New players, new entries?
The connection and influence of the private military and security industry on political assistants of the ministry of Defense in the Netherlands
B.W.Dencher S1743546
Master thesis Crisis and Security Management Faculty Governance and Global Affairs University Leiden
Supervisor: Dr. C.F. van den Berg Final version: 23 March 2017 Summary A new functionary made its debut across different parliamentarian systems in in the 1980s and 1990s. Ministers were increasingly faced with a deficiency in both their own capacity and capability to respond adequately to the growing demands placed on them by the civil service, parliament and the then emerging 24-hour media circus. To ensure their own political survival, ministers appointed political advisors to their side. With the first of these appointments in the Netherlands in 1994, political assistants have become a common and accepted sight in the governmental and political elite of the Netherlands. While first being scrutinized as shadowy figures, political assistants are now widely believed to have a positive effect on the workings of government. The first wave of research, domestically and international, found that the political assistants could serve as channels for the unwarranted influence of lobbyists and interests groups due to their function as gatekeepers, and trusted aides, to the minister. However, the first wave of research is seen to be inconclusive on this issue. This thesis has sought to provide an answer to this question by examining the connections between the private military and security industry and political assistants working at the ministry of Defense and if the former uses the latter to exert influence on the Defense policy of the Netherlands. The findings of this research, based on interviews with several political assistants, an unique dataset containing information on all political assistants since 1994 and an extensive literature study, show that a connection that would allow even the most occasional influence to be extorted on the Defense policy does not exist between political assistants of the ministry of Defense and the private military and security industry. The interviewed insiders do hint that a connection exists at other levels of the Defense organization, with former military personnel becoming lobbyist and utilizing their connections to their former colleagues. The unwarranted influence of the private sector could therefore still exist but seems to ignore the political assistant. This does not imply that their relevance for the private sector will remain low, as the function of the political assistant is continuously evolving and might one day possess a level of influence over Defense policy. It is therefore of importance to conduct further, and a wider, research into political assistants and their connection to the private sector to develop a deeper understanding of the interactions between the political assistant and the private sector.
2 Table of contents
Summary ...... 2
Table of contents ...... 3
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 5
1.1 Scientific relevance ...... 7
1.2 Social Relevance ...... 8
1.3 Thesis lay out ...... 9
Chapter 2: Literature overview ...... 10
2.1 Political Assistants in the Netherlands ...... 10
2.2 Private military and security industry in the Netherlands ...... 17
2.2.1 Defense Industry in the Netherlands ...... 17
2.2.2 Private military contractors ...... 19
2.2.3 The Dutch government and PMC’s ...... 21
2.3 Political assistants and the private industry...... 24
2.4 Hypotheses flowing from the theoretical findings ...... 28
Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 32
3.1 Research design ...... 32
3.2 Empirical strategy ...... 33
3.3 Operationalization ...... 34
3.4 Validity ...... 36
3.5 Reliability...... 37
Chapter 4: Empirical findings ...... 39
4.1 Political Assistants and the Private Industry ...... 40
4.2 Political assistants and Connaughton’s typology ...... 45
4.3 Political assistants and the four Arena’s ...... 51
Chapter 6: Conclusion ...... 53
3 List of References ...... 55
Newspaper articles ...... 59
Defense industry websites ...... 60
Appendix 1: Private Military Companies ...... 61
1.1 Categorization of PMC’s ...... 61
1.2 Overview of employed PMC’s by the Dutch government in Afghanistan ...... 61
Appendix 2: Summary of interviews ...... 64
2.1 Standard interview invitation e-mail ...... 64
2.2 Interview questions ...... 65
4 Chapter 1: Introduction
‘In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.’ (Pres. D. Eisenhower, 1961
‘A homogenous interest group—in this case, defense contractors— has a vested interest in increasing spending or favorable regulation that will transfer wealth from government to the group.’ (Brito and Watkins, 2011, p. 39)
‘The number and influence of ministerial advisors have become a source of public concern in the last decade in many countries. Media and government enquiries have pointed out their growing numbers, the opacity of their status and the lack of clear accountability structures in which they operate.’ (OECD, 2011, p. 3)
The new functionary mentioned by the OECD (2011) emerged in the administrative and political elite of the Netherlands in the 1990’s and has firmly established itself in the Hague in 2017. Called special advisors or ministerial advisors in other countries but known as political assistants (PA) in the Netherlands, these men and women1 are tasked with aiding their minister2. These tasks vary widely, however the primary goal is the same: ensuring the political survival of their minister. In the Dutch ’merit-based’ and a-political civil service PA’s, themselves highly politicized functionaries, are in a special position and act as confidants of their minister, safeguarding their political interest. The manner in which they do so has caused them to be seen as a ‘shadow army’ (NRC, 2012), themselves eschewing the public eye. Academical attention has been substantial in various countries, finding that PA’s can influence policy and act as gatekeepers to their ministers whom is approached by private interest groups and lobbyist. These groups aim to further their own agenda by influencing the minister and governmental policy, which constitutes as an unwarranted influence that causes a democratic deficit. Political assistants could be an interesting actor for these groups considering their proximity to a minister. This
1 In this thesis PA refers both to a male and female PA.
2 In this thesis minister and a state secretary share the same denomination.
5 research seeks to determine if PA’s are connected to the private sector, and if so, how this connection influences the policy of the minister. The private military and security industry, abbreviated to PMSI, has grown in importance in the past twenty years, with national militaries heavily depended on this industry’s products and services. This dependency is also seen in the Netherlands, with the government being a major customer the national and international operating industry. The increased dependency on the private sector is a source of great concern for various academics and activist groups. They warn that the interest of this sector threaten democratic principles such as the publicly owned and controlled monopoly on the use of force, which is eroded by depending more and more on the private industry. This study aims specifically on those PA’s that work or have worked at the ministry of Defense and their connection with the private military and security industry in the Netherlands. The citations at the start of this chapter are not to be taken lightly. Developing insight into this connection will provide clearance on several important issues concerned with the relation of PA’s and the private security industry. Are they connected, do PA’s have contacts within this sector? If so, what is the effect of these contacts of the PA’s, does it influence the decision making of their minister? And how do the political assistants at the ministry of Defense compare to their colleagues within the Netherlands and abroad? Are there substantial similarities that would allow the findings to extrapolate to other ministries? In order to obtain the required knowledge to answer these questions the following research question has been formulated:
What is the relation between PA’s at the ministry of Defense and the private security industry and how does it influence policy of the ministry of Defense?
Sub questions have been formulated in order to answer the research question, and are as follows: 1. Are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s have been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
6 2. Does the classification of Connaughton regarding political advisors, when applied on the PA’s of the ministry of defense, correspond with earlier findings on Dutch PA’s and do they differ strongly from PA’s at other ministries? 3. In what arena do PA’s from the ministry of Defense work primarily and why, and how does this compare to the findings in the literature concerning other PA’s?
As will be seen in chapter 4, the various subquestions incorporate existing theory, discussed in chapter 2, that enables one to establish a clear picture of the primary activities and connections that political assistants have. These findings complement the empirical findings from the interviews, allowing for a objective assessment of the connection between political assistants and the private military and security industry.
1.1 Scientific relevance
Much has been written on both political assistants and the private military and security industry and the manner in which the latter tries to influence public policy. However, the body of knowledge on how these two interact in the Netherlands is presently undocumented and the different findings remain inconclusive on the influence private actors have on political assistants. This research aims to explore this connection and help answer the question if PA’s are targeted by the private sector. The research is conducted within a research group, consisting of multiple Master students, led by dr. van der Berg. Open-source data has been gathered on all political assistants since 1994 and it is supplemented by survey’s filled out by multiple former and present political assistants. This provided an unique dataset, allowing each student to utilize the data in their own specific master theses. Van den Berg will use the dataset in an international research project called Ministerial Advisers Research Consortium, or MARC, which aims to build an internationally accessible source concerning political advisors. Additionally, this research aims to supplement the growing body of knowledge on political assistants in the Netherlands by conducting interviews with former and present political assistants of the ministry of Defense. These interviews provides unique data on these political assistants and their connections to the private military and security industry. In sum, the research aims to provide both unique quantitative and qualitative data on PA's in the Netherlands.
7 1.2 Social Relevance
Political assistants have become part of the elite of public administration in the Netherlands. They operate on behalf of their ministers, safeguarding their interests, while also working closely with senior civil servants on a daily basis. Their position is unique in the Netherlands but much remains unknown about the PA’s and the influence they have on their surroundings. This research seeks to develop the understanding on political assistants, providing a more complete picture on how the Dutch government works, enlarging its transparency. Political assistants are criticized by journalists, seeing them as ‘shadow army’s’ (NRC, 2012; Volkskrant, 2015; Volkskrant, 2016). Is this denomination warranted, or should they be judged more kindly? Their position allows for unwarranted influence to reach the minister and obscures the manner in which policy is formulated. Enlarging the understanding of their true nature, and effects on their surroundings, is thus essential. This research aims to provide more insight into this shadowy niche of government. The private military and security industry has become increasingly powerful and have been found to successful influence governmental policy in many countries with weak but also strong democratic institutions. The seemingly never ceasing increasing number of threatening developments in the field of international security provide ample demand for their products and services. The increased dependency on the private sector for the provision of hitherto publicly provided tasks raises concern with many. To better understand if the sector causes their own demand, or influences governmental policy through unseeable channels, it’s imperative to establish a clear notion of the manner in which they operate. The increasing dependency on this sector, while also providing beneficial services and products, is not without risks. Some academics claim that the ‘unwarranted influence’ of the ‘military- industrial complex’, warned for by Dwight Eisenhower, is already an reality in the United States, which is constantly seeking to ‘manipulate public policy to perpetuate itself.’ (Ledbetter, 2010). While this may not be the case yet in the Netherlands, the ministry of Defense remains an target for continuous advocacy groups of the private military and security industry and is likely to remain as such as various political parties are looking to increase the Defense budget, that currently sits at €7.9 billion (Rijksoverheid, 2017). The
8 general public, as well as the academical society, should be vigilant against the unwarranted influence of the private industry, especially against the ever growing private military and security industry that deliberately influence the government to perpetuate and enrich itself at the cost of taxpayers money and, more importantly, the democratic principles of a transparent and accountable government.
1.3 Thesis lay out
A substantial body of knowledge on political assistants and the private military and security industry will provide the fundament on which this research builds, which will be discussed in chapter 2, the theoretical framework. Included in this chapter are the various hypotheses that will be tested to help answer the research question. Chapter 3 will present the methodology of this research. The research design, the research population, the methods of data collection and the validity and reliability of the research will be presented. Following on the previous chapters, the empirical findings will be presented in chapter 4. The results from the dataset and the interviews will be combined to affirm or reject the various hypotheses stated in chapter 2, allowing the sub questions to be answered. Finally, chapter 5 will present the conclusion of this research. The research question will be answered, its implications for both the academical and societal spheres will be discussed and avenues for further research will be advised.
9 Chapter 2: Literature overview
This chapter will present the current body of knowledge on political assistants, in the Netherlands and abroad. Secondly, the private military and security industry will be discussed. What companies are considered part of it, what are private military companies and how does the government, i.e. the ministry of Defense, interact with this industry? Lastly, the manner in which the private military and security industry has been seen to influence those working in government will be discussed. These three part provide a literature overview and constitute the theoretical background of this thesis. The theoretical findings will show gaps of knowledge as well pose questions. The literature overview will therefore be accompanied with hypotheses that are linked to the sub questions (see chapter 1). The hypotheses and the subquestions will be answered in chapter 5 by using the theoretical findings presented in this chapter and the empirical findings which flow from the collected data.
2.1 Political Assistants in the Netherlands
Two waves of research can be distinguished in the Netherlands regarding political assistants. The first wave, which focussed on the practical activities of the PA’s, can be said to have started with Frequin, a senior civil servant, who dedicated a small chapter to his experiences with political assistants, with one seeing himself as a ‘plunger’ tasked with ‘unclogging the congested’ relation between the minister and his civil servants (2006, p. 71). Frequin considered a PA as either a partisan, with the same political background as the minister, or a politically neutral person tasked primarily with maintaining communications with political connections of the minister and the media (Ibid.). According to Frequin, the first unofficial political assistant can be traced back to the 1960’s (p. 70). This informal version continued to exist until the incumbency of Paars I in 1994. The coalition government existed out of the social-democrats (PvdA), the liberals (VVD) and the social-liberals. They decided that the prime minister and the two vice prime ministers were all allowed to appoint one political assistant. Maijenburgh notes that this was the first formal naming of these functionaries (2007, p. 19). Not all political parties were accepting of this change, with the VVD claiming
10 that ministers could do without (Ibid.). This attitude changed over the years, as can be seen in table 2.1 below, which shows the number of ministers (which includes state secretaries) and the number of political assistants for the past eight cabinets.
Cabinet Ru5e II
Ru5e I
Balkenende IV
Balkenende III poli9cal assistents Balkenende II ministers Balkenende I
Paars II
Paars I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Absolute numbers of political assistants or ministers
Table 2.1
Aimed to shed more led on the PA, Maijenburg set out to map the hitherto largely unknown phenomena of PA’s, as well as their various relations and rolls. Maijenburg added an important aspect to the definition of a PA that will be used in this research as well. Thus, a PA is considered to be
“A civil servant with a temporary appointment, which is parallel to the appointment of the minister he or she serves, who is tasked with supports the minister with specific focus on political party activities” (Maijenburg, 2007, p. 5)
The use of political assistants grew, as the table clearly shows. Maijenburgh notes several reasons for this. Firstly, the ukase of Kok in 1998 forbid civil servants to talk with the media and members of the Dutch parliament, making the PA a helpful tool for the minister to
11 communicate with the parties mentioned (Maijenburgh, p. 20). The ukase stipulated that the PA would function as a liaison, a connector between the ministry and the other parties, a difficult task considering the tension and competition that can exist between those actors. Secondly, Maijenburg points out that the christian-democrats (CDA) and PvdA widely used PA’s, causing the VVD to adopt them as well in fear of lacking behind on the other political parties (pp. 20-21). Following Frequin and Maijenburg, de Vries (2008) set out to gain insights into the ‘black box’ and improve the understanding of PA within the administrative system, the relations a PA had and how information was handled within these relations by the PA (2008, p. 5). The job prescription, written in 2003 by then prime minister Balkenende (CDA), for political assistants was found to be unclear, with the specific goal or tasks unspecified in the one page document (Ibid.). It positioned the PA ‘directly under the minister’ , meaning the PA reports to the minister, but the PA is stationed as an employee of the Secretary General (SG), with salary depending on the specifics of earlier experience, the minister he or she serves and the challenges of that position (Secretariaat Ministerraad, 2013, p. 67; de Vries, p. 5). According to de Vries found the first and foremost interest of the PA is the political survival of the minister (p. 5). To this end, the PA has many relations and tasks that vary in their intensity. PA’s are found to act as gatekeepers for their ministers, with interest groups and lobbyist targeting them to move relevant information to the minister (de Vries, p. 50). The research of de Vries opened up the black box broadly and was followed by research that specifically focussed on the role PA’s have as liaisons, aiming to understand the ‘strategic value’ PA’s (Steen et. al., 2009, p. 10). This research underscores earlier findings concerning the primary role played by PA’s as being connectors (Steen et. al., p. 37).
Political assistants are seen around the globe, with similarities and differences existing between them. Eichbaum and Shaw (2007) conducted research on political assistants in both New Zealand and Australia, seeking to gain more understanding of the triangular relation between the minister, the civl servants and the political assistants. In both countries, PA’s became necessary as the ‘amount of information’ presented to policy makers increased just as rapidly as the pressure the ‘policy environment places ministers’ under (Eichbaum and Shaw, p. 465). The PA is essential in aiding their minister to cope with the increased pressure,
12 coming also from the constant media coverage, providing themselves as the necessary resource to keep the minister capable of his or her tasks (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2011, p. 598). They found that PA’s enjoy an ‘asymmetrical advantage’ over civil servants, with civil servants in New Zealand in general say that this advantage is not ‘being exercised to negative effect’ (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2007, pp. 455-457). To the contrary, the civil servants in New Zealand are positive towards PA’s, finding their policy contribution useful as they ‘add value to … the rigor of the policy process’ (Ibid.). The PA increases the ‘advice base, increasing ministers’ options, testing officials’ advice, and democratizing processes by providing an additional point of entry for external policy actors’ (p. 457). Later research by Eichbaum and Shaw (2011) further clarified the role ministerial advisors play. They found that two thirds of the PA’s scheduled meetings between the minister and interest groups, and also attending these meetings (2011, p. 590). Additional interaction with these external stakeholders also entailed creating special policy groups which was done by ‘encouraging interest groups to lobby appropriate organizations’ believed to be beneficial for the policy development (Ibid.) These findings support those of de Vries (2008, p. 50), and others, that PA’s can influence the policy process by proposing their own issues and new policies to the minister (Eichbaum and Shaw, p. 595).
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD, has published two research papers aimed specifically to enlarge the scarce literature on political assistants. In both cases the scope has been limited to members of the European Union (EU) and candidate member states. In short, the OECD found that a political assistant has several tasks, with the primary as acting as a liaison for their minister. Secondly, the PA offers as the closest aide to the minister and advising the minister on grounds of political expertise. The OECD found similarities between the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, with the civil service remaining political neutral towards their minister and thus requiring the PA to fill this gap. Additionally, the OECD found that unwarranted influence of private actors or parties can reach and influence the ministers policy through the PA, who works closely with the minister. The PA can work as an ‘informal emissary to outside groups’, with these groups including ‘pressure groups, … think tanks, business leaders…’ (OECD, 2007, p. 12). The close proximity to the minister and the close interaction with the ‘private sector’ makes
13 political assistants ‘particularly vulnerable to undue influence’ (OECD, 2011, p. 12) Considering these findings, in combination with the findings of de Vries that PA’s are targeted by lobbyists and interest groups, hints that the political assistant in theory could be used to exert unwarranted influence on the minister (2008, p. 50).
Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen conducted an comparative analysis of Dutch and Flemish political assistants aimed at their tasks and behavior in four arenas, those being internal vertical arena, internal horizontal arena, political-parliamentarian arena and lastly the external societal arena (2011, p. 65). Their findings suggest that PA’s have little influence in the vertical arena, considering themselves unable to influence policy of the minister (Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, p. 69). Political assistants claimed to primarily focus on the political-parliamentarian arena, in which they focus primarily on preparing their minister for debates and discussions, to ensure that ‘the political process goes smoothly in the political arena’ (Ibid.). These findings underscore the aforementioned findings that the PA act as a connector, a liaison for their minister. The four arena’s and the connections of the PA are visualized in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 (Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, 2011, p. 72)
14 While other researchers mention the possibility of unwarranted influence from the private sector as a legitimate cause for concern, Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, see PA’s as an effort to maintain the ‘relative’ purity of the Dutch system in which PA’s operate as liaisons: they ‘stabilize the current system and ensure its pure mode of operation’ (2011, pp. 73-74).
The French and Belgian system of ministerial cabinets has been criticized, as they are considered to be partisans, supporting the minister and enforcing a closed circle of likeminded trustees around him or her (Frequin, 2006, p.47). Maijenburgh (2007, p.44) found that the English political advisors whom are appointed by their minister share many characteristics with PA’s, with differences still remaining present.
Connaughton (2010) studied political assistants in Ireland and interviewed several of them, allowing her to formulate four different types of political assistants which are based on their origin and their role: 1. Expert. This PA is a highly qualified political ‘outsider’, not part of the political system. The expertise of this PA is used to initiate new policies and enhance existing ones. This PA is not expected to take an active role in the political arena but is instead expected to use his or her expertise to the full potential to supplement and assist the minister. 2. Partisan. This PA is a fellow member of the minister’s party and has been given the position from this perspective. The PA is expected to assist the minister by keeping a sharp eye on the political arena, ensuring an overall good performance of the minister in this respect. The PA stays in close contact with the ministers political party members, parliamentarians and other influentials associated with the party. 3. Coordinator. The PA assists the minister by staying in touch with the various actors whom are deemed relevant by the minister. This entails the vertical and horizontal arena, as well as the political-parliamentarian arena and the societal arena. His or her most important task is to manage ministerial policies and ensure their accordance with each other. The aim of this labour is to get good and timely results that can be claimed by the minster or his or her cabinet for political gains.
15 4. Minder. This type of PA is especially appointed on grounds of trust and affinity with the minster. The PA has generally no specific speciality to offer but work close to the minister and their relationship already existed prior to the ministers appointment.
Table 2.3 provides a comprehensive overview of Connaughtons typology.
Role Profile Political Communicate Policy- Impact making role
Expert Specialist Passive Technical Knowledge Expertise
Partisan Responsive Active Political Politics Political dominance
Coordinator Generalist Variable Both Fixer Management
Minder Generalist/ Active Political Politics/ passive Mutuality responsive
Table 2.3 (Connaughton, 2010, p. 352)
In sum, various Dutch researchers have compared the historical development and the position of PA’s in the Netherlands with those positions similar to them in other countries, as seen in the research of Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen (2011) as well as Maijenburgh (2007) and the reports of the OECD (2007:2011). The various authors are not conclusive in their assessment of the influence the private sector has on PA’s and the corresponding influence PA’s can have on the public policy process or the key decision maker, the minister. The empirical findings, presented in chapter 4, will provide more insights into this for the PA’s that have worked, or are working, ate the ministry of Defense.
Still untouched here is the American system, where a ‘spoils system’ allows the president- elect to appoint new, also coming from the private sector, civil servants. This allows clientelism and nepotism to take place, causing much concern for conflicts of interest and the unwarranted influence of the private sector even tough the US has strong institutions, independent media and a legal framework in place to counter these forms of corruption (Bovens et. al., 2001). A connected concern is regulatory capture, a course of events in which
16 a body of government puts the interest of the private sector over those of the society. This will be described in depth in chapter 2.3.
2.2 Private military and security industry in the Netherlands
The aim of this research is to develop increased knowledge of the interaction between PA’s and the private military and security industry, in the Netherlands (see Chapter 1). While the former, PA’s, have already been discussed in depth, the latter will be examined in this section. What companies are considered part of this industry and what findings are there available in the manner the industry seeks to influence public policy for their own benefit? In contrast to the relative scarcity of academical publications that detail PA’s, the private military and security industry has caused more widespread interest and a corresponding large body of academical publications. Therefore the focus will be limited to the type of companies that are known to have interacted with the ministry of Defense in the years after 1994. A brief look into the historical development of the industry is required to fully understand its importance for - and its connection to the government. In addition, various major projects and collaborations between the ministry and the industry that have taken place since cabinet Kok I until now will be discussed. Lastly, the manner in which the industry seeks to influence key decision makers at the ministry of Defense will be discussed. Before moving on, it’s critical to establish what companies are considered part of the private military and security industry.
2.2.1 Defense Industry in the Netherlands
The private military and defense industry consists of several subcategories. The arms industry, also called defense industry, produces military equipment, for example such as helicopters or assault rifles, are part of this industry, but so are private military companies, who provide logistical services to national militaries (PMC’s). Some of the largest defense companies in the Netherlands are Thales, manufacturer of radar and communication systems (Thales, 2017), and Damen Shipyard Group, who build naval vessels ‘ranging from 7 to 200 meters’ (Damen, 2017). While some are native to the Netherlands, such as Damen, others originate from elsewhere and have a branch in the Netherlands. A prime example is Airbus
17 Defense and Space who provided a training simulator for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (Airbus, 2017). These three and other, smaller, companies are part of the Netherlands Industry of Defense and Security Foundation, abbreviated to NIVD, consisting out of 169 companies3, and is tasked to optimize the interest of the defense industry and promote it at the national and international level (NIDV, 2017). Their mission is to ensure ‘the sustainable positioning of the Dutch Defence and Security-related Industry (NL-DVI) in national and international orders (from the government and elsewhere) and in national and international supplier chains. The NL-DVI is synonymous with the highest possible quality and effectiveness of equipment, services and application-oriented knowledge. The NIDV is a strategic partner of the government in the area of defence and security and a key figure in the triple helix collaboration between the government, knowledge institutes and the business community’ (NIDV, 2017). The total number of companies in the industry is considered to be 651 in 2015, together employing 24.800 people, whom shared a turnover of €4.54 billion, of which €3.09 billion is made from the armaments export, in 2015 (MinDef, 2016, pp. 3-5) The Dutch government supports the Dutch defense industry in different ways. A clear example are the Defense Industry Strategies (DIS) published in 2007 and 2013 by the ministry of Defense in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs4. Both documents highlight the ‘golden triangle’ that exists between the government, the private industry and research institutes and aims to ensure the ‘alignment of the operational interests and needs of Defense, the Dutch Defense and Security related industry and research institutes ins such a manner that they can make an high quality contribution to the safety of the Netherlands. This will additionally allow them to be competitive in the European and international market’ (DIS, 2013, p. 3). The collaboration between the private defense industry in the Netherlands and the government is also seen in the political representation that accompanies the defense industry when they conduct trade missions abroad or go to international military and security trade shows. For example, Damen supplies naval vessels to Vietnam, with Thales building the radar and communication system, while the entire project is partly financed by the Dutch ministry of Defense (NRC, 2013). The collaboration between the Dutch government and the Dutch defense industry has born fruit, as the Stockholm International
3 For a full overview, see https://www.nidv.eu/en/participants/
4 These documents are published solely in Dutch. Citations from these documents are therefore translated by the author.
18 Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows in their annual reports on the world wide defense industry: the Netherlands ranks tenth as major weapon exporter in the years from 2011 to 2015, with 2 percent marketshare (SIPRI, 2016, p. 20).
2.2.2 Private military contractors
Another part of the private military and industry industry are private military companies (PMC’s) who provide national militaries with ‘military and/or security services’ that ‘include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel’ (ICRC, 2008). While mostly consisting of noncombatant duties, PMC’s operate in areas where ‘shots are fired and bombs go off’, causing PMC personnel to ‘wear body armor, carry arms, and travel in Humvees’ (Goodsell, 2007, p. 679). A full overview of the services and the corresponding classification of different types of PMC’s can be found in appendix 1.1. McFate found that PMC’s can deliver multiple services, thus allowing for mixed forms of companies or companies that offer a total package of military services, functioning in ‘all three categories, but this is exceptional; most companies specialize in only one category’ (p. 18). Goodsell found that they provide ‘provide logistical support and also perform protection, training, consulting and planning services . Some … actually engage in combat under contract’ (Goodsell, 2007, p. 678). PMCs find employment with a wide range of nation states, with the United States government being their primary costumer, and also non-state actors such as the United Nations, rebels and multinational companies who operate in hostile environments. PMC’s provide a temporary increase in military capabilities, acting as force multipliers, which has made it into a multi-billion sub sector of the private military and security industry operating worldwide (Singer, 2008; McFate, 2015; Percy, 2009). The role of PMC’s in contemporary conflicts is substantial. Over half of the personnel employed by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan are supplied by PMC’s, showing how deeply they are intertwined with the US military and its foreign policy (Avant and de Nevers, pp. 88-91). Not surprisingly, PMC’s are considered to be instrumental actors in modern warfare,
19 with their provision of specialized services, support and advice to nations and non-state actors, (McFate, 2014, pp. 6-8).
The precedents of private military companies can been found throughout history, for example in the Swiss pikemen that sold their services to many medieval rulers (McFate, pp. 26-50). The role of these private providers of armies became significantly less after the emergence of standing armies raised by centralized nation states, lasting from approximately the 19th century until the fall of the Iron curtain in the 1990s (Ibid.) With the fall of the Soviet Union many West European nations gutted their defense budgets, and were confronted several years later with the shortcomings of their militaries when new types of conflicts flared up to which they were unable to respond in a satisfying manner (Ibid.). They turned, partially, towards PMC’s that provided those services which the governments had cut spending on. Avant found that the revenues ‘from the global international security market would rise from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010’ (2007, p. 8). Estimates put the revenue of the global revenue earned by this sector in 2003 around $100 billion (Ibd.). The ‘insatiable need for security in Iraq and Afghanistan fueled the growth of today’s private security industry’ which allowed it to grow from a ‘multimillion-dollar to a multibillion-dollar market’ (McFate, p. 12). The rise of PMC’s over the past decades can be seen in the wider context of securitization, and the subsequent responsibilization and commodification of security (Loader, 2000; Krahmann, 2008; Isima, 2009). Isima (2009) notes that security had been provided privately before the rise of the modern, Westphalian, state and is now one again provided by the market as aforementioned governments started to privatize ‘public monopoly of the the means of legitimate violence for security purposes’ (pp. 113-116) in a world that became globalized, causing the private industry to become increasingly powerful. de Waard (1999), Singer (2008), Percy (2009) and McFate (2014) all illustrate a continues growth of the private military companies, which has been driven by ‘multiple and complexing rationalities.’ (White, 2011, p. 98). A major issue is the fragmentation of power, shown by Matthews (1997). Pointing to the rise of non-traditional security threats, projected by a complicated mix of non- state actors, and the increased importance of technology Matthews has caused others to see the world as becoming a durable disorder, classified as a neomedieval world order, in which
20 the private market of force plays an increasingly important role as governments are seen to share their power, reluctantly, with these private actors (Cerny, 1998, McFate, 2014). The use of PMC’s is also found to raise ethical, the allocation of the justified use of force, and legal issues, with the regulating legal frameworks ‘outdated and ineffective’ (Leander, 2005, p. 19). Avant (2007) argues that the allocation of violence matters, as the increased allocation of the use of force at the market side of the spectrum increases the dependency of the state, and thus the general public, on private military companies (pp. 263-264). The increased share of PMC’s that exist alongside the ‘system of states and state forces’ (Avant, 2007, p. 3), in numerous (post)-conflicts has ‘undermined states collective ability to monopolize violence in the international system’, causing ‘serious consequences for politics and political order’ (Ibid., p. 264).
2.2.3 The Dutch government and PMC’s
As previously noted, nation states have increasingly used PMC’s for their various tasks. The Netherlands is no exception to this. PMC’s have been employed during the Dutch mission in Afghanistan which lasted from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch government was concerned about the various implications of this employment and therefore requested AIV, a Dutch non- governmental council on foreign affairs and security issues, to investigate and share her opinion on the matter. The AIV found that ‘The Dutch armed forces are … making increasing use of private service providers.’ (2007, p. 5). This increased reliance on PMC’s causes several issues, such as the lack of total control over the required resources due to the command structure being split between the military and the PMC. For example, privately supplied military aircrafts were crucial in supplying the Dutch forces in Afghanistan (AIV, p. 15; Leeuwe, 2008). The AIV warns for relying to much on PMC’s as well for the ‘fundamental conflict of interest’ that exists due the PMC’s for profit motive that contrasts with the general interest of the government, causing potentially grave issues when PMC’s refuse certain assignments demanded by military commanders (Ibid.). Much concern is raised by the AIV when discussing the legal and ethical issues that come into play when employing PMC’s. The state that contracts PMC’s should take heed that it takes on ‘a special political and moral responsibility’ (AIV, p. 16) and that the legal and political responsibility for PMC misconduct
21 lies entirely with the Dutch government (AIV, pp. 30-31). In regards of the threat on the monopoly on force (or violence) of the government posed by the use of PMC’s, the AIV strongly reaffirms that the state should minimize the use of PMC’s as much as possible in order to retain its monopoly (AIV, p. 31). Pattinson is one of the academics who shares the view of the AIV, stating that governmental use of PMC’s reinforces the commodification of military services which has strong negative ‘consequences for national and international security’ (2010, p. 446). The AIV also highlights the rising ‘gap between political ambitions and military capabilities’ (pp. 8-9). They found that the Dutch armed forces are unable to sustain the required level of operational capabilities, due to budget cuts, to provide satisfactory levels of performance in several aspects of modern warfare or peacekeeping, such as logistics, in the operations that are requested from them by the Dutch government. Their use of PMC’s is a solution to this problem (Ibid.), as these companies can provide the required level of services and provide a decisive advantage over adversaries (Duingan, 2011). The AIV found that the transparency, accountability and media coverage of PMC's is relatively small when contrasted with regular, governmental, armed forces (AIV, p. 14). Not surprisingly, this is in part caused by the secretive attitude of PMC’s, but just as much caused by the focus of governmental reports and media on the regular armed forces rather then on PMC’s (Ibid.). This is hampering the democratic control of the governments actions in an fundamental aspect of its being, namely the exercise of the monopoly of force, be it domestically or abroad, as it is ‘unclear who is responsible for what’ (AIV, p. 14). The AIV found that ‘the Netherlands is operationally dependent on private contracting for military operations in Afghanistan’ (AIV, p. 28). They found that the armed forces are working together with multiple companies, that supply different services and have different home countries: ‘In Afghanistan … catering at Dutch military camps and the supply of food and fuel have been outsourced to private companies; civil aviation companies are frequently used for local transport needs; civilian mechanics repair military materiel in the operational area, and armed Afghan contractors perform guard duties around the Dutch bases. In Afghanistan, the Netherlands is also cooperating closely with a private party employed by the United States to train the local security services.’ (AIV, 2007, p. 5). For a full overview of the findings of the AIV, which is not complete to the lack of information given to them by the
22 Dutch government, see appendix 1.1. The AIV concludes that hiring ‘responsible and well- regulated PMCs can … contribute to the effectiveness of military operations and the enhancement of stability’ allowing the government to ‘reduce the gap between their ambitions and shortages in transport and logistical capacity’ (AIV, p. 33).
PMC’s are not only used by the Dutch government. The Dutch commercial shipping sector, represented by the Koninklijke Vereniging van Nederlandse Reders (KNVR) has been pressing the Dutch government for many years in an effort to legalize the employment of PMC’s for their sector. PMC’s that operate on the sea are called private naval companies, or PNC’s, and provide the same surge in capacity and capabilities their land based counterparts offer (Berube, 2007, pp. 609-614). Berube considers PNC’s to be a ‘vialbe, robust, accountable, adaptable and potentially cost-effective solution’ to safeguard the international waters from piracy, smuggling and non-traditional threats (pp. 613-614). The Dutch commercial shippers have been under threat of Somali pirates since the second halve of the 00’s, and they have pressed the Dutch government to allow them to hire private military contractors to protect their ships. Reluctant to change legislation but still wishing to assist the commercial shipping sector the government provided their own solution. They supplied Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD’s). These detachments of Marines are available for hire to Dutch shippers but are more expensive, less flexible and less reliable to be available on a short notice and are substantially larger than their private counterparts. The shippers have publicly stated that they have employed PMC’s illegally in order to protect their ships, its cargo and their own sailors, ignoring the law, since 2010 (Schuttevaer, 2010). As one shipper stated, going ‘without protection would be suicide’ (NRC, 2012a). The shippers are unsatisfied with the slacking protection of the Dutch government, and have continuously lobbied to have the law changed and have met with the minister of Defense on several occasions. They want to be legally allowed to contract ‘serious private military companies instead of illegal Rambo’s’ (Ibid.). A new law, proposed by the VVD and the CDA in 2016, would allow the shippers to legally hire private military companies to provide protection against piracy (NRC, 2016).
23 2.3 Political assistants and the private industry
The private military and security industry in the Netherlands is seen to exist of many different companies, and is already connected to the ministry of Defense through the Defense Industry Strategies (DIS). Also, the government has used PMC’s and is pressured to allow commercial shipping companies the same in order to protect their vessels against piracy attacks. The manner in which the private industry connects to the ministry of Defense, and its officials, warrants further explanation. As already discussed in chapter 2.1, de Vries found that PA’s act as gatekeepers to the minister, making them a target for lobbyists and interest groups who desire to influence the minister (2008, p. 50). Additionally, Eichbaum and Shaw found that PA’s can initiate policy proposals and invite interest groups to participate in discussions on governmental policy, facilitating interest groups from the private industry (2011, p. 590). Other findings support the notion that PA’s are interesting for the private sector to approach (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2008). On the other hand, Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (2011) found that PA’s exert little to none influence over the policy of the ministry. This subchapter will discuss the manner in which unwarranted influence is exercised by the private sector on various sectors of government. The concepts, sharing similar and overlapping characteristics, of the revolving door, regulatory capture and the iron triangle will be discussed as they all concern the same issue: the potentially harmful influence of the private sector on public officials and policy.
The iron triangle was formulated by George Adams in 1982, as being the network of relationships that ‘bind the private sector, the Congress, and the Department of Defense (Rayman, 1982, p. 612). The network effectively excludes public influence and results in high defense procurements for the private industry. Additionally, Adams showed that persons whom first worked for the public agencies find employment en masse within the private defense industry (Rayman, pp. 612-613). This iron triangle in the sector of defense was further explored by Briody (2004) who looked into the Carlyle Group. He found that this group’s financial successes coincide with the hiring of outgoing, or former, senior officials of the department of Defense and even a former president. His findings suggest that the revolving door successfully helped Carlyle Group to obtain more contracts from the
24 Department of Defense, or in other words, steer the policy of the Department to favor the company.
The issues shown by Adams and Briody (2004) can be considered examples of regulatory capture, which encompasses characteristics of the iron triangle and the revolving door concepts. Dal Bó (2006) provides a review of the existing literature on regulatory capture that evolved after Stigler published in 1971. Stigler, in 1971, and Peltzman, in 1976, idea of regulatory capture assume that companies will ‘provide incentives to regulators, and that regulators can be thought of as single persons’ (Dal Bó, p. 211). These incentives can be positive, such as ‘campaign contribution to politicians’ and the ‘promise … of future lucrative employment in the industry’, known as the revolving door phenomenon (Ibid., p. 212). Furthermore, Dal Bó suggests that the private sector also offer information to ‘ensure a more favorable treatment’, causing regulating bodies to see the world as the private sector wants them to see it (p. 220). This notion is furthered by the clarification of the two different types of regulatory capture, which is provided by Engstrom (2013). He differentiates between materialist capture, considered to be the classical version, and non-materialist capture, also called cultural capture (p. 32). Materialist capture is caused by the regulators personal material wellbeing and achieved in the manner described by Dal Bó (2006) as positive incentives. Non-materialist capture on the other hand results in the regulatory agency thinking similarly as their private counterparts, resulting in regulatory policy and actions that favor the private sector (Engstrom, p. 32). An example of non-materialist capture is seen in the financial deregulation, the lowering op capital requirements of commercial banks. The commercial banks allegedly convinced the financial regulators that what ‘was good for Wall Street, is good for America’ (Engrstrom, p. 32). Engstrom (2013) points out to the scarcity of empirical evidence and the problem that it’s difficult to pinpoint regulatory capture precisely, as policy comes about in a complex manner. Several authors however provide interesting studies that will counter Engstrom’s notion, albeit in regards to regulatory capture in the sector of military and defense.
Leuchinger and Moser (2014) researched the effect of the revolving door by examine t he appointment of private sector personnel to administrative positions on grounds of political
25 connections to the US President and the appointment of former public sector personnel to positions within defense companies or associated private bodies, and the preferential treatment given to those private companies during their appointment. Their focus was on the Department of Defense, the ministry of Defense in the United States, and the American defense industry. These officials are appointed to increase the power of elected officials, in this case the President, over the bureaucracy. A conflict of interest is deemed present, as these appointees have motives and incentives to give preferential treatment to their former employees: they want to work there again after their appointment ends or they simply want something in return. Similarly, the revolving door also puts appointed officials back on the street, leaving office when a new President enters the White House. Those former officials are seen to (re)join the private military and security industry, bringing with them their connections and information ‘about processes, upcoming decisions’ and the insights into the direct competition of their new employers (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 103). Their connections are seen to heavily influence the value of defense procurement contracts as companies with former appointees receive more lucrative contracts (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 5). While strong institutional and legal frameworks are in place to counter any form of fraud or corrupt behavior, Leuchinger and Moser are doubtful of their enforcement, concluding that even in a country with strong countermeasures, conflicts of interests in the defense industry can persist. They see this at best to be caused by ‘informational advantages’ that some companies have over their competitors, and in the worst scenario caused by preferential allocation of contracts to certain firms that disregard the interests of the ‘taxpayers and the armed forces’ (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 21). Dal Bó commented on the revolving door with caution, questioning wether former public officials are being hired by private companies is driven by the ‘expertise or the lobbying potential’ they bring to their new employer (p. 214).
Hall and Coyne (2014) studied the policy process of the increasing use of unmanned aerial systems, popularly known as drones, and found that ‘this policy process’ developed ‘in the existing relationships, networks, and power distributions between the players based on past interactions and policies’ (p. 457). In these interactions, they found that the private market had extensively lobbied and provided financial support to elected officials for their own benefit, i.e. an increased demand for drone’s of which they profited (Ibid.). Closer to the Netherlands,
26 Rufanges (2016) examined the arms industry and the manner in which they lobby throughout Europe. He found four types of lobbies for the private military and security industry: Firstly, he found industry associations such as the NIDV as being the main body of lobbying for the industry. They seek to operate closely with national governments, and other parts of the lobby such as think tanks, to ensure an increased demand for their industries products. Secondly, the companies own lobbies maintain communications with various relevant officials in order to promote their companies interest. Thirdly, expert panels are started with the aim of gaining ‘influence and recognition’ which is done through holding conferences, publishing papers or holding seminars that promote increased defense budgets in order to face new threats (Rufanges, pp. 314-315). Fourthly, think tanks are funded as nonprofit organizations but are funded by industry actors. Their goal is to hold debates, publish reports and hold conferences that advocate an increased defense budget. The overall goal of these lobbies is to influence and steer, directly or indirectly, the political agenda to those issues that are relevant to themselves and in general ensure that the government seeks to maintain a ‘high level of military and security spending’ (Rufanges, p. 317). These interest can go against those of the general public, as shown by Hall and Coyne study of the development of drones in the US. They found that the narrow interests of the drone producing industry, part of the larger defense industry, generally don't align with the ‘broader notions of public interests as it relates to defense’ (Hall and Coyne, p. 457). Their findings thus suggest that the policy actor has been capture in both a materialist, funding political campaigns, and non-materialist way, influencing policy through expert panels for example, successfully to further their own narrow interests.
While large differences exist between the defense budgets of the US and the Netherlands it is theoretically possible that similar revolving door practices and regulatory capture occur in the Netherlands, even without the phenomena of appointed officials. Goldman, Rochelle and So (2013) found that political connections, which can result in ‘one-on-one time with the government agency’ increase the chances of winning a contract bid (p. 13). Their findings suggest that if a company has political connections to officials in the ministry of Defense their chances of gaining a contract, and thus governmental resources, is significantly higher than companies without such connections (Goldman, Rochelle and So, 2010, p. 42). Faccio (2010)
27 showed that this is not only the case for the US but is in fact visible in over forty-seven countries, including the Netherlands, with his findings focussing on many different sectors, and not specifically the defense industry. Nonetheless, his findings strongly point to the benefits of political and institutional connections for firms over unconnected companies (Foccia, p. 924). Gen and Wright (2013) found, in their study of policy advocacy, that success is higher when a interest group has access to people within the governmental agency and is able to utilize those relationships. In fact, they see relationships, financial resources, a certain degree of agency and specialized knowledge and skills as essential competencies to successfully conduct activities aimed at influencing and changing the vies of key decision makers (Gen and Wright, pp. 180-186). As shown by Rufanges and others, these four competencies are found in the private military and security industry lobby in several countries.
2.4 Hypotheses flowing from the theoretical findings
As already discussed in chapter 2.1, de Vries found that PA’s act as gatekeepers to the minister, making them a target for lobbyists and interest groups who desire to influence the minister (2008, p. 50). Considering the findings of de Vries, as well as others such as Leuchinger and Moser (2014), discussed in chapter 2.3, the following hypothesis can be formulated in order to achieve more knowledge on the connection:
Hypotheses 1.1: PA’s are contacted by the PMSI in order to gain access to the minister.
As was shown by the various authors, the private military and security industry in the US operates in many ways, of which the revolving door is a prominent tool to gain influence within the ministry of Defense and thus with policy makers and key decision makers. It is interesting to establish if this practice is also done by the private industry in the Netherlands by employing political assistants. Therefore, the following hypotheses have been established:
Hypotheses 1.2: PA’s are offered employment within the PMSI after their function ends.
28 Hypotheses 1.3: Formers PA’s, currently employed by the PMSI, use their contacts in their previous employment to benefit the PMSI.
While similarities might be expected, large differences also exist between the Netherlands and the US. Additionally, political assistants are not primarily focussed on the private sector, instead focussing primarily on actors that operate in the parliamentarian and ministerial arena’s. It could therefore also be the case that private actors show no interest in them. This is formulated in the third hypothesis, a so called null hypothesis, that will be tested in the empirical phase of the research.
Hypotheses 1.4: PA’s are not interesting actors for- and are therefore not contacted by the PMSI.
These hypotheses, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, will be used to answer sub question 1, which is as following: are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s has been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
Considering the theoretical findings of Connaughton and others, such as Eichbaum and Shaw, discussed in chapter 2.1, a number of hypotheses have been formulated that aim to improve the understanding of the type of PA’s that are employed, and what causes differences between them. One such difference can exist due to the demand for specialized knowledge, or on the other hand the search for a more overall skilled PA to supplement the minister (see Eichbaum and Shaw). The following hypotheses have been formulated to steer the research into the differences between PA’s:
Hypotheses 2.1: PA’s that worked for the state secretary are more likely to be experts due to the more in depth required knowledge on files. PA’s that worked for the ministers are not experts but partisans whom are more focussed to supplement their minister in regards of political dominance.
29 Hypotheses 2.2: Different types of PA’s at the ministry of Defense are recruited by the different political parties.
Hypotheses 2.3: PA’s at the ministry of Defense differ from other PA’s in their classifications due to the budgetary differences between the ministries.
In order to answer hypothesis 2.3 a comparison will be made by using the survey data, as well as publicly available information on the budgetary differences between ministries. The hypotheses will help answer sub question 2, which has been formulated as: does the classification of Connaughton regarding political advisors, when applied on the PA’s of the ministry of defense, correspond with earlier findings on Dutch PA’s and do they differ strongly from PA’s at other ministries?
The following four hypotheses are linked to the findings of Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (see chapter 2.1). They found that PA’s in general focus primarily on the political-parliamentarian arena, while various findings of chapter 2.3 point to an strong connection with the horizontal arena of appointed officials. It’s
Hypotheses 3.1: PA’s from the ministry of Defense are distinctly active in the societal arena, with substantial attention going towards contact with the PMSI.
Hypotheses 3.2: There are no differences between PA’s of the minister and PA’s of the state secretary of Defense in regards of their relative activity in the various arena’s.
Hypotheses 3.3: PA’s that operate largely in the societal arena are more likely to have connection to the private sector that is connected to their ministry and subsequently are more likely to work in the private sector after their tenure as PA.
These hypotheses will help to answer sub question 3, which is as follows: In what arena do PA’s from the ministry of Defense work primarily and why, and how does this compare to the findings in the literature concerning other PA’s?
30 The hypotheses will be answered in a linear fashion in chapter 5, meaning that firstly the hypotheses connected to sub question 1 will be answered before moving on to those related to subquestions 2 and 3. It may be that some hypotheses are accepted or rejected in combination of one another, or that several hypotheses will prove to be unable to accept or reject on grounds of the collected data. The following chapter 3 will further discuss the methodology of the research.
31 Chapter 3: Methodology
It is important to put forth the manner in which the research was conducted, what the various research steps have been taken during the research. These steps will be elucidated in this chapter, followed by a clarification on the type of research design that has been implemented and the empirical strategy. The following part is aimed to give a birds-eye view of the research, while later parts of the chapter will allow for more in-depth clarification of the chosen approaches and methods. It is of importance to note that this thesis has has been written under the supervision of dr. C.F. van den Berg, associate professor at the Institute of Public Administration of Leiden University, as part of a wider research on political assistants in the Netherlands. Aimed to start the second wave of research on political assistants in the Netherlands, van den Berg established a capstone group of master students who would write their thesis on various aspects of PA’s in the Netherlands. This group of students have gathered open-source data that was transferred into a dataset in collaboration with the Parliamentarian Documentation Center (PDC). The open-source data was supplemented by former and currently employed political assistants whom filled out a survey. This dataset will be used by van den Berg to conduct an international research on special advisors, such as political assistants in governmental circles, in collaboration with various scholars from around the world whom together form the Ministerial Advisers Research Consortium, or MARC. They aim to further the broadening of the literature and allow for comparative analysis. This thesis can be placed within the wider context of both the capstone and the MARC, as it provides unique data on political assistants of the ministry of Defense and their connection to the private sector. In that sense, this research is explorative, while it also seeks to test existing theoretical findings on political assistants.
3.1 Research design
The nature of the research and the research goals (see chapter 1) require a mixed research design, with both a quantitative and qualitative research design with corresponding differences in data collection. The quantitative part of the research is considered to entail the
32 data collection done in cooperation with the capstone group and the PDC, while the qualitative research methods provided unique data from the interviews. The findings from both parts will provide the empirical findings, that combined with the theoretical findings presented in chapter 2, will allow the various hypotheses, sub questions and the research question to be answered. With the increased focus on the qualitative part of the data, as this provides unique and deep insights, a nonlinear research path has been followed. This allowed for the researcher to make himself familiar with the specific contexts in which the study population was and is active. Findings in different phases of the research required adjustments in the planning, as they prompted new avenues for research. This flexibility has allowed the researcher to answer the research goal and question, resulting in a grounded theory that will provide the field with new insights into the connection between political assistants and the private military and security industry.
3.2 Empirical strategy
The collection of the various forms of data required different empirical strategies. The data- set constructed with cooperation of the PDC was collected using LinkedIn and Google search queries. For example, one would search LinkedIn for the term ‘political assistant’ and narrow the search results down to a certain ministry in the Netherlands. Google searches were conducted similarly. These would, for example, show a personal website that explicitly stated the person worked as political assistant for a minister. The survey was send to all those found to be, or have been, political assistants and whose e-mail address was available. During the research period more e-mail addresses became known, with those also receiving an e-mail. The results of the survey are available at the PDC, and are used in chapter 4. From the total of 116 political assistants found, 38 filled out the survey, constituting just below one third, namely 32 percent, of all PA’s. At the time of writing, none those respondents were of the smaller research population of the PA’s that worked at the ministry of Defense. The political assistants of the ministry of Defense, six in total (including the present PA), were send a separate e-mail in which the researcher asked them to participate in an interview (see Appendix 2.1). Two responded negative, one did not respond at all and three
33 PA’s agreed to participate in an interview. All participants have been interviewed, on the promise of remains anonymous. The findings of the interviews will thus be discussed in such a manner that they cannot be irreducible to the interviewees. Transcriptions of the interviews can be requested at the researcher and will be supplied after agreement of the interviewees. The interviews were prepared with the goal of ensuring a good atmosphere in which the PA could freely share his or her experiences with the interviewer. The questions were used to guide and steer the interview. On several occasions they offered the opportunity to steer the conversation into the topics that matter, such as the connection between the PA and the private military and security industry. At the same time, the questions were not to be followed at the cost of follow up questions, allowing the furthering of the interview into areas on which the PA themselves strolled. For example, one PA pointed out that she believes that the private sector specifically employs former Army, Navy or Air force officers to operate as lobbyists for them. This idea was followed up on by the interviewer, yielding findings that were unforeseen at the onset of the interview. As seen in chapter 2, a literature research has been conducted in order to gain proper understanding of both the private military and security industry and the political assistants by reviewing the academical publications on them, appearing both in scientific periodicals, research reports and books. Additionally, it has shown what the focus of earlier academics has been, what they found and how this thesis research will help to fill a knowledge gap. By focussing on the various topics a clear, integrated, view of the existing literature has been formulated that provides the theoretical backbone of the research. Both in the process of selecting literature as choosing the focus of the research the personal influence of the researcher and the corresponding choices have limited the scope of the research to those areas found personally relevant. This in itself is a limitation on the research that is inherent to conducting such a study.
3.3 Operationalization
The goal of the research is to assess the connection between PA’s and the PSMI and the subsequent effects of that relationship on the policy or decisions of the ministry of Defense. To this end various concepts are used and have already been used in the literature overview
34 (see chapter 2). Several of these concepts are of more importance than others and some require more a thorough operationalization. For example, a political assistant in the Netherlands is a function a person holds in which he or she directly works for the minister or state secretary. The work that he or she does requires more explanation. For example, it should be clear how the research determined wether the PA’s that have been interviewed are classified as, for example, minders, partisan or experts. To this end the following section will clarify how the various concepts have been measured during the interviews with the PA’s. The concepts that require elaboration are the following:
• The connection between PA’s and the PMSI. • The classification of the PA’s role. • The four arena’s in which the PA’s operate.
The connection between the PA’s and the PMSI can be found in the professional occupations held prior and after being a political assistant. To this end the research used a similar method as employed by Leuchingher and Moser (2014). The careers of the PA’s were analyzed for several sectors and organizations such as governmental agencies, private companies and companies that are considered part of the private military and security industry, i.e. (see chapter 2.3). Another indicator of the connection of the PA’s were the moments in which they had contact with this sector during formal and informal meetings, the manner in which this contact was conducted, the frequency of the contact and the effect of this contact.
Classification of the role’s PA play in the various arena’s has been developed by Connaughton (2010). This typology is applied in this research as well. In order to correctly place the PA’s in a certain type various tasks the PA would be expected to do to effectively operate were asked to the PA’s. For example, the literature suggests that PA’s are not active in the societal arena as much as they are in the political-parliamentarian arena. The PA’s were asked where they would spend most of their time during a typical day at the office. These questions were unscripted follow up questions asked, during most interviews, asked after question 4 (see appendix 2.2). The PA’s would describe in length the practicalities of their day to day job, responding to questions if they would often meet outside of the Hague with representatives
35 from private companies, whether they would meet up with parliamentarians. These findings were taken back, and combined with the findings of the rest of the interview, during which the PA’s would tell more about the interactions they had in their day to day operations, and would combine a wholesome picture of the primary and secondary functions the PA had. For example, one PA highlighted frequently the importance and amount of time he or she would spend on reading all the documents, amending them so they would be better understand by their readers, the members of parliament for example. This corresponds with Connaughton’s model in which the PA is placed at the political side of the communication spectrum (2010, p. 351). The same has been done for the PA’s work in the other fields formulated by Connaughton such as the policy-making role they played or their impact in regards to their minister (2010, p. 352).
In the aspect of deterring in which of the four arena’s the PA would be primarily active a similar approach was used as previously described in regards of the role a PA would be considered to play at the ministry. As the PA’s were expected to be unfamiliar with the concepts of the four arena’s as formulated by Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen (2011), these arena’s were called differently during the interviews. The political- parliamentarian arena was called the House of Parliament, or the Binnenhof, the internal vertical arena was the ministry of Defense, or the simply the ministry. The societal arena was considered to consist of interest groups, lobbyist and other bodies that are not part of the political-parliamentarian, the internal vertical or horizontal arena’s.
3.4 Validity
The internal and external validity differs for the research methods used. Firstly, the quantitative internal validity is high as the dataset is filled with those variables that were agreed upon before collecting them. For example, it was agreed, amongst others, to insert the name of the PA and the minister he or she served. Such information was openly available on websites, such as LinkedIn, and was collected of all the PA’s from 1994 onwards. The external validity of the quantitative collected data is high as well as the data has been collected for
36 almost all the PA’s, with a few variables missing of different PA’s. A survey was distributed by e-mail to the known political assistants, but was not filled in by all PA’s. None of the six PA’s that worked at the ministry of Defense filled out the survey. As no results of this survey returned for the relevant PA’s, the survey results hold a thus is of a lower internal and external validity then the aforementioned, open source collected, data and the corresponding dataset.
The validity, both internal and external, of the qualitative collected data is low. The insights that were sought after are hard to obtain, as the interviewed PA’s could jeopardize their reputation when their statements are tracked back to them. It could be that the interviewed PA’s withheld information, but this is considered unlikely when comparing the interview findings with the theoretical findings and the quantitive findings (see chapter 5). As noted earlier, a questionnaire was made before the interviews in order to obtain as much relevant information as possible and ensure the internal validity of the three interviews. The external validity however of these interviews is low as only three out of six PA’s at the ministry of Defense have shared their experiences and their experiences can not be used to speak for the other three. The differences between the experiences of PA’s are potently large due to a multitude of factors, i.e. age, educational background, their received mandate, and other circumstantial factors.
3.5 Reliability
In an attempt to achieve an high level of reliability of the findings triangulation was sought by bricolage, drawing on various sources and material, ranging from survey’s, interviews to the academic literature, to conduct the research. The survey’s and interviews offered the opportunity to gain the first order interpretation, the point of view of the political assistants. Spuriousness is difficult to prevent due to the many factors that can influence the policy of the minister. By focusing primarily on the connection between PA’s and the PMSI, with the explicit goal to uncover their relationship, the other factors were leveled out as much as possible.
37 However, the reliability of the interviews is low. This is due to the fundamental issues with interviews, with interviewees, for example, responding differently to different interviewers. Nonetheless, the findings from the interviews can be used to paint a picture from the PA’s perspective on their connection to the private sector. The findings that are collected through the quantitative methods are of higher reliability due to their sources. The data is expected to be highly similar if one would repeat the collection of it in the described manner.
38 Chapter 4: Empirical findings
This chapter discusses the empirical findings of the research into the connections between political assistants and the private military and security industry. Moving from sub question 1 to 3 it will present the findings that allow the hypotheses to be accepted or rejected, allowing the sub questions to be answered. Before moving on to the sub questions, the research population will be discussed briefly. As noted in chapter 3, the interview results are treated anonymously, thus limiting the amount of detail that can be spent on the various PA’s. For example, it is not possible to link various quotes to certain PA’s, cabinets, and ministries state secretary as this will allow the statements to be traced back to the interviewed PA. Therefore it will not be specified, for example, if minister refers to either a state secretary or minister when this is discussed in relation to a political assistant.
As noted in chapter 3, a total of 116 political assistants were found, of which 5 worked and one still works as PA at the ministry of Defense. Out of these six PA’s, three served state secretaries and three served ministers, including the current PA. The state secretaries that employed PA’s were Cees van der Knaap (Balkenende I, II III, and briefly IV) and Jack de Vries (Balkenende IV), both from the CDA. The ministers that employed PA’s were Eimert van Middelkoop (Balkenende IV) and Hennis (Rutte I and II). The denied interview requests have implications for the generalization of the empirical findings, which will be discussed in chapter 6 when discussing the limitations of the research. Five of the six Defense PA’s obtained university master degrees (MA), with only one, graduating from the HBO, university of applied sciences, with a BA degree. When compared with the entire population of PA’s of 116, thus all the PA’s that have been appointed since Kok I up to Rutte II, it shows that the general population is already highly educated, with very few, four, not obtaining a higher educational degree after their graduation from secondary education. The differences and comparisons between the PA’s of the ministry of Defense and the others will be discussed in subchapter 4.2 in more depth.
39
4.1 Political Assistants and the Private Industry
This subchapter will present the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques and will use that data to answer the hypotheses 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, culminating in the answering of sub question 1. The sub question and the hypotheses are repeated, before moving on to the empirical findings on the connection between political assistants and the private military and security industry:
Sub Question 1: Are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s has been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
• Hypotheses 1.1: PA’s are interesting for the PMSI due to their proximity to a main key decision maker, namely the minister of Defense, and are therefore contacted by the PMSI in order to influence the policy of the ministry. • Hypotheses 1.2: PA’s are offered employment within the PMSI after their function ends. • Hypotheses 1.3: Formers PA’s, currently employed by the PMSI, use their contacts in their previous employment to benefit the PMSI. • Hypotheses 1.4: PA’s are not interesting actors for the PMSI and are therefore not contacted by the PMSI.
It’s possible to map the career path of all the six PA’s prior and after their period as political assistant by using the dataset that has been produced under the guidance of van der Berg (see chapter 1 and 4). When examining the career path of all the six PA’s prior to their appointment it becomes clear that none have been employed by companies that can be considered part of the private security industry, or any other companies that are connected to the department of defense. Five out of six PA’s have worked for a political parties in the years before their tenure as PA, with two of those working in that capacity before becoming PA. Out of all PA’s, only one did not work for a political party at any point prior to becoming PA. Table 4.1 shows the last professional sector of the PA’s before becoming political assistant.
40 Three PA’s already worked at the ministry of Defense before becoming PA there. All interviewed PA’s note that they worked together with their minister prior to becoming his or her political advisors.
Sector Last Sector Prior PA First Sector after PA Current sector
Governmental agency 1 1 2 (incl. current PA to Hennis)
Ministry of Defense 3 3 2
Private sector 1 1
Private Military and Security Industry
NGO
Political Party 2
None (unemployed) 1
Table 4.1
The PA’s largely remain within the governmental sector after they resign as political assistants. Three out of five, excluding the current PA of minister Hennis, continued their career at the ministry of Defense, where they took up their first position after their resigning as political assistant. Only one out of five PA’s, joined the private sector, at a company not related to the private military and security industry. One of the former PA’s, is currently unemployed but has worked for a governmental agency for several years after resigning as PA. None of the Defense PA’s joined a company that is part of, or is associated with, the private military and security industry in their careers after being a PA (see table 5.1) The research into the career paths, including all professional positions held before and after being a PA at the ministry of Defense, of all PA’s shows that none have ever worked for a company that can considered to be part of the private military and security industry. There are no sings that a revolving door, which is seen in the US, is present in the case of political assistants of the ministry of Defense. On ground of these findings, hypothesis 1.2 is rejected and considered false.
The findings from the interviews shed more light on the contact that has been between the PMSI and the PA’s and will help answer both hypothesis 1.1 and 1.3.
41 One PA befriended a representative of Thales and acknowledged to have facilitated meetings between that company and the minister. Prior to this, they, the PA and the minister, visited an international military and security trade show, in Europe, and accompanied the minister on visits to Thales. The PA admitted to be more inclined to schedule appointments for Thales with the minister to the friendship with the representative of Thales. The PA noted that ‘If you know someone well you would be more inclined to help them out. Known makes loved 5. … If I knew that another company would have a meeting with the minister I would go to the secretary and arrange a meeting for Thales’. This coincides with the findings of Gen and Wright (2013) presented in chapter 2.3 that companies that know persons inside the governmental agency are more likely to gain access to that agency. It also hints that PA’s occasionally play a facilitating role for interest groups. An other PA that was interviewed does not recall any incidents in which he or she was contacted by the private military and security industry. Even more so, this PA considered him- or herself to be of ‘zero interest’ to the private sector. She notes that the defense industry focusses on the Dienst Materiaal en Ondersteuning (DMO), freely translated as the Department of Equipment and Support, whom are approached by former armed forces employees now under contract by the private military and security industry. In the PA’s own words, recalling a meeting with lobbyist from the PMSI: ‘I was in the same room, and was greeted by the different persons attending the meeting but as soon the meeting got started I became another fly on the wall. The representatives were not interested in me in any way and only said hello and goodbye out of common decency’. She then told how she viewed the contacts between the PMSI and the DMO: ‘Many former high ranking officers would work for the companies in that sector, bringing their contacts within the military. It’s them you should look into’. This view has been put forth to the other interviewed PA’s. All PA’s confirmed that these former employees have easy access to the employees at the ministry due to their personal relation with former co-workers, once again underlining the findings of Gen and Wright, as well as hinting that the revolving door does exist in the Netherlands. Instead of focussing on PA’s, the findings from the interviews suggest the industry focusses on former military personnel to become lobbyists, also seen in chapter 2.3. All three of the PA’s received
5 The Dutch saying ‘bekend maakt ook bemind’, which freely translated means that if one knows something it is more easily appreciated.
42 no offers from the private security industry after resigning. A third PA experienced little interest from the side of the private military and security industry. However, one incident is remembered lively. The PA was contacted by a representative from the commercial shipping industry by telephone who tried to mobilize support for a policy change that would favor his industry. The representative suggested that the PA could discuss, with his minister, a different policy approach towards vessel protection detachments (VPD). The representative tried to convince the PA that the deployment of privately provided VPD’s, to be provided by PMC’s, would be a wishful development in countering the increase of pirate attacks on Dutch commercial shipping vessels nearby Somalia. After a long discussion the PA politely thanked the representative and made no explicit promises towards the him. Various officials of the ministry came, slightly upset, to the PA the next morning asking why the minister all of a sudden agreed to the solution opted by the representative of PMC’s. The PA however had not yet discussed anything with the minister, who continued to hold his policy line on this matter, being that privately supplied VPD’s were not allowed for Dutch commercial shippers. The PA claims that the representative assumed he or she had agreed with his proposal and leaked that information to various sources: ‘He (the representative) thought I was on board and therefore the minister as well. It caused a small riot amongst other senior officials the next morning’. It could also have been done deliberately to pressure the minister to change his line. What the motives from the representative may have been, this is the only moment that the PA was approached by the private military and security industry, or any private sector for that matter, during his period as PA. He recalled no other moments in which any private actor tried to contact or influence him, or through him, the policy of his minister.
All the interviewed PA’s consider their influence on the policy and decision making process within the ministry of Defense as nonexistent. They consider their close position to the minister or state secretary not of such a nature that they can influence the decision making in any way, especially not able to favor a specific company. Their primarily function was to support and assist their minister by acting as a liaison. As will be discussed in chapter 5.2, all PA’s strongly resemble Connaughtons classification of the partisan, focusing primarily on the political arena and spending little time in the horizontal arena. Their institutional position at
43 the ministry provide them with no decision making capabilities and all interviewed PA’s strongly noted that their influence on the minister’s decision or policy is nonexistent. The examples provided by the interviewed PA’s do show that the private sector knows that the PA is close to the minister or state secretary, is able to get in touch with them and is boldly enough, in the case of protection against Somali pirates, to suggest a policy change to them. In the words of the contacted PA: ‘the representative suggested that I would lay out his suggestions to the minister and show him that a change in policy was necessary’. Such anecdotes confirm the previous findings of the scarce interests in PA’s by the private sector as noted by Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen (2011), whom found PA’s to scarcely interact with the private sector. Instead, PA’s state that the private military and security industry employ former armed forces personnel to lobby for them, hinting that the revolving door is ‘alive and kicking’, as one interviewed PA put it. Further research into this direction is suggested in chapter 6.
With three out of six PA’s interviewed, combined with no responses on the survey from any PA’s that worked at the ministry of Defense, it is difficult to answer the hypotheses for the entire population of PA’s at the ministry of Defense. The combination of the findings presented in chapter 5.1, and the theoretical findings, presented in chapter 2, it’s possible to answer, with a degree of caution hypotheses 1.1 and 1.3. Firstly, the interest shown in political assistants by the private military and security industry is small, notwithstanding their close position to the minister, which is confirmed by the empirical findings. The private industry apparently sees little to gain from trying to influence PA’s, rather betting their money on different actors within the ministry, with the DMO as being of special focus according to the political assistants. In sum, hypothesis 1.1 is considered false and thus rejected. As mentioned earlier, hypothesis 1.2 and 1.3 are also considered false and thus rejected, as none of the PA’s worked for the PMSI before or after their tenure as PA. This applies to all of the six PA’s at the ministry of Defense. The interviews indicate that the PA’s did not receive job offers from the PMSI after their tenure as PA. Considering both previous hypothesis and the corresponding findings, hypothesis 1.4 is seen to be true and therefore is accepted. The first sub question can be answered, and is therefore repeated below:
44 Sub Question 1: Are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s has been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
There are nearly no indicators that the political assistants at the ministry of Defense have been influenced by the private military and security industry in order to influence Defense policy. One clear case of an attempt to influence ministerial policy is the aforementioned anecdote of the PA who was approached by the commercial shipping industry. This experience stands alone, though the PA’s that did not partake in the interviews could have had multiple of such experiences and examples. The theoretical findings and the interviews suggest that the PMSI aims its efforts not at the PA’s but at other high ranking officials at the ministry of Defense. The DMO was mentioned in all interviews as being targeted by the private sector, with further research required to provide insights into these allegations. The suggestion is made that even tough the Dutch defense budget is much smaller then the American, the phenomenon of the revolving door can also be found in the Netherlands.
4.2 Political assistants and Connaughton’s typology
This subchapter will answer sub question 2 and the corresponding hypotheses, which are as follows:
Sub Question 2: Does the classification of Connaughton regarding political advisors, when applied on the PA’s of the ministry of defense, correspond with earlier findings on Dutch PA’s and do they differ strongly from PA’s at other ministries?
• Hypotheses 2.1: PA’s that worked for the state secretary are more likely to be experts due to the more in depth required knowledge on files. PA’s that worked for the ministers are not experts but partisans whom are more focussed to supplement their minister in regards of political dominance.
45 • Hypotheses 2.2: Different types of PA’s are recruited by the different political parties. Differences exist in background, such as education and age, and classification. • Hypotheses 2.3: PA’s at the ministry of Defense differ from other PA’s in their classifications due to the budgetary differences between the ministries.
When comparing findings on the day to day tasks of the interviewed PA’s it becomes evident that their primary focus was to ensure their ministers survival. No clear differences existed in the focus of the interviewed PA’s. Of the three, two already worked at the ministry, with one stating that his or her knowledge on a certain issue was relevant for the minister. This PA later noted that this knowledge did came to use, but not frequently. All PA’s would regularly attend meetings, as well as read documents meant for the minister and brief the minister on those documents. Two of the three PA’s also read most documents send out by the minister, especially those that were send to the parliament. As one PA stated: ‘I would read everything that would end up at the ministers desk and brief the minister on the pieces. The minister didn’t read that many pieces him/herself and relied on me , and other senior officials, to keep him informed. He/she was however a very talented politician and functioned very well in that respect.’ This PA reflected on her time as PA and viewed this aspect of her function as her primary contribution, saying that: ‘I helped the minister by prepping him for debates and keeping him well informed. It’s that work that made the job enjoyable and satisfactory for me. All PA’s developed, or already had, a good working relationship with their minister. They would discuss different topics with their minister, all playing the devil’s advocate to as one PA put it, help the minister ‘formulate and structure’ his or her ‘train of thought’. They all assisted the minister by preparing him or her for the debates in parliament and supporting him or her during these debates.
When assessing the findings from the interviews with the typology provided by Connaughton several connections can be made, resulting in a cautious classification of the interviewed PA’s. All the three interviewed PA’s could be classified as minders as their primary task was to ensure that their ministers were not harmed by actions of their civil servants, as well make sure that the minister him or herself was prepared in situations that their ministers political
46 survival was being threatened. This is why they would read the documents of the civil servants and their minister before they went to the parliament. As one PA put it: ‘I frequently encountered documents, written by civil servants, that weren’t, how do I put it, not that political. They would write in their own vocabulary, that of the civil service, while I wanted them to write for their target audience, the politicians in parliament.’. A different PA described her function as entailing several main tasks. In the PA own words the function came down to three main tasks: ‘First and foremost I would read all the incoming and outgoing documents, inform the minister on the content and advice on the formulation of the documents to ensure that they didn’t harm the minister’s position in any way.’. In addition to this, the PA also maintained contacts within the parliamentarian arena: ‘I would meet up with members of parliament, of the opposition and also of the coalition partners, to find out what they wanted to ask the minister. I would use that information to adequately prepare the minister for the debates’. Hypothesis 2.1 is thus clearly false, as differences between the PA’s are too small to allow a clear distinction between those working for state secretaries or minister to be made. The PA’s that have been interviewed are considered to fall into the minder role of Connaughton, and not the partisan or expert. They do posses parts of both these characteristics, but their primary focus was the political survival of their minister, corresponding with the minder’s role as ‘looking out for for issues that may be potentially harmful to ministers, both politically and in terms of reputation’ (Connaughton, 2010, pp. 351-352).
The interviewed PA’s that worked for the state secretary did not employ their expertise, if applicable, to such an extent that it is justified to call give them the role of experts. The PA’s that worked for ministers are considered to be partisans, as they have a stronger profile that corresponds with those of the generalists as described by Connaughton (2010, pp. 351-352). Their communication in the vertical arena, in the ministry itself, can be characterized as political. They would ensure that the political substance was clear in documents send to and from the minister, without focusing on the technicalities of the documents. This focus on formulation and not on substance of documents is stated by one PA clearly: ‘I did not have any knowledge or influence on those matters from my humble position. I was there purely to ensure the political survival of my minister’.
47 As discussed in chapter 4.2, the PA’s influence on policy was nonexistent, with their focus being primarily on the political survival of their minister. Differences thus don’t seem to exist on the grounds of the classification provided by Connaughton. Differences do however exist in the age of the recruited PA’s. Most parties are seen to employ young PA’s, with one political party being an exception to this rule. One cause for this may be a lack of suitable candidates, in turn caused by the small size of this party. When comparing this with the other parties that have employed PA’s at the ministry of Defense, it shows that the CDA would let their minister some freedom in choosing his or her PA’s, with one of those being of a different political background then the CDA. Contrasting this, the VVD is seen to place, or them being picked by the minister, promising and talented young party members in the position of PA, with some of them becoming candidates for the parliament int the election of 2017 (Volkskrant, 2015; 2016). The educational background of the PA’s is largely homogenous, with only one not having a master’s degree title but a bachelor degree. Except for one PA, all PA’s have clear political background. Four of the five were already connected to the political party of their minister, and one was from a different political background than the minister the PA worked for. Four out of the six PA’s already had worked in the circles of government, with three working at the ministry of Defense prior to becoming PA there. Two of the political assistants worked for the political party of their minister before becoming their PA.
Taken all this in account it becomes clear that the political parties employ mostly comparable candidates, with the general characteristics being a young party member, aged between twenty and thirty, with experience in the ministry, another branch of government or the political party. As one PA noted, the function is ‘demanding but fun’ but is difficult to combine with a demanding private life if one’s is married or has children. The choice for young party members therefore seems clear, as they both seem to enjoy the high paced aspects of the job as well as have a private life that allows them to spend the required time in the Hague and elsewhere. The same PA noted that the stress the function put on her relationship was substantial, as he or she would his or her hometown early in the morning, before seven o’clock in the morning, and would often return home at midnight. In the PA’s own words: ‘Working as a PA is a real thrill. Your right in the middle of it, of the Hague and
48 every day was exiting but also tough. I would recommend anyone to take up the position who’s young, say 24 to 30. After that people tend to settle down with a partner, get kids. It happened to me, it became more and more difficultutl to combine my work in the Hague with my personal life… Overall taken I was happy I took the job, I learned a lot and thoroughly enjoyed it. Looking back, I find it hard to understand how I managed, it was an intense period.’. The choice of ministers and political parties to assign young and talented party members as the function required the PA to be available early and work late, sometimes days at end. The same PA commented: ‘If there was a debate coming up I would be picked up early in the morning, sometimes by the minister himself, and would work on the way to the Hague. If the debate was in the evening I would be present the entire time, getting back home late and get up early again. You don’t work your regular 9 to 5, you should be flexible.’. Hypothesis 2.2 is thus largely rejected, as five out of 6 A’s at the ministry of Defense share many of their characteristics.
The characteristics of the PA’s at the ministry of Defense seem to be shared with the entire population of 116 PA’s. The population is highly educated, as can be seen in figure 4.2 and figure 4.3, showing the educational levels of the entire population of political assistants as well as the same for the PA’s of the ministry of Defense, on the right. It shows that the educational of most PA’s is highly similar:
0,85% 3,42% 8,55% Post-doc 2,56% 16,67% 6,84% University BA degree
34,19% University MA degree University MA degree University of Applied Sciences BA degree University of Applied VWO Sciences BA degree 83,33%
Not avalaible 43,59%
MBO N=117 N=6
Figure 4.2: Level of Figure 4.3: Level of education of education of the all PA’s the Ministry of Defense PA’s
49
Other findings from the dataset of the PDC, combined with the resource done on the PA’s of the ministry of Defense, suggest that the age when PA’s start is similar across different cabinets and ministries, with a small majority, 16 PA’s, being younger between twenty and thirty years old, with 11 being over 30 when starting their first job as PA. The data thus shows the starting age for 27 of the 117 PA’s, which renders these findings not useful for answering any hypothesis, but still points to a small preference for younger PA’s as was found in the interviews with PA’s of the ministry of Defense.
Hypothesis 2.3 is difficult to answer without first looking at the budget of the Defense ministry, which is considerably smaller then other sectors. Its budget for 2017 was set at €7.9 billion, which is considerably smaller then sectors such as healthcare and social benefits received, respectively receiving €75.4 billion and €78.5 billion (Rijksoverheid, 2017). The theoretical findings are inconclusive on the influence the budget would have on the type of PA that would be employed but it would not be surprising that in larger ministries, with larger budgets, the minister would be more inclined to choose an expert or coordinator as his or her focus will be on ensuring better policy formulation and implantation. PA’s are seen, by Eichbaum and Shaw, to help level-out the minsters resources and capacity with those of the civil servants he or she is supposed to lead. Ensuring more control or influence over these bureaucrats could thus be achieved by appointing an coordinator or expert type of PA to his or her side. However, the hypothesis cannot be answered in this research as the required insights are too inconclusive on this point. A wider, more encompassing, inquiry with interviews with multiple PA’s from different ministries is needed for this hypothesis to be answered satisfactory.
In regards to subquestion 2, this research has found that the PA’s of the ministry of Defense whom have been interviewed share many of the characteristics of the minder role as formulated by Connaughton. The empirical findings from the interviews suggest that there are no substantial differences between PA’s that have worked for the minister or the state secretary. Additionally, the empirical findings from the data-set of the PDC and the theoretical findings on PA’s strongly suggest a preference of political parties, the CDA and VVD to be
50 precise, to appoint promising youngster, aged between twenty and thirty, as PA’s to their minister of Defense. Over the wider population of PA’s it was found that this preference is considerably less as just over half of the PA’s are younger than thirty. In assessing the influence of the budgetary level of a ministry as being a factor for the preference for a certain PA type, as classified by Connaughton, the findings are inconclusive. The theoretical findings suggest that a larger ministry, with a strong bureaucracy and an high budget could be of influence on the decision as a minister would require a specialist or an coordinator to ensure him or her to be as efficient and capable as the civil servants of the ministry, i.e. to level-out the minister capacities and capabilities with those of the civil servants. Considering the findings, sub question 2 has been partially answered, with the influence of the budget level of a ministry on the choice for a certain PA type remaining unanswered. The activities undertaken by so-called minders show great comparison to the findings regarding the activities of Dutch PA’s, both found in the existing literature as well as found during the interviews.
4.3 Political assistants and the four Arena’s
Lastly, the research tried to determine in which of the four arena’s, as formulated by Vancoppennolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (2011) PA’s at the ministry of Defense where primarily active and if these findings corresponded with the existing literature on PA’s in the Netherlands. To this end the following sub question was formulated:
Sub Question 3: In what arena do PA’s from the ministry of Defense work primarily and why, and how does this compare to the findings in the literature concerning other PA’s?
The following hypotheses were tested in order to answer the sub question: • Hypotheses 1: PA’s from the ministry of Defense are distinctly active in the societal arena, with substantial attention going towards contact with the PMSI. • Hypotheses 3.2: There are no differences between PA’s of the minister and PA’s of the state secretary of Defense in regards of their relative activity in the various arena’s.
51 • Hypotheses 3.3: PA’s that operate largely in the societal arena are more likely to have connection to the private sector that is connected to their ministry and subsequently are more likely to work in the private sector after their tenure as PA.
These hypotheses have in part been answered in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. The PA’s were found to spend very little time on their own initiative in contact with the private military and security industry, and were not frequently contacted by the industry. It thus cannot be concluded that the PA’s were distinctly active in the societal arena. Instead, the findings from the interviews affirm the earlier findings of Vancoppennolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen, with the PA’s being primarily active in the political-parliamentarian arena. Hypothesis 3.1 is therefore rejected, and this findings support the findings in discussed in 4.1 that the connection between the private sector and the PA’s is virtually non-existent. Additionally, the interview findings affirm hypothesis 3.2 that the activity is similar for both PA’s of the state secretary and the minister. Lastly, hypothesis 3.3 has been answered in part in chapter 4.1 by showing that none of the PA’s of the ministry of Defense have connections prior or after their period as political assistant in terms of employment in that sector. As has been found from the interviews, the PA’s were primarily active in the political-parliamentarian arena, as well as in the horizontal arena, consisting of the ministry of Defense.
The sub question can be answered by confirming the earlier findings of Vancoppennolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (2011) who found that the PA is primarily active in the political-parliamentarian arena. The activities of the interviewed PA focussed on the horizontal arena of the ministry, with much of their work concerning contact with the civil servants in their role as minders for their minister. The findings add to the notion, as found in chapter 4.1 and 4.2, that the private military and security industry is not interested in political assistants in their efforts to exert influence at the ministry of Defense. This goes against findings of, amongst others, the OECD whom found that political advisors could be used by interest groups to exert influence on the minister, whom is seen as a key decision maker in the policy process (OECD, 2007: 2011).
52 Chapter 6: Conclusion
The goal of the research was to gain insights in the manner in which the private military and security industry uses political advisors, a relative young addition to the political and governmental elite of the Netherlands, to exert influence at the ministry of Defense. Therefore the main research question of this research was formulated as being:
What is the relation between PA’s at the ministry of Defense and the private military and security industry and how does it influence policy of the ministry of Defense?
It was found that the relation between the PA’s and the private military and security industry is almost nonexistent and it constitutes as no influence on the policy of the ministry of Defense. It was found that the private sector has little to none interest in PA’s, whom consider themselves not to be in any position or capacity to influence the policy of the ministry. Their job is to focus on other matters, being more concerned with the political-parliamentarian and interacting with the civil servants at their ministry in order to ensure the political survival of the minister. Considering their role as minders, PA’s themselves were found to be primarily active in the political-parliamentarian and horizontal arena, concerning themselves barely with the societal arena.
The findings of the research are however limited by a incomplete qualitative data collection as not all political assistants were found willing or able to participate in the interviews. It could be that these political assistants have had different experiences with the private sector then those who did partake in the interviews. This deficit in qualitative data was leveled out by assessing the career paths of the PA’s, and subsequently found no hints of a revolving door scenario in the case of political assistants as is seen in the US.
The findings of this research can be used as a point of departure for future studies, such as a comparative analysis of the influence of private actors on PA’s, or ministerial advisors for that matter, between different parliamentary systems, in order, for example, assess if differences stem from institutional or cultural differences. The notion that differences exist between the connection depending on the ministry at which the PA is stationed have come forth from the
53 conducted interviews and the research. A comparative study focussing on the PA’s of different ministries and their connection to the private sector is thus an interesting lead to follow up on in future research. Also, the interviews and the theoretical findings suggest that insight can be gained by studying the career path of former military personnel and if they truly work for the private military and security industry in order to lobby at their former employer, the Dutch military or ministry of Defense.
If recent events throughout the world are to be indicators of the future it would appear ever more perilous times are ahead of us that would threaten us in many ways. A critical academic community, especially those engaging in the study of crisis and security management, should take a active stance in researching the possibility of unwarranted influence of the private military and security industry, whom would seek to inflate threats to turn a profit. The warning of president Dwight D. Eisenhower of a military-industrial complex may seem from a different era, the stakes they would threaten warrant, and even demand, a actively critical and investigative academic community that works to hold all involved parties, be them PA’s, commercial shippers or defense industries, accountable and enforce transparency of their policies, and even more relevant, the motivation of their behavior.
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57 McFate, S., (2014), The Modern Mercenary: Private armies and what they mean for world order, New York, NY, Oxford University Press.
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58 Strom, K., Berzofsky, M., Shook-Sa, B., Barrick, K., Daye, C., Horstmann, N., Kinsey, S., (2010), The Private Security Industry: A review of the Definitions, Available Data Sources, and Paths Moving Forward: Literature Review and Secondary Data Analysis. RTI International, report, retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf
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Ledbetter, J., “What Ike got Right.”, The New York Times, published December 13, 2010, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/opinion/14ledbetter.html.
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59 NRC, (2013), Nederlandse werf bouwt twee oorlogsschepen voor Vietnam, retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/08/22/nederlandse-werf-bouwt-twee-oorlogsschepen-voor- vietnam-a1432219 on 24 February 2017.
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Airbus Netherlands, http://www.airbusdefenceandspacenetherlands.nl/activities/defence/, accessed on multiple occasions in January and February 2017.
Damen Shipyards Group, www.damen.com, accessed on multiple occasions in January and February 2017.
Thales Netherlands, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/netherlands/global-presence-europe/ netherlands, accessed on multiple occasions in January and February 2017.
NIDV, www.nidv.eu/en/, accessed on multiple occasions in January and February 2017.
60 Appendix 1: Private Military Companies
1.1 Categorization of PMC’s As published by McFate (2014, pp. 16-17)
Funtional Name Description Public Sector counterpart Typical Tasks and Missions Combat Arms Expeditionary Infantry Combat: Deploying organizations whose Special Forces military units to defeat primary function is to kill Armed Aviation the enemy and achieve or train others to kill the Armor wartime objectives. enemy in foreign lands. Artillery Combative tasks. Combat Engineers Generating foreign forces: this involves demobilizing adversarial forces and/or raising new ones Combat Service/security Expeditionary Noncombat engineers Operational coordination support companies organizations that provide Communications operational assistance to Intelligence and Intelligence collection, combat arms units espionage analysis and risk assessment
Information and Cyber Warfare Combat Service Support/ Organizations that Transportation Equipping and supplying general contractors provide logistical Medical Services soldiers and civilians in assistance to combat arms Ordnance the field with food, water, units ammunition etc. etc.
Maintaining equipment such as vehicles, generators, buildings etc. etc.
Constructing military bases and infrastructure
Demining
1.2 Overview of employed PMC’s by the Dutch government in Afghanistan Published by the AIV (2007, pp. 24-26)
61 Task Organisation/ Number of persons Value of contract in Nationality € millions Fuel transport from Shell Unknown, but at 12 (as of March Baluchistan, British/Dutch least 100 persons 2007) Pakistan, to Tarin according to the Kowt and Deh AIV’s estimates. Rawod. Armed security is subcontracted.
Food transport from Supreme: Unknown, but at 71 (including next Kabul/Kandahar to headquarters in least 100 persons row, as of March Tarin Kowt and Deh Switzerland, Dubai according to the 2007). Rawod. Armed and Germany. AIV’s estimates. security is subcontracted. Catering services at Supreme (see above). 30 See above Kamp Holland (Tarin Kowt).
Employment of local ? ? 3 (status as of March personnel. 2007). Helicopter ? ? ? maintenance Maintenance of ? ? ? Bushmaster armoured vehicles.
Local air transport: PANH – Russia. ? 42 (total cost of air MI-26 helicopter support for supplying Tarin operations in Kowt and Deh Afghanistan, as of Rawod. September 2007)
62 Task Organisation/ Number of persons Value of contract in Nationality € millions Local air transport: PANH – Russia. ? See above two Antonov AN-12 transport aircraft supplying Tarin Kowt.
Local air transport: SAFAIR – South 7 See above Hercules L-100 cargo Africa. aircraft. Local air transport: Voyageur: Canada. 6 See above DASH-7 for passenger transport. Aircraft will be equipped with self- protection devices. Afghan Security Afghan nationals ? ? Guard (ASG) for employed on an armed security on the individual basis by outer perimeter of the Netherlands Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod.
Security for embassy Identity of company ? ? and diplomats in unknown. However, Kabul all the security guards have Dutch diplomatic passports.
63 Appendix 2: Summary of interviews
2.1 Standard interview invitation e-mail Geachte heer /mevrouw (NAAM),
Graag wil ik u benaderen voor het afnemen van een interview t.b.v. mijn masterthesis. Ik studeer Crisis and Security Management (CSM). Voor mijn scriptie doe ik onderzoek naar politieke assistenten onder leiding van prof. dr. Caspar van den Berg en met behulp van het Parlementair Documentatie Centrum (PDC). Caspar begeleidt een onderzoeksgroep die kijkt naar politieke assistenten vanaf het kabinet Kok I. Het doel van het onderzoek is om de kennis over het politiek assistentschap uit te breiden met een focus op de rol die zij spelen in de Nederlandse parlementaire democratie. Hiervoor heeft u als het goed is onlangs een survey ontvangen.
Naast de algemene onderzoeksresultaten van de survey ben ik ook geïnteresseerd in specifieke informatie voor mijn individuele onderzoek.
Mijn onderzoek richt zich op de relaties die een politiek assistent heeft met de private veiligheidssector en verschillende externe belangengroepen. In mijn onderzoek focus ik mij op de politiek assistenten van het Ministerie van Defensie. Ik ben geïnteresseerd in de (eventuele) uitwisseling van ideeën en voorstellen tussen de private sector en de politiek assistent en richt mij op de vraag in hoeverre deze ideeën uiteindelijk bij de minister terecht komen. Kortom, komen de voorstellen of ideeën van de private veiligheidssector, aangebracht door de politieke assistent zichtbaar terug in beleid van het ministerie van Defensie. Aangezien u als politiek assistent heeft gewerkt met (MINISTER/STAS) wil ik u erg graag spreken over uw ervaringen en visie op het eerdergenoemde.
Ik begrijp dat dit over inhoudelijke en privacygevoelige informatie gaat maar alle informatie uit interviews verwerk ik anoniem in mijn scriptie. Ik hoop dat u bereid bent om hierover in gesprek te gaan en uw ervaringen als politiek assistent te delen t.b.v. het onderzoek. Voorafgaand het interview kan ik uiteraard mijn vragen naar u toesturen.
64
Ik ben benieuwd naar de mogelijkheden en hoor graag van u.
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Ben Dencher
2.2 Interview questions The following is a standardized version of the interview questions that were prepared for the interviews. During the interviews, the questions were used to guide the interview as well as ensure that various topics passed the revue. They proved to be more of guidelines to the interviews, with various follow up questions not included in the overview below.
1. You have studied (X) and after finishing you started working at (X). In (YEAR) you were appointed as the political assistant of (X). Could you tell in your own words how you were approached? How did you become the PA of (X)? 2. What was the introduction that you received at the start of your new job? Did you receive a special training? Did you had contact with your predecessor (if applicable)? 3. What was the reason you were picked? Did you have expertise that was crucially needed? 4. Could you provide a detailed description of your job? So to say, a job prescription in your own words? 5. How would you describe your relation with (minister/state secretary)? Did you accompanied him to all his meetings? Did you worked separately most of the day? Was it purely professional or also more loose? 6. Were you in a position to suggest policy initiatives or amendments to policy proposals? 7. While you were PA, several hot topics were being discussed/worked on. For example, the acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter is one such case. Could you reflect on your time as PA and tell me the most important issues during your assignment? And how did you play a role in them?
65 8. In your function as PA you maintained contact with many civil servants and officials from the armed forces. Did you also had contact with the private security industry, such as companies as Thales, Damen Shipyards? What contact dominated your day to day work? 9. Did you had contact or were you ever approached by representatives from the NIDV (Dutch Institute for Defense and Security)? What did they ask of you and how did they approached you? 10. Could you recall an example when a private party, such as Thales or Damen Shipyard Group, tried to influence you or the (minister/state secretary)? 11. Were you offered a job by the private security sector, or companies associated with this industry, after your tenure as PA? If yes, what companies did this?
66 67