A Short History of NATO
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NATO Expansion: Benefits and Consequences
University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2001 NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences Jeffrey William Christiansen The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Christiansen, Jeffrey William, "NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences" (2001). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8802. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8802 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ■rr - Maween and Mike MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of M ontana Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. **Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Yes, I grant permission X No, I do not grant permission ________ Author's Signature; Date:__ ^ ^ 0 / Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. MSThe»i9\M«r«f»eld Library Permission Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATO EXPANSION: BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES by Jeffrey William Christiansen B.A. University of Montana, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2001 Approved by: hairpers Dean, Graduate School 7 - 24- 0 ^ Date Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. -
Law and Military Operations in Kosovo: 1999-2001, Lessons Learned For
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) The Judge Advocate General’s School United States Army Charlottesville, Virginia CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO) Director COL David E. Graham Deputy Director LTC Stuart W. Risch Director, Domestic Operational Law (vacant) Director, Training & Support CPT Alton L. (Larry) Gwaltney, III Marine Representative Maj Cody M. Weston, USMC Advanced Operational Law Studies Fellows MAJ Keith E. Puls MAJ Daniel G. Jordan Automation Technician Mr. Ben R. Morgan Training Centers LTC Richard M. Whitaker Battle Command Training Program LTC James W. Herring Battle Command Training Program MAJ Phillip W. Jussell Battle Command Training Program CPT Michael L. Roberts Combat Maneuver Training Center MAJ Michael P. Ryan Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Peter R. Hayden Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Mark D. Matthews Joint Readiness Training Center SFC Michael A. Pascua Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Jonathan Howard National Training Center CPT Charles J. Kovats National Training Center Contact the Center The Center’s mission is to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and to devise training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill this mission in five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge Advocate General's Corps for all-source data, information, memoranda, after-action materials and lessons learned pertaining to legal support to operations, foreign and domestic. Second, it supports judge advocates by analyzing all data and information, developing lessons learned across all military legal disciplines, and by disseminating these lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps, and Joint communities through publications, instruction, training, and databases accessible to operational forces, world-wide. -
New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War Translation and Introduction by Sergey Radchenko1 n a freezing November afternoon in Ulaanbaatar China and Russia fell under the Mongolian sword. However, (Ulan Bator), I climbed the Zaisan hill on the south- after being conquered in the 17th century by the Manchus, Oern end of town to survey the bleak landscape below. the land of the Mongols was divided into two parts—called Black smoke from gers—Mongolian felt houses—blanketed “Outer” and “Inner” Mongolia—and reduced to provincial sta- the valley; very little could be discerned beyond the frozen tus. The inhabitants of Outer Mongolia enjoyed much greater Tuul River. Chilling wind reminded me of the cold, harsh autonomy than their compatriots across the border, and after winter ahead. I thought I should have stayed at home after all the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Outer Mongolia asserted its because my pen froze solid, and I could not scribble a thing right to nationhood. Weak and disorganized, the Mongolian on the documents I carried up with me. These were records religious leadership appealed for help from foreign countries, of Mongolia’s perilous moves on the chessboard of giants: including the United States. But the first foreign troops to its strategy of survival between China and the Soviet Union, appear were Russian soldiers under the command of the noto- and its still poorly understood role in Asia’s Cold War. These riously cruel Baron Ungern who rode past the Zaisan hill in the documents were collected from archival depositories and pri- winter of 1921. -
Shaken, Not Stirred: Markus Wolf╎s Involvement in the Guillaume Affair
Voces Novae Volume 4 Article 6 2018 Shaken, not Stirred: Markus Wolf’s Involvement in the Guillaume Affair and the Evolution of Foreign Espionage in the Former DDR Jason Hiller Chapman University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae Recommended Citation Hiller, Jason (2018) "Shaken, not Stirred: Markus Wolf’s Involvement in the Guillaume Affair nda the Evolution of Foreign Espionage in the Former DDR," Voces Novae: Vol. 4 , Article 6. Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol4/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Voces Novae by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hiller: Shaken, not Stirred: Markus Wolf’s Involvement in the Guillaume A Foreign Espionage in the Former DDR Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review, Vol 3, No 1 (2012) HOME ABOUT USER HOME SEARCH CURRENT ARCHIVES PHI ALPHA THETA Home > Vol 3, No 1 (2012) > Hiller Shaken, not Stirred: Markus Wolf's Involvement in the Guillaume Affair and the Evolution of Foreign Espionage in the Former DDR Jason Hiller "The principal link in the chain of revolution is the German link, and the success of the world revolution depends more on Germany than upon any other country." -V.I. Lenin, Report of October 22, 1918 The game of espionage has existed longer than most people care to think. However, it is not important how long ago it started or who invented it. What is important is the progress of espionage in the past decades and the impact it has had on powerful nations. -
Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan Mcmurry Western Oregon University, [email protected]
Western Oregon University Digital Commons@WOU Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History 2018 Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan McMurry Western Oregon University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Legal Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation McMurry, Keegan, "Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials" (2018). Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History). 264. https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/264 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons@WOU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@WOU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Schießbefehl1 and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan J. McMurry History 499: Senior Seminar June 5, 2018 1 On February 5th, 1989, 20-year old Chris Gueffroy and his companion, Christian Gaudin, were running for their lives. Tired of the poor conditions in the German Democratic Republic and hoping to find better in West Germany, they intended to climb the Berlin Wall that separated East and West Berlin using a ladder. A newspaper account states that despite both verbal warnings and warning shots, both young men continued to try and climb the wall until the border guards opened fire directly at them. Mr. Gaudin survived the experience after being shot, however, Mr. -
Ostpolitik Revisited1 Karl Cordell, University of Plymouth Stefan Wolff, University of Nottingham
A Foreign Policy Analysis of the “German Question”: Ostpolitik Revisited1 Karl Cordell, University of Plymouth Stefan Wolff, University of Nottingham Abstract Taking a constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis and using German policy vis-à-vis Poland and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic as an example, we examine Ostpolitik since the 1960s as a case of a norm-driven foreign policy. We argue that the content of Ostpolitik, including changes over time, can be explained by reference to a prevailing norm consensus in Germany about the country‘s foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, which began to develop in the 1960s. 1 The authors wish to thank the British Academy for their support through LRG-35361 in the preparation of this paper. They also extend their thanks to Klaus Bachmann, Andrzej Dybczyński and Zdeněk Hausvater. This article partially draws on findings presented in Cordell and Wolff (2005a). 1 1. Introduction During his historic visit to Warsaw in December 1970 for the signing of the second of the so-called Ostverträge,2 German Chancellor Willy Brandt undertook a momentous and unprecedented gesture. During a commemorative act for the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April/May 1943, he fell to his knees in an act of apology for German atrocities committed against Poland and especially Polish Jews during the Second World War. Some 24 years later, In August 1994 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the (Home Army‘s) Warsaw Uprising of August/October 1944, German President Roman Herzog similarly apologised for German actions during the war in a speech in Warsaw and expressed Germany‘s unconditional support for Polish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). -
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization the Origins of NATO the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
The Origins of N A TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION European Economic Recovery power production), and dollar reserves to pay for necessary and European Integration imports. The war had rent the social fabric of many nations, setting social class against social class and ethnic group n the aftermath of the total defeat of Nazi Germany in against ethnic group. Political tensions were exacerbated by 1945, Europe struggled to recover from the ravages of the participation of many Europeans in collaborationist occupation and war. The wartime Grand Alliance be- regimes and others in armed resistance. Masses of Europe- tweenI the Western democracies and the Soviet Union ans, radicalized by the experience of war and German collapsed, and postwar negotiations for a peace settlement occupation, demanded major social and economic change foundered in the Council of Foreign Ministers. By 1947 and appeared ready to enforce these demands with violence. peace treaties with Italy and the defeated Axis satellites were The national Communist Parties of Western Europe stood finally concluded after protracted and acrimonious negotia- ready to exploit this discontent in order to advance the aims tions between the former allies, but the problem of a divided of the Soviet Union.2 and occupied Germany remained unsettled. U.S. leaders were acutely aware of both the dangers of In April 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall re- renewed conflict in Europe and of their ability to influence turned from a frustrating round of negotiations in the the shape of a postwar European political and social order. Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow to report that the Fresh from the wartime experience of providing major United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Lend-Lease aid to allied nations and assistance to millions of a prescription for the future of central Europe and that the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Soviets appeared ready to drag out talks. -
Merkel's China Legacy
Issue Brief July 23, 2021 Merkel’s China Legacy Emma Janson Angela Merkel’s time as the Chancellor of Germany is soon coming to an end. An unofficial mainstay of the European Union, she leaves office having helped put in place many of the structural aspects enabling the EU to function as a single actor. At the same time, Merkel leaves behind a legacy of Germany being at odds with many other member states with regards to a major challenge facing the Union: the rise of China as a systemic rival. When Merkel first took office, many Western countries looked to China with hopes of political liberalization, which might come about as a result of the country’s increasing economic growth.1 However, as she leaves office, China has turned towards more autocratic governance, and many European observers look to China with concern2, not just for the sake of human rights but also as a systemic threat to Europe.3 Introduction published when she first became chancellor in 2005 do not depict her as a calculating “business before Angela Merkel spent her formative years in everything” leader. In the wake of a meeting with East Germany, studying Russian and coming of the Dalai Lama in 2006, she was described as overly age within a communist system.4 Partly due to idealistic and chastised for a supposed tendency to these experiences, Merkel often emphasizes the hurt German business interests due to her focus on importance of maintaining good relations with both “softer values.”8 Such criticisms were echoed when 5 This has often been held up the East and the West. -
"Ostpolitik As a Source of Intra-Bloc Tensions" by Dr
1 "Ostpolitik as a source of intra-bloc tensions" by Dr. Oliver Bange, Mannheim University (Project "Ostpolitik and Détente") [Ostpolitik caused friction on a number of different levels – it sparked tensions within Willy Brand’s party, the SPD, parliament, the coalition cabinet, tensions with the Western allies, and even within the Eastern bloc. It is the latter two that this paper is devoted, arranging documents from various national archives around nine distinct but interconnected arguments. Inevitably, such a vue d’ensemble has to start with an explanation of the goals and tactics underlying the new Eastern policy as devised during Brandt’s time as foreign minister of the “Grand Coalition” from December 1966 to September 1969, and put into practice during his chancellorship of the social-liberal coalition until 1974 and then onwards to the CSCE in Helsinki on August 1, 1975.] One might compare the "Neue Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr with a coin: the currency, or ultimate goal, imprinted on it is called "unification" – in order to avoid any compromise to the original borders of the vanished Reich, Brandt refused to speak about "re- unification", preferring the "unification" or "Zusammenwachsen" (growing closer) of the two existing German states. The two sides of the coin represent two long-term strategies to achieve unification. Undermining Communism by exposing the people under its rule to Western values and liberties was one side of the coin. However, the eventual breakdown of Communism itself would not guarantee German unification. The other side of the coin was therefore to devise an all-European security system, taking care of the legitimate security concerns of all nations (including the United States and the Soviet Union) concerned by a prospective unification of the two German states. -
The Importance of Osthandel: West German-Soviet Trade and the End of the Cold War, 1969-1991
The Importance of Osthandel: West German-Soviet Trade and the End of the Cold War, 1969-1991 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Charles William Carter, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Dissertation Committee: Professor Carole Fink, Advisor Professor Mansel Blackford Professor Peter Hahn Copyright by Charles William Carter 2012 Abstract Although the 1970s was the era of U.S.-Soviet détente, the decade also saw West Germany implement its own form of détente: Ostpolitik. Trade with the Soviet Union (Osthandel) was a major feature of Ostpolitik. Osthandel, whose main feature was the development of the Soviet energy-export infrastructure, was part of a broader West German effort aimed at promoting intimate interaction with the Soviets in order to reduce tension and resolve outstanding Cold War issues. Thanks to Osthandel, West Germany became the USSR’s most important capitalist trading partner, and several oil and natural gas pipelines came into existence because of the work of such firms as Mannesmann and Thyssen. At the same time, Moscow’s growing emphasis on developing energy for exports was not a prudent move. A lack of economic diversification resulted, a development that helped devastate the USSR’s economy after the oil price collapse of 1986 and, in the process, destabilize the communist bloc. Against this backdrop, the goals of some West German Ostpolitik advocates—especially German reunification and a peaceful resolution to the Cold War—occurred. ii Dedication Dedicated to my father, Charles William Carter iii Acknowledgements This project has been several years in the making, and many individuals have contributed to its completion. -
NATO at Seventy (PDF)
PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org/Transatlantic Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The authors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source. Design and Layout by Andrew Facini Cover photo: A U.S. Marine carries cold weather equipment as he begins to march across the Icelandic terrain in preparation for NATO’s Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, October 19, 2018. (NATO Photo) Copyright 2019, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 About this Report “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis” is a report by the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. This Project aims to strengthen teaching, research, and policy-making on the relationship between the United States and Europe. This report is timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2019 as the world’s most successful alliance faces perhaps the most daunting and complex set of challenges in its history. -
Germany's New Ostpolitik
ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2016-7-1(22)-116-121 GERMANY’S NEW OSTPOLITIK Gilbert Doctorow When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 The generalized failure of International and the possibility of German reunifi cation arose, Relations professionals, not to mention lay setting on the immediate to-do list of Europe journalists and the broad public, to get its and of the broader trans-Atlantic community collective mind around the German problem the realization of political ambitions that dated begins in Germany itself. I propose to examine from the very start of the Cold War, there were that fi rst, then to look into the conceptual forebodings in France and the U.K. that there limitations that prevail in the United States, the could be trouble ahead. As President Francois single greatest arbiter of world opinion on all Mitterand reportedly joked with regard to his international matters large and small. I will end own misgivings, he liked Germany so much this survey with a look into the reactions to the that he wanted there to be two of them. changing role and ambitions of Germany within At a minimum, Germany’s European Russia, which surely has to be one o f the most allies feared that the new more powerful interested powers in what is occurring. Germany would break free of the constraints of the European Economic Community and * * * NATO to defi ne an independent path serving In Germany, the post-reunifi cation move its own interests. There was particular concern of its capital from what was intended to be that Germany might strike a strategic deal with its temporary site in Bonn to the city which Russia to secure peace in Europe without the forged the German nation, Berlin, was always Americans and at the expense of the West.