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ReportReport B B Full DataFull Data Presentation Presentation
prepared for MONCTON TECHNOLOGY PLANNING GROUP Preparedby the for the MONCTON TECHNOLOGY PLANNING GROUP By the IC²IC² Institute,Institute atTHE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN JANUARY 2007 THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
April 2007
Established in 2004, the Moncton Technology Planning Group is comprised of community leaders representing technology-based business, institutional research, venture capital, and local government. The MTPG’s purpose is to advance dialogue and action that will lead to the growth of technology-based enterprise in Moncton. Members of the group offer a wealth of innovation and technology experience, and share the common goal of building on the community’s strengths and potential to accelerate the growth of Moncton’s knowledge-based economy.
Steve Palmer, C.O.O., Whitehill Technologies Michelle Carinci, C.E.O., Atlantic Lottery Corporation Jon Manship, Chairman, Technology Venture Corporation Bob Rybak, Vice President of Technology, Spielo Robin Drummond, Senior Director, Government Sponsored Group, Spielo Rodney Ouellette, Executive Director, Beauséjour Medical Research Institute Stephen McClatchie, VP Academic and Research, Mount Allison University Marc Surette, Canada Research Chair, Cellular Lipid Metabolism, Université de Moncton Réjean Hall, Director, Innovation Support Office, Université de Moncton Graham Sheppard, Principal, NBCC Moncton Doug Robertson, Chair, Economic Affairs Committee of Council
The IC² Institute (The Innovation, Creativity & Capital Institute www.icc.utexas.edu) is an organized research unit of The University of Texas at Austin with the vision that science and technology are resources for economic development and enterprise growth; and the mission to enhance research and education on the enterprise system in order to promote widespread wealth creation and shared prosperity. Established in 1977, the IC² Institute founded the Austin Technology Incubator (ATI) in 1984; and in 1996 established the Master of Science Degree in Science and Technology Commercialization (MSSTC). Recently, ATI expanded to include the Austin Wireless Incubator, the Clean Energy Incubator, Digital Media incubation, as well as an active Global Commercialization Program. The institute has over 235 international fellows in business, academia and government – peers of excellence who actively support the vision and mission of the Institute worldwide. The IC² Institute directed by Professor John Sibley Butler, who is also the Director of the Herb Kelleher Center for Entrepreneurship at the McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin.
David Gibson, Co-Principal Investigator, Ph.D. Bruce Kellison, Co-Principal Investigator, Ph.D. Elsie Echeverri-Carroll, Research Scientist, Ph.D. John Green, Research Associate, MSSTC Darius Mahdjoubi, Research Associate, Ph.D. Robert Meyer, Research Associate, JD, MBA, MSSTC, LLM Rita Wright, Professional Librarian, MSLS Margaret Cotrofeld, Technical Writer/Editor Ryan Michael Coster, Graduate Research Assistant, Mount Allison University Megan Meyer, Undergraduate Research Assistant, The University of Texas at Austin Gina Phillips, Undergraduate Research Assistant, The University of Texas at Austin
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ACCELERATING Technology-Based Economic Growth & Entrepreneurship in Greater Moncton
REPORT B: FULL DATA PRESENTATION
Prepared for the MONCTON TECHNOLOGY PLANNING GROUP By the IC² Institute at THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
April 2007
With the cooperation of the government, universities, & businesses of Greater Moncton
The IC² team gratefully acknowledges the support and encouragement of the Moncton Technology Planning Group and its chair, Douglas Robertson. Group members not only opened their businesses, offices, and research programs to team members during the study but also facilitated interviews and data collection across Moncton and throughout New Brunswick. For their invaluable counsel in helping the research team to understand New Brunswick’s educational system, we thank Réjean Hall at the Université de Moncton; Virendra Bhavsar, David Foord, and Gregory Kealey at UNB; Michel Thériault at NBCC/CCNB; Richard Corey at NBCC; Graham Sheppard at NBCC-Moncton; and Claude Allard at CCNB-Dieppe. Finally, we would also like to recognize Mathieu Brideau of Business New Brunswick, and Ben Champoux with the City of Moncton for research assistance and expert advice.
This report is dedicated to the memory of Len Weeks: a true champion of innovation, as well as a mentor and friend to entrepreneurs in the Province of New Brunswick.
© Copyright January 2007, IC² Institute, The University of Texas at Austin. All rights reserved.
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ACCELERATING Technology-Based Economic Growth & Entrepreneurship in Greater Moncton
REPORT B: FULL DATA PRESENTATION
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 9
RESEARCH METHODS ...... 11 MONCTON’S TECHNOLOGY PATH ...... 11 STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS...... 12 CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW ...... 13 KEY OBJECTIVE 1: ACCELERATE TARGETED INDUSTRY CLUSTERS ...... 15 BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ...... 16
CASE STUDY: MEDSENSES...... 16 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND NEW VENTURES: AN OVERVIEW ...... 18 Three Styles of Venture Development...... 19 CASE STUDY: BMG CONSULTANTS, INC...... 22 AN INNOVATION PATH FOR MONCTON...... 23 R&D Paradigm vs. Innovation Paradigm...... 23 R&D Paradigm: Local IP Challenges...... 24 Coordinating Both Development Paradigms...... 25 Moncton’s ICT strength ...... 25 ICT and R&D...... 26 CASE STUDY: SPHERIC TECHNOLOGIES...... 26 STRATEGIES FOR A MONCTON TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION CENTER (MTCC)...... 28 Phase I Suggestions for the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) ...... 28 Phase II Suggestions for the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) ...... 30 PROPOSAL: CREATIVE LEARNING INSTITUTE IN DIGITAL MEDIA ...... 33 Why Moncton ...... 33 Suggested Creative Learning Institute Affiliates ...... 33 CASE STUDY: MINDSWEEP ...... 34 KEY OBJECTIVE 2: FOCUS ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP ...... 37 FINANCING ...... 39
CASE STUDY: WHITEHILL TECHNOLOGIES...... 39 CASE STUDY: MICRO-OPTICS ...... 41 FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND STYLES OF VENTURE DEVELOPMENT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS ...... 42 Venture Capital Institutional Investment...... 43 International Venture Capital Patterns...... 45 Leading VC institutional investors in the Moncton region ...... 46 Individual Investors and Angels ...... 47 Government Agencies ...... 48
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Bank Loans...... 51 Self-Funded Ventures ...... 52 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 52 Self-Funded Ventures ...... 53 Loans ...... 53 Government Agencies...... 53 Individual (Angel) Investment Network...... 53 Institutional Investment...... 54 CENTRAL TEXAS ANGEL NETWORK: A POSITIVE MODEL ...... 54 CASE STUDY: VIMSOFT INC...... 55 CASE STUDY: INTELISYS AVIATION SYSTEMS, INC...... 56 KEY OBJECTIVE 3: FOSTER ACADEMIC & RESEARCH EXCELLENCE ...... 59 TALENT, EDUCATION & TRAINING ...... 62
CASE STUDY: ARDENT DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS...... 62 EDUCATION...... 63 Technical Education: K-12 ...... 65 Bilingual Education ...... 66 Success Rates of Placing Students at a University ...... 67 Quality of Math Education...... 67 Drop-Out Rates...... 68 An Issue of Concern— A Declining Student Population ...... 68 K-12 Education for Tomorrow’s Workforce ...... 70 K-12 Education: Assets and Challenges...... 71 UNDERGRADUATE: IT EDUCATION...... 71 Private Colleges: IT-Related Programs...... 72 Community Colleges – IT-Related Courses...... 73 Universities: Science & Engineering Education ...... 74 Universities in Moncton ...... 75 Other Universities in New Brunswick Province Educating Most of the Monctonians...... 75 Closing the Gap in the Local Supply of University-Educated Workers...... 77 CASE STUDY: VE NETWORKS ...... 81 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT BASE ...... 83
CASE STUDY: WIND ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ...... 83 CASE STUDY: NANOPTIX ...... 84 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT FUNDING...... 86 R&D Investments: Universities...... 87 Distribution of Research Funds at Universities in the Province...... 91 ICT-RELATED RESEARCH CENTERS...... 93 University of New Brunswick at Fredericton...... 93 Mount Allison University (Sackville, NB) ...... 94 CENTERS RELATED TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP ...... 94 Université de Moncton...... 94 University of New Brunswick at Fredericton...... 94 University of New Brunswick at Saint John ...... 94 R&D INVESTMENTS IN THE NB UNIVERSITIES: ASSETS & CHALLENGES...... 94 ACTION PLAN TO ACCELERATE MONCTON’S KNOWLEDGE-BASED GROWTH ...... 95 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER...... 95 Preferred IP Policies and Technology Transfer Practices...... 95 IP Ownership: The Oxford and Cambridge Model ...... 96 Moncton: Existing IP Practices...... 98 Action Items...... 99
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KEY OBJECTIVE 4: PARTNERSHIP AND ALLIANCES ...... 101 ECONOMIC BENCHMARKING: MODEL FOR SUCCESS ...... 101
MONCTON—A SMALL CITY WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY GOALS ...... 102 Choosing a Benchmark City for Moncton...... 102 Oulu —Small In Size, Big In Technology...... 105 The Beginnings ...... 106 Oulu Today ...... 106 Behind Oulu’s Success...... 107 NEAR-TERM ACTION ITEMS ...... 107 CASE STUDY: THIN FILMS AND PHOTONICS RESEARCH GROUP (GCMP)...... 108 ENLARGING NETWORKS ...... 109 KEY OBJECTIVE 5: PROMOTE A COMMON VISION FOR DEVELOPMENT ...... 111 CLOSER REGIONAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL EXPERTISE ...... 112
BUILDING KNOWLEDGE-BASED INFRASTRUCTURE IN MONCTON...... 112 Bioinformatics: The Bridge between ICT and Research & Development (R&D) Centers...... 112 Beauséjour Regional Health Authority ...... 112 South-East Regional Health Authority, Moncton Hospital...... 113 Action Plan ...... 114 CASE STUDY: ATLANTIC CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ACRI) CASE STUDY...... 114 CASE STUDY: SPIELO/GTECH ...... 116 A LAND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE...... 119 Clustering Digital Content Assets and R&D Commercialization Assistance ...... 119 Background...... 119 Deal Structure...... 120 Finance...... 121 Marketing ...... 121 Benefits, Motivation and Rewards...... 122 CASE STUDY: MONCTON FLIGHT COLLEGE ...... 122 CONCLUSION...... 125
FINAL FOCUS: THE OPPORTUNITY AT HAND...... 125 APPENDICES ...... 127
APPENDIX A. 2006 SURVEY ANALYSIS, MONCTON REGION GRADUATE STUDENTS ...... 128 Survey Sample ...... 128 Survey Methods ...... 130 KEY SURVEY FINDINGS...... 130 APPENDIX B. SURVEY INSTRUMENT ...... 141 English...... 141 Français...... 148 APPENDIX C. OPEN RESPONSES TO SURVEY...... 155 APPENDIX D. MONCTON TRI-CITY AREA IT COMPANY TIMELINE ...... 161 Methodology & the Dataset...... 161 Timeline Trends ...... 161 APPENDIX E. BENCHMARKING CITY COMPARISONS...... 174 APPENDIX F. THE RESEARCH TEAM ...... 176 APPENDIX H. BIBLIOGRPAHY...... 180
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and RECOMMENDATIONS1
Accelerating Technology-Based Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship in Greater Moncton provides select strategies for Moncton, New Brunswick, to take control of its economic destiny. The report emphasizes the importance of having common visions and action plans to mobilize key local partnerships. A main theme is the importance of collaboration and cooperation among Greater Moncton business, academic, and government sectors. The effectiveness of these partnering activities will largely determine the region’s ability to create high-value jobs; educate, attract, and retain talent; and to accelerate economic growth while sustaining a high quality-of-life for all citizens.
The overall vision is for Greater Moncton to be nationally and internationally recognized as a region that is known for education and research excellence, creativity and entrepreneurial success, and globally competitive business development in targeted technology sectors.
The report is organized in two parts. Report A (Executive Summary and Recommendations) contains key findings and action items. Report B (Full Data Presentation) contains the body of the report and supporting research data collected by the IC² team during the study.
Greater Moncton has been a regional leader in the use of strategic planning to guide economic development, as evidenced by at least three community-wide strategic planning efforts undertaken in 1989, 1994, and 1998. In 2004, the Moncton business community perceived that its direction and unity of purpose (that had been so successful in the 1990s) were being challenged. It found itself at a crossroads, partly due to the decreasing frequency of new business investments and the increasing frequency of call center jobs moving overseas. Consequently, Moncton stakeholders set as their mission to increase the quality of jobs in the economy and to increase the level of educational attainment in the workforce.
This report emphasizes the key role of significant but limited assets, and both real and perceived challenges, for accelerating technology-based growth and entrepreneurship in Greater Moncton. Challenges include: 2 Successfully recruiting established firms Launching and growing business start-ups Growing centers of R&D excellence Post-secondary education opportunities Expansion of career employment opportunities in knowledge-based industries The emigration of Moncton’s young, educated talent
1 The section “Executive Summary & Recommendations” is also published under separate cover as “Report A.” Some of these materials are included with more detail in the remaining sections of this report. 2 Building on Our Success: A Strategic Plan for Greater Moncton, Enterprise Greater Moncton, April, 2004; New Brunswick Capacity Study: Gaming, Simulation and Animation Industry Report, Red Hot Learning, Inc., October, 2004; City of Moncton Economic Development Strategy, City of Moncton, November, 2005; Research & Discovery, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2005).
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Limited national and international visibility The lack of a common vision, brand, and strategic plan
In recognition of regional challenges, The Moncton Technology Planning Group (MTPG)3 and other community leaders came together to commission the IC² Institute at The University of Texas at Austin to do an action-oriented study for accelerating technology-based entrepreneurship and economic development in Greater Moncton. The underpinning belief is that: Technology-based growth is key to the creation of wealth and career oriented jobs. Rapidly changing national and global realities require change in regional economic development strategies and policies. Moncton needs to be pro-active in determining its own destiny, rather than reacting after the fact.
Working closely with the Moncton Technology Planning Group (MTPG), the IC² Institute at The University of Texas at Austin conducted an assessment of Moncton’s business, academic, and government assets, challenges, and opportunities. A main objective was to identify specific near- and longer-term action initiatives for accelerated technology-based entrepreneurship and economic growth in Greater Moncton to: Facilitate successful recruitment of companies and talent (e.g., professional, entrepreneurial) in targeted industry sectors. Assist the growth of existing local technology-based organizations. Assist in the incubation and accelerated-growth of regionally based and globally competitive companies. Leverage regional public and private assets more effectively, as well as national and international partnerships, see Figure 1.
Figure 1. Four Strategies for Regional Economic Development
Company/Talent Company/Talent New Firm/Talent Relocation Retention & Development Expansion
Regional, National, Global Partnerships for Leveraged and Smart Economic Development
Source: IC² Institute, The University of Texas at Austin
3 The Moncton Technology Planning Group (MTPG) is comprised of community leaders representing business, institutional research, venture capital, municipal government and community economic development.
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RESEARCH METHODS
The IC² Institute research team collected and analyzed data from January to September 2006, including: Five team and individual visits to Moncton Interviews with over 100 local and provincial leaders in academia, business, and government (See Appendix G for the complete list of interviewees.) Reviews of 45 published economic development reports on Moncton, NB, and Atlantic Canada (See Appendix H for bibliography.) A survey of 2006 college and university graduates from Moncton’s post-secondary educational institutions to gauge their future employment plans and impressions of Moncton’s economy (see Appendices A, B, C for the complete survey and analysis.)
The scope of work included: Developing a benchmark of existing Information and Computer Technology (ICT) companies within Greater Moncton Documentation of Moncton’s research and development assets including governmental programs and educational resources, and existing private companies Developing case profiles of local technology-based businesses and entrepreneurial successes Identifying specific assets and challenges for technology-based innovation and company growth, including assessing available and potential sources of capital
MONCTON’S TECHNOLOGY PATH
Moncton has two clear asset classes for growing a knowledge-based economy. The first is represented by Moncton’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector with over 400 companies (see Timeline Companies in Appendix D).4 Within ICT, Moncton’s strengths exist in the area of interactive software (including game design, IT education, and software design), digital media, and informatics (manipulating, storing, and classifying recorded information, especially in the health sciences). The second technology-based asset class is represented by Moncton’s existing R&D centers, including the Atlantic Cancer Research Institute, the science research being conducted at the Université de Moncton, and the bioscience commercialization initiatives at Mount Allison University. Technology transfer and commercialization from these R&D centers, to a large degree, is in its infancy. Large-scale commercial development in R&D, with significant local job growth, while encouraged, is a longer-term proposition.
Simultaneous investment in both ICT and targeted R&D activity is recommended. Investment of resources in ICT can be distributed across more companies and more
4 We use the definition of ICT companies supplied by Statistics Canada: “Industries primarily engaged in producing goods or services, or supplying technologies, used to process, transmit or receive information.” It is based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Statistics Canada website, “Special Aggregation: Information and Communication Technology (ICT),” accessed November 16, 2006.
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entrepreneurs, creating greater potential for job creation and economic growth. On the one hand, with the array of ICT assets that currently exist in Moncton, it is recommended to focus finances (and other resources for near-term wealth and job creation) toward assets that offers the greatest and quickest return on investment: innovation and entrepreneurship in digital content including services and product development. This report’s recommendations specifically embrace five of the eight focused sectors from Moncton’s 2005 Strategy Report: Gaming technologies Animation sector Information and communications technologies Software development E-learning
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
To better focus Moncton’s priorities and objectives with regard to accelerated technology- based growth and entrepreneurship, “strategies for success” were defined in terms of five key objectives, which are supported by content as follows.
OBJECTIVE 1. Accelerate technology-based business development in established and emerging industry clusters with the greatest growth potential. The industry cluster with the greatest growth potential in Moncton is ICT (Information and Communications Technology). Key recommendations include the creation of Moncton Technology Commercialization Center that will serve the needs of ICT entrepreneurs and provide commercialization services to Moncton’s R&D centers; and a plan to build a Creative Learning Institute in Digital Media in which to test game design and equipment for Spielo, Atlantic Lottery Corporation, and other local companies. It also recommends an innovation path for Moncton based on existing ICT strengths and R&D centers of excellence. It expands on the importance of nurturing fast- growing companies by presenting a novel typology of companies and their use of different sources of financial capital.
OBJECTIVE 2. Develop Greater Moncton as an emerging center of technology-based entrepreneurship. An environmental scan and assessment is presented of the sources of financial capital available to growing technology companies in the region, with emphasis on increasing the amount of funding available for start-up companies. A model for organizing angel investors in Moncton in also offered.
OBJECTIVE 3. Foster academic and research excellence that is specifically linked to regional economic development. Educational assets are summarized and analyzed in order to recommend strategies to improve the post-secondary educational attainment gap between the Anglophone and Francophone communities in Moncton. Existing R&D investments are also examined, with particular attention paid to university- based sponsored research. Existing and preferred intellectual property and tech transfer regimes in Moncton and the region are also summarized.
OBJECTIVE 4. Foster and leverage regional, national, and global value-added partnerships and alliances. Specific steps are outlined, that the city could take to create an incubator and
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innovation center through a land development initiative. The presence of significant activity in bioinformatics in the city, especially at the two hospitals, suggests that bio- and health- informatics could be a bridge between ICT and R&D assets in the city.
OBJECTIVE 5. Promote a common vision and coordinated action initiatives targeted to brand Greater Moncton as an important emerging center of technology-based entrepreneurship and business development. Oulu, Finland is presented as a model of success for IT development, and overall conclusions are presented to assist local champions to coordinate a regional effort for action.
CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW
In order to provide a rich and more textured perspective on the business environment for technology companies in Moncton, seventeen case studies on individual companies or organizations have been developed by IC² project staff. Data on individual companies or organizations were collected from a variety of public information sources, as well as interviews with principals and business partners. Interspersed throughout the report, the purpose of the case studies is to celebrate success stories in Moncton’s technology sector, to highlight assets and challenges for tech firms in Moncton, and to summarize “lessons learned” from which similar companies might benefit in the future. These companies illustrate the breadth and depth of innovation in Moncton’s economy, as well as the vibrant economic impact that technology firms can make in the Moncton region. Firms were not selected randomly; instead the IC² team members made a deliberate attempt to include ventures that were: important for lessons learned represented a cross section of different technology sectors represented a variety of company sizes, years in business, etc.
Company case studies appear as follows: Large Firms Micro Optics, page 41 Nanoptix, page 83 Spielo/GTECH, page 116 Whitehill Technologies, page 39
Small Companies/Start-ups Ardent Development Solutions, page 62 BMG Consultants, Inc., page 22 InteliSys Aviation Systems, Inc, page 56 MedSenses, page 16 MindSWEEP, page 34 Spheric Technologies, page 26 VE Networks, page 80 Vimsoft, page 55
Case study-type write-ups on other institutions/organizations: Atlantic Cancer Research Institute, page 115 Moncton Flight College, page 122 Thin Films and Photonics Research Group (GCMP), page 108
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Wind Energy Research & Development, page 82
In prologue, the following appendices are offered for further data examination: A. Survey Of Graduate Students Results, Analysis; B. Survey Instrument; C. Open Responses To Survey; D. Timeline Companies; E. Benchmarking City Comparisons; F. The Research Team; G. Interviews; H. Bibliography.
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KEY OBJECTIVE 1: Accelerate Targeted Industry Clusters Accelerate technology-based business development in established and emerging industry clusters with the greatest growth potential.
Vision: Greater Moncton experiences accelerated technology-based company growth for enhanced wealth and job creation. Challenges: Limited density/size of R&D centers and industry sectors Inventor-owned intellectual property regime Limited sources of financing for start-ups Limited talent for senior management and corporate board Strategies: Establish an inventory of established academic assets. Establish an inventory of regional industry. Link R&D centers to local business and start-ups more effectively through such activities as a Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC), a Creative Learning Institute in Digital Media, and a Bioscience Consortia. Better identify and coordinate sources of financial support for R&D through commercialization and business start-ups. Specific Actions: Provide a strategy for establishing a Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) – Incubator. Focus on dual, simultaneous economic development strategies for: o Near-Term Innovation-Based Growth (e.g., ICT, Gaming) o Longer-Term R&D-Based Growth (e.g., Biosciences, Informatics, Thin Films). Initial tenants in the incubator could include: Dr. Yves Gagnon, K.C. Irving Chair in Sustainable Development at the Université de Moncton, has a technology commercialization proposal to develop a new company to build a small wind turbine for residential and small business applications; also Dr. Gagnon’s proposed Eco-Efficiency Center would promote reduced industrial energy use through better energy management, efficient waste processes, and outreach efforts (see complete case study). Dr. Rodney Ouellette, Scientific Director and CEO, Atlantic Cancer Research Institute, has research that is viable for commercialization (see complete case study). Both IT departments at the two Moncton hospitals have expressed interest in developing closer contacts with local IT companies and
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commercializing research from their hospitals by opening an office in a new incubator. Enhance existing assets and knowledge, which are closer to the market place; success with near-term objectives will provide momentum and resources to support more long-term research and development. Strengthen outreach to regional business know-how. Involve faculty and students from the Université de Moncton, Mount Allison University, New Brunswick Community Colleges in Moncton and Dieppe and others. Develop links with the Austin Technology Incubator (www.ati.utexas.edu). Develop national and international partnerships and alliances focused on targeted industry sectors through, in part, strategic alliance with IC² Institute (www.icc.utexas.edu). Finance: Provide subsidized office space at the proposed MTCC for VC and angel investors. o Invite VC and angels from outside region. Promote “Bootstrapping” as a viable form of venture funding. o Form an advocacy organization to coordinate resources and provide mentorship for gazelle-type ventures. Develop and organize a local business angel network. Identify and coordinate VC, angel, and governmental financial support for business development (downstream activities) as well as R&D development (upstream activities). Education/Training: Improve workforce education and training program mechanisms within specific technology sectors in the Greater Moncton Region (see Key Objective 3).
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
CASE STUDY: MedSenses Interview with Trisha Coady, CEO
MedSenses (medsenses.com) offers custom-built continuing education modules for healthcare professionals in need of specialty and mandatory training. This e-learning start-up provides hospitals and other developers with the ability to seamlessly integrate a variety of portable courseware, complete with 3-D interactive tools, into other proprietary learner management systems. The company’s two founders, Trisha Coady and Lynn Casey, are nurses from Moncton Hospital who started writing content for instructor-led courses and seminars in 2001. “We wanted to get critical thinking back into the course materials we delivered, which was well-received by our audiences,” said Coady. In January 2006, the pair secured a three-year entrepreneurial leave from the hospital in order to devote themselves full-time to the start-up.
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Background In 2004, Coady and Casey formulated their business plan by talking with industry associations in a variety of countries to ascertain the need for continuing education in the nursing field. “We discovered that hospitals are desperate to save money on continuing education in order to meet budgetary constraints,” said Coady. They also want to exercise due diligence to improve the quality of patient care, decrease patient length of stay, and minimize the occurrence of medication errors. A related market, healthcare corporations, also has the specific need to offer accessible, high- quality continuing education to their employees.
As information technology began to spread throughout the nursing field, MedSenses realized that an online format would be the most efficient manner to accomplish these goals. Their first courses included 3-D animations and interactions that were created in collaboration with local animators. “Medical animators were too expensive for us, so we contracted with a Moncton company, Kervan Media, to provide us with graphic design, learning management systems software connections, and technical support,” Coady said.
MedSenses is trying to tap an enormous market: there are 56 million nurses in the world, and it is vital for hospitals to constantly recruit, retain, and provide continuing education for this skilled workforce in order to maintain high levels of patient care. The firm’s current clients include corporations and individual end-users across Canada and the U.S., providing a modest revenue stream to the fledgling firm. MedSenses courses are accredited by the American Nurses Credentialing Center (the only nursing credentialing body in North America), which provides a critical advantage in the marketplace.
Assets and Challenges Connectivity: MedSenses became frustrated with the lack of adequate wireless internet services in both of the office locations that the company has occupied in downtown Moncton. Neither Aliant nor Rogers offers local technical support; instead technical trouble-shooting and problem-solving are forwarded to a third-party call center. Although broadband internet coverage is available, it also only provides marginal technical support. In addition, Coady says that Aliant is unable to break apart three phone lines for their needs; consequently the company will probably go with VOIP when it is time to upgrade to a system that can handle greater call volume. “It’s frustrating that we are an on-line company that cannot get on-line access on Main Street in Moncton,” she says.
Financing: Coady and Casey went everywhere in their search for start-up capital -- banks, credit unions, BNB, NBIF, NBIC, ACOA, BDC, and Enterprise Greater Moncton -- with no success. “Everyone was reluctant to support two nurses from Moncton,” Coady says. As a result, she and her co-founder turned to a private investor for MedSenses’ first funding round, which kept MedSenses afloat during its R&D phase from September 2005 to May 2006. They then found a business mentor in Saint John to help position the company with investors, and to assist with networking and building a board of directors. Following the R&D phase, when it grew necessary to seek a second round of funding, the same funding agencies and sources that turned them down for the first round, saying they were too inexperienced, turned them down again just months later saying they were now too advanced. Coady observes that venture capitalists expect a large amount of equity for a small amount of investment,
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while potential institutional investors do not accurately evaluate MedSenses’ intellectual property.
Global reach: Like other ICT start-ups in Moncton, MedSenses understands the importance of attacking international markets at early stages in its growth. Currently the company has been contacted by U.S. and Canadian software firms in the healthcare industry to negotiate value-added channel relationships. Coady and Casey have also been contacted by a U.K. marketing firm to discuss a possible E.U. market infiltration as well. The company’s immediate focus is to reach 1.3 percent of the 3.3 million nurses in North America with its courses by 2008.
Lessons Learned Networking and Mentoring: MedSenses believes that the key to helping start-up firms succeed is to improve the networking and mentoring environment. “We have networked with Learn NB and through the Cyber Socials, but many business mentors and angel investors in the region understand ‘bricks and mortar’ companies more quickly than ICT companies,” said Coady. “But once we found the right people, by pushing our networking activities to the limit, Moncton has been a great place to be located.”
Funding: Any start-up, but especially a technology start-up, has trouble raising capital – a problem that is magnified in an environment dominated by traditional industries and a lack of well-networked angel investors. MedSenses has been particularly frustrated by programs that offer funding opportunities but then quixotically remove the offer. Coady cites the “Women in Business Initiative” by TriCo Credit Union, which has promoted a $150 million fund for women-owned businesses. Loans, however, are only available if a start-up has $1 million in the bank as collateral.
MedSenses has learned that VC investors are more receptive to investing in the ICT industry because they understand the incredible potential for rapid growth and wealth creation of such companies. Coady’s experience shows that investors in traditional industries -- as well as some government agencies -- still consider ICT businesses to be high risk, despite easy access to global markets and low overhead costs.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND NEW VENTURES: AN OVERVIEW
Perhaps the most influential researcher to underscore the importance of new entrepreneurial firms for job creation is MIT researcher David Birch5 who was the first recipient of the prestigious International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research by the Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research.6 According to Birch, a type of business venture which he designated “Gazelle ventures,” accounted for more than 70 percent of the employment growth in the U.S. between 1992 and 1996, while representing only about 3 percent of the firm population.7 Birch demonstrated that Gazelle
5 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2005 Report on High-Expectation Entrepreneurship http://www.mazars.de/download/studien/GEM%20full%20report.pdf#search=%22DAVID%20BIRCH%20%22who %20is%20creating%20jobs%22%22 6 http://www.fsf.se/eng/index.htm 7 Birch, D. (1987). Job Generation in America. The Free Press, New York. Birch, D. (1995). Who is Creating Jobs? Cognetics, Cambridge, MA.
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ventures are distinct from other types of business ventures in style, manner, pattern and result. Birch’s work has important implications for how Moncton might address the question of how best to promote and finance knowledge-based firms.
For new venture development, the need for capital investment increases in a direct relationship to the time required to bring a new technology to market. The two investments of time and money increase in tandem, according to the complexity of the technology under development. It is generally true that great technology advancements require great investments of both. It is assumed that financial debt is necessary in order to provide marketable advancements in technology. However, it is a false assumption that new venture success is directly related to access to large amounts of venture capital. A novel theory of innovation postulates that the ideal path for new ventures is not always through heavy capital investment.
Three Styles of Venture Development There are two main thresholds in the early stages of venture development: Start-up—when the founders spend substantial amounts of their time (part time to full time); and Breakeven—when total sales become equal to total costs, and the new venture has the capability to gain positive cash flow. Accordingly, the early stages of venture development are classified into three distinct stages: Ideation, Survival, and Growth. The Ideation stage precedes the start-up threshold, when generating new ideas is the main concern of the new venture. The Survival stage occurs between start-up and the breakeven point, when cash flow is negative and the new venture is trying to keep itself afloat. The Growth stage happens after the new venture is able to pass the breakeven point and has a positive cash flow.
All new ventures may be divided into three types as they each pass through these stages of venture development. New ventures seem to conduct business in similar fashion during the Ideation stage: the core technology is defined while the conceptual groundwork is laid for marketing, human resources, and company organization. After the Ideation stage, new ventures enter the Survival stage and follow one of three paths: the slow lifestyle path (“Turtle” ventures); the fast organic path (“Gazelle” ventures); or the express path (“Rocket” ventures), Figure 2. 8
“Rocket ventures” are “revenue calibrated” in the sense that they are capable of fast growth if fueled adequately with extensive investments of capital. During the Survival stage of business development, Rocket ventures set out upon the risky course of assuming a substantial debt burden in order to reach the breakeven point in sales (thereafter growing with irresistible market momentum). This development pattern is generically considered to be the one true commercialization path. New ventures of this type include pharmaceutical start-ups and other high-tech ventures that are venture-capital-driven. During the Survival stage, Rocket ventures plunge into massive debt in order to build organization, perfect a core technology, and recruit the talent needed to perfect a venture that will explode through the Growth stage, where massive profits are anticipated. Astronomical revenues and staggering profits are expected to manifest and provide both a) repayment of the incurred debt and b) high rewards for the founders and their shareholders.
8 The section Three Styles of Venture Development is based on the studies of Darius Mahdjoubi.
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Figure 2. Patterns of Cash-flow and Sales in Three Styles of Venture Development
$ Startup Break-Even Point
(Cash Flow) Slow Lifestyle Path – (Sales) $ Turtle Ventures Time Survival Growth Ideation
$
(Sales) $ (Cash Flow) Fast Organic Path – Time Gazelle Ventures Ideation Survival Growth
$
(Cash Flow) (Sales) $ Express Path – Time Ideation Survival Growth Rocket Ventures
© Darius Mahdjoubi, 2006
However, many Rocket ventures do not exit the Survival stage; many languish for years in the stark absence of profitability while they continue to attract investment in consecutive rounds of venture capital. Data and practical experience both demonstrate that only a fraction of these ventures ultimately succeeds. Many venture capitalists aspire to a one-in-six success rate. The core technologies that spawn successful Rocket ventures usually arise from a research infrastructure of talent, equipment, and facilities.
“Turtle” ventures, in comparison to Rocket ventures, are financially conservative. Turtle ventures are founded by entrepreneurs motivated to reach the breakeven point of profitability (reflected in cash flow) with a minimum of debt. Their business goals are modest, growth is slow, and sweat equity is common. Founders of Turtle ventures think and act small in the beginning. In a sense, they try to carry what they need with them as they move along the business cycle.
While few Rocket ventures flare into profitability, and Turtle ventures cling to the safety of low cash flow, Birch’s data showed that some new ventures build value while minimizing fixed costs; keep expenses at a minimum, and achieve profitability with modest sales but a strong balance sheet; and then are able to position themselves to warrant major venture capital investment. These “Gazelle ventures” survive conservatively until they reach profitability with a razor-sharp competitive edge. If properly resourced with financial support at the right moment in their business cycle, these companies can attain rapid growth and significant revenues but without the debt burden and the high mortality rate of Rocket ventures. Moncton has such success stories, including Spielo and Whitehill Technologies. These two ventures show exactly this history; enterprise value was cautiously established before venture capital was invested. Their founders were familiar with latent market demand in ICT sector niches; their technologies were pulled by an identified market demand rather than pushed by creative scientific impulse.
“Gazelle ventures” hold a position between Turtle and Rocket ventures. Gazelle and Turtle ventures are both self-funded companies in the first two stages of company development: Ideation and Survival. Yet Gazelle ventures are distinct from Turtles in the aspirations of
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their entrepreneurs, and the type of technologies they pursue. The differentiation of Gazelle ventures from Rocket ventures can be made during the Survival stages of development. Gazelle ventures are not based on technologies that require lengthy, expensive scientific processes. At the same time, the founders aspire to achieve returns beyond sustenance levels; the companies are founded on a longer term plan for growth that can be well articulated; the management style strives for efficiency and does not scale for explosive growth until the product is profitable; frequently the technology is based on reverse engineering; management seeks to satisfy a specific, identified market demand, in lieu of establishing organizational buildup to support the perfection of a technology that requires expensive, lengthy development. Birch first pointed out twenty years ago, that only after reaching profitability, when imminent success is likely, do Gazelle enterprises assume the higher risks that Rocket ventures at start-up.
Understanding the distinct role of Gazelle ventures is what earned Birch reputation and acclaim. His novel theory of innovation, applicable to the circumstances in Moncton, proposes a method not merely for identifying but also nurturing Gazelle ventures. Rocket, Gazelle, and Turtle ventures each rely on specific sources of capital. Rocket ventures need extensive financial backing and operate like mature businesses very early in their life cycles. Yet the presence of capital does not guarantee longer term sustainability; and abundant initial capital will sometimes result in unrestrained spending. In contrast, Gazelle ventures seek modest amounts of financial capital from personal resources, minimal loans, and credit from suppliers and customers.
New high-tech ventures with laboratory-based R&D-derived core technologies require large infusions of capital for product development; these ventures, by necessity, will be Rocket ventures. Hard science R&D must usually be fed with large amounts of capital through the Survival stage because the chasm to be crossed between a prototype and a market launch is vast. Furthermore, the requirement for executive management and board governance is much higher for Rocket ventures than for Gazelle ventures. Costly investments during Survival stage leave little room for error in the commercialization path; early missteps that are later magnified during the growth stage cannot be afforded.
Cutting-edge R&D as the ideal innovation model (as it evolved in the 20th Century) requires heavy funding to sponsor a large research base and additional infusions of capital as each new competitive advantage is refined for marketability. ICT, however, is market-driven, not research-driven and can display short time-to-market periods when managed by market- savvy penurious founders. If one compares the time-to-market for a new drug versus a new software program, a new bio science product versus a new video game; or a new cancer treatment versus an internet service, one immediately recognizes the difference between Rocket venture development and the Gazelle/Turtle type of venture development.
Many founders of “Turtle” ventures never intend to achieve large growth, but prefer their companies to remain modest. As such, their contribution to the macro economy is minimal, except in the aggregate. Other ventures by their very nature must be undertaken as Rocket ventures with all the risk that is entailed to that model. As such, the cost to society for Rocket ventures – when measured across the large number of failures – limits their net contribution to the macro economy. Gazelle enterprises, on the other hand, leverage dedicated resources with the least risk, to produce the greatest return on a community’s investment.
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If a community’s sole metric is home-grown homeruns, resources should be dedicated exclusively to Rocket ventures. If, however the desired metric is knowledge-based economic development, the probability of success increases when placing investments in Gazelle enterprises. However, if not properly resourced by their environment, Gazelle ventures will be relegated to remain Turtle ventures, and their communities will be the poorer for it. The question is not how Moncton can grow a limited number of Rocket ventures, but how might the region nurture as many Gazelle ventures as possible.
CASE STUDY: BMG Consultants, Inc. Interview with Louis-Philippe Gauthier, Co-founder and President
Background BMG specializes in web site development, web applications, and eMarketing. As the largest Francophone IT company in Atlantic Canada, the firm has a strong link to the communications field through their ownership of CapAcadie.com, the largest French news and information portal in Canada outside of Québec.
Philippe Gauthier, a graduate of the Université de Moncton, co-founded the company in 1996. At first, Gauthier shunned government funding or assistance from angel investors and focused instead on growing the company from sales and savings. From 1996 to 1999, the tools that allowed the use of databases via the web proliferated; BMG's first big project, in 1998, was to develop the first fully web-based payroll processing system in Canada for the federation of French Credit Unions.
In 2005, Bristol (Atlantic Canada’s largest full service communication firm) became the majority shareholder of BMG. These new partners provided BMG with access to capital and new market opportunities. This transaction has had a substantial impact on BMG’s revenues and has allowed the company to more than double its employee base from four to ten employees in one year.
Assets and Challenges Gauthier feels the entrepreneurial climate in Moncton and Dieppe could improve by mentoring of young people with the initiative and desire to become entrepreneurs. Both French- and English-speaking businesses should offer more internships and more readily provide personal mentoring to students and young people. Gauthier is the president of the Conseil Économique du Nouveau Brunswick (the association representing the French business community for over 25 years); he also teaches MIS courses in the MBA program at the Université de Moncton. Gauthier explains that while some mentoring does take place, a more systematic process would be beneficial. He suggests that Enterprise Greater Moncton and the Chamber of Commerce, in collaboration with the CÉNB, and the Université de Moncton, could lead the effort to foster mentor programs.
Lessons Learned Gauthier asserts that the cultural differences that exist between the cities of Moncton and Dieppe should be leveraged as opportunities to contribute to economic development in both cities. Every effort should be taken by local leadership in government and business, he says, to encourage business growth in both cities, because "any plan to grow Moncton necessarily includes Dieppe." A publicly funded ICT incubator available to entrepreneurs in both cities could be a successful first
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step, because the ICT industry in Dieppe is not very large; companies based in Dieppe would benefit from synergies created around an ICT incubator that housed firms from both the Francophone and Anglophone communities.
AN INNOVATION PATH FOR MONCTON
Moncton has two clear asset areas in its knowledge-based economy: organically launched ICT companies, and the R&D activity represented by centers of excellence like the Atlantic Cancer Research Institute. Moncton’s knowledge-based innovation economy is currently developing along two paths. The first path is innovative, in which start-up companies, mostly in the ICT sector and outside the R&D centers, arise spontaneously from entrepreneurial initiatives. In the near term, the growth and expansion of these companies and the emergence of new ones in the ICT sector could be dramatically assisted by a supply of resources housed in a new incubator. Longer-term, an innovation center could evolve around the incubator, providing a wider range of resources and services for entrepreneurs and companies large and small, and some governmental agencies like Atlantic Canada Lottery. Taking an even longer view (20 years), the innovation center itself could transition into a research park. The second path for increasing knowledge-based entrepreneurship in Moncton involves commercialization of R&D coming out of the research centers in the region, much of which is in the bioscience disciplines. Developing companies and creating wealth along both these paths will involve strategies that are both distinct and overlapping; the R&D paradigm and the innovation paradigm.
R&D Paradigm vs. Innovation Paradigm9 In the 1950s and 1960s, the prevailing view was that the combined effect of basic research, applied research, and development was the only path to regional economic prosperity. A paradigm grew around the discovery of knowledge (developed within specific scientific disciplines in university, government, or corporate labs) that was shared with industry through technology transfer and introduced to the public.
Technology-intensive companies closely affiliated with universities and corporate private labs undeniably contribute to economic growth and job creation. However, since the 1970s a second alternative -- the Innovation paradigm – emerged that integrates customer development with organically derived technology. Companies that dwell in the sector where digital content resides (such as Apple, Microsoft, Compaq, Lotus, and Dell) were not founded on university research but achieved success because they seamlessly merged technologies with markets. The founders did not possess strong technical capabilities or academic credentials; many of them were college dropouts. Contrasting these two paradigms provides a new perspective for Moncton’s potential business development strategies from the micro level of individual companies to the macro level of regional community development. Bioscience technologies require the structure of the R&D paradigm; ICT development, on the other hand, tends to flourish in the Innovation paradigm. Each paradigm displays distinct parameters, including management styles, investment patterns, product life cycles, resource needs, etc.
Because the technologies that come out of lab-based research require a massive amount time-consuming product development, start-up companies in the R&D paradigm require a
9 The section R&D Paradigm vs. Innovation Paradigm is based on the studies of Darius Mahdjoubi.
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large, ongoing cash infusion of venture capital (the Rocket model of development). These companies need particularized resources, including boards of directors, mentor management, and advisors with first-hand experience in that business model. Successful commercialization of cutting-edge science normally requires rigorous technology assessments, market studies that involve complex patent searches, and industry analyses that carefully evaluate technologies that compete closely in a tight market space. It is difficult to nurture and protect a competitive advantage that is based on incremental advancements of basic science; consequently early-stage R&D companies tend to polarize employment between senior management and scientific personnel.
The founders of start-up companies in the Innovation paradigm, on the other hand, tend to be self-funded; and if they reach profitability, they do so more quickly than R&D-based companies because they are usually smaller-scale companies with low overhead and rapid product development. These companies also need particularized resources and incubator services. The core technology of these organically grown companies is innovation of existing knowledge, usually provided by a founder with an intuitive sense of market direction and technology application. The high cost associated with protecting intellectual property, is not usually an issue; and the division of labor in early stage organic innovative ICT companies is egalitarian: concentrated among skilled labor, project managers, and entrepreneurial founders.
The rate of new start-up activity and the time-to-market for new products and services is markedly different in these two paradigms. It is not by coincidence that the bioscience cluster along Route 128 in Boston is vertically integrated with a more closed structure, while Silicon Valley benefits from open networks of communication horizontally across firms. The R&D paradigm tends to result in vertically integrated firms, while innovation paradigm firms flourish under non-proprietary standards, in decentralized organizations with cooperative information sharing and in which some processes are outsourced. In order to fully leverage assets and resources, bioscience commercialization will, as a rule, proceed under a different paradigm than digital content and therefore should be planned for accordingly.
R&D Paradigm: Local IP Challenges Excellence can be found in a number of bioscience niches in the Moncton region. However, numerous factors mitigate the choice of R&D-based bioscience as the primary near-term target sector for building a knowledge-based economy. While exceptional successes are in store from ongoing bioscience R&D, the challenge to efficiently commercialize those successes in the near term is great, and is tied to complex IP, tech transfer, and financial capital issues. As a result, the R&D model is unlikely to contribute to significant job growth in Moncton in the short- to mid-term. For the foreseeable future, significant advances in this sector are most likely to be accomplished through licensing agreements. Out-licensing, which normally leads to migration of IP outside of the region, is not a strong method for promoting local job growth.
Start-ups in the bioscience sector require close attention to business formalities in the early stages, so that in later stages venture capital companies can make investment without facing the frustration of dealing with equity apportionment, anti-dilution, defective share holder agreements, and other contentious governance issues. It is of high concern that, in the Atlantic provinces, talent for the highest level of corporate governance and executive management mentorship is in short supply.10
10 The challenges facing bioscience start-ups in Atlantic Canada were outlined in an interview with Peter Forton, Growthworks.
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Also of high concern, the current IP regime grants university inventors unilateral decision- making power over new technologies. Even excellent legal counsel and commercialization expertise must face the challenge to avoid circumstances in which intellectual property is inadvertently negotiated away in head-to-head discussions between faculty/inventors and multi-national corporations’ licensees and research sponsors. If institutional experts could be unilaterally empowered to make commercialization decisions, the situation would be vastly different. Presently, most inventors may elect whether or not to embark on a commercialization path – a decision that can come late or not at all. Faculty/inventors, as IP owners, have a qualified obligation to participate in commercialization initiatives, even in the presence of low personal interest for the process. A conundrum exists: while there is often a “disconnect” between IP generators and economic development planners, other inventors plea for help with commercialization.
Coordinating Both Development Paradigms In Moncton, simultaneous investment of resources in ICT and formal R&D is appropriate. Greater potential for job creation and economic growth should be realized with resources invested in ICT, which will ultimately spread resources across more companies and more entrepreneurs. Moncton would be best served to focus its resources in this sector, as it emphasizes innovation in digital content services and product development.
Moncton’s ICT strength The recommendation to invest in Information and Communications Technologies specifically addresses the five key threats and challenges that the City of Moncton identified in its 2005 strategy report:
1. Demographics: The niches in the ICT sector that are recommended directly appeal to the more youthful age brackets and address the aging population dilemma. 2. Limited post-secondary education opportunities for Anglophones: Establishment of new articulation agreements and computer science and applied IT programs in Moncton to raise the number of post-secondary educational offerings for Anglophone students. 3. Lack of challenging employment opportunities in knowledge-based industries and the creative economy: Employment data suggest demand for ICT jobs is up, even while enrollment in IT programs at CCNB and NBCC is down. A promotional campaign to reverse this trend is needed region- and perhaps province-wide. ICT entrepreneurship should be directly supported by the proposed Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC). 4. Weak attractiveness factors that are crucial to making our city more appealing to younger people: It is recommended, for example, that an international gaming conference be staged in Moncton and that digital content niches be promoted in primary and secondary educational programs 5. Weak national and international visibility: Moncton’s ICT entrepreneurship could be accelerated with the support of a specialized incubator. While the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) can be branded provincially, international entrepreneurship can also be promoted through competitions promoting international student exchange similar to the USA/Canada/Mexico program in place at the Université de Moncton’s Faculty of Business. The 2005 Plan presented eight focused sectors for development; of these, we suggest targeting five: Gaming technologies Animation sector Information and communications technologies
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Software development E-learning
A primary ICT focus also reverberates at the national level. The Committee on the State of Science and Technology in Canada, sponsored by the Council of Canadian Academies, in its 2006 report, specifically promotes “new media, multimedia, animation and gaming, where Canada is internationally recognized as a leader, with a number of successful companies as well as a reputation for superb skills training” and recognizes its upward trending momentum second only to oil sands nationally. Aside from technologies and sciences related to natural resources, the national view is “the perception of strength is greatest for…information and communications technologies (ICT).”
ICT and R&D To increase knowledge-based entrepreneurship, the City of Moncton should purposefully move toward a dual economic development strategy that leverages the community’s ICT assets while it nurtures the community of R&D researchers. It is vital for Moncton to support ICT start-up companies that arise organically through entrepreneurial, market-driven innovation, as evidenced by the predominance of digital content companies in the community’s timeline of overall start-up activity (see Appendix D). It is also important to commercialize R&D in the region, for longer-term growth with high potential for return. Both these strategies would be promoted with the development of a regional business incubator. Further, an incubator would create new communication channels between these two entrepreneurial communities, which could result in more synergistic commercialization of new technologies as they emerge into the marketplace.
CASE STUDY: Spheric Technologies Interview with Adam MacDonald, Co-founder
In 2001, Spheric Technologies was founded like many local start-ups: in the basement of a suburban home. With the leadership of founders Dan Martell and Adam MacDonald, the company has been in full operation for two and a half years and is quickly building a reputation as a competitive provider of consulting and support services for companies using a BEA® Aqualogic portal.
Background Early in its operations, Spheric was off to a running start, earning $1 million in gross sales in its first fiscal year. The company currently employs a team of 10 and hopes to expand its operations by 12 employees in the next year. Most of Spheric’s clients (roughly 90 percent) are in the United States, though the company also serves a number of Canadian clients. The Spheric team travels across North America to assist these clients to plan and implement customized portals using the BEA® Aqualogic technology; they also perform limited amounts of research and product development in Moncton to complement these services.
One of Spheric’s central doctrines is to do more with less. Martell and MacDonald have established a lean operation to keep costs as low as possible. Any function outside of the company’s core competency is outsourced, so that time and money are not spent trying to develop unnecessary skill sets. This lean operating philosophy has been a driving force in overall growth, as it enables them to frequently underbid competition and secure projects. Spheric has also financed the entirety of its
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operations and growth from sales revenue without help from loans, government grants, or venture capital.
Assets and Challenges Basing Spheric’s operations in Moncton is critical to its competitive edge. Low salary and overhead costs enable the company to keep operating expenses low, and consequently, able to underbid the competition. Spheric has also benefited from open communication lines with other technology firms in the region, particularly Ardent Technologies. Company officers regularly participate in Moncton’s Cyber Socials to develop relationships with other local technology companies. While these companies compete -- both in the marketplace and for local talent -- they also cooperate to their mutual benefit. For example, other companies will sometimes refer potential employees to Spheric when the applicants’ skill sets are better suited to its operations. Likewise, Spheric and Ardent have established a support relationship so that Spheric employees located all over North America can receive technical support from Ardent staff if no one is available at Spheric.
But while Spheric does not require extensive office space (its employees frequently work at client sites), they have found it difficult to find affordable office space that is centrally located. Likewise, Moncton’s business internet connectivity is insufficient to their needs; and is all the more frustrating because resources are in place that could make local connectivity more effective.
Spheric also faces significant difficulties traveling in and out of Moncton; there are few direct flights and the airport is small. Employees often need to make numerous connections in order to reach their destination, which can add hours to travel time. Continental’s new direct flight has been helpful, but more resources in air travel are needed.
Spheric leadership feels that -- while technology education in Moncton is strong -- local colleges should be more responsive to the needs of local companies. While coursework prepares students generally, there is a need for specialized courses in technology areas: a benefit that would be felt at Spheric and other local technology companies as well. NBCC, CCNB, and other local colleges with technology programs should more frequently seek input from the ICT industry regarding curriculum selection and course offerings -- in order to provide graduates with the skill sets required by local industry.
Lessons Learned Spheric suggested several initiatives to assist new companies in Moncton. First, internet connectivity should be improved with more fiber optic lines; further, a wireless network in downtown Moncton would be beneficial. “I would love nothing better than to be able to go down to Timothy’s, grab a cup of coffee, and do some of my project management work,” says twenty-something founder, Adam MacDonald.
MacDonald also recommended a formalized system to help entrepreneurs in the community to share experiences and resources. MacDonald suggested a new system like Cyber Socials be established that is open to all entrepreneurs in the region rather than just technology firms. He is also an advocate for a formalized mentoring program in the community to help foster better business skills. While
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Spheric has sought needed consulting services in larger Canadian cities, local resources would be preferable.
STRATEGIES FOR A MONCTON TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION CENTER (MTCC)11
The recommendation for a Moncton regional technology commercialization center (incubator) and larger innovation center (science park) is to start small, leverage available resources to the benefit of the tenant companies, and build a track record of success. IC² Institute’s Austin Technology Incubator (ATI) was launched in 1989 in 4,000 square feet of donated office space. The City, the County, and The Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce seed-funded the three-year experiment – about $30,000 each for three years – to create wealth, generate jobs, diversify Austin’s struggling economy, fill office space, and help catalyze and build an entrepreneurial infrastructure for the City. The main expenses were salary for the incubator director and her assistant, office supplies, and building taxes. Office furnishing and equipment were donated from university surplus and by local office/furniture supply stores in hopes of developing a new customer base. Professional legal, accounting, management, and marketing talent from the region also donated their time to assist the companies in order to help grow future paying clients. In addition to receiving rent from tenant companies, a private financial donor contributed additional needed funds. Of the first three tenant companies: One was recruited from California, one from a local research consortium, and another from The University of Texas at Austin. The strategy was to select the best candidates for near-term success to establish a positive track record.
Phase I Suggestions for the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) The delivery of value-added services becomes a vital differentiator between successful and unsuccessful incubators.12 The National Business Incubator Association (NBIA) published a report of the incubation industry and identified typical services (by more than 75 percent of the respondents) offered by technology incubators: • assistance with business basics • marketing assistance • accounting/financial management • investor and strategic partner linkages • networking activities • links to higher educational institution • conference rooms and other shared facilities • shared administrative services
Figure 3 provides an overview of the critical components of ATI and shows the public private regional support (university, business, government, non-profit) that was key to the incubators success. Each of these sectors was represented in ATI’s Advisory Board. A Technical and Business Advisory Board also helped review and select the best incubator tenant companies. ATI was affiliated with the newly formed Texas Angel Capital Network as there was limited Angel and VC investment available in the region in 1989. Most important was the selection of a highly capable incubator director. ATI’s first director was not a technologist, but she was extremely capable at evaluating or “sizing up” prospective tenant companies; in building
11 “Overview of U.S. Incubators and the Case of the Austin Technology Incubator,” by J. Wiggins and D. Gibson, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2 (2003). 12 Ibid, p. 58.
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regional academic, business, and government networks; in focusing on and assisting with tenant-company mentoring for success; and being entrepreneurial in leveraging physical resources, talent, and business know-how. The incubator’s director and know-how networks also worked to help find financial support and building alliances with established companies.
Outputs of ATI centered on shortening time-to-market by minimizing mistakes and maximizing value-added learning. ATI was a living learning experiential laboratory for students and faculty. As graduating companies grew, they hired local students and other employees, paid taxes, filled local office space, and generally contributed to the local community. These same organizing principles were emphasized when ATI, in 1991, moved into its second facility of 60,000 ft. and housed about 22 companies (mostly IT). The incubator staff was kept to about 4 persons, but the professional know-how network grew to include hundreds of professionals.
Figure 3. Important Basic Components of Technology/Business Incubators
Product/Process Incubator Affiliation T Commercialization e
n Profits
a Non-Profit Government Private University Viable n . Companies t Technology Economic Entrepreneurs Development Incubator C Technology o (non-profit/profit) m Job Creation p Industrial Support Systems a Competitiveness Capital Administration n Global i Know-How Facilities Networks Networks e s Experimental Laboratory
Based on the ATI model, Initial crucial MTCC criteria for success include: Deal flow – promote sufficient numbers of technology and business applicants so the incubator has the ability to select the most promising business ideas. Community support and involvement – local business and government officials support the incubator and provide free or discounted professional advice to tenant companies University support and involvement –faculty and students teach and work at the incubator, helping the companies with technology and business assessments, marketing plans, financial plans, etc., while the companies provide experiential learning opportunities.
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Figure 4. Ten success factors for the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center
Concise program On-site learning Access to milestones with and leveraging financing and clear policies and of resources capitalization procedures
Tie to a In-kind university professional support
Incubator
Selection Community process for support tenants
Entrepreneurial Perception Entrepreneurial networks: regional, of success education national, international
Phase II Suggestions for the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) As a Phase II model for MTCC, we again look to the Austin Technology Incubator. When ATI’s initial success warranted larger facilities, the incubator moved to its present location, where it occupies about 40,000 sq. ft. in a university-owned building. Financial support has been provided by tenant company office rent, research projects, occasional contributions from the city, and private sector partnerships. Over the years, as a result of changing local and global conditions, ATI has transitioned from a location for subsidized rent, business plan support, and business know-how support, to enhanced value-added support and market making activities (see Figure 5). Initially ATI welcomed a broad range of technology-based companies, but it has increasingly focused of late on industry sectors that are most linked to regional emerging business sectors and related UT-Austin academic excellence, including IT, wireless, Clean Energy, and Digital Media.
An additional current focus of ATI is to facilitate global incubation; international companies are incubated at ATI with an emphasis on “market making” support. For example, ATI is currently mentoring 12 select companies from Mexico. The TechBA program is funded by the Mexican government with the goal to accelerate technology business growth though increased access to U.S. markets and business alliances. ATI has also launched cooperative programs with Poland and Portugal and has had tenant companies from Brazil, Japan, and Canada.
ATI served as a catalyst for Austin’s economic recovery in the 1990s by developing an entrepreneurial support infrastructure, expanding the region’s tax revenues, and increasing demand for commercial office space. Over the years ATI has measured itself according to four basic criteria: business creation, wealth generation, innovation, and value to the
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Figure 5. ATI’s Transition in Value-Added Activities for Tenant Companies Value to today’s entrepreneur
“Market making”
Sector-specific acceleration (clean energy, Start-up wireless) infrastructure support
Time 1989 •Office space As at left, plus: As at left, plus: 2006
•Professional •High-touch •Access to services consulting “chokepoint” Example services facilitation technologies, key offered to •“Virtual Board” customers •Capital networks entrepreneurs •Target capital •Business matchmaking consulting (e.g., Sevin Rosen)
Source: Isaac Barchas, ATI Director 2006
university (student internships and entrepreneurship research). As of 2006, ATI has graduated more than 150 companies, raised $720 million (USD) in capital, had four companies launch initial public offerings, had 20 of its companies acquired, launched 30 independent profitable companies, and created 3,000 direct and 7,000 indirect jobs. ATI has won numerous awards, including NBIA’s award as Incubator of the Year and the prestigious Justin Morrill Award from the Technology Transfer Society. Four of its companies have won NBIA incubator “Company of the Year” awards. Indeed, ATI has served as a model incubator for a number of incubation programs in the U.S. and worldwide. Important lessons have been learned about successful business incubation:
Sustainability must be addressed. In the USA, more that 75 percent of all incubators are non-profit being supported by local governments, academic institutions and/or local businesses.13 After its initial success in launching fast-growth companies, in about 1995 ATI started asking for 1-3 percent equity in companies admitted into ATI and more recently requests financial compensation for value-added services provided by industry sector efforts.
Develop a workable selection process. Selecting the right companies is a key consideration that sets apart one incubator from another. The selection process needs to be rational, well communicated, and appropriate to the mission and context of the incubator while being flexible enough to allow for exceptions in unusual situations. Specific product and business criteria should govern the companies allowed in and those kept out. Each of the various stages (application, recruitment, due diligence, selection,
13 Ibid, p. 57.
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induction, and orientation) requires attention. Adequate databases should be kept; records of agreements should be archived.
ATI employs both an internal and external review process requiring both written and oral material from those who apply. The written material (business plan and/or executive summary) shows the quality of thought put into the business and the depth of domain knowledge of the team. The verbal presentation provides an opportunity to meet and observe the team. The external process brings the company before a panel of outstanding investors, entrepreneurs and service professionals from the community; thus assuring a fair hearing of its business proposal. The external panels also provide a way for ATI to connect to the community and provide potential alliances between the presenting company and the audience members.
Develop service system that delivers on behalf of client companies. All incubators are service organizations. Whatever services it offers – from facilities to partner networks to funding to education and training – an incubator must measure itself according to two standards. It should design value-added services that client companies need and deliver those services in a consistent, timely, and value-added fashion.
Provide entrepreneurial leadership. A critical attribute of successful incubation programs in the U.S. is an entrepreneurial staff. From director to receptionist, each should assume a “can-do” attitude, an ability to solve problems, a clear focus on results, and a willingness to work hard. An incubator’s first director usually sets the tone for the future development and long-lasting success or failure of an incubator program.
Establish clear metrics of success. Every incubator program should establish criteria of success against which it measures its performance. According to the NBIA, industry- wide priorities include creating jobs, creating new business, reducing business failures, accelerating business success, facilitating capital investment, and leveraging funds. Select incubators may have other domain-specific and local objectives such as encouraging minority or women entrepreneurs, revitalizing a distressed neighborhood, commercializing technologies, diversifying local economies, moving people from welfare to work, building or accelerating growth of a local industry, generating income and benefits for the sponsoring organizations, retaining businesses in the local community, and enhancing a community’s entrepreneurial climate.
ATI’s growth has taken a natural and logical course: growing in size as it takes on more companies; growing in services as “best practices” are honed and developed; enlarging its networks as a natural result of pairing high potential companies with venture capitalists and other professionals in the community; expanding to strategic new industry sectors as the region’s economy diversifies. Most importantly, the Austin Technology Incubator is an interactive component in Austin’s economy as a whole – and it is supported by broad-based interests and financial investments. With similar community focus and support, the MTCC could serve as a similar catalyst to accelerate technology development in Moncton.
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PROPOSAL: CREATIVE LEARNING INSTITUTE IN DIGITAL MEDIA
We propose the creation of a collaborative gaming and ICT-related innovation center in Moncton. Tentatively called the “Creative Learning Institute in Digital Media,” the center would operate as an idea laboratory for new technologies, where students could interact with companies to test new devices, games, consoles, and other technologies. Initial funding could come from appropriate government programs, Atlantic Lottery Corporation, and Spielo/GTECH. Such a gaming facility could dedicate a portion of its revenues to support research activities at the center. Technologies and talent could be drawn from the funding partners and affiliates (see below) as well as secondary and post-secondary educational institutions across Atlantic Canada. Similar alliances could be formed with national and international affiliates including The University of Texas at Austin; Austin’s game, film, and arts businesses and communities; and select IC² global partners (e.g., Portugal, Poland, Korea).
An underlying premise is that enhanced creativity will result from collaboration between creative talent that is broad-based, eclectic, and from diverse backgrounds and geographic locations. Atlantic Canada is a preferred product and market development location for gaming technologies; new alliances can enlarge current markets and create new ones while increasing the region’s international reputation in this industry sector.
Why Moncton Atlantic Lottery is headquartered in Moncton. GTECH has major operations in Moncton as well as Austin, Texas and Poland. Moncton benefits from strong, knowledgeable executive and knowledge links to GTECH. Being based in Atlantic Provinces, Canada, Atlantic Lottery is free from many product development and marketing constraints that exist in such places as Texas and generally in the U.S. Moncton is a central location to draw on student talent from colleges and universities in Atlantic Canada. Moncton desires to accelerate technology based growth and has champions dedicated to this vision.
Suggested Creative Learning Institute Affiliates Austin, Texas Related Assets: Austin is the third largest gaming development location in the U.S. with successful gaming pioneers and current leaders such as Richard Garriott, NC Soft. Dell Computers, founded and based in Austin, is moving rapidly into gaming through alliances with champions like Garriott and others. Digital film producer Richard Linkletter, a graduate of UT Film School, films many of his creative and innovative productions in Austin. The City of Austin is working to build its Digital Media economic development related activities. The University of Texas at Austin is building a Digital Media Center of Excellence, drawing on computer sciences, engineering, and the creative arts. IC² Institute’s Austin Technology Incubator (ATI) is considering the creation of a Digital Media Facility to leverage with the successful ATI Wireless Incubator. Austin’s entertainment sector (e.g., film, music) is world-recognized and growing. IC² Institute has an on-going Visiting Scholars Program with Korea Telecom, which is moving into the mobile gaming space and is sending its executives to study at UT’s Film
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School for developing content know-how (Korea is a leader in gaming and wireless technologies).
Portugal-Related Assets: Portugal has developed trusted relationships with key academic, business, and government officials in technology commercialization over the past ten years. The Portuguese government is developing a 5-year R&D and commercialization agreement with IC² Institute and UT-Austin focused on Digital Media. Several Portuguese companies have novel technologies and content based on the EU market, e.g., www.YDREAMS.com.
Poland-Related Assets: IC² Institute has established networks based on 3 years of program development with leading Polish universities. Poland has relatively inexpensive world-class technology and software developers. The University of Texas at Austin’s College of Communication is linked to the world famous Lodz Film School in Poland. Dell Computers is opening a plant in Lodz, Poland.
Clearly, other country partners for talent, technology, finance, and markets could and should be added, but it is suggested to launch the Moncton Creative Learning Institute with the above known, value-added entities.
CASE STUDY: MindSWEEP Interview with Eric Papillon, President and Founder
MindSWEEP was founded in Dieppe as a web development company in 2002. The company offers web design, hosting, marketing and promotion, as well as other IT services to clients all over the world. MindSWEEP started with 12 clients and a team of 3 technology experts, including founder Eric Papillon.
In the first two years of operations, its revenues doubled, and after four years, its client list has increased to 450, serving clients in the United States, Mexico, Africa, and nearly every province in Canada. About 10-15 percent of its 450 clients are located in or around the Moncton/Dieppe area. With a meager $1,200 annual marketing budget, Papillon feels the increase in clients is a result of customer service and satisfied client referrals.
Papillon has been asked to speak repeatedly as a model entrepreneur to students at CCNB-Dieppe, and in 2005 his company was awarded the City of Dieppe’s “Emerging Business Award.”
Background Eric Papillon started his web-development business amid the technology crash of 2001-2002 with very little business background. He moved to Dieppe from Prince Edward Island where he had worked as a general manager for a struggling IT company. Papillon decided to start his business in Dieppe because the majority of his competitors were in Moncton, and he hoped to absorb a large portion of the local Dieppe market if he was located there. “I’ve always been the kind of guy to take a
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risk,” he says. Starting MindSWEEP from scratch with little investment support was a significant risk.
Currently renovating their offices in Dieppe, MindSweep also plans to open an office on Prince Edward Island. “Enlarging our current offices makes more financial sense than moving into a new location, with rents as high as they are,” says Papillon. It has been challenging for Papillon to find reasonably priced office space in Dieppe. Though it would be slightly less expensive to move to Moncton, he feels the competitive advantages of staying in Dieppe are worth the extra expenses.
Assets and Challenges Papillon found it difficult to obtain early-stage funding. He sought support from governmental agencies such as the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), and the National Research Council Industrial Research Assistance Program (NRC- IRAP), but was disqualified under their funding restrictions. (To be eligible for funding, he needed to have more capital on hand and to document revenue from international contracts.) MindSWEEP also had difficulty obtaining commercial loans; banks were reluctant to fund a new technology company when so many had recently failed in the area.
MindSWEEP has not had difficulty finding quality staff locally, though Papillon does feel that many of the graduates of local universities are not given sufficient opportunity to practice what they are learning. To be part of the solution to that problem, he consistently hires students for internship positions to help them gain necessary experience.
Lessons Learned MindSWEEP requires fiber optic internet connections to run its business. Unfortunately, the small number of suppliers makes subscribing to a service expensive. Papillon feels that a fiber optic loop around the city of Moncton would be beneficial to MindSWEEP and other companies that require the connection; further, he feels that an established loop would attract more providers of fiber optic service increase competition, and lower the cost of internet connectivity.
The Moncton/Dieppe area would also benefit if local universities or community colleges would develop IT education that integrated entrepreneurship and basic business skills (although a new concern arises to establish access to start-up capital for new entrepreneurs graduating from such a program).
Papillon supports the development of a new technology center that would provide free or discounted services such as teleconferencing to emerging companies. It would likewise be beneficial if the region established an incubator center for young companies to provide affordable office space and common services such as reception staff, and necessary electronics such as telephones, computers, copiers, and fax machines. Papillon has been contacted by private sources seeking to establish such facilities in both Dieppe and Prince Edward Island, but a government- funded resource would be more useful to local companies like MindSWEEP.
He is a proponent that internship programs be provided through regional universities, as well as incentives for local companies to participate in these programs in order to provide students better preparation to join the local workforce upon graduation.
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Finally, Papillon asserts that the region needs to develop additional financing opportunities for start-ups in addition to conventional ACOA or IRAP funding. It is difficult for companies to obtain support from these agencies before they have demonstrated revenues, but impossible to develop products to generate revenues without investment capital.
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KEY OBJECTIVE 2: Focus on Entrepreneurship Develop Greater Moncton as an emerging center of technology-based entrepreneurship.
Vision: Greater Moncton becomes a national and international center for educating, recruiting, and retaining entrepreneurial talent. Challenges: Greater Moncton is currently losing some of its best entrepreneurial talent to higher- paying jobs and more exciting career opportunities in Toronto, Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax, and elsewhere (See Student Survey, Appendices A, B, C). Existing entrepreneurial support mechanisms are fragmented. Strategies: Celebrate Moncton’s entrepreneurial successes that have overcome regional challenges (see Case Studies for Spielo/GTECH, Whitehill Technologies, Ardent Development Solutions, BMG, Mindsweep, VE Networks, and Vimsoft). Recognize the importance of – and actively support – grassroots development of entrepreneurial initiatives to educate, retain, and recruit talent. Specific Actions: Organize a Greater Moncton Entrepreneurial Council: o Facilitate monthly meetings with small dues for refreshments, promotion, speaker fees, etc. o Provide a forum for regional, national, and international speakers. Use Internet and web infrastructure for virtual community-building among Moncton entrepreneurs. Foster entrepreneurship of younger individuals in the region: o Create a regional business plan competition for university and college students and an associated competition for regional high schools. o Offer entrepreneurial training for key personnel in start-ups and in established firms. o Take advantage of the talent of local residents who are retired or semi-retired, who would be outstanding mentors for younger entrepreneurs. Provide small grants which may lead to larger funds from outside sponsors: o Create a venture research fund for faculty and students supporting new research leading to commercialization that is unlikely to be supported by traditional sponsors without further development. o Limit most grants to around $20,000 Canadian (or less). o Focus funds to encourage research and innovation in targeted technology areas. o Make a concerted effort to bring back entrepreneurial talent that traditionally has left the community for post-secondary education and for better paying jobs and career development elsewhere.
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Simultaneous investment in both ICT and targeted R&D activity is recommended. Investment of resources in ICT should be distributed across more companies and more entrepreneurs, creating greater potential for spectacular success in job creation and economic growth. With the array of ICT assets that currently exist in Moncton, it is recommended to focus finances (and other resources for near-term wealth and job creation) toward the single asset that offers the greatest and quickest return on investment: innovation and entrepreneurship in digital content including services and product development. Five of the eight focused sectors from Moncton’s 2005 Strategy Report are recommended: Gaming technologies Animation sector Information and communications technologies Software development E-learning
Current recommendations (see below) specifically answer five key threats and challenges to the ICT growth that the City of Moncton identified in its 2005 strategy report:
1. Demographics The niches in the ICT sector that are recommended directly appeal to more youthful age brackets to address Moncton and New Brunswick’s aging demographics. 2. Limited post-secondary education opportunities for Anglophones Establishment of new articulation agreements and computer science and applied IT programs in Moncton to raise the number of post-secondary educational offerings for Anglophone students (See Key Objective 3).14 3. Lack of challenging employment opportunities in knowledge-based industries and the creative economy Employment data suggest demand for ICT jobs is up, even while enrollment in IT programs at NBCC and CCNB is at capacity. 4. Weak attractiveness factors that are crucial to making the city more appealing to younger people It is recommended, for example, that an annual gaming conference be staged in Moncton and that digital content niches be promoted in primary and secondary educational programs. 5. Weak national and international visibility Moncton’s ICT entrepreneurship could be accelerated with the support of a specialized incubator. While the Moncton Technology Commercialization Center (MTCC) can be branded provincially, international entrepre- neurship can also be promoted through competitions promoting international student exchange similar to the USA/Canada/Mexico program in place at the Université de Moncton’s Faculty of Business.
14 The City of Moncton’s “Downtown Moncton Development Vision” supports the idea of locating a university presence in the downtown area. See p. 5, http://www.moncton.ca/search/english/cityhall/downtown/strategy- draft.pdf
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FINANCING
CASE STUDY: Whitehill Technologies Interview with Steve Palmer, Chief Operating Officer
Whitehill Technologies was founded in Moncton in 1997 to develop software for billing-related document conversion for law firms and their clients. Whitehill has since developed similar products for customers in the insurance and financial services industries. They currently have over 800 clients in the U.S., Europe, and Canada, with annual revenues over $25 million. The company operates from a 20,000 square-foot facility in Moncton and has a large presence in Markham, Ontario and other smaller offices, including Roanoke, Virginia.
Background As a start-up company in Moncton, Whitehill benefited at first from provincial and federal programs that wanted to see it succeed in the region; service excellence among its original employees, many of whom are still with the company; and supportive infrastructure in the growing city of Moncton. Whitehill's founders recognized a niche in the processing of legal documents and in short order developed a product, a marketing strategy, and a sales force. Many law firms, the founders realized, have very high levels of customer service and often customized documents to meet client needs. Document customization is often a time-consuming manual process that is prone to errors. Whitehill developed software to automate this process. These products "lead and leverage," according to Palmer; that is, they are globally competitive with international software vendors, but they leverage a client's existing software, complementing legacy systems. Whitehill products are not dominant applications but are extremely adaptable to client needs.
The company succeeded quickly for a number of reasons. First of all, its marketing and sales strategy was to penetrate U.S. markets with its first products. Usually the pattern for software start-ups in Moncton is to first market products or services locally, then to a Canadian market, and then to the U.S. and England. According to Palmer, however, “As a software company, if you’re going to make it, you’ve got to make it in the States,” so going directly after U.S. clients enabled Whitehill to prove early on that it was globally competitive with its products and services. A second strategy that helped Whitehill grow successfully is that its early operations were financed not with venture capital but from ongoing revenues. The firm is a good case of a company that started with a modest amount of initial capital which was able to grow quickly and finance itself organically from sales, rather than from an extensive amount of external capital. Whitehill was forced to pursue a number of revenue- generating services that, while not necessarily in its niche, could add value for its clients.
Assets and Challenges Palmer believes that Whitehill’s employee team and management group is unusually dedicated to the company and its mission, and he believes a big part of that is Moncton itself. Many Moncton residents live in the area for personal rather than professional reasons and thus have a strong attachment to Moncton and Atlantic Canada. Since business opportunities are not as widespread in Moncton as they might be in a larger city, Whitehill employees are more willing to work through
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personal and professional difficulties to stay with the company. Consequently, Whitehill’s staff has developed a strong sense of continuity and community which is evident in an extraordinarily cohesive upper-management team, as well as in product support, sales, professional services, and software development groups, which all work and communicate effectively together. Their cohesiveness, according to Palmer, creates innovation and superior performance throughout the organization.
Among the biggest challenges of growing a company Whitehill’s size, Palmer said, is that Moncton lacks a talent pool large enough to locate local employees with certain specialized skills. Whitehill has been able to fill 85-90 percent of its professional staffing needs locally in Moncton, but for certain skilled positions, Whitehill has had to hire employees in other cities who work for the company remotely. Recently, Whitehill was unable to locally staff an experienced sales manager for its insurance operations – a position that required a professional with over 10 years of sales experience as well as numerous ties to the insurance industry. In a larger city, it may have been easier to find an employee to meet such a specialized need, but Whitehill was unable to find the right fit in Moncton, so it hired a consultant based in the U.S. for the position.
Additionally, finding experienced senior managers is a challenge for Moncton's technology companies. Whitehill’s senior management team is composed primarily of professionals who worked in large organizations prior to the company's founding. But the limited number of large technology companies locally means that there are few experienced technology managers available, which may mean that Whitehill will need to compete in national and international labor markets to recruit senior-level managers to guide the company to its next level of growth.
Lessons Learned Palmer believes that one of the most important attributes to recognize about start-up firms is that the success rate is always fairly low. “The numbers game says you need a bunch of start-ups to get success stories,” he says. Consequently, he feels it is important to celebrate entrepreneurial successes and encourage those who fail to try again. Palmer says, “We in New Brunswick need to be less envious of entrepreneurial success and support entrepreneurial endeavors in any way possible.” Tales of start-up success and failure should be given broad press coverage in local and regional media so that young people with business ideas can have a more realistic idea of what entrepreneurship is all about.
Finally, Palmer believes that one of Moncton’s greatest needs is to mentor young entrepreneurs through a strong, multifaceted mentoring program should be developed for the city. The Rising Stars program currently run by the Greater Moncton Knowledge Industry Network and Enterprise Greater Moncton is a good start. Start-up company executives and others with strong business or technical expertise should advise young company founders throughout the process of starting and growing a new business, both through individual mentoring and by serving on advisory boards. Also, Palmer believes that many of Moncton’s IT firms have business models that can be replicated easily in different niche markets. “There are many 50- to 100-person businesses that could flourish and do niche plays,” he says. Business leaders in the community should identify successful, repeatable business models and share this information to cultivate new economic activity.
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CASE STUDY: Micro-Optics Interview with Mike Power, former VP Sales, October 23, 2006
Micro-Optics was a Moncton technology company that started in 1994 and ceased operations in 2003. Its principals included researchers from the Université de Moncton. It raised a large amount of venture capital and grant support from provincial and federal agencies. It sold its manufactured product into international markets. Its experience, successes, and demise, therefore, hold valuable lessons for other regional start-up companies, investors, and policy makers.
Background Mark Savoie founded Micro-Optics in 1994 around a new technology to carve eyeglass lenses with a novel method that introduced new efficiencies and eliminated traditional manufacturing steps. The prototype involved a “cut and coat” process that was extremely promising. With financial help from a few angel investors, friends, and family, Savoie built the prototype and created a management and sales team with an initial $1 million. By late 1996, Savoie had completed the prototype and Micro-Optics was successful in attracting $5-10 million in a second round of financing from ACOA, the NRC, and venture capitalists.
Mike Power joined the company in 1997 to begin selling the first fully functional machines worldwide. Just as the firm was moving the machines to market, however, the first UltraLab process problems appeared. Micro-Optics’ instrument cut glass so finely that the cutting process left sub-micron marks on the glass surface that defracted light and caused lenses to be defective. Scientists at the NRC could not help because the manufacturing scale was so new: Micro-Optics’ instrument was shaving lenses in nanometers, not microns. To remediate the problem by buffing the lenses would re-introduce steps in the lens carving process that the machine was designed to eliminate.
Management decided to move forward with placing the $500,000 machines with the first customers, despite reintroducing buffing to the cut-and-coat process. Between 1997 and 2000, as the company developed a second iteration of the machine with fully integrated robotics, 20 machines were sold to companies like Essilor Laboratories of America, Oakley, Eye Care Center, Kaiser Permanente, Wal-Mart, and other eyewear manufacturers worldwide for $1 million per unit.
Micro-Optics employed 150-160 people in Moncton in 2000, many of whom were talented engineers trained at universities in Atlantic Canada. The company’s financials, however, were not secure. Cash flow and invested capital were not enough to cover operations. There were no economies of scale, and the manufacturing facility worked around the clock to deal with maintenance and process issues. Two more rounds of venture capital and ACOA grants were required to pay vendors during production delays, not invest in new markets. Most of the marketing effort and huge amounts of money, Power says, were spent managing customer expectations and handling complaints about the machine. Finally, in 2003 the company ceased operations and declared bankruptcy. Somewhat ironically, approximately 25 Micro-Optics machines are still in use around the world and are
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considered to be the best on the market. In all, Micro-Optics absorbed more than $34 million in venture capital investment and received $6 million in loans and grants from ACOA. It is estimated that in total, Micro-Optics raised more $50 million in financing during its 9-year lifespan.15
Lessons Learned Micro-Optics succeeded on many fronts and fell short on others. For the purposes of the case study, however, it is important not to focus on why the company went out of business but to take away lessons from its experience that might inform other technology entrepreneurs in Moncton.
Manufacturing: Micro-Optics developed a technology that clearly improved a manufacturing process in a large market (eyewear). The problem was rooted in bringing a complex machine to market before it was ready. “Dozens of different things could throw off machine results,” Mike Power said, “which made it difficult to repair. Essentially the machine was the culmination of more than a hundred discrete processes. Each adjustment required recalibrating many other parts. Once the machines had been sold and installed, repairs became expensive, time-consuming, and financially draining.” Management considered selling the core technology to a more experienced German manufacturer in 2002 but passed on the opportunity.
Financing: Once the decision was made to sell machines with known but fixable problems, cash flow from sales went not into product development but to pay for repairs and to parts vendors. New venture capital and ACOA funding, while substantial, was consistently delayed, and as a result much of the money raised paid for bills instead of new business investments. Obtaining venture capital, and the due diligence undertaken by venture capital firms, became a hindrance in itself. “The supply chain was financing our business,” says Power. Tight controls by Canadian VC firms precluded a financial buffer to cover unexpected manufacturing problems, even in the first two rounds. The perception was that ACOA and the venture capitalists working with the company were too risk averse and needed to take a much longer- term view of the business.
Management: Technology entrepreneurs excel at identifying markets for new products but typically lack the management experience to know “what they don’t know.” In Micro-Optics’ case, the initial leadership team seemed reluctant to seek outside management help to cope with manufacturing problems and cash flow issues that threatened the company. And although finding bright engineers trained in Atlantic Canada’s universities was relatively easy, it was more challenging to locate managers of engineers in the region. “Running the manufacturing operation around the clock,” says Power, “was simply not sustainable.” Moncton needs to find ways to attract experienced mid- to senior-level management to the area for its technology firms, perhaps though provincial tax incentive programs and relocation grants.
FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND STYLES OF VENTURE DEVELOPMENT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For economic development on a regional scale, it is critical to make financial capital available for entrepreneurial business growth. In order to maximize regional resources, it is
15 Mr. Denis Lanteigne, Atlantic Innovation Fund, interview of July 30, 2006.
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important to provide a coordination of investment programs across the spectrum of the company business life cycle. In addition to examining a company’s internal management strength, it is crucial to recognize its place in the business life cycle to determine both its qualifications and the need for capital investment. Sources of capital that are not mutually exclusive can be coordinated as a matter of policy in a way that enables appropriate financial support for high tech companies as they transition through consecutive stages of their business development.
Government policy and civic agenda show commitment to regional development by providing an explicit and accessible financial infrastructure for entrepreneurial investment. Burgeoning companies will contribute to economic growth when provided: commercial credit from suppliers and customers government-sponsored grants and direct loans corporate investors to partner with new companies in exchange for equity institutional loans by banks and other financial institutions angel investors (both individuals and groups) traditional venture capital equity investment by institutional investors
Varied financial capital resources provided across time will provide companies with the greatest support, and consequently the greatest leverage of the region’s available financial resources for economic growth. Sources for capital should not act independently, but in harmony. For example, in the case of the Moncton region, investments made by the Business Development Bank of Canada – a crown corporation of the Federal government that provides both business loans and venture capital – would increase its investment performance through better communication and coordination with other banking and venture capital sources in the area.
A closer view of Moncton’s financial capital resources is presented for: institutional venture capital investment angel and individual investment government investment mechanisms including ACOA and IRAP bank loans and self-funding
Venture Capital Institutional Investment Venture capital (VC) is the equity or equity-linked investment in young, privately-held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who typically is active as a director, advisor and/or manager of the investment firm.16
Table 1 summarizes total institutional investments of venture capital made in the tri-city Moncton region (Moncton, Dieppe, and Riverview) between 1999 and 2005. This seven- year period shows a total of 13 VC investments placed in new ventures. The average rate of VC investment has been two per year, except for 2004 in which there were three investments. The total amount of VC investment in the Moncton region per capita is not large, relative to other cities in Atlantic Canada. The majority of VC investment in New Brunswick occurs in Fredericton, most likely because of its history of successful entrepreneurial VC investment17. The sources of venture capital in Moncton shows a skewed
16 Kortum, Samuel and Josh Lerner. (2000). Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation. RAND Journal of Education. Vol. 31, No. 4, Winter 2000. pp. 674-692. 17 Data for this section kindly provided by Mr. Michael Arbow, New Brunswick Security Commission.
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pattern, with only two firms making 7 of the 13 VC investments; further, these two firms merged in 2005.
Table 1: Venture Capital Investment in Moncton18
CDN$ (1000s) Firm Industry – Sector Lead Investor Firm stage 8,355 Micro Optic Design med dev: Precision lens mfg ACF Equity Early 7,500 Spielo Gaming: automated lottery Finova – KPMG Expansion 400 Custom Assemblies Mfg La Societe Investissment Expansion 5,259 Micro Optic Design med dev: precision lens mfg CDP Expansion 8,327 Micro Optic Design med dev: precision lens mfg ACF Equity Expansion 5,000 Whitehill Technologies Software Longitude Fund Start-up 10,433 Micro Optic Design med dev: precision lens mfg ACF Equity Expansion 1,592 Micro Optic Design med dev: precision lens mfg ACF Equity Expansion Advanced Lodging consumer – motel Growthworks Early 771 Motion-Fab ophthalmic lenses ACF Equity Start-up 700 Nanoptix mfg – thermal printers Growthworks Early 4,100 Whitehill Technologies Software Growthworks Early 72 Chatham Biotech Biopharma NBIF Start-up
The pattern of VC investment has also been skewed toward one company, Micro Optics, which took 5 out of the total 13 VC investments for a total of $34 million (all figures are in Canadian dollars unless indicated), or 72 percent out of $53 million invested during the period. In addition to VC investment, Micro Optic Design also received financial support from other third-party sources including ACOA (CDN $6million). It is estimated that in total, Micro Optic Design raised more $50 million before it ceased operations in 2003 (see the case study, p. 40).19
The fact that approximately 72 percent of the total $53 million VC investment in the Moncton region was invested in a single company over a seven-year period is of critical importance; Micro Optic Design was ultimately a failed investment. Whether or not it was a seemingly wise investment of funds at the time is not the issue; however, of critical importance to policy makers is whether the region as a whole was aware of the narrowly targeted investment decisions that were made to the exclusion of other potential new company candidates. In the past ten years, various Moncton government entities have provided a number of regional policy and economic assessments; and while all of those reported high or superior strength in a number of sectors in the ICT industry, none of those assessments identified the medical device sector as one of the most promising. When two-thirds of available capital over a seven-year period has been dedicated to a niche outside the region’s economic strengths, the question remains whether the region as a whole is well served. On the other hand, successful VC investment stories are not absent in Moncton. Very successful business cases include Spielo, Whitehill, Nanoptix, and Motion-Fab.
Spielo, a designer, manufacturer and distributor of gaming technology solutions, was founded in 1990. In 1999 Spielo received its first round of VC investment ($7.5 million) from Finova-KMPG. Spielo currently is a wholly owned subsidiary of GTECH Corporation and has over 300 employees in Moncton. (See complete Case Study, page 118.)
18 Compiled from the Thompson Macdonald database that has tracked VC investments in North America since 1995. Data not independently verified. This data is available to the subscribers of the database. 19 Mr. Denis Lanteigne, from the Atlantic Innovation Fund (an ACOA program), interview of July 31, 2006.
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Whitehill Technologies, a software company, was founded in 1997. The main source of start- up capital was the founder’s personal resources. The firm had some major U.S. sales successes early in its lifecycle, and was able to finance operations primarily through revenues. By year 1999, the company had about 40 employees. Its first round of VC investment was made in 2001 by Latitude Partners, with another round in 2004 by Growthworks. By 2001 (time of the first round of VC investment), Whitehill Technologies’ workforce had grown to approximately 50 full-time employees20. “As an entrepreneur, bootstrapping is a great teacher, because you immediately need to generate revenue,” said current chief operating office Steve Palmer.21 (See complete Case Study, page 39.)
Nanoptix, provider of thermal direct printers, was founded in 1996 and received its first round of VC investment in 2004. (See complete Case Study, page 85.)
Motion-Fab Ltd. was established in January 2004 to provide vertically integrated IT solutions encompassing custom design engineering services, prototyping, manufacturing/assembly processes, and after-delivery support for electromechanical and automation solutions. Motion-Fab received its first round of VC investment in 2004, from Growthworks.
International Venture Capital Patterns The pattern of VC investment in Moncton is not identical to VC investment patterns in the U.S., but understanding the U.S. experience could prove to be useful for future VC investments in Moncton, since the U.S. venture capital industry has been a world leader, and its performance often preludes similar patterns in other parts of the world. Data in Figure 6 reveals a bell-shaped curve for total U.S. VC investment of about USD$20 billion in 1998, peaking to about USD$105 billion in 2000 and then receding back again to about USD$20
Figure 6. USA VC Investment Patterns 1995-200522
U.S. Venture Capital Investments, 1995-2005
60% 120
50% 100
40% 80
30% 60
20% 40
10% 20 Total VC Investment, $B
0% 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 % 1st Stagel % 2nd Stage % 3rd Stage
% 4th Stage Total VC Invst. $B
20 Data for this section kindly provided by Ms. Lynne Reid, Whitehill Technologies Media Relations Specialist. 21 Interview of Steve Palmer, Whitehill Technologies. 22 From PricewaterhouseCoopers Money Tree Database.
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billion in 2002 during the infamous dot com boom-and-bust phenomenon. Total VC investment has remained flat since 2002.
The data’s critical pattern reveals that between 1995 and 2005 overall VC investment shifted from first stage to fourth stage investments. The shifting patterns of venture capital investments since 1995 have drastic implications for the business development of new ventures that require a high level of initial financial capital. The data implies that the U.S. venture capital industry has a tendency to invest in mature (fourth stage) businesses. Competition for VC is more intense, and early-stage capital investment is especially more difficult to acquire.
The resulting trend is clear: regional economies will suffer if they rely on VC investments in high-tech start-up companies that require large initial financial infusions, in lieu of self- funded companies that do not require large preliminary budgets for technology development and business organization.
Leading VC institutional investors in the Moncton region The five most prominent VC institutional investors in the Moncton region are Atlantic Venture Fund (ACF), the New Brunswick Innovation Foundation, the Business Development Bank of Canada, the New Brunswick Investment Management Corporation, and Roynat Capital, although none of these firms have local Moncton offices.
Atlantic Venture Fund (ACF): ACF is an Atlantic Canadian “labor-sponsored investment fund,” following a uniquely Canadian method for raising venture capital resources. 23 ACF funds invest across the Atlantic Provinces to support the growth of emerging businesses. Investors in Atlantic Canada benefit from up to 70 percent tax savings on their investments. Residents of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Labrador may purchase investment with both a federal and provincial tax credit, while residents of Prince Edward Island (PEI) receive only federal tax credit. Between 1996 and 2006, about $400 million has been invested in Atlantic Canada, mostly in technology-based businesses including IT, advanced manufacturing, and software spin-out companies24. Between 1996 and 2006, ACF invested approximately $60-70 million, and the company has taken co-investment positions with other Canadian sources for a total of about $130 million. ACF’s current investment is about $30 million. ACF recently appointed a resident investment manager in a Fredericton office but has no presence in Moncton.
The New Brunswick Innovation Foundation (NBIF): NBIF is a non-profit government-owned organization that stimulates innovation as a means of improving productivity and growing the knowledge-based economy in New Brunswick. With a $35 million pool of capital to invest from the Province, NBIF makes investments in research and development and early-stage companies in New Brunswick. NBIF’s three main funds are a venture capital fund (VCF), an enterprise innovation fund (EIF), and a seed equity fund (SEF). NBIF’s portfolio at present
23 In some respects ACF is comparable to American mutual funds. In the U.S., investors who contribute to venture capital funds (usually in the role of limited partners) are typically large institutions with massive amounts of available capital, such as state and private pension funds, university endowments, insurance companies, and pooled investment vehicles. 24 Interview of Mr. Peter Forton, Senior Vice President, Growthworks.
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includes nine companies with five in Fredericton, three in St. John, and two in Moncton (Chatham Biotech and Vimsoft).
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC): BDC is a financial institution wholly owned by the federal government of Canada. BDC delivers venture capital, loans, and consulting services to Canadian small businesses, with a particular focus on the technology and export sectors of the economy. BDC Venture Capital is the venture capital arm of BDC, which invests in all stages of a company's development cycle, from seed through expansion, with a focus on technology-based businesses that have high growth potential and that are positioned to become dominant players in their markets. BDC Venture Capital has an office in Halifax with responsibility for Moncton, but so far it has made no investments in Moncton. BDC representatives believe that there are adequate financial resources in Atlantic Canada but a lack of technical talent and science-based new technologies 25.
The New Brunswick Investment Management Corporation: NBIMC is the trustee and investment manager for the pension assets of approximately 45,000 members of the Public Service, Teachers’, and Judges’ pension plans with assets totaling $7 billion in 2005. NBIMC has been inactive in Moncton.
Roynat Capital (RC): RC is a member of the Scotiabank Group, a Canadian merchant bank. RC concentrates on longer term capital investment for mid-sized and high-growth firms with sales between $5 million and $200 million. This segment is rare in the Moncton region, and RC has been inactive in Moncton.
Why hasn’t Moncton attracted a larger amount of venture capital investment? In interviews, venture capital representatives describe a shortage of experienced technology managers familiar with nurturing VC-funded ventures. On the other hand, in the eyes of more risk- averse public institutional investors such as the Business Development Bank of Canada, sufficient capital is considered to exist in Atlantic Canada, but the region has a shortage of technology talent and entrepreneurial ideas in which to invest. These viewpoints perhaps have limited merit, but the larger problem appears to be an unwillingness of both private and public institutional investors to invest in early-stage ventures.
Individual Investors and Angels Individual Investors (Angel Investors) are defined as “individual accredited” investors who typically invest personal capital in fledgling businesses in exchange for ownership equity. As a matter of law26, according to Canadian regulations, an individual accredited investor is: (1) An individual whose net income before taxes exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years or whose net income before taxes combined with that of a spouse exceeded $300,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years and who, in either case, reasonably expects to exceed that net income level in the current calendar year; (2) An individual who, either alone or with a spouse, has net assets of at least $5 million; (3) A person, other than an individual or investment fund, that has net assets of at least $5 million as shown on his most recently prepared financial statements.”27
25 Telephone interview of Mr. Tony Van Bommel, Director of Advanced Technologies BDC, on August 17, 2006. 26 The legal distinction has tax ramification and separates habitual investors that may take part in their family and friends ventures and in this study are classified under the personal resources of entrepreneurs. 27 There are comparable laws in the U.S. The federal securities laws define the term accredited investor in Rule 501 of Regulation D as: 1) natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase; 2) a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those
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Unlike venture capitalists, who manage the pooled money of third parties in a professionally managed fund, angel investors rely on their own assets for investment; self-motivated, they often prefer to keep out of the spotlight (having already achieved a high degree of success in their own right). Angel investors are often motivated by the psychic return of helping mentor young entrepreneurs; although the potential for profitability is paramount.
Individual investors may have preference for particular styles of venture development. Some operate like small venture capitalists; they seek new ventures that follow an aggressive growth style of development with clear and fast exit strategies. Others look for new ventures that follow patterns of organic growth with longer term objectives. In the most cost-effective situations, individual investors are organized into angel networks to share market analyses and pool investment capital. All parties benefit from such an arrangement.
Based on estimations28, there are about ten yearly angel investments in Moncton, each one about $30,000. There are reports that financially well-resourced individuals in Moncton invest independently, but these individual investments are not easily traceable. A strong need exists to identify and network these independently acting angel investors. In the Moncton region there is no recognized network of individual investors.
First Angel Network (FAN): FAN, located in Halifax and established in 2005, is a network to link individual investors in Atlantic Canada including Moncton. FAN consists of about 60 individual angel investors who all are residents of Atlantic Canada. The Network has to date funded three rounds of investment with two different companies. Applicant entrepreneurs are required to pay a fee (currently $3000) for each presentation. In Atlantic Canada, individual angel investors usually have a business background in manufacturing, and thus may feel uncomfortable with placing investments in IT29.
Government Agencies Government agencies stimulate regional economic development by both direct and indirect financial incentives through the Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency (ACOA) and NRC-IRAP (the National Research Council-Industrial Research Assistance Program).
The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency ACOA is the lead federal government agency responsible for regional economic development in Atlantic Canada, including New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. ACOA's strategic priorities include: cultivating a climate of entrepreneurship; developing market and trade opportunities; promoting tourism and innovation; and encouraging human resource development and best management practices. ACOA's approach to regional development is defined by the need to develop policies tailored to Atlantic Canada's opportunities and challenges.30 Because of political realities, vigilant advocacy is necessary to influence federal decision-making to promote Atlantic positions and interests.
ACOA's core mission is focused on strategic priorities that include innovation, community development and infrastructure, trade and investment, business skills and entrepreneurship, years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year. (http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm). 28 Interview, Mr. Ross Finlay, First Angel Network, on August 4, 2006. 29 Comment based on the interview of Mr. Peter Forton on August 8, 2006. 30 Dennis Wallace, President of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), at a C.D. Howe Institute policy roundtable held in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on February 18, 2003. Source: http://www.acoa- apeca.gc.ca/e/about/regdev.shtml
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and access to capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). ACOA also delivers a range of federal initiatives directed at specific economic needs and adjustment challenges facing the Atlantic region, including infrastructure projects. ACOA not only provides financial resources, it is predisposed to specific views on the process of innovation and development. The purpose of this section is not to evaluate ACOA’s performance, but to examine potential impacts of ACOA investments in the Moncton region. Total ACOA expenditures in Atlantic Canada and ACOA expenditures in the Moncton region (for years 2002 and 2003) are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
The two tables illustrate how the patterns of total ACOA expenditures in Atlantic Canada and in Moncton are distinct, which is likely due to Moncton’s relatively advanced economy compared to the average urban area in the rest of Atlantic Canada. Table 3 demonstrates that almost all (97 percent) of ACOA expenditures in Moncton in 2002 and 2003 ($32.2 million) went to two programs: the Atlantic Innovation Fund ($16.6 million) and the Business Development Program ($14.4 million). The average AIF award in Moncton was $3.3 million, and the average BDP award was $257,000.
Table 2: Total ACOA Expenditures (in Atlantic Canada) - 2002-200331
Description (100,000s CDN$) % of Total Direct Support to Business 97.6 27.0 Indirect Support to Business 59.4 16.4 Adjustment Programs 4.6 4.6 Infrastructure Canada 39.5 10.9 Federal Provincial Cooperation Agreements 32.0 8.9 Atlantic Innovation Fund - AIF 25.1 6.9 Strategic Community Investment Fund 22.4 6.2 Trade, Tourism, Invest, and Entrepreneurship & Business Skills 19.1 5.3 Community Economic Development 9.4 2.6 Other 40.5 11.2 Total 349.6 100
Table 3. ACOA Expenditures in Moncton - 2002-200332
Description (CDN$) % of No. of Average Total Cases Investment Atlantic Innovation Fund -AIF $ 16,606,090 52% 5 $ 3,321,218 Business Development Program - BDP $ 14,415,328 45% 56 $ 257,417 Entrepreneurship & Skills Development $ 813,451 3% 11 $ 73,950 Community Investment Fund $ 197,612 1% 4 $ 49,403 Trade, Tourism and Investment $ 197,612 1% 5 $ 39,522 Total $ 32,230,093
31 Source: ACOA documents and ACOQW web site: http://www.acoa-apeca.gc.ca/e/about/regdev.shtml 32 Source: ACOA documents and ACOQW web site: http://www.acoa-apeca.gc.ca/e/about/regdev.shtml
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The Atlantic Innovation Fund –AIF: Through the AIF, ACOA provides direct investments to increase research and development in the public and private sectors, although ACOA does not concentrate only on R&D. Tables 4 and 5 summarize AIF activity in Moncton.
Table 4. All AIF Non-Commercial Grants to Academic Institutions
Funding Proponent Name and Project Description CDN $000,000 Concept + Inc. $1.2 Create generic electronic circuit boards for new product development (2002) Institut de recherche médicale Beauséjour $6 Medical biotechnology innovation (2001) Université de Moncton $5 Advanced optics: materials, devices and applications (2002) Université de Moncton $2.7 Design/development of innovative thin film smart systems (2003) Université de Moncton $2.9 SynergiC3: E-learning productivity enhancement framework Total $17.8
Table 5. All AIF Commercial Grants to Private Organizations
Funding Proponent Name and Project Description (CDN$ 000,000s) Micro Optics Design Corporation (founded in 1993) Advanced ophthalmic lens design (2002) $6 Apex Industries Inc. (Founded in 1961) High velocity machining of monolithic structures $5.5 Spielo Manufacturing Incorporated (founded in 1990) Mercury project to build I-link product ( 2001) $1.9 Whitehill Technologies Inc. (founded in 1997) Applied development tool for industry specific web-based portals (2004) $2.8 Total $15.7
Business Development Program (BDP): BDP provides interest free loans for business start- ups and modernizations, new technology adoption, software & prototype development, management training, and marketing and export development. BDP targets business investments that do not meet the preferred client profiles of commercial lenders. Based on a list provided by ACOA, between 2001 and 2005 Moncton businesses that received financial support under the BDP program includes 129 cases, totaling $24.7 (46 percent of total). The average investment in each case was $190,000.
Strategic Community Investment Fund: Based on a list provided by ACOA, 129 Moncton awards were made under the BDP program between 2001 and 2005, totaling $24.7 (46 percent of total). The average investment in each case was $190,000.
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Entrepreneurship and Business Skills Development Partnership (EBSDP): The $59.6-million EBSDP is designed to increase the number of Atlantic Canadians choosing to start a business and to improve the ability of existing businesses to compete and grow successfully. It has three key elements: Innovation Skills Development Initiative; Women in Business Initiative; and Young Entrepreneur Development Initiative. From October 2002 to March 31, 2003, the Entrepreneurship and Business Skills Development Partnership approved over $9 million in assistance toward 125 projects. A breakdown for monies invested in Moncton is not immediately available; some of these awards were for publications projects to benefit Atlantic Canada as a whole, while others were placed with individual SME applicants.
The Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ATIP): ATIP strengthens the export performance of the Atlantic region by developing and enhancing export markets, export activities; and foreign direct investment in the region. Based on a list provided by ACOA, between 2001 and 2005 in Moncton 17 awards were made under the ATIP program, totaling $1 million. The average investment in each case was $59,500.
Seed Capital Program (SCP): SCP provides business skills training and loans to start, expand, or improve a small business. A maximum of $20,000 is available per applicant in the form of a repayable, unsecured personal loan with flexible interest and repayment terms. A maximum of $2,000 is available per applicant for specialized training and business counseling. As a result, the scope of the program is relatively small.
ACOA disburses about $15 million per year in Moncton and is the most important source of financial capital in the Moncton region. ACOA has been active in supporting the “development” stage of R&D projects (through the Atlantic Innovation Fund) as well as providing support for existing businesses through its Business Development Program. ACOA’s Seed Capital Program, because of its limited scope, has not been as active in supporting new ventures.
Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) is a program of the National Research Council, the Canadian government’s main organization for funding research and development. IRAP concentrates on providing a combination of technical and business- oriented advisory services along with financial support to its targeted enterprises. It consists of approximately 230 “Industrial Technology Advisors” across Canada, including 3 in Moncton and 8 in other locations in New Brunswick. IRAP provides non-repayable grants in seed and start-up stages and technical advice for business development to fledgling companies. It is estimated that IRAP injects about $20 million capital into Atlantic Canada.33 IRAP financial contributions are based on cost sharing and matching funds are required.
Bank Loans While Venture Capitalists seek equity in return for investment, banks offer the alternative of debt financing: a key mechanism in business start-up and growth. In Canada, commercial banks are the main source of business loans -- usually asset-based requiring collateral to secure the debt. Collateral may comprise a company's equipment, real estate, accounts receivable, and inventory, whereby the lender takes a first priority security interest in those assets financed.
Major Canadian commercial banks such as Royal Bank, Canadian Imperial Bank (CIBC), Bank of Nova Scotia, TD Bank, and Business Development Bank (BDC) provide asset-based
33 Source: Mr. William Langely, interviewed on August 20, 2006
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commercial loans through the Canada Small Business Financing (CSBF) Program that is the funding program applicable to new ventures, which provides financing up to $250,000 for the establishment, expansion and improvement of small businesses.
The CSBF program supports the purchase of buildings, equipment and renovation of existing businesses or the purchase of new business provided they operate in Canada. The program is delivered to the banking customer by financial institutions on behalf of Industry Canada. To obtain a loan, the applicant must present a business proposal directly to the financial institution. Lenders are required to apply the same care and procedures in making a CSBF loan as they would for conventional loans of similar amounts. The decisions of where to grant these loans rest entirely with the lender; Industry Canada does not participate in the decision-making process of granting loans under the Program. When a loan is approved, the lender forwards the complete application with a cheque for the 2 percent registration fee to Industry Canada34. The rate of interest is prime plus 3 percent.
Since the CSBF Program is asset-based, it is difficult for knowledge-based firms that rely on intellectual capital, and without sales records, to qualify for CSBFP loans. “The Comprehensive Review of the CSBFP Program” performed by Industry Canada35 indicates that: …a working capital “gap” exists in small business financing and that working capital needs are growing relative to the needs for fixed asset financing. The concentration of the CSBFP on fixed asset financing makes the program particularly unsuitable for financing knowledge-based businesses that typically lack fixed assets and have a greater need for working capital. It has been suggested that either the CSBFP be expanded to include working capital financing or a separate program be established to guarantee working capital loans based on guidelines other than the current CSBFP program. Whether or not CSBFP will proceed to implement the policy concerns that the Comprehensive Review indicates remain to be seen.
Self-Funded Ventures Self-funding, or “bootstrapping,” involves starting a new business with little or no external funding. Compared to equity-financed ventures, self-funded ventures tend to grow slower in the early stages of venture development. However, the ability of self -funded ventures to initiate and sustain growth with a moderate amount of initial capital makes it possible for self-funded firms to form during periods when external capital is scarce. Furthermore, self- funded firms absorb less available capital accessible in an economic region and tend to leverage those funds with less risk. Due to shortage of VC funding and bank loans, the majority of new knowledge-based ventures in Moncton need to rely on self-funding.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The indication is that the Atlantic region can absorb more investment funds if the financial resources have been formed and are available to institutional investors. Organizational investors receive their funds from public resources such as personal or institutional retirement plans. The existing patterns of capital formation define the future patterns of capital investment. Accordingly it is recommended that the different tiers of government active in Moncton facilitate the process of capital formation through tax incentive policies.
34 Data for this section kindly provided by Ayoub Najah: CSBFP 35 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incsbfp-pfpec.nsf/en/la00210e.html
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While the ACOA Seed Capital Program was established to serve small start-ups, in Moncton there are no existing programs that target the development of self-funded, fast-growth “Gazelle” ventures (i.e. those that begin as self-funded companies with a business plan that envisions fast growth after the business case is proven). Regional development strategies need to identify and support Gazelle ventures, due to their key role in growing a technology- based economy and new jobs.
In Moncton, there is insufficient financial capital is available to sustain the existing pipeline of R&D projects. The New Brunswick Innovation Fund and ACOA’s Atlantic Innovation Fund are exemplary cases of agencies that promote R&D-based new technology companies. However, as discussed earlier, both the shortage of venture capital and limited governance expertise for express-path ventures, seem to downplay t economic development based on R&D for the short- and mid-term.
Self-Funded Ventures Support for self-funded ITC ventures should be a priority. Moncton companies like Spielo, Whitehill Technologies, Ardent Development Solutions, BMG Consultants, Vimsoft, and others are all examples of successful self-funded Gazelle ventures. Institutionally, steps should be taken to facilitate the stream of initial capital and credit needed by self-funded ventures. Support should be specifically provided for the development of knowledge-based Gazelle-type ventures, perhaps including the formation of a “Moncton Gazelle ventures Network” or similar advocacy organization to coordinate funding possibilities and networking for fast-growth companies in Moncton.
Loans Guidelines for the Canada Small Business Financing (CSBF) Program should be adjusted to provide support for knowledge-intensive new businesses in information technology and knowledge-based industries. Elements of the U.S. Small Business Development program, which provides business advice and business consulting services, should also be considered.
The New Brunswick Liberal Party platform that secured the September 2006 election promised that the new government will provide start-up capital of up to $100,000 for new businesses and up to $60,000 for business expansion and diversification. If implemented, such loans may be used to support new technology-based organic growth ventures in Moncton.
Government Agencies A public initiative should be undertaken to provide matchmaking services between entrepreneurs and funding sources.
Individual (Angel) Investment Network Moncton angels should be encouraged to organize into a network, focused to support the technologies that are consistent with the regional development of Moncton. Angel networks in Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin are often initiated by a few individual investors with the experience and willingness to mentor other angels in their investor role. Moncton is home to many wealthy individuals and families, some of whom could act as the core for an angel investor network. Cross-networking an angel investor network with the Gazelle entrepreneur’s advocacy organization should increase the region’s start-up business synergy; and could include workshops to help entrepreneurs with business plan presentations, etc.
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Institutional Investment Since capital must be “pooled” before it can be “invested,” a longer term plan is needed. Cooperation with both Federal and Provincial governments will be required to enhance existing venture capital pools generated by public tax-deductible retirement funds.
Institutional investment firms should be encouraged to establish permanent offices in Moncton since institutional investors have a tendency to invest in geographic areas in the proximity of their offices. Office space for VCs should be arranged free of charge at the proposed incubator. Organize existing VC managerial talent into mentor councils, and enlarge local VC networks to interact with experienced VC managers outside the Moncton area to assist with practical advice that will help facilitate regional deal flow.
A longer term project to form cooperation between the sources of investment capital in the Moncton region is strongly encouraged. To precipitate the further development and deployment of VC capital in Moncton, deliberate steps should be taken to create a venue for information sharing among sources of capital. With the understanding that VC firms compete for the best investment prospects, such coordination among firms would mine efficiencies of scale, avoid duplication of effort, consolidate expertise, and potentially lower administrative costs.
CENTRAL TEXAS ANGEL NETWORK: A POSITIVE MODEL
“The Central Texas Angel Network is a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to providing quality early-stage investment opportunities for accredited Central Texas angel investors, and to assisting, educating and connecting early stage growth companies in Central Texas with information and advisors for the purpose of raising money and assisting in their growth” (www.centexangels.org).
In order to bring better organization to Austin’s informal angel network community, a few local champions joined the Houston Angel Network (HAN) and attended their monthly meetings to get ideas for forming a similar angel network in Austin. Indeed, they found that one third of the companies presenting to HAN were located in Austin. These champions adapted Houston’s format to the realities of Austin and formed the not-for-profit Central Texas Angel Network (CTAN) for entrepreneurs and angels.
Today, they welcome all excellent entrepreneurial business ideas (including real estate, energy ventures, etc) and do not limit themselves to technology-based start-ups. They realized that considerable wealth has been created by Austin companies that did not rest on technology-based IP, such as Whole Foods, GSDM Advertising, and even Dell Inc. In addition, they did not appreciate the “in-club” or “we are the best and brightest” mentality often exhibited by technology entrepreneurs. Accordingly, they focused their angel recruitment efforts on seasoned and successful businesspeople, not just technology leaders. They invited 40 potential angels and 30 have accepted the invitation to date. Members are required to sign an SEC Accredited Investor form and pay an annual Fee of $1,500 (to discourage membership by service providers). These fees provide a salary for CTAN’s part- time Executive Director, and cover food and drink for meetings. Board members provide a place to meet. The group decided to meet four times a year rather than monthly, and instituted the following process of operation: The funding range of the Angel Network is $200,000 to $3 million.
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The group only considers companies that are Texas-based, with a preference for Austin-centric ventures. About 15 companies apply for funding each quarter. They are asked to write a one- page summary and include a fee of $250. A one-page PDF file for each company is emailed to the CTAN membership, who are invited to share this information with their colleagues and friends. As the Chair emphasized, “Information dissemination promotes a democratic as opposed to a secretive culture. It also helps get the word out about companies that aren’t selected to present.” Select CTAN angels volunteer to provide additional due diligence on a company(ies) of particular interest to them, as needed.
A Screening Meeting is held, in which CTAN members briefly discuss all the candidates and vote to establish the top four ventures. The leaders of these four companies are invited the CTAN quarterly meeting, where they may present for 15 minutes and respond to a 5 minute Q&A session. CTAN members have the opportunity to arrange further meetings with the entrepreneur and perhaps elect to invest in the venture; these negotiations are confidential.
CASE STUDY: Vimsoft Inc. Interview with Mitch Manuel, President, Founder, and Chief Executive Officer
Vimsoft Inc. was founded in Moncton by software programmer Mitch Manuel in December 2003. The company has developed a novel programming method to efficiently create equipment asset management programs for its customers. Their client focus is primarily in the broadcasting industry, and the company was recently able to secure a long term contract with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).
Background Manuel, a former Spielo employee, was able to obtain preliminary funding from his family and friends and take advantage of a provincial tax benefit for private capital investments. With these funds and early revenues, Manuel hired two employees (a software developer with whom he had worked at Spielo, and a product manager with 35 years of business experience). Together, they developed a suite of customizable programs named “VimBiz,” that enables companies to efficiently manage their business processes and assets. The programs also track asset locations and service requests in order to protect company value and to analyze precise carrying costs and costs of ownership.
Assets and Challenges The low cost of living in Moncton makes it easier to recruit and retain technically advanced employees since they require lower salaries than in other Canadian cities. Additionally, Moncton has hundreds of qualified programmers working in the city, so if Vimsoft’s demand for technical talent expands, Manuel believes he could easily fill these positions. However, government programs will only help finance the hiring of an employee that is either unemployed or underemployed. If a start-up company like Vimsoft wants to hire a qualified and experienced programmer, that programmer is most likely currently employed, and the cost of hiring an employee away from another company is too high for a start-up. "Finding a qualified programmer who is underemployed or unemployed is rare," says Manuel.
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Another advantage in Moncton is that the technology sector is a small community in which strong relationships can be developed. Vimsoft out sources its marketing and graphic design requirements to local companies; and due to the strong ties he developed working at Spielo, Manuel could quickly assemble a team on a contract basis to expand his capacity.
Vimsoft found it difficult to obtain start-up capital from NRC-IRAP. When Vimsoft's application was reviewed, Manuel was told that Vimsoft needed to have a larger revenue base before it could receive IRAP support. The funding that Vimsoft needed, however, was to develop the product that would generate its revenues. It had to look elsewhere for these funds. Help arrived in February 2007 when Vimsoft obtained venture capital financing from Technology Ventures Corporation and NBIF.
Lessons Learned One of the biggest difficulties Vimsoft has faced as a young start-up is obtaining the necessary capital to develop its product. With IRAP and bank loans unavailable during Vimsoft's product development phase, it has been difficult to locate capital to sustain operations. Its recent success in obtaining venture capital financing underscores the regional need for seed-stage funding to be more accessible to young start-up companies. Manuel obtained funding from family and friends by discussing the tax benefits they would receive from both the province and the federal government for investing capital funds in start-up commercial activity. Moncton could implement a similar municipal tax benefit to supplement the provincial and national programs.
Manuel commented that navigating the myriad government assistant programs for start-ups can be confusing and frustrating. One ideal program would be a centralized, one-stop office where companies can receive information about all the programs and perhaps some consulting advice on which programs to which to apply. The possibility of placing his company in an incubator would be appealing, in order to receive management advice and assistance for his technology concepts while pursuing a market opening.
CASE STUDY: InteliSys Aviation Systems, Inc. Interview with Jock English, Chief Operating Officer and Vice President Sales and Marketing
InteliSys Aviation Systems, Inc. was founded in 1987 in Montreal by Chief Executive Officer Ralph Eisenschmind. In 1999 it moved its headquarters to Shediac, NB, which is about 30KM (17 miles) from Moncton. The company develops integrated software packages for low-cost, mid-size, and regional airline carriers around the world. InteliSys’s business growth has accelerated steadily since its formation, though particularly since 2001. It has 18 full-time employees and annual revenues of approximately $2 million. The third quarter of 2005 was its first positive profit quarter, and it has continued to operate with positive net income since then.
Background InteliSys has created an integrated operating system for small airlines. The system centralizes all operating and database systems necessary for an airline based on its flight schedule. Surprisingly, the devastation to the airline industry after September 11, 2001, initiated a strong growth period for the company. Prior to 9/11, Air Canada had provided the majority of the operating system technology required for
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the smaller regional airlines in the country. When the industry experienced financial distress in the downturn, however, InteliSys was able to provide these companies with their necessary technology infrastructure. A large percentage of the regional airlines in Canada have adopted InteliSys' technology, though market penetration was a slow and arduous process.
InteliSys has also focused its marketing in Saudi Arabia, China, and other areas of Asia where it has successfully negotiated important contracts with smaller national airlines. It has had a representative marketing its technology in China for 3 ½ years, and it recently completed a project to integrate many of the necessary features for Asian travel into its computer system. This investment has the potential to yield substantial returns in coming years.
Assets and Challenges InteliSys Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of Sales and Marketing Jock English cited Moncton’s high level of training and education as one of the area’s primary assets. He feels that the education provided at NBCC-Moncton is excellent and more than sufficient to prepare his employees for the technology job functions at InteliSys. He estimates that about 90 percent of InteliSys employees were educated at a college rather than a university. The education they have received, primarily at NBCC-Moncton, is highly applied, and students complete their programs with strong technical skills. Additionally, being able to employ students without educations from large universities (who carry substantial student loan debts) allows InteliSys’s cost structure to remain competitive.
One primary difficulty InteliSys has faced in its attempt to grow into a global competitor in Moncton is access to reliable internet service. Though New Brunswick was one of the first areas of Canada to install a wide network of fiber-optic lines in the early 1970’s, service has become unreliable. Aliant, one of two ISP’s in Moncton, owns nearly a monopoly of the fiber optic lines running through the city, so prices are high, and English has had poor service experience. He recently experienced a connection outage due to a firewall update error and was surprised to find little response from Aliant representatives. “They didn’t seem to understand that when we’re down for 30 seconds, we are in big trouble. There is a line forming at an airline counter somewhere halfway across the world and it’s because Aliant is down.”
Lessons Learned Technology Collaborations: InteliSys is part of a wide network of technology companies in the Moncton area. While there are numerous technological organizations that bring these companies together, they lack unity. A leading organization, with the influence to unite the numerous and diverse groups, would enable more effective networking of technology professionals and strengthen the industry in the area. The technology sector in Moncton has the potential to attract significant amounts of talent if its strengths can be adequately united and publicized through such organizations.
Infrastructure: English feels the current fiber optic infrastructure system is a major impediment to business in Moncton. The installation of a fiber optic ring around the city would be a minimal (approximately $1 million) investment that could quickly pay for itself both directly (through usage fees) and indirectly (through increased economic activity in the city). An alternative to the installation of an improved fiber
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optic system may be to create a WiFi umbrella for downtown Moncton that could provide reliable internet access to the business sector.
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KEY OBJECTIVE 3: Foster Academic & Research Excellence
Foster academic and research excellence that is specifically linked to regional economic development.
Regional excellence in research and education provides the long-term foundation to accelerate economic development. Illustrations abound, including Stanford University and Palo Alto, CA; MIT and Boston, MA; and the University of Texas at Austin, as well as less famous universities and regions. Recruiting world-class faculty in targeted technologies leads to greater funding from industry and government, recruitment of higher-quality students, and increases company spinout activity from educational institutions, as it enhances research and education excellence.
Vision: To fully leverage and develop existing and emerging academic assets (research, education, and training) that are key to accelerating the growth of established and emerging technology-based industries in targeted, niche sectors. Assets: Area R&D activities in the biosciences are a long-term asset and growing stronger every year. In 2005 and 2006, over $750,000 in CIHR research funds was awarded to Université de Moncton scholars; in addition, the Centre de Formation Médicale du N.B. initiated its four-year MD degree program in 2006 in Moncton, which increases research capacity in the city and may pave the way for a medical school associated with Université de Moncton. The Atlantic Cancer Research Center; research underway at both local hospitals; and R&D groups at the Université de Moncton such as the Thin Films and Photonics program have untapped commercialization potential. Moncton has a large representation of community and private colleges. Université de Moncton, the largest Francophone university in Atlantic Canada locally educates bilingual engineers and scientists to help provide the region’s talent needs. Université de Moncton reports that 89 percent of its full-time students are originally from New Brunswick, 70 percent of its graduates reside in New Brunswick, and 80 percent work in the province.36 Moncton has a number of nearby universities, such as UNB-Fredericton, that provide excellent masters and doctoral programs in science and engineering fields. Challenges: There is no major Anglophone university in Moncton, which contributes to a disparity between the percentage of local Anglophone and Francophone workers with post- secondary education. There is a need to foster shared vision and effort on targeted activities across businesses, academic institutions, and local and provincial government leaders.
36 Data taken from interview with Daniel Grant, Université de Moncton Placement Officer.
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The entire Atlantic Region faces population decline. Numbers show that by the end of the next decade, there will have been, spread over two decades, a 33 percent decline in the number of high school graduates in New Brunswick alone.37 In the long run, without increased immigration, this situation is likely to continue.38 Universities in the province—with a few exceptions (e.g. University of New Brunswick at Saint John)—are not attracting sufficient numbers of science and engineering students from outside the NB province or from other countries. Strategies: Support existing and emerging research and development centers as valuable resources that create the “seed corn” for future economic development. Establish academic-business “Partnerships for Research Excellence” that will benefit the larger community in terms of regional, national, and global perceptions that Greater Moncton is committed and action-oriented, and that regional leaders work cooperatively. o Raise funds to endow faculty chairs at regional universities, in targeted industry sector areas such as ICT, Gaming, Bioengineering, Computer Science, Entrepreneurship and Commercialization. o Recruit outstanding faculty that are likely to win competitive grants and recruit outstanding students, especially in these targeted areas. o Concentrate on building upon existing and emerging regional strengths, e.g., the Thin Films and Photonics Research Group (GCMP) at the Université de Moncton. Develop a regional approach in Greater Moncton for specific clusters that links academic and industry leaders, and fosters targeted growth through effective recruitment. o Greater Moncton has an emerging model in regional cooperation in biosciences including Mount Allison, UNB, Université de Moncton, and the two Moncton Hospitals and includes public-private sector support and leading-edge research, i.e. the Atlantic Cancer Research Institute. Focus both on short-term objectives, which concentrate on the use of existing knowledge and strength of existing assets; and longer-term objectives, which include the creation of new, cutting-edge research and development that is a desirable longer-term objective for the educational institutions. Specific Actions: Pursue opportunities for greater alignment of post-secondary capacity in ICT with regional industry needs, and encourage Université de Moncton, NBCC-CCNB, and other post-secondary educational institutions to increase collaboration through planned channels. Expand and clarify articulation agreements (community college-to-university, and across universities) to encourage post-secondary educational enrollment, especially among Anglophone students. Develop reliable math testing protocols at the school district level that fulfill two characteristics: (1) they allow comparisons of math scores for both the Anglophone
37 This trend is explained, in part, by an aging population—the median age of the population in Moncton is 38 years old—and by the decline in the rates of growth of the young cohorts (ages 5-14 and 15-19). 38 Data provided by Dr. Richard Wiggers, Senior Policy Analyst, Post-Secondary Affairs, New Brunswick Department of Education during interview on August 3, 2006.
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and the Francophone population and (2) they can be compared with scores of students in other cities in Canada and other industrialized countries.39 Increasing Moncton’s sample size in the PISA test could be an effective way to address the issue. Explore development of K-12 curriculum initiatives and youth training programs with the participation of the ICT business community. Encourage more active participation of entrepreneurs on the Board of Directors for the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission (MPHEC) in the determination of new programs to be initiated at universities in Atlantic Canada. Increase distance education opportunities, especially at the post-graduate level. The continuing education of engineers and scientists is a necessary condition for the growth of a knowledge-based industry in Moncton. Promote a campaign to matriculate more students into Moncton’s ICT and other technology-based education/training programs.
The importance of having a college-educated workforce in a local economy cannot be overemphasized. Worldwide, the most successful technology regions have regional universities that graduate talent into the local economy. For Greater Moncton, the Université de Moncton and CCNB-Dieppe are huge assets, and especially for Moncton’s Francophone community. For Anglophone students, NBCC-Moncton, Mount Allison University, and Atlantic Baptist University enjoy well-deserved reputations for excellence among both students and employers. But the province’s post-secondary educational institutions need to do more to raise the percentage of Greater Moncton workers with degrees in the sciences and engineering, especially in the Anglophone community.
Develop Student Internships and Job Placement Opportunities Pilot test a variety of innovative ideas and approaches for improving student placement with local employers. Better employer and student placement service relationships and interactions are needed to achieve higher retention levels of graduates and to facilitate co-op programs, between local employers and undergraduates, that will build important ties between “town and gown” before students graduate. Develop technology-based education and training programs at the high-school level to get students interested at an early age in ICT and engineering fields. Many of the interviewees from the NB Department of Education noted that student interest in trade skills was much higher than in ICT skills. Support college and university internships with companies in targeted industry sectors to build ties with Moncton businesses early in students’ educational programs. Develop an internship program for high school students with local employers. Host job fairs for targeted industry sectors and regional universities. Develop and fund research and education workforce projects.
39 Moncton needs to sell an image to the international high-tech community that its educational system is among the best in the world. In Austin, for instance, the Chamber of Commerce website advertises that Eanes and Round Rock School Districts (where Dell Computer is located) in the Austin metropolitan area are rated “gold medal,” the highest of Expansion Magazine’s cost-performance category.
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