Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement BACKGROUNDER - October 20151 1 Photo: Allyson Neville-Morgan/CC SUMMARY examples over the last 25 years were the 1989 agree- The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ment with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), (NCA) seeks to achieve a negotiated the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in settlement between the government of 1994 (albeit which broke down in 2011), and the Myanmar and non-state ethnic armed New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1995. Upon organizations (EAOs) that paves the way coming to office as president in August 2011, U for peace-building and national dia- Thein Sein initiated an effort to end fighting on logue. Consisting of seven chapters, the a nation-wide scale and invited a large number of “draft” text of the NCA agreed on March EAOs for peace talks, with negotiations initially 31, 2015, stipulates the terms of cease- seeking to secure a series of bilateral accords. Upon fires, their implementation and monitoring, and concluding many of these, the government agreed the roadmap for political dialogue and peace in February 2013 to multilateral negotiations over ahead. As such, the NCA, if signed by all parties, a single-document national ceasefire agreement would represent the first major step in a longer that encompasses the majority of EAOs. Signifi- nationwide peace process. While the government cantly, this was the first time that the government in particular hopes to conclude the NCA before had agreed to negotiate a multilateral ceasefire.2 national elections take place on November 8, de- mands for amendments in the final text, ongoing 2. Negotiation Structure and Actors skirmishes, and the issue of which groups might be excluded from the agreement have proven Union-level negotiations have been conducted stumbling blocks in negotiations. through a tripartite structure of government, eth- nic, and third-party representatives. In this struc- ture, the government, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar 1. Background to Peace Talks Defence Services), and the Hluttaw (Parliament) Already prior to the semi-civilian government com- ing to power in 2011, Myanmar’s long-running ISDP Backgrounders seek to give context to the civil war saw several ceasefires signed between a headlines by providing accessible, balanced infor- number of EAOs and government forces. Notable mation and facts on topical issues and events. THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY – WWW.ISDP.EU 1 have been represented through the dual Un- run by various government and civil society repre- ion Peace-making Committees. These consist of sentatives. The MPC was designed as a secretariat an 11-member “Central Committee” (UPCC) to support the chief negotiator and the UPWC as chaired by President Thein Sein, and a 52-mem- well as reporting to the President’s Office. It also ber “Working Committee” (UPWC) running the facilitates some third-party involvement in the actual negotiations, headed by Vice-president Sai peace process and provides third-parties with a Mauk Kham and composed of largely regional- platform through which they can engage. level representatives. U Aung Min is one of four vice-chairmen of the UPWC and also the govern- Table 1. EAOs, Bilateral Ceasefires, and NCA5 ment’s chief negotiator. Groups invited by the gov’t to sign the NCA Not invited Standing bilateral ceasefires No bilateral ceasefires Around 21 EAOs have been in some way en- Non-NCCT NCCT NCCT NCCT gaged in the NCA process. Four of these groups— ABSDF ALP KIO AA the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National NDAA NCF ANC NSCN-K DKBA LDU Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA),National So- RCSS/SSA-S KNU/KNLA-PC MNDAA cialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN- UWSA KNPP TNLA K), and the Restoration Council of Shan State KNU WNO (RCSS/SSA-S)—were invited by the UPWC to NMSP participate in negotiations bilaterally, and although PNLO SSPP/SSA-N the RCSS/SSA-S has attended NCA meetings with Note: The ABSDF participates through UNFC affiliation and the UNFC, these EAOs have chosen not to partic- while the KIO has a bilateral agreement for cessation of hos- ipate yet in the NCA negotiations. The remaining tilities, it does not have a formal bilateral ceasefire agreement organizations have either directly or indirectly par- ticipated in negotiations through membership in 3. Process and Amendments or close affiliation to either the 13-member Unit- ed Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC),3 and/ After seven rounds of negotiations, the NCCT or the loosely UNFC-based 16-member National and UPWC met on March 31, 2015, for an of- Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).4 Over the ficial signing of a “Provisional Draft NCA.” The course of negotiations the NCCT has effectively parties had managed to overcome significant dif- grown into the most prominent representative of ferences and deadlocks in the previous months EAO interests throughout the NCA negotiation to agree to the breakthrough provisional NCA process. text. A significant milestone was when, on Febru- ary 12, the government made a commitment to In later stages of negotiations, at the 2nd Law a “federal” system,6 requested by the NCCT, and Khee Lar Ethnic Conference on June 2-9, 2015, which had previously been seen as tantamount to the NCCT was replaced as the main ethnic nego- a disintegration of the Union. Most of the NCCT tiating body by a 15-member “Senior Delegation” representatives, not having the authority to sign (SD) of top armed group leaders; this so as to ne- the agreement, referred this draft to the individual gotiate twelve amendments proposed by the EAOs EAO leaderships for review and who subsequently at the conference, and in particular to press for the proposed 12 amendments. These included, among issue of inclusivity of all UNFC members in the others, that signatories come from the highest NCA process (see Process and Amendments). level on all sides, including the military and gov- ernment, and that the NCA encompass all NCCT The overall peace process itself is coordinated members. Indeed, the UPWC has invited only 15 by the multi-purpose Myanmar Peace Center EAOs to sign the initial NCA,7 with an option for (MPC)—a quasi-governmental body headed by half of those excluded to negotiate their inclusion Minister of the President’s Office U Aung Min and later on. THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY – WWW.ISDP.EU 2 Other points of disagreement included the Tat- NCA to be a part of his presidential legacy, and his madaw’s demand for an NCA to be in “accord- chief negotiator Minister U Aung Min has given ance with” the military’s “6-point guidelines” EAOs a final deadline of October 15. (Eight groups which has been resisted by EAOs, as this would subsequently signed the NCA on this date.) NLD imply an implicit acceptance of the controver- leader Aung San Suu Kyi, however, urged EAOs sial 2008 Constitution.8 Another contentious not to sign the agreement “in haste,” calling for issue between EAOs and Tatmadaw representa- a “meaningful” accord. The constitutionally man- tives has centered on implementation of “Security dated elections will be held on November 8, and Reintegration.” While the government side has in order for the NCA to be shepherded through by emphasized Disarmament, Demobilization, and President Thein Sein, it would need to be signed Reintegration (DDR) of ethnic armed groups, in advance of the vote and before the instatement the latter underline the necessity of Security Sec- of the new government. This however also con- tor Reform (SSR) that involves the formation of a stitutes an additional reason why some EAOs are “federal army” comprising of ethnic combatants. reluctant to sign as it would bolster the president’s bid before the election. Over a series of subsequent ethnic summits and 9 new negotiating rounds (round 8 on the July 22-24 5. Text of the NCA and round 9 on August 6-7), most of the remain- ing 12 points of disagreement were negotiated or The NCA consists of 7 chapters and 33 para- deferred for further discussion in later stages of the graphs which detail the NCA’s (1) basic principles, ceasefire and political dialogue and, as such, written (2) aims and objectives, (3) ceasefire premises, (4) into the text of the agreement (see Text of the NCA). guidelines and regulations governing the ceasefire, The issue of inclusivity, however, continues to be (5) guarantees for political dialogue, (6) future the main obstacle to the final signing of the NCA tasks and responsibilities, and (7) administrative by all EAOs (see Inclusivity: A Stumbling Block). obligations and guidelines for dispute settlement. It is furthermore important to note that the NCA In terms of inclusivity, the NCA states the aim to as such embodies only the first step of the peace include all “relevant” EAOs in the signing of the process. At the signing of the final draft on March NCA. 31, 2015, both sides agreed to a 7-step roadmap for peace and national reconciliation. The stages As stated in Chapter 1, if the accord is signed of this roadmap are: (1) NCA signing, (2) Draft- in its currently published form, signatories agree ing political dialogue and negotiating security re- to the basic principle of establishing a federal un- 10 integration matters, (3) Holding political dialogue ion “in the spirit of Panglong,” while upholding and implementation of security reintegration, (4) the principles of “non-disintegration of the Union 11 Union Convention, (5) Union Accord Signing, and perpetuation of national sovereignty.” Ac- (6) Union parliament approval, and finally (7) Im- cording to representatives of the Tatmadaw and plementation. EAOs, it was vital that the two main parties to the conflict agreed to respect the other’s basic codes or aspirations as a basic foundation to enable the 4.