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Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Pol itical Reconstruction Process D.D. van Grieken April, 2005 Utrecht 1 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process A study of the ways in which Afghan ‘collaborating warlords’ have frustrated Afghanistan's political reconstruction process since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 D.D. van Grieken Student number: 0059145 University of Utrecht Language and Culture Studies International relations & Conflict Studies Dr. C. van der Borgh Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht Utrecht, The Netherlands April, 2005 Front Picture General Dostum was one of several Afghan warlords who routed the Taliban with the help of small bands of U.S. Special Forces. Source: 2002 National Geographic Society, (available at: www.nationalgeographic.com/.../ photo1_popup.html, accessed: 19 April 2004). 2 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process 3 Collaborating Warlords inE Afxgheancisutatni’vs Peo liSticaul Rmecmonsatrurcyti on Process The events of September 11, 2001 have shed new reconstruction of Afghanistan: the security and light on the problematic nature of weak and failed legitimacy gap. states, demonstrating that these states are no longer an isolated and distant problem. The consequences of Warlords state failure affect not only those populations within the Afghanistan’s history has visibly demonstrated the states themselves, but have shown to also touch relation between state failure and the emergence of people in neighbouring regions and as far as on the warlords. Factors such as the country’s division by other side of the world. Phenomena such as terrorism, sharp social cleavages, the existence of a localized illicit transnational networks, the movement of money, social system, Afghanistan’s rugged geography and drugs and weapons throughout the region, massive its subjection to external influences, have all and chaotic refugee flows, uncontained (ethnic) prevented the state from developing into a strong violence, and uncontrolled epidemics are all spill-over ‘nation-state’. Internal conflict and ineffective central effects which generally find their origin and breeding state institutions have subsequently lead to a power ground in weak and failed states. and legitimacy vacuum which opened up the (political) space for local strongmen or, so called As a failed state suffers from three primary capability ‘warlords’, to emerge. The traditional adherence to gaps (e.g. the legitimacy gap, security gap and localised rule, in combination with more modern capacity gap), central government is no longer able to developments such as the introduction of modern exert power on (large parts of) its territory, ensure the weapons, increased poppy production and the security of its own citizens and maintain the internal augmented importance of Islam, advanced the legal order, nor is it capable of delivering public emergence of the first Afghan ‘warlords’. ‘Warlords’ services or creating the conditions to this end. Given are defined according to the following the fact that failed states themselves inherently lack characteristics. Warlords: the ability, capacity and means to reverse the process of state failure, the international community is largely (a) have control over a certain territory lacking or responsible for taking on the task of ‘repairing’ failed contesting central government’s authority states. However, there appears to be a lack of (b) exert a certain amount of authority in this area consensus among academic scholars concerning the (c) have a military background on which their character of the required strategy. The academic political ascendance is largely based. discussion spreads from comprehensive strategies (d) apply a legitimating discourse (religion, (addressing all factors that cause instability and state nationalism etc.) failure) to minimalist approaches (addressing merely (e) dispose of weapons and finally the political challenges first). This thesis however (f) financially benefit from profits made through argues that international actors attempting to ‘repair’ a conflict trade and the secondary war economy. failed state, should start from addressing exactly those capability gaps that caused the state to fail in the first After the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, place. In other words: actors should try to ‘fill the which produced a widespread power vacuum and a capability gaps’. This thesis focuses on two capability complex political context, several of the Afghan gaps that are of particular interest to the political warlords were able to consolidate their positions of 4 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process power once more. With U.S. forces employing state failure (security and legitimacy gap) rather Northern Alliance militias as proxy troops in the ‘war on than of state building. terror’, the traditional adherence to local power structures, the inadequacy of the 2001 Bonn Based on information from academic works and Agreement, the inability of international forces to reports by NGO’s it has become clear that uphold the writ of central government beyond Kabul, ‘collaborating’ warlords have not only engendered and the dramatic increase of poppy cultivation, the adverse security conditions within parts of right conditions were created for the Afghan warlords Afghanistan by continuing their inter-warlord conflict, to re-emerge. The resurgence of the warlord but have also undermined the capability of the phenomenon does not only form a threat to long- central state to ensure internal security by refusing lasting peace and democracy but has also confronted to disarm and demobilise their militias, as well as by international actors with the significant and long-term obstructing the formation of the Afghan National dilemma of warlordism. Army. Moreover, warlords who have taken on a collaborating spoiler role have severely hampered Given that Afghanistan’s most prominent warlords the capability of the state to create legitimate have attained control over large parts of the country’s authority. The mere existence of powerful territory, and as their political and economic power ‘collaborating’ warlords and the fact that they run often exceeds that of central government, they will personal ‘fiefdoms’, has drastically limited the generally resist central government and thus pose a state’s ability to exert and expand its authority, daunting threat to the political reconstruction process especially in the provincial areas. Moreover, of Afghanistan. As the Afghan warlords will attempt to ‘collaborating’ warlords have frustrated democratic maintain their positions of power, they will be likely to processes (such as the convening of the adopt a ‘spoiler’ role. The Afghan warlords can be Emergency Loya Jirga) and have been reluctant to classified into the following categories: (1) total spoilers enact democratic reforms. (2) partial (or limited) spoilers and, (3) collaborating spoilers. Given that his last category of warlords - The ways in which the major collaborating warlords warlords who have adopted a ‘collaborating spoiler’ in Afghanistan have frustrated the political role- indicates a unique and largely unrecognised reconstruction process, have demonstrated that the spoiler role, it is suitable for further examination. profound transition from warlord to peacelord in post-Taliban Afghanistan is extremely complex. The Collaborating Warlords experiences in Afghanistan have shown that it is Collaborating warlords are Afghan warlords who were naïve to expect military commanders –who lack any previously associated with the Northern Alliance experience in administration, democracy and good opposition force, who have received high-level posts governance- to make the transition from warlord to within the central state system due to this affiliation, peacelord in the short-term. Although the integration but who have played a double role by adhering to their of powerful warlords may have averted more violent personal agenda and objectives at the same time. This spoiler behaviour, and despite that the warlords category of warlords has demonstrated a unique have physically contributed to the Afghan central spoiler experience in the Afghan reconstruction state, ‘collaborating’ warlords have unmistakeably process since they have contributed to elements of frustrated, intimidated and delayed the country’s 5 Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process political reconstruction process. With much authority and power organised around these Afghan warlords who claim to be loyal to the central state yet act in contradictory ways, the consolidation of a legitimate, democratic central state in Afghanistan, remains distant. 6 Collaborating Warlords inC Afoghnantiestann’tss P olitical Reconstruction Process CONTENTS 6 PREFACE 8 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 9 INTRODUCTION 10 Central Question 11 1. ‘REPARING’ FAILED STATES 13 1.1 FAILED STATES 13 The Origins of Failed States 14 Defining State Failure: Three Capability Gaps 16 The Consequences of Failed States 17 1.2 ‘REPAIRING’ FAILED STATES 19 Approaches to State Failure 19 Comprehensive Approach to State Failure 20 Filling the Capability Gaps 23 Creating Legitimacy and Authority 24 Ensuring Security 29 1.3 ‘REPAIRING’ FAILED STATES: WORKING WITH WARLORDS 34 The Emergence of Warlords 34 The Spoiler Problem 36 How to Manage Spoilers? 38 Warlords, Spoilers or Local Strongmen? 41 From Warlords to Peacelords? 43 The Paradox of Working with Warlords