Collaborating

Warlords

in Afghanistan’s

Pol itical Reconstruction Process

D.D. van Grieken April, 2005 Utrecht 1 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

A study of the ways in which Afghan ‘collaborating warlords’ have frustrated Afghanistan's political reconstruction process since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001

D.D. van Grieken Student number: 0059145

University of Utrecht Language and Culture Studies International relations & Conflict Studies

Dr. C. van der Borgh Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht

Utrecht, The Netherlands April, 2005

Front Picture General Dostum was one of several Afghan warlords who routed the Taliban with the help of small bands of U.S. Special Forces. Source: 2002 National Geographic Society, (available at: www.nationalgeographic.com/.../ photo1_popup.html, accessed: 19 April 2004).

2 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

3 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Executive Summary

The events of September 11, 2001 have shed new reconstruction of Afghanistan: the security and light on the problematic nature of weak and failed legitimacy gap. states, demonstrating that these states are no longer an isolated and distant problem. The consequences of Warlords state failure affect not only those populations within the Afghanistan’s history has visibly demonstrated the states themselves, but have shown to also touch relation between state failure and the emergence of people in neighbouring regions and as far as on the warlords. Factors such as the country’s division by other side of the world. Phenomena such as terrorism, sharp social cleavages, the existence of a localized illicit transnational networks, the movement of money, social system, Afghanistan’s rugged geography and drugs and weapons throughout the region, massive its subjection to external influences, have all and chaotic refugee flows, uncontained (ethnic) prevented the state from developing into a strong violence, and uncontrolled epidemics are all spill-over ‘nation-state’. Internal conflict and ineffective central effects which generally find their origin and breeding state institutions have subsequently lead to a power ground in weak and failed states. and legitimacy vacuum which opened up the (political) space for local strongmen or, so called As a failed state suffers from three primary capability ‘warlords’, to emerge. The traditional adherence to gaps (e.g. the legitimacy gap, security gap and localised rule, in combination with more modern capacity gap), central government is no longer able to developments such as the introduction of modern exert power on (large parts of) its territory, ensure the weapons, increased poppy production and the security of its own citizens and maintain the internal augmented importance of Islam, advanced the legal order, nor is it capable of delivering public emergence of the first Afghan ‘warlords’. ‘Warlords’ services or creating the conditions to this end. Given are defined according to the following the fact that failed states themselves inherently lack characteristics. Warlords: the ability, capacity and means to reverse the process of state failure, the international community is largely (a) have control over a certain territory lacking or responsible for taking on the task of ‘repairing’ failed contesting central government’s authority states. However, there appears to be a lack of (b) exert a certain amount of authority in this area consensus among academic scholars concerning the (c) have a military background on which their character of the required strategy. The academic political ascendance is largely based. discussion spreads from comprehensive strategies (d) apply a legitimating discourse (religion, (addressing all factors that cause instability and state nationalism etc.) failure) to minimalist approaches (addressing merely (e) dispose of weapons and finally the political challenges first). This thesis however (f) financially benefit from profits made through argues that international actors attempting to ‘repair’ a conflict trade and the secondary war economy. failed state, should start from addressing exactly those capability gaps that caused the state to fail in the first After the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, place. In other words: actors should try to ‘fill the which produced a widespread power vacuum and a capability gaps’. This thesis focuses on two capability complex political context, several of the Afghan gaps that are of particular interest to the political warlords were able to consolidate their positions of

4 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

power once more. With U.S. forces employing state failure (security and legitimacy gap) rather Northern Alliance militias as proxy troops in the ‘war on than of state building. terror’, the traditional adherence to local power structures, the inadequacy of the 2001 Bonn Based on information from academic works and Agreement, the inability of international forces to reports by NGO’s it has become clear that uphold the writ of central government beyond Kabul, ‘collaborating’ warlords have not only engendered and the dramatic increase of poppy cultivation, the adverse security conditions within parts of right conditions were created for the Afghan warlords Afghanistan by continuing their inter-warlord conflict, to re-emerge. The resurgence of the warlord but have also undermined the capability of the phenomenon does not only form a threat to long- central state to ensure internal security by refusing lasting peace and democracy but has also confronted to disarm and demobilise their militias, as well as by international actors with the significant and long-term obstructing the formation of the Afghan National dilemma of warlordism. Army. Moreover, warlords who have taken on a collaborating spoiler role have severely hampered Given that Afghanistan’s most prominent warlords the capability of the state to create legitimate have attained control over large parts of the country’s authority. The mere existence of powerful territory, and as their political and economic power ‘collaborating’ warlords and the fact that they run often exceeds that of central government, they will personal ‘fiefdoms’, has drastically limited the generally resist central government and thus pose a state’s ability to exert and expand its authority, daunting threat to the political reconstruction process especially in the provincial areas. Moreover, of Afghanistan. As the Afghan warlords will attempt to ‘collaborating’ warlords have frustrated democratic maintain their positions of power, they will be likely to processes (such as the convening of the adopt a ‘spoiler’ role. The Afghan warlords can be Emergency Loya Jirga) and have been reluctant to classified into the following categories: (1) total spoilers enact democratic reforms. (2) partial (or limited) spoilers and, (3) collaborating spoilers. Given that his last category of warlords - The ways in which the major collaborating warlords warlords who have adopted a ‘collaborating spoiler’ in Afghanistan have frustrated the political role- indicates a unique and largely unrecognised reconstruction process, have demonstrated that the spoiler role, it is suitable for further examination. profound transition from warlord to peacelord in post-Taliban Afghanistan is extremely complex. The Collaborating Warlords experiences in Afghanistan have shown that it is Collaborating warlords are Afghan warlords who were naïve to expect military commanders –who lack any previously associated with the Northern Alliance experience in administration, democracy and good opposition force, who have received high-level posts governance- to make the transition from warlord to within the central state system due to this affiliation, peacelord in the short-term. Although the integration but who have played a double role by adhering to their of powerful warlords may have averted more violent personal agenda and objectives at the same time. This spoiler behaviour, and despite that the warlords category of warlords has demonstrated a unique have physically contributed to the Afghan central spoiler experience in the Afghan reconstruction state, ‘collaborating’ warlords have unmistakeably process since they have contributed to elements of frustrated, intimidated and delayed the country’s

5 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

political reconstruction process. With much authority and power organised around these Afghan warlords who claim to be loyal to the central state yet act in contradictory ways, the consolidation of a legitimate, democratic central state in Afghanistan, remains distant.

6 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Contents

CONTENTS 6

PREFACE 8 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 9 INTRODUCTION 10 Central Question 11

1. ‘REPARING’ FAILED STATES 13

1.1 FAILED STATES 13 The Origins of Failed States 14 Defining State Failure: Three Capability Gaps 16 The Consequences of Failed States 17 1.2 ‘REPAIRING’ FAILED STATES 19 Approaches to State Failure 19 Comprehensive Approach to State Failure 20 Filling the Capability Gaps 23 Creating Legitimacy and Authority 24 Ensuring Security 29 1.3 ‘REPAIRING’ FAILED STATES: WORKING WITH WARLORDS 34 The Emergence of Warlords 34 The Spoiler Problem 36 How to Manage Spoilers? 38 Warlords, Spoilers or Local Strongmen? 41 From Warlords to Peacelords? 43 The Paradox of Working with Warlords 45 Conclusion 46

2. THE AFGHAN POLITICAL CONTEXT 48

2.1 STATE FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN 48 The Afghan State: Weak from Origin 48 Constraints to Afghan State-Building 49 Actual State Failure 51 2.2 WARLORD POLITICS 53 The Rise of the Afghan Warlords 53 Kalashnikovization, Opium Production and Islamization 54 Internal Conflict 56 The Rise of the Taliban 56 2.3 A NEW FUTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN 57 Al-Qaida; September 11, 2001 and the Fall of the Taliban 57 The Political Reconstruction Design 58 The Afghanistan Interim and Transitional Authority 61 Conclusion 62

3. WARLORDISM IN POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN 64

3.1 WARLORDS IN THE POST-TALIBAN ERA 64 The Return of the Afghan Warlords 64 Are the Afghan ‘Warlords’ True Warlords? 68

7 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

3.2 SPECIFYING DIFFERENT TYPES OF WARLORDS 71 Afghan Warlords Adopting a Spoiler Role 72 Afghan Warlords Adopting a Total Spoiler Role 73 Afghan Warlords Adopting a ‘Collaborating’ Spoiler Role 74 Conclusion 76

4. THE ROLE OF COLLABORATING WARLORDS IN AFGHANISTAN"S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 78

4.1 WARLORDS ADOPTING A COLLABORATING SPOILER ROLE 78 From Warlords to Peacelords? 78 Collaborating Spoilers: A Contribution to State Failure 81 Afghan Warlords adopting a ‘Collaborating Spoiler’ Role 83 4.2 COLLABORATING WARLORDS ENGENDERING INTERNAL INSECURITY 86 Adverse Security Conditions 87 Inter-Warlord Conflict 88 Hampering the SSR Process 90 4.3 COLLABORATING WARLORDS UNDERMINING CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY 94 A Basic Legitimacy Deficit 94 Contributing to General Insecurity 95 Frustrating Democratic Processes 96 Reluctance to Enact Democratic Reforms 100 Running Local ‘Fiefdoms’ 101 Conclusion 106

5. CONCLUSIONS 107

Appendix I. Overview of Chapter 1 109

Appendix II. Map of Afghanistan 110

Appendix III. Afghanistan’s Roadmap to Democracy 111

Appendix IV. International Actors in Afghan Political Reconstruction 112

Appendix V. Table of Warlords in Afghanistan 116

Appendix VI. Map of Major Warlords in Afghanistan 118

NOTES 119

8 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Preface

Working on this thesis has been an extremely endless enthusiasm and theoretical feedback of interesting and useful experience. In spite of the Chris van der Borgh of the Centre for Conflict training I received during my studies in writing Studies in Utrecht. Thank you so much for guiding essays, it has been a challenging process either me during this year. Moreover, I could not have way. A constantly shifting political situation in finished this thesis without the help and mental Afghanistan and the abundant flow of information on support of my closest friends and family. Special this ‘hot topic’ have regularly blurred my vision. In thanks go out to those who have read several addition, the numerous writers’ blocks, a well known chapters in search of irregularities and typing errors: phenomenon among students writing their final my mother Marianne van Grieken and my dear thesis, have every so often made me want to throw friend Debbie de Wit, and to my father Wim van out my computer, physically harm those I love and Grieken who has helped putting it all together. Yet, eat my mouse (which is a big thing for me, being a finally but most of all, I would like to seize this vegetarian). A well-deserved ‘winter-travelling’ opportunity to thank my best friend and greatest proved to be a perfect solution to these problems: love Boudewijn van Opstal, who has stood by me after returning as ‘a girl that had seen the world’ I during the complete process. With utmost patience viewed all that I had written in a completely different he has read my chapters again and again, and with way. The more I became familiar with the great persuasiveness he has convinced me that phenomenon of ‘warlords’ in Afghanistan, the more I demarcating (“Afbakenen!”) the field of analyses is came to realise that some of them play a unique an essential part of writing a final thesis. Now I have role in the country’s political reconstruction process. finished, I can say with confidence that following this It is primarily for this reason that I decided to focus advise has made a world of difference for the quality the central question on this specific category of of this thesis (and probably for all my future Afghan warlords: the warlords who have adopted a decisions as well because, to be true, I find ‘collaborating spoiler’ role (that and the fact that I everything interesting). Boudewijn, thank you so was rapidly reaching page nr. 250). much for your advise, for the great lay-out and for With all ups and downs of the writing process believing in me all the way! And yes, I will marry taken together, I look back on this past year with you! great pleasure. I would never have expected to enjoy writing a thesis on one subject and for such a long time. But I did, and I largely owe this to the

9 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Abbreviations and Glossary

AIA Afghan Interim Administration AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ANA Afghan National Army ANBP Afghan New Beginnings Program AREU Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund ATA Afghan Transitional Administration CLJ Constitutional Loya Jirga DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ELJ Emergency Loya Jirga EU European Union HRW Human Rights Watch ICRC International Cooperation of the Red Cross INGO International Non-Governmental Organizations ISAF International Security Assistance Force MoC Ministry of Communication MoD Ministry of Defence MoF Ministry of Finance MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoI Ministry of Interior MSF Doctors Without Borders NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team SSR Security Sector Reform UN SRSG United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council WFP World Food Program

10 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Introduction

September 11, 2001. Several hijackers crash two Yet, in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the passenger jets into New York's World Trade Centre, existence of powerful warlords has also offered an one in the Pentagon in Washington and one in a field opportunity for short-term state formation. As the in Pennsylvania, killing 3.245 persons in total. These Afghan warlords were one of the few remaining shocking events did not only indicate western society’s power structures, those warlords willing to weaknesses, but also shed new light on one of the cooperate, were integrated into the new central most remote places on earth: Afghanistan. After all, it state system by the major international actors in was in this distant and forgotten place that the attacks Afghanistan. However, the power of these warlords of September 11 were prepared.1 This fact has was hereby legitimised, enabling them to demonstrated that the internal collapse of states, such consolidate their hold on local and regional as Afghanistan, has severe consequences far beyond territories. As a result, the expected transition from the country’s own territorial borders. As a result of the warlord to ‘peacelord’ became extremely difficult. September 2001 terrorist attacks global attention has Given their newly attained political positions, these therefore been refocused on the threats posed by warlords have come to play a double role: while these so called ‘failed’ and ‘weak’ states, and on the being assumingly loyal to Kabul they have largely necessity of creating the conditions for sustainable declined to deviate from their local and regional peace and stability within them.2 agendas, and have abused their political positions. Although an ideal formula for creating sustainable Consequently they have spoiled, delayed and peace in internally broken down and war-torn societies sometimes even paralysed the political has not yet been devised, in recent years the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. These conviction has grown among scholars as well as warlords have thus adopted, what this thesis among practitioners, that democratic governance plays designates as a “collaborating spoiler” role. The a central role in the political reconstruction of failed exact ways in which “collaborating warlords” have states.3 There are, however, significant obstacles frustrated Afghanistan’s political reconstruction hampering the political reconstruction process in failed process are central to this thesis. states. As will be clear from the case study of post- Taliban Afghanistan, international actors initiating and supporting political reconstruction often have to deal with a specific type of localised leadership. ‘Local strongmen’, better known as ‘warlords’, emerge in the power vacuum resulting from state failure. These powerful actors pose a pressing internal security threat as they attempt to maintain their local positions of power at the expense of central state authority.

1 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite, Nationbuilding in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Vintage, London, 2003), p.21. 2 Mark Malloch Brown, ‘Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework for Sustainable Peace’, in: Global Governance, Volume: 9, Issue: 2 (April 01, 2003), pp.141-146: p.141. 3 Malloch Brown, 'Democratic Governance', p.141.

11 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Central Question 2: In which ways have warlords -adopting a This thesis examines the role of ‘local strongmen’, or collaborating spoiler role- undermined the capacity ‘warlords’, in the political reconstruction process of of the Afghan central government to create legitimacy and authority? Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in November

2001. For reasons of limited space it is necessary to I presume that a study of the role of warlords restrict the focus of this thesis to one specific category adopting a ‘collaborating spoiler’ role in the political of local strongmen: warlords who have adopted a reconstruction process of Afghanistan leads to a ‘collaborating spoiler’ role. The existence of greater understanding of the challenges posed by ‘collaborating warlords’ in Afghanistan demonstrates a this type of local leadership. Even though warlords unique spoiler role which has not yet been thoroughly are often the sole remaining power structures and discussed in academic literature. Accordingly, the the integration of powerful warlords may limit their central question of this thesis is: motivation to attack the reconstruction process, this

thesis will point at the threats posed by so called In which ways have Afghan warlords -who ‘collaborating spoilers’. Given that these warlords have adopted a ‘collaborating’ spoiler role- frustrated the political reconstruction process are integrated into the central state system they are in Afghanistan, since the fall off the Taliban in able of spoiling the political reconstruction process 2001? from within. This fact demonstrates a serious threat to the consolidation of peace and democracy in the To identify the specific ways in which the warlords Afghanistan and indicates one of the perils of adopting a ‘collaborating’ spoiler role have affected working with warlords. Afghanistan’s political reconstruction process, this thesis will investigate in which ways warlords’ activities and behaviour have contributed to those two elements that lay at the core of state failure in Afghanistan: the lack of internal security and the lack of state legitimacy and authority. As will be clear from Chapter 1, Afghanistan’s state failure can be primarily reduced to two ‘capability gaps’: the security gap and the legitimacy gap. This means that the Afghan central government has been incapable of either ensuring (internal) security as well as creating a sufficient amount of legitimacy to exert authority. Accordingly the two secondary questions are:

1: In which ways have warlords -adopting a collaborating spoiler role- engendered internal insecurity in Afghanistan, and in which ways have they undermined the capacity of the Afghan central government to ensure security?

12 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Chapter 1 introduces a number of different scholarly the ways in which the most prominent collaborating works and theories with regard to the task of warlords have contributed to exactly those capability ‘repairing’ failed states. This chapter will provide an gaps that lay at the core of state failure: the security insight in the concept of failed states as well as in the and legitimacy gap. Based on this outline, Chapter 4 ‘conceptual labyrinth’ that currently exists with regard elaborates on the examples of collaborating spoiler to the political reconstruction of failed states. Although behaviour, and aims to clarify in which specific ways there clearly is no ‘quick-fix’ to internally broken down these warlords have spoiled, delayed and frustrated and war-torn societies, in recent years the conviction Afghanistan’s political reconstruction process. has grown among scholars as well as among practitioners, that democratic governance plays a central role in the reconstruction of failed states. Moreover, Chapter 1 introduces and defines the warlord phenomenon and examines the threats of rampant warlordism and spoilers to the endeavour of post-war political reconstruction.

Chapter 2 discusses the origins of the Afghan state and the reasons for its weaknesses since Afghanistan’s independence in 1919. The main focus of this Chapter is however on the factors which have created the right conditions for the Afghan warlords to emerge to the political scene. In addition, this chapter discusses the political reconstruction design for Afghanistan which was created by primary international actors after the fall of the Taliban.

Chapter 3 discusses the factors which caused the resurgence of the warlord phenomenon after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. Moreover, to provide more insight in the role played by Afghan warlords in Afghanistan’s political reconstruction process, this chapter defines the Afghan warlords and provides a categorisation of different types of Afghan warlords.

Chapter 4 examines the ways in which one specific category of Afghan warlords -warlords who have adopted a ‘collaborating spoiler’ role- have frustrated the political reconstruction process in Afghanistan. To exemplify the ‘collaborating’ role adopted by several Afghan warlords, an outline is provided which indicates

13 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 1. ‘Repairing’

Failed States

The attacks of September 11, 2001 have refocused 1.1 Failed States global attention on the threats posed by so called

‘failed’ and ‘weak’ states’. As these developing Terrorists training at bases in Afghanistan and countries have shown to be a safe haven for Somalia. Transnational crime networks putting down international terrorists posing a threat to the complete roots in Myanmar/Burma and Central Asia. Poverty, global community, the necessity of creating the disease, and humanitarian emergencies overwhelming conditions for sustainable peace and political stability governments in Haiti and Central Africa. A common within them, has become clearer than ever. It is in this thread runs through these disparate crises that form the fundamental foreign policy and security challenges light that the attention for the task of ‘repairing’ failed of our time. These crises originate in, spread to, and states has been drastically increased, which has disproportionately affect developing countries where resulted in a great number of different scholarly works governments lack the capacity, and sometimes the and theories. This chapter will provide an insight in the will, to respond.4 ‘conceptual labyrinth’ that currently exists with regard to the political reconstruction of failed states. Although Developing countries such as the ones mentioned in there clearly is no consensus on a solution for the citation above, are also called ‘weak’ or ‘failed internally broken down and war-torn societies, in states’.5 The concepts of ‘failed state’, respectively recent years the conviction has grown among scholars ‘failing state’ and ‘weak’ state are not new. Since the as well as among practitioners, that democratic end of the colonial period, governments in the governance plays a central role in the reconstruction of developing world have been struggling to establish failed states. transparent and accountable state institutions.6 Not only is there no ‘quick-fix’ to state-failure, the However, recently, the idea of state failure is used endeavour of ‘repairing’ a failed state is also hampered more and more to account for the international by several significant obstacles. Previous cases of political emergencies of today; such as terrorism, state failure (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia) have transnational crime networks, internal conflict, shown that international actors attempting to repair poverty and humanitarian emergencies. Today’s failed states are often faced with one of these weak and failed states are generally characterized obstacles; the existence of a specific type of localised by governments unable or unwilling to provide the leadership. It is the emergence of ‘local strongmen’, services that their own citizens and the international better known as ‘warlords’, from the power vacuum community expect from them such as to “offer within a failed state, which poses a daunting threat to protection from internal and external threats, deliver the state’s reconstruction. As warlords attempt to basic health services and education and provide maintain their localised positions of power, these actors generate internal security as well as hamper the 4 M. Weinstein, John Edward Porter and Stuart E. functioning of the central state, and hereby thus Eizenstat, On the Brink: Weak States and US National contribute to exactly those elements that lay at the Security: A Report of the Commission for Weak States and U.S. National Security, Centre for Global core of state failure. Development, Washington May 2004 (available at: http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf, accessed September 2, 2004), p.1. 5 Weak and failed states are particularly prevalent among the 70-plus low-income countries. See: Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.7. 6 Ibidem, p.9.

14 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and security and deliver public services.10 In this thesis, needs of the population.”7 More specifically, a failed however, the focus will not be on those states of state “fails to exert power on (large parts of) its territory which the central government is not willing, but to ensure the security of its own citizens, since he has merely on failed states of which the central lost the monopoly on violence; is no longer able to government is not able to exert power, provide maintain the internal legal order; and is no longer able security and deliver public services. to deliver public services or to create the conditions to this end”.8 The Origins of Failed States In most chronic cases of state failure – such as in Afghanistan, Haiti or Somalia- states have completely Which factors cause state weakness and failure in failed and lack the capacity, and sometimes also the the first place? According to Weinstein et al, state will, to respond to transnational crime, extreme failure has one clear root cause: “Development as poverty, humanitarian crises or internal instability. broadly understood-progress towards stable, However, the description of failed states is not accountable national institutions that can meet the necessarily restricted to these extreme situations in needs of their citizens-is not taking place in too 9 which there is completely no state authority left. The many of the countries we refer to as “developing”.”11 concept ‘failed state’ can also be used to describe In contrast, the Dutch AIV and CAVV argue that, in states in which state authority is still exerted on large the case of state failure, the factors that prevent the parts, or even their complete territory, but which fail to state from functioning effectively are stronger than provide security and provide essential services. These the factors that promote state functionality.12 In their cases are also considered to be failed states when the view, although no case is the same, one could central governments lack the willingness to provide describe a combination of factors which prevent the state from functioning properly and which generally lay at the core of state failure. These factors can be 7 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.6. divided into the following three separate categories: 8 Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of given circumstances, friction between institutions of Public International Law (CAVV), Failing States: a global different origin and internal and external abuse.13 responsibility, Report No. 35, May 2004, p.11. 9 In Max Weber’s view ‘authority’ can be understood as a First, the concept of given circumstances form of “legitimate domination”. He defines ‘domination’ as indicates several adverse conditions which place “the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” the state under strain and make it vulnerable, or as Authority is thus not merely a mode of “power” or “ Weinstein et al designate these, the factors which influence” over others, but in fact implies “a minimum of 14 voluntary compliance”, or in other words an “interest” in stall ‘development’. Some are long-term an obedience. Such an interest can originate form “custom, structural factors, such as poverty, population personal advantage, purely effectual or [from] ideal motives of solidarity”, but more importantly, the basis for a given pressure, inequality, undemocratic institutions, a authority (or legitimate domination) is in fact “the belief in non-productive economy and severe legitimacy”. In other words, to have authority is not merely to proclaim that one is in ‘power’; it is necessary for followers to see it the same way. According to Weber, the notions of authority and legitimacy are thus closely 10 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.10-11. interrelated. See: Max Weber, ‘The types of Legitimate 11 Weinstein et al,, On the Brink, p.11. Domination’, 1978, in: Michael Hechter and Christine 12 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. Horne (ed.), Theories of Social Order. A Reader (Stanford, 13 Ibidem, p.25. 2003) pp.183-203, p.183. 14 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.11.

15 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

unemployment, which advance general dissatisfaction a breeding ground for (violent) reactions from and make states prone to internal instability and underpinned, often ethnic, minorities.18 In addition, conflict. State vulnerability can however also be the newest states, created after the process of brought about by more proximate factors such as decolonisation and the Cold War, strongly contrast economic shocks, pressure for political reform, political to the western European, so called ‘nation-states’, transitions and regional conflicts. Moreover, whose cultural and political borders are congruent. international factors, such as the proliferation of small After all, these newly created states often lack arms, transnatioanl drug trade and the external support democratic traditions as well as a form of collective for corrupt governments, can worsen already existent identification with the state, both necessary for a weakness and strengthen the power of incompetent central state system to function effectively. Instead, and authoritarian governments.15 these non-western societies were often based on Although state vulnerabilities do not directly lead to traditional patron-client relations which were the failure of states, they prevent the central accepted by elite as well as mass and remained to government from functioning effectively and from exist even after the Cold War period.19 fulfilling its obligations.16 Often, failed states Thirdly, state legitimacy is actively undermined experience deficient economic development, depend by internal abuse and external abuse. In contrast to on donor countries and play a minor role in the two structural factors mentioned above, in this international trade. The resulting, often underachieving case state failure is advanced by people national economy makes state power an important themselves. In fact, World Bank argues that: “State (and sometimes the only feasible) way to obtain failure is man-made.”20 Internal abuse or corruption financial assets for non-state entities. In the absence of entails the exploitation of traditional patron-client an effective judicial system, ‘conflict trade’ (meaning structures by patrons or local bearers of power who the trade in non-military goods for sustaining local war choose to use these structures for extreme self economies) forms an important source of income and enrichment. Since these elite actors focus on short enables non-state actors to exert local power and to term benefits, they do not consider it necessary to undermine the central government’s authority.17 obtain durable public support by providing their Secondly, the AIV and CAVV commissions regard clients with services.21 Moreover, in conjunction with the friction between institutions of different origin to be internal abuse of power, states also suffer from an important factor in the failure of states. It means external abuse of power exercised by third-parties. that the concept of the modern, from Western Europe Foreign actors may benefit from a failed state and imported notion of the ‘state’ (meaning the collection of the accompanying war economy since it enables institutions), conflicts with local traditions and them to obtain income from conflict- or arms trade. institutions in non-western countries. In the colonial- In addition, neighbouring governments may benefit period, western state institutions as well as geographical entities were externally enforced upon several non-western heterogeneous peoples, creating 18 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.26. 19 Ibidem, p.26-27. 15 See: Weinstein et al,, On the Brink, p.11, and AIV and 20 Citation from the World Bank, World Development CAVV, Failing States, p.25-26. Report 1997, The State in a Changing World, 16 Ibidem, p.25. Washington, p. 162, in: Ibidem, p.27. 17 Idem. 21 Ibidem, p.27-28.

16 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

from the weakness of a certain state, since this “foster legitimacy, maintaining institutions that enables them to exert more power in the region.22 protect basic rights and freedoms, hold individuals accountable for their actions, enforce laws and Defining State Failure: Three Capability Gaps contracts equally, and enable broad-based citizen 26 participation in the political process.” However, in According to Weinstein et al, concepts such as “weak” failed states governments have lost many of their and “failed”, are in fact imprecise and explain little citizen’s confidence. They do not longer identify about the meaning of actual state failure. The themselves with the central government. In addition, commission therefore focuses on three functions that people do not longer feel protected by the central effective governments must be able to perform: (1) state and mistrust the central judicial system. In a ensuring security, (2) meeting the basic needs of failed state the judicial system may be ineffective citizens, and (3) maintaining legitimacy. In the case because it conflicts with existing local traditions or that a state fails to perform these vital functions, the because the system is corrupt and in the hands of 27 resulting “capability gaps” form a threat to its own one particular (ethnic) group. Consequently, the citizens, its neighbouring countries and the “legitimacy gap provides an opening for political international system as a whole.23 Similar to what the upheaval and crisis, as well as eases the conduct of Dutch AIV and CAVV commissions designate the corrupt policies that the public would oppose if given 28 elements characterising failed states, Weinstein et al the opportunity to do so.” It however, also provides define the weakness of failed states according to the an opening for non-state actors to attain power and incapability of states to maintain legitimacy, ensure legitimacy from an increasingly dissatisfied security and provide services.24 population. Once these non-state actors have entered the political arena, they pose a serious Legitimacy Gap. threat to the establishment, development and the Failed and weak states suffer from a lack of state well functioning of the central government and 29 legitimacy.25 To function effectively, a state must centralised state institutions.

Security Gap.

22 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.28. The state’s most basic function is to ensure security 23 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.13. by protecting its citizens from internal and external 24 See: Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.13, and AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. threats, preserving effective rule and order within its 25 Max Weber identifies three types of authority or territory and most importantly, by maintaining its ‘legitimate domination’, which differ according to the kind 30 of legitimacy which is claimed. The validity of the claims to monopoly over the use of force. However, when a legitimacy may be based on either rational, traditional or government is incapable of fulfilling this function, the charismatic grounds. “Legal authority”, based on rational grounds, rests on “a belief in the legality of enacted rules internal security situation will be heavily affected and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” (184) Authority will however be called traditional “if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”. virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers.” (193) In (184) See: Weber, ‘The types of Legitimate Domination’. this case, obedience thus stems from personal loyalty and is 26 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.15. indebted to the person who occupies a position of authority 27 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. by tradition. Finally, the basis for “charismatic authority” 28 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.15. lies in “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or 29 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 30 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.14.

17 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

since a “gap emerges that other states, non-state income and insufficient education and training, actors, and simple criminals may seek to fill with centralised state institutions in weak and failed violent, hostile, or illicit acts.”31 A situation of this kind states are often faced with a lack of staff, expertise arises when non-state actors have the ability, the and financial means which are urgently needed for means and the motive to take power from the state.32 the delivery of public goods and services.37 In failed states state authority is deficient due to a defective infrastructure and an ineffective A certain number of states are chronic cases of organisational structure, enabling non-state actors to state failure. In other words: the governments of exert power locally. Moreover, the state has insufficient these states have failed comprehensively on all means to fulfil its obligations and tasks effectively, three dimensions; legitimacy, capacity and security. motivating dissatisfied non-state actors to take over Cases like these, such as Afghanistan, Angola, these tasks locally and enabling them to attain wealth, Burundi, the DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, power and prestige. What is more, in a situation of Somalia and Sudan, have often resulted in internal insecurity and impunity, non-state actors are able to conflict or civil war with much civilian suffering and a obtain means (financial assets, weapons) from conflict lack of government control over vast parts of the trade, which are necessary for devolving central power state’s territory.38 Other developing countries and exerting power locally.33 (approximately fifty countries fall within this category) are designated to be ‘weak’ states, whose Capacity Gap. governments’ performances are weak in only two According to Weinstein et al, a state “must play a areas.39 Cases like these are for example the central role in meeting the basic needs of its citizens, Indonesian government struggling with insurgent both by providing physical infrastructure such as roads, forces in control of large parts of its territory, or the schools, and clinics and by investing in skills and illegitimate government in Burma faced with large- structures that empower citizens and make progress scale smuggling, criminality and political en military possible.”34 Some governments are however largely opposition. Although these governments are lacking unable –or even unwilling- to fulfil this function and capabilities in only two areas, these states still form consequently “a gap in capacity results, creating the a significant threat to regional and international conditions for suffering, epidemics, humanitarian security.40 crises, loss of public confidence, and potential political upheaval.”35 The delivery of basic goods and public The Consequences of Failed States services is especially difficult or even almost impossible in states where security conditions cannot Within states themselves, the human costs of state be assured. Therefore, states struggling with a security weakness and failure are extremely high. “When gap, find it often equally hard to meet the basic needs governments are weakened and fail, it is the local 36 of the population. In addition, due to low government people who suffer the most-losing access to the most basic government services (…); at the mercy 31 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.14. 32 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. 33 Idem. 37 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p. 24-25. 34 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.14. 38 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.13. 35 Ibidem, p.15. 39 Ibidem, p.14. 36 Idem. 40 Idem.

18 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

of armed groups, corrupt officials, and epidemic collapse over central power in weak and failed disease; driven from their homes; and denied any states generates instability and conflict in the region, opportunity to improve their communities or build better and can therefore “create massive refugee flows, lives for their children.”41 The state is increasingly uncontained violence, and uncontrolled epidemics”. unable to provide its citizens with the necessary In places where major regional powers are weak security and basic human rights are no longer (Nigeria, Pakistan, DRC), these states are in fact guaranteed. Impunity is widely spread and in most undermining regional stability in stead of cases states are struck by internal conflict in which encouraging it.45 In addition, illicit transnational severe violations of humanitarian law take place. networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, Citizens are forced to leave their homes and are are attracted to the power vacuum in failed states confronted with inescapable suffering. Societies are which allows for the trouble-free movement of broken down and ‘social capital’ eradicates. As a result money, people drugs and weapons throughout the of the violence, destruction and increased mutual region.46 distrust, entrepreneurship becomes too risky and The events of 11 September 2001 have shed economical malaise increases. A ‘secondary war new light on the issue of failed states, economy’42 arises enabling regional or local non-state demonstrating that failed states are no longer an entities to take and exert local power, using the war isolated and distant problem.47 Today, these states economy and ‘conflict trade’ as their financial pose a threat not only to their own populations but foundation.43 also to neighbouring states and regions, and even Weak and failed states have however to the global community as a whole.48 After all, consequences far beyond their own territorial borders. several failed states function as a haven and They put neighbouring governments and peoples at operating base for terrorist networks whose risk through numerous spill-over effects.44 The influence is noticeable globally. The clearest example of this is Afghanistan which has proven to 41 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.10-11. have functioned as a sanctuary to Al-Qaeda 42 A secondary war economy arises when internal war has destructed or obstructed the primary economy, the terrorists planning and training for the September 11 territorially-based domestic production (agriculture) and has attacks. In addition, drug production and drug trade eroded the tax base. Privatized military groups then seek alternative sources of funding such as acts of looting, flourishes in several (regions of) failed and weak robbery, extortion, pillage and hostage-taking, in order to states, which greatly boosts international illegal sustain their violent activities. These different militias, in control of different territories, are able to control market trade. What is more, because of the degradation of prices and to generate income through ‘war taxes’ or the national state system and the increase of ‘protection’ money from the production of drugs and primary commodities and from illegal trade. Moreover, internal instability, international streams of refugees these groups generate income through external assistance arise and frontier-running is no longer restrained.49 from individual families and diaspora living abroad, from foreign governments, through ‘custom duties’ and the Finally, weak states, especially those with significant ambush of international agencies delivering humanitarian natural resources and regional economic powers, assistance. In conclusion, “war provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in 45 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.10. order to sustain the war”. See: Mary Kaldor, New and Old 46 Idem. Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era (Oxford, 2001), 47 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, Appendix 1, ‘Request p.102-104 and 110. for Advise’, p.1. 43 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.30. 48 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.6 &8. 44 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.9. 49 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p. 30-31.

19 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

do not merely pose a threat to international security, and failed states require renewed attention and an but also form a limitation on “global economic efficient, coherent international response.54 progress”.50 After all, state weakness in the Caucasus, However, despite that the international Central Asia and Africa threatens vast parts of the community has become increasingly aware of the world’s energy supplies, and prevents emerging risks and consequences of state failure; no shared markets such as Indonesia and Nigeria from taking strategy for addressing states in stagnation and fully part in the global economy.51 decline has been developed thus far. No consensus even exists among academic scholars concerning development priorities and the reconstruction of 55 1.2 ‘Repairing’ Failed States failed states. In fact, one could speak of a conceptual labyrinth with regard to the theories

discussing the reconstruction of failed states. Approaches to State Failure Concepts such as ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’,

‘nation-building’, ‘state-building’, and ‘peace- State weakness and failure within today’s developing building’ are often used in academic literature on the countries presents a serious 21st century security subject, however, these concepts are used in threat across the entire global community. Weak and different meanings and to different means. failed states generate instability, which harms not only As a result of this conceptual labyrinth, the their own citizens but also influences their neighbours discussion around ‘repairing’ failed states is quite and even threatens international security, peace and divers. It spreads from comprehensive strategies to successful economic globalisation.52 It is exactly very minimalist approaches. On one side of the because of these spill-over effects and the widespread spectrum there are academic scholars stressing the consequences of state failure, that the lack of capacity need for a comprehensive (peace building) in several developing countries is “now more pressing approach to state failure - in which evenly attention than ever.”53 In fact, Weinstein et al argue that is given to all problem areas; either political, “international peace and security -and progress toward security, economical, social or psychological. On the development- now depend, in part, on the capacity of other side however, there are scholars emphasising governments in the developing world to defend their the need to focus primarily on the political aspects citizens, meet their basic needs, and build legitimacy in of state failure. Even among this last group of their eyes and those of the international community.” scholars – which stresses the need for political The task of reversing state weakness can therefore not reform - no consensus exists on the ways to be completely left to the weak and failed states consolidate a new political order. While much of the themselves. As the international community has literature argues that the promotion of democratic become familiar with the consequences of state failure, governance is the sole way to build a stable state there is a growing recognition among scholars as well as practitioners that the task of repairing failed states is 53 largely an international responsibility. Today’s weak Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.9. 54 See: Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.8-9; AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p. 94-95. 50 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.10. 55 Sultan Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 51 Idem. reconstruction: the challenges and critical dilemmas', in: 52 Ibidem, p.6. Third World Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 23, No 5, pp.801-816, p.811.

20 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

and prevent future conflict, some scholars warn for the to fill the power vacuum. Once state legitimacy and contradictory effects of fast democratisation and stress central state institutions are eroding, states are thus the challenges external actors are faced with. increasingly at the mercy of localised non-state However, even other authors regard attempts to actors and are accordingly extremely prone to transform a failed state into a democratic one to be internal conflict. In addition, once internal conflict is unrealistic and over-ambitious. Instead, these authors existent, the government is increasingly hampered advocate a more modest and realistic recovery in meeting the basic needs of its citizens. In other program. words; the notions of internal conflict and state failure are strongly interrelated, and are sometimes Comprehensive Approach to State Failure even negatively reinforcing. Therefore, this thesis argues that aspects of the theories on peace In this chapter I presume that existing academic building, designed as an approach to (post) conflict theories on peace building - meaning the external societies, are also applicable to today’s weak and attempts of the international community to provide failed states. long-lasting and self-sustainable peace in states torn According to earlier experiences in war-torn by internal conflict - are also applicable to the issue of societies, peace has shown to be no “quick fix” but a state failure and provide some useful guidelines for development process which requires sustained and repairing failed states. broad external assistance for “years of ‘post-war 58 After all, the concepts of internal war and state recovery’”. Building peace “requires sound failure are strongly connected. Internal war is not a foundations based on a commitment to righting “single catastrophic event but a devastating way of wrongs and achieving an acceptable level of social 59 life”, closely linked to the lack of central state authority justice and accountability”. From this perspective, and internal security, poverty and societal tensions.56 repairing failed states, too, should not just aim to In fact, the product of state failure generally is violent restore the status quo, but should also have a internal conflict. While factors such as ethnic “corrective dimension” if it is to “secure not only the differences, economic inequality and the availability of successful implementation of initial reconstruction small arms are regarded to worsen societal tensions activities, but, more importantly, sustain that 60 and increase the chances of internal conflict, the investment into the future.” Moreover, similar to immediate cause of internal conflict is always the resolving internal conflict, the reconstruction of state’s failure to manage these tensions in a peaceful failed states should be a matter of addressing all manor, Mark Malloch Brown argues.57 As was critical issues contributing to state failure, through a suggested in the paragraphs above, the legitimacy and comprehensive approach much like peace 61 security gap suffered by many weak and failed states, building. provides an opening for internal political upheaval and 58 crisis and for other states, non-state actors or criminals Barakat and Chard, ‘Theories, rhetoric and practice’, p.818. 59 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.810. 56 Sultan Barakat and Margaret Chard, 'Theories, rhetoric 60 Idem. and practice: recovering the capacities of war-torn societies', 61 The term ‘peace building’ gained wide-spread attention in: Third World Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 23, No 5, pp. 817- in the 1990’s, when the international community 835, p.818. conducted several post-conflict peace building operations 57 Malloch Brown, 'Democratic Governance’, p.142. in countries just emerging from violent internal conflicts.

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During the 1990’s many academic scholars argued the Dutch AIV and CAVV Advise on failed states that building peace was a matter of addressing those argues that “[t]he repair of failed states should issues that had caused internal conflict in the first involve all the factors that played a part in the place. According to John Paul Lederach, for instance, state’s failure. This means that the state should not actors in peace building should “attempt to address the be literally restored as it was before. A plan must be underlying structural, relational and cultural roots of devised to build safeguards against a repetition of conflict”. “I am suggesting that “peacebuilding” be the failure into the fabric of the state and into understood as a comprehensive term that substantive policy.”64 encompasses the full array of stages and approaches Similarly, Weinstein et al argue that the roots of needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, the security challenge presented by state weakness peaceful relations and outcomes”.62 The full magnitude and failure lie in “development, broadly understood of this comprehensive peace building task is clearly as progress towards stable, accountable national shown by Miall et al who have incorporated their institutions that can meet the needs of their citizens perspective of post-settlement peace building into a and take full part in the workings of the international conceptual framework.63 As is shown in Box 1, these community.”65 In their view, this process of authors have divided the task of post-settlement peace ‘development’ is not taking place at all in many building into support for making up the deficits in five ‘developing’ countries. Weak states have often different areas; military/security, political/constitutional, failed to reach economic development and just as economic/social, psychological/social, and often failed to establish transparent, participatory international. In addition, this framework shows that and accountable institutions of authority that Miall et al regard the task of peace building to be a convey legitimacy.66 Therefore, actors attempting to long-term project, enclosing interim/short term, reverse state failure should aim to empower weak medium-term and long-term measures. and failed states to better meet the legitimate needs of their citizens through the promotion of a broad Given that the product of state failure generally is range of development policies.67 This means that violent internal conflict, this thesis suggests that the providing goods and services is just one element of comprehensive approach to internal conflict is similarly the total reconstruction spectrum, and increased applicable to state failure. Indeed, some scholarly support is required for the complete array of what works argue that the political context in failed states Weinstein et al call “state-building”: “creating or asks for an equally comprehensive approach strengthening government institutions such as addressing all challenges of state failure. For instance, legislatures, judiciaries, health and education 68 systems, police forces and militaries.” However, different meanings were attributed to the concept. One of the first definitions of peace building was given by former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- Ghali who stated in 1992 that peace building operations seek "to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". See: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992) p.11. 64 AIV and CAVV, Failing States. 62 Citation of John Paul Lederach in: Hugh Miall, Oliver 65 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.6. Ramsbotham en Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict 66 Ibidem, p.11. Resolution (Cambridge 1999) pp. 185-215: p.187. 67 Ibidem, p.3. 63 See: Miall et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p.203. 68 Ibidem, p.11.

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Box 1 Post-settlement peace building: a framework

Interim/short-term Medium-term Long-term measures measures measures

Military/security Disarmament, Consolidation of new Demilitarisation of politics, demobilisation of national army, integration transformation of cultures of factions, separation of of national police violence army/police Political/constitutional Manage problems of Overcome the challenge Establish tradition of good transitional government, of the second election governance including respect constitutional reform for democracy, human rights, rule of law, development of civil society within genuine political community Economic/social Humanitarian relief, Rehabilitation of resettled Stable long-term macro- essential services, population and economic policies and communications demobilized soldiers, economic management, locally progress in rebuilding sustainable community infra-structure and de- development, distributional mining justice Psychological/social Overcoming initial Managing conflicting Healing psychological wounds, distrust priorities of peace and long term reconciliation justice International Direct, culturally sensitive Transference to local Integration into cooperative support for the peace control avoiding undue and equitable regional and process interference or neglect global structures

Source: Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, ‘Table 7.3, Post-settlement peacebuilding: a framework, in: Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge 1999), pp.185-215, p.203.

While the previous scholars primarily speak of and services; institution building to improve ‘state-building’ and ‘development’, others, such as efficiency and effectiveness of existing institutions; Sultan Barakat argues that international actors the structural reform of political economic, social attempting to repair failed states, should devise a and security sectors.”69 broad “reconstruction” strategy. Barakat This form of ‘reconstruction’ is also referred to understands “reconstruction, as the first step in a as ‘nation-building’ in some of the literature long-term recovery process, [which] entails discussing weak and failed states. For instance, economic, social and psychological readjustment, Larry Goodson argues that “nation-building” that is, the full range of integrated activities and (meaning “the comprehensive reconstruction of the processes that have to be initiated in order to polity, economy, and physical infrastructure of a reactivate the development process that has been disrupted by the conflict: restoration of the physical 69 infrastructure and essential government functions Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.809.

23 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

bludgeoned land”70) provides “the hedge against a report on failing states) state weakness and failure return of instability and terrorism” in failed states.71 can be attributed to three dimensions or “capability He claims that the security threat failed states pose gaps”: (1) the legitimacy gap; the inability to to the international community, cannot solely be maintain legitimacy, (2 ) the security gap; the addressed by military means; “an ounce of nation- inability to ensure security, and (3) the capacity gap; building prevention will be worth a pound of military- the inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens.73 operation cure.”72 Accordingly, Goodson regards all Accordingly, since weak and failed states, by approaches summarized under the term ‘nation- definition, lack security, capacity and legitimacy to building’ to be vital elements of any strategy aimed govern effectively, the key to repairing failed states at failed states. lays exactly in these three elements. In conjunction Although the above mentioned authors use with Weinstein et al and the AIV and CAVV report, different concepts (either ‘reconstruction’, this thesis argues that for external actors to ‘development’, ‘nation-building’ or ‘state-building’) adequately respond to state failure, they should thus and provide different meanings of these concepts, attempt to ‘fill’ the three capability gaps.74 they all advocate a comprehensive approach to state weakness and failure. Similar to the reasoning Recovery will involve all the factors that played a of the above mentioned authors, this thesis argues part in the state’s failure. This means that the that repairing failed states is much like the type of state should not be literally restored as it was before. A plan must be devised to build peace building that was indicated in the conceptual safeguards against a repetition of failure into the framework of Miall et al: A comprehensive and long- fabric of the state and into substantive policy.75 term task, requiring international support in a wide range of problem areas. Moreover, repairing failed However, despite the apparent importance of states, just as ending internal conflict, calls for addressing the capacity gap to the reconstruction of dedication, determination, patience and staying a failed state, this thesis is limited to discussing power of the international aid community. merely two of the three capability gaps. Since the

main scope of this thesis is on the political Filling the Capability Gaps reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the following chapters will be focused on the legitimacy The wide spectrum of activities summarised in the and security gap. From the perspective of state framework provided by Miall et al clearly illustrates formation and democratisation these two capability the magnitude of the task to reconstruct failed gaps are most interesting for analyses. After all, to states. However, this thesis considers not all (re)construct a democratic state, legitimacy and indicated reconstruction areas to be of equal security have to be created by reforming and importance. After all, as was suggested by developing existing state institutions and security Weinstein et al (as well as by the AIV and CAVV structures, which are very complex processes. Moreover, given that localised leadership –which

70 Larry Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction’, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14., No 73 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.14-15. 1, January 2003, 82-99, p. 98. 74 Ibidem, p.16. 71 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.96. 75 Translation from the Dutch citation in: AIV and 72 Ibidem, p.97. CAVV, Failing States, p .94.

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contributes to both the security and legitimacy gap- importance to (post) conflict societies. Such is central in the following chapters, the aspects of scholars focus on the political dimension of internal legitimacy and security are of great relevance to this conflict, and seek to devise the recovery strategy thesis. accordingly.80 Resultantly, in recent years, several authors have increasingly emphasised the mutual Creating Legitimacy and Authority convergence between post-war peace building on one side and good governance and democratisation 81 As was shown in the framework for post-settlement on the other. peace building (See Box 1), one of the critical tasks One good example of such an author is Roy of peace building is making up the Licklider, who regards the distribution of political political/constitutional deficit.76 International actors, power in the state to be the primary objective of such as the UN, attempt to fulfil this task by peace building. He states that since political managing problems of the transitional government competition lies at the heart of internal conflict, through power-sharing arrangements and by international actors should "establish a set of constitutional reform underpinned by free and fair political institutions through which societal conflicts 82 elections. In the longer term, the strategy holds may be pursued without large-scale violence". In support for and the establishment of a tradition of the same way, Elizabeth Cousens argues that the good governance including respect for democracy, strategic focus of peace building efforts should be human rights, rule of law, and the development of on political reform, since the lack of political civil society within a genuine political community.77 institutions and state capacity are the root causes of 83 The intended result of the support for political and internal conflict. To address the legitimacy and constitutional reform is to create a form of “authority” authority gap, international actors should thus first or “legitimate domination”.78 Governments should build capable political institutions which earn the have their citizen’s confidence and citizens must respect and trust of the people. The aim of identify themselves with their state’s institutions. As international actors should therefore not be the was suggested earlier, for a state to function elimination of conflict, but should be good effectively the state must foster legitimacy, through governance; the development and strengthening of establishing institutions that protect basic rights and effective social, political, legal and, eventually, freedoms, holding individuals accountable for their legitimate authoritative mechanisms by which a actions, enforcing laws and contracts equally, and polity can resolve its claims, grievances and enabling broad-based citizen participation in the 79 political realm. 80 Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in: Elizabeth M. In contrast to the literature advocating the need Cousens & Chetan Kumar (ed), Peacebuilding as Politics. Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (London, for a comprehensive approach to peace building, 2001), pp.1-20: p.8. 81 several academic scholars regard support in the Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, ‘Introduction: Postconflict Peacebuilding and Democratization’, in: political/constitutional realm to be of primary Global Governance, Volume: 9, Issue: 2 (April 01, 2003), pp. 135-139: p.141 82 Roy Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, in: ed. 76 Miall, et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p.204. C. A. Crocker, F. Olser Hampson and P. Aall, Turbulent 77 Ibidem, p.203. Peace, The Challenges of Managing International 78 Weber, ‘The types of Legitimate Domination’, p.183. Conflict (Washington, 2001) pp.697-718: pp.706-707. 79 Weinstein et al, On the Brink, p.15. 83 Cousens, ‘Introduction’, p.12.

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competition in a peaceful manner, Cousens legitimate form of domination or authority. This argues.84 revival of ‘wilsonianism’89 can be found in theories Since good governance is quite a vague term, it of many academic authors, among one is Timothy may be helpful to define it further. According to Sisk. Sisk argues that the democratic solution to Barakat and Chard the term ‘governance’ can be weak and failed states is the only feasible way to understood as “‘the manner in which power is construct “a legitimate system of post war exercised in the management of a country’s governance.”90 In Sisks opinion democracy – economic and social resources for development’” characterised by “periodic and genuine elections, and they see “‘good governance’ as involving constitutional limitations on the exercise of ‘systems of accountability, adequate and reliable governmental power, and respect for basic civil information and efficiency in resource management liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and the delivery of public services’”.85 Through the and conscience”91 - is the only “just” and “legitimate development of institutions increasing collaboration way to peacefully manage differences among between the state, civil society and the market, and contending social groups.” After all, a democratic through national capacity building, external actors system of government allows for conflict to continue are capable of supporting good governance in failed in a peaceful manner through democratic institutions states.86 In addition, Barakat and Chard indicate such as the parliament and legal courts, he argues. that the need to establish local and national good These democratic institutions are a system of “non- governance has recently become a core concept violent conflict management”, since they promote within modern recovery efforts in collapsed and war- "bargaining, compromise, and inclusive coalitions".92 torn states.87 Moreover, the strategy of promoting democracy has In fact, in recent years the term ‘good been based on the assumption that only governance’ has become increasingly identified with democracies with a free market economy benefit some form of democracy.88 In other words, their citizens and safe-guard international stability in academic scholars as well as international actors, the long run.93 increasingly see democratic governance as the 89 Wilsonianism refers to the foreign policy of US President Woodrow Wilson. He stated that '[D]emocracy 84 Cousens, ‘Introduction’, p.12. promises "the supreme and peaceful rule of counsel" or 85 Citation from World bank (1992) Governance and rational debate, which is the recipe for "peace and Development (Washington, DC : World Bank) p.1-3. in: progress". His strong belief was that democracies were Barakat and Chard, ‘Theories, rhetoric and practice’, more peaceful than non-democracies, as well in their p.821. domestic affairs, as in their relations with other states. 86 Barakat and Chard define an institution as either “an See: Roland Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost, The Faulty established law, custom, usage, practice, organisation or Assumptions of Postconflict Peacebuilding', in: ed. C. A. other element in the political or social life of a people” or Crocker, F. Olser Hampson and P. Aall, Turbulent Peace, as “[a]n establishment, organisation or association The Challenges of Managing International Conflict instituted for the promotion of some object, especially (Washington, 2001), pp. 765-784: p. 765-766. one of public utility, religious, charitable etc.” Moreover, 90 Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Democratisation and Peacebuilding: they define capacity building as “strengthening the Perils and Promises’, in: ed. C. A. Crocker, F. Olser capability of administrative and managerial personnel ‘to Hampson en P. Aall, Turbulent Peace, The Challenges of plan, implement, manage or evaluate … programs Managing International Conflict (Washington, 2001) designed to impact on social conditions in the pp.785-800, p.785. community’”. Citations from ‘Barakat and Chard, 91 Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost’, p.766. ‘Theories, rhetoric and practice’, p.820. 92 Sisk, ‘Democratisation', p.785 and 799. 87 Ibidem, p.817. 93 Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, Rebuilding 88 Call and Cook, 'Introduction', p.135. Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality, Policy Brief 12,

26 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

In compliance with the theory indicated above, amount of development assistance is likely to lead Nicolle Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor to sustainable outcomes. The intellectual and emphasise the need for international efforts to be political capacity of a society to use this assistance aimed at improving democratic governance in a fair, equitable and participatory manner may be throughout weak and collapsed states.94 These of greater significance in ensuring sustainable authors understand democratic governance to development than the level of development comprise “the rule of law, including legal protection assistance itself”.97 of citizens’ rights, interests, and personal security as The recent global attention for democratic well as fairness in the administration of justice and governance has encouraged many international independence of the judiciary. Democratic actors such as individual states, multilateral governance however also includes the right of organisations and international non-governmental political participation, and transparent and organisations (INGO's), to pursue a common accountable government institutions”.95 Also strategy for dealing with failed states: promoting stressing the need for democratic governance, democratic governance and democratisation. Malloch Brown emphasises that support for Democratisation is generally understood as "a democratic governance is central to the process of gradually introducing more participatory government’s capacity for peacefully managing politics, including elections and the creation of a civil internal tensions and disputes. Accordingly, he society supportive of tolerant, pluralistic politics regards democratic governance to be vital to the through adherence to constitutional rules of the consolidation of sustainable peace and game".98 Indeed, for the last ten years the development.96 In fact, Malloch Brown argues that international community has applied a “democratic- “in the absence of democratic governance, no reconstruction model”99 aiming to transform failed states into democratic ones. The elements of this

January 2002, Carnegie Endowment for International democratic-reconstruction model are summarised Peace (available at: by Ottaway and Lieven as follows: http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief12.pdf, accessed August 22, 2004), p.4. 94 Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, The parties involved in the conflict must reach Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security agreement on a new permanent political system. Sector: An institutional Assessment Framework, Prepared by The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Elections must be held as soon as possible. The ‘Clingendael’ for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign new state must be multiethnic, secular, and Affairs (The Hague, August 2003), p.31. democratic (…). While the accord is being 95 Ball et al, Enhancing Democratic Governance, p.31. 96 Support for democratic governance in failed states can implemented, peace and order are guaranteed by an be provided in several ways, for example through; international force, as well as by the presence of a strengthening and reforming institutions (such as large number of U.N. administrators. The commissions and interim authorities), creating greater civic participation in these institutions, providing more international financial institutions take in hand the oversight over development activities, supporting restructuring of the country’s economy. International dialogue aimed at consensus building, supporting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are funded national elections and voter education, deploying international observers, reforming the police and judiciary, decentralizing governance to increase participation by civil society and guaranteeing fair development assistance to ensure that this does not lead 97 Malloch Brown, ‘Democratic Governance’, p. 142. to an aggravation of internal tensions. See: Malloch 98 Sisk, ‘Democratisation’, p.785. Brown, ‘Democratic Governance’, p. 143-144. 99 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.4.

27 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

to work in their specialized areas, ranging from latter from the political reform process, has shown to 100 humanitarian aid to election organizing. be a mistake.105 State-formation may in some cases be contradictory to democratisation: Just as an The Challenges and Debates of Democratising apparent non-democrat may come to play a Failed States constructive role in the process, a convincing As was demonstrated above, a great number of democrat may cause problems further down the authors seem to accept the principle of ‘liberal road.106 Earlier democratising attempts have also 101 democracy’. According to the above mentioned shown that a new constitution should not be forced authors, the promotion of democratic governance is upon the country. In fact, the process of establishing a crucial task for the international aid community a new constitution including the necessary attempting to fill the legitimacy gap in weak and consensus-building and negotiations is of more failed states. However, despite the wide-spread value than the constitution itself, Thomas Carothers enthusiasm for democracy and democratic argues. International actors should therefore back governance, some academic scholars are more off and “encourage wide, genuine participation in hesitant in advocating the “raw democratic the writing and approval process”.107 102 process”. After all, earlier experiences of applying Moreover, in failed states lacking democratic the democratic-reconstruction model in collapsed traditions, elections should not be rushed since they states have demonstrated that the consolidation of “aggravate rather than resolve internal conflict”.108 democracy is not as straightforward as the Resultantly, the short-term goals of international aforementioned theories may suggest. efforts (i.e. national elections) are contradictory to Experiences of democratisation in for instance, the higher, long-term objective of consolidating Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda and Angola have sustainable peace. Roland Paris therefore strongly made several authors quite sceptical of international criticises the ‘Wilsonian assumption’ within democratising efforts and have shown that some international peace building efforts. From Paris’ 103 important lessons can and should be learned. perspective the assumption that the short-term One lesson to be learned is that democracy is not liberalisation of states - in the political sphere consolidated when external actors appoint personal meaning democratisation – will lead to domestic, favourites to govern the country. This will create a stable peace, has clearly proven to be flawed.109 In compliant but unrepresentative new government, fact, Paris argues that this liberalisation strategy is 104 lasting as long as the military occupation does. contra-productive: It serves to exacerbate rather Similarly, the division of a country’s political elites than moderate societal conflict because it into the exclusive categories of ‘democratic’ and strengthens just those conditions that led to societal ‘non-democratic’ and accordingly excluding the conflict in the first place: political competition and 110 economic strive. The short-term realisation of 100 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.4. elections for instance, can raise ethnic rivalry and 101 Miall et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution p.204. 102 Idem. 103 See: Thomas Carothers, ‘Messy Democracy’, in: the 105 Carothers, ‘Messy Democracy’, p.2. Washington Post, April 8, 2003 (available at: 106 Idem. http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/2003-04-08- 107 Idem. carothers-washpost.asp, accessed April 23, 2003) and: 108 Idem. Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost’, p. 765-784. 109 Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost’ p.766. 104 Carothers, ‘Messy Democracy’, p.2. 110 Ibidem, p.766-767.

28 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

political competition and may therefore cause a foundations for more peaceful and democratic relapse into conflict. societies in the long run", Paris argues.115 By If fast democratisation is indeed a faulty constructing a firm institutional foundation for foundation for peace building, then the international democratic politics, international actors in failed community has only two options: “either abandon states can thus lay the basis for a smoother and the practice of postconflict peacebuilding or fix it”, less risky transition to democracy and ultimately, to Paris argues. However, since internal conflict inflicts long-lasting peace.116 tremendous suffering on civilian populations and Although the above mentioned scholars point risks spill-over to neighbouring countries, Paris out the risks of fast and full-scale democratic argues that “outside actors can and should assist reconstruction, these scholars still accept the war-shattered states”, but need to fix the existing principle of liberal democracy. However, in contrast, peace building mechanism, so that democracy and some authors strongly oppose the strategy of durable peace are promoted. The main question is imposing or even enforcing democracy upon thus: "How to set war-shattered states on the path indigenous people. Instead, these authors, such as toward liberal (…) democracy in the long term while Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, argue that the avoiding the destabilising effects of political (…) promotion of democracy in failed states is an liberalisation in the short term?"111 Paris’ answer to overambitious and unrealistic Western this question is to apply a strategy of reconstruction programme.117 According to Ottaway "institutionalisation before liberalisation".112 and Lieven the “democratic-reconstruction model” International actors must delay liberalisation until does not leave any room for the input of the state’s political institutions have been constructed, which citizens, nor takes into account the state’s traditional are able to manage the societal tensions that arise social and political structures.118 Moreover, they from the process of democratisation itself.113 Instead argue that much of the democratic-reconstruction of short term democratisation, international actors model does only fit the demands of a very select should thus build governmental institutions that are group of westernised diaspora, many of whom have effective, - in the sense that they make authoritative lived almost their entire life in the west. Ottaway and decisions - sufficiently neutral and professional to Lieven regard these people not only to be out of channel societal conflict peacefully. Meanwhile, touch with their traditional society, but also accuse international actors should promote the growth of them of having vested interests in applying the moderate, cross-factional political parties and western model, which would ensure them of constrain extremist power.114 To achieve these employment and status in their homeland. What is goals, the international community must not be more, these authors argue that, to function afraid to exert direct control over the new effectively, the democratic reconstruction model institutions, at least initially, and to act illiberal "by would have to be enforced upon, reluctant local constraining civil liberties and political activity in the leaders refusing to give up their positions of power short run, in order to build the institutional and (fanatic) religious authorities resisting

111 Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost’, p.775. 115 Paris, 'Wilson's Ghost’, p.767. 112 Ibidem, p.781. 116 Ibidem, p.781. 113 Ibidem, p.767. 117 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.1 114 Ibidem, p. 776-777. 118 Ibidem, p.4.

29 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

secularity. For such a strategy to succeed, a strong state, replacing all forms of authority in the short foreign military campaign and presence would thus term. Instead, international actors may be better be necessary, hereby placing the country under served by a more moderate approach, accepting foreign occupation. According to Ottaway and ordered anarchy and providing only the minimal Lieven, as former cases of such a strategy have conditions for a state to function. The role that shown (such as the intervention in Somalia), foreign indigenous power holders and traditional power occupation only leads to internal conflict between structures may have within such a modest and international forces and powerful local leaders and realistic program, will be discussed later in this militias.119 In short, they argue that an occupational chapter. strategy is likely to reach the exact opposite of the original intents. Fore these reasons Ottaway and Ensuring Security Lieven find that this “Western dominated, socio- political engineering approach” is not very likely to As was suggested in section 1.1 of this chapter, 120 succeed in failed states. failed states are characterized by three capability Instead, Ottaway and Lieven argue that the gaps. Apart from the legitimacy gap discussed international community needs to “devise a more above, governments of failed states also experience modest and realistic program, aimed at creating a deficit in their capabilities to ensure security. As peace and restoring basic economic functions rather states must be protected against aggression and 121 than rebuilding the entire state”. This internal disorder, citizens must be exempted from reconstruction programme would have to be based state repression, violent internal conflict and on the reality of the country and would not require rampant criminality.124 However, lacking the 122 “full-fledged military occupation”. Instead, these capability to strengthen internal security, authors argue, the international community would governments of failed states are trapped in a vicious have to initially accept some version of ordered circle of state failure and insecurity. If states and anarchy before it could work to attenuate the state’s people “are not secure form the fear of random, worst shortcomings. Then, a rather loose “national capricious, systemic or unsanctioned violence at the mediation committee” has to be created, functioning local, national, regional and international levels, indefinitely instead of an initial six months. “This development will not become sustainable”.125 The committee should seek not to create the whole spiral of insecurity undermines the reconstruction apparatus of a modern state, but rather the minimal process: Efforts to build state institutions delay; conditions for medieval civilization: the avoidance of economies cannot thrive, investments finish and major armed conflict, the security of main trade corruption and criminality are out of control. For routes, and the safety and neutrality of the capital”, these reasons, the international community is set 123 Ottaway and Lieven point out. In compliance with with the task of breaking this spiral by devising a this view, one could argue that repairing failed coherent policy on security. states is not a matter of building a completely new

119 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.5. 123 120 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.5-6. Ibidem, p.4. 124 121 Enhancing Democratic Ibidem, p.1 Ball, Bouta and Van de Goor, 122 Idem. Governance, p.30. 125 Idem.

30 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

However, similar to the lack of a coherent is taken advantage of during demobilisation".128 strategy for political reform, there also appears to be Stedman concludes that, disarmament, if it takes no consensus on the contents of a policy with place at all, follows demobilisation. In the absence regard to security. While some scholars stress the of demobilisation, disarmament does not occur.129 need for a comprehensive approach to providing However, the success or failure of disarmament is security, others emphasise the need for short-term closely linked to the local security situation. disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Especially in failed states, where the central state is former combatants, while even other authors unable to provide internal security, disarmament is believe that only an international peace keeping extremely difficult. After all, local leaders and militias force is able to effectively ensure security in the arisen from the power vacuum have turned to arms short term. "as a means of security self-help".130 Fearing to lose their positions of power and out of fear for their Stephen John Stedman stresses the importance of adversaries, these powerful local entities will be short term demobilisation, disarmament, and very hesitant to give up their weapons. Moreover, reintegration (DDR) of former combatants within the DDR can be hampered by the lack of discipline broader framework of post-war reconstruction. This within the different factions. This complicates faction author regards the demobilisation of soldiers and leaders to convince rank-and-file soldiers to disarm their (re)integration into a national army or civil life, and demobilize.131 to be crucial to the ending of civil war and the In failed states the possession of arms is strengthening of internal security.126 The DDR however not just a function of ongoing insecurity. programme for former faction leaders and ex- Arms are also an important economic asset since combatants generally involves "assembling the many ex-combatants and local strongmen find that fighters to disarm them and give them some crime is the easiest way to prosper economically. preparation for re-entering civil life (…) including "Where combatants’ livelihoods have become some skills and basic education, and providing them dependent on violent predation, the proclivity of with some basic resources for some time."127 rank-and-file soldiers to disarm depends on the Stedman argues that third-party actors play a expected opportunities of socio-economic central role in enabling the process of reintegration, most importantly access to land or demobilisation by providing leadership, resources other employment and income opportunities", and personnel. Moreover, external actors can Nitzschke argues.132 According to Nitzschke, the decrease the risks for combatants when putting international aid community should therefore down their arms, by "acting as guarantors and deterring any party from taking advantage of their 128 Stedman, 'International Implementation’, p. 746. 129 Ibidem, p.747. adversary's vulnerability or protecting any party that 130 Idem. 131 Heiko Nitzschke, International Peace Academy, Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, Report of the 725th 126 Stephen John Stedman, 'International Implementation Wilton Park Conference, Sussex, October 27-29, 2003 of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars', in: ed. C. A. (New York, December 2003) (available at: Crocker, F. Olser Hampson en P. Aall, Turbulent Peace, http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/TRANSFORMI The Challenges of Managing International Conflict NG_WAR_ECONOMIES.pdf, accessed March 7, 2004), (Washington, 2001) pp.737-752: p.746. p.8. 127 Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, p. 705. 132 Nitzschke, Transforming War Economies, p.8.

31 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

provide socio-economic support to ex-combatants state”.136 In this way, time is bought to ultimately and warlords early in the DDR process, so that pass on responsibilities to an indigenous national these actors are more likely to give up their guns security force. and leave violent militias. In this way, disarming, Rachel Bronson, however, regards an demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants does international peacekeeping force to be insufficient. not only form an answer to the internal security She argues that for international actors to effectively problem that militia’s pose, but also forms a solution ensure security in failed states, they should not only to the wider problem of the secondary war economy provide an international peacekeeping force but which is sustained by local strongmen and rebels should initiate a “security-conscious nation building who benefit financially from the continuation of war. plan”.137 Bronson emphasises that the primary The provision of socio-economic support to ex- reason for international actors to struggle with the combatants should be a long-term process and task of providing security in failed states, is the should not be implemented temporarily. To reach mismatch between the resources of international sustained internal security and to dismantle the actors and the requirements of a failed state. While power of factions and their leaders in the longer- a failed state is in need of security in the short term, term, "DDR should not be pursued as a ‘quick-fix’ international actors, such as the US military, are strategy [but] needs to be integrated into a larger, often “not very well suited for the task of long-term framework of postconflict peace building establishing security in precarious environments.”138 and economic reconstruction”, Nitzschke argues.133 With a lack of paramilitary forces and poorly In contrast, to the emphasis on short-term DDR, organised civilian policing tools, ill-equipped and the authors Ottaway and Lieven argue that to inadequate elite combat forces are left to do the job. ensure security the international community should This mismatch ensures that a failed state continues provide failed states with a large and capable to use its security forces ineffectively, and international peace keeping force - preferably accordingly, obstructs the withdrawal of international authorised by the United Nations.134 In the absence forces.139 To prevent this situation, Bronson advises of national security mechanisms, and since a newly international actors to properly address the security created national army will not be capable of problem within failed states by providing assistance ensuring the primary security conditions, Ottaway at different points along the security spectrum. and Lieven regard only an international Accordingly, her proposed ‘security-conscious peacekeeping force to be capable of establishing nation-building plan’ includes three discrete sets of short-term stability throughout the country and forces, needed to repair the lack of security in weak providing the right conditions for central state and failed states. functionality.135 Similarly, Larry Goodson argues that an adequate force of international peacekeepers is “High-end military capabilities are required to destroy vital to providing internal security and necessary to hostile forces and secure external boundaries. “move beyond the entrenched problems of a failed 136 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction’, p. 98. 137 Rachel Bronson, ‘When Soldiers Become Cops’, in: 133 Nitzschke, Transforming War Economies, p.9. Foreign Affairs, 81, 6 (2002), pp.122-133, p.122. 134 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.6. 138 Bronson, ‘When Soldiers Become Cops’, p.122. 135 Idem. 139 Ibidem, p.122-123.

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Constabulary or paramilitary organizations are international actors must therefore devise a needed to handle threats such as riots and comprehensive policy aimed at reforming the widespread organized violence (although high-end complete public security sector, Ball et al argue. To military support and back-up may be necessary). help governments devise such a policy, Ball et al Finally, police, judges, and an effective penal system have developed an ‘Institutional Assessment are also necessary to ensure that basic law and order are established and effectively defended”.140 Framework for Enhancing the Democratic Governance of the Security Sector’. Even though Although emphasising the need for an equally Ball et al do not focus on failed states specifically, I comprehensive approach to providing security, regard this study to be applicable to the study of Nicole Ball Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor failed states as well since their study aims to stress not so much the capacity of the international strengthen the security sector in developing post- actors in providing security forces, but indicate the conflict countries, which can be considered weak or need for strengthening national security capacity failed states according to the definition as stated in through support for so called, ‘security sector the beginning of this chapter. governance’. The three groups comprising what is In contrast to the concept of ‘good governance’ commonly known as ‘the security sector’ are; (1) which, as was suggested above, has been Bodies authorized to use force, such as armed increasingly recognised as central to the forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; consolidation of democracy, little attention has been intelligence services; secret services; custom given to the need for democratic governance of the 143 authorities and; reserve or local security units (2) security sector. Nevertheless, Ball et al regard Civil management and oversight bodies, such as the democratic governance of the security sector to be president/prime minister; national security advisory essential, not only for the “quality of security, i.e., bodies; legislature and legislative select creating a safe and secure environment for the state committees; ministries of Defence, internal affairs, and its entire population”, but also for the success of foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; sustainable political, economic and social develop- 144 and statutory civil society organizations, and finally, ment within the concerning state. In fact, these (3) Judicial and public security bodies, such as authors argue that a policy of security sector judiciary; justice ministries; Defence attorneys; governance forms a precondition for stability and criminal investigation and prosecution services; peace in war-torn societies, since a secure environ- 145 prisons; human rights commissions and ment is essential to sustainable development. ombudsmen; correctional services; customary and The principles of democratic security sector traditional justice systems.141 governance are summarised in Box 2. In failed states, the security sector is autonomous: it is politically powerful, technically obscure and generally lacks civilian and democratic control.142 To address the lack of internal security,

140 Bronson, ‘When Soldiers Become Cops’, p.125. 141 Ball et al., Enhancing Democratic Governance, p.32- 143 Ball, et al., Enhancing Democratic Governance, p.30. 33. 144 Idem. 142 Ibidem, p.33. 145 Idem.

33 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Box 2 Principles of Democratic Governance in the Security Sector

Within the security sector democratic governance means: • Accountability of security bodies to civil authorities and civil society

• Adherence of security bodies to international law and domestic constitutional law • Transparency of security-related matters • Adherence of security sector to the same principles of public expenditure management as

non-security sectors • Acceptance of clear hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and security bodies, clear statement of mutual rights and obligations between civil authorities and security bodies • Capacity among civil authorities to exercise political control and constitutional oversight of security sector • Capacity within civil society to monitor security sect or and provide constructive input into political debate on security policies • Political environment conducive to an active role on the part of civil society • Access of security forces to professional training co nsistent with requirements of democratic societies • High priority accorded to regional and sub-regional peace and security by policy makers

Source: As stated in: Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An institutional Assessment Framework, Prepared by The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague, August 2003), p.31-32, which

was derived from: Nicole Ball, “Democratic Governance in the Security Sector”, Prepared for UNDP Workshop on “Learning from Experience for Afghanistan,” February 5, 2002, p.3, www.undp.org/eo/Publication/Afghanistan.htm

Ball et al regard strengthening democratic security skill development, rule orientation and adherence to sector governance to be a complex, time consuming democratic principles, (4) Strengthening oversight and daunting task for external actors, since it mechanisms; including both the internal (legislature) involves many terrains and many local and external and external (civil society) component, and finally stakeholders.146 These authors have therefore (5) Managing security sector expenditures; identified several prioritized areas on which external increasing efficiency, affectivity, accountability and actors should focus. Ball et al have indicated five so transparency of security policies and budgets.147 called “entry points” that they believe to have the greatest potential for external actors aiming to promote democratic security sector governance. These are: (1) Strength-ening legal and constitutional frameworks; defining the prerogatives and limitations of those in power and defending the wide range of rights for citizens, (2) Policy development, planning and implementation; assessing the security environment, developing implementing and managing security policies, (3) Increasing professionalism; doctrinal development,

147 Ball, et al., Enhancing Democratic Governance, p.33- 146 Ball, et al., Enhancing Democratic Governance, p.30. 34.

34 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

1.3 ‘Repairing’ Failed States: they have ensured their dominance over like- minded groups, strong and powerful group leaders Working with Warlords emerge primarily to“ nurture personal prosperity”.150

After all, internal conflict, an unproductive economy The previous sections of this chapter, 1.1 and 1.2, and wide-spread poverty motivates dissatisfied have both focussed on the general theories with faction leaders “to change their approach from a regard to the origins and reconstruction of failed purely doctrinaire political stance to one of states. Section 1.3 will however focus on the 151 perceived economic advantage”. Accordingly, problem of warlords which external actors are faced these leaders, or so called warlords, exploit the dire with while aiming to repair failed states. The case security situation and the collapse of state authority study of Liberia (See Box 3) is a tragic but perfect to pursue specific personal objectives. By means of example of what often happens when a central charismatic leadership and military power they are government fails on all three dimensions able to obtain territory, frightening and terrorising (legitimacy, security and capacity) of state failure. unarmed civilians into submission. John Mackinlay The study of Liberia by William R. Stanley shows identifies five motives for warlords to secure local that national disintegration and the collapse of power in failed states. He argues that they are central government result in a power vacuum which motivated by (1) the desire to capture land and warlords “as de-facto rulers over large portions of resources free of external interference, (2) the easy the national territory” attempt to fill.148 Repairing exploitation of defenceless citizens, (3) the prospect failed states is thus not always as straightforward as of lucrative trade in often illegal businesses, (4) the the theories may suggest. International actors prospect of exploiting international organisations attempting to repair collapsed states, will often have and finally, (5) the desire to transform traditional to cope with warlords who pose a daunting economic methods into more lucrative, often illegal, challenge to the consolidation of peace, security 152 ones. By means of smuggling, armed robbery, and democracy. extortion, arms trafficking, internal taxation systems,

the exploitation of minerals and international The Emergence of Warlords assistance, and through drug production, warlords

are able to collect sufficient financial resources to As is shown by the case of Liberia, warlords emerge obtain their follower’s loyalty and to prosper from the power vacuum resulting from national 153 personally. disintegration and internal collapse.149 In the absence of central state authority and internal security, groups are initially focused to protect themselves and their resources. However, once

150 John Mackinlay, University of Bristol, Warlords, 148 William R. Stanley, ‘Background to the Liberia and (available at: Sierra Leone implosions’, in: Geo Journal , March http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/pga/warlordspreview.p 2004, Vol. 61, Nr. 1, pp.69-78, p.69. df accessed March 5, 2004), pp.1-6, p.4. 149 Gordon Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, in: 151 Mackinlay, Warlords, p.1 Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2003, vol.56, 152 Ibidem, p.1-2. no.2, pp. 181-191, p.182. 153 Ibidem, p.6.

35 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Box 3. State Failure and the Emergence of Warlords: the Case of Liberia

Throughout most of the 19th century and for years after World War II, the United States held an unofficial protectorate in the West-African country of Liberia. During the late 19th century, Liberia’s central government was severely ill functioning; “the country’s infrastructure hardly existed. Health facilities and communications were deplorable. Government was at pains to provide even rudimentary services in the scattered and isolated Americo-Liberia coastal settlements.” (Stanley, p.71) While American investments accelerated economic development in Liberia, external interference drastically influenced social dynamics. “Not only did Liberia’s Government favor those émigrés [Americo-Liberians] who settled along the coast while at the same time denying meaningful citizenship to the natives of the interior, its policies until the 1950s exploited those who constituted the greater portion of the country’s population.” (Stanley, p.76) Moreover, with the transformation of Liberia’s economy the militia tradition amongst Americo-Liberians faded away, leaving soldiering almost entirely to recruits from the tribal hinterlands whose ethnic groups suffered repetitively under Americo-Liberians domination. “This inequity between Americo-Liberians and tribal peoples was to bring the country to its knees and all but destroy the fabric of nationhood.”, Stanley argues. (Stanley, p.76) The dynamics of national disintegration in Liberia where set in motion in April 1980, as one small faction of newly trained recruits brutally ended the old oligarchy by murdering the President, his security detail, and most of the leading Americo-Liberian politicians. Once the Americo-Liberian top was removed, no one remained to fight the coupe. As a result, Monrovia was looted by troops no longer under restraint. Violent change was to be expected. Within a decade, the new, decentralised leaders (or warlords) were either fighting each other or were caught up in conflict with various (ethnic) factions. In time, the only troops left to support the original Americo-Liberian junta were from one small tribe. As armed groups flourished (“Carrying a gun was the only sure way to be guaranteed a meal.” (Stanley, p.75)), the vast interior of Liberia fell into anarchy. Several different factions secured their positions in the countryside and arranged their own hierarchies. Events in April and May 1996, when Monrovia “once before exploded into an orgy of factional strife, looting and mass killing”, (Stanley, p.69) and the reports of Liberia’s civil war in autumn 2003, show that peace and internal stability are still far from reality in Liberia. From American policy one can make up that the United States are very hesitant to intervene once more in the “Liberian quagmire.” (Stanley, p.69) Instead, the US prefers to provide financial and logistics support to West African countries as to encourage African intervention. Unfortunately, peacekeeping efforts conducted by African countries have not been fruitful. In fact, the problems with leadership at all levels and inadequate logistics and training have often even “exacerbated an already unstable situation”, Stanley argues. (Stanley, p.69)

Source: William R. Stanley, ‘Background to the Liberia and Sierra Leone implosions’, in: Geo Journal , March 2004, Vol. 61, Nr. 1, pp.69-78.

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Once in power, warlords consolidate their notion of the state.158 Warlords will thus generally position by imposing their “own will and system of resist the establishment of democratic institutions - government upon an area for profit, prestige and the such as a national representative government pursuit of his personal objectives”.154 Moreover, by elected through national elections and a judicial controlling security, powerful warlords are able to system based on democratic and universal human monitor the flow of trade and goods in and out their rights – since these sharply contradict their territory, meanwhile accumulating resources and traditional social system of local leadership and funds. Through the provision of local security and force them to cross ethnic and tribal lines. some public services, warlords assure that, in the Moreover, in the wake of a centralised state, local absence of the central state as provider, allegiance warlords will refuse to give up their positions of and loyalty is directed towards them instead of to power, as their primary objective is to “preserve the abstract state.155 Resultantly, their degree of their territorial control free from external economic and political power often even exceeds interference”.159 Nor will local warlords agree to give that of the country’s central government in the up the financial benefits of localised rule. Since territories under warlord control.156 warlords financially benefit from the lack of internal security in a failed state, they have vested interests The incidence of warlords in a failed state forms a in the continuation of internal conflict and instability. pressing challenge to international actors attempting Accordingly, warlords will generally try to maintain to promote peace and democracy.157 With positions the status quo so and resist centralisation so that of power and authority organised around powerful their illegal businesses can continue to flourish. local leaders, the prospect of a democratic centralized state remains distant in many failed The Spoiler Problem states. After all, as was already suggested in section 1.1, the modern, liberal, democratic and As was suggested in the previous paragraph, representative state model strongly conflicts with the warlords generally have two motivations for local traditions and institutions in non-western opposing peace and the establishment of a states. These states often lack democratic tradition centralised democratic government. In the wake of and collective identification with the abstract central international efforts to consolidate peace and state. Instead, these countries have a deep tradition democracy, warlords may for these two reasons of localized and personalised rule, based on patron- attempt to (violently) derail the reconstruction client and tribal relationships. Once states have process. Once leaders or parties, who profit from a failed and central state authority has been absent continuation of conflict, who anticipate their for a long time, local networks of dependence, marginalisation or their exclusion from political influence and allegiance have developed around power, or who are not committed to building co- powerful warlords rather than around the abstract operation across factional or ethnic lines, violently disrupt the peace process, they are regarded to be 154 Mackinlay, Warlords, p.1 155 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, p.183-184. 156 Ibidem p.182. 158 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, p.182-183. 157 Nitzschke, Transforming War Economies’, p.3. 159 Mackinlay, Warlords, p.1.

37 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

spoilers.160 Spoilers believe that peace threatens process perspective’, in which spoilers are merely their position of power, worldview and (financial) regarded as being an obstacle to peace. interests, and therefore use violence to undermine The violence carried out by these spoiling non- international attempts to achieve peace.161 In fact, state actors, also called spoiler violence, continues “[p]eace processes create spoilers”, Stephen John after the declaration of a cease-fire and after the Stedman argues.162 It is, after all, extremely rare ‘official’ violence has halted. Accordingly, threats that all civil war leaders and factions see peace as and incidences of spoiler violence severely beneficial. Even in the case that all parties value complicate and hamper the activities of international peace, they would not do so concurrently, nor would actors involved in ‘conflict mediation’.166 Spoilers do they all agree on the terms for acceptable peace.163 however not only form an obstacle to reaching a For that reason negotiated peace always results in negotiated peace agreement, they can also obstruct ‘losers’: leaders and parties who have not reached the implementation of the provisions within the their war aims, or are afraid of losing their acquired peace agreement. For instance, in the case of positions of power.164 The difference between the Rwanda and the Arusha Peace Accords, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a peace agreement results international actors attempted to end the three-year from, as Darby and Mac Ginty call it, the civil war in Rwanda, but were faced with fierce fragmentation of non-state factions into two main resistance from Hutu extremists advocating Tutsi groups: the Dealers and the Zealots. While the extermination. Under the banner of the CDR former are willing to compromise and to take part in (Committee for the Defence of the Republic), these peace negotiations, the latter, refuse to adjust their Hutu extremists strongly opposed the Arusha 'pure' cause and resist every form of compromise.165 compromise and acted as a spoiler in the From the group of Zealots, spoilers arise who implementation process. By planning and decide that the agreed kind of peace is not in their threatening with genocide, boosting political interest. violence, ethnic killings and ethnic hatred, pledging To use the term spoiler indicates a quite to attack the parties of peace, and assassinating different way of addressing powerful local leaders, several-even moderate Hutu-party leaders, the CDR than when the term warlord is used. Applying the delayed and drastically complicated the peace concept warlord indicates that local leaders are process in Rwanda.167 judged from a ‘conflict situation-perspective’. However, using the term spoiler indicates a ‘peace Not all spoilers are however the same. According to Stedman there are several different types of spoilers

160 Stephen John Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention as posing different types of spoiler problems, which ask Strategic Interaction: The Spoiler Problem and the Case for different strategies of spoiler management. The of Rwanda', in: P. Wallensteen (ed.) Preventing Violent Conflicts, Past Record and Future Challenges (Uppsala, 1998) pp.67-86, p.69. 166 Conflict mediation is third-party intervention in which 161 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention’, p.69. the mediator tries to reach an agreement among the 162 Idem. conflicting parties, either with ‘pure’ negotiations or with 163 Idem. ‘muscle’ which means pushing the parties in the right 164 Ibidem, p.70. direction. See: Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom 165 J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, 'Conclusion: The Woodhouse, 'Terminology', in: Miall et all. Management of Peace', in: J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge 1999), pp. (eds.) The management of Peace Processes (London, 20-21. 2000) pp.228-261, p.233. 167 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention’, p.78-82.

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different spoiler problems differ on the dimensions certain ‘pure’ principles, such as religion, makes of the position and type of the spoiler. First, compromise impossible. In these cases it is Stedman differentiates between inside and outside impossible to reach a negotiated peace spoilers.168 Inside spoilers sign a peace agreement settlement.174 and indicate to be willing to compromise. However they fail to implement the provisions of the How to Manage Spoilers? agreement, hereby delaying the whole peace process. In contrast, outside spoilers are excluded Spoilers pose daunting challenges to international from the peace process and use a strategy of actors attempting to repair failed states. Since these violence to attack the process, for instance via non-state actors are able of derailing the peace- and 169 bombings and assassinations. reconstruction process, the international community Secondly, spoilers vary by type. Stedman has no choice but to work with them.175 Stephen 170 identifies limited; greedy and total spoilers. John Stedman even argues that the success of Limited spoilers have limited goals; they either want external peace- and reconstruction efforts depends (political) recognition, a share of power or they want on the strategy of third-party actors with regard to to have their grievances addressed. In addition to managing spoilers. "Where international custodians limited spoilers, there are greedy spoilers. This type have created and implemented coherent, effective of spoiler holds goals that expand or contract during strategies for protecting peace and managing 171 the process based on analyses of cost and risk. spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has The most severe spoiler problem is however posed triumphed. Where international custodians have by total spoilers. These are often radical factions failed to implement such strategies, spoilers have with radical ideologies who resist every form of succeeded at the cost of hundreds of thousands of compromise. They pursue "total power and lives", Stedman argues.176 The question then rises, exclusive recognition of authority and hold is how to successfully manage opposing and violent immutable preferences: their goals are not subject warlords so that peace and democracy are 172 to change". Individual leaders of these radical promoted? As was suggested above, different types factions often play an important role in the problem of spoilers pose different spoiler problems for of total spoilers. According to Stephen John international actors, and accordingly, ask for Stedman, some individual leaders are different strategies of so called, spoiler “psychological incapable of redefining a conflict and management. Stedman identifies three different reordering their preferences” and have a fixed, spoiler management strategies: coercion, 173 subjective perception of the conflict. For instance, socialisation and inducement.177 a leader’s drive for total power or its attachment to First, the strategy of coercion entails that external actors aim to discourage or modify 168 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.70. unacceptable spoiler behaviour by the threat or use 169 Ibidem, p.70-71. 170 Ibidem ', p.71-72. of force or punishment. This strategy can reduce the 171 Ibidem, p.72. 172 Ibidem, p.71. 173 Stephen John Stedman, ‘Negotiation and Mediation in 174 Stedman, ‘Negotiation and Mediation’, p.347. Internal Conflict’, in: Mark Malloch Brown (ed.) The 175 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.4. International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, 176 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.69. 1996) pp.341-376, p.347. 177 Ibidem, p.73-74.

39 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

spoiler's capacity to undermine the peace process the spoiler joins or not”.182 Of importance to this and might deter future atrocities and violence. For strategy is that a predetermined time is set; once instance, by means of coercive diplomacy spoilers the process is set in motion, parties which have not can be threatened with aerial attacks. Moreover, joined the process yet, will be left behind and will be spoilers can be arrested through the use of force unable to lay any legitimate claims. In this case, and be held responsible for their deeds. Indeed, one international actors will have to take active could argue that, based on human rights and measures to limit the spoiler’s ability to derail the democratic principles, (former) militant leaders and peace process. The withdrawal strategy, however, (ex-) combatants who have blood on their hands assumes that the spoiler benefits from international and are trying to violently derail peace processes, presence and threatens or punishes the spoiler with should be punished in courts of law. the withdrawal of international support and troops On the other hand, this ‘criminalisation’178 of from the peace process.183 spoilers and holding to account the people guilty of Secondly, a strategy of socialisation requires violent crimes, leads to several significant problems. third-party actors to set norms for acceptable Roy Licklider, for example, poses the question behaviour for internal parties committed to peace where to draw the line in convicting people for and for external parties who seek to join the peace taking part in the conflict. After all, everyone in the process. This can be done on the intellectual level, conflict has been guilty of collaborating with one for example by demanding the commitment to the side or the other during the war. Since the "truth is protection of human rights, or on the material level, elusive and in the eye of the beholder”, justice through applying so called 'sticks and carrots' to cannot be administered fairly.179 Moreover, failed respectively punish or reward spoilers.184 For states do not even have the resources to have fair instance, international actors can deliver additional trials for every person involved in human rights humanitarian aid to a certain area to reward spoilers abuses, since atrocities often involve vast numbers for acceptable behaviour, and accordingly, stop of people. Therefore, decisions on who will be put to humanitarian aid as a punishment in case spoilers trial will be unfair and arbitrary.180 Thirdly, in many have used violence. failed states marred by internal war, the punishment Finally, Stedman identifies the strategy of of local and regional actors with significant political inducement. This strategy entails "taking positive and economic power, such as warlords, will lead to measures to address the grievances of factions who a disturbance of the fragile security situation. Many obstruct peace".185 Third-party actors thus attempt third-party actors are not willing to take this risk. to induce the spoiler into joining the peace Two more common variations of the coercion negotiations or into complying with the provisions strategy are, as Stedman calls it, the departing train within the peace agreement, by giving the spoiler and the withdrawal strategy.181 The departing train what it wants. Spoilers may demand greater strategy holds the assertion that “the peace process protections, greater benefits, or legitimisation and will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether recognition of their status. According to some

178 Nitzschke, Transforming War Economies, p.6. 182 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.74. 179 Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, p. 712. 183 Idem. 180 Idem. 184 Ibidem p.73. 181 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.74. 185 Idem.

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authors, the strategy of inducement is necessary compatible with other parties' demands, then, since it is of crucial importance to include all parties limited spoilers may have to be coerced or in the peace process. Darby en Mac Ginty, for socialised.189 Finally, the greedy spoiler requires a example, argue that the achievement of a lasting strategy of socialisation since this type of spoiler peace agreement will only be possible when may be brought into the peace process eventually, international actors commit to the principle of Stedman argues. However, international actors ‘sufficient inclusion’. In other words, the peace should be careful with inducing the spoiler too process should include "both all actors who much, since this will lead to only more demands and represent a significant proportion of the community, might set a precedent for future violence.190 and all actors who have the ability to destroy an Moreover, international actors have to take into agreement".186 On the other hand, the strategy of account the number of spoilers present. After all, a inducement might form a precedent and may lead to strategy to deal with one spoiler has implications for more use of terror in the future. More importantly, the strategy selected to manage another spoiler. this strategy presents an "uncomfortable moral Actions taken to deal with one spoiler may even ambiguity", as will be explained later in this unintentionally strengthen other spoilers.191 chapter.187 It is thus of great importance for international actors to diagnose the spoiler problem correctly so As was suggested, different types of spoilers pose that the most appropriate and effective strategy is different types of spoiler problems which ask for selected. However, the reality for international different strategies of spoiler management. Each actors appears to be much less straightforward. unique spoiler problem thus has implications for the Stedman emphasises that international peace managing strategy selected. Therefore, in makers are forced to work within the “fog of accordance with the aforementioned types of peacemaking”.192 Since external actors often do not spoilers, Stedman identifies the most suitable and have a clear view on the exact spoiler problem, effective strategies to manage the limited, greedy before devising a suitable spoiler management and total spoilers. strategy, they must diagnose several uncertainties Since a total spoiler defines its goals in all-or- that could indicate a threat to peace, such as; (1) nothing terms, it cannot be induced or socialised; the goal of the spoiler, (2) the intention to non- both strategies would solely strengthen the spoiler. cooperate and use violence, (3) the degree of According to Stedman, there are only two commitment of the spoiler, (4) the degree of appropriate strategies for managing a total spoiler; leadership and control over followers, (5) the degree the use of force to defeat the spoiler and the of unity within the spoiler, and (6) the probable departing train strategy, in which, for instance, they 188 could deprive the spoiler of recourses. The 189 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.75. inducement strategy is, however, an appropriate 190 Idem. 191 To give an example from Rwanda: The UN chose to way to manage limited spoilers which have set coerce one party into implementing the peace agreement acceptable demands. If these demands are not by threatening to withdraw the UN peacekeeping operation. However, hereby the UN emboldened the other party rejecting the peace agreement to attack the 186 Darby and Mac Ginty, 'Conclusion', p.255. peace process and the parties involved in it. See: 187 Ibidem, p.254. Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.71. 188 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.75. 192 Ibidem, p.67.

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consequences of the selected spoiler management discourage the spoiler form attacking the internal strategy, on the spoiler’s behaviour, on other conflict parties, or will they encourage the spoiler to parties, and on external actors.193 continue its strategy? As was suggested, the First, they must find out why a certain party tries selected strategy may also affect the behaviour of to derail the peace process or refuses to meet the other conflict parties. Therefore, external actors may obligations indicated in the peace agreement. A have to ease their coercion of one spoiler to prevent party may, for instance, have agreed to commit to disturbing the fragile balance of power and peace but is stalling to fulfil its obligations because it motivating other parties to act as spoilers. “fears putting its security in the hands of its Moreover, the inducement of one spoiler may trigger adversaries”.194 A party may also have signed the unacceptable behaviour of other parties. For these agreement pure out of tactical reasons in the hope reasons, the strategy pursued by peace makers this would bring the party to power. Secondly, should be selected carefully, taking into account the international actors have to judge the intentions positions and reactions of all parties involved, behind the violence of parties outside the peace Stedman argues.197 process. Attacking the parties within the process According to Stedman, it is of high importance to may be an attempt of parties to force themselves the success of the external intervention as a whole within the peace negotiations or to force the that international actors faced with the emergence inclusion of their demands. It may also be a strategy of warlords in failed states, correctly anticipate to to weaken the internal parties’ commitment to the spoilers and spoiler violence. Therefore, peace agreement, or a strategy motivated by total goals makers have to ask themselves the question: “Who aimed at destroying the complete peace process. are the threats to peace?” instead of generally Thirdly, spoilers may differ on their degree of focusing on what may possibly form a threat to commitment to their own goals; while some parties peace, Stedman argues.198 International are only willing to seek limited opportunities to reach peacemakers must be aware of the security risk that their goals, others are willing to take large risks and warlords acting as spoilers, pose to the peace pay high costs to improve their position.195 process, by constantly mapping the goals, Fourthly, all the above interpretations of spoilers intentions, strategies and tactics of the different assume that the spoiler forms a unified party and parties. International actors aiming to bring peace that the leader’s actions evolve from group consent. and stability to failed states are thus faced with the However, as Stedman points out, uncertainty exists challenges of cutting through the ‘fog of peace about the extent to which a leader has control over making’ and successfully managing violent its followers. A leader may for instance hesitate to warlords. commit to peace out of fear for their reaction.196 Finally, international peace makers face Warlords, Spoilers or Local Strongmen? uncertainties about the consequences of the type of spoiler management selected. Will these actions Recently, much scholarly literature has dedicated the term ‘warlord’ to the specific kind of local 193 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.76-77. 194 Ibidem, p.77. 195 Idem. 197 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.77-78. 196 Idem. 198 Ibidem, p.85.

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leadership emerging “from failed states where the influence the scope and pace of the peace process structure, authority and power of the central or even attempt to derail it. Yet, not all strong local government have either decayed or fragmented leaders are unwilling to cooperate with external altogether.”199 Although the term ‘warlord’ only actors, nor do they all oppose democratic reform. recently gained wide spread recognition in the Some of them may in fact, as will be suggested context of failed states, it had already been used to further on in this thesis, be willing or can be classify leadership in pre-Communist China. Since convinced to join the peace process and to commit that time the term warlord has been assigned to to peace. local leadership in large areas of Sub-Saharan For the abovementioned reasons, this thesis Africa and in failed states such as Somalia, Liberia, prefers to ascribe the abovementioned type of Angola (UNITA), Sierra Leone (RFU), Burma (the powerful local leaders with the more neutral term of United Wa Army), Kosovo (UCK) and local ‘strongmen’ instead of designating them Afghanistan.200 Despite much academic literature exclusively as either ‘warlords’ or ‘spoilers’. refers to the powerful local leaders as ‘warlords’, However, to only use the term ‘strongmen’ would this thesis argues that the almost cliché term of lead to confusion since the concept of ‘warlord’ has ‘warlord’ may in fact be not as useful as one might currently received increased attention and as a suggest. result, many people are now familiar with it. In According to Peake ‘warlord’ is “an evocative addition, despite the difference in concept, local term, it conjures up a series of cinematic images of strongmen are defined in the same way as warlords. leadership in societies beset by protracted, violent Therefore, I will use the terms warlord, strongmen conflict”.201 In line with this reasoning, this thesis and spoilers simultaneously, however always considers the term warlord to be quite normative referring to the following definition. and to have a strong negative connotation. After all, Warlords clearly differ from ‘formal’ the concept warlord is strongly related to war and administrators such as governors, mayors and emphasises the military dimension of such local chiefs of police, as well as from ‘informal’ leaders. However, not all warlords solely fight wars administrators such as clan leaders, tribal men and and therefore not all of them are literally ‘warlords’. mullahs active in failed states.202 Instead, warlords Moreover, the term ‘warlord’ does not acknowledge can be identified by means of the following the mutual differences between diverse warlords. characteristics: (a) They have control over a certain While some warlords merely use their weapons as a territory lacking or contesting central government’s way to defend their territory, others use weapons as authority (b) They exert a certain amount of a means to conduct illegal activities such as authority in this area (c) Their political ascendance extortion, robbery or drugs and arms trade. is strongly linked to their military power.203 In other In addition, by using the term ‘spoiler’ exclusively, authors focus too strongly on the peace 202 Mullahs are Islamic clergy who have studied the Qur'an and the Hadith. They are considered to be experts processes within failed states, describing strong on related religious matters and to be able to give local leaders merely as ‘spoilers’ who negatively direction and make judgments based on their religious studies. See: “Mullah”, Wikipidea, the Free Encyclopedia, (available at: 199 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, p. 182. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mullah, accessed September 200 Mackinlay, Warlords, p.1 27, 2004). 201 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, p. 182. 203 Peake, From Warlords to Peacelords?, p.182.

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words they are often former military leaders who peaceful futures”.205 This is especially true in failed have attained or strengthened their position of states, which have been experiencing a lack of power during the war (d) They apply a legitimating centralised state and political institutions for quite a discourse (religion, nationalism etc.) (e) They long time.206 Since the political and economic power dispose of weapons and finally (f) They financially of local strongmen often exceeds that of the central benefit from profits made through conflict trade and government in these states, the key to repairing the secondary war economy. failed states may in fact lie with community level structures and with strong local leaders. Moreover, From Warlords to Peacelords? since the primary responsibility for reconstruction and sustainable peace lies with the governments Stedman’s theory on spoilers shows that powerful and civil societies of failed states themselves, local leaders are able to dramatically influence the indigenous mechanisms should be used by peace and recovery process in failed states. international actors to promote consensus, 207 However, despite that warlords can act as spoilers participation and respect for human rights. attempting to undermine the peace process, some However, the traditional power structures differ more moderate warlords may also affect the peace drastically from the Western European institutions process positively. After all, as was suggested by and even differ between societies. One great Darby and Mac Ginty, paramilitary organisations challenge facing the international community is thus and military factions split into two groups after identifying the traditional mechanisms and international actors have become involved in conflict processes that once guaranteed internal order, and management. From the first group, the Zealots, accordingly reviving, reforming, transforming or 208 spoilers arise who are refusing to adjust their even establishing them. objectives and resist every form of compromise. If local structures of power should be the starting However, the second group, the Dealers, are willing point for political reconstruction in failed states, then to compromise and take part in the peace one could argue that, in line with the scholars negotiations.204 This latter group consists of more discussed in section 1.2, international actors should moderate faction leaders who are able and willing to also start with the promotion of ‘good governance’ change their perspectives from war to peace. This and democratic governance at the local level, thesis argues, that these faction leaders or warlords instead of implementing it from the centre. This can in fact undergo the profound transition from strategy is indeed advocated by J.S. Edralin who warlord to ‘peace lord’. In other words, as emphasises that international actors should ‘traditional’ leaders and local bearers of power, primarily implement ‘capacity building’ for local, in these warlords may become a form of ‘local stead of central government. In fact, she sees governance’ and in this way, may eventually have a “capacity building as ‘the main pillar’ of good positive influence on the failed state’s recovery. governance which ‘…needs to combine Much academic literature indeed regards decentralised management with democratic “engaged leadership” to be “essential for countries to survive the transition from conflict to more 205 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords?’, p.181. 206 Idem. 207 Malloch Brown, ‘Democratic Governance’, p. 145. 204 Darby and Mac Ginty, 'Conclusion’, p.233. 208 Idem.

44 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

accountability”.209 In Edralin’s point of view, identity. After all, local governance alone cannot “capacity building should aim to develop local ultimately substitute for a strong and modern leadership, ‘community initiative and participation’ to national centralized state, he argues.215 A second ‘create a sense of ownership and empowerment’” in lesson that can be learned according to the UNDP failed states.210 In addition, Barakat argues that it is report is that “[d]ecentralization is a useful tool in essential for international actor to strengthen local post-conflict situations because it broadens capacity if they aim to secure their investments in participation in peace building, helps groups the future.211” The past has shown that committed overcome ethnic conflict, and drives growth and funds have often remained unspent due to a “lack of development at the grassroots level”.216 A capacity” and that “useful assistance begins with decentralised approach also allows for broader recognising and valuing the strengths of the (…) participation in decision making. In this way, disabled country”.212 decentralisation works as a means to “jumpstart” The strategy of focusing international assistance development at the local level while long-term on local capacity and leadership is also advocated processes are centrally initiated.217 by a 2002 UNDP report based on governance However, applying a decentralised approach to lessons learned from earlier international promoting democratic governance in the context of reconstruction efforts.213 In this report, Rajiv Pillay a failed states, also involves the risk of advises international actors to “[s]trengthen capacity “fragmentation”. According to Barakat, international at the local level first”.214 Despite that in most peace actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction, building and governance programs capacity is firstly should not assume that there will be “high levels of created at the centre and then gradually expanded acceptance and adherence to government codes to the local level, Pillay argues that in failed states and guidelines”.218 In fact, strongmen’s “vital the opposite approach - with an initial focus on the potential will not be transformed overnight into local level - is more useful since failed states effective decision making and management of the completely lack capable centralized institutions. recovery process”. One of the key tasks for to the However, simultaneously, he warns that care should international aid community is therefore to be taken so that strengthening local level institutions persuade, convince, or even force local strongmen does not prevent the emergence of a national to commit to peace and democratic governance. As Stedman suggested, the success of international

209 Barakat and Chard, ‘Theories, rhetoric and practice’, peace building and reconstruction efforts largely p.821. depends on the selection of adequate and effective 210 Idem. 211 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's strategies to manage those actors who are able of reconstruction’, p.812. undermining peace and the reconstruction of failed 212 Citation of Miles in: Idem. 219 213 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), states. Lessons Learning, Learning from Experience for Afghanistan, Report on Afghanistan Programming Workshops 21 February 2002, Evaluation Office & Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, New York, 215 Pillay in: UNDP, Lessons Learning, p.6 (available at: 216 Idem. http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/afghanistan- 217 Idem. workshop/full_report.pdf, accessed September 24, 2004), 218 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's p.6. reconstruction’, p.814. 214 Pillay in: UNDP, Lessons Learning, p.6 219 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.69.

45 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

The Paradox of Working with Warlords abusers with a certain amount of external legitimacy. One academic scholar indicated by Roy International actors applying a decentralised Licklider, argues that former militia leaders should approach to promoting democratic governance in be trialled in court or should at least, publicly plead failed states, are however, not only risking guilty and apologize. From this perspective, neither fragmentation. While strengthening local capacity victims nor perpetrators will be able to live together and cooperating with local strongmen, external as long as the crimes are not publicly acknowledged 222 actors are also confronted with an important moral and some form of punishment has been given. dilemma. As Pauline H. Baker argues, every actor in However, arresting these people and putting them post-war reconstruction will be faced with the on trial means risking a relapse into conflict. dilemma of reconciling “the two imperatives of Therefore: "Peace and justice may thus be directly 223 peace: conflict resolution on the one hand, and opposed", Licklider argues. democracy and human rights on the other.” 220 In addition, working with warlords also means As was suggested by the scholars in the working with local leaders who stand for everything previous paragraph, in failed states and in the that the international community is in fact trying to absence of traditional centralised (state) structures it eliminate: Warlords are a form of localised power is of high importance to adhere to a decentralised resisting centralised and democratic forces; they approach to promoting good governance. From this use weapons for obtaining resources and are perspective, local strongmen are vital indigenous forcing their citizens into submission while ignoring power structures on which the promotion of good international human and civil rights; they are often governance should be based, creating a form of involved in illegal activities such as opium power-sharing between local actors and the production, extortion and drug and arms trade; and international community. However, as Pauline Baker refuse to cross ethnic, tribal or inter-cultural lines. claims, the need to create power-sharing For these reasons, working with warlords to mechanisms with rival factions contradicts to "the consolidate democracy and sustainable peace, need to bring human rights abusers to justice, seems to be quite paradoxical. The paradox of establish political legitimacy and establish rule of dealing with warlords lies at the heart of the debate law, and build new state structures that can earn the on how to consolidate peace and democracy in the confidence and trust of the people".221 After all, twenty-first century failed states, and is best warlords are often, besides being strong local or summarised by the following questions posed by regional bearers of power, also former civil war Pauline Baker: leaders of whom are the most complicit and guilty of war crimes. In these cases, cooperating with Should peace be sought of any price to end the warlords thus means providing human rights bloodshed, even if power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and democratic principles? Or should the objective be a democratic 220 Pauline H. Baker, 'Conflict Resolution versus peace that respects human rights, a goal that may Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace?’, in: ed. C. A. Crocker, F. Olser Hampson en P. Aall, prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the Turbulent Peace, The Challenges of Managing International Conflict 222 (Washington, 2001) pp. 753-764, Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, p. 711- p.756. 712. 221 Baker, 'Conflict Resolution', p.756.

46 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

time that it takes to reach negotiated peace? 224 to be forced to solve the paradox by choosing between two excluding solutions. However, the best way to solve the dilemma is maybe to adopt a To solve this paradox, external actors must middle course. In this way international actors overcome the fundamental contradiction between should refrain from entering a power-sharing system reaching peace and promoting transitional justice, with warlords, but use the warlords as pure local Baker argues. For external actors to achieve this, bearers of power, while making allowances for their Baker identifies two different ways which are non-liberal and non-democratic characteristics. embodied in two types of peacemakers: the “conflict Even though this strategy has obvious objectives 225 managers “and the “democratizers”. These two from an human-rights perspective, in a failed state groups have inherently different values, goals and this may be the most logical strategy to adopt. The strategies. While the conflict managers are involved way the international community selects the most conflict prevention, mediation and resolution and effective, suitable and legitimate strategy, however tend to be inclusive, the democratizers on the other strongly depends on the circumstances in each hand, advocate human rights, democratic different failed state and post-conflict situation. institutions, and the rule of law and tend to be 226 exclusive. To put it more simply; conflict Conclusion managers want to "keep an eye on the 'bad guys' while making them part of the power-sharing st Weak and failed states pose one of the biggest 21 arrangements", while democratizers seek to exclude century threats to internal security and global peace. the 'bad guys' from power by punishing or purging National disintegration in countries such as these human rights offenders.227 Conflict managers Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Haiti, thus seek a rapid end to conflict and emphasise the Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, has short-term solutions to the violence. Accordingly, shown that the consequences and human costs of they see "peace as a precondition to democracy".228 state failure are not isolated to the weak and failed This stands in sharp contrast to the democratizers states themselves. Instead, state failure generates who tend to focus on the longer-term solutions and numerous regional spill-over effects (such as try to address the root causes to conflict. As was massive refugee flows; uncontained violence; mentioned above, democratizers seek to provide uncontrolled epidemics; illicit transnational networks durable, self-sustaining peace and thus see of particularly terrorist and criminal groups; and the democracy and justice as a precondition to trouble-free movement of money, people drugs and peace.229 weapons) which have proven to seriously threaten International actors active in post-war international security and global economic progress. recovery and the repair of failed states, thus seem It is for these reasons that the task of reversing state weakness and failure, cannot be left to the 223 Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, p. 712. weak and failed states themselves, but should be 224 Baker, 'Conflict Resolution’, p.756. promoted and supported by the international 225 Idem. 226 Ibidem, p.756-760. community applying an adequate and coherent 227 Ibidem, p.760. reconstruction strategy. 228 Idem. 229 Idem.

47 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

However, a conceptual labyrinth seems to exist non-state actors attempting to fill the subsequent with regard to the strategies for repairing failed power-vacuum. These, so called, ‘warlords’, pose a states. To provide more transparency on the daunting challenge to the international actors subject, this chapter has extracted two clear starting involved in the reconstruction of failed states, since points for reconstruction from the several different they oppose forces of democratisation and strategies put forward by academic scholars. Based centralisation; use military power, illegal trade on the theories on state failure, as provided by the networks, and weapons to strengthen their AIV and CAVV as well as Wienstein et al, this positions; and often have the motivation and the chapter argues that repairing failed states is a means to violently undermine the peace and matter of addressing those main capability gaps that reconstruction process. The success of international caused state failure in the first place; the legitimacy efforts in failed states, therefore, largely depends on gap and the security gap. Reversing state weakness the type of strategy selected to manage these and failure should therefore hold the support for warlords. The question is whether international political reform –meaning the establishment or actors are better served by coercing warlords into transformation of democratic state institutions and submission, or by a more moderate approach and the endorsement of democratic governance- to working with warlords as local bearers of power. As create legitimacy and authority, as well as the several scholars emphasise the importance of local support for security sector reform –meaning the good governance and the need to start from demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of indigenous power structures, this chapter poses the ex-combatants, and the establishment or question: Can ‘warlords’ really become ‘peace enhancement of democratic governance of the lords’? security sector- to ensure security. The case study of Afghanistan in the following Strategies to repair failed states are, however, chapters will attempt to answer these questions by not as straight forward as they may suggest. The elaborating on the role of the Afghan warlords within collapse of state institutions in several developing the Afghan reconstruction process, as well as on the countries (such as Sierra Leone, Somalia and strategies adopted by international actors to Afghanistan) has lead to the emergence of strong manage these warlords.

48 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 2. The Afghan Political Context

”Designing a stable and sustainable state-building the space for the emergence of Afghan ‘warlords’. process requires a thorough understanding of the After years of internal conflict, Taliban domination historical, cultural and political context of the country and the subsequent fall of the Taliban regime, where it is applied.”230 Given that this thesis focuses Afghanistan’s post-war political context continues to on the political reconstruction process within post- be heavily affected by warlords and their Taliban Afghanistan, it is equally important to accompanying warlord politics. understand the pre-2002 Afghan political context. To comprehend why Afghanistan is considered to The Afghan State: Weak from Origin be a failed state and why warlords play a central role within the country, one must take cognizance of “The Anglo-Russian competition in Central Asia that the history of the Afghan state. This chapter will developed out of early nineteenth century power therefore focus on the origins of the Afghan state as politics in Europe ultimately led to the creation of the well as on the factors that have opened up the state of Afghanistan and caused the demarcation of its wholly inappropriate borders. The combination of space in which the Afghan warlords emerged. foreign encroachment and simultaneous internal

anarchy led to the creation of an Afghan state without the concomitant development of an Afghan 231 2.1 State Failure in Afghanistan nation”.

Afghanistan emerged as a state when a great The pre-2002 Afghan political context has its roots Pushtun confederation, consisting of the Saddozai in the problematic process of state formation since Popolzai clans of the Durrani tribes, carved out an Afghanistan’s independence in 1919. The country’s empire enclosed by India and Persia in the mid- division by sharp social cleavages, the existence of eighteenth century. They were succeeded by the a localized social system, its rugged geography and Mohammadzai Barakzai clans, also of Durrani tribe its subjection to external influences, has prevented origin.232 Due to its “geostrategic position” (the the state from developing into a true ‘nation-state’. Afghan mountain formation formed a buffer zone This troubled process of central state formation has between two rival imperial powers) Afghanistan has largely determined Afghanistan’s course in history had a unique experience in state formation since the and lies at the heart of Afghanistan’s state failure. nineteenth century.233 Within the borders of the The lack of central state institutions, the traditional buffer zone separating the Russian Empire and the localised rule, in combination with more recent British Indian Empire, an Afghan state was created developments such as the introduction of modern in 1880. weapons, poppy production and the increased importance of Islam, have in addition, opened up

231 Larry Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture in 230 Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’, in: Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, Problematic Path to Peace: Lessons in State Building in No. 18, Post-Colonial Discourse in South Asia/Khitab the Post-September 11 Era’, Foreign Policy in Focus, Ma Bad al-Kuluniyaliyah fi Junub Asya (1998), pp.269- March 2004 (available at: 289, p. 274. http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/SR2004afgh-stbuild.pdf, 232 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p. 271. accessed October 18, 2004), p.2. 233 Ibidem, p. 270.

49 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Backed by British geopolitical interest and a shared identity, but rather a collection of disparate massive subsidies of money and weapons, the groups forced together by the vagaries of Pashtu government of King Abdur Rahman (also geopolitics.”239 Accordingly, Afghanistan never called Iron Amir) was brought to power.234 Abdur developed into a so called ‘nation-state’ - of which Rahman’s reign formed the foundation for a the political and social/cultural borders were centralised Afghan state and marked the start for congruent - nor has it ever had a strong central the Afghan state-building process. However, in government. contrast to West-European states which had spread Secondly, Afghanistan did not experience their state-building process over centuries, Afghan growing internal divisions. Instead, the factors state formation had to take place in an extremely dividing Afghan society and contributing to state short time span. It is therefore not surprising that the failure had already been fully existent since Afghan Afghan state-building process met withy fierce independence and had, in fact, been responsible for resistance and alienated many Afghan peoples from preventing initial state-building as well. Third, the the central state.235 As a result, the already limited suggested phase of decline - in which state Afghan state formation process ultimately collapsed authority is no longer exerted over the entire into a process leading to complete state failure. country, the dominating elite collects all state income and is increasingly unable to deliver basic According to the theory on failed states as public services and to ensure internal security240 - suggested in the AIV and CAVV Report, the process also seems to be inapplicable to the Afghan case. leading to state failure can be divided into three After all, the factors hampering initial nation-building phases: growing internal divisions, decline and continued to hinder the development of strong actual failure.236 However, this theory appears to be centralised state institutions during the following largely inapplicable to the case of Afghanistan. First, decades. Resultantly, the governing Pashtun the theory as suggested by the AIV and CAVV, monarchy had always been extremely limited in assumes that the concerning state started off as a exerting central control and authority. The Afghan strong state. Yet, Afghanistan has never been a state has thus been originally weak. It was however strong state. In fact, it has been a weak state from not until the early 1970’s that the Afghan state the day it emerged as a state. Although signs of entered the phase of actual state failure. nation-building have been evident since the rise of the Durrani Pushtun tribe in 1747, the nation- Constraints to Afghan State-Building building process in Afghanistan never really took 237 off. Moreover, even though the country was a As was suggested above, the factors dividing monarchy from 1747 until 1973, state legitimacy has Afghan society and preventing initial state-building, 238 always been precarious. “Afghanistan has never have also continuously limited the ability of the been a nation in the sense of a common people with Afghan state to exert central authority and control. Three primary factors placing the Afghan state 234 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.2. under strain, explain why it has always been weak 235 Idem. 236 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.29-30. 237 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.270. 238 Barakat, ‘Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 239 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.270-271. reconstruction’, p.803. 240 AIV en CAVV, Failing States, p. 30.

50 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

and why strong centralised state institutions were deeper by linguistic, sectarian, geographic and other never developed. These three constraints to state- cleavages”, Larry Goodson argues.244 The Pushtuns building are: (1) Afghanistan’s rugged geography, have been the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan (2) its division by sharp social cleavages, and (3) since its emergence as a state. They are the largest the existence of a localized social system.241 remaining tribal society in the world and comprise Although preventing imperial invasions in the around 45-50% of Afghanistan’s total population of nineteenth century, Afghanistan’s rugged terrain almost 29 million people245, speak Pushtu and was and still is, greatly disadvantageous to the generally live in the south and east of central state. The Afghan mountains of Hindu Kush, Afghanistan.246 Besides the Pushtun tribes, the splitting the country in two, divide Kabul from the Afghan population is made up of several, largely rural areas and isolate Afghanistan from the outside non-tribal ethnic minorities resenting Pushtun world.242Despite the existence of some passes ascendancy. These include the Farsi-speaking through the Hindu Kush, mobility between different Tajijks who comprise about 25% of the population regions was quite difficult, especially in winter times. and primarily live in the northeast and urban areas. Moreover, Afghanistan lacks railroads and has only The Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Turkomans, who one major road called the ‘Ring Road’. Today, the comprise around 9% of the population, live in the road has been largely destroyed by decades of war, north-centre. In addition, Afghanistan houses turning large parts of it into gravel track.243 The Hazara people who form the largest group of the forbidding mountain terrain and the lack of Shia population in Afghanistan. This group infrastructure has severely limited the possibilities comprises approximately 13% of the total population for the central state to foster greater national unity and can be primarily found in the central and to expand its control over the rural areas. mountains.247 The remaining percentages of the Moreover, the delivery of public services and public Afghan population consist of small ethnic groups goods has been extremely difficult. Had the Afghan such as Farsiwan, Qizilbash, Chahar Aimaq, central state been able to bring visible benefits Nuristanis, Baluch, and Brahui.248 Islam however, (such as basic services and roadways) to the mass provides “an all-encompassing social, normative of its population, hostility to the central state would and ethical framework for daily life” for almost all have faded eventually. However, as has been Afghan people. With as much as 80% of the total suggested earlier, the inability of the state to deliver population Hanafi Sunni and the remainder Jafari basic services was one of the key factors placing Shia, Afghanistan is almost completely Islamic.249 the state under strain and eventually causing actual A third factor placing Afghanistan’s central state state failure. under strain and constraining state-building in Apart from the geographical factor, 244 Afghanistan’s state-building was and still is, Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.83. 245 According to the CIA, World Factbook, Afghanistan hampered by a second factor; the existence of has a population of 28,513,677 people estimated by July sharp social cleavages. “Afghanistan is a country 2004. See: CIA, ‘The World Factbook’, (available at: famously riven by ethnic divisions made even http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.htm l, accessed 12 September 2004). 246 241 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.83-84. Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p. 270. 247 242 Ibidem, p.84. Idem. 248 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.271. 243 Ibidem, p.273.

51 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Afghanistan was the existence of a unique develop into a strong state and eventually socioeconomic system within Afghan rural society. contributed to the process leading to complete With the rise of Pushtun tribes, Pushtu traditional failure of the Afghan state. institutions became dominant as well. For instance, their tribal code (known as Pushtunwali) functioned Actual State Failure as a legal system and the jirga (tribal assembly) functioned as a form of government within After state functioning had declined for almost a 250 Afghanistan. Similarly, a traditional social system century, the weak Afghan state entered the phase of originating from the Pushtun people can be found, actual failure in 1973. The situation of actual failure at least in its most fundamental form, within the complies with the definition of a failed state as was whole of Afghanistan. The core of this given in the first chapter. In the case of state failure socioeconomic system is the local group or qawm. the central government has lost its legitimacy, its Goodson defines the qawm as “any communal monopoly on violence and the ability to provide its group, including village, extended family, or ethnic citizens with basic public services. Subsequently, a 251 group”. The qawm is governed locally, often by a power vacuum and secondary war economy arise jirga and its wealth is derived from land and which warlords and other non-state actors attempt 252 agriculture. As was suggested in Chapter 1, the to fill, and in which crime flourishes.254 Western European notion of the state - with its During the 1960s a struggle had developed demands for national unity, taxes and a national between Communists and Islamists in army - intrudes on the traditional institutions of a Afghanistan.255 In 1973, encouraged by Cold War non-western society such as Afghan society. In developments in the region, a coup was organised Afghanistan, loyalty, dependence and allegiance by Afghan communists (supported by the Soviet were not directed towards the abstract central state, Union) which abruptly ended the authority of the but to the local group or qawm. Afghan society was Pashtun monarchy. Communist ascendance did thus largely self-governing and self-contained. The however not only end the Pashtun monarchy, but fact that most individuals identified themselves in also brought the traditional ethnic balance to an end relation to their qawm, severely limited the state’s and opened the way for non-Pushtuns to take ability to create a united Afghan nation. In fact, power.256 In 1978, a group of educated young imposing centralised state institutions on a tribal people who were frustrated about the situation of society has an unintentional and contradictory severe unemployment and the pace of the state’s effect. If a central government attempts to impose modernising reforms, seized power in a second laws incompatible with the social and tribal codes, it military coup. The group, united under the banner of risks a violent reaction from the qawm and its the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 253 leaders, Larry Goodson argues. (PDPA) produced a communist revolution with the It was the combination of these three constraints aim of boosting the state’s modernising to state-building that prevented Afghanistan to

249 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.271. 253 250 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.272. Ibidem, p.272. 254 251 AIV en CAVV, Failing States, p. 30. Idem. 255 252 Ibidem, p.276. Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.279. 256 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.84.

52 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

programme.257 In support of the PDPA government trained by Pakistan, China Saudi Arabia and the and in fear of Islamic resistance, the Soviet Union United States (under the presidencies of President invaded Afghanistan the following year.258 As a Jimmy Carter and President Ronal Reagan), which reaction to the Soviet invasion, internal conflict all aimed to prevent the spread of Communism.261 broke out between Soviet troops and Soviet backed The ‘Great Game’ of superpowers was thus played militias on one side, and a variety of ethnic and once more, however, this time it was the Soviet tribal (though mainly Islamic) resistance groups on Union aiming to expand in the south, and the United the other. States aiming to influence events on the north in From 1979 until 1989, Soviet military forces Iran, Central Asia and China.262 occupied Afghanistan. In 1986 the Soviet Union What had started as a united struggle against installed Major General Mohammad Najibulla as Soviet power in the 1970’s, gradually developed into President of the Communist Democratic Republic of an internal conflict during the 1980s, as the different Afghanistan. The period of Soviet occupation was ethnic militias of the Mujahedeen started to fight marked by internal conflict and fierce resistance to each other. As a consequence, the remaining state the Soviet regime. Many Durrani tribesmen institutions continued to disintegrate.263 In reaction (including former Afghan King Mohammad Zahir to the Geneva Accords of 1988, Soviet troops Shah) were however unable to assert their retreated in 1989. However, in the absence of an traditional dominance as they remained relatively adequate answer to the post-occupational period, uninvolved in the conflict. They left the struggle President Najibullah’s Soviet-backed government against Soviet power to other non-Durrani did not fall until 1992. During these three years the resistance leaders. Some of these men were party Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA) leaders who represented the Islamic movement, had been established in exile. However, since key such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin groups in the conflict (refugees and the Shiite Hekmatyar. Other resistance leaders were new community264) were excluded, and the former actors. These included Rashid Dostum of the Mujahedeen forces could not agree, the IIGA never formerly pro-government Uzbek militia, and Afghan acted as a functional government.265 The fall of the commanders of the Mujahedeen,259 such as Ahmas Communist regime in Afghanistan eventually left a Shah Massoud and Ismael Khan.260 The power vacuum which was filled by factions and Mujahedeen consisted of a variety of tribal and armed militias (tanzimat), either backed by the ethnic opposition groups strongly opposing and fighting against Soviet power in Afghanistan. The

Mujahedeen were significantly financed, armed, and 261 During the war, the US, Saudi Arabia and China supplied $6-12 billion worth of weapons and military supplies to the Mujahedeen. In comparison, from 1978 to 257 Ottaway and Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan, p.2. the early 1990’s the Soviet Union supplied $36-48 billion 258 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's on military equipment to the Communist regime. See: reconstruction’, p.804. Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.277. 259 Mujahedeen (also transliterated as mujahideen, 262 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's mujahedin, mujahidin, or mujaheddin.) literally translates reconstruction’, p.804. from Arabic as “strugglers”. See: Wikipidea, The Free 263 Ibidem p.806. Encyclopedia, (available at: 264 Religions in Afghanistan: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi'a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahedeen, accessed 8 Muslim 19%, other 1%, in: CIA, World Factbook. september 2004). 265 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 260 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.276. reconstruction’, p.805.

53 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

USSR, the USA or other regional countries.266 It to ground and legitimize its claims in other ways272, was not until the early 1990s that Russia and the which will be discussed later in this chapter. With United States brought the armament of rivalling authority increasingly derived from the wealth and factions to an end.267 However, the internal conflict power of these local warlords, the country became unremittingly continued. Meanwhile, the different ever more ruled through ‘warlord politics’. factions became “proxies for the interests of their own regional power sponsors”, with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran, India, 2.2 Warlord Politics Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the other.268

In the early 1990s, after twenty years of violent As was suggested, Afghanistan’s political rule has internal conflict, a “large-scale erosion” of Afghan traditionally been highly localised as a result of its society had taken place. Villages had been emptied ethnic heterogeneous population and its indigenous and traditional village hierarchies were largely social system. This localised nature of political ruined by the massive dislocation of people.269 leadership on one side, and the absence of central Moreover, the social and political institutions of state structures and state legitimacy on the other, Afghanistan, such as governmental institutions, 273 has been mutually reinforcing. In combination armed forces, political parties, universities and civil with the introduction of modern weaponry, poppy society, were completely destroyed or irreversibly production, and the increased importance of Islam, transformed. In addition, the war had drastically these factors were responsible for a situation of affected traditional leaders and power groups such rampant warlordism in Afghanistan during the as the landed elite (Durrani tribesmen and khans), 1990’s. military commanders, tribal leaders and the intelligentsia. These were either killed, had fled, or The Rise of the Afghan Warlords were discredited by the war. “The entire framework of Afghan society was affected”, Goodson points It was from the power vacuum left by the fall of the out.270 As a result, the Afghan central state had pre-war political system and the destruction of faded, losing its monopoly on violence, its Communist dominance that new elites, in the form legitimacy, its authority and the ability to provide its of warlords, arose. With a history either as citizens with basic goods and services. Because commanders of the Mujahedeen or militia leaders, little authority had been exercised from the top for these warlords maintained existing positions of such a long time, power had devolved to the local authority after the war against Soviet troops had level.271 A new elite had emerged which was not ended. They even gained political eminence by able to ground its claim to leadership on traditional maintaining their corps of fighters,274 and by (qawm) bases anymore. Instead, this new elite had collectively forming the Mujahedeen administration. During the governing years of this Mujahedeen 266 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.84-85 267 Missy Adams, 'The War On Terror : Afghanistan', in: administration (1992-1996), this group of separate Time, (1 October, 2001) Vol. 158, p.26. 268 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 271 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.84. reconstruction’, p.806. 272 269 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.282. Ibidem, p.805. 273 270 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.275. Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.184.

54 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

leaders nevertheless failed to govern the country result, there have “[t]raditionally (…) existed few effectively. “The conversion from overthrowing a reasons to bring national concern into one’s government to administering as part of one was not reckonings: in Afghanistan, all politics is local.”279 easy: it proved impossible to agree on a national Local elites made political calculations thus not in government”, Peake argues.275 Despite their joint light of the national good, but based on “local issues approach in overthrowing the Russians, the different and their ramifications, while the principal incentives resistance groups and their leaders were unable to and causes for leaders to act [were] primarily rooted agree on one governing strategy once the common in their locality”.280 In this sense, one could argue enemy was overthrown. Moreover, they were held that after the pre-war political system and the Soviet back by an aversion to power sharing, which also regime were destroyed, the country returned to a prevented the development of a functioning central new (warlord) form of traditional localised government.276 leadership. Consequently, the country entered a new phase of conflict and was split up into “essentially Kalashnikovization, Opium Production and autonomous spheres of local leadership” in the form Islamization 277 of local administrations ran by this new elite. Different warlords took control over cities and The rise of warlords is however insufficiently 278 provincial areas, creating new geographical explained by the mutual reinforcement of traditional entities which differed drastically from the traditional local leadership and the absence of a strong central social system built around the qawm. After all, these state. In fact, the emergence of warlords was new autonomous spheres were based on the advanced by three other developments in outcome of internal conflict instead of being based Afghanistan: “Kalashnikovization”, increased opium on traditions around ethnic origin or tribe. Moreover, production, and the “Islamization” of Afghan society. as an alternative to the traditional tribesmen, The term Kalashnikovization was first used in warlords were this time provided with allegiance. Pakistani newspapers to describe the deteriorating Consequently, warlords in Afghanistan became an and violent situation after the CIA had delivered AK- increasingly powerful elite. 47 (Kalashnikov) rifles to the Mujahedeen.281 In Nevertheless, despite its differences with the Afghanistan, this term has however come to stand traditional social system, this new social structure for “more war fought at a technology level was, once again, based on some type of localised inconsistent with national development”.282 The leadership. Since a strong central government was introduction of the Kalashnikovs to Afghanistan led never achieved in Afghanistan, local actors had to increased banditry and lawlessness. After all, always been able to exert a certain amount of modern weapons enabled militia’s and their warlord (political, economic or military) control locally. As a leaders to extract resources from citizens, often by quasi-legal methods, but also by extortion, rape, 274 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.183. 275 Ibidem, p.184. 276 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.805. 279 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.184. 277 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.184. 280 Idem. 278 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 281 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.277. reconstruction’, p.806. 282 Idem.

55 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

robbery, looting and murder.283 These practises financial gain – but also the means (money, were seen in many parts of the country, reducing weapons) to attain and maintain power. these parts to anarchy between 1992 and 1994. The final development attributing to the rise of A second development contributing to the warlords was the increasing “Islamization” of Afghan emergence and sustainability of warlords was society.287 The 1990s trend towards Islamization Afghanistan’s increased opium production. Poppy originated in the century-long struggle between cultivation spread drastically over the country since modernizers and traditionalists, and was the beginning of the war in 1973. The dramatic strengthened by the struggle between Communists increase in drug production was the result of the and Islamists which started in the 1960s.288 The continuous internal conflict in Afghanistan which had latter struggle had become ultimately apparent largely destroyed the agricultural infrastructure. during the years of Soviet domination, which Consequently, as people would not profit from the mobilised an increasingly militant Islamic resistance cultivation of vegetables and fruit for several years, movement. It was the structure and basis of support poppy production proved to be the most profitable for that movement which empowered the Islamist alternative. After all, poppy was the best crop factions among the Mujahedeen and pushed available and met the people’s needs in the short forward the more ‘fundamentalist’ leaders and term.284 The profits made from the opium sector did militias. For the Islamists, modernisation became however not only form a source of income for rural increasingly affiliated with the Communist regime people disadvantaged by the war. It also formed an and consequently, hardly any room was left for a opportunity for greedy warlords and their militia’s to secular or moderate alternative among the Soviet quickly attain financial assets. Drug production resistance.289 In the 1990s, the trend toward proved to be a lucrative business and consequently, Islamization formed a welcome opportunity for many warlords tried to exploit it using their military former Mujahedeen leaders (now called warlords) to power. In addition, the availability of weapons claim political power under the guise of fighting a appears to be closely linked to poppy cultivation and jihad, or holy war, against the former pro- the production of drugs. Weapons do not only Communists and more moderate factions. protect the drugs, but weapons are also bought with According to Goodson, in a society traditionally money from drug profits, which consequently adhering to Islam, it has always been necessary to increases the military power of warlords.285 What is legitimise claims for political power through the more, the increased poppy production assured the Islam.290 One could thus argue that the Islamization warlords’ sustainability once they had obtained of Afghan society in the early1990’s contributed to power, since the profits enabled the distribution of patronage through wages.286One could thus argue 287 Oliver Roy suggests three meanings of Islamization: that the rapid growth of the drug industry advanced the implementation of shariá (Islamic law); purifying the emergence of warlords since it provided them society through preaching and a return to fundamental religious practices; and the establishment of an Islamic with not only an important motivation - personal and state through violence if necessary. All three meanings have played a role within the different Afghan groups pressing for Afghanistan’s Islamization. Source: Oliver 283 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.278. Roy in: Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.279. 284 Ibidem, p.279. 288 Ibidem, p.279. 285 Idem. 289 Ibidem, p.280. 286 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.183. 290 Ibidem, p.279.

56 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

the rise of warlords since it enabled them to Afghanistan’s succeeding elite in 1994; the legitimize their violent struggle and claims to power. Taliban.294

Internal Conflict The Rise of the Taliban

It was the combination of the abovementioned In October 1994, the Taliban (meaning ‘Students of factors which shaped the circumstances in which Islam’ in Pashtu) rose from the southern hinterlands warlords could arise and warlord politics flourished. of Afghanistan and emerged as an alternative for The traditional localised nature of leadership had the internal disarray of the previous years.295 This prevented the development of strong state armed Islamic movement stood under leadership of institutions while the absence of a central state had Mullah Mohammed Omar, and received large-scale enabled former militia leaders to develop into local financial and logistical support from Pakistan. The bearers of political, military and economic power. In movement took Kandahar in 1994, easily spreading addition, the availability of high-technology weapons its power throughout the country. In the wake of the had provided them with the ability to use force, the Taliban’s arrival, the former Mujahedeen forces and increased drug production had given them a source leaders had three main choices: fight, flee or join the of funding and the Islamization of Afghan society Taliban. Some leaders left the country and resettled had provided them with an ideology to legitimise in Pakistan, the Persian Gulf or Europe. Many of the their claims to power.291 warlords who decided to stay, organised themselves It was the very combination of these factors under the name of the ‘Northern Alliance’.296 which produced a “cult of violence” exacerbating the Without much resistance, Herat fell in Taliban hands existing ethnic, linguistic and social cleavages in in 1995, followed by the Afghan capital of Kabul in Afghanistan.292 In the years following 1992 a power 1996.297 struggle erupted and internal conflict broke out, as The rise of the Taliban opened the opportunity warlords of erstwhile Mujahedeen and former for a much younger form of leadership than supporters of the Communist regime resorted to Afghanistan was used to.298 The Taliban leadership violence to settle disputes of personal gain, rivalry mainly consisted of young men (Afghan refugee and ascendancy. These disputes were heightened students from Pakistan, mid-30s in age) of Pasthu by ethnic and tribal differences and, in combination origin. In addition, the ascendance of the Taliban with the Kalashnikovisation of Afghan society, led to represented the culmination of the trend toward an extremely violent context. Yet it was this “cynical Islamization in Afghanistan. Apart from peace, order and continuous struggle for power”293 that and the recovery of the traditional Durrani Pashtu increasingly undermined whatever legitimacy these dominance, the Taliban promised the Afghan people leaders had outside their local territories. This a return to traditional Islamic society. Ironically, the situation ultimately paved the way for the rise of foundation for this Islamic trend was laid by the

294 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.280. 295 Ibidem, p.184-185. 296 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.185. 291 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.281. 297 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 292 Idem. reconstruction’, p.806. 293 Ibidem, p.276

57 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

various Mujahedeen groups which were then held territory, it found it extremely difficult to recapture by the Taliban to be un-Islamic.299 any further land. As a result, the map of Afghanistan Although the Taliban managed to establish an changed little between the years 1996 and 2001. administration which successfully extended Taliban control throughout the rural areas, the Islamist regime was harsh and bleak, and was even 2.3 A New Future for Afghanistan resented in those parts of the countryside where the movement had its roots.300 “Enforcing an austere, Al-Qaida; September 11, 2001 and the Fall of the anti-modernist interpretation of Islam, it banned Taliban women from employment and education. A catalogue of policies and prohibitions were imposed In the late 1990’s, with the support and complicity of that ranged from public executions to a ban on kite the Taliban regime and the Mujahedeen flying”.301 Although the Taliban was de-facto administration that preceded it, Afghanistan became governing the country between 1996 and 2001, the 304 the base for the al-Qaida network. This network movement has never been officially internationally consisted of large numbers of foreign nationals who recognised as Afghanistan’s government.302 In came from Pakistan, Chechnya and several Arab 1998, the Taliban controlled 90% of the Afghan countries, who were attracted to the variety of territory. In the areas under control it was able to radical Islamists housing Afghanistan. These people establish a relative peace, in the sense that factions came to Afghanistan to go to military training camps had stopped fighting. The remaining 10% of the ran by al-Qaida (several of these camps were Afghan territory, a northeast sliver of the country, originally established with Western money to was however in hands of the Northern Alliance, provide the Mujahedeen with training during the which consisted of minority forces and warlords of 305 Cold War). The existence of the al-Qaida network Taijks, Hazara, Uzbek and Pushtun origin. This became apparent with the terrorist attacks on the Alliance was led by former Afghan President American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Burhanuddin Rabbani and stood under military in 1998, however, it were the attacks of 11 leadership of Ahmed Shah Massoud.303 While the September 2001 which put the network in the global Northern Alliance succeeded in defending this small 306 spotlight.

298 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.277. 299 Ibidem, p.280. 303 300 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road', p.86-87. Many Taliban policies were based on their 304 interpretation of Islamic law which, among others, meant Al-Qaida (also transliterated as al-Qaeda, al-Qa'ida, that Friday prayers were obligatory, and traditional hudud al-Quaida, el-Qaida, äl-Qaida, or al Qaeda) means the punishments (punishments as described in the Koran) foundation in Arabic. It is an Islamist terrorist were applied. Moreover, women were forced to a organization that is involved in terrorist plots around the restricted life since they were eliminated from the public world. The terrorist group is led by Osama bin Laden and space, were prevented their participation in virtually all Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is said that al-Qaida has more than occupations and schooling, and were restricted in their 18,000 potential terrorists scattered around the world movement by the obligatory burqa (a veil covering the operating in more than 60 countries. See: Wikipidea, The body from head-to-toe). See: Goodson, ‘The Free Encyclopedia, (available at: Fragmentation of Culture’, p.280-281. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahedeen, accessed 301 September 8, 2004). Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.185. 305 302 Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's Barakat, 'Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.807. reconstruction’, p.801. 306 Idem.

58 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Since the attacks on the United States of 11 alliance proved to be an appropriate partner in the September 2001, the dynamics of the Afghan U.S.-led military campaign. Backed with new internal situation has changed drastically. In a supplies, financial means and American air power, period of three months, the negative political and the Northern Alliance ground troops were able to military deadlock, existing for almost five years, was capture city after city. In November 2001 Kabul fell, lifted. The series of events starting this radical and with it the Taliban regime itself.312 Despite the change was initiated by the murder of Ahmad Shah successes of the U.S.-led military strike in crushing Massoud (leader of the Northern Alliance) in the the Taliban both military as well as politically, it did north of Afghanistan on 9 September 2001.307 Two not produce the death or capture of either al-Qaida days later, on September 11, 2001, four American leader Osama bin Laden or Taliban leader passenger planes, hijacked by terrorists, crashed Muhammad Omar. Moreover, the swiftness of into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and a Operation Enduring Freedom, “caught the world field in Pennsylvania, killing nearly 3.000 people in a unprepared” to embark upon the daunting nation- matter of hours. These attacks were considered to and peace building challenges the new Afghan be very different from all earlier terrorist attacks, context posed.313 Accordingly, the international aid since they were aimed at key symbols of American community was left with the overwhelming task of military and economic power.308 The attacks were devising a disciplined and enduring policy aimed at immediately attributed to the network of al-Qaida. rebuilding a durable state in Afghanistan.314 After years of attempts to “contain and isolate” al- Qaida and the Taliban, the shock of September 11 The Political Reconstruction Design enabled the U.S. to go directly onto Afghan 309 territory. In reaction to the refusal of the Taliban The rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime as a to hand in the al-Qaida leadership, the U.S. result of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, assembled a ‘coalition of the willing’ and started a “caught the world unprepared” to embark upon the military campaign in Afghanistan on October 7, daunting political and security challenges the new 310 2001. With the help of 39 countries contributing Afghan context posed.315 The principal question at materially, the United States aimed to destroy al- that time was with what form of administration the Qaida’s network and to undermine the military Taliban should be replaced with. To allow the 311 capacity of the Taliban. Northern Alliance leaders to install themselves as The Northern Alliance formed the only coherent government leaders was no real alternative, since resistance force to the Taliban. For this reason, the they were unrepresentative of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. In addition, allowing 307 Haneef Atmar en Jonathan Goodhand, Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan; What Lessons Can Be Learned?, International Alert Report, 2002 (available at: 312 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.185. http://www.international- 313 Frank G. Wisner et al, Afghanistan: Are We Losing alert.org/pdf/pubdev/Afghan_rpt.pdf , accessed June 23, the Peace?, Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task 2003) p.6. Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations 308 Barakat, ‘Setting the scene for Afghanistan's (CFR) and the Asia Society, June 2003. (available at: reconstruction’, p.802. www.asiazociety.org/policy_business/afghanistan061703 309 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.85. .pdf, accessed October 15, 2004), p.7. 310 Barakat, ‘Setting the scene for Afghanistan's 314 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.85. reconstruction’, p.802. 315 Wisner et al, Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?, 311 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.85-86 p.7.

59 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

these leaders a second attempt at governing the arrangements in Afghanistan pending the country could end as unfortunate as their first efforts reestablishment of permanent government in 1992.316 Also complicating Afghan reconstruction institutions”, to be known as the ‘Bonn Agreement’, was the fact that there was disagreement among a political two-step plan was set up to provide the international actors on fundamental issues such as country with a democratic government in two the state’s structure (unitary versus federal) and the years.320 purpose of post-war peace building.317 Some actors By means of establishing the Bonn Agreement, adhered to a minimalist perspective or the idea of the U.N. did not only devise a political plan but also ‘nation building lite’, which entailed that the ultimate placed a request for international support to deliver goal was to “establish a stable, reasonably effective humanitarian help and to contribute to and Western-friendly government” able of thwarting reconstruction on the long-term.321 “In the UN (…), international terrorists from abusing the Afghan there was a widespread agreement that the territory.318 However, other actors proposed a more international community must engage itself ambitious plan aimed at developing “genuinely decisively in Afghanistan, to prevent the country, democratic and rights-based governing structures qua ‘failed state’, from sliding back into civil war and as well as to promote economic development”.319 It becoming a sanctuary for drug production and was this ambitious plan that materialised in the terrorists.”322 With the consequences of its failure to ‘Bonn Agreement’. intervene in Afghanistan in the early 1990’s visibly in Under the auspices of the Special mind, the international community responded by Representative of the United Nations Secretary- collectively supporting the Bonn Agreement and the General for Afghanistan -Lakhdar Brahimi- several following process.323 Accordingly, the Agreement representative groups were brought together in was amplified by U.N. Security Council resolutions, Bonn, Germany, in an attempt to map out and was accompanied by series of “international Afghanistan’s political future. From 27 November assistance mechanisms” such as coordination until 5 December 2001, eleven UN representatives structures, pledging conferences and agreements and forty-two representatives from four different on division of labour among donors.324 “Taken Afghan groups attended the talks. The Northern Alliance was accompanied by representatives of the Rome group, who were predominantly Pashtun; the Cyprus group, backed by Iran; and finally the Peshawar group backed by Pakistan. Under the name of the “Agreement on provisional 320 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.186 and see the Bonn Agreement: 'Agreement on Provisional 316 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.186. Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re- 317 Astri Shurke, Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne establishment of Permanent Government Institutions', Strand, Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two (available at: http://www.unama- Years after Bonn, Report prepared for the Norwegian afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chr. Michielsen Institute, Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm, accessed February 24, 2004 (available at: May 21, 2003). http://www.cmi.no/publications/2004/rep/r2004- 321 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road', 85. %204.pdf, accessed October 31, 2004), p. 4. 322 Shurke, at al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.5. 318 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 4. 323 Ibidem, p. 5-6. 319 Idem. 324 Ibidem, p. 1.

60 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

B o x 4 . T h e P o s t - T a li b a n T r a n s i t i o n a l Structure

F ive Pillars: • an interim governing structure with a timetable for a transition to a more ‘broad- based, gender-sensitive, multi- ethnic and fully r epresentative’ government • state capacity to be rebuilt at the central level (w ith immediate external funding of salaries of government officials) • large-scale international aid for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes

• a ‘light footprint’ international presence, which meant a UN assistance mission only (with sovereignty residing in the Afghan transitio nal administration), and a limited international peacekeeping force (only in the cap ital city) • the UN rather than the United States would formally take the lead support role

during the political transition.

S ource; Astri Shurke, Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne Strand, C onflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years after Bonn, Report prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chr. Michielsen Institute, February 24, 2004 (available at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/2004/rep/r2004- %204.pdf, accessed October 31, 2004), p.5.

together, these mechanisms formed the initial peacekeeping force able of helping the Afghan template for what was variously referred to as government to restore central state authority over peace-building, state-building or, more uncooperative warlords, in Bonn and Tokyo many conventionally, the reconstruction of Afghanistan”, donors felt that a limited international presence and Shurke et al argue.325 a standard UN peacebuilding mission was the best From negotiations at the United Nations and way to address the post-war situation in during the Bonn and Tokyo326 donor conferences, a Afghanistan, given America’s opposition to a strong five pillar “transitional structure” for post-Taliban international force and Afghanistan’s traditional Afghanistan materialised (See Box 4).327 This peace aversion to foreign forces.330 As a consequence, in building design was based on UN experience with line with the provision of a limited international previous post-war missions such as Kosovo and peacekeeping force, the UN Security Council East Timor, as well as on recommendations uttered passed Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001, in the so-called ‘Brahimi report’328.329 Despite that authorizing the deployment of an International some voices called for a strong international Security Assistance Force (ISAF) merely in the capital city. 331

325 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 1. 326 The International Conference on Reconstruction in Afghansitan was held in Tokyo from 21 until 22 January, 2002. 327 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 3. 328 ‘The Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform’ is a study on UN Peacekeeping Operations prepared by a panel led by Lakhdar Brahimi. Among others, the report clarifies what UN peacekeeping is trying to accomplish, what kinds of forces are required, and what conditions might necessitate different kinds of missions. It also takes http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_08/alia/a0082308.htm, a critical look at past peacekeeping efforts to improve the accessed April 3, 2005) structure and management of UN response. See: United 329 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 3. States Embassy, ‘Fact Sheet, The Brahimi Report on UN 330 Idem. Peacekeeping Reform’, (available at: 331 Ibidem, p. 46.

61 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

The Afghanistan Interim and Transitional the Central Bank of Afghanistan. Moreover, the IA Authority had the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and good governance of Afghanistan and had full The Bonn Agreement indicated a ‘Roadmap to jurisdiction over the printing and delivery of national Democracy’.332 The first step to be taken on this currency. roadmap was the establishment of the Afghanistan The Supreme Court is a permanent institution Interim Authority (AIA), consisting of three interim which provides for a legal framework in Afghanistan institutions; an Interim Administration (IA) presided and is repository for all judicial power. The Special over by a chairman, a Special Independent Independent Commission for the Convening of the Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Emergency Loya Jirga (SIC), consisted of 21 Loya Jirga (SIC), and a Supreme Court. The members and had the final authority for determining establishment of these institutions were regarded by procedures and regulations for allocating seats in 335 the Bonn participants as the first step in the creation the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ). Moreover, the of a broad, multi-ethnic and fully representative Commission was set with the task to ensure that a government. significant number of women, as well as other The AIA, being repository of Afghan sovereignty, segments of Afghan society, were represented in was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 with a six- the ELJ. The Emergency Loya Jirga was formed out month mandate. The most important part of the AIA, of 1.501 representatives selected through local the Interim Administration consisted of a chairman elections, took place in Kabul, and lasted from June (Hamid Karzai), vife vice-chairman and twenty-four 11 until June 19, 2002. The function of the ELJ was other members (among them a number of powerful to decide on the appointment of a Head of State, on regional commanders).333 These IA members had the key positions within, and on the structure of the been selected by the participants of the UN talks in Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). However, Bonn. Although the main task of the Interim the ELJ could not live up to the expectations created Administration was the day-to-day conduct of state in Bonn. Despite the fact that the loya jirga was “the affairs and representing Afghanistan in its external very institution meant to give democracy a chance 336 relations, the IA established several independent to flower”, it was not only unable to come to a commissions (Civil Service Commission, Human unified decision on the ATA structure and on key Rights Commission, Judicial Commission334) and cabinet positions, it also failed (with exception of Karzai) to bring several new and important Pashtuns into the Transitional Administration.337 The 332 See Appendix III. ‘Afghanistan’s ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, for a factual outline of the steps sheer size and composition of the ELJ, as well as incorporated in the Bonn Agreement. the intimidation by warlords during the ELJ election 333 Barakat, ‘Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.802. process, prevented it from becoming an opportunity 334 The independent Civil Service Commission was to provide the IA with a shortlist of candidates for key posts in the administrative departments; the Human Rights traditions. See Paragraph II, point 2 and Paragraph III, C., Commission was responsible for human rights point 5 and 6 of the Bonn Agreement. monitoring, the investigation of violations and the 335 Loya Jirga is a Pushtu term, meaning a ‘Grand development of domestic human rights institutions; and Assembly of Elders’. See: Barakat, ‘Setting the scene for the Judical Commission was to rebuild the domestic Afghanistan's reconstruction’, p.802. justice system in accordance with Islamic principles 336 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.83. international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal 337 Ibidem, p.90.

62 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

for democratic politics.338 Moreover, given that the After some delay, the Constitutional Commission ELJ was a “stylized version of the jirga (council) proposed a draft Afghan Constitution to Hamid system”,339 it was set with a task far greater than Karzai on November 3, 2003. The new 162-article was provided for by the traditional system, in which Constitution became the official law of Afghanistan national leaders convened grand councils to when the Constitutional Loya Jirga, which began legitimize major decisions that had already been December 14, 2003, approved it by consensus on made.340 Thus, to expect the ELJ to decide on January 4, 2004.341 complex issues such as the ATA’s structure, To conclude the roadmap to democracy and to appeared to be largely unrealistic. establish a fully-representative national government, As a result of the ELJ’s failure, the structure and no later than two years from the date that the key positions had to be proposed by Hamid Karzai. Constitutional Loya Jirga was established, free and His proposal was agreed upon by the Loya Jirga, fair elections were to take place as was required by establishing the ATA on June 19, 2002. With the the Bonn Agreement.342 While the original date was establishment of the ATA, the Interim scheduled in June 2004, by March 2004 Karzai Administration, the SIC and the ELJ ceased to exist. decided to postpone presidential elections to The succeeding Transitional Administration (TA) September 2004, due to a low level of voter was set to be in function for two years after national registration and a worsening internal security elections decide on a fully representative central situation. However, for the same reasons, elections government. Its main tasks were to create basic had to be postponed for a second time. Eventually, government policies needed to restore peace, bring Afghanistan's presidential elections took place on 9 stability and economic growth in Afghanistan, October, 2004. Parliamentary elections are establish several commissions tasked with scheduled for April 2005.343 addressing the key challenges, and most importantly, position a firm government structure. Conclusion The TA consisted of a Head of State (Hamid Karzai), two vice-presidents, thirty ministers and a Afghanistan has always been a weak state. Since Chief of Justice. In comparison with the Interim its independence in the early 20th century, the Administration few significant changes were made country has experienced a problematic process of in TA key positions. state formation and nation building. Factors such as An equally important step in the ‘Roadmap to its division by sharp social cleavages, the existence Democracy’ was the establishment of a of a localized social system, its rugged geography Constitutional Commission on October 5, 2002 by and its subjection to external influences, have all the Transitional Administration, which was to create prevented the state from developing into a strong a draft for a new Afghan constitution. Following, a Constitutional Loya Jirga was required by the Bonn 341 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, ‘Constitution of Afghanistan’, (available at: Agreement to convene within eighteen months of http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Constitution% the establishment of the ATA for ratifying this draft. 20of%20Afghanistan, accessed September 7, 2004). 342 See Bonn Agreement: Paragraph I, point 4. 343 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Introduction’, 338 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p.93-94. (available at: 339 Ibidem, p.92. 340 Ibidem, p.83.

63 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

‘nation-state’. The lack of central state institutions and the traditional adherence to localised rule, led, in combination with more modern developments such as the introduction of modern weapons, increased poppy production and the amplified importance of Islam, to the emergence of the first Afghan ‘warlords’ in the 1980’s. After two decades of internal conflict, Taliban domination and the subsequent fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan appeared to enter a completely new future, when national and international actors consented on the Bonn Agreement –paving the way for Afghanistan’s democratic reform. However, despite its good intensions, the Bonn Agreement has failed to address the problems posed by the Afghan warlords effectively. Although many elements of the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’ have been successfully established, Afghanistan’s post- war political context continues to be heavily affected by warlords and warlord politics.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan /intro.htm, accessed October 1, 2004), p.5.

64 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 3. Warlordism in

Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Post-Taliban Afghanistan differs sharply from the to rein localised power, Afghan strongmen - also post-conflict situations in Kosovo and East-Timor called ‘warlords’ in much of the academic literature - given that Afghanistan is not “post-conflict in any have shown to be undeniable actors within the meaningful sense of the word”. Instead, “the post- country’s complex political context. With much war situation had serious built-in elements of conflict power and authority organised around these that were either ignored or deliberately set aside in powerful Afghan warlords, internal security and the Bonn.”344 After all, since the fall of the Taliban, the consolidation of a legitimate democratic central low-level war between the US-led coalition and state, remains distant. The resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaida forces has continued in the Afghan warlords is therefore one of the greatest south and throughout the country mutually threats to Afghanistan’s reconstruction.346 combating warlords have re-emerged. US forces working in partnership with local commanders to The Return of the Afghan Warlords hunt down Taliban and al-Qaida fighters have, in fact, fostered the resurgence of the warlord As was suggested in Chapter 2, the military strategy phenomenon. Combined with the traditional of the U.S.-led coalition forces was extremely adherence to localised rule, the absence of an effective in breaking the back of the Taliban regime international peacekeeping force able of ensuring and reducing much of al-Qaida’s power. Yet, the stability in the short-term and the flourishing opium fast erosion of the previous administration also production and trade, this U.S. support for military produced “long-term political ramifications” that commanders opened up the space in which the created an extremely complex political context in Afghan warlords could resurface and consolidate which Afghanistan’s new government still struggles their power. to move the country forward.347 One of the most apparent elements of the post-Taliban context in 3.1 Warlords in the Post-Taliban Era Afghanistan is the re-emergence of local and regional military commanders (warlords) to the As Afghanistan has passed the first stages of Afghan political scene. In fact, Shurke et al argue political reform and post-conflict reconstruction after that the immediate post-Taliban Afghanistan was the fall of the Taliban, there are rising concerns largely ruled by a handful of powerful provincial about the internal security situation among many warlords heading military-political organisations, Afghan and international stakeholders. So called which were mutually divided by ethnic and/or 348 ‘warlordism’ is again rampant in large parts of the religious borders. The powerful re-emergence of Afghan country, creating adverse security conditions.345 Despite national and international 345 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting To Be efforts to expand central authority beyond Kabul and Rescued’, in: Far Eastern Economic Review, March 21, 2002, pp.14-18, p.14. 346 344 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 3. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 91. 347 Ibidem, p. 86. 348 Astri Shurke, Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne Strand, 'After Bonn: conflictual peace building', in: Third

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these Afghan warlords can be attributed to several role in the subsequent reconstruction process and international, as well as national factors.349 U.S.-led coalition forces are regarded as essential First, given that the Northern Alliance formed the elements of this process. However, according to only coherent resistance force to the Taliban, the Shurke et al, U.S. support for those warlords that U.S.-led military coalition used Alliance forces as contributed to the fall of the Taliban, has continued proxy troops in Operation Enduring Freedom.350 even after November 2001, making the role of U.S. U.S. cooperation with the different ethnic militias forces in Afghanistan quite controversial. After all, in allied under the Northern Alliance has, however, contrast to other major international actors (such as allowed for those military commanders to strengthen the United Nations) Washington “has seen the their positions and to return to regional and local military struggle against remnants of the Taliban levels of power.351 Active U.S.-led presence in and al Qiada as the task with the highest priority.”354 Southern Afghanistan, and the cooperation of U.S. Seeing warlord factions as “useful instruments” in troops with local forces under control of warlords, the war on terror, “the U.S. continued to provide a has created the assumption among many Afghans number of these once powerful figures with money, that several warlords, in fact, enjoyed U.S. support, finance and –ultimately – political legitimacy.”355 In either directly or indirectly.352 For example, in May fact, Shurke et al argue that during the complete 2002 an Afghan observer for the loya jirga election post-Taliban era, the U.S-led coalition’s support for process commented: the warlords has been significantly consistent. The American policy of backing Afghan warlords was Because the United States does not have any even officially declared and brought to a higher level troops – no land troops – to deploy, it was only when an American military spokesmen declared on bombing, and they used these people as land February 7, 2004 that U.S. troops had begun troops to capture and take the place of the training and equipping a “a new Afghan militia force” Taliban. Therefore they came into power, and then aimed at supporting the operations against Taliban Hamid Karzai had no police and no army and he and Al Qaida insurgency.356 Although the force was compelled to accept their authority and their power in Kabul.353 differed from the Afghan National Army and was characterised as a temporary force, this As a result of the operation’s success in toppling the announcement ironically coincided with efforts to Taliban regime, the U.S. have come to play a key accelerate the process of DDR supported by 357 President Karzai and the UN. This is a clear World Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 23, No 5, pp..875-891, p. example of what Shurke et al have labelled 879. “conflictual peacebuilding”.358 349 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords’, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2002 (available at: http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/warlords.pd f, accessed October 12, 2004), p.17. 353 HRW interview with Observer O, Kandahar, May 25, 350 For further information on the role of the Unites States 2002, in: idem. in Afghanistan, see: Appendix IV: ‘International actors in 354 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 45. Afghan Political Reconstruction’. 355 Idem. 351 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to 356 Ibidem, p. 46. Reconstruction’, p. 86. 357 Idem. 352 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.17. 358 Ibidem, p. 3. For further information on ‘conflictual peacebuilding’, see: Appendix IV. ‘International Actors in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction’.

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According to Ahmed Rashid, American troops have commanders all around this area very easily stimulated re-emerging warlordism by means of threaten the local population. Many of them have supporting several Pashtun warlords and their been given satellite telephones, and they use these to scare everyone. They say to people, “If you do factions (such as Hazarat Ali in Jalalabad and Gul not do what we say, we will tell the Americans you Agha in Kandahar). While providing these warlord are Taliban or Al Qaeda, and have the Americans militias with weapons in name of a low intensity war bomb you.” They misuse the phones, they to hunt down Taliban, Al Qaida and Afghan intimidate people.363 fundamentalist forces, U.S. forces have however failed to pressure their military leaders into loyalty to A second factor contributing to the re-emergence of 359 Karzai’s government. In fact, America’s policy warlords was already suggested in Chapter 2. “prompted many warlords to openly defy the ATA”, Afghanistan’s political rule has traditionally been 360 Mark Sedra argues. highly localised as a result of its ethnic According to a June 2002 Human Rights Watch heterogeneous population and its indigenous social (HRW) report, American reliance on such local system organised around the qawm. Even though commanders - in spite of their human rights history the traditional social system was largely destroyed – was based on the need to provide internal security by the Soviet invasion and by the years of internal in Afghanistan. In line with official U.S. policy, the conflict resulting from it, in large parts of level of “entanglement” and the amount of U.S. Afghanistan local forms of authority have retained 361 ground troops could in this way be limited. Even their legitimacy.364 The Afghan people are though the U.S. did not acknowledge its policy as traditionally in the habit of providing local and actively and deliberately supporting warlords, doubt regional leaders, instead of an abstract central and confusion was easily created among ordinary state, with legitimacy and loyalty. In a context Afghans who saw U.S. forces cooperate with combining traditional adherence to local leaders, 362 Afghan warlords. The 2002 HRW report even suspicion and hostility towards central state argues that as a result of U.S. cooperation with local institutions, national disintegration and a widespread commanders in the area of Kandahar, these power vacuum, the Afghan warlords were, once commanders were enabled to directly use American more, able to obtain regional and local power in the support for intimidating Afghan citizens and forcing provincial areas. them into submission. An Afghan loya jirga observer The third factor contributing to the re-emergence told HRW: of warlords is the inadequacy of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. First of all, it did not include all conflict The commanders who the United States have parties, nor were the delegates fully representative supported, there is no one to stand up to them. The of the diversity of the Afghan population.365 Secondly and more importantly, the Bonn 359 Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting To Be Rescued’, Agreement did not provide an adequate answer to p.16. 360 Mark Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction, Where Do We Go From Here?’, Foreign 363 HRW interview with Observer O, in: HRW, Policy in Focus, March 2003 (available at: Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.17-18. http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/SRafghan.pdf, accessed 364 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic October 18, 2004), p.9. Path to Peace’, p.14. 361 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.17. 362 Idem.

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one of Afghanistan’s most problematic realities: the government outside Kabul”371, a power vacuum friction between the traditional Afghan decentralised continued to exist in the provincial areas.372 As system of governance, and the European central these areas were not covered by either the state model it aimed to consolidate.366 “The presence of international peacekeepers or by resultant tension, between traditional modes of central state authority, regional warlords were decentralized government and the modern uninhibited to consolidate their power, to run local conception of a unitary state has come to the fore”, administrations and to battle each other for Mark Sedra argued in March 2004.367 According to ascendancy and personal gain. Sedra, “in light of the congruity of the political Apart from the international factors mentioned process with existing authority structures, it is hardly above, one main national factor can designated that surprising that centrifugal forces, in the guise of has contributed to the resurgence of the Afghan warlords, have emerged”, and work in resistance to warlords. As was suggested in Chapter 1, a international actors attempting to enforce upon them situation of impunity enables non-state actors, such a central state model.368 as warlords, to obtain means (financial assets, The fourth factor contributing to the return of the weapons) from a secondary war economy, which Afghan warlords, is the fact that after the fall of the are necessary for devolving central power and Taliban, the U.S.-led military coalition and the exerting power locally.373 In the case of Afghanistan, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) initially impunity has primarily meant that warlords were free refused to expand the International Security to revive the poppy cultivation. Since the fall of the Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul. ISAF was Taliban – The Taliban regime prohibited the use and inaugurated on December 20, 2001, by the UNSC, production of drugs - poppy cultivation and the drug composing of around 4,800 troops drawn from trafficking have increased exponentially.374 nineteen different countries. Its mandate was to Recently, drug laboratories have even emerged in provide security for Kabul and its immediate Afghanistan enabling the refining of heroine in surroundings.369 Its successes in stabilising Kabul, Afghanistan itself.375 Today, Afghanistan is at risk of raised the hope that an expansion of ISAF beyond becoming a “narcostate”.376 The country is the Kabul would drastically improve the security world’s largest poppy producer, providing the world conditions throughout Afghanistan. However, ISAF’s with almost 75% of the global production. In 2003, expansion would entail considerable costs for the the production of opium totalled to 3,600 tonnes, as countries contributing to it, and accordingly, many much as 1.7 million people were directly engaged in countries were opposed to an expansion.370 As a it, and the farmers’ and traffickers’ income result, “[i]n the absence of a force willing and surmounted to a total of $2.3 billion, according to capable of upholding the writ of the central 371 Mark Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, in: Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2003 (available at: 365 http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/SRafghanrecon2003.pdf, Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic accessed October 18, 2004), p.4. Path to Peace’, p.8. 372 366 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.1. Ibidem, p.2. 373 367 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p.24. Idem. 374 368 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. Idem. 375 369 Ibidem, p.5. Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 376 According to both Hamid Karzai and Antonio Maria Reconstruction, p.8. Costa, head of the UNODC. Source: Global Security.org, 370 Idem.

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figures from the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes these powerful regional leaders in Afghanistan true (UNODC).377 The profits made from the production ‘warlords’? In other words: do they fit the description and trade of narcotics are major source of income of ‘strongmen’ or ‘warlords’ as was suggested in for the Afghan warlords.378 Accordingly, these Chapter 1? (a) Are they former military leaders and financial benefits form not only an apparent is their political ascendancy strongly linked to their incentive for warlords to attain territories and local military power? (b) do they have control over a power, but they also finance the warlords’ existence, certain territory beyond central government’s writ? enabling them to ‘buy’ their fighters allegiance and (c) do they exert authority in this area? (d) do they loyalty. apply a legitimating discourse (religion, As a result of these five main developments, by nationalism)? (e) do they dispose of weapons? and 2002 and in large parts of Afghanistan, warlords finally (f) are they financially dependent on profits were the real power on the ground. A Herat resident from the secondary war economy? claimed on September 11, 2002: “What has (a) Regional military leaders in Afghanistan are changed in Afghanistan? All our hopes are crushed. mostly former Mujahedeen leaders or militia We are completely disappointed. Look: all the same commanders who have failed to make military or warlords are in power as before. Fundamentalism political progress at the national level. In fact, all of has come into power, and every day they Afghanistan’s most prominent warlords have a strengthen their power.”379 With the return of the military background: While Attah Muhammad, Ismail Afghan warlords to the political scene, the political Khan, Hazrat Ali, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Haji reconstruction of Afghanistan, “on the basis of a Muhammad Ishaq Rah Gosar and Abdul Rabb al- well-intentioned but misguided attempt to reassert Rasul Sayyaf were all Mujahedeen commanders, the primacy of the Kabul-based central Abdul Rashid Dostum commanded a militia aligned government”, proved to be extremely difficult.380 with the pro-Communist Afghan national army. Most of these military commanders maintained their Are the Afghan ‘Warlords’ True Warlords? private armies or militias after Soviet troops retreated in the 1990s, using these factions and The previous paragraphs spoke of the re- military achievements to consolidate legitimacy and 382 emergence of the Afghan ‘warlords’.381 Yet, are authority in regional territories. Northern warlord and provincial governor Haji Muhammad Ishaq Rah Gosar explains in an interview in October 2002: ‘Afghanistan-Introduction’, p.2. 377 Samina Ahmed, ‘Warlords, Drugs, Democracy’, in: It was my long history as a leader in the holy war The World Today, May 2004, pp.15-17, p.16. 378 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.5. (jihad) against the Soviets that gave me the regard 379 HRW interview with D.A.H., Herat, September 11, of my people. The people have seen that and 2002. in: Human Rights Watch, All Our Hopes Are respect me for it. For sure fighting was not a good Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan, HRW Afghanistan Report Vol. 14, No. 7, thing. During the period people were deprived of New York, November 2002 (available at: their schooling and we have large numbers of http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/afghan3/herat1002.pdf, martyrs, widows, amputees and cripples. Leading accessed October 16, 2004), p.5. 380 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 87. 381 See Appendix V. ‘Table of Warlords in Afghanistan’, Afghanistan’, for an overview of the most prominent for a comprehensive outline of Afghanistan’s warlords in warlords in Afghanistan in 2004. 2003, and see Appendix VI. ‘Map of Major Warlords in

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through these adversity and deprivations, however, (b) Since the Taliban regime has been 383 has also taught us skills. overthrown, Afghanistan’s significant leaders dominate large parts of the country. Barnett R. During the Taliban years, if they had not been Rubin even argues that “the warlords are the main captured or forced to flee, the former military and power holders in most of Afghanistan”.387 After all, Mujahedeen commanders largely joined forces in since they all had a background as military the war against the Taliban. Many prominent commanders, they have often maintained their own factional leaders (such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, private armies or militias, enabling them to control Ustad Muhammad Atta, Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, regional territory and to demarcate territorial Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Ustad Mohammad borders. Moreover, with their private armies Mohaqiq and Ismail Khan) became aligned under controlling local security, the Afghan warlords are the banner of the Northern Alliance. Others (such as able to run civil administrations virtually independent Abdul Karim Khalili) were active in one of the from central government, levy duties and keep smaller anti-Taliban factions, of which the Hizb-i- taxes.388 Warlord power is currently so strong that Whadat Islami Afghanistan faction, was the most neither the Afghan National Army, nor international 384 prominent. It is the warlords’ military background, security forces have shown the ability to rein warlord reputation and strength which currently provides power or to control provincial territories beyond Afghanistan’s most significant leaders with political Kabul.389 power. “Political power is almost exclusively a (c) In Afghanistan, local power structures are reflection of coercive power, held by a handful of traditionally provided with a certain amount of 385 regional military groups”, Shurke et al argue. legitimate authority at the expense of more Some experts even argue that the Afghan warlord’s centralised power structures. This is also true for the “political authority derives solely from their military post-Taliban era. Although most Afghan warlords 386 capabilities”. experience strong support from specific ethnic communities, ethnic loyalty is not their primary

382 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. source for deriving ‘legitimate’ authority. Today, 383 Citation of governor Haji Muhammad Ishaq Rah most Afghan warlords derive their regional authority Gosar during an interview in October 2002 in Mazar-i- Sharif, in: Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. from “a combination of appeals to Islam, illicit 384 Apart from the Northern Alliance, the Hizb-i-Whadat economic activities (such as opium trade), and Islami Afghanistan faction (Islamic Unity Party of 390 Afghanistan) representing the Shi’a Muslim Hazara gunmen.” In fact, Peake claims that: “Rooting minority, was the second most powerful military party in their legitimacy in their backgrounds of military opposition to the Taliban. The group maintained positions in central Afghanistan after being driven out by the Taliban in 1998. The HWIA faction was founded by (available at: Iran in the 1980s and was supported by Iran throughout http://www.cfr.org/background/afghanistan_karzai.php, the years of internal conflict. Since Abdul Karim Kahlili, accessed October 15, 2004), p.4. a Hazara from the Behsud district and vice president 387 Citation of Barnett R. Rubin in: Pan, ‘Afghanistan, within the ATA, took over from former leader Ali Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.1. Mazari, the party has been declining. See: Global 388 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.187. Security.org, ‘Karim Khalili’ (available at: 389 Joseph Cirincione and Joshua Williams, ‘We Are http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan Losing the War in Afghanistan’, Carnegie Endowment /khalili.htm, accessed October 26, 2004), p.1-2. for International Peace (available at: 385 Shurke, Harpviken and Strand, ‘After Bonn’, p. 889. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cf 386 Esther Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, m?fa=print&id=15861, accessed October 11, 2004), p.1. Council on Foreign Relations, September 15, 2004 390 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 91.

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commanders, many of Afghanistan’s significant introduced by the United States during the Cold leaders have regional power and authority that War, provides regional leaders and their militia’s collectively match - if not outweigh - that of the with the necessary means to defend their territory fledging central administration”.391 and to extract resources from citizens. As was (d) In Afghanistan, as a society traditionally suggested in Chapter 2, the availability of weapons adhering to Islam, it has always been necessary to is closely linked to the poppy cultivation and the legitimise claims for political power through the production of drugs, since the illegal businesses are Islam.392 Islamism in Afghanistan retains quite some protected by modern weapons. The availability of strength and still enables regional leaders (such as modern weapons, and the prominence of armed Islamic conservatives Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul warlords in Afghanistan has resulted in the fact Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar393) that: “Afghanistan today is ruled by the gun. If you to legitimise their claims to political power.394 These don’t have one, you’re nobody.”397 “hard-core Islamists” are profoundly opposing liberal (f) Afghanistan’s significant warlords are largely reforms such as secular government, women’s financially dependent on profits from the secondary rights and press freedom.395 They also regard war economy. In the situation of impunity existent in modern education and elections as a threat to the large parts of Afghanistan, warlords are able to present.396 Under the guise of fighting a jihad, or “charge import duties on trade through their holy war, they legitimise their (violent) struggle provinces, smuggle antiquities and lumber, and against American troops, its allies and the skim reconstruction efforts”.398 Moreover, they may international aid community. employ criminal acts such as extortion, robbery and (e) The availability of modern weapons in violence.399 However, more importantly, many Afghanistan, such as the Kalashnikovs firstly Afghan warlords exploit global criminal opportunities; in the Afghan case this primarily

391 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.182. means involvement in drug trafficking and the 392 Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture’, p.279. cultivation of poppy fields.400 According to Barnett R. 393 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is leader of the Hizb-I Islami party which espouses an extremist anti-western ideology. Rubin, the Afghan warlords profit from the drug The party received support from Pakistan and Saudi- trade at every level: Arabia and has attracted thousands of radical Islamists to Afghanistan, among them Osma bin Laden. See: HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.1. Other large [T]hey tax the opium grown locally, they charge Afghan Islamic political parties are the Jami’at-e Islami tolls on the roads used to transport the opium to (Islamic Community) of the Northern Alliance group headed by former President Rabbani; the Junbish-e- wholesale markets, and they take a share of the Melli-ye Islami (Islamic Movement) led by Northern profits from the centers where the opium is warlord Rashid Dostum; and Wahdat-mili-Islami, led by processed. In addition, many warlords get the Akbari, a Hazara warlord. See: Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘Disarmament accelerated drugs to international markets using their as elections approach’, 21 September 2004, (available at: http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/d8ba133e63ba 9e1685256f16006ec14a?OpenDocument accessed 21 January, 2005), p.1. IRIN, ‘Afghanistan, Disarmament accelerated as 397 Citation of Kathy Gannon, Associated Press bureau elections approach’, p.1. chief for Pakistan and Afghanistan, in: Pan, ‘Afghanistan, 394 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.5. Reconstruction’, p. 91. 398 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.5. 395 Idem. 399 Ahmed, ‘Warlords, Drugs, Democracy’, p.16. 396 Idem. 400 Warlords, University of Bristol, p.1

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existing networks for moving men, money, and From all the above, this thesis concludes that 401 arms (…) despite some small differences, the most significant military leaders in Afghanistan neatly fit the Experts have argued that the warlords are using definition of ‘warlord’ as was provided in Chapter 1. these profits to provide their private militias with 402 arms and to fund their political campaign. The booming opium cultivation and drug trade, however, 3.2 Specifying Different Types of do not only finance the warlords and their factions hereby ensuring their existence, but also detract Warlords from the primary economy hereby undermining the whole range of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan is currently residence to around thirty Afghanistan.403 warlords. A comprehensive outline of different The most significant warlords in Afghanistan, warlords in Afghanistan as of 2003 is given in however, do not completely depend on the profits Appendix V. In the previous chapter the Afghan made from drug trade but exploit several other warlords were primarily described as being one opportunities to finance their existence.404 Some unified group. However, despite that all Afghan Afghan warlords, such as Islamic fundamentalist warlords, to a certain extent, fit the description of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, receive external support from ‘warlords’ mentioned above, they also visibly differ diaspora in neighbouring countries like Iran and from each other. For example, the most visible Pakistan (both countries have a record of meddling difference among warlords in present day in Afghanistan’s internal affairs).405 For example, Afghanistan is that not all warlords are equally Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is reported powerful. In the provincial areas hundreds, possibly to be providing sanctuary and arms to Gulbuddin thousands of less significant military leaders are Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami party.406 Moreover, existent. “It ranges from leaders who have Afghan and American officials have accused thousands of men under arms to the guy on the 408 Pakistan – even though the country officially corner who has 20 guys with guns”. There are, cooperates in the fight against Al-Qaida and the however, a handful of very powerful warlords in Taliban – of allowing Islamic militia groups to train Afghanistan whose authority extends regionally as 409 fighters in Pakistan and sending them into well as nationally. These warlords, as well as the Afghanistan to attack Afghan and U.S. forces.407 areas under their control in 2004, are indicated in Appendix VI. Apart from being categorised according to their 401 Barnett R. Rubin in: Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.5. power and significance, the different Afghan 402 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.5. warlords can also be divided into specific types. 403 Cirincione and Williams, ‘We Are Losing the War in Afghanistan’, p.1. While several warlords have shown to be willing to 404 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.5. cooperate with the ATA and international actors, 405 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction’, p. 92. others have strongly resisted cooperation and have 406 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction, p.2. 408 407 Citation of Sam Zarifi, deputy director of the Asia Carlotta Gall, ‘Pakistan Allows Taliban to Train, a Division of HRW, in: Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Detained Fighter Says’, in: the New York Times, (Kabul, Warlords’, p.3. August 4, 2004).

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therefore adopted a spoiler role. However, even This situation created a strong feeling of within this category, one can differentiate between marginalisation among, particularly the Pashtuns, Afghan warlords who have adopted a total spoiler who were the traditional rulers of Afghanistan and role, a partial (or limited) spoiler role, and warlords the country’s single largest ethnic group.414 Given who have adopted a so called ‘collaborating’ spoiler the uneven distribution of power – which continued role. in the subsequent ATA - other ethnic groups and factions excluded or disadvantaged by the Afghan Warlords Adopting a Spoiler Role agreement, were motivated to adopt a spoiler role. Secondly, as was already suggested above, the As was suggested in Chapter 1, spoilers believe Bonn Agreement failed to address the friction that peace threatens their position of power, between institutions of different origin: It did not worldview and (financial) interests, and therefore provide a strategy for reconciling the de facto attempt to (violently) undermine international decentralised system of authority, with the attempts to achieve it.410 Afghan warlords have centralised authority structure of the proposed 415 adopted a spoiler role for several reasons. democratic state. The inadequacy of the Bonn As was suggested in Chapter 1, international Agreement was the result of the fact that: actors initiating a peace process have to adhere to the principle of ‘sufficient inclusion’ for the process The paradigm of state building has an innate to be sustainable. In other words: All conflict parties proclivity for advancing strong centralized forms of government. Accordingly, a disproportionate able of derailing the process have to be integrated amount of resources are spent on strengthening in the peace process. “If one or more parties remain central state institutions at the expense of outside the process, they retain the option of provincial and local-level structures.416 adopting a spoiler role at a later stage, an adverse situation that has materialized in Afghanistan”, As a result, efforts designed to consolidate a strong Sedra argued in March 2003. After all, the Bonn central state, undermined local authority structures, Conference of December 5, 2001, did not include all even before a strong central state was conflict parties, nor were the delegates fully consolidated.417 In a country such as Afghanistan representative of the diversity of the Afghan where local forms of authority have always retained 411 population. Instead, the conference was their legitimacy, and people have expressed “an 412 dominated by one group; the Northern Alliance. aversion to strong central authority”,418 this As a result, the leading faction of the Northern development has led to “suspicion and even hostility Alliance dominated by Panshiri’s, was politically towards central state institutions.”419 This is privileged, inevitably creating emotions of mistrust especially true among warlords who fear to loose 413 and suspicion among different ethnic factions. their positions of power from which they financially

409 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.3 414 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 28. 410 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention’, p.69. 415 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic 411 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic Path to Peace’, p.4. Path to Peace’, p.8. 416 Ibidem, p.14. 412 Ibidem, p.13. 417 Idem. 413 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic 418 Ibidem, p.2. Path to Peace’, p.13. 419 Ibidem, p.14.

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benefit. Many Afghan warlords’ current behaviour spoilers are inherently opposed to central authority, can therefore be characterised as “scrambling to refuse to compromise and, accordingly, are maintain their positions.”420 Such warlords aim to unappeasable.426 As was suggested in Chapter 1, maintain the status quo by causing general total spoilers are often radical factions with radical insecurity and by undermining central state ideologies who resist every form of compromise. authority. They pursue "total power and exclusive recognition Thirdly, spoiler behaviour was motivated by of authority and hold immutable preferences: their frustrations among militias, as well as among goals are not subject to change".427 For these ordinary Afghans, with regard to wide-spread reasons, total spoilers are never integrated into the poverty and the lack of viable employment peace process, and as a result, total spoilers are opportunities.421 After all, Afghanistan is one of the often also outside spoilers. most impoverished countries in the world, with up to The occurrence of total spoilers is largely seventy percent of its population living below the restricted to the former Taliban territories of poverty line.422 In addition, the pace of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, where support reconstruction drastically declined and humanitarian for the Taliban regime and other conservative assistance was largely restrained as a result of Islamic party’s has always been quite strong. One of recent adverse security conditions. The slow pace the most prominent warlords who have adopted a of reconstruction, the lack of ‘peace dividend’, and total spoiler role, is strong eastern warlord and the dissatisfaction with the way reconstruction is former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin being implemented, have engendered feelings of Hekmatyar.428 As leader of the fundamentalist and growing resentment and have caused Afghan’s to anti-Western Hizb-i-Islami party, Hekmatyar has pick up arms.423 “Frustration across the country over strengthened its alliance with the Taliban insurgency the lack of improvement in standards of living and and al-Qaida forces.429 Despite international efforts the rise of insecurity is palpable and growing”, to destroy Taliban and al-Qaida insurgency, (such Sedra argued in October 2003.424 In some cases, as the continued search for insurgency forces under resentment and frustrations have led to support for Operation Enduring Freedom) Taliban forces have anti-government spoiler groups.425 in fact regrouped and reorganized, Sedra argues. They have learned from earlier experiences with Afghan Warlords Adopting a Total Spoiler Role coalition forces and have adjusted their strategy accordingly, launching “hit and run assaults” aimed As was suggested by Stephen John Stedman, one at “soft targets”, particularly from across the border 430 can differentiate between different types of spoilers; in Pakistan. According to Sedra: “In an effort to they are either limited, greedy or total spoilers. Total destabilize the government and derail the reconstruction process, they have focused the bulk

420 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.182. 421 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 426 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction’, p.4. Reconstruction’, p.2. 422 Sedra, and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic 427 Stedman, 'Conflict Prevention', p.71. Path to Peace, p.2. 428 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 423 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. Reconstruction’, p.2. 424 Ibidem, p.7. 429 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.2. 425 Ibidem, p.6. 430 Idem.

74 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

of their attention on Afghan security forces, ATA civil Karzai’s central government.436 In addition, 2003 servants, aid workers, and civilians loyal to the reports indicate that Hekmatyar’s followers and government, choosing to shy away from direct some Taliban fighters have formed a group called engagements with the heavily armed and well- Lahskar Fedayan-e- Islami, or Islamic Martyrs trained coalition forces.”431 These Taliban elements Brigade, which is aimed at conducting suicide are strongly affiliated with al-Qaida.432 In October attacks against U.S. and ATA targets.437 2003 it was believed that “mid-level al-Qaida leaders” had returned to Afghanistan to restore al- Afghan Warlords Adopting a ‘Collaborating’ Qaida cells and to deliver resources and logistical Spoiler Role 433 support to the Taliban insurgency. Both groups have also been reported to offer financial rewards According to Mark Sedra, not only warlords acting for placing attacks on coalition and Afghan as total spoilers are existent in present-day government forces. These rewards have proven to Afghanistan. Sedra claims that the majority of exert a pull on ordinary Afghans in the South who Afghan warlords have, in fact adopted, what he are struggling to support their families and have calls, a partial spoiler role. “The majority are partial been disillusioned with previous development and spoilers, individuals who could conceivably be 434 reconstruction efforts. integrated into a central state system with the right This alliance of fundamentalist Islamic groups, combination of incentives and disincentives.”438 combining al-Qaida, Taliban insurgency as well as Whether they are designated partial or, as Stephen Hekmatyar’s conservative Islamic Hizb-i-Islami Stedman calls them, limited spoilers, these spoilers party, strongly resists western interference in have limited goals and are in fact willing to Afghanistan’s internal affairs and therefore refuses compromise. For these reasons partial spoilers can any form of cooperation or compromise. Its be coerced or induced into displaying acceptable dissatisfaction with the way Afghanistan is behaviour, and as Sedra argues, can possibly be reconstructed has found expression in attacks on integrated into a central state system. the ATA and its international collaborators. The Adequate examples partial (or limited) spoilers alliance is supposedly responsible for several in Afghanistan are the Afghan warlords who were terrorist attacks launched in 2002 against the ATA, willing to cooperate with the central Afghan Afghan civilians, coalition forces, and international Authority after the fall of the Taliban. Most humanitarian organizations. These attacks include prominent examples within this category are an attempt to assassinate President Karzai, as well Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Abdul Rashid Dostum, as a car bombing in Kabul killing over thirty Afghan Ustad Muhammad Atta and Mohammad Ismail 435 civilians. In March 2003, Hekmatyar declared a Khan. As these warlords were formerly allied under jihad (or holy war) against the U.S.-led coalition, the Northern Alliance opposition force -despite their which can be considered as an indirect threat to history of mutual hatred and hostility- these warlords have become some of the most powerful regional 431 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.2. 432 Idem. 433 Idem. 436 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 434 Idem. Reconstruction’, p.2. 435 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 437 Idem. Reconstruction’, p.2. 438 Idem.

75 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

warlords in present-day Afghanistan. Given that the Commander and Provincial Governor (Ismail Khan) Northern Alliance formed the only coherent or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Fazal Hadi resistance force to the Taliban, the Alliance’s Shinwari). Thus, because these local leaders military leaders and their forces received formed the sole viable power structure in post- considerable U.S. support for their contribution in Taliban Afghanistan, and because they had “backed OEF. Consequently, after the fall of the Taliban - the right horse”443 during the war, they were despite efforts to include all Afghan conflict parties provided with significant amounts of ‘legitimate’ in the December 2001 Bonn Conference- one political authority. Accordingly, a major part of the faction of the winning Northern Alliance (the Shura-e functioning and the possible success of the Bonn Nezar faction, dominated by the Pansjiri’s) was able agreement and the Roadmap to Democracy, were of dominating the conference.439 The predominantly dependent on the Afghan warlords “undergoing the military position of these Pansjiri commanders within profound transition from warlord to peace lord”.444 Afghanistan permitted them “to significantly dictate In practice, the transition from warlord to peace the structure of the ensuing agreement”, Sedra and lord has, however, proven to be extremely difficult. Middlebrook argue.440 Many of the warlords who were ascribed with As a result of their share in overthrowing the ministerial titles in the Afghan Cabinet did not Taliban, and due to their willingness to compromise, deviate from their original plans to strengthen their several strong regional warlords (especially those of positions regionally and locally, despite their the Shura-e Nezar faction) were appointed as either assumed allegiance to Karzai.445 In fact, these provincial governors or as key members of the warlords have not shunned violence to maintain or Afghan cabinet. “In the absence of viable expand their territories, which has resulted in a alternatives, a deal was made with regional leaders, situation of continued instability, ethnic violent who were slated to be the base to begin the hewing conflict and fierce clashes between different of a civilian form of politics”, Peake argues.441 The warlords throughout the country. “In time-honoured military head of the Northern Alliance, Marshal fashion, faction leaders refused to give up control Muhammad Qasim Fahim was given the Defence over any patches of ground they ruled”, Goodson portfolio, Abdallah Abdallah was granted the argues.446 In addition, Pan points out that they “have Foreign Affairs portfolio and Younis Qanooni was largely used their official positions to cement their appointed to the Interior Affairs portfolio.442 own authority in the regions they control and have Moreover, several former Northern Alliance resisted attempts to disarm their personal militias or commanders (although from other factions and meld them into the national army.”447 Moreover, they ethnic tribes) were appointed positions within the have taken “benefits that suit them in the process of Interim Authority as either Minister of Planning their country’s reconstruction, such as national title (Mohaqeq), deputy Defence Minister (Rashid Dostum), Military Corps Commander of Mazar-i-

Sharif (Ustad Mohammad Atta), Military 442 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 27. 443 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.187. 444 439 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic Ibidem, p.186. 445 Ibidem, p.187 Path to Peace’, p.13. 446 440 Idem. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to 441 Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?”, p.186. Reconstruction’, p. 87. 447 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.1.

76 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

and financial rewards”.448 Many of the Afghan ‘Collaborating’ spoiler behaviour demonstrates a warlords who had been integrated into central unique spoiler role adopted by warlords. As several government were thus closer to being powerful Afghan warlords were not only integrated “peacemongers”, than to becoming ‘peace lords’, into the peace process but into the central state Peake argued in 2003.449 system as well, they were provided with unique This specific group of Afghan warlords is thus opportunities. The warlords’ subsequent decision to playing a double role: while being assumingly loyal prioritise their regional agenda’s and to take to Kabul, they abuse their formal positions to advantage of these opportunities, has demonstrated expand their territories, assert their authority and to an exceptional challenge to the political thrive personally. This, in fact, exemplifies another, reconstruction of the Afghan failed state. It is for this unique spoiler role. These warlords are not merely reason that the category of warlords adopting a limited or partial spoilers nor inside spoilers (which ‘collaborating spoiler’ role is interesting for further sign a peace agreement and indicate to be willing to examination. In addition, while several studies of compromise but fail to implement the provisions of spoiler behaviour in post-conflict situations have the agreement). Instead, warlords- such as been conducted, the challenge posed by Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Abdul Rashid Dostum, ‘collaborating’ spoilers is largely unaccounted for in Ustad Muhammad Atta and Mohammad Ismail academic studies. For this reason as well, Chapter Khan- have adopted, what this thesis calls, a 4 will focus exclusively on the ‘collaborating’ role ‘collaborating’ spoiler role. Despite being part of adopted by several Afghan warlords and aims to political transition, being actively integrated into clarify in which specific ways these warlords have government and being nominal partners to Kabul, undermined Afghanistan’s political reconstruction these warlords have frustrated the political process. reconstruction process from the inside. In fact, they have largely ‘spoiled’ the political reconstruction of Conclusion Afghanistan, in two ways. (1) While defending and expanding their control over large parts of The promptness and effectiveness of Operation Afghanistan, these Afghan warlords have Enduring Freedom did not only cause the Taliban contributed to a situation of general insecurity, regime to fall, but also produced a wide-spread hampering the state’s capability to ensure internal power vacuum and an extremely complex political security. (2) While running local administrations and context. U.S. forces using Northern Alliance militias acting largely independent from central government, as proxy troops in the war against al-Qaida and the as a result of their drastically increased military, Taliban, in combination with the traditional political and economic power, these warlords have adherence to local power structures, the inadequacy prevented the central government from expanding of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, the inability of its authority beyond Kabul and have hereby international forces to uphold the writ of central severely undermined the state’s ability to create and government beyond Kabul, and the dramatic maintain state legitimacy and authority, nationally. increase of poppy cultivation, confronted international actors aiming to repair the Afghan failed state with a considerable long-term problem: 448 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.183. 449 Idem. the resurfacing of the Afghan warlords.

77 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

As Afghanistan’s most prominent warlords have It is particularly this last category of warlords that attained control over large amounts of territory poses an extraordinary and daunting threat to beyond the writ of central government; exert Afghanistan’s reconstruction. With much authority authority in these areas; have a military background and power organised around those Afghan warlords on which they base their political ascendance; apply who claim to be loyal to the central state, yet act in a legitimating discourse; dispose of weapons; and contradictory ways, the consolidation of a legitimate, are financially depended on profits from conflict democratic central state remains distant. Because trade, the secondary war economy or diaspora, this of this unique spoiler experience, Chapter 4 will thesis regards them to be true ‘warlords’. The focus solely on the specific conducts of these Afghan warlords can, however, not be regarded as ‘collaborating’ warlords and the ways in which they one unified group. Instead, they can be classified have spoiled the political reconstruction process in into the following categories: (1) total spoilers (2) Afghanistan. partial (or limited) spoilers and, (3) collaborating spoilers.

78 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 4. The Role of ‘Collaborating’ Warlords in

Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction

It is on the most unique and unusual category of representative government.”451 With some warlords that Chapter 4 focuses: those Afghan exceptions, this timetable has been largely adhered warlords who were previously associated with the to, which is considered as an unprecedented Northern Alliance, who have received high-level achievement in Afghanistan. However, as Shurke et posts within the central state system due to this al argue, “the way transition unfolded was probably affiliation, who have subsequently become nominal of more importance”.452 Given that the Bonn partners to Kabul, and who have nonetheless Agreement was aimed at reconstructing an adhered to a personal agenda at the same time. effective, representative and legitimate Afghan This category of warlords has demonstrated a central government, international reconstruction unique spoiler experience in the Afghan efforts in post-Taliban Afghanistan were primarily reconstruction process. With much authority and focused on restoring an effective, powerful and power organised around the Afghan warlords who legitimate state apparatus.453 Nonetheless, with claim to be loyal to the central state yet act in authority largely centred on regionally based contradictory ways, the consolidation of a legitimate, powerful warlords and their political-military groups democratic central state in Afghanistan remains able of undermining the reconstruction process, distant. To create a greater understanding of the creating central state legitimacy proved to be a slow challenges posed by this type of local leadership, and conflictual process. Chapter 4 focuses solely on the ways in which the Afghan warlords -adopting a ‘collaborating’ spoiler From Warlords to Peacelords? role- have ‘spoiled’, delayed and sometimes even paralysed Afghanistan’s political reconstruction. As was already mentioned in Chapter 1, the issues of political reconstruction (in the Afghan case meaning the creation of a central state with a 4.1 Warlords Adopting a sufficient amount of state authority and legitimacy to Collaborating Spoiler Role function effectively) and internal security are closely related. To overcome the perils of regional warlord

power, the international community is set with the After 23 years of internal conflict in which “most of critical task of restoring internal security and the machinery of the state [had] collapsed, and rebuilding the coercive capacity of the state timed in indigenous capacity [had] been severely line with the reconstruction of legitimate political depleted”,450 the 2001 Bonn Agreement laid the authority.454 However, the complexity of building foundations for Afghanistan’s political transition process. The Agreement formulated principles of political development and provided for a detailed 451 ‘The Bonn Agreement’: Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Re- timetable for the political transition to a “broad- establishment of Permanent Government Institutions based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully (‘Bonn Agreement’), (available at: http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.ht m, accessed May 21, 2003) 452 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 27. 450 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic 453 Ibidem, p. 8. Path to Peace’, p.8. 454 Shurke et al, ‘After Bonn’, p.875.

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peace in an originally weak or failed state, and the government would likely be unable to handle without strains over “how to divide the spoils of peace outside intervention”, the international actors in characteristic of new states”,455 are especially post-war Afghanistan were left “no option but to evident in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Shurke et al, integrate partial spoilers into a new polity over time argue that “[f]uture conflicts are supposed to be through a policy of negotiation and consensus dealt with trough institutions established by the building”, Sedra argues.459 Moreover, the political transition, but the transition itself is in international community in Afghanistan anticipated danger of being undermined by the absence of a that the introduction of several warlords within ‘legitimate monopoly of force’ as virtually all military central government would not only lessen the power [is] controlled by various warlords.”456 chances for post-conflict violence, but “including the Accordingly, these authors suggest that the success warlords would [also] spur them to support the of peace building in Afghanistan hinges on “bringing establishment of a strong central government”.460 In aboard many of the forces that also constitute the other words, it was anticipated that these warlords major threats to security”.457 would eventually make the profound transition to peacelords. “Afghanistan exemplifies a paradox that affects The transition from warlord to peacelord has many countries aspiring to recover from conflict, however appeared to be an extremely complex and as a peace process involves engaging with slow process. As was suggested in Chapter 3, the leaders who have in the past fomented and immediate post-Taliban Afghanistan was largely perpetuated conflict, in the hope that they can ruled by a handful of powerful regionally based use their leadership in a more positive fashion. warlords heading military-political organisations and In states with no other avenues for finding 461 potential leaders, there are few alternatives. Is it mutually divided by ethnic or religious borders. an impossible dream to expect a transition from These different entities and their rapidly shifting warlord to peacelord? Certainly it seems a alliances, were fostered either by neighbouring 458 difficult one.” powers – which pursued their own security interests in Afghanistan and not all of which were conducive Given the fact that power and politics in Afghanistan to a stable government - or by the US-led coalition, were traditionally localised, warlord authority often hereby enabled to strengthen their positions and to exceeded that of central government in the revitalise their organisations. The overall result was provincial areas and in the absence of alternative “considerable coercive capacity vested in the sources of authority, the international community warlords, but with no parallel capacity at the centre”. decided to deliberately integrate several powerful This amount of power and authority exerted by warlords (Afghan military commanders allied to the regional warlords in the post-Taliban era, partly US-led coalition) into the central state system. explains why the warlords were extremely hesitant Since“[a]ny process to sideline or exclude them to fully commit to the new central state system. would encounter a violent reaction that the Barnett R. Rubin argues that “since there is little or

455 Shurke et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 878. 459 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 456 Idem. Reconstruction’, p.2. 457 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 43. 460 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.1. 458 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.191. 461 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 879.

80 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

no state structure, giving up commanding an armed only forced to “practice politics” and cooperate with group in order to become a minister, amounts to former enemies, but were also expected to abandoning power rather than sharing it”. (re)construct “the basic building blocks of Accordingly, in spite of the view that the Afghan administration and governance.” However, very few powerful warlords may be the key to state formation of the warlords who received positions within central and the strengthening of central government, “they government actually showed to possess those skills have little incentive to do so”.462 According to Peake necessary for repairing a failed state. After all, as this is due to the fact that: they were “well-versed in conflict and schooled in the politics of patronage and local networks”, as well Political and economic power, afforded to them as “tied to military deeds”, they have revealed little by effective autonomy over large tracks of land, capacity to address the challenges of democratic serves as a disincentive to join the central governance.466 administration: if they did, the consequent loss of Since exactly those leaders, with the least independent revenue streams would weaken capacity and incentive to do the job, were their local position.”463 incorporated into central government, it may not be

surprising that the profound transition from warlord The warlords thus preferred “strengthening their to peacelord presented several serious local power base rather than moving on to a highly challenges.467 The theories advocating the need to uncertain position in the government” (the most start from traditional power structures to repair a prominent exception to the rule was powerful failed state have proven to be far less warlord Qasim Fahim, who joined the government straightforward in practice than they appear on as a Minister of Defence at a time when he 464 thesis. In fact, the introduction of warlords into the controlled almost all armed forces in the capital). central state system (Mark Sedra even speaks of In fact, according to Peake: “the phenomenon of warlord government”468) has

shown to have disastrous consequences on the It is naïve to expect leaders, especially in countries with entrenched traditions of local rule, long-term. Sedra argues that “[t]he presence of to join together in institutions of governance out regional commanders in the Cabinet (…) delayed of altruism. To rope political leaders into this reform, divided the government, and engendered process, the government needs to offer the resentment of the ordinary Afghans.”469 As was meaningful institutionalised incentives. So far suggested by the previous chapter, several of those this has not been done: little real pressure has warlords who had been ascribed with key positions been applied, and incentives have been within the central state system, did not deviate from insufficient to force regional recalcitrants to fully 465 their plans to strengthen their positions regionally, integrate. despite their assumed loyalty to the central By integrating warlords into the central state system, government in Kabul. Instead of transforming into these, from origin military commanders, were not the anticipated peacelords on whom Afghanistan’s

462 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. 466 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.191. 463 Ibidem, p. 187. 467 Idem. 464 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 45. 468 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Democracy Before peace’, p.6. 465 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.191. 469 Ibidem, p.5.

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political reconstruction was to be based, several repair a failed state. In this way, addressing the Afghan warlords have in fact shown closer to being, security and legitimacy gap is considered to be one what this thesis calls, ‘collaborating spoilers’. of the most critical tasks within the political reconstruction process. After all, without a certain Collaborating Spoilers: A Contribution to State level of internal security, the endeavour of state Failure building and development as a whole is extremely difficult. Similarly, the lack of viable, representative Collaborating spoiler behaviour forms an important and legitimate state institutions substantially threat to the Afghan central state, since it delays complicates the task of ensuring security. The and occasionally even paralyses Afghanistan’s complexity of addressing both capacity gaps at the political reconstruction. Warlords who have adopted same time is adequately expressed by Shurke et al, a collaborating spoiler role do not only prevent the who state that: central state from working effectively, but also add to the adverse security conditions. In fact, this thesis While it would have been unrealistic to expect rapid reform of the armed forces in a situation argues that collaborating spoiler behaviour where the national authority is deeply disputed, it displayed by several powerful Afghan warlords, has proved virtually impossible to encourage contributes to exactly those two capability gaps that popular participation in the political process as lay at the core of state failure: (1) the incapability of long as political influence largely remains the the state to ensure internal security, and (2) the equivalent of military power, still held largely by incapability of the government to create and local and regional warlords.470 maintain state legitimacy and authority. As was suggested in Chapter 1, there is a strong As is clear from the above citation, and as will be interlinking between the two primary capability gaps clear from this chapter, warlords and their existent in failed states. The lack of internal security ‘collaborating spoiler’ behaviour have severely does not only prevent the state from exerting and complicated the already complex task of addressing expanding its authority, but also hampers the state both the legitimacy and security gap within a failed in delivering basic services to its population. Given state. Since ‘collaborating spoilers’ have contributed that the delivery of services is crucial to the to exactly those capability gaps that caused state consolidation of central state legitimacy, adverse failure in the first place, they have thus primarily had security conditions thus greatly affect the functioning a negative influence on Afghanistan’s political of the central state. On the other hand, the lack of reconstruction. The specific ways in which Afghan central state legitimacy lies at the core of adverse warlords -who have adopted a collaborating spoiler security conditions. After all, the fact that the state role- have actually added to the Afghan central lacks legitimacy and is incapable of exerting government’s capability gaps (and as such, have authority throughout its territory, opens up the space affected Afghan political reconstruction) are for non-state actors to come to power. indicated in Box 5. In line with the outline provided This thesis departs from the idea that since the for in Box 5, the focus of this chapter will be on the two primary capability gaps lay at the core of state ways in which warlords -who have taken on a failure, they should also be the starting point and primary concern of international actors attempting to 470 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 43-44.

82 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

collaborating spoiler role- have frustrated be discussed in part 4.3 of this Chapter. Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The ways in which Collaborating spoiler behaviour which has led to an these warlords have undermined the government’s increase of internal insecurity will however be capacity to create state legitimacy and authority will discussed in the paragraphs of part 4.2.

Box 5. Collaborating Spoilers Frustrating Political Reconstruction: The Warlords’ Contribution to the Capability Gaps

Capability Gap Collaborating Spoiler Role Specific Behaviour Warlords

Security Gap 1. Inter-Warlord Conflict - Maintaining/expanding Rashid Dostum, territories through (ethnic) Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Contributing to conflict Mohammad Atta Internal Insecurity Ismail Khan

Undermining the 2. Hampering DDR/SSR - Refusing the disarmament Qasim Fahim, capacity of the Processes and demobilisation of Gul Agha Sherzai, Afghan central state warlord factions Ismail Khan, to ensure security - Obstructing formation of Din Mohammed Afghan National Army

Legitimacy Gap 1. Contributing to Internal See above See above Insecurity Undermining the capacity of the 2. Frustrating Intimidating the: Ismail Khan, Afghan central state Democratic Processes - Election of Emergency Qasim Fahim, to create authority Loya Jirga delegates Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and legitimacy - Emergency Loya Jirga - Constitutional Loya Jirga

3. Reluctance to enact Refusing reforms within Qasim Fahim Democratic Reforms Ministry of Defence

4. Running Local - Local rule at the expense Ismail Khan, Rashid Fiefdoms of central government Dostum, Mohammad - Collection of taxes/duties Atta.

Source: Author’s own interpretation, partly based on the theories of “capability gaps” provided by: Weinstein, M., John Edward Porter, and Stuart E. Eizenstat On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security: A Report of the Commission for Weak States and U.S. National Security, Centre for Global Development Washington May 2004 (available at: http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf, accessed September 2, 2004).

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Afghan Warlords adopting a ‘Collaborating are of ethnic Uzbek origin and members of his 471 Spoiler’ Role political party; Junbish-e-Melli-ye Islami. General Abdul Rashid Dostum is regarded to be Before the ways in which Afghan warlords have quite controversial; “he often changed sides in 472 frustrated Afghanistan’s reconstruction can be Afghanistan’s complex web of shifting alliances”. discussed more thoroughly, the following Dostum began his career as a Communist union paragraphs will give a brief outline of the most boss in the 1970s. Accordingly, during the Soviet powerful warlords who have adopted a occupation of Afghanistan, Dostum was allied with ‘collaborating spoiler’ role: Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Soviet regime. Under Soviet power, he became Ustad Muhammad Atta, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, commander of 20,000 militia fighters, controlling and Ismail Khan. Although there are many more most of northern Afghanistan. While supporting warlords who have (partly) adopted a ‘collaborating communist reforms in the country, he was one of spoiler’ role, the majority of this chapter will focus on several military commanders defending President these specific warlords given that they have played Najibullah’s Communist Democratic Republic of a major role in the political reconstruction of post- Afghanistan against attacks by the Mujahedeen 473 Taliban Afghanistan. The following outline aims to opposition. However, after President Najibullah’s provide more insight in the characters behind the rule ended in 1992, Dostum switched sides by warlords’ names and is meant as a factual basis for joining Mujahedeen forces under Ahmed Sha the subsequent paragraphs. Massoud, with whom he captured Kabul. After being Warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ustad Muhammad part of the Mujahedeen government of subsequent Atta, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, and Ismail Khan Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani for a short were all militia commanders formerly associated time, he temporarily entered into an alliance with with the Northern Alliance during the war against the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Islamic forces. In Taliban regime. Although they did not play an 1994, Dostum’s alliance attacked Kabul, this time equally important role within the Alliance, due to turning against his former allies of the Jami’at-e their affiliation with the U.S.-led coalition and their Islami party; Ahmed Massoud and President 474 share in overthrowing the Taliban, these warlords Rabbani. Yet, after the Taliban took power in have had a unique experience in receiving 1996, General Dostum realigned himself with former legitimate political authority. To provide more insight President Rabbani fighting alongside former in their role as warlords, the following paragraphs Mujahedeen military leaders –such as General will discuss each warlord separately. Mohammad Fahim and Ustad Mohammad Atta-

General Abdul Rashid Dostum 471 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan Politics’, (available at: General Abdul Rashid Dostum (1954) currently is http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan Deputy Defence Minister in the ATA cabinet. Yet, he /politics.htm, accessed October 1, 2004), p.2. 472 Global Security.org, ‘Abdul Rashid Dostum’ is an Uzbek warlord, representing the Afghan Uzbek (available at: minority community and heading a militia force http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan /dostum.htm, accessed October 8, 2004), p.1. consisting of around 20,000 fighters, of whom most 473 Global Security.org, ‘Abdul Rashid Dostum’, p.1. 474 Idem.

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within the Northern Alliance opposition force. political party Jami’at-e Islami, a primarily ethnic Despite the iron grip of the Taliban regime in almost Tajik grouping.478 the complete country, General Dostum was able to In contrast to General Rashid Dostum, run his own ‘mini-fiefdom’ in the area around the city Mohammed Atta fought against the Soviet regime in of Mazar-I Sharif. His monopoly position in the the 1980s, among other Tajik Mujahedeen Islamists. region made him a rich man and he ruled with a Within the Mujahedeen, Atta was allied with the tight rein. It is said that he financed his army with Jami’at-e Islami party of former President Rabbani, the profits made from poppy cultivation and he is Ahmed Massoud and the powerful warlord in Kabul; reported to have repetitively ordered public Muhammad Fahim. However, after the Soviets were executions.475 evicted and the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in In 1997, the Taliban captured Dostum's bastion 1996, Atta became allied together with Uzbek and airfield in Mazar-e-Sharif which forced him into General Dostum and Ustad Mohammad Mohaqeq exile in Uzbekistan and Iran. He returned to of Shi’a Hazara origin, within the Northern Alliance. Afghanistan in 2000 joining the Northern Alliance for As was already indicated, the Northern Alliance fell a second time.476 This time his alliance with the apart as soon as the Taliban regime was opposition force proved to be extremely fruitful. He successfully brought down by the U.S.-led coalition was not only able to recapture his home town of in 2001. Even though all three former Northern Mazar-I Sharif, his role in overthrowing the Taliban Alliance commanders were provided with a position regime under U.S. leadership also provided him in the central state system, Atta and Fahim on one with a position within the Afghanistan Interim side and Dostum on the other, became extensively Administration. In 2002, Afghan President Hamid opposed. Dostum loyalists have described Karzai appointed Dostum as deputy Defence Mohammad Atta as being “too fundamentalist for minister, providing him with effective control over the moderate secular reform they espouse”.479 In security affairs in Afghanistan’s northern provinces 2002, Defence Minister Qasim Fahim appointed his of Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, and strong military commander Atta as the Corps Faryab.477 Subsequently he was appointed to the Commander of Mazar-i-Sharif. This way Atta was post of Presidential Advisor on Military Affairs within presented with the task of checking the power of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration. Uzbek warlord Dostum, which led to heightened tensions between the two warlords. General Ustad Mohammad Atta General Ustad Mohammad Atta currently General Mohammad Qasim Fahim commands around 20,000 troops in Northern Today, General Mohammad Qasim Fahim (1959) Afghanistan. He is in close relationship with Afghan and some of his former Northern Alliance Defence Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who commanders (Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Atta, appointed him as Corps Commander of Mazar-i- Ustad Mohammad Mohaqiq) form “the back bone of Sharif. Both Atta and Fahim are members of the

478 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.2. 479 Global Security.org, ‘Ustad Atta Mohammad’ 475 Global Security.org, ‘Abdul Rashid Dostum’, p.1. (available at: 476 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.2. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan 477 Ibidem, p.2. /ustad.htm, accessed October 8, 2004), p.1.

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Karzai’s government”.480 General Mohammad willingness to take on the Afghan warlords.482 In Qasim Fahim, who was appointed ATA Minister of August 2004, Fahim withdrew his support from Defence, is arguably the most powerful warlord of President Karzai and instead, backed the Tajik all, given the fact that he is in charge of the Afghan former Education Minister, Yunus Qanuni in the Nation Army (ANA). While Fahim was first presidential elections. Western diplomats and appointed Vice President to Hamid Karzai, he coalition commanders are growing increasingly became Defence Minister of the ATA in 2002. concerned about the recent power struggle between As a student of Islamic law, Fahim joined the the Tajik Fahim and the Pashtun President Karzai: Mujahedeen in the late 1970s. In contrast to “Any change in leadership is seen as an unwanted General Dostum, Fahim gained a reputation as a distraction from the process of nationbuilding and “sturdy and reliable leader”. After fighting Soviet the war on terrorism.”483 troops in north-western Afghanistan he was promoted to head intelligence operations soon after General Mohammad Ismail Khan the Mujahedeen forces had entered Kabul in 1992. General Mohammad Ismail Khan (1946) is a warlord The general was also set with the task of defending of Tajik origin and is one of many regional warlords Afghanistan’s southern frontline, first against acting independently of Karzai’s central authority. southern Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, He has a strong following among ethnic Tajijks–the later on against the emerging Taliban troops. As a second largest ethnic group after the Pashtuns and factional leader within the Northern Aliiance, Fahim a member of the Jami’at-e Islami party led by former played an important role in the fierce clashes of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani.484 1997 which erupted in the Panjshir Valley and Originally, Khan was an officer in the national around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif between the army stationed in Herat before he started fighting Alliance and Taliban.481 against Soviet forces just months after their arrival On September 13, 2001 Fahim succeeded in Afghanistan in 1979. He moved up to becoming a Ahmed Shah Mahsoud as the senior military mujahideen commander and fought the Soviets until commander of the Northern Alliance, after Massoud they withdrew from the country a decade later. He was assassinated on September 9. This promotion became governor of the Herat province for the first provided him with a key position in the Afghan time, where he ruled until he had to flee the region Transitional Administration. In June 2002, President and was eventually captured by Taliban forces once Karzai appointed him as first vice president and they emerged to power in 1995. In March 2000 he Minister of Defence within the Afghan cabinet. In was able to escape from his captors which allowed July 2004, President Karzai dropped Mohammad him to join the Northern Alliance as a low-profile Qasim Fahim as his running mate for the October 9, member. He fought Taliban forces, earning him the 2004 presidential elections. According to Pan, many experts saw Karzai’s move as a sign of his

482 Pan, ‘Afghanistan, Karzai vs. the Warlords’, p.2. 480 Global Security.org, ‘Mohammad Qasim Fahim’, 483 Global Security.org, ‘Mohammad Qasim Fahim’, p.2. (available at: 484 Global Security.org, ‘General Mohammad Ismail http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan Khan’ (available at: /fahim.htm, accessed October 8, 2004), p.1. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan 481 Global Security.org, ‘Mohammad Qasim Fahim’, p.1. /ismail.htm, accessed October 8, 2004), p.1.

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gratitude of Herat's population.485 After Northern reconstruction.489 These scholars argue that the key Alliance forces entered Kabul in 2002, fighters loyal to repairing a failed state -where non-state entities to Khan recaptured the city of Herat. In 2002, have undermined the state’s monopoly on violence Afghan President Hamid Karzai appointed Khan to and drastically limit the central state from the post of Provincial Governor and military functioning effectively- is ensuring a minimum level commander of the Herat province within the ATA. of physical security first. According to Larry However, on August 13, 2003 President Karzai Goodson, security is the “primary topic of decreed that officials could no longer hold both concern”.490 Mark Sedra even declares that “a military and civil posts, and dismissed Khan from his minimum level of physical security is required for post of military commander.486 While Khan held the nationbuilding to proceed.”491 Without internal office of Provincial Governor for another year, Khan security, Sedra argues, “economic development and largely disregarded Kabul. In March 2004 a violent democratisation are unattainable”.492 Similarly, conflict broke out in the western Herat province Shurke et al, point out that “[m]oving from a security between forces loyal to warlord Khan, and Afghan environment in which various armed actors National Army-units under control of Abdul Zahir constitute the major threat in the life of most Neyebzadeh who is loyal to Karzai’s central Afghans, to one where there is a legitimate authority administration. In September 2004 Karzai also controlling the means of coercion, is at the core of removed Khan from the post of Provincial Governor. peacebuilding.”493 In fact, in March 2004, Sedra and Simultaneously, the Afghan President offered him Middlebrook argued that “restoring a semblance of the post of Minister of mines and industry in the security and stability to this troubled country is central government, but Khan declined.487 unmistakably the most imposing challenge to Nevertheless, as the leader of the Tajiks –the Afghanistan’s state-building process.” Yet, “[i]t is a second largest ethnic group after the Pashtuns - he challenge that the international community simply will continue to exert authority from Herat.488 must overcome, as the costs of failure – the re- emergence of the country as a haven for terrorists and its degeneration into a narco-mafia state (…) 4.2 Collaborating Warlords are clearly more prohibitive than the costs of action.”494 Engendering Internal Insecurity

Many academic scholars regard internal security to be the foremost need within Afghan

489 See: Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction’, p. 94.; Sedra, & Middlebrook, 485 BBC News, ‘Profile: Ismail Khan’, Monday, 13 ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic Path to Peace’, p.3.; Sedra, September, 2004 (available at: Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction, p.11. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2535261.stm 490 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 94. , accessed March 4, 2005) 491 Sedra, Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction, 486 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, ‘Ismail Khan’, p.11. (available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ismail_Khan, 492 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic accessed March 4, 2005) Path to Peace’, p.3. 487 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, ‘Ismail Khan’. 493 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 43. 488 Cor Speksnijder, ‘Met hun wapen verliezen strijders 494 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic hun eer’, in: de Volkskrant, October 7, 2004, p.6. Path to Peace’, p.7.

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Adverse Security Conditions increasing narcotics trade and production; the rising incidence of banditry and general criminality (such The adverse security conditions in post-Taliban as theft, extortion and rape); the return of Afghan Afghanistan have proven that there is no ‘quick-fix’ warlords on the political scene and the continuous to the country’s pressing security dilemmas. outburst of violent clashes between them, has 498 Consequently, the lack of internal security has contributed to the adverse security situation. become a source of increased concern among Yet, the most prominent factor which has many Afghan’s and international stakeholders alike. caused Afghanistan’s security dilemmas is the The unease about the security situation is failure of the Bonn Agreement to adequately adequately exemplified by Afghan Foreign Minister recognize the importance of internal security to the Abdullah, who warned in July 2003 that if urgent entire reconstruction effort. Since the Northern action was not taken to address Afghanistan’s Alliance held military control over the capital during security dilemmas, the country would once become the Bonn conference, the international actors had “a failed state…ruled by drug lords, war lords, by been unable to adequately address the pressing forces of darkness, unstabilized by terrorism”.495 security challenges. Consequently, the Bonn Minister Abdullah’s concerns are in fact justified. Agreement merely provided a vague framework Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, security containing a “declaration of intent”, rather than a conditions have actually deteriorated in large parts detailed accord on mechanisms for the transition of of Afghanistan.496 Although the toppling of the authority, the structure of the security sector and a 499 Taliban regime was a welcome revolution for many clear time schedule. In addition, it failed to include Afghans, as a result of several factors and some essential issues conventionally included in conditions, the security situation in vast parts of peace agreements such as provisions for DDR and 500 Afghanistan has effectively returned to the status the creation of a national army. According to quo before 1994. Merely differentiating the current Shurke et al, it was exactly this absence of a clear security situation from the one in 1994 is the relative strategy for the security sector, and the fact that this stability that is being enjoyed in the capital city of framework stood in sharp contrast to the Kabul.497 comprehensive political framework, which caused 501 There are several factors and conditions the troubled transition to peace in Afghanistan. responsible for the current security dilemmas in However, as this chapter focuses on the ways in Afghanistan. First, a low intensity war, fought which ‘collaborating’ warlords have contributed to a between U.S coalition forces and an alliance of situation of general insecurity, merely two factors resurgent Taliban, al-Qaida forces and loyalists of are of importance: (1) the incidences of inter-warlord the Hizb-i Islami party, continues. In addition, a conflict since the fall of the Taliban, and (2) the combination of factors such as the resurgence of refusal of warlords to disarm and demobilise their anti-government spoiler groups; the rapidly heavily armed militias.

498 See: Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. 495 Citation from Mr. Abdullah in: Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: and Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic In Search of Security’, p.9. Path to Peace’, p.3. 496 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic 499 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.43. Path to Peace’, p.3. 500 Ibidem, p.4. 497 Idem. 501 Ibidem, p.43.

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Inter-Warlord Conflict Mohammad Atta and, Ismail Khan) within the central state system, by early 2003, Northern Afghanistan The return of the Afghan warlords to the political was overwhelmed by the same ethnic clashes that 506 scene has demonstrated a revival of the pre-Taliban plagued the area in the 1990s. General Abdul years of the early 1990’s which were primarily Rashid Dostum, who was appointed to the post of characterised by violent conflict and an atmosphere AIA Deputy Defence Minister and his Junbish-e- of general insecurity.502 In the provincial areas Melli-ye Islami party, were fighting former President outside Kabul – and to a lesser extent even within Rabbani and his Jami’at-e Islami party in different 507 the capital itself – warlords employed criminal acts northern provincial areas. In addition, General such as extortion, robbery and violence in a culture Dostum was involved in conflicts with northern of impunity, in which international crime, opium warlord and military commander Mohammad Atta. production and illegal drug- and arms trade have Appointed to the post of deputy defence minister, flourished.503 Consequently, security conditions for Dostum was provided with effective control over ordinary Afghans in the provinces have become security affairs in Afghanistan’s northern provinces depended on the warlords, especially in the of Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, and 508 absence of a country-wide international military Faryab. This enabled Dostum to consolidate his presence.504 power and authority in an area covering six Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, provinces, with an estimated population of five 509 Afghan warlords of different origin have again million. However, as equally powerful warlord become engaged in fierce battles throughout the Mohammad Atta was appointed Corps Commander country, reducing many Afghan provinces to a state of Mazar-i-Sharif by Defence Minister Fahim, he of chaos, instability and anarchy. Pashtun followers was set with the task of checking Dostum’s power in of Karzai’s government were fighting the Tajiks, the the north. Given that both regional commanders are Uzbeks and other minority groups led by former considered powerful regional warlords, and in the Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, Uzbek absence of a common enemy, central state commander Rashid Dostum and Islamic authority and international peacekeepers, this conservative Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf. In addition, arrangement unmistakably led to heightened mutual while Uzbek General Dostum and Pashtun warlords tensions and eventually to continuous conflict for in south Afghanistan strongly backed the former political control over the northern province of Balkh. Afghan King Zahir Shah, General Ismail Khan in The fact that both warlords were nominal partners to western Afghanistan backed former President the central government did not prevent them from 510 Rabbani, the rival of the Panjshiriis within the continuing their “hit-and-run battles” involving Jami’at-e Islami party.505 tanks and artillery and taking many innocent lives. In In spite of the integration of some of the most October 2003, sixty people were reported to have powerful warlords (such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, 505 Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting To Be Rescued’, 502 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to p.16. Reconstruction’, p. 94. 506 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.1. 503 Ahmed, ‘Warlords, Drugs, Democracy’, p.16. 507 Idem. 504 Shurke, et al, ‘After Bonn’, p. 884. 508 Ibidem, p.2. 509 Global Security.org, ‘Abdul Rashid Dostum’, p.2. 510 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.2.

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been killed in violent clashes west of Mazar-I Sharif provided for in the agreement (dismantling their between these two powerful warlords.511 Even private militias, giving up either their civil or military though Governor Haji Muhammad Ishaq Rah Gosar post) nor did they deviate from their own regional was appointed to the post of Provincial Governor by agenda’s and continued to largely disregard Kabul. the central government with the aim of stabilising Formal function profiles and policy guidelines the Northern province, and despite the brokering of issued to provincial leaders and warlords were thus several cease-fires, clashes have continued at the largely ignored. Even the removal of governors in time of writing (October 2004). some troublesome areas did not “make other Conflict in the north was however not restricted leaders with a strong local power base follow suit, to the abovementioned collaborating warlords. such as general Dostum and Ismail Khan.”515 Nor General Ismail Khan, who was appointed to the post did inter-warlord violence cease. In fact, August of military commander and Provincial Governor of 2003 marked the bloodiest month since the fall of the Herat province, battled Pushtuns in Herat and in the Taliban in November 2001; in a two-day time the neighbouring Badghis province.512 This span, over fifty Afghan people were killed in several continuous situation of insecurity and instability has different incidents throughout Afghanistan.516 descended large parts of Northern Afghanistan into Moreover, from August 2003 until august 2004, over chaos and anarchy. 550 individuals died in political related violence, Efforts undertaken by the central government to including numbers of Islamic militants killed in use its formal powers to rein warlordism by clashes with US troops and Afghan security appointing key officials and issuing decrees, have forces.517 had limited success.513 In an attempt to bring the In March 2004 a violent struggle broke out in the adverse internal security conditions caused by inter- Herat province between forces loyal to the regional warlord conflict to an end, on May 20, 2003, a 13- warlord Ismail Khan and Afghan army units under point declaration was signed by ten provincial General Abdul Zahir Nayebzadeh, who has governors, one deputy governor and two military admitted loyalty to Karzai’s central administration. commanders, under auspices of Afghan President The fighting started after an unsuccessful attempt to Hamid Karzai. The provincial authorities hereby assassinate Khan, but a successful killing of the agreed to follow their job descriptions and to warlord's son, Mirwai Sadeq who was a minister in implement the laws, regulations and legislative the Afghan cabinet. Groups loyal to Ismail Khan documents henceforward. Moreover, they pledged held general Nayebzadeh responsible for the to implement internal and external policies as incidents, accusing him of attempting to undermine directed by the central government in Kabul and Ismail Khan’s regional leadership. As a reaction to agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of other the violence in Herat, Karzai dispatched a force of provinces or to hold military and civilian posts at the 1500 Afghan National Army soldiers led by Defence same time.514 Yet, despite these pledges the Minister Mohammad Fahim to restore order in the warlords largely failed to implement the provisions province. Fahim succeeded in establishing a cease- fire and pledged to provide more troops which would

511 Global Security.org, ‘Ustad Atta Mohammad’, p.1. 512 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.1. 515 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 13. 513 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 13. 516 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. 514 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.3. 517 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Introduction’, p.3.

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prevent regional conflict, guarantee security, and government unilaterally.521 In fact, Karzai argued, demonstrate the presence of central government in not Taliban insurgents, but the Afghan warlords and the Herat province. The entry of National Army their private militias are the greatest threat to forces into the Herat province marked the first time Afghanistan’s internal security.522 that the central government visibly acted to exert its authority beyond Kabul.518 Hampering the SSR Process From spring 2004 on, security conditions steadily deteriorated as Afghanistan prepared for As was suggested in Chapter 1, international efforts the October 9 elections. According to Mark Sedra: are crucial to the improvement of security in a failed “One need only glance at security statistics from the state since the central government and domestic first half of 2004 in Afghanistan to grasp the severity security forces will be invariably incapable of of the situation: ensuring a basic level of security themselves. Academic scholars nonetheless propose different • 23 US soldiers were killed from hostile fire strategies to restore internal security within a weak in half 2004 compared to 12 in all 2003. or failed state. While some scholars advance a • 179 Afghans were killed by anti-government comprehensive approach aimed at reforming and insurgents in the first six months of 2004 democratising the entire security sector, others compared to 19 in all 2003. claim that an international security force able of • 17 international aid workers were killed in the filling the security vacuum is the most adequate way first half of 2004 compared to 14 in all of to create a stable situation in the short term. Even 2003.”519 other scholars have emphasised the need for a DDR program within the wider SSR spectrum. The dramatic deterioration of the security situation These authors see the demobilisation, disarmament in Afghanistan can be largely contributed to an and reintegration of ex-combatants as a crucial increase in violent attacks perpetrated by Taliban element of post-war reconstruction and stress the and al-Qaida insurgents. However, despite the importance of creating a strong, effective and increase in Taliban insurgency, President Karzai capable national army, which will eventually be able stated in an interview with the New York Times on to carry out basic security functions. 12 July 2004, that the threat posed by Taliban According to Shurke et al, a critical task of the insurgency was largely “exaggerated”.520 After all, international aid community is to keep reforms in the the Taliban had been seriously weakened by its security sector “in step” with the political defeat in November 2001 and has not been in the negotiations for a transitional government.523 Yet, position of overthrowing the new Afghan whilst the political process in Afghanistan had a clear timetable, no timetable and merely a few 518 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Introduction’, p.3. 519 Mark Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Democracy Before peace’, FPIF Special Report, in: Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), 520 Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, ‘Afghan President September 2004 (available at: Describes Militias as the Top Threat’, in: the New York http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/2004afghandem.pdf, Times, (Kabul, July 12, 2004) accessed October 18, 2004), p.3-4. 521 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.3 522 Gall and Rohde, ‘Afghan President Describes Militias as the Top Threat’. 523 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 884.

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specific provisions were set for security sector DDR pilot-project (entitled the Partnership for Peace reform. For international actors to assemble a Program) for Afghan militia fighters was completed national army in advance of the appointment of a by the United Nations Assistance Mission for new government, would inevitably influence this Afghanistan (UNAMA) in conference with the political transition. Not only would the national army ATA.529 As was suggested in Chapter 1, a DDR appear as yet another faction, military powers on programme for ex-combatants generally involves the ground would also slow down the pace of "assembling the fighters to disarm them and give reforms as they were unwilling to give up their them some preparation for re-entering civil life (…) troops and weapons as long as insecurity over the including some skills and basic education, and political balance existed.524 Nonetheless, “[l]eaving providing them with some basic resources for some the regional political-military groupings intact with no time."530 Yet, despite adequate funding, little counterpart at the centre, (…) was practically to progress was made on the DDR front. Even tough invite the warlords to challenge the political process previously “spontaneous demobilisation” – as a if they became dissatisfied.”525 In addition, post- result of low and irregular pay- had taken place, and Taliban Afghanistan lacked a countrywide at a local level regional disarmament agreements peacekeeping force able of filling the security had been signed in the North since May 2002, it vacuum left by the fall of the Taliban. The largest was not until October 2003 that the U.N. initiated a international military presence was the U.S.-led fully-fledged DDR programme.531 This major coalition which was not mandated to keep the initiative to improve Afghanistan’s internal security peace, but was merely instructed to fight the ‘war on was designed to disarm over 100,000 former militia terror’. Accordingly, its presence was primarily fighters in three years. Nevertheless, determined by considerations in relation to its own “[d]isarmament and demobilisation is proceeding military campaign.526 Both factors ensured that

Security Sector Reform (SSR) became of primary military reform (U.S.); (2) police reform (Germany); (3) importance to restoring internal security in post- DDR (Japan); (4) judicial reform (Italy); and (5) counter 527 narcotics (UK). See: Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Taliban. Security’, p.4. Although the pace of the SSR process has been much slower than was expected, significant gains have been made since its initiation. In March 2003 Sedra Refusing to Disarm Warlord Militia’s and Middlebrook pointed out that achievements in the In April 2002 an international donor conference was SSR field included: (i) the inauguration of an Afghan National Army and police force, (ii) the design and held in Geneva establishing “Afghanistan’s New implementation of a national DDR program, (iii) the Beginning Program”(ANBP) of which the formation of a National Drug Control Strategy, (iv) the initiation of a comprehensive review of the countries Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of judicial infrastructure, and (v) steady progress in de- ex-combatants formed one of the primary mining. See: Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s 528 Problematic Path to Peace’, p.7-8. elements. In August 2002, the proposal for a 529 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction’, p.4. 530 Licklider, ‘Obstacles to Peace Settlements’, p. 705. 524 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 884-885. 531 International Crises Group (ICG), Disarmament and 525 Ibidem, p. 885. Reintegration in Afghanistan, ICG Asia Report N°65, 30 526 Idem. September 2003 (Kabul/Brussels, 2003), p.ii., (available 527 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. at: 528 The SSR agenda within Afghanistan’s New http://www.icg.org//library/documents/asia/ent_and_reint Beginnings Program (ANBP), is divided into five pillars, egration_in_afghanistan.pdf , accessed September 8, which are supported by a different donor country: (1) 2004)

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slower than we want it to”, a British advisor to the element, was negotiated in the absence of an DDR process claimed in September 2004. Fewer international force and a non-factional Afghan force than 20,000 (around 17,000) members of militia which could safeguard its authority throughout forces had by then left their militias, while it should Afghanistan.535 Consequently, the Afghan Ministry have been 27,000 men. For this reason, the of Defence (MoD), which was heavily dominated by objective to demobilise 100,000 militia fighters in the Tajik-based Shura-i-Nezar faction of the Panshir three years appears to be too optimistic.532 valley and led by Marshall Mohammed Qasim One of the most important reasons for the slow rate Fahim, came to play a primary role in the DDR of the SSR process -and especially for the project.536 As a result, most warlords and military indolence of the U.N-backed DDR programme is the commanders –especially those in the Southern rebuttal of warlords –including those who have been Pashtun regions- persistently refused to hand in integrated into the central state system- to dismantle their weapons to the MoD which they regarded to be and disarm their militias and to give up their in the hands of a rival faction.537 weapons to the Afghan Ministry of Defence In reaction to the slow pace of the DDR (MoD).Disarmament efforts led by the United programme, in January 2003, the ATA established Nations have generally decreased as many militia four commissions set with the task of overseeing an fighters refuse to hand in their weapons and submit accelerated process of demobilisation and to central authority.533 Militia fighters and warlords disarmament.538 This was the result of a meeting alike have shown to be fearful of loosing their attended by four major (collaborating) warlords: military power since this would mean losing their Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Atta, Ismail Khan, Gul local or regional authority as well. After all, Agha Sherzai and Din Mohammed, in which they Afghanistan is largely ruled by the gun and the agreed to a plan aimed at disarming and possession of arms has been traditionally rooted in demobilising up to 250,000 militia fighters, and Afghan culture. “Many men have grown up with a creating a 70,000 men strong national army.539 As gun and therefore losing it, means loosing their a result of several warlords’ continued refusal to honour.”534 Giving up their arms would thus mean disarm, Afghan president Karzai signed a decree in giving up their security, power and position, and July 2004 declaring that any warlord who refuses to subsequently, would mean increasing their abide by the ongoing demobilisation, disarmament vulnerability to rival factions. and reintegration (DDR) process, would be In addition, many warlords were hesitant to hand “considered disloyal and rebellious”.540 On July 12, in their weapons to a Ministry which they perceived 2004, President Karzai stated in an interview with as being filled with members of one rival faction. the New York Times, that to address the problem of After all, Afghanistan’s New beginning Program warlordism, new action was required to disarm the (ANBP), of which the disarmament, demobilisation warlords: “We tried to do it by persuasion,” he said, and reintegration pilot-project forms a crucial

535 ICG, Disarmament and Reintegration, p.i. 532 Speksnijder, ‘Met hun wapen verliezen strijders hun 536 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. eer’. 537 Idem. 533 Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Introduction’, p.4- 538 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 5. Reconstruction’, p.4 534 Speksnijder, ‘Met hun wapen verliezen strijders hun 539 Idem. eer’. 540 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Democracy Before Peace?’, p.4.

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but now “the stick has to be used”.541 Nevertheless, supported training programme was plagued by Karzai’s statements to adopt a firmer strategy in several problems with regard to recruitment, reaction to the warlords are quite empty without resources and the ethnic composition of recruits. being backed up by a drastic expansion of ISAF, or These problems limited the success of the by a strong national army.542 With limited progress programme to 5,000-6,000 troops as of September in the SSR and the DDR programmes, Karzai’s 2003.546 speeches emphasising the need for regional leaders Since former (warlord) militia fighters were to sign up for government and his attempts to recruited for the ANA, the development of the army threaten the warlords into submission will continue was largely dependent on the cooperation of to be largely fruitless.543 warlords to join the programme and to demobilise Both reasons for the Afghan warlords to refuse their militias. Appointed to the post of deputy disarmament and demobilisation have caused the defence minister, General Dostum was initially set DDR project in Afghanistan to initially proceed at an with the task of overseeing the construction of a extremely slow rate, and accordingly delayed the national army. Accordingly, he had to demobilise his complete SSR process. As the disarmament, private army (which he primarily uses to fight demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants Muhammad Atta’s Janiat-i-Islami faction in battles are crucial to the improvement of internal security centred around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif547). conditions, the warlords refusing to dismantle and However, Dostum refrained from doing so. Just as disarm their militias have contributed to the General Dostum, many regional warlords were very continued existence of adverse security conditions, hesitant to commit to the SSR process as they saw and in doing so, they have contributed to state the emerging Afghan National Army (controlling failure rather than to state building. Kabul and the north-eastern part of Afghanistan) “as just another ethnic faction”.548 Headed by Defence Obstructing the Formation of an Afghan Minister Mohammad Fahim, the national army was National Army (ANA) reported to be largely consisting of Tajik forces, In 2002 Chairman of the AIA, Hamid Karzai claimed which are deeply resented by other ethnic groups. that a national army was essential for building “If the resources are not there, then Fahim will just internal security and eventually for a “strong, rebuild his own army as he is already doing and call independent Afghanistan”.544 Accordingly, in April it the national army”, an Afghan cabinet minister 2002 the ISAF and the U.S. military started training claimed in 2002.549 Moreover ministers from other a brigade of the new Afghan National Army (ANA) ethnic groups also attacked the fact that three consisting of different Afghan militias. The brigade, Panjshiri leaders were in government (Defence however, merely represented a tiny fraction (600 Minister Mohammad Fahim, Interior Minister Younis soldiers) of the total number of armed men assigned Quanuni and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah) for the ANA (around 100,000).545 The U.S.-

541 Gall and Rohde, ‘Afghan President Describes Militias as the Top Threat’. 542 Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting’, p.15. 546 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. 543 Idem. 547 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. 544 Citation of Hamid Karzai in: Ibidem, p.18. 548 Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting’, p.15. 545 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 885. 549 Idem.

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and accused them of “stuffing ministries, the army Pansjiri members. Both factors have largely delayed and the police with Pansjhiris.”550 the formation of the ANA. Moreover, his refusal to Despite the accusations Defence Minister Fahim implement reforms within the Ministry of Defense denied all charges. On March 5, 2002, he called all (as will be discussed in part C) as to increase the regional leaders and commanders to Kabul to MoD’s ethnic diversity, has equally delayed and discuss the new national army and the even paralysed the DDR process. demobilisation of factions. He urged the warlords to put away their heavy weapons in depots under their control to eventually hand them over to the Defence 4.3 Collaborating Warlords Ministry. Despite that the Afghan warlords verbally Undermining Central Authority and agreed, implementation of disarmament will however not occur as long as they feel threatened Legitimacy by Fahim’s power, Ahmed Rashid argues.551 Consequently, the training of ANA and Afghan From a reconstruction and development police forces has proceeded at such a pace that perspective, the situation inherited by the interim they are both unlikely to strengthen DDR efforts in Afghan Administration in early 2002 was far worse than had been anticipated either by the the future. 552 It will take several years before a incoming cabinet or the international community. strong and genuine national army has fully taken After 23 years of civil war, basic security could shape. Moreover, even after a functional national not even be guaranteed in the capital. army has been created, the question remains “as to Accordingly, the task of establishing an affective where the ultimate loyalty of many of its recruits will program of reconstruction (…) – an objective lie, as they are likely to be drawn from the ranks of necessitating extensive policy and institutional fighters from warlord militias.”553 In addition, the fact reforms- appeared to be particularly imposing. that the ANA is largely Tajik-dominated will Moreover, before this task could be embarked upon, the very legitimacy and efficacy of the state eventually limit its potential for long-term had to be established (…).555 deployment in non-Tajik areas, and will in fact, cause ethnic tensions to rise. 554 A Basic Legitimacy Deficit Defence Minister Qasim Fahim has thus adopted a ‘collaborating spoiler’ role. Despite being Establishing central state legitimacy and authority one of the most important actors in Afghanistan’s has proven to be extremely difficult in the complex reconstruction (and especially in the SSR process), political context of post-Taliban Afghanistan. he has failed to really contribute to the process. Not Although the new Afghan government and its only has he abstained from initiating and international allies have largely reached this goal in purposefully pushing the disarmament of warlord the capital of Kabul, in the provincial areas, central militias, but he has also deliberately overflowed the state legitimacy remains distant. However, ANA and the Defence Ministry with Tajik-forces and according to Shurke et al, state building requires the

550 Rashid, ‘Afghanistan, Still Waiting’, p.15. 551 Ibidem, p.16. 554 552 ICG, Disarmament and Reintegration, p.ii. ICG, Disarmament and Reintegration, p.ii. 555 553 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic Path to Peace’, p.5.

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central government to assert its authority locally.556 legitimacy deficit. During the years of political In fact, they argue that in the Afghan case the reconstruction the credibility and legitimacy of question of who controls the central state lies at the Karzai’s government continued to be precarious, heart of the legitimacy issue, and is even essential particularly in the South-eastern, Pashtun regions of for asserting central state authority at the local Afghanistan.562 Consequently, the critical task in the level.557 The legitimacy of the Afghan Interim political transition period was for central government government has however “faced a legitimacy to establish a broader base of legitimacy and problem from the start”.558 reconstructing national authority.563 Attempts to First of all, the Bonn Agreement, signed on improve its legitimacy and authority, especially December 5, 2001, and largely devised by outside Kabul, have however met with resistance international actors, was no conventional peace and obstacles. One of the main obstacles to agreement: It included merely the winning parties, repairing the ‘legitimacy gap’ has been which sided with the United States in a war won by ‘collaborating spoiler’ behaviour. an external force.559 As a result, the defeated party The ways in which warlords –who have taken on (the Taliban) was not only excluded from the a ‘collaborating spoiler’ role- have undermined the process, but the agreement also failed to supply a capacity of the central state to create authority and way to integrate the parties and populations legitimacy throughout the country, are central in the associated with the Taliban.560 Secondly, after following paragraphs. They can be classified in four Bonn, many key positions in cabinet were appointed different categories: the way in which collaborating to one faction of the winning Northern Alliance; the warlords have (1) contributed to general insecurity, Shura-e Nezar faction which is dominated by the (2) influenced democratic processes, (3) refrained Pansjiris. Accordingly, the Pansjiris were able to from enacting democratic reforms, and finally (4) ran monopolise power at the central level, and with local fiefdoms. skilled diplomacy and international support, they retained much power.561 This situation was primarily Contributing to General Insecurity of concern to populations in the southern Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. These people were formerly Violent warlord politics and the continued existence related to the Taliban regime and saw their of armed warlord militias do not only have direct traditional positions of power drastically human and material consequences, nor do they marginalised. Yet, the situation in Kabul also merely contribute to the current undesirable security worried other ethnic groups who were less situation. The fact that collaborating warlords have thoroughly represented in central government than continued regional conflicts while being assumingly the Tajik-based Panshiris. loyal to Kabul, and have largely refrained from the As a result of the abovementioned factors, the demobilisation and disarmament of their militias, AIA en subsequent ATA were faced with a basic has also directly undermined the ability of the state to create and expand central state authority and 556 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.11. legitimacy. In large parts of Afghanistan authority 557 Idem. 558 Ibidem, p. 4. 559 Ibidem, p. 3. 560 Ibidem, p. 4. 562 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.14. 561 Ibidem, p. 12. 563 Ibidem, p. 27.

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now mainly evolves from the gun, not from the personnel as a consequence of violent clashes central state. Efforts to expand central state throughout Afghanistan in 2003. In late 2003, authority to the provincial areas have been largely several high profile International Non-Governmental undermined by the adverse security conditions in Organizations (INGO’s), such as the Red Cross vast regional parts of the country. Threats and acts (ICRC) and the World Food Program (WFP) even of violence committed by regional warlords and the retreated international staff from high-risk areas.567 incidences of inter-warlord conflict have, for Since this thesis regards the collaborating instance, drastically hampered the election of loya warlords to be partly accountable for the jirga delegates, the registration of Afghan voters and undesirable security conditions in Afghanistan, it the actual course of the presidential elections. also perceives them as being largely responsible for Warlords contributing to an atmosphere of undermining the central state’s ability to deliver general insecurity have also undermined the central services and as such, to consolidate its legitimacy government’s ability to create legitimacy and beyond Kabul. After all, in a country such as authority in a more indirect way. As is suggested by Afghanistan, where trust and faith in the central Mark Sedra, adverse security conditions indirectly state have always been extremely precarious, the impact humanitarian and development work.564 In delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services are fact, undesirable security conditions throughout vital for creating state legitimacy. Benefits resulting Afghanistan have prevented the ATA and from a strong central state serve as an incentive for humanitarian organisations allied to it, from people to trust in and commit to central government. providing the mass of its population with “peace As was suggested in Chapter 1, the inability of the dividend”, meaning visible improvements in the state to deliver basic services is one of the key general standard of living and noticeable benefits factors placing the central state under strain and resulting from peace (such as basic services -health causing actual state failure. Providing ordinary care and education- and the reconstruction of Afghans with humanitarian help and basic services roadways).565 To give an example; attacks on thus is an adequate way for the central government reconstruction workers and de-miners drastically to increase its legitimacy. The current security delayed the rehabilitation of the country’s main road situation, largely resulting from inter-warlord conflict between Kabul, Kandahar and the city of Heart in and several warlords refusal to fully commit to the west.566 As was suggested in Chapter 2, the peace, has however forced the ATA to break its reconstruction of physical infrastructure is however promise of providing significant benefits to the of great importance to central government since it Afghan people.568 enables the state to foster greater national unity and to expand its control over the provincial areas. In Frustrating Democratic Processes addition, general insecurity has caused a major disruption of international assistance. According to Although contributing to a general atmosphere of the United Nations, over thirty percent of Afghan insecurity demonstrates one direct and one indirect territory was not accessible for humanitarian way in which collaborating (and similarly non-

564 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. 565 Ibidem, p.6. 567 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.1. 566 Ibidem, p.7. 568 Ibidem, p.6.

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collaborating) warlords have undermined the tactics of intimidation.”573 From several districts in governments ability to increase its legitimacy Kandahar province and in Kandahar city itself, HRW throughout the country, some warlords have also received for instance, information about military directly and knowingly weakened the central state commanders intimidating community members. A by influencing or hampering democratic processes. local commander had directly threatened One good example of such collaborating spoiler commission members and his political rivals in order behaviour is the way warlords have influenced and to have his proxy representatives for the loya jirga intimidated the elections of Emergency Loya Jirga elected. One commission observer said: (ELJ) delegates in June 2002. There was a leader named Wakil Dost The Election of Emergency Loya Jirga Mohammad Khan, who was an elder, not a Delegates, June 2002 military commander. He had four hundred supporters with him. These supporters wanted In June 2002, as was provided for by the 2001 Bonn the election to go forward. But there was a Agreement, an Emergency Loya Jirga deciding on commander there as well, named Haji the structure and key positions of the Transitional Mohammad, and he told us that he would not Administration was to be organised by the Special allow the election to go forward. He told us [the Independent Commission for the Convening of the loya jirga commission observers], “If all twenty Emergency Loya Jirga. According to the INGO [of the representatives to be chosen] are not Human Rights Watch, the clearest evidence of the selected from my group, I will hold you 574 growing power of the Afghan warlords was “their prisoner.” ability in many parts of Afghanistan to subvert the 569 In May 2002, HRW researchers conducted loya jirga process.” While the ELJ’s selection extensive interviews in several Southern provinces. criteria unequivocally called for the exclusion of The questioned locals, journalists and independent delegates who were involved in human rights observers of the loya jirga process all spoke of abuses or criminal activities, the Special instances of violence, intimidation and an Commission proved to be unable to enforce these 570 atmosphere of general insecurity threatening the criteria. As a result, despite the efforts of the loya jirga election process.575 In one of the worst Special Commission, some regional warlords were areas, Zabul province, authorities associated with able to dominate the election process of the loya 571 the Hizb-I Islami party tried to control and jirga delegates. While in Northern Afghanistan manipulate the loya jirga election process. In the regional warlords Rashid Dostum and Atta provincial capital Qalat, direct interference by the Mohammad selected themselves to the loya jirga, in provincial governor even forced the U.N. and the Western Afghanistan Ismail Khan was reported to 572 loya jirga commission to call off the first stage of the control the election process. Some regional election process, twice.576 The inability of the warlords even manipulated the election process commission members to prevent these acts is best through “threats, beatings, imprisonment, and other

569 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.2. 573 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.1. 570 Idem. 574 Ibidem, p.6. 571 Idem. 575 Ibidem, p.2. 572 Idem. 576 Ibidem, p.3.

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described by a citation of a senior member of the characterized by threats and intimidation, and, more loya jirga observation commission: generally, served to endorse the use of military threat to limit the democratic process.”580 (…) We have no power. When we are going to As a result of these intimidations, few changes these elections we have no arms, no protections, were made in key positions previously appointed for we only have these radios. So we cannot make this the Interim Administration. According to Peake, the man [Governor Tokhi] stop his influence. We are loya jirga in fact confirmed the ascendancy of trying to prevent the people with guns [the warlords] Afghan warlords within the Afghan cabinet.581 “[I]n from taking part in the election, we are just trying to the absence of an independent security force and get out the information about the loya jirga process, but the warlords make all these problems. The night an adequate supervisory capacity, the warlords and thesiss [pamphlets] they publish say that we should their guns have been able to monopolize power in fight against the foreigners and Americans, and we many areas of Afghanistan”, HRW concluded in are asked many questions by the warlords [about June 2002.582 Saman Zia-Zarifi, senior researcher our allegiance, our patriotism]. It is very difficult for HRW, even argued after election day that without any security.577 "Afghanistan's warlords are stronger today then they

were ten days ago before the loya jirga started”.

According to her, “Short term political expediency The Emergency Loya Jirga, June 2002 has clearly triumphed over human rights".583 Intimidation did however not halt after the election of loya jirga delegates. Intimidation and threats of The Constitutional Loya Jirga, 13 December violence continued to occur during the actual 2003 Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. Some warlords Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya Jirga assembly were said to have threatened to use violence to was held in Kabul on 13 December 2003 and was ensure the positions of their liking in cabinet.578 aimed at deciding upon a draft constitution. Islamic Moreover, according to Goodson, provincial conservative and warlord Ustad Abdul Rasul governors and some prominent warlords were given Sayyaf,584 was elected to be one of the 502 “last-minute credentials and seats of honour in the representatives at the Constitutional Loya Jirga front row, ensuring that many delegates would be 579 unable to vote or behave independently.” A 580 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 47. classic example of collaborating spoiler behaviour 581 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.187. 582 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.2. during the Emergency Loya Jirga is the way 583 Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Analysis of New Defence Minister Fahim, who controlled the bulk of Cabinet: Warlords Emerge from Loya Jirga More armed force in Kabul, demanded access for the Powerful Than Ever, Kabul, June 20, 2002 (available at: http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/06/afghancabinet.htm, intelligence service to the loya jirga meeting hall. accessed October 3, 2004) 584 Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is a former mujahedeen The decision by UN Special Representative of the commander. As Wahnabi Pashtun warlord he leads a Secretary General Brahimi to succumb to Fahim’s Wahabi Pashtun militia which was formerly allied under the Northern Alliance. At that time he was the only anti- demands resulted in a loya jirga that “was Taliban Pashtun leader that was allied within the Northern Alliance prior to the fall of Kabul. Source: Global Security.org, ‘Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’, 577 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.3-4. (available at: 578 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.187. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan 579 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 94. /sayyaf.htm, accessed October 8, 2004), p.1.

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(CLJ) in Kabul. Sayyaf initially refused to divide Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention the 502 CLJ delegates randomly among ten of Vice -renamed the Ministry of Haj and Religious working groups, as was planned by the Affairs- which aimed to prevent public displays of 588 Constitutional Commission's secretariat, suggesting “un-Islamic” behaviour of Afghan women. that the delegates should be deliberately partitioned As Sayyaf is considered to be “a conservative, among the ten groups to guarantee an equal anti-west, anti-American and a hard line Islamic 589 allocation of, among other factors, professional fundamentalist” he differs from the other major expertise, provincial origin and gender. “Those who ‘collaborating warlords’. Based on his apparently know the constitution, the ulema [Islamic scholars], different view on Afghanistan’s political future, and the lawyers should be split into different groups Sayyaf could be considered as just a dissident so that the results of the discussion and debate will within the political debate, who opposes the be positive, and closer to each other,” Sayyaf formation of a democratic state and accompanying argued.585 As a result, Sayyaf was able to influence constitution. However, given that this powerful the constitutional draft by chairing one of the warlord does meet the characteristics of a ‘warlord’ working groups at the CLJ. Reaching a stalemate in (as were indicated in Chapter 1) and given the fact the debate over the draft constitution in January that he has deliberately intimidated the course of the 2004, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was forced to CLJ, this thesis considers him to be a ‘collaborating find a middle ground with uncompromising Islamic warlord’. fundamentalists like Sayyaf. Accordingly, an ambiguous clause forbidding any law from offending Based on the incidences of intimidation, threats and Islam was included in the draft. Although the draft acts of violence committed by warlords during the constitution provided for democratic rights such as election of loya jirga members, during the women’s rights, critics claimed that such a clause Emergency Loya Jirga itself, as well as during the would eventually enable fundamentalist Islamic Constitutional Loya Jirga, one could argue that beliefs to exceed democratic rights.586 collaborating warlords have hereby undermined the In addition, Sayyaf’s influence was felt when proceedings and transparency of political reforms Karzai appointed Sayyaf’s ally Fazal Hadi Shinwari which are necessary for creating central state as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Given that legitimacy and authority. The fact that these Shinwari was over the age limit and had training warlords have influenced and intimidated only in religious, not secular, law, his appointment democratic processes has undermined the promise was in contradiction to the laws provided for in the of a representative and democratic state. Once constitution. Being provided with this legitimate again, warlords were able to advance their military position, Shinwari continued to fill the Supreme power for a political ambition. Court with traditional mullahs who called for “Taliban-style punishments”.587 These court members even renewed the Taliban's dreaded

585 Citation of Ustad Abdul Rassul Sayyaf in: Global Security.org, ‘Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’, p.1. 588 Global Security.org, ‘Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’, p.1. 586 Idem. 589 Idem. 587 Idem.

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Reluctance to Enact Democratic Reforms to be seen as an endorsement of military pressure 592 from the Northern Alliance.” General Mohammad Qasim Fahim is one of the The prominence of the Northern Alliance was most apparent examples of a warlord who has taken also felt during the first stages of Afghanistan’s on a ‘collaborating’ spoiler role. Given his position reconstruction. Since Afghanistan’s New beginning as senior military commander of the Northern Program (ANBP) had been negotiated in the Alliance, and accordingly being viewed as the absence of an international force or non-factional country’s most powerful warlord, he was appointed Afghan force which could safeguard its authority 593 as first Vice President and Defence Minister within throughout Afghanistan, the Afghan Ministry of Afghanistan’s new cabinet. Although Fahim’s Defence (MoD) – which has been dominated by positions presuppose his loyalty to the central Tajik commanders of Fahim’s Shura-i-Nezar faction government, he has also continued to largely follow since its establishment in early 2002, came to play a his own personal agenda. key role in the ANBP programme. Accordingly, Since the fall of the Taliban regime, Mohammad Fahim’s post of Defence Minister demanded him to Qasim Fahim’s prominence on the political scene commence the national disarmament, has been unambiguous. As senior military demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) pilot-project commander of the Northern Alliance, Fahim send and initiate the creation of an Afghan National Army his troops into Kabul without waiting for U.S. (ANA). Minister Fahim‘s compliance to the ANBP approval in the last phase of the U.S.-led military programme was thus of crucial importance to the campaign against al-Qaida and the Taliban. success of Afghan reconstruction. Accordingly, during the Bonn Conference, Northern Nonetheless, during the year 2003 Fahim has Alliance forces had complete military control over primarily acted as a break on the DDR process, in Kabul. As the U.S. intended to uphold the military spite of the confidence reposed in him by Karzai capacity of the Alliance and its constituent groups and the international community. Until September for the subsequent war on terror, Washington, nor 2003, Fahim proved to be utterly reluctant to enact the United Nations wanted to offend Fahim. reforms in the Tajik-dominated Ministry of Defence 594 Consequently, the Bonn Agreement became as to increase the degree of ethnic diversity. It noticeably indistinct on security issues.590 Although was not until September 2003, that reforms led to the Bonn Agreement had specified the withdrawal of 22 new appointments to the Defence Ministry, heavy armoury from Kabul, Fahim refused to among them deputies representing the Pashtun comply with this provision forcing the U.S. and the Hazara and Uzbek ethnicities. Nevertheless, despite International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to being of non-Tajik origin, most new Pashtun MoD work within his boundaries.591 After all, as Shurke et members were Fahim loyalists. In addition, two of al pointed out in 2002: “ISAF’s policy (…) has been the three top posts within the MoD continued to be to maintain as low key a presence as possible. The filled by Fahim’s Tajik-based Shura-i-Nezar 595 dilemma is that this policy may inadvertently come faction. As a result, despite that the reforms are

592 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 47. 593 ICG, Disarmament and Reintegration, p.i. 590 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 43. 594 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.3-4. 591 Ibidem, p. 27-28. 595 Ibidem, p.4.

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significant; experts wonder whether the MoD new an atmosphere of general insecurity, or by refusing members will be able to assert meaningful to enact reforms. The Afghan warlords have also influence, and whether the reforms will eventually drastically complicated the endeavour of Afghan appease the sceptical Afghan (especially Pashtun) state building by running local fiefdoms and exerting people.596 local authority at the expense of Karzai’s central Not only has Fahim delayed the execution of government in Kabul. The existence of powerful democratic reforms within the MoD, he has also local warlords in large parts of Afghanistan and the refrained from actively pushing the Afghan warlords amounts of legitimacy and authority they exert in to disarm and demobilise their militia’s. It was not these areas have directly undermined the state’s until July 14, 2004 that he signed a decree on capability to create legitimacy and authority in pledging to push for the disarmament of warlords several different ways. and militias who refuse to take part in the DDR- programme. He even reassured the world that he Local Rule at the Expense of Central State would not “allow anybody to resort to the gun” in Authority August 2004597. It is yet too early to tell whether he By mid 2002 the Afghan warlords were the real will keep these promises. power on the ground in large parts of Minister Fahim’s reluctance to enact democratic Afghanistan.600 The Afghan warlords, once again, reforms and to actively contribute to Afghanistan’s consolidated their political and economic power New Beginnings Program, has demonstrated clear regionally, running local administrations virtually examples of ‘collaborating’ spoiler behaviour. This independent from the fledging central government. type of spoiler behaviour has extensively stalled the In reference to this situation, Sedra argued in start and progress of Afghan reconstruction as a October 2003: whole, but especially of the DDR-pilot project.598 After all, as a result of the prominence of Tajiks Despite of the central government’s efforts to within the MoD, regional warlords and militia leaders emasculate the warlords, these traditional (particularly from the Pashtun heartlands in strongmen have retained their stronghold on political and economic life across much of southern Afghanistan) have been extremely Afghanistan. Sporting private armies and reluctant to hand in their weapons to the MoD, as garnering resources through the drug trade, aid they perceive it to be controlled by a rival faction.599 from foreign states and various forms of criminal activity, these figures have proven difficult to Running Local ‘Fiefdoms’ dislodge.601

The resurgence of warlordism in Afghanistan has According to Peake this “dispersion of power into however not only undermined central government’s regional tracts has profound implications for the authority and legitimacy outside Kabul by producing country’s recovery from conflict. It is a direct obstacle to coordinated reconstruction efforts”. After 596 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. all, as Shurke et al pointed out: state building 597 Citation of Defence Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim, August 12, 2004, in: Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Democracy Before peace’, p.2. 599 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. 598 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.4. 600 Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Long Road’, p. 90. 601 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.3.

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requires the central government to assert its province. Yet in practice, Khans’ troops remained authority locally.602 However, in Afghanistan under his control. In addition, Khan did hand in 20 (collaborating) warlords exert local power and million dollar of tax revenues to the Ministry of authority at the expense of the central state. The Finance, yet in fact, this was only a small portion of fact that a powerful warlord is the real power on the the total amount he had collected as governor and ground in a certain territory logically means that the he only submitted it after repeated pleading by the central state has little authority in the same area. In Minister.607 Thus, being appointed an official fact, the well-functioning of the central government provincial governor did not convince Khan to neglect hereby become dependent on the willingness and his personal agenda. compliance of regional warlords to cooperate with or Even more representative of the way in which commit to central authority. This is especially true in provincial warlords -regardless of being nominal areas where strong warlords and (self-proclaimed) parts of central government- have undermined governors, such as Ismail Khan, Rashid Dostum central state authority and legitimacy is the political and Atta Muhammad rule. context within the northern Balkh province. The An adequate example of the way in which a Balkh province is under effective control of two of collaborating warlord has undermined central state Afghanistan’s most powerful collaborating warlords: authority by acting independently from the Kabul General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Muhammad government and following his own agenda, is Atta. Consequently, the capacity of the central demonstrated by the way powerful warlord Ismail government to exert authority in this area is limited Khan ruled the Afghan province of Heart. Despite by and largely dependent on the compliance of that Ismail Khan was formally appointed to the post these local warlords to central state policy. of Provincial Governor for the Herat province, he However, despite both their association with and has ruled the province as his personal fiefdom.603 In presumed allegiance to the central government, fact, some argue that Khan has become a both regional commanders are considered to be representation of the lack of control exerted by the independent warlords who autonomously rule the government in western Afghanistan.604 For instance, areas occupied by their troops.608 As a the success of appointing local civil servants in the consequence, the Balkh province is an entity run province was dependent on the approval of Ismail almost completely separated from central Khan. “Nobody has a job without the approval of government. The lack of state authority is clearly Ismail Khan.”, people said in Herat.605 In addition, indicated by the political weight of the official ATA despite that Khan gave signals that he was willing to provincial governor. According to Peacke this man deal with the central government within a political “is regarded as third in the rankings of political framework; he was not willing to fully accept Kabul’s importance.”609 authority.606 For instance, mid 2003, Ismail Khan did To rein the power of the warlords within the receive the general who Karzai had sent to take Balkh region, the Afghan central government has official command of the military forces in the Herat attempted to undermine their regional authority. For

602 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.11. 606 603 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 15. BBC News, ‘Profile: Ismail Khan’. 607 604 Idem. Idem. 608 605 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 12. Global Security.org, ‘Afghanistan-Politics’, p.2. 609 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188.

103 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

example, in May 2003, President Karzai drastically collections, use of torture, acts of looting, robbery, reduced Rashid Dostum in importance by extortion, intimidation and pillage, in which opium dismissing him from his deputy Defence minister production and drug traffic flourished and with the portfolio, and appointing him merely as ‘presidential local warlords controlling security, police and courts, advisor on security and military affairs’ for which he were not adequately managed by the central state. had to move to Kabul.610 Despite the good In fact, on the regional and local level where intentions of Karzai’s move, visible practical effects warlords called the shots, local power structures were absent: hostilities in the city of Masar-i-Sharif remained largely unaffected by the central did not cease, nor has Dostum been relocated to government’s attempts to rein warlord power.616 As Kabul.611 a consequence, the ordinary Afghan population suffered heavily from the post-Taliban context in Not only does strong local rule exercised by regional which warlords and their military factions ruled. warlords indicate a lack of authority exerted by Generalised violence and criminality threatened central government; the portrayal and legitimacy of their livelihoods and well-being as they were central government also appears to be strongly terrorised and intimidated by warlords reasserting affected by the way administrative rule is asserted their power over large parts of Afghanistan.617 locally.612 For example, many people in the Vardak “Regardless of their ideology and the source of their province regarded the government to be divided and support, these warlords are creating a climate of weak, noting that it was unable to refrain armed repression that once again threatened the security groups and militias from roaming freely in several and well-being of the Afghan people”, Human Rights parts of Afghanistan and in particular in the South- Watch claimed in June 2002.618 East where militants attacked aid workers and One of the most apparent examples of a Afghan and foreign troops.613 collaborating warlord running his personal fiefdom is the powerful warlord and Provincial Governor Ismail In this situation, the villagers had few reasons to Khan, who has created “a virtual mini-state in Herat, support a government that at the outset they felt with little allegiance to Kabul.”619 Once he came to was nonrepresentative and hence carried little power in the province of Herat after the fall of the legitimacy. Asked why they did not support the Taliban, he has proven impossible for Karzai’s Karzai government more actively against the national government to dislodge.620 As a result, militants, the villagers answered: “What will happen Herat has remained much as it was under Taliban to us tomorrow if the Taliban or Gulbuddin get back in power? Can anyone assure us that this will not control: “a closed society in which there is no happen?”614 dissent, no criticism of the government, no independent newspapers, no freedom to hold open Provinces or “mini fiefdoms”615 that were badly ruled meetings, and no respect for the rule of law.”621 by warlords, with incidences of illegal tax Khan’s de facto government consists of fighters and

610 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.3. 616 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 13. 611 Idem. 617 HRW, Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, p.1-2. 612 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.14. 618 Ibidem, p. 2. 613 Idem. 619 HRW, All Our Hopes Are Crushed, p.4. 614 Idem. 620 Idem. 615 Ahmed, ‘Warlords, Drugs, Democracy’, p.15. 621 Idem.

104 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

commanders of the mujahdeen and subsequent followers—their hands are bloody. For them, killing Northern Alliance. According to HRW, throughout a bird is the same as killing a man.”625 2002, politically motivated arrests and violence were Several Afghan warlords (such as Khan, Dostum common and reports were made of criminal and Atta) have thus not only created undesirable detainees who had been beaten severely, tortured, security conditions, but have also engendered intimidated, or insulted. In addition to political cases, resentment and discontentment among the HWR also reports of a pattern of arbitrary arrests, population, despite being nominal partners to Kabul. especially of the Pashtun minority.622 According to As the provincial governors appointed to restore HRW, Khan, in fact, directs and was aware of much order in these regions largely failed to do so, the of these cases: central government was consequently blamed for all that went wrong in the area in the first place.626 The There is convincing evidence that he personally state’s reluctance to intervene was seen as a failure ordered some of the political arrests and of the central state, and demonstrated the lack of beatings. In one case, Ismail Khan himself struck central state authority in these territories. In this a political prisoner and then ordered him to be way, the incidences of bad local rule can thus be tortured. In several other political cases, Amniat regarded as diminishing the already questioned (intelligence) agents tortured or beat detainees as legitimacy and credibility of Kabul.627 punishment for challenging Ismail Khan’s rule— often after explicit threats had been communicated from Ismail Khan himself. The Similar to the way the central state is held regularity of beatings and torture demonstrates responsible for the failures of localised rule, one that these cases are neither spontaneous nor the might expect that the successes of local rule acts of “rogue” officers or agents. Rather, the exercised by regional warlords are also attributed to abuses seem to be part of Ismail Khan’s policy to the central state. Yet ironically, ‘successful’ aspects create terror in the population in order to ensure of local rule, as is clear from both Herat and Balkh their obedience and acquiescence.623 province, are in fact attributed to the local power

structure themselves. As was suggested above, for Consequently, a climate of fear was created in the Ismail Khan the province of Herat was his personal Herat province. A man, who was tortured by Khan’s fiefdom. In the flourishing province, Khan controlled forces, described to HRW the effect of Khan’s local administration down to the district and sub- repressive reign: “At any time I feel that I am in district levels, ensured public order and relative danger. When I leave my house, I do not know if I peace, and even spend much of the revenue he will return. I do not know whether something will collected locally. Consequently, despite his “heavily- happen to me, if there will be some car crash, or 624 handed rule”, Khan was provided with a certain that I will be hit in the back of the head.” In amount of legitimate authority at the expense of addition, an Heart resident explained to HRW on Karzai’s central government.628 A street hawker said September 11, 2002: “Ismail Khan and his during Khan’s rule: “Ismail Khan was very tough in

622 HRW, All Our Hopes Are Crushed, p.4. 625 HRW, All Our Hopes Are Crushed, p.3. 623Ibidem, p.5. 626 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.14. 624 HRW interview with A.L., Herat, September 11, 2002 627 Idem. in: Idem. 628 Idem.

105 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

terms of social freedoms. But he has done some large part of these revenues to the central good works here and people appreciate that, there government in Kabul.634 As a consequence of such is no doubt.”629 Similarly, in the Balkh province, in practices, in 2002, Kabul received only 80 million of which powerful warlord Dostum rules, “[b]asic an estimated 500 million dollars collected in custom services such as schools and health centres are duties.635 funded by a combination of resources from regional By collecting taxes and customs duties warlords leaders and international aid. Regional power deprive the Afghan central government of revenue holders even receive kudos and publicity by collection essential for its development as a subsidizing the running of certain governmental sovereign state.636 After all, the collection of taxes offices.”630 and customs duties forms an indispensable source These collaborating warlords have thus largely of income for the central state.637 Yet, as the taken over some of the duties of the central state, revenues are primarily flowing to the bank accounts however on a regional or local level rather than on of warlords, the state is severely hampered in the central level. Through the provision of services financially contributing to reconstruction. Since these warlords create popular backing (despite their delivering services and basic goods (which is a vital heavily-handed rule), hereby legitimizing their reign part of reconstruction) is crucial for the state to over the region. As a consequence, the central state create legitimacy and trust among its population, the is not attributed with the credits of success. Instead, fact that collaborating warlords largely refuse to the local power structures themselves are provided hand over revenues, drastically undermines the with a certain amount of legitimacy at the expense Afghan government’s capability to enhance central of the central state. In fact, Shurke et al argue that state legitimacy.638 In addition, this exact legitimacy in these cases: “Local success thus can make gap also holds the warlords back from handing in localism trump centralism.”631 their revenues. Accordingly, given the government’s lack of legitimacy and authority outside Kabul, it is Collection of Taxes and Customs Duties “unlikely that the ATA will be able to assert full More practically, collaborating warlords running control over the country’s tax and customs system local administrations retain complete control over for many years to come”, Sedra argued in 2003.639 taxes in the territories under their control.632 Given For now, the central government’s development and the absence of central state authority in these efficacy are thus partly dependent on the willingness provincial areas, the bulk of these profits does not flow to the Ministry of Finance but is kept by 634 BBC News, ‘Profile: Ismail Khan’. 635 633 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 15. regional warlords. For instance, Provincial 636 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic Governor Ismail Khan raised millions of dollars from Path to Peace’, p.14. 637 Ibidem, p.5. customs revenues on goods which passed his 638 The ATA worked hard to alter this situation. In May territory, but was accused of failing to pass on a 2003, it brokered an agreement with 12 of Afghanistan’s key governors and military commanders in which they pledged to hand over all customs revenues to the central 629 BBC News, ‘Profile: Ismail Khan’. government and to halt all military interference in 630 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.188. political and civil affairs. Although this was a landmark 631 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p.14. agreement, the Afghan government continues to collect 632 Sedra and Middlebrook, ‘Afghanistan’s Problematic merely a part of the total amount in tax revenue. See: Path to Peace’, p.5. Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.7. 633 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: In Search of Security’, p.7. 639 Idem.

106 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

of regional warlords to hand over taxes and customs Dostum, Ismail Khan, Mohammad Qasim Fahim duties. One could thus say that since the Afghan and Rasul Mohammad Atta) have contributed to warlords have largely refused to comply with state failure rather than to state formation. These Kabul’s demands, they have undermined attempts warlords have not only engendered adverse security to fill the state’s legitimacy gap and prevented conditions within parts of Afghanistan by continuing central government from functioning effectively. their inter-warlord conflict, but have also undermined the capability of the central state to Conclusion ensure internal security by refusing to disarm and demobilise their militias, as well as by obstructing It is on a unique and unusual category of warlords the formation of the Afghan National Army. In that Chapter 4 focuses: those Afghan warlords who addition, warlords who have taken on a were previously associated with the Northern collaborating spoiler role have severely hampered Alliance, who have received high-level posts within the capability of the state to create legitimacy. The the central state system due to this affiliation, who mere existence of powerful warlords and the fact have subsequently become nominal partners to that they run personal ‘fiefdoms’ have also Kabul, and who have nonetheless adhered to a drastically limited the state’s ability to exert and personal agenda at the same time. This category of expand its authority, especially in the provincial warlords has demonstrated a unique spoiler areas. Moreover, collaborating warlords have experience in the Afghan reconstruction process. frustrated democratic processes (such as the Those warlords who were nominally aligned to the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga) and have central government and assumingly loyal to the been extremely reluctant to enact democratic central state have in fact, refused to fully commit to reforms. and accept authority from the central state. By doing All the abovementioned factors combined have so, these ‘collaborating warlords’ have undermined demonstrated that the transition from warlord to the political reconstruction process in Afghanistan. peacelord in post-Taliban Afghanistan has been Given that ‘collaborating warlords’ actively extremely complex. Although powerful warlords undermine both the capacity of the central state to have not been able to overthrow the central create legitimacy and authority outside Kabul, as government, they have unmistakeably frustrated well as the state’s capability to ensure internal and delayed the country’s political reconstruction security, they have in fact contributed to exactly process. As Peake had already mentioned; the case those capability gaps that lay at the core of state study of Afghanistan has shown that it is naïve to failure. expect military commanders, who lack any The actual ways in which the warlords have experience with governance and are merely trained contributed to both the security and legitimacy gap in conflict, to be able of constructing “the basic experienced in the Afghan failed state, are indicated building blocks of administration and governance.” 640 in Box 5: Collaborating Spoilers Frustrating Political Reconstruction: The Warlords’ Contribution to the Capability Gaps From this framework it is clear that several warlords (and especially the four most prominent collaborating warlords Abdul Rashid 640 Peake, ‘From Warlords to Peacelords’, p.191.

107 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 5. Conclusions

This thesis has demonstrated that there is a strong these warlords have frustrated, delayed and relation between state failure and the emergence of sometimes even paralysed the political warlords. The power and legitimacy vacuum in reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, resulting from ineffective central state institutions, a traditional adherence to localised rule, It is on this specific category of warlords which this sharp social cleavages and the country’s subjection thesis has primarily focused: Those Afghan warlords to external influences opened up the political space who were previously associated with the Northern in which local strong men, or so called ‘warlords’ Alliance, who have received high-level posts within emerged. Under influence of modern developments, the central state system due to this affiliation, who such as the introduction of Kalashnikovs, increased have subsequently become nominal partners to poppy production and the amplified importance of Kabul, and who have nonetheless adhered to a Islam, the right conditions were created for these personal agenda at the same time, were labelled by Afghan warlords to exert certain amounts of local me ‘collaborating warlords’. The category of and regional authority at the expense of the central warlords –who have adopted a ‘collaborating state. Consequently, the Afghan warlords became spoiler’ role- has demonstrated a unique spoiler undeniable actors within the pre-Taliban Afghan experience in the Afghan reconstruction process. political context. Given that they have actively undermined the central state’s capacity to create legitimacy and Although its significance was drastically reduced authority outside Kabul, as well as the state’s during the Taliban’s reign, since the fall of the capability to ensure internal security, these Taliban regime in November 2001 the warlord ‘collaborating warlords’ have contributed to exactly phenomenon has become apparent once again. As those capability gaps that lay at the core of state a result of U.S. support for Northern Alliance forces failure. in the ‘war on terror’, the traditional adherence to local power structures, the inadequacy of the 2001 The framework provided for in Chapter 4 (Box 5: Bonn Agreement with regard to warlordism, the Collaborating Spoilers Frustrating Political inability of international forces to uphold the writ of Reconstruction: The Warlords’ Contribution to the central government beyond Kabul, and the dramatic Capability Gaps), has exemplified the exact ways in increase of poppy cultivation, the Afghan warlords which ‘collaborating warlords’ have frustrated the have in fact resurfaced stronger than ever. As political reconstruction process in Afghanistan. The several warlords played a crucial role in toppling the framework has shown that several warlords Taliban, they have received high-level posts within (especially the four most prominent collaborating the central state system. Their newly attained warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan, ‘legitimated’ political posts provided these warlords Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Rasul Mohammad with extraordinary opportunities to consolidate their Atta) have, in fact, advanced state failure rather regional power, ones which they, unfortunately, than state formation. These warlords have not only have made the most of. Despite being nominally engendered adverse security conditions within parts aligned to the central government in Kabul, these of Afghanistan by continuing their inter-warlord warlords have refused to fully commit to and accept conflict, but have also undermined the capability of authority from the central state. As a consequence, the central state to ensure internal security by

108 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

refusing to disarm and demobilise their militias, as have frustrated and sometimes even paralysed, well as by obstructing the formation of the Afghan political reconstruction in Afghanistan. National Army. As a certain level of physical security is a necessary precondition for the political The existence of ‘collaborating warlords’ in reconstruction of a failed state, this thesis concludes Afghanistan and the ways in which these warlords that by doing so, collaborating warlords have have frustrated the country’s political reconstruction contributed to the security gap and have thus to a process, have proven that the evidence for a certain amount delayed and frustrated Afghanistan’s transformation from warlord to peacelord is meagre. reconstruction process. Experiences in post-Taliban Afghanistan have demonstrated that it is indeed naïve to expect Equally important to the political reconstruction of military commanders –who lack any experience in Afghanistan is the degree in which the central state administration, democracy and good governance- to is capable of establishing a broad base for make the profound transition from warlord to legitimacy and authority. In Afghanistan, this peacelord on the short-term. Although the process has however been severely hampered by integration of powerful warlords may have averted collaborating warlords. The mere existence of more violent spoiler behaviour, and despite that the powerful warlords and the way they have run their warlords have physically contributed to the Afghan personal ‘fiefdoms’, has drastically limited the central state, ‘collaborating’ warlords have state’s ability to exert and expand its authority, unmistakeably also frustrated, intimidated and especially in the provincial areas. Moreover, delayed the country’s political reconstruction collaborating Afghan warlords have negatively process. With much authority and power organised influenced democratic processes, such as the around those Afghan warlords who claim to be loyal election of ELJ delegates, the convening of the ELJ to the central state yet act in contradictory ways, the and the constitutional process. In addition, several consolidation of a legitimate, democratic central warlords of this unique category have been state in Afghanistan, remains distant. It is therefore extremely reluctant to enact democratic reforms up to the new Afghan government as well as to the which are crucial to the consolidation of a international actors involved in Afghanistan, to representative democratic government. Based on encourage or even force the ‘collaborating warlords’ the evidence collected which demonstrates the into submitting to central state authority and into ways in which Afghan collaborating warlords have making the profound transition from warlord to contributed to the legitimacy gap, this thesis peacelord. concludes that by doing so, collaborating warlords

109 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix I. Overview of Chapter 1

Source: Authors own interpretation, based on the theories provided for in Chapter 1.

110 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix II. Map of Afghanistan

Source: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Map no.3958 Row 3’, January 2004, (available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf, accessed, April 6, 2005)

111 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix IV. Afghanistan’s Democratic Roadmap

The Roadmap to Democracy A f g h a n i s t a n

5 DECEMBER 2002: AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Bonn IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The Bonn Agreement Agreement formed a detailed time-table to move to a stable and democratic government in Afghanistan and to new measures for maintaining public order.

AIA consists of Special Independent Commission for Interim the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga (SIC), Authority 22 JANUARY 2002 Supreme Court, Interim Administration (IA), I. SPECIAL INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE 22 DECEMBER 2001 22 DECEMBER 2001 CONVENING OF THE Established EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA II. SUPREME COURT III. INTERIM ADMINISTRATION Consisted of 21 members Permanent institution (no members of IA) Legal Framework: A. CENTRAL BANK Consisted of a Chairman; OF AFGHANISTAN - Final authority for -Is the repository of Hamid Karzai, 5 Vice determining procedures & all judicial power Chair members and 24 regulations for allocation -1964 constitution is B. Civil service other members. of seats in ELJ re-established by BA Commission - Is symbol for Afghan -Determining number of -IA entitled to sovereignty people participating in ELJ legislate new laws - Convenes of day-tot- - Must ensure a significant -Recommendations C. Human day conduct of A affairs number of woman and other made by Judicial Rights - Represents A. in segments of Afghan society Commission Commission international relations in ELJ - divisions between - Is in control of A. conservative, Islamic D. Judicial armed forces law and progressive Commission - Established institutions ideas in constitution A,B,C,D 11-19 JUNE 2002

EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA Transitional 19 JUNE 2002 Authority ‘Grand Council’: formed after local TRANSITIONAL elections: 1.501 representatives were elected in a process that was marred Established ADMINISTRATION by intimidation, nepotism, bribing. 5 OCTOBER 2002 - Decided on the appointment of a Head of State; Hamid Karzai CONSTITUTIONAL TA, is part of ATA and leads A. until - Was to decide on key TA positions COMMISSION general elections are held in 2004 and approve proposals for the - Karzai proposed TA structure structure of TA: no decisions were - consists of 2 vice-presidents, 30 made by ELJ - provided an opportunity for 14 DECEMBER 2003 ministers, and chief of justice - establish several commissions to democratic politics BUT: it failed to CONSTITUTIONAL address key issues facing TA assert civilian leadership, to promote LOYA JIRGA -create basic government policies democratic expression, and to draw needed to restore peace and stability, authority away from the warlords and create a macro-economic framework CLJ is the final -place firm government structure 9 OCTOBER 2004 determinant of the Afghan Constitution New Free and Fair 4 JANUARY 2004 Constitution Elections

Source: Based on the schedule as provided by Wilmoth Field Warne Lawyers, 'Afghanistan Interim and Transitional Administrations-Updated June 14, 2002', (available at: http://www.afghanembassy.net/pdf/Afghanistan%20Government%20Updated%2014%20June%2020021.pdf, accessed May 23, 2003) and based on the time schedule provided for in ‘The Bonn Agreement’, (available at: http://www.unama- afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm).

112 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix IV. International Actors

in Afghan Political Reconstruction

The military campaign in Afghanistan and the integrate all UN activities in Afghanistan. subsequent fall of the Taliban unleashed an Accordingly, UNAMA has become the focal impressive increase in the number of point for international assistance to humanitarian aid organisations in the country, Afghanistan.644 As the UN explicitly intended to international attention for Afghanistan, funds, leave merely an institutional ‘light footprint’ and foreign military forces.641 The international (meaning that it was willing to assist in the commitment to repairing the Afghan state was, recovery of Afghanistan but would not dictate and still is, expressed in military, political as the direction or shape of the process), well as economic terms.642 Although there are UNAMA’s mandate includes “promoting many international actors playing important national reconciliation; fulfilling the tasks and roles in Afghan political reconstruction, such as responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations individual countries, international financial in the Bonn Agreement, including those related institutions (the World Bank) and a great to human rights, the rule of law and gender number of non-governmental organisations, a issues; and managing all UN humanitarian, small selection of key international actors relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in (United Nations, United States and ISAF) can Afghanistan in coordination with the Afghan be identified. Administration”.645 Currently, there are approximately sixteen UN agencies present in The United Nations: UNAMA & the UNSRSG Afghanistan which work in cooperation with Legitimately representing the international their Afghan government counterparts, national community, the United Nations is thoroughly and international NGO’s. All UN programs involved in the restoration of several weak and support the political reconstruction process in failed states. Its current involvement in such Afghanistan and recognise the Afghan states has resulted from the UN’s choice of Administration’s primary role within the policy to complement classical peace keeping process. 646 operations with the exercise of civil Given that the UN Special responsibilities. By doing so, the UN has Representative of the Secretary General drastically enhanced its capacity to address (UNSRSG) for Afghanistan is heading UNAMA the root causes of state failure and has and thus has overall responsibility for all UN considerably contributed to the restoration of programs within the country 647, he is regarded weak and failed states during several to be one of the key international actors operations.643 involved in Afghanistan’s reconstruction.648 Under auspices of the United Nations, The UNSRSG for Afghanistan, Lakhdar the Bonn Agreement was established during Brahimi, has been greatly respected for his the December 5, 2001 Bonn conference. role in previous UN programs as well as for his Subsequently, the UN Security Council activities in Afghanistan, such as his role in the authorized the International Security formation of the Bonn Agreement. As he is Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide familiar with the Afghan context, Brahimi has security in and around the capital of Kabul, and demonstrated to be able of creating an mobilized the United Nations Assistance independent UN role separated from the Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to assist the apparent US dominance.649 ATA in political reconstruction. UNAMA was established by Security Council resolution 1401 on March 28, 2002 and aimed to

641 To map the magnitude of assistance for Afghanistan, 644 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 876. The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 645 UNAMA website, ‘About UNAMA, Overview’, published in 2003 a second edition of the 218-page “A to (available at: http://www.unama- Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance’ (available at: afg.org/about/overview.htm, accessed March 24, 2005). http://www.areu.org.pk/atoz.html , accessed November 3, 646 UNAMA website, ‘About UNAMA’. 2003) 647 Idem. 642 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 61. 648 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 4. 643 AIV and CAVV, Failing States, p. 94-95. 649 Ibidem, p.6.

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The United States of America two Afghan-Americans who returned form exile As was suggested in Chapter 2, the United in Washington for two key positions in the States of America have had a history of Afghan cabinet (ministers of interior and influencing Afghanistan’s internal affairs. finance).653 This way, the U.S. had During the 1980s, under the presidencies of incorporated its influence in Afghanistan’s President Jimmy Carter and President Ronal political reconstruction from the start. Reagan, the United States had significantly In addition, U.S.-led coalition forces financed, armed and trained the variety of are regarded as essential elements of the tribal and ethnic groups united under the international commitment to Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen which strongly opposed and reconstruction. This commitment –symbolised fought against Soviet power. Paradoxically, by the international presence and forces some authors argue that it was exactly this (including U.S. troops) – is seen as crucial to incidental support for Afghan militias in the preventing a relapse into civil war.654 1980s, which has indirectly lead to the Moreover, as the present military operation dramatic events of September 11, 2001. and the continuing warfare are principal facts Michael Ignatieff argues that: in post-Taliban Afghanistan, UN negotiators and other actors have adapted to this context 'Afghanistan would never have become “by including the spectre of the B-52 in their a home for al Qaeda had its institutions diplomatic toolbox”.655 Even though the not been pulverised by twenty years of civil war, and this in turn would never coalition forces have confirmed that their task have happened had the United States is to pursue the war on terror and not to not abandoned the country after funding facilitate a process of peacebuilding, “the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance'. 'It created practice of carefully pressuring non-compliant and exploited local proxies to fight an anti-imperial war and then failed to actors into line by displaying (or just recalling) dictate and maintain peace among the an image of what may fall from the sky has victors. Failing to do so, it found itself a come to be known as ‘B-52 diplomacy’.”656 decade later, confronting the same What is more, given that attempts by the proxies – Osama bin Laden had been one of the mujahedin receiving American central government to marginalise or transfer support – now turned into deadly regional warlords were largely unsuccessful, in enemies'.650 those few successful cases, support from the U.S. has proven to be crucial.657 Finally, The fact that the Bush Administration was despite initial concerns that U.S. commitments willing to use its military forces to initiate ‘the would not materialise, American aid and war on terror’ in Afghanistan and used its technical assistance drastically increased in “super power status” in relation to its allies, has late 2003 when Washington became actively made the US “the single most important 651 involved in the constitutional process to foreign actor on the Afghan scene”. support its preferred legal design and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) targeted candidates.658 against the Taliban regime, started on October At present, as U.S. forces have 7, 2001, under U.S central command and 652 continued to hunt down Taliban and al Qaida consisted of approximately 14,000 soldiers. As a result of the operation’s success in 653 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 6. toppling the Taliban regime, the U.S. have 654 Ibidem, p.46. played a key role in the subsequent 655 Idem. reconstruction process. For instance, the U.S. 656 Idem. was able to select the Chairman of the AIA 657 This was for instance the case in de province of Khost, (Karzai), and decided on the appointment of where Padsha Khan Zadran – a U.S. ally challenging the by Kabul selected governor - was effectively unseated after the U.S. increasingly perceived him as a hindrance 650 Ignatieff, Empire Lite, p.12. to the U.S.-led military campaign. Similarly, when the 651 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 6. governor of Kandahar, Gul Agha Shirzai was transferred 652 The United States National Army, ‘Areas of to Kabul and replaced with a close ally of President Operations’ (available at: Karzai, this also met the terms of Coalition priorities. http://www.army.mil/operations/, accessed October 15, See: Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 45-46. 2004) 658 Ibidem. p. 6.

114 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

fighters under the banner of OEF, the U.S. has problem in their own right.665 In addition, U.S. remained the dominant factor within the support for local structures has not only military coalition.659 The role of U.S. forces in fostered the warlord phenomenon, it has also Afghanistan is however quite controversial. In indirectly contributed to the drug industry and contrast to the other major international actors the secondary war economy, hereby (such as the United Nations) Washington “has deteriorating the consequent security dilemma seen the military struggle against remnants of in Afghanistan.666 the Taliban and al Qiada as the task with the Thirdly, U.S. preoccupation with the highest priority.”660 Accordingly, the U.S. has ‘war on terror’ in Southeast Afghanistan has continued the low-level war against the Taliban also meant that U.S. forces were not interested and al Qaida insurgents during the transition in peacekeeping practices. For almost two phase. As a result, “conflict has been years the U.S. have failed to address calls embedded in the process of rebuilding the from Karzai, the UN (both Kofi Annan and his Afghan state and economy” and has thus SRSG), and many aid organizations for an “complicated virtually all aspects of the expansion of ISAF. As no other states were peacebuilding agenda implicitly endorsed in willing to provide forces without active U.S. Bonn”, Shurke et al argue.661 The complexity of support, the UN-authorized peacekeeping attempting to build peace and to wage a war force, remained deployed only in Kabul, and simultaneously is labelled by these authors as not in the provincial areas.667 “conflictual peacebuilding”.662 The conflictual elements in Afghanistan’s peace building International Security Assistance Force process are demonstrated in three ways: (ISAF) First, American and British forces have In line with one of the of the provisions collaborated with local warlords, employing provided for in the Bonn Agreement (a limited their local militias as proxy troops in Operation international peacekeeping force, mandated Enduring Freedom. As was suggested in for only in the capital city), the UN Security Chapter 3, support (weaponry and training) for Council passed Resolution 1386 on these local structures of power contributed to December 20, 2001, authorizing the the re-emergence of the Afghan warlords, and deployment of the International Security has even assisted them to gain local power Assistance Force (ISAF).668 This force differed and to exert local authority at the expense of dramatically from classical UN peacekeeping Karzai’s central government. Shurke et al forces, as it was set up separate from the UN argue that by adhering to such a strategy, the civilian mission and was shaped as a ‘coalition US have clearly “subordinated matters of of the willing’. This construction made sure that democratic development and human rights to the force was not only deployed quickly (it was the needs of a close working relationship with not formed by the UN but consisted of national Afghan military commanders at both the troops under UN resolution), but also allowed national and local levels.”663 for greater flexibility. Moreover, in contrast to Secondly, the continued low-intensity regular UN peacekeeping forces, ISAF war in Southeast Afghanistan, between the operated with minimal institutionalisation in US-led coalition and alleged Taliban and Al relation to the UN and within a more uncertain Qaida elements, has “served to sharpen the timeframe.669 ISAF consisted of approximately conflictual part of the peacebuilding 4,800 troops extracted from 19 different process.”664 After all, the repeated offensives in countries, and its relationship to the UN the South and East carried out by U.S.-led mission (UNAMA) was described as one of coalition forces have become a security “close consultation”.670

665 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 43. 659 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 45. 666 Ibidem, p. 5. 660 Idem. 667 Idem. 661 Ibidem, p. vii. 668 Ibidem, p. 46. 662 Ibidem, p. 3. 669 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 883. 663 Ibidem, p. vii. 670 United Nations, United Nations Resolution 664 Ibidem, p. 5. 1386/2001, paragraph 4. (available at: http://ods-dds-

115 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

ISAF’s initial mandate was to provide beyond Kabul its primary task would probably security for Kabul and its ‘surrounding areas’. have become providing internal security and Most observers agree that ISAF has positively strengthening national authority, generally “by contributed to Afghan reconstruction by asking the warlords to withdraw their units from preventing violent acts and by ensuring a their respective provincial capitals.”677 This necessary minimum of security and ‘neutral situation would have undeniably led to violent political space’ in Kabul.671 In fact, the success confrontation with warlords as there were no of ISAF in stabilizing Kabul has fostered the political rewards to be given in return for their view that the security environment across “cantonment”. Alternatively, ISAF’s expansion Afghanistan would be greatly improved if ISAF would thus merely have legitimised the power were expanded outside the capital. U.N. and presence of warlords by operating Secretary General Kofi Annan, U.N. SRSG alongside them.678 In this respect, Shurke et al Lakdhar Brahimi, as well as Afghan President argue that “given the entrenchment of old-time Hamid Karzai, consistently called for additional warlords, it was difficult to see how to avoid the deployment of the security force beyond uncomfortable choice between cooperation Kabul.672 This option was however precluded (which would legitimize them) and form the beginning by three factors. confrontation (which carried the prospect of First, the Americans were strongly military confrontation).”679 concerned that the expansion of ISAF beyond It was not until two years after the Kabul would compose an obstacle to their Bonn Conference that a minor expansion of military campaign against the Taliban and Al ISAF was planned. Germany, which assumed Qaida elements. The U.S. feared that soldiers joint command of ISAF with the Netherlands of the peacekeeping force would fall hostage on 10 February 2003, proposed at an to the enemy and be used to hamper the U.S. international security conference in Munich in war on terror, or that a U.S. rescue would February 2003, that the command of ISAF become necessary which would divert would eventually be handed over to the North resources from its military campaign.673 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).680 As Second, as was suggested, the fact that the NATO took over command of ISAF in August U.S. opposed ISAF’s expansion and refused to 2003, the possibility of expansion drastically provide troops for it, convinced other states to increased. In November 2003, the UN Security refrain form providing forces as well, as they Council passed a resolution which provided were not taking the risk without active U.S. the space for a possible expansion of ISAF support.674 In addition, countries that may have beyond Kabul.681 A possible ISAF’s expansion been contributing to ISAF (including the UK, could give the Transitional Authority increased Canada and Norway) were instead convinced flexibility and room for manoeuvre to confront by President Bush (who pleaded that you are uncooperative warlords and extend the writ of either with us, or against us”) to provide forces central government into the provincial areas. to the U.S.-led coalition in order to display their However, this would mean a considerable cost backing for the U.S..675 for international actors, who have already Third, and equally important is the shown to be hesitant to make additional troops question concerning ISAF’s mandate if the available.682 force was deployed beyond Kabul in areas where particularly powerful warlords reigned.676 In Kabul ISAF’s mandate was merely ensuring a ‘secure environment’, yet ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N017085 677 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 883-884. 5.pdf?OpenElement, accessed November 5, 2004) 678 Idem, p. 884. 671 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 47. 679 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 47. 672 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 883. 680 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 673 Idem. Reconstruction’, p.8. 674 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 5. 681 Shurke et al., Conflictual Peacebuilding, p. 47. 675 Shurke, et al, 'After Bonn’, p. 883. 682 Sedra, ‘Afghanistan: Between War and 676 Idem. Reconstruction’, p.8.

116 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix V. Table of Warlords in Afghanistan

N Spoiler ATA Current Supported Additional Warlord Origin Region A Role function Affiliation by Information

ATA’s Ministry Ustad Mohammad Ethnic Collabor Military Jamiat- e Islami Mazar- i- Sharif of Defence, Atta Tajik x ating Commander party Tajikistan Presidential Uzbekistan, Abdul Rashid Ethnik Collabor Advisor on Jumbish- e Islami Sheberghan (North) USA, Dostum Uzbek x ating military party Turkey affairs Saudia Arabia, Allied with the Gulbuddin Kandahar, formerly Taliban Ghilzai Hekmatyar Total Spinboldak, Kunar, Hizb- e Islami Pakistan’s ISI suspect in Pashtun Kunduz and numerous acts formerly USA of terrorism Amanullah Khan SouthWest

Mohammad SouthWest

Kareem Khan Herat Jami'at- e Ethnic Collabor Provincial Ismail Khan x Herat Province Islami until 1992 Iran and USA Tajik ating Governor

His men are Collabor Provincial Aligned with US known for Gul Agha Sherzai Pashtun x Kandahar Province ating Governor forces extreme lawlessness. Chief Justice Itihad- i- Islami Demanding Pakistan’s ISI, and party, affiliated Shari’a law for Mawlawi Fazl Hadi Saudia Arabia Chairman of Kabul (ATA) with Sibghatullah Afghanistan’s Shinwari Supreme Mojaddedi and legal system

Court Sayyaf. (wants to consolidate Pacha Khan Paktia, Logar, Possibly US Zadran Paktia Paktika and

Khost provinces into greater Paktia) Islamic Emergency Itihad- i- Islami Saudi Arabia, Abdul Rabb al- Collabor Conservative, Loya Jirga Kabul, Paghman party, Wahabi Pakistan’s ISI, Rasul Sayyaf x ating supports strict Member faction USA Sharia law Russia, Former Burhanuddin Tajikistan, Ethnic Afghan Rabbani Total Badakhshan, Kabul Jamiat- i- Islami Iran, Tajik President Pakistan’s ISI, (1986-1992) USA Kabul, Panjshir Shura- e Nizar Mohammed Qasim Ethnic Collabor Defence ATA, Russia, (ATA) faction of Jamiat- Fahim Tajik x ating Minister India i- slami party Jandad Khan Kunar province

Zabith Jalil Farah province Ismail Khan

Malik Zarin Kunar province

Mohd Hussain Zabul and Maqoor

Reportedly Hazrat Ali Jalalabad, Nangahar Pakistan’s ISI, guilty of gross Mashriqi Shura province US human rights violations

117 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process

Defence Qazi Kabir Qunduz province Minister Fahim Pirahan Gul Qunduz province

Haji Qudus Nimruz province

Haji Ghafoor Nimruz province

Sardar A. Rahman Nimruz province Gurgage Hisb- i- Islami Pakistan’s ISI, Holds an ultra Jalalabad, Nangahar (Khalis), a break- Taliban extreme vision Yunus Khalis Province off party from and Al-Qaida of Islam Hekmatyar’s Hisb- ties

i- islami party Afghanistan’s Sighbatullah Jahb- e Mili Najat- Pakistan’s ISI, first religious Kabul Mojadidi e Afghanistan Taliban fundamen- talist Allied with Formerly worked Russia, Iran, Abdul Malik Mazar- i Sharif, Taliban, with Dostum, now Defence Pahlawan Kabul before Joining opposed Minister Fahim opposition Collabor Hisb- i- Wahdat Iran, Northern Abdul Karim Khalili x Bamiyan ating Islami Alliance Shura- e Nizar Defence Basir Salangi Kabul faction of Jamiat- Minister Fahim i- Islami party Shura- e Nizar Defence Commander Jurat Kabul faction of Jamiat- Minister Fahim i- Islami Party Reportedly Intelligence Defence broke from the Mullah Khaksar Kabul Minister of the Minister Fahim Taliban days Taliban and USA before its downfall Involved in conflict and Formerly Sayaf's killings 1992- Defence Zirakgul Zadran Ittehad- i- Islami 1996. Minister Party General in Received U.S. Fahim, ANA support during war against terror **) Collabor Provincial Hamidullah Tokhi x Zabol Province ating Governor Refused the post of vice president (to Haji Din *** Collabor Provincial Eastern Nangarhar Lieutenant under x succeed his Mohammed ating Governor province Yunus Khalis murdered brother Haji Qadir )

Source: This table has been largely based on the table provided by: Rights & Democracy, Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Lobbying and Advocacy Strategy, 2003, (available at: http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/advocacyPlanAfghan.pdf, accessed 5 September 2004). The author has however supplemented the third and fourth column.

* NA stands for Northern Alliance. The column designates which warlords were prominent members of the Northern Alliance opposition force against the S.U. ** Sedra, ‘In Search of Security’, p.11. *** For information on this warlord see: Sedra, ‘Between War and Reconstruction’, p.4. and Camelia Entekhabi-Fard, ‘Eurasia Insight: Afghan Politician’s murder touches off Political Discord’, Eurasianet, Posted July 10, 2002 (available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071002a.shtml, accessed March 4, 2005)

118 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process Appendix VI. Map of Major Warlords in Afghanistan

Source: Global Security, ‘Afghanistan Politics, Warlords 2004’, (available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/images/afghan-map_warlords_2004.gif, accessed October 1, 2004).

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