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A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State

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A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State ASIA PAPER July 2018 EUROPEAN UNION A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State © Institute for Security and Development Policy V. Finnbodavägen 2, Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden www.isdp.eu “A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State” is an Asia Paper published by the published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The Asia Paper Series is the Occasional Paper series of the Institute’s Asia Program, and addresses topical and timely subjects. The Institute is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and cooperates closely with research centers worldwide. The Institute serves a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. It is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion. This publication has been produced with funding by the European Union. The content of this publication does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the paper lies entirely with the authors. No third-party textual or artistic material is included in the publication without the copyright holder’s prior consent to further dissemination by other third parties. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. © European Union and ISDP, 2018 Printed in Lithuania ISBN: 978-91-88551-11-5 Cover photo: Patrick Brown patrickbrownphoto.com Distributed in Europe by: Institute for Security and Development Policy Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden Tel. +46-841056953; Fax. +46-86403370 Email: [email protected] Editorial correspondence should be directed to the address provided above (preferably by email). Contents Preface .................................................................................................................... 5 Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 6 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 8 Northern Shan State: Overview ................................................................... 9 Methodology, Structure, Challenges ........................................................ 17 Myanmar’s Political Transition ...................................................................... 22 Changing Ceasefire Arrangements ........................................................... 22 USDP and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement .................................. 25 NLD’s Peace Efforts ..................................................................................... 27 Actors and Alliances ......................................................................................... 30 Military and Political Alliances Among EAOs ....................................... 40 Key Features and Trends .................................................................................. 45 Forms of Escalation ...................................................................................... 45 Conflict Hotspots and Multi-Actor Conflict Zones ............................... 52 Resource Extraction and Illicit Trade ....................................................... 55 Impacts on the Local Population ............................................................... 61 Origins of Armed Conflict: A Historical Perspective ................................. 69 Onset of Armed Conflicts (1949–1958) ..................................................... 70 The Rise of Armed Ethno-nationalist Movements (1959–1967) ........... 72 The Expansion and Collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (1968– 1989) ................................................................................................................. 79 The Ceasefire Period, 1989–2009 ................................................................ 85 Continuity and Change in Northern Shan State .................................... 93 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 102 Selected Bibliography ..................................................................................... 105 Tables and Maps Index Map 1: Shan State……………………………………………………………....11 Map 2: Township Map – Shan State (North)…………………………....….12 Table 1: Armed Actors in northern Shan State, 2018………………….…..16 Table 2: EAO Signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement….....27 Table 3: Members of Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC), 2017……………………….……………………………43 Table 4: Armed Conflicts in Northern Shan State by Period, 1949–2018...............................................................................................................70 Table 5: Ceasefire and Surrender Agreements by EAOs in northern Shan State, 1989 – 1996……………………………………….……………...…....87-88 Preface Drawing on both primary research and a range of secondary sources, this paper aims to provide a clearer, historically informed understanding of the complex situation in northern Shan State in Myanmar, by analyzing its conflict dynamics grounded in a subnational perspective. Involving since 2009 escalating armed conflict featuring several Ethnic Armed Organizations, the Tatmadaw, plus an array of other actors, ongoing conflict in the sub-region holds significant implications for the prospects of ending Myanmar’s decades-long civil wars. It should be noted that developments in Myanmar are invariably fast moving which means that information can quickly become outdated. This report considers developments up until March 2018. Commissioned by ISDP, the report reflects the inputs of several authors who would prefer to remain anonymous. ISDP, June 2018 Acronyms 21CPC 21st Century Panglong Conference AA Arakan Army ABSDF All Burma Students' Democratic Front AFPFL Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League AIO Arakan Independence Organization ALP Arakan Liberation Party ANC Arakan National Council ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army CEFU Committee for the Emergence of the Federal Union CNF Chin National Front CPB Communist Party of Burma CPCS Center for Peace and Conflict Studies DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army EAO Ethnic Armed Organization FPNCC Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee IDP Internally Displaced Person/s KDA Kachin Defense Army KIA Kachin Independence Army KIO Kachin Independence Organization KKY Ka Kwe Ye KMT Kuomintang KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party KNU Karen National Union KNU/KNLA PC Karen Nation Union/ Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council KRF Kokang Revolutionary Force LDU Lahu Democratic Union MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army MNTJP Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party MoIP Ministry of Immigration and Population MTA Mong Tai Army MDS Myanmar Defense Services NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement NCCT Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team NDF National Democratic Front NAA National Alliance Army NA (B) Northern Alliance (Brotherhood) A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State 7 NMSP New Mon State Party PNF Palaung National Front PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization PSC Peace and Solidarity Committee PSLA Palaung State Liberation Army PSLF Palaung State Liberation Front PLSO Palaung State Liberation Organization PNDF Pawngyawng National Defense Force RCSS Restoration Council of Shan State SAZ Self-Administered Zone SNUF Shan National Unity Front SSA Shan State Army SSA/RCSS Shan State Army/ Restoration Council of the Shan State SSA/SSPP Shan State Army/ Shan State Progress Party SSIA Stan State Independence Army SSNA Shan State National Army SSPP Shan State Progress Party SUA Shan United Army SURA Shan United Revolutionary Army TRA Tailand Revolutionary Army TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army ULA United League of Arakan UPC Union Peace Conference USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party UWSA/P United Wa State Army/Party WNO Wa National Organization Introduction Myanmar’s internal armed conflict erupted in 1948 just after it gained independence from Britain. The principle armed actors in Myanmar’s civil wars have involved the Myanmar Defense Services, or Tatmadaw,1 and dozens of armed resistance groups.2 In 2008, after decades of militarized violence under civilian and then military regimes, the Tatmadaw initiated political reforms which allowed for the transition to a quasi-democratic or hybrid regime.3 In 2011, the newly elected Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government commenced engagement with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in an effort to resolve the long-running civil war. These efforts have been continued by the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government since March 2016. Since 2011, the patterns of engagement between the Tatmadaw and EAOs feature several significant changes. The first is the promulgation of a multilateral ceasefire agreement involving the civilian government, the 1 The Tatmadaw is the name of Myanmar’s armed forces, or Defense Services as they are officially known. Martyred nationalist leader General Aung San is widely considered the father of the modern Tatmadaw for his role in leading Burma’s nationalist forces to independence from the Japanese and the British. For more information on the
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