StorEastk Germanmann Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua East German Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, 1979–1990 ✣ Klaus Storkmann When the East German minister for national defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, planned to travel to Nicaragua in 1982, he had a speech prepared for the rally in Managua. Although the trip was canceled on short notice at the request of Managua, Hoffmann’s preserved manuscript sheds interesting light on the policy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) toward Central America. The document emphasizes the similarities between the situations in the GDR and in Central America: Although thousands of kilometers lie between our two countries, we feel it is clear that the U.S. imperialists are preparing a new campaign here in Central America which is part of their global war against progress and peace on all conti- nents, part of their “crusade” against socialism and the national liberation move- ments and against the independence of the peoples!...Itisnecessary to foil those aggressive machinations. In your efforts, dear comrades, you can still rely on the support of the GDR.1 The manuscript alludes to the obligation and promise of further assistance: “We will continue to support the people of Nicaragua and its Sandinista Peo- ple’s Army in whatever way we can and in accordance with the geographic conditions and...also assist in developing the capability to put up a defense against any imperialist attacks.”2 Archival documents pertaining to the visit of the Nicaraguan defense minister, Humberto Ortega, to the GDR in late April 1983 also contain many ideological comments and at the same time provide insights into the motives for the assistance. Hoffmann told Ortega, 1. Unterlagen für geplante Militärdelegation des MfNV nach Nikaragua Oktober 1982, in Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BAM-F), DVW 1/115672. 2. Ibid. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 2014, pp. 56–76, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00451 © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 56 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00451 by guest on 27 September 2021 East German Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua The working people and soldiers of the GDR feel very deeply about the similari- ties of our struggles on major fronts of the international class conºict. In Central America as in Central Europe, the struggle for safeguarding peace and social progress is carried out against the same main enemy, against the most reaction- ary and aggressive circles of imperialism, the monopolists and militarists of the USA!3 Hoffmann’s comments here and in his undelivered speech ended with the promise and obligation that the East German National People’s Army (NVA) was “ready to do what is in our power to support the defense of the revolution in Nicaragua.”4 Hoffmann’s words were no empty promises. Under the ubiquitous slogan of “anti-imperialist solidarity,” the GDR and its armed forces provided exten- sive military assistance to developing countries and armed guerrilla move- ments in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.5 In the 1980s, Nicaragua was a priority for this military assistance. This article fo- cuses on contacts at the level of the ministries of defense, on Nicaraguan re- quests to the NVA, and on political and military decision-making processes in the GDR. The article examines two main ªelds of military cooperation, the provision of materiel and training assistance. The research here was prepared within the scope of a larger and more extensive project on military contacts of the GDR to the so-called Third World. The research is primarily based on ªles preserved from the GDR military and the leadership of the state party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). Military Contacts between the Armed Forces of the GDR and Nicaragua For the purpose of establishing military contacts at the ministry of defense level and making arrangements for possible further cooperation, Nicaraguan 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. These question are taken up in Klaus Storkmann, Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die Dritte Welt (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2012). Earlier major publi- cations relating to these topics include Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interven- tions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Henry Heller, The Cold War and the New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945–2005 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006); Gareth M. Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert W. Clawson, ed., East-West Rivalry and the Third World: Security Issues and Regional Perspectives (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986); and Bruce E. Arlinghau, ed., Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982). 57 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00451 by guest on 27 September 2021 Storkmann Defense Minister Larios Montiel traveled to the GDR for the ªrst time in September 1979. The chief of the NVA’s main staff, Lieutenant General Fritz Streletz, sent an account of his talks with Montiel to the SED leader Erich Honecker. According to Streletz, the Nicaraguan emphasized the “urgent” necessity to build up the armed forces and to “secure the political power gained.” He said his country was at an “extremely critical stage.” Because of the political situation, Nicaragua “was not able to import armaments openly from socialist countries ...orelse it would give the enemies of the revolution a pretext for imperialist aggression.” Furthermore, his country was “bank- rupt” because of the war and could not purchase anything “because the state treasury was empty.” Nevertheless, Montiel submitted a request to the NVA in Strausberg, the seat of the GDR Ministry of Defense, asking for the deliv- ery of means of transport, engineering and signal equipment, medical equip- ment, clothing and equipment for aviators, patrol boats, and training for technical non-commissioned ofªcers in all of Nicaragua’s armed services. In addition to the GDR, Montiel traveled to the USSR, Bulgaria, Libya, and Al- geria to put forth similar requests.6 The ªrst ofªcial NVA visitors to Nicaragua were Lieutenant General Helmut Borufka and Major General Heinrich Winkler in January 1980. Borufka was the inspector-general of the NVA and responsible for military training activities, and Winkler was chief of the Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry for National Defense. The deputy chief of the Engineering- Technical Foreign Trade Agency (ITA), Colonel Günter Anders, accompanied them. The ITA was part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and was responsible for commercial business concerning military technology and armaments. The functions of the three ofªcers deªned the ªelds of the intended military coop- eration. They met Minister of Defense Ortega, his deputies, Luis Carrion and Eden Pastora, and the chief of Nicaragua’s General Staff, Joaquin Cuadra, in Managua. Ortega hoped that the GDR would provide training for technical personnel and all kinds of military equipment “except medium and heavy weapons” He was anxious to ensure that the military assistance would not be- come public knowledge. A “political blunder” could turn the “bourgeois- democratic states” of Latin America into “enemies of Nicaragua” und thus “endanger the country’s basis of existence.” Moreover, the United States must not be given an “excuse for open intervention.”7 The signed minutes mention 6. Bericht Generaloberst Streletz über erstes Gespräch mit Militärdelegation aus Nikaragua in der DDR an Honecker vom 18.09.1979, and Brief von Armeegeneral Hoffmann an Honecker vom 15.11.1979, both in BAM-F, AZN 32639, pp. 39–43, 101–102. 7. Bericht Hoffmann an Honecker über Militärdelegation in Nikaragua vom 01.02.1980, in BAM-F, AZN 32640, pp. 21–25 58 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00451 by guest on 27 September 2021 East German Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua the intended “fraternal cooperation” between the two armies “to consolidate the young Nicaraguan revolution.”8 Details were recorded in several annexes. The GDR undertook to provide 150 W-50 trucks and large quantities of clothing and equipment (including 40,000 steel helmets, mess kits, water bottles, backpacks, and tents) by the end of 1980. The two sides also agreed that another 350 W-50 trucks could be provided in subsequent years. Because the ITA was responsible for this deal, it presumably was a commercial transaction.9 In addition, the GDR of- fered 15,000 AKM-8 submachine guns and 10 million rounds of ammuni- tion, 10,000 hand grenades, 10,000 anti-personnel mines, and communi- cation and radio equipment. Nicaragua requested further clothing, ªeld kitchens, drugs, and several dressing stations. As early as 1980, the NVA also offered to provide Nicaragua training for military personnel.10 Humberto Ortega traveled to the GDR for the ªrst time in late March 1980. In his luggage, he had long lists for the people he was going to see in Strausberg. Among the many new requested items were 45,000 uniforms, an- other 10,000 battle dress uniforms, and 3,000 binoculars. General Hoffmann promised to fulªll most of the requests.11 Hoffmann’s ªrst visit to Nicaragua was planned for October 1982 in con- nection with a visit to Cuba, but at the last minute the Nicaraguan authorities requested that he postpone the visit. Colonel-General Horst Stechbarth, who was then chief of the NVA Ground Forces, later recalled that the visit to Managua did not take place because Defense Minister Ortega had warned that the “complicated situation” in the country made it impossible to guaran- tee the security of the NVA generals.12 Instead, Ortega and other military ªgures ºew to Havana to confer with the high-ranking NVA delegation.