Labour's Lost Legions THE SECOND LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1957-60 AND GRASSROOTS PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE AUCKLAND REGION IN his annual report to the Auckland Labour Representation Committee (L.R.C.) on 23 April 1959, the president, W. J. Cuthbert, remarked that the 'membership of Branches, from returns which have come to hand, show that during the last year the membership has remained surprisingly stable and the anticipated lack of interest has not become apparent as yet. As the Branches are the foundation of Party organisation, from reports and observations it would appear that in the Auckland L.R.C. area at least the Party is well founded.'1 Cuthbert's remarks are surprising when, perhaps only with the advantage of hindsight, it is realized that the number of financial branches in the Auckland region dropped from 106 to 80 and the financial membership from 6,889 to 4,992 during the year covered by his annual report. The decline in the Labour Party's electoral support, membership, and grass roots activity in the nineteen electorates north from and including Franklin during the three years between the election of the second Labour govern- ment in 1957 and its ignominious defeat in 1960 was even more dramatic.2 Between the 1957 and 1960 elections the number of voters on the elec- toral rolls of the nineteen constituencies examined rose from 302,952 to 324,301. The combined Labour vote in the area went in an inverse direc- tion, from 142,998 to 133,572. Thus, in 1957 Labour received the support of 47.2 per cent of the voters on the roll; in 1960 only 41.2 per cent.3 The number of Labour Party branches in the region in 1957 was a record 110 and the average branch membership was 65. By 1960 there were only 80 branches each with an average membership of 49. As a result the total direct membership in the nineteen northern electorates was almost halved from 6,889 to 3,828. This drop was brought about not only by an almost unprecedented reduction in the number of branches in 1958 and 1959 but also by a unique election-year failure in 1960 to reactivate those branches or replace them with new ones. When Labour membership is presented as a percentage of the Labour vote it declines 143 144 barry gustafson from 4.8 in 1957 to 2.9 in 1960, and as a percentage of all electors on the roll the drop is from 2.3 to 1.3. There was little change in the occupational composition of the Party between the two elections (as revealed by the known occupations of financial members). All types of supporters appear to have been alienated, although possibly the disillusion was somewhat greater among the least skilled manual workers, as Table 1 indicates. Table 1 Occupational Groupings as Percentages of Total Financial Membership 1957 and 1960 Occupational category 1957 1960 N = 3771 N = 2006 Professional-large proprietor .6 .6 Managerial-semi-professional 1.4 1.4 Other white-collar 7.3 8.1 Farmer .8 1.0 Skilled manual 13.0 12.2 Semi- and unskilled manual 26.2 20.9 Housewife 35.3 35.0 Retired 15.4 20.7 Total 100 0 99.9 The decline in the number of branches and membership was paralleled by a sharp decrease in meeting activity and fund-raising at the branch level. This reflects not only the reduced number of people involved but also waning enthusiasm on the part of those who remained. The average number of meetings per branch in 1957 was ten and the average attendance sixteen. In 1960 the surviving branches met, on average, only eight times and the average number of members present dropped to thirteen. Annual financial statements for 89 out of a possible 110 branches were available for the 1957-58 financial year and 69 out of 80 for 1960-61. After adjusting for inflation, a branch started the 1960 election year with an average bank balance only three-fifths that of 1957.4 Income from all sources for 1960 was exactly half that received in 1957 and as a result, even after drawing on reserves, average expenditure by branches dropped by almost the same proportion — to just under 51 per cent. It is obvious from contemporary statistical records that Cuthbert and most other Labour Party leaders both in and outside Parliament were either insensitive to or — more likely — unwilling to admit to the clamour of criticism arising from the grassroots. The unpopularity of the second Labour government among voters in general was quite obvious, but the extent to which hard core party support was affected has not previously been fully appreciated. labour's lost legions 145 In the minutes of branches and the correspondence records of Head Office between 1940 and 1970, there is more dissatisfaction expressed with the Party in general and the Parliamentary Labour Party in particular during the three years 1958-61 than in all the other twenty-seven years taken together. Much of the criticism was very specific and indicates why Labour's extra-parliamentary ranks were so decimated between 1957 and 1960. The new Labour government was very vulnerable, possessing only an effective majority of one in parliament. It was immediately forced, by economic circumstances almost entirely outside its control, to adopt austerity measures.5 These were bound to hurt many Labour voters. The economic situation also prevented Labour from moving quickly and comprehensively to satisfy the wide diversity of demands and expectations which accompanied the change of government. The expectations of many of Labour's supporters prior to the 1957 election had been very high, perhaps unreasonably so, even before the economic crisis which hit New Zealand in late 1957. Many people, disregarding the economic limitations, continued to be dogmatic and inflexible in their views on what the new government should be doing, in what order, and at what speed. The government, however, quickly decided that its paramount priority was to correct the alarming deficit which had emerged in New Zealand's balance of payments. In late 1957 and early 1958, the prices paid overseas for New Zealand's wool, dairy produce, and meat all fell together. The result was a drop in income from exports of about one-fifth. Accompanying the reduction in the nation's external purchasing power was a considerable increase in imports, caused largely by importers over-ordering because they feared, correctly, that the election of a Labour government would lead to the imposition of stricter import control. In 1957-58 New Zealand imported £54 million more in goods than it exported. The combination of falling overseas prices for exports and over-importing during the last few months of the National Party administration resulted in New Zealand's overseas reserves suffering, between October and December 1957, one of the most dramatic slides in the history of New Zealand trade; from £83 million to £45 million, barely enough foreign currency to meet six weeks' payments at the then current level. Labour, which took office in December 1957, argued that the outgoing National government had squandered eight years of record income from exports and that drastic action was inevitable. Three major measures were taken almost immediately: imports were restricted to a level which was more within New Zealand's ability to pay; internal consumption and demand were reduced, thus minimizing the inflationary pressures created by a reduction in imported goods; and a crash programme of industrial expansion was undertaken so that more goods could be produced locally instead of being imported. All three measures achieved considerable success, partly at least because of the ability and strength of the three 146 barry gustafson ministers most concerned — A. H. Nordmeyer (Finance), P. N. Holloway (Industries and Commerce), and R. Boord (Customs). By 1960, without the creation of unemployment or damage to the country's productive capacity, the balance of payments crisis had been largely overcome, inflation was reasonably under control, and the basis had been laid for a dramatic expansion of New Zealand industry in subsequent years. The National Party in opposition, aided by a sympathetic press, however, vehemently denied that the balance of payments situation when Labour took office had been as serious as Labour claimed. National spokesmen argued that Nordmeyer was simply having to find enough money to pay the bribes which, National alleged, had won the 1957 election for the Labour Party. Particularly mentioned was Labour's promise of a taxation rebate of up to £100 for each taxpayer if Labour was elected. Gradually, the National Party switched public attention away from the balance of payments crisis to a much more easily comprehended economic issue, Labour's controversial 1958 budget. Although Nordmeyer increased social security benefits and hurt least those taxpayers who had family commitments or lower incomes, his 1958 budget was designed primarily to restrain the demand for consumer goods, especially those which had to be imported and, therefore, paid for initially with New Zealand's very scarce overseas funds. The budget not only increased direct taxation on incomes but also through indirect taxation raised the prices of cigarettes, beer and spirits and the cost of running a car, which together comprised the modest pleasures of many wage-earners. The National Party opposition under K. J. Holyoake commenced immediately a campaign of criticism against what it labelled and what has been known since as'the Black Budget'. National's sustained attack, which was well-publicized in and supported by the press, continued unabated until long after the defeat of the Labour government in 1960.