www.ssoar.info From Merkel to Kramp‐Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself? Dostal, Jörg Michael Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Dostal, J. M. (2019). From Merkel to Kramp‐Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself? The Political Quarterly, 90(2), 286-296. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12680 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur This document is made available under a CC BY Licence Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden (Attribution). For more Information see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69731-0 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2, April–June 2019 From Merkel to Kramp-Karrenbauer: Can German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself? € JORG MICHAEL DOSTAL Abstract Germany’s Christian Democrats have started preparing for the time after Angela Merkel. After ten years as German chancellor facing a weak opposition, Merkel unexpectedly split the country in late 2015 and early 2016 because of her ‘open border’ policies that allowed more than 1 million refugees and migrants to rapidly enter Germany. Her management of the subsequent crisis was largely considered a failure and her party suffered a series of dra- matic election defeats. Reacting to the negative electoral feedback, and in particular the breakthrough of the rightist and anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Chris- tian Democratic Union organised an intra-party contest to replace Merkel as party leader. Three candidates with different political profiles, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich Merz and Jens Spahn, contested the election. By voting for Kramp-Karrenbauer, the CDU membership voiced support for maintaining a large-scale political coalition based on efforts to find compromises between different party wings and social and cultural interests. Keywords: Angela Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany, Friedrich Merz, Jens Spahn (SPD). In the last federal election of 2017, the Introduction former achieved 32.9 per cent and the latter IN THE twenty-first century, German politics 20.5 per cent of the national vote, their sec- has been transformed. The German polity is ond-worst and worst result ever in the now characterised by deep cultural, social history of the Federal Republic. Their subse- and political divisions. Two chronic policy- quent reluctant forming of a ‘grand coalition’ making conflicts have jointly undermined an government in March 2018 (the term appears earlier more consensus-driven political cul- hardly appropriate any longer since both ture. These are firstly the social welfare parties barely assemble a majority in parlia- retrenchments that were enacted between ment) raises the question as to whether Ger- 2003 and 2005 by the then ‘red-green’ Social many will follow most other EU countries in Democratic and Green Party coalition gov- experiencing an increasingly fragmented and ernment; and secondly the decision of Ger- weak party system. many’s Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) to This article takes up the case of the German allow refugees and migrants to enter the Christian Democrats (CDU), still the largest country in late 2015 and early 2016, which centre-right party in a core EU country, and resulted in the rapid influx of more than 1 asks how it plans to reorganise its political million people from African and Asian strategy in what will soon be the post-Merkel countries into Germany. era.1 In particular, how will the CDU manage In the larger context of socio-economic the transition away from Merkel to a new change and growing social inequality, these party leadership and, directly related, how is two political cleavages have jointly under- the party going to react to political challenges mined the electoral appeal of the traditional from right-wing populists (the Alternative for German ‘catch-all’ or ‘people’s parties’, the Germany (AfD) party), on the one hand, and centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/ competing centrist political forces (the Greens CSU) and the centre-left Social Democrats and the SPD) on the other? 286 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA In what follows, Merkel’s successful polit- was introduced in 2015. There were various ical past between 2005 and 2015 is briefly rounds of ‘rescuing’ public and private sketched. Next, the two central German banks and efforts to stabilise the euro cur- political cleavages (welfare, and refugees rency zone, none of these measures being in and migration) are examined in order to line with supply-side economics or neoliberal provide some background to better under- doctrine. Going against the general pattern stand the behaviour of Merkel and her of slow decision making, but not against the party in recent times. Thirdly, Merkel’s refu- general logic of her understanding of policy gee and migration policies since September making, Merkel moved quickly after the 2015 and the ensuing backlash are dis- Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 cussed. The fourth section examines how to commit Germany to abandoning nuclear the CDU reacted to Merkel’s decline in energy at some future point. This new pol- popularity and how her resignation as icy, the exact opposite of her previous party leader was prepared. The fifth section course, was subsequently termed ‘energy describes the subsequent contest, in early transition’ (Energiewende). In order to estab- December 2018, between centrist Annegret lish her party, and herself, as the natural Kramp-Karrenbauer and two more conser- centre of German politics, coalition with all vative candidates, Friedrich Merz and Jens relevant competitors (namely the SPD, anti- Spahn. Finally, the conclusion analyses the nuclear Greens and Liberals) had to be possi- future political opportunity structure for the ble at any point. In a similar context, the CDU in Germany’s by now well-established CDU’s profile on socio-cultural issues shifted six party system: will the CDU be able to from conservative to liberal and progressive reinvent itself under the new leadership of values. In particular, the party accepted Kramp-Karrenbauer? same-sex partnerships, expansion of public childcare, the ideal of dual earner house- holds, and dual nationality and citizenship Merkel’s successful past offers for certain categories of migrants. – Before being taken up by the Merkel-CDU, (2005 2015) these policies had initially been advanced by For most of Merkel’s chancellorship since electoral competitors. 2005, observers have argued that her leader- Analysts have therefore described Mer- ship pushed the CDU firmly to the centre kel’s general approach between 2005 and ground of German politics. During her time 2015 as ‘calculated demobilisation’ based on in office, she was credited with taking over ‘reduced party competition’ and an ‘elec- many policies of her electoral competitors— toral campaigning avoidance strategy’.2 the SPD and the Greens, in particular—while While conservative Merkel critics argued ‘modernising’ her own party in parallel. that she had turned the CDU into an empty Crucially, when Merkel became chancellor in shell devoid of any clear policy commit- 2005, she abandoned the radical welfare ments, her admirers instead praised her for- retrenchment of the previous SPD and Green mula for electoral success: occupying the Party coalition government in favour of political centre ground by borrowing poli- a return to small-step and incremental poli- cies from centrist competitors, and policy cies. Her economic policies were centrist, making based on consultation and incre- essentially going with the flow of events. mentalism. During her ‘grand coalitions’ She abandoned ‘ideological neoliberalism’ in with the SPD (2005–2009, 2013–2017, and favour of a more accommodating style, again since March 2018) and her single spell which also included re-regulatory policies on as leader of a centre-right coalition with the numerous occasions. Liberals (FDP) between 2009 and 2013, Mer- During her chancellorship, pensions were kel profited to a large extent from demobil- at first retrenched. Later on, policy delibera- ising mistakes of her coalition partners. tion started to focus on how to compensate After each electoral cycle, Merkel’s political disadvantaged groups and some minor partners suffered electoral defeat while her countervailing measures were enacted. After CDU maintained the role of the natural lengthy debate, a statutory minimum wage party of government. C AN G ERMAN C HRISTIAN D EMOCRACY R EINVENT I TSELF? 287 © The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 During the Merkel era, a general increase between 2003 and 2005 represented the high- in social inequality occurred. The working est peak of the neoliberal wave in Germany and middle classes experienced stagnant or rather than a stable neoliberal hegemony. The declining wages, while deregulated service reforms triggered a dramatic backlash—the work with low job security expanded.3 largest anti-government street movement