Nonviolent Struggle and the Revolution in East Germany
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Remembering East German Childhood in Post-Wende Life Narratives" (2013)
Wayne State University Wayne State University Dissertations 1-1-2013 Remembering East German Childhood In Post- Wende Life Narratives Juliana Mamou Wayne State University, Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations Part of the German Literature Commons Recommended Citation Mamou, Juliana, "Remembering East German Childhood In Post-Wende Life Narratives" (2013). Wayne State University Dissertations. Paper 735. This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState. REMEMBERING EAST GERMAN CHILDHOOD IN POST-WENDE LIFE NARRATIVES by JULIANA MAMOU DISSERTATION Submitted to the Graduate School of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 2013 MAJOR: MODERN LANGUAGES (German Studies) Approved by: _____________________________________ Advisor Date _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ © COPYRIGHT BY JULIANA MAMOU 2013 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my great appreciation to the members of my Dissertation Committee, Professor Donald Haase, Professor Lisabeth Hock, and Professor Anca Vlasopolos, for their constructive input, their patience, and support. I am particularly grateful for the assistance -
Bezpieczeństwo Teoria I Praktyka Nr 1-2, 2008
C zasopism o Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego BEZPiECZENSTWO TEORIA I PRAKTYKA numer 1-2 (I) Kraków 2008 BEZPIECZEŃSTWO TEORIA I PRAKTYKA Czasopismo Krakowskiej Adres redakcji Szkoły Wyższej im. ul. Kanonicza 9 31-002 Kraków Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego Itel. (012) 292 74 00, 433 99 00 e-mail: [email protected] Rada Wydawnicza Klemens Budzowski Zbigniew Maciąg Jacek M. Majchrowski Rada Programowa Mieczysław Bieniek, Stanisław Dawidziuk, Bogdan Klich, Jerzy Konieczny, Mirosław Kwieciński, Sławomir Mazur, Andrzej Pepłoński, Jan Widacki, Wiesław Wróblewski (przewodniczący) Redaktor naczelny Klemens Budzowski Sekretarz redakcji Halina Baszak Jaroń Recenzenci prof. dr hab. Leopold Ciborowski prof. KSW dr hab. Jerzy Konieczny prof. KSW dr hab. Mirosław Kwieciński prof. dr hab. Andrzej Furier dr Marcin Lasoń Tłumaczenia język rosyjski: Oleg Aleksejczuk język angielski: Piotr Krasnowolski Redakcja nie zwraca m ateriałów niezamówionych. Projekt okładki i stron tytułowych Decyzja o opublikowaniu tekstu uzależniona jest od Joanna Sroka opinii redakcji i recenzentów. Redakcja zastrzega sobie prawo modyfikowania tytułów i skracania tekstów Łamanie przeznaczonych do druku. A rtykuty powinny być przesyłane w dwóch egzemplarzach wraz z wersjq Joanna Sroka elektroniczną. Adiustacja i korekta redakcyjna Na zlecenie Kamila Zimnicka-Warchoł Krakowskiej Szkoty Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego Katarzyna Machała (teksty w języku angielskim) www.ksw.edu.pl Wydawca Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne sp. z o.o. - Copyright© -
Driven Into Suicide by the Communist Regime of the German Democratic
Central European History 0 (2019), 1–23. © Central European History Society of the American Historical Association, 2019 doi:10.1017/S0008938919000165 1 2 3 Driven into Suicide by the Communist Regime of the 4 German Democratic Republic? On the Persistence 5 6 of a Distorted Perspective 7 8 Q1 Udo Grashoff 9 10 ABSTRACT. The assumption that the Communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic 11 (GDR) drove many people to suicide has persisted for decades, and it is still evident in academic 12 and public discourse. Yet, high suicide rates in eastern Germany, which can be traced back to the 13 nineteenth century, cannot be a result of a particular political system. Be it monarchy, 14 democracy, fascism, or socialism, the frequency of suicide there did not change significantly. In 15 fact, the share of politically motivated suicides in the GDR amounts to only 1–2 per cent of the 16 total. Political, economic, or socio-cultural factors did not have a significant impact on suicide 17 rates. An analysis of two subsets of GDR society that were more likely to be affected by 18 repression—prisoners and army recruits—further corroborates this: there is no evidence of a 19 higher suicide rate in either case. Complimentary to a quantitative approach “from above,” a qualitative analysis “from below” not only underlines the limited importance of repression, but 20 also points to a regional pattern of behavior linked to cultural influences and to the role of 21 religion—specifically, to Protestantism. Several factors nevertheless fostered the persistence of 22 an overly politicized interpretation of suicide in the GDR: the bereaved in the East, the media in 23 the West, and a few victims of suicide themselves blamed the regime and downplayed important 24 individual and pathological aspects. -
The Beginning of the Berlin Wall Erin Honseler, Halie Mitchell, Max Schuetze, Callie Wheeler March 10, 2009
Group 8 Final Project 1 The Beginning of the Berlin Wall Erin Honseler, Halie Mitchell, Max Schuetze, Callie Wheeler March 10, 2009 For twenty-eight years an “iron curtain” divided East and West Berlin in the heart of Germany. Many events prior to the actual construction of the Wall caused East Germany’s leader Erich Honecker to demand the Wall be built. Once the Wall was built the cultural gap between East Germany and West Germany broadened. During the time the Wall stood many people attempted to cross the border illegally without much success. This caused a very unstable relationship between the government of the West (Federal Republic of Germany) and the government of the East (German Democratic Republic). In this paper we will discuss events leading up to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the government that was responsible for the construction of the Wall, how it divided Germany, and how some people tried to escape from the East to the West. Why the Berlin Wall Was Built In order to understand why the Berlin Wall was built, we must first look at the events leading up to the actual construction of the Wall in 1961. In the Aftermath of World War II Germany was split up into four different zones; each zone was controlled by a different country. The western half was split into three different sectors: the British sector, the American sector and the French sector. The Eastern half was controlled by the Soviet Union. Eventually, the three western occupiers unified their three zones and became what is known as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). -
The Superpowers: a Soviet Perspective
Commentary Karen Brutents Europe Between the Superpowers: A Soviet Perspective Robert Hutchings writes that the end of the cold war resulted from ‘‘the interaction between super- power relations and developments in Europe’’ and ‘‘was not some- thing bestowed on Europe by U.S. and Soviet leaders, but neither was it something that Europe could have achieved on its own.’’ Nevertheless, he suggests that the accurate term for these events is ‘‘self-liberation.’’ Indeed, the emergence of the popular and opposition move- ments ultimately served as the major factor in the liberation of Eastern Europe. The materials at our disposal show that the effect of perestroika in the Soviet Union, along with Mikhail Gorba- chev’s policy line and practical steps, played a decisive role in trans- forming latent discontent into a mass movement in the majority of Eastern European nations. Even in Poland and Hungary, where democratic demonstrations were more active, the Communist re- gimes still maintained a foothold. That foothold was particularly firm in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. As for the German Demo- cratic Republic (GDR), a key country in the Warsaw Treaty Orga- nization, its citizens began to rise up only when it became clear that Gorbachev not only sympathized with them but would never allow the use of force against them. Before that, most of them re- mained silent, apparently out of guilt rooted in World War II and a related fear that disturbances in the GDR might cause the Russians and their troops stationed in Germany to seek revenge. It is also ................. 16548$ COM5 11-06-07 10:07:58 PS PAGE 218 Europe Between the Superpowers: A Soviet Perspective 219 possible that some of the intelligentsia were restrained by a sense of responsibility and an understanding that the use of force in the GDR could lead to a global military confrontation. -
The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies
1 The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies Vladimir Tismaneanu The revolutions of 1989 were, no matter how one judges their nature, a true world-historical event, in the Hegelian sense: they established a historical cleavage (only to some extent conventional) between the world before and after 89. During that year, what appeared to be an immutable, ostensibly indestructible system collapsed with breath-taking alacrity. And this happened not because of external blows (although external pressure did matter), as in the case of Nazi Germany, but as a consequence of the development of insuperable inner tensions. The Leninist systems were terminally sick, and the disease affected first and foremost their capacity for self-regeneration. After decades of toying with the ideas of intrasystemic reforms (“institutional amphibiousness”, as it were, to use X. L. Ding’s concept, as developed by Archie Brown in his writings on Gorbachev and Gorbachevism), it had become clear that communism did not have the resources for readjustment and that the solution lay not within but outside, and even against, the existing order.1 The importance of these revolutions cannot therefore be overestimated: they represent the triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological monism, bureaucratic cynicism and police dictatorship.2 Rooted in an individualistic concept of freedom, programmatically skeptical of all ideological blueprints for social engineering, these revolutions were, at least in their first stage, liberal and non-utopian.3 The fact that 1 See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157-189. In this paper I elaborate upon and revisit the main ideas I put them forward in my introduction to Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) as well as in my book Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992; revised and expanded paperback, with new afterword, Free Press, 1993). -
1961 3 Politmagazine | 1 Nachrichten ● Die Rote Optik (1959) ● Der Schwarze Kanal ● Panorama ● SFB-Abendschau (Alle 13
17 TV- und Filmbeiträge insgesamt. Phase I: 1956 – 1961 3 Politmagazine | 1 Nachrichten ● Die rote Optik (1959) ● Der schwarze Kanal ● Panorama ● SFB-Abendschau (alle 13. August 1961) Politische TV-Magazine stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser zeitlichen Anfangsphase beider deutscher Staaten. Am Beispiel von drei Politmagazinen und einer Nachrichtensendung betrachten wir die Berichterstattung von jenem Tag, der Berlin und Deutschland in zwei Teile trennte. Der 13. August 1961 aus Sicht von Ost und West – Ein Meilenstein der Geschichte. Phase II: 1962 – 1976 3 Filme | Fiktion ● Polizeiruf (1972) ● Blaulicht (1965) – Die fünfte Kolonne (1976) In den 70er Jahren setzte man verstärkt auf Unterhaltungssendungen, in Ost wie West. Eine besondere Rolle spielte dabei die Entwicklung des „Tatort“ (BRD) und des „Polizeiruf“ (DDR), den die DDR als Gegenstück zum westdeutschen Krimi-Format einsetzte. Besonders brisant: Im allerersten „Tatort – Taxi nach Leipzig“ wurde ausgerechnet ein DDR-Schauplatz in Szene gesetzt. Bei „Blaulicht“ und „Die fünfte Kolonne“ bezichtigen sich Ost und West gegenseitig der Spionage. – Spannende Gegensätze in der TV-Unterhaltung. Phase III: 1976 – 1982 4 Magazine | 2 Nachrichten ● Der schwarze Kanal (1976) – ZDF-Magazin (1976) ● Prisma (1970) – Kennzeichen D (1979) ● Aktuelle Kamera (1976) – Tagesschau (1976) Im Mittelpunkt dieses Zeitabschnittes stehen zwei konkurrierende politische Magazine aus Ost und West: „Der schwarze Kanal“ und das „ZDF-Magazin“. Die beiden Nachrichtensendungen „Aktuelle Kamera“ und „Tagesschau“ behandeln die unterschiedliche Darstellung der Ausbürgerung des kritischen DDR-Liedermachers Wolf Biermann. Phase IV: 1983 – 1989 2 Politmagazine | 2 Nachrichten ● Objektiv (1989) – Kontraste (1989) ● Aktuelle Kamera (1989) – Tagesschau (1989) Nachrichten und ihre Verbreitung stehen im Mittelpunkt dieses Themenbereichs. Wie entwickelten sich Informationssendungen in West und Ost. -
Honecker's Policy Toward the Federal Republic and West Berlin
Scholars Crossing Faculty Publications and Presentations Helms School of Government Spring 1976 Contrast and Continuity: Honecker’s Policy toward the Federal Republic and West Berlin Stephen R. Bowers Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Bowers, Stephen R., "Contrast and Continuity: Honecker’s Policy toward the Federal Republic and West Berlin" (1976). Faculty Publications and Presentations. 86. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/86 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 308 STEPHEN R. BOWERS 36. Mamatey, pp. 280-286. 37. Ibid., pp. 342-343. CONTRAST AND CONTINUITY: 38. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Volume VIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 1364. 39. Robert Ferrell, 'The United States and East Central Europe Before 1941," in Kertesz, op. cit., p. 22. HONECKER'S POLICY 40. Ibid., p. 24. 41. William R. Caspary, 'The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review LXIV (June, 1970). 42. For discussion on this point see George Kennan, American Diplomacy (New York: Mentor Books, 1951); Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, TOWARD THE FEDERAL 1955). 43. Gaddis, p. 179. 44. Martin Wei!, "Can the Blacks Do for Africa what the Jews Did for Israel?" Foreign Policy 15 (Summer, 1974), pp. -
China's Fear of Contagion
China’s Fear of Contagion China’s Fear of M.E. Sarotte Contagion Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible “even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4” in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imagi- nary date of May 35.1 Party censors make it “inconceivable for scholars to ac- cess Chinese archival sources” on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a “‘for- bidden zone’ in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching.”2 The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow oth- ers to leave the country.3 And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to- M.E. Sarotte, the author of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe, is Professor of History and of International Relations at the University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank Harvard University’s Center for European Studies, the Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of Southern California for ªnancial and institutional support; Joseph Torigian for invaluable criticism, research assistance, and Chinese translation; Qian Qichen for a conversation on PRC-U.S. -
Germany 2020 Human Rights Report
GERMANY 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Germany is a constitutional democracy. Citizens choose their representatives periodically in free and fair multiparty elections. The lower chamber of the federal parliament (Bundestag) elects the chancellor as head of the federal government. The second legislative chamber, the Federal Council (Bundesrat), represents the 16 states at the federal level and is composed of members of the state governments. The country’s 16 states exercise considerable autonomy, including over law enforcement and education. Observers considered the national elections for the Bundestag in 2017 to have been free and fair, as were state elections in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Responsibility for internal and border security is shared by the police forces of the 16 states, the Federal Criminal Police Office, and the federal police. The states’ police forces report to their respective interior ministries; the federal police forces report to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the state offices for the protection of the constitution are responsible for gathering intelligence on threats to domestic order and other security functions. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reports to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and the state offices for the same function report to their respective ministries of the interior. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces. Members of the security forces committed few abuses. Significant human rights issues included: crimes involving violence motivated by anti-Semitism and crimes involving violence targeting members of ethnic or religious minority groups motivated by Islamophobia or other forms of right-wing extremism. -
The Rhetorical Crisis of the Fall of the Berlin Wall
THE RHETORICAL CRISIS OF THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL: FORGOTTEN NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL DIRECTIONS A Dissertation by MARCO EHRL Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Nathan Crick Committee Members, Alan Kluver William T. Coombs Gabriela Thornton Head of Department, J. Kevin Barge August 2018 Major Subject: Communication Copyright 2018 Marco Ehrl ABSTRACT The accidental opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, dismantled the political narratives of the East and the West and opened up a rhetorical arena for political narrators like the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German leadership to define and exploit the political crisis and put forward favorable resolutions. With this dissertation, I trace the neglected and forgotten political directions as they reside in the narratives of the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German political leadership between November 1989 and February 1990. The events surrounding November 9th, 1989, present a unique opportunity for this endeavor in that the common flows of political communication between organized East German publics, the West German press, and West German political leaders changed for a moment and with it the distribution of political legitimacy. To account for these new flows of political communication and the battle between different political crisis narrators over the rhetorical rights to reestablish political legitimacy, I develop a rhetorical model for political crisis narrative. This theoretical model integrates insights from political crisis communication theories, strategic narratives, and rhetoric. -
Post-Communist Democracies and Russia
Post-communist democracies and Russia Instructor: Ion Marandici Course: Political Science 01:790:381, Fall 2013 Location: ARH-100 on Cook/Douglass Time: MW 5:35-6:55 PM Office hours: Monday 7:00-8:00 pm, Hickman Hall 402 or by appointment at the Center for European Studies (Douglass Campus), office 303. Email: [email protected] Course overview: This course will focus on a group of countries, which for the most part of the 20th century have been under the Communist rule. This group of countries can be further subdivided into four categories. After 1989, some of the former Communist countries initiated a successful double transition (both political and economic) that ended with their membership in the European Union (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Baltic Republics). Some of the less successful countries from the region are E.U. candidates (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro), while others are potential candidates (Albania, Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, democracy and market economies did not emerge in all of the former communist countries. The second group of countries ended up developing hybrid political regimes with unclear prospects in terms of democracy and market reforms (Moldova, Ukraine, Russia). The third group of countries includes authoritarian states like Belarus, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. Ironically, the United States of America depend on some of these countries for the successful completion of the operations in Afghanistan, while Europeans try to diminish their dependence on Russia, by building new pipelines thoughout the region. Hence, we will explore whether there is a link between the richness in resources and the prospects for democratization.