Labour's Lost Legions

THE SECOND LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1957-60 AND GRASSROOTS PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE REGION

IN his annual report to the Auckland Labour Representation Committee (L.R.C.) on 23 April 1959, the president, W. J. Cuthbert, remarked that the 'membership of Branches, from returns which have come to hand, show that during the last year the membership has remained surprisingly stable and the anticipated lack of interest has not become apparent as yet. As the Branches are the foundation of Party organisation, from reports and observations it would appear that in the Auckland L.R.C. area at least the Party is well founded.'1 Cuthbert's remarks are surprising when, perhaps only with the advantage of hindsight, it is realized that the number of financial branches in the Auckland region dropped from 106 to 80 and the financial membership from 6,889 to 4,992 during the year covered by his annual report. The decline in the Labour Party's electoral support, membership, and grass roots activity in the nineteen electorates north from and including Franklin during the three years between the election of the second Labour govern- ment in 1957 and its ignominious defeat in 1960 was even more dramatic.2 Between the 1957 and 1960 elections the number of voters on the elec- toral rolls of the nineteen constituencies examined rose from 302,952 to 324,301. The combined Labour vote in the area went in an inverse direc- tion, from 142,998 to 133,572. Thus, in 1957 Labour received the support of 47.2 per cent of the voters on the roll; in 1960 only 41.2 per cent.3 The number of Labour Party branches in the region in 1957 was a record 110 and the average branch membership was 65. By 1960 there were only 80 branches each with an average membership of 49. As a result the total direct membership in the nineteen northern electorates was almost halved from 6,889 to 3,828. This drop was brought about not only by an almost unprecedented reduction in the number of branches in 1958 and 1959 but also by a unique election-year failure in 1960 to reactivate those branches or replace them with new ones. When Labour membership is presented as a percentage of the Labour vote it declines 143 144 barry gustafson from 4.8 in 1957 to 2.9 in 1960, and as a percentage of all electors on the roll the drop is from 2.3 to 1.3. There was little change in the occupational composition of the Party between the two elections (as revealed by the known occupations of financial members). All types of supporters appear to have been alienated, although possibly the disillusion was somewhat greater among the least skilled manual workers, as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1 Occupational Groupings as Percentages of Total Financial Membership 1957 and 1960 Occupational category 1957 1960 N = 3771 N = 2006

Professional-large proprietor .6 .6 Managerial-semi-professional 1.4 1.4 Other white-collar 7.3 8.1 Farmer .8 1.0 Skilled manual 13.0 12.2 Semi- and unskilled manual 26.2 20.9 Housewife 35.3 35.0 Retired 15.4 20.7 Total 100 0 99.9

The decline in the number of branches and membership was paralleled by a sharp decrease in meeting activity and fund-raising at the branch level. This reflects not only the reduced number of people involved but also waning enthusiasm on the part of those who remained. The average number of meetings per branch in 1957 was ten and the average attendance sixteen. In 1960 the surviving branches met, on average, only eight times and the average number of members present dropped to thirteen. Annual financial statements for 89 out of a possible 110 branches were available for the 1957-58 financial year and 69 out of 80 for 1960-61. After adjusting for inflation, a branch started the 1960 election year with an average bank balance only three-fifths that of 1957.4 Income from all sources for 1960 was exactly half that received in 1957 and as a result, even after drawing on reserves, average expenditure by branches dropped by almost the same proportion — to just under 51 per cent. It is obvious from contemporary statistical records that Cuthbert and most other Labour Party leaders both in and outside Parliament were either insensitive to or — more likely — unwilling to admit to the clamour of criticism arising from the grassroots. The unpopularity of the second Labour government among voters in general was quite obvious, but the extent to which hard core party support was affected has not previously been fully appreciated. labour's lost legions 145

In the minutes of branches and the correspondence records of Head Office between 1940 and 1970, there is more dissatisfaction expressed with the Party in general and the Parliamentary Labour Party in particular during the three years 1958-61 than in all the other twenty-seven years taken together. Much of the criticism was very specific and indicates why Labour's extra-parliamentary ranks were so decimated between 1957 and 1960. The new Labour government was very vulnerable, possessing only an effective majority of one in parliament. It was immediately forced, by economic circumstances almost entirely outside its control, to adopt austerity measures.5 These were bound to hurt many Labour voters. The economic situation also prevented Labour from moving quickly and comprehensively to satisfy the wide diversity of demands and expectations which accompanied the change of government. The expectations of many of Labour's supporters prior to the 1957 election had been very high, perhaps unreasonably so, even before the economic crisis which hit in late 1957. Many people, disregarding the economic limitations, continued to be dogmatic and inflexible in their views on what the new government should be doing, in what order, and at what speed. The government, however, quickly decided that its paramount priority was to correct the alarming deficit which had emerged in New Zealand's balance of payments. In late 1957 and early 1958, the prices paid overseas for New Zealand's wool, dairy produce, and meat all fell together. The result was a drop in income from exports of about one-fifth. Accompanying the reduction in the nation's external purchasing power was a considerable increase in imports, caused largely by importers over-ordering because they feared, correctly, that the election of a Labour government would lead to the imposition of stricter import control. In 1957-58 New Zealand imported £54 million more in goods than it exported. The combination of falling overseas prices for exports and over-importing during the last few months of the National Party administration resulted in New Zealand's overseas reserves suffering, between October and December 1957, one of the most dramatic slides in the trade; from £83 million to £45 million, barely enough foreign currency to meet six weeks' payments at the then current level. Labour, which took office in December 1957, argued that the outgoing National government had squandered eight years of record income from exports and that drastic action was inevitable. Three major measures were taken almost immediately: imports were restricted to a level which was more within New Zealand's ability to pay; internal consumption and demand were reduced, thus minimizing the inflationary pressures created by a reduction in imported goods; and a crash programme of industrial expansion was undertaken so that more goods could be produced locally instead of being imported. All three measures achieved considerable success, partly at least because of the ability and strength of the three 146 barry gustafson ministers most concerned — A. H. Nordmeyer (Finance), P. N. Holloway (Industries and Commerce), and R. Boord (Customs). By 1960, without the creation of unemployment or damage to the country's productive capacity, the balance of payments crisis had been largely overcome, inflation was reasonably under control, and the basis had been laid for a dramatic expansion of New Zealand industry in subsequent years. The National Party in opposition, aided by a sympathetic press, however, vehemently denied that the balance of payments situation when Labour took office had been as serious as Labour claimed. National spokesmen argued that Nordmeyer was simply having to find enough money to pay the bribes which, National alleged, had won the 1957 election for the Labour Party. Particularly mentioned was Labour's promise of a taxation rebate of up to £100 for each taxpayer if Labour was elected. Gradually, the National Party switched public attention away from the balance of payments crisis to a much more easily comprehended economic issue, Labour's controversial 1958 budget. Although Nordmeyer increased social security benefits and hurt least those taxpayers who had family commitments or lower incomes, his 1958 budget was designed primarily to restrain the demand for consumer goods, especially those which had to be imported and, therefore, paid for initially with New Zealand's very scarce overseas funds. The budget not only increased direct taxation on incomes but also through indirect taxation raised the prices of cigarettes, beer and spirits and the cost of running a car, which together comprised the modest pleasures of many wage-earners. The National Party opposition under K. J. Holyoake commenced immediately a campaign of criticism against what it labelled and what has been known since as'the Black Budget'. National's sustained attack, which was well-publicized in and supported by the press, continued unabated until long after the defeat of the Labour government in 1960. The criticisms were accepted and echoed uncritically by many of Labour's supporters. The sentiments of many Labour Party members in and after 1958 are reflected and exemplified by the secretary of the Warkworth branch, R. Middlemas who told the Prime Minister and the Labour Party's National Executive in identical letters that, in the unanimous opinion of his branch, the 'present policies beyond doubt are causing widespread dissatisfaction and dismay among our supporters. The Branch feels that unless some radical changes are made and some recognition given to our Labour principles, there is little hope of our Party becoming the Government again at the next election. The Branch considers that that would be a major disaster for the Party and one from which it [would] take many years to recover.'6 The secretary of the Helensville branch reported to Head Office that, 'at the present time the attitude to the Party is one of apathy' and that meeting attendances were very small.7 The secretary of the Panmure- labour's lost legions 147

Mt Wellington branch suggested a public relations campaign over radio, 'as a constructive step towards the rebuilding of confidence in the Labour Party, for a large percentage of electors who, mainly through newspaper headlines, have lost confidence in us as a Government'.8 The secretary of the Glen Innes branch, reporting a drop of one-third in the branch's financial membership during 1958, said that there was no support for the party, and that the branch executive could do nothing but hope for 'a rebirth of support for Labour's cause'.9 Similar expressions of regret at the decline in membership and activity reached Head Office.10 Many more expressions of concern at the widespread apathy, frustra- tion, disillusion, alienation, and decline were recorded in the minutes of branches or in the chairmen's or secretaries' annual reports. J. Fox, chairman of the Birkenhead branch, for example, 'deplored the fact of decline in membership and poor attendance at monthly meetings',11 comments identical to those expressed by the chairman and secretary of the Grey Lynn branch,12 by the president of the North Shore L.R.C.,13 and by the Roskill14 and Blockhouse Bay15 branches. R. J. Tizard, the former M.P. for Tamaki, within twelve months of Labour losing the seat, was lamenting 'the general run-down position of all the branches in the electorate'.16 The 1959 and 1960 conferences of the party also reflected the mood of rank and file party members. Mrs E. Morris reported to the Blockhouse Bay branch in 1959 that, in all her years of attending Labour Party con- ferences, 'there had not been the criticism as took place at this year's',17 but by the following year the anger and resentment had been replaced by apathy, and an even more experienced conference delegate, H. Jackson of Grey Lynn, could report to his branch, 'that in his opinion the conference lacked spirit and inspiration'.18 The specific cause of much rank and file unrest appears to have been the 1958 budget. One branch secretary, explaining his branch's decline in membership from 35 in 1957 to 12 in 1958, claimed to 'have found it entirely due to the budget'.19 With one dissenter, the - branch, which drew its membership almost exclusively from a state housing area, decided that the 'budget was harsh, would hit working men hard, would result in the cost of living rising' and would probably cost Labour the next election. Even the one dissenter finally agreed to a letter being sent to the Prime Minister and the party's National Executive protesting 'against the continuing rise in the cost of living and particularly the recent budget proposals which we feel will spell the end of the Labour Govern- ment at the next elections. ... In our workshops and factories the budget has caused more strife and storms among enthusiastic and ardent Labour supporters of the past — many of them declaring that Labour has let them down. Many will refuse to vote at all . . . and it takes no stretch of the imagination to know how the man who votes at election time according to straws in the wind ... is going to vote next time.'20 Other branches felt that the budget imposed an unfair burden of taxa- 148 barry gustafson tion on lower income groups. The Northcote branch resolved to oppose specifically the increase in petrol tax.21 The Papakura branch decided that it would 'emphatically protest to the Government against the taxing on a higher rate of overtime and bonus payments'.22 The Warkworth branch felt that 'the working population is carrying an unequal burden and that the wealthier section should have had to bear a very much larger portion of the heavy taxation than is the case'.23 One of the most determined attempts by an Auckland branch to con- demn the Government's taxation and economic policies came from the Hillsborough branch, which prepared, duplicated, and forwarded seven motions and a covering letter to the Roskill electorate's Inter-Branch Council and to the Auckland L.R.C. The seven proposals were:

1. The Labour government to introduce legislation making it compulsory for all Arbitration Court wage orders to be immediately incorporated into existing awards and industrial agreements. 2. Raise income tax exemptions on wages and salaries under £1040 per annum. 3. Make substantial reductions in taxation on consumer goods such as beer, tobacco, petrol etc. 4. Introduce a system of price control based on the same principle as workers' applications for wage increases. All price increases to be justified at public sittings of tribunals. 5. Immediately restore purchasing power. 6. Nationalize banks. 7. Nationalize insurance companies or, alternatively, lower State Insurance companies' premiums by 20 per cent.

A meeting of the Roskill Inter-Branch Council, attended by 28 delegates, unanimously endorsed all seven proposals24 but the executive of the Auckland L.R.C. in turn unanimously rejected the suggestions, which it believed should not have been produced and circulated without the approval of the local Member of Parliament, A. J. Faulkner. The L.R.C. executive was particularly concerned at the number of copies which might have been circulated because it believed that 'the preamble to the resolutions contained in the Hillsborough Branch letter is deliberately worded to cause strife and destroy the confidence of members', and 'their letter in the hands of our opponents would be used to undermine the Party'.25 Nevertheless, the Hillsborough branch expressed widely-held sentiments when it pointed out in the covering letter that among the average rank and file supporters of the Labour Party,

There is no doubt that today considerable apprehension is felt as to the Labour Government's apparent inability to give timely heed to the restiveness and uneasiness of its own supporters and potential supporters. We are convinced that the present increasing unpopularity of the Labour Government can uner- ringly be blamed on the administration of its policy of internal economy. The burden of taxation has fallen unreasonably heavily on the shoulders of the masses of people, commonly referred to as 'wage and salary workers', and labour's lost legions 149 though the daily papers continually publish the increasing turnovers and spiralling record profits of companies, both private and public, operating in New Zealand, the wage and salary earner is conscious of the shrinking purchasing power of the 'take-home' pay packet. . . . The masses are not very concerned with the causes which induce this position, but they are vitally concerned and vociferous on its personal effects.26

The National Party's allegations that there was a drastic rise in the cost of living appear to have been accepted without reservation by many Labour supporters. In fact, the second Labour government managed to limit the overall rise in the cost of living, especially in food prices, far more than had the first National Party government, 1949-57. This is shown clearly in Table 2.27

Table 2 Changes in the Consumers' Price Index, 1950-1960 First National Government Food Prices All Groups 1950 +50 +30 1951 +84 +63 1952 +66 +49 1953 +43 +31 1954 +39 +32 1955 +19 +19 1956 +46 +26 1957 - 2 +17 Annual Average 1950-57 +43.4 +33.4 Annual Average 1955-57 +21 +20.7

Second Labour Government Food Prices All groups 1958 +13 +36 1959 + 5 +32 1960 +13 + 6 Annual Average 1958-60 +10.3 +24.7

Over National's eight years in office the average annual increase in the food price index, despite an actual decline in 1957 caused by the collapse of export prices for agricultural products, had been more than four times that under Labour and a comparison of the average annual increases in the all-groups index was also clearly in Labour's favour. The rise of a mere six points in the index for all groups in 1960 was obviously much less than the increase in any other year during the 1950-60 period. Even if the comparison is limited to the last three years of the National Party's 150 barry gustafson administration, the food index average annual increase was twice as much as under Labour, although the all-groups annual average was somewhat less than during Labour's term of office. Many Labour Party branches, however, were unconvinced by official statistics and Labour government protestations on the subject of inflation. Images may be electorally more important than realities. The Warkworth branch, for example, expressed disappointment at the Government's 'refusal to institute price control'.28 The Grey Lynn West branch resolved that 'the continued rising cost of living is indicative of the Government's lack of implementing its policy of price stabilisation and control'.29 The Otahuhu branch protested against 'the continued rising cost of living' and requested price control.30 Several branches were not content with recording an isolated objection but kept up a running barrage of protest against what they regarded as the government's poor performance in relation to prices and the cost of living. The Onewa branch, for example, wrote to its L.R.C. three times in five months asking the L.R.C. to 'draw to the attention of the Govern- ment that the price of consumer goods is still rising steadily' and that the Government should be taking some action.31 The Glen Eden branch, in October 1958, sent a telegram to Nash stating that, 'This Branch greatly disturbed at the steeply rising cost of meat and other essential foods. Public reaction is very unfavourable and we urge that the Government take firm steps to hold meat prices in particular.'32 This protest was followed by a letter from the branch to Nash in November and a further letter in December, 'expressing our disappointment with his reply and asking what definite steps the Government is taking or intends to take regarding the cost of living'.33 The most persistent branch in criticizing the government on the cost of living issue was Roskill, which called for price control on no less than eight separate occasions between October 1958 and May I960.34 The widespread discontent within the branches at Labour's handling of the economy facilitated criticisms of the govern- ment's performance in other areas. The social security system and hospital and medical services, for example, came under fire from the Te Papapa- Oranga35 and Roskill36 branches. Some branches were also disappointed with the Labour government's failure to recognize Communist China37 and to support Peking's admission to the United Nations,38 together with the government's timid defence policy — specifically in regard to disarmament39 — and with the Parlia- mentary Labour Party's reluctance to take a lead internationally in seeking to have banned the testing of nuclear weapons.40 An increasing acerbity was becoming obvious in branch resolutions and correspondence relating to criticism of the Labour government. One branch secretary, for example, referring to the continued non-recognition of Peking, wrote: 'We begin to doubt the value of Conference when its clear-cut decisions can be ignored for so long, to say nothing of the apparent hypocrisy of members of the Parliamentary Labour Party urging the National Govern- labour's lost legions 151 ment to a course which they are not prepared to follow themselves when they have the opportunity. Our Branch, in turn, would urge the Parlia- mentary Labour Party to implement Party policy instead of continually evading the question with prevarication.'41 Another secretary was equally terse in his letter, pointing out that the Beachhaven-Birkdale branch was opposing publicly Soviet and United States nuclear tests, 'because of the apathetic attitude of the Party as a whole to something that could mean the very lives of each and everyone in this country. All [in the branch] felt that vigorous and positive statements by the leaders in times of crises are absolutely necessary. . . . This could be one way of showing the general public that the Labour Party is a forward-looking progressive party and not the dying or dead party it appears to be.'42 Several branches bitterly attacked the Labour government's apparent lack of concern about, and action on, the issue of a New Zealand rugby football team, from which Maoris had been excluded, touring South Africa in 1960. In July 1959, for example, the Roskill branch expressed its opposition to the tour,43 and in April 1960 the same branch called on its Inter-Branch Council to urge the National Office to state publicly the Labour Party's attitude.44 The press was provided with copies of the resolutions. The Glen Eden branch wrote to Nash, 'deploring the fact that he has failed to commit himself in the question of the All Black Rugby tour to South Africa';45 the Papakura branch asked its L.R.C. to write to Nash urging him as Prime Minister to stop the tour if Maoris were excluded;46 and the secretary and vice-president of the Birkdale branch narrowly failed to persuade their branch to pass a motion protesting 'to the Prime Minister for standing aside and allowing the good name of our country to be dragged into the mire by the action of the Rugby Union in the Maori-All Black situation', and urging the cancellation of the tour.47 The Springleigh branch expressed its opinion more succinctly in a letter to the Auckland L.R.C. criticizing the presence at the official farewell to the All Blacks of the Hon. C. F. Skinner, M.P. The letter concluded: 'Whatever the view of the Deputy Prime Minister, members feel that the rank and file of the Party still support racial equality.'48 Several branches and prominent branch members also recognized that the relations between industrial and political Labour were not as harmonious as they might have been. The Otahuhu branch, for example, pleaded with 'the present Government to do all possible to win back the support of industrial Labour'.4" Shortly after the 1957 Election, F. G. Young, at the time national secretary of the large Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Industrial Association of Workers, the chairman of the Roskill-Epsom branch of the Labour Party, and an executive member of the Auckland L.R.C., attacked the Parliamentary Labour Party and, in particular, its leader, Nash, in a letter to Nash, copies of which were sent to all Labour M.Ps. One copy of this letter was printed by the weekly newspaper, Truth.50 In the letter, Young condemned the new Labour government's 152 barry gustafson

60 per cent cut in the importation of whisky and other spirits and accused Nash of 'trying to demonstrate that the will of is greater than the will of the people'. Young pointed out that the action jeopardized the employment of hundreds of members of his union, which 'with a membership of over 20,000 is the largest affiliation to the party you [Nash] represent and the fund raised by my members during the recent campaign is miles in excess of the amount received by any other affiliation'. Young's letter, although defended by his union and branch, was regarded by the Auckland L.R.C. as 'an insulting challenge to the Government to resign and face the electors on a matter of policy' and Young was censured by the L.R.C. at a meeting at which he resigned from the L.R.C. Executive. An amendment requesting the New Zealand Executive to expel Young from the party was defeated (on a show of hands), partly because Nash had suggested that the matter should be forgotten.51 The union subse- quently defected from the Labour Party in 1959 and was not persuaded to return until the mid-sixties. Another prominent Auckland branch member, Preston Boorman, who at the time was a member of the Labour Party's National Executive, made a biting attack on the Government's Minister of Labour in a letter read out at the monthly meeting of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants' branch at the Otahuhu railway workshops. The letter stated, among other things: The all-time-low of the Labour Movement especially in Auckland brought about by the Minister for Labour more than all the other factors put together has been a sore point with me because of the fact that he has alienated the sympathies of the Trade Union movement against the Labour Government by his 'big stick' methods and his apparent belief that the employers are always right and the workers are always wrong. It is a strange thing that whatever Government is in power it has never found in a dispute in favour of the workers. The workers are always wrong.52 The feeling, reflected in both Boorman's and Young's letters, that the Parliamentary Labour Party was out of touch with its traditional sup- porters was widespread among Auckland branch members. So also were the beliefs that Labour's leadership was mediocre and/or unprincipled, and contemptuous of grass-roots feelings. The Three Kings branch expressed its disquiet at an apparent complete lack of grassroots efficacy in relation to party decision-making.53 The secretary of the Balmoral branch suggested that Evidently the rank-and-filers are regarded merely as hewers of wood and carriers of water and are not supposed to have any right to prescribe or influence the policies of the Parliamentary Party except in very broad outline. The natural result of this in the ordinary Party member, especially if he is capable of real political thought, is a sense of futility and frustration and an entire loss of all enthusiasm for Party work and organisation. I can testify to the great difficulty I am having in holding together my own branch and I strongly suspect that I have outlined the principal cause. It seems to me that it is nearly always the labour's lost legions 153 most original and courageous remits which are consigned to thefreezingchamber, for anything bold and clearcut the Parliamentary Party has evidently no stomach — in short it has no guts.54

The Glen Eden branch sought a 'provincial rally of L.R.Cs, Branches and Affiliations', despite expected opposition from the Parliamentary Party and the National Executive, because 'the widespread criticism of the Government, the generally unfavourable reception to the 1959 Budget, and the feeling of frustration which exists throughout the Labour Move- ment today' made 'an early and emphatic expression of opinion by the rank and file . .. imperative'.55 Hillsborough, which stated that 'supporters are losing heart and cohesiveness by virtue of the fact that our great Labour Party seems to have lost the initiative in the House of Repre- sentatives';56 College Trust, which wanted the Auckland L.R.C. 'to take steps that our M.Ps are kept in touch with public thinking and future propaganda be directed to workers with the object of making them again regard the Labour Party as their Party',57 and Birkdale, whose chairman lamented 'the failure of the Labour Government to keep up with the times',58 all expressed similar sentiments. Personal criticism of the Parliamentary Labour Party was not uncom- mon before and immediately after the defeat of the Labour government at the elections in November 1960. One old Auckland branch member shortly before the election bitterly complained: 'I have had many good friends in the movement — I still have — but sorry to say there are some later ones come into the picture as M.Ps that would be in their right place if they joined the Holyoake gang of Tory Masters that look down on men like me as something just to be walked on or passed by on the other side like the Pharisee of old.'59 A Papakura branch member suggested to his branch that the Labour Party's theme song should be 'Give me some men who are stout-hearted men', a sentiment which he claimed reflected what was lacking in the Labour movement.60 His opinions were no doubt consolidated by the party's then Auckland regional organizer, C. J. Moyle, later to become M.P. for Manukau and subsequently Man- gere, who, according to the minutes, spoke to the branch at its next meeting 'for approximately two hours on some of the failings of the Parliamentary Labour Party and its future aims and objectives'.61 There was, incidentally, little appreciation shown of the strain on M.Ps of governing with a majority of one, a strain which was telling heavily on the health of a number of Labour parliamentarians. A number of branches felt that the party generally and the Parliamentary Labour Party in particular had jettisoned their principles with the apparent abandonment of the aim of the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and called for a return to 'first principles'.62 This, of course, is a perennial criticism within any Labour party and should not be regarded as peculiar to the 1957-60 period. The criticism of the National Executive and the Parliamentary Party was well summed 154 barry gustafson up in a letter from O. P. Smith, Secretary of the Mairangi Bay branch. Smith, acting on his branch's instructions, wrote: It is obvious from the Election results that the Executive of the Labour Party has lost touch with the rank and file of the Labour movement. Since the election it has been very hard to work up any enthusiasm among Labour supporters to attend branch meetings and it appears the time has arrived, if the Party is to survive, [that] a more positive lead will have to be given by Headquarters. In this branch's opinion it would be better to state certain principles and stick to them than all the time apologising for doing nothing in case some of our so-called friends may be offended. Would it be possible for the National Executive to take a stronger line with the Parliamentary Party and put a little more life into it?63 In 1957 there were 110 financial branches in the nineteen electorates then in the Auckland Region. Twenty-nine of those branches are quoted in the records cited above, some on numerous occasions, protesting against the policies, actions, and attitudes of the Labour government and stating what those branches believed the policies, actions, and attitudes — or lack of them — were doing negatively to Labour's electoral support, financial membership, and grassroots morale. Only two of the branches quoted went into recess, but 30 other branches whose views are not preserved in extant minute books or correspondence slipped quietly into lecess — most have never been reactivated.64 Thus, well over half of Labour's branches were so annoyed by their parliamentary leadership that they either sought by trenchant criticism to alter its policies in one or more areas of government or simply opted out of the political scene altogether. The branches that remained were reduced in membership, weakened in grassroots leadership, and demoralized. As one L.R.C. and branch chairman — R. H. Burnes of Hobson — gloomily reflected, 'if we want the next election we must have a gimmick or a depression'.65 Burnes's pessimistic cynicism is understandable when it is realized that nowhere was the collapse of Labour's branch support more dramatic and complete during the late 1950s than in the Hobson electorate, the sprawling, northern-most electorate in New Zealand. The signs of decline in that area, whose interests had been ignored by successive Governments, had been obvious even before 1957, at a time when the number of Labour branches and the size of their memberships were increasing elsewhere. Four of Hobson's branches went into recess in 1954; another one followed in 1955; two more expired in 1957; four vanished in 1958; and the last branch, Russell, recessed in 1961.66 Within the space of six years Hobson's twelve Labour Party branches at the time of the 1954 election, when W. E. Rowling was Labour's candidate* had been reduced to none. A majority of Labour's remaining handful of activists in the Hobson electorate, despite the fact that Labour's candidate C. J. Moyle had pushed Social Credit into third place at the 1957 election, decided that it would be better for Labour not to contest Hobson at the 1960 election.67 N. J. McNeil, who for several decades had been involved in Labour labour's lost legions 155 politics in anti-Labour rural electorates and who was at that time the leading activist in the Kerikeri area, and H. K. Hatrick, a former Labour candidate for the seat and at that time a prominent local body figure, proposed that the Social Credit candidate, V. F. Cracknell, be given a clear run against the new National Party candidate, L. F. Sloane. They convinced R. E. Young, the L. R. C. secretary, who came from Kaikohe, and P. Hill, the president of the Dargaville branch at the time of the previous election. More significantly, the proposal not to contest the seat was 'heartily endorsed' by the 1957 Hobson Labour candidate and former Hobson L.R.C. chairman, C. J. Moyle, who had become the Labour Party Organizer in Auckland,68 and A. Learning, the Area Representative on the Labour Party's National Executive.69 There was little realization shown by anyone of the repercussions of any Labour withdrawal either on other rural seats, where Labour was in a minority, or on the New Zealand-wide total Labour vote, often quoted in debate and analysis. A two-way contest for Hobson in 1960, however, was not to be for more local reasons. Despite assurances from McNeil that Cracknell had voted for Moyle in 1957, that he was a socialist as well as a monetary reformer, and had promised to support Labour on any division in Parliament, G. T. Webber, supported by P. Vezich, a prominent Dargaville member of the Labour Party for the previous twenty years, and R. H. Burnes, and J. L. Riley, chairman and secretary respectively of the Russell branch, opposed what they termed 'a negative and retrograde step reflecting a defeatist attitude' and insisted on the right of Labour supporters in the electorate to have a Labour candidate for whom to vote.70 In the absence of an alternative, Webber agreed, reluctantly, to carry Labour's banner himself. The heavy defeat suffered by Webber confirmed the opinions of at least some of those who had wanted Labour to leave Hobson to Social Credit and it was not until the late 1960s, when Cracknell as an M.P. failed to identify himself with the Parliamentary Labour Party, that Labour sup- porters in the Hobson electorate started reforming their branches.71 In 1963 the Mangonui branch came out of recess, although it collapsed again in 1969. The Dargaville branch was revived in 1965 and remained active thereafter. Kerikeri was reformed in 1968, Rawene-Hokianga became financial in 1969, and Kaitaia, Okaihau, and Whangaroa Maori appeared in 1970. By 1970 the Labour Party had as many branches and almost as many financial members in the Hobson electorate as it had formerly in 1957. Although Labour's branch organization throughout the rest of the Auckland region did not face as strong a challenge from Social Credit and was never as devastated as it was in Hobson in the early 1960s, it did not share Hobson's regeneration in the late 'sixties. Instead, the grass- roots of the party, sparse indeed after 1960, slowly but steadily shrivelled 156 barry gustafson up and withered away. Only a few very hardy roots and a few tender young shoots added a little colour to an otherwise barren landscape. One or two branches became nostalgic islands of the past, providing a social centre for ageing members. For example, the Owairaka branch minutes, two months before a general election, record that after discussing the depression of the 1930s 'the meeting closed at 8.30 with a refreshing cup of Choysa tea and once again those lovely sandwiches and pikelets'.72 The Maungakiekie branch minutes convey something of the same atmo- sphere: 'Question time followed with a nice cuppa put on the table by the good girls of our Branch.'73 The Waiheke Island branch collected its members, almost all pensioners, in taxis and held its meetings around afternoon tea. The College Trust branch held its meetings in a pensioners' hall and organized picnics, day bus trips, a Christmas social, and a Christmas party for grandchildren, in addition to the normal political activities. Others literally died off, as the following page recording expenditure in one branch cash book demonstrates:74

£ s. d. 31/3/64 Capitation for National Office 6 6 0 10/3/64 Stamps (social notices) 5 0 20/4/64 Stamps, pad, envelopes 14 4 6/5/64 Flowers (Mrs F., Middlemore Hospital) 1 3 0 25/5/64 Membership and Receipt Book 3 0 19/7/64 Flowers (Mrs G., Lavington Hospital) 1 7 6 14/8/64 Flowers (Mr P., Cremation) 1 8 6 14/8/64 Telegram (Mrs P., Bereavement) 2 1 16/8/64 I.B.C. (Cost of Tv Raffle) 5 0 0 /8/64 Funeral Wreath (Mr H.) 2 2 0 18/9/64 Social Notices 5 0 18/9/64 Funeral Wreath (Mr C.) 2 4 0 12/10/64 New Constitution books 20 at 1 /- 1 0 0 20/10/64 1 Year's contribution 400 club 12 10 0 23/10/64 Funeral Wreath (Mr McB.) 2 2 0 31/10/64 Funeral Wreath (Mrs B.) 2 2 0

Certainly the subsequent decline in Labour party grassroots membership and activity cannot be attributed solely to disillusion with the second Labour government's performance. The over the past quarter-century has been caught up at many points in and by the continuous process of social evolution, which has led to organic and not always recognized or welcomed change, a continuing transformation discussed more fully elsewhere.75 However, the second Labour government's term in office from 1957 to 1960 proved decisive because the government's actions produced a reaction which impelled many manual-worker activists out of the Labour Party's primary level organization and helped to move many peripheral supporters into non-voting for most of the 1960s. The effect of the exodus labour's lost legions 157 on Labour's already depleted ranks and rather ramshackle organization was shattering. As Don Aitkin has said in his telling account of a con- servative party, 'a party which relies upon enthusiasm as its principal resource will find itself organisationally bankrupt when enthusiasm evaporates'.76 The feeling grew and persisted among many traditional activists, particularly those with manual-worker occupations and family backgrounds, that the Labour Party was no longer their party or that they had lost control of it. For example, one disenchanted branch officer wrote, in explaining his decision to resign from the party, that 'The main reason for the Labour Party becoming a Liberal Party is the growth of a middle class in New Zealand. . . . This class and not the working class are the mainstay of the N.Z.L.P.'77 Partisanship, a passionate loyalty to one's party depends to a large extent on one believing that, despite everything, the party basically represents one's beliefs, one's interests, and one's viewpoint. If that intellectual certainty and that emotional commitment are destroyed then the link holding the person to the party becomes, if it holds at all, tenuous. Labour's leaders in the period 1957-60 failed to convince not only the electorate at large but even a significant proportion of the party's own active membership that the second Labour government had handled well a serious and complex economic crisis which was not of its own making. Because the party's leaders were understandably preoccupied with the economic situation, they had neither the time nor the inclination to attend to intra-party matters and appeared oblivious to the repeated danger warnings from within the party itself. Membership statistics, financial returns, and branch correspondence were all ignored or discounted. Even the almost unprecedented move at the 1959 New Zealand Labour Party conference to amend the usual vote of thanks and confidence following the Prime Minister's Parliamentary Party Report to read, 'That this Conference deplores the fact that the Parliamentary Labour Party is completely out of touch with the rank and file of the Labour Party' had little apparent effect on forcing the leadership to rethink its policies, tactics and public image. Admittedly, conference defeated the amendment and carried the vote of confidence on the voices, but only after debate had been cut off by a card vote which the platform won by the very close margin of 277 to 253.78 In the following years many members expressed their opposition more directly in the only way they saw left open to them. As S. H. Barnes has observed in relation to the Italian Socialist Party, 'Party leaders who habitually act contrary to the wishes of their followers do not have followers for very long. Perhaps the most effective limitation . . . is the ability of the membership to vote with its feet, to become inactive or even to leave the party.'79 That is what happened to the New Zealand Labour Party in 1959 and 1960. The lesson was neither fully understood nor remembered.

BARRY GUSTAFSON 158 barry gustafson

NOTES

1 W. J. Cuthbert, President Auckland L.R.C., 1958-59 Annual Report, presented to A.G.M., 23 April 1959. 2 This article is based on the membership returns, annual financial statements, correspondence records, and extant minute books of all branches in the 19 electorates for the period 1957-61. 3 Statistics derived from Government Printer, The General Election 1957 and The General Election 1960, H-33, Wellington, 1958 and 1961. 4 The method used to compensate for depreciation was the multiplication of the money value by 1.000 and the subsequent division by the Consumers' Price Index (All Groups) for the year concerned. The C.P.I, is found in N.Z. Official Year Book (NZOYB) 1971, p. 687. For the 1957-58 financial year 89 out of a possible 110 branch financial statements were available and for 1960-61 69 out of 80. 5 For a full discussion of the 1957-60 Labour Government's performance, including its handling of the economy, see Robert Chapman, 'The Scene is Set: 1957-1960' in R. M. Chapman, W. K. Jackson, A. V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action. The I960 General Election, London, 1962, pp. 30-73; M. A. Hirschfeld, 'The New Zealand Labour Party in Office, 1957-60', unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1970. Hirschfeld's thesis includes as Appendices transcripts of interviews with several Labour Ministers, notably with Sir , the second Labour government's controversial Minister of Finance. 6 R. Middlemas, Secretary, Warkworth branch, to A. J. McDonald and Rt Hon. W. Nash, M.P., 18 June 1959. In footnotes hereafter the financial membership of the branch cited will be given, on the first reference, for the two election years, 1957 and 1960. Unfortunately, neither figure is available for Warkworth. 7 P. White, Secretary, Helensville branch, to A. J. McDonald, 21 April 1958. 1957:58; 1960:29. 8 E. Mclnnes, Secretary, Panmure-Mt Wellington branch, to A. J. McDonald, 27 August 1958. 1957:84; 1960:51. 9 J. Porteous, Secretary, Glen Innes branch, to the Secretary, Auckland L.R.C., 27 October 1959. 1957:149; 1960:97. In 1961 membership dropped to 7. 10 e.g. Mrs E. Barrett, Secretary, Royal Oak branch, to A. J. McDonald, 14 March 1960, and E. G. Barnes, Secretary, Kelston West branch, to A. J. McDonald, 6 April 1960. Royal Oak, 1957:134; 1960:84. Kelston West, 1957:44; 1960:11. '1 Birkenhead branch minutes, 17 March 1959. 1957:45; 1960:43. '2 Grey Lynn branch minutes, 10 March 1959. 1957:85; 1960:68. 13 A. L. Walker, President, North Shore L.R.C., Annual Report, 1959-60, presented to the L.R.C's A.G.M., 27 April 1960. n Roskill branch minutes, 5 September 1960. 1957:19; 1960:14. is Blockhouse Bay branch minutes, 9 December 1959. 1957:293; 1960:207. 16 R. J. Tizard, cit. St Heliers Bay branch minutes, 4 December 1961. For example, St Heliers, 1957:147; 1960:93. Glen Innes, 1957:149; 1960:97. Orakei, 1957:248; 1960:208. Kohimarama-Mission Bay, 1957:77; 1960:recess. Glen Brae, 1957:50; 1960: recess. Tamaki-Eastern Suburbs Junior, 1957:7; 1960:recess. 17 Blockhouse Bay branch minutes, 9 June 1959. 18 Grey Lynn branch minutes, 12 July 1960. 19 H. Preston, Secretary, Takanini branch, to A. J. McDonald, 27 May 1959. 1957:33; 1960:recess. 20 Te Papapa-Oranga branch minutes, 29 June 1958. 1957:56; 1960:52, and A. I. Jost, Secretary, Te Papapa-Oranga branch, to A. J. McDonald, 7 July 1958. The letter was discussed by the National Executive and referred for consideration to Hon. P. N. Holloway, Minister to Industries and Commerce; see A. J. McDonald to A. I. Jost, 14 July and 12 August 1958. The distinction was made by Jost between 'enthusiastic and ardent Labour supporters', many of whom he believed would not vote at all in 1960, and less committed voters, who he believed would change their allegiance. The prophecy concerning non-voting was fulfilled, as Chapman, in Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, pp. 264-9, shows conclusively. 21 Northcote branch minutes, 10 May 1958. 1957:57; 1960:34. 22 Papakura branch minutes, 4 December 1958. 1957:70; 1960:64. 23 R. Middlemas, Secretary, Warkworth branch, to A. J. McDonald and Rt Hon. W. Nash, 18 June 1959. labour's lost legions 159

24 Roskill I.B.C. minutes, 16 November 1959. 25 N. V. Douglas, Secretary, Auckland L.R.C., to A. J. McDonald, 26 November 1959, and to E. A. Gallagher, Secretary, Hillsborough branch, 26 November 1959. The letter to Gallagher asked how many copies had been duplicated and to whom they had been circulated. It also asked the branch to meet its M.P., Faulkner, and the L.R.C. Executive. Unfortunately no record of that meeting is extant. 26 E. A. Gallagher, Secretary, Hillsborough branch, to Secretary, Auckland L.R.C. n.d. [late October or early November 1959], 1957:22; 1960:15. 27 Summary of Price Movements, NZOYB, 1971, p. 700. 28 R. Middlemas, Secretary, Warkworth branch, to A. J. McDonald and Rt Hon. W. Nash, 18 June 1959. 29 R. G. Jorgensen, Secretary, Grey Lynn West branch, to N. V. Douglas, Secretary, Auckland L.R.C., 15 October 1959. 1957:166; 1960:118. 30 Mrs F. E. R. Samson, Secretary, Otahuhu branch, to A. J. McDonald, 20 November 1958. Also Otahuhu branch minutes, 19 November 1958. 1957:86; 1960:56. Onewa branch minutes, 31 March, 30 June and 28 July 1958. 1957:52; 1960:13. " Glen Eden branch minutes, 14 October 1958. 1957:59; 1960:51. 33 ibid., 11 November, 9 December 1958. 34 Roskill branch minutes, 6 October 1958, 13 July, 10 August, 14 September, 12 October, 7 November 1959, 4 July and 5 September 1960. 35 Te Papapa-Oranga branch minutes, 29 June 1958. 36 Roskill branch minutes, 13 June and 5 September 1960. 37 R. Middlemas, Secretary, Warkworth branch, to A. J. McDonald and Rt Hon. W. Nash, 18 June 1959. 38 A. L. Walker, Secretary, Takapuna Central branch, to A. J. McDonald, 17 May 1960. 1957:51; 1960:30. 39 ibid., and Roskill branch minutes, 5 September 1960. 40 L. N. Chiles, Secretary, Beachhaven-Birkdale branch, to A. J. McDonald, 30 November 1961. 1957:50; 1960:55. 41 A. L. Walker, Secretary, Takapuna Central branch, to A. J. McDonald, 17 May 1960. McDonald replied, 27 May 1960, pointing out that party policy only included matters in the party's election manifesto, not conference decisions. 42 L. N. Chiles, Secretary, Beachhaven-Birkdale branch, to A. J. McDonald, 30 November 1961. 43 Roskill branch minutes, 13 July 1959. See also Chapman, Jackson, and Mitchell, pp. 71-72, for a concise summary by Chapman of the tour controversy, and pp. 283^1, in which Chapman concluded that the staggering drop in the Labour vote in the Maori seats at the 1960 election was caused largely by Maori disapproval of the Labour Government's handling of the tour issue. 44 ibid., 11 April 1960. 45 Glen Eden branch minutes, 14 July 1959. 46 Papakura branch minutes, 6 October 1960. 47 Birkdale branch minutes, 13 October 1959. Hirschfeld's transcript of an interview with Hon. A. H. Nordmeyer includes Nordmeyer's observation that Nash was persuaded by 'some of the hierarchy of the Rugby Union' not to intervene. Nordmeyer added that, 'I personally felt at the time that that was a mistake. ... I found afterwards that the view was shared by others and although we would not have gained a majority . . . I think we could at least have done something more than we did to let it be known that we disapproved of the line the Party took.' Hirschfeld, Appendix III, p. 25. 48 T. S. Hills, Secretary, Springleigh branch, to Secretary, Auckland L.R.C., 29 May 1960. 1957:70; 1960:60. 59 Otahuhu branch minutes, 16 December 1958. 50 Truth, 28 January 1958, p. I. Young was a former member of the Legislative Council and Past President of the N.Z. Federation of Labour. 5' Auckland L.R.C. minutes, 27 February and 23 April 1958, and Roskill-Epsom branch minutes, 12 March 1958. 52 Preston Boorman, No. 3 Area Officer on the National Executive, to C. Stewart, President, Otahuhu Railway Workshop branch of the A.S.R.S. [n.d.]. The letter was tabled at the A.S.R.S. meeting on 23 April 1959 and a copy sent to A. J. McDonald. « Three Kings branch minutes, 12 December 1960. 1957:42; 1960:32. 54 A. A. Brooker, Secretary, Balmoral branch, to A. J. McDonald, 14 February 1961. 1957:55; 1960:50. 160 barry gustafson

55 Glen Eden branch minutes, 14 July 1959. The 1959 Budget continued Nordmeyer's 1958 policy of restraining internal consumption in order to minimise overseas borrow- ing. Petrol, beer, and tobacco taxes were retained. Few taxation concessions were made for fear of refuelling inflation. 56 E. A. Gallagher, Secretary, Hillsborough branch, to Secretary, Auckland L.R.C., n.d. [late October, or early November 1959]. College Trust branch minutes, 13 February 1961. 1957:67; 1960:67. 58 W. E. Bradford, Chairman, Birkdale branch, cit. Birkdale branch minutes, 24 April 1961. 59 W. Court to A. J. McDonald, 11 August 1960. 60 Mr Moss, cit. Papakura branch minutes, 6 April 1961. 61 Papakura branch minutes, 4 May 1961. 62 For example, Greenhithe branch minutes, 14 May 1958; Springleigh branch minutes, 16 January 1961; St Heliers branch minutes, 21 March 1961; Te Papapa- Oranga branch minutes, 23 April 1961; Birkdale branch minutes, 25 October 1961. Greenhithe, 1957:16; 1960:recess. 63 C. P. Smith, Secretary, Mairangi Bay branch, to A. J. McDonald, 4 March 1961. 1957:60; 1960:40. 64 There was a net loss of 26 branches between 1957 and 1960 because of the forma- tion or reactivation of six branches not financial in 1957. The 32 branches functioning in 1957 which went into recess by 1960, with their 1957 membership in brackets, were: Maori (16); Beachhaven (21); Broadwood (8); Browns Bay (52); Dargaville (20); Dominion Road Extension (22); Eden Junior (10); Eden Terrace (88); Favona (26); Glen Brae (50); Glenfield (43); Herald Island (20); Hikurangi (78); Kaikohe (37); Kaikohe Maori (16); Kohimarama-Mission Bay (77); Lakeside (134); (33); North (55); Oratia (35); Otiria Maori (16); Panmure- Mt Wellington Maori (16); Papatoetoe Women's (33); Puhinui (10); Pukekohe (46); Sandringham (27); Stanley Bay (52); Tamaki-Eastern Suburbs Junior (7); Te Atatu (20); Te Hapua Maori (7); Woodhill (18); Waipapa-Kerikeri (27). Half of these branches were city or suburban branches, eight were country or country-town, five were Maori, two were Junior, and one was a women's branch. 65 R. H. Burnes, Chairman, Hobson L.R.C. and Russell branch, Annual Report, 1960-61. 66 The branches, with their last financial memberships recorded at Head Office prior to going into recess, were: Waiharara (30), Waihopo (23), Mangonui (17), and Rawene (13); Herekino (51); Kaitaia (12), and Umawera (35); Broadwood (8), Darga- ville (20), Kaikohe (37), and Waipapa-Kerikeri (27); and Russell (16). 67 Hobson L.R.C. minutes, 3 July 1960, fully summarizes the final discussion and each delegate's contribution to it. 68 See R. E. Young, Secretary, Hobson L.R.C., to J. L. Riley, Secretary, Russell branch, 10 June 1960, and C. J. Moyle, N.Z.L.P. Organiser, to R. E. Young, 4 June 1960, and to A. J. McDonald, n.d. [June I960]. 69 See R. E. Young to J. L. Riley, and A. Learning to R. E. Young, 10 December 1960, which concludes: 'The voting in your area confirms your view that we should not have contested the seat'. 70 See R. H. Burnes and J. L. Riley, to A. J. McDonald, 20 May 1960, and corres- pondence from R. E. Young and C. J. Moyle, cited note 68. 71 A onetime Labour branch secretary in Hobson (prior to 1960) to B. S. Gustafson, 24 September 1970, wrote: 'some of us voted for Social Credit during the two follow- ing elections . . . until the Vietnam issue made me realise I could not. . . with the decline of Social Credit there is now a chance for Labour.' A second Labour branch secretary in another part of the Hobson electorate to B. S. Gustafson, n.d. [September 1970], said that he had for a time held an office in the Social Credit Party but switched back to Labour because most Social Credit activists were 'simply monetary reform fanatics' and he wanted to 'be of assistance to my fellow men'. 72 25 September 1969. 73 15 May 1967. 74 Westmere branch Income and Expenditure Book, 1964-65 expenditure. Westmere's membership in successive election years was 1957:55; 1960:47;' 1963:42; 1966:33; 1969:not financial 1970, therefore, no return for 1969. 75 Barry Gustafson, Social Change and Party Reorganization: The New Zealand Labour Party Since 1945, London and Beverly Hills, 1976. labour's lost legions 161

76 D. Aitkin, The Country Party in New South Wales: A Study of Organization and Survival, Canberra, 1972, p. 315. 77 W. Hyde to the Secretary, Papatoetoe branch, 1 August 1961. 78 1959 Conference Report, pp. 21-22. Eighteen different delegates spoke to this amendment and to another criticizing the Government. 79 S. H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation, New Haven, 1967, p. 6.