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FE25/Al6•3

Serial: 00299 "· "l • J . .... ·. 1·"· Naval Operating Bad~~ Norfolk, Virgini~ f . li~-;~t1;0-~~;-£-A c-~i s~"G-2~~YDGS- December 22-, · .1;~4 .2 . ,.

by From: 0 --an- er~~. -~~te~~~ ~ 1•. ·· .. A ic Fleet. ;/ " \ To Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet • . · ~~ ~, · .. ·~~'- .. Via Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantiq,:t(j\~ :... /~:,~~,·, ,; Fleet. "'·'!;_· . ,, ., ·r · , . t~:' ·'- •1 • :.,. Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recommendatiori*;: ~ · ;'iJ . '- ...... ~!:: . 1. The following repo.rt is derived from a study of tine various o nerations carried out by personnel, individual ships and task groups of the Western Naval Task Force in operation TORCH on November 8-11, 1942, in the PORT LYAUTEY-FEDALA-CASABLANCA-SAFI areas of northwest French Morocco. From the voluminous reports submitted, only the principal matters of interest have been con­ sidered. All comments and recoomendations a'lJp ear under their proper headings. H.AVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. Material Performance~ -- The 'l10HCH operation served as a severe material test for the heavy arraa1ients of the capital ships engaged. Turret crews wer·e called upon to serve their guns for long periods of actual firing time. '.1.'he perforn ance of turrets . on battleships and heavy cruisers was excellent. ~he few casual­ ties that occurred were only temporary in nature and were .soon restored. Powder and shell ·supply was fast, and loading crews per­ formed without casualty. It may be s aid in general that naval gun­ fire ·delivered by all gunfire supporting ships gave substantial assistance to the land ing forces and aided n aterially in overcoming enemy opposition. ., '1 ' I( r, .. ~) '• .,, , ) .,, '

~ --- ,,, FE25/A16•3 . UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET ~- ---- A 1 Il'm~ ous FORCE1 Serial! 00299 (Admi~i · ''.~~ ttv~ Cdmtna. n ~.. ~ ··; _ ·,, 1 vu..o~ t·~-' -~.1·. 1) 1 INMf -V:Q;·.. J'@l?~ a 8 D.,. ,, ~se; Norref.l~ 1 ia, - December 22, 19L,2 • .; SubJect:I TORCH Operation, comments and reconunendations.

to the capture of the KASBA Fort and the coastal defense guns at MEHDIA might have been avoided by having the early support of naval gunfire on these targets. h. Naval Gunfire Support in the FEDALA-CASABLANCA Area.­ This consisted largely of silencing ener:iy coastal defense batteries and warding off attacks by French light naval forces against ships in the transport area. The landings on the beaches were supported by gunfire from the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, U.S.S. BROOKLYN, U.S.S. WILKES, u.s.s. SWANSOH and the U.S.S. LUDLOW. In addition there were twelve light support craft in the FEDALA area equipped with barrage rockets, and all landing craft were equipped with machine euns. Shortly after the first assault wave had landed on the beaches, and just as day was breaking, coastal batteries at C.APE FEDJ\LA and POIHT BLONDIN opened fire on the landing craft and on t he beaches. The destroyers and the BROOKLYN replied with counterbattery fire. The AUGUSTA., which had steamed some distance to the northward of the transport area, -moved in within range and opened fire on CAPE FEDALA. The shore batteries were soon silenced and quickly fell to our advancing troops. Thereafter there was little opposition ashore and no re­ quests for naval gunfire. 5. Naval Gunfire Against. French Light Forces.- At about 0745 on Uovember 8, 19.42, it was noticed that a French cruiser and sor:.ie destroyers had sortied from CASABLANCA in the direction of FEDAL.A and had commenced firing on our destroyers and landing craft. These French vessels :were engaged by the BROOKLYlJ and the AUGUSTA, and later came under the fire of our covering force, the MASSACHUSETTS, \'JICHITA, TUSCALOOSA and their destroyer screen. As a result of this engage­ m_ent, the French c.ruiser PRIMAGUE'I' and destroyers ALBATnOS and nALIH w,ere beached a4d put out of .action, and several othe:r French destroyerr were sunk. Our naval vessels were assisted durint:; this engagement by aircraft. 'J.'hereafter naval gunfire suppo r'jj took the form of engaging any French vessels that sortied from CASABLANCA, and warding off air attacks frofl the transport and beach areas.

-2­ .AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Operating Base, olk, Virginia, mcember 22, 1942 • ./ , Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recommendations.

6. Naval Gunfire Support in the SAFI .Area.- Fro11 a naval gunnery standpoint, the operations at SAFI were successful oeyond reasonable expectations. The gunfire action was initiated at 0428 on Novenber 8, 1942, when the assault destroyer BERNADOU was just rounding the bell buoy off the tip of the nain harbor jetty. At this moment a French 75-mrn gun opened up on the BERNADOU, followed by machine eun and rifle fire from both jetties. The BI:;HN.ADOU, fol­ lowed by the COLE, countered immediately with fire from 20-mm and- 3-inch 50-caliber guns. .The MERVINE countered the fire of a French ~ , 75-mm battery with several extremely accurate salvos. Within six minutes all enemy fire was silenced and no further opposition fron the 75-Mill battery and machine guns at the harbor mouth was encount­ ered. 'fhe gunfire of the NEW YOillC and PHILA:'.JELPHI.A was very effective against other French coastal batteries consisting of four 130-mm and three 155-mrn guns, and silenced ther.i after a few salvos. Host of this activjty tQok place in darkness and only the intermittent flashe8 of ener.iy batteries could be used as points of aim. Observation of the enemy's defensive equipment and the destruction wrought upon it indi­ cate that potentially strong hostile resistance was shattered quickly and effectively by rapid, acourate and overwhelning naval gunfire. ?. Autonatic Gun Control.- In the U.S.S. 11ASSACHUSETTS it was def·initely proved that a man cannot natch a moving pointer within the linits of error allowed for automatic gun control equip­ ment for a period of time r:i.uch in excess of ten minutes, due to fat­ igue. This fact clearly indicates the desirability for the complet­ ion of the installation of full autonatic features in train and ele­ vation in all turrets. 8. Map of the Landing Area.- It is realized that the map [ used were the best that could be procured in the tine available. Goot maps are very important in an operation of t his kind. If possible, a standard topographic nap of the landing area, suitable for navigat­ ional as well as mili ta'ry use, with the II-square gr id ayster:i super­ imposed in colored light lines, should be issued well in advance to all units connected with the problem of naval gunfire support and .,

FE25/A16-3 UNITED STATES ATL A1'~TIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Comma nd} Ne.val Operati:?:iB Base, .. Norfolk, Vir~inia, D e c c ~bor 22, 1942.

,/ Subject: TORCH Oper::tion, co::i .cnts ~ne. r ·::; con .cnd~.tions. - --- - . ------­

shore operations of the landin~ force.

9. Fire Su"l"\ ·-ort Areas. - Fi::.:e su;.; .~ ort croups should be

assirned...., to larvr. · e-unr• e~'.t rict e d. fire snI·-;ort 8_reas in order to allow fpr maneuvering and lo:n,c f ir5..!!(; :r.uns, q.."1h.lll1TY3 -..:'ed by numerous tm~ns.

10. Q2_g c1 us :\91!.§__?n d Re c Oll.:.~.n.~a t i r.I!:~ : (a) Li;;h' cruisGrs of t he SAV ·;N1?AI-I and CLE\t""ELA1'ID ty?t' . by virtue of their e;·~-- eat volume of fire~ lone. :!:'anr:e , a ccuracy- , high perfornance o: v.rr.mun i t ion and maneu.v erabilit~:' , are the mos t effective eunfire su~:ro rtine ships for landinc operations.

(b) Destroyers are extrem12 J_:~ eff'ectivo in delivering close sup~ortine f ir~ , direct fire on beaches and direct fire on targets of opportunit; .

( c) Pls.:: ..~ .f']:.ot i.s t:::.e mo.st effective method of con­ trolline accurate Tl.a_· ~· ---~ cunfire on desienated tarce ts ashore.

{ d) Cr c::L_.:;r~r and battleship s ;- ottinc; ~")lanes must ei.th~· - , h~ve fie,hter }.:'rotec 1Jicn or be capatlo of con ~l de:rr, ble more sr; ·:=::e '.':. .

(e )_ TI'..o ;:rocuromon'.t' of ~l:le new h~-C. h 8P.facity arn.r:i:J1 ·~ -­ tion will e;reatly L-. .;:·0u3e th .::; effe:;tiveness er· l!. c.~1 a l c1...lnf ir<; ,.

{f) Or...e OJ:' t".'10 bor:1'o:J.rc1.CTent ; ractises [illo uld be sr.t..c:: ­ uled· each cun ?·. er~' y3ar for all t ,T''O s of shins ca-:.iat l e of civ~ . r: ..~ cunfire su ::::~ ort in l andinc orera t:'.. ons in order to insi.lre their. readiness for this r articular cu&nerj mission.

( 1 s'li1' --, "',' ,. ,,,--if':i_'1"c <::U""'"' 01"t t...1c·} At ... - G,q ...... <::!t ono-· - !::' .... r_~~·- ... -... ~ ·-· - drec.•si;;;J rch"'_v ·-".r­ sol should be condti..ct P-a. -prior to f-1.ny landinf, o ~~ er a tion. This should include ar.t 1: 'l~ uombardrac rit of land objectives and the e 1f' .. ~loyment of shore fi :e'.J control "·:· ties and I)} _a no spot. A corJ. ~'t:-..:' ence of all units i 11v0 .:i _ved shou-:i..(1 be held before and after su:--··--. ·­ rehearsal. ,.

FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET 1-i.MPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 ACr.linistrative Command)

Subject: ~nd reco.m:·-iendations.

- -- ~ ---~ - -- - ~ -- ~ - - AMMUNITION

11. Expenditure of Ammunit~2L!..~- This operation served to emphasize the fact that ammwiition available for naval g unfire su~::_J o r' ·, of overseas operations is limited, and its conservation is an import­ ant consideration. Commensurate with the situation, the princi}) le of deliberate · fire ·which is essentia1 for accuracy .and conservation of ammunition. never should be lost sic:; ht of. Certain s hips in the FEDAL,':1 -CASABLAl'ifCA area. ' especially those in the Co-ve ::: ine: Force, were assicned the1 dual task o f.' destroying hostile surfa ce ves s els and neu­ tralizing shore batteriGs . This work necessarily entailed lar ;-~ e ex­ penditures of ammunitio::-i, but the amounts used were not considered out of ~roportion to the tasks . involved.

12. Q,ualit;z__Q_f ..l\.mrnunition.- The 16-in ch armor piercing J}rojectiles fired by the MASSACHUSETTS ·we r e unsctisfa ctory for this operation as many of theill· :p 1~oved to be duds. The 6ff~ct of 8-inch armor piercinc: ~: ro j ectil ss ac a inst shore t d r r~ ets an0 li'rench light forces was disar; ointinf, . ~l. 1 }-;-3 performance 6f the 14-inch bombardment pro.)ectiles fired b:,r ths T::':YJ,S and i-1--::- r Y03K w::,s s atisfactory, and althouc;h ·a few duds rvere reywrte d this am.munition ma de a definitely better showinc: than the ;_:i ::."mo:::.· :::iiercine :::; :rojectiles of other calibers . The performance of tJ:ie 6-inch hic;h ca:[) a city pro,jectilE:os was e :: ~ ccll c:n :~ and no duds were found. The 6-inch fire of the SAVMH·JfuI and PIIILA·· DELPHIA was most f :ivorably conL. ented u -.:- on. The 5-inch antiMaircra:i:' t rrojectiles fired by de s troy e r~ proved- most effecti ve jn clos e su~ ­ portinc fire. L:::stly, t he ~erformo.nce of 100-yi ourid bombs dro p ~ "' ed from naval aircraft was only mediocre as a number of t bem f ailed to exrlode. It is believed, hovvever • that the se duds were ca used by d~oppine the bombs from too low an altitude. 13. A.P. Pro,iectiles. - Durinc; the bomba rdment of shore objectives it was virtually impossible to observe the imnacts of A.P. projectiles. Water spla shes we r e easy to see. but ~hen the f all of a shot occurr ed on l and i t usua lly vv-e nt unseen~ For examnle it is estimated tp.at the acti on a.:;a inst Battery EL HANK would have '-b esc1 about fifty :."'e r cent more efficient as f a r i .ture of ammuni t in·:·. was concerned. had bombardment ammunition FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Seri.al: 00299 (Adninintrutive Command) Naval Operatine Base. Norfolk) Vir5inia, December 22, 1942 • ./ Subject: TORCH recommendations.

14. Dept the assault phase, depth charges were successfully used by ship based seaplanes ·and land planes ·· against shore ob,jectives. Subsequent to the landings, the enemy sub::1..arine attacks '.vere nade on the tr::msI.'ort3 i::.-: the F3T.)~'.\LA area .:nd a l::.rGe 1;.unber of de_pth charees ·.vere expended. It was · fortunate that these expenditures were anticipated and re~lacements were provided for in the minelayer TERROR. Over 250 depth charges were issued as re:!lacements to about one-th:.rd of the destroyers and patrol boats engaged. 15. Colored Snlashes.- The ?roj9ctiles fired by French naval vessels all a ~~ eared to be dye loaded. 3~lashes observed were red, ~ink, ~ur~le, blue and yellow. They were vivid in color and easily recoc;niz1ble. Shell s1.'lashes of shcre batteries did not apDe ar to be colored.

16. Conclusi9~~and Reco.m...~endations:

(~) In the boobardment of l~nd fortifications it is essential thst all fire support shi;-s be su~:--." lied '.V i th special bombairdment amrn. uni~ion fitted T., ith sensitive fuzes. To do a sat­ isfactor~r job of nautralization, hi2h cariacity shells with inst i:i· taneous acting fu:;.es are required.

(b) The follow-un convo~r in an overseas ori eration should carry reserve ammunition for fire SUJ17J Ort shi:ps. (c) Only -bout 25 ?ercent of powder in battleships should be reduced charees. FI1E CQETROL 17. Fire from the ships was controlled both by plane spot and shore fire control r- arties. Flcne s~ot w~s the most effective means of brine.in~ a tart~et under f ire wi th a ccuracy in the shortest time. All re ~" orts received indicate that both the shore fire control parties 'and aircraft s ~1 otters OY' erated effic'!ep.tl;yi in controllin,9: and s:;-ottinc ships' c,u_11fire. The - or,'8r 1 ation~ t' ne~ASABL A...T\J CA and ..

FE.~5 I Al6-3 Serial: 00299

.?ubject:

------~ ------~ ~ ------­

SAFI .1reo.s -::mre sucb. ;'ls to rer.;.1ire,, little u:>e cf the Rh.ore fire con-· trcl ~~~1rties. The ti1:ie s :;en.t in trair..ir...; ·shore fire control- parties, z:ircraft s-::otters a::::C.. conba.tant shins in boobardment exerci~s ·was · well re"?:lid by tte effective "0~rt ~:ia;)rea. by n..'l V:!l 6Ul°rt'ire in su .~:~ort of the l:1nC:.int;s.

18. Fire Control Information~.:. Short. :fire control i'.H1rti~s un.d s:ootti:r..g ::?lc.nes si>c ~1. l c~ a.;-:1:~lif:v theii :reoucsts fer fire sun~: ort b•t i.ncludin{~ such ir..fcrr..iation 8S -· loc~~ticn {)f (:~Jn front li;'}.e , t~r:;e cf ·· 0 1 0 t '-4··,rr·et ~.., , t•p:: Y._""'° Cf· . f1're re..,UJ.'".:.. - r" - d•. , ..:~~·oh. "r>O""'O =""' . .~"'ed "· .1ncvn.:.1. - 1·-: .:.--.Lr::.ntc1:> Cf('"'....,., ,,•.:...:. trc· ~'"'"''"'2; ,~">t '. --,4t.r>d·· · 1 1 c.<,,.... ,.,,r...,.(.,, other...,...., - ,.,.!:-',,,ert;ne"t ~ ...... d ..":"" t '~"' t·hv.- t "i:•...,.,.,.• i ,.. .1... ,.,a•J,~ "'r'f ov"'nrv-inr. -L\.J'' tr- -'"-'' . +i:•Jl..!..,e ts"'i"'"' J...s..- .:J .:.f'n"r>n1"sh \,.•...:..-• . J.. ­ int; fire su:r:~:; ort. All shore fire coi1trcl j~ ;..: ;:·tie.s sl;touJ..d l~eep the Att;:1ck Force Ccr:~;;~,--:. :·;f! er L:ifor:-,m c:. of to.r ~o ts t.:..:~.cte !' f ire.

19. Rnclo.r. - Or.c of the gre<:ltes..t · c:.;::sets tc na VJ. (:'. ,; tion o.nd :r ire centre l r ecG ~~ tl ~~ C.cvolopea :!.n r;;_C:.::lr. Both the SC '.lI:- d SG types were of inc3.lcu~blc value during the a :;;:;: ro. ~. ch phase i 1;_ t;uiding the Attuck Grou;;s to thci:r:- proper ::, osit;ions • I1: b ~~ttlG, v1}:.o.n our shi;1s nre Gl1f~~t. f; il1f; OJ:lQci~.T "fcJrCCf~ t;.~[1t ,::.r3 llSil1~~ CVf;J. SiVO t,c ~ ctiCCJ cArtd SDJ.ol-;:G 1 1 '"'Creo.,...,s~--. .•1. , ;t.J... C'V ••'~•:. b V""' r ",_.:,<·'~ '- . 1'•..1. ,'·•r '-)....,V""' ·~'' ,1":. t >': ·L\...t·.I t r·~t'-'~ri- l..,r..t" r t...t.:l.t'"'.l'-.'-· -.., ~r.ic' t~.'.. , -.,,.:i t. '-~ h,.-,llJ'-'U ., ..1..... ;-1•.., ,1.. ;:)~ •.-..".'~ ~-·.!. r.o .. ­ VJ. tcJ.. Unfcrtu.n~tel;r, r.D.0_o.r sets as nc~:.J :1 .:;-;.s t.1 lle{~ ...-:~ ~G tco CCJ!-yll.­ ca.ted ,~r.c-i.. toachy :rcr thG cc.ncus,sio~~ c- :::.d nlioc:c oauso;:~ b ~; 13J;J:)s' i)J.n..; " l:t1' C'l::>.,...~T~C"' •· '> l()""-J-··· c- ~ r --.-, ~ 1 s+ "'~0 e nore rii ~~.. f .:-.LY;.,...,,, tl;-t.. .1..1. ov.&. v:.. .1\J vv..-. v-:..v ,'.' .= :.o . ~-'... V:o->e .lR \J\,\~.._.-.• ..:i ..., .,..,..,w .n"''.s.~,,..._ v br->- .. ,.... "'...... - - .;:,:.--) ....,...... l....A..:i I sc th. ~ t t1-, GJ c~c not fa.:i l c;.~ 3hccl-;: cf ~~unfiro. A ,'Jtud;r sho :.:i. ld bo .~·i.r-tc~,-; of the offect of sJ1.ocl( m~ ,-:. J.l ct;_r r-o. e_ ,. rs , ,~:d oc:.ui:;1mcnt. A Y:Trittc;i_ procedure for a_uickly C:.L:; ;;nosi:n.:: c :~ uses cf L .::. ilurG sl'.culc be 2;roviC.ec. ~l:d distributed tc c.ll shipG c0.ui-i ;:. o c~ ~,.1itl"_,_ t~1 is 5.nstru;-Km t. All future i nstrUL::..on.ts s h oulC_ bo s>cc.k te s t ~o .;::l,~. vibrd tio ;1 tos tcd bofcro ij1Gtn11 .-~ t:i.cn.

AIRC?!\.FT BOEBIHG .~r:D STR .\Fil-G

20. .rl.~rcra!t Bom~il!8·- Th.12 :'.1U~-:lber cf hi ts ob t

. UNITED STA':l'LS h.'I'LAHTIC :FLE:CT FE25/Al6-J ANIPEIBIOUS ]'ORCE (Administrative Comr~and) Serial: 00299 Naval Operating Base, Horfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942.

Subject:

batteries with no apparent dam.age to the guns themselves.

1 21. Lffect of Si:i.oke on ·Aircraft Bombing. - '.i. he effect of smoke near g,..ound objecitives seriously hanpered the uccuracy of bomb­ ing and led pilots to assume that Greater danaee had been done than was actually the case. Indications are that smoke was used by the enemy ~ot only for passive defense of docks and perhaps airports, but to give the impress.ion that danage had been inflicted. For ex­ ample, in several instances the smoke r.1al:ing apparatus W1:1S turned on after the first bombs had dropped, making the target ~rery diffi­ cult for the succeeding bombers to see, and ,s ivin0 tne impression that much damage had been done. '.L11lis often ca"Lt.s e cl _p ; l.ots not to bomb, on the false assumption that the particular objectivos had been des­ troyed, thus proving that ~uoke is a very vulu&ble def ense for ground installations such as docks, navy yards, air fields and shore bat­ teries. It is recommended that an investigation be r11aoe as to the feasibility of installin€; smoke raakine apparatus near ground install­ ations, particularly air fields and han~ars.

22. Bomb Handline; on ACV's.- Bomb handling b~ means of two electric whip hoists is unsatisfactor~r beqause of the excessive time required to supply bombs for rearming, and because of the diffi­ culty encountered in hoisting heu.vy bombs on long whips throuc;h four deck levels at sea~ A bomb elevator for this ex-oiler type of car:~i should be developed and installed during t~e first navy yard avail­ ability period. 23. Bom.bs Carried by Aircraft. - Results obtained from. bombs under 1000 potinds, unless direct hits were obtained, were dis­ appointing, due to insufficient destructiv8 pow r, r. Oomr:iensurate with the mission, the maximum nur,iber of 1000-pound bombs should be carried UNITED STA'l1 ~S A'.l'LJUJTIC i!,L:EET ~$/.U6-3 .A1.JP1-HBIO"JS FORCE (Administrative Co:mr:Jand) Serial: 00299 Naval Operating Base, Iforfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942.

Subject: vehicles, light tanks, aircraft and light A. A.M.G. installations. However, a higher percentage of incendiary ammunition should have been used to obtain maximum effect of ground strafing against in­ flammable targets such as aircraft, unarmored motor trans~orts and fuel tanks. 25. Fighter Director Control. - bvery capital naval vessel should have qualified fighter director control officers and suitable radio equipment for controlling coubat air patrol. At least two ships of each transport division should b e fitted for fighter director control. Destroyers should have r adio eQuipment suitable for teamine; with aircraft in huntine; down submarines. 26. Conclusions ADd Recommendations: (a) Positive arming in every bomb rack must be assured.

(b) ~eans should be devised to insure positive le ctcing or arming at will of hydrostatic arming devices for depth charges. (c} Glide bombing is useful only against weak anti-aircraft op~ osition. (d) Any p lane having less than t wo ca liber .50 machine guns forvmrd is inadequs.tely arned. (e) Caliber .50 incendiaries are very effective.

NAVli.L AIR LIAISON Al::·D AIR SUL -) CRT 27. Naval Air Liaison Parties. - Prior to sailing, the Amphibious Force Air Officer arranged t hrough the Comrn.uniceition Officer and Signal o..:ficer of the .A.m_rhibious li, orce Staff for the delivery on board transports of four SCR 193 radios mounted for operation in l'-rm.y jeeps, and also arranged f or four naval liaison UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEE~ FE25/A16-3 AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (Administrative Command) Serial: 00299 Nav~l Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, . Dcceober 22, 1942

Subject: and recoI!lI!lendations. parties, each consisting of one naval aviator and one aviation radio­ r.i.an , to accor:1pany t b.e assault troo:!J S a s h ore. These naval .::: ir liaisor::. parties 1'..'Jerc assi;..,ned to re;.~i:.!entul he::.dquurters of the ?th, 30th, 47th and 60th Inf::mtry Re ;_; iments. They '.'lent ashore Y!ith t!:e assa '...llt forces a:r:d u~on C3.ll reverted to the divisional comr.mnd nosts for tl:.e most direct control of a ir SU"? port by the Division.a l Cornm::r.ders • The followi:ig favorable comr.le:r:t on the effective '...lSe of r 8d. io by t:t.e nav ~ l air li a iso~ parties in controlling a ir support for tI'-e : round forces was na~ e by t he British observer from Lord Mountb~tten 's Staff:

11 From. the ~ir point of vim! the o t: er c~. t:.cn.s •:!ere 0 nrob,, bl•T t.he r.1ost S''ccesc:T'ul, t-. J.'' l. 1"'~ ' ..,, ,~:"· 0 •"l"' :-' "' S PiT6 "l" - ~ - J - ..... ~ """ .-..:• - .. ...t.'> """' '""'•.) ...., _ ...... ,, ·-- oJ • ­ seen. Th e su;:port .::; i ven by tile ::-~.'.:lvo.l aircr~ft ":rn. s quite astoundine to .c.e, on the cround , to wha t I had ever seen before. I r:ever b~fore ::a.a seen a rc ;- ,i­ uer.tal com;::al:der 1.·:ith l::.is •N i:::- clcss direct to the air­ plane at the sar.:;.e time as to the airdrome. E~ch commander had a set to t~e aircraft and to the carrier, the result beinc that .the su'!)::; ort was r:. i ven rouc hly within a period of half an hour. In one outstandintS case, and a very vit . ~l case, sup;.: ort vm.s t,; i ve:! v1 i thin four .minutes. Tha t case was 1".rhon G c ~: c r a l Truscott was makinc his fin:.ll att . ~cl: on t t.e Citadel, vicinity of Media Fortre ss. T:-.cy '.'Jere usi,1::, 75-rJm h o"!!itzers to reC.uce tt.e fortress. Tl:ey (Tru!1cctt 's ~~ :.:. v ;1 l .:.ir - ;sor.: ,....,-f'-f' J.' ,....l.· n''O,:, U"" + i-,"' ,... ,.,. C ,.., l.0 VO"' o.P + ·-,-, ;,... """' t ll.. tA,J;...,., .L \.;.a. .a. cn­ r) :_--' - ~ "' - _: 1 V ..1,.t. - ~ - ""'" J. .&. U.I J ...,,.1.., .J... 1. ) - ;:;..."1,d s:~i d to t ~c ci::- , 11 C::n ;,rou hel'J?a T::..cl"e ~ :::.i·.;-.:; c :-.cd to be a :;.::tr"ol of .:: i ve boY.1bers (SBD-30) in the a ir and t::ey car;ie v:Jitt.in four ninut.es. Tl:is :..' esulted in the Citadel bein~ taken without casualties."

nThere ·w2 s a lso e. noth0r case of :reallv sn l e ::c~ id 2ir 0 SUD.,.., O"l"t 11 1 S 11 1 0 '"18 J. ·1" 1 ·r1., -1·; J !:.."' - ' a t"l"... Pnr.>~C._ ,, , ._ ,/..~ 0 --c:o l" r "" CC C<::!C!f...,_ -'l -- ...... "'h"' t .....1-- e ar.'.J.ored forces req_ue :ited su~; ~:ort ( :.: tt :~ ck) on a :'o c:. d block. It vas fcrtt comi nc . in thirteen cin~tes and so 'Hell delive::-ed t :_.:.: t tl:e ..::::2:2or ed column 1.:1as we ll wider wa~r 3.:r:.d :::C.v.J.::cin,, v1ithin o all hour• II nr\ l -10­ UNITED STATES ATLP~TTIC FLEET FE25/Al6-3 AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (Ad.ministrative Command) Serial: 00299

------28. Conclusions And Reconmcndations: (a) The naval air liaison officer need not be an. aviator , but he sl1ou.ld be a.n officer having i ntima te lcnow­ ledse of uir operations and tactics.

(b) Tho rQdio~an assi ~ned to t he nGval air liaison. party ne ed not have a n avia tion r &tinc, but llc s hould be farn.ili~r ~.J ith aviation procedure and s hculC. be a .;ood radio material ma n.

(c) The n a v .-. 1 air liaison pwt y shoul d have a similar component assi r; :1~ed from the Arny f orces of occupation in order that the ch::.ne:; e over fron n.~ v rr l to :.1ilitcJ.ry control v1ill be U...'1interrupted.

(d) The ,:;. ir liaison rn.rty should be enbarJccd as a teG.m - officers, .r;1en, vehicle a nd equ ipr.,e n t - on the saHc shin . It s hould Bove ashore ~:.rit h t he a.:;::iault battalion and take·- station near t l:.e battalion CO!iYil8.n c1 post. It should revert to the rec:; ir.:e r.-tal cor.ir..a.nd :ri ost ':.. 7 ~-:,,e11. that }>Ost is e stab­ lisb.ed.

(e) The vehicle a nd radio should be ~-;at o r- nroofcd an0. should be :;rovidod ;·1i t h a,".l. oouatc cov o1~ ::1rotection a gainst salt water S?ray. (f) In every casG Y:here nc.val airera.ft are utilized in t ho as sault phase of un u.mp.1 -~ i'oio us operation, a n <-:! V.:..: l air liaison party should be a ssi .--. ned to ouch aro ~1 a u 1t_ ro &; iment.

(g) Army and N <~ Vy commanders sllould 1) e pro­ perly indoctrinated a s to t l1e desirabtlit :T of, and limit­ ations of ,:.ir-t"_; rotmd liaison. FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES A'i1LJUJ11:1 IC FLEET .A.IvIPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: (Administrative 0omrau nd) !Javal Operating Base, l~orfolk, Virginia, Decenber 22, 1942• ..Subject: ,..l.10RCH and recommendations.

SHORE AND BZACH P.AHTIES 29. Procedure.- The doctrine and operating procedure out· lined in "Standing Operating I1 rocedure, Amphibious .Force, u. s. Atlantic Fleet" is considered basically sound. This procedure was not fully complied with in some cases, probably due to insufficient training, imnroper debarkation priorities and inadequate neuns. It was noted particularly th&t the efficiency of shore and beach ptirtiG varied widely at different locali"Lie s hnd on separute beaches. 30. Corrective Me asures .- An analysis of all available facts concerning the activities of shore and beach parties during Operation TORCH leads to the following r 8com.r.1Gndations : (a) Shore and beach party pe!'son.. e l should be highly trained spediC:J.lists under one corilI!lander (hr Tiy ). This training should be continuous. (b) Army and Navy e l ements of the shore and beach parties should be made available to the Gomr;1ander Amphibious Force as soon as possible in order that the rwximum £tmount of time can be devoted to training prior to the next amphibious operation. 'l1hese elements should be J orr.ed into a shore regiment. (c) The shore regiment s11ould be withdrawn from the theatre of operations upon completion of its .mission so that it can be reconstructed and continue its trbining as a unit. This is considered to be the only way in which experienced and "battle­ wise" shore and beach parties can be developed.

-12­ FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administr~tive Command) haval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, flL'~iC'n Dec ember 22, i942. Subject: f ~W ts and recommendations. - ­ ------­ ------­ - - -­ LANDING BOATS 31. Pooling of Landing Boats.­ The necessity for pool­ ing of landing boats was due to the fact that all transports and cargo ships were not in themselves capable of carrying the proper number of boats for their respective tasks. Pooling, therefore , resulted in maximum operating efficiency. This meant that boats, upon being lowered, had to proceed to other vessels for the ir initiaJ loading. Duo to the extreme darkness, some ' boats had diffic~lty in finding their way, and others wore unable to do so. Regardless of the amount of prior training in boat handling during darkness, inany future amphibious operation involving landings at night - and in fact . at any other time - all bout coxswains should be provided with a chart or sketch of the landing area showing the locutions of ships in the transport area, lines of departure , beaches and other prominent fea­ tures, ~Jith compass courses to and from all thes e obje ctives. 32. Loading Nets.- Chain nets ar e not s atisfactory because they are slipper y , break eHsily and cut the hnnds. liilanila net~ are adequate, but they must be c~r u fully watched because they stretch during dt; barkation and unless they are kept clear of the water they may foul the propellers of landing boats loading alongside . 33. Surf Operations. - The surf at Jf:C DALJ1.. , after the first day, was much higher and more destructive in its effect than any experienced by the boat officers and coxswains during drill and training exercises on the Atlantic coast of' the United States. LCM's LCP's and LCV's, although generally well designed and capabl ~ of giving excellent s ervice , aru definite l y unsuited for landing through a surf higher than s even f eet . Moreover, in more than one case in the TORCH Operation, when u ramp was lower8d , the r ucoding s eas entered the ramp opening and weighed ,down tho boat. Thereafter, suc­ ceeding s eas broke ove r the stern, swaffiping the boat. Expeditious unloading, followed irnmediately by closing the ramps, would have r educed the number of these casua ltie s. 34. Rumps and Ramp Operating Mechanism.- Ivlahy failures occurred in the ramp operatinb me chanism of LCV's and LCM(J)'s. While .it.is possible to close the rainp .o:r -an LCV, using hand tackle, it . is FE25/Al6-3 IDUTED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET ANPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Naval Op er ating Base, orfolk , Virginia, Dec enber 22, 19 42. ·subject: ts and recommendations. ------not practicable to do so on an LCM(J) due to the weight involved. The installation of a mechanicc::illy driven r amp hoist on the LCH(J) is imperative, and such e. mechanism on LCV's is highly desirc:i ble . The present method of closing the rnmp on LCH(3) 's is unsatisfoctor:Y due to the time involved and the expose d position of the rJ.a n ope-r nt-­ ing the hand windlass. 35. Unloading At Be a ches.- Considerable delay wa s caust-·r by congestion of boats and difficulty of unloading heavy we ights ot beaches. The need for mechanical aids, improved me thods end equip­ ment for unloe.ding boats is a pparent. Onc e on the beach, equipment and supplies roust be quickly unloa ded and carried out of the tidal area to prevent loss of cargo and stranding of bo ots. Items such as gasoline and rnnmunition must be removed quickl y t o l ess exposed locations so that they do not become a mena c e to further operations in the event of an enemy bombing atteck.

36~ Standardization Of Equipment.- The basic design and propelling equipment of landing bo a ts ha ve been standardized. However, equipment such as propellers, propeller shafts, keyways in propellers and other small parts continue to vary according to the interests of manufacturers or inspectors. Standardization of equip­ ment is essential in order to reduce the variety of spare parts and equipment needed to effe ct repairs. 37. Boat Ma chine Gun Fire.- This proved to be effective against surface· t argets and aircraft. It is r ecomrnended that in pre­ paring for future amphibious operations, bo ot mo chine eun practices be extended to include firing at sleeve s or balloons. 38. Boat Ma chine Gun J\.lount s. - The scarf :ring ma chine gun mount on LCP's is too light and too easily bent. Th e bra cket mount fitted on LCV's proved quite satisfactory. 39. Life J a ckets And Belts.- Th e kapok life jacket should be worn by member s of l andi ng bo at crews and the pneumatic bel" type should be worn by troops. The k·apok type, once propcrl;t donned, .J:!1!:25[Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET Af.:IPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (A\dministrative Command) Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, Dec emb er 22, 1942 comments and recommendations, is ready for instant use and requires no further attention. It offers a certain amount of splinter protection for tho wear er and will properly support an unconscious man i n the water . Howe ver, this type interferes with the e quipment of troops and cannot r ea:l .i. ~ -~ be discarded. On the other h o. nd, the pneuI'.ls tic belt type , olthrJt.: gl . not as reliable as the kapok type, is bet ter suited for troop U SG because it is less bulky, does not greatly interfere with equipm6 .. J. +, . and is easily discarded. 40. Recor.1r.lendotions: (a) All transports employed i n future omphibious operations should be prepar ed to load 8octs ot the r oil. (b) Londing bo ots should be provided with a sinple type directi onal gyro compa ss. (c) Landing bo ots should be powered by Di€sel engines and all boot fuel t anks of transports should be con­ verted to bo ot Dies el oil storoge t anks. (d) All l anding boots should be fitted with TBY radio equipment. ( e ) SomE:; system of shielded low-power lighting should be used on transports, or o lurninous pa int or silimar luminous composition should be o ·: )plied to t he parts of cron es, booms and other transport e quipment i n o way thot will f ocili­ t ate night loading of boats. (f) Cost propellers should not be used on l anding boa ts as they shotter on striking solid obj ects. (g) A standard rig for bo at lines should be used on all transports to f acilitate handling bo ats alongside during darkness. ' ' '

UNITED STA TES Nl1LAirn:c fiE!:T AMPHIBIOUS FOHCE Serial: 00299 {Administrative Command)

Subject:

COMMUNICATIONS 41. A general report on communications for the entire operation will be made in separate correspondence. The fo:t.lowing brief comments are of interest in connection with the period covered by this report. 42. Plans.- The noval and amphibious communication planning, although s eriously handicapped by conditions existing during the planning period, wa s in general adequate . The plan was executed reasonably well - better thun might have been ex­ pected, considering the unusual complications involved, the last minute receipt of instructions, mat e.:: rial a.r:d p8rsonnel, and the inadequate training of personnel. Army conrnuni c:.: t i ons, insofar as they affected the assault phase of this oper ation, were gen­ erally not in accordonco with the Army communication plan. It is considered that the Army plan would have b ~e n satisfactory if carried out. 43. Procedures And Codes.- The joint and combined character of the operation introduced many unusual complications, particulorly on the He adquarters (Force Flag) Ship. Messages were handled in British, British-U.s., Army, Joint Army-IJavy, and Navy procedure, using both no!'Llal ( enciphered) and special operation call signs. British codes and ciphers, Army codes, British-U.S. codes, joint Army-Navy ciphers, Navy ci phers, a nd special amphibious cryptographic aids we r e employed. Many me ssages ha d to bEJ enciphered in two or three system s to r eoch the desired addresss es. As only l arge combatant ships s nd trans port flagships held the ECM, strip systems wer e employed for n l ar ge propor~ion of Force traffic. 44. Traffic Load.- The traffic load and the proportion of encrypted traffic of high precedence grew a s the operat i on progressed. Communic ation personnel of the Force Fl agship WE. re practically swamped, alt.hough working under all-out conditions. Th e traffic lo8d on other flagships was proportionately high. -16­ FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET . AMPHIBIOUS FORCE · Serial: 00299- (Administrative Command) Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia December 22, 1942 "Subject: TORCH Operation, -- ... - -­

45. ~r~- During the assault phase, speed gen­ erally took precedence over security, end plain language was used to a large extent for local communications. Security suffered more than necessary, however, owing to inadequate indoctrination of personnel. This was particularly true on circuits handled by non-communication personnel, such as the TBS, air, and shore fire control voice circuits. 46. Precedence.- On November 11, 79% of the outgoing messages and 62% of the incoming messages handled on the flagship were of priority precedence or higher. The majority of these were of operational priority precedence. COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS 47. Broadcast Schedules.- (a) nfuch difficulty was experienced with the Gibraltar F Schedule owing to numerous garbles in call signs and t exts, poor servicing, and occasional severe static conditions. The garbling is thought to have been due to poorly cut tape. This schedule was badly over­ loaded at times. (b) The reception of Annapolis was not reliable on the ?furoccan Coast. It is believed that the difficulties would have been overcome had local radio silence prevailed. 48. Ship. (a) The TBS (super fre quency voice) channel was in continual use and was generally of er eat value. However, the transL1ission of much non-essential traffic and poor circuit discipline was reported in each task group. (b) The Energency Warning and Force Fox Chan­ nel was not as useful as it mi ght have been owing to the necessity of using I.C.W. to permit reception by the Army ashore, and to SOiile poor transmitti-ng. r .,.., f "" ~ ~ ~ r­ ; ~J ) ~ \~ • \ FE25/Al6-;3 TThTJ:mr.!D S'rATES ATLANTIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 002"99 (Administrative Conrn.and) Naval Operating Base, ;;t..ll~Jl'Pll' :~ irginio • 22, 1942. Subject: TORCH Op

(c) The Northern Attack Group utilized the newly installed 2-3 me voice transmitters on a transport circuit, reportod 'to have been highly successful and to have been the most useful circuit guarded by transports. 49. Ship-Shore.- Ship-shore communications were slow in being established, but once established, functioned satisfactor­ ily. Delays were generally due to loss or wetting of equipment and to operetional conditions beyond the control of communicntion personnel. The visual channel provided by portable seorchlights on the beach was of great value ot FEDALA. 50. Boat Control.- Boat control circuits failed early in the landing, owing to wetting of the Army SCR 541 set, generally employed. Navy TBY sets were reported to be unsatisfactory owing to too short range, (and probably to lack. of properly skilled operators). 51. Shore Fire Control.- Communications between shore fire control parties and bombarding ships were established in about 60%of the cases. These ch~nnels were most successfully employed at PORT LYAUTEY where all three parties maintained comrlunications for several days and directed fire on nw:lerous targets. 52. Naval Air Liaison.- Ground-air communications were furnished by four naval air liaison parties, utilizing specially equipped Army "jeeps". These channels were successfully handled and were of the utmost value when properly utilized by the associated Army command ers • 53. Ground-Air Visual Signals.- Only one case of ground troops utilizing the panel code for comm.unication with aircraft was reported. This code would have been most useful in marking front lines and in directing aircraft toward specific objectives. The yellow smoke signal for indicatin[; friendly forces was also little used.

' - FE25/A16-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET .AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Naval Operating Base, folk, Virginia · ecember 22, 1942.

Subject: rbal~!J.l l and recoriunendations.

54. Portable Radio Equipment.- Owing to sea and surf conditions, some equipment was lost and nuch equip~ent was soaked with salt water. The Army type ultra portable (SCR 511) set was put entirely out of comnission by salt water and could not be ade­ quately protected while in use. The SCR 284, when properly water­ proofed for the trip to the beach, was successfully used after landing. However, recurrent troubles were experienced due to shorting of the power cable. The navy r.1odel TBX proved to be the most reliable equipment. 55. Training.- Althought personnel taking part in this operation were, in general, not adequately trained, the communi­ cations provided sufficed. Such cor.ununications would not have been adequate in an assault against a strong, alert, and determined enemy. In this connection, the need of permanently assigning troops to Amphibious forces for protracted training in specialized assault operations is indicated. PHYCHOLOGICAL WARF.ARE 56. There is little doubt that in certain situations phychological warfare ~ay prove to be a potent factor in amphibious operations. Inasmuch as phychological warfare is propaganda, it should be planned and executed only by experts with a thorough knowledge of the religious, social, economic, historical, political and linguistic backgrounds of the country or countries involved. During the planning st~ge of an amphibious operation the Attack Force Comr1ander should be kept cognizant of the phychological mea­ sures suggested for employment, the governmental and Allied agencies involved, and our own government's political and social policies with respect to liberated areas. With this information as a back­ ground, the Attack Force Commander should be the one to decide whether phychological warfare will or will not be em.ployed, inasmuch as he is responsible for the success or failure of the military plan. 'Only under for amphibious operations, by a broadcasting unit FE25/.Al6-.3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET .Al-IPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942. · Subject:

in a vessel of the Attack Force. The question of the existence of special circumstances should he made a matter of serious study in connection with each operation. The TORCH Operation presented the first opportunity for such an experiment in the United States Navy. Its use could be of value only in a situation peculiar to this particular operation, where there were many dissidents in the civilian and military groups of the enemy. In an attack against definitely and completely antagonistic opponents its operation manifestly would have little value, and might well be dangerous to one's own force. GENERAL COHMENTS AND RECOMHEHDATIONS

58. Headguarters Ship.- No shi p of t :-~ e We s tern Naval Task Force was suited to be a headquarters ship due to the small space alloted to communication equipment and personnel. In order to enable the flagship AUGUSTA to handle t he United States, British and Army channels of communicati on, two temporary coding rooms and one temporary radio roon had to be set up in addition to the ship's permanent three radio rooms and one coding room. Additional equipment was installed in . every available foot of space to such an extent that difficulties wer e anticipated due to antennae being crowded together. The TORCH Operation clearly deaonstrated that a headquarters ship with adequate conm1unicati on facilities is essential to amphibious operations. Furthermore, if possible in an operation of this nature, there should be a relief headquarters ship with duplicate equipment. Provision should be made in a headquarter~ . ship for members of all staff sections to view the miniature picture of the operation in all its aspects. 59. Aerological Unit.- An aerological unit, trained and equipped for forecasting, is ess ential for amphibious operations. This unit should be embarked in the flagship so that the co:r.uuander may have personal access to the aerological officer and to the analysed weather maps. Such a unit may be conveniently organized as part of the intelligence section in a gen eral staff organization. -20­

- .­

UNITED STATES 1..TLjJ'JTIC FLEET .AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Seria l: 00299 - (...A..dministra tive Cornnand) Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942. ., . Subject: and recommendations •

60. Weather Forecasts.- As a result of actual ex­ perience in the TORCH Operation it was clearly demonstrated that a highly trained and well equipped aerolog ical unit accompanying an overseas expedition is in a better position to give more accurate weather forecasts than units far removed from the scene. Fore ­ casts received from the \-:ar Department and Gibraltar were i,.velcome, but it would have been unfortunate if full reliance lw d been placed on their accuracy. Using all avbilable aerolog ical information, including synoptic reports c~nd pilot balloon soundings, the Force Aerological Officer was able to issue weather forecasts that were exceeding ly accurate. 61. Aerial Photography. - Many ph ot ographs were t aken during the action which, after photo interpr eta tion , we re useful in planning succeeding flights of planes . Grea ter pr ovision of photographic equipment to ships :must be riiade in order t.l:w.t this arm can be more extensively used. With t he l a test e quipment, air photographs taken during action can be flown directly to the llead­ ~ uarters ship, dropped on board, speedily developed and made avail­ able for photographic i nterpretation in time to permit a task force commonder to not e the progress of t he a ction and to nake suitable changes in the disposition of his f orces. In this con~ nection, a well equipoed photograph laboratory is h i ghly e ssentia l in a headquarters ship .

62~ Value Of The ACV As A Carrier.- ACV's ar e va luable additions to the fl ~ et a t thi s critical time when every effort is being ruade to augr1ent t h e nur:iber of carriers available . They can handle a potent e ir group and can opera te under most weat her con­ ditions. Their speed is insufficient, but t~e f a ct that they are independent of fuel worries is a great asset i n this wa r of long distances. These carriers fuel destroyers successfully and they can fuel cruisers under f avorable s ea condi t i ons . 63. Plane Complement For ACV.- Tlle c 01i1binat ion of 9 TBF-1 and 29 F4F-4 pl an es f or the mission r e quired of t his type of vessel ·is satisfactory in t hat it permits flexibility of deck

-21­ FE25/Al6-J UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (.Administrative Command)

J , ··Subject: TORCH Op eration, ------spotting and plane handling. However, it is believed that a comple­ ment of 15-18 TBF-1 and 16-18 F4F-4 planes presents a very work­ able air group that will have the advantage of greater striking power. It will enable the air group to maintain a combat air patrol over the carrier and at the same time provide a fighter escort for the striking group. 64t Plane Op eration On ACV's.- It is r e commended t hat aircraft carried o·n the ex-oiler type of ca:r· rier be operated in waves so that after the first take-off all aircraft will not r e­ turn from missions at the same time. ri'he reasons for t L. is are that the elevator is slow and the amount of parking space inf ront of the barrier is small. Th erefore it takes appreciably longer to land a large number of planes on this type of carri er than it does on . a large carrier. The operation of the VSB ( s:.::.:i ) t ype of air­ plane on an ACV is not recomraended due to difficu ltie s encountered in plane handling. 65. Fueling At Sea From ACV's.- The fueling of ships, and in particular destroyers, from this type of vessel in a smooth sea is practicable but r equires · careful station keeping du e to the overhang of the flight .deck end walk-ways. In a rough sea, however, when there is appre ciable motion, there is considerable hazard, and fueling operations under these circumstances should be conducted only when conditions are urgent.

66. Control Of The Air.~ It is hardly necessary to emphasize that control of the air is a prerequisite to any landing operation, and that no such operation should be atterapted without the assuranc e that our own air force is strong enough- to gain early control of the air. 67. Recognition Of Own Aircraft.- Recognition of own and friendly aircraft continues to be a major pr oblem for air lo..o.kouts and anti-aircraft gunner y p ersonnel. Several instances occurred in which own or friendly aircra ft we re f ired upon by our own forces, due primarily to failure of planes to approach own forces from t he proper sectors and use r ecognit ion signals, and :B°E2?/AJ_6-J UNITED STATLS ATL.t\l'JTIC FLEET 1.J,:PHI BIOUS ::T ORCE Serial: 00299 (Administra tive C0Ill.[1a nd) Nava l Operat ing Base, Norfolk, Virginia , ·: ernber 22 , 1942.

..J I' Subject: TORCH Op ~~ :i~~...£9r~ i tn .....~ .mme ndations. difficulty in identifying plane s under condition of poor visibility .

68. S creenin~ Destroyers.- Destroyers r equire experience and indoctrination in order to screen carriers effective ly. Durin6 high speed, a ctive o ,..., era tion, destroyers must keep submarine s down by vigorous maneuverint:, and punitive action, but the y should not leave their screening stations ~or any considera ble l engt h of time in order to hunt and follow up contacts. They shou ld be deployed as continuously a s poss ible across t he carrier' s van. Lookouts are just as essential as t hey ever we r e . Sound equipr;J.e nt cannot be depended upon ~ h e n d ~ stroyers ar e screening c~~ ~ t a n t ships a t high speed.

69. I:Jeutra lization of L n er~ Bat t ·J :r i e E: ~) ur i n g Da r kness.-. Effective neutrCJ. lization of i:; neny shoru b u t te;1~ f;;-z,- - b y shi ps' gunfire alone durine; darlme ss cannot be entire ly r e l i ed upon. Sholl bursts cannot be s een c.ind consequently s potting i s ili1p oss i bl e . It is con­ sidered that a deter mined enemy with mode r11 batterie s und !'ire con­ trol e quipment could e f f e ctively pr event u ni ght l und ing in spite of strong naval gunfire support. Us e of fla r e s and night bonbing of eneray shore batterie s by a ircrc.t ft f!l i t_; ht be the s olution to this problen. 70. Accumulation Of Non-Essential Infl amrimble s. - Ho. unnecessary inflaLlm.ablo materia l should be a llowe d to accumulate . Some difficulty was experienced in ke epinb down t he amount of burn­ able raateria l, even with trash burner s con tinually in oper a tion. In son e ins tances exces s trC:i s h ha d to be we tted down, compressed in burla p bags, vrn i ghted and thrown overbobr d at n i c:; ht. Be fore proceeding on an oversea s oper a tion ever y effort should be made to dispose of l etters, cardboard boxes and papers s towed i n n en's lockers, c.illd all exce s s inflammable conta iners. Only 8 minin um number of s\mbs and brooms 2.hould be allowed to r ems. i n in rae ssing and living spaces to a llovJ trash , v:h ich invariable a ccumulate s during any main batter y f irinc , t o ·be colle ct ed and disposed of during lulls of the 0ngagenent. AP ' s C:.l lld Af:' s should have garbage grinders installed so t ha t r efuse may be burned in incinerators.

\,• ' l~~ ..­ -23­ . f , . ' kL \ I. ' . 1 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEHWf • ' - i l..J _~ . FE25/AJ.6-3 AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Vii._,,,, IU (Administrative Command) Serial: 00299 Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virsinia, December 22, 1942.

Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recommendations. ------71. Disposition of Essential Inflammables.- Heavy clothinc, when not needed, should be struck below the water line. All loose clothin::; and other s.::i.nll burnable materials should be stowed in metal drawers and lockers. All crews and . chief petty officQrs' mattresses should be removed from bunks and stacked in the c ~ter of livine spaces to enable fire 9arties to fie ht fires from two or more sides. All canvas covers except eun covers should be struck below the waterline. ?2. Vent Ducts and Covers.- Light metal vent covers '.!ill not stand up durine· action.. They soon '.:L rp out of shape or are blown off altogether, allowing the effect of r:un blast to be transferred to the licht metal ducts which soon blov1 out. Either ra.o:re rur,;_,e d covers should be ir.stalled or vent ducts should be made of heavier material.

73. Light MetaJ. Doors.- On the n.:dn deal~ r_; nd ::ibove, J.ight metal doors ar'e apt .to c'arry away duo to heavy t;un blasts in action. On the'~1ASSACHUSETTS thirteen of twenty-five such doors carried away, r. ermittin0 the full blast of turrets to enter the surroundinc structure and damaee light metal bulkheads. These doors should be made of heavier material and the quick closing mechanisms should be sturdier. ?4. Ventilation.- The ship's ventilation problem in battle is a serious one. Air replenishment schedules should be drawn up so that shots of fresh air can be given speedily during lulls in action.

?5. Drinkinp; W,: ter.- Althouc;h v~rious t:-,rpo s of c.rinl:ing ' .'later cont.:lir..ers 'Here i.r:lprovised on board ship for ~1 se durine; action., .. .nore benefit was obtained by lo,"1vinG fresh '.' l ~ tor turned on for drink­ inc :purposes than by turning it off for protection. Ordinarily the fresh water cut-off system is a simple one and can be taken care of during an ene,ac ement if necessary.

-24­ ~ FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEE'l1 .AMPHIBIOUS FORCE l I I • • ( Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command~ · Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942

Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recoE1mendations. ------76. Wetting Down.- Just prior to general quarters all wooden decks, fenders, manila lines and other inflarnLlable material on the topside should be thoroughly wetted down. During each lull in action this wetting down process should be repeated. 77. Naval Component For Engineer Regiment (Shore)•­ Experience in the TORCH Operation has confirmed the extreme im­ portance of having a permanent naval component for each engineer regiment (shore}. The work of these forces requires an intimacy between the two services concerned which can only be obtained by having a single permanent organization, living together, eating together and working together.

78. Equipment Of .Assault Troops.- Ar~y and Navy per­ sonnel assigned to assault waves were overburdened with equipment which induced fatigue and increased risk of drowning. ~he solu­ tion to this problem is the establishment of lightly equipped amphibious assault "Connnando" units. This matter has been con­ sidered in separate correspondence. 79. Staff Medidal Officers.- For better coordination of effort, Arny and Navy staff medical officers should be embarked in the same vessel, preferably the headquarters ship, enroute to the theatre of operations. 80. Medical Officers Assigned To Beach Parties.- Training of medical officers assigned to beach parties should emphasize the importance of maintaining liaison with adjacent beach party medical sections and with the nearest .Army medical activity. 81. Casualty Heports.- Complete mimeographed instructions in regard to filling out casualty reports were issued prior to sail­ ing, but after the attack these instructions were in many cases not fully complied with. In any future operation, mimeographed form reports requiring only completion an rding, will be i fl8Ued • • l

FE25/Al6-) UNITED STATES A'l~LA!TTIC FLEET AMI)HIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Naval Op erating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, De cember 22, 1942 •

.1 · 'Subject: TORCH Ope ration, comments

82. Infra-red Light.- The use of tho infra-red light proved valuable, but not completely effective. The infra-rod glass filter should be used, as polarized papEJr is 1.:ins il. tisfactory. For best results in any situation requirin~ the emp loyr!lent of this light, full consideration should be given to such factors as horizontal and vertical arc of light beam, weight, spact:i, povrn r, portability and watertightness. 83. Infra-red Scope.- The infra-red scope proved fairly effe ctive, but in its present forra it takes the oper ator n any hours to learn how to use it efficiently. Lver y e ffort should be made to develop a telescope th: t will produce a dire ct i mage . 84. Us e s Of The Infra-re d Light. - v:hen a conpletely satisfactory infra-red light has been produced, and personnel have been trained in its use and the use of tho infra-red scope , uany advantages will accrue . Such lichts nay take the place of screened speed lights on transports nnd ships' range lights in convoy, They may be used by assault destroyers l e ading boat waves toward the line of departure , a s beach rJ.arlrnrs, and e specially as homing guides between landing boats and thoir transports. 85. Clothing und Ship's Stores. - Ships of all typos taking part in amphibious operations must be prepared to ma}~e large issues of clothing , fresh und dry provisions, and ship's store stock to several activities upon little or no udv8nce notice. It is r ecomme nded that the amount of gene ral store s carried upon s etting out on such an operation be r educed to a two or throe months' stock based upon previous issubs, and that the additional· space so gained be utilized to carry as muc h dry provisions, cloth­ ing and ship's store stock as can be put aboard. In this connection, toilet paper and soap are extreme ly i mp ortant, as are cooking utensils. 86. Loading of Store s.- Loading of all storEJ s should bu done is such a manner that a major caliber sholl hit in any part of the ship ·w ill not wipe out the entire supply of any one i tern. ·

-26­ FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLJ.,.!JTIC FLEET AKPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, December 22, 1942. ..Subject: TORCH Operation, comme

This of course means a departure f'rohl the usual stowage practice. All stowage should be low c.nd tight, with concentration of \'~eights near the keel, E:t.nd even distribution of load. Damage control fittings should be kept clear for working. Sacked stores, 1:1uch as coffee, beans and rice, should be in readily accessible loca­ tions as they .may be of grec...t value in bulwarking to prevent the spread of water in the ship. 87. Profile Of The Coastline.- If conditions are favorable, the use of a submarine or c.tn airplane to obtain a pro­ file o:f the coastline of the landing area ·weeks prior to the attack is recor:l!.1ended. From the resulta11 t pictures the proper personnel can study an accurate silhouette of the coa stline as it will actually appear directly from seawa rd. Such photographs, properly identified as to beaches a.11d proninent l a ndmarks, will be valuable uids in l c:. nding oper c ~ tions. 88. Surprise.- The slowness of French ships in leaving port would seem to indicate that they were taken by surprise by our forces, and tha.t either full crews were riot on board or steam was not up. Many city lights and even navigational lights were OI.l prior to the attack. 89. La.nding Fields Ashore.- Vfuen CV's and especially A. CV's, are used to support l anding operations, every effort should be made to secure landing fields near the beachhead. The follov.ing advantages will accrue:

(a) Planes nre i nr:iediately avctilable for duty.

(b) Reports of reconnaissance can be D~ de orally direct to interested Rr my personnel.

( c) Coruba t patrol over the l&nding area reI!lb.ins longer on station.

( d) Opera~··0+11:3 .are unhaa pere ',Ju such f&ctors as light vv inds, diff ·. 1 ~ .11 .in locat i ug, ~ !!Fi! ·. r, c.t nd tiu e lost 1 1 ill flying to C:J. nd fro , ~~:=:,!. ·~ , · .. _'.. ~lalJ

-27-:­ • J

UNITED S~TES ATL ANTIC FLEET FE25/Al6-3 AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (Administrative Command) Serial: 00299 Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, · December 22, 1942.

$ubject: TORCH Operation, comments ., .. _ .. _ ------·------~ ------­ 90. Transmission of this letter by registered mail Within the continental limits of the United Sta~~ess aut~~i~~· If/; . . -' L l {/f H. K. '/ITT

Copies to: ComCarriers Com.Battleships ComCruDi v 7 ComCruDiv 8 Co.mTr ansports Chief of Combined Operations.

-28 ./' J:" E:' ,( 2.) 11 1 / SP~·ia.1: 0124/ I

;Ju':J ;l1"'.! ct: rJn. m3.ry of First Conclusions on Amp hibfous Aspects of TOitCH ·-! . Plann1ne . W To comply with secrecy requ1.rements, it is necessary for the task forc0 hori.d qnart ers to do deta5_led pla nning for subordinate units. (b) Planning is necessarily in very great det,ail. (c) Frequent joint conferences duri.n[s the planning phase are essential to proper plannir'1g, (d) Joint planning of Arrrry and Navy Ta sk Forces s:1ouJ.d 1)egin as so~n a s possible~ (e) Final joint conferences of commanders and staffs, to :LncJ.ude those of gimfiro support vessels and of infan-try battalions, ::i.s imperative for proper coordination.

~. I&ad;i"'n,g (a) I.oa.dinG of .ships can only be done properly by tho uce of previonsly trained Tra.nspq-rt Quartermasters. (b) Each Arm~r ~~ask Group should util:i.ze a senior officer, prefern.'r:ily a general Qfficer, as Senior Trn.nsport Quartermaster. In the one group in vrhich it was done, the l oading and m1loacl1.ng of transports \"las r,:reatJ.7 -- facilite.ted. r.: LC"') ~1.lliM ', ~ J Thoro11gh el~mentary amphib~.ou.s tr 11~ . 11J.ng is required for t:?oops, boats' _ crows, o.nd transport crows. Training should he progressive , wit h freq11.m1~ tests to c'l etBrminc its effectiveness. Initially t his tra:i.ning shoul d bo cona.uctod in quiet water only, to a ccustom personnel tl!l equipment and t~ ea ch o·r,'·18r. Tho i-:>ulk of tho el.emcnto.ry training should be conduct.Gd :i.n rouc;h 1·n1 t or wit h modoro.to or strong surf. ,Toj,nt training, including at least two droos rohoo.rsa ls compl et e F:i.t ll aircraft :.md siJrfaco combo.tant ships, is essent ial to success with mini­ mum costs a gainst a strong o..nd ctotorm:tnod enemy . (c) En route, train:t!lg of all individuals should ho constant nnd under rcmlistic concl.itions. Pl astic mor1.ols shoulo be used on onch sh5_p to fµmili m:~ :i.z o Zi.CJ1:1l mun with his part :t.n tho opor~.tfon . Movement of 18.nd­ ing porsm::nol to boat stations should 0o conducted night 1 ~r .

· ~l.tlo ll§ Lj_r;htly -oqnippcd, spocfo.lly-tro.:i.nod amphibious l:isso.ult troops ar c best ·.do.ptcd to tho ~nitial requireme nts of a l ending opor v. tion . As noyr 1uj.ppcd, I11fo..ntry troops aro too l:-101:\v.iQ~ .') r donod f or t ho nssr.ult• .val gunfire in support of tho ltmd:i..~ ~;op ' o.tion hns proved 5.ts worth. 1 Losost coo rdJnq, ~ion , i;:d th 'nss;;tu1t t;r.9 0,p"' · no cos r-~n r y to ensure tho no::Jt '"'f( o-c t. J. v..-.: r ostL1 +,,s' . -Th'J.s - coor. dJ.n-. u·' t.ion cnn b o f nci ·.1. l. t r..t OL~-. by conf · oron cos. r

: ".... 1 • 4 I -:­ prior to sailing , at whi ' ~nt,l 4[\~i' ~~1··~mp· ,. er officers of gunfire support vessels can ~ i /JIU@] ~E)# . , manders and their stafr s, I {c) The effj_cacy of numerous small aircraft carriers upporting a land­ ing 0pe·.·:\tion under the conditions of Torch has been clRarly demon ­ 3tr:1terJ. Perhaps no other element contrj.buted so greA. +ly t o the 8UC CA s s of Operation TORCH. (d) Comm unication failures may well be disastro1 1s if a ma jor foe oppn~ es. The u::rn of specially d esigned h~ad quarters ships a s flagsM.ps i s clearly i ndicated, ( e) It C.'\!'11ot be t ak en for granted t hn.t COJJ'IJnanders 1d1l keep 'b i gher r ead­ quart P;r s informed of the situa tiori . Fail11rA of troop-unit comrnn.noe r ~ to do so may well r esult in serious consequences. Snecir>.l l i:;t:i_son gr oup s E"·. r o r eclu.i.red, to go a f t er informa tion Hno to ol:'itain :i.t. (f) (1) Fi:ri. l ure of troops to act a ggressively, failurP. of trocm s on t h e 1JC' :. ch to r en. ct promptly to hostile air att ac1c, f ail11r e of Bert el" :llld Shor e Parti es to orgnnlze promntl;v the orderl? l"ovr-mn nt o!' supplies to planned dumps, cnn all 'be attributed in l qr gA part t o f ailures of small-1mit l eadership. J1m:i.o:r off icers shonlci he tra iner to exer ci s e i nitiat ive a :riri ensu:rA t'bat t hej r men no wr .r:i.t t!-!oy h ::cve been t rained to ri o, and th!"l.t t h('ly do it a.t t r A r i g'b t tine and pl 11 ce . ( 2) Ar.: phibious opo:rntions v.rill frRquently be conc1 11 ctnri w1. t 'b troops i no x~xi r i r:i n c c d i n battle. Unl ess exception:ll] y wr;l l Jeri , sti ch troops ::'.r r: i :i.itially b0wildnr ed, nnr wiJl r P.mrdn confus0a until l ;:;ndors o. ct aggre ssively. The u s o of' scout bont s a s outHri eri in A.rn pl'd. l1ious Foren Instruct ions ~) rov e'' to be sound proceci.urc for ol;tri,ining inform'l.t i on rm ri f or gu:i r'l i ng l ~rna 1 nG era.f t nnd supporti ng t h o:i.r oper .'1 Hons .

5. Sur·• b 4 W Th ,., Shor.0- Pnrt;r r egimcnt::il orgA.nizntion, fl S cover nd i n Str:mning Opernt­ i ng Proci:>dure , Amphi bious Force , has provr d sounci . Wr r.n t r oop comrrn nd­ or s rn :1t or in.lly modifi ed t hat oTgci.nizntion, difficul t i cs r 13 rml t'"'d . (b ) F,.,r t h.; compl ot o o.nd t i mely unlon.d i ne of' t r ri.nsports ~rH, h out th,,. use of h l" rbor o.nd dock f o. ci1ities, a t hr ee-ba ttalion Shor r: Pn.,..ty r egi ment in support of 011 ch i !lfantry divi sion js ess ential. ( c) V.h <1r 0 t h 1:i numh::ir of cargo vehic1':1s ( 2!-ton trucks ) wn.s r 0dnc;x'l below t h 0 11w .~unt indicated by Standing Op era. ting Procedure , Amphihi ous For ce , cone ·i sti on on t.h r·· bo"'.Ch ·3 S r e sult 0d. ( J. ) Suf f i c1 ont trninod winchmen .!3.re r equired to pormit continuou s oper aUon j n shifts. (o) F".ch ho ..,.t cnr ryi ng supplie s a shor e shoulo cnrry only nno class of sPppl :r ·".nd one i t om on ~n r. h trip , t o facil itat e proper sort5ng ashor e . ·· (f ) VJh cn c:ppropr i nt e , Shore Party r egi ments shoul d hnv8 pror cr equi pmont f or i ni ti ~l unlo ri.di ng nt ports soi zc-, a e11rly i n tho opr::,..n.tion. ( g) _Shore Pnr ty comma nder s are expe cted to utilize , wh en ne cessar y , t ho s orvi ~ r" s of all. p ersonnel on t h0 , 1J'rob o numbe:r s of enlist ed spectators w11.t c i1n& Shor.0 Pa ·· .Vidt ,. tril"'cmtn_ l to mo r al e . 1 ,.' . ~' ' L,;, ":'go ".liz::. tion 1)° Th e per manent 11s si gnmont to the Am phibious Force of lig'btly- eqtLi. pned , sp c cj.nlly-trnined mnphibious ri.ssnul t troops Forco 5.s cs snntiftl, if \ succocding onnr rttions ar e to ho fil1dorta 1ren without lon~ r;:J,:urs for t rai ning now unit s . Such troops s o d b ,• w'ff;P.d'!"..awn wi Mi n"vnl

- 2 ­ r

olomi:::nts from '1.nr1 pr·"'p'l.rod for tho next t o. sk. ( b) For si.miJ. c.r r ·:: o.sons, ~. ss ic ,,-d to th(; Amphibious Amnhibious Forc0 will: (1) Grc.'\tly docr..:J ns·::-, th0 timo for prr,pnration '1.nd tr'lining needad between successive operntions. (2) Grrn tJ.y incro.'\se the offoctivonnss of execution of sucr.oedlng opcrntions by utilizing personnel n.nd units s on sonn(l by p'l.rticipn­ tion in the preceding one s.

/ ( I ·.. ~· ,., ·... . t . D:" -:;-t; r:ibuti.on:

CominCh (2) C:i ncLnnt ( 2) ~· FD WD GS (2) ~ - 3 :.:iGS (2) :c i!GF (2) Engr Amphi bi '.".n Comm.'..l.nd, Crimp Edwn.rds (2) E· igr Amphibir. n Commnnd , G:·. rr" r) ollo , Fln.. (2) i! ~' v::.l \r!rt:r. Collogo, l!.:J '.tport, U. I. (2) Comm':nd (, GcJ..;.;rcl St a.ff School , Ft. Lo'.".v ornrnrth, l\.".'..ns .'1.s ( 2) Corr Ar·.phF'orp·' c (2) Co rn A.l' phForSoprlc (2) CornP.mphForMf;rl (2) Cin cp -·. c (2) CG Ii-5 th Div (20) For distribution to include n.ttn.ched units, C« i;r~;; • )U\"'/C Sp .'1.C ( 2) 1 '.) /,uth Engr Ro gt (4) '.:0111 1.'ng Gen (20) Ccrr, '1 ranspo:cto (10) ·~al! L'mding Craft Group (5) .:.: r; Ar 1 1or ·-~ d Forco , Ft. Knox, Ky . (2) 8: .• :;t nff of f icJr AFAF (1)

- 3 ­ Filo I1o. FE25/Pll

Sorinl: 0140 February 8, 1943 . Classification changed to RES'l'JUCTED • 8 AU'G 19 44

by authority cf AC of S, U-~, WDGS .,, , NO. 3 - 43 ) by~L~- - ~~ ~ f. Subject: Specific Tactical Lessons Derived from Operation TORCH in FRENCH WEST MOROCCO,

I, The following specific tactical lessons have been derived from the subject operation:

1. WEAPONS -- §;. Pestroyer:: raider tr9ops -- The SAFI and LYAUTEY operations demonstrated the value of raider troops in destroyers to seize lightly defended harbors or perform similar missions. :Q. Bayonet - - The bayonet wa s an effective weapon, especially at MEHDIA.

Q. AutomatiC....£1...r!!!§ -- The Thompson suhmnchine gun, Garand rifle, and other automatic arms tended to clog with sand. Immersion in saJ.t water adversely affected the functionin ~ of automatic weapons. The submachine - gun magazine adversely affects firing from the prone position.

d. An~iai_r_crfl.ft.. p,uns Caliber - .50 machine guns gave good results against low-flying planes.

Q. }'anks ..: - Er..rly landing of tanks was a feature of first impor­ tance at SAFI to delay enemy reserves, and at r11EHDIA to protect the right flank.

f, Solf-propelleg 105-mm howitzer - - The self-propelled 105-r.i:n howitzer proved a formidable weapon at ME HDIA. Even when it was unable to fire, its presence produced a moral effect. It r equires protection against hand grenades for close work.

g. E:_ockct guns -- The Army rocket gun was reported particul n rJ~,r offoctivo at MEHDIA ago.inst tanks and in tho final assault on KASB.ll.. Tho No.vy rocket gun for support boats was appo.rontly used on u few occasions, but its effect was undetermined. h· f'Javal (1) ( 2) RABAT against FEDALll.• ( 3) using depth charges ·~ for Naval gunfire (4) ina.l nssuult on

( 5) from MARRAKECH on SAFI. ( 6)

RESTRICTED - 1 ­ !( }I ,.

j.. Arm: 1:1 1 .g;raf't"' r. - f,rtny fighter o.irpl nne s deck• loo.dad on a small carrier wore o i ~ lcf ' a s'H ~ o ns soon ns those wor e seized a nd prepar ed. Fuel, bombs, ammunition, and ~ e . ppli es wor e l a nded from ships for tho l ogisti cs support of these planes. At ME HDIA 8. chc..rtorod mercha nt ves sel with a U. S. Nava l Armed Guard pr ocoodod upriver as soon ns pr a ct.icr.blo to l and such supplies a t PORT LYAUTEY airport.

l· Ro -co~dition~pg weapons --Syst cmntic r e-conditioning is called for, on tho spot, to uso o.bnndonod or rn£Llfunctioning wor:tpons on or ncc.r tho boa.chc s. This · ~m s demonstra t ed both nt FEDf.LA o. nd MEHDIA.

2. LOCJ.L DEFENSE OF BEACifilS -- a. ~L shor9-pnrty_qpgincors nnd _}2y.....bcach pnrtios -- (1) At SAFI, Shoro-Pn;ty '.llf ork wa s dol o.yed by f a ilure of Bench Partie s o.nd Shoro-Pa.rty onginoors to ma.kc a limit od loco. l offens ive to clear out snipers. Shore Parties (including Boa. ch Partie s) need sufficfont infantry tra ining for this purpose. They co.nnot r e l y wholly on friendly info.ntry . (2) North of FED.ALA on D plus 2 d.ny, Shore Po.rtios r einforced by boo.ts' crews wo re put i n locnl r e serve for t ho 30th Infantry nt the time of tho onomy t a nk attack. Engineers, Bench Pc.rtios, and boo.t s ' crows organized the ground, r econditioned boo.t guns (cc.l. .30 a nd .50), Gnr cmds, o.. nd Thompson submachine guns. Ther o was difficulty in r o•oonditioning 37-mm guns. ( 3) J.t MEHDIA, t a nk counter-attacks ri.ga i nst tho right fla nk nnd o. strong countcr-o.ttnck a long the bea ch aga inst the l oft f l o. nk omphnsizod tho need for ndoqua.tc locnl def ense of boo.ch-flanks. Equi pping Shore Partie s with 37-mm guns cmd cal. • 50 mo.chino guns for o.ntit nnk o.nd r. ntio. ircr2.ft def once proved sound. It o.lso proved sound to o..fford Boa.ch Partie s mr..rkmnnship train­ ing with pistols, rifle s, o. nd co.l. • 50 mo.chino guns.

Q. Intronching of Shore Parties - - Intronch­ ing is necessary for protection of Shore Partie s ago.inst o.vio. tion

£.• Antio.ircrnft def ense of bcnchQ..g -­ Early o.ntinircrnft def ense of the benche s wn s indica t ed as n subje ct which deserves specia l o.ttontion.

3. INTRENCHING - - While troops and Bench Po.rtios previously untrained nnd unpra cticed in intrcnching will intronch r apidly under firo , they do not intrcnch properly. Trenche s a re not properly dug nor properly sited. Ther e is a t endency towc.rd era -rding. Fields of fire a.re not vm ll sel ected.

4. LOCAL PROTECTION AGA I NST RI.IDS l'.I® PJ.TROLS -- Troops wor e not nlvmys sufficiently o. l ert ago.inst incursions by hostile rn.idor s o.. nd ground scouts. At FEDJ.LA, o.n outgunrd s l ept pcacef u1ly 1;1ith one sentry post ed noll to the front. Irrcgul c.r enemy troops knovm ns 11 Ghoums 11 vmr c in the c..r eo. , c.nd proved adopt a t stealthy o.ppronche s c. nd sudden o.. ttncks_. 1. ~ up of t nonty of those irregulars spotted the America n outguo.rd before do..rk c.. ntl crnnl ed t wo mile s on their bellie s to ~l tt o.. c k it. Tho outgunrd nc.s rushed during the night, nnd sevor o. l sleeping men ner e J;rnifed. ki.tor, n U. S. pntrol ca.pturcd tho entire enemy group.

- 2 ­ 5. SPEED_OF ACJ• . -. a.. .Thor.o wns.. n d.· ofini·to tondoncy of troops, without previous nc ..;·: f.:ra·. ~ ~ ct slovrly c..nd hosito.ntly in corto.in j_nstnnco · , · '. - . t-iilf. , s om destroyers rm s not 1 o..s r apid ns plnnnod. . ·· , ~t1 ' ~'- • • :. ·ut off from its propo.rod bench positions and panned in its~lli!r.3 s m roly contv.incd therein for some time until tho loca l Ta sk Force Commnndor, on soeinG tho situa­ tion, promptly force d surrondor by firing n shell into tho buildings•

.Q. By contro.st, thoro wn s much r apid nnd successful o. ction on tho pnrt of individuo.ls. At. FEDAill., tho Command­ ing Gonornl, Services of Supply, for Tho (Army) Wostorn Task Force l nndod in tho first rmvo ns a n obsorver,in ardor to gain first-hand informo.tion of tho c. ction. Ono member of tho Army Tnsk Force Sta.ff l o.ndod oo.rly from e>. boat ;7r ocked by enemy shelling, swcn o.nd rrc.dod nshoro, nssistod in giving first a.id to o. bo.dl~,r wounded coxsrmin, o.nd, ho..ving lost ull M.s offocts except clothing, obtained 1700.pons, o. nd ont or od tho torm to round up tho Gorm::m !.rmistico Commission n.nd find spo.co for tho Force Commnnd Post. Another member of this st.'1ff nns i-,rruckod on rocks in l o.nding rrith £1 ssnult troops, obtninod .n.nothor cnr, o.nd rode through tho lines t o Cl.SJ. BIJ..NCA on n diplomntic nission for tho Force Commc.ndor. On return, obsorvin:_:; thr·.t o.n ntt.'.'.ck rr<'.s c1osing on FEDLLA PORT, ho organized it quickly rrith info.ntry nnd a. platoon of tc.nks, c.nd rode on top of o. t o.nk in tho nssnult,in ardor to give groo.tor confidence to tho younr; troops. 1..ccompnnfod by other officers, ho mndo n second trip to CASA BIJ~NCA (and roturnod) in tho afternoon of tho SL.mo do.y.

6. HOUR OF IJ.NDING OF HIGHER QQLW:'!!JJDERS -- Those incidonts omphu.sizo tho importnnco of nn oerly lo.nding of higher commo.ndors or of their ropro­ sonto.tivos to control critical phc.. sos of tho o.ction, This is tho more important 1·1ith inoxporicncod troops o.nd c:.e~o. inst strong r o;:;istr.nco. The possibility of oo.rly intervention of onomy roinforcomo nts, ns o.t SJ.FI, is also n fo.ctor.

7. PERSONAL LEJ.DJ~RSHIP MID MORJ~LE -- Q. :... In hot £lighting, ouch ns occurred o.t ME HDI!.., tho f o. ctor of porsonc:.1 l oo.dorship still hr:.s its old domino.nee. Hore, during tho crisis, ovory rwo. ilc~blo soldier c.nd s o.. ilor w1:ts put into tho c. ction nshoro . Tho Commo.nding Gonor o. l ::.nd Sb.ff po..rticipatod pcrsonn.lly. Tho final o.sso.ult ngQinst tho Kf'..SBA ho.d touches of "Bco.u Gosto", tho nttnck omployinc; tho nost modern non.pons ngninst o. 1918 onomy do fending n vir.1lod fort. Notr!ithsto.ndinc; t ho f r. ct th"... t tho o.tto..ckor disposed of n hi[;hly E1o chnnizcd t r.sk force (reinforced infa ntry r cgir:10nt 1·rith light t o..nks, solf-propollod 105-mm ho ~7 itz o rs, o.nd other pouorful nrms), tho older woe.pons wore not outmoded, Tho mo.gnzino rifle, uith h..'"'.nd oporo.tod bolt, ·:-muld hnvo boon more cffoctivo tho.. n n.utom.".tic c.r ms clogge d r:ith s:i.nd. The Fort rms fino.lly co.pturod by o. conbinc.tion of divo-bonbing D.nd bo.yonct nssnult.

b. ·-:ns under such condi­ tions thn t tho spirit of unity: dovolopod r;st 1, ~. odl y , not only 11i thin tho Army units, but 1t;ithin for.c , 'n· 1 ding tho nc.vo.1 person­ nel nhich fought r. lor~~l'

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$. . . STRAGGL~NG if*NP TRAFFICf¢o~GL r- -:0~ The disbipline of an orgo.n­ i~ a tion vm s evidenced; o.S alW?J.M~ ' '· PY' the . prB"~erwe or absence of strnggling. An o.dequa.te est" Jz>!i~en't of nild.tc.t1~fi 0 is nn inpor.. to.nt consideration. This also ho.s~'n 4 hea~1.hg on ;l'..r-i!ffic c ntro1.

9. LOADING LANDING CR!.FT - - ConMent vro.s renerm d on the importnnco of loading at the ro.il, to: .9:. Obviate circling while wc.. iting to proceed to tho (boat) line of departure. £. Reduce the time-interval in the transport urea. £. Require less training of troops, by reducing use of l and .. ing nets.

10. ARHOR FOR LANDING CRJ.FT -- The inportance of nrmor for landing craft was noted not only to protect them against effects of fire, but also to strengthen boo.ts nnd thus reduce bont losses· on bcgches and rocks.

11. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION -- Grea.tcr simplicity wo. s indicated for Signal Operation Instructions. In so~o instances it was also noted tho.t the enemy used identical pyrotechnics, cnusing confusion.

12. VEHICLE-Ui.:NDING CRAFT -- The shortage of LCM empho.sixod tho need for la.nding era.ft to handle ho2vior vehicles. At MEIIDL\, it vms felt that a ho.lf-dozon LCT (5) nould have "mo.de it a cinch."

13. NIGHT OR DAY LANDINGS -- Night landings still hc.ve the definite advantage of reducing troop losses from onomy fire ashore. At SAFI it was concluded that a strong -air dofonso could definitely hnve defeated o. daylight landing. Night landings, on the other hnnd, require r.mch · bettor training of bo2.ts 1 crews. Such landings, also, subject ships to grontor risk from submarines o.nd, on occasion, fr6n o.ir attn.ck.

14. OBSTACIES -- Except at SAFI, where tho bench was out-flanked, there vmre no prepared defenses nt tho bench. At FT. BLONDIN (FED.ALA) and a.t MEIIDii'. tho vriro ontunglemonts 1;rero successfully breached by vlire-cuttors and Bo.ngalore torpedoes. No undorwo.tor obstnclos vvore encountered. Success in future Ydll co.11 for definite .r.ieo.suros nnd effective training, in order to deal v!ith dofonsos on the boo.ch and with obstacles on its npproo.ches.

15. TANK M1\NEUVERS - - I i ' a f.rrao od Division, renlizntion thn.t the side-armor of tho M5 li~l} ·llic could be penotro.ted by tho enemy 37-rnm gun hnd lad to training to avoid presenting tho sido-nrmor to the enemy. At MEIIDif. there no.s 6. protracted bo.ttlo of t anks ago.inst tanks. Tho enemy light Renaults wo re rea.sonn.bly '.7011 armored, though

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' " !".'.:\. • • . • ~· ·· - •t-1 k~ n . their r:inximur1 speed wn s osti ,~ - ' · 'n~y ,8J~ ..~·f\· Superior numbers of ho stile t o.nks f orced our o.rnor . t . ' n!fcuvq ,. .' -~ .o.lly' to delay. Tho open hi l lsid. cs and vo.lloys wor e sc . ~ 'f.~}jf~: ~:fa. '' , d pitted by crnt ors f ormed by our supporting no.vG.1 gunfi, o4un, iution. Our tank units which had rocoivod tho tro.ining mentioned oid present­ ing side-nrmor t o hostile gunfire) wor e very succe s sful. Tnnk clements not so trQinod ho.d considor nblo losses. Such tra ining c ~ n bo ~ iv o n very effectivel y on tho mo.nouvor ." bgo.rd. This is done in tho Navy, to o. fford tra ining i n t nctic:--.1 mnouvcring of ships. For t .:mks , tro. i ning on tho mo.neuvor boo.rd can bo f ollovred by trnining in tho fiold.

16. TR.11.NSPORT LOADINGS -- ·canrrnndors stat ed thri.t, in sane insto.nces., ships could ho.vo co.rriod incronsod nurabors of personnel o.nd vehicles. · · It vm.s snid tho.t one AK could hnve co.rriod 6 t o 12 nore 2t-ton trucks· of utnos t inport cmco in cloo.rin[{ supplies from tho boo.ch. It wn s ost>i­ nntcd, nlso, that Armor ed Force ships could hnvo cnrriod Moro vehicle s of various typos, including to.nks. Comnttndor AL1phibious Force onphn­ sizo s thQ. t this is tho unit commo.ndor 1 s proscribed r e sponsibility. Vfhor o there is doubt ns to l oo.dings, sufficient vohicks should bo brought to tho docks; those not landed ccm be sent bo..ck or otherwise disposed of.

17. SUBSISTENCE -- Tho K ration vm s very successfully used; tho C ro.tion rm s loss o.pprccio.tod. Mon did not tire of tho K r ation during tho fighting o.nd consolida tion.

18. EV.1'.CUf.TION OF WOUNDED -- Medical personnel f niled, o..t first, t o provide trenches for protection of wotmdod (soo nlso pc.r. 3). HoH­ ovor, o. prc..ctical systorl of trenches wc..s s oon adopted t o ncconodnto litter patients. Troop units cannot o.fford t o depend uholly on ships to nfford hospito.lizl'.tion f or 1-roundod. Transports, ns '7t:'. S tho cnso a.t FEDAI.Ji., · nay ha.vo to novo suddenly fnr out t o son, t o oscnpo subr.m.rino v.ttncks. Troop units under such circul'.lsfo.ncos, nust be propo.rod to provide their 01.m fncilities and, nlso, t o ca.re f or survivors of torpedo nttc,cks o.nd f or cnsuo.ltics previously ovo.cuo.t cc. to ships uho mny be returned t o shore l'.ftor subrrk'l.rino o.tto..cks.

19. .fil:l+Cli DUMPS FOR SUPPLY -- In tho initia l l nndings, bench dumps for supply i:roro frequently not properly or go.nizod. Supplies di<'l. not, until D plus 5 Dny, begin moving into scgr or;~tod dur.1ps, in certain insta.ncos,. It wns observed th.o.t ordno.nco dumps nffordod spocio.l· instnncos of improper disporsnl nnd sorting. Dump r..roo.s \?ore often not ir.1provod. Infantry r or:,; i171cnts c.o not hnvo onouc;h orc;~nie o ... t o hnndlo o.ru:runi­ tion in the initinl stc'"'..gos of c. l c.ndingf"'nor. ~0 1 , ·_ · s hc.vo enough or

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DISTRIBUTION: C. G. RICHAHDSON Cominch (2) Acting Chi ef of Staf f . Cj_nclo.nt (2) AFAF Adn. CoBd . ( 51) Ea. ch Division including ntto. chcC. Corps troops ( {10, Trnnsports (25l Lo.ndi ng era.ft Gr. (25 Tro.ining Center (100 OpDiv, VffiGS (1 G-3, WDGS (1 CG LGF (1 I. Condt. C & GSS (1 Prosdt. NWC (1 CG Second Ar ny (1 Engr Anphibio.n C onn~nd (1 c.o. Co.op Gordon J ohnst on J Co.rrnbollo, Florido. (1) Ch Armd For (1) Comdt. AF School (1) Filo (175)

J. M. BOIT, Flag Secretary ,. ~

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