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Lessons Learned from MPSI's Work Supporting the Peace Process In Lessons Learned from MPSI’s work supporting the peace process in Myanmar March 2012 to March 2014 The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative Yangon, Myanmar March 2014 “... This should be a true ceasefire, and if so we will be pleased. If the ceasefire breaks down, the situation could be worse than before, and meaningless for me to continue to live.” villager from Poe Thaw Su, Kyauk Kyi Village Tract, Eastern Bago. October 2013. ii LIST OF ACRONYMS AHRN Asian Harm Reduction Network ALP Arakan Liberation Party AusAID Australian Agency for International Development CBO Community-based organisation CIDKP Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People CNF Chin National Front CPCS Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent/Buddhist Army EAG Ethnic Armed Group EBO Euro-Burma Office EPRP Ethnic Peace Resources Project FSPs Fragile State Principles IDPs Internally displaced persons ILO International Labour Organisation INGO International non-governmental organisation JPNA Joint Peacebuilding Needs Assessment KCBNG Karen Community Based Network Group KIO Kachin Independence Organisation KKO Klo-Htoo Baw Organization KNLA Karen National Liberation Army KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party KNU Karen National Union KORD Karen Organisation for Relief and Development MNEC Mon National Education Committee MNLA Mon National Liberation Army MPC Myanmar Peace Centre MPSI Myanmar Peace Support Initiative MWO Mon Women’s Organisation NGO Non-governmental organisation NIS Nordic International Support Foundation NMSP New Mon State Party NPA Norwegian People’s Aid NRC Norwegian Refugee Council PDSG Peace Donor Support Group PNLO Pa-oh National Liberation Organisation RCSS Restoration Council Shan State SSA-S Shan State Army South SSPP Shan State Progressive Party UN United Nations UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council WGEC Working Group for Ethnic Coordination iii Table of Contents Executive Summary – The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative......................................................v Summary Tables: Challenges and Achievements; Projects; Lessons Learned and Reflections ......ix Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 1 Background............................................................................................................................2 1.1 Historical Overview – Peace and Armed Conflict in Myanmar ........................................................................ 2 1.2 The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative...................................................................................................................... 3 2 Lessons and Reflections .........................................................................................................7 2.1 The Range of Challenges Faced...................................................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Achievements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Key Areas of Learning..................................................................................................................................................... 14 2.4 Lessons learned from the Ethnic Peace Resources Project ............................................................................ 25 2.5 Reflections on the MPSI Approach ............................................................................................................................ 27 3 Applying the New Deal Framework to the Myanmar Context...............................................28 3.1 Why is the New Deal Framework Relevant to Myanmar?............................................................................... 28 3.2 MPSI Lessons and Recommendations Related to the New Deal................................................................... 29 3.3 MPSI Lessons and Recommendations Derived From the Fragile States Principles............................. 32 Annex 1: Overview of MPSI-supported projects............................................................................i Annex 2: Considerations When Planning and Implementing Projects in Conflict-affected Areas ............................................................................................................................................... xxix Annex 3: Interview responses from MPSI’s listening project .................................................. xxxii Annex 4: Independent Review of MPSI – Executive Summary.................................................. xliii Table of Boxes Box 1: Key stakeholders in the Myanmar peace process..................................................................................3 Box 2: MPSI associated projects key facts.........................................................................................................6 Box 3: CASE STUDY - Observations on direct communications and reconciliation.........................................12 Box 4: MPSI listening project ..........................................................................................................................15 Box 5: Communities' trust in the peace process.............................................................................................17 Box 6: NRC ID card programme.......................................................................................................................18 Box 7: Mon education projects .......................................................................................................................20 Box 8: Building trust through local negotiations of security and access to justice .........................................22 Box 9: Fragile States Principles........................................................................................................................28 Box 10: The ten Fragile State Principles ..........................................................................................................31 Box 11: Overview of Conflict sensitivity / Do No Harm.................................................................................xxix Box 12: Practical tools to help secure accountability in conflict-affected areas...........................................xxxi iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – THE MYANMAR PEACE SUPPORT INITIATIVE The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) • The MPSI was launched in March 2012, following a request from the Government of Myanmar to the Government of Norway to lead international support to the peace process. MPSI was never intended to be a mediation initiative, but rather designed to come in just behind the political momentum of the peace process, helping to support ceasefire agreements reached by the Government and Ethnic Armed Groups. Enabling this role to be played by an international actor was a first for Myanmar, reflecting the new opportunity for peace between national actors. It was also quite a unique arrangement in comparison to other peace-making processes internationally. • This report brings together research conducted in the last year, including an MPSI ‘Reflections’ report produced in early 2013, an independent review of MPSI undertaken in 2014, and is informed by field trips, discussions with peace process stakeholders, the insights of MPSI staff, meetings and workshops with Government and Ethnic Armed Groups, community meetings and project reporting. The report seeks to reflect on those two years of support, and suggest ways to frame and improve international support to the peace process and aid into conflict-affected areas. • In the last two years MPSI has facilitated projects that built trust and confidence in - and tested - the ceasefires, disseminated lessons learned from these experiences, and sought to strengthen the local and international coordination of assistance to the peace process. In doing so MPSI engaged with the Government, Myanmar Army, Ethnic Armed Groups, political parties, civil society actors and communities, as well as international partners, to provide concrete support to the ceasefires and emerging peace process. • MPSI associated projects have been undertaken across five ethnic States (Chin, Shan, Mon, Karen and Kayah) and two Regions (Bago and Tanintharyi). Projects have been delivered in partnership with seven Ethnic Armed Groups, thirteen local partners (four of which are consortia), and nine international partners. Flexible and responsive funding was received from Norway, Finland, The Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the European Union and Australia. • From the outset, the intention had been for the MPSI to provide temporary support to the emergence and consolidation of peace, in the absence of appropriate, longer-term structures and while more sustainable international peace support responses were mobilised. In line with its stated purpose of being a temporary structure, MPSI aspired for its work to be continued by local actors, national and international Non-governmental organisations and other entities including sector donor funding instruments, such as the Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG). • There have been many contextual, political and structural challenges for MPSI in carrying out its role. These have included tensions in the peace process itself, especially delays in starting necessary political dialogue; managing the expectations
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