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Q1 2021 FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL RESULTS (IFRS) St Petersburg – May 18, 2021 Agenda HIGHLIGHTS, Alexey Yankevich Member of the Management Board, FINANCIALS CFO Igor Shkirov Head of Planning, Performance and UPSTREAM Data Management Department, Upstream Nikita Anichkin DOWNSTREAM Head of Economics, Investment and Data Management Department, Downstream Gazprom Neft 2 Disclaimer This presentation contains forward-looking statements concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Gazprom Neft and its consolidated subsidiaries All statements other than statements of historical There are a number of factors that can affect the All forward-looking statements facts are, or may be deemed to be, forward- future operations of Gazprom Neft and can contained in this presentation are looking statements. Forward-looking statements cause those results to differ materially from expressly qualified in their entirety by are statements of future expectations that are those expressed in the forward-looking the cautionary statements contained or based on management’s current expectations statements included in this presentation, referred to in this section. Readers and assumptions and involve known and including (without limitation): should not place undue reliance on unknown risks and uncertainties that may cause these forward-looking statements. actual results, performance or events to differ a) price fluctuations in crude oil and oil Each forward-looking statement materially from those expressed or implied in products speaks only as of the date of this these statements. presentation. Neither Gazprom Neft b) changes in demand for the Company’s nor any of its subsidiaries undertake products any obligation to publicly update or Forward-looking statements include, among other c) currency fluctuations things, statements concerning the potential revise any forward-looking statement d) drilling and production results exposure of Gazprom Neft to market risks and as a result of new information, future statements expressing management’s e) reserve estimates events or other information. expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, f) loss of market and industry competition projections and assumptions. These forward- g) environmental and physical risks looking statements are identified by their use of h) risks associated with the identification of terms and phrases such as ‘‘anticipate’’, suitable potential acquisition properties and ‘‘believe’’, ‘‘could’’, ‘‘estimate’’, ‘‘expect’’, ‘‘intend’’, targets, and successful negotiation and ‘‘may’’, ‘‘plan’’, ‘‘objectives’’, ‘‘outlook’’, completion of such transactions ‘‘probably’’, ‘‘project’’, ‘‘will’’, ‘‘seek’’, ‘‘target’’, i) economic and financial market conditions in ‘‘risks’’, ‘‘goals’’, ‘‘should’’ and similar terms and various countries and regions phrases. j) political risks, project delays or advancements, approvals and cost estimates k) changes in trading conditions Gazprom Neft 3 1Q 2021 highlights 1Q 2021 financial performance . Revenue: ₽611 billion (+18.7% year on year) . Adjusted EBITDA*: ₽194 billion (+95.3% year on year) . Net income: ₽84 billion Operational progress in 1Q 2021 . Hydrocarbon production down 2.8% year on year (mtoe) . Refining volumes down 2.9% year on year (mt) 1Q 2021 vs 4Q 2020 . Revenue up 11.1% . Adjusted EBITDA* up 24.1%, net income up 3.3% . Hydrocarbon production up 0.5% (mtoe) . Refining volumes down 2.3% (mt) * Including GPN share in EBITDA of associates and joint ventures Gazprom Neft 4 EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION FLEXIBLE PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT IS ENSURING OPERATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY Gazprom Neft 5 Higher hydrocarbon production due to relaxation of OPEC+ restrictions Daily hydrocarbon production Production growth factors (thousand toe per day) (mtoe) 24.8 24.1 0,2 +3% -1.9 0,4 0,6 272,4 267,7 261,4 255,5 260,5 21,9 20,0 +4% 175,0 167,7 165,5 159,2 161,9 +43% 4,1 2,9 1Q 20 2Q 20 3Q 20 4Q 20 1Q 21 1Q 20 Brownfields OGF, GPN- Others 1Q 21 Zima Zapolyarye Hydrocarbons Greenfields Liquid hydrocarbons Brownfields Percentage changes may differ from the calculated figures and values may not sum to total due to rounding Gazprom Neft 6 Lower operating costs as a result of optimising expenditure on planned repairs and equipment maintenance Operating expenses (RUB/toe) -2.7% -4 -20 -38 14 Operating expenses (RUB billion) 1,771 1,723 33 31 30 30 28 1Q 20 2Q 20 3Q 20 4Q 20 1Q 21 1Q 20 Brownfields* Major projects** Joint operations*** International assets 1Q 21 Percentage changes may differ from the calculated ones and * Noyabrskneftegas, Khantos, Vostok, Orenburg, GPN Yamal the values ​​may not converge in the totals due to rounding ** Prirazlomnoye, Zapolyarye, Meretoyakhaneftegaz *** Tomskneft, SPD (proportionally consolidated companies) Gazprom Neft 7 Operations at new assets – key highlights Zima GPN-Zapolyarye +107.7% +260.9% Hydrocarbon production 0,54 0,83 (mtoe) 0,26 0,23 1Q 2020 1Q 2021 1Q 2020 1Q 2021 Key events . 3D seismic surveying of the Vayskiy block . Heavy-weight oversize equipment – stabilisation column (471 km2) now complete – for the gas condensate stabilisation unit at the . Now moving on to cluster well development, Pestsovoye field delivered and installed with 13 new wells commissioned . Construction of the first production well at . Drilling services are transferred to captive Kharasaveyskoye field now complete, and anticipated power generation gas productivity confirmed . Preliminary water discharge oil-treatment . Delivery of modular equipment for the Chayandinskoye facility commissioned oil field now complete . 1MW-capacity power-supply service for . Construction of unique record-breaking 2,505-metre Blockchain computing modules launched horizontal-section well at the Chayandinskoye field now complete, with four additional 800-metre side-tracks drilled Gazprom Neft 8 Commissioning of key infrastructure will facilitate higher oil production and supplies 10% Chayandinskoye oil 920,000 toe Share of oil-rims production and gas condensate after 2023 in the Group's production plan total hydrocarbon production field (OGCF) in 2021 oil rim Plans to end-2021: RUSSIA . to complete construction of modular oil Sakha Republic treatment facility Chayandinskoye oilfield . to complete drilling of nine “Fishbone” wells Well bushes Well bushes Oil treatment plant ESPO trunk pipeline A system for transporting oil from the Chayandinskoye field to the East Siberia– Pacific Ocean (ESPO) trunk pipeline is commissioned in Q1 2021 Gas treatment unit No. 3 Gazprom PJSC Acceptance point km mt Gazprom PJSC 70+ 1.5 in length annual throughput Oil pumping station capacity Gazprom Neft 9 Partnerships to preserve the unique eco-system of the Polar Circle Agreement signed between Messoyakhaneftegaz and the Government of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug on Development of an innovative dispersant for oil-spill working together on permafrost research and preservation liquidation under ice-bound conditions in cooperation with specialists from the Moscow Institute of Physics • collection of geocryological monitoring data and Technology’s Engineering Centre • analysis and evaluation of the condition of permafrost strata • development of solutions to regulate cryogenic processes Risk-mitigation initiatives by Gazprom Neft 80% 100% dispersant effectiveness Russian-made under ice-bound components Geotechnical Pile-supported conditions monitoring system: construction to provide a “safety cushion” Dispersant action Ongoing monitoring of any . satellite monitoring foundation deformation to of pipelines ensure safe operation . drone-imaging of potentially Temperature monitoring hazardous areas to ensure full reliability of building foundations . temperature measurements in 1 Oil film on the 2 The dispersant 3 These oil appraisal wells Thermal stabilisation surface of breaks the oil droplets are systems to prevent any water-ice film into small acted upon by permafrost melting mixture droplets micro- organisms Gazprom Neft 10 DOWNSTREAM LOWER DEMAND UNDER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS REFLECTED ON A YEAR-ON-YEAR REFINING VOLUMES Gazprom Neft 11 Gradual recovery of the pricing environment Crude price and average netbacks ($/bbl) Crude mix (mt) 80 -1.3% 16.3 16.1 0.2 0.2 60 4,7 4,4 0.3 1,1 1,2 40 20 10,3 10,0 0 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 4Q19 1Q20 2Q20 3Q20 4Q20 1Q21 1Q 20 1Q 21 Brent International market Refining netback Crude export Crude export netback Export to CIS Domestic market Refining Percentage changes may differ from the calculated ones and the values ​​may not converge in the totals due to rounding Gazprom Neft 12 Greater motor fuels output following the launch of the Euro+ complex at the Moscow Refinery Motor fuels production in Russia (mt) Refining throughput (mt) -2.3% 4.7 4.7 10.7 10.3 10.2 10.0 0,8 0,8 9.2 5,0 5,2 4,8 4,8 4,8 2,7 2,5 2,8 2,5 +14.8% 2,4 2,6 2,3 1,9 1,9 2,0 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,9 0,8 0,7 0,9 0,9 0,7 1Q 20 1Q 21 1Q 20 2Q 20 3Q 20 4Q 20 1Q 21 Yaroslavl Omsk NIS Omsk Moscow Moscow Yaroslavl Gazprom Neft 13 Gazprom Neft signed an agreement with the Ministry of Energy on increasing oil refining depth On March 22, Gazprom Neft and the Ministry of Energy Units’ capacity established agreements on developing new deep conversion refining facilities at the Omsk and Moscow Omsk refinery refineries The conclusion of agreements allows the company to receive an investment premium being up to 30% of the excise duty on crude oil Hydrocracking unit 2 mtpa of crude oil for 10 years Delayed coking unit (DCU) 2 mtpa of crude oil Increasing the depth up to thanks to the prompt conclusion
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