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From Merkel to Kramp‐Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself? Dostal, Jörg Michael

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Dostal, J. M. (2019). From Merkel to Kramp‐Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself? The Political Quarterly, 90(2), 286-296. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12680

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Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69731-0 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2, April–June 2019

From Merkel to Kramp-Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself?

€ JORG MICHAEL DOSTAL

Abstract Germany’s Christian Democrats have started preparing for the time after Angela Merkel. After ten years as German chancellor facing a weak opposition, Merkel unexpectedly split the country in late 2015 and early 2016 because of her ‘open border’ policies that allowed more than 1 million refugees and migrants to rapidly enter Germany. Her management of the subsequent crisis was largely considered a failure and her party suffered a series of dra- matic election defeats. Reacting to the negative electoral feedback, and in particular the breakthrough of the rightist and anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Chris- tian Democratic Union organised an intra-party contest to replace Merkel as party leader. Three candidates with different political profiles, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich Merz and Jens Spahn, contested the election. By voting for Kramp-Karrenbauer, the CDU membership voiced support for maintaining a large-scale political coalition based on efforts to find compromises between different party wings and social and cultural interests. Keywords: Angela Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany, Friedrich Merz, Jens Spahn

(SPD). In the last federal election of 2017, the Introduction former achieved 32.9 per cent and the latter IN THE twenty-first century, German politics 20.5 per cent of the national vote, their sec- has been transformed. The German polity is ond-worst and worst result ever in the now characterised by deep cultural, social history of the Federal Republic. Their subse- and political divisions. Two chronic policy- quent reluctant forming of a ‘grand coalition’ making conflicts have jointly undermined an government in March 2018 (the term appears earlier more consensus-driven political cul- hardly appropriate any longer since both ture. These are firstly the social welfare parties barely assemble a majority in parlia- retrenchments that were enacted between ment) raises the question as to whether Ger- 2003 and 2005 by the then ‘red-green’ Social many will follow most other EU countries in Democratic and Green Party coalition gov- experiencing an increasingly fragmented and ernment; and secondly the decision of Ger- weak party system. many’s Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) to This article takes up the case of the German allow refugees and migrants to enter the Christian Democrats (CDU), still the largest country in late 2015 and early 2016, which centre-right party in a core EU country, and resulted in the rapid influx of more than 1 asks how it plans to reorganise its political million people from African and Asian strategy in what will soon be the post-Merkel countries into Germany. era.1 In particular, how will the CDU manage In the larger context of socio-economic the transition away from Merkel to a new change and growing social inequality, these party leadership and, directly related, how is two political cleavages have jointly under- the party going to react to political challenges mined the electoral appeal of the traditional from right-wing populists (the Alternative for German ‘catch-all’ or ‘people’s parties’, the Germany (AfD) party), on the one hand, and centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/ competing centrist political forces (the Greens CSU) and the centre-left Social Democrats and the SPD) on the other?

286 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA In what follows, Merkel’s successful polit- was introduced in 2015. There were various ical past between 2005 and 2015 is briefly rounds of ‘rescuing’ public and private sketched. Next, the two central German banks and efforts to stabilise the euro cur- political cleavages (welfare, and refugees rency zone, none of these measures being in and migration) are examined in order to line with supply-side economics or neoliberal provide some background to better under- doctrine. Going against the general pattern stand the behaviour of Merkel and her of slow decision making, but not against the party in recent times. Thirdly, Merkel’s refu- general logic of her understanding of policy gee and migration policies since September making, Merkel moved quickly after the 2015 and the ensuing backlash are dis- Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 cussed. The fourth section examines how to commit Germany to abandoning nuclear the CDU reacted to Merkel’s decline in energy at some future point. This new pol- popularity and how her resignation as icy, the exact opposite of her previous party leader was prepared. The fifth section course, was subsequently termed ‘energy describes the subsequent contest, in early transition’ (Energiewende). In order to estab- December 2018, between centrist Annegret lish her party, and herself, as the natural Kramp-Karrenbauer and two more conser- centre of German politics, coalition with all vative candidates, Friedrich Merz and Jens relevant competitors (namely the SPD, anti- Spahn. Finally, the conclusion analyses the nuclear Greens and Liberals) had to be possi- future political opportunity structure for the ble at any point. In a similar context, the CDU in Germany’s by now well-established CDU’s profile on socio-cultural issues shifted six party system: will the CDU be able to from conservative to liberal and progressive reinvent itself under the new leadership of values. In particular, the party accepted Kramp-Karrenbauer? same-sex partnerships, expansion of public childcare, the ideal of dual earner house- holds, and dual nationality and citizenship Merkel’s successful past offers for certain categories of migrants. – Before being taken up by the Merkel-CDU, (2005 2015) these policies had initially been advanced by For most of Merkel’s chancellorship since electoral competitors. 2005, observers have argued that her leader- Analysts have therefore described Mer- ship pushed the CDU firmly to the centre kel’s general approach between 2005 and ground of German politics. During her time 2015 as ‘calculated demobilisation’ based on in office, she was credited with taking over ‘reduced party competition’ and an ‘elec- many policies of her electoral competitors— toral campaigning avoidance strategy’.2 the SPD and the Greens, in particular—while While conservative Merkel critics argued ‘modernising’ her own party in parallel. that she had turned the CDU into an empty Crucially, when Merkel became chancellor in shell devoid of any clear policy commit- 2005, she abandoned the radical welfare ments, her admirers instead praised her for- retrenchment of the previous SPD and Green mula for electoral success: occupying the Party coalition government in favour of political centre ground by borrowing poli- a return to small-step and incremental poli- cies from centrist competitors, and policy cies. Her economic policies were centrist, making based on consultation and incre- essentially going with the flow of events. mentalism. During her ‘grand coalitions’ She abandoned ‘ideological neoliberalism’ in with the SPD (2005–2009, 2013–2017, and favour of a more accommodating style, again since March 2018) and her single spell which also included re-regulatory policies on as leader of a centre-right coalition with the numerous occasions. Liberals (FDP) between 2009 and 2013, Mer- During her chancellorship, pensions were kel profited to a large extent from demobil- at first retrenched. Later on, policy delibera- ising mistakes of her coalition partners. tion started to focus on how to compensate After each electoral cycle, Merkel’s political disadvantaged groups and some minor partners suffered electoral defeat while her countervailing measures were enacted. After CDU maintained the role of the natural lengthy debate, a statutory minimum wage party of government.

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© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 During the Merkel era, a general increase between 2003 and 2005 represented the high- in social inequality occurred. The working est peak of the neoliberal wave in Germany and middle classes experienced stagnant or rather than a stable neoliberal hegemony. The declining wages, while deregulated service reforms triggered a dramatic backlash—the work with low job security expanded.3 largest anti-government street movement Between the 2005 and 2009 federal elections, since the unification of Germany in 1990. electoral participation declined by around 7 Post-Hartz reform, the basis of the German per cent—mostly demoralised former SPD welfare state model, namely status protection voters—before recovering in the 2017 elec- of skilled workers in a system of social insur- tions when the AfD managed to mobilise ance, largely disappeared. large numbers of former non-voters. More- Instead, the German welfare state became over, the share of the vote of ‘wing’ parties based on a much more limited concept of opposing Merkel on the left and right side of social protection associated with liberal the political spectrum (the Left Party and the rather than Bismarckian or social democratic AfD) expanded. Crucially, calculated demo- welfare policies. The dramatic cuts in social bilisation during the Merkel chancellorship security coverage, expansion of means- had a strong social class dimension: voters testing principles in unemployment insur- with lower socio-economic positions (un- ance, pension retrenchment and deregulated skilled and skilled blue collar workers and labour markets all resulted in growing the urban poor) have increasingly turned social inequality and a massive decline of away from participating in elections alto- satisfaction with the political system. By gether or, more recently, have switched to retrenching the welfare state, the SPD lead- vote for the rightist AfD party.4 ers effectively demoralised their own elec- While observers continue to disagree torate. SPD voters were on average more about the exact ingredients of Merkel’s past likely to rely on welfare state policies than success formula, the date when her fortunes the economically better-off electorate of the turned will likely be agreed to have been the CDU/CSU. From the CDU’s political point 3 September 2015. On this day, Merkel of view, letting the electoral competitors of decided to allow refugees and migrants the SPD volunteer for the electoral costs of waiting in Hungary to enter Germany. Her welfare retrenchment was of course the decision subsequently set in motion a large- optimal outcome. scale population movement of more than 1 Yet this relative protection of the CDU/ million refugees and migrants into Germany CSU from electoral decline came to an end in late 2015 and early 2016. This policy deci- in the autumn of 2015. In early September, sion immediately turned her from a repre- Chancellor Merkel took her lonely executive sentative of consensus into the most decision, without consulting with the Ger- polarising politician in her own country and man parliament or fellow EU member coun- far beyond. tries, to open Germany’s borders to refugees and migrants who had entered the EU via the Balkan route—often from Turkey—and Germany’s two chronic policy- had assembled in the Hungarian capital of fl Budapest. Initially, it was assumed that most making con icts of the refugees and migrants were of Syrian To begin with, the post-2003 welfare retrench- origin fleeing the war, and Merkel’s ‘human- ment and labour market deregulation (so- itarian’ decision received extensive support called ‘Hartz reforms’), enacted under the for- from civil society representatives and the mer chancellor Gerhard Schroder€ (SPD), was media. However, public attitudes started to jointly passed in parliament by SPD, Greens shift following large-scale sexual assaults on and the then CDU/CSU opposition. This women in the German city of Cologne and occurred at a moment in time when neoliberal other places on New Year’s Eve 2016, in political ideas—deregulation, privatisation which most perpetrators turned out to be and growing acceptance of social inequality— recent arrivals. Following these and other had captured the imagination of Germany’s crime incidents, a massive backlash occurred political class. However, the Hartz reforms that is still ongoing.

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 Crucially, the reason for the deep split in Merkel’s rapid domestic decline public attitudes with regard to refugees and since 2015 migrants goes beyond simple impression management. In fact, the German public has Merkel’s decision to allow the free entry of never engaged in an open debate of migra- refugees and migrants into Germany on 3 tion-related issues. Until the end of the twen- September 2015 was from the beginning tieth century, the Christian Democrats based highly contested. Only three days later, the some of their electoral appeal on the state- then CSU party chairman and current Ger- ment that ‘Germany is not a country of man interior minister Horst Seehofer criti- immigration’. Historically, Germans used to cised the action, commenting that ‘Merkel’s subscribe to a concept of ethnic nationalism, border opening is a major mistake that will which differs from notions of civic or repub- keep us busy for a long time’ and that ‘we lican nationalism along the lines of the US or can only avoid a democratically legitimated French model. However, Germany has since right wing if we take up worries and fears 5 the 1990s increasingly turned into a multi- in the population’. Such anxieties prepared ethnic society. There have been major migra- the stage for the subsequent decline in Mer- tion waves from Eastern Europe and the kel’s standing and popularity. Her initial former Soviet Union to Germany—in addi- political explanation was that Germany tion to earlier cohorts of migrants from Tur- opened its borders to grant shelter to refu- key and other southern countries. The share gees from the Syrian war and from other of people in Germany with a ‘migration war zones in a ‘humanitarian gesture’. What background’ is now around one quarter of was surprising about this claim was that the resident population. Some of them hold Germany and the other EU countries had for dual citizenship—they were granted German a long period failed to finance humanitarian citizenship without resigning their original assistance for those Syrians who had left one—while others do not. Crucially, younger their country for neighbouring states in the age cohorts among the German resident pop- Middle East and in Turkey. (The UN relief ulation include the by far highest migrant effort had been underfunded and continues (and Muslim-migrant) shares. to be underfunded today.) Thus, Merkel’s post-2015 refugee and Following the quick growth in the number migration policies clashed with long-standing of refugees and migrants entering Germany, cultural values and German anxieties, includ- a second explanation gained currency, ing the observation that many German cities namely Germans were helping others in have turned from predominantly ethnic Ger- order to prepare their own long-term eco- man into ethnically segregated cities over the nomic prosperity. This account stressed that last generation or so. Ultimately, a combina- many of the refugees were ‘doctors and tion of long-term and short-term factors, espe- nurses’ who, following their social integra- cially Merkel’s failure to communicate clearly tion into German society, would soon con- with the German public over her migration tribute to the economic prosperity of their policies, meant that confidence in Merkel’s host society. Some enthusiasts started to refer leadership was in the eyes of many observers to the newcomers as ‘the new Germans’. damaged beyond repair. Her near-complete Looking back, neither of these initial isolation on the issue in the EU context—Ger- explanations for Merkel’s policy-making many’s decision was largely resented by could be confirmed. Among the around one neighbouring EU countries—further under- million asylum seekers entering Germany scored the poor impression. Ultimately, the during the open border episode between EU-Turkey agreement with Turkish President September 2015 and March 2016, around 70 Recep Tayyip Erdogan largely closed off per cent were young people, under the age access to the ‘Balkan route’, thus limiting of thirty, and around two-thirds were male. the further arrival of migrants in Germany. During 2016 and 2017, more than 1.2 million The agreement also included outsourcing asylum requests were received by the Ger- the protection of parts of the EU’s external man authorities, which included additional border to Turkey, in exchange for financial people who had entered the country before contributions. and after the open border episode or had

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© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 travelled on other routes to reach Germany. The CDU responds to Merkel’s Less than a third of the people entering orig- decline in popularity inated from Syria, while the remainder origi- nated from a large number of African and Many observers of Merkel’s conduct since Asian countries. Around half of the new- 2015 have criticised that she failed to com- comers did not carry any identity papers municate her policies in a transparent man- and subsequent practical experience sug- ner. A typical voice in this respect was the gested that most of them would rely on the German singer Herbert Gronemeyer€ stating German welfare state for a long period of that ‘I would hold against her that she sim- 8 time. ply does not communicate’. Some CDU par- Many critics of Merkel’s course suggested liamentarians also felt that Merkel had that she had opened the gates for chaotic stopped interactions with sections of the mass migration, which in effect privileged party, disagreeing with her handling of the the most robust migrants and those paying crisis. To be fair, Merkel faced a Catch 22 sit- smugglers to enter the EU. Critics within the uation. Especially in the former East Ger- CDU pointed out that the German state had many, her decline in popularity was so simply lost control and that the most basic dramatic that attempts to communicate with administrative procedures—such as keeping citizens became exercises in ridicule. In one track of the number of new arrivals—were typical instance, Merkel attended a meeting no longer being followed.6 In the smart in the city of Chemnitz following the murder phone era, refugees and migrants could react of a German citizen by migrants. Her intro- in real time to changes in the state’s policy ductory remark that ‘I know that my pres- and administration, while the state could not ence is a provocation for some of you’ overcome the limitations of an analogue and triggered the response: ‘When do you slow administrative process. resign?’ Refugee and migrant-related problems still Since September 2015, the CDU has expe- hold the highest salience of any political rienced dramatic defeats in all regional elec- issue in Germany. Longitudinal opinion tions and the 2017 federal election with only polls show that the topic ‘foreigners/integra- two exceptions (Saarland and North-Rhine tion/refugees’ has been considered the most Westphalia). The rightist AfD managed to significant issue ever since September 2014 enter each of Germany’s sixteen regional by a plurality and sometimes a majority of parliaments, gaining around a quarter of respondents. For most of the time, the issue their support from former CDU/CSU voters, was considered more significant than four while also collecting many votes from former other topics (unemployment, economic non-voters and from former Left Party sup- issues, education and pensions) combined. porters, particularly in the former East Ger- Between August 2015 and February 2016, many. Following another dramatic electoral more than 80 per cent of people considered defeat in the regional state of Hesse in Octo- the topic the most important issue, while the ber 2018 (the vote share of the CDU declined figure declined below 50 per cent in April from 38.3 per cent to 27 per cent), Merkel 2017. Significantly, numbers quickly climbed announced her decision to resign as CDU back up again between June and August party leader and, more crucially, made it 2018 when Merkel’s government signed the known that her current term as chancellor ‘UN Global Compact for Migration’ thereby would be her last. Thus, she will retire as triggering a new round of domestic debates chancellor in 2021 at the latest—even this and criticism. Other longitudinal opinion tenure is only secure if the current coalition polls suggest that the German public has government manages to stay in office until been evenly divided on whether Merkel was then. doing a good or a bad job concerning refu- Merkel’s decision reflected her loss of gees and migration. Since October 2017, authority in the party. Crucially, the unprece- however, a majority thought that she was dented lengthy negotiations following the doing a bad job.7 Thus, the topic’s salience 2017 federal elections on forming a new continues to firmly dominate Germany’s coalition government—first with Greens and political agenda. Liberals for three months, ending in failure;

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 then with the SPD to agree yet another grand served as an important intermediate step to coalition for lack of any alternative option— prepare the post-Merkel period once she made Merkel look weak as a national leader. leaves the chancellorship at the end of her Critics observed that ‘the defence of power current term in 2021, or at an earlier point. by means of electoral success stands above Within the CDU party hierarchy, her succes- the internal conflict [within the CDU] over sor as party leader enjoys important agenda- concepts and policy content’ and that the setting powers. Crucially, there exists a peaceful coexistence between mid-level party convention in the CDU by which the party bodies and the leadership ends ‘as soon as leader has the first right to suggest the leading representatives can no longer credi- party’s candidate for chancellor (self-nomina- bly represent the promise to successfully tion included). The three candidates compet- defend power’.9 ing for Merkel’s position as party leader In February 2018, Merkel still tried to lead at a party conference in December 2018 the renewal of her party when she pushed to were Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich install Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as the Merz and Jens Spahn. new secretary general of the CDU. After The three candidates were associated with regaining the chancellorship in March 2018 different wings and tendencies within the —traditionally the major source of authority CDU. Kramp-Karrenbauer, an economic cen- within the CDU when in government—she trist with somewhat conservative social lean- nevertheless suffered further decline of her ings, was most closely associated with authority in party circles. Competing power Merkel and considered to be her preferred centres in the CDU, such as the parliamen- candidate. Merz was on the contrary Mer- tary group in the federal parliament, the kel’s b^ete noire in the sense that he had com- CDU regional prime ministers, and internal peted with her for dominant influence in the party associations such as the employee party in the early 2000s. Back then, he had association (CDA), the economic council gained a reputation as a neoliberal purist (Wirtschaftsrat) and the mid-sized business and advocate of large-scale deregulation of association (MIT), started to display more the German economic model. In 2002, Mer- autonomy from the chancellor. kel made him leave his position as CDU lea- In this context, a new round of internal der in the federal parliament in order to conflict within and between the two Chris- allow her to take over his position. His unex- tian Democratic parties (the CDU and the pected return to become a candidate for the CSU) concerning the unilateral rejection of CDU leadership in 2018 made him the migrants at Germany’s borders in June 2018 immediate favourite of CDU-associated busi- was particularly damaging. This conflict was ness circles. In contrast to Merz, Spahn as the final call on CDU party bodies to act in Germany’s current health minister could be order to defend future electoral prospects. In described as a more flexible representative of September 2018, CDU federal parliamentari- the conservative wing. He is sometimes asso- ans unexpectedly rejected Merkel’s candidate ciated with the expansion of welfare state Volker Kauder as parliamentary leader in activities in Germany’s rapidly aging society. favour of Ralph Brinkhaus, a CDU MP rep- By the political standards of the CDU, he resenting moderate Merkel critics. The dra- was clearly the most radical choice in terms matic election defeat of the CDU in the of a political renewal of the party. Since each Hesse regional elections in the same month of the three candidates stands for a particu- meant that Merkel now faced decisive pres- lar vision of the future of Germany’s Chris- sure to ‘voluntarily’ resign her position as tian Democrats, it is worth briefly portraying party leader. them in turn.

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer The future of the CDU: three Kramp-Karrenbauer, age fifty-six, originates candidates, three scenarios from Germany’s federal state of Saarland, Replacing Merkel as CDU leader was an the smallest non-city state with a population effort to stop the party’s electoral decline. It of less than 1 million people. After studying

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© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 political and administrative sciences, she has marriage, a measure that was enacted in spent almost all her life as a professional Germany in 2017. As a representative of the politician acting as a big fish in the small socially conservative wing of her party, pond of regional Saarland politics. She only Kramp-Karrenbauer stresses that she stands started to gain a national profile because of by the social ideal of traditional families her association with Merkel in recent years (‘the traditional constellation of father, and her subsequent election as CDU general mother and their biological children’) and of secretary during a party conference in Febru- associated tax and welfare policies.11 ary 2018. Kramp-Karrenbauer first entered the Saarland parliament in 1999 and subse- quently acted as minister with various port- Friedrich Merz folios between 2000 and 2011.10 Between Merz, age sixty-three, differed from the other 2011 and February 2018, she was the regio- two candidates for the position of CDU lea- nal prime minister (Ministerpr€asident) of the der in the sense that his career as a profes- Saarland. sional politician appeared to have already During her political career, she led three ended for good in 2009 when he left the fed- Saarland coalition governments, first briefly eral parliament for a new career as a busi- with Greens and Liberals between 2011 and ness lawyer. After studying law, Merz had a 2012, before switching to a grand coalition parliamentary career—first in the European with the SPD that was twice re-elected in Parliament, between 1989 and 1994, and 2012 and 2017. Crucially, Kramp-Karren- then, between 1994 and 2009, in Germany’s bauer’s regional grand coalition differed federal parliament. Throughout his political from Merkel’s grand coalition at the federal life, Merz was almost exclusively associated level in the sense that the CDU maintained with business interests, acting as the leading high levels of support, receiving 40 per cent advocate of the CDU’s neoliberal turn. In the of the votes in 2017, gaining 5 per cent, early 2000s he gained country-wide fame for which amounted to a singular success in an his proposal to simplify radically the Ger- otherwise depressing recent CDU election man tax system. His plan is still remembered record. A second contrast to Merkel’s style as the ‘beer mat’ style of tax declaration, but of governing was that the Saar-SPD survived left no subsequent political impact. When the collaboration with the CDU in good Merkel became chancellor in 2005, Merz was health receiving 30 per cent of the votes in not offered a ministerial appointment. Subse- 2017. Overall, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s policy quently, he shifted his portfolio of activities of compromise and collaboration with other toward the business sector becoming first a political parties derived from the political lawyer with an international law firm in culture of the post-industrial Saar region in 2005 and then, in 2009, the chairman of the which strong state leadership was required Atlantik-Brucke€ , Germany’s most senior to restructure the economy from an earlier transatlantic network in which politicians dependency on coal mining and the steel and company executives rub shoulders with industry. equivalent US leaders. In February 2016, Over the years, Kramp-Karrenbauer Merz became one of three supervisory board became associated with the social wing of chairmen of BlackRock Germany, the biggest the CDU with regard to economic policies. US investment fund with many investments In Germany’s second federal parliamentary in German-based major corporations. branch of the regions (Bundesrat), she sup- One of the consistencies of Merz’ political ported as Saar prime minister in 2012 and life was his habit to act as a contrarian with 2013 SPD plans for a fixed quota of women a poor sense of timing. His strong self- on supervisory management boards and confidence as one of Germany’s leading SPD and Green Party suggestions to intro- pro-business representatives resulted in his duce a statutory minimum wage and higher publication, in 2008, of a monograph titled taxes on high income earners. On socio- Let us Dare more Capitalism. The book cultural issues, Kramp-Karrenbauer voiced restated principles of German-style ordolib- in 2015 her opposition to the legal equalisa- eralism, suggesting that capitalism could tion of homosexual with heterosexual gain more public support by turning

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 employees into stock market investors and rapid political career included spells as lea- shareholders in their own enterprise in order der of the CDU’s working group on health to ‘overcome class differences that have only between 2009 and 2015 and as one of the been kept alive artificially for a long time’.12 deputy leaders of the CDU/CSU parliamen- However, his book was remarkably silent tary group in 2013. He was then appointed about the origins of the then ongoing global as a parliamentary state secretary in the min- financial crisis, notably insufficient public istry of economics in 2015. In March 2018, regulation of the banking sector. He there- Chancellor Merkel appointed him as Ger- fore failed to catch the public mood at the many’s minister of health. His short track time. record in this role suggests that he plans to His unexpected return into politics in gain a reputation as a mediator who can 2018, campaigning to become Merkel’s deliver reforms based on consensus build- replacement as CDU party leader, triggered ing.15 In this respect, Spahn differs from his an initial wave of goodwill, particularly fellow conservative Merz. within his own party. Friendly media cover- Before and during his campaign to become age described him as the ‘James Dean of the new CDU leader, Spahn was the stron- German politics’ who ‘died early enough to gest critic of Merkel’s refugee and migration become a hero’ (that is, had not been policies. He repeatedly voiced concern about involved with Merkel’s government).13 How- the illiberal attitudes of Muslim migrants in ever, he once again failed to reach out to sec- Germany, describing migration as ‘the ele- tors of the CDU beyond the market-liberal phant in the room’ and criticising those wing. While promising to regain half of the who evaded discussing the issues and taking voters of the rightist AfD, he did not make difficult decisions.16 explicit how he intended to regain these vot- The decision about who would succeed ers beyond being critical of Merkel’s refugee Merkel as party leader was taken at a party and migration policies. His only other nota- conference in early December 2018. Spahn ble policy suggestion was introducing a tax- had failed to attract much attention for his free allowance for private stock market candidacy since the media overwhelmingly investments. framed the contest as a two-horse race As head of BlackRock Germany and an between Kramp-Karrenbauer and Merz. income millionaire, he involuntarily added Kramp-Karrenbauer won the contest to to the impression that he was out of touch become the new CDU party leader in the by claiming in an interview with a tabloid second round with around 52 per cent of newspaper to belong to the ‘upper middle the party delegates’ vote, narrowly beating class’ rather than the ‘small very rich and Merz with around 48 per cent support. very wealthy upper class’.14 Subsequently, Spahn as the third candidate achieved some commentators took great pleasure in around 15 per cent in the first round and pointing out to him that income millionaires was dropped from the second ballot. His were statistically not part of Germany’s voters evenly split up between the two ‘middle class’. In summary, Merz failed to remaining candidates. reinvent himself as a politician able to reach out to the general public. Conclusion: can German Christian democracy reinvent itself? Jens Spahn There are two levels of analysis of the CDU’s As the youngest candidate by far, Spahn, at behaviour in recent times: the tactical and thirty-eight, was from the beginning consid- the strategic level. Looking at short-term fac- ered to be without any realistic prospect of tors, the CDU has in recent months managed winning the contest. After joining the CDU to organise a textbook power transition at fifteen, he became the youngest directly away from Merkel to Kramp-Karrenbauer. elected member of Germany’s federal parlia- By separating Merkel’s leadership of the ment at age twenty-two in 2002, and started government as chancellor from the party to focus on health policies. His subsequent leadership and by offering the CDU

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© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 membership a choice between three candi- Germany former Left Party supporters— dates with very different visions for the switched to the AfD to voice their disagree- party’s future, the party management is now ment with Merkel’s refugee and migration prepared for the time after Merkel. policies, claiming that their own social inter- There can be no reasonable doubt that ests had been ignored for too long. Kramp-Karrenbauer is the most promising It is significant to underline the close rela- choice for the CDU’s immediate future. Her tionship between the ‘first’ (post-2005) and political profile is much broader than that of the ‘second’ (post-2015) dealignment of for- her two contenders—the unreconstructed mer centrist voters from the centre-left and neoliberal Merz who had left frontbench poli- the centre-right, respectively. These two elec- tics for more than a decade and failed to toral shifts away from the centre are related expand his appeal beyond pro-business cir- by the feeling that the future holds little cles, and the more conservative Spahn who hope for those not able to compete in a had campaigned on opposing Merkel’s refu- rapidly changing socio-cultural and socio- gee and migration policies, that is, the most economic environment with little promise of painful subject that the party wished to leave welfare and security by the state. One French behind. As one observer has argued, the observer puts it as follows: ‘The population choice of Kramp-Karrenbauer means that ‘the would not feel as threatened by the refugees planned neoliberal restructuring (Umcodier- if the welfare state would not have been ung) of the CDU by Merz was avoided, and retrenched. It is often said that people vote the path of liberal modernisation will be for the AfD because they fear for their own further followed’.17 Thus, a narrow majority support by the welfare state. That one can of CDU delegates voted for the candidate that easily comprehend; after all their social offered the relatively best prospects to safety net was indeed massively cut down, maintain the CDU as a broad political although not because of the refugees but coalition. long beforehand by [SPD chancellor] Ger- From a strategic point of view, however, hard Schroder€ ’.19 the future of the CDU remains in doubt. In How is Kramp-Karrenbauer going to repo- recent years, there has been a dramatic sition the CDU in a period of growing social increase in electoral volatility. The CDU as insecurity? In terms of addressing the vari- the self-declared ‘party of the centre’ faces ous urgent issues—refugees and migration, the problem that the centre of society is social integration, economic policy-making— increasingly difficult to define: ‘The more the she needs to keep the party united and able bourgeoisie and bourgeois behaviour disap- to act. Her first high-profile activity as party pear as social phenomena, the less powerful leader was organising a workshop in early centrist strategies of political parties February 2019 with experts and practitioners, appear’.18 To be clear, the increasing elec- and without Merkel in attendance, to draw toral volatility is due to the decline of social lessons from the post-2015 refugee and integration in German society. One of the migration policies. During this meeting, major trends of twenty-first century Ger- Kramp-Karrenbauer acted as moderator many has been the growing split between inviting others to voice grievances and pre- winners and losers of modernisation. In the sent ideas on how to rebuild political trust. context of a fragmented centre, petty bour- Nevertheless, this discussion converged on geois milieus believe that their future social what had already been debated for years: standing is threatened. Crucially, the welfare cuts in welfare payments for migrants, more retrenchment of 2003 to 2005 (the ‘Hartz repatriation of failed asylum seekers and reforms’) produced a first dealignment of a efforts to strengthen border security and cohort of petty bourgeois and blue collar cooperation between EU countries. None of voters from the SPD and, less visibly, the this is going to produce quick results or sat- CDU/CSU. Some of these voters have re- isfy critics of Merkel’s track record. entered the electoral process in 2017 by vot- As for the related issue of social integra- ing for the AfD. In doing so, they were now tion, it is unclear how Kramp-Karrenbauer joined by a second dealignment: many for- intends to tackle the root causes of social cri- mer CDU/CSU and SPD voters—and in East sis, namely Germany’s dualistic labour

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 market with many categories of working of managing party affairs, CDU and CSU poor, and the decline of trust in welfare state members vote in two separate elections for institutions. Here, the CDU’s liberal wing two different party leaders, and only the for- mer case is discussed here. argues for a zero-sum choice between wel- € ‘ fare policies and tax cuts, favouring the lat- 2A. Blatte, Reduzierter Parteienwettbewerb durch kalkulierte Demobilisierung: Bestim- ter. Kramp-Karrenbauer has already mungsgrunde€ des Wahlverhaltens im Bun- signalled that she is willing to support CDU destagswahlkampf 2009’, in K.-R. Korte, Die liberals in demands to abolish the so-called Bundestagswahl 2009. Analysen der Wahl-, Par- ‘solidarity surcharge’ (Solidarit€atszuschlag), a teien-, Kommunikations- und Regierungsforschung, tax that was initially introduced after Ger- Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2010, pp. 273–97; M. H. many’s unification in 1990. The coalition Spreng, ‘Der Wahlkampfvermeidungswahlka- agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD of mpf. Eine Analyse der CDU-Wahlstrategie ’ March 2018 stated that this tax will be abol- 2009 , Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegun- gen, vol. 23, no. 1, 2010, pp. 52–4. ished for the lower 90 per cent of income ‘ ’ earners during the current government. The 3 O. Nachtwey, It doesn t matter who replaces Merkel. Germany is broken’, New York Times, CDU now demands that it should also be 7 December 2018. abolished for the top earners, which would 4A.Schafer,€ Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit. satisfy liberals but questions Kramp-Karren- Warum die sinkende Wahlbeteiligung der Demokratie bauer’s commitment to the social wing of schadet, Frankfurt, Campus, 2015; T. Schwu- her party.20 In short, she is subject to strong chow, interview with M. Micus, ‘Die Aktivier- and contradictory demands. ung der Nichtwahler€ durch die AfD’,16 It is too early to tell whether Kramp- September 2016; http://www.demokratie-goe Karrenbauer can protect and/or reinvent the ttingen.de/blog/aktivierung_nichtwaehler (ac- CDU as a political coalition. The rapid rise cessed 18 February 2019). of the AfD as a party combining national 5 H. Seehofer, CSU party conference speech, 6 September 2015, quoted in P. Muller,€ Der conservative cadres, often with roots in the Machtkampf. Seehofer und die Zukunft der CSU, pre-Merkel CDU, supported by uprooted Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2016, and disappointed voters from across the p. 117. political spectrum has demonstrated that 6 C. Linnemann, Die machen eh, was sie wollen. Germany’s party system is now in flux. Wut, Frust, Unbehagen—Politik muss besser wer- From the point of view of the CDU after den, Freiburg, Herder, 2017, p. 82. Merkel, how to deal with the difficult rela- 7 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer, ‘ ’ ‘ tionship between social and cultural integra- Wichtige Probleme in Deutschland and Poli- ’ tion under conditions of a structurally tik-Archiv ; https://www.forschungsgruppe. weakened state after a generation of deregu- de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Langzeitentwick lung_-_Themen_im_Ueberblick/Politik_-_Archiv/ lation and privatisation remains an open #Asylpol (accessed 18 February 2019). question. 8 ‘Gronemeyer€ kritisiert Merkel: “Sie kommu- niziert einfach nicht”’, Die Welt, 17 October Notes 2018. 9O.D’Antonio, C. Werwath, ‘Die CDU: Inner- All German sources translated by the author. parteiliche Willensbildung zwischen Gremien- 1 For historical reasons, Germany’s Christian arbeit und Grauzone’, in K.-R. Korte, J. Treibel, Democrats are nominally organised into two eds., ‘Wie entscheiden Parteien? Prozesse separate parties, namely the CDU in fifteen of innerparteilicher Willensbildung in Deutsch- sixteen German federal states and the Christian land’, Zeitschrift fur€ Politikwissenschaft, Sonder- Social Union (CSU) in the state of Bavaria. In band, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, pp. 35–61 the German federal parliament, the two parties (54). have always formed a joint parliamentary 10 If not otherwise indicated, factual information group (Fraktionsgemeinschaft). The two parties about the three candidates derives from the have twice, in 1976 and in June 2018, consid- online database ‘Munzinger Internationales ered splitting up their joint parliamentary Biographisches Archiv’; https://www.munzing group. The current article discusses the party er.de/search/query?query.id=query-00 (access- case of the CDU but refers to the CDU/CSU ed 18 February 2019). when reference is made to the joint parliamen- 11 K. Dunz, E. Quadbeck, Ich kann, ich will und tary group in the federal parliament. In terms ich werde. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, die

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© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 CDU und die Macht, Berlin, Propylaen,€ 2018, 17 A. v. Lucke, ‘Frauen an der Macht: Die CDU p. 158. nach Merkel’, Bl€atter fur€ deutsche und interna- 12 F. Merz, Mehr Kapitalismus wagen. Wege zu einer tionale Politik, vol. 64, no. 1, 2019, pp. 5–8 (6). gerechten Gesellschaft, Munich, Piper, 2008, 18 F. Walter, C. Werwath, O. D’Antonio, Die pp. 99, 117. CDU. Entstehung und Verfall christdemokratischer 13 E. Lose, ‘Friedrich Merz: Dieser Kandidat passt Geschlossenheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, p. nicht auf einen Bierdeckel’, Frankfurter Allge- 201. meine Zeitung, 31 October 2018. 19 D. Eribon, quoted in D. Binswanger, ‘Die 14 Quoted in E. Lohse, ‘Millionar€ der Mittelschicht: Herrschenden haben Angst—und das ist wun- Ist Merz ein Kandidat von gestern?’, Frankfurter dervoll’, Republik, 12 January 2019; https:// Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 November 2018. www.republik.ch/2019/01/12/die-herrschenden- 15 M. Brocker,€ Jens Spahn: Die Biographie, Frei- haben-angst-und-das-ist-wundervoll (accessed 18 burg, Herder, 2018, pp. 240, 257. February 2019). 16 J. Spahn, ‘Weiter ungeordnete, uberwiegend€ 20 M. Schieritz, ‘Solidaritatszuschlag:€ Milliarden mannliche€ Zuwanderung’, Frankfurter Allge- fur€ Topverdiener’, Die Zeit, 19 December meine Zeitung, 1 November 2018. 2018.

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019