Far right in Western Europe: From the margins to the spotlights?
An analysis of the factors influencing the public presence of far right in Western Europe
Pieternella Jantje (Ellen) Wit, s1592548 Master thesis, final draft Crisis and Security Management, intake February 2015 Supervisor: Dr. Joery Matthys Second reader: Dr. Elke Devroe 30 March 2016
2
3
Table of contents
1. Introduction ...... 7 2. Theoretical framework ...... 8 2.1 Concepts ...... 8 2.1.1 Far right ...... 8 2.1.2 Public presence...... 10 2.2 Explanatory factors ...... 10 2.2.1 Factor 1: the migrant crisis ...... 11 2.2.2 Factor 2: quality of life ...... 13 2.2.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration ...... 13 2.2.4 Factor 4: changing image of the parties ...... 14 3. Methodology ...... 15 3.1 Research design ...... 15 3.2 Case studies ...... 15 3.3 Data gathering ...... 17 3.4 Operationalization ...... 18 3.4.1 Far right ...... 19 3.4.2 Public presence...... 19 3.4.3 Factor 1: the migrant crisis ...... 21 3.4.4 Factor 2: quality of life ...... 21 3.4.5 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration ...... 21 3.4.6 Factor 4: changing image of the parties ...... 22 3.4.7 Operationalization table ...... 23 4. Analysis ...... 24 4.1 Case I: Belgium ...... 24 4.1.1 Far right public presence ...... 25 4.1.2 Factor 2: quality of life ...... 29 4.1.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration ...... 29 4.1.4 Factor 4: changing image ...... 30 4.1.5 Overview Belgium ...... 31 4.2 Case II: Germany ...... 32 4.2.1 Far right public presence ...... 32
4
4.2.2 Factor 2: quality of life ...... 36 4.2.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration ...... 36 4.2.4 Factor 4: changing image ...... 36 4.2.5 Overview Germany ...... 38 4.3 Case III: the Netherlands ...... 39 4.3.1 Far right public presence ...... 39 4.3.2 Factor 2: quality of life ...... 41 4.3.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration ...... 42 4.3.4 Factor 4: changing image of the parties ...... 42 4.3.5 Overview the Netherlands ...... 43 4.4 Comparison ...... 43 4.4.1 Dependent variable: far right public presence ...... 44 4.4.2 Independent variables: explanatory factors ...... 46 4.4.3 Interaction between the variables ...... 47 5. Conclusion ...... 49 5.1 Answering the research question ...... 49 5.2 Reflection on results ...... 51 6. Appendices ...... 53 Appendix A: List of parties ...... 53 Appendix B: Quality of life ...... 54 Appendix C: Attitudes towards European integration ...... 58 7. Bibliography ...... 61 Books and articles...... 61 Consulted websites ...... 62 Databases and other sources ...... 69
5
List of figures and tables
Figures Figure 1 - Far right ideological features...... 19 Figure 2 - Number of forcibly displaced people worldwide ...... 21 Figure 3 - The logos of National Front and National Democracy ...... 31
Tables Table 1 - European Social Survey (2002), Round 1 (ed.6.4), displayed in column percentages...... 17 Table 2 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages...... 17 Table 3 - Operationalization ...... 23 Table 4 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public statements ...... 27 Table 5 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public presence ...... 27 Table 6 - Belgium: National Democracy, public presence ...... 29 Table 7 - Belgium: Quality of life ...... 29 Table 8 - Belgium: Attitudes towards European integration...... 30 Table 9 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, changing images ...... 31 Table 10 - Belgium: National Democracy, changing images ...... 31 Table 11 - Belgium: Overview of the findings ...... 32 Table 12 - Germany: National Democratic Party, public statements ...... 34 Table 13 Germany: National Democratic Party, public presence ...... 34 Table 14 - Germany: The Republican, public statements ...... 35 Table 15 - Germany: The Republican, public presence ...... 35 Table 16 - Germany: Quality of life ...... 36 Table 17 - Germany: Attitudes towards European integration ...... 36 Table 18 - Germany: National Democratic Party, changing images ...... 38 Table 19 - Germany: The Republican, changing images ...... 38 Table 20 - Germany: Overview of the findings ...... 39 Table 21 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public statements ...... 40 Table 22 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public presence ...... 41 Table 23 - Netherlands: Quality of life ...... 42 Table 24 - Netherlands: Attitudes towards European integration ...... 42 Table 25 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, changing images ...... 43 Table 26 - Netherlands: Overview of the findings ...... 43 Table 27 - Dependent variable: far right public presence………...... 45 Table 28 - Independent variables: explanatory factors + indicators ...... 46 Table 29 - Independent variables: explanatory factors...... 47 Table 30 - Interaction between dependent and independent variables ...... 48
6
1. Introduction
Recently, it seems as if increased attention is given to far right in Western European media. For example, Belgium reports extensively on Flemish Interest (FI), Germany on Pegida, and the Netherlands on the Freedom Party (FP).1 But to what extent is far right in Western Europe moving from the margins to the spotlights? Is it simply the media emphasizing their every move, or has the public presence of far right in fact increased in the past years? This is the first important issue that this thesis would like to research. As such, the first part of this thesis will be in essence about fact checking. However, we do social research mainly because there is an aspect of our understanding of what goes on in society that is to some extent unresolved (Bryman, 2012). In addition to the fact checking part, this thesis would like to investigate what the explanatory factors are of an increase or decrease in public presence of far right. For example, it is suggested in the media that far right flourishes due to the contemporary migrant crisis. Recently, a variety of Dutch media quoted Frans Timmermans, the Dutch vice-president of the European Commission, warning for an ‘extreme right surge’ if no solution is found for the migrant crisis (among others: Elsevier, 24 September 2015). However, is this a valid concern? The contemporary migrant crisis will be one of the explanatory factors that this research will look into. In order to research both the alleged increase in far right public presence and the explanatory factors for a shift in this public presence, this thesis has developed the following research question:
Has the public presence of far right in Western Europe increased or decreased in the past years, and what factors can explain this shift in far right public presence?
This research has scientific and societal relevance, because it looks into the societal problem of far right, of which some aspects are to a certain extent unresolved. By doing research on this issue, this thesis would like to contribute to the debate on present day far right, and the factors explaining its degree of public presence. Aspects of this have been researched by various scholars, but not on an academic level in the light of the current migrant crisis. As such, this research can hopefully contribute to the debate on far right, and to finding a solution for this societal problem, going hand in hand with potential threats to security. Indeed, what links this issue to the study of Crisis and Security Management is the potential security risk posed by far right, due to inter alia their negative ideas about immigrants. The link with Public Administration is mainly the fact that this research investigates the role of a particular family of electoral-focused political parties, in society. In chapter 2, the theoretical framework will be discussed. Chapter 3 will explain the methodology. Chapter 4 is home to the analysis. Both subquestions are analysed in chapter 4. As explained, the research question is twofold, since it can be divided into the following two subquestions: ‘Has the public presence of far right increased or decreased in the past years?’ and ‘What factors can explain this increase or decrease in far right public presence?’. The more descriptive part of chapter 4 is about fact checking. This part will try to examine the picture painted by the media, more or less suggesting that public presence of far right has increased. In other words, this part of the analysis will examine whether the public presence of far right has increased or decreased in the past years. The more explanatory parts of chapter 4 will look at the factors explaining far right public presence. One factor, the migrant crisis, has been derived from the media. Additional explanatory factors will be derived from literature. Chapter 4 will end with a comparison. In chapter 5, this thesis will answer the research question, and reflect on the results. Appendices and a bibliography can be found in respectively chapter 6 and 7.
1 A list of all the parties, their official names and the abbreviations can be found in Appendix A.
7
2. Theoretical framework
This chapter will explain what this thesis is going to research, by explaining the concepts and the explanatory factors. Indicators for the different variables are discussed in the operationalization (§3.4).
2.1 Concepts
In this paragraph, the concepts from the research question, far right and public presence, will be explained. Far right public presence is the dependent variable, as it is the event studied, that is expected to change (Bryman, 2012).
2.1.1 Far right Inter-war and wartime extreme right mainly encompassed fascism (Hainsworth, 2008; Griffin, 1991). However, there is a broad consensus in scholarship, that throughout the years, far right became decreasingly associated with fascism. This thesis focusses on post-war far right. Hainsworth (2008:2) explains that ‘contemporary extreme right has emerged in socio-political and historical circumstances that are very different to the pre-war and war-time ones.’ After World War II, with the defeat of fascism and the triumph of liberal democracy, extreme right politics was marginalized (Hainsworth, 2008). In line with numerous other scholars, Mudde (2000) is of the believe that the rise of extreme right-wing parties comes in waves. The interest of this thesis goes out to the third wave of post-war right-wing extremism, which is believed to have its roots in the 1980s (Mudde, 2000). As stated by Ignazi (2003): ‘The extreme right parties of the 1980s, in fact, are no longer neo-fascist parties.’ Especially since the 1980s, extreme right and neo-fascism were no longer interchangeably connected, due to the emergence of new - and the renewal of old - extreme rights parties (Ignazi, 2003). Harrison and Bruter (2011:30) make the same distinction, by describing ‘old’ extreme right parties as focussing on neo- fascist ideology, and ‘new’ extreme right parties as building upon an anti-systemic and populist legacy. Due to the foregoing, terminology is a major issue when researching the political family at the right-most position of the political spectrum. Ignazi (2003) explains that despite the fact that the third wave is a different type of extreme right, as they no longer have a connection with (neo-)fascism, these parties are nevertheless still grouped under extreme right as they lay outside the mainstream. The fact that they are in the right-most position of the political spectrum did not change (Hainsworth, 2008). However, due to its link with fascism, the label ‘extreme right’ is a controversial label that is generally not appreciated by (followers of) parties described as such (Hainsworth, 2008:5). Their position in the political spectrum is the same, but most extreme parties are way more moderate than the extreme parties decades ago, in the (inter-)war period. The context of time and place has a significant influence on how parties are labelled (Hainsworth, 2008:10). Eatwell (2004:14) captures the foregoing critique in his description of the term ‘extreme right’ as ‘a convenient but flawed shorthand’. Mudde (1995) explains that this is inter alia because right-wing extremism is a relatively new term, in contrast to ‘isms’ such as socialism, liberalism and communism. Nevertheless, the ‘slippery and contested label’ is used by most researches into this utmost right political family (Hainsworth, 2008: 8). As such, various scholars argue that extreme right is a controversial concept due to its link with fascism or (Neo-)Nazism. Consequently, one might consider the term too narrow to apply to more moderate right-wing parties, or incapable of dealing with policy and ideology overlap with more mainstream political parties (Hainsworth, 2008:22). This research would like to use a more broad interpretation of the political right-wing family, and therefore prefers the term ‘far right’. This research would like to investigate parties at the utmost right, but also those parties at the right side of the spectrum that are somewhat more moderate but overlap with extreme right parties in their policy and ideology. Consequently, this research deems the term ‘far right’ more suitable for analytical - non-
8 political - purposes. It encompasses ‘extreme right’, but also right wing parties that are not called ‘extreme’ in everyday terms. As such, it takes into account ‘the overlap between the right and the extreme right’ (Hainsworth, 2008:7). Moreover, besides the scope of the term ‘far right’, there are some additional reasons for choosing this concept. The term ‘far right’ is one of the terms originally used for the political family, and as such on of the most traditional terms. Second, the term is most self-explanatory, as it refers to the place of the political family in the political left-right spectrum. Last, the term is suitable for universal use, and already broadly applied (Harrison and Bruter, 2011: 22). This research is convinced that by looking at ideology, it can achieve a ‘distinct enough grouping of political parties’ (Hainsworth, 2008). However, it is a significant disadvantage that the term ‘extreme right’ is more discussed in literature. A very important consequence for this research is that literature on ‘extreme right’ will be applied analogously to ‘far right’ in this thesis. Needless to say, this will only be done where appropriate, and with the necessary caution. The same also applies to some other terms, that are interchangeably used with the term ‘far right’, such as ‘new populist right’ or ‘radical right wing populism’ (Harrison and Bruter, 2011:22). Mudde (2000) goes more into depth regarding the ideology of extreme right, making use of the concept ‘party family’. According to Mudde, this so-called ‘party family’ functions as a label, under which political parties are grouped according to their ideology. Hainsworth (2008:67) defines political ideologies as ‘bodies of interconnected ideas or systems of thought that constitute a basis for political action, reflection and debate.’ As stated by Hainsworth (2008:22): ‘It is the manner in which they deal with issues, such as immigration, identity, security, culture and nation that helps to locate the extreme right.’ He asks the question: ‘Is there a magic formula whereby a party or movement can be irrefutably labelled?’ (Hainsworth, 2008:68). Unfortunately, there is no such magic formula in existing scholarship. This makes selecting cases for an extreme right study a complicated process. Or, does it? Mudde (2000:185) created a list of those parties that are ‘generally considered to be members of the extreme right party family of Western Europe’. He states that ‘we seem to know who they are even though we do not exactly know what they are’ (Mudde, 2000:7). By this, Mudde criticizes the fact that researchers never seem to have trouble selecting their cases, while the concept of ‘right-wing extremism’ is not even clearly defined (yet). Aware of this pitfall, Ignazi (2003:95) has chosen to select parties not on connotation, but based on association. As such, he does not look at explicit extreme right language, but at viewpoint on certain themes, that can lead to an association with extreme right ideology by potential voters (Ignazi, 2003;95). This is in line with a statement made by Hainsworth, 2008:23), that alleged members of the extreme right party family do not ‘have exactly the same, essential characteristics, but (…) there is enough in common to consider the phenomena in question as a collectivity of family, worthy of broad, comparative analysis’. There is broad consensus that ideology is one of the core elements to consider, when selecting parties for the extreme right party family. For most authors, a party must fulfil several different features to reflect this ideology. However, the lists of these features vary in length, content, and (their number of) mandatory features. Similar to the list of generally selected cases, Mudde (2000) made a list of ten characteristics generally attributed to extreme right: nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, anti-democratic features, populism, anti-party sentiments, the strong state, ecologism or environmentalism, ethical outlook (for example traditional or religious), and socio-economic policy (such as socialism or (neo)-liberalism). At least half of the researched authors require ‘nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state’ (Mudde 2000:11). Mudde defines these characteristics as follows: nationalism is ‘The belief that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation or ethnic community) should be congruent’ (Mudde, 2000:187); racism/exclusionism is ‘The distinction between groups whereby one group (they) is excluded from certain aspects of the life of the other group (we)’ (Mudde, 2000:187); xenophobia is ‘Fear, hate or hostility with regard to groups that are perceived as ‘alien’ or ‘strange’, such as foreigners, immigrants, asylum-seeker, etc.’ (Mudde, 2000:188); anti-democratic features is about ‘Criticism of ‘democracy’ as a political system’ (Mudde, 2000:188); and finally, the strong state is about law-and-order (‘The belief in order and authority, accompanied by the demand for strong punishment of breach of the rules’ and ‘a strong
9 police force’) and militarism (Mudde, 2000:188). However, as noted by Hainsworth (2008:68), not all of these features are (always) seen as essential for a characterization as ‘extreme right’. The ‘magic formula’ used for this thesis, is explained in the operationalization. Taken all the foregoing into account, it is now time to formulate a definition suitable for this research. Finding an all-encompassing definition is a difficult task, as there is no consensus on such a definition among scholars. Deciding which parties belong - or not belong - to the far right political family is a challenge. For example, with regards to extreme right ‘There are as many differences as there are similarities within the (…) party family’ (Harrison and Bruter, 2011: 1; Schain et al., 2002:6). Mudde (1996) has found no less than 26 different definitions of the term ‘extreme right’, in his book on defining the extreme right party family. It is not within the scope of the thesis to discuss all possible definitions; however, it is important to find a definition suitable for this thesis and for analytical purposes. Once again, it is important to note that most parties characterized as extreme right by scholars, do not label themselves as such (Hainsworth, 2008:5). For this research, it is therefore not of relevance whether political parties consider themselves to be extreme right or far right. It is of relevance whether a party - for analytical purposes - fits within the far right corner, in its broad sense. The definition used in this research is a combination of factors used in different definitions, from inter alia Hainsworth (2008), Harrison and Bruter (2011), Ignazi (2003), and Mudde (2000), and reads as follows:
An electoral focused political party, located at the right side of the political spectrum, whose ideological identity is based on ideological features such as nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia.
2.1.2 Public presence ‘Presence’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘The state or fact of existing, occurring, or being present’. With regards to a political party, one can be present in the streets, in elections, but for example also in newspapers or on social media. ‘Public’ can be defined as ‘concerning the people as a whole’. As such, ‘public presence’ for a political party can be described as ‘being present to the people as a whole’. In the research question, ‘increase(d) or decrease(d)’ refers back to ‘public presence’. As such, a shift in public presence has to be researched. Researching a shift requires a first (before) and a second (after) measurement, performed at a different point in time. The timescope of these measurements is based on the contemporary migrant crisis, which will be explained in more detail in the operationalization (§3.4.2).
2.2 Explanatory factors
In this paragraph, the explanatory factors, or the independent variables, will be discussed. As stated by Hainsworth (2008:28), ‘various factors need to be taken into account in explaining extreme right emergence and success. Mono-causal or one-sided approaches to explaining the extreme right’s success fail to capture the complexity of the phenomenon.’ It is exactly because of this reason, that this thesis does not only look into the factor of the contemporary migrant crisis, derived from the media, but also into the most important other possible explanatory factors, derived from the literature. One can think of a large variety of different factors that can be of influence on far right public presence. However, most authors focus on terminology and ideology, and devote little attention to explanatory factors. An authors that does pay significant attention to reasons for extreme right success and decline is Hainsworth. Hainsworth (2008) comes with several factors to explain extreme right successes, ranging from broad postwar developments, to more specific issues. In general, Hainsworth (2008:25) acknowledges the potential influence of ‘significant, socio-economic, political, cultural and structural changes’. On a more specific note, Hainsworth (2008:25-27) mentions inter alia the possible role of political culture, party system, weakened voter identification, globalisation, migration, environment
10 and European integration. Another factor mentioned by the author that can be of influence, is that ‘in order to enhance their appeal and benefit from available opportunities, the parties have changed their image over time’ (Hainsworth, 2008:28). In addition to immigration, this thesis has filtered three of the most important - researchable - possible explanatory factors for a shift in far right public presence out of the literature: quality of life, attitudes towards European integration and the changing image of the parties.
2.2.1 Factor 1: the migrant crisis The contemporary migrant crisis is an important factor for this thesis. It was due to this explanatory factor, derived from the media, that the author started wondering which factors can form an explanation for a shift in far right public presence. The timescope of this thesis is based on this factor, as the timescope parallels a rise in the number of migrants. This will make it easier to see the potential influence of the migrant crisis on far right public presence. Also, the cases are selected based on inter alia this factor. In addition, the ideological features chosen to qualify as a far right party are also partially based on this factor, since ideological characteristics that (can) have a link with the migrant crisis are taken into account. This is mainly based on a negative attitude towards ‘strangers’ by political parties. This can be just an attempt to capture votes. However, more than often, a negative attitude towards immigration is part of the extreme right ideology (Hainsworth, 2008:70). Far right parties have made immigration one of the spearheads of the political debate. To a large extent, they even owe their success to this topic, as the far right stance on immigration often provokes a (disapproving) response from other political parties (Hainsworth, 2008:76). The German federal criminal investigation department argues that extreme right has always been very heterogeneous, but that the migrant crisis is uniting them in their ideologies (Elsevier, 22 October 2015). But wat is exactly the relationship between immigration and public presence of far right parties? Does it increase far right public presence? Hainsworth (2008:76) argues that ‘there is no mechanistic relationship between the number of immigrants in a given area and the number of votes for the extreme right. Often, it is the fear of outsiders rather than the reality of their actual presence that encourages a voter to opt for the extreme right.’ This theory by Hainsworth will be shortly reflected upon in the conclusion. In 2013, the United Nations refugee agency UNHCR reported that the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people worldwide had reached 51,2 million (UNHCR, 20 June 2014b). As such, the current migrant crisis is the worst migration crisis since World War II. One year later, at the end of 2014, the number of forcibly displaced people already reached a staggering 59,5 million. This is the highest increase ever seen in a single year (UNHCR 18 June 2015). More than half of all these refugees originate from just three countries (UNHCR, 18 June 2015). The mayor increase in the number of refugees is predominantly due to the war in Syria (UNHCR, 20 June 2014b). Armed conflict in Syria has been going on for years, starting in 2011, as part of the Arab Spring movement. Pro-democracy protests led to unrest, resulting in supporters of President Bashar al-Assad getting into conflict with his opposition (BBC, 12 March 2015). The civil unrest escalated into a civil war, wherein rebels and government forces took up arms to fight each other. The fighting evolved into a conflict between the Sunni majority and the government’s Shia minority, getting even more complicated by the increasing involvement of jihadist groups such as Islamic State (IS). IS made use of the instable situation in Syria, by starting a ‘war within a war’, and conquering large amounts of Syrian territory (BBC, 12 March 2015). Meanwhile, over 200,000 Syrians have lost their lives. The UN says to have evidence that both sides of the conflict have committed war-crimes. Moreover, the OPCW has documented use of toxic chemical weapons. A large humanitarian crisis is the harrowing result: millions of people have fled Syria, and an additional 7,6 million are internally displaced (BBC, 12 March 2015; Syrian Centre for Policy Research, March 2015). So far, peace efforts made by inter alia the Arab League and the United Nations have not yet led to the desired result. Besides Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia have the dubious honour of significantly contributing to the refugee crisis. With regards to Afghanistan, the situation has been unstable for decades. In 1996,
11 the Taliban rose to power by seizing control of Kabul. A radical version of Islam entered into force, and a year later Taliban controlled about two-third of the country. The United Nations started a hunt for Osama Bin Laden - the head of al-Qaeda. However, the situation in Afghanistan further escalated after the 9/11 attacks, when Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden (BBC, 7 March 2012). As a response, the United States started bombing Afghanistan. In 2002, the NATO-led ISAF missions joined in the fight against Taliban (BBC, 30 September 2015). In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was found and killed by American soldiers in Pakistan (BBC, 7 March 2012). Meanwhile, there are still many foreign troops present in Afghanistan. However, the downscaling has begun. At the end of 2014, NATO formally ended its mission in Afghanistan. In addition, other countries are also downscaling their military presence. With regards to Somalia, after the fall of the Siad Barre-regime in 1991, the country collapsed into anarchy. This resulted in a non-resilient country, with rival warlords fighting each other. A high number of internally displaced people was the result (BBC, 5 May 2015). However, matters only got worse due to the countries lack of resiliency. Natural disasters such as droughts forced many people to flee the country, especially during the famine of 2011. This 2011 drought was said to be the worst in six decades (BBC, 5 May 2015). Due to a high number of displaced people, a true migrant crisis has developed. While the crisis has been going on for years, it has never been more of a concern for Europe than it is now. The European Union is facing the migrant crisis more directly than ever, as refugees from countries in the European surroundings head for Europe in large numbers. As stated by the UNHCR (4 September 2015): ‘Europe is facing the biggest influx of refugees in decades. Only in this year, over 300,000 people have risked their lives by trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea’ (UNHCR, 4 September 2015). Within the EU we enjoy the free movement of persons. In 1985 and 1990 the Schengen Agreements were signed, establishing the Schengen area. 22 European Union members, as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are full members of the Schengen area. Within this area, internal border controls for all persons are abolished. To compensate for the abolishment of the internal border controls, measures were taken to strengthen and harmonise external border controls (European Parliament, June 2015). In other words, the focus in the European Union shifted from the internal borders to the external borders. External border control is more or less a common problem, whereas migration problems a currently an issue of separate European Union countries. With regards to refugees, the European Union approach is still more or less fragmented. Asylum claims for countries within the Schengen Area are arranged by the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation contains criteria for appointing the Member State responsible for examining an asylum claim in Europe. The main criterion is based on family links, but the second most important criterion entail that responsibility is appointed to the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the Schengen Area (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The idea behind this criteria is twofold. First, it ensures that one Member State only is responsible for examining the asylum request. Second, it aims to speed up the process in appointing the responsible State, to ensure effective access to the asylum procedure. However, in practice, the Dublin Regulation has several downsides. One of these downsides clearly shows in the current refugee influx: the Dublin Regulation places a (too) heavy burden on states at some of the external borders of Europe (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). For refugees crossing the Mediterranean See, Italy and Greece are the main landing points. As described by New York Times, ‘tens of thousands of migrants and refugees are working their way north through the Balkans’ (New York Times, 26 August 2015). For example, refugees travel from Greece to Hungary, via Macedonia and Serbia. Over 40,000 refugees have crossed the border into Macedonia in the past two months (New York Times, 26 August 2015). Apart from France, none of the Western European countries have external Schengen borders. 2 Nevertheless, Western Europe is way more popular amongst asylum-seekers than other parts of Europe. For example, hardly any migrants are heading for Eastern Europe.
2 There are various definitions for ‘Western Europe’ in use. This research will make use of the definition by the United Nations (Statistics Division, 31 October 2013), which encompasses the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
12
2.2.2 Factor 2: quality of life Quality of life is a concept that is extensively discussed in scholarship. As of 1997, more attention was devoted to the quality of life discourse in Anglo-Saxon literature. One leading author in this field is Adam Crawford, a criminal justice researcher applying the quality of life discourse to governing anti- social behaviour, focusing inter alia on the increasing criminalization of behaviour reducing the quality of life. Crawford explains that the quality of life discourse gained more interest ‘with the focus on commercial benefits and economic perspectives’ (Devroe, 2012:501). According to Crawford (2013:41,175,255), quality of life influencers are among others employment, feeling of safety, and bodily health. In addition, Crawford argues that another example of a quality of life issue is the fear of crime (2013:309). Frans Timmermans recently discussed the link between fear and the popularity of extreme right. Timmermans stated in the Europe House Lecture 2015 that the rise of the extreme right could be explained by ‘a fear of losing something’. He argued that many European citizens are afraid to lose their jobs, their feeling of security, and the benefits of their welfare state, with the extensive influx of migrants. According to Timmermans, this fear of losing things as a result of migrants is a direct effect of a lack of dialogue in society, and consequently not hearing each other’s stories (Timmermans, 9 November 2015). The fear described by Timmermans can easily result in seeking someone to blame, which can result in the ‘blaming’ of immigrants. ‘Blame’ is defined by the Oxford Learner’s Dictionary as thinking or saying that somebody (or something) is responsible for something bad. Far right parties often reflect - and contribute to - the idea that immigrants are to blame for ‘the bad’. Hainsworth (2008:27) does not only consider fear turning into blaming, but also shame turning into blaming: ‘In this climate of change (incorporating elements such as precariousness, insecurity, skill shortage and labour mobility), extreme right parties have become attractive options for so-called ‘modernisation losers’.’ This line of thought was also followed by criminologist John Braithwaite, who wrote about the displacement of shame by blaming others (Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2011:66). Shame is known for affecting the subjective well-being, in turn having its effect on the quality of life (Sirgy, 2002:10). This thesis can agrees with the reasoning that a low quality of life can results in ‘blaming’, and as such being an important factor in explaining far right public presence. However, besides fear and shame, there are many other factors that can influence quality of life. In literature, many definitions of quality of life can be found, differing widely per discipline. An example of a quit comprehensive definition is the following by Robert Lane (Offer, 1996:7): ‘quality of external conditions, sense of well-being, and the qualities of persons living those lives.’ As this thesis is about comparison between countries, its interest goes out to the quality of life of these separate countries. This has led the author to the indicators for quality of life set out by the European Commission: material living conditions, productive or main activity, health, education, leisure and social interactions, economic and physical safety, governance and basic rights, natural and living environment, and finally, overall experience of life (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). The ‘cocktail’ of indicators used to measure quality of life for this research will be further discussed in the operationalization (§3.4.4).
2.2.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration Besides a negative attitude towards migrants, another spearhead of many of the far right parties is a negative attitude towards the European Union, the Euro, and/or European integration. This is clearly the case for some parties researched in this thesis. For example, the Dutch Freedom Party titled their election programme for 2012-2017 ‘Hún Brussel, óns Nederland’ (or: ‘Their Brussels, our Netherlands’) (Partij voor de Vrijheid, July 2012). A negative attitude in society towards European integration can consequently cause more people to relate to Eurosceptic far right parties.
13
2.2.4 Factor 4: changing image of the parties Parties can change their image overtime, which can have an influence on far right public presence. This changing image can be as a result of for example a change in leadership, a court ruling, or disappointing (election) results. As will be explained in the operationalization, it is important to keep in mind that if parties want to run for elections, in general they have to be more moderate, and thus be less explicit in their far right ideology. Otherwise they risk scaring off potential voters, or being banned by court. An example is the German National Democratic Party (NDP). Around 1969, the NDP suffered from disastrous losses in votes and members, which according to Mudde (2000:29) is mainly explained by the loss of their law-abiding image, for instance due to their controversial youth movement, and consequently the threat of a constitutional ban of the party due to their alleged extremist character. In addition, by being too explicit in their far right ideology, parties risk being paralyzed by a so-called ‘cordon sanitaire’ of other political parties. This is a phenomenon exclusive to Belgium, where a ‘cordon sanitaire’ was placed on Flemish Bloc after the 1991 federal elections, where the party managed to receive more than 10% of the votes in Flanders (Migration Policy Institute, 12 June 2007). In an attempt to paralyze the party, the other Belgian political parties formed an agreement to no form a coalition government with Flemish Bloc. It is clear that it can be beneficial for political parties to adapt their image. As stated by Hainsworth (2008:28): ‘in order to enhance their appeal and benefit from available opportunities, the parties have changed their image over time’. This goes in particular for parties with anti-party sentiments, as participation in elections more or less equals an acknowledgement of the political system. The time period examined in this thesis might be somewhat short for investigating a change in image of the parties, but the factor will nevertheless be researched, as it is a factor that is often mentioned in literature as a possible explanatory factor for a shift in far right public presence.
14
3. Methodology
This chapter will explain how this thesis is going to find an answer to the research question.
3.1 Research design
Although the analysis contains some quantitative aspects, the research strategy of this thesis will be qualitative research. Qualitative research emphasizes words rather than numbers. This choice has been made, because the author has no experience in quantitative research, emphasizing ‘quantification in the collection and analysis of data’ (Bryman, 2012:35). This is a very practical consideration; however, keeping in mind the significant time constraint for this research, qualitative research seems to be the wiser choice. Advantages of qualitative research are, for example, that it is very suitable for issues that cannot be easily quantified. In quantitative research, gathered data is translated into numbers, and measurements are often structured and standardized. On the other hand, a consequence is that quantitative research, generally speaking, is more scientifically endorsed. Another important difference between both research strategies is the position of the researcher. In contrast to quantitative research, in qualitative research the researcher becomes part of the studied phenomenon. Proponents view researchers as part of the studied social world, whereas opponents argue that the researcher should view the social world in an external and objective manner. Consequently, a disadvantages of qualitative research is that the researcher can be seen as less objective and neutral (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative research predominantly makes use of an inductive approach, focusing on the generation of theory (Bryman, 2012). Instead of going from general to specific, or from theory to data, which is the case with a deductive approach, this research would like to move from data to theory. However, this research can be best be labelled as iterative, involving a ‘weaving back and forth between data and theory’ (Bryman, 2012:26). The research eventually makes use of a mixed inductive/deductive approach, as theory will be used before the gathering of data, but theory might also be developed in the conclusion, after the gathering of data. With regards to the framework for the collection and analysis of data, the research design used for this thesis will be a case study design. As described by Bryman (2012: 66): ‘The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case’. This research will make use of case studies, as this allows the researcher to use the data gathering methods described in §3.3. In addition, the researcher is of the opinion that case study is a suitable way of researching a recent shift. Also, there are interesting case studies available with regards to extreme right in Western Europe. Finally, an important reason is that it allows the researcher to investigate a case thoroughly. Case study design is typically associated with qualitative research, as the goal is to understand few cases more in depth, whereas quantitative research makes use of a large N. The latter point out the disadvantage of case studies: the small number of cases taken into account makes it difficult to generalize the research results beyond the cases studied. This is the problem of external validity. External validity deals with generalization of the results. This research hopes to be generalizable to Western Europe. For this reason, the author has chosen for a multiple case study. However, generalizing the results beyond the specific context that was studied remains an issue. Nevertheless, it is a good indicator for the whole of Western Europe, and therefore this research can add to the debate on far right and immigration.
3.2 Case studies
As explained, to increase the validity of the research, three cases will be studied. Obviously, ‘the main argument in favour of the multiple-case study is that it improves theory building’ (Bryman, 2012:74). When researching multiple cases, it is easier for the researcher to investigate the possible influences
15 of the independent variables on the dependent variables. The more cases are studied, the less changes are that found relationships are based on coincidence. In the case of investigating countries, as done in this research, it might be even more important to perform a multiple-case study. This is because differences between individual countries can be significant. This can be due to an extensive number of factors, such as economic circumstances, the political climate, internal conflict, a countries history, etcetera. Therefore, in this research three out of nine Western European countries are subject to research. In short: studying multiple cases improves the possibility of generalizing to the whole of Western Europe, while still enabling the author to make an extensive analysis of all the cases. The cases chosen are Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.3 A practical reason for choosing these cases is language. Furthermore, there are various additional reasons, based on the presence of far right-wing, and their public opinion on immigrants. Germany its historic links with Nazism puts far right in a special historical context. Nowadays, Germany is in the centre of attention with regards to the migrant crisis. An example is the uproar in the city of Heidenau, at the Eastern-German border, where extreme right-wing protesters started violent demonstrations as a response to the migrant influx (The Guardian, 11 September 2015). Also, more recently, a German politician running for mayor of Cologne was stabbed because of her ‘liberal stance on refugees’ (CNN, 19 October 2015). Belgium also has a history and a present with far right, where a large role is played by Flemish nationalism. The Netherlands, finally, is interesting inter alia due to their popular Freedom Party. In addition, the Netherlands recently witnessed sympathizers of the far right disturbing a consultation evening about a possible asylum seekers center in the municipality of Steenbergen. Some argue that far right sympathizers tour around the country to visit and negatively influence similar meetings, to create an atmosphere where pro-immigrants are afraid to speak up (NOS, 23 October 2015; Elsevier, 23 October 2015). The foregoing shows that all three cases have their own struggles concerning the migrants crisis. In addition, the three cases are selected based on their difference in public opinion towards immigrants, as shown in the tables below. Data reflecting this public opinion is derived from the European Social Survey (EES). This survey has now been held 7 times, of which both the first round (2002) and the last round (2014) examined the variable ‘immigration’. For example, the question was asked whether immigrants made their country a worse or better place to live.’4 The result of this question are displayed in the tables below. For 2002, it shows that Belgium has a significantly less positive attitude towards migrants then Germany. From all Belgian respondents, only 0,7% is of the opinion that immigrants make their country a better place to live, being the lowest score from all Western-European countries. The Netherlands falls in between Belgium and Germany. In 2014, again in Belgium the least people are of the opinion that immigrants make their country a better place to live (1%), whereas Germany is again the least negative (3,8%). The foregoing makes a comparison between the three cases interesting, as they are all three situated in Western Europe, but differ in opinion on immigrants.
3 The cases are consistently mentioned and analysed in alphabetical order. 4 The literal question read as follows: ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ (European Social Survey, 2002; European Social Survey, 2014).
16
Table 1 - European Social Survey (2002), Round 1 (ed.6.4), displayed in column percentages.
Table 2 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.5
3.3 Data gathering
As explained in the previous paragraph, this thesis has made use of case studies to gather data on far right public presence and its possible explanatory factors. This paragraph will provide more details on the specific methods used for the gathering of this data. A visit to the cases involved has not been considered for long. Nor the time, nor the resources for such visits were available to the researcher. It might have been feasible for one more in depth case study, but not feasible for a multiple case study. Also not part of the gathering process are interviews and survey research. Data on far right public presence is hard to gather via interviews and survey research. Furthermore, the researcher has no experience in both data gathering methods. Moreover, consideration such as the time limit have also made the researcher decide not to include interviews or survey research. The former takes up a lot of time, both in performing and processing the interviews. The same goes for the latter, while in addition, a significant amount of time has to be granted to the respondents for filling in the survey. Finally, both methods come with the necessary risks, as interviews might be cancelled or weak in content, while surveys can easily result in a lack of respondents.
5 The 2014 results for Luxembourg for this question were not (yet) available.
17
As such, this thesis has chosen for more flexible and accessible data gathering methods, where the researcher has experience with. These methods are library research and desktop research, which both have the advantage that they are not dependent on third actors, and are flexible with regards to place and time. The advantage of library research is that it provides the user with academic, trustworthy sources. However, a disadvantage of library research is that it takes a significant amount of books and articles to gather all the pieces of information needed. In addition, another disadvantage is that it is more difficult to find up to date sources. This gap is filled by desktop analysis, which is a very appropriate method to find recent data, such as information on the recently established Dutch party ‘For The Netherlands’. Desktop analysis allows the researcher to search with a more narrow focus. Furthermore, the methods chosen are very transparent, capable of replication, and suitable for a longitudinal analysis. Moreover, the methods have less ethical concerns than other research methods. In this thesis, both methods are used interchangeably. However, as a consequence of the before mentioned advantages and disadvantages of both data gathering methods, library research is mostly used for background information, such as in the theoretical framework, and in the introductions of the case studies in the analysis. Desktop research is found mostly in the other parts of the analysis. This is mostly in the form of document analysis, involving the examination of a significant amount of written material. For this research, this entails for instance the comparing of the content of elections programmes, and the use of a variety of newspaper articles. The (online) newspapers analysed for this research are inter alia the following: BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welle, Elsevier, The Guardian, The Irish Times, Le Monde, The New Observer, New York Times, NOS, Het Nieuwsblad, NRC, De Redactie, Spiegel Online, De Standaard and Volkskrant. The newspaper content analysis has taken the form of a critical media discourse analysis, wherein a critical assessment of media language is pivotal. As explained by Teun van Dijk (2001:352), ‘Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.’ This research has made use of this method by searching newspaper articles online, and subsequently scanning them critically, by looking at both text and non-text. Looking at the text was done by either scanning or completely reading the articles, and filtering out the information (potentially) relevant for this research. Looking at non-text was done by taken into account several other factors reflecting the language of the article. For example, the tone of the articles has been taken into account, such as whether an article is critical, cynical, neutral, or otherwise. Also, the political context has been taken into account. For example, was an article written in a nation-wide or even internationally read newspaper, or perhaps in a political party newspaper? And when issued by a political party, was the newspaper meant for international or external purposes? This research has taken into account that seeing the text in the right socio-political context can shed an entirely different light on the content of a newspaper article. In the analysis, it was first identified which parties do or do not match the definition of far right used in this thesis. After the gathering of data by use of the explained methods, library analysis and desktop analysis, this research analysed and interpreted the data. For this matter, the gathered data was written down in an explanatory context, and in a structured way by use of (sub)headings. Eventually, all the results have been presented in tables, making use of arrows to indicate a positive or negative shift in the variable. This makes an analysis possible, by comparing the cases and their results, and looking at commonalities and differences. The comparison is done at the end of the analysis. Finally, the connections found - or not found - are interpreted, and a conclusion on the gathered data is formed.
3.4 Operationalization
In this paragraph, the dependent variables (far right and public presence) and the independent variables (the explanatory factors) will be operationalized.
18
3.4.1 Far right Far right was defined by the author in the theoretical framework, as an electoral focused political party, located at the right side of the political spectrum, whose ideological identity is based on ideological features such as nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia. The indicators are as follows: 1. Political party - political group identified by official label - placing candidates for public office through elections at federal level 2. Ideological identity - right side of the political spectrum - two of the following characteristics: nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia
Political party An important factor is that it concerns a political party. Heywood (2013) defines a political party as ‘a group of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power, by electoral or other means’. However, this definition is too broad for this research. Mudde (2000) defines a political party as ‘any political group identified by an official label that places candidates for public office through elections’. In line with Mudde (2000) and with Hainsworth (2008), the focus will be on those parties that have opted for electoralism. For this research, a party has opted for electoralism if it has contested elections on a federal level in the 21st century. Non-parliamentary movements do not fall within the scope of this definition (Hainsworth, 2008). Unfortunately, this means that interesting organizations such as Pegida will not be taken into account. Another disadvantage is that far right is sometimes anti- party, and therefore not always suitable to research under the definition of an electoral focused political party. Finally, it is important to keep in mind is that if parties want to run for elections, they have to be more moderate, and thus fewer of the mentioned ideological features will be (obviously) applicable to them. This definition is nevertheless chosen, to delimit the research. In addition, parties running in (federal) elections are more suitable for research on ‘public presence’.
Ideological identity To qualify as a far right party for this research, parties must belong at the right side on the political left-right spectrum. In addition, the political party must have a certain ideological identity. As explained earlier, a wide range of ideological features can be linked to far right. For this research, the emphasis is on the possible influence of the migrant crisis. Therefore, nationalism, exclusionism and xenophobia are the most relevant characteristics, as they (can) have a connection with a negative attitude towards immigrants. A commonly perceived ‘negative attitude against strangers’ is therefore a criteria in the selection of cases. Therefore, a party that is extreme or far right due to its Figure 1 - Far right ideological features environmental position, will not be taken into consideration if this negative attitude against strangers is not present. One out of three features is not enough to fall within the scope of this research, as this would also qualify parties such as the New-Flemish Alliance, based on their Flemish nationalism. Two out of three features is enough to be selected for the case studies of this thesis. This is legitimate inter alia due to the use of the term ‘far right’ instead of ‘extreme right’. In addition, this is legitimate because the definition used for the case selection is for analytical purposes. The figure on the left will function as a tool to locate political parties. Only parties located in the overlapping parts of the spectrum qualify for this research.
3.4.2 Public presence Public presence was defined by the author in the theoretical framework as ‘being present to the people as a whole’. Measuring public presence can be done via multiple indicators, taking into account both what the parties say, and what the parties do: the scope of the party family, the number of votes,
19 public statements, and public manifestations. Social media will be analysed where possible and relevant, for example in the search for public statements. The indicators are as follows: 1. Scope of the party family - number of parties - number of members 2. Votes - federal elections 3. Public statements and manifestations - public statements - public manifestations and mobilization capacity
The scope of the far right party family By comparing the size of the far right party family in the past years, this research can investigate whether the family has grown, which is an indicator for its public presence. The scope of the far right party family requires two measurements. On the one hand, it entails the number of far right parties. On the other hand, an expansion of the number of far right parties does not automatically entail an expansion in the number of supporters. For example, a party can split in two due to internal strife, adding a new party, but not necessarily new members. The number of members of far right parties is an indication of the number of people publicly supporting these parties, and the party family as a whole, as such being an indicator for the public presence of far right. Determining the number of parties is a matter of definition, as thoroughly discussed in this research. However, even more difficult is determining the number of members of those parties. It is important to note here, that there is no official database with numbers of members of the parties. It is up to the parties themselves to publish these numbers, which decreases the reliability of these numbers, since it is in the interest of the parties to exaggerate their number of followers (Knack, 12 November 2014).
Number of votes The number of votes concerns votes in federal elections.
Public statements and manifestations Public statements can be spoken or written, for example in press conferences, party meetings, newspapers, on their websites or on their social media. This paper also considers election programmes as public statements. It is argued that election programmes do not show the true face of a party, out of tactical consideration (Mudde, 2000:20). However, they are nevertheless a good example of the party’s external orientation. However, they will not be used in the analysis, as election programmes are only issued prior to elections, and as such, the year of publication does not give an indication of public presence, but merely an indication of electoral focus. Party papers will also not be taken into consideration, when their primary orientation is internal (Mudde, 2000:21). Media coverage is out of this scope, as this is more about the attention that far right is getting, not about their public presence. Although these two factors often go hand in hand, this is not a given. For example, they can also be the focus of the media because of their decline, or their absence in public presence. Public manifestations mainly encompass own protests and demonstrations. Similar to public statements, manifestations with a primary internal orientation will not be taken into account. The main example of this are (national) party meetings. In order to measure increase, not only the number of public manifestations is important, but also the mobilization capacity. If more manifestations attract less supporters, one cannot righteously speak of an increase in public presence.
20
3.4.3 Factor 1: the migrant crisis The migrant crisis has been explained in §2.2.1. As mentioned, the timescope of this research is linked to the contemporary migrant crisis. As such, the indicator for the migrant crisis is the timescope. The starting point of this migrant crisis is disputable, as it can be seen from multiple perspectives and by multiple definitions. For this research, the scope will be from 59,5 2011 to 2015. This range has been chosen based on the figures of UNHCR, as displayed in figure 2 (UNHCR Global 51,5 Trends 2010-2014). This figure shows the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide, including asylum-seekers and 45,2 internally displaced persons. As of 2011, the number of 43,7 42,5 forcibly displaced people has continuously increased. As such, this research would like to gather data as from 2011, in order 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 to investigate whether this increase goes hand in hand with a shift in far right public presence. Figure 2 - Number of forcibly displaced people worldwide
3.4.4 Factor 2: quality of life The second explanatory factor is quality of life. It is used in a variety of different disciplines, and differs widely per context. For this research, quality of life refers to the general well-being of the people of case X as a whole. Quality of life is a variable that has been extensively debated in literature, yet there is no consensus on an all-encompassing way of measuring this variable. However, there is increasing agreement that quality of life encompasses more than just the narrow context of GDP figures (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). With regards to the quality of life of a country, the European Commission has its own set of nine indicators: material living conditions, productive or main activity, health, education, leisure and social interactions, economic and physical safety, governance and basic rights, natural and living environment, and finally, overall experience of life (Eurostat, 5 November 2015). The indicators used to measure quality of life for this research, are based on these nine indicators established by the European Commission. The author has used indicators from the European Social Survey, that have as much overlap as possible with the European Commission indicators. The European Social Survey was chosen as a source, as it is a large and professional database, containing data collected from a large variety of countries, over a long period of time, and about a broad range of social aspects. This makes comparison between two different years and three different countries possible in a trustworthy way. The European Social Survey has now been done seven times, and consists of core and rotating modules. Some of these core themes, such as ‘Socio-demographics’ and ‘Subjective Well-Being, Social Exclusion, Religion, National and Ethnic Identity’ provide useful data for measuring the quality of life in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands in 2011 and 2014. The following six questions of the 2010 and 2014 social survey (European Social Survey) will be used for this research: 1. Doing last 7 days: paid work? 2. Feeling about household’s income nowadays? 3. How happy are you? 4. Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark? 5. Subjective general health? 6. How satisfied with life as a whole?
3.4.5 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration The third factor is about attitudes towards European integration. As mentioned, a negative attitude in society towards European integration can cause more people to relate to Eurosceptic far right parties. To measure attitudes towards European integration, this research selected three questions from surveys reflecting the level of trust of European citizens in the European Union, and their opinion on a
21 unifying Europe. A question on specifically the European Parliament is involved, as the European Parliament is the so-called heart of democracy of the EU, or ‘The citizens voice in the EU’ (European Parliament, 2015). Below, the three questions used are listed. The first two questions are from the European Social Survey, the third question is from the Standard Eurobarometer (European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer): 1. Trust in the European Parliament 2. European Union: European unification go further or gone too far 3. Trust in the European Union
3.4.6 Factor 4: changing image of the parties The last factor measures a change in image of the parties. A change in image between 2011 and 2015, making the party either more explicit or less explicit in their nationalist, xenophobe or exclusionist stance, can influence the public presence of far right parties. As previously mentioned, a party can change its image for multiple reasons. In addition, a party can change its image in multiple ways. The indicators used to measure this variable are based on these ‘multiple ways’. For example, a party can change its image by a change in party leader, or a change in the tone of its election programme. This research has tried to cover the most important possible changes by use of the following indicators: 1. Change in party name 2. Change in party leader 3. Change in party symbol 4. Change in party partnerships > coalition partners on a federal and European level 5. Change in election programme
22
3.4.7 Operationalization table Below, the operationalization of all different variables is schematically depicted.
Theory Concepts Definition Indicators Data sources Media seem to Far right The presence of - number of parties Various suggest that the public far right to the - number of members public presence presence people as a whole - votes of far right has - public statements increased - public manifestations - mobilization capacity As of 2011 the Migrant crisis The continuous - timescope 2011 - 2015 UNHCR number of rise in migrants forcibly displaced from Africa and people has the Middle East continuously increased A low quality of Quality of life The general well- - Doing last 7 days: paid work? European Social life can results in being of the - Feeling about household’s Survey ‘blaming’ people of a income nowadays? country as a - How happy are you? whole - Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark? - Subjective general health? - How satisfied with life as a whole?
A negative Attitudes Public opinion - Trust in the European European Social attitude towards towards towards Parliament Survey, the European European European Union - European Union: European Standard Union, the Euro, integration (integration) unification go further or gone Eurobarometer and/or European too far integration is a - Trust in the European Union spearhead of many far right parties Parties can Changing A change in the - Change in party name Various change their images external image of - Change in party leader image overtime, a party - Change in party symbol for example to - Change in party partnerships gain more - Change in election popular support programme
Table 3 - Operationalization
23
4. Analysis
This chapter will measure per case study whether a shift has taken place in far right public presence in Western Europe between 2011 and 2015. In addition, a possible shift in the explanatory factors will be measured. As explained in chapter 3, the indicator for the migrant crisis is the timescope. The number of forcibly displaced people worldwide from 2011 till 2015 was explained in the graph. This thesis is of the assumption that this increase leads to an increase in migrants heading for Western Europe. In addition, this thesis presumes that this leads to an increase in immigrants for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. As such, factor 1, the migrant crisis, will not be discussed in the analysis, as an increase for all three cases is assumed. The other explanatory factors will be examined thoroughly in this chapter, in order to determine a shift in these variables between 2011 and 2015. For the figures of 2014, data from the European Social Survey over 2014 has been used. For the figures of 2011, data from the European Social Survey over 2010 and 2012 has been used (European Social Survey). Data over 2010 is used to measure ‘quality of life’, whereas data over 2012 is used to measure ‘attitudes towards European integration’. This slight inconsistency is explained by the fact that the questions asked in the survey differ per year. In addition, data is used from the 2011 and 2014 Eurobarometer for the measuring of ‘attitudes towards European integration’ (European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer). At the end of the chapter, a comparison will be made involving all variables. First, the dependent and independent variables will be discussed separately. Second, the interaction between the dependent and independent variables will be subject to comparison.
4.1 Case I: Belgium
In his book on extreme right, Hainsworth devotes a significant amount of attention to Belgium, home to a variety of extreme right groups since World War II (Hainsworth, 2008:29). Important with regards to Belgium are the internal struggles between the Dutch speaking Flanders, and the French speaking Wallonia. The Guardian describes the link as follows: ‘Flemish leaders are increasingly strident in demanding greater autonomy, while the Walloon leaders retreat to their bunkers and refuse to negotiate. Flemish separatism was once the stronghold of the extreme right: it is now much more mainstream’ (The Guardian, 9 May 2010). Both Mudde and Hainsworth devote little attention to the groups linked to French movements. The Belgian National Front (NF)6 is briefly mentioned, as a French- speaking party active in Wallonia, but never achieving any significant results in elections (Hainsworth, 2008:33). The focus is mainly on Flanders. Mudde (2000) argues with respect to Flanders, that nationalism had difficulty rooting after World War II. As of 1949 Flemish nationalist parties were slowly re-established, but it was not until the 1960s that they really gained significance, due to the language dispute between Dutch and French speaking Belgians (Mudde, 2000:83). Hainsworth (2008:29) confirms, by stating that Flemish nationalism became the driving force behind extreme right in post- war Belgium. In 1979 Flemish Bloc (FB) was founded, remaining a small party for the first few years. However, perhaps inspired by the French FN, attention for the party grew with the introduction of their anti-immigrant politics, with their slogan ‘Eigen volk eerst!’, translated as ‘own people first’ (Mudde, 2000:88; Hainsworth, 2008:32; Ignazi, 2003:132). Mudde (2000:115) describes Flemish Bloc as a party revolving around nationalism, being xenophobic in the sense that they perceive foreigners as a threat, aiming at living separately in their own state with their own ethnic community. Ignazi (2003:132) agrees that Flemish Bloc added ‘nationalism’ to their ‘regionalism’, by stating that in 1984 anti-immigration became one of their central issues. They became politically significant due to their success in the 1988 elections (Hainsworth, 2008). However, their real breakthrough was in 1991, with more electoral success following in inter alia 1994 and 1999 (Mudde, 2000). They emerged as one of
6 The term ‘National Front’ refers to the Belgian National Front, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
24 the most successful extreme right parties in Western Europe (Hainsworth, 2008:32). In 2004, the Court characterised Flemish Bloc as a racist party. Consequently, they re-emerged as the somewhat more moderate Flemish Interest (Hainsworth, 2008:42). This party has been active ever since, receiving almost 250000 votes in the May 2014 elections (Election Resources, 6 June 2014). Flemish Interest will be discussed in more detail in the analysis.
4.1.1 Far right public presence Inter alia the following (still existing) parties do not match the definition of this research: New-Flemish Alliance (N-FA), List Dedecker (LD), Parti Communautaire National-Europeén (PCNE), and New Belgian Front (NBF). According to Mudde, the New-Flemish Alliance can be characterized as nationalist and authoritarian, but not as anti-democratic, xenophobic or populist (Doorbraak, 30 September 2015). Lijst Dedecker (LDD) is on the right sight of the political spectrum, and it labels itself as nationalist (NRC, 27 May 2014). However, despite their caution with entitling immigrants with Belgian citizenship, this research sees no legitimate reason to label them as xenophobic or exclusionist, and consequently as far right (Lijst Dedecker, 2010; Landsford, 2015). The Parti Communautaire National-Europeén would label as a far right party for the sake of this research. However, they do not have the electoral focus required for being selected. The same goes for the New Belgian Front. Similar to List Dedecker, they label themselves as nationalist (FNB, 19 May 2008). In addition, this thesis would like to argue that their stance on immigrants and the Islam also justifies a characterization as xenophobic/exclusionist. For example, they link immigrants to terrorism, they state that foreigners should work or go home, that foreign offenders should be sent back, that immigrants looking for social security are not welcome, and that Islam is dangerous (FNB, 19 May 2008). However, both the Parti Communautaire National- Europeén and the New Belgian Front have not contested federal elections in the 20th century, neither for the Senate, nor for the chamber, and for that reason this research does not consider them electoral focused (Election Resources, 6 June 2015).
The following parties fall within the scope of this research: 1. Flemish Interest 2011 & 2015 2. National Democracy 2011 & 2105
Flemish Interest Flemish Interest is a nationalist party. Its nationalistic character can be deduced from their party name. In addition, in their statement of principles, the party also labels itself as a ‘Flemish Nationalist Party’ (Vlaams Belang, Beginselverklaring). This thesis would like to argue that Flemish Interest can be characterized as far right, as it has xenophobe and exclusionist characteristics. For example, the former party leader advocated for a ‘homogeneous ethnic communit[y]’ (Jamin, 2012:69). Jamin (2012) analysed the programme of Flemish Interest, and concluded that FI feels that it must be protected against certain enemies. They oppose ‘immigrants who threaten the cultural integrity and biological homogeneity of the Flemish people’ (Jamin, 2012:70). As such, they are against immigration, and in favour of a system of segregation. For this matter, they put forward some extreme anti-immigrant measures that violate human rights (Jamin, 2012:70). The 2010 election programme of Flemish Interest is titled ‘Vlamingen 1st’ (Vlaams Belang, 2010). The third chapter of this document is on immigration and Islamization. They call immigration a particularly challenging social issue, and argue that the main aim of immigrants is to improve their economic well-being, whilst pretending to flee for conflict and chaos. As a consequence, they plead for stopping migration by ‘closing the gates’ (Vlaams Belang, 2010:21). In addition, they want to counter Islamization, as they feel that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants often don’t integrate into Belgian civil society. According to Flemish Interest, this lead to tension, as their behaviour is not only ‘different’, but also often unacceptable, and in violation of human rights. As a solution, they inter alia propose to no longer recognize Islam (Vlaams Belang, 2010:27). The 2014 election programme of Flemish Interest also devotes a chapter to immigrants,
25 titled ‘baas in eigen land’, or ‘boss in own country’ (Flemish Interest, 2014:21). It describes the mass- immigration of the past decades as ‘bringing in unemployment, poverty, criminality and conflict’ (Flemish Interest, 2014:21).The propose strict rules for obtaining the Belgium nationality, and citizenship. In addition, countering Islamization is again an important spearhead. This entails a stop in subsidizing and recognizing Islam, but also a stop in building Mosques (Flemish Interest, 2014:22).
Members In 2011, Flemish Interest (VB) had 17139 members. Furthermore, in 2014, the party had 17255 members (KU Leuven, 30 October 2014). This is a slight increase relative to 2011.
Votes7 On 13 June 2010, Flemish Interest received 506697 votes in the elections for the Chamber of Representatives (7,8%), equalling 12 seats. On 25 May 2014, Flemish Interest received 247738 votes in the elections for the Chamber of Representatives (3,7%), entitling them to 3 seats. In addition, they received 491547 votes in the 2010 Senate elections (7,6%), which equalled 3 seats. (Election Resources, 6 June 2014). However, as of 2014, the Senate will no longer be directly elected, making a comparison between the 2010 and 2014 Senate elections impossible (Legalworld, 15 November 2013).
Statements For public statements, this thesis scans all publications on the official Flemish Interest website (vlaamsbelang.org). Flemish Interest publishes various documents on a regular basis. First, they publish an e-magazine. However, these e-magazines do not contain a date of publication, and are therefore unusable for this research. In addition, the e-magazine is a newsletter, which one can sign up for via e- mail, giving it an internally oriented character (Vlaams Belang, E-magazine). As such, these e-magazines will not be taken into account. Second, they publish Financial Economic Comments (FEC), which are of a too specific economic nature, to take into account in this research (Vlaams Belang, Financieel Economische Commentaren). Third, they publish the ‘Vlaams Belang Magazine’ on a monthly basis (Vlaams Belang, Vlaams Belang Magazine). This magazine seems to have a more external orientation, as it is an actual magazine that is also published in hardcopy, for which a paid membership is possible. In addition, the topics discussed seem to be for a wider audience than just the party members. Besides their magazines, FI has also published various brochures (Vlaams Belang, 2015). However, as is the case with the e-magazines, these brochures do not contain a date of publication. Finally, with regards to statements on their website, their press releases have been taken into account (Vlaams Belang, Persberichten). Besides public statements on the Flemish Interest website, another of their official media channels has been analysed: their Facebook page (Facebook, Vlaams Belang). However, the first post on their Facebook page is from 2 January 2013. As such, a comparison is not possible. It is, however, easy to conclude that Flemish Interest has started to use a new media channel between 2011 and 2014. The author has estimated their total posts in 2014 to be around 600, by counting their posts in both January (58) and December (42) and multiplying the average (50) by 12.8 In contrast with their Facebook page, their YouTube channel was already active in 2011 (YouTube, Vlaams Belang). As such, this means of public communication has been taken into account for the public statements. In 2011, they posted 48 videos, whereas in 2014, they posted 74 video’s.
7 For the figures of 2011, the June 2010 elections in Belgium offer the most accurate results. For the figures of 2014, the May 2014 elections in Belgium offer the most accurate results. 8 For this estimation, the months January and December where chosen. The author has chosen to use January and December, as the author is of the belief that using these first and the last month of the year leads to the most accurate average, as Facebook is an upcoming medium, on which far right parties might become more active in the course of the year.
26
2011 2014 Magazines9 11 10 Press releases 333 185 YouTube 48 74 Total 392 269 Table 4 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public statements
Manifestations To measure the number of public manifestations of FI, this research has scanned their press statements for announced manifestations. In order to not overlook any manifestation announced for the beginning of 2011 and 2014, the press releases of November and December 2010 and 2013 were also taken into account. In addition, further desktop research has been done to identify FI public manifestations not covered in the press statements. The first press release examined is that of 19 May 2011, announcing a protest manifestation on the 12th of June (Vlaams Belang, 19 May 2011). However, this manifestation did not take place, as the lecture they were protesting against was cancelled (Filip Dewinter, 26 May 2011). As such, this announcement will not be taken into account. The same goes for the symbolic ‘Wetstraat’-operation (Vlaams Belang, 14 June 2011). This will not be taken into account, as it was a manifestation by the members of parliament. In 2014, a request was done for a protest in Brussels, on the occasion of a fair for Muslims (Vlaams Belang, 4 November 2014). However, this request was turned down (Vlaams Belang, 7 November 2014). As such, this press statement has not been taken into account. Also, the Flemish Interest participation in a manifestation in Mechelen will also not be taken into account, as this was not an own manifestation. The following public manifestations fall within the scope of this research: - a manifestation against the building of a large mosque in Lier, with around 500 participants (Vlaams Belang, 1 June 2011; De Redactie, 5 June 2011); - the occupation of a building appointed as the location of a new large mosque in Antwerp, with around 20 people attending (Vlaams Belang, 30 June 2011; Het Nieuwsblad, 30 June 2011); - a manifestation against the building of a mosque in Ukkel, with around 60 participants (Vlaams Belang, 12 October 2011; HLN, 13 October 2011); - an ‘Estates-General’ against Di Rupo in Brussels, where about 500 party members attended (Vlaams Belang, 15 November 2011; De Redactie, 20 November 2011); - a ‘1 May manifestation’ in Ninove, with about 500 people attending (Vlaams Belang, June 2011). - a protest against minister Turtelboom (Vlaams Belang, 27 March 2014). The number of people attending is very unclear, but estimated around 25 based on a photograph of the event; - a blockade in front of the Belgian ABVV headquarters, with about 40 persons (Vlaams Belang, 12 December 2014; De Redactie, 12 December 2014).
2011 2014 Members 17139 17255 ↑ Votes 506697 247738 ↓ Statements 392 269 ↓ Manifestations 5 2 ↓ Mobilisation10 316 32,5 ↓ Table 5 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, public presence
9 This is a monthly magazine. However, in 2011 2 editions were combined. In 2014, 2 editions were missing. 10 The average number of participants for the manifestations.
27
National Democracy National Front, formed in 1985, is the most important far right party in French-speaking Belgium. It owns part of its success to the well-known French National Front, as they use the same name, acronym, and in the past even programme, as this successful French far right party (Jamin, 2012). In 2012, the party had to change his name after a lost lawsuit filed by Marine Le Pen, the President of the French FN, who no longer wanted to be associated with their Belgian counterpart (Elections Meter, 7 September 2012). From then on the party was called National Democracy, the name that will also be used in this research. This thesis would like to argue that the Belgian National Democracy falls within the scope of this thesis. First, the party can be labelled as nationalist. It labels itself as such, and the title of the party also stipulates its nationalist character (Delwit, 2007). Second, this research is of the opinion that the Belgian National Democracy can be labelled xenophobic/exclusionist, based on statements of the party (officials). For example, one of the ND Members of the Walloon Parliament stated that ‘[ND] would be able to ‘protect’ the Belgian nation and its white population (…) against immigration and ‘its disastrous consequences’ (Jamin, 2012:65; Abramowicz, 1996:197). Immigration is one of the spearheads of ND policy. For instance, they argue for a difference in treatment between European and non-European immigrants, specifically African and Muslim immigrants (Jamin, 2012). They argue that they fight the Islamization of Belgium (Démocracie Nationale, 2015). Stigmatizing and demonizing immigrants is not a stranger to the Belgian ND, who is trying to link immigrants to the feeling of insecurity of the Belgian people. Taking the foregoing into consideration, this thesis deems it justifiable to characterize the party as far right.
Members Unfortunately, this thesis has not been able to find the number of members of National Democracy.
Votes On 13 June 2010, National Democracy received 33591 votes in the elections for the Chamber, which was not enough for a seat (Binnenlandse Zaken, 2010; Election Resources, 6 June 2014). They did not take part in the 2014 elections for the Chamber.
Statements and manifestations According to Jamin (2012:63), ‘the shadowy atmosphere surrounding the French-speaking extreme right in Wallonia and Brussels makes it a particularly difficult object to describe and analyse.’ Delwit (2007:142) observes that ‘In radical contrast to its Flemish alter ego, the FN is an invisible and silent party.’11 Unfortunately, this paper can only agree with Jamin and Delwit. As mentioned, information on the number of members cannot be found. The same goes to a certain extent for ND public statements. The 2012 name change of the party perhaps explains this in part. The official ND website (dnat.be) publishes various documents. However, the absence of an archive makes comparison more or less impossible. A website under the party’s old name is nowhere to be found. In addition, the name change also has implications for Facebook research. The presumed official page currently in use has its first post on 24 May 2014 (Facebook, Démocratie Nationale). The presumed official old page also does not go back to 2011 (Facebook, FN Belge). In addition, it is difficult to determine which page is the official old DN page, if there is one in the first place. With regards to their YouTube channel, the first publication is from 20 February 2012 (YouTube, Démocratie Nationale). A channel under its old name was not found by the author. As such, one can conclude that DN started using 1, arguably 2, new media channel(s) between 2011 and 2014. With regards to public manifestations, the 2012 name change of the party, combined with the lack of available information on the party, makes a valid comparison between 2011 and 2014 virtually impossible.
11 By ‘its Flemish alter ego’ the author refers to Flemish Interest. By ‘FN’, the author refers to the Belgian National Front, the old name of National Democracy.
28
2011 2014 Members - - - Votes 33591 - ↓ Statements - - - Manifestations - - - Mobilisation12 - - - Table 6 - Belgium: National Democracy, public presence
4.1.2 Factor 2: quality of life To measure quality of life in Belgium, all six indicators have been measured for 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix B. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. The first indicators is paid work. In 2010, 50.9% of the Belgian respondents said to have done paid work in the last seven days. In 2014, the figures were exactly the same. As such, paid work seems to have been a stable factor in Belgium between 2011 and 2015. This is different for the second indicator, feeling about households’ income. In 2010, 38,8% of the Belgian respondents felt to be living comfortably on the present income. In 2014, this had decreased to 36,3%. A decrease was also seen with regards to feelings of happiness. For indicator three, 8,5% of the respondents argued to be overall extremely happy. In 2014, this percentage had slightly decreased to 8,4%. A larger decrease was seen for indicator four, representing the feeling of safety of walking alone in the local area after dark. The percentage of respondents feeling very safe dropped from 23,5 to 19,9%. General health, covered by indicator five, was also subject to a decrease. In 2010, 23,9% of the respondents would say their general health was very good. In 2014, this was one percent less, as 22,9% of the respondents was of this opinion. However, there was also an increase to be seen. Indicator six reflected that more Belgians became extremely satisfied with life as a whole: 8,4% of the 2014 respondents, compared to 7,1% of the 2010 respondents. Four indicators have shown a negative development in quality of life in Belgium. Based on these results, this thesis would like to conclude that quality of life in Belgium has decreased between 2011 and 2015.
2011 2014 Indicator 1 50.9 50.9 - Indicator 2 38.8 36.3 ↓ Indicator 3 8.5 8.4 ↓ Indicator 4 23.5 19.9 ↓ Indicator 5 23.9 22.9 ↓ Indicator 6 7.1 8.4 ↑ Table 7 - Belgium: Quality of life
4.1.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration To measure the attitude towards European integration in Belgium, three indicators have been measured in 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix C. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. With regards to indicator one, trust in the European Parliament, a small rise was seen. In 2010, 0,7% of the respondents had complete trust in the EP, whereas in 2014, this was 1%. A decrease was seen in indicator two, on European unification. In 2010, 5,2% of the people were of the opinion that European unification should go further, while in 2014 this was 4,4%. A decrease was also seen with regards to trust in the EU. Indicator three shows us that number of people tending to trust this institution dropped
12 The average number of participants for the manifestations.
29 from 57 to 43%. Based on the foregoing figures, this research would like to conclude that attitudes towards European integration have worsened in Belgium between 2011 and 2015.
2011 2014 Indicator 1 0.7 1.0 ↑ Indicator 2 5.2 4.4 ↓ Indicator 3 57 43 ↓ Table 8 - Belgium: Attitudes towards European integration
4.1.4 Factor 4: changing image Flemish Interest and National Democracy will be examined for signs of a change in image.
Flemish Interest Flemish Interest is the former Flemish Bloc. However, this name change took place in 2004 already, as a response to a conviction for racism (Vlaams Blok, 2004). What did took place between 2011 and 2015 is two changes in party leader. In 2012, Gerolf Annemans became the successor of Bruno Valkeniers (VTM, 16 December 2012). A change in party image was part of Annemans priorities, taking the ‘straightforward’ stance on nationalism of the party founder as the example, together with the traditional FI stance on strangers (De Standaard, 16 December 2012). His rule can be seen as somewhat more explicit far right than under his predecessor Valkeniers. In October 2014, Annemans was replaced by Tom van Grieken (De Standaard, 5 May 2015). Van Grieken was very explicit in his mission to change the party image. Specifically, he argues that he wants the party to lose its xenophobe and exclusionist image (De Standaard, 5 May 2015). As such, the party became somewhat more explicit with the first change in party leader, and somewhat milder with the second change in party leader. The party symbol did not change between 2011 and 2015. With regards to partners on a federal level, the party has long been subject of a cordon sanitaire. While this agreement is not officially in place anymore, up to the present day, Flemish Interest has never been part of the Belgian coalition (Volkskrant, 2 October 2006). In contrast, Flemish Interest is a member of the ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ group in the European Parliament. Here, it partners with parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party and the French National Front (Euractiv, 2015; European Parliament, 2015). However, as this group was formed in 2015, this falls out of the scope of this research. As such, there is not a difference worth mentioning, between FI partnerships in 2011 and 2015. The final criteria to be assessed is Flemish Interest election programme. Flemish Interest took part in the June 2010 and May 2014 elections (as previously discussed). In addition, the election programmes for both years are available on the internet, making a comparison possible. A first difference worth mentioning is the title. The 2010 document is titled ‘Vlamingen 1st’ (Flemish first), which is an explicit nationalist message. The 2014 document is titled ‘Uw stok achter de deur’, which can be interpret as ‘Your means of coercion’. This is not explicitly nationalist, xenophobe or exclusionist. The 2010 document contains six spearheads, of which immigration & Islamization is one. The document speaks of immigration gone out of control, and advocates a stop in migration by closing the gates (Vlaams Belang, 2010:22). In addition, it pleads for a ban on financial aid for asylum seekers, and it wants to withdraw the recognition of Islam (Vlaams Belang, 2010:25-27). The 2014 document contains ten chapters, of which one is titled ‘Boss in own country’ (Vlaams Belang, 2014). The 2014 document is significantly shorter on the issues of immigration than the 2010 document. Is writes about abolishing the possibility for illegal migrants to claim rights (Vlaams Belang, 2014:21). In addition, is argues for stricter rules concerning family reunification and citizenship (Vlaams Belang, 2014:21-22). Similar to the 2010 document, the 2014 election programme calls for a withdrawal of the recognition of Islam. Also, it pleads for a general building stop of new mosques (Vlaams Belang, 2014:22). Overall, this thesis does not see reason to argue that the election programme became significantly more nationalist, xenophobe or racist.
30
Change? More or less explicit? Party name - - Party leader yes ↑↓ Party symbol - - Party partnerships - - Election programme - - Table 9 - Belgium: Flemish Interest, changing images
National Democracy National Democracy is the former Belgian National Front. The party was forced to change its name in 2012, after a lost lawsuit filed by Marine Le Pen, President of the French FN, who no longer wanted to be associated with their Belgian counterpart (Elections Meter, 7 September 2012). Both names contain the word ‘national’, and are as such similarly explicit in their nationalist ideology. Before the name change, the party was led by Patrick Cocriamont (Gutenberg, 2016a; Europe-politique, 17 May 2014). After 2012, under its new name, the party was led by Marco Santi (Landsford, 2014:135). Its firm stance against immigration was - and still is - one of the spearheads of the party’s ideology. This research did not find any signs of a shift in explicitness of Figure 3 - The logos of National the party’s far right ideology due to the change in leadership. As Front and National Democracy previously mentioned, the party is hard to research, as it is an invisible and silent party (Delwit, 2007:142). Together with the name and leader, the party symbol also changed. This was also one of the consequences of the lost lawsuit (Elections Meter, 7 September 2012). Before the name change, National Front used a flame in the three colours of Belgium. This logo has a clear nationalist aspect. After the name change, National Democracy used a more neutral logo, as seen in the images on the left. With regard to party partnerships, there is also no significant shift to be seen. In 2010, the party did not receive enough votes to claim a seat in the Chamber. In 2014, the party did not take part in the elections. As such, they have not taken part in the Belgian coalition in either 2011 or 2014. Also, they are not represented in the EP. As the party did not take part in the 2014 elections, it is also impossible to research any possible differences in the election programmes.
Change? More or less explicit? Party name yes - Party leader yes - Party symbol yes ↓13 Party partnerships - - Election programme - - Table 10 - Belgium: National Democracy, changing images
4.1.5 Overview Belgium In the table below, the findings for case I are summarized.
13 Besides a change in party symbol by National Democracy, there were no concrete signs of a change in image of the Belgian far right parties. Based on only this change in symbol, this thesis would not argue that a change in Belgian far right party image has taken place.
31
Public Quality Attitudes towards Changing presence of life European integration images Belgium ↓ ↓ ↓ -
Table 11 - Belgium: Overview of the findings
4.2 Case II: Germany
Needless to say, Germany has a history regarding far right, that is different from those of the other cases. After World War II, a 5% threshold came into force in Germany, which until today prevents smaller parties from winning any seats in the country’s parliament (Spiegel Online, 4 October 2013). However, the focus will be on post-war far right. Mudde (2000) contributes a significant amount of pages to the case of post-war Germany. According to Mudde (2000), only two parties were of particular relevance during the first wave of right-wing extremism in Germany: the Socialist Reich Party and the German Conservative Party-German Right-Wing Party. The latter developed into the German Reich Party and eventually into the National Democratic Party Germany. Mudde (2000) argues that the forming of the latter party out of several smaller, fragmented right-wing parties, marks the start of the second wave. He argues as such, because its number of members quickly multiplied from 473 in November 1964 to 25000 by the end of 1966 (Mudde, 2000:27). Comparable significant successes were booked in (parliamentary) elections, until their disastrous loss in the 1969 elections. By the end of the 1970s, their membership dropped to around 8000, and they lost their seats in the parliaments (Mudde, 2000:29). The main explanations suggested by Mudde (2000), are the loss of their law-abiding image, for instance due to their controversial youth movement, and consequently the threat of a constitutional ban of the party, due to their alleged extremist character. With regards to the third wave, according to Mudde (2000), again two parties were of particular significance: the German People’s Union (GPU) and the Republican (REP). The German People’s Union was established by a wealthy German businessman, its first spear point being limiting foreign immigration (Mudde, 2000). However, the party had money, but no cadre. The party had occasional electoral successes, but was unable to uphold these successes, due to its dysfunctional organisational structure. The Republican, founded in 1983, started out as a conservative party. However, under the influence of renewed leadership, the party radicalized, as it developed nationalist and xenophobic ideas (Mudde, 2000: 58). The party’s big breakthrough was in 1989, both electoral and in terms of members. But ‘as quickly as the successes of the REP had come, the defeats followed’ (Mudde, 2000:34). Nevertheless, the party is still in place, and will be discussed in more detail in the analysis.
4.2.1 Far right public presence Inter alia the political party ‘Alternative for Germany’ does not fall within the scope of this research, for similar reasons as mentioned with regards to the New-Flemish Alliance. There is a widespread debate on the ideology of Alternative for Germany. There is consensus that the party belongs on the right side of the political spectrum, but whether the party should be characterized as far right is debatable. The BBC describes the debate as follows: ‘To some, it is a party that speaks up for the people, (…) tackling tough issues which other parties are afraid to mention. To others, [it] is a dangerous populist force, whipping up anti-foreigner feeling, and giving right-wing extremist ideology a respectable face’ (BBC, 2 September 2014). The party is by some linked to far right politics, because of inter alia their stance on immigration (Deutsche Welle, 29 November 2015). The German Minister of Finance called Alternative for Germany a demagogical and populist party, and a German police union leader labelled supporting AfG as helping the Nazis (The Irish Times, 29 September 2014; Politico, 11 September 2015). However, this thesis does not consider AfG a far right party. It is of the opinion that
32
AfG can be labelled nationalist, but not xenophobic/exclusionist. Immigration is one of the 20 points listed in their political guiding principles. Here, they argue that immigration policy should have clearer legal guidelines, and they name some deciding factors for immigration. Also, they state that Germany must and should help war refugees (Alternative für Deutschland, 2014). Keeping in mind that a party running for elections is less likely to explicitly state a xenophobe or exclusionist nature, this thesis is still of the opinion that there is not enough convincing ‘proof’ for characterizing AfG as xenophobe of exclusionist. One can argue that some of the members have these tendencies, as put forward by a study of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (Euractiv, 21 November 2014). But similar to Arzheimer (2015), this thesis would argue that is somewhat strict on immigration and integration, but not xenophobe or exclusionist. In addition, the German People’s Union does not match the definition of this research, as it was dissolved at the end of 2010. However, it merged with the National Democratic Party, a party that is still active today (Bundesministerium des Innern, 24 July 2013). The figures on the GPU most close to the date of merging are from 2009, when the German People’s Union had around 4500 members, and 2010, when it had around 3000 members (Bundesministerium des Innern, 24 July 2013). As such, the GPU just falls outside the scope of this thesis, but it nevertheless has in influence in the figures, via its mergence with the NDP.
The following parties fall within the scope of this research: 1. National Democratic Party 2011 & 2015 2. The Republican 2011 & 2015
National Democratic Party The National Democratic Party is part of the second wave of extreme right parties in Germany (Hainsworth, 2008:53). In literature, there is consensus on the status of the National Democratic Party as a far right party. For example, Ivaldi labels the NDP as ‘clearly extreme right because of [its] origins, ideology, personnel and behaviour (Ivaldi, 2004:23-24; Hainsworth, 2008:18). Moreover, the party is often even characterized as neo-Nazi. One of the benchmarks of the NDP is facilitating the ‘survival and continued existence of the German people in its ancestral Central European lebensraum’ (NPD, 2015). Ignazi (2003:67) argues that ‘the NPD took up many classical themes of right extremism, such as the rehabilitation of the Nazi past, the recasting of a ‘great’ Germany, and the reference to hierarchical, authoritarian, and militaristic principles’. In addition, according to Ignazi (2003:67), the NPD also introduced the immigrants as an important (political). Indeed, the NDP calls itself the only German electoral focused party that is not willing to accept the potential catastrophic consequences of the German immigration- and asylum policy (NPD, 2015). Based on the foregoing, this thesis deems it justifiable to characterize the National Democratic Party as far right.
Members The NPD had 6300 members in 2011, and 5200 members in 2014 (Statista, 2015).
Votes On 27 September 2009, the NDP got 635525 votes, representing zero seats (Der Bundeswahlleiter, November 2009). On 22 September 2013, the NDP got 560828 votes, again representing zero seats (Der Bundeswahlleiter, April 2015).
Public statements For the NDP public statements, their official website (npd.de) is scanned. They publish both announcements and press statements, but unfortunately, these only go back to November 2012. However, NDP does have a YouTube channel that has been active for 6 years (YouTube, DS-TV). IN 2011, they posted 12 videos, whereas in 2014, they posted 15 videos. In addition, the NDP also has its
33 own Facebook page (Facebook, NPD - Die soziale Heimatpartei). In 2011, around 480 messages were posted, whereas in 2014, around 648 messages were posted.14
2011 2014 YouTube 12 15 Facebook 480 648 Total 492 663 Table 12 - Germany: National Democratic Party, public statements
Public manifestations Analysing NDP in a way that is consistent, reliable and comparable is difficult, as there is no database until 2011 available on the NDP official website. In addition, the Facebook page contains way to many messages to scan for this purpose. As such, public manifestation by the NDP will not be taken into account.
2011 2014 Members 6300 5200 ↓ Votes 635525 560828 ↓ Statements 492 663 ↑ Manifestations - - - Mobilisation15 - - - Table 13 Germany: National Democratic Party, public presence
The Republican The Republican was founded in 1983, with the aim of a German reunification. As such, the party started off as nationalist, but not showing any signs of traditional extreme right. However, a shift to the far right was made, when the party got a new leader associated with fascism, who defined immigrants as ‘carriers of crime’ (Ignazi, 2003:71-72). Consequently, the party became more focused on national identity, repatriating of foreigners, and closing the frontiers to the latter (Ignazi, 2003:72). As such, under the influence of renewed leadership, the party radicalized, as it developed nationalist and xenophobic ideas (Mudde, 2000: 58). In addition, the REP found allies on the European stage in (the French) National Front and Flemish Interest. The Republican is one of the parties marking the third wave of extreme right-ism (Hainsworth, 2008:54). In literature, the far right status of Republican is not called into question. Hainsworth (2008:17) characterised The Republican as part of the ‘’new’ post- industrial extreme right’. Ivaldi labels the party as ‘clearly extreme right because of [its] origins, ideology, personnel and behaviour’ (Ivaldi, 2004:23-24; Hainsworth, 2008:18). Based on the foregoing, this thesis agrees with the consensus in literature, that the REP can be characterized as far right.
Members On the last day of 2010 (31 December), Die Republikaner had 5959 members (Deutscher Bundestag, 14 February 2012: 103). The most recent figures show 5800 members in 2013 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 29 August 2013).
14 As explained in footnote 8, this was measured by counting the posts over two months for each year. For 2011, this thesis checked posts in both October and December, and for 2014, this thesis checked the posts in both January and December, subsequently multiplying the average by 12. Note: for 2011, the month October has been used instead of the month January, as Facebook was unable to load the message from January 2014. 15 The average number of participants for the manifestations.
34
Votes16 On 27 September 2009, Die Republikaner got 193396 votes, representing zero seats (Der Bundeswahlleiter, November 2009). On 22 September 2013, Die Republikaner got 91193 votes, again representing zero seats (Der Bunderwahlleiter, April 2015).
Public statements For public statements of the Republican, their official website (rep.de) is scanned. REP publishes a variety of documents on their websites, one of these being their press statements (Die Republikaner, Aktuelle Pressemitteilungen). These press statements are a primary example of public statements, and as such, they are taken into account for this research. In 2011, 84 press statements were issued. in 2014, 21 press statements were issued. REP also publishes a party newspaper 10 times a year. However, in order to get access to this newspaper, one must have a subscription. As such, this thesis does not consider the party newspaper to have an external orientation. In addition to the documents published on their website, the Republican also has its own YouTube channel (YouTube, RepublikanerTV). In 2011, they published 17 videos, whereas in 2014, they published 15 videos. Furthermore, REP has been active on Facebook since November 2010. They have posted a total of 150 messages in 2011, and a total of 738 messages in 2014.17
2011 2014 Press releases 84 21 YouTube 17 15 Facebook 150 738 Total 251 774 Table 14 - Germany: The Republican, public statements
Public manifestations To measure the number of public manifestations of the Republican, this research has scanned their press statements for announced protests or demonstrations. In their press statement of 3 May 2011, they promote the ‘Marsch für die Freiheit’ in Cologne (Die Republikaner, 3 May 2011). This event had about 1100 participants (March für die Freiheit, 11 May 2011). However, this was not a REP event, and as such will not be taken into account. A similar statement falling outside the scope of this research is that of the REP calling upon its members to take part in a Pegida demonstration in Dresden, whit about 15000 participants (Die Republikaner, 8 December 2014; Die Republikaner, 16 December 2014). What is taken into account is a protest against the Euro(-politics) in München on 15 October, with an unknown number of participants (Die Republikaner, 22 September 2011).
2011 2014 Members 5959 5800 ↓ Votes 193396 91193 ↓ Statements 251 774 ↑ Manifestations 1 0 ↓ Mobilisation18 - - - Table 15 - Germany: The Republican, public presence
16 For the figures of 2011, the September 2009 elections in Germany offer the most accurate results. For the figures of 2014, the September 2013 elections in Germany offer the most accurate results. 17 This was measured by counting their posts in both January and December, and subsequently multiplying the average by 12. A more thorough explanation can be found in footnote 8. 18 The average number of participants for the manifestations.
35
4.2.2 Factor 2: quality of life To measure quality of life in Germany, all six indicators have been measured for 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix B. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. With regards to the first indicator, paid work, more German respondents have indicated that they have done paid work in the last seven days. In 2010, 52,6% gave a confirming answer, while in 2014, 56,5% gave a confirming answer. A raise in positive answers was also seen for the question on feelings about the households’ income nowadays. In 2010, 32,1% said to live comfortably on the current income, whereas in 2014, this was 40,3%. This is a large increase. A small decrease was seen for indicator three, happiness. In 2010, 10,8% of the German respondents indicated to be extremely happy, opposite to 10,4% of the German respondents in 2014. However, this was also the only decreasing indicator for quality of life in Germany. Indicator four, feeling of safety of walking alone in the local area after dark, rose from 25,4 to 26,2%. Indicator five, subjective general health, rose from 14,2 to 16%. And finally, indicator six, the satisfaction with life as a whole, rose from 11,4 to 12,3%. Where Belgium only saw one indicator increase, Germany saw only one indicator decrease. As such, one can conclude that according to these figures, quality of life has taken a rise in Germany between 2011 and 2015.
2011 2014 Indicator 1 52.6 56.5 ↑ Indicator 2 32.1 40.3 ↑ Indicator 3 10.8 10.4 ↓ Indicator 4 25.4 26.2 ↑ Indicator 5 14.2 16.0 ↑ Indicator 6 11.4 12.3 ↑ Table 16 - Germany: Quality of life
4.2.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration To measure the attitude towards European integration in Germany, three indicators have been measured in 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix C. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. With regards to indicator one, trust in the European Parliament, a slight decrease has taken place. In 2010, 0,8% of the German respondents declared to have complete trust in the EP. In 2014, this was 0,7%. Worsening attitudes were also measured with regards to opinions on European unification, indicator two. While in 2010 9,9% of the respondents was of the opinion that European unification should go further, in 2014 this was only 8,5%. Finally, a decrease was also seen in trust in the European Union. There was a decrease of three percent in the number of respondent declaring to trust the European Union: 37% in 2011 compared to 34% in 2010. As a decrease in all indicators has taken place with regards to this case, this research would like to conclude that attitudes towards European integration have worsened in Germany between 2011 and 2015.
2011 2014 Indicator 1 0.8 0.7 ↓ Indicator 2 9.9 8.5 ↓ Indicator 3 37 34 ↓ Table 17 - Germany: Attitudes towards European integration
4.2.4 Factor 4: changing image The National Democratic Party and the Republican will be examined for signs of a change in image.
36
National Democratic Party The NDP did not change its name between 2011 and 2015. However, it did change its party leader multiple times. The party has had four different party leaders between 2011 and 2015. At the start of 2011, Udo Voigt was the NDP party leader (Gutenberg, 2016b). It can be said that Voigt was a controversial leader. For example, he was convicted for incitement in 2009 (Spiegel Online, 24 April 2009). Also, he said in an interview that he doubted the Holocaust (Spiegel Online, 22 September 2011). In addition, an election poster featuring Voigt caused uproar in 2010. In this poster, Voigt was pictured on his motorcycle, with the slogan ‘Gas geben’, or ‘step on the gas’. This was seen as very provocative (Spiegel Online, 11 August 2011). It is safe to say that Voigt was not providing the NDP with a ‘soft’ image. In November 2011, he was replaced by Holger Apfel (Gutenberg, 2016b). Holger Apfel wanted Voigt to resign, and eventually became the new president. Apfel announced a strategy of ‘serious radicalism’ (Spiegel Online, 22 September 2011). Apfel his idea was to stop being openly neo-Nazi, but nevertheless remain radical (Deutsche Welle, 30 December 2013). As such, radicalism was not moved away from. Nevertheless, Apfel can be seen as more moderate in his discourse, trying to make the party a future oriented national party, also focussed on topics such as the European Union and the Euro (Spiegel Online, 22 September 2011). In addition, he tried to increase the party’s presence in the media (Spiegel Online, 12 August 2013). Holger Apfel was succeeded by Udo Pastörs, who was not a fan of the softer NDP image. Similar to Voigt, Pastörs had also been convicted for hate speech in the past (Deutsche Welle, 30 December 2013). In an article by Deutsche Welle (20 December 2013), speculating about the possible upcoming presidency of Pastörs, it is argued that ‘Everything points to the NPD dropping its recent facade of apparent seriousness and openly acknowledging its neo-Nazi policies again’. With the presidency of Pastörs, the image of the NPD again hardened. The current party leader is Frank Franz, who succeeded Udo Pastörs in 2014 (NPD, 2016; Spiegel Online, 1 November 2014). Frank Franz declared that the legacy of his predecessor would be maintained (Spiegel Online, 1 November 2014). Nevertheless, the party got a political make-over under Franz his presidency. He made a significant effort to repel the party’s racist image, presenting itself more as a ‘friendly centrist party’ (The New Observer, 22 November 2015). As such, the hardened image under Pastörs was again softened. Concerning the party symbol, this also changed between 2011 and 2015. However, the change in the logo was minimal, entailing hardly more than a different tone of red (Wikipedia, 31 December 2015). With regards to partnerships, it was previously mentioned that the NDP did not get any seats in the elections. However, they are active in the European Parliament as of 2014. Currently, former party president Udo Voigt represents the NDP in the European Parliament. However, contrary to most MEP’s, Voigt is not connected to a political group (Europees Parlement, 2016). Lastly, regarding the election programme, the party took part in both the 2009 and 2013 federal elections in Germany. In addition, both election programmes are available online. The programme of 2009 is titled ‘Deutschlands starke Rechte’ (NPD, July 2009). It consists of 13 chapters, of which one is devoted to policy on foreigners. According to the NDP, the focus should be on the returning of foreigners, instead of integrating them in German society. They argue that their repatriation programme for foreigners is the answer, together with more attention for the preservation of the German people (NPD, July 2009:30). The programme of 2013 is called ‘Natürlich Deutsch’ (NPD, 2013). Similar to the 2009 document, it consists of 13 chapters, of which one is devoted to identity. The chapter starts with the slogan ‘Priority for Germans: Stop foreign infiltration, Islamization and asylum fraud!’ (NPD, 2013:41). Next, one of the parties supreme benchmarks is highlighted: ‘survival and continued existence of the German people in its traditional central European Lebensraum’ (NPD, 2013:42). The argue that the fundamental right to asylum should be abolished and that foreigners should not have access to the German social security system (NPD, 2013:44). In addition, they firmly oppose Islam (NPD, 2013:45). Comparing both documents, one can argue that the 2013 election programme of the NDP is more explicit in its far right ideology than the 2009 document.
37
Change? More or less explicit? Party name - - Party leader yes ↓↑↓ Party symbol yes - Party partnerships - - Election programme yes ↑ Table 18 - Germany: National Democratic Party, changing images
The Republican The Republican did not undergo a name change between 2011 and 2015. However, it did undergo a change in party leader. The current president of the party is Johann Gärtner (Die Republikaner, 2016). His predecessor was Rolf Schlierer, who was the president of the party for twenty years (Endstation- Rechts, 19 August 2014). However, the 2014 shift in party leader will most likely not mean a significant shift in far right ideology, based on the fact that Gärtner has worked under Schlierer for eightteen years (Endstation-Rechts, 19 August 2014). With regards to the party symbol, this seems to have changed. Whereas the party now features a dark blue logo on its website, with its full name and initials and a small German flag, it used to use a different logo in the past. This logo also featured the full name and initials, but is had a white background and a more prominent German flag. However, it is unclear when this change in symbol took place. It might even be the case that both logos are still in place. Regardless, the change in logo would not have been significant. With regards to party partnerships, the party did not receive any seats in the 2009 and 2013 elections. On the same notion, they were not able to secure any seats in the European Parliament in 2009 or 2014. Fortunately, the participation of the party in the 2009 and 2013 elections does allow for a comparison of election programmes, which are both available for examination. Both election programmes are short, and do not feature a title in contrast to some other party’s election programmes. The 2009 programme features seventeen benchmarks, one of them being stopping Islamization (Die Republikaner, 2009:3). Here, the party proposes the ‘prohibition and dissolution of Islamist associations and institutions’ (Die Republikaner, 2009:3). Another of the seventeen spearheads is integration (Die Republikaner, 2009:3). With regards to integration, the party is of the opinion that immigrants have to adapt to our values and way of life. Inter alia, they oppose dual citizenship (Die Republikaner, 2009:3). The 2013 programme contains 30 spearheads, of which one is integration (Die Republikaner, 2013:15). According to the party, this means that immigrants have the obligation to make an active effort to integrate. Immigrants that have been in Germany for years, and who have failed to integrate, should be sent back to their country of origin (Die Republikaner, 2013:15). This research does not see a significant difference between the 2009 and 2013 documents, with regards to the far right tone.
Change? More or less explicit? Party name - - Party leader yes - Party symbol ? - Party partnerships - - Election programme - - Table 19 - Germany: The Republican, changing images
4.2.5 Overview Germany In the table below, the findings for case II are summarized.
38
Public Quality Attitudes towards Changing presence of life European integration images Germany ↓ ↑ ↓ -
Table 20 - Germany: Overview of the findings
4.3 Case III: the Netherlands
Similar to Belgium, the post-war period in the Netherlands was about denazification. The Dutch People’s-Union (DPU) was one of the first significant parties to emerge in the post-war Netherlands, in the extreme right spectre (Mudde, 2000). However, their extreme character led to a characterization as a criminal association, leading the party downhill. In 1980, the Centre Party (CP) was formed. Although seen as more moderate than the DPU, the CP gained attention mainly because of one of their spear points, being: ‘The Netherlands is not an immigration country, so put a stop to the stream of foreigners’ (Mudde, 2000:120). As such, the electoral successes of the CP were often interpreted as a statement against foreigners. In 1984 the Centre Democrats (CD) was established. Similar to Flemish Bloc, the party remained rather small in its first years. Electoral success was booked in 1989 and, although of a disappointing nature, also in 1994. But just like similar parties, the CD suffered from scandals and political opposition, leading to electoral losses in the 1988 elections. Meanwhile, the CP was declared bankrupt, and it its place came the ‘weak copy’ Centre Party’86 (CP’86) (Mudde, 2000:143). The CP’86 suffered from various internal and external problems and disputes, but it got a boost when joined by up to a 100 members from a youngsters party. This brought the party both expansion and unity. However, in 1995 the party was declared a criminal organisation, marking the beginning of the decline of the party. As states by Mudde (2000:147): ‘Although the CP’86 never maintained larger membership, many of those within the party (leadership) have been highly active in the extreme right scene, both inside and outside of the Netherlands.’ Ethnic nationalism was one of their spear points, and, moreover, external exclusiveness: only Dutch ethnic nationals should live within the Dutch externa borders (Mudde, 2000:150). ‘According to the party the flood of foreigners has led to the loss of identity in the Dutch ethnic community’ (Mudde, 2000:152). Immigration was always viewed as something negative, clearly showing signs of xenophobia (Mudde, 2000). Nevertheless, Hainsworth argues that in general, the extent to which Dutch parties can be called extreme right is debatable. According to this author, it is their stance towards immigration that eventually does characterize them as such (Hainsworth, 2008:44). After the turn of the millennium, the third wave of populist right wing appeared in the Netherlands. In a short period of time, three parties were founded: List Pim Fortuyn, Proud of the Netherlands, and the Freedom Party (Lucardie and Voerman, 2015). Proud of the Netherlands disappeared soon. The same goes for List Pim Fortuyn. According to Hainsworth (2008:46), this party was characterized by its negative attitude towards asylum seekers and foreigners. An important reason for the quick decline of this party, was the assassination of its popular leader (Lucardie and Voerman, 2015; Parlement & Politiek, 2016c). In contrast to the former parties, the Freedom Party was able to book some significant electoral successes. Similar to List Pim Fortuyn, the party has a popular leader. The Freedom Party will be discussed in more detail in the analysis.
4.3.1 Far right public presence A party that does not fall within the scope of this research, is the Dutch People’s Union. According to Hainsworth (2008:46), it was the Dutch People’s Union that brought back fascism in the Netherlands after World War II. The neo-fascist DPU was founded in 1971 by former members of the Dutch war- time fascist movement NSB (National Socialist Movement) (Hainsworth, 2008:46). Ethnocentric
39 nationalism was an important part of the DPU’s ideology, as they ‘aimed at unifying all the Flemish- speaking people in a Great Dutch State and at expelling any ethnically diverse persons’ (Ignazi, 2003:164). Local candidate (the Hague) Joop Glimmerveen emphasized xenophobia, and caused an DPU radicalization once he became the DPU president. In this role, he turned the party even more towards racism, Nazism, and violence against immigrants (Ignazi, 2003:164). Based on the parties nationalist, xenophobe and racist ideology, the party seems to be within the scope of this research. However, a party must have contested nation-wide elections in the 21st century to qualify, which is not the case with the DPU (Kiesraad, Databank Verkiezingsuitslagen).
The following parties fall within the scope of this research: 1. Freedom Party 2011 & 2015 2. For The Netherlands 2015
Freedom Party The Freedom Party was founded in 2006. One of its benchmarks is countering Islamization of the Dutch society. Its political leader is Geert Wilders, who has been leading the party since it was founded. The FP has booked some electoral successes in 2006 and 2010. After the 2010 elections, where the FP became the third party, the first and the second party formed a ‘minority-coalition’, with the support of the FP in parliament. In 2012, the party lost nine seats (Parlement & Politiek, 2016a).
Members The Freedom Party does not have any members, except for its political leader (Montesquieu Instituut, December 2012).
Votes19 The Freedom Party got 1454493 votes in the 2010 elections, entitling them to 24 seats. In the 2012 elections, the party got 950263 votes, entitling them to 15 seats (Kiesraad, 2010; Kiesraad, 2012).
Public statements For public statements, the FP official website was analysed (pvv.nl). The FP publishes a newsletter, but one has to sign up for this. As such, it seems to have an internal orientation, and will not be taken into account. The website also contains publishes all press releases (Partij voor de Vrijheid, Persberichten). In 2011, they released 21 press statements, whereas in 2014, they released 31 press statements. With regards to Facebook, it was hard to find the official FP page, if there is one to begin with. Neither the official FP website (pvv.nl), nor the official Geert Wilders website (geertwilders.nl) refer to an official Facebook page. However, the latter does refer to the YouTube channel PVVpers, where zero videos were posted in 2011, contrary to 15 in 2014 (Youtube, PVVpers).
2011 2014 Press releases 21 31 YouTube 0 15 Total 21 46 Table 21 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public statements
Public manifestations In the 2011 and 2014 press statements, no announcements or recaps concerning protests or manifestations are published (Partij voor de Vrijheid, Persberichten). According to a variety of sources, the first FP manifestation was organized in September 2013 (for example: React, 23 September 2013;
19 For the figures of 2011, the June 2010 elections in the Netherlands offer the most accurate results. For the figures of 2014, the September 2012 elections in the Netherlands offer the most accurate results.
40
Anti-Fascistische Actie, 22 September 2013). As such, one can conclude that a comparison between 2011 and 2014 is impossible, but that the FP has turned to public manifestations as of 2013.
2011 2014 Members Votes 1454493 950263 ↓ Statements 21 46 ↑ Manifestations 0 - ↑ Mobilisation20 - - Table 22 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, public presence
For The Netherlands For The Netherlands is a relatively new party, that was founded in 2014. As such, this party only counts in the statistics for the ‘number of parties’ per case, as it does not allow for a 2011-2015 comparison. The party started as the group Bontes/Van Klaveren in the Second Chamber, and consists of former FP politicians (Voor Nederland, 2015; NRC, 21 June 2014). For The Netherlands has not yet participated in elections for the Dutch Second Chamber (NRC, 21 June 2014). However, this research nevertheless deems the party electoral focused, as they currently have the political group ‘Bontes/Van Klaveren’ representing them in the Second Chamber (Voor Nederland, 2015; NRC, 21 June 2014). In addition, the party had appointed a new party leader, with the focus on the next Dutch Second Chamber elections (Voor Nederland, 2015; Volkskrant, 15 August 2015). However, this new party leader and For The Netherlands found to be unable to live up to each other’s mutual expectations, leading to an end in the cooperation (NOS, 13 January 2016).
4.3.2 Factor 2: quality of life To measure quality of life in the Netherlands, all six indicators have been measured for 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix B. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. For the first indicator, paid work, the number of positive (confirming answers) decreased. In 2010, 56,1% indicated to have done paid work in the past seven days, while in 2014, this was only 50,4%. For indicators two, a small increase was seen. The number of people indicating to live comfortably on the present income rose with 0,1%, from 47,2% in 2010 to 47,3% in 2014. A small rise was also seen with regards to indicator three, happiness. In 2010, 7,1% of the Dutch respondents indicated to be extremely happy. In 2014, this was 7,7%. Indicator four is about the felling of safety of walking along in the local area after dark. 18,6% of the Dutch respondents gave the most positive answer in 2010, by indicating that they feel very safe. In 2014, the number of respondents giving this most positive answer had increased to 20,6%. Subjective general health, indicator five, has also increased. An increase of almost 6% had been measured, as in 2010 13% of the respondents felt to have a very good general health, compared to 18,7% in 2014. Nevertheless, people were less satisfied with life as a whole in 2014. In 2010, 7,3% indicated to be extremely satisfied, opposed to 7% in 2014. As such, there were some increases and decreases in Dutch quality of life indicators, but overall the figures show an increase in quality of life between 2011 and 2015 for the Netherlands.
20 The average number of participants for the manifestations.
41
2011 2014 Indicator 1 56.1 50.4 ↓ Indicator 2 47.2 47.3 ↑ Indicator 3 7.1 7.7 ↑ Indicator 4 18.6 20.6 ↑ Indicator 5 13.0 18.7 ↑ Indicator 6 7.3 7.0 ↓ Table 23 - Netherlands: Quality of life
4.3.3 Factor 3: attitudes towards European integration To measure the attitude towards European integration in the Netherlands, three indicators have been measured in 2011 and 2014. The tables with the results can be found in Appendix C. For all indicators, the percentages reflecting the most positive answer possible are indicated in the table below. For indicator one, trust in the European Parliament, a small increase was measured. In 2010, 0,1% of the respondents declared to have complete trust in the Union, opposite to 0,3% in 2014. For indicator two, European unification, a worsening in public opinion was seen. Support for more European unification dropped from 2,9% in 2010 to 2,1% in 2014. Finally, a decrease was also seen with regards to the last indicator. Whereas in 2010 53% of the Dutch respondents declared to generally trust the European Union, this was only 46% in 2014. As this case study measures one increase and two decreases in public opinion, this thesis would like to argue that attitudes towards European integration have worsened in the Netherlands between 2011 and 2015.
2011 2014 Indicator 1 0.1 0.3 ↑ Indicator 2 2.9 2.1 ↓ Indicator 3 53 46 ↓ Table 24 - Netherlands: Attitudes towards European integration
4.3.4 Factor 4: changing image of the parties The Freedom Party will be examined for signs of a change in image. As For The Netherlands was founded in 2014, this party does not allow for a comparison.
Freedom Party The Freedom Party did not change its name between 2011 and 2015. In addition, a change in party leader also did not take place. Geert Wilders has been party leader of the Freedom Party as from the beginning (Parlement & Politiek, 2016a). The same goes for the logo of the Freedom Party. As previously explained, the Freedom Party took part in both the 2010 and 2012 federal elections in the Netherlands. In both elections, the party managed to secure seats. In the 2010 elections, the FP got enough votes for 24 seats, making the FP the third party (Kiesraad, 2010). However, despite the large number of seats, the Freedom Party did not take place in the coalition. Nevertheless, there was some kind of gentlemen’s agreement between the FP and the first and second party. The 2012 elections entitled the Freedom Party to 15 seats, again making it the third party (Kiesraad, 2012). Similar to the aftermath of the 2010 elections, the Freedom Party did not take place in the coalition, but in the opposition. With regards to the European Parliament, it was mentioned earlier that a coalition of far right parties was started in the European Parliament in 2015. Similar to Flemish Interest, the Freedom Party is part of this coalition. However, the founding year is not within the scope of this research, and as such, this will not be taken into account (Euractiv, 2015; European Parliament, 2015). The coalition could have been formed immediately after the May 2014 elections, but the five initiating parties,
42 among which Flemish Interest and the Freedom Party, were unable to attract enough members from other member states (Parlement & Politiek, 2016b). Their participation in the 2010 and 2012 election makes a comparison in their election programmes possible. It is import to note here, that there is only a two-year gap between both elections, in contrast to the four-year gap in the Belgian and German situation. The 2010 document is titled ‘The agenda of hope and optimism’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). The programme covers thirteen themes, among others a chapter on countering Islam and mass-immigration. Here, it is argued that jobless immigrants have to leave, that immigrants can only be entitled to social security after ten years, and that a double nationality should be prohibited (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010:13). In practice, the Freedom Party wants a stop in the building of mosques, a closing of all Islamist schools, a partial ban on headscarves, and a ban on burkas and the Koran. In addition, their main point in this chapter is a full immigration stop for people from Islamic countries (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010:15). The 2012 document is titled ‘Their Brussels, our Netherlands’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, July 2012). This title is slightly more nationalist than the 2010 title, but it is about anti-European Union sentiments, not about racist, xenophobe or exclusionist ideas. The 2012 document covers ten themes, one of them being the immigration policy. The statements made do not differ much from those made in the 2010 document. Among others, the 2012 document advocates to close the doors for immigrants from Islamic countries, and repatriate those that have not been able to find a job (Partij voor de Vrijheid, July 2012:35). In addition, it calls for a prohibition on double nationality, a stop in the building of mosques, a closing of all Islamic schools, a prohibition on minarets, etcetera (Partij voor de Vrijheid, July 2012:37). The document is to a large extent similar to their previous election programme.
Change? More or less explicit? Party name - - Party leader - - Party symbol - - Party partnerships - - Election programme - - Table 25 - Netherlands: Freedom Party, changing images
4.3.5 Overview the Netherlands In the table below, the findings for case II are summarized.
Public Quality Attitudes towards Changing presence of life European integration images Netherlands ↑ ↑ ↓ -
Table 26 - Netherlands: Overview of the findings
4.4 Comparison
In this paragraph, the results from the analysis are subject to comparison. First, the dependent variable far right public presence is discussed. Second, the independent variables, the explanatory factors, are discussed separately. Finally, the dependent and independent variables are discussed in relation to each other, as a means of detecting patterns between the variables.
43
4.4.1 Dependent variable: far right public presence In the table below, the shifts in indicators for far right public presence are shown for each case study.21 In Belgium, in both 2011 and 2014, two parties matched the definition of a far right party used in this research: Flemish Interest and National Democracy. Flemish Interest saw their number of members increase slightly between 2011 and 2015. In contrast, Flemish Interest saw their number of votes decrease by more than 50 percent. Regardless of their increase in YouTube activity, a decrease was also seen in their number of public statements, due to a drop in issued magazines and press releases. Finally, a decrease was also seen in their number of manifestations and their mobilization capacity. For National Democracy, reliable sources on the number of members were not found. With regards to the number of votes, it was easy to conclude that this had dropped, as National Democracy took part in the 2010 elections, but not in the 2014 elections. Unfortunately, the other indicators were also unable to measure for this ‘invisible and silent party’ (Delwit, 2007:142). To summarize the findings for Belgium, besides a small rise in the number of members of Flemish Interest, there are no sign of increased public presence of the far right in Belgium between 2011 and 2015. In Germany, again two parties matched the definition of this research in both 2011 and 2014: the National Democratic Party and The Republican. The National Democratic Party saw a decrease in their number of members, as well as a decrease in their number of votes. In contrast, their number of statements took a rise, due to an increase in YouTube and Facebook activity. Unfortunately, not enough information was available to measure their public manifestations and their mobilization capacity. Similar to the NDP, a decrease in number of members and votes was seen for The Republican. The decrease in number of members was slight, whereas the decrease in number of votes was substantial. Again similar to the NDP, their number of statements had increased. This was due to a significant rise in their Facebook statements. Finally, a decrease in their number of manifestations was measured. As such, similar to Belgium and apart from the rise in public statements, there are no concrete signs of an increase in far right public presence in Germany. The Netherlands is the only case that has seen an increase in the number of far right parties. A shift was seen from one party in 2011, the Freedom Party, to two in 2014, with the founding of For The Netherlands. As such, this made comparison possible for only one party: the Freedom Party. The FP does not have any members, except for its political leader. It did however take part in elections, seeing their number of votes decrease significantly between the 2010 and 2012 elections. In contrast, their number of public statements took a rise, due to an increase in press releases, and an increase in video statements on their YouTube channel. With regards to public manifestations and their mobilization capacity, the party has only started using this method of public presence as of 2013. For 2014, reliable figures were not found. This thesis would like to argue that the founding of a new party is in itself a concrete sign towards a rise in far right public presence. In addition, despite a decrease in votes for the FP, their number of public statements took a rise. As such, in contrast to the other two case studies, for this third case study there are signs of an increased far right public presence.
21 The table only contains absolute numbers. To make them relative, this thesis would have to compare the shift in far right public presence, to the shift in non- far right public presence. However, due to inter alia time constrains, this is not within the scope of this research.
44
Belgium Germany Netherlands
2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014
2 2 - 2 2 - 1 2 ↑
Parties
FI 17139 FI 17255 ↑ REP 5959 REP 5800 ↓ FP x FP x
ND ? ND ? NDP 6300 NDP 5200 ↓ FNL x
Members
FI 506697 FI 247738 ↓ REP 193396 REP 91193 ↓ FP 1454493 FP 950263 ↓
Votes ND 33591 ND x ↓ NDP 635525 NDP 560828 ↓ FNL x
FI 392 FI 269 ↓ REP 251 REP 774 ↑ FP 21 FP 46 ↑
ND ? ND ? NDP 492 NDP 663 ↑ FNL x
Statements
FI 5 FI 2 ↓ REP 1 REP 0 ↓ FP 0 FP ?
ND ? ND ? NDP ? NDP ? FNL x
Manifestations
FI 316 FI 32,5 ↓ REP ? REP x ↓ FP x FP ?
ND ? ND ? NDP ? NDP ? FNL x
Mobilization Table 27 - Dependent variable: far right public presence [x] = not applicable [?] = numbers unavailable or not found
45
4.4.2 Independent variables: explanatory factors
Quality of life Attitudes towards Changing images
European integration FI ND Paid work -
Feeling about income ↓ European Parliament ↑ Party name - - Happiness ↓ European unification ↓ Party leader ↑↓ - Feeling of safety ↓ European Union ↓ Party symbol 22
Belgium - ↓ Subjective general health ↓ Party partnerships - - Life as a whole ↑ Election programme - - Paid work ↑ NDP REP
Feeling about income ↑ Party name - - European Parliament ↓ Happiness ↓ Party leader ↓↑↓ - European unification ↓ Feeling of safety ↑ Party symbol - - European Union ↓
Germany Subjective general health ↑ Party partnerships - -
Life as a whole ↑ Election programme ↑ -
Paid work ↓ FP FNL
Feeling about income ↑ Party name - European Parliament ↑ Happiness ↑ Party leader - European unification ↓ Feeling of safety ↑ Party symbol - European Union ↓ Subjective general health ↑ Party partnerships -
Netherlands Life as a whole ↓ Election programme -
Table 28 - Independent variables: explanatory factors + indicators
In the analyses, the explanatory factors were discussed per case. However, this does not go for the first explanatory factor, the migrant crisis. As explained in chapter 3, and as recalled in the beginning of this chapter, an increase for all three cases is assumed. As such, the first explanatory factor discussed per case was factor two, quality of life. In Belgium, a decrease was seen for most of the indicators. Exceptions were the indicator on paid work, where no change was seen, and the indicator on satisfaction with life as a whole, which took a rise. A completely different situation was seen in Germany, where almost all indicators showed a positive development, except for a small decrease in the indicator for happiness. With regards to the Netherlands, a similar situation was measured, where most indicators showed a positive development, except for the indicators on paid work and satisfaction with life as a whole. Of all six indicators for quality of life, there is no indicator displaying the same results for each case study. For factor three, attitudes towards European integration, a worsening attitude towards European integration was measured in all three cases. In Belgium, trust in the European Parliament showed a small increase, whereas the indicators on European unification and trust in the EU measured a decrease. In Germany, trust in the European Parliament showed a small decrease. In addition, worsening attitudes were also measured with regards to the other two indicators, reflecting opinions on European unification and trust in the European Union. Finally, in the Netherlands, a small increase was seen in the trust in the European Parliament, in contrast to the other case studies. For the other two indicators, similar as in Germany, worsening attitudes were measured. Two out of three indicators for this variable on European integration display the same results for each case study, as people are getting less positive about both European unification and the European Union in all three researched countries. However, it is striking that this is very different for trust in the European Parliament, as in both Belgium and the Netherlands trust in this institution has grown between 2011 and 2015.
22 Besides a change in party symbol by National Democracy, there were no concrete signs of a change in image of the Belgian far right parties. Based on only this change in symbol, this thesis would not argue that a change in Belgian far right party image has taken place.
46
The fourth and final explanatory factor, changing images, proved hard to measure. By looking at changes in party name, party leader, party symbol, party partnerships and the election programmes, this thesis aimed to determine whether parties had changed their image overtime, which in turn can influence far right public presence, as explained in chapter 2. In Belgium, for Flemish Interest, there were no concrete signs of a change in party name, symbol, partnerships or election programme. However, a change in party leader did occur, and even twice. Nevertheless, this was neutralized, as with the first change in party leader the party became somewhat more explicit in their far right ideology, whereas with the second change in party leader, the party became somewhat milder. With regards to the second Belgian party, National Democracy, there were no concrete signs of a change in party partnerships or election programmes. However, a change in name, leader and symbol did take place. Nevertheless, the change in party name and party leader did not seem to hand in hand with a change in party image. For the change in party symbol, it can be argued differently, as the new party symbol more nationalist. However, based on solely this change in symbol, this thesis would not argue that a change in Belgian far right party image has taken place. In Germany, for the National Democratic Party, changes were seen in party leader, party symbol, and the election programmes. The change in party symbol did not cause in change in party image. However, according to this research, this was different for the changes in party leader and the election programme. Nevertheless, these changes were neutralized, as the change in leader made the image less explicit, whereas the change in election programme made NDP image more explicit. With regards to The Republican, only a change in party leader was found. However, similar to the Belgian National Democracy, this change in party leader did not account for a change in party image. Finally, in the Netherlands the image of the Freedom Party was examined, but no changes were found in any of the indicators. As explained, comparison was not possible for For The Netherlands, as this party did not exist until 2014. As such, also in the Netherlands, no change in image of the far right party family was measured. Eventually, changes were only observed for Flemish Interest, National Democracy, and the National Democratic Party. One might argue that the timescope investigated in this thesis was probably somewhat short to be able to measure concrete changes in the far right party images.
Quality of life Attitudes towards Changing images European integration Belgium ↓ ↓ - Germany ↑ ↓ - Netherlands ↑ ↓ -
Table 29 - Independent variables: explanatory factors
4.4.3 Interaction between the variables In the final table below, both the dependent and independent variables are combined for all three cases. In addition to the three explanatory factors discussed in the analysis, the migrant crisis as an explanatory factor is added to the table for a complete overview. The table below can be seen as a concise schematic summary of the results derived from this research. What immediately catches the eye, is that the results for almost all independent variables are the same per case. In all three cases, attitudes towards European integration worsened. In addition, in all three cases there was no change in party image measured, and in all three cases a rise in the number of migrants was presumed. The only exception to this consistency in results is the independent variable ‘quality of life’, where the results of Belgium differ from the results of Germany and the Netherlands. Belgium is the only case where the quality of life seems to have decreased. With regards to the dependent variable, far right public presence, the results also differ per case. An increase in seen in the Netherlands, whereas a decrease is seen in Belgium and Germany. As
47 such, a decrease in far right public presence in Belgium goes hand in hand with an increase in migrants, a decrease in both quality of life and attitudes towards European integration, and a non-changing image of the parties characterized as far right. In Germany, a decrease in far right public presence goes hand in hand with a rise in migrants, an improved quality of life, worsening attitudes towards European integration, and again non-changing images of the far right parties. With regards to the Netherlands, an increase in far right public presence goes hand in hand with an increase in migrants, an improved quality of life, worsening attitudes towards European integration, and again, stabile images of the far right parties. In the following chapter, conclusions will be drawn with regards from these results.
Public Migrants Quality Attitudes towards Changing presence of life European integration images Belgium ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ -
Germany ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ -
Netherlands ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ -
Table 30 - Interaction between dependent and independent variables
48
5. Conclusion
5.1 Answering the research question
Has the public presence of far right in Western Europe increased or decreased in the past years, and what factors can explain this shift in far right public presence?
The results of this research point towards a decrease in far right public presence. Links between the possible explanatory factors and far right public presence were found, but these are all present in two out of three cases, making the links weak. Possible explanations can be found for the links, but this does not go for causal relationships. It is hard to determine in what way the variables correspond, and if there are possible third variables explaining the pattern. However, it is clear that the results do not correspond with the expected outcome, as contrary to the picture painted by the media, in general far right public presence did not increase. The remainder of this chapter will provide a more extensive answer to the research question.
Has the public presence of far right in Western Europe increased or decreased in the past years? As explained in the introduction, the research question is twofold. The first part is concerned with fact checking. It was explained that it seems as if increased attention is given to far right in Western European media. In the analysis, this thesis examined to what extent far right in Western Europe moved from the margins to the spotlights. In order to answer the first subquestion, whether the public presence of far right has increased or decreased, a case study was done into three Western European countries: Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. This research looked into the following indicators: the number of far right parties, the number of members, the number of votes, the number of public statements and manifestations, and the mobilizations capacity of these manifestations. The shift in public presence is not the same for all three case studies. In Belgium and Germany, a decrease in far right public presence has taken place. In the Netherlands, an increase in public presence has taken place. As such, there is no ‘yes or no’ answer to the first part of the research question. The answer differs per case, but there are more signs pointing towards a decrease in far right public presence. In the introductory chapter of this thesis, it was stated that it is widely suggested in the media that far right flourishes due to the contemporary migrant crisis. As an example, Frans Timmermans was quoted, warning for an ‘extreme right surge’ if no solution is found for the migrant crisis (Elsevier, 24 September 2015). Between 2011 and 2015, the number of forcibly displaced people has continuously increased (UNHCR Global Trends 2010-2014). This thesis is of the assumption that between 2011 and 2015, this has meant an increase in asylum-seekers in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. However, the findings of this research do not show an increase in far right public presence in all three of the case studies. In fact, it showed a decrease in two of the three cases. This might show that the increased media attention for far right is not linked to a factual increase in public presence of this far right party family. In addition, evidence is also found that supports the theory by Hainsworth (2008). Hainsworth (2008:76) argues that ‘there is no mechanistic relationship between the number of immigrants in a given area and the number of votes for the extreme right. Often, it is the fear of outsiders rather than the reality of their actual presence that encourages a voter to opt for the extreme right.’ Contrary to the fear of outsiders, the number of votes for extreme right were included in this research. The findings show that the number of votes for all investigated parties (Flemish Interest, National Democracy, the Republican, the National Democratic Party and the Freedom Party, have decreased, while the number of migrants has increased. This would indeed suggest, as Hainsworth argues, that there is no mechanistic relationship between the number of immigrants and the number of votes for extreme right (Hainsworth, 2008:76).
49
What factors can explain the shift in far right public presence? As a follow-up, this thesis looked into the explanatory factors of a shift in far right public presence. Defined as being the most important factors - being feasible for research - this thesis examined the possible influences of the contemporary migrant crisis, quality of life, attitudes towards European integration, and changing images of far right parties. Again, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands were used for a case study. In Belgium, quality of life went down, and attitudes towards European integration got more negative. Besides a change in party symbol by National Democracy, there were no concrete signs of a change in image of the Belgian far right parties. Based on only this change in symbol, this thesis would not argue that a change in Belgian far right party image has taken place. In Germany, quality of life improved, and attitudes towards European integration got more negative. In addition, similar to Belgium, there were no concrete signs of a change in image of the far right parties. In the Netherlands, quality of life went up, attitudes towards European integration worsened, and again there were no signs of a change in image of the far right parties. With regards to the first possible explanatory factor, an increase in migrants was presumed for all cases. As previously explained, the indicator for the migrant crisis is the timescope. The timescope of this research is linked to the increase in migrants heading for Western Europe. This thesis presumes that this leads to an increase in immigrants for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. This increase goes hand in hand with a decrease in public presence in two out of three cases. As such, a (weak) negative relationship is seen. A possible explanation might be that the rise in migrants fuels positive thinking on migrants, instead of leading to a more negative attitude towards migrants. Tables 1 and 2 in paragraph 3.2 endorse this theory, as they show that in all three case studies a rise was seen in the number of respondents that were of the opinion that migrants make their country a better place to live. However, one cannot argue that there is a causal relationship, as there can always be a third variable responsible for both the shift in public presence and the shift in migrants. With regards to the second possible explanatory factor, quality of life, a (weak) positive relationship is seen. Quality of life has gone up in Germany and the Netherlands, but it has decreased in Belgium. As such, a variety of combinations is seen between quality of life and far right public presence. In the first case, quality of life gets worse, but far right public presence also decreases. In the second case, there is again a decrease in far right public presence, but here the quality of life improved. And in the third case, Quality of life also increased, but the public presence of far right grew. In two out of three cases, the two variables shift in the same direction. Contrary to the expected correspondence between the two variables, a rise in quality of life equals a rise in far right public presence, and a decrease in quality of life equals a decrease in far right public presence. A possible explanation could be, that those with (the perception of) a higher quality of life also (feel as if they) have more to lose. Also, higher quality of life could increase the gap socio-economic gap between nationals and migrants. The foregoing might fuel feelings of fear towards migrants, making it easier for far right parties to gain foothold in the respective country. However, a causal relationship cannot be determined. It is hard to determine which variable influences which. Migrants might influence quality of life, but it could also be the other way around. Furthermore, a third variable might be causing the observed pattern. With regards to attitudes towards European integration, the third possible explanatory factor, again a (weak) positive relationship is seen. For all case studies, the attitude towards European integration has worsened in the past years. A negative attitude in society towards European integration can lead to a more prominent role of far right parties, as besides a negative attitude towards migrants, another spearhead of many of the far right parties is a negative attitude towards the European Union, the Euro, and/or European integration. In this research, this relationship is found in one of the cases: the Netherlands. Here, far right public presence increased, hand in hand with worsening attitudes towards European integration. In the other two cases, the worsening attitudes correspond with a decrease in far right public presence. A possible explanations might be that because people are already getting more sceptical towards EU integration, far right parties feel less need to campaign against EU integration. Finding a reason behind the link is difficult, let alone determining a
50 causal relationship. The link between both is not very strong, and one cannot prove that a shift in one variable causes a shift in the other. The third variable problem is again of importance. The fourth and final explanatory factor is changing images of the parties. This variable proofed to be hard to measure. No shift was measured for the final possible explanatory factor, changing images. No concrete signs of a change in party image have been found. Neither of changes towards the centre right, nor of changes towards the more extreme right. As such, while no change seems to have taken place in the far right party images, their public presence grew in the Netherlands and decreased in Belgium and Germany. It is difficult to draw conclusions about any patterns between this variable and the public presence of far right parties. So what factors can explain the shift in far right public presence? Based on the results, this thesis would like to conclude that none of the possible explanatory factors clearly explains the shift in public presence. All shifting factors researched are probably explanatory factors to some extent, but the links seem to be weak. Possible explanations can be found for the links, but this does not go for causal relationships. It is hard to determine in what way the variables correspond, and if there are possible third variables explaining the patterns. However, it is clear that the results do not correspond with the expected outcome, as contrary to the picture painted by the media, in general far right public presence did not increase. In the following paragraph, this thesis will reflect on the results.
5.2 Reflection on results
Every research has its limitations. This research is no different. In general, time has been an important constraint for this thesis. Also, it has been a constraint that the author has experience in legal research, instead of social research. In addition, several other factors posed limitations on this research. For instance lack of information, some information only being available in French, the hard to research fourth explanatory factor, etcetera. In every aspect of this research, choices had to be made. Decisions on what to include in the research, but most of all on what not to include in the research. All choices made, such as the choices for the scope, the time frame, the definitions, the case studies and the methodology, have influenced this research in their own matter. The initial idea was to write about Germany and the refugee crisis, by means of a case study in the German town of Heidenau. In the process of narrowing down the research, and formulating a research question, the topic of extreme right wing came into the picture. Eventually, the main focus shifted from the migrant crisis to the far right party family, making the migrant crisis one of the factors taken into account. Nevertheless, the factor of the migrant crisis has had the necessary influence on this research. For example, this factor has been of influence in the timescope chosen, in the cases selected, and in the parties selected. If this factor had not been part of this research, this thesis and its results could have been significantly different. For example, the timescope could have been more broad. Also, more parties might have been selected, as some parties could have been characterized as far right based on for example their environmental ideology, or their preference for a strong state. On this matter, making the choice between using ‘far right’ or ‘extreme right’ was a difficult decision, as both concepts have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, the advantage of the term ‘extreme right’ is that it is more widely used. However, the advantage of the term ‘far right’ is that it is less controversial. In addition to the lack of consensus on the terminology, it was also challenging to operationalize the concept. There is not consensus whatsoever on a definition. There is no consensus on what ideological features can be contributed to far right, how many of these features have to be part of a party’s ideology, and if any of these features are obligatory to make a characterization as far right party possible. Also, there are endless viewpoints available for an examination of a party’s ideology. For example, one can look at the roots of the party, what a party communicates internally and externally, what it does, what it might hide, what its members and voters are like, etcetera. All of these considerations - and the final choices made - have had a significant influence on the research.
51
As explained in the conclusion, there are links found, but one cannot argue that these links are very strong. This is the issue of internal validity, relating mainly to the issue of causality. Despite the best efforts of this research, one can never be sure that the independent variable, explanatory factor x, really is at least in part responsible for the variation that has been identified in the dependent variable, far right public presence As explained, relationship can be the other way around, or there might be a third variable responsible for the shift in both the public presence and the explanatory factor. Nevertheless, the possible explanatory factors researched were all factors extensively discussed in literature. All of these factors are probably influencers of far right public presence, but in a much larger context with various other explanatory factors. Far right public presence turns out to be a complex phenomenon, that cannot be explained in a thesis comprehending three case studies and four explanatory factors. In addition to the limitations on the internal validity, there are limitations on the external validity. External validity deals with generalization of the results. As mentioned in the methodology, this research hoped to be generalizable to Western Europe. Generalizing to the whole of Europe is out of the question, as (among others) the migrants crisis affects European countries in many different ways, and in various intensities. For example, in light of the migrant crisis, one cannot compare the situation in Estonia with the situation in Greece. Similar difference also exist within Western Europe, but these differences are smaller, making a generalization more justifiable. It is important to take into account that three out of nine Western European countries have been part of this research, meaning that a third of the total population has been covered. Nevertheless, generalizing the results beyond the specific context that was studied remains an issue. The results will most likely not be completely equal to the results of a research covering all nine countries, but overall the research could be a good indication for the whole of Western Europe. Despite its limitations, lessons can be drawn from this research that have a broader societal relevance. Whereas the results might not be as expected, they provide some interesting insights. For example, the author expected a decrease in quality of life to lead to an increase in far right public presence, following the line of reasoning behind the ‘blaming theory’ explained in §2.2.2. However, this did not show in the results. As such, this theory and these results might provide some interesting insights for future research. The same goes for attitudes towards European integration. The author expected a worsening in these attitudes, which was indeed the case. However, the author also expected that this would go hand in hand with an increase in far right public presence, but this relationship was in general not found. Perhaps, people do not reach out to far right parties because of their Eurosceptic viewpoints. It would be interesting to look more thoroughly into the relationship between anti-European sentiments and far right parties, as they way the two correspond is still very unclear. The most important lesson is probably the importance of fact checking. The influence of the media in Western Europe is significant. It is not without reason that the media are sometimes referred to as the ‘fourth branch of government’. It is important to realize that the media have a huge influence on the information we (do not) read, hear and see. As a consequence, the way we frame certain issues can be significantly influenced by the media. The author expected a grow in public presence in all of the three cases. It can be of influence that the author is a Dutch citizen, as the expected shift in public presence did take place in the Netherlands. As such, the expectations of the author were possibly formed in part due to the Dutch background. Increased attention for far right in Western European media can lead to the believe that far right has increased its public presence. However, the results of this research show differently. This thesis hopes to serve as a warning, to always check your facts. An image painted by the media is not necessarily correct. It is always of added value to check the facts, and reflect on what other factors might have been of influence. This thesis would like to, once more, zoom in on a quote of Hainsworth (2008:28): ‘various factors need to be taken into account in explaining extreme right emergence and success. Mono-causal or one-sided approaches to explaining the extreme right’s success fail to capture the complexity of the phenomenon.’
52
6. Appendices
Appendix A: List of parties
Belgium ◦ Flemish Bloc ◦ Vlaams Blok FB/VB ◦ Flemish Interest ◦ Vlaams Belang FI/VB ◦ List Dedecker ◦ Lijst Dedecker LD/LD ◦ National Front ◦ Front National NF/FN ◦ New Belgian Front ◦ Front Nouveau de Belgique NBF/FNB ◦ New-Flemish Alliance ◦ Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie N-FA/N-VA ◦ Party Communautair National- ◦ Parti Communautaire National-Europeén PCNE/PCNE European
Germany ◦ Alternative for Germany ◦ Alternative für Deutschland AfG/AfD ◦ German Conservative Party- ◦ Deutsche Konservative Partei- GCP-GRP/ German Right-Wing Party Deutsche Rechtspartei DKP-DRP ◦ German People’s Union ◦ Deutsche Volksunion GPU/DVU ◦ German Reich Party ◦ Deutsche Reichspartei GRP/DRP ◦ National Democratic Party ◦ Nationaldemokratische Partei NDP/NPD Germany Deutschlands ◦ Pegida ◦ Pegida Pegida ◦ The Republican ◦ Die Republikaner REP/REP ◦ Socialist Reich Party ◦ Sozialistische Reichspartei SRP/SRP
The Netherlands ◦ Centre Democrats ◦ Centrumdemocraten CD/CD ◦ Centre Party ◦ Centrumpartij CP/CP ◦ Centre Party’86 ◦ Centrumpartij’86 CP’86/CP’86 ◦ Dutch People’s-Union ◦ Nederlandse Volks-Unie DPU/NVU ◦ For The Netherlands ◦ Voor Nederland FNL/VNL ◦ Freedom Party ◦ Partij Voor de Vrijheid FP/PVV ◦ List Pim Fortuyn ◦ Lijst Pim Fortuyn LPF/LPF ◦ Proud of the Netherlands ◦ Trots Op Nederland PON/TON
Other ◦ National Front (France)23 ◦ Front National NF/FN
23 The term ‘National Front’ refers to the Belgian National Front, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
53
Appendix B: Quality of life
Indicator 1 Doing last 7 days: paid work Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)
2010
Table 31 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed.3.2), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 32 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
Indicator 2 Feeling about household’s income nowadays Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?
2010
Table 33 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed. 3.2), displayed in column percentages.
54
2014
Table 34 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
Indicator 3 How happy are you? Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?
2010
Table 35 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed. 3.2), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 36 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
55
Indicator 4 Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark How safe do you - or would you - feel walking alone in this area after dark? Do - or would - you feel...
2010
Table 37 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed. 3.2), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 38 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
Indicator 5 Subjective general health How is your health in general? Would you say it is ...
2010
Table 39 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed. 3.2), displayed in column percentages.
56
2014
Table 40 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
Indicator 6 How satisfied with life as a whole All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied.
2010
Table 41 - European Social Survey (2010), Round 5 (ed. 3.2), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 42 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
57
Appendix C: Attitudes towards European integration
Indicator 1 Trust in the European Parliament Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...... the European Parliament?
2012
Table 43 - European Social Survey (2012), Round 6 (ed. 2.1), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 44 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
58
Indicator 2 European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?
2012
Table 45 - European Social Survey (2012), Round 6 (ed. 2.1), displayed in column percentages.
2014
Table 46 - European Social Survey (2014), Round 7 (ed. 1.0), displayed in column percentages.
59
Indicator 3 Trust in the European Union I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union.
Spring 2010 Belgium: 57% Germany: 37% Netherlands: 53%
Source: European Commission (Spring 2010), Standard Eurobarometer 73.
Autumn 2014 Belgium: 43% Germany: 34% Netherlands: 46%
Source: European Commission (Autumn 2014), Standard Eurobarometer 82.
60
7. Bibliography
Books and articles
Abramowicz, M. (1996), Les Rats Noirs: L’extrême droite en Belgique francophone, Brussels: Editions Luc Pire. Ahmed, E. and Braithwaite, J. (2011), Shame, pride and workplace bullying, in Karstedt, S., Loader, I. and Strang, H. (eds.), ‘Emotions, crime and justice’, United Kingdom: Hart Publishing. Arzheimer, K. (2015), ‘The AfD: Finally a successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic party for Germany?’, West European Politics, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 535-556. Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (eds.) (2009), ‘Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement’, London and New York: Routledge. Braun, A. amd Scheinberg, S. (eds.) (1997), ‘The extreme right: Freedom and Security at Risk’, USA: Westview Press. Bryman, A. (2012), Social research methods, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Caiani, M., Della Porta, D. and Wagemann, C. (2012), Mobilizing on the extreme right: Germany, Italy, and the United States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crawford, A. (ed.) (2013), ‘Crime and insecurity: The governance of safety in Europe’, London and New York: Routledge. Delwit, P. (2007), The Belgian National Front and the question of power, in Delwit, P. and Poirier, P. (eds.), ‘Extrême-droite et pouvoir en Europe’, Bruxelles: Université de Bruxelles. Denzin, N.K. (1978), The Research Act, 2nd edition, New York: McGraw-Hill. Devroe, E. (2012), ‘A swelling culture of control? - De genese en toepassing van de wet op de gemeentelijke administratieve sancties in België’, Reeks Politiestudies nr. 2, Antwerpen & Apeldoorn: Maklu. Dijk, T.A. van (2002), Critical discourse analysis, in Tannen, D., Schiffrin, D. and Hamilton, H. (Eds.), ‘Handbook of Discourse Analysis’, pp. 352-371, Oxford: Blackwell. Eatwell, R. and Mudde, C. (2004), ‘Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge’, London: Routledge. Griffin, R. (1991), The Nature of Fascism, Great Britain: Pinter Publishers Limited. Hainsworth, P. (2008), The Extreme Right in Western Europe, New York: Routledge. Harrison, S. and Bruter, M. (2011), Mapping Extreme Right Ideology, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan. Heywood, A. (2013), Politics, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan. Ignazi, P. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ivaldi, G. (2004), Droites populistes et extremes en Europe occidentale, Paris: La Documentation Française. Jamin, J. (2012), Extreme-right discourse in Belgium: A comparative regional approach, in Mammone, A., Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (eds.), ‘Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: From local to transnational’, London and New York: Routledge. Landsford, T (ed.) (2014), Political Handbook of the World 2014, USA: CQ Press. Landsford, T (ed.) (2015), Political Handbook of the World 2015, Singapore: CQ Press. Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2015), Rootless populists? The Dutch Pim Fortuyn List, the Freedom Party and others, in Strijker, D., Voerman, G. and Terluin, I. (eds.), ‘Rural protest groups and populist political parties’, Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, pp. 265-290. Mammone, A., Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (eds.) (2012), Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: From local to transnational, London and New York: Routledge.
61
Mudde, C. (1995), ‘Right-wing extremism analyzed: a comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 203-224. Mudde, C. (1996), ‘The War of Words defining the Extreme Right Party Family’, West European Politics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 225-248. Mudde, C. (1998), The Extreme Right party family: An ideological approach, PhD-Thesis, Leiden: Leiden University. Mudde, C. (2000), The ideology of the extreme right, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Offer, A. (ed.) (1996), In pursuit of the quality of life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, M., Heywood, P. and Wright, V. (eds.) (1997), Developments in West European Politics, Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD. Schain, M., Zolberg, A., Hossay, R. (2002), Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sirgy, M.J. (2002), ‘The psychology of quality of life’, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Solomos, J. (2003), Race and Racism in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Witte, H. de (red.) (1997), Bestrijding van racisme en rechts-extremisme: Wetenschappelijke bijdragen aan het maatschappelijk debat, Leuven: Acco.
Consulted websites
Alternative für Deutschland (2014), ‘Political Guidelines of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)’, via WWW
62
63
European Parliament (2015), ‘MEP’s’, via WWW
64
Marsch für die Freiheit (11 May 2011), ‘Bildbericht zum Marsch für die Freiheit’, via WWW
65
Politico (11 September 2015), Karnitschnig, M., ‘Why Germany needs the far right’, via WWW
66
De Standaard (5 May 2015), ‘Vlaams Belang-voorzitter: ‘We moeten af van ons imago’’, via WWW
67
Vlaams Belang (June 2011), ‘1 mei: Geslaagde manifestatie’, Vlaams Belang Magazine, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 6-27, via WWW
68
Databases and other sources
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, via WWW
69