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Will Myanmar's Northern Alliance Join the Peace Process?

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Will Myanmar's Northern Alliance Join the Peace Process? PRIO POLICY BRIEF 02 2019 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 3 Address: Visiting Norway NO-0134 Oslo, 9229 Grønland, PO Box Institute Oslo (PRIO) Research Peace Will Myanmar’s Northern Alliance Join the Peace Process? As of February 2019, Myanmar’s Northern Brief Points Twitter: PRIOUpdates Twitter: PRIO.org Facebook: www.prio.org Alliance (NA) is a key player in the country’s armed conflicts. Prodded by • The Northern Alliance (NA) is a China, the Myanmar government has coalition of four armed groups engaged in informal talks with the NA’s • In 2017, its members joined a seven- four members, who are part of a broader member political alliance (FPNCC) political alliance: the Federal Political • The NA’s cohesion is put to the test in Negotiation and Consultative Committee 2019 as the government cracks down on (FPNCC). On 21 December 2018, the one of its members, the Arakan Army Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) declared (AA) a four-month unilateral ceasefire in the • China and Myanmar have agreed to areas where three of the four NA armies build an Economic Corridor from ISBN: operate. Yet the army is engaged in a major Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal as part of 978-82-7288-952-3 (online) 978-82-7288-951-6 (print) counter-insurgency operation against the China’s Belt & Road Initiative fourth member: the Arakan Army (AA), The stability of the Economic Corridor who carried out a surprise attack against • would benefit from peace between the Border Guard Police in Rakhine State on Myanmar government and the Northern 4 January. On 5 February 2019, Facebook Alliance closed down the accounts of the Northern Alliance and its members, calling them “dangerous organizations”. What is the Northern Alliance? Can its members become full participants in Myanmar’s Stein Tønnesson peace process? Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Ne Lynn Aung Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS) Marte Nilsen Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) What is Myanmar’s Northern Alliance? and dominated by Christian Baptists. Its main predecessor, the Palaung National Liberation forces are in Kachin State, but at least one Army, had agreed to a ceasefire in 1991 and The Northern Alliance (NA) is a military brigade operates in northern Shan State. disarmed in 2005. From the outset in 2009, coalition of four armed groups, each of which the TNLA has enjoyed vast public support, also has a political wing: Arakan Army/ In 2008, the KIO became frustrated as the and is likely to have 4–5,000 active fighters. United League of Arakan (AA/ULA); Kachin government ignored it in the consultations for It recruits them from the scattered villages Independence Army/Organization (KIA/ Myanmar’s new constitution. This frustration in the Palaung highlands of northern Shan KIO); Myanmar National Democratic Alliance grew when a sympathetic party was prohibited State, and taxes road transportation. The TNLA Army/Myanmar National Truth and Justice from taking part in the 2010 elections. In June rarely clashes with the Tatmadaw, but in 2018 Party (MNDAA/MNTJP); and Ta’ang National 2011, armed conflict broke out between the it fought the SSA/RCSS (SSA-South), which, Liberation Army/Palaung State Liberation Front KIA and Tatmadaw, and has continued since. after signing the NCA, moved north from its (TNLA/PSLF). None of these groups have a In December 2012, the Tatmadaw launched an southern strongholds, entering TNLA territory. ceasefire agreement with the government. offensive against the KIO capital Laiza, taking This exacerbated ethnic suspicions between the control of the hills overlooking it. Yet, President highland Palaung and lowland Shan; thousands In April 2017, the four groups formed the Thein Sein ordered the Army to stop short of of civilians were displaced. The Tatmadaw did Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative invading it, perhaps to leave room for talks. not intervene except when its own positions Committee (FPNCC) together with three groups were threatened. The SSA/SSPP (SSA-North) who do have bilateral ceasefire agreements with The KIO took active part in the talks that led has joined the TNLA in a fighting alliance the government: Shan State Army/Progress to the NCA but did not sign it. The leaders in aimed at pushing the RCSS back south. This Party (SSA/SSPP); Shan State East National Laiza may have anticipated Aung San Suu Kyi’s has spurred an internal Shan conflict. Democratic Alliance Association/Peace and victory in the November 2015 elections, and Solidarity Committee (NDAA/PSC); and hoped that she would offer better terms. In June Rakhine United Wa State Army/Party (UWSA/UWSP). 2016, she met KIO leader N’Ban La. Later on, However, none of the FPNCC members have she established a new National Reconciliation The Arakan Army (AA) was formed in 2009 signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and Peace Center and a Peace Commission, by the charismatic Tun Myat Naing. Since its (NCA) from October 2015, which formulates but maintained the existing NCA as an entry homeland is in the west, it seems paradoxical the basic principles for Myanmar’s official peace ticket to the peace process. Three Union Peace that it belongs to a northern alliance. Its first process. The government insists that only NCA Conferences were held in 2016–18, but the KIO fighters, however, were recruited from among signatories can be full participants in the Union could only attend as observer. migrant workers in the Kachin jade mines and Peace Conferences in the capital Naypyidaw. were trained by the KIA, and its headquarters Ten groups, with the Karen National Liberation The KIA’s reasons for joining the NA and remain on KIA-held territory. Only since Army/Union (KNLA/KNU) and the Shan State FPNCC in 2016–17 were pragmatic. Just a small 2015 has AA moved troops into Rakhine and Army/Restoration Council for Shan State (SSA/ river separates the KIO capital from China. By southern Chin State. A rapidly growing number RCSS) as most important, have signed the NCA. co-operating with the China-oriented groups of AA-Tatmadaw clashes took place there during in Wa, Mongla and Kokang, the KIA hoped 2015–19. When the NA was formed, its immediate task to avoid isolation. The resumption of armed was to attack the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces struggle in 2011 had been popular among the The Tatmadaw’s expulsion of Rohingya to of Myanmar) in Monekoe town, near China. Kachin youth, who were tired of a ceasefire Bangladesh in 2017 seemed dangerous from the In 2015, the MNDAA had almost overrun the that failed to bring much benefit and allowed AA’s perspective: It could make people believe Kokang capital Laukkaing, and in March 2018 land grabbing and exploitation of resources. By that the Rohingya – not the Tatmadaw – were it attacked police stations and a casino there. 2017, however, the Kachin again seemed war their main adversary. The AA wants to resurrect These offensives were motivated by a shift in weary. The KIA had lost much territory and the ancient Arakan, which was conquered by the Tatmadaw’s tactics from ground battles to faced recruitment challenges. Lately, however, Burma in 1784. using artillery and aerial bombardment. The there have been few clashes, and the KIO and NA needed to show military initiative. government plan again to talk. In February 2018, the police fired into a Rakhine crowd who were marking the anniversary of the We shall now present the seven FPNCC Kokang 1784 defeat, killing seven. Their martyrdom members, before assessing the likelihood that and the government’s detention of Rakhine they may join the peace process. The main force in the Monekoe and Laukkaing nationalist MP Aye Maung helped the AA gain offensives was the MNDAA, which has 2–3,000 support. It has close informal ties with the Kachin regular troops. Its leaders were driven out of Arakan National Party, which in 2015 won 22 Myanmar in 2009, and their attempt in 2015 to seats in the Rakhine State parliament. The KIA was founded in 1961 and has upwards make a comeback failed. They may now want to of 5,000 regular troops. From 1994–2011 it had negotiate their return to Laukkaing. On 4 January 2019, the AA raided four police a bilateral ceasefire with the government, and posts in northern Rakhine, killing fifteen its political wing, the Kachin Independence Palaung officers. This provoked a joint decision by Organization (KIO), governed substantial State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and parts of Kachin State from its capital Laiza. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing to send The KIO/KIA is predominantly ethnic Kachin was founded in 2009 with KIO support. Its reinforcements and crush the AA. They are PRIO POLICY BRIEF 02 2019 www.prio.org www.prio.org Source: © Ne Lynn Aung, 2019 willing to negotiate with the AA leaders but phones. They do not seek independence but Burmese king in Mandalay. Shan State contains do not accept any presence of their fighters in want to secede from Shan State and have their a great number of ethnic minorities: Wa, Pa’o, Rakhine. own ethnic state in Myanmar. Hence their Palaung, Kachin, etc. most obvious adversary is not the Myanmar Wa government but the SSA/RCSS, which fights for The rivalry between the SSA/SSPP and SSA/ Shan unity. The Wa’s reputation suffers from RCSS is a Cold War remnant. Leaders close to Just like the MNDAA and NDAA, the UWSA their trade in drugs. Yet, the 1989 ceasefire has China took a leftist position, while those closer was founded amidst the Burmese Communist never been broken. The Wa did not take part to Thailand opted for an ethno-nationalist Party’s collapse in 1989 by people who had been in the NCA negotiations but want to change program, after first having served the drug-lord the backbone of a four-decade rebellion.
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