East German Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, 1979–1990

Home , Heinz Hoffmann, Heinz Kessler, Humberto Ortega, Margot Honecker, Otto Winzer

EastStork Germanmann Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua

✣ Klaus Storkmann

When the East German minister for national defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, planned to travel to Nicaragua in 1982, he had a speech prepared for the rally in Managua. Although the trip was canceled on short notice at the request of Managua, Hoffmann’s preserved manuscript sheds interesting light on the policy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) toward Central America. The document emphasizes the similarities between the situations in the GDR and in Central America:

Although thousands of kilometers lie between our two countries, we feel it is clear that the U.S. imperialists are preparing a new campaign here in Central America which is part of their global war against progress and peace on all continents, part of their “crusade” against socialism and the national liberation movements and against the independence of the peoples!...Itisnecessary to foil those aggressive machinations. In your efforts, dear comrades, you can still rely on the support of the GDR.1

The manuscript alludes to the obligation and promise of further assistance: “We will continue to support the people of Nicaragua and its Sandinista Peo- ple’s Army in whatever way we can and in accordance with the geographic conditions and...also assist in developing the capability to put up a defense against any imperialist attacks.”2 Archival documents pertaining to the visit of the Nicaraguan defense minister, Humberto Ortega, to the GDR in late April 1983 also contain many ideological comments and at the same time provide insights into the motives for the assistance. Hoffmann told Ortega,

1. Unterlagen für geplante Militärdelegation des MfNV nach Nikaragua Oktober 1982, in Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BAM-F), DVW 1/115672. 2. Ibid.

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The working people and soldiers of the GDR feel very deeply about the similarities of our struggles on major fronts of the international class conºict. In Central America as in Central Europe, the struggle for safeguarding peace and social progress is carried out against the same main enemy, against the most reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism, the monopolists and militarists of the USA!3

Hoffmann’s comments here and in his undelivered speech ended with the promise and obligation that the East German National People’s Army (NVA) was “ready to do what is in our power to support the defense of the revolution in Nicaragua.”4 Hoffmann’s words were no empty promises. Under the ubiquitous slogan of “anti-imperialist solidarity,” the GDR and its armed forces provided extensive military assistance to developing countries and armed guerrilla movements in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.5 In the 1980s, Nicaragua was a priority for this military assistance. This article fo- cuses on contacts at the level of the ministries of defense, on Nicaraguan requests to the NVA, and on political and military decision-making processes in the GDR. The article examines two main ªelds of military cooperation, the provision of materiel and training assistance. The research here was prepared within the scope of a larger and more extensive project on military contacts of the GDR to the so-called Third World. The research is primarily based on ªles preserved from the GDR military and the leadership of the state party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

Military Contacts between the Armed Forces of the GDR and Nicaragua

For the purpose of establishing military contacts at the ministry of defense level and making arrangements for possible further cooperation, Nicaraguan

3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. These question are taken up in Klaus Storkmann, Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die Dritte Welt (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2012). Earlier major publi- cations relating to these topics include Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interven- tions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Henry Heller, The Cold War and the New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945–2005 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006); Gareth M. Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert W. Clawson, ed., East-West Rivalry and the Third World: Security Issues and Regional Perspectives (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986); and Bruce E. Arlinghau, ed., Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982).

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Defense Minister Larios Montiel traveled to the GDR for the ªrst time in September 1979. The chief of the NVA’s main staff, Lieutenant General Fritz Streletz, sent an account of his talks with Montiel to the SED leader Erich Honecker. According to Streletz, the Nicaraguan emphasized the “urgent” necessity to build up the armed forces and to “secure the political power gained.” He said his country was at an “extremely critical stage.” Because of the political situation, Nicaragua “was not able to import armaments openly from socialist countries ...orelse it would give the enemies of the revolution a pretext for imperialist aggression.” Furthermore, his country was “bank- rupt” because of the war and could not purchase anything “because the state treasury was empty.” Nevertheless, Montiel submitted a request to the NVA in Strausberg, the seat of the GDR Ministry of Defense, asking for the delivery of means of transport, engineering and signal equipment, medical equipment, clothing and equipment for aviators, patrol boats, and training for technical non-commissioned ofªcers in all of Nicaragua’s armed services. In addition to the GDR, Montiel traveled to the USSR, Bulgaria, Libya, and Al- geria to put forth similar requests.6 The ªrst ofªcial NVA visitors to Nicaragua were Lieutenant General Helmut Borufka and Major General Heinrich Winkler in January 1980. Borufka was the inspector-general of the NVA and responsible for military training activities, and Winkler was chief of the Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry for National Defense. The deputy chief of the Engineering- Technical Foreign Trade Agency (ITA), Colonel Günter Anders, accompanied them. The ITA was part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and was responsible for commercial business concerning military technology and armaments. The functions of the three ofªcers deªned the ªelds of the intended military cooperation. They met Minister of Defense Ortega, his deputies, Luis Carrion and Eden Pastora, and the chief of Nicaragua’s General Staff, Joaquin Cuadra, in Managua. Ortega hoped that the GDR would provide training for technical personnel and all kinds of military equipment “except medium and heavy weapons” He was anxious to ensure that the military assistance would not become public knowledge. A “political blunder” could turn the “bourgeois- democratic states” of Latin America into “enemies of Nicaragua” und thus “endanger the country’s basis of existence.” Moreover, the United States must not be given an “excuse for open intervention.”7 The signed minutes mention

6. Bericht Generaloberst Streletz über erstes Gespräch mit Militärdelegation aus Nikaragua in der DDR an Honecker vom 18.09.1979, and Brief von Armeegeneral Hoffmann an Honecker vom 15.11.1979, both in BAM-F, AZN 32639, pp. 39–43, 101–102. 7. Bericht Hoffmann an Honecker über Militärdelegation in Nikaragua vom 01.02.1980, in BAM-F, AZN 32640, pp. 21–25

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the intended “fraternal cooperation” between the two armies “to consolidate the young Nicaraguan revolution.”8 Details were recorded in several annexes. The GDR undertook to provide 150 W-50 trucks and large quantities of clothing and equipment (including 40,000 steel helmets, mess kits, water bottles, backpacks, and tents) by the end of 1980. The two sides also agreed that another 350 W-50 trucks could be provided in subsequent years. Because the ITA was responsible for this deal, it presumably was a commercial transaction.9 In addition, the GDR offered 15,000 AKM-8 submachine guns and 10 million rounds of ammunition, 10,000 hand grenades, 10,000 anti-personnel mines, and communi- cation and radio equipment. Nicaragua requested further clothing, ªeld kitchens, drugs, and several dressing stations. As early as 1980, the NVA also offered to provide Nicaragua training for military personnel.10 Humberto Ortega traveled to the GDR for the ªrst time in late March 1980. In his luggage, he had long lists for the people he was going to see in Strausberg. Among the many new requested items were 45,000 uniforms, another 10,000 battle dress uniforms, and 3,000 binoculars. General Hoffmann promised to fulªll most of the requests.11 Hoffmann’s ªrst visit to Nicaragua was planned for October 1982 in connection with a visit to Cuba, but at the last minute the Nicaraguan authorities requested that he postpone the visit. Colonel-General Horst Stechbarth, who was then chief of the NVA Ground Forces, later recalled that the visit to Managua did not take place because Defense Minister Ortega had warned that the “complicated situation” in the country made it impossible to guaran- tee the security of the NVA generals.12 Instead, Ortega and other military ªgures ºew to Havana to confer with the high-ranking NVA delegation. They explained that the request for postponement was due to the possibility that the visits would be used by the United States “for propaganda purposes and various other actions.” Hoffmann expressed his appreciation for the “very complicated situation” and gave assurance of the GDR’s “full solidarity.”13

8. Protokoll über den Aufenthalt einer Arbeitsdelegation des DDR-Verteidigungsministeriums (MfNV) in der Republik Nikaragua, signed by Humberto Ortega and Lieutenant General Borfuka in Managua, 23 January 1980, in BAM-F, DVW 1/54279. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., Annexes 4, 5, and 6. 11. Bericht Hoffmann an Honecker über Militärdelegation aus Nikaragua in der DDR vom 01.04.1980, in BAM-F, AZN 32640, pp. 58–64. 12. Horst Stechbarth, Soldat im Osten: Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse aus fünf Jahrzehnten, ed. by KulturKunststatt Prora and NVA-Museum (Hüllhorst, Germany: Ed. Stadt und Buch, 2006), pp. 184–189. 13. Bericht über Treffen der DDR-Militärdelegation mit nikaraguanischem Verteidigungsminister Humberto Ortega in Havanna vom Oktober 1982, in BAM-F, DVW 1/114495, pp. 196–203.

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In late April 1983, Ortega visited the GDR again, arriving from Moscow. In addition to talks with NVA commanders, his program included troop visits to ground force units in Brandenburg/Havel, a border regiment, and the border installations in the district of Schwerin and the “Otto Winzer” Ofªcers’ School in Prora/Rügen.14 The original intention for Ortega to attend the ofªcial parade in East Berlin on 1 May was abandoned because the Nicara- guan had expressly requested there be no “activities in public” and no “reports in the mass media.” He wanted the visit to be a working visit without any military ceremony, and he wore civilian clothes even during the troop visits. Ap- parently, this procedure was also used during his visit to Moscow.15 The expert discussions focused on the situation in Nicaragua and the possibility of East Germany’s further cooperation and assistance. In particular, the minister requested that 36 Nicaraguans undergo training in the NVA. During Ortega’s visit to East Berlin, a contractual agreement on further cooperation between the two ministries of defense was signed. The preamble emphasized the goal of deepening the friendly relations between the NVA and the Sandinista People’s Army. The future cooperation was to include delivery of military equipment “in accordance with the GDR’s capacity to act,” the provision of training for “military cadres” in the GDR, “political and military education in the armed forces,” and the mutual exchange of information. De- tails were to be laid down in additional agreements or protocols.16 Even as late as mid-October 1989, East German Defense Minister Heinz Kessler visited Cuba and Nicaragua. He was accompanied by four other generals as well as by the chief of the People’s Navy, Vice Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, who replaced Kessler as minister a few weeks later.17 Onlyafew days earlier, the Sandinista leader and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega (the brother of Humberto) had traveled to the GDR to attend the celebra- tions marking the fortieth anniversary of the GDR. Kessler explained to Ortega on 8 October that Nicaragua could “always rely on the ªrm friendship and active solidarity of the SED.” Kessler promised that the GDR would “continue to provide political, diplomatic, moral and material support for

14. Befehl Nr. 28/83 des DDR-Verteidigungsministeriums für den Besuch einer Militärdelegation aus Nikaragua in der DDR im April 1983, in BAM-F, DVW 1/67048. 15. Schriftwechsel Hoffmann mit Honecker über den Besuch einer Militärdelegation aus Nikaragua in der DDR im April/Mai 1983, in BAM-F, DVW 1/114496, pp. 94–103. 16. Vereinbarung zwischen dem DDR-Verteidigungsministerium (MfNV) und dem Verteidigungs- ministerium der Republik Nikaragua über die Zusammenarbeit auf militärischem Gebiet, signed by Colonel General Fleißner and Commandante Osbaldo Lacayo Gabuardi in Berlin, 3 May 1983, in BAM-F, DVW 1/54280. 17. SED Politbüro Meeting, 26 September 1989, TOP 8, in Stiftung Archiv Parteien und Massen- organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BA), DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 3242; and also in BAM-F, DVW 1/67080.

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Nicaragua in the future with speciªc actions in accordance with the GDR’s capacity to act.”18

Military Attachés in Managua and East Berlin

In view of the GDR’s extensive military cooperation with Nicaragua, it is sur- prising that the two sides were not represented by military attachés in each other’s capitals. To maintain military contacts, the GDR military attaché in Havana was given a second accreditation in Managua in 1984.19 The ofªcer observed and reported the military situation in Nicaragua from Havana. Mili- tary intelligence is a typical activity of attachés all over the world. To maintain contacts with the Nicaraguan military leadership, an assistant of the military attaché from Havana was employed at the embassy in Managua for long peri- ods. In 1989 the leadership of the Nicaraguan army considered this “current practice” to be no longer sufªcient for “the excellent state of bilateral relations.” The Nicaraguan ofªcers deemed it appropriate to withdraw the assistant from Cuba and to install him directly in Managua. Kessler was “posi- tively disposed” toward this request.20 At no stage did Nicaragua have a military attaché accredited to East Berlin. But this, too, was only the ofªcial version. As early as 1985, a captain was installed as plenipotentiary of the Nicaraguan ministry of defense at the embassy in East Berlin and ofªcially accredited with civilian diplomatic status. His primary tasks were to look after the ofªcers studying in the GDR and to deal with other issues regarding the cooperation between the two armies.21

Requests from Managua to the GDR

Requests from Managua to the NVA included weaponry, musical instruments, and “special training” for 100 Nicaraguan ofªcer students. For exam- ple, a list from December 1986 included training for ªve military musicians,

18. Protokoll Gespräch Armeegeneral Heinz Kessler mit Daniel Ortega, Berlin, 10.10.1989 [Memo- randum of Army General Heinz Kessler´s conversations with President Daniel Ortega, Berlin, 10 Oc- tober 1989], in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.035/146, pp. 44–50. 19. For more on the accreditation, see MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua [GDR MoD main staff, cooperation with Nicaragua], in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 241–244. 20. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, p. 32. 21. See correspondence in MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 1–8.

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extensive equipment for riºe ranges, several service ribbons, and various musical instruments in addition to combat training for another 24 ofªcer students.22 Kessler asked for an evaluation of each list and then submitted a proposal to Honecker that was almost identical to Ortega’s request, which was approved.23 “Special training” referred to the immediate training of 100 future motorized riºe and reconnaissance platoon leaders. In October 1986, Humberto Ortega submitted a new request to GDR Ambassador Heinrich März, seeking to increase by $10 million a special credit of $15 million that had been granted for military deliveries. The funds were intended to be used for the replacement of transport and communica- tions equipment. Ortega wrote to his GDR counterpart saying that to prepare for a major offensive scheduled for early 1987 the Sandinista armed forces needed further “assistance in solidarity,” including 10,000 light machine guns and a total of 10,000 riºes of various types.24 In talks with Honecker during a visit to the GDR in September 1986, Daniel Ortega urgently asked for “weapons, mainly riºes.” The Nicaraguan president described the situation in his country as “currently very serious and complicated.” The remaining years until the change of presidents in the United States gave

cause for serious concern: The possibility of direct intervention by the United States in Nicaragua cannot be excluded at any time because Reagan has taken a personal interest in this issue so that he will not allow his term to come to an end without the Nicaraguan revolution having been crushed.25

Ortega talked about the decision to arm the population of Managua and other major cities and organize them in a military form: “This measure was intended to have a certain deterrent effect on the United States that would stop it from launching some form of direct intervention.”26 Honecker told Ortega that the topic should be raised directly with the Ministries for Na- tional Defense and State Security.27 Subsequently, senior GDR ofªcials

22. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, pp. 124–130, 134–140. 23. Schriftwechsel Armeegenerel Heinz Kessler mit Honecker über militärische Kooperation mit Nikaragua [Memorandum and reports from Army General Heinz Kessler to Honecker on military cooperation with Nicaragua], in BAM-F, AZN 32673, p. 6–7. 24. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, in BAM-F, AZN 31488, pp. 99–101. 25. SED CC, Memorandum of Honecker’s conversations with Daniel Ortega, East Berlin, 17 Sep- tember 1986, in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.039/299, pp. 142–143. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid.

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repeatedly referred to Honecker’s personal commitment to provide military assistance to Nicaragua. In 1989, the NVA received new requests for training assistance from Humberto Ortega. The Sandinista armed forces again wanted to have more than 100 military personnel trained at NVA training facilities. After a “thor- ough examination,” Kessler submitted a proposal to Honecker recommend- ing that all requests from Managua be granted. Honecker agreed.28 East Germany was by no means the only Communist country the Nica- raguan authorities asked for assistance. Inquiries were also made in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, and other Soviet-bloc capitals. The ªles of the GDR Minis- try for National Defense contain references to deliveries made by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Algeria. According to information given by Humberto Ortega during his talks in Strausberg, the Czechoslovak government provided surface-to-air missiles and submachine guns, Soªa provided RPG-7 rocket launchers, and Algiers provided antitank guns. Ortega said he had also requested tanks, helicopters, and artillery in Moscow and submachine guns in Soªa.29

GDR Military Assistance and Soviet–East German– Nicaraguan Relations

Evaluating the decisions taken in favor of or against the provision of military assistance only from angles that are speciªc to East Germany would not do justice to the Cold War context. The GDR closely coordinated its activities with the Soviet Union. This coordination is not always evident in archival materials, but we need to take account of what Defense Minister Hoffmann told his Soviet counterpart in 1978: “Until now the GDR Ministry for Na- tional Defense has coordinated all supplies and services for the military support of developing countries with the General Staff of the USSR.”30 Hoffmann’s statement was expressly conªrmed by the long-standing chief of the NVA’s Main Staff, General Streletz, when he was interviewed

28. Schriftwechsel Armeegenerel Heinz Kessler mit Honecker über militärische Kooperation mit Nikaragua vom 17.02.1986, in BAM-F, AZN 32649, pp. 104–105. 29. Verteidigungsminister Hoffmann an Honecker, 01.04.1980, in BAM-F, 32640, pp. 58–64. On a visit by Daniel Ortega to Moscow, Belgrade, Soªa, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw in 1985 and extensive requests to Prague and Budapest, see, for instance, the documents in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 113–117. 30. Brief Verteidigungsminister Hoffmann an sowjetischen Verteidigungsminister Ustinow, 21.02.1978 [Letter MoD GDR, Hoffmann to MoD USSR, Ustinov, 21 February 1978], in BAM-F, AZN 30552, pp. 14–15.

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about the matter. Streletz emphasized that the GDR had never made military contacts and provided military assistance single-handedly. Such decisions were always made in consultation with Moscow. Soviet Ministry of Defense ofªcials, not the SED General Secretary, determined whether to accept or re- ject a request for military assistance. Yet, even though the decision-making process reºected the Soviet Union’s dominance within the Eastern bloc, the GDR by no means followed the Soviet Union blindly. The military support provided to Third World countries, including Nicaragua, was at least in the beginning more the result of East Germany’s ambition than of an order from the Soviet leadership. In 1981 the Soviet authorities decided that, in view of the “revolutionary course of development in Nicaragua” and the “increasing threat to the country from imperialist and other reactionary circles,” the Eastern bloc should deliver armaments and military equipment. However, because of the tense situation in the Caribbean and “other international factors,” the Soviet Union refrained from transporting the weapons to Nicaragua on its own ships. Ac- cording to Soviet information, Algeria initially made transports to Nicaragua on behalf of Moscow in 1981 but stopped doing so later. From then on, East German vessels were to carry out this precarious task. Ofªcials at the SED International Relations Department and the GDR Ministry of Transporta- tion held talks in Moscow with Vice Admiral Nikolai Grishin regarding this issue in January 1982. Grishin told them it would be “advantageous” for the Soviet side if the GDR could take over all further deliveries for 1982 and subsequent years. SED Politburo member Hermann Axen immediately informed Honecker and pointed out that these transports were “very complicated in the current international situation.” Vessels carrying 36 122-mm howitzers and twelve B-21 rocket launchers were still in Algerian ports. Another 2,400 or so tons of equipment and armaments were awaiting transport in the Soviet Union.31 At that time, the “international situation” was indeed “very complicated.” The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, and Ronald Rea- gan’s initial year in ofªce all brought a resurgence of the Cold War. Observers spoke about a new “ice age” in U.S.-Soviet relations. In Nicaragua, a war had begun between the Sandinista government and anti-Communist guerrillas who were politically and militarily supported by Washington. Leaders in Moscow apparently thought that Soviet ships carrying armaments might pose political and military risks. Whether the GDR accepted this hazardous task from Moscow is unclear.

31. Both papers were classiªed secret. Report SED CC, AIV to Honecker, 25 January 1982; and At- tached memo of SED CC AIV Moscow talks, 20 January 1982, in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.035/ 146, pp. 33–43.

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The tension between Soviet inºuence on the one hand and national pe- culiarities and interests on the other was evident in the decision-making process of the NVA’s foreign contacts. Describing the GDR as a “proxy” or a “stand-in” for the Soviet Union would, however, go too far and would not ad- equately reºect the quality of the coordination processes between East Berlin, Strausberg, and Moscow. These complex issues cannot be reduced to a simple formula. The sources currently available do not substantiate the notion that each state in the Eastern bloc had to support one or more Third World countries in accordance with a plan prepared by Moscow. Such a scheme seems rather im- probable in view of the declassiªed evidence. When interviewed about this, General Streletz conªrmed that each member-state had coordinated its activities with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. Multilateral integration into the structures of the Warsaw Pact was of less importance. A document laying out “Principles for coordinating the activities of the participating states of the Warsaw Pact in the implementation of military cooperation with developing countries” (Grundsätze der Koordinierung der Handlungen der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages bei der Verwirk- lichung der militärtechnischen Zusammenarbeit mit den Entwicklungsländern), which took effect in 1980, is an attempt to coordinate the action taken by all the Warsaw Pact states. The increasing importance of the Third World as a ªeld of action within the East-West conºict also resulted in the growth of the interest of the political establishment in coordination within the Eastern bloc, something that was deemed a necessity. The Soviet leadership had urged such coordination. The ªles that have been preserved reveal differences and ten- sions among the individual bloc members, in particular with the leading power of the bloc. The governments in Budapest, Bucharest, or Prague de- fended their own interests. And so did East Berlin, at least in the late 1980s. Differences regarding the issue of military contacts with the Third World in turn show that the Warsaw Treaty Organization was not a monolithic bloc. Even East Germany went its own way as the USSR scaled down its military support for Nicaragua and many other Third world allies. The triangular rela- tionship between Managua, Moscow, and East Berlin looked completely dif- ferent in the late 1980s.

Moscow Changes Direction, East Berlin Does Not

According to SED Central Committee memoranda, representatives of Nica- ragua in the latter half of the 1980s expressed “insecurity” about changes in

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Soviet policy and the possible consequences for their country. They sensed that the USSR was no longer ready to deliver weapons directly to Nicaragua but only to Cuba.32 The new aim of Soviet foreign policy as deªned by Mikhail Gorbachev was to end the Cold War. Accordingly, Gorbachev cur- tailed military backing for several Third World regimes. Nicaragua was at the top of the list to cancel weapons deliveries. During another visit to East Berlin in October 1989, President Ortega complained about Soviet weapons deliveries to his country failing to arrive. The suspension of deliveries was a “unilat- eral decision” and a “major concession” of Moscow to Washington that had already lasted one year and would be continued. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is said to have urged Managua to stop importing light arms and munitions from other states as well. Ortega told Kessler that he rejected this idea. Because the United States continued to support the anti-Communist guerrillas in Nicaragua, Ortega’s military needed additional weaponry. Army General Kessler is said to have explained that Nicaragua could “always rely on the ªrm friendship and active solidarity of the SED.” In October 1989, the defense minister gave assurance that the GDR would “continue to provide political, diplomatic, moral and material support for Nicaragua in the future with speciªc actions in accordance with the GDR’s possibilities.”33 The new principles of Soviet foreign policy as deªned by Gorbachev thus had an impact on the GDR’s policy toward Nicaragua. East Berlin did not follow Moscow’s change of direction—on the contrary, the GDR demonstra- tively assured Managua that it would continue to provide military support. The GDR leadership’s increasing rejection of Gorbachev’s new course was thus also reºected in the military assistance provided to the Third World. The GDR did not comply with Moscow’s policy regarding a new détente with Washington and also continued to arm Marxist dictatorships in the Third World. In doing so, the NVA leadership believed itself to be in agreement with at least part of the Soviet military leadership. The former chief of the NVA Main Staff, General Streletz, recalled that Gorbachev’s concessions to “the West” and the United States were not identical to the opinions and interests of the Soviet General Staff. The Soviet military leadership, he argued, was increasingly disaffected with Gorbachev. Changes in the military policy and military doctrine had been planned long before 1985. He claimed that the Warsaw Pact’s new military doctrine is erroneously attributed to Gorbachev and that work on the plans and preparations had already begun in the Soviet

32. Memorandum from Krenz, n.d., in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.039/299, p. 204. 33. SED International Liaison Department, Memorandum of Kessler’s conversations with Daniel Ortega, East Berlin, 8 October 1989, in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.035/146, pp. 44–50.

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General Staff before 1985.34 Looking back, Streletz said that the GDR’s policy toward the Third World did not change during the Gorbachev years, and the GDR continued to fulªll its obligations to partners. The reduction of the GDR’s military assistance in the late 1980s was not the result of Gorbachev’s policy but of economic difªculties.35

Military Assistance: Trucks, Armaments, Uniforms, Medical Supplies

A Ministry for National Defense list from 1983 contains details of all deliveries made to Managua up to that point. According to the list, 1,000 MPi-41 submachine guns and ammunition, 10,000 ªeld service uniforms, inºatable boats, and motorcycles, as well as drugs worth a value of 500,000 East Ger- man Marks (DDM) were provided free of charge in February 1981. The total value of this delivery was stated as 2.3 million DDM. Another aid delivery, compiled in October 1982, consisted of a further 1,000 submachine guns and ammunition, 1,500 antitank hand grenades, 500 pistols, 50 light machine guns and ammunition, drugs worth a value of 260,000 DDM, blankets and tents. The total value of this delivery was approximately 2.5 million Marks.36 In addition, medical laboratories and other medical equipment worth 2.5 million Valutamarks were delivered as part of a commercial deal in 1982. In 1983, another 3,000 sub-machine guns and 2.6 million cartridges were delivered according to documents. That same year, commercial agreements for military equipment worth a total value of 34.8 million Valutamarks were concluded, with payment being made through a government credit provided by the GDR. Apparently, the GDR was unable to fulªll all of Managua’s requests: “It was not possible to meet the requirements of the Sandinista People’s Army entirely because of the approved amount of cred- its.”37 Contractually agreed commercial deliveries included materiel such as 310 W-50 trucks and minibuses and 112 ªeld kitchens. According to another balance sheet from 1985, since 1981 the NVA had delivered, free of charge, materiel valued at ten million DDM, in particular

34. NVA Colonel-General Fritz Streletz, Interview, Strausberg, 12 March 2009. 35. Ibid. 36. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, n.d., in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 340–344. 37. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, n.d., in BAM-F, AZN 31488, pp. 6–10

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hand-held weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and training aids. The medical aid provided was valued at about 91,000 DDM.38 When Managua asked for another ªeld hospital and the associated equipment from NVA stocks in 1985, the NVA provided it in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance and the GDR Solidarity Com- mittee. The total value of the hospital and the technical equipment was some 2.8 million DDM.39 According to balance sheets compiled later by the Minis- try of National Defense, the ªeld hospital was used to build the “Carlos Marx” hospital in Managua. The materiel was usually delivered by ship; for instance, in February 1987 by MS Pasewalk. That ship, with a “relief supply for the Sandinista armed forces,” headed for the Port of Corinto in February 1987.40

Military Training in the GDR

Questions regarding the possibility of Nicaraguan military personnel under- going training in the GDR had already been a topic of talks between the two ministries of defense since early 1980. The agreement signed by the NVA In- spector General in September 1983 provided for 36 ofªcer students to undergo training in the NVA. Twelve students each were to be trained as tank, artillery, and motorized riºe platoon leaders. The courses, consisting of two years of military training preceded by a one-year German language course, were scheduled to take place in the period from October 1983 to August 1986. The GDR undertook to bear the costs for the training and to provide a monthly allowance of 200 DDM and a one-time clothing allowance of 400 DDM. The costs of travel to and from the GDR were shared by the two countries: Nicaragua paid for the ºights to Moscow and the GDR paid for the connecting ºights to Berlin. Further organizational and legal questions were resolved in the annexes. The “military cadres” had to be 18–25 years old and preferably unmarried. During the training, the students wore GDR uniforms without the GDR national emblem. On national holidays, the students were allowed to wear Nicaraguan uniforms. The Nicaraguans were not supposed to be granted home leave during the three-year period. The courses were con- ducted in the German language in accordance with NVA training programs

38. GDR Ministry of National Defense, Army General Hoffmann, to Honecker, 6 May 1985, signed by Honecker, in BAM-F, 32677, p. 97. 39. BAM-F, AZN 32697, pp. 14–23; and BAM-F, AZN 32677, pp. 106–107. 40. Letter GDR MoD, Colonel General Streletz to GDR embassy in Managua, 14 February 1987, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, p. 152.

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and on NVA equipment. Training included political education as well.41 The Nicaraguans and many military persons from other countries were trained at the “Otto Winzer” ofªcer’s school in Prora/Rügen, which had been estab- lished speciªcally for the training of foreign military cadres. In June 1983, a four-man NVA delegation traveled to Managua to nego- tiate the agreement. The directive conªrmed by the minister gave the ofªcers room for negotiation. “Upon urgent requests from the Nicaraguan party,” the GDR would be able to provide training in the ªelds of chemical services, rear services, and signaling for up to 24 additional ofªcer students. What is re- markable is the provision to “offer no or only limited Marxist-Leninist education for the military cadres” if such a request should come from Managua.42 Apparently, Managua did not make such requests. The preamble of the training agreement includes explicit statements regarding the political objectives of the military assistance. The cooperation served the “common interests in the struggle against imperialism” and at the same time the “objectives of the Sandinista People’s Revolution.” The “ªrm alliance of all anti-imperialist forces around the socialist community of states” was deªned as an “indispensable prerequisite for consolidating peace and security.”43 After receiving short-term requests from Nicaragua, the NVA trained another 100 ofªcer students to be motorized riºe and artillery platoon leaders in a ªve-month crash course from September 1985 to February 1986. A relevant additional protocol to supplement the training agreement of 1983 was signed in September 1985. In contrast to earlier arrangements, the NVA bore all the ºight costs.44 The 100 ofªcer students were picked up by a special Interºug

41. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Republik Nikaragua über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nikaragua in der DDR, unterzeichnet am 20.09.1983 in Berlin durch Generalleutnant Handke und Botschafter Emilio Moreno Gutierrez, in BAM-F, DVW 1/54281; and Befehl Nr. 97/83 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nikaragua in der DDR, in BAM-F, DVW 1/67049. 42. DDR-Verteidigungsministerium, Direktive für die Beratungen einer Spezialistendelegation des MfNV mit Beauftragten des Verteidigungsministeriums der Rep. Nikaragua, bestätigt vom Minister am 03.06.1983 [GDR Ministry of National Defense; Directive for the consultations of a delegation of specialists from the Ministry of National Defense with representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Nicaragua, approved by the Minister, 3 June 1983], in BAM-F, DVW 1/54281. 43. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR (see note 41 supra). 44. “Protokoll zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Republik Nikaragua über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nik- aragua in der DDR vom 20.09.1983, unterzeichnet durch Generalmajor Werner Otto und Botschafter Rodrigo Cardenal Martinez in Berlin am 20.09.1985,” in BAM-F, DVW 1/54281; and GDR Ministry of National Defense, Colonel General Streletz, to military attaché in Havana, 3 Sep- tember 1985, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 10–11.

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aircraft in Managua in September 1985. Making arrangements in Nicaragua was a responsibility of the GDR military attaché in Havana.45 A new bilateral agreement was signed in Managua in September 1987 that committed the NVA to train 155 Nicaraguan military personnel at inter- vals from November 1987 through August 1992, and it provided four years of training for twelve future motorized riºe unit commanders, twelve future artillery unit commanders, and twelve future engineer unit commanders. A one-year German language course again preceded the military training. The largest item by far was the training of 100 ofªcer students as motorized riºe and reconnaissance platoon leaders in one-year courses beginning in Novem- ber 1987. Because the training did not include a German language course, an additional twelve Nicaraguan interpreters and translators were employed and thus more or less trained as well. The total of 155 “military cadres” included ªve interpreters and translators and two military musicians who were also trained. The GDR armed forces undertook to pay all the training costs and to provide a monthly allowance, this time in various scales from 150 to 250 DDM, with a one-time clothing allowance of 400 DDM. The provisions for the payment of travel expenses were more favorable for Nicaragua this time. The GDR paid for the ºight costs from Havana. The other implement- ing regulations and legal provisions were largely the same as those in the agreement of 1983.46 As before, the Nicaraguans were trained in Prora/ Rügen. A new additional protocol from October 1989 reduced the ongoing training of twelve ofªcer candidates to become commanders of motorized riºe units from three years to one year. The ofªcer students were to be employed as interpreters and translators for a new special course from the day the protocol was signed.47 The NVA planned two such courses for late 1989: Over a period of eleven months, two groups of 25 Nicaraguans were to be

45. “Protokoll zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Republik Nikaragua.” 46. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Republik Nikaragua über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nikaragua in der DDR, unterzeichnet am 20.09.1983 in Berlin durch Generalleutnant Handke und Botschafter Emilio Moreno Gutierrez, in BAM-F, DVW 1/54282; and Befehl Nr. 112/87 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nikaragua in der DDR, in BAM-F, DVW 1/67059. 47. “Protokoll zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Republik Nikaragua über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nik- aragua in der DDR vom 20.09.1983, unterzeichnet durch Generalmajor Werner Otto und Botschafter Rodrigo Cardenal Martinez in Berlin am 20.09.1985,” 20 September 1985, in BAM-F, DVW 1/54282; and Änderung zum Befehl Nr. 112/87 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung vom 09.11.1989, in BAM-F, AZN 1, Vol. 2.

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trained as motorized riºe or reconnaissance platoon leaders. The courses were scheduled to take place at the ofªcer school in Prora from November 1989 to September 1991. Based on a separate agreement dated 26 October 1989, an order issued by the GDR minister of defense in January 1990 contained details of a four-year training course for twelve Nicaraguan ofªcer students earmarked to become commanders of motorized riºe and signal units starting in October 1990 or 1992.48 Furthermore, in 1989, the NVA developed plans for training courses for Nicaraguan ofªcer students for the period until August 1996. Both sides attached great importance to keeping secret their cooperation, particularly the training of ofªcers. When an ofªcer from the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense—a major who had headed the Secretariat of Minister Humberto Ortega—defected to the United States in October 1987, Managua and Strausberg assumed that Washington learned about the cooperation.49 The Ministry for State Security (MfS) was always apprehensive about the possibility that foreign students could be informants for the secret services of their countries or even Western states. A meeting of the MfS, the Soviet Com- mittee for State Security (KGB), and other East European security services shows that the danger of inªltrated agents was considered very real. With a view to Nicaraguan “cadres,” the KGB representative cautioned that “the op- ponent inªltrated agents into the circle of cadres designated for training.”50 Even though in this case the cadres under suspicion were those earmarked to be trained for the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry and secret service, the MfS almost certainly expected a similar danger with regard to the military personnel trained in the GDR. According to information from the GDR Ministry for Disarmament and Defense compiled after the political transition of 1989–1990 for the West German Federal Ministry of Defense, a total of 244 Nicaraguans were trained in the NVA. In July 1990, 85 Nicaraguan military personnel were still being trained.51 Another 62 Nicaraguan military personnel were scheduled to

48. Befehl Nr. 2/90 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern der Sandinistischen Volksarmee der Rep. Nikaragua in der DDR, n.d., in BAM-F DVW 1/54284. More extensive correspondence on this training agreement and order can be found in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, pp. 1–26. 49. MfNV, Hauptstab, Zusammenarbeit mit Nikaragua, n.d., in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, p. 225. 50. Gerhardt Ehlert, Jochen Staadt, and Tobias Voigt, Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR (MfS) und dem Ministerium des Innern Kubas (MININT), No. 33: Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat (Berlin: Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, 2002), p. 227. 51. DDR-Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (MfAV), Informationsmappe für Gespräch Beauftragter MfAV im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, Juli 1990, n.d., in BAM-F, DVW 1/43753, pp. 138–144.

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begin their training in the GDR in 1990. In July 1990, the continuance of this training was uncertain. Five months after the free elections of March 1990, Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann, a former priest, hinted to Man- agua that the training might be terminated.52 On 6 September 1990, Eppel- mann ofªcially informed the Nicaraguans that the training of foreign military personnel who were still in the GDR would be terminated. He said that in addition to the termination of the training activities, “all the prerequisites for continuing” the training would “cease to exist” after the GDR was incorpo- rated into the Federal Republic. In his letter to Managua and other capitals, Eppelmann said he “was convinced [that our foreign partners will] under- stand the current situation” and asked them “to accept that the contractual relations will be terminated by common consent on the date stated.”53

Balances and Statistics

In connection with the examination of a new “request” from Nicaragua, the East German deputy to the minister and chief of technology and armaments asked for a calculation of the value of the support that had been provided to Nicaragua free of charge through November 1984. Colonel-General Werner Fleißner reported that since 1981, shipments worth 9.35 million DDM had been delivered.54 The balances were updated almost every year. In the follow- up to a working meeting of the chiefs of the general staffs of Cuba and Nica- ragua with Soviet military advisrs in Havana in April 1985, the GDR Minis- try of National Defense prepared a balance sheet of the support provided so far by the NVA for the Sandinista People’s Army free of charge since 1981. According to this balance sheet, the NVA had delivered materiel worth 10 million DDM, in particular hand-held weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and training aids. Since 1983, 35 Nicaraguans had been trained by the NVA. The costs incurred for the training amounted to 1.2 million DDM. Medical aid worth about 91,000 DDM had also been provided.55 In 1986, 131 military personnel were registered as having undergone training. The ªeld hospital

52. MfAV, Minister Eppelmann, an Verteidigungsminister, Streitkräfte- oder Generalstabschefs Vietnams, Kambodschas, Jemens, Syriens, Mocambiques, Äthiopiens, Nikaraguas und den “Bot- schafter des Staates Palästina in der DDR,” all dated 20 August 1990, in BAM-F DVW 1/43753, pp. 129–137. 53. Ibid., pp. 121–126. 54. GDR Ministry for National Defense, Colonel General Fleißner to Colonel General Streletz, 26 November 1984, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 1, pp. 10–11. 55. Hoffmann to Honecker (see note 38 supra), p. 97.

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Table 1. Assistance from the East German Ministry for National Defense to Nicaragua, 1986–1988 (volume in GDR Marks)

Year Materiel Training Medical care Total 1986 120,000 2,960,000 — 3,080,000 1987 4,877,000 — 46,500 4,923,600 1988 4,102,100 3,857,800 82,300 8,042,200

Sources: Compiled and calculated from the data in GDR Ministry for National Defense, “Assistance to De- veloping Countries and Progressive National Liberation Movements,” from Army General Kessler to Honecker, 8 January 1987, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 3–5; GDR Ministry for National Defense, Kessler to Honecker, 9 January 1988, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 46–48; and GDR Ministry for National De- fense, Kessler to Honecker, 16 January 1989, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 96–98.

worth 3 million DDM, which had been delivered in 1985, was also included in the balance sheet.56 In the late 1980s, the GDR Ministry for National Defense included its “anti-imperialist solidarity” spending in an annual balance sheet that shows a clear increase in NVA spending for Nicaragua (see Table 1). From 1986 to 1988, the relevant spending almost tripled, rising from 3 million DDM to more than 8 million. If categorized into deliveries of materiel and spending for training and medical care, major differences can be seen for each year. The percentages spell out the annual changes. The great ºuctuations in spending for training tally with the great differences in the numbers of Nicaraguans trained in the NVA each year. In contrast, the share of the spending for medical care was about 1 percent in 1987 and 1988. Among all states and liberation movements supported by the NVA, Nica- ragua occupied the third place for military aid in 1986, with support worth 3 million DDM provided. In 1987, Nicaragua topped the spending list, having received support worth 4.9 million DDM. The 8 million Marks listed for 1988 were the second-largest amount spent on any single country that year. The GDR Ministry of Defense’s spending on Nicaragua amounted to 13 percent of its overall support for foreign armed forces and organizations in 1986, 20 percent in 1987, and roughly 19 percent in 1988.57 The statistical surveys

56. Armaments and equipment worth some 10 million DDM continued to be delivered. See DDR- Verteidigungsministerium, Bisherige unentgeltliche Hilfeleistungen der NVA an die Sandinistische Volksarmee 1981 bis September 1986, in BAM-F, AZN 8475, Vol. 2, pp. 242–243. 57. Compiled and calculated from the data in GDR Ministry of National Defense, Kessler, to Honecker, 8 January 1987, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 3–5; GDR Ministry of National Defense, Kessler, to Honecker, 9 January 1988, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 46–48; and GDR Ministry of Na- tional Defense, Kessler, to Honecker, 16 January 1989, in BAM-F, AZN 32 673, pp. 96–98.

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emphasize the importance of Nicaragua for the leaders of the SED. Accord- ingly, the GDR Ministry of National Defense counted the Central American country among the nine supported “focal countries of the national and anti- imperialist struggle for liberation.”58

A Cold War Sideshow

A determination of the historical scale and impact of GDR military aid re- quires a brief examination of the military commitment of other states, East and West, and their armed forces in Africa. To protect their interests there, the superpowers exploited the conºicting parties. Both the Eastern bloc and the West regarded the conºicts in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and not least Central America as a Cold War sideshow, albeit one that was not quite “cold.” East Germany was not the only actor in this drama. Weapons from all over were sent to the Third World. Soviet weapons, U.S. weapons, East German weapons, West German weapons, and many more were used in wars and civil wars in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. Neither the governments nor the guerrilla ªghters spared the civilian populations. Nor did the weapons did disappear with the end of the East-West conºict. Hoffmann’s 1982 promise that the NVA was “ready to do what is in our power to support the defense of the revolution in Nicaragua” was far from empty. In this article I have given a sense of the volume and nature of GDR military assistance to Nicaragua from 1980 to 1989, including the provision of materiel and training. Large quantities of vehicles, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition ºowed from East Germany to the Sandinistas. From 1983, the NVA also trained Nicaraguan military personnel in the GDR. Hoffmann’s memoranda from 1982 provide insights into the motives for such extensive assistance for Nicaragua:

We consider Central America and the Caribbean to be one of the most impor- tant theaters of the international struggle for peace and progress. The situation has become much more difªcult since the United States has launched an open crusade against socialism and progress on all continents and has in particular wanted to rule again over its Latin American backyard under the slogan of “re- moving all inºuence of Moscow.”59 The perceived political duty of promoting international solidarity was one of the main driving forces for the leadership in East Berlin. The GDR’s

58. GDR Ministry of National Defense, Chief of the Main Staff, 19 June 1987, in BAM-F, AZN 31871, pp. 219–220. 59. Unterlagen für geplante Militärdelegation des MfNV nach Nikaragua Oktober 1982.

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military commitment to Central America, which was ultimately ordered by the SED, corresponded with this perception. The preamble of the training agreement of 1983 emphasizes the “common interests in the struggle against imperialism” and deªnes the “ªrm alliance of all anti-imperialist forces around the socialist community of states” as an “indispensable prerequisite for consolidating peace and security.” For East Berlin and Strausberg, and probably Moscow as well (at least initially), the war in Nicaragua was part of the global conºict between the blocs, between the opposing social systems. The GDR leaders considered the Sandinista government in Managua an ally, a member of the Communist camp in the ongoing East-West conºict. Publicists and occasionally even contemporary historians sometimes make the mistake of taking the ideological rhetoric of SED politicians and NVA leaders literally and weighing every word. Such an ideologically focused perception of GDR politics, one that is based exclusively or largely on such rhetoric, does not do justice to the reality and complexity of the GDR. It negates the con- straints of political realism. In the case of Nicaragua, however, ideologically based motives played a decisive role. The promotion of international solidarity was one of the main driving forces for policymakers in East Berlin. By and large, Nicaragua did not affect the security interests of the GDR. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua thanked the GDR and its armed forces several times for the assistance rendered. Talking to Egon Krenz in June 1986, Nicaragua’s Vice President Sergio Ramirez expressed appreciation for the military assistance received from the Soviet Union, the GDR, Cuba, and other socialist countries. The “material support” provided was an “indispensable prerequisite” for the military successes achieved. According to Ramirez, the military situation changed in 1986 in favor of the Sandinistas.60 When Gorbachev unveiled a new foreign policy intended to end the global conºict with the United States, East Berlin was unwilling to following his initiatives. In contrast to Moscow, East Berlin continued and even scaled up its weapons deliveries to Nicaragua and other regimes, such as Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia. Even after the overthrow of Honecker in October 1989, the government in Managua expressed its respect for him as a person and thanked him for the assistance he had ordered to be rendered, in particular in the military ªeld. Daniel Ortega candidly explained to Krenz on 19 October that the “relieving” of Honecker of his functions “affected Nicaragua deeply” and that the country “appreciated his historic merits.”61 The strengthening of the GDR was im-

60. Memorandum of talks between Krenz and Ramirez, East Berlin, 16 June 1986, in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.039/299, p. 91. 61. Memorandum on Egon Krenz’s talks with Daniel Ortega, East Berlin, 19 October 1989, in SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.035/146, pp. 52–56.

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portant to Nicaragua and the “ªghting peoples.” Ortega told Krenz that a weak GDR would weaken them. The new SED Secretary General gave his assurance that the GDR would “continue to stand ªrmly on the side of a free Nicaragua.”62 The rapid political changes that started in autumn 1989 quickly swept this promise aside. Nicaragua had seen more than ten years of belligerent turmoil and civil war. From 1980 through 1990, the war claimed about 60,000 lives, mostly ci- vilians. Peasants were driven out, villages were devastated, and entire districts were deprived of their livelihood. The world paid little attention to the fam- ines. Anti-personnel mines claim victims to this day, thus preventing farmers from cultivating large parts of their land. The experience of ten years of war has left its mark on the collective mind because of the everyday occurrence of violence in human relations. The civil war ended in Nicaragua in late 1989, just as the last Commu- nist East European regimes collapsed. Daniel Ortega’s Sandinista Party lost the 1990 February elections. But Daniel Ortega regained power in a free elec- tion in 2006 and remains in ofªce today. In July 2008, Ortega publicly awarded Margot Honecker, the widow of the SED Secretary General, who died in Chile in 1994, a high decoration as a sign of his undiminished gratitude. According to his spokeswoman and wife, Rosario Murillo, Mrs. Honecker was also honored on behalf of her husband: “He showed such solidarity, such particular interest, such love for the free people of Nicaragua.”63 The Cold War was neither a national nor a bilateral conºict. In many re- spects, it was multilateral. The foreign policy of the GDR lay within the gravitational ªeld of the East-West conºict and was ªrmly tied to the policy of the Eastern superpower. Therefore, its relations with developing countries and the military support it provided to them were also part of this gravitational ªeld. The contradiction between sovereignty and bloc discipline within the Warsaw Pact persisted until the end of the Cold War.

62. Ibid. 63. “Ein Orden für Honecker,” Stern.de, 21 July 2008, available on http://www.stern.de/politik/ ausland/:Nicaragua-Ein-Orden-Honecker/631701.html. Margot Honecker was later honored for the services rendered by her husband.

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