Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

BACKGROUNDER - October 20151

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Photo: Allyson Neville-Morgan/CC

SUMMARY examples over the last 25 years were the 1989 agree- The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ment with the (UWSA), (NCA) seeks to achieve a negotiated the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in settlement between the government of 1994 (albeit which broke down in 2011), and the and non-state ethnic armed New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1995. Upon organizations (EAOs) that paves the way coming to office as president in August 2011, U for peace-building and national dia- Thein Sein initiated an effort to end fighting on logue. Consisting of seven chapters, the a nation-wide scale and invited a large number of “draft” text of the NCA agreed on March EAOs for peace talks, with negotiations initially 31, 2015, stipulates the terms of cease- seeking to secure a series of bilateral accords. Upon fires, their implementation and monitoring, and concluding many of these, the government agreed the roadmap for political dialogue and peace in February 2013 to multilateral negotiations over ahead. As such, the NCA, if signed by all parties, a single-document national ceasefire agreement would represent the first major step in a longer that encompasses the majority of EAOs. Signifi- nationwide peace process. While the government cantly, this was the first time that the government in particular hopes to conclude the NCA before had agreed to negotiate a multilateral ceasefire.2 national elections take place on November 8, de- mands for amendments in the final text, ongoing 2. Negotiation Structure and Actors skirmishes, and the issue of which groups might be excluded from the agreement have proven Union-level negotiations have been conducted stumbling blocks in negotiations. through a tripartite structure of government, eth- nic, and third-party representatives. In this struc- ture, the government, the (Myanmar 1. Background to Peace Talks Defence Services), and the Hluttaw (Parliament) Already prior to the semi-civilian government com- ing to power in 2011, Myanmar’s long-running ISDP Backgrounders seek to give context to the civil war saw several ceasefires signed between a headlines by providing accessible, balanced infor- number of EAOs and government forces. Notable mation and facts on topical issues and events.

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 1 have been represented through the dual Un- run by various government and civil society repre- ion Peace-making Committees. These consist of sentatives. The MPC was designed as a secretariat an 11-member “Central Committee” (UPCC) to support the chief negotiator and the UPWC as chaired by President Thein Sein, and a 52-mem- well as reporting to the President’s Office. It also ber “Working Committee” (UPWC) running the facilitates some third-party involvement in the actual negotiations, headed by Vice-president Sai peace process and provides third-parties with a Mauk Kham and composed of largely regional- platform through which they can engage. level representatives. U Aung Min is one of four vice-chairmen of the UPWC and also the govern- Table 1. EAOs, Bilateral Ceasefires, and NCA5 ment’s chief negotiator. Groups invited by the gov’t to sign the NCA Not invited Standing bilateral ceasefires No bilateral ceasefires Around 21 EAOs have been in some way en- Non-NCCT NCCT NCCT NCCT gaged in the NCA process. Four of these groups— ABSDF ALP KIO AA the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National NDAA NCF ANC NSCN-K DKBA LDU Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA),National So- RCSS/SSA-S KNU/KNLA-PC MNDAA cialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN- UWSA KNPP TNLA K), and the Restoration Council of Shan State KNU WNO (RCSS/SSA-S)—were invited by the UPWC to NMSP participate in negotiations bilaterally, and although PNLO SSPP/SSA-N the RCSS/SSA-S has attended NCA meetings with Note: The ABSDF participates through UNFC affiliation and the UNFC, these EAOs have chosen not to partic- while the KIO has a bilateral agreement for cessation of hos- ipate yet in the NCA negotiations. The remaining tilities, it does not have a formal bilateral ceasefire agreement organizations have either directly or indirectly par- ticipated in negotiations through membership in 3. Process and Amendments or close affiliation to either the 13-member Unit- ed Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC),3 and/ After seven rounds of negotiations, the NCCT or the loosely UNFC-based 16-member National and UPWC met on March 31, 2015, for an of- Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).4 Over the ficial signing of a “Provisional Draft NCA.” The course of negotiations the NCCT has effectively parties had managed to overcome significant dif- grown into the most prominent representative of ferences and deadlocks in the previous months EAO interests throughout the NCA negotiation to agree to the breakthrough provisional NCA process. text. A significant milestone was when, on Febru- ary 12, the government made a commitment to In later stages of negotiations, at the 2nd Law a “federal” system,6 requested by the NCCT, and Khee Lar Ethnic Conference on June 2-9, 2015, which had previously been seen as tantamount to the NCCT was replaced as the main ethnic nego- a disintegration of the Union. Most of the NCCT tiating body by a 15-member “Senior Delegation” representatives, not having the authority to sign (SD) of top armed group leaders; this so as to ne- the agreement, referred this draft to the individual gotiate twelve amendments proposed by the EAOs EAO leaderships for review and who subsequently at the conference, and in particular to press for the proposed 12 amendments. These included, among issue of inclusivity of all UNFC members in the others, that signatories come from the highest NCA process (see Process and Amendments). level on all sides, including the military and gov- ernment, and that the NCA encompass all NCCT The overall peace process itself is coordinated members. Indeed, the UPWC has invited only 15 by the multi-purpose Myanmar Peace Center EAOs to sign the initial NCA,7 with an option for (MPC)—a quasi-governmental body headed by half of those excluded to negotiate their inclusion Minister of the President’s Office U Aung Min and later on.

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 2 Other points of disagreement included the Tat- NCA to be a part of his presidential legacy, and his madaw’s demand for an NCA to be in “accord- chief negotiator Minister U Aung Min has given ance with” the military’s “6-point guidelines” EAOs a final deadline of October 15. (Eight groups which has been resisted by EAOs, as this would subsequently signed the NCA on this date.) NLD imply an implicit acceptance of the controver- leader Aung San Suu Kyi, however, urged EAOs sial 2008 Constitution.8 Another contentious not to sign the agreement “in haste,” calling for issue between EAOs and Tatmadaw representa- a “meaningful” accord. The constitutionally man- tives has centered on implementation of “Security dated elections will be held on November 8, and Reintegration.” While the government side has in order for the NCA to be shepherded through by emphasized Disarmament, Demobilization, and President Thein Sein, it would need to be signed Reintegration (DDR) of ethnic armed groups, in advance of the vote and before the instatement the latter underline the necessity of Security Sec- of the new government. This however also con- tor Reform (SSR) that involves the formation of a stitutes an additional reason why some EAOs are “federal army” comprising of ethnic combatants. reluctant to sign as it would bolster the president’s bid before the election. Over a series of subsequent ethnic summits and 9 new negotiating rounds (round 8 on the July 22-24 5. Text of the NCA and round 9 on August 6-7), most of the remain- ing 12 points of disagreement were negotiated or The NCA consists of 7 chapters and -33 para deferred for further discussion in later stages of the graphs which detail the NCA’s (1) basic principles, ceasefire and political dialogue and, as such, written (2) aims and objectives, (3) ceasefire premises, (4) into the text of the agreement (see Text of the NCA). guidelines and regulations governing the ceasefire, The issue of inclusivity, however, continues to be (5) guarantees for political dialogue, (6) future the main obstacle to the final signing of the NCA tasks and responsibilities, and (7) administrative by all EAOs (see Inclusivity: A Stumbling Block). obligations and guidelines for dispute settlement. It is furthermore important to note that the NCA In terms of inclusivity, the NCA states the aim to as such embodies only the first step of the peace include all “relevant” EAOs in the signing of the process. At the signing of the final draft on March NCA. 31, 2015, both sides agreed to a 7-step roadmap for peace and national reconciliation. The stages As stated in Chapter 1, if the accord is signed of this roadmap are: (1) NCA signing, (2) Draft- in its currently published form, signatories agree ing political dialogue and negotiating security re- to the basic principle of establishing a federal un- 10 integration matters, (3) Holding political dialogue ion “in the spirit of Panglong,” while upholding and implementation of security reintegration, (4) the principles of “non-disintegration of the Union 11 Union Convention, (5) Union Accord Signing, and perpetuation of national sovereignty.” Ac- (6) Union parliament approval, and finally (7) Im- cording to representatives of the Tatmadaw and plementation. EAOs, it was vital that the two main parties to the conflict agreed to respect the other’s basic codes or aspirations as a basic foundation to enable the 4. Deadlines process to move forward. These principles will be implemented “in accordance with the outcomes The government has indicated that it wants to sign of a future political dialogue.” Chapter 1 affirms, the NCA before the November 8 elections. Presi- furthermore, that the Union is to become a secu- dent Thein Sein has made clear that he desires the lar state which avoids misuse of religion for po-

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 3 litical interests, embraces a national identity based demobilization, and reintegration. These processes on diversity—an important point for ethnic na- are currently defined differently by both parties tionalities who contend that the current national and further agreement as to how these will be im- identity has been constructed and perpetuated by plemented in the Myanmar context by these par- successive Burman-dominated governments—and ties to the conflict is required. Chapter three also speaks of equal rights and non-discrimination expands upon these provisions by highlighting the for all Myanmar citizens.12 It also confirms an guidelines for the deployment of military forces, agreement to further discuss the issue of a Union demarcation of areas of control, communications Armed Forces (Pyidaungsu Tatmadaw), inclusive between the parties, movement of troops, the pro- of and representing Myanmar citizens of all ethnic tection of civilians, and provision of humanitarian groups (non-Burmans are currently weakly repre- assistance. It also provides for joint work on land- sented especially in high-level positions). mine clearance and in the administration of rule of law in ceasefire areas. Addressing EAO concerns over political dia- logue, Chapter 2 outlines the intention of the sig- The NCA’s third chapter further covers pro- natory parties to begin a process of inclusive politi- visions establishing a ceasefire “joint monitor- cal dialogue. This is expanded upon inChapter 5, ing committee,” comprised of members of the where a roadmap is outlined according to which UPWC, EAOs, and “trusted, well respected indi- this dialogue is to take place, as well as planning viduals, ”which is to implement and control ad- for security reintegration (see below), within 90 herence to a “military code of conduct,” as well days after the NCA is signed. Indeed, Chapter 5 as investigate violations and perform conflict reso- of the agreement gives guarantees for the politi- lution functions. The composition of the code of cal dialogue which is of utmost importance for conduct is as yet unspecified. It has been pointed the EAGs as no ceasefire in Myanmar in the past out that in effect there still is no formal Military has moved to a political dialogue phase. As of yet, Code of Conduct agreed on for the NCA that has however, no clear clauses are included outlining been made public. The Tatmadaw has throughout what is to be done if this dialogue does not com- the negotiation period managed to hold off any mence, or fails to reach a conclusion. commitments in this regard, with some sources suggesting that such a code of conduct must refer Chapter 3 of the agreement specifies activi- to the Tatmadaw’s “six-point guiding principles” ties that will not be allowed including: violence- or needs to be drafted in line with the Tatmadaw’s inciting propaganda, armed conflict, troop rein- existing general code of conduct. As yet, there are forcement and recruitment, the establishment of no provisions for independent or international new military bases, and the laying of landmines, monitoring. The chapter also states that the role of all unless specifically agreed to by the parties to international actors including government repre- the conflict. There is a separate point emphasized sentatives and international organizations already regarding troop recruitment by EAOs, allaying ac- involved in the peace process“ as observers, advi- cusations by government that EAOs are using the sors or in the provision of technical assistance to ceasefire negotiations to recruit as many soldiers as the Committee will be jointly decided” by the par- possible, and vice versa. This point also postpones ties to the NCA. further discussion of the “security reintegration process” which refers to matters related to security Chapter 4 of the text lays out the roles and sector reform or development and disarmament, responsibilities of the joint implementation com-

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 4 mittee, which will reach decisions by consensus. must have drawn up a framework for political dia- The permission for the functioning of liaison of- logue and begin to move towards its implementa- fices is also clarified, which is important as con- tion. Finally within 90 days after the agreement tact with EAOs is currently not allowed under the political dialogue can begin, including discussions 1908 Unlawful Associations Act, unless by special around security reintegration. agreement of the government. It also states that the Military Code of Conduct and others rules Table 2. NCA Short-term Timeframe after Signing and regulations applicable to the NCA will be en- acted within a month of the signing. Time Event 2015-10-15 Tentative date for NCA signing Chapter 6 lays out further tasks and respon- Within Notify the signing of the NCA through- sibilities including confidence-building measures 24hrs out the signatories’ respective command such as removal of signatory EAOs from listing structures. Military codes of conduct distributed to government and EAO under the Unlawful Associations Act, and the re- commanders. lease of persons detained under this Act. Also of 5 days Explain provisions contained in agree- note in this chapter is that EAOs will be allowed to ment to own organizations implement “interim arrangements” which include: 14 days EAOs and government: joint coordina- health, education, and socio-economic service de- tion meeting livery, as well as environmental conservation, drug 30 days Enact the military code of conduct and eradication, cultural promotion, international and ceasefire related rules and regulations. national aid and private sector activities. Chapter Lay-out timetable and formation of 7 contains miscellaneous points on overall imple- Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) and mentation of the NCA. Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) 6. Short-term Implementation 60 days Jointly adopt framework for political dialogue. UPDJC to start dialogues after having drawn up frameworks for politi- According to Chapter 3 of the NCA document, cal dialogues. if the ceasefire is signed the following short-term 90 days Begin political dialogue and negotiate timeframe applies: both sides must notify of the security reintegration matters signing of the NCA and distribute military codes of conduct throughout their command structures within 24 hours. The provisions of the agreement 7. Inclusivity: A Stumbling Block must subsequently be explained to ethnic armed groups within a five-day period. Fourteen days af- The issue of inclusivity has proven to be the main ter signing EAO and government representatives stumbling block to the signing of the NCA by all are to host a joint coordination meeting to define EAOs. The government has consistently denied the exact timeframes governing the ceasefire and inclusion of six ethnic organizations in the initial its implementation. Chapter 4 specifies that thirty signing of the NCA, some unless certain condi- days after the agreement the next timetable is to be tions are met. With ongoing fighting along the laid out. At that point a Joint Monitoring Com- China border in the Kokang area of Shan State, mittee (JMC) and Union Peace Dialogue Joint the government maintains that bilateral cease- Committee (UPDJC) must also be put together to fires first need to be signed with the carry the peace process forward. Chapter 5 dictates (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance that ninety days after the agreement The UPDJC Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Lib-

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 5 eration Army (TNLA). It further refuses to allow The EAOs subsequently requested that the three smaller groups (Wa National Organization president remove not only signatories to the NCA (WNO), Lahu Army (LA), and Arakan National but those who would sign from the unlawful as- Council (ANC)), to sign.13 This position has been sociations list. The president responded that these opposed by the SD and NCCT who emphasize groups could be removed from the list in a phased that they want the NCA to be “all-inclusive.” approach as they negotiated individually. How- Many EAOs believe that the government is prac- ever, with the Commander-in-Chief travelling ticing a divide-and-rule policy through its exclu- abroad, the EAOs felt that they could not obtain sion of some groups and that it is not respecting a military assurance that this would be followed, the whole SD bloc. Recent developments concern- and a date for signing was again postponed until ing the issue are outlined below. further compromise could be reached.

The EAOs met in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on On October 15, in a ceremony in Nay Pyi Taw, August 21-24 to reach mutual agreement on the the NCA was signed between the leaders of eight inclusivity issue and the signing of the NCA. groups and the government.14 The groups which Agreement could not be reached, however, and signed are as follows: RCSS/SSA-S, KNU, CNF, five EAO representatives were selected to attend a ALP, PNLO, KNU/KNLA-PC, DKBA, and AB- meeting on September 9 with President U Thein SDF. The remaining groups continue to postpone Sein and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing their final decision on signing the NCA. to agree on the final text and signatories. The eth- nic representatives laid out a four-point plan for signing without the six groups including: no mili- 7.1 International Witnesses tary offensives against these groups, their inclusion in political dialogue, access to humanitarian aid, While inclusivity has proven the main stumbling and their removal from the unlawful associations block, other problematic issues also exist. The gov- list. The government side stated it will allow the ernment had originally agreed that China and the ANC, LA, and WNO to participate in the politi- UN could be witnesses to the NCA process. Fol- cal dialogue once the NCA has been concluded. lowing the rounds of negotiations over the NCA, the EAOs requested an expanded list of witnesses, However, the government treats the three and the president agreed to invite the EU, India, groups it is in armed conflict with, the MNDAA, Japan, Norway, and Thailand to the final- sign AA, and TNLA, differently. Although the presi- ing of the agreement along with China and the dent remains open to an “all inclusive” agreement, UN. Since signing the “final draft” in March, it these groups will be brought in progressively and has been reported that tensions have arisen among through different routes. The president is in direct EAOs over the list of final witnesses to the NCA, contact with the MNDAA leadership, the TNLA whereby allegedly “China-aligned” or “China-in- can join the NCA by signing a bilateral agreement, fluenced” EAOs have expressed concern over un- and the AA can either join the other Rakhine party due U.S., U.K., EU, and Japanese “involvement” to the NCA, the (ALP), in the process. Notwithstanding, representatives or the KIO (an organization it is allied with). In from the UN, EU, China, India, Thailand, and Ja- a joint statement, these EAOs rejected these ar- pan witnessed the October 15 signing of the NCA rangements, demanding that they be included di- with eight groups. rectly in the NCA.

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 6 8. Scenarios and Spoilers be incomplete, and more importantly the fighting may spill over into other regions, which could po- In a scenario where the NCA is signed by all EAOs tentially drag in other ethnic armed groups which it is important to note that the NCA is simply a share territories and alliances. Indeed, in recent prelude to political dialogue and a substantial weeks there have been reports of an escalation in peace-building process, where difficult questions fighting between the Tatmadaw and EAOs around such as the constitutional makeup, power and KIO and SSPP/SSA-N-held positions. Non-invit- resource-sharing, and “security reintegration” will ed groups such as the TNLA and MNDAA have come under discussion. Thus, addressing the un- also seen increased fighting. derlying issues of the conflict will represent the real test of all parties’ commitment to peace. Fail- Finally, if the NCA is not signed in the near fu- ure to find consensus on these issues could lead ture, one can expect the same ongoing skirmishes, to the resumption or continuation of armed con- battles, and wartime behaviour that have charac- flict. In particular, guaranteeing autonomy under terized the country for the past half century, es- a federal system is a cornerstone of EAO demands. pecially along the China and Indian borders. The So far the government has agreed to an “open dia- EAO areas will continue to be largely inaccessible logue,” and building a Union according to federal to government forces and economic opportunities principles, as stated in the Deed of Commitment in these regions will remain scant allowing conflict from February 12, 2015, which would seemingly economies to continue to flourish. It would also represent a significant shift from its previous po- have implications for the elections as several areas sition on a more unitary state with some power in Shan, Kachin, and Kayah states, and potentially devolved to the states and regions (see the 2008 others, will be declared ineligible for voting due to Constitution). A further challenge regards the im- security concerns, thus disenfranchising thousands mediate implementation of the NCA. This could and placing into question the legitimacy of the be complicated, for example, by overlapping ter- elections especially among ethnic groups. Further- ritories between EAOs and government forces, more, existing bilateral ceasefire agreements with which would have to be clearly demarcated and some groups may also be undermined if EAOs upheld to avoid potential skirmishes that could see that progress towards political dialogue—for undermine a newly minted NCA. which an NCA is first necessary—is not made.

With EAOs split between those willing to sign and those holding out until the inclusivity issue is Notes resolved, another scenario to consider is one where, 1 initially at least, NCA is signed by some groups Issued on October 2, this backgrounder seeks to but not by others. If the NCA is signed without establish basic facts and provide a general overview the participation of non-signee groups, then con- of the NCA. However, events and information flict could continue especially in Shan State along in Myanmar can be opaque and subject to rapid the China border, undercutting the success of the change. It was updated on October 19. NCA; there could even be an increase in fighting 2 Following the coup d’etat of 1962, many of the as the government would be free to focus its re- EAOs had wanted to negotiate as a bloc in vari- sources on the KIO, AA, TNLA, MNDAA, and ous alliances from at least 1976. Through bilateral others. The use of selective ceasefires to target other negotiations in 2012 and 2013, members of the groups has a long and well-documented history in United Nationalities Federal Council requested Myanmar. An NCA without these groups would that the government negotiate with them as a bloc.

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 7 3 The UNFC represents 13 ethnic armed groups of which being “the non-disintegration of national including: KIO, NMSP, SSPP/SSA-N, KNU, solidarity.” These are defended by theTatmadaw or KNPP, CNF, LDU, ANC, PNLO, TNLA, WNO, defence services. MNDAA. Note: the KNU suspended member- 12 The definition of “citizen” and the manner in ship in September 2014. which ethnic populations are or are not to be con- 4 The NCCT represents 16 ethnic armed groups sidered citizens is currently based on the contro- including: AA, ALP, ANC, CNF, DKBA, KIO, versial Myanmar citizenship law of 1982. KNPP, KNU, KNU/KNLA-PC, LDU, MNDAA, 13 The government contends that including them NMSP, PNLO, SSPP/SSA-N, TNLA, and WNO. would open the door for a slew of other small 5 See Appendix 1 on p. 9 for a more extensive over- groups to the NCA, all of whom cannot be accom- view of EAOs engaged in the NCA process. modated. The legitimacy bestowed by a ceasefire 6 Known as the Deed of Commitment for Peace could also enable these smaller groups to recruit and National Reconciliation. combatants and could encourage other groups to 7 In spite of being members of the NCCT, the seek violent means if they want government at- government refuses to recognize six groups includ- tention. The NCCT argues, on the other hand, ing: AA, ANC, LDU, MNDAA, TNLA, and the that these groups have been alliance members for WNO. decades and that despite their smaller size—and 8 The Tatmadaw adopted “six principles” to serve lack of weapons—that their stance and presence as its guideline and position towards the ceasefire has validity. process. Although precise translations may vary, 14 On October 12, the government removed the they broadly encompass the following: (1) To have KNU, ABSDF, and RCSS/SSA-S from their list- a keen desire to reach eternal peace; (2) to keep ing under the Unlawful Associations Act. Accord- promises agreed to in peace deals; (3) to avoid ing to the government, the other five groups had capitalizing on the peace agreement; (3) to avoid not been on the list. placing a heavy burden on local populations; (4) to avoid placing a heavy burden on local people; (5) to strictly abide by the existing laws; (6) to “march” towards a democratic country in accord- ance to the 2008 constitution 9 The NCA text is available at the following link: https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/ 2015/10/14/myanmar-nationwide-ceasefire- agreement-doc-english/. 10 This refers to the Panglong Conference and agreement in 1947 between the independence leader General Aung San on behalf of the then Government of Burma and representatives of three main ethnic groups (Chin, Kachin, and Shan) at which administrative autonomy for ethnic states and financial- and wealth-sharing arrangements were agreed upon. 11 Two of the three national causes of the country as laid down by the government in 1988, the third

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 8 Appendix 1. Overview of Ethnic Armed Organizations

Full Name(s) UNFC member Area of operation Est. Strength Groups invited by the government to sign the NCA Groups with standing bilateral ceasefires with the government Non-NCCT Members All Burma Students’ Democratic Semi-aligned; KIO,KNU and KNPP controlled areas 400+ Front (ABSFD) represented in SD National Democratic Alliance Not member Eastern Shan State 4500+ Army - Eastern Shan State (NDAA) National Socialist Council of Not member ; Sagaing Region <500 Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) Restoration Council of Shan State Not member Southern Shan State 8000+ / - South (RCSS/SSA-S) United Wa State Army / Party Not member Wa Self-Administered Division; Eastern 30,000 (UWSA) Shan State NCCT members Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) Member Northern Rakhine & Kayin States 60-100 Chin National Front (CNF) Member North-western Chin State; Sagaing 200+ Region

Democratic Karen Benevolent Not member Eastern 1500+ Army (DKBA) KNU/KNLA-Peace Council No member Central Kayin State <200 (KNU/KNLA-PC) Karenni National Progressive Member Kayah State 600+ Party (KNPP) (KNU) Member Kayin and Mon states, Tanintharyi 5000+ Region New Mon State Party (NMSP) Member Mon and Kayin States; Tanintharyi 800-2000 Region Pa-O National Liberation Member Southern Shan State 400+ Organization (PNLO) Shan State Progress Party / Member Northern Shan State 8000+ Shan State Army - North (SSPP/SSA-N) Groups with no bilateral ceasefires with the government Kachin Independence Member Kachin State; Northern Shan State 10,000+ Organization (KIO) No bilateral ceasefire signed and not invited by the government to sign the NCA NCCT members (larger groups) Arakan Army (AA) Not member KIO controlled areas; Chin State; Karen 2000+ State; Myanmar National Democracy Member Kokang Region, North-eastern Shan 3000+ Alliance Army (MNDAA) State Ta’ang National Liberation Army Member (Northern) Shan State 4500 (TNLA) NCCT members (smaller groups) Arakan National Council (ANC) Member n/a n/a (LDU) Member n/a n/a Wa National Organization / Army Member n/a n/a (WNO) Note: Estimates on strength derived from figures published by Myanmar Peace Monitor (2015).

The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 9