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Country of Origin Information Report Syria June 2021
Country of origin information report Syria June 2021 Page 1 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Publication details City The Hague Assembled by Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Table of contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents ..........................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political and security situation .................................................................... 6 1.1 Political and administrative developments ...........................................................6 1.1.1 Government-held areas ....................................................................................6 1.1.2 Areas not under government control. ............................................................... 11 1.1.3 COVID-19 ..................................................................................................... 13 1.2 Armed groups ............................................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Government forces ....................................................................................... -
Syria Sitrep October 28
Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020 1 Oct. 29 - Nov. 1: ISIS Continues Assassination Campaign against Leaders 5 Nov. 4 - 7: ISIS Attack Cells May Have of Security and Governance Institutions in Eastern Syria. ISIS claimed the Strengthened in Aleppo Province. ISIS claimed assassination of the director of the oil department within the Syrian Democratic Forces responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) (SDF)-supported Deir e-Zor Civil Council in al-Sabha on October 29. Possible ISIS that killed a commander of the Turkish-backed Faylaq militants attempted and failed to assassinate Abu Khawla, the head of the Deir e-Zor al-Sham in al-Bab on November 4. ISIS militants Military Council in Hasakah city, Hasakah Province, on November 1. ISIS also claimed detonated an IED in al-Bab on November 7, killing three the assassination of Commander Hafal Riad of the Kurdish Internal Security Forces in Free Syrian Police officers. On the same day, ISIS Markadah, Hasakah Province, on the same day. claimed responsibility for an IED that killed one and injured an unknown number of people in 2 Nov. 2: Iranian-affiliated Militiaman Shamarikh. This amount of Confesses Plot to Degrade Security Situation 4 Qamishli ISIS activity is unusual in by Assassinating Key Figures. Authorities Turkish-controlled Aleppo arrested Radwan al-Hajji when he attempted to 5 Province and may indicate assassinate Hammouda Abu Ashour, the leader of Manbij increased capabilities in the the Al-Furqan Brigade, in Kanaker, Damascus 5 Hasakah region or that ISIS is transitioning Province. Al-Hajji revealed a list of 17 Kanaker 1 this area to an attack zone. -
Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society
Conflict Research Programme Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society Sohaib al-Zoabi April 2020 2 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society 1. Executive Summary 2015 had taken control of the majority of Deraa is known to be the cradle of the the two southern provinces of Deraa and Syrian uprising of 2011. There were many Quneitra. The situation remained largely reasons for the province’s increased unchanged until the De-escalation popular resentment against the political Agreement of May 2017, which led to a regime in Syria, including the regime’s relative decrease in the intensity of hardline security policies; its monopoly of violence, and included all southern areas. the public sphere in the interest of a tight However, the situation shifted rapidly once circle of local middlemen directly linked again at the end of June 2018, when the with the security apparatus; the continued Syrian regime, backed by the Russian tightening of the margin of basic freedoms; forces, began a brutal military campaign and the uneven development between against Deraa. This campaign ended in Deraa’s rural and urban areas. what is known as the Deraa Reconciliation The protest movement in the Deraa Agreement of June 2018, between the province is distinct given the role played by opposition forces and the regime, carried Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded out under the direct oversight of Russia. the involvement of the surrounding rural This agreement stipulated return of the areas. whole southern area to regime control, with the integration of opposition military The peaceful nature of the uprising in factions into the Russian-backed Fifth Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil Corps. -
Political Economy Report English F
P a g e | 1 P a g e | 2 P a g e | 3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY And ITS SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS IN THREE SYRIAN CITIES: TARTOUS, Qamishli and Azaz Economic developments and humanitarian aid throughout the years of the conflict, and their effect on the value chains of different products and their interrelation with economic, political and administrative factors. January 2021 P a g e | 4 KEY MESSAGES • The three studied cities are located in different areas of control: Tartous is under the existing Syrian authority, Azaz is within the “Euphrates Shield” areas controlled by Turkey and the armed “opposition” factions loyal to it, and most of Qamishli is under the authority of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” and the “Self-Administration” emanating from it. Each of these regions has its own characteristics in terms of the "political war economy". • After ten years of conflict, the political economy in Syria today differs significantly from its pre-conflict conditions due to specific mechanisms that resulted from the war, the actual division of the country, and unilateral measures (sanctions). • An economic and financial crisis had hit all regions of Syria in 2020, in line with the Lebanese crisis. This led to a significant collapse in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound and a significant increase in inflation. This crisis destabilized the networks of production and marketing of goods and services, within each area of control and between these areas, and then the crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated this deterioration. • This crisis affected the living conditions of the population. The monthly minimum survival expenditure basket (SMEB) defined by aid agencies for an individual amounted to 45 working days of salaries for an unskilled worker in Azaz, 37 days in Tartous and 22 days in Qamishli. -
Territorial Control Map - Southern Front - 20 Feb 2017 Eldili Southern Fronts (SF) & Islamic Groups (IG)
Territorial Control Map - Southern Front - 20 Feb 2017 Eldili Southern Fronts (SF) & Islamic Groups (IG) Nawa Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade - ISIS Syrian Regime and Allied Militias Saidah Recently Captured by SF/IG Abu Hartin Ain Thakar Izraa Recently Captured by ISIS Buser al Harir Information Unit Information Al Shabrak El Shykh sa´ad Tasil Al Sheikh Maskin Melihit Al Atash Al Bunyan Al Marsous Adawan Garfah Military Operation Room Nafa`ah Israeli occupation Jamlah Ibtta Nahtah - Southern Front Factions, Islamic Opposition & Sahem El Golan Aabdyn HTS Launched (Death over Humiliation) Battle Al Shajarah Jillin Housing Daraa City, & captured Most of Al Manshia Alashaary Mlaiha el Sharqiah Baiyt Irah Jillin Dael El Sourah District & capturing part of the highway that lead Elmah Al Hrak Hayt Mlaihato (Customs el Garbiah Crossing Border), postponing by that Al Qussyr Tafas Khirbet Ghazaleh any Syrian Regime attempts to Re-Open it. Zaizon - First OfficialAl Darah reaction from Jordan Government Muzayrib Al Thaala was closing 90 KM of its borderAl Suwayda with Daraa & Quneitra against everyone, even injured civilians. Tal Shihab El Karak Western Ghariyah Al Yadudah Eastern Ghariyah - Military Operations Center (MOC) reaction was Athman putting pressure on Southern Front Factions to stop the battleUmm Wald or at least participating in it. Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade Elnaymah Al Musayfrah Daraa Saida Jbib Attacks on Opposition Kiheel Al Manshia - 20 Feb 2017 (Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade - ISIS) El SahoahLunched a new battle against Southern Front Custom Border Om elmiathin Factions & OtherKharaba Islamic Groups. Al Jeezah - Technically ISIS Attacks on the Opposition El Taebah Al Ramtha controlled areas is more dangerous for the Irbid Nassib Ghasamnearby countries.Mia`rbah Nasib Border - ISIS controlled areas not more than 213 km² & share borders with bothBusra "Jordan & Israeli Occupation areas in Syria". -
S/2012/503 Consejo De Seguridad
Naciones Unidas S/2012/503 Consejo de Seguridad Distr. general 16 de octubre de 2012 Español Original: inglés Cartas idénticas de fecha 28 de junio de 2012 dirigidas al Secretario General y al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente de la República Árabe Siria ante las Naciones Unidas Siguiendo instrucciones de mi Gobierno y en relación con mis cartas de fechas 16 a 20 y 23 a 25 de abril, 7, 11, 14 a 16, 18, 21, 24, 29 y 31 de mayo y 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 25 y 27 de junio de 2012, tengo el honor de trasmitir adjunta una lista pormenorizada de las violaciones del cese de la violencia cometidas por grupos armados en Siria el 24 de junio de 2012 (véase el anexo). Agradecería que la presente carta y su anexo se distribuyeran como documento del Consejo de Seguridad. (Firmado) Bashar Ja’afari Embajador Representante Permanente 12-55140 (S) 241012 241012 *1255140* S/2012/503 Anexo de las cartas idénticas de fecha 28 de junio de 2012 dirigidas al Secretario General y al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente de la República Árabe Siria ante las Naciones Unidas [Original: árabe] Sunday, 24 June 2012 Rif Dimashq governorate 1. On 23 June 2012 at 2020 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on a military barracks headquarters in Rif Dimashq. 2. On 23 June 2012 at 2100 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement checkpoints in Shaffuniyah, Shumu' and Umara' in Duma, killing Private Muhammad al-Sa'dah and wounding three soldiers, including a first lieutenant. -
Security Council Distr.: General 8 January 2013
United Nations S/2012/401 Security Council Distr.: General 8 January 2013 Original: English Identical letters dated 4 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council Upon instructions from my Government, and following my letters dated 16 to 20 and 23 to 25 April, 7, 11, 14 to 16, 18, 21, 24, 29 and 31 May, and 1 and 4 June 2012, I have the honour to attach herewith a detailed list of violations of cessation of violence that were committed by armed groups in Syria on 3 June 2012 (see annex). It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Bashar Ja’afari Ambassador Permanent Representative 13-20354 (E) 170113 210113 *1320354* S/2012/401 Annex to the identical letters dated 4 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council [Original: Arabic] Sunday, 3 June 2012 Rif Dimashq governorate 1. On 2/6/2012, from 1600 hours until 2000 hours, an armed terrorist group exchanged fire with law enforcement forces after the group attacked the forces between the orchards of Duma and Hirista. 2. On 2/6/2012 at 2315 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device in a civilian vehicle near the primary school on Jawlan Street, Fadl quarter, Judaydat Artuz, wounding the car’s driver and damaging the car. -
Weekly Conflict Summary
Weekly Conflict Summary February 22-28, 2018 The Syrian government’s siege and bombardment of Eastern Ghouta remained intense despite two separate ceasefires from the UN and Russia. Fighting around the borders of Eastern Ghouta continued, as did opposition shelling of Damascus city. In northern Syria, new opposition coalitions have taken significant territory from Hai’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra), apparently with minimum fighting. Operation Olive Branch, the Turkish-led offensive into Afrin, gained control over the whole of the Syria-Turkish border from Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, a Kurdish-led organization in northern Syria). Figure 1 - Areas of control in Syria by February 28, with arrows indicating fronts of advances during the reporting period 1 of 3 Weekly Conflict Summary – February 22-28, 2018 Eastern Ghouta Figure 2 - Situation in Eastern Ghouta by February 28 Strikes on opposition-held Eastern Ghouta continued throughout this reporting period. The situation in the besieged area is increasingly dire, with reports of a lack of access to basic nutrition, repeated attacks on hospitals, and mounting civilian casualties. On February 24, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a 30-day nation-wide ceasefire “without delay”. The resolution was adopted after repeated delays due to disagreements between the US and Russians on the text before the vote. The UN vote was intended to allow emergency aid deliveries to the region’s hardest-hit areas. Despite the resolution, fighting has continued throughout most of Syria, and has been particularly intense in Eastern Ghouta and in the northwestern Afrin region. -
Losing Their Last Refuge: Inside Idlib's Humanitarian Nightmare
Losing Their Last Refuge INSIDE IDLIB’S HUMANITARIAN NIGHTMARE Sahar Atrache FIELD REPORT | SEPTEMBER 2019 Cover Photo: Displaced Syrians are pictured at a camp in Kafr Lusin near the border with Turkey in Idlib province in northwestern Syria. Photo Credit: AAREF WATAD/AFP/Getty Images. Contents 4 Summary and Recommendations 8 Background 9 THE LAST RESORT “Back to the Stone Age:” Living Conditions for Idlib’s IDPs Heightened Vulnerabilities Communal Tensions 17 THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE UNDER DURESS Operational Challenges Idlib’s Complex Context Ankara’s Mixed Role 26 Conclusion SUMMARY As President Bashar al-Assad and his allies retook a large swath of Syrian territory over the last few years, rebel-held Idlib province and its surroundings in northwest Syria became the refuge of last resort for nearly 3 million people. Now the Syrian regime, backed by Russia, has launched a brutal offensive to recapture this last opposition stronghold in what could prove to be one of the bloodiest chapters of the Syrian war. This attack had been forestalled in September 2018 by a deal reached in Sochi, Russia between Russia and Turkey. It stipulated the withdrawal of opposition armed groups, including Hay’at Tahrir as-Sham (HTS)—a former al-Qaeda affiliate—from a 12-mile demilitarized zone along the front lines, and the opening of two major HTS-controlled routes—the M4 and M5 highways that cross Idlib—to traffic and trade. In the event, HTS refused to withdraw and instead reasserted its dominance over much of the northwest. By late April 2019, the Sochi deal had collapsed in the face of the Syrian regime’s military escalation, supported by Russia. -
Operation Euphrates Shield: Implementation and Lessons Learned Lessons and Implementation Shield: Euphrates Operation
REPORT REPORT OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD: IMPLEMENTATION OPERATION AND LESSONS LEARNED EUPHRATES MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MERVE SEREN, NECDET ÖZÇELIK The report presents a one-year assessment of the Operation Eu- SHIELD phrates Shield (OES) launched on August 24, 2016 and concluded on March 31, 2017 and examines Turkey’s future road map against the backdrop of the developments in Syria. IMPLEMENTATION AND In the first section, the report analyzes the security environment that paved the way for OES. In the second section, it scrutinizes the mili- tary and tactical dimensions and the course of the operation, while LESSONS LEARNED in the third section, it concentrates on Turkey’s efforts to establish stability in the territories cleansed of DAESH during and after OES. In the fourth section, the report investigates military and political MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MERVE SEREN, NECDET ÖZÇELIK lessons that can be learned from OES, while in the fifth section, it draws attention to challenges to Turkey’s strategic preferences and alternatives - particularly in the north of Syria - by concentrating on the course of events after OES. OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD: IMPLEMENTATION AND LESSONS LEARNED LESSONS AND IMPLEMENTATION SHIELD: EUPHRATES OPERATION ANKARA • ISTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • KAHIRE OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD IMPLEMENTATION AND LESSONS LEARNED COPYRIGHT © 2017 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. SETA Publications 97 ISBN: 978-975-2459-39-7 Layout: Erkan Söğüt Print: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., İstanbul SETA | FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TURKEY Tel: +90 312.551 21 00 | Fax :+90 312.551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] | @setavakfi SETA | İstanbul Defterdar Mh. -
Full Report 2019
Annual Report 2019 Copyright © 2020 Syrian Forum All rights reserved [email protected] www.SyrianForum.org Content Syrian Forum 04 A Message from the Chairman of the Board 04 A Message from the Chief Executive Offcer 05 About the Syrian Forum 06 Departments 07 Where We Work 08 Syrian Forum’s Programs 09 Syrian Forum’s Impact 10 Partners 13 Relief and Development 14 Accomplishments 15 How We Work 16 Support by Sector 18 Partnerships 25 Economic Empowerment 26 Accomplishments 27 Employment Statistics 28 Vocational Training Programs 30 Cooperation and Partnerships 33 Training and Innovation 34 Accomplishments 35 Why Bousla 36 2019 Programs 37 Partnerships 39 Public Policy and Research Center 40 Accomplishments 41 Why Omran 42 Omran’s Impact 43 Highlights 44 Collaboration 53 Media Track 54 Accomplishments 55 Why AlSouria.net 56 Our Reach 57 Njoom AlGhad Academy 60 Accomplishments 61 Program Summary 62 4 Syrian Forum Mustafa Sabbagh Chairman of the Board As the Syrian crisis continues, the tragedy Throughout the past years, we have of millions of displaced Syrians and refugees strategically widened our partnerships seeking a safe shelter increases, and with to include regional and international this horrific catastrophe, our core mission at organizations, we have overcome numerous Syrian Forum is to support the Syrians in their challenges and celebrated new successes aspiration to have a free and dignified life. but were always focused to serve Syrians intellectually, physically and holistically. We Since its establishment, Syrian Forum has -
The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S
ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the No. 394 Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Jan 2016 Yossef Bodansky The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Yossef Bodansky January 2016 Abstract Almost three months into the Russian military intervention in Syria and Iraq - a clear strategy has emerged. Russia is spearheading a regional allied effort to consolidate tangible gains - to stabilize the lines before Winter freezes the fighting. When fighting resume in early Spring 2016, the Jihadist forces will no longer be able to threaten the Fertile Crescent of Minorities and the buffer areas surrounding Shiite Iraq. Emboldened, better equipped and retrained - the forces allied with Russia will then be able to go on the strategic offensive under a unified master-plan. In mid-October, the Kremlin clarified that the Russian strategic-political objectives in Syria are to stabilize and consolidate the Assad administration as the key to defeating the Jihadist forces, as well as to compel the US-led West to accept and acknowledge this reality. For the Kremlin, all anti-Assad forces are terrorists. In mid-November, Putin returned to Moscow from the G-20 summit convinced that any attempt to deal with Obama was an exercise in futility and that a major face-off, even crisis, over Syria was only a question of time. Hence, the Kremlin resolved to seize the strategic initiative. Thus, the Russian military intervention has already had a profound impact on the region’s strategic-political posture.