars mobile ICBM enters mass to deliver at least 10 or 12 of the new SLBMs every year. Any production in 2010 - essentially this is a Topol-M version plans to spur missile production may therefore be unfeasible with three multiple warheads. But at the expected rate of due to lack of funding and spare manufacturing capacity. production, this will not make much of a difference – the On the whole, the new strategic arms reductions treaty decommissioning of the old missiles will still far outpace any clearly serves America’s interest more than Russia’s, as it new deliveries. The looming loss of 46 R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod enables Washington to maintain the existing structure 5) heavy ICBMs, which are to be written off over the period and basic composition of its strategic arsenal without any of 2016-2019, will make an especially big dent in the Russian substantial reductions. The nuclear cuts agreed under this nuclear deterrent. Each missile carries 10 nuclear warheads, treaty are in fact phony, for the most part – a product of meaning that Russia will lose half of its deployed warheads accounting chicanery rather than the real thing. The new in one fell swoop. According to some projections that have system of counting the bombers and air-based nuclear surfaced in the media, by 2020 the land-based component of warheads in particular is nothing short of fraudulent, and the Russian strategic nuclear forces will include no more than clearly designed to mislead the public. 108 mobile Yars missiles, 27 mobile Topol-M’s, 95 silo-based The treaty represents a clear failure of the Kremlin’s Topol-M’s, and 30 old silo-based UR-100NUTTH missiles – a bid to institutionalize the ongoing decline (or rather a 4 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty Global Security

managed degradation) of the Russian strategic nuclear parity being the main reason why the Kremlin had agreed deterrent. Predictably, Washington has refused to mirror to discuss the new agreement in the first place. All that the rapid dwindling of the Russian arsenal, and the agreed being the case, the only real outcome of this new “strategic new ceilings are clearly not what Moscow had hoped for. As a arms reduction treaty” will be a massive Russian program result, Russia will now have to brace itself for a massive effort to develop and modernize its strategic arms, prompting, to modernize its nuclear forces or, at the very minimum, to in all likelihood, a similar push in the United States. For keep them from shrinking well below the limits agreed in the Russia, the upcoming decade looks set to become a period new treaty. Onerous new spending is inevitable if Russia is to of break-neck nuclear rearmament rather than genuine maintain genuine nuclear parity with the United States, said disarmament.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5 The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty International Relations

Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy Fedor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal

ince the turn of the century, Russia has been ever more First, this part of the world (which includes Saudi Arabia Sactive in the Greater Middle East (an area stretching from and Pakistan) is a source of the radical Islamist threat. Russia North Africa to the Indian subcontinent). Its policy here, has already confronted that threat in the Caucasus, and could however, is radically different from what it was in Soviet well be dragged into a new clash with radical Islam in Central times, when Moscow was a key player in the region. That Asia, where Moscow’s allies will count on its support in the policy is now completely devoid of ideology. The new goals event of a crisis. It would hardly be realistic to expect full are, in the descending order of priority: commercial gain, cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments on this stability in the former Soviet republics, and influence on the issue. Each of those governments is itself walking on thin international arena. ice, constrained by numerous political and religious factors. The commercial considerations are quite obvious. But pragmatic cooperation is necessary, to try at least to Intense international competition means that in many minimize the risks, if not avert them altogether. markets Russia is losing out to other nations due to its Second, nations such as Turkey and Iran have a role to lack of technological prowess or political clout. Russian play in at least two regions of the former Soviet Union – the manufacturers (the defense contractors or the atomic South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both territories are part of industry) find warmer welcome in those countries which, Russia’s sphere of vital interests. The way in which Ankara for one reason or another, are at odds with the West. In the and Tehran will choose to exercise their influence in those Middle East than means primarily Iran and Syria. Libya used territories greatly depends on the nature of their relations to be in the same group – until about five years ago. with Moscow. Both are potentially capable of wreaking havoc The approach has obvious limitations: if a nation falls out on Russia’s plans in the region, which is why Moscow must try with the West, it either becomes victim of political or economic to keep rivalry with the two capitals to a minimum. Relations pressure, including sanctions – or sells out its loyalties, as with Turkey are now on the ascendant. Not so with Iran, for was the case with Tripoli. Moscow has always walked a fine reasons whose origins lie outside the region. But recent history line here, trying to protect its trade without straying beyond does hold some positive examples of Moscow’s cooperation the boundaries of international law (i.e. not breaking any with Tehran in the former Soviet territories, including the sanctions), or allowing its Middle Eastern dealings to sour settlement of the Tajik conflict and Iran’s decision to desist relations with the West too much. Of course, Russia is trying from supporting separatism in the Caucasus. to expand its presence in the region beyond the “problem” Third, Russia’s policy towards many of its neighbors nations. It is also working to break into new markets – either is largely informed by Moscow’s strategy of maintaining traditional Western turf (the Gulf monarchies) or the former Gazprom’s hold on its Eurasia markets. Turkey and Iran have Soviet sphere of influence (the North Africa). a key role to play here – Turkey as a leading transit nation The Russian energy giants, especially Gazprom, are and Iran as a potential competitor on the European market. showing great interest in the Middle East. Relations with That is why Moscow is interested in Tehran’s continued Turkey, which aspires to become the main energy crossroads isolation – and if said isolation is eventually broken, Russia in the western part of Central Eurasia, are at an all-time high. can always fall back on the old idea of a “Gas OPEC”, which Russian officials have aired a number of ideas on supplying includes, apart from Iran, large gas producers such as Algeria gas to Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Another proposal mooted and Qatar. Alas, there has been much political talk here, but several years ago was to team up with Nigeria and build a precious little action. pipeline to the Mediterranean coast. So far, however, all these Finally, as part of its efforts to bolster its international plans remain firmly in the realm of the hypothetical, and standing, Russia is trying to step up its relations with all the look more like an attempt to put some pressure on Russia’s key international players. Moscow is the only capital of the G8 European clients and remind them of the role of Gazprom. that can sit down at talks with almost every single player in Stability in the former Soviet republics remains another the Middle East – with the possible exception of the Taliban, priority of Russia’s foreign policy – and events in the Greater but including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, HAMAS, Hezbollah Middle East impinge on that stability very directly. and Iran. Russia has repeatedly tried to cash in on its unique 6 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy International Relations

position to secure a greater say in world affairs – but with achieve equal standing with America. Moscow continues little success so far, it has to be said. In itself, the ability to to play a complex game in the region, with all three of engage various players in dialogue does not confer greater its key priorities in mind - but there priorities can often sway. From time to time, this ability actually causes some clash. Commercial interest sometimes stands in the way tensions: the other players begin to suspect Russia of double of political gains, and vice versa. The need to participate in or triple dealing, while expectations of real progress remain the global game (on the Iran issue, for example) jeopardizes unfulfilled. constructive relations with Tehran on the regional level (in Russia’s problem in the Greater Middle East is fairly the Caspian and the Caucasus). Nevertheless, for the time unique. Moscow has too many interests there and too much being Russia is likely to stick to its tactical course of keeping leverage to be simply one of several players. And yet this all its options option, without committing to any definitive leverage isn’t strong enough to shift the course of events or strategy.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7 Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy International Relations

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects Mikhail Barabanov

n 21 April Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement objectionable, and want the peninsula returned to the Oto extend the lease of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base in Russian fold one way or another. Crimea is one of the key Sevastopol, which was due to expire in 2017, for another reasons why many Russians are very negative about an 25 years, with a possibility of a further five-year extension. independent Ukraine. Were it not for the Crimean problem, The agreement, which Ukraine’s new president Viktor Russia would have been far more relaxed about many aspects Yanukovich signed shortly after his election, has become the of Ukraine’s foreign and internal policy. In many ways, the clearest testament so far of the new “post-Orange” Ukrainian Crimean issue continues to stoke Russia’s “interventionist” government’s course towards closer ties with Moscow. potential towards Ukraine. Such an unambiguous overture towards Russia is not As part of the historic compromise between Moscow something most commentators expected from Yanukovich. and Kiev reached in 1997, Russia was given a 20-year lease They thought the new Ukrainian leader would try to of the Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol. By dint of this maintain at least a semblance of a balance between Russia lease Ukraine essentially recognized Russia’s special interests and the West. By steering sharply eastwards, Yanukovich in Crimea, in return for Russia’s recognition of Ukraine in is apparently hoping to consolidate his main electorate in its present borders. The agreement was formalized in the Ukraine’s Russian-speaking eastern regions and secure the Great Treaty between the two countries. Russia recognized Kremlin’s unswerving political support. Crimea to be part of Ukraine, and Ukraine reciprocated by For Moscow, meanwhile, the extension of the lease is accepting the fact of Russia’s comprehensive (as opposed to less important militarily than politically, as it enables the just military) presence on the peninsula. Russian political and military presence to remain firmly That compromise, however, has done nothing to established in Crimea for a long time to come. Populated address the crux of the problem, and the 20-year term of mostly by ethnic Russians and transferred from Soviet Russia the lease was drawing to an end all too quickly – with little to Soviet Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev in a move to no change in the Crimean situation. The locals’ affinity many still find mind-boggling Crimea remains a bone of towards Russia has, if anything, become even stronger over contention and a ticking time bomb in bilateral relations. the intervening 13 years – spurred by growing nationalist The vast majority of the Crimeans do not want the peninsula trends in Ukraine under the Orange government of 2004- to be part of Ukraine and are quite hostile to the very idea of 2010, as well as Russia’s better economic fortunes. Kiev Ukrainian statehood. Crimea’s Russian-speaking population has failed to strengthen its influence in the province to any believes itself a victim of language, ethnic and political perceptible degree, and the nationalist Orange pressure on discrimination by the Ukrainian government. It considers the Crimean populace has backfired, stoking anti-Ukrainian this government alien to Crimea, with no real mandate to prejudice. Time has neither solved the Crimean problem nor govern the territory, and with a claim to legitimacy based even dulled its pain. on a historical fluke. In any referendum the Crimeans would The approach of the critical year 2017 was sure to undoubtedly vote in droves to split from Ukraine and join enflame the situation even further. Ukrainian nationalists the Russian Federation. The situation is compounded by (including President Viktor Yushchenko, whose term expired tensions between the Slavic majority and a small Crimean- in the spring of 2010, and Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko) Tatar minority, with the Slavs accusing Kiev of supporting viewed Crimea as the umbilical cord that tethered Ukraine the Tatars as a counterbalance to the ethnic Russians. And to hated Moscow and stymied its pro-Western course. They the fact that Crimea also happens to host the main base of the were doing everything they could to slash that bond and boot Russian Black Sea Fleet adds yet another layer to this tangle of Russia out of Crimea. Furthermore, the Russian naval base in Russia’s concerns. The fleet is perceived by the ethnic Russian Sevastopol was seen as a drag on the Ukrainian nationalists’ population of Crimea as a symbol of their links with Russia NATO membership aspirations. and a sure guarantee against any oppression by Kiev. For Russia, meanwhile, leaving Sevastopol was Russian public opinion and large sections of the completely unacceptable for political reasons, and Russian political establishment find Ukrainian control of Crimea public opinion would never have forgiven such a move. The 8 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects Advertisment Advertisment International Relations

evacuation of Sevastopol would be seen in Russia as a disgrace make use of the Crimean situation as a powerful tool for and betrayal of the Crimeans, left at the mercy of “evil” Kiev. putting pressure on Ukraine as a whole. Sevastopol serves It would seriously weaken any Russian government, even as a grappling hook to keep not just Crimea, but the rest the popular and autocratic government of Vladimir Putin. of Ukraine on a parallel course. That is especially true for What is more, Putin himself clearly loathed the prospect of Ukraine’s southern regions, which are the most vulnerable presiding over the final chapter of the “greatest geopolitical to Russian influence. So if ever Kiev starts spoiling for a fight catastrophe of the 20th century”, as he once termed the with Moscow (once Yanukovich is gone, for example), Russia collapse of the Soviet Union. will always be able to jerk the strings attached to Crimea, After years of simmering, Crimea was threatening creating a multitude of problems for Ukraine on a wide range finally to erupt into a full-blown crisis between Russia and of issues. For the fragile Ukrainian state, which is already split Ukraine. Such a crisis would serve the interests of neither along ethnic and cultural lines, the consequences of such the two political establishments, nor the peoples of the two pressure could be catastrophic. Crimea will continue to serve countries. Ukrainians in particular were uneasy over growing as a foothold for Russian intervention in the event of some confrontation with Russia, stoked by the incompetent kind of crisis. And clearly any such intervention, once started, President Yushchenko’s increasingly loony ultranationalism. will not stop at Crimea and almost certainly lead either to a Those concerns played a large part in Viktor Yanukovich’s complete loss of Ukrainian independence or the country’s victory in the 2010 presidential race. territorial disintegration. Such disintegration along existing Yanukovich himself rightly believed that the bust-up cultural and ethnic divides would likely lead to eastern and with Russia during the tenure of President Yushchenko and southern Ukraine (the country’s densely populated industrial Prime Minister Tymoshenko tenure was one of the most heartland) being annexed by Russia. The rest of Ukraine dangerous and destabilizing challenges Ukraine would would become a smallish landlocked nation, akin to Hungary, have to face in the years to come. So the new Ukrainian and pose no real threat to Russia. president’s seemingly unexpected decision to jump headfirst The bottom line is that the new agreement on the Black into mending fences with Russia straight after his election Sea Fleet has legitimized and institutionalized the Russian is in fact entirely reasonable. Having averted the looming military and political presence in Ukraine. It has also allowed crisis with Russia, Yanukovich now has the breathing space to Moscow to keep the existing pretexts for intervention, if address his country’s other problems, safe in the knowledge ever such intervention became necessary. No wonder then that he has the full backing of Moscow. that Ukraine’s Orange opposition is having a fit. But the The only way to defuse the ticking Crimean time Yanukovych party and the majority of Ukrainians believe bomb before it blew up was to reaffirm the commitment than the deal their president has signed is a reasonable price to the historic compromise of 1997 – which is exactly to pay for normalizing relations with their great eastern what Yanukovich has done by extending the current status neighbor. Rather that continue the struggle against “Russian quo for another 25 years. In practice that translated into imperialism”, which hasn’t brought Ukraine any good, the accepting Moscow’s terms, while at the same time haggling new government in Kiev has chosen acquiescence. That is a for some practical concessions in return. Being a pragmatist, considerable boost for Russia’s standing in the entire post- Yanukovich opted for a tangible prize in the form of lower Soviet space. The political and geopolitical consequences of Russian gas prices, which can give Ukraine’s economy a the new Black Sea Fleet agreement are truly colossal. much-needed breather. Its economic price, meanwhile, should not be For Russia itself, the Black Sea Fleet deal with Yanukovich exaggerated. The advertized 41bn dollars which Russia will is undoubtedly a monumental political feat. On the one ostensibly pay for Sevastopol over the next decade is little hand, it has become clear that Ukraine’s new leadership is more than an accounting ploy to dangle before Ukrainian determined to achieve a serious improvement in relations public opinion. The actual discount on the Gazprom gas price with Russia and to make some real concessions if necessary. for Ukraine will translate into far less grandiose sums, and That opens up some promising vistas for promoting Russia’s the annual rent for Sevastopol will still be a drop in the ocean interests in Ukraine on a wide range of issues. Ukraine’s of numerous bilateral debts and settlements. Some estimates political establishment is ready for dialogue, and the era of the put the real consolidated profit Ukraine will garner from the nationalist-minded Orange government, unable to function deal at no more than 3 or 4 billion dollars over the coming as a serious partner in any negotiations, is well and truly over. decade. But even that modest sum will serve as a welcome On the other hand the new deal strengthens Russia’s position respite for Ukraine’s languishing economy especially as in Crimea and gives it a strong foothold in Ukraine, which can Yushchenko’s crusade against “Russian nationalism” was be used to extend Russian influence there even further. raking in nothing but losses. Russia needs to maintain its presence on the peninsula This deal with Kiev is a real comeback for Russia, not just for the sake of Crimea itself. Moscow can always reversing all its losses in Ukraine over the past seven years # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9 Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects International Relations

in one fell swoop. The agreement essentially confirms that of the Western-backed nationalist anti-Russian forces in Russia remains the key player in the former Soviet Union, the former Soviet Republics. It turns out that the Russian and that Russian influence here is bolstered by a whole range sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, the idea of which of facts on the ground that work in Russia’s favor. These Western countries hate so much and refuse to recognize, is “imperial” facts have in the end outweighed all the efforts based on far stronger foundations than many believed.

10 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects Defense Industries

RAC MiG: Back From the Brink

Konstantin Makienko

The Algerian fiasco of walking away from the trade-in agreement, apparently in the expectation that the 2006 contract for the MiG-29SMT’s AC MiG, a world-famous Russia maker of combat aircraft, would not be fulfilled. Rwas staring into a financial abyss in 2007-2008 after a big Algerian contract fell through. Its very ability to survive in its current shape was in doubt. The Algerian deal for 28 MiG- On the brink 29SMT and six MiG-29UBT fighters, worth USD 1.284bn, was signed in March 2006. Under the terms of the contract, The collapse of the Algerian contract was a severe blow the aircraft were to come “from the production reserves in to RAC MiG corporation’s finances and reputation. After the final stages of the technological cycle”. In simple terms, Algeria stopped the payments under the contract (only the Russian supplier was going to finish the MiG-29 Fulcrum USD 250m had been paid out of the total of almost USD airframes it had started back in 1992, when MiG continued 1.3bn), MiG’s debts reached 45bn roubles (1bn euros at the churning out fighter jets at the Soviet rate, but the Russian early 2009 exchange rate). Heads rolled in the company’s Air Force could no longer afford to buy them. The contract HQ. In January 2008, Director-General Sergey Tsivilev was also involved trading in 22 old Algerian MiG-29 fighters, replaced by Anatoliy Belov. Only a year later, Belov was let go 14 MiG‑23’s and ten MiG-21’s, for a total of USD 300m. for health reasons. The top job in the company was given to Over the period of December 2006 to April 2007, the director-general of its main Russian competitor, Mikhail Algeria took delivery of 15 aircraft, apparently including Pogosyan of the Sukhoi bureau. Pogosyan not only kept his four MiG-29UBT two-seat combat-trainer jets. Then in April job at Sukhoi, but was soon appointed head of the Combat 2007, the Algerian Air Force raised a number of technical Aviation division of the United Aircraft Making Corporation complaints about the quality of the planes it had received, (OAK). All those events led commentators to believe that the and stopped taking any more deliveries under the contract. arrival of Pogosyan had signaled the beginning of RAC MiG’s All the solutions the Russian side had offered (from repairing takeover by its bigger and more successful rival, Sukhoi. There any defects to replacing the aircraft) were rejected, and in was even talk that RAC MiG could be liquidated altogether. early 2008 all 15 of the new MiGs were returned to Russia. But recent developments in 2009 and early 2010 have proved Algeria’s refusal to compromise suggests that problems with that those dismal predictions were wide of the mark, and the planes were just an excuse, and the real reason behind the the turnaround in the company’s fortunes is already well crisis was the internal power struggle between the various under way. clans of the country’s military junta. One hypothesis was that problems with the MiG-29SMT deliveries were used by the head of the Algerian National Defense Ministry’s security Financial stabilization and intelligence department, Brigade General Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene, in his turf war with the head of the Army MiG’s finances, which were in ruins after the Algerian HQ, Brigade General Ahmed Gaid Salah. Mediene was backed fiasco, have been propped up by the government. As part by Air Force commander Abdelkader Lounes, the commander of the economic crisis package and measures to support of Fighter Aviation, Faycal Boutella, and the chief engineer of the aerospace industry, the corporation was given 15bn the Air Force, M. Zerad- all four belong to the Kabyle clan of roubles in early 2009 (about USD 416m at the January 2009 the Algerian military and political elite. There is also another exchange rate) so that it could pay its creditors and ease the piece of evidence pointing at the political nature of the crisis. debt burden. Another lump sum of 15bn roubles followed In summer 2006 – that is, even before the delivery of the at the end of 2009 (USD 0.5bn at the exchange rate at the first MiG-29UBT planes, which arrived only in December – time). Furthermore, the government also gave the Russian Algeria was looking to buy new RD-33 turbofan engines of Air Force extra funding (which was not part of the National the 3rd series. The engines were to be fitted onto the MiG-29 Armaments Program) to buy the MiG fighters that were to fighters bought previously from Belarus – those same planes be sold to Algeria. The Air Force even had to abandon its were to be traded in under the Russian contract. That means traditional strictures against using any hardware that has that the Algerian Air Force was looking into the possibility foreign-made components. The MiG-29SMT’s previously # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 11 RAC MiG: Back From the Brink Defense Industries

destined for Algeria had at least one crucial foreign-made New contracts component: the Sigma 95 navigation system made by France’s Sagem. By the end of 2009 the Russian Air Force On December 6, 2009, Russia signed a 400m euro took delivery of 31 former “Algerian” planes, out of the total contract with the Burmese Air Force for 20 MiG-29 fighters of of 34. The remaining three are to be delivered in 2010. It is not various modifications. Ten MiG-29B and six MiG-29SE fighters clear how much money MiG has received for those planes – a will come from MiG’s reserve of unfinished produce, and the conservative estimate would be about 20bn roubles (USD remaining four MiG-29UB’s from the Russian Air Force stock. 600m). The total amount of government financial support to The contract has become a real trophy for Rosoboroneksport RAC MiG in 2009 is therefore something in the area of USD and RAC MiG – they saw off stiff competition from Belarus, 1.5bn. That financial injection was instrumental for MiG’s who offered a very attractive price. It is also notable that the swift return from its near-death experience. Burmese military chose the Russian fighter over China’s more Thanks to government aid, the corporation was able to advanced FC-1 and J-10 planes, whose price could well have continue R&D on its key future fighter programs, the MiG‑29K been comparable to the MiG-29 versions. and the MiG-35, which should keep MiG competitive on the On March 12, 2010, during Prime Minister Vladimir international market. On September 28 and 29, one MiG‑29K Putin’s visit to India, New Delhi exercised its 2004 option and one MiG-29K-UB carrier-based fighters performed to buy 29 MiG-29K carrier-based fighters worth “more several take-offs and landings on the Admiral Kuznetsov than 1.5bn dollars”. The successful MiG-29K take-off and aircraft carrier in the Barents Sea, successfully completing landing tests in September 2009 appear to have persuaded a crucial stage in the MiG-29K program. That success has India to place an order for another batch of carrier-based opened up the prospects of new contracts for this fighter with fighters, even though only six aircraft have been delivered the Indian Air Force and possibly with the Russian Navy as so far from the first batch of 16 MiG-29K/KUB jets. The well. Meanwhile, a MiG-35 fighter prototype took to the air Indian contract greatly improves the chances that another in India in October-November 2009 for several demo flights 26 of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighters will be bought by as part of the Russian bid for the Indian Air Force MMRCA the Russian Navy for the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier. That contract for 126 multirole fighters. In April 2010, the fighter contract is expect to be signed before the end of 2010, with performed launches of guided air-to air and air-to surface deliveries in 2011-2012. Once that deal materializes, RAC weapons using a guidance system based on the Zhuk-MAE MiG will have secured orders for about a hundred jets, active phased array radar. meaning that the launch of large-scale, full-cycle mass Recent progress of the new MiG-29 fighter series production of the MiG-29K becomes almost a certainty. In programs has been crucial for securing a whole series of new practical terms, the damage to the company’s reputation contracts. The company now has orders for a total of almost sustained during the Algerian crisis is already a thing of 80 aircraft, 60 of which are to be built from scratch. the past.

RAC MiG actual and potential orders portfolio Customer Order Order status Production status Value Actual contracts Burmese Air Force 10 MiG-29B, Contract signed on December 6, 2009 From production About USD 500m 6 MiG-29SE reserve Indian Navy 10 MiG-29K Remaining units to be delivered under Full-cycle production USD 330m a January 20, 2004 contract; six of the total 16 units already delivered Indian Navy 29 MiG-29K Contract signed on March 12, 2010 Full-cycle production USD 1.5bn Not identified 24 MiG-29M2 Contract apparently signed in 2005 Full-cycle production USD 1bn-1.2bn or 2006 (estimate) Total 79 units USD 3,330m – 3,530m Potential contract Russian Navy 26 MiG-29K Pending Full-cycle production 28bn-32bn roubles (estimate) Source: CAST estimates, media reports. 12 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief RAC MiG: Back From the Brink Defense Industries

Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program Alexandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

ussia’s attempts to launch mass production of its latest President Dmitry Medvedev pledged in his state of the R9M723 Iskander-M tactical missile have run into serious nation address last year that production of the Iskanders difficulties. Many of the Russian missile manufacturing would be stepped up. He said the defense industry had been technologies are obsolete. Much of the equipment is decrepit set the target of delivering five Iskander battalions in 2010. and requires urgent replacement. But now a somewhat belated The ambition has at least the merit of grandeur: last year the decision has been made to face the facts and tackle all these suppliers managed to come up with only three launchers problems head-on - even if it means sourcing new machinery and 13 missiles, according to Popovkin himself. Meanwhile, from the West. Army Commander Vladimir Bondarev has already unveiled the equipment tables for the new missile formations. Each Iskander-M battalion is supposed to have four launchers and Grand designs eight missiles. If the five battalions promised by Medvedev are to materialize, the industry will therefore have to churn Work on the Iskander program began at the Kolomna out 20 launchers and at least 40 missiles (not counting the Machine-Building Design Bureau back in Soviet times. For spares mounted on loader-transports). In other words, the a period after the collapse of the former Soviet Union it was current Iskander-M production capacity is a fraction of what mothballed, along with numerous other Soviet military is required. projects. Years later, Russia brought it back to life, but in a substantially altered form, to reflect the latest requirements. The changes involved replacing electronic components and The problems of mass production making use of some other technological advances of the past 20 years. In 2006, when the Iskanders formally entered service, it The Iskander-M system, with a maximum range of was decided to launch their mass production at the Votkinsky 500 km (to comply with the INF treaty requirements) entered plant (Votkinsky Zavod) – one of the former Soviet Union’s service in 2006. In the same year, first deputy premier Sergey largest missile technology centers, with long and glorious Ivanov unveiled plans for the new missile’s rollout. Under the history. The plant was founded on the orders of Empress 2007-2015 State Armament Program, five missile brigades Elizabeth back in 1759 as a metallurgical (“iron-making”) were due to receive a total of 60 Iskander battalions. The factory. In the 1860s, the plant added a machine-building figures were soon confirmed by Defense Ministry officials floor and started making steam engines. Under the new and the developers of the new missile. Everyone involved Soviet government it became a producer of artillery in 1937, believed back at the time that delivering six or seven Iskander and then in the 1950s ventured into missile technology. battalions a year for the next nine years was entirely realistic. Over the years it has mass-produced the R-17 (SS-1 Scud), They were wrong. Temp-S (SS-12), and Oka (SS-23) short-range missiles; Over the past four years, Iskanders were trotted out thrice the intermediate-range Pioner (SS-20), as well the mobile for the Victory Day parades on Red Square (in 2008-2010), and intercontinental Temp-2S (SS-16) and Topol (SS-25) missiles. on a more practical note, used during the war with Georgia in Since the fall of the Soviet Union the plant has launched August 2008. But on latest available information, Russia still production of the new universal Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM and has only one military unit actually armed with the Iskanders of the future strategic Bulava (SS-N-30) SLBM – though the – a single battalion of the 60th missile forces training center latter missile is still in development, and recent tests have in Znamensk (the Kapustin Yar training range). The Russian been disappointing. deputy defense minister for armament, Vladimir Popovkin, The choice of the Votkinsky plant was therefore a promised as far back as June 2009 that the long-awaited second foregone conclusion. Luckily for Russia, it inherited the battalion of the Iskanders would soon be delivered to the armed former Soviet Union’s leading mass production missile forces. But almost a year on, there has been no news of any of factory that had for decades specialized in short-range and the regular missile brigades receiving the new missiles. solid-fuel missiles. There was no point looking for another

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 13 Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program Defense Industries

contractor – especially since the Votkinsky plant, the maker reasons of obsolescence, degraded precision parameters of the Tochka and Oka missiles, already has a solid record and plain old wear and tear. To illustrate, the programming of cooperation with both the developer of the Iskander (the modules of 169 machine tools still in use at the Votkinsky Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau) and the main plant rely on ancient paper tape input. These modules have customer, the Defense Ministry. But it turns out that some long been discontinued by the manufacturer, so repairing important considerations had not properly been taken into them takes ages and costs an arm and a leg. account. The biggest problem is that the Votkinsky plant’s Under the technical specifications outlined in the equipment and technology have not had a serious upgrade announcement of the contract, a total of 10 production for two decades. The company is already working flat out on buildings are to be refurbished. Some of them are situated two other large missile projects – the Topol-M and the Bulava, at the main site of the plant, which straddles the river Votka, so there is little spare capacity for the Iskander contract. And while others are some distance away at the assembly and it is only now that the search for a solution to this problem fitting base, where the missiles are put together and tested. has begun in earnest. In addition to that base, which is 11 km away from the main site, the upgrade program will involve eight production floors and three technological departments (including the Finally, a decision central laboratory and the main metrology department). Essentially, the entire production chain will be retooled, In late 2009 the government invited bids for a contract from the manufacture of individual parts, components and to develop project documentation for a big program entitled materials (such as plastics and thermal insulators) to the “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass hull workshop, bonding, assembly, fitting, quality control, Production of the Iskander-M Product”. The announcement painting and packaging floors. was published on the official state procurement web site The documents also contain the list of new equipment to (www.zakupki.gov.ru). The contract, worth 4m roubles, is be procured. It has to be said that much of it is Russian-made, just the first stage of a program which aims to equip the including machining centers, some machine tools, furnaces plant with the latest high-tech hardware (the mechanical and and overhead cranes, fault detectors and X-ray machines. assembly floors being the top priority), and “eliminate the But a lot of the new machinery is to be sourced from foreign existing deficit of manufacturing capacity”. The government suppliers. The Soviet machine-tool and instrument-making has stressed that the “deficit” is not the result of any plans to industry lagged far behind the Western competition. The state boost the plant’s nominal capacity: back in Soviet times the of that industry in present-day Russia is probably as sad as existing stock of production tools was sufficient to make a the state of the Votkinsky plant itself. It simply cannot deliver much wider range of missiles, and in much higher numbers. the standards required in modern manufacturing. No wonder This deficit rather reflects “the physical wear and tear of then that some hardware crucial for the success of the entire the old machinery and the need to equip the plant for new upgrade program will have to be brought from places such technological processes”. as the United States, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Austria and The announcement of the contract outlines the current the Czech Republic. That includes new machining centers, condition of the Votkinsky plant in great detail. It mentions computerized turning lathes, cutting equipment and various that 2,665 pieces of various equipment are currently in use instruments, such as calibrators and spectrometers (see Table on the floors manufacturing “special products”. The age of 2). Ten of the 33 articles on the list of new equipment will be all that equipment is nothing short of alarming (see Table foreign-made. Imports will account for 145.64m roubles of 1). Almost 80 per cent of it has been in use for more than a the 314.34 million cost of the project (46.3 per cent). decade (see the chart). Some 1,537 units (58 per cent of the It should also be mentioned that the sole bidder for the total) are past their service life and need to be replaced for initial project design contract was OAO “Prikampromprpoekt”

Table 1. Age of the Votkinsky plant equipment Years in 5 or less 5 to 10 10 to 15 15 to 20 over 20 Total service Number of units 199 391 538 687 850 2665 Share (%) 7% 15% 20% 26% 32% 100 Source: technical task description in the announcement of the design documentation contract under the “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass Production of the Iskander-M Product” project.

14 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program Defense Industries

(Prikamskiy Institute of Industrial Design, based in Izhevsk). announced in June. Shortly before that, the government made Under the Russian legislation, the state contract must now a separate announcement on the purchase of another batch be awarded to that bidder. Meanwhile, on March 30, 2010 the of new equipment for the plant, worth 105m roubles. That government announced the next contract under the Votkinsky means that the Votkinsky refurbishment project is not stuck Plant program - this one for engineering documentation. at the initial stage, and certainly not dead. Things finally seem The contract is worth 7m roubles; the winner should be to be moving forward.

Table 2. List of foreign-made equipment to be purchased for the Votkinsky plant Equipment Company Country Requirement Cost (RUR) (units) Vertical Machining Center MC 80 / 5ax SIMPLE STROJTOS Czechia 2 36 mln Horizontal Machining Center TOStec OPTIMA TOS VARNSDORF Czechia 1 30 mln Machining Center C 20 HERMLE Germany 2 30 mln CNC Lathe Emcoturn E25 EMCO Austria 2 9 mln Cut-Off Machine Exotom-150 Struers Denmark 1 3.5 mln Guillotine Shears TruShear TRUMPF Germany 1 6 mln Welding System MagicWave Type Fronius Austria 3 3 mln Dry Ice Blaster Triblast-2 TRIVENTEK Denmark 1 6.14 mln Portable XRF Analyzer Alpha-2000 Innov-X Systems United States 4 20 mln Calibrator Transmille 3010 (3041) Transmille Great Britain 1 2 mln TOTAL 10 companies 6 countries 18 145.64 mln Source: technical task description in the announcement of the design documentation contract under the “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass Production of the Iskander-M Product” project.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15 Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program Defense Industries

Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 Andrey Frolov

ussia’s defense procurement budget includes the Defense he said. Another 160bn (27 per cent) would be channeled into RMinistry’s spending on the repair and maintenance of its R&D3. That leaves 100bn roubles (17 per cent) for the repair existing hardware, contracts for new equipment and military and upgrade programs. The figure of 592bn seems too high R&D programs. (that must have been the pre-crisis spending target), but the relative shares of its components have remained more or less unchanged over the past few years, so they seem to be an Overview accurate reflection of the real situation. That means that of the estimated 500bn roubles of actual spending on defense In a departure from the previous years’ practice, procurement programs, about 280bn (56 per cent) was spent Russia has not officially announced the exact figures of its on new hardware, up to 135bn (27 per cent) on R&D and defense procurement spending in 2009. There is no official another 85bn (17 per cent) on repair and upgrade programs explanation for this – but the general understanding is that (See Figure 1). the figures simply kept changing throughout the whole year, The Defense Ministry has also released approximate reflecting the government’s latest anti-crisis measures. We figures on the relative share of each service in the total estimate Russia’s total spending on defense procurement defense spending (not just procurement). Maj Gen Aleksandr in 2009 at 500bn roubles, which is roughly the average of Shevchenko said that “right now”, the share of the strategic all the publically announced figures and very close to the nuclear and space forces is over 20 per cent, the Army and latest available official statistics. With the country’s total Airborne Troops account for over 40 per cent, the Navy for defense spending estimated at 1,080bn roubles1, defense 15 per cent and the Air Force for 20 per cent of the military procurement accounted for about 46 per cent of that figure. budget4. The naval component of the nuclear deterrent seems In 2008, that share was only 32 per cent – meaning that the to account for the bulk of the spending on the nuclear forces. overall cuts in Russia’s defense spending last year (the pre- Sergey Ivanov said that about 40 per cent of the military budget crisis spending target was 1,376bn roubles) affected mostly would be spent on the Navy5 in 2009, mainly on building the upkeep of the army, with procurement escaping relatively Project 955 nuclear-armed submarine cruisers – and also, unscathed2. in all likelihood, on sorting out teething problems with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov has Bulava SLBM, which those subs are supposed to carry. provided a rough breakdown of total procurement spending. The defense procurement program continues to suffer Of the 592bn roubles that went into procurement programs, from irregular disbursement of funds. In the first quarter 332bn (56 per cent) would be spent on buying new hardware, of 2009, Russian defense contractors received from the

Table 1. Official statements on Russia’s defense procurement spending in 2009 (in chronological order) Defense procurement Announced by Details spending, bn roubles 428 Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said that 300bn roubles made up 70 per cent of the Popovkin defense procurement budget. 497 Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov Ivanov said that 332bn roubles made up 66.8 per cent of the defense procurement budget. 592 Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov 489 Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov Serdyukov said that 378bn roubles made up 77.3 per cent of the defense procurement budget. 508 Deputy chairman of the Russia Duma Shtorgin said 47 per cent of the total defense spending budget and taxes committee Sergey (1,080bn) went into armament programs Shtorgin Source: CAST. 16 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 Defense Industries

Figure 1. Russian defense procurement spending in 2005-2009

Source: media reports, author’s estimates. government only 63 per cent of the moneys due to them6 in 2009. But the bulk of those deliveries was made of the (73.6bn roubles). By September, that figure fell to 60 per cent7. MiG-29SMT fighters turned down by Algeria - meaning that And although a system of three-year contracts was formally the record was a blip, unlikely to be repeated or broken any introduced in 2008, one-year contracts still accounted for the time soon. The fall in the numbers of new weapons platforms bulk of Russia’s 2009 defense procurement program. delivered to the Russian Air Force will come as early as 2010. 3. Spending on Navy procurement contracts has Key developments in 2009 also gone up. Orders have been placed not just for auxiliary vessels but big warships as well. For the first time since 1993, 1. One of the key developments in 2009 was the signing the Russian shipbuilders have laid down a new Project 885 of large new arms contracts, mainly for weapons systems (Severodvinsk class) nuclear-powered attack submarine, and that had not previously been supplied to the Russian armed a second Project 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov class) frigate. At forces. Some of the largest of those contracts include the the same time, spending on the repair and maintenance of purchase of 64 Sukhoi fighters by the Russian Air Force (48 the Russian Navy’s warships has gone down. Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM and four Su-30M2 aircraft), followed by 4. Army procurement programs have continued at the purchase of new aircraft engines and airborne weapons about the same pace as in the previous years. There has been for those jets. no sharp rise in deliveries, and no large new contracts have 2. In addition to signing new contracts, the Russian Air been announced. But there has been a marked increase in the Force set a new post-Soviet record for new aircraft deliveries numbers of upgraded hardware.

Table 2. Space launches for the Defense Ministry in 2009 Date Satellite Launch Vehicles Number and type of satellites put into orbit February 28 Proton-K One 17F15 Raduga-1 relay satellite April 29 Soyuz-U One Kobalt-M photo reconnaissance satellite May 22 Soyuz-2.1a One 14F112 Meridian telecommunications satellite July 6 Rokot Three telecommunication satellites of the Rodnik communications system July 21 Kosmos-3M One 11F627 Parus navigation satellite November 20 Soyuz-U One 14F138 Lotos-S radio reconnaissance satellite of the Liana system December 14 Proton-M Three 14F113 Uragan-M navigation satellites of the GLONASS-M system Source: Russian media, www.russianforces.org. # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 17 Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 Defense Industries

Table 3. Comparison of some defense procurement figures for 2007-2009 Figure 2007 2008 2009 Nominal spending (real terms 302.7 365 (322.2)* 500 (405.6)* figure in 2007 prices), billion roubles Strategic missile forces and space forces Topol-M and Yars ICBMs 7 11 9 Sineva SLBMs 10** 6** 6** Space SLV launched 7 7 7 Space vehicles put into orbit 4 13 11 Air Force and Air Defense hardware Strategic and Long-range 1 Tu-22M3 (u) 1 Tu-160 (n), 6 Tu-95MS (r) 2 Tu-160 (r; u), approximately bombers 6 Tu‑95MS (r)** Front line bombers 2 Su-34 (n), 6 Cu-24M2 1 Su-34 (n), 12 Su-24M2 (u) 2 Su-34 (n), 2 Su-24M2 (u) (u) Attack aircraft 6 Su-25SM (u) 8 Su-25SM (u) 12 Su-25SM (u) Fighters 8 Su-27SM (u) 8 Su-27SM (u), 2 MiG-31BM (u) 31 MiG-29SMT/UBT (n), 8 Su-27SM (u) n/a MiG-31BM (u) Anti-submarine aircraft 1 Tu-142MZ (u) n/a n/a Tu-142M/MZ Jet trainers n/a n/a 1-3 Yak-130 (n) Helicopters 4 Mi-28N (n), 1 Ka-50 (n), n/a 10 Mi-28N (n), 3 Ka-52A (n), 2 Ka-50 Mi-8MTV-5 (n) (n), approximately 10 Mi-8 (n)**, 1 Ka‑252RLD (n), 6 Ansat-U (n) 1 Mi‑26T (r), 14 Mi-24 (r), 20 Mi-8 (r) Special-purpose aircraft 1 Il-20 (u), 1 Il-22 (u) 1 Il-20 (u), 1 Il-22 (u) n/a Passenger aircraft n/a 1 Tu-154M (n) 1 Tu-154B2 (r) UAV s n/a 1 Tipchak, 10 ZALA 421-08, 10 10 Pchela-1K Strekoza Air defense systems 1 battalion of S-400 (n) 1 Pantsir-S1 system (prototype), 1 battalion of S-400 (n), 4 Pantsir-S1 170 radars, 75 automated systems (n) control systems Navy Strategic ballistic-missile 1 Project 667BDR (r) 1 Project 667BDRM (r) - nuclear-powered submarines Non-strategic nuclear-powered - 1 Project 949A (r), 1 Project 971 - submarines (r), 1 Project 945A (r), 1 Project 671RTMK (r) Heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers - 1 Project 11435 (r) - Guide-missile cruisers - 1 Project 11641 (r) 1 Project 11442 (r) Diesel-electric submarines - 1 Project 20120 (n) 1 Project 877 (r) Destroyers and escorts - - 1 Project 956 (r), 1 Project 11540 (n) Corvettes - 1 Project 20380 (n) -

18 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 Defense Industries

Figure 2007 2008 2009 Assault landing ships and boats - 1 Project 1176 (n), 2 Project 1 Project 1176 (n), 1 Project 775 (r) 11770 (n) Minesweepers 2 Project 1265 (r) - 1 Project 02668 (n) Transport ships - - 1 Project 20180 (n) Auxiliary ships and boats - 1 Project 19910 (n), 1 Project 1 Project 12150 (n), 1 Project 21980 (n), 19920 (n) 1 Project 21270 (n), 1 Project 19920 (n), 1 Project 304 (r) Deep-sea submersibles 1 Project 16180 (n) 1 (n), 1 Project 1855 (r) 1 Project 16811 (n) Land-based missile systems - - 1 Bastion (n) Armored vehicles, artillery and transport vehicles Main battle tanks 31 T-90A (n), 62 T-90A (n), 31 T-72BA (u) 63 T-90A (n), 31 T-72BA (u) approximately 40 T-72BA (u) Armored combat vehicles 31 BMP-3 (n), 90 BTR-80 41 BMP-3 (n), 155 BTR-80 (n), 306 or 357 armored combat vehicles (n), 60 BTR-70 (u), 10 55 BTR-70 (u) 30 BMD-4 (n), (BMP-3, BTR-80, Dozor and BMD-4 (n) approximately 6 Sprut-SD (n) others) (n), 10 Nona-SVK (n), 150 BMD-2/BMD-4 (u), 2 BMO-T (n), approximately 6 Sprut-SD (n) Artillery and mortars 300 (n; u; r) 152 (n; u; r) 20 (n), 85 (u), 36 (r) Automobiles 4,000 (n), about 3,000 4,500(n), including 3,000 trucks About 4,000 (n) (r)** Tactical missile systems 1 Iskander-M battalion 4 Iskander-M launchers (n) 3 launchers and 13 Iskander-M (n) missiles (n) * – adjusted for the 2008 inflation of 13.3 % and the 2009 inflation of 8.8 %. See: Russian Federal Statistics Service web site (www.gks.ru). ** – author’s estimate. Notes: (n) – new, (u) – upgraded, (r) – repaired. Source: Russian media, www.russianforces.org.

1 Defense procurement budget to rise to 1,175bn roubles in 2010 – Putin // RIA Novosti, November 21, 2009. 2 In January 2009, the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK), Anatoliy Shlemov, said that funding of the priority programs would remain unchanged. See: Funding of United Shipbuilding Corporation defense procurement contracts to remain unchanged // Prime-TASS, January 16, 2010. 3 Defense procurement funding to remain unchanged at 1,300bn roubles in 2010-2011 – Sergey Ivanov // ARMS-TASS, June 2, 2009 4 Ivanov: Most of the Defense Ministry spending to be channeled into the Navy // Vzglyad, June 3, 2009. 5 Treasury disburses 73.6bn roubles under defense procurement program // ARMS-TASS, April 8, 2009. 6 Some 60 per cent of defense procurement funding has reached contractors, rest to follow by year’s end – Putin // ITAR-TASS, September 15, 2009. 7 Nikolskiy A. Gref turns down profits // Vedomosti, February 17, 2009.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 19 Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 Arms Trade

Russian Loans for Arms Contracts Dmitry Vasiliev

ussia began offering credit as an inducement for foreign need be. The deals on the table now include the upgrade of Rbuyers of its weapons shortly after the collapse of the Jordan’s air defense systems sold to it by the former Soviet former Soviet Union. In 1992 India was given an USD 830m Union (Strela-10/SA-13 and Osa/SA-8 mobile SAM systems, loan to buy a whole range of Russian arms, including fighter ZSU-23-4 Shilka SPAAG), joint production of the RPG-32, jets, tanks and armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons, missiles, the purchase of the TOS-1M heavy tank-chassis-mounted etc.1 In particular, the money was used to finance the purchase flamethrowers, etc.4 of 10 Su-30K fighters in 1998, worth USD 300m.2 The contract In September 2007, Russia offered a USD 1bn financing was part of the largest Russia-Indian defense cooperation scheme to Indonesia, which has since bought six Mi-17 program to date - to develop a new modification of the Su-30 utility helicopters (delivered in 2008) and placed an order for fighter, the Su-30MKI, and launch licensed assembly of 140 another six Mi-35M attack helicopters (worth an estimated such planes in India. The Su-30K’s were bought pending USD 100m, with a delivery date in 2010). It has also signed a the completion of the program, so that they could later be contract for 18 BMP-3F naval infantry fighting vehicles (USD upgraded to the Su-30MKI specification. 40m, for delivery in 2010).5 It was expected that Indonesia But that first Russian “loans for arms” deal was not really would also contract Russia to build two new Project 636 (Kilo part of a deliberate strategy. It was largely a continuation class) diesel-electric submarines and design a corvette based of the old Soviet tradition of military largesse towards its on the Russian Project 20380 (Steregutschi class). But so far allies. The truly calculated use of financial instruments to those deals have not been signed, partly because of the world promote Russian weapons abroad did not begin until the turn economic crisis. of the century, when oil prices shot up, buoying the Russian In September 2009, Russia and Venezuela signed an economy. That turnaround in economic fortunes coincided agreement involving a USD 2.2bn loan.6 It is not clear what with the presidency of Vladimir Putin; the national defense exactly Venezuela has bought. The only known contract is for industry (including defense exports) was a far greater priority 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks from the Russian to him than to his predecessor. Defense contracts now figured army stock. As for the rest of the second Venezuelan package large during the foreign visits by the Russian president and (the first was signed in 2006), it is known to include large senior officials. That period saw the signing of some of the numbers of SAM and artillery systems (some of it from the largest Russian weapons deals to date, including the high- Russian army stock), as well as small arms. The overall worth profile contracts with Algeria and Venezuela. Those contracts of the new Venezuelan deal is far more than the USD 2.2bn were largely made possible by Russia’s willingness to offer of Russian credit: some estimates put the figure as high as various offsets , including attractive financing schemes. It USD 5bn.7 is clear, however, that offsets became a significant factor in In February 2010, Sri Lanka received a USD 300m the Russian arms trade only after the year 2000. One indirect Russian loan, to be spent on Russian military and dual- piece of evidence to support that claim can be found in the purpose produce, primarily helicopters.8 Finally, in April US CRS reports on conventional arms transfers to developing 2010 a deal was agreed with Bolivia on a USD 100m loan to nations. The first time those reports mentioned Russia’s finance the purchase of 10 Mi-171 utility helicopters for the growing use of flexible financial instruments was in 2003. government’s campaign against the drugs.9 There are several known examples of Russia’s use of Overall, the number of the “loans for arms contracts” the “loans for arms contracts” scheme. The Indian contract deals Russia has signed so far isn’t that great, and for two aside, the first such loan, of USD 350m , was given to Jordan in reasons. First, Moscow only offers these loans in exceptional 2006 so that it could place an order for two Il-76MF military circumstances - such as when it is trying to enter a new market transport aircraft (worth USD 100m, with a now delivery (Sri Lanka after the end of the civil war, Bolivia following the date in 2011), 200 Kornet-E (AT-14) anti-tank guided-missile arrival of Evo Morales, the traditionally pro-Western Jordan systems, 182 Igla (SA-18) man-portable SAM systems with and Indonesia), or to flog second-hand equipment, which is the Dzhigit pedestal twin-launcher mounts, and a batch of the not very competitive anyway (such as the hardware from the new RPG-32 Hashim hand-held anti-tank rocket launchers Russian army stock sold to Venezuela). Notably, a financing (all delivered in 2008)3. Moreover, the loan has not been used deal was offered to Greece, a NATO member, when Russia up yet, so Russia has still more of its military wares on offer was bidding for a contract to supply several hundred BMP- to Jordan – and is even ready to give Amman a new loan, if 3M infantry fighting vehicles. (Alas, Greece is now facing an

20 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Loans for Arms Contracts Advertisment Advertisment Arms Trade

economic meltdown, so new APCs are probably the last thing “weapons credits” issued after 2008 has fallen, and the only on its mind.) Meanwhile, the financing of the Indonesian new financing deals are for dual-purpose hardware, such contract for six Su-27 and Su-30 fighters signed in 2007 (the as helicopters. Customers have also slowed down the rate year the Russian loan was issued) does not in fact come from at which they are using up the previously extended Russian that loan. The money was borrowed from foreign banks, loans. and the deal itself is worth USD 335m.10 The explanation Finally, with the ongoing economic crisis, financing is simple: these fighters are in great demand on the world new weapons deals is a burden for the Russian treasury. But market, and Indonesia had already bought four Su-27 and the loans really are an effective mechanism of bolstering Su-30 fighters (delivered in 2003), so a contract for another arms exports and keeping the national defense contractors batch of them in order to have just enough for a squadron in business. For Russia, these exports are not so much a was more or less a done deal. In other words, when a contract political instrument (with the possible exception of arms looks certain, no incentives are offered. sales to the Middle East) as an economic strategy. Without On the other hand, the economic crisis means than foreign contracts, the Russian defense industry will sink - so not every country can afford to take out a loan to buy new government financing of arms exports can be viewed as one weapons. Our figures indicate that the amount of Russian of the mechanisms of state support for the sector.

1 Kalashnikova N. Russia launches new foreign policy – this time in the East // Kommersant, January 28, 1993; SIPRI ARMS Transfer Database. 2 Makiyenko K. Sukhoi design bureau in India – the Su-30MKI project // Arms Exports, special edition, 2006. 3 Zygar M. Weapons of Mutual Understanding // Kommersant, February 11, 2008; Novichkov N. Jordan’s Special Forces Acquire Vehicle- Mounted Kornet-E // Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, May 2008. 4 Rosoboroneksport offers Jordan air defense upgrade solutions // ITAR-TASS, May 11, 2010; Russia to arm Jordan with flame-throwers // Marker, May 11, 2010. 5 Six Russian Mi-35 jets to be sold to Indonesia // Oborona.ru, June 18, 2008. 6 Russia to sell 5bn dollars worth of arms to Venezuela // RIA Novosti, February 5, 2010. 7 Ibid. 8 Bezeka E. Russia to give Sri Lanka a 300m dollar loan to buy weapons // RIA Novosti, February 5, 2010. 9 Bolivia to receive 100m dollar Russian loan to buy helicopters // RIA Novosti, April 3, 2010. 10 Indonesia to use French loan to buy Russian Sukhoi fighters // Interfax-AVN, September 22, 2008.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 21 Russian Loans for Arms Contracts Armed Forces

Russia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage Ruslan Pukhov

n October 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Army transformation ISerdyukov announced a new stage of military reform, and the most radical transformation of the Russian military The main thrust of the reform has been to abandon the machine since the Red Army was born in 1918. The MoD set traditional Soviet and Russian model of a mass mobilization about implementing the new strategy with gusto – most of army. The idea is that in peace time the new Russian Army the structural changes had been implemented by December 1, should be made of fully-manned formations which are always 2009. The reform has affected the army’s numbers, structure, ready for combat duty – the so-called permanent readiness command system and officer training. forces. All skeleton-strength units are to be disbanded. The key elements of the reform are as follows: All Army formations should be fully manned, i.e. become •• Accelerate the downsizing of the armed forces to 1 permanent readiness forces. To that end, Russia is moving million people by 2012; away from conscription and towards professional military •• Reduce the number of officers (from 335,000 to 150,000 service. The increase in the numbers of permanent readiness vacancies) and restructure the officer corps; forces will compensate for the overall downsizing of the •• Centralize the officer training system by reorganizing Army. The skeleton-strength units, manned in peace time 65 military schools into 10 “systemic” military training by officers without any private soldiers, are to be disbanded. centers; That means than many officer vacancies – most of them •• Reorganize and downsize central command, including senior – will be axed. the MoD and the General Staff; Another important change as part of the new brigade •• Bring in more civilian staff into the army’s logistics and structure is the transition towards a three-tier command auxiliary services; system comprising district command, operational command •• Eliminate cadre-strength (skeleton) formations and and the actual brigades. The existing divisions, combined bring all units up to permanent readiness status; services armies and army corps are being replaced with •• Reorganize the reserves and their training system; brigades, all taking their orders from their respective •• Reduce the number of units, formations, and military operational commands. Eight such commands were to be bases; set up on the basis of the existing combined-services armies, •• Reorganize the Army into a brigade system, abolishing but those plans remained on paper throughout 2009 and, the division, corps and army echelons; and so far, the old armies structure is still in place. Six strategic •• Reorganize the Air Force and Air Defense, abolishing commands are being set up on the basis of the six existing armies, corps, divisions and air regiments to replace military districts. The commanders of the districts have been them with a new structure of airbases and aerospace put in charge of the respective new strategic commands. defense brigades. Prior to the launch of the reform in 2008, the Russian There has been much media hype over the cuts of the Army (not including Airborne Troops) had 24 divisions (3 central military command, reorganization of the military tank divisions, 16 motorized-rifle divisions and 5 machine- training centers, redundancies in the officer corps and gun-and-artillery divisions); 12 independent motorized- the abolition, to all intents and purposes, of warrant rifle and rifle brigades; plus two division-strength military officers. bases in Armenia and Tajikistan. In practice, out of those 24 Meanwhile, the sweeping structural transformation of divisions and two military bases, only five motorized-rifle the Russian Armed Forces in 2009 – especially the Army, the divisions and one base were fully manned in 2008. Three Air Force and Air Defense – has largely remained below the of them were in the North Caucasus military district (the media radar, both at home and abroad. This lack of attention 19th, 20th and 42nd divisions), one in the Moscow district is entirely undeserved: in the space of just 11 months the (the 3rd division) and one in the Volga-Urals district (the Russian Armed Forces have been rapidly reshaped in the 27th division), plus the 201st military base in Tajikistan. The “new look” (“novyi oblik”) mold, which is radically different rest of the division-strength formations had just one or two in many ways from the traditional model of the Red, then regiments fully manned. Only about 13 per cent of the Army’s Soviet, then finally Russian Army. Strangely enough this formations could be deemed permanently combat-ready. revolutionary transformation spearheaded by Minister Over the course of 2009, 23 divisions were disbanded Serdyukov has attracted very little attention. and their elements used to form 40 new brigades and 22 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage Armed Forces

brigade-strength military bases. That number, correct as of could have one). By 2015 the Army will also have 18 new 1 December, includes four tank brigades, 35 motorized rifle army aviation brigades, following the decision to reverse the brigades and one “cover” (fortifications) brigade. Only two transfer of army aviation service to the Air Force command. division-strength formations still remain: the 18th machine- gun-and-artillery division stationed on the South Kuril Islands, and the 201st base in Tajikistan. All four of the new Air Force, Air Defense and the Navy tank brigades were assembled from elements of the old tank divisions. Of the 35 motorized rifle brigades, 10 had been in The newly merged Air Force and Air Defense has also place before 2008, 21 have been formed from pre-existing undergone radical structural transformations and cuts. motorized rifle divisions, and another four have been newly The old Soviet regimental structure of Air Force created using equipment stored in the reserve depots. Most formations, which dated all the way back to 1938, has been of the new brigades had been formed by June 1, 2009. They abandoned. The new basic formation in this type of service have been taking part in various exercises starting from last will be the airbase rather than the old air regiment. Each spring, and the lessons learnt during those exercises are being airbase will include the command, one to seven air squadrons, used to make certain adjustments to the structure of the new an airfield service battalion and communication units. The formations. idea is to bring all airborne and ground support units under All the new brigades are permanent-readiness forces, a single airbase command. Many believe this structure has which means that the proportion of the Army formations that been borrowed from Belarus, where it was introduced quite have permanent combat-ready status is now 100 per cent, up a while ago. from the pre-reform figure of 13 per cent. At least 95 per cent A total of 52 airbases had been formed by the end of of the vacancies in the new brigades have been filled; some 2009, replacing 72 Air Force and Air Defense regiments, brigades are already fully manned, and all of them are fully 14 previously existing airbases and 12 independent air supplied with equipment and provisions. squadrons. The total number of Air Force and Air Defense As of late 2009, a total of 85 new brigades have been formations has been slashed from 340 to 180. formed in the Russian armed forces as part of the reform. All air division HQs have been disbanded, and the Apart from the 40 combined arms brigades, that number airbases take their orders directly from the new Aviation includes nine missile brigades, nine artillery, four rocket- commands. Seven such commands have been set up to artillery, nine air-defense and one engineers brigade, plus replace the old aviation armies, as well as Air Force and a communications brigade, a electronic warfare brigade, Air Defense armies. The 37th Air Army of the Supreme and some others. The seven existing special task force Command (strategic aviation) has been reformed into the (“spetsnaz”) brigades have retained their special status, and Long-Range Aviation Command. Similarly, the 61st Air Army a new experimental reconnaissance brigade has been created of the Supreme Command (military transport aviation) has in Mozdok, in the North Caucasus. Many support formations been restructured into the Transport Aviation Command. have had their status downgraded to regiment or battalion. The old Special Task Force Command (and its 16th Air The existing army storage and repairs depots have now Army) now forms the core of the new Operative-Strategic become the main reserve component of the Army. Those Aerospace Defense Command, which has special status and depots are essentially big warehouses holding enough arms is responsible for air defense of Moscow and almost the and equipment to field a military formation of a certain size. entire Moscow Military District. Another four territorial More than 60 such depots have now been formed; most hold commands have been set up to replace the six former Air enough equipment to field a brigade, including 15 combined- Force and Air Defense armies, which were subordinated to arms brigades (one tank brigade and 14 motorized-rifle their corresponding Military District commands. brigades). In the “new-look” Russian army, the function of The Air Force training system has also been reformed. serving as mobilization centers now resides with military The Gagarin Air Force Academy and the Zhukovskiy Air schools and regional training centers. Force Engineering Academy have been merged to become There have been some vacillations over whether to make the Zhukovskiy-Gagarin Air Force Academy with an HQ in the same structural changes in the Airborne Troops - but after Monino. All pilot training has been centralized under the Gen Vladimir Shamanov was appointed their commander, single Krasnodar Aviation Institute. it was decided to leave the divisional structure intact. The The Air Defense Forces, which are now part of the Russian service has retained all its divisions (two Airborne and two Air Force, have undergone serious restructuring. All the Air-Assault). The divisions themselves have been beefed former air defense divisions and corps have been disbanded up. The number of independent airborne and air-assault and replaced with 13 aerospace defense brigades, which brigades has gone up from three to four, and plans are afoot combine fighter aviation air bases, SAM regiments and radar to create another two (so that each of the six military districts regiments. These 13 brigades have been distributed between # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 23 Russia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage Armed Forces

the Operative-Strategic Aerospace Defense Command and country will have long enough to mobilize, which means that the four Air Force and Air Defense commands. there is no longer a need to maintain the skeleton-strength As part of the reform in 2009, the Russian Air Force formations in peace time. In the event of mobilization there and Air Defense wrote off large numbers of old and obsolete will be plenty of time to assemble and deploy additional hardware, including aircraft, and shed a lot of personnel. military formations. Some 50,000 officer vacancies were expected to be cut in this To the adherents of the old dogmas, and those who still service as part of the reform. discern the need to prepare for a large-scale conventional Meanwhile, the Russian Navy was spared any radical military conflict with the West in the best traditions of World reorganization in 2009. Important steps have been made, War II, the Serdyukov reform is a demolition of the country’s however, to simplify its structure and reduce the number core defense infrastructure. But the main reason why the of Navy formations, which should eventually fall from 240 reform is unpopular among the military is, of course, the to 123. The brunt of the cuts so far has been borne by the redundancies. No wonder then that its proponents have been Navy Marines: the only Marine division (the 55th, of the taking so much flak. Minister Serdyukov and the top brass Pacific Fleet) has been downgraded to a brigade. The Caspian therefore well deserve credit for steering the course of the brigade has been disbanded altogether, and the remaining reform so firmly throughout 2009, despite all the criticism and four brigades have been reformed into regiments. resistance, as well as the difficult economic situation following the world financial crisis. Nevertheless, all the changes implemented in 2009 are What next? only the first and relatively easy stage of the coming radical transformation. So far, the reform has been limited mostly to The overarching idea behind Minister Serdyukov’s administrative reorganization. Each new military formation reform is that the shape of the Russian Armed Forces should (the commands, brigades and airbases) is essentially just a be dictated by the new nature of the conflicts Russia may structural shell with a new table of organization. Each will now have to face. These are primarily local conflicts, mostly on the have to be filled with the actual content and then brought fully territory of the former Soviet Union. Such conflicts require a to life to become an effective and well-coordinated fighting strong rapid-reaction armed force that can be permanently force. That task is compounded by the need to start training maintained in a combat-ready state. For its defense against the personnel in the use of the new hardware, now that it has other great powers (primarily USA and NATO) Russia will finally begun to arrive. Add to that the overall goal of having now rely on its nuclear deterrent. It is perfectly obvious that military units and formations always prepared for action, neither the present, nor the foreseeable future holds the ready to deploy within a few hours of receiving their marching threat of a sudden large-scale land invasion of Russia. Any orders, and the whole undertaking becomes rather daunting. adversary even theoretically capable of such an invasion (the Essentially Minister Serdyukov and his team now have to USA, NATO or China) would require a long time to mobilize, prove over the course of 2010 that the massive reorganization deploy and concentrate a large land force on our borders. of the army in 2009 was the right thing to do, and that the That gives Russia a long enough period of threat before any “new-look” armed forces have really become more capable possible war, so the requirements to the reserve strength and effective than the “old-style” army. The year 2010 will truly of its armed forces need not be as stringent as before. The make or break the Serdyukov reform.

24 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage Facts & Figures

Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Mikhail Lukin, Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House Anton Lavrov

The table below lists air crashes, serious accidents Ministry, the FSB and the Federal Border Service. (in which the aircraft was lost or seriously damaged) and The table includes planes and helicopters lost or accidents with fatalities. The period from August 1, 1999 damaged on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia in covers the beginning of the second campaign in Chechnya. 1999-2010, as well as in Georgia in August 2008. It also The list includes only the aircraft that belonged to the lists the aircraft that were flying into or out of the conflict law-enforcement agencies: the Defense Ministry, the Interior zones.

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 1 August 9, Mi-8MT 41 Botlikh 487th independent helicopter 3 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile at an Lt Col Yuriy Naumov, 1999 (Dagestan) combat and command airfield, destroyed by fire First Lt Alik Gayazov regiment 2 August 9, Mi-24P 06 Botlikh 487th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile at an 1999 (Dagestan) combat and command airfield, destroyed by fire regiment 3 August 11, Mi- 114 Botlikh 685th independent mixed 3 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile Maj Andrey Orlov, 1999 8MTV2 (Dagestan) air regiment of the Interior immediately after landing, caught fire Maj Andrey Anoshenkov, Ministry’s Internal Troops First Lt M.Yurin 4 August 25, Mi-8 Makok 31st independent air 0 Unknown Fell shortly after take-off, main rotor and Lt Col Anatoliy Ermolov 1999 (Dagestan) squadron of the Federal tail boom damaged during the fall, cockpit Border Service glass broken 5 September 9, Su-25 Karamakhi 960th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Fuel line damaged by hostile fire from the 1999 (Dagestan) ground (possibly by a man-portable SAM), the pilot ejected to safety. Another version: technical problems 6 September Mi-8MT Akhar 326th independent helicopter 3 Hostile fire Caught fire after being hit from a ZU-23-2 Lt Col Vasiliy Pershikov, 11, 1999 (Dagestan) squadron air defense system, the pilot ejected but was Capt Vladimir killed by small arms fire while still in the air Burmistrov, Capt Aleksandr Antipenko 7 September Mi-26 Botlikh 685th independent mixed 0 Pilot error The helicopter mushed during landing in Maj Ivan Rudakov 25, 1999 (Dagestan) air regiment of the Interior heavy turbulence and hit the ground. The tail Ministry’s Internal Troops boom broke off, the helicopter turned over and caught fire 8 September Mi-24P Shalkhi 487th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error Collision with trees Capt I.Kozlov 26, 1999 (Ingushetia) combat and command regiment 9 October 1, Mi-8MT 24 Terekli-Mekteb 85th independent helicopter 0 Unknown The helicopter lost steering after being fired Maj A.Samartsev 1999 (Dagestan) squadron at from the ground, fell to the ground and disintegrated on impact. Another version: damaged during landing due to pilot error 10 October 3, Su-25 Tolstoy-Yurt 899th guard assault air 1 Unknown Flew into a mountain side while flying at low Lt Col Andrey 1999 (Chechnya) regiment altitude. Another version: hostile fire from the Khmelevskiy ground, presumably hit by a portable SAM 11 October 4, Su-24MP Urus-Martan 11th independent 1 Hostile fire Hit by a portable SAM, the commander did Maj Konstantin Stukalo, 1999 (Chechnya) reconnaissance air regiment not survive the ejection First Lt Sergey Smyslov

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25 Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 12 October 5, Mi-8MT 23 Buynaksk 85th independent helicopter 0 Unknown Lost steering after being hit by hostile fire Maj Vladimir Bakota 1999 (Dagestan) squadron from the ground, fell down and disintegrated on impact. Another version: damage during landing due to pilot error 13 October 14, Mi-24P ShelkovskaYa 85th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error Hit the trees, sustained some damage but Capt V.Plotnikov 1999 (Chechnya) squadron then landed successfully 14 November 29, Mi-8 Alkhan-Yurt 55th independent helicopter 1 Hostile fire Hostile fire from the ground Maj Igor Plutalov, 1999 (Chechnya) combat and command Capt Evgeniy Sizonenko, regiment Capt Damashevskiy 15 December 2, Mi-24V 08 Mozdok 440th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, the systems Maj Yuriy Suchkov 1999 (SevernaYa combat and command failed, fell to the ground and disintegrated OsetiYa) regiment on impact 16 December 9, Mi- Kharami pass 685th independent mixed 0 Unknown Autorotation during landing, fell and Lt Col Vladimir 1999 8MTV (Dagestan) air regiment of the Interior disintegrated on impact Shlyakhturov Ministry’s Internal Troops 17 December 13, Su-25 Chishki 368th assault air regiment 0 Technical Self-ignition of an unguided rocket in one of Col Sergey Borisyuk 1999 (Chechnya) problems the wing pylons, the rest of the plane caught fire. The rocket may have been ignited by hostile fire from the ground 18 December 13, Mi-8MT Yarysh-Mardy 325th independent transport 0 Hostile fire Hit from the ground during an S&R Maj Vyacheslav 1999 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter operation, attempted emergency landing Khristoforov regiment after the hydraulics failed, disintegrated on impact and burst into flames 19 December 13, Mi-8MT Yarysh-Mardy 440th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Picked up the crew and soldiers from the Maj Vladimir Alimov, 1999 (Chechnya) combat and command trail helicopter during an S&R operation, Vladimir Sterlyus regiment then came under fire from the ground and sustained heavy damage, but managed to return to the airfield 20 December 13, Mi-8MT Starye Atagi 325th independent transport 2 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during Maj Aleksandr Dzyuba 1999 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter an S&R operation regiment 21 December 13, Mi-24P Starye Atagi 440th independent helicopter 2 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during Maj Andrey Sovgirenko, 1999 (Chechnya) combat and command an S&R operation and exploded in mid-air Capt Aleksandr Ivanov regiment 22 December 14, Mi-8MT Starye Atagi 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during 1999 (Chechnya) an S&R operation 23 December 17, Mi-8T 84 Starye Atagi 55th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error The pilot lost orientation during a night-time Capt N.Denisov, 1999 (Chechnya) combat and command landing, the helicopter hit the ground. The Maj I.Yanushkevich regiment tail rotor and chassis were damaged, the tail boom broke off 24 December 27, Mi-24P Botlikh 487th independent helicopter 0 Technical The main rotor lost power during take-off, Maj Aleksandr Shabanov 1999 (Dagestan) combat and command problems leading to hard landing and disintegration regiment on impact 25 January 21, Mi-8 65 Ya l k horoy 325th independent transport 0 Unknown Fell down and overturned shortly after take- Col Nikolay Maydanov 2000 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter off. One of the passengers on board was Maj regiment Gen Vladimir Kazantsev, deputy chief of the Airborne Troops HQ. According to one of the versions, the cause of the incident was heavy icing of the main rotor 26 January 22, Su-25 461st assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit from a man-portable SAM, emergency Maj A.Karmanov 2000 landed after losing the left engine. The aircraft was written off 27 January 24, Mi-8MT 47 Neftyanka 487th independent helicopter 0 Unknown Autorotation during landing, the helicopter Capt Dmitriy Svetushkov 2000 (Chechnya) combat and command hit the treetops, fell onto the left side, burst regiment into flames and disintegrated. One of the versions suggests that the pilot lost control, possibly due to hostile fire from the ground

26 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 28 January 29, Mi-8 Konzhukhoy 325th independent transport 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground Col Nikolay Maydanov, 2000 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter Yuriy Derevyanko, regiment Sergey Emets 29 January 30, Mi-24P 20 Botlikh 487th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error Pilot error during the crossing of a mountain Maj Ruslan Obukhov 2000 (Dagestan) combat and command range led to emergency landing on a regiment mountain slope, during which the aircraft disintegrated 30 January 31, Mi-24P 08 Kharsenoy 85th independent helicopter 2 Hostile fire Hit from a ZU-23-2 air defense system Maj Andrey Zavitukhin, 2000 (Chechnya) squadron Capt Aleksey Kirillin 31 February 11, Mi- 78 Ya l k horoy 153rd independent helicopter 1 Pilot error The helicopter landed with one of the wheels Maj Yu.Lopatin 2000 8MTV (Chechnya) squadron of the 8th special in a trench, crushing a soldier on the ground task force air division and sustaining damage to the chassis 32 February 18, Mi-8MT 48 Shatoy 490th independent helicopter 15 Hostile fire Hostile fire from the ground Maj IlYa Skripnikov, First 2000 (Chechnya) combat and command Lt Dmitriy Brykaev, First regiment Lt Dmitriy Rychkov 33 February 18, Mi- 62 Itum-Kale 490th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error Crashed during landing Maj V.Makarov 2000 8MTV1 (Chechnya) combat and command regiment 34 February 20, Mi- 61 Rokgort, Itum- 325th independent transport 0 Pilot error Crashed during landing Maj Viktor Kapasinov 2000 8MTV1 Kale (Chechnya) and combat helicopter regiment 35 February 22, Mi-24V 03 Shatoy 487th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, fell down Maj??? Yuriy KHarchenko 2000 (Chechnya) combat and command and exploded. The crew had ejected regiment 36 March 2, Mi- 64 Shatoy 325th independent transport 1 Technical The main rotor lost power, leading to hard Maj Viktor Kapasinov, 2000 8MTV2 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter problems landing. One of the rotor blades cut into Capt V.Vasilev regiment the cockpit 37 March 7, Mi-24P 33 Gizel (North 55th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, fell not Maj Dmitriy Shvetsov, 2000 Ossetia) combat and command far from the home airfield and disintegrated Capt O.Oderov regiment on impact 38 May 7, 2000 Su-24MP Benoy-Vedeno 11th independent 2 Pilot error Flew into a mountain side in adverse weather Maj Yuriy Kazakov, (Chechnya) reconnaissance air regiment conditions Capt Evgeniy Kurdyukov 39 May 14, 2000 Mi-8MT 41 Dyshne-Vedeno 0 Pilot error Fell into the vortex ring mode and hard- (Chechnya) landed 40 May 14, 2000 Mi- Nalchik-20 9th independent air squadron 0 Technical Engine failure shortly after take-off. Two Capt D.Lubov 8MTV2 of the Interior Ministry’s problems unguided rocket projectiles ignited during Internal Troops the crash, hitting a residential building 41 May 29, 2000 Mi- 57 Botlikh 0 Unknown Details are unclear, the helicopter 8MTV2 (Dagestan) was damaged due to technical problems or hostile fire from the ground 42 June 12, 2000 Mi- 83 Khankala 487th independent helicopter 4 Pilot error Shortly after take-off the main rotor blades Capt Albert Zagidulin, 8MTV2 (Chechnya) combat and command caught the chassis of the helicopter flying First Lt Andrey regiment ahead; the aircraft fell to the ground from Moshnyakov, an altitude of 150 meters Capt German Doroshenko, Sr Warrant Officer Vladimir Ryabov 43 June 19, 2000 Mi-24V 32 Novogroznen- 487th independent helicopter 0 Technical Right engine failure in mid-air leading skiy (Chechnya) combat and command problems to emergency landing regiment 44 August 6, Mi-8 Arshty 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and 2000 (Ingushetia) emergency landed 45 August 11, Mi-8MT (Chechnya) 487th independent helicopter 0 Pilot error Hit the ground during landing Maj S.Korotkin 2000 combat and command in mountainous terrain and heavy wind, regiment disintegrated on impact

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 27 Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 46 April 26, 2001 Mi-8 (Chechnya) 0 Pilot error The aircraft got caught in air turbulence from the rotors of other helicopters while landing assault troops, lost steering and fell to the ground 47 May 21, 2001 Mi- Shali 325th independent transport - Pilot error Hard-landed in adverse weather conditions, Maj I.Baranov 8MTV (Chechnya) and combat helicopter overturned and caught fire regiment 48 May 30, 2001 Mi-8 Tsentoroy 55th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire while evacuating a special Lt Col Igor Rodobolskiy (Chechnya) combat and command task force unit, the bullets hit the fuel tank, regiment leading to emergency landing 49 May 31, 2001 Mi-8 Nesterovskaya 12th independent air 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and Lt Col Leonid (Ingushetia) regiment of the Federal emergency landed. The commander Konstantinov, Border Service sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter Capt Valeriy Norov, was carrying a delegation of the Russian Capt Sergey Kurachenko, Duma Warrant Officer Dmitriy Ignashkov 50 June 14, 2001 2 Su-25 05 Itum-Kale 461st assault air regiment 2 Pilot error Hit the ground in mountainous terrain Lt Col Yuriy Yakimenko (Chechnya) and Capt Oleg Podsitkov 51 June 25, 2001 Mi- (Chechnya) 55th independent helicopter 0 Technical The main rotor lost power during take-off, Maj V.Kuzmenko 8MTYa2 combat and command problems the helicopter fell and disintegrated regiment on impact 52 June 26, 2001 Mi-8 Argun Gorge Federal Border Service 0 Hostile fire Oil pump damaged by hostile fire from (Chechnya) the ground, the helicopter emergency landed 53 July 19, 2001 Mi-8MT Engenoy 487th independent helicopter 9 Unknown Fell while attempting to land and caught Lt Col S.Korotkiy (Chechnya) combat and command fire. One of the versions suggests that the regiment helicopter was overloaded 54 July 20, 2001 Mi-8 Nozhay-Yurt 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground (Chechnya) 55 August 1, Mi-26 Severnyy 685th independent mixed 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained 2001 airport, Grozny air regiment of the Interior heavy damage, lost steering and emergency (Chechnya) Ministry’s Internal Troops landed 56 August 14, Mi-8MT Tuskharoy Federal Border Service 3 Pilot error A rotor blade caught a mountain slope during Maj Andrey Kirienko, 2001 (Chechnya) landing; the aircraft fell and disintegrated Maj Vladimir Turovtsev, on impact Capt Vladimir Burakov 57 August 15, Mi-8MT Alleroy 325th independent transport 0 Pilot error A rotor blade caught a mountain slope during Maj N.N. Aksenov 2001 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter landing; the aircraft fell, sustaining damage to regiment the tail boom and chassis 58 August 15, Mi-24V Tsa-Vedeno 487th independent helicopter 2 Hostile fire Shot down by hostile fire from the ground Capt Andrey Churbanov, 2001 (Chechnya) combat and command (presumably a grenade launcher) First Lt Oleg Tumakov regiment 59 September 2, Mi- Khindoy 326th independent helicopter 4 Unknown Lost steering during landing and fell down. Maj Valeriy Gurin, Rafael 2001 8MTV (Chechnya) squadron One of the versions blames technical Vasilev, Sergey Kalinin problems (tail rotor failure), another - hostile fire from the ground 60 September 2, Mi-24 Itum-Kale Federal Border Service 0 Pilot error Got caught in a downdraught and hard- Capt R.Mikhaylov 2001 (Chechnya) landed, sustaining heavy damage 61 September Mi-8MT 33 Grozny 325th independent transport 13 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM shortly after take- Capt Vladimir Manaev, 17, 2001 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter off; a Defense Ministry commission Capt Oleg Cherkasov, regiment was on board First Lt Aleksandr Aksakov 62 October 2001 Mi-24 Sharo- 55th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained Maj Konstantin Kisten Argunsk Gorge combat and command heavy damage but managed to land (Chechnya) regiment at the home airfield 63 December 1, Mi-26 Stoderevskaya 325th independent transport 2 Technical Emergency landed after both engines failed, Maj Oleg Bondarenko 2001 (Stavropol and combat helicopter problems one of the main rotor blades smashed into Ter r itor y) regiment the cockpit

28 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 64 January 27, Mi- 45 Kobi (Chechnya) 70th independent mixed 14 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM while carrying a Maj Aleksandr 2002 8MTV2 special task force air regiment group of senior Interior Ministry officials Nepokrytykh, of the Interior Ministry’s First Lt Kirill Lubyanov, Internal Troops Lt Aleksandr Pestov 65 January 28, Mi-8 Dyshne-Vedeno 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, emergency 2002 (Chechnya) landed and burnt down 66 February 3, Mi-24P 72 Chechnya Independent aviation 3 Unknown Disappeared in adverse weather conditions Maj Anatoliy Kirpanev, 2002 training center of the Federal while returning from Tuskharoy to Khankala. Capt Vasiliy Tominets, Border Service Presumed cause: collision with the ground Lt Dmitriy Zolin 67 February 7, Mi-8MT Grozny 7 Technical Lost steering due to technical problems Maj Yuriy Pukhnarevich, 2002 (Chechnya) problems (versions include tail rotor, gearbox or engine Capt Yuriy Plakhteev, failure), started autorotating, fell from an First Lt Aleksey Lebedev altitude of 50 meters and burst into flames 68 February 8, Mi-8 Irgakly 487th independent helicopter 0 Technical Emergency landed due to problems with the Maj Sergey Palagin 2002 (Stavropolskiy combat and command problems gearbox kray) regiment 69 February 27, Mi-8 Chechen-Aul 487th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM. The warhead Lt Col Sergey 2002 (Chechnya) combat and command did not detonate, but damaged the left engine Chernyavskiy regiment and ruptured an oil feed tube, leading to emergency landing 70 April 29, 2002 Su-25 Dyshne-Vedeno 368th assault air regiment 1 Pilot error Hit the ground while exiting from a nosedive Maj Igor Bezryadin (Chechnya) 71 July 20, 2002 Mi- Mt. Stolbovaya, independent aviation 12 Pilot error Hit the ground in mountainous terrain Lt Col Sergey Nesterenko, 8MTV2 Guli training center of the Federal Maj Aleksandr Zarubin, (Ingushetia) Border Service First Lt Sergey Balev, Warrant Officer Pavel Telegin 72 August 2002 Mi-8 Itum-Kalinskoe 487th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Emergency landed after coming under fire Maj Sergey Palagin Gorge combat and command from the ground and taking heavy damage (Chechnya) regiment 73 August 19, Mi-26 89 Khankala 325th independent transport 127 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM (the missile hit Maj Oleg Botanov, 2002 (Chechnya) and combat helicopter the right engine), then emergency landed on Capt Aleksey regiment a minefield Amelshenko, Capt Vladimir Rytsar, First Lt Andrey Galoyko, Sr Warrant Officer Vladimir Melnik 74 August 31, Mi-24P Beshil-Irzu 487th independent helicopter 2 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Capt Nikolay Volodin, 2002 (Chechnya) combat and command Capt Aleksandr Blokhin regiment 75 September Mi-24V Galashki 55th independent helicopter 3 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Maj Vladimir Vlasov, 26, 2002 (Chechnya) combat and command First Lt Dmitriy regiment Dorofeev, First Lt Evgeniy Bulov 76 September Mi-24V Severnyy airfield 685th independent mixed 0 Technical Autorotation during landing due to tail rotor Maj Yu.Noskov 30, 2002 (Chechnya) air regiment of the Interior problems failure. Fell and disintegrated on impact Ministry’s Internal Troops 77 October 12, Mi-8MT (Chechnya) 487th independent helicopter 0 Technical Engine problems during landing in Maj S.Chekmizov 2002 combat and command problems mountainous terrain; the helicopter hit the regiment ground, overturned and disintegrated 78 October 17, Mi- 46 Komsomolskoe 14th independent air 3 Pilot error Hit an electricity pylon while trying to avoid Lt Col Vladimir 2002 8MTV2 Yellow+D8 (Chechnya) squadron of the Interior hostile fire from the ground, fell into the river Strekalovskiy, Ministry’s Internal Troops Terek. The aircraft was then blown up on the First Lt R.Gerasimenko, spot as it could not be repaired or evacuated Capt Oleg Korovin 79 October 29, Mi- Khankala 14th independent air 4 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM during landing. Lt Col Aleksandr Volodin, 2002 8MTV2 (Chechnya) squadron of the Interior The missile hit the tail rotor; the helicopter Capt Pavel Borodin, Ministry’s Internal Troops started to autorotate, hit the ground, exploded First Lt Vladimir and burnt down Tsaregorodtsev # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 29 Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 80 November 3, Mi-8MT Khankala 487th independent helicopter 9 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM during take-off Maj Vladimir Semakin, 2002 (Chechnya) combat and command Maj Aleksandr Nesterov, regiment First Lt Sergey Ryumin 81 November 11, Mi-24P Pravoberezhnoe 55th independent helicopter 0 Technical Began to lose steering in mid-air, lurched to Capt Sergey Misyura 2002 (Chechnya) combat and command problems the left and fell into a nosedive. Crash landed regiment onto its right side and burnt down 82 February 27, Mi-8 Tazen-Kala 319th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire during take-off, sustained Lt Col Aleksandr Markov 2003 (Chechnya) combat and command heavy damage and emergency landed regiment 83 March 20, 2 Mi-24 Mt. Daykhokh 319th independent helicopter 4 Pilot error The two helicopters hit the ground in adverse Lt Col Vitaliy Boyko, 2003 (Chechnya) combat and command weather conditions and mountainous terrain Maj Aleksandr regiment Darvin, Capt Vladimir Skripochnikov, First Lt Rodion Sultanov 84 July 6, 2003 Mi-8MT Bachi-Yurt 332nd independent guard 5 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground shortly after Maj Pavel Zheltukhin, (Chechnya) helicopter combat and take-off, sustained damage to the tail rotor Capt Ruslan command regiment and the tail boom, then fell to the ground Skorospekhov, Capt Sergey Muravev 85 August 2, Mi-24 Konzhukhoy 0 Technical Emergency landed due to engine failure and 2003 (Chechnya) problems disintegrated. The helicopter was then blown up as it could not be repaired or evacuated 86 August 7, Mi-8MT Dyshne-Vedeno 112th independent helicopter 1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained Lt Col Viktor Tyurikov, 2003 (Chechnya) regiment damage to the main gearbox, which, Maj Aleksandr Orlov, combined with a fire on board, forced the Capt Yuriy Patskevich pilot to attempt emergency landing. The helicopter was then hit several times from grenade launchers while trying to land and exploded 87 November 18, Mi-24 Khankala 487th independent helicopter 0 Technical Hard-landed due to engine malfunction, Maj Yuriy Borisikov 2003 (Chechnya) combat and command problems turned over and disintegrated on impact regiment 88 April 26, 2004 Mi-24 Ersenoy 55th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained (Chechnya) combat and command heavy damage and emergency-landed regiment 89 May 26, 2004 Mi-8 Belgatoy 0 Hostile fire Came under fire while landing assault troops, (Chechnya) the fuel tank was ruptured 90 May 26, 2004 Mi-24 Belgatoy 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground while Maj Viktor Butenko (Chechnya) covering assault troops landing 91 September 5, Mi-8 Karabulak 675th independent mixed 2 Pilot error Flew into a mountain side in adverse weather Maj Anatoliy Galchin, 2004 (Ingushetia) special task force air regiment conditions Capt Andrey Andrenkov, of the Interior Ministry’s Capt Aleksandr Mager Internal Troops 92 September Mi-24V Alkhan-Kala 45th independent helicopter 2 Pilot error The tail boom caught an electricity pylon; Capt Sergey Zaleznitskiy, 12, 2004 (Chechnya) combat and command the helicopter fell to the ground and burnt First Lt Mikhail Korotya regiment down 93 March 10, Mi-8 Alkhan-Kala FSB 16 Pilot error Caught an electricity pylon and fell down. Maj Valeriy Kataev 2005 (Chechnya) An FSB special task force group was on board 94 March 22, Mi-8 Oktyabrskoe Interior Ministry’s Internal 2 Technical Autorotation due to tail rotor failure; Yuriy Fomin 2005 (Chechnya) Troops problems the helicopter hard landed and fell onto its side 95 April 1, 2005 Mi-8 Alpatovo 0 Technical Emergency landing due to engine failure (Chechnya) problems 96 July 16, 2005 Mi-8 Tesbichi FSB 9 Technical Lost steering during descent and hit (Chechnya) problems a mountain slope 97 September Mi-8MT Yuzhnyy (North 4th Air Force and Air Defense 11 Pilot error Hit the trees in adverse weather conditions Lt Col Aleksandr 11, 2006 Ossetia) Army and mountainous terrain Sviridov,

30 # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Facts & Figures

No Date Aircraft Side Location Regiment Ca- Cause Details Crew number sual- ties 98 April 27, 2007 Mi-8 Shatoy 825th independent helicopter 20 Unknown Crashed during landing due to autorotation. Lt Col Sergey Korolev, (Chechnya) regiment The helicopter was carrying a GRU special Capt Vyacheslav task force group KudryaShov, Nikolay Sidygalov 99 May 17, 2008 Mi-8 Tangi 55th independent helicopter 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground while Maj Valeriy (Chechnya) combat and command evacuating a special task force group, caught Chukhvantsev, First Lt regiment fire. Emergency landed after flying 8 km with Valeriy Evdokimov, First the single left engine working Lt Yuriy Golovnev 100 April 22, 2008 Mi-8 Chozhi-Chu FSB 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and (Chechnya) emergency landed 101 August 8, Su-25BM Zarskaya road 368th assault air regiment 0 Friendly Came under friendly fire from a portable Lt Col Oleg Terebunskiy 2008 (South Ossetia) fire SAM system 102 August 8, Su-25SM 08 Red Tskhinval 368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire The aircraft was hit by a man-portable SAM Lt Col Oleg Molostov 2008 (South Ossetia) but managed to return to the airfield 103 August 2008 Su-25SM (South Ossetia) 368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire The aircraft was hit by a man-portable SAM but managed to return to the airfield 104 August 9, Tu-22M3 36 Karbauli 52nd guard heavy bomber air 3 Unknown Main version: shot down by Georgian air Lt Col Aleksandr 2008 (Georgia) regiment defense Koventsov, Maj Vyacheslav Malkov, Maj Viktor Pryadkin, Maj Igor Nesterov 105 August 9, Su-24M Dzeveri 929th state flight testing 1 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Col Igor Zinov, 2008 (Georgia) center Col Igor Rzhavitin 106 August 9, Su-25SM Tskhinval 368th assault air regiment 0 Friendly First hit by a Georgian man-portable SAM, Col Sergey Kobylash 2008 (South Ossetia) fire then came under friendly man-portable SAM fire from South Ossetian guerrillas 107 August 9, Su-25BM Itrapis (South 368th assault air regiment 1 Friendly Hit by mistake by Russian air defense Maj Vladimir Edamenko 2008 Ossetia) fire 108 August 11, Su-24M 42 Red Tskhinvali 968th research and training 0 Friendly Hit by mistake by Russian air defense 2008 (South Ossetia) mixed air regiment of the 4th fire pilot training center 109 August 11, Su-25SM 09 Red (South Ossetia) 368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM, but managed to Capt Ivan Nechaev 2008 return to the airfield 110 August 11, Su-25 46 Red (South Ossetia) 461st assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM but managed to Maj Ivan Konyukhov 2008 return to an airfield, despite fire on board and right engine failure 111 August 16, Mi- 205 Ugardanta 12th independent air 1 Pilot error While attempting to land, the Mi-8MTKO Sr Warrant Officer 2008 8MTKO (South Ossetia) regiment of FSB and the collided with the stationary Mi-24 and turned Aleksandr Burlachko, and 487th independent helicopter over. Both helicopters then burnt down Igor Pan Mi-24 combat and command regiment

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 31 Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 Our Authors

Mikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Andrey Frolov. Graduated with an honours degree from the Faculty of Foreign Affairs of Saint Petersburg State University and in 2003 from the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations. In 2003–2004 – researcher at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center), executive editor of Yader ny Kontrol magazine (in Russian). In 2004 – project manager of Export control system transformation in Russia.

Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent aviation analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 1994–1997 worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House since 2003.

Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, published in Russian and English with participation of Foreign Affairs, and an international columnist with the Kommersant daily, Vedomosti, The Moscow Times and Gazeta.ru online source; leading national radio stations and TV channels. Fyodor Lykyanov graduated from Moscow State University 1991 as a Germanist. He worked as a correspondent, commentator and editor for many Russia media. Member of the Presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an influential independent organization providing foreign policy expertise.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) since 1997. In 1996 he graduated from the School of International Information of MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 1996-1997 - postgraduate student of the French-Russian Master d’Etudes Internationales Sciences Po - MGIMO. In 1996-1997 - researcher for the Conventional Arms Project of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center). Since 2007 Member of the Public Advisory Board of the Russian Defense Ministry.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

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