DOCSLIB.ORG

In Pretoria on Dee. 19. F~~~~ (SADF)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
In Pretoria on Dee. 19. F~~~~ (SADF) KEESING'S VOLUME XXXI Relations with Zimbabwe inside Botswana territory, thus contradicting an earlier SADF Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations at claim that they were on the Namibian side of the border. Dis- ,el on M~~ 31, 1983, but relations between the cussions on possible border adjustments in the region were held ne under strain later in the year as a result of in Pretoria On Dee. 19. ltional Army's military activities in North and Both the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Roelof .nd provinces, which bordered Botswana to the "Pik" Botha, and the Minister of Defence, Gen. Magnus Malan, ecurity situation in Zimbabwe, see 33 135 A and had alleged that Botswana was being used as an infiltration route into South Africa by fighters of the African National Congress 13, border troops of both countries clashed near (ANC). uana after a five-man patrol of the Botswana Defence Mr Pik Botha said on Aug. 26, 1984, that relations between Botswana I under fire 4 km inside the Botswana border. At an and the SADF were "not satisfactory" at present. The South African of the bilateral defence and security commission 0x1 government, he said, knew that the ANC was looking to Botswana as an rson Munangagwa, the Zimbabwean Minister of State infiltration route into South Africa, the ANC having been expelled from cr's Office responsible for security, stated that members Mozambique as a result of the Nkomati pact between South Africa and ned forces were under strict instructions not to enter Mozambique [see 32835 A]. Mr Botha affirmed that if necessary the SADF ,and he denied that any had done so; it was suggested would "strike back" over a wider front and not necessarily limit its actions Id have occurred between BDF troops and dissident to attacks on "terrorist" targets. pposition) Zimbabwe African People's Union. During 1983 and 1984 the Botswana government continued to ident On Dee. 20, 19833 a member the Zimbabwe affirm that it would not enter into a security agreement with South i shot dead aftera group of armed men were challenged ~f~i~~.ln addition to the ~k~~~~ipact with ~~~~~bi~~~in %bout200 metres inside Botswana. Mr Munangagwa March 1984, South Africa had concluded an agreement in 22 that a contingent of six Zimbabwean troops had been conducting a "hot pursuit" February 1982 with Swaziland, which remained secret until 1984 against anti-government [see 33080 A], and had also concluded the Lusaka accord with insurgents in the area. Mr Robert hgola in February 1984 [see Page 331981. Mugabe, the Prime Minister of In June 1983 a statement from the Office of the President Zimbabwe* stated On Dee. 23 that categorically denied a report in the Johannesburg Rand Daily the of the "Idier had been Mail of June 6, which suggested that the two governments were "quite unnecessary", and that the Zimbabwe contingent had not negotiating a possible agreement to prevent the use of each other's opened fire and had not deliberm territories as bases for subversion. ately crossed the border; he also The Office of the President denied knowledge of any such negotiations, claimed that his government had or of the "agreement in principle" to which Mr Pik Botha had referred "substantial" information about in the newspaper report, and asserted that it was in any case Botswana's South African involvement in the longstanding policy not to permit its territory to be used for this purpose. training of dissidents in the Dukwe The South African authorities, it was claimed, had given a totally wrong refugee camp in Botswana [see impression of a meeting held on April 21 between Mr Botha and Mr map], and about their infiltration Mogwe (then Minister of Foreign Affairs), during which matters of mutual back into Zimbabwe. (A number of interest had been discussed. people from the south-western part In an interview in the Washington Post in May 1984 during an Zimbabwe had taken refuge official visit to the United States [see below], President Masire from anti-insurgency stated that officials from Botswana and South Africa had had operations in camps in Botswana.) three meetings about a non-aggression pact, a draft of which had in late December 1983 toured villages along the border been presented by the South Africans. South Africa had "hinted ,ces to the inhabitants that they would be protected ruders. Two arms caches situated near the border had strongly" that if Botswana refused to sign, the South African the BDF earlier in December by captured Zimbabwe government might deploy troops along the mutual border and jissidents, who were subsequently deported to Zim- cause disruptions of traffic. In a speech made on May 30, 1984, Mr Mogwe stated that the agree- ovemment had since independence maintained a policy ments signed between South Africa and its neighbours were not voluntary, !es, while forbidding them to launch guerrilla operations but had been forced by South African destabilization of those countries; ica or Zimbabwe from the camps. Security at the main he reaffirmed Botwana's policy of non-aggression and said that no such Dukwe, about 50 km from the Zimbabwe border, had agreement would ever be signed voluntarily with South Africa. South 1983 [see 32062 A], all refugees being required to African radio on Sept. 12 reported President Masire as saying that Bat- Is at all times. In May and June 1983 over 200 foreigners swana would lose its independence if it entered into a security agreement m the country, most of whom were Zimbabweans. In with South Africa. only 45 out of an estimated 3,000 Zimbabwe refugees An ANC communiquC from Lusaka on Sept. 13 condemned 'Iement accepted the Zimbabwe government's offer of what it described as attempts by the South African government tio on. to compel Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact, and rejected Relations with South Africa as totally false Mr Botha's suggestion that the organization's armed wing, Umkhonfowe Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), was using :rs of the south ~f~i~~~~~f~~~~ F~~~~(SADF) iured in an incident on act. 25, 1984, when BDF Botswana as a base for its operations. All ANC operations, the fire on an SADF patrol boat on the ,-hobe river communiquC asserted, were conducted from within South Africa. Strip (the narrow stretch of Namibian territory Mr Pik Botha affirmed, however, on Jan. 31, 1985, that since .na, Angola and Zambia-see map). In a statement December 1984 there had been a "marked increase" in the number 26 the BDF said that the SADF marines were of ANC fighters entering South Africa from Botswana via the ---------- --- --- ---------- ------ KEESING'S VOLUME XXXI Relations with Zimbabwe inside Botswana territory, thus contradicting an earlier SADF Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations at claim that they were on the Namibian side of the border. Dis- ,el on M~~ 31, 1983, but relations between the cussions on possible border adjustments in the region were held ne under strain later in the year as a result of in On Dee. 19- ational Army's military activities in North and Both the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Roelof ,nd provinces, which bordered Botswana to the "Pik" Botha, and the Minister of Defence, Gen. Magnus Malan, ecurity situation in Zimbabwe, see 33135 A and had alleged that Botswana was being used as an infiltration route into South Africa by fighters of the African National Congress 13, border troops of both countries clashed near (ANC). wana after a five-man patrol of the Botswana Defence Mr Pik Botha said on Aug. 26, 1984, that relations between Botswana I under fire 4 km inside the Botswana border. At an and the SADF were "not satisfactory" at present. The South African ,of the bilateral defence and security commission on government, he said, knew that the ANC was looking to Botswana as an rson Munangagwa, the Zimbabwean Minister of State infiltration route into South Africa, the ANC having been expelled from cr's Office responsible for security, stated that members Mozambique as a result of the Nkomati pact between South Africa and ned forces were under strict instructions not to enter Mozambique[see 32835 A]. Mr Botha affirmed that if necessary the SADF ,and he denied that any had done so; it was suggested would "strike back" over a wider front and not necessarily limit its actions Id have occurred between BDF troops and dissident to attacks on "terrorist" targets. pposition) Zimbabwe African People's Union. During 1983 and 1984 the Botswana government continued to ident On Dee. 20, 1983, a member of the Zimbabwe affirm that it would not enter into a security agreement with South i shot dead after a group armed Inen were Africa. In addition to the Nkomati pact with Mozambique in lbout 200 metres inside Botswana. Mr Munangagwa March 1984, South Africa had concluded an agreement in 22 that a contingent of six Zimbabwean troops had been conducting a pursuit.. February 1982 with Swaziland, which remained secret until 1984 operation against anti-government [see 33080 A], and had also concluded the Lusaka accord with insurgents in the area. Mr Robert A"gola in February 1984 [see Page 331981. Mugabe, the Prime Minister of In June 1983 a statement from the Office of the President Zimbabwe- stated On Dee. 23 that categorically denied a report in the Johannesburg Rand Daily the of the "Idier had been Mail of June 6, which suggested that the two governments were "quite unnecessary", and that the negotiating possible agreement to prevent the use of each other's Zimbabwe contingent had not a opened fire and had not deliber- territories as bases for subversion.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Winning Hearts and Minds in the Namibian Border War
    85 WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE NAMIBIAN BORDER WAR Lieneke Eloff de Visser1 Abstract During the Namibian border war, South African counterinsurgency doctrine acknowledged the importance of securing the allegiance and cooperation of the population. This article demonstrates that, in the operational zone, the responsibility of winning the hearts and minds of the Namibian people largely fell to the SADF (South African Defence Force). Although the SADF dedicated considerable resources to this task, these efforts were often at cross-purposes with those of institutions in the political, police and administrative domains. In addition, there was a lack of unity and purpose within the SADF. This article argues that lack of unity between and within the different domains undermined the effort at winning the hearts and minds of the Namibian population, and must at least partly have contributed to SWAPO´s victory in the 1989 elections. Introduction In devising appropriate responses to the challenges of the Namibian border war (1974–1989), the South African military drew on the work of C.A. „Pop‟ Fraser and John McCuen. Fraser, a WWII veteran, became Chief of Joint Operations of the South African Defence Force in 1966. In an unpublished study entitled Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars, released in the early sixties, Fraser distilled the basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare from the work of authors such as Galula and Trinquier. McCuen served in staff and command positions in the United States Army in Vietnam, Thailand, Germany and Indonesia. While serving on the US Army General Staff in 1966 his book, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War – The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency, was published.
    [Show full text]
  • Searchlight South Africa: a Marxist Journal of Southern African Studies Vol
    Searchlight South Africa: a marxist journal of Southern African studies Vol. 2, No. 7 http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.PSAPRCA0009 Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka’s Terms and Conditions, available at http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education. The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law. Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org Searchlight South Africa: a marxist journal of Southern African studies Vol. 2, No. 7 Alternative title Searchlight South Africa Author/Creator Hirson, Baruch; Trewhela, Paul; Ticktin, Hillel; MacLellan, Brian Date 1991-07 Resource type Journals (Periodicals) Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) Ethiopia, Iraq, Namibia, South Africa Coverage (temporal)
    [Show full text]
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume 2
    VOLUME TWO Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998. Archbishop Desmond Tutu Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize Chairperson Dr Alex Boraine Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza Vice-Chairperson Ms Mary Burton Dr Wendy Orr Revd Bongani Finca Adv Denzil Potgieter Ms Sisi Khampepe Dr Fazel Randera Mr Richard Lyster Ms Yasmin Sooka Mr Wynand Malan* Ms Glenda Wildschut Dr Khoza Mgojo * Subject to minority position. See volume 5. Chief Executive Officer: Dr Biki Minyuku I CONTENTS Chapter 1 Chapter 6 National Overview .......................................... 1 Special Investigation The Death of President Samora Machel ................................................ 488 Chapter 2 The State outside Special Investigation South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 42 Helderberg Crash ........................................... 497 Special Investigation Chemical and Biological Warfare........ 504 Chapter 3 The State inside South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 165 Special Investigation Appendix: State Security Forces: Directory Secret State Funding................................... 518 of Organisations and Structures........................ 313 Special Investigation Exhumations....................................................... 537 Chapter 4 The Liberation Movements from 1960 to 1990 ..................................................... 325 Special Investigation Appendix: Organisational structures and The Mandela United
    [Show full text]
  • I.D.A.Fnews Notes
    i.d. a.fnews notes Published by the United States Committee of the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa p.o. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138 February 1986, Issue No, 25 Telephone (617) 491-8343 MacNeil: Mr. Parks, would you confirm that the violence does continue even though the cameras are not there? . Ignorance is Bliss? Parks: In October, before they placed the restrictions on the press, I took Shortly after a meeting ofbankers in London agreed to reschedule South Africa's a look atthe -where people were dying, the circumstances. And the best enormous foreign debt, an editorial on the government-controlled Radio South I could determine was that in at least 80% of the deaths up to that time, Africa thankfully attributed the bankers' understanding of the South African situation to the government's news blackout, which had done much to eliminate (continued on page 2) the images ofprotest and violence in the news which had earlier "misinformed" the bankers. As a comment on this, we reprint the following S/(cerpts from the MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour broadcast on National Public TV on December 19, 1985. The interviewer is Robert MacNeil. New Leaders in South Africa MacNeil: Today a South African court charged a British TV crew with Some observers have attached great significance to the meeting that took inciting a riot by filming a clash between blacks and police near Pretoria. place in South Africa on December 28, at which the National Parents' The camera crew denied the charge and was released on bail after hav­ Crisis Committee was formed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Apartheid Divide
    PUNC XI: EYE OF THE STORM 2018 The Apartheid Divide Sponsored by: Presented by: Table of Contents Letter from the Crisis Director Page 2 Letter from the Chair Page 4 Committee History Page 6 Delegate Positions Page 8 Committee Structure Page 11 1 Letter From the Crisis Director Hello, and welcome to The Apartheid Divide! My name is Allison Brown and I will be your Crisis Director for this committee. I am a sophomore majoring in Biomedical Engineering with a focus in Biochemicals. This is my second time being a Crisis Director, and my fourth time staffing a conference. I have been participating in Model United Nations conferences since high school and have continued doing so ever since I arrived at Penn State. Participating in the Penn State International Affairs and Debate Association has helped to shape my college experience. Even though I am an engineering major, I am passionate about current events, politics, and international relations. This club has allowed me to keep up with my passion, while also keeping with my other passion; biology. I really enjoy being a Crisis Director and I am so excited to do it again! This committee is going to focus on a very serious topic from our world’s past; Apartheid. The members of the Presidents Council during this time were quite the collection of people. It is important during the course of this conference that you remember to be respectful to other delegates (both in and out of character) and to be thoughtful before making decisions or speeches. If you ever feel uncomfortable, please inform myself or the chair, Sneha, and we will address the issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Trc-Media-Sapa-2000.Pdf
    GRAHAMSTOWN Jan 5 Sapa THREE OF DE KOCK'S CO-ACCUSED TO CHALLENGE TRC DECISION Three former security branch policemen plan to challenge the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's decision to refuse them and seven of their former colleagues, including Eugene de Kock, amnesty for the 1989 murder of four policemen. De Kock, Daniel Snyman, Nicholaas Janse Van Rensburg, Gerhardus Lotz, Jacobus Kok, Wybrand Du Toit, Nicolaas Vermeulen, Marthinus Ras and Gideon Nieuwoudt admitted responsibility for the massive car bomb which claimed the lives of Warrant Officer Mbalala Mgoduka, Sergeant Amos Faku, Sergeant Desmond Mpipa and an Askari named Xolile Shepherd Sekati. The four men died when a bomb hidden in the police car they were travelling in was detonated in a deserted area in Motherwell, Port Elizabeth, late at night in December 1989. Lawyer for Nieuwoudt, Lotz and Van Rensburg, Francois van der Merwe said he would shortly give notice to the TRC of their intention to take on review the decision to refuse the nine men amnesty. He said the judgment would be taken on review in its entirety, and if it was overturned by the court, the TRC would once again have to apply its mind to the matter in respect of all nine applicants. The applicants had been "unfairly treated", he said and the judges had failed to properly apply their mind to the matter. The amnesty decision was split, with Acting Judge Denzil Potgieter and Judge Bernard Ngoepe finding in the majority decision that the nine men did not qualify for amnesty as the act was not associated with a political objective and was not directed against members of the ANC or other liberation movements.
    [Show full text]
  • Umkhonto Wesizwe's Contribution to The
    JOERNAAL/JOURNAL KWHELA UMKHONTO WESIZWE’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENCE OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION IN ANGOLAJ GC Kwhela** 1. INTRODUCTION Prior to independence, on 11 November, 1975, the prospective Angolan govern- ment under the leadership of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçaõ de Angola) was under continuous attack from the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertaçaõ de Angola) and UNITA (Uniaõ Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). The FNLA was attacking from the then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) with the support of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was repelled at Quifangondo, close to the capital, Luanda. UNITA was advancing from the south in conjunction with the South African Defence Force (SADF) with the aim of capturing the capital before Independence Day. The joint UNITA-SADF forces, which held the town of N’Gunza (which was then called Novo Redondo), were repelled at the Queve River, Cuanza Sul Province by the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). FAPLA forces were later on reinforced by Cuban forces that provided assistance in resisting the advancement of the joint UNITA-SADF forces to Luanda and ultimately the SADF withdrew from Angola on 27 March 1976. Although the conflict continued throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s in the Cunene, Cuando Cubango and Moxico provinces of Angola, the joint UNITA- SADF forces began another offensive in 1983 with the rejuvenated support of the United States under the Reagan administration. This was the first instance in which uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, became a prominent actor in the defence of the African revolution in Angola, in what was then called the "eastern front" within the Malanje province.
    [Show full text]
  • Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb and the Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 1
    White Elephants:Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb and the Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 1 WHITE ELEPHANTS: WHY SOUTH AFRICA GAVE UP THE BOMB AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY Maria Babbage This article examines why the South African government chose to dismantle its indigenous nuclear arsenal in 1993. It consid- ers three competing explanations for South African nuclear disarmament: the realist argument, which suggests that the country responded to a reduction in the perceived threat to its security; the idealist argument, which sees the move as a signal to Western liberal democratic states that South Africa wished to join their ranks; and a more pragmatic argument—that the apartheid government scrapped the program out of fear that its nuclear weapons would be misused by a black-major- ity government. The article argues that the third explanation offers the most plausible rationale for South Africa’s decision to denuclearize. Indeed, it contends that the apartheid South African government destroyed its indigenous nuclear arsenal and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to “tie the hands” of the future ANC government, thereby preventing any potential misuse of the technology, whether through its proliferation or use against a target. Maria Babbage is a Master of Arts candidate at the Norman Paterson School of Inter- national Affairs, Carleton University ([email protected]). Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 15/Spring 2004 Copyright © 2004, the Trustees of Princeton University 7 http://www.princeton.edu/~jpia White Elephants:Why South Africa Gave Up 2 Maria Babbage the Bomb and the Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 3 In March 1993, South African President F.W.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
    The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM by Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt April 2001 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm . Contents Page Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i The Authors ............................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments .......................................................................................v Chronology ................................................................................................vii I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 II. The Origins of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program.............3 III. Project Coast, 1981-1993....................................................................17 IV. Rollback of Project Coast, 1988-1994................................................39
    [Show full text]
  • South Africa After Apartheid: a Whole New Ball Game, with Labor on the Team
    r , * ',-,- - i i-.-- : ii ii i -ii,,,c - -. i - 198 Broadway * New York, N.Y. 10038 e (212) 962-1210 Tilden J. LeMelle, Chairman Jennifer Davis, Executive Director MEMORANDUM TO: Key Labor Contacts FROM: Mike Fleshman, Labor Desk Coordinator DATE: June 7, 1994 South Africa After Apartheid: A Whole New Ball Game, With Labor On The Team Friends, The victory parties are finally over and, in the wake of Nelson Mandela's landslide election as South Africa's first-ever Black President, South African workers are returning to their jobs and to the enormous challenges that lie ahead. For the 1.2 million-member Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), whose support for Mandela's ANC was critical to the movement's runaway 62.5 percent victory, the end of apartheid brings new opportunities for South African workers, but also some new problems. One result of the ANC victory is the presence of key labor leaders in the new government. Two high ranking unionists, former COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo, and former Assistant General Secretary Sydney Mufamadi, were named to cabinet posts -- Mufamadi as Minister of Safety and Security in charge of the police, and Naidoo as Minister Without Portfolio, tasked with implementing the ANC/COSATU blueprint for social change, the national Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). Former National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) economist Alec Erwin was named Deputy Minister for Finance. Former Mineworkers head Cyril Ramaphosa, elected General Secretary of the ANC in 1991, will exert great influence on the shape of the permanent new constitution as the chair of the parliamentary constitution-writing body.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of the South African Security Establishment an Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power
    BRADLOW SERIE£ r NUMBER ONE - ft \\ \ "*\\ The Rise of the South African Security Establishment An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power Kenneth W. Grundy THl U- -" , ., • -* -, THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Rise of the South African Security Establishment An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power Kenneth W, Grundy THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS August 1983 BRADLOW PAPER NO. 1 THE BRADLOW FELLOWSHIP The Bradlow Fellowship is awarded from a grant made to the South African Institute of In- ternational Affairs from the funds of the Estate late H. Bradlow. Kenneth W. Grundy is Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. Professor Grundy is considered an authority on the role of the military in African affairs. In 1982, Professor Grundy was elected the first Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs. Founded in Cape Town in 1934, the South African Institute of International Affairs is a fully independent national organisation whose aims are to promote a wider and more informed understanding of international issues — particularly those affecting South Africa — through objective research, study, the dissemination of information and communication between people concerned with these issues, within and outside South Africa. The Institute is privately funded by its corporate and individual members. Although Jan Smuts House is on the Witwatersrand University campus, the Institute is administratively and financially independent. It does not receive government funds from any source. Membership is open to all, irrespective of race, creed or sex, who have a serious interest in international affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • Soutr#Yafrlca
    EPISCOPfnCHU~HMEN SOUTr#YAfRlCA \.4 W.st 11th SftH. • New York, N, y, loon phone, (2t2j 4iNJ066 - FDr A Free SOIItbem AMell- Eastertide 1977 SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA? Meetings between representatives of five Western powers and officials of the South African regime have stirred a rash of reports and rumours about a breakthrough in settling the issue of Namibian independence. None of the participants is saying very much, although there has been a flood of leaks, mainly from .sources close to the South African-sponsored Turnhalle conference in the Namibian capital of Windhoek. The burden of stories appearing in the Western press is that South African Prime Minist­ er' Balthazar Johannes Vorster has yielded to pressure from the five mem~ bers of the United Nations Security Council - the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada - and that a number of concessions have been or ' are close to being made by the regime which illegally occupies the International Territory of Namibia in defiance of the lawful authority,the United Nations. There were two meetings in Cape Town in April, and future five power 'de­ marches' upon Vorster are forecast. US Vice President Walter Mondale is talking y.1ith the South African chieftain in Vienna on 19 May and US am­ bassador to the UN Andrew Young visits Johannesburg on 21 May. The UN conference on Zimbabwe and Namibia underway in the Mozambique capital of Maputo 16-21 May will exert an influence on events. London OBSERVER journalist David ~artin writes from Maputo that the 'un­ derstanding' between the West and Vorster includes: - Pretoria's acceptance of 'an internationally acceptable solution' and the principle of UN involvement in nation-wide elections in Namibia 'held under universal suffrage without literacy qualifications'.
    [Show full text]