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. N! ~IDUNCLASSIFIE OPCl(IJTt4N "I ~ . ,,r ~ f(c H,, - 0 ~u.. ~ CJ) (.)~ z :::J . UNCLASSIFIED -- r .,, FE25/Al6•3 Serial: 00299 "· "l • J . .... ·. 1·"· Naval Operating Bad~~ Norfolk, Virgini~ f . li~-;~t1;0-~~;-£-A c-~i s~"G-2~~YDGS- December 22-, · .1;~4 .2 . ,. by From: 0 --an- er~~. -~~te~~~ ~ 1•. ·· .. A ic Fleet. ;/ " \ To Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet • . · ~~ ~, · .. ·~~'- .. Via Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantiq,:t(j\~ :... /~:,~~,·, ,; Fleet. "'·'!;_· . ,, ., ·r · , . t~:' ·'- •1 • :.,. Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recommendatiori*;: ~ · ;'iJ . '- ..... .~!:: . 1. The following repo.rt is derived from a study of tine various o nerations carried out by personnel, individual ships and task groups of the Western Naval Task Force in operation TORCH on November 8-11, 1942, in the PORT LYAUTEY-FEDALA-CASABLANCA-SAFI areas of northwest French Morocco. From the voluminous reports submitted, only the principal matters of interest have been con sidered. All comments and recoomendations a'lJp ear under their proper headings. H.AVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT 2. Material Performance~ -- The 'l10HCH operation served as a severe material test for the heavy arraa1ients of the capital ships engaged. Turret crews wer·e called upon to serve their guns for long periods of actual firing time. '.1.'he perforn ance of turrets . on battleships and heavy cruisers was excellent. ~he few casual ties that occurred were only temporary in nature and were .soon restored. Powder and shell ·supply was fast, and loading crews per formed without casualty. It may be s aid in general that naval gun fire ·delivered by all gunfire supporting ships gave substantial assistance to the land ing forces and aided n aterially in overcoming enemy opposition. ., '1 ' I( r, .. ~) '• .,, , ) .,, ' ~ --- ,,, FE25/A16•3 . UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET ~- ---- A 1 Il'm~ ous FORCE1 Serial! 00299 (Admi~i · ''.~~ ttv~ Cdmtna. n ~.. ~ ··; _ ·,, 1 vu..o~ t·~-' -~.1·. 1) 1 INMf -V:Q;·.. J'@l?~ a 8 D.,. ,, ~se; Norref.l~ 1 ia, - December 22, 19L,2 • .; SubJect:I TORCH Operation, comments and reconunendations. to the capture of the KASBA Fort and the coastal defense guns at MEHDIA might have been avoided by having the early support of naval gunfire on these targets. h. Naval Gunfire Support in the FEDALA-CASABLANCA Area. This consisted largely of silencing ener:iy coastal defense batteries and warding off attacks by French light naval forces against ships in the transport area. The landings on the beaches were supported by gunfire from the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, U.S.S. BROOKLYN, U.S.S. WILKES, u.s.s. SWANSOH and the U.S.S. LUDLOW. In addition there were twelve light support craft in the FEDALA area equipped with barrage rockets, and all landing craft were equipped with machine euns. Shortly after the first assault wave had landed on the beaches, and just as day was breaking, coastal batteries at C.APE FEDJ\LA and POIHT BLONDIN opened fire on the landing craft and on t he beaches. The destroyers and the BROOKLYN replied with counterbattery fire. The AUGUSTA., which had steamed some distance to the northward of the transport area, -moved in within range and opened fire on CAPE FEDALA. The shore batteries were soon silenced and quickly fell to our advancing troops. Thereafter there was little opposition ashore and no re quests for naval gunfire. 5. Naval Gunfire Against. French Light Forces.- At about 0745 on Uovember 8, 19.42, it was noticed that a French cruiser and sor:.ie destroyers had sortied from CASABLANCA in the direction of FEDAL.A and had commenced firing on our destroyers and landing craft. These French vessels :were engaged by the BROOKLYlJ and the AUGUSTA, and later came under the fire of our covering force, the MASSACHUSETTS, \'JICHITA, TUSCALOOSA and their destroyer screen. As a result of this engage m_ent, the French c.ruiser PRIMAGUE'I' and destroyers ALBATnOS and nALIH w,ere beached a4d put out of .action, and several othe:r French destroyerr were sunk. Our naval vessels were assisted durint:; this engagement by aircraft. 'J.'hereafter naval gunfire suppo r'jj took the form of engaging any French vessels that sortied from CASABLANCA, and warding off air attacks frofl the transport and beach areas. -2 .AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Command) Operating Base, olk, Virginia, mcember 22, 1942 • ./ , Subject: TORCH Operation, comments and recommendations. 6. Naval Gunfire Support in the SAFI .Area.- Fro11 a naval gunnery standpoint, the operations at SAFI were successful oeyond reasonable expectations. The gunfire action was initiated at 0428 on Novenber 8, 1942, when the assault destroyer BERNADOU was just rounding the bell buoy off the tip of the nain harbor jetty. At this moment a French 75-mrn gun opened up on the BERNADOU, followed by machine eun and rifle fire from both jetties. The BI:;HN.ADOU, fol lowed by the COLE, countered immediately with fire from 20-mm and- 3-inch 50-caliber guns. .The MERVINE countered the fire of a French ~ , 75-mm battery with several extremely accurate salvos. Within six minutes all enemy fire was silenced and no further opposition fron the 75-Mill battery and machine guns at the harbor mouth was encount ered. 'fhe gunfire of the NEW YOillC and PHILA:'.JELPHI.A was very effective against other French coastal batteries consisting of four 130-mm and three 155-mrn guns, and silenced ther.i after a few salvos. Host of this activjty tQok place in darkness and only the intermittent flashe8 of ener.iy batteries could be used as points of aim. Observation of the enemy's defensive equipment and the destruction wrought upon it indi cate that potentially strong hostile resistance was shattered quickly and effectively by rapid, acourate and overwhelning naval gunfire. ?. Autonatic Gun Control.- In the U.S.S. 11ASSACHUSETTS it was def·initely proved that a man cannot natch a moving pointer within the linits of error allowed for automatic gun control equip ment for a period of time r:i.uch in excess of ten minutes, due to fat igue. This fact clearly indicates the desirability for the complet ion of the installation of full autonatic features in train and ele vation in all turrets. 8. Map of the Landing Area.- It is realized that the map [ used were the best that could be procured in the tine available. Goot maps are very important in an operation of t his kind. If possible, a standard topographic nap of the landing area, suitable for navigat ional as well as mili ta'ry use, with the II-square gr id ayster:i super imposed in colored light lines, should be issued well in advance to all units connected with the problem of naval gunfire support and ., FE25/A16-3 UNITED STATES ATL A1'~TIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 (Administrative Comma nd} Ne.val Operati:?:iB Base, .. Norfolk, Vir~inia, D e c c ~bor 22, 1942. ,/ Subject: TORCH Oper::tion, co::i .cnts ~ne. r ·::; con .cnd~.tions. - --- - . - -- - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - shore operations of the landin~ force. 9. Fire Su"l"\ ·-ort Areas. - Fi::.:e su;.; .~ ort croups should be assirned...., to larvr. · e-unr• e~'.t rict e d. fire snI·-;ort 8_reas in order to allow fpr maneuvering and lo:n,c f ir5..!!(; :r.uns, q.."1h.lll1TY3 -..:'ed by numerous tm~ns. 10. Q2_g c1 us :\91!.§__?n d Re c Oll.:.~.n.~a t i r.I!:~ : (a) Li;;h' cruisGrs of t he SAV ·;N1?AI-I and CLE\t""ELA1'ID ty?t' . by virtue of their e;·~-- eat volume of fire~ lone. :!:'anr:e , a ccuracy- , high perfornance o: v.rr.mun i t ion and maneu.v erabilit~:' , are the mos t effective eunfire su~:ro rtine ships for landinc operations. (b) Destroyers are extrem12 J_:~ eff'ectivo in delivering close sup~ortine f ir~ , direct fire on beaches and direct fire on targets of opportunit; . ( c) Pls.:: ..~ .f']:.ot i.s t:::.e mo.st effective method of con trolline accurate Tl.a_· ~· ---~ cunfire on desienated tarce ts ashore. { d) Cr c::L_.:;r~r and battleship s ;- ottinc; ~")lanes must ei.th~· - , h~ve fie,hter }.:'rotec 1Jicn or be capatlo of con ~l de:rr, ble more sr; ·:=::e '.':. (e )_ TI'..o ;:rocuromon'.t' of ~l:le new h~-C. h 8P.facity arn.r:i:J1 ·~ - tion will e;reatly L-. .;:·0u3e th .::; effe:;tiveness er· l!. c.~1 a l c1...lnf ir<; ,. {f) Or...e OJ:' t".'10 bor:1'o:J.rc1.CTent ; ractises [illo uld be sr.t..c:: uled· each cun ?·. er~' y3ar for all t ,T''O s of shins ca-:.iat l e of civ~ . r: ..~ cunfire su ::::~ ort in l andinc orera t:'.. ons in order to insi.lre their. readiness for this r articular cu&nerj mission. ( 1 s'li1' --, "',' ,. ,,,--if':i_'1"c <::U""'"' 01"t t...1c·} At ... - G,q ........ <::!t ono-· - !::' .... r_~~·- ... -... ~ ·-· - drec.•si;;;J rch"'_v ·-".r sol should be condti..ct P-a. -prior to f-1.ny landinf, o ~~ er a tion. This should include ar.t 1: 'l~ uombardrac rit of land objectives and the e 1f' .. ~loyment of shore fi :e'.J control "·:· ties and I)} _a no spot. A corJ. ~'t:-..:' ence of all units i 11v0 .:i _ved shou-:i..(1 be held before and after su:--··--. · rehearsal. ,. FE25/Al6-3 UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET 1-i.MPHIBIOUS FORCE Serial: 00299 ACr.linistrative Command) Subject: ~nd reco.m:·-iendations. - -- ~ ---~ - -- - ~ -- ~ - - AMMUNITION 11. Expenditure of Ammunit~2L!..~- This operation served to emphasize the fact that ammwiition available for naval g unfire su~::_J o r' ·, of overseas operations is limited, and its conservation is an import ant consideration.