“What Are Marines For?” the United States Marine Corps
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“WHAT ARE MARINES FOR?” THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA A Dissertation by MICHAEL EDWARD KRIVDO Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2011 Major Subject: History “What Are Marines For?” The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era Copyright 2011 Michael Edward Krivdo “WHAT ARE MARINES FOR?” THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA A Dissertation by MICHAEL EDWARD KRIVDO Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, Joseph G. Dawson, III Committee Members, R. J. Q. Adams James C. Bradford Peter J. Hugill David Vaught Head of Department, Walter L. Buenger May 2011 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT “What Are Marines For?” The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era. (May 2011) Michael E. Krivdo, B.A., Texas A&M University; M.A., Texas A&M University Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III This dissertation provides analysis on several areas of study related to the history of the United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era. One element scrutinizes the efforts of Commandant Archibald Henderson to transform the Corps into a more nimble and professional organization. Henderson's initiatives are placed within the framework of the several fundamental changes that the U.S. Navy was undergoing as it worked to experiment with, acquire, and incorporate new naval technologies into its own operational concept. Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Henderson's programs are provided and comparisons drawn with those priorities established by his successor, Commandant John Harris. In addition, the operations undertaken by the Corps during the Civil War are evaluated in terms of their relative benefit for the national military establishment as a whole. The Corps organization and operational concept is scrutinized and compared with that of similar military structures. In particular, the relationship between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Confederate States Marine Corps are compared. In the process, the iv South's Corps, born in part out of that of the North's, exhibited many distinct advantages that the USMC solidly resisted adopting during the war years. The influence of key leaders, both military and civilian, reveals many problems that continued to negatively affect the Corps' ability to meet operational requirements as defined by senior naval and Army commanders. Yet despite these issues, the Corps' Civil War experiences served as a crucible for forging a new generation of leaders who earnestly fought for reforms and increased professionalization of the unit. Although the Corps suffered from several problems related to lack of institutional vision and leadership failings of some senior officers, at a small unit level the officers and Marines performed their duties in a competent, enthusiastic, and courageous manner. Therefore, Marines continued to be in great demand by naval commanders at all levels, who actively sought their service in a variety of operation. v DEDICATION This study is dedicated to my son, Michael, and my daughter, Kaitlan, and especially my wife, Dianne. Their patience and understanding has helped make this a qualitatively better product. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, for the superior guidance and mentoring he has graciously imparted over the years, during my graduate studies. He has patiently coached me in making the transition from professional military officer to professional historian. In the process, he has always been keen to point out opportunities to further hone my research and writing skills. I am deeply thankful for all of his advice and counsel. Similarly, Dr. James C. Bradford has always been available to serve as a sounding board for new ideas and concepts that have helped shape this study. He has been very generous in providing me with another set of eyes throughout the writing process and in recommending new sources of information. Dr. Bradford has also graciously afforded me the opportunity to publish some of the fruits of my research. Dr. R.J.Q. Adams has been there for me from the start of my graduate studies at Texas A&M University, always ready with solid advice and fresh perspectives. He challenged me to dig further into some critical aspects of my study, and encouraged me throughout the project. Along similar lines, Dr. David Vaught was also there from the beginning, and I always knew that I could count on him to provide me with different ways of looking at the evidence that added a whole new dimension to my writing. Both forced me to broaden my work and write to a larger audience. I thank Dr. Peter Hugill for introducing me to aspects of technology and international affairs that had immediate relevance for this study. Along with new vii methodologies for analyzing old problems, he taught me to see connections previously invisible. Working with him was a pleasure that I will miss. In addition, I also wish to thank the generous support of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and the Marine Corps Historical Division at Quantico, Virginia. Their support provided me with the resources to pursue new leads and points of analysis. In particular, the professional staff of the Archives and Special Records section at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center exceeded all expectations, always working hard to dig out the most obscure source in response to my queries, and often providing other references without being asked. This research effort would not have been possible without their help. Acknowledgement is also given to the Andrew W. Mellon Research Foundation and the outstanding staff of the Virginia Historical Society in Richmond, Virginia. The former provided the financial means of accessing the excellent sources of the latter's facility, and the consequent wealth of information that they safeguard. Finally, I thank the excellent faculty and staff of the History Department at Texas A&M University, to whom I owe a debt that can never be repaid. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………… iii DEDICATION …………………………………………………………………… v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………… vi TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………. viii LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………….. x LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………… xii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………. 1 Marine Corps Historiography and the Civil War………….…….… 10 II THE CHANGING NATURE OF NAVAL WARFARE, 1815-1861.…….. 25 III ARCHIBALD HENDERSON’S MARINE CORPS….………………….... 67 IV CHANGE OF COMMAND, CHANGE OF DIRECTION……………….... 117 V CRACKING IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FIRE: FROM THE SECESSION CRISIS TO BULL RUN …………………………………………………... 150 VI THE CORPS STAGGERS OFF TO WAR: ORGANIZING, RECRUITING AND EMPLOYING MARINES………………………….. 192 VII EMPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS: BLOCKADES, RAIDS AND LANDINGS...……………………………………………………………… 241 Marine Barracks…………………………………………………… 241 Marine Detachments………………………………………………. 245 Ad hoc Units Formed from Detachments…………………………. 260 Deliberately Formed Battalions…………………………………… 274 ix CHAPTER Page VIII THE WAR’S END, AND THE PATH AHEAD ...……………………….. 298 IX AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS …………………………………… 352 REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………... 376 VITA……………………………………………………………………………….. 402 x LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page 2-1 Contemporary Map of Hampton Roads Action, 8-9 March 1862… 26 2-2 Side and Top Views of the USS Monitor…………………………. 28 2-3 Contemporary Drawing of the USS Fulton I……………………… 34 2-4 USS Fulton II……………………………………………………… 38 2-5 The USS Princeton………………………………………………… 41 2-6 The USS Naugatuck (Stevens’ Battery), 1862……………………... 42 2-7 11-inch Dahlgren Pivot Gun on the USS Kearsarge (1864)………. 53 3-1 The Marine Corps' Organization after the 1834 Act……………….. 98 4-1 Capital Area Defenses Occupied by Marines, January 1861…….... 134 5-1 Situation at Bull Run, 12:00-2:00 P.M., 21 July 1861…………….. 177 6-1 Hatteras Forts and the Union Scheme of Maneuver………………. 193 6-2 Marine Corps Organization after Congress’ Act of 24 July 1861… 203 6-3 DuPont’s Seizure of Port Royal, South Carolina………………….. 224 7-1 Sketch Map of Confederate Mines in the James River, May 1864 . 257 7-2 Sketch of the Plan for the Second Attack on Fort Fisher………….. 266 7-3 Contemporary Drawing of Marines Moving on Fort Fisher, 1865... 269 8-1 Organizational Model of the Confederate States Marine Corps as Created on 16 March 1861…………………………………………. 320 xi FIGURE Page 8-2 Expanded CSMC Structure, 21 May 1861 .………………………… 321 8-3 Map Showing the Deployments of Company A, CSMC …………... 325 8-4 CSMC Battalion Deployments during the War …………...……….. 327 xii LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 5-1 Listing of U.S. Marine Officers Who Resigned or Were Dismissed Between December 1860 and December 1863……………………… 166 7-1 Location and Approximate Size of Marine Barracks, November 1862…………………………………………………….. .. 244 7-2 Representative Sizes of Marine Detachments on Board Warships, 1861………………………………………………………. 245 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In the fall of 1859, the political leadership of the United States found itself unexpectedly confronted with a crisis of great consequence. On the night of 17 October, a small band of radical abolitionists led by John Brown crossed into Virginia, seized the Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, and threatened to distribute weapons and support to slaves in the area to encourage them to kill their masters and thereby gain their freedom. The raid sent shockwaves through the region and the Federal government decided it needed to take immediate action to "protect the public property . endangered by riotous outbreak" before the situation inflamed already sensitive sectional differences. Looking for a quick, yet precise response to the action, military leaders turned to the Marines at the barracks in nearby Washington D.C. to quell the disturbance. Once orders to respond were received, the Marine Corps' headquarters quickly organized, equipped, and transported to the affected area a contingent of 86 men to deal with Brown's force.