Joint Force Quarterly Joint Education for the 21St Century a PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL by Robert B

Home , East Field (Saipan), Sam Nunn, USS Augusta (CA-31), USS Barry (DD-248), USS Barry (DD-933), USS Barry (DDG-52)

0107 C1 3/4/04 7:02 AM Page 1 JOINT FORCEJFQ QUARTERLY East Asian Security

Interservice Training

Rwanda

JFACC—The Next Step

Battle for the Marianas

Spring95

Uphold Democracy

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 0207 Prelims 3/3/04 3:14 PM Page ii

To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.

—Giulio Douhet

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CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili

Asia-Pacific Challenges 6 by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin

JFQ FORUM A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia 8 by Richard C. Macke

JFQ The PLA: In Search of a Strategic Focus 16 by Ronald N. Montaperto

Japan’s Emergent Security Policy 20 by Patrick M. Cronin

Assessing the U.S.-North Korea 23 Agreement by Masao Okonogi

South Korea’s Defense Posture 26 by Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi

Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Two Tracks PHOTO CREDITS 32 by Ralph A. Cossa The cover photograph shows USS San Jacinto with USS Barry (astern) transiting the Suez Canal (U.S. Navy/Dave Miller); the cover insets (from top) include Chinese honor guard (U.S. America and the Asia-Pacific Region Army/Robert W. Taylor); T–37 trainer (U.S. Air 37 by William T. Pendley Force); refugees in Goma, Zaire, during Opera- tion Support Hope (U.S. Air Force/Marv Krause); Marines landing in the Marianas (U.S. Coast Guard); soldiers on board USS Dwight D. Eisenhower preparing for Operation Restore Democracy (U.S. Navy/Ken Riley). The Joint Challenge to Interservice Training The front inside cover features F–16s on by Henry Viccellio, Jr. the flight line at MacDill Air Force Base (U.S. 43 Air Force). The background photo on these pages de- picts Marine AAVs from USS Dubuque moving Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough toward a beach near Vladivostok during Exer- by Robert B. Adolph, Jr., Charles W. Stiles, and Franklin D. Hitt, Jr. cise Cooperation from the Sea (U.S. Navy/ 48 Charles W. Alley). The insets (from top left) are of a color guard at Japan Defense Agency headquarters (DOD/R.D. Ward); a psychological op- Joint Intelligence and Uphold erations loudspeaker team in Haiti (55th Signal Democracy Company/Jean-Marc Schaible); a B–2 bomber 54 being refueled by a KC–135 tanker during a test by Thomas R. Wilson flight at Edwards Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force); and British soldiers arriving in Kigali during Operation Restore Hope (Combat Cam- JFACC—Taking the Next Step era Imagery/Marvin Krause). The back inside cover catches members of 60 by Marcus Hurley the 5th Special Forces Group jumping with British and Kuwaiti commandos (U.S. Army/Tracey L. Leahy). UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda The back cover reproduces a painting by Harry A. Davis of the 28th Division marching 66 by R.A. Dallaire and B. Poulin through the streets of Paris in 1945 (U.S. Army Center for Military History).

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SPRING 95 / NUMBER 7

OUT OF JOINT Joint Force Quarterly Joint Education for the 21st Century A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL by Robert B. Kupiszewski 72 Hans Binnendijk Editor-in-Chief Patrick M. Cronin When Waves Collide: Future Conflict Executive Editor Robert A. Silano 77 by Richard Szafranski Editor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Struggle for the Marianas Production Coordinator Calvin B. Kelley by Bernard D. Cole 86 Senior Copy Editor

The Typography and Design Division of Special: The Air Force White Paper the U.S. Government Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction. Global Presence Joint Force Quarterly is published for the 94 by Sheila E. Widnall and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Ronald R. Fogleman the Institute for National Strategic Stud- ies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN employment of land, sea, air, space, and 100 Chester William Nimitz special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat opera- FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET tions conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. 101 Letters to the Editor The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint warfighting, inter- IN BRIEF service issues that support jointness, and topics of common interest to the Armed 105 Learning from Rwanda Forces (see page 132 for details). Please by Steven Metz and James Kievit direct editorial communications to: Editor 109 Writing Joint Doctrine Joint Force Quarterly by Charles M. Edmondson ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 111 JTFs: Some Practical Implications by Susan J. Flores Telephone: (202) 475–1013 / DSN: 335–1013 FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 THE JOINT WORLD Internet: [email protected] 114 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Education, and Literature The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within OFF THE SHELF are those of the contributors and do not 119 A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War: A Review Essay necessarily reflect the views of the De- by Allan R. Millett partment of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted 126 Getting to Know Jomini: A Book Review portions of this journal may not be re- produced or extracted without permis- by Michael D. Krause sion of copyright proprietors. An ac- knowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly 129 Joint in Spite of Themselves: A Book Review should be made whenever material is by Brian R. Sullivan quoted from or based on its contents.

POSTSCRIPT This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. 132 A Note to Readers and Contributors February 1995

ISSN 1070–0692

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Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Publisher GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA ast Asia is a region bursting with su- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff perlatives. It is propelled by eco- Chairman of the Advisory Committee nomic growth rates unrivalled by Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF National Defense University Eany other region. It contains the Members of the Advisory Committee world’s most populous nation and teems BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman with over a quarter of its people. It is also Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF the most heavily armed corner of the world, The Joint Staff containing the forces of three major nuclear MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA U.S. Army War College powers, the three largest armies, and the A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College most overheated international arms market. Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF While a young America still hugged the Armed Forces Staff College Atlantic coast, we could and did ignore this Col Robert C. Hughes, USAF National War College vast region. Westward expansion changed Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC Marine Corps War College that. As California and the Pacific Northwest Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF swelled with new citizens, our gaze turned The Joint Staff more and more to the Pacific and East Asia. Col Andrew Pratt, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College BG Randall L. Rigby, USA U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF AWord from t Air Command and Staff College Chairman of the Editorial Board Hans Binnendijk Institute for National Strategic Studies As late as the early part of this century, we Members of the Editorial Board sat idly by as European powers and a rising Richard K. Betts Columbia University Japan vied with each other in the region. We COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA remained so disengaged that we occasionally U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Eliot A. Cohen served as a neutral peacemaker. By the 1930s The Johns Hopkins University this no longer sufficed. It was challenges COL Robert A. Doughty, USA U.S. Military Academy arising in Asia, not in Europe, that led us LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC Marine Corps War College into World War II. Aaron L. Friedberg After destroying imperial Japan’s war Princeton University Alan L. Gropman machine, America became a blocking force Industrial College of the Armed Forces to Soviet domination. In the most tempestu- COL Peter F. Herrly, USA National War College ous years of the Cold War, Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF we fought more conflicts Naval War College and lost more lives in Asia William T. Hodson the world’s most dynamic Information Resources Management College than in the rest of the COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA region needs dynamic solutions U.S. Army War College world combined. For forty- Mark H. Jacobsen five years, our view of this Marine Corps Command and Staff College William Manthorpe region was solidified by Joint Military Intelligence College Cold War realities. But with that era over it Thomas L. McNaugher Brookings Institution is time to find new bearings. The East Asia Col Charles H. Mead, USAF Strategic Initiative begun in 1989 was in- Armed Forces Staff College John J. Mearsheimer tended to start that process. University of Chicago As this initiative recognized, our inter- Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF Air Command and Staff College ests in this vibrant region are now so great LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) that it is impossible for us to withdraw or Hudson Institute James H. Toner take a back seat as East Asia moves into the Air War College next century. That is not just an external LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) RKK, Limited

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Western Europe, Asia is still a very divided region of the world. There are no NATOs or CSCEs where East Asian nations work collectively to calm one another’s distrusts and in- securities. Today, these states take their cues from their perceptions of what others are doing or are adding to their arsenals. On the other hand, many believe that Europe and Asia are too different to expect that security arrangements that work in one area can work in the other. Already the region has reached the point where economic relations m the Chairman DOD ( R.D. Ward) have become far more in- The Chairman greeting tegrated than security re- the deputy chief of lations. Over the past five the PLA general staff as the Secretary of view but one shared by East Asian nations as years, the growth of trade between Asian na- Defense looks on. well. Nearly all agree that America’s presence tions has outstripped that with the rest of and power are an irreplaceable counterbal- the world. Is it prudent to anticipate that ance to the region’s greatest perils. economic relations will eventually lead secu- Today, our commitment is anchored on rity relations to a more stable plateau? If so, alliances with Japan and South Korea, the lat- can existing security arrangements provide ter challenged by the regime to its north. But enough time? Asia is poised for great change. China is on a These and other concerns need to be ad- path of economic reforms that many think dressed. The world’s most dynamic region will catapult it to world power and lead at needs dynamic solutions. That is why I am some point to political changes. Hong Kong pleased that the JFQ Forum in this issue of will revert back to China in 1997, and there the journal is focusing on the challenges to is the unresolved question of Taiwan. Rus- this region. There was a time when Ameri- sia—in the midst of its own economic and cans viewed Asia as a distant and exotic land political reforms—remains every bit a great full of mystery. It is now our back yard—and, Asian power. For decades Moscow fed insta- some would be quick to point out, it may bility and conflict in the region. And, in the well be our front yard in the next century. very heart of the region, the divided Korean peninsula will one day mend, hopefully JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI through peaceful means although that is by Chairman no means assured. These are merely the fu- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ture events we know about: in an uncertain world much more could occur. The burgeoning markets of East Asia hold immense promise, but economic progress will only succeed if stability and peace are maintained. Can current security arrangements adequately preserve these conditions? Unlike

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oday more than ever the eco- Strategically, the interests of the major nomic and political rhythms of powers intersect in East Asia. The subregion the Asia-Pacific region affect our is the nexus of three of five permanent T national interests. Growing inter- members of the U.N. Security Council dependence with the economies of the re- (China, Russia, and the United States), and gion is altering the international security Japan is a leading aspirant for that status. landscape. The GNP of Asian countries For the moment, none of these major pow- presently amounts to a quarter of global ers sees the others as a threat. Historical and GNP and may climb to half by the middle of contemporary trends, however, as well as the the next century. Meanwhile, American jobs virtual absence of regional security institu- tied to the region’s economy will double tions, suggest that a long-term great power from 3 to 6 million in the next five years. concert is far from certain, particularly if Japan and China are the world’s second and economic fortunes change. China is a rising third largest economies, while India shows power, at once eager to continue its eco- great potential. New concentrations of nomic boom and ultrasensitive to questions of sovereignty. Russia is a declining power whose weakness, ironically, poses a greater threat to the region than its military strength. Japan is a maturing industrial democracy still defining its identity within the international security realm. The United States remains Asia-Pacific the preeminent guarantor of regional stability, yet alone it lacks the resources to contend with the entire region. Adding these strategic factors to Asia’s Challenges economic dynamism, many analysts view the region as the global crossroads By HANS BINNENDIJK and of the next century. One thing seems certain: the United States will face PATRICK M. CRONIN greater competition and expend much effort to win the cooperation of other major power centers in the region. At the same time, new patterns of wealth have led some nations of the region competition are emerging. China’s economic to redefine their contacts around the world. growth and opaque military modernization U.S. prosperity and security will be increas- set the stage for the rise of a major regional ingly inseparable from this dynamic growth. power. Japan will retain its security relations Because of widespread, sustained eco- with the United States but may inch toward nomic development the region is relatively greater autonomy. India appears ready to peaceful. Gloomy predictions of famine, buttress its ambitions by expanded involve- civil war, and state failure do not seem to ment in the global economy. The Korean apply to Asia. Despite the potential for large- peninsula seems likely to stay divided for scale conflict there, none has occurred since some time, although it will eventually unite the Vietnam War. Instead, prosperity, pro- into a formidable power. Moreover, the ductivity, and development have dominated members of ASEAN promise to grow in the landscape. stature and potential, making it increasingly necessary to engage such countries as In- donesia and Malaysia. Intense competition could lead to regional conflict. Asia has fault lines based on historical differences: territorial claims in the Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin are, South China Sea, the future status of Taiwan, respectively, the Editor-in-Chief and the Executive Editor of Joint Force Quarterly.

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China’s boundary disputes with India and upon which to found continuing economic Russia, the question of Korean unification, growth and prosperity. friction between India and Pakistan, turmoil Asian states have reached an unspoken in Cambodia, and Japan’s quarrel with Rus- consensus that stability is essential in coping sia over the Kuril Islands. Other conflicts with domestic issues that may take years to could arise from economic competition, par- resolve. In this context, all can agree that ticularly in Northeast Asia. While there is no there is little to be gained—and much to Bosnia in Asia, many territorial, maritime, lose—by altering the status quo. As Asia and resource disputes could escalate. In Eu- moves through this transitional period, a rope, NATO has weathered the discord over basis for a new regional security order will the violent breakup of the former Yu- emerge. This order will inevitably reflect the goslavia. In Asia, it is not clear that Amer- aspirations and strengths of major Asian ica’s key alliance with Japan is equal to that powers. Our challenge is to secure stability, level of divergence, and thus putting our and by doing so to secure our own interests. compact with Japan on a solid footing for The keys to this task will be severalfold: the next century must be a national priority. to recast our alliance with Japan in post-Cold At the same time, the United States must War terms and put it on a firm foundation ensure that its security relations with South for the next century; strengthen our alliance Korea withstand the lingering challenge with the Republic of Korea to bolster deter- posed by North Korea’s nuclear and conven- rence in the short run and provide long-term tional programs and, on the other hand, a regional support; engage China in ways that sudden rush to- link it to regional and international systems; ward reunifica- promote ties with South Asia; advance multi- tion. In the short lateral institutions where they can make a term, Washington difference (as in Northeast Asia); further rela- must continue to tions with other regional allies, particularly ensure full imple- Australia, our southern anchor; develop our mentation of the relations with the dynamic states of South- October 21, 1994 east Asia; and maintain a credible overseas Agreed Frame- presence both to reassure the region and to work. If it en- be ready for rapid crisis response. dures, this accord Notwithstanding a more vibrant multi- will help focus lateral and regional security architecture, an

U.S. Army (Robert W. Taylor) more attention on important role remains for the Armed Forces. working with Even if a concert of great powers can be Seoul to provide a “soft landing” for Pyong- achieved and works well—both big ifs—the yang as well as on the future of the Korea United States will have a key part in under- peninsula within the region. pinning that stability, providing balance for Moreover, we must integrate China into regional powers, responding to aggressive both regional and international systems. middle powers, containing chaos from failed There is no more critical security task than states, or building coherent regional support engaging that nation in transparency and for contingencies in other parts of the world. confidence-building measures to increase If we are willing to adjust alliance relation- great power cooperation in regional and ships and able to use political and economic global issues. Territorial questions remain a relations wisely, our forces will continue to be concern, given that actions taken with re- welcomed as agents of peace and stability. JFQ gard to Taiwan could bring China and Amer- ica into confrontation. Similarly, the way in which China views the use of force and, conversely, its willingness to seek peaceful resolution of other territorial and resource disputes will be pivotal to a regional stability

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American and Korean securing flight line.

A Commander in Chief Looks at

East Asia U.S. Air Force (Paul Caron) By RICHARD C. MACKE

y priorities as Commander in lies at the nexus of diplomatic and military Chief, Pacific Command affairs, strategic and operational concerns, (CINCPAC), are warfighting and and joint and service matters. In the face of Mpeople. After all the interna- such complexity, only strategy—the effective tional economic analyses, the careful politi- linkage of ends, ways, and means—can fully cal-military considerations, the strategic mil- address my responsibility for applying joint itary planning—the fundamental business of forces to achieve U.S. objectives in the Asia- U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is warfight- Pacific region. ing. Warfighting is readiness—our constant The Intersection of Interests focus. But people are an inextricable part of East Asia has seen the intersection, not that focus. It wasn’t just technology, equip- always peaceful, of the strategic interests of ment, or doctrine that won the Cold War several major powers. As one senior regional and Operation Desert Storm. It was the ex- leader quipped, “This is a tough neighbor- cellence of our people. Just as a warfighting hood.” Russia maintains significant regional priority drives readiness, the people priority military capabilities as it makes the transition demands quality of life. from socialism to a market economy. Simulta- Although these priorities may be clear, neously, China is unleashing the economic no simple, singular view of East Asia can energy of one-fifth of the world population provide a complete perspective on this com- and seeks to define a regional and global role plex region. East Asia is a point of conver- commensurate with its burgeoning economy. gence for the interests of major powers and still exhibits the strategic dynamics of the contingency era and the Cold War. PACOM

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Macke

Japan has increased its political clout and fi- The Korean peninsula still presents the nancial resources throughout the region and ghastly potential for high intensity conflict. If the world over a few decades. Now the sec- North Korea violates the armistice and breaks ond largest economy in the world, Japan is across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), there undergoing its most significant political will be no need for a U.N. Security Council change in 38 years, but it remains a firm vote or chance to seek the sense of the Sen- treaty ally and is strategically more important ate. America will be at war. Desert Storm will than it was during the Cold War. South not be the model; thousands will die. Korea, a thriving market economy and an- In addition to a classic Cold War con- other close ally, is a maturing democracy. In frontation, I face diverse contingency require- North Korea, the struggle of an ments. The PACOM area of responsibility regional diversity and isolated regime to survive with (AOR) takes in half of the world’s surface and its military capabilities intact two-thirds of its population. The area enjoys dynamism produce an poses a challenge to the South the fastest economic growth on earth, but at- environment where crises and to regional stability. Strate- tendant changes could disrupt political and are inevitable gic circumstances, however, dif- social orders. Together with recurring natural fer fundamentally in Southeast disasters, the regional diversity and dynamism Asia where the Association of produce an environment where crises are in- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has begun a evitable. PACOM must be prepared for both multilateral security dialogue. Two members cold wars and contingencies, major regional of ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines, are conflicts and minor crisis response, forward U.S. allies. The combined voice of this organi- presence and rapid reinforcement. zation gains increased attention from both re- A Matter of Perspective gional and global audiences. East Asia has lacked a convergent percep- East Asia is a tough neighborhood, per- tion of threat—the traditional cause of multi- haps—but it is also a promising one. The sta- lateral security arrangements. Therefore it bility made possible by decades of U.S. com- does not have (and probably does not need) mitment and forward presence has comprehensive, NATO-like institutions. But generated astounding rates of economic interest is rising in sub-regional, multilateral growth. Our economy grew sevenfold over security dialogues based on mutual interests the last hundred years. Indonesia and the rather than common perceptions of threat. other Asian “tigers” will do that in a genera- Such developments have a long way to go tion. East Asia offers both the greatest peril before taking shape, and in the meantime and the most promise for the Asia-Pacific re- the lack of a multilateral security organiza- gion and the world. tion puts CINCPAC at the diplomatic-mili- Cold Wars versus Contingencies tary interface of many issues. Security and As South Korean Foreign Minister Han economic concerns are similarly intermin- Sung Joo observed, “During the Cold War pe- gled. I tell my friends at the Department of riod, a fault line ran across East Asia. Now the State that total coordination and cooperation trends of reconciliation and cooperation have are essential for our mutual success. replaced unproductive confrontation here Even in the military sphere my perspec- and elsewhere. Every country in the region tive must be multifaceted. I link operational except North Korea has joined in these goals of joint task force (JTF) commanders trends, rendering the fault line obsolete.” Ob- and General Gary Luck, commander of our solete perhaps, but certainly not irrelevant. forces in Korea, with the strategic goals of the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am a supported as well as a supporting CINC. I lead forward presence forces in East Asia, for- Admiral Richard C. Macke, USN, is Commander ward-based forces in Guam, Hawaii, and in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. He has served Alaska, and forces on the West Coast. as Commander, Naval Space Command; Director Many have characterized PACOM as a for Command, Control, Communications, and maritime theater. Although my largest com- Computer Systems (J-6), Joint Staff; and Director ponent force is Navy, this is more than a of the Joint Staff.

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Our commitment to the region and its stability is unequivocal. As the President has stated: “America is, after all, a Pacific nation . . . America intends to stay.” In peace we seek to promote stability throughout the region; in crisis we seek to deter violence and promote cooperation; and, in the event of war, we would seek swift and decisive victory. Means. The means to achieve these ends include more than 330,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of PACOM’s unified armed forces. We employ not only forces, but also diplomatic and defense programs, funds, and activities to engage nations in the AOR. Ways. PACOM has three principal ways to apply the available means to achieve our strategic ends. U.S. Army (Romona E. Joyce) Royal Cambodian ▼ Forward presence. If we are not forward in soldiers drilling. the Pacific, we can’t engage and participate. If we maritime theater. Air forces offer great flexi- don’t participate, we have no influence. Our for- bility in overcoming the tyranny of distance ward presence is the linchpin of our Pacific strat- in this huge AOR; but this is not an air the- egy. There’s no better way to demonstrate U.S. ater. It includes the seven largest armies in commitment than to station and deploy Ameri- the world; however, this is not a land the- can men and women in the region. ▼ Strong alliances. Five of the seven U.S. mu- ater—or an amphibious theater, even tual defense treaties currently in force are in the though I command two-thirds of the active PACOM AOR—a solid guarantee and foundation combat power of the Marine Corps. PACOM of regional stability. is a joint theater. ▼ Crisis response capabilities. Commitment How should one begin to look at this without capability is hollow. Ready, effective mili- mosaic of interests, perspectives, and consid- tary capabilities are essential as tools of engage- erations? The answer is through the lens of ment and response. strategy—the effective linkage of ends, ways, The PACOM theater military strategy and means. of cooperative engagement takes advantage Ends, Ways, and Means of every recognized role for military Ends. There is no confusion over strate- forces, including compellence, deterrence, gic ends in East Asia. Our current national and reassurance. security strategy of engagement and enlarge- Compellence in War. Applying military ment enhances U.S. security, promotes pros- power to make people do things—by vio- perity at home, and extends the community lence or threat of violence—is known as of free market democracies. President Bill compellence. The American way of war is Clinton made his first overseas trip to Japan swift, decisive victory, employing every and Korea where he outlined a vision of a available capability of the joint combat Pacific community built on shared strength, team. It depends on ready military capabili- prosperity, and commitment to democratic ties applied in close coordination with our values and ideals. He delineated clear secu- diplomatic and economic means. The Ko- rity priorities for a new Pacific community: rean peninsula remains a potential arena for the application of PACOM forces in their ▼ a continued American military presence in the Pacific compellence role. General Luck leads the ef- ▼ stronger efforts to combat the prolifera- fort there with our inseparable ally, the Re- tion of weapons of mass destruction public of Korea (ROK). I have the greatest ▼ new regional security dialogues confidence in the U.S.–ROK combined ▼ support for democracy and more open so- team. PACOM would work closely with cieties. General Luck and our friends in the region to coordinate the flow of forces to Korea

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Two-Tiered Command and Control

Monitors situation Commander in Chief, Provides theater direction U.S. Pacific Command Strategic/operational focus (CINCPAC) Maintains OPCON of JTF

Joint Intelligence Provides intelligence Center Pacific support to CINCPAC, CJTF

Provides forces Component Provides logistics support

Commander Operational/tactical focus Joint Task Force Coordinates combat forces (w/CINCPAC JTF Cell) Provides direction to tactical forces

Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Tactical focus Joint Special Army Component Navy Component Marine Component Air Force Component Execute tactical Operations operations

and the supporting political, economic, and force headquarters are predesignated and un- military activities of off-peninsula forces. dergo a focused training and exercise pro- Our war plans for Korea are solid—studied gram. To help these service headquarters and refined to the highest levels of detail. transition from their normal, service-ori- Our fervent hope is that operation plans ented, tactical responsibilities to true joint will never become operation orders. But operations, CINCPAC has developed a cadre commanders and staffs of the Joint Staff, of trained personnel, the Deployable Joint PACOM, and U.S. Forces Korea have totally Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The met their obligation to prepare for war. cell is a tailorable group of subject matter ex- Deterrence in Crisis. Although we must be perts with communications and intelligence prepared for war, it is far better to deter a po- equipment available for air deployment on a tential enemy or defuse a developing crisis. few hours notice to augment a JTF comman- The basis for deterrence is the same: a ready, der’s staff. This group of 20–60 officers and agile, joint military capability—both forward enlisted from the PACOM staff and service and reinforcing. The components are experienced in crisis action the basis for deterrence is a Asia-Pacific region, inter- planning, joint operations, and a wide range ready, agile, joint capability— estingly, has been the of warfighting skills. They participate in ini- setting for some painful tial PACOM headquarters planning for a cri- both forward and reinforcing lessons in the art of joint sis and then carry that knowledge to the JTF warfare in the past. We commander. Members of the group are nei- do not intend to relearn the lessons of his- ther helpers nor note takers from higher tory. A single-service staff cannot masquer- headquarters. Once the cell reports to the ade as a joint staff. Crises must be managed JTF commander, he owns them. JTF com- with increased speed and efficiency—and manders who use this type of cell consider it with total joint teamwork. critical to successful JTF operations. Pacific Command has thus adopted a two-tiered command and control concept, whereby a JTF reports directly to the unified commander (CINCPAC). These joint task

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Two-tiered command and control and While the activities of reassurance may DJTFAC are good concepts—but useless un- seem peripheral to the more traditional mis- less we exercise them. We’ve done exactly sions of deterrence and compellence, they that 31 times over the last three years in ei- are in fact closely associated since reassur- ther real-world crises or exercises. Each of ance activities generate the conditions of sta- the predesignated JTF headquarters is exer- bility—conditions that preclude the need for cised at least twice a year. I take care to par- warfighting. This stabilizing role of peace- ticipate personally in these exercises, and time military activities is the basis of the the JTF commanders and I get together at U.S. transition to a strategy of engagement. least once a year to discuss warfighting is- Reassurance will be one of the fundamental sues and our joint exercise program. roles for military forces in the Asia-Pacific re- Reassurance in Peacetime. As Sir Michael gion. But reassurance does not negate the Howard noted in “Lessons of the Cold War,” need for capabilities of deterrence and com- reassurance is a military function that we pellence. Without the capability to prevail in recognize less easily than deterrence or com- war, our ability to reassure is compromised. pellence. Reassurance is the use of military Therefore we must resist any temptation to power to engage others through peacetime build forces solely for reassurance. military activities such as combined exer- The Way Ahead cises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, or The United States will continue to pur- search and rescue exercises. sue a strategy of cooperative engagement Through these diverse peacetime where China goes, so throughout East Asia and the Asia-Pacific re- military activities, reassurance goes the future of Asia gion. In every country I have visited the pri- creates a general sense of mutual mary concern is, “Will America stay?” It is in security that is not specific to our interest and that of the countries of the any particular threat or scenario. We reach region that we remain engaged. out to each other in military-to-military con- Japan. Our alliance with Japan is a linch- tacts and relations. We maximize the trans- pin of stability in Asia. Continued American parency of our capabilities and intentions. guarantees and close cooperation with Japan By taking advantage of such training oppor- underscore our commitment to the doctrine tunities, we increase our ability to cooperate of forward engagement on a global scale. We in times of crisis. Working together, we sus- enjoy an extraordinary strategic situation in tain the conditions of stability necessary for which the security interests of the number prosperity and democracy. one and number two global economic powers A tally of some of the PACOM peace- are inextricably linked. Australian Prime Min- time military activities gives one an idea of ister Paul Keating once remarked that this ar- the dimensions of this endeavor. In FY94, rangement has “bought a lot of stability.” Se- those activities included: curity guarantees to Japan, embodied in the ▼ 325 bilateral exchange and training pro- forward presence of 47,000 American service grams ▼ men and women, immeasurably advance U.S. reciprocal exercise and small unit ex- strategic interests in the region. Japan, mean- change programs supporting 155 joint and com- while, demonstrated that our security rela- bined exercises and treaty obligations ▼ 77 humanitarian and civic assistance pro- tionship transcends government transitions, grams in 23 countries with Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Mu- ▼ 606 port visits in 25 countries rayama acknowledging the constitutionality ▼ 411 staff talks with the ministries of de- of the Japanese Self Defense Force and the re- fense and services of 28 nations quirement for the U.S.-Japan security rela- ▼ 18 conferences promoting the profes- tionship. That security guarantee is an indis- sional development of officers and militaries that pensable, stable foundation as the United are nonpolitical, obedient to the rule of law, and States and Japan work together, as Ambas- respected by society (over a thousand representa- sador Walter Mondale puts it, “to put our eco- tives, the future military leadership of 36 Asia-Pa- nomic relationship on as firm a footing as our cific nations, participated). political and strategic relationships.” China. Where China goes, so goes the future of Asia. We cannot ignore a country

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Russians and Americans on Malamute DZ. U.S. Army (Robert Ryan)

the transparency of our relationship, and addressing basic questions on roles, doctrines, and strategies. In short we are reassuring each other, a process of cooperative engagement that holds great promise for furthering the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Russia. After a lifetime preparing for military deterrence or compellence vis-à-vis So- viet military forces, it is encouraging to see our relationship with Russia move to a new Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway) phase where our military activities advance Australian F/A–18 mutual reassurance. PACOM has conducted during Pitch Black ’93. with more than one-fifth of the world’s pop- the first combined exercises with the Rus- ulation, intercontinental nuclear weapons, a sians, a series of search and rescue exercises veto in the U.N. Security Council, and one that began last year. Two have been very suc- of the most dynamic economies in the cessfully completed and a third including world. All the countries of this region watch Canadian forces is scheduled for March. In China closely. Is China a threat? A threat is June 1994 an amphibious exercise, Coopera- composed of capabilities and intentions. Ev- tion From the Sea in Vladivostok, featured a erything we know today tells us that im- Marine company and its Russian naval in- proved Chinese capabilities are highly prob- fantry counterpart in an amphibious disaster able. The key is their intentions. If China relief scenario. A Russian Federation Army wants to be a contributing member of the squad visited and trained with a battalion of th Infantry Division in early September. community of Asia-Pacific nations dedicated the 6 PACOM and Russia maintain a Far East Field to advancing regional stability, then all of Grade (O–6) Working Group to develop coop- our efforts will be easier. The key is to en- erative engagement activities that reinforce gage the Chinese so they will work with us mutual, long-term trust and confidence. to maintain stability. Korea. There are two dimensions to the We have overcome the diplomatic hur- Korea story. In South Korea we have a long- dles of the last year and are advancing our term ally that has become a mature democ- program of cooperative engagement with racy and achieved economic prosperity, a China. There have been a number of visits at success story for U.S. forward presence and the senior level including a recent trip by the commitment. Our security commitment to Secretary of Defense. We are working our contacts with the Chinese in a deliberate fashion. Both parties are learning, enhancing

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our partners in the Asia-Pacific region are comfortable. C4I Innovations. The way ahead must include further command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) innovations. Without effective C4I, training and operations are not feasible—in East Asia or anywhere else in my AOR. PACOM maintains an integrated view of C4I, the key to which continues to be effective partnerships with: ▼ government agencies to develop leading- edge technologies (PACOM will host DOD’s Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration for FY95) ▼ component commands (the Theater Con- vergence Oversight Board will continue to direct efforts to enhance the convergence of all C4I systems throughout the theater) ▼ countries in the AOR (our Combined Inter- U.S. Army (Brian Gavin) operability Program is expanding its focus through Rangers boarding Thai numerous memoranda of understanding). helicopter during Cobra Gold ’94. Korea is solid, irreversible, and a linchpin to To stay on the leading edge of technol- stability on the peninsula. North Korea pre- ogy, we are prepared to take some risks. It’s sents an altogether different picture: we are a O.K. to “build a little, test a little,” even “falter long ways from reassurance in the coopera- a little,” but with full interoperability as the tive engagement sense with North Korea. one inviolable criterion. The operational and But the October 1994 agreement regarding strategic payoffs of effective C4I are immense. its nuclear program may be the first small Training Efficiencies. No amount of tech- step in that direction. We are hopeful that as nology or restructuring will obviate the need North Korea’s power transition unfolds, we to train for war, but resources for training will see a regime committed to policies that execution will be limited. Thus training effi- offer promise for the future. With patience ciency must be improved. In PACOM we and close coordination with our allies, I am continually review our Exercise Road Map, optimistic that we can move from the re- looking for opportunities to bring service quirements of military deterrence to military training requirements under the umbrella of reassurance on the Korean peninsula. joint exercises. We extend that analysis to Multilateral Military Activities. As out- combined exercise requirements, looking for lined in President Clinton’s trip to Asia, one ways to capture combined training opportu- of the administration’s security priorities is nities and requirements while simultane- to advance new regional security dialogues. ously meeting service and unified command The Asia-Pacific area is cautiously examining needs. This is an area where we have great regional dialogues such as the ASEAN Re- hopes for our increased emphasis on multi- gional Forum. PACOM will advance regional lateral military activities. The Chairman has security dialogues by seeking opportunities laid out a challenge to have joint training for multilateral military activities that sup- meet the high standards we currently set for plement our current bilateral relationships. service training. We intend to meet this Combined training, seminars, planning ar- challenge through careful planning, close rangements, or exercises reinforce trans- coordination, and a judicious balance of dis- parency and mutual confidence by allowing tributed simulations—headquarters and field nations of the region to advance their com- exercises that get the maximum out of our mon security interests through reassurance precious training dollars and our service rather than reaction to perceived threats. We members’ valuable time. are content to proceed in incremental steps, PACOM has a mature program of joint perhaps starting with small sub-regional ar- procedures and training. We’ve been at the rangements, advancing at a rate with which

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joint training business for some time and A Pacific Nation have learned some valuable lessons. We’ve The PACOM theater military strategy of learned that we must carefully balance the cooperative engagement enables me to link number of pre-designated CJTF headquarters ends, ways, and means and to maintain mul- against the available training resources and tiple perspectives on East Asia and the entire the personnel turnover cycles for those head- AOR. In the final analysis, however, only quarters. We’ve learned that careful and con- one perspective matters—the perspective of tinuous long-range coordination with the the American people. Asians worry about service components is essential. And we’ve this. They know that American presence and learned that an up-front investment in ade- commitment have made their emerging quate exercise simulations—and prosperity possible. They are glad to hear our warfighting and people an adequate C4I network to sup- government assure them we intend to stay. are job one port the distributed conduct of But they worry about the perspective of the those simulations—is essential. American people. Does America have the As ACOM assumes a greater role will and the resources to continue its ex- in joint training, we are working closely with traordinary contribution to regional peace that unified command to both share lessons and stability? Will America forget the Asia- learned and coordinate our efforts. Pacific region? Warfighting and People. Warfighting and America will not forget, because its com- people, my command priorities, are job one. mitment is based on its best interests. The In a time of shrinking defense resources, I in- Nation understands that its economy is creasingly find myself in the business of sup- poised to participate in the extraordinary porting and coordinating service require- economic growth of the Asia-Pacific re- ments within the PACOM AOR. Beyond gion—a growth we helped make possible. synchronizing service, joint, and combined America understands the burdens and the training, I play a role in identifying the im- benefits of global leadership. The United pact of Base Realignment and Closure deci- States has a long history of Asia-Pacific en- sions. PACOM is also an active participant in gagement and will not forget that it has lost the important work of the Joint Requirements more than 100,000 sons and daughters in Oversight Council (JROC). As the JROC pro- three Pacific wars in this century. America is cess develops, we are approaching the level of and will remain a Pacific nation. JFQ total service integration envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to the benefit of our people, our readiness, and our country.

The Rationale for Continued U.S. Forward Presence in Asia

military forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is an essential element of regional security and America’s global military posture. For- U. S. ward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. forces required to meet national security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies, and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of [U.S.] interest in the security of the entire region. —Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (February 1995)

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The PLA In Search of a Strategic Focus

By RONALD N. MONTAPERTO Trooping the line in Beijing.

China’s influence reaches every corner of Asia and, PLA strategic planners are apparently deeply increasingly, the world. Your future is important to us divided in their assessments of the regional and to all of the Asia-Pacific region, indeed is important security environment. The terms of this debate should interest U.S. strategists for two to the world.... reasons. First, the debate reveals much about —Secretary of Defense William J. Perry assumptions implicit in Chinese strategic thinking. Second, it explains the purposes of China’s military modernization program. n a recent address to the National De- Chinese analysts agree that regional se- fense University of the Chinese People’s curity is in a state of flux. The bipolar order, Liberation Army (PLA), the Secretary of based on containment, is fading as a com- IDefense outlined the strategic basis of plex multipolar order emerges. Economic de- relations between Washington and Beijing velopment means that Asian powers are and stressed the importance of solid, mutu- identifying more national interests and have ally beneficial military-to-military contacts. resources to pursue them with greater inde- His remarks came as China is deeply in- pendence. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and volved in defining strategic priorities for the an increasingly confident Association of next century. How these priorities are de- Southeast Asian Nations question, and in fined, in turn, will determine PLA capabili- some cases are revising, long-held notions ties, roles, and missions. By acknowledging on the proper roles and relations among re- China’s central role in guaranteeing peace gional powers. The Chinese have no doubt and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and about the implication of such developments by proposing a broad strategic dialogue, Sec- for the United States. The PLA perceives retary Perry faced—and attempted to dis- America as a nation which is unable to uni- arm—the perception now prevalent among laterally determine the course of Asian af- PLA leaders that the United States regards fairs. It also sees the new security order as China as a hostile peer competitor of the fu- probably multipolar, though it is impossible ture. The effect of the Secretary’s remarks to discern more than a glint of their vision. may not be evident for some time because

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Montaperto

It is here that PLA analysts diverge in preparing to deal with a near-term military determining which regional relations will be threat. Rather the problem is twofold: imme- the most influential. Some think that the diate and tactical on one hand, more evolution of the American partnership with broadly strategic and future-oriented on the Japan will be decisive. Conflicting priorities other. Immediately and tactically, China is and competing interests between Washing- determined to maintain control over situa- ton and Tokyo will grow and act as a con- tions with the greatest potential for conflict. stant source of instability. Eventually, U.S.- This means putting teeth in claims to Japanese competition will be the fault line sovereignty in the South China Sea and along which the region divides. Other ana- being able to enforce Chinese demands on lysts hold that relations between Washing- Taiwan, although the Chinese remain san- ton and Beijing will drive regional events guine about future developments in both while still others think that the engine of areas. This leads to the other more broadly change will be conflicts between rich and strategic and future-oriented dimension of less affluent regional powers. Finally, a few the problem. Mindful of an uncertain future, analysts see a future shaped by American ef- Beijing must create an economy capable of forts to maintain a defining Asia-Pacific role supporting a range of economic, political, despite a growing regional resistance to such and military options that guarantee a major a U.S. role. voice in the new structure and secure its These analyses illustrate that Marxist di- place at the table. alectic—which assumes that a system is the China’s relationship with the United

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) product of contradictions between opposite States and other regional powers as well as forces—is pervasive among PLA strategic the forces which the PLA is presently design- thinkers. Although communism is defunct ing serve both imperatives. They can alert as a basis of political economy, much less as the region to China’s priorities as the secu- a means of legitimizing rity system unfolds. Military modernization over the last few years China’s the rule of the Chinese in particular is a manifestation of Beijing’s officially published defense Communist Party, typi- commitment. Together these policies and cal Marxist categories programs ensure that China’s position is budget has roughly doubled of mind on interna- well-considered by other regional powers. tional relations persist The PLA is focused on strategic issues in the debate among PLA strategists. The and concerns. In the near term, given the thrust of Beijing’s security policies and the centrality of economic development and se- future PLA force structure will be directly vere deficiencies in key military capabilities, shaped by this debate, which also is a con- Beijing will wish to avoid disrupting a re- text for interpreting military modernization. gional stability that supports broad eco- Over the last few years China’s officially nomic contacts. This might not apply, how- published defense budget has roughly dou- ever, if the territorial dispute in the South bled. This development, coupled with air- China Sea altered the status quo or Taiwan craft purchases from Russia, an intransigent declared its independence. In the long run stand on territorial claims in the South the situation is less clear. Chinese strategists, China Sea, and a commitment to build a like counterparts in other countries of the re- force projection capability, sparks universal gion, will continue to face ambiguities and concern among regional security planners. uncertainties. Their approach will reflect a Whatever their disagreement may be high degree of nationalism manifested over the future shape of the regional security through a determination to secure China’s system, Chinese strategists concur that a cru- role as a pivotal force in regional affairs. cial juncture has been reached. In this light Much depends on policies implemented by Beijing’s major security challenge lies not in the United States in concert with regional allies. Such policies can resolve uncertainties Ronald N. Montaperto is a senior fellow in the or exacerbate them. In any event, broad en- Institute for National Strategic Studies at the gagement with China and especially strate- National Defense University. He has served as an gic dialogue with the PLA are essential to analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and shaping regional security to support vital taught at the U.S. Army War College. American interests. JFQ

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U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM)

MISSION: PACOM has a four-fold mission: to foster peace, democracy, and freedom throughout the Pacific Ocean region; to deter conflict through forward presence and combat ready forces; to strengthen political, economic, and security cooperation; and to win in war should deterrence fail. PACOM stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic, an area of responsibility which is more than 100 million square miles or roughly half of the earth’s surface.

BACKGROUND: PACOM was among three unified commands—including Far East Command and Alaskan Command—established in the region in 1947. The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) later absorbed the responsibilities of Far East

South Korean sentry, Foal Eagle ’93.

U.S. Air Force (Mike Reinhardt) Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway)

USS Tarawa at anchor in Hong Kong. U.S. Navy (Jeff Hilton)

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Command when it was disestablished in 1957. That (PACAF). In addition, PACOM has four sub-unified com- same year PACOM service component commands mands: U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), U.S. Forces Japan were formed with their headquarters in Honolulu (USFJ), Alaskan Command (ALCOM), and Special Opera- and CINCPAC headquarters were transferred to tions Command Pacific (SOCPAC); it also has two stand- Camp H.M. Smith near Pearl Harbor. Army, Navy, ing joint task forces (JTFs): Joint Interagency Task Force- and Air Force components re- West (formerly JTF-5), stood up in ported to CINCPAC and the 1989 to conduct counterdrug opera- Marines, under a type commander, to Japanese Maritime tions, and JTF-Full Accounting, formed Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. Self-Defense Force in 1992 to investigate the missing in Due to the extent of command re- ships. Southeast Asia. sponsibilities, CINCPAC was relieved of In 1972 PACOM took responsi- direct command of Pacific Fleet in bility for U.S. forces in the Indian 1958, although Deputy CINCPAC had Ocean, Southern Asia, and Arctic area previously assumed de facto command. under a worldwide unified command Command relations were further re- realignment. To the north, the com- aligned by the DOD Reorgani- mand also assumed responsibility for zation Act of 1958 with com- a portion of the Arctic Ocean and bat-ready forces placed under Aleutian Island chain formerly under the operational command of Alaskan Command. The Pacific coast- CINCPAC. PACOM has four com- line of South America became the re- ponent commands today: U.S. sponsibility of Atlantic Command

Army Pacific (USARPAC); U.S. Japanese Defense Agency which took responsibility for all ocean Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), areas fronting South America. including U.S. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific ALCOM, a sub-unified command formed in 1989, has (FMFPAC); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific responsibilities for the land, sea, and air defense of (MARFORPAC); and U.S. Pacific Air Forces Alaska, including the Aleutians and surrounding waters—less the air defense mission of the Alaskan region of North American Aerospace Defense Command Thai helicopter, (NORAD). Moreover, the PACOM area was expanded in Cobra Gold ’94. 1976 to include the east coast of Africa. The combined commands in the region are United Nations Command (UNC) and Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), both with headquarters collocated with USFK in Seoul. UNC is charged with oversight of the Armistice agreement of 1953 to preserve peace in Korea; CFC was established in 1978 to oversee bilateral military operations. JFQ Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway) Australian guarding Rapier missile, Pitch

Black ’93. U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) Russian MI–8 during combined search and

Joint Combat Camera Center (Andy Dunaway) rescue exercise. U.S. Navy (Jeff Hilton)

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Japan’s Emergent Security Policy By PATRICK M. CRONIN

Tokyo’s new outpost. Japanese Defense Agency

apan, long regarded as America’s global order. The panel delivered a report on bedrock ally in the Asia-Pacific region, “The Modality of the Security and Defense is in the midst of the most extensive Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st review of defense policy in more than Century” to Prime Minister Tomiichi Mu- J 1 twenty years. The results of this assessment rayama in August 1994. The National De- will likely unfold incrementally rather than fense Program is now under review, with an in one fell swoop. Nonetheless, by the end official version expected by year’s end. Even of the century we should see a new security if the advisory report receives a dilatory re- relationship between Washington and sponse, it will survive as a powerful guide for Tokyo, more autonomous Japanese military Japanese defense planners. Above all, the re- capabilities, and increased participation on port calls for a new comprehensive strategy, the part of Japan in multilateral security or- arguing that “Japan should extricate itself ganizations. from its security policy of the past that was, At the core of this rethinking is the if anything, passive, and henceforth play an likely emergence of a National Defense Pro- active role in shaping a new order.” Japan’s gram Outline in the coming year. Current post-Cold War strategy should rest on Japanese defense planning is based upon heightened multilateral cooperation, contin- guidelines outlined in 1976. A special advi- ued alliance with America, and well-bal- sory panel was named in early 1994 to re- anced, ready, and mobile military forces. structure the outline to reflect the emerging

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Cronin

While that three-pronged approach is not But none of these dangers is viewed as a new, the emphasis placed on the first and major mission for the Japanese military. In- third pillars, as opposed to a predominant stead, peacekeeping is clearly the new SDF reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, repre- raison d’être. Peacekeeping has been a grow- sents a discernible shift in strategy. ing mission ever since the Gulf War tainted Recasting Japanese security priorities has Japan’s international standing. Despite the obvious implications for the United States, fact that Tokyo contributed $13 billion to which has a force of some 47,000 personnel the coalition effort to counter Iraqi aggres- in Japan, including the Seventh Fleet flagship sion and belatedly sent minesweepers to the in Yokosuka, the Third Marine Expeditionary Gulf, Japan appeared unwilling to risk lives Force on Okinawa, and more than 100 Air for the international community. Peacekeep- Force combat planes. It is therefore signifi- ing received a tremendous boost from suc- cant that the report reaffirms cessful SDF participation in the U.N. Transi- faced with lower defense the centrality of the alliance tional Authority in Cambodia. Japanese budgets and downsizing, with the United States in the peacekeepers arrived in Mozambique and Japanese security calculus. The Rwanda in late 1994 as further deployments Japan is likely to put a report touts the present part- to the Middle East and Balkans were being premium on jointness nership as an alliance for actively considered. peace. It notes the essential Hence, it is not surprising that the advi- nature of the U.S.-Japan security relations sory panel pegged many of its recommenda- and urges both parties to reassert the al- tions for SDF restructuring on peacekeeping, liance’s rationale and make systemic im- to include organizing ground units for oper- provements to clarify bilateral roles and mis- ations other than war and humanitarian as- sions. It encourages building a missile sistance; shifting the focus of the Ground defense system with American collaboration, Self-Defense Force (GSDF) from large, slow- providing host nation support, and improv- moving platforms to highly mobile systems; ing combined operations. In addition, it calls emphasizing jointness among the services; for a NATO-style acquisition and cross-servic- enhancing intelligence; building long-range ing agreement, and for bilateral research, de- transport aircraft; considering midair refuel- velopment, and production. ing assets; acquiring maritime support ships Attention to strengthening defense rela- for sustainability; and bolstering research

Japanese Defense Agency tions with Washington is counterbalanced, and education in foreign languages and in- however, by an emphasis on multilateral ap- ternational relations expertise. Reflecting in proaches and autonomous capabilities. The part concern over the ability to respond agenda is centered on an expanded role in quickly to the Gulf War or another potential peace operations and regional organizations conflict, such as on the Korean peninsula, such as the Association of Southeast Asian the report recommends reorganizing, aug- Nations Regional Forum and the Council for menting, and streamlining the Japanese se- Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The curity apparatus in order to be in a position report urges U.S.-centered multilateralism to make a swift and substantial response in but does not state how alliance roles and time of crisis. missions will be related to the new agenda of Faced with the prospect of lower defense the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Absent a prox- budgets and downsizing ground forces, imate threat the report consistently refers to Japan is likely to put a premium on height- the opaque and uncertain environment of ened jointness. Large and historic barriers the post-Cold War era. Potential dangers are must be negotiated, however, if jointness is listed as disruption in international mar- to provide synergy on tomorrow’s battle- itime traffic, invasion of territorial air space, field. Prior to World War II the Imperial illegal territorial occupation, limited missile Army and Navy reported separately to the attack, terrorism, and armed refugees. Emperor without an intermediary to coordinate planning. Interservice rivalry was in- Patrick M. Cronin is a senior research professor tense as the army guarded against Russia, the in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, principal land power in the region, and the National Defense University, and Executive navy shadowed the United States, the major Editor of JFQ. maritime competitor. So colossal was the

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MSDF Aegis ships, and the ASDF Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

Awakened public opinion in Japan and political reform will inevitably require adjustments in U.S.-Japan security relations. Despite increased economic frictions, however, both countries appear to recognize the long-term mutual benefits of close and continued partnership in the post-Cold War era. In the words of a leading Japanese analyst, Takeshi Kondo: From the moment that the Japan-U.S. alliance breaks down, Japan will start having enormous difficulties in its relationship with other Asian countries. Nor will these difficulties be limited to Asia. Japan will also

U.S. Air Force (Lem Robson) have a hard time in its relationships with Russia and Marine F/A–18, the Middle East....2 Japanese F–1, and From an American perspective, a reinvig- Air Force F–16 during chasm that the navy never informed the orated partnership with a more confident Cope North 94–1. army of its critical defeat at Midway while Japan is vital for ensuring regional and global the army privately set out to construct its stability. Meanwhile, a Japan active in the in- own submarines. ternational arena can bolster other market After the war Japan took some modest democracies on a vast range of traditional as steps toward inculcating its residual defense well as less traditional security issues. In sum, forces with a common culture. An interser- the demise of the old U.S.-Japan alliance is vice education system was instituted in 1952 giving rise to a new, improved partnership with the creation of the National Defense built upon constructive interdependence. JFQ Academy. A Central Procurement Office managed service acquisition and a Joint Staff NOTES Council coordinated service plans. Joint exer- 1 For an English translation of this document, see ap- cises provided basic operational training for pendix A to Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Re- the GSDF, the Maritime Self-Defense Force defining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force Program, McNair paper 31 (Washington: Institute for (ASDF). But jointness never really developed, National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, not least because of a deliberate policy to con- November 1994), pp. 21–60. 2 Takeshi Kondo, “U.S.-Japan Economic and Security strain military effectiveness. For example, the Relations,” Securitarian [Tokyo], July 1, 1994, p. 14. services face elementary problems in conducting joint operations because of poor or nonexistent means of rapid communication. It is unlikely that Japan will adopt any sweeping reforms such as the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act in the near future. Peacekeeping deployments to Mozam- bique and more recently to Rwanda involved both the GSDF and ASDF. Of course, deploying multiservice contingents is far different from employing joint forces in ways that provide added military capabilities. In particular, any future deployment of a theater missile defense system—which is currently only under preliminary joint study with the United States—probably would require intense coordination among GSDF missiles,

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he United States and North Korea with North Korea in six months. Also, alter- reached a framework agreement in native energy sources (heavy oil) will be pro- October 1994 that has profound vided until the first light-water reactor is Tconsequences for the security of completed. With regard to normalizing rela- the Korean peninsula. Under a reciprocal tions, Washington and Pyongyang agreed to process of approximately ten years’ duration, reduce trade and investment barriers, open the accord seeks to change the status of liaison offices in their respective capitals, North Korea’s nuclear development from a and upgrade bilateral relations to the ambas- temporary freeze to total abandonment. sadorial level based on progress in other Graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and re- areas. Moreover, the accord promotes the lated facilities would be frozen within a implementation of the North-South Korea month and placed under International Joint Declaration for denuclearization and Atomic Energy Agency supervision, but re- reconvening North-South dialogue. solving past suspicions is postponed five While a crisis was averted and the Cold years. In addition, America will form and War in Northeast Asia is coming to a close, represent an international consortium to re- there is widespread dissatisfaction over this place graphite-moderated with light-water agreement. Many consider it as welcome but reactors and negotiate a supply contract as leaving much to chance. They object to a five-year postponement before special inspections can be implemented and feel that all provisions of the accord Assessing the may not be faithfully carried out. Many people in Japan and South Korea are dissatisfied with the fund- U. S.-North Korea ing of the light-water reactor. Other reservations about the agreement fuel this dissatisfaction. One concern al- Agreement ready mentioned is the assumption that a reciprocal process of ten years— By MASAO OKONOGI

On the DMZ. U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart)

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while a light-water reactor is built—will pro- its relations with both the United States and vide a phased transformation of mistrust Japan. into mutual trust. In sum, the North Korean leadership is Criticism aside, North Korea would not attempting to sell, piece by piece and to the have acceded to an accord without a post- highest bidder, its outmoded baggage of the ponement period even if the United States Cold War such as nuclear development and had negotiated more effectively. What Kim Il gloomy relations with Japan and South Sung accepted in his talks with former Presi- Korea. Then Pyongyang hopes to adjust to dent Jimmy Carter was to freeze nuclear de- and survive in a new era. Time will be velopment, not abandon it. For North Korea needed to form a judgment on which rela- transferring spent fuel overseas tionship will improve first, Japan-North the North Korean leader- and early implementation of Korea or North Korea-South Korea. Without ship is attempting to sell special inspections would be doubt, however, the North will move toward tantamount to abandoning its the realization of cross-recognition. When it its outmoded baggage nuclear program. In other has sold its remnants of the Cold War, a new of the Cold War words, by the time Washing- international political system will emerge on ton accepted Carter’s media- the peninsula. tion, the option of economic sanctions al- Leaving aside the health of Kim Jong Il, ready had been abandoned, and to expect a North Korea’s future in the short term will more advantageous agreement than the one depend on whether he and other leaders can negotiated would have been unrealistic. complete the above process smoothly. This Another aspect is that Pyongyang views is the first hurdle. If they fail, the North will Washington as its only negotiating counter- be isolated internationally, economic hard- part and intends to fully rely on U.S. imple- ships will mount, the prestige of Kim Jong Il mentation of the agreement. The objective, will fall, and the new regime will face col- one may assume, is to maximize in future lapse in two or three years. This could entail overtures to Tokyo and Seoul the shock ef- a violent situation which is a worst-case sce- fect of the fact that the U.S.-North Korea ac- nario. On the other hand, if the North suc- cord was made over the heads of Japan and ceeds, relations with Japan and South Korea South Korea. Hereafter, North Korea will will improve and transfers of foreign capital adroitly utilize relations with America as and technology will commence. But improv- diplomatic leverage and to improve its posi- ing external relations does not guarantee the tion vis-à-vis Japan and South Korea. Py- long-term stability of the regime. If transfers ongyang may also try to make Tokyo and of foreign capital and technology progress, Seoul compete for an advantageous position. another kind of contradiction will be evi- This bodes well for implementing the dent—between the old regime that Kim Jong agreement. Not only that, North Korean Il is endeavoring to inherit and the new leaders will probably conform to U.S. policy policies for implementing an open economy. as much as they can and try to gain equal This is another hurdle. status with the South. Also in this accord the North Korea faces the same dilemma North pledged to make efforts together with that the former Soviet Union and China the United States to strengthen the interna- confronted. If the leadership stays firmly tional nuclear nonproliferation regime. Thus, committed to the old political system and from another perspective, it can be stated controls the flow of people, money, goods, that American diplomatic influence has ex- and information, economic reconstruction panded to the northern part of Korea. In this becomes impossible. On the other hand, if situation, the South should rid itself of the liberalized policies prevail, contradictions in inertia of the Cold War era and reconstruct the old system will become evident and demands for reform will grow. It is likely that the North Korean leadership, fearing politi- Masao Okonogi is professor of international cal instability, will try to separate moves to- relations at Keio University and has taught at ward openness and reform. But the prece- both the University of Hawaii and The George dents of the Soviet Union and China suggest Washington University. His works include a study that economic reform is needed to liberalize of American intervention in the Korean War.

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North Korean propaganda village. U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart)

and improve living standards, and systemic coexistence of the two Koreas. Doubt re- economic reform would have to extend to mains over how efficiently North Korea’s ideological and political reforms under this leadership can use foreign capital and tech- scenario. nology given its rigid political and economic There is a second scenario. If confronta- systems. But if the infrastructure is strength- tion between conservatives and reformers ened and basic industries rebuilt, it is possi- arises in Pyongyang—which seems in- ble that the North could harness its relatively evitable—the consequences would be dra- inexpensive, high-quality labor force to de- matic. A policy debate can easily turn into a velop labor-intensive enterprises. Japanese power struggle. In such circumstances con- capital and technology would do more than tradictions deepen regardless of who tri- open up North Korea’s economy and raise its umphs. The triumvirate of leadership, sys- standard of living. It would eventually pro- tem, and state would collapse and the North mote reform of its political system. So, for would be absorbed by the South and the Ko- better or worse, the economic exchange be- rean peninsula unified. It would be desirable tween North Korea and Japan after the nor- if North Korea avoided this scenario by malization of relations could serve as a cata- opening up and reforming its society, and by lyst for imploding the North Korean regime. establishing a Chinese-style socialist state. Even if that happens, however, a systemic South Korea is wary of the enormous costs collapse through a process of liberalization that would be involved in any sudden col- and reform is likely to resemble the German lapse of the North and rapid unification, rather than the Rumanian model. The agree- preferring instead long-term coexistence ment reached by the United States and North with an open socialist state to the North. Korea may well have paved the way for such The possibility of this scenario is low, but it a process. JFQ is another possible outcome. The role played by Japan in these circumstances is of some consequence. The transfer of capital and technology that is an- ticipated once bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea are normalized will help the North reconstruct its economy, if only temporarily, and also contribute to the

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MH– 53J Pavelow II at Taegu Air Base.

South Korea’s U.S. Air Force (Mike Reinhardt) Defense Posture By YOUNG-KOO CHA and KANG CHOI

rom a South Korean perspective, while Uncertainty and Threats the overall security environment im- Among South Korean security concerns, proved with the demise of the Soviet the foremost threat is presented by North Fempire, there is now greater uncer- Korea’s aggressive intentions and large mili- tainty and a growing number of threats with tary establishment. While it has signed im- which to contend. Mismanagement and important accords with Seoul—the Basic proper handling of emerging issues and lin- Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denu- gering problems will be detrimental to South clearization, and the Provisions—North Korean security as well as to stability and Korea has failed to implement the terms. peace throughout Northeast Asia. Within Rather it is committed to communizing the this environment, there are two compelling entire Korean peninsula by use of force. For necessities: first, to maintain a strong security Pyongyang unification calls for integrating alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) the divided territory as well as consolidating and the United States, and second, to aug- juche ideology and its ways. The North can- ment the ROK military on the peninsula and not afford to give up this ultimate goal be- across Northeast Asia. This article examines cause it has legitimized the regime and per- the uncertainty and threats that face South suaded its people to unite and to make Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and South Ko- sacrifices. Toward this goal North Korea has rean defense requirements. adopted a strategy of five besieging offensives: political peace, ideological, external/

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent diplomatic, espionage, and, finally, those of either the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, or the Korea military.1 But history has proven the first Institute for Defense Analyses.

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four to be unattainable. The North is left While it is uncertain whether North Korea with the military offensive in which it has has nuclear weapons, it definitely has the ca- an advantage over the South. In a word, pability to produce them.3 Strategically, a North Korea’s aggressive intent can be nuclear-armed North could prevent the backed only by military means. United States from using nuclear weapons Even with a faltering economy, North by holding South Korea and parts of Japan Korea has made every effort to modernize its hostage. Pyongyang could thus undermine forces and to maintain a military edge over extended deterrence and confound escala- the South.2 Not only are the North’s forces tion control in a conflict between the two highly mobile and mechanized; approxi- Koreas.4 In other words, by complicating mately 65 percent are near the demilitarized strategic responses and weakening the credi- zone (DMZ) and on a high state of readiness. bility of deterrence vis-à-vis the South, a nu- These strengths would permit the North to clear-armed North could gain an active de- launch a blitzkrieg against the South without terrent against the United States while reinforcement, redeployment, or massive launching a conventional attack. Thus, mobilization. It is believed that North Korea under any circumstance, North Korea can- plans either to sweep the entire peninsula not be allowed to acquire such weapons or before American reinforcements arrive or to retain a clandestine nuclear capability. partly occupy the Seoul metropolitan area in The focus on nuclear issues has tended the early stages of a war. In both cases South to overshadow other weapons of mass de- Korea, with its capital located only 40 kilo- struction, that is, chemical, biological, and meters from the DMZ, would suffer severely. toxin weapons. While one should not un- Arms control may be the most suitable derestimate the strategic value of biological way to reduce military tension along the and toxin weapons, chemical weapons are of DMZ. But arms control talks are unlikely to particular concern. Although party to the Bi- yield success. Though ological and Toxin Weapons Convention, North Korea is not committed initiatives have been pro- Pyongyang eschewed the Chemical Weapons to creating a stable military posed some 280 times Convention. Perhaps this is because it has since the Korean War, developed a reliable chemical weapons capa- situation on the peninsula most of them are unreal- bility. It is believed that the North has stock- istic and have served piled 1,000 tons of such weaponry and can mainly as propaganda. In fact, in the Basic produce 4,500 tons of chemicals annually. It Agreement and the Provisions, the North has various chemical agents, including sarin, agreed to introduce some declaratory arms tabun, phosgene, adamsite, mustard gas, and control measures and to negotiate further. But blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide).5 it has failed to do so. Moreover, it has been Furthermore, it has delivery means which trying to weaken the ROK–U.S. combined de- include artillery pieces, multiple-launch fense posture by demanding the withdrawal rocket systems, mortars, and missiles. of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as a precondition Rodong and Taepo Dong–2 missiles could for talks. Thus, North Korea is not committed threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United to creating a stable military situation on the States by making most major East Asian peninsula. Rather it tries to retain a militarily cities vulnerable to attack.6 favorable condition for achieving forceful In addition to these capabilities, there unification. One can therefore expect the mil- are sober operational reasons for being itary threat to continue. alarmed about chemical weapons. Unlike bi- The North’s conventional military ological and toxin weapons, chemical threat has been heightened by its possible weapons can yield immediate military ef- possession of weapons of mass destruction. fects by softening positions prior to assault, sealing off rear-echelon reserves, blocking lines of retreat, and neutralizing artillery.7 Young-Koo Cha is Deputy Director of the Policy These effects fit into North Korean offensive Planning Office in the Ministry of National doctrine. Even the threat of chemical Defense, Republic of Korea, and Kang Choi is an weapons is a force multiplier because it associate research fellow in the Arms Control Research Center at the Korea Institute for makes opponents use special protective Defense Analyses.

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equipment which reduces combat effective- and fuel capacity of more than 4,000 kilome- ness.8 Together with conventional superior- ters would greatly enhance air cover. PLAAF ity North Korea’s weapons of mass destruc- has also acquired an airborne refueling sys- tion and a diehard intent to unify the tem, and some A–5s and F–8s are allegedly peninsula by force present an ominous equipped with such kits. This in-flight capa- threat that will likely remain the most seri- bility will substantially increase China’s oper- ous security concern for Seoul in the foresee- ational flexibility and allow for “positioning able future. the launch site farther from the source of a Another, related uncertainty that con- potential counterstrike.”9 fronts South Korea stems from the instability The virtual dissipation of a land force re- of North Korea. While Kim Il Sung was alive quirement on the Sino-Russian border has the regime was regarded as being stable. His allowed China to divert resources to secure death last year has led to an artificially im- its maritime interests. In 1992 the navy posed stability. His son and apparent succes- added several classes of ships to the fleet. Its sor, Kim Jong Il, does not have the charisma continuing efforts to acquire an aircraft car- to consolidate power, but he may attempt to rier are known. With Russian naval versions legitimize his rule through economic reform. of the Su–27 Flanker or the MiG–29 Fulcrum However, history reveals that such revision is fighter, a carrier would significantly aug- likely to undermine the regime’s stability. ment China’s power projection capability This is Kim Jong Il’s dilemma. The real dan- and upset the naval balance in Asia. ger is that the leadership of North Korea will China’s shopping spree for advanced mobilize the populace to slow the breakdown weapons has caused Taiwan to launch its of the regime. Even if the North does not own arms buildup. Taipei is not likely to lag wage a “scapegoat war” against the South, behind Beijing’s military growth and mod- any sudden collapse of its government for ernization program.10 Sino-Taiwanese rear- economic and political reasons would be mament, left unchecked, could touch off a detrimental to South Korean security. How spiraling arms buildup throughout North- should we handle the inevitable chaos and east Asia. A resurgent Taiwan could arouse upheaval in North Korea? China to embark on a more intensified Tokyo is becoming wary of Should we help restore weapons procurement binge with help from Beijing’s increasing military order? Or should we facili- Russia and Ukraine. In turn, this could goad tate the collapse of the the Japanese into an arms race. Tokyo is be- power and the dangers of regime? What kind of mili- coming wary of Beijing’s increasing military competition tary preparedness and ac- power and the dangers of competition be- tions will be needed to tween the two countries. Accordingly, Japan manage a transitional period before peaceful is likely to match the Chinese buildup. Due unification? We should think now about to the size and maturity of its economy, ways to cope with such a collapse. Japan has formidable purchasing power and The third and last South Korean security the ability to develop a threatening arsenal concern is the arms buildup in neighboring at relatively short notice.11 states. In spite of a regional relaxation of su- Such buildups and modernization in the perpower tensions, or perhaps because of it, region may not pose an immediate threat to the countries of Northeast Asia are spending South Korea, but they are likely to increase more on defense and have announced force instability as well as the South’s defense bur- improvements, especially in naval and air ca- den in the long run. Furthermore, this trend pabilities. China has significantly beefed up will confuse ROK strategic calculations and its air force in recent years and is on a shop- predictions by presenting an ever-shifting ping spree for advanced aircraft. The publi- balance of power. In sum, South Korea faces cized purchase of 72 Su–27 Flanker fighters North Korea’s aggressive military, uncertainty from Russia will enhance the power projec- about the stability of the Pyongyang regime, tion capability of the People’s Liberation and a regional arms race. None of these secu- Army Air Force (PLAAF). Despite the defen- rity issues can be effectively managed by the sive role of the original design, the Su–27 can be converted to a multi-role combat/attack version. Its combat radius of 1,500 kilometers

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South alone and require close cooperation the leading American role in managing re- with the United States. gional security, deterring North Korean aggression, providing the United States a for- The ROK–U.S. Security Alliance ward base, and maintaining free trade and The alliance between South Korea and markets by protecting strategic resources and the United States, which began with the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Based ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, on common interests, we can divide respon- has been the backbone of South Korean de- sibilities and design a framework for security fense. It has provided a secure environment cooperation. for the South’s economic miracle and de- So long as the South-North confronta- mocratization and contributed greatly to tion continues, U.S. forces can provide a bal- peace and stability in Northeast Asia by de- ance on the peninsula, compensating for the terring communist expansion. The ROK–U.S. insufficiency of ROK forces. If peaceful coex- security arrangement has changed with the istence between the North and South takes environment. It started with a patron-client root, the Korean-U.S. security arrangement relationship and evolved into a genuine al- can be adjusted. When the North Korean liance with the establishment of the threat is gone, for instance, the alliance ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command should be refocused from a peninsular to a (CFC) in 1978. With the birth of CFC, the al- regional perspective. South Korea would liance entered a partnership like no other, then assume the lead in crises on the penin- departing from the notion that it was merely sula while the United States would take the a by-product of the Korean War. South lead in regional and global crises with its Korea, based on its sustained economic de- partner playing a supporting role. This im- velopment and defense modernization, took plies that South Korea and the United States on more responsibility for its defense during should continue to nurture the alliance the 1980s, efforts that helped consolidate through mutually supporting security coop- the Korean-U.S. security partnership. eration, and also gradually transforming the With the end of the Cold War, many de- relationship from cost-sharing to responsi- bate the nature of the security order that bility-sharing. To maintain this kind of al- should take its place. We must recognize, liance, Seoul should strive for a more bal- however, that despite the diminished status anced force. Such a structure will enable the of the old international order, a new order South to assume a greater regional role and has not yet settled on Northeast Asia. While ease the American burden. the threat of global communist expansion is On the American side, it is essential to virtually gone, the threat from the North maintain a reliable and clear naval and air lingers on the Korean peninsula. This means presence in the region, despite inevitable that the rationale of the traditional troop reductions. The U.S. presence has not ROK–U.S. security alliance is still valid. The only stayed a spiraling arms race but has pre- compact needs to look to its long-term struc- vented other regional actors from develop- ture and purpose—to a time when the mili- ing military capabilities. Of course, the tary threat from the North is insignificant— United States can reduce forces on the while grounded in the near- to mid-term peninsula after unification or a substantial requirement to maintain a credible deter- reduction in tension, while it maintains the rent. This transformation should not be force level of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). If we driven by a time constraint but by a realistic take into account the size of USFJ, we may assessment of the situation. In the mean- doubt whether the United States can fulfill time, both countries should identify com- the role of security guarantor in East Asia. mon security interests and present a clear se- Thus, even after unification, it would be de- curity vision, which could contribute to sirable for the United States to retain sub- peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well stantial forces in South Korea as a signal of as to the prosperity of both countries. its long-term resolve. In this regard, mutual security interests The Republic of Korea and the United can be identified as: preventing the emer- States should expand their partnership be- gence of a regional hegemon, maintaining yond the military sphere to tackle other challenges. Such a comprehensive security

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The Two Koreas shared responsibility that is comprehensive and driven by profit and common interests, North Korea South Korea not a threat. The speed of this structural Total Armed Forces 1,128,000 633,000 transformation will depend on trends in the Land Forces security environment on the peninsula and Tanks 3,700 1,900 in Northeast Asia. Policy changes that might Armored Personnel Carriers 2,500 2,000 affect ROK–U.S. security relations should be Artillery 2,300 3,500 made in a gradual manner while the com- Self-Propelled Artillery 4,500 900 bined deterrent capability of the two coun- Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems 2,280 140 tries is maintained. Surface-to-Surface Missiles 84 12 ROK Defense Requirements Surface-to-Air Missiles 10,000 1,020 Under that framework South Korea Helicopters 340 622 would have to assume greater responsibili- Air Forces ties which would require augmenting its Combat Aircraft 770 447 overall defense capability. But given the Naval Forces force level outlined in the Bottom-Up Re- Submarines 25 5 view to cope with two major regional con- Destroyers 0 8 flicts simultaneously, as few as four Army di- Frigates 3 32 visions, eight Air Force wings, and three Patrol Craft 390 122 aircraft carriers would be sent to the penin- Amphibious Craft 231 14 sula if war broke out there. That would represent a force level far below that required to Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994–1995 (London: Brassey’s for 12 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.) repel North Korea. In order to compensate for a deficient force level, ease the U.S. burden, maintain a reliable combined defense posture, and assume a greater responsibility relationship would include the political, eco- on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia, nomic, social, and environmental as well as South Korea must maximize the integrated military dimensions of security. Then we combat capabilities of its armed forces should clearly identify how our alliance of through a balanced improvement of each free market democracies serves those dimen- service and functional area. Considering the sions. For example, we can enhance our mu- North’s blitzkrieg planning and the destruc- tual competitiveness by expanded techno- tive power of its modern weapons, priority logical cooperation. Moreover, we can work must be given to improving technologically- together to secure resources and safeguard advanced assets like early-warning and bat- SLOCs. In sum, a comprehensive ROK–U.S. tlefield surveillance, air-ground-sea mobile security alliance could better serve the inter- warfare, and precision weaponry. ests of both countries well beyond the Ko- ROK land forces should focus on im- rean peninsula. Finally, we should focus on proving mobility and fire support with the linkage in the Korean-U.S. alliance and a lighter forces and a streamlined organiza- multilateral security order in Northeast Asia. tional structure.13 To prepare for offensive Most agree on the desirability of a subre- mobile war the army should reorganize gional mechanism. The main problems in corps, infantry divisions, and brigades into creating such an organ could be overcome mechanized forces. Reserve forces should by using our present bilateral alliance as the also be organized into infantry divisions and basis for a multilateral arrangement and supplied with firepower and equipment to making them mutually reinforcing. strengthen unit capability and reduce man- The current ROK–U.S. security alliance power. To establish a balanced force struc- should be retained and its framework ture, however, switching from the predomi- strengthened until the North Korean threat nantly army-based defense posture against decreases or disappears. In the meantime, we massive land attack to one that would secure should think about the modification of our traditional alliance to cope with a changing security environment. It should be transformed into a region-wide compact based on

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national air defenses and maritime interests, rapid deployment forces. Such a balanced South Korea must invest more in naval and force structure would enable South Korea to air capabilities than in the past. take responsibility for countering a low-in- Naval improvement must be focused on tensity North Korean provocation and to securing a qualitative superiority to counter- provide greater support to the United States balance the North’s numerical edge and in the region. This would strengthen our al- changes in the security environment. The liance in the long term, making it a true ROK navy should have a balanced, three-di- partnership. JFQ mensional combat capability comprising surface, underwater, and aviation. To prevent NOTES North Korean submarines from cutting off 1 Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, SLOCs, the navy especially needs submarines, Defense White Paper 1993–1994 (Seoul: Ministry of Na- helicopters, and surface patrol tional Defense, 1994). 2 Ibid., p. 55. South Korea should planes (P–3Cs). In addition, there 3 There is a controversy over whether North Korea should be more exercises held by enhance C3I to augment has a nuclear capability. But most South Koreans think the ROK and U.S. navies de- that they have at least the wherewithal to produce some combined forces signed to supplement the multi- nuclear weapons. Some people also believe they have al- national Rim of the Pacific (RIM- ready made a crude nuclear device. 4 Young-Koo Cha, “Security Threat Perceptions: A PAC) exercise conducted biennially since Korean View,” a paper presented at a workshop on “Real 1971 under U.S. Pacific Fleet Command. Threat Perceptions in Asian States” cosponsored by the With regard to airpower, it is imperative East-West Center, the Center for Naval Analyses, and to secure assets that can meet the require- the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Hon- ments of future warfare and that are appro- olulu on August 24–25, 1992, p. 4. 5 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Chemical priate to the geography of the Korean penin- and Biological Warfare Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence Re- sula. Currently, the ROK government is view(Asia) (May 1993), p. 228. proceeding with the Korean Fighter Program 6 “Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” in (KFP) to secure next-generation combat air- Proceedings of RINSA International Symposium ‘94 on Ca- craft. This program includes the gradual in- pabilities and Prospect of Special Weapon System of 14 North Korean Military, September 1, 1994, pp. 26–31. troduction of 120 F–16s. But the air force 7 Michael Sheehan, “North Korea’s Chemical, Biolog- also needs an enhanced electronic warfare ical and Toxin Warfare Capabilities: Implications and capability to increase the survivability of tac- Options,” in Proceedings of RINSA International Sympo- tical aircraft and to counter electronic war- sium ‘94, September 1, 1994, p. 70. fare as well as strengthened defense of core 8 Ibid., p. 87. 9 James G. Roche, “Tactical Aircraft, Ballistic and Korean and U.S. combat facilities. Finally, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Developing World,” a 3 South Korea should enhance its C I system paper presented at the conference on the Project on Ad- to augment the interoperability of combined vanced Weaponry in the Developing World sponsored forces and link its land and air forces. The by the American Association for the Advancement of fact that peacetime operational control Science in Washington on June 11–14, 1992, p. 12. 10 Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi, “Land-Based Con- passed to South Korea at the end of 1994 fidence-Building Measures in Northeast Asia: A South makes this even more important. Washing- Korean Perspective,” a paper presented at a conference ton should encourage Seoul to acquire C3 on Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue cosponsored technologies. by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation In the meantime, we should also focus and the National Institute for Research Advancement in Tokyo on May 16–17, 1994, p. 16. on training to operate these systems and 11 Buzen and Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” structures. The formation of CFC in 1978 pp. 9–10. enhanced combined operations by enabling 12 Heritage Foundation, “The Folly of Clinton’s De- South Koreans and Americans to work to- fense Plans for Korea,” Backgrounder, no. 228 (Washing- gether. Through Exercise Team Spirit both ton: The Heritage Foundation, June 28, 1994), p. 2. 13 Defense White Paper 1993–1994, pp. 100–02. countries have been provided with valuable 14 Ibid., pp. 104–06. opportunities to conduct a combined mission at peninsula-level. We should expand combined exercises to the regional level to cope with the new security environment. Depending on the nature of potential crises, we should think about forming combined

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Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Two Tracks Joint Combat Camera Center (Robert Shanks) U.S. and Thai officers planning amphibious By RALPH A. COSSA operations.

t was not that long ago that most U.S. Previously support had arisen in ASEAN, policymakers and their Asian counter- and particularly on the part of the Philip- parts viewed multilateralism with suspi- pines, for introducing security issues into Icion. When the Japanese foreign minis- PMC deliberations. The way was eventually ter suggested establishing a forum to discuss cleared at the 1992 PMC in Manila when a regional security issues at the 1991 Associa- joint statement was issued on the peaceful tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) settlement of territorial disputes involving Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) his mo- the Spratly Islands which are claimed in tion was not well received. The United their entirety by both China and Taiwan and States, for one, was cool to such a proposal. partially by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philip- Over the last few years, however, there have pines, and Vietnam. been decided shifts in American and re- Regional nongovernmental organiza- gional attitudes toward, as well as support tions (NGOs), many of which have close for, multilateral security initiatives. On the government affiliations, were also calling for U.S. side, the first clear signal came in 1993 greater multilateral security dialogue at offi- during Senate confirmation hearings for the cial and NGO levels. Moreover, in 1991–92, post of Assistant Secretary of State for East a consortium of institutes that focus on se- Asia and Pacific Affairs when the nominee, curity and international affairs in the ASEAN Winston Lord, identified an enhanced mul- region collaborated with similar organiza- tilateral security dialogue as one of ten ad- tions in the United States, Japan, and Korea ministration priorities for Asia. to promote official and nongovernmental security dialogue which set the stage for

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both the Council for Security Cooperation Asia—also added to earlier cautious ap- in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN proaches to multilateral security initiatives Regional Forum (ARF). both in Washington and in the capitals of Given this groundswell of support, the the region. Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa On a positive note, however, other less called for a meeting similar to that proposed ambitious multinational efforts have been in 1991 when he visited Bangkok two years silently making headway for decades. The later. President Bill Clinton iced the cake Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), for when he embraced the idea of multilateral se- instance, which links Australia, Malaysia, curity dialogue in Asia, referring to it as a pil- New Zealand, Singapore, and the United lar of his vision for a new Pacific community Kingdom, has been in effect for more than during a trip to Japan twenty years and helps promote understand- the time is right to seize the and South Korea. This ing, trust, and complementarity among opportunities that multilateral change in attitude was Asian and Western nations. In addition, it solidified at the 1993 offers indirect linkages, via the Australian security initiatives hold PMC when participants connection, between the United States and met informally with the the ASEAN members of FPDA. representatives of China, Russia, Vietnam, Regional militaries have often taken the and other PMC observers. The group decided lead in multinational efforts thanks to the that they would reconvene the following year success of programs promoted by our Armed in the precedent-setting ARF. Forces. The Pacific Armies Senior Officer Lo- It is important to note that the Presi- gistics Seminar (PASOLS), for instance, cre- dent, among others, has stressed that Asian ated by the U.S. Army in 1971, annually multilateral security initiatives must build brings together officers from more than on, and remain compatible with, the endur- twenty countries to discuss common logis- ing bilateral relationships that continue to tics matters as well as combined operations serve Asian peace and stability. There seems and training. Similarly, the Pacific Armies to be a clear consensus not only in Washing- Management Seminar (PAMS), begun in Joint Combat Camera Center (Robert Shanks) ton but among officials across Asia that to be 1978, is a forum for senior officers from effective multilateral initiatives should build more than thirty nations to discuss military on and not seek to replace existing relation- management problems. Recent agendas of ships. Nonetheless, there is growing senti- PASOLS and PAMS meetings have focused on ment that the time is right to seize the op- international peacekeeping and disaster re- portunities that complementary, multilateral lief, operational areas apropos to multina- security initiatives hold. tional efforts. These initiatives have also provided a Military/Security Initiatives comfortable venue for officers from China, This is not to imply that multilateral se- Russia, Japan, and India, among others, to curity arrangements are totally new to Asia. interact with counterparts from other coun- Many have been attempted, a significant tries that they would find it politically diffi- number under American sponsorship. Some, cult, if not impossible, to meet on a bilateral like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization basis. Such confidence-building measures (SEATO), could not stand the test of time. have also enabled proposals emanating from The failure of these pacts may have height- the ASEAN PMC, ARF, and several NGOs for a ened skepticism of multilateral security al- more structured multilateral forum for talks liances in South and Southeast Asia. The among defense officials and military officers. backing of Asian multilateral initiatives by the Kremlin during the Cold War—seen as Political/Economic Activities thinly-veiled attempts to weaken American Multilateral mechanisms can serve as influence and gain Soviet footholds in building blocks for more ambitious Asian multilateral initiatives. While security-ori- Colonel Ralph A. Cossa, USAF (Ret.), is Executive ented endeavors have proliferated since Director of Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously he 1991, they are complemented by a wide served as a senior fellow in the Institute for range of multilateral economic activities that National Strategic Studies at the National Defense also continue to flourish in the region. University and as a regional intelligence analyst.

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Osan Air Base, Korea. the most successful practical examples of Asian multilateral cooperation. Through its various mechanisms and close affiliation with think tanks in the region, ASEAN has helped lay the basis for several of the most promising emerging multilateral activities. Emerging Security Mechanisms At the official level ARF convened its in- augural meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 which brought together ministers from all six ASEAN members (namely, Brunei, In- donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa- pore, and Thailand) with their dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and European Union) and other regional players (China, Russia, and Vietnam, plus Papua New Guinea and Laos). The meeting issued a final communiqué that underscored a commitment “to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern” in order to make “significant efforts toward confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.” Ministers agreed to convene annually with the next meeting scheduled for this coming summer in Brunei. ARF is particularly suited to serve as the Combat Camera Imagery (Mark A. Borosch) consolidating and validating instrument behind the many security initiatives proposed by governmental and NGO sessions in recent years. Its support of ideas such as an arms U.S. Navy Japanese destroyer register, exchanges of unclassified military in- Sawakaze underway formation, maritime security cooperation, in Pearl Harbor. Of particular importance is the Asia Pa- preventive diplomacy, and other confidence- cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum building measures should generate more sup- that links 18 regional economies. While port for both official and nongovernmental aimed at managing the ramifications of efforts to develop innovative measures for growing interdependence, it also has signifi- dealing with sensitive security issues. cant political and security consequences. The most promising mechanism at the While few support adding security topics to NGO level is CSCAP, which links regional se- the APEC agenda, the fact that the 1993 and curity-oriented institutes and, through 1994 APEC meetings were conducted by them, broad-based committees comprised of heads-of-state gave a political-security di- academics, security specialists, and former mension to the organization. The most im- and current foreign and defense ministry of- portant outcome of these meetings, like ficials. Committees have been formed in other dialogues, may be the process itself Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South since exchanges promote understanding that Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philip- often results in reducing the risk of conflict. pines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Another multinational organization States as well as the European Union. North with economic foundations has also as- Korea, India, Russia, and Vietnam, among sumed important political and security dimensions. ASEAN, formed in 1967, is one of

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others, have expressed interest in joining. coalition assembled to deal with Iraqi ag- Given CSCAP’s inclusivity—its bylaws en- gression during Desert Storm). courage membership by any country or terri- Yet despite such limitations, emerging tory that supports multilateral dialogue and multilateral security mechanisms can be im- confidence-building—attempts are being portant as vehicles for promoting long-term made to bring both China and Taiwan into peace and stability in Asia. Among their ap- the organization. plications, they could: CSCAP, which predates ARF, is now focus- ▼ assist Japan in becoming a more “normal” ing on providing direct support while pursu- nation ing other “track-two” diplomatic efforts. Sev- ▼ facilitate greater Chinese integration eral CSCAP issue-oriented working groups are ▼ allow Russia to play a constructive secu- dedicated to topics found in the ARF commu- rity role niqué. Of particular note is a multinational ▼ help ensure continued U.S. engagement ▼ working group—led by member committees assure that other regional voices are heard ▼ from the United States, Singapore, and provide governments with venues to test Korea—that is addressing security and confi- new ideas ▼ promote regional identity and greater co- dence-building measures in Asia. operation. Efforts aimed at dealing directly with Northeast Asia security concerns are also un- Japan. Multilateral security forums offer derway. Most are attempts to bring officials a particularly effective means for Japan to from the major Asian powers (viz., the become involved in regional security in a United States, Russia, China, and Japan), to- way that is nonthreatening to its neighbors. gether with representatives from North and It is unfortunate that a number of countries South Korea, to discuss regional security is- in the region are uncomfortable about sues. A few efforts, including one sponsored Japan playing an expanded security role. by CSCAP, include Canada as a central Nonetheless, as Japan strives for normaliza- player. NGO sponsorship is seen as key to tion, many voices at home and elsewhere bringing officials from these countries to- call for (and, in some cases, demand) it to gether since it permits them to participate in become more active internationally. Partici- a private, as opposed to official, capacity. pation in ARF and similar forums offers Japan a means to exert greater leadership in The Balance Sheet international security affairs. Multilateral security dialogue holds This is not to suggest that Japan should promise but has limitations. While multilat- remilitarize or chart a course independent eralism may better handle nontraditional from its closest security ally, the United problems such as refugees, pollution, and States. Japanese security efforts, to remain the like, bilateralism and ad hoc groups ap- nonthreatening to neighbors, must be accom- pear better suited for traditional plished within the framework of the U.S.- multilateral security threats. A NATO-style alliance Japan security alliance. U.N. peace operations dialogue holds promise aimed at defeating or contain- provide another useful forum for greater ing a specific threat, to the ex- Japanese participation in security affairs. but has limitations tent that it is relevant, simply China. Multilateral mechanisms are also does not apply to a post-Cold useful vehicles for interaction between War Asia. Broad-based forums like ARF and China and its neighbors. Beijing is gradually CSCAP are useful for discussing problems. overcoming its reluctance to engage in mul- They are ill-equipped (and not eager) to re- tilateral dialogue, as demonstrated by its solve crises once they have occurred. Insti- participation in ARF and APEC. China’s in- tutional forums are particularly valuable as volvement in a range of security-oriented confidence-building measures for avoiding, forums can promote transparency in its ca- not reacting to, crises. Ad hoc coalitions as pabilities and intentions in ways that con- well as focused issue- or problem-oriented tribute to regional stability. Should Beijing groupings appear more useful in solving be excluded or exempt itself from such fo- problems or dealing with Asian crises (as has been the case elsewhere, witness the

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rums there would be a tendency to perceive President Clinton has indicated that forward China as part of the problem, that is, as an military presence in Asia serves as the adversary to be contained, which would be bedrock for his vision of a new Pacific com- counterproductive. Care should be taken munity. Nonetheless, given lingering re- not to make either China or any other na- gional apprehensions, it remains incumbent tion the reason for multilateral security ar- on the United States to demonstrate that its rangements. On the other hand, China multilateral involvement is aimed at provid- must demonstrate a desire to cooperate with ing additional means of engagement and its neighbors. will not serve as a subterfuge or excuse for Russia. Multilateral forums offer Russia reduced military presence in Asia. similar opportunities for regional integra- Multilateral forums also provide avenues tion. The Kremlin has signaled a desire to for other regional actors to raise security is- become more directly involved in multilat- sues of mutual concern. The capability of eral security dialogue in Asia. For example, ASEAN to amplify the voices of its individual during the U.N. Security Council debate members further demonstrates the utility of over sanctions against North Korea, Russia multinational mechanisms for smaller na- proposed an international conference of tions. Track-two organizations such as major Asian states to help CSCAP can also provide “benign cover” for forward military presence defuse the crisis (thereby governments to vet policies and strategies in in Asia serves as the bedrock giving Moscow a seat at an academic setting prior to adopting formal the table). Russia’s in- proposals at the official level. Moreover, for a new Pacific community volvement in the Asian NGOs can serve as advocates for the inter- security dialogue pro- ests of nations, territories, and regional motes a degree of familiarity and respectabil- groups that may be excluded from official ity that also bolsters those in the Kremlin gatherings. In addition, nations that find it most committed to reform and international politically unacceptable or uncomfortable to cooperation. The Russian foreign ministry engage in bilateral dialogue can interact at has also helped form a broad-based member the multinational level, particularly in NGO committee necessary to support the coun- forums. Asian multinational gatherings also try’s entry to CSCAP. contribute to a sense of regional identity and The United States. Organizations such as greater cooperation. This will no doubt spill ARF also provide a framework for continued over into the political and economic U.S. involvement in Asian security affairs. It spheres, just as growing political and eco- should be noted that America’s policy con- nomic cooperation has helped advance ex- version in support of multilateralism has panded security dialogue. raised concerns among Asian skeptics over Washington’s long-term commitment to the The time is opportune for the United region. Even traditional Asian proponents of States to become more actively involved in multilaterialism, although pleased with the emerging multilateral security mechanisms U.S. change of attitude, express anxiety that provided they support bilateral relation- multilateral security dialogue and coopera- ships. Efforts that build on existing bilateral tion not be used as a rationale for a reduced relationships and multilateral economic, po- military commitment. They are worried that litical, and low-key security initiatives in Americans (particularly in Congress) will see Asia are particularly valuable. ARF at the multilateral security arrangements as a sub- governmental level and CSCAP at the NGO stitute for a continued military presence by or track-two level are especially relevant the United States in Asia. steps. Subregional groupings focused on Policymakers in Washington seem to be Northeast Asia could also make a significant aware of this concern and stress that support contribution. JFQ for increased regionalism is built on the premise that multilateral efforts complement, and should not be viewed as a substitute for, enduring bilateral relationships.

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Thai soldiers in Tandem Thrust ’93.

AMERICA U.S. Air Force (Marvin Krause) and the Asia-Pacific Region By WILLIAM T. PENDLEY

hange is a word heard so often that with almost a billion people and a growing it has lost its impact. Most of the at- middle class. tention to change in Asia has been Centers of international power and lead- Cfocused on dynamic economic ership have historically been aligned with growth. It would be almost impossible to the global economic axis. In the age of miss a shift as dramatic as that in the global Greece and Rome that axis centered on the economic axis reaching from the Atlantic to Mediterranean. In the age of European colo- the Pacific basin. The world’s highest growth nial dominance and the rise of America, it rates are in Asia and huge mar- moved to the Atlantic. At some point in the Japan is grappling with kets are opening throughout the late 1980s and without fanfare, the GNP of region. One must aggregate the the Asia-Pacific region exceeded that of Eu- a fundamental identity member nations of the European rope. With Japan and America accounting crisis that it avoided Union to equate Europe with for more than 40 percent of world GNP, the facing in the Cold War Japan or, increasingly, with axis shifted again. But economic change is greater China which includes only part of the dynamic. It could be both Taiwan and Hong Kong. overemphasized while more significant No single nation in Europe, not even a re- strategic changes are ignored. unitied Germany, comes close. To Japan and Japan is grappling with a fundamental greater China must be added South Korea identity crisis that it avoided facing in the and member states of the Association of Cold War. Can it find an international iden- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which tity through a global economic leadership have a growing regional economy with more role while still tying its political and security than 300 million people. If the region is expanded to include South Asia, India is added

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interests to those of the United States? Will but rather what has not changed and may it instead seek that international identity in not change even with a new generation of closer relations within Asia? leaders. A hundred years of foreign domina- Regardless of the road Japan takes, its tion followed by the excesses of the Great close and largely subordinate relationship Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in a with the United States will change. The period of relative isolation caused China to growing value of global and Asian markets miss major conceptual changes in the world. will lessen the relative importance of Amer- It is still stuck in a 19th century mindset rep- ica to Japan. The protracted conflict and resented by territorial great powers with large competition in U.S.-Japan economic rela- military forces. It still focuses on national tions will push Japan in other directions. sovereignty issues and rejects interdepen- Technological progress will allow Japan to dence and international cooperation except choose advanced military technologies suffi- in narrow, self-serving ways. It pursues age- cient to provide for its defense. While Japan’s less border disputes that have led to a variety reorientation may be slowed by stumbling ef- of limited conflicts since the Korean War. forts at reform and more effective govern- Probably the most destabilizing factor in ment, it will still evolve into a more indepen- the next decade will be modernizing the dent state. This change has vital strategic People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with empha- implications for the United States. sis on its air and naval forces and power pro- It is fashionable to focus on China’s eco- jection capabilities. China remains insensi- nomic development and uncertain political tive to the impact that its actions have on future. This has resulted in extreme projec- other states because it assumes that they options on both counts. China’s economic erate on the same 19th century conceptual growth potential has been overestimated in basis. This assumes that the Japanese moti- straight line projections similar to Japan be- vation for rearming will be unaffected by fore its economic bubble burst. Some cite Chinese military modernization since rear- growing inflation and an overheated Chi- mament would happen anyway as a result of nese economy as well as the sluggish transi- national sovereignty and a drive for great tion from state enterprises to a market econ- power status. Emphasis is thus on taking ad- omy as signs of imminent collapse. Political vantage of Japan’s restraint to gain a forecasts run from the return to hard-line stronger relative position. Military modern- conservatism to the breakup of China into ization coupled with territorial disputes and provincial power centers. China’s perception of what a great power is Economic and political change will and how it should act makes for an uncer- probably continue but at an uneven pace. tain and probably dangerous future for both The economic boom will peak and level off Asia and the United States. as China is forced to deal with nagging eco- Korea is a powder keg with a short fuse nomic sectors that it has tried to ignore. The positioned at the point of convergence of new generation of leadership appears more Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and American technocratic and less ideological than its an- interests. The departure of Kim Il Sung has tecedent. Although there may be more heralded a new era. The collapse of the democratic progress in the Chinese Commu- Pyongyang regime is underway and only its nist Party, including internal dissent, there timing and method remain unknown. Kim will be opposition to creating rival political Jong Il inherited a failing state that had only movements. been held together by the personality cult of The greatest danger that China will pose his father. In the face of a rapidly declining over the next decade is neither economic economy and growing discontent, he must growth nor uncertainty over its leadership, make changes to improve living conditions without threatening those elites who could depose him. Such changes can only be real- Rear Admiral William T. Pendley, USN (Ret.), ized by an economic opening of the North teaches at the Air War College and was previously and its integration into the international Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East economy—the so-called China model. Asia and Pacific Affairs. He also served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), U.S. Pacific Changes needed to prolong a dynastic Command. regime in the short term will unleash forces

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policy or military presence is seen as an impediment to reunification, Korean national- ists will sever the relationship during the reunification process or shortly thereafter. Fostering a positive long-term relationship requires new thinking on the alliance among Americans and South Koreans. It requires a military reorganization that accu- rately reflects the roles and contributions of both partners. The principal change in Korea and most of Asia is a vibrant nationalism firmly rooted in pride over the economic progress made during the last three decades. Recognizing that change is essential to U.S. strategic interests in the region.

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) Southeast Asia is the real frontier of East Japanese ASDF Asia where the interests of the major powers personnel loading may clash. Unlike the Vietnam War era when AIM–9 missile. in North Korean society that will ultimately some Americans read every struggle in South- change or destroy that regime. east Asia as a drive for Chinese hegemony, This does not mean that North Korea Beijing’s future efforts in the South China Sea will pass easily from the world scene but may constitute just such a move. While only that the regime will be gone by early in China’s aims in the region may be primarily the next century. It is extremely difficult for economic, expanding territorial claims and external powers to influence the decline and military modernization could be seen as an ultimate end of an isolated regime with effort to get a stranglehold on Japan’s vital strong military forces and a deeply rooted sea lines of communication and hinder ac- ideology, notwithstand- cess to the Persian Gulf. The one constant in the passing of North Korea is ing the October 1994 nu- Southeast Asia is its geostrategic position, clear framework accord. and that constant has become more impor- simply a minor transition in The challenge to the in- tant in an industrialized world economy the long history of East Asia ternational community which is increasingly dependent upon free will be to avoid a major trade and access to energy resources. conflict or a spillover into South Korea of in- Geography is a constant in strategic ternal upheavals in the North. This requires terms, but there has been dynamic change continuing to retard Pyongyang’s nuclear in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese threat in program but with realistic goals. It also de- the region was a galvanizing force for ASEAN mands an innovative policy for opening the and led to initiatives that went beyond end- North economically to hasten either positive ing Hanoi’s occupation of Cambodia. Closer changes in the regime and its integration relations were forged among national elites into the international community or its to mitigate old disputes. Dynamic economic peaceful departure from the scene. growth led by Singapore spilled over fron- The passing of North Korea is simply a tiers to deepen the regional integration and minor transition in the long history of East establish what Robert Scalapino has termed Asia. More important will be the strategic Natural Economic Territories. changes resulting from a unified Korea, and While rapid economic growth has rein- they must be the focus of U.S. policy. The forced nationalism in Southeast Asia, there foundations for relations with a reunified has been a determined effort by ASEAN to Korea in the next century will be laid in the foster multilateralism through economic, po- next decade. It is critical that America be litical, and security initiatives. This has been viewed by Koreans as a positive force in the not only a reaction to Vietnamese expansion peaceful reunification of their nation. If U.S. but also a recognition of the growth in Chi- nese and Japanese power which no regional state can deal with unilaterally. Through multiple tracks the members of ASEAN

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sought direct engagement with China and at- economic growth of recent years, America’s tempted in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Con- political and security interests sprang from its ference (PMC) and other multilateral forums economic interests. Even in the Cold War a to integrate China into regional dialogues. Si- major motivation of national security policy multaneously, individual ASEAN states tried was to ensure that Japan’s economy would re- to maintain American presence and engage- tain a Western tilt. The growth of our domes- ment in the region. One result of these ef- tic economy and maintenance of a healthy forts has been the launching of the ASEAN international economy will depend in large Regional Forum (ARF) for a multilateral secu- part on the continued expansion of the Asian rity dialogue and bilateral measures such as economy in the next century. Thus political, the U.S.-Singapore facilities agreement. economic, and security engagement will only ASEAN has been a leader in multilateral ap- support American interests as it contributes to proaches because of the realities present in peace and stability. relations among its members and Vietnam, While interests remain constant, poli- China, Japan, and the United States. The cies must evolve with regional changes. same multilateral approaches have the po- With Japan it is essential to forge a more bal- tential to benefit the region as a whole. anced alliance with a decreasing reliance on the security component and an increasing American Interests emphasis on political aspects. Only under a After more than a century of engagement broader alliance can mutual benefits be bal- American interests in East Asia remain rela- anced; and without such an alliance relatively consistent. The United States has tions will continue to be defined in narrow sought access to resources, markets, and capi- security or economic terms with public sup- tal, as well as the freedom of navigation in port on both sides of the Pacific rapidly the waters of the region, which has led to op- eroding. Such an alliance requires more fre- posing the dominance of a single power that quent high-level American political contacts could pose a threat to such access or freedom than in the past. of navigation. In recent years the Nation has It will also be important for the United promoted market economies as well as States to consolidate its military bases in human rights and democratic institutions Japan and if necessary reduce its force struc- which support its interests. During its engage- ture. With a change in the Pyongyang regime ment in Asia and long before the dramatic or reunification on the peninsula, Washing- ton should expect to further reduce its forces Repatriating Chinese in Northeast Asia. Given a reluctance to fight refugees from another conflict on the Asian mainland, ef- Kwajalein Island. forts should be made to maintain U.S. air and naval presence with limited though highly mobile ground forces. This will be easier once the Korean issue is resolved. While changes in the Asian security environment will permit reduced ground forces, America should seek access and support agreements that will guarantee its ability to protect its interests and those of its allies. The U.S.-Japanese alliance is seen by many in Asia as both an insurance against Japanese militarism and an assurance of continuing U.S. engagement. This makes it vital to balance reduced military presence with strengthening of the alliance in other areas. While Washington and Tokyo will continue to be economic rivals, it is vital that bilateral economic issues are resolved to avoid damaging the alliance by mismanaging economic relations. As change continues to buffet Asia it U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

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will be increasingly meaningful to subordinate short-term national security and economic in- Australians boarding terests to broader strategic objectives. Marine CH–53D American relations with China have Sea Stallion. been difficult for half a century. The United States has considered China its real enemy in two Asian wars. Only from 1972 to 1989 was the relationship a loose strategic partnership. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China turned its attention and anxiety toward the United States. It feared an America that would take advantage of a perceived unipolar world to throw its weight around to seek global dominance. Operation Desert Storm

and public discussion of China as a potential U.S. Navy (Terry C. Mitchell) enemy only added to this perception while underscoring the technological weakness of the Chinese military. China viewed itself as tives share common interests in maintaining the possible new object of a more aggressive peace and stability in Asia. U.S. containment policy. The decision by the Clinton administra- On the other hand, the United States tion last year to decouple most-favored-na- was unsure of China’s intentions. Missile tion trading status from human rights and and nuclear technology exports, aggressive to reengage China in political, economic, territorial claims, continuing defense budget and security dialogues was an important step growth, and a history of support to the toward broader strategic engagement. Sup- Khmer Rouge and Iran made China a chal- port for multilateral initiatives such as ARF is lenge to the peaceful global order that the also important. While direct leverage on United States hoped China is limited, how Washington manages it is important that our forward would replace the its security relationship with Tokyo, rela- presence not be viewed as Cold War. These con- tions with Taipei, and force structure in Asia cerns unfolded against has a positive or negative influence on Bei- threatening by Chinese eyes a backdrop of Tianan- jing’s actions. It is important to maintain a men Square and cur- strong security relationship with Japan and a tailed contacts between the United States force structure in Asia which is reassuring in and China. A strong lobby in Congress the context of that relationship. It is equally brings together human rights activists and important that our forward force presence supporters of Taiwan, two groups which op- not be viewed as threatening by Chinese pose normal relations with Beijing. Yet U.S. eyes. It is this delicate balance that may per- strategic interests require engagement with mit a continuation of peace and stability in China, the center of Asia and the fastest Asia and discourage a regional arms race growing economy in the world. China casts over the next decade. a growing shadow over all the subregions of It is also essential to press for an end to Asia. As a permanent member of the U.N. the North’s nuclear weapons program. But Security Council it has a major voice in that it may be naive to think that this pro- organization’s role in crises around the gram—which is at the core of Pyongyang’s globe. By accepting or rejecting the Missile security concerns—will be terminated Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear through diplomatic negotiations. The best Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chinese will be that one could probably hope to achieve is a major determinant in the pace of global to slow the progress of the program while proliferation. Attempts to contain or working to peacefully change the regime’s threaten China could lead to a Cold War international conduct. The objective is not that is not in the interest of either China or merely to end the North Korean nuclear the United States, which for different mo- weapons program but more importantly to change the regime in order to peacefully re- unify the Korean peninsula or to integrate

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Korea. This will facilitate transitioning CFC to the Korean general officer who exercises peacetime operational control over all South Korean forces in CFC. While a U.S. Army four-star general should retain the U.N. Com- mand, it is not necessary for him to be located in Korea, and this command should be activated only for major exercises or in the event of a new conflict. Negotiating access agreements for port, air, and supporting facilities throughout East Asia and the Pacific will be vital in maintaining flexible power projection in an era of de-

U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart) creasing overseas basing. Southeast Asia is a Conference Row, priority area for such agreements. That prior- Panmunjom. ity is a result of U.S. withdrawal from Philip- the North as a positive participant in the pine bases and a continuing need to be able international community. to project forces into the Persian Gulf re- While the North Korean transition plays gion. This calls for a wide range of old and out, it will be vital to maintain a strong de- new policy initiatives. America must revital- terrent in South Korea and unified positions ize its alliance with Thailand, which has with South Korea and Japan on policy initia- been strained by the Cambodian situation, tives toward North Korea. It will be increas- and also explore alternative access arrange- ingly important also to integrate China into ments with the Philippines in the context of consultations on engagement with North the existing security treaty. In addition, the Korea. Concurrently, America must continue United States must improve relations with moving toward a supporting role in its al- Indonesia and Malaysia, finalize an access liance with the Republic of Korea. The pres- accord with Brunei, and continue its facili- ence of a highly visible American comman- ties agreement with Singapore. der forty years after the armistice—in a Access agreements are not gifts and nation with twice the population and at there will be costs in the form of military as- least ten times the GNP of the North and sistance, improvements in infrastructure, re- which provides more than 90 percent of the gional exercises, and political engagement. forces for its own defense—is no longer real- These costs will be insignificant, however, istic or in the best interest of the United when measured against maintaining the States. Continuing this arrangement can flexibility and necessary capability to project only foster anti-Americanism and the in- U.S. forces throughout the Asia-Pacific re- creasing vulnerability of the United States to gion and into the Persian Gulf. JFQ charges of prolonging the separation of the two Koreas. In this transition to a supporting role it is critical that deterrence not be undermined. This means maintaining our forces in the South as well as increasing air and missile defense systems. U.S. efforts should continue to emphasize rapid reinforcement of heavy forces but with priority on air and naval forces. The steps which have been taken to designate the Seventh Fleet Commander as the Combined Forces Command (CFC) naval component commander go in the right direction. The next logical step is to appoint an Air Force officer as commander of U.S. Forces

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The Joint Challenge to Interservice Training MH–60/MH–47E air By HENRY VICCELLIO, JR. refueling simulation.

U.S. Army

ew deny that the last several years management and efficiency. Change also of- have been a dynamic period for the fers opportunities to train as a team. Many military, possibly only matched by are working to expand and consolidate inter- F the period immediately after World service training, including members of War II. It has been a time of downsizing, Congress, the Office of the Secretary of De- budget cuts, policy debates, program cancel- fense, and the services. We can no longer af- lations, base closures, ford four independent training overheads. We train as a team... and an elusive peace div- Initiatives such as the Goldwater-Nichols fight as a team... idend. As the Armed DOD Reorganization Act and other actions Forces grapple with have genuinely improved Joint Professional and win as a team. change, the emphasis Military Education. The new mission of the —General Colin L. Powell, USA has been on improving Armed Forces Staff College—which prepares officers for joint duty at the appropriate

Summary

Throughout our history—in World War II, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, and other conflicts—the Armed Forces have proven they can effectively come together in a theater of operation and achieve victory. That is not to say there have not been problems of coordination and communication that have detracted from our past successes. One of the best ways of eliminating these problems is to focus on fundamentals by revamping and expanding interservice initial skills training programs. One example of a highly successful effort is the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System. There is a good deal of consolidated training taking place today and even more planned. Our objective is to teach every soldier, sailor, marine, airman, and coastguardsman the same basic skills. Through joint education and training the Armed Forces will be ready to meet the challenge of future conflicts and protect our national interests.

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point in their careers—is one example. Both offer courses with instructors and students the Industrial College of the Armed Forces drawn from more than one service. Today we and the National War College have long are going one step further, rotating unit com- graduated joint-qualified officers. Other edu- manders at the squadron level to achieve full cational programs track with this direction, consolidation of training activities and to but in the realm of training the services have capitalize on the strengths of each service. emphasized organic training since the 1960s. Two criteria are key to interservice courses. As the services assumed greater autonomy One is protecting service equities—to ensure they withdrew from collocated, multiservice, that the interests of each service are met under and joint arrangements for training activi- the arrangement. If this criterion is observed ties. It is time to reverse that trend. service parochialism is usually checked and progress can be remarkable. The other criterion Interservice Review is upholding the standards of each service Over two decades ago as the Vietnam which shifts the emphasis from the least com- war came to a close the Interservice Training mon denominator to the best solution. By tak- Review Organization (ITRO) was established. ing such an approach, we can move toward ac- Though voluntary, ITRO has facilitated ser- cepting the challenge issued in 1992 by vice discussions on course criteria, costs, and Senator Sam Nunn in his address on roles and shortfalls. Today ITRO members missions for the Armed Services on the Senate the greatest poten- range from action officers to the floor: “The fundamental question is not what leaders of education and training tial for integration is best for the Marine Corps, the Army, the commands (the latter constituting Navy, or the Air Force...the question is, is found in common the organization’s executive board). ‘What is best for America?’ ” That challenge initial training It gained momentum through a con- has become the bedrock of efforts to provide cept of reviewing interservice train- what is best for the Nation by providing the ing arrangements that appears convenient best standards for students of all services. but takes time to implement. Due to a burst By proceeding in this manner, we avoid of energy in the Senate as well as the Chair- establishing interservice training schools man’s report on roles and missions, and in that fail to increase efficiency. For example, the face of budget realities, ITRO activity has the Air Force would be out of its element accelerated over the last two years. To teaching the Navy sonar or underwater quicken the review process, the organization welding just as the Army would have scant looks at broad functional areas and critiques interest in instructing the Marines about them establishing and examining common F/A–18 aircraft radar maintenance. links that promote efficient interservice training. This type of review has benefits for Initial Training the services since the potential for infra- Reviews indicate that the greatest poten- structure divestiture—getting rid of what is tial for integration is found in common ini- unneeded—increases as we train together. tial training where individual service re- The reviews look at three basic ways to quirements are similar. This is foundation make single-service courses multiservice. The training which leads to particular career first involves establishing quotas for courses fields or specialties. The services have taken managed and operated by one service by pro- advantage of such opportunities resulting in viding spaces for students from other ser- a total of nearly 400 joint courses today. vices. The second is collocation where Nearly half of all multiservice training oc- courses which are managed by two or more curs on Air Force bases—predominantly be- services make use of facilities and equipment cause of the quality and availability of facili- of a principal host; the training remains sep- ties, and because as the Air Force downsized arate but resources are shared. The final is it gained excess capacity which benefits all consolidation which implies total integra- the services. And although the chart shows tion; two or more services combine efforts to only 10 percent of training courses, those courses have very high student loads. From an Air Force perspective, 29 per- General Henry Viccellio, Jr., USAF, is Commander of cent of enlisted personnel coming out of Air Education and Training Command and formerly boot camp each year at Lackland Air Force served as Director of the Joint Staff.

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Base will go into a multiservice environment Interservice Training Status for initial tech school. Ten years ago, less than 20 percent of Air Force enlisted person- Approved/Implemented nel trained in such an environment. Based Army on a growing trend in interservice initial Metals Technology Welding skills programs, over half of new Air Force Helicopter Maintenance enlisted personnel will soon be trained in a Vehicle Operator multiservice environment. CE–Equipment Operators, Engineer Technicians A few examples illustrate how interser- Construction Mechanics (Army/Marine Corps) vice training works. As the DOD executive HVAC, Refrigeration (Army/Marine Corps) agent the Air Force teaches intelligence at Navy Goodfellow Air Force Base, predominantly in Explosive Ordnance imagery and signals intelligence. The dog Non-Morse Operations Analyst Water Survival handler school at Lackland Air Force Base Carpenters, Buildings trains DOD personnel as Construction Mechanics (Navy/Air Force) well as students from other Vehicle Mechanics (Navy/Air Force) Federal agencies which use Marine Corps canines. The Air Force also IBM Computer Training operates a law enforcement Air Force school at Lackland for Navy Law Enforcement/Corrections Cryptology and Air Force “cops.” In ad- Weather dition, English—the official Calibration language of aviation—is Food Service taught at Lackland to more Undergraduate Space Training than 4,500 foreign students Power Line Specialist from nearly 110 countries Utilities Plumbers

U.S. Army (Gary Bryant) annually while the Foreign Electricians, HVAC, Refrigeration (Air Force/Navy) Fire Protection (Air Force/Army/Marine Corps) Maintaining AH–1 Language School is admin- Cobra. Survival/Evasion istered by the Army at the Presidio of Mon- terey. Though not the executive agent, the Nearing Decision Air Force has a multiservice weather school at Aircraft Maintenance Keesler Air Force Base attended by officer and Intelligence enlisted students from all services. The Army Air Traffic Control teaches welding at Aberdeen Proving Ground Communications Training Information Technology and the Navy teaches metal working in Environmental Memphis, and so on. More interservice training goes on today than many realize. Under Review The advantages of interservice initial Transportation skills training include lowering costs as re- Medical Specialties dundancies are reduced, downsizing the Supply Logistics Petroleum overall infrastructure, fostering teamwork, and nurturing jointness by exposing students to interservice dialogue early in their careers. Once servicemembers have passed would be enhanced by creating either a De- through that window into advanced training fense Training Agency or appointing a CINC- and begin working with operational equip- TRAINING, but the services do not currently ment unique to their services, or once they support the idea. As one moves beyond ini- learn to employ equipment as required by tial skills training, it is vital to retain service their service doctrine and tactics, this poten- identities. This is where applications among tial is diminished. the services become more distinct and train- Specific training is essential to ensure ing must build on the cultures and missions that trainees assume operational assignments of each service. By bringing their unique ca- with the right skills, attitude, and foundation pabilities together the individual services to do the job. Some think that this training make joint warfare successful.

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Administration and command are also is- track, the airlift/tanker/maritime track, or a sues. In the past when there were few inter- helicopter track. service initial training opportunities, each ser- The Air Force has been “growing its vice could easily afford what might be called own” pilots since 1947. Spurred by Senator an “overseer” organization. These were small Nunn’s challenge and Secretary Aspin’s sub- bodies of between seven and forty people at sequent guidance, we are changing as we es- the bases of other services where training tablish interservice training and then con- took place. As we move toward solidate the infrastructure. This began with as in technical training more interservice programs, such instructor pilots (IPs) and already Navy IPs the services have large organizations increase manpower are flying T–37s at Reese Air Force Base while costs. A solution might be to cre- Air Force IPs are flying T–34s with the Navy flight training infra- ate a student squadron which is at Whiting Field. These exchanges are the structures interservice or joint in nature. foundation for joint primary training. Under that system service-specific We will put a rapidly growing number of support organizations may prove unneces- students into interservice training annually sary. The net result would be lower man- in the coming years. After an initial adjust- power costs for each service involved. ment phase we will ramp up quickly and operate two fully consolidated squadrons. The Flight Training rest will become joint as JPATS arrives on the Climbing skyward from ground train- scene in 1997. Each primary squadron, ing, one increasingly observes a commit- whether training at an Air Force or Navy ment to joint ventures in flight training. base, will eventually have about 200 students General Colin Powell noted that, “The equally divided between the two services. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each have To achieve this end we are well on the aviation arms essential to their assigned way to interservice fixed wing pilot training. warfighting roles. Each air arm provides Even the squadron leadership will be joint as unique but complementary capabilities. the commander and second-in-command They work jointly to protect America’s air- are rotated. The first two officers involved in power.” Projecting power demands joint interservice command are an Air Force lieu- training to build complementary capabilities tenant colonel (executive officer of Training which is just what we do in navigator as well Squadron 3 at Whiting Field) and a Navy as pilot training. commander (operations officer for the 35th As in technical training the services Training Squadron at Reese Air Force Base). have large flight training infrastructures. The A new approach to training pilots of Navy has closed down Chase Field and the multi-engine aircraft evolved through a Air Force has shut down Williams and study of flight training in the Navy and Air Mather Air Force Bases. The services are also Force. Naval aviators now train in T–44 twin looking at ways to deal with other parts of engine turboprops while the Air Force uses the infrastructure. In addition, former Secre- new T–1 twin-engine jets for specialized un- tary of Defense Les Aspin reacted to the dergraduate pilot training. The Navy had Chairman’s Report on the Roles, Missions, and trained jet pilots in turboprops while the Air Functions of the Armed Forces of the United Force trained C–130 pilots in jets. The Navy States by directing the consolidation of por- and Air Force are developing a cross-flow tions of flight training programs. Accord- system where C–130 pilots from the Air ingly, we merged initial fixed-wing aircraft Force, Navy, and elsewhere will fly T–44s, training—primary training—with that of while jet-bound personnel such as E–6 pilots other services and transitioned to a Joint Pri- going on to Take Charge and Move Out Air- mary Aircraft Training System (JPATS). The craft (TACAMO) will go to Reese Air Force Secretary of Defense also ordered the cre- Base and fly T–1s. Both instructor and stu- ation of a four-track follow-on training dent exchanges began in 1994. structure. Toward that end students graduat- Navigator training has been joint for ing from JPATS will follow the Navy fighter over twenty years. The student body mix has attack and E–2/C–2 path designed for carrier recently been half Navy/Marines and half operations, the Air Force bomber/fighter Air Force. All Air Force navigator training is now conducted at Randolph Air Force Base

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headed for fighters or B–1s will go to Pen- sacola for advanced training with Navy radar-intercept operators in T–39s and T–2s.

As General George Patton commented, “Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by people.” To echo his re- mark, properly trained and educated soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are key to our Nation’s defense. Before the Marines hit the beach to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia, before Air Force F–16s or Marine U.S. Air Force T–1A trainer. F–18s patrolled the skies over Bosnia, before relief supplies were airlifted to the Midwest since Mather closed. There is a 22-week basic during the floods of 1993, and before the course and an advanced course for electronic first Special Forces soldiers slipped across the warfare officers and weapons systems offi- border into Iraq during Desert Storm, they cers who are assigned to fighter aircraft or received the best training in the world. bombers after earning their wings. In moving toward greater consolidation The Navy has a somewhat different ap- in initial skills training we have to ensure proach. It gives some T–34 basic flying in- that the warriors of tomorrow are just as struction to navigators at Pensacola Naval well trained. Recent events, together with Air Station. Two-thirds of the way through initiatives by Congress and DOD, have the program, those selected for larger aircraft helped expand the prospect for interservice are sent to Randolph Air Force Base for train- training. Once seen as a convenience, such ing. The remaining trainees receive more training has become an imperative. With T–34 time, then some T–39 time, after which our counterparts in other services, the Air they go to either E–2s at Norfolk Naval Air Education and Training Command has a full Station or stay at Pensacola, where the Navy plate in providing the best possible trained has specially modified T–39s with fighter- and educated soldiers, sailors, marines, and type radars to teach fighter navigators. The airmen. The services must share their unique Navy also gives navigators basic fighter ma- capabilities in order to foster joint culture. neuver training in T–2s. This offers enough We are going to fight together and we are of an advantage that Air Force navigators going to win together. JFQ

Joint Primary Training System (JPATS)

Navy Air Force Screening Bomber/Fighter

Marine Corps Navy Screening Joint Fighter/Attack Primary and E–2/C–2 Training Air Force Airlift/ Screening Tanker/ Maritime

Coast Guard Helicopter Screening Operational Assignments in the Field and Fleet

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Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough By ROBERT B. ADOLPH, JR., CHARLES W. STILES, and FRANKLIN D. HITT, JR.

The Secretary and of this amendment must clarify the wording Chairman visiting of the Chairman’s duties to better focus his CINCCENT. efforts. This is not a matter of trivial defini- tions. In fact, the exact meaning of words in Goldwater-Nichols was what set the stage for much of the confusion that has followed. These issues are very complex. This article may well raise more questions than it answers. As established by Goldwater- Nichols, the expanded, interrelated CJCS functions include: ▼ developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces ▼ performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces ▼ formulating policies for joint training ▼ establishing and maintaining a uniform DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) system of evaluating preparedness.1 hile the statutory role of the One knowledgeable observer, William ChairmanW of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Odom, has suggested that the Chairman was expanded and strengthened by the should have “unrestricted authority in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense joint exercise program.” 2 The result, accord- Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress failed ing to Odom, would be a vastly improved to provide him the wherewithal to do the vehicle to develop joint doctrine. His under- job in four key areas all relating directly to lying assumption is that better joint doctrine joint readiness. Congress must address this will improve joint readiness, an implied oversight by amending the current law. Part CJCS task. Exercises represent one of the best

Summary

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act strengthened the role of the Chairman with one hand and weakened it with the other by failing to provide adequate resources in four crucial areas. CJCS is charged with developing joint doctrine but is so understaffed and underfunded that doctrinal development must be passed to the services, which seem unable to handle it. Further, the Chairman must assess service capabilities, yet a more rigorous evaluation is needed. Joint training also poses a dilemma: the services train forces for joint operations, but no one has responsibility for training CINCs and their staffs to use those forces. Finally, the Joint Staff evaluates preparedness (readiness) under a uniform system that is not up to the job. Among the answers to such problems are inviting retired CINCs to rate active ones, enhancing exercise evaluations, enacting legislation to bolster the doctrine process, and lifting the manpower cap on the Joint Staff.

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means to improve readiness. While the Joint emphasis on joint doctrine.” 5 Those institu- Chiefs have a large exercise budget, most of tions, the services, are not suited to write their funding underwrites the costs of mov- joint doctrine. ing personnel and equipment. JWFC is working with a contractor to The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is develop a command post exercise (CPX) pro- chartered to be the focal point for joint doc- gram to assess CINCs’ staffs. According to trine, assessment, and training issues. JWFC one player: works for the Chairman through the Direc- The CINC will assign standards to the task and tor, Operational Plans and Interoperability conditions identified. When the CINC wants his staff (J-7), Joint Staff. Unfortunately its vast mis- exercised and assessed he will select his areas of sion must be accomplished with extremely focus. The JWFC will provide the CINC feedback by limited resources. The JWFC mission reads: way of an after action review.6 Assist the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs in JWFC foresees CINCs funding the de- their preparation for joint and multinational opera- ployment of JWFC personnel to conduct tions in the conceptualization, development, and as- CPXs for CINCs’ staffs and joint task force sessment of current and future joint doctrine and in (JTF) commanders and their staffs. The the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises.3 JWFC program model under development uses the Army’s Battle Command Training The key term is assist. What JWFC does Program (BCTP). Although JWFC finds the is neither authoritative nor evaluative in model laudable, it lacks an evaluation; thus nature. The staff routinely observes joint their method of implementation would be exercises as well as real-world radically different. Moreover, no opportuni- Goldwater-Nichols made crises. In turn, they recom- ties exist for training and evaluating CINCs CJCS responsible for joint mend actions on doctrine with their staffs. Nor is a program to accom- and training which may be doctrinal development plish this goal envisioned, though one is ignored. Perhaps the circum- needed. Aside from the reasons already without providing the spect mission statement with stated, evaluations provide better input to resources its focus on assistance reflects doctrinal development. the fact that, although strengthened by Goldwater- Developing Doctrine Nichols, the Chairman is still not in the Among the plethora of problems con- chain of command. fronting the Chairman, developing joint doc- According to a member of JWFC: trine is one of the thorniest. Joint Pub 1–02 defines joint doctrine as “Fundamental prin- We generally don’t write doctrine. Currently, the services write most of it and sometimes I think they ciples that guide the employment of forces of are the greatest impediment to a genuine joint doc- two or more services in coordinated action trine development process. If the services don’t like a toward a common objective.” 7 Joint doctrine particular piece of joint doctrine they can and do is the foundation for effective joint training make it die.4 and therefore the basis of joint readiness. But Is this what Congress intended in enact- Goldwater-Nichols made CJCS responsible ing Goldwater-Nichols, or did they want for joint doctrinal development without pro- CJCS to exercise a greater role? As one ob- viding the resources. This compelled the server stated: “The requirement to write Chairman to subcontract the writing of most joint doctrine was superimposed over exist- joint doctrine to the services—not a good ing institutions that previously had little idea. Not only does this prolong the time needed to publish doctrine, it is unlikely that a service can write high quality joint doctrine. Service parochialism is often too pow- Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Adolph, Jr., USA, is erful, and the service agencies charged with with the Joint Special Operations Command; preparing joint doctrine may lack joint expe- Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Stiles, USAF, serves rience. “The assignment of joint doctrine at the headquarters of Combined Forces Command writing responsibilities, which often become in Korea; and Lieutenant Commander Franklin D. an additional duty, is based on personnel Hitt, Jr., USN, is assigned to U.S. Strategic Command. They collaborated on this article while availability instead of experience and ability. attending the Armed Forces Staff College.

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Assess is synonymous with estimate. Why did Congress mandate that CJCS provide just an estimate of capabilities? An assessment is obviously based upon a judgment absent better data. Net in this context could be synonymous with gist. A net assessment, in other words, merely means providing the gist of an estimate. Was this the actual intent of Congress? By contrast, one definition of evaluation is to determine by careful appraisal and study. If more information could be made available through a JCS- funded joint mobile training group (JMTG), one sufficiently manned to provide a genuine evaluation as opposed to a net assessment, why shouldn’t we create one? The ultimate result would be to improve joint readiness. This point is significant given the continuing downsizing of the Armed Forces. As the services grow smaller and we attempt U.S. Navy (Steve Miller) to do more, better, with less, improved readi- Rangers aboard USS ness will be increasingly important. George Washington. The poor quality of many of the initial drafts According to a faculty member at the produced so far reflects this situation.” 8 Armed Forces Staff College, net assessment Writing joint doctrine is too important in this context means “a total estimate of to be relegated to the services. The over- the warfighting capabilities of the services.” 9 whelming success of Operation Desert Storm Is this accurate? Clearly there is disagree- has been credited in part to provisions of ment on a precise definition of the term. Goldwater-Nichols. General H. Norman Regardless, why did Congress direct the Schwarzkopf, USA, was able to integrate his Chairman to perform net assessments? It joint and combined forces and synchronize seems unlikely that the services would con- their activities to devastating effect against duct rigorous evaluations of commanders, the forces of Saddam Hussein. This was no staffs, and units, yet CJCS is only tasked to accident. Joint warfare works and its basis is perform net assessments on the most senior joint doctrine. CJCS needs dedicated person- joint leaders and their staffs. Perhaps, since nel and funding for the critical task of writ- Goldwater-Nichols was passed in the Reagan ing and evaluating this doctrine. era when defense budgets were large, the Given the necessary wherewithal, how focus was on quantity rather than quality. does one develop and improve joint doc- This seeming contradiction might also have trine? An excellent source would be a data resulted from the Chairman being out of the base developed from evaluations of actual chain of command. Obviously, the Secretary joint CPXs. of Defense is in that chain and can conduct evaluations. Net Assessment Another approach is to have CJCS ad- Congress tasked the Chairman to per- minister a careful and thoroughgoing analy- form net assessments of military capabilities. sis (evaluation) for the Secretary. The mecha- This is no small matter. Congress may use nism for providing such an analysis is now such findings to determine future service unavailable; but creating a team of officers roles and missions, fund weapons programs, exclusively dedicated to conducting and or decide what personnel programs to sup- evaluating CPXs would provide the answer. port. The assessments would also influence Obviously, joint readiness is the result of joint doctrinal development. But what exactly is net assessment?

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various factors. The most important is qual- ness. Many times their reports rely heavily ity training. Unfortunately, there are prob- on anecdotal evidence. lems there as well. The Joint Staff must “accomplish evaluation by monitoring, observing, analyzing, Policy for Training and assessing joint activities.” 11 The para- The authors collectively have over fifty mount J-7 evaluation vehicles are real-world years of service and, in our experience, we operations and JCS/CINC-sponsored exer- have never encountered a command that cises. By its own admission J-7 only con- has failed a major joint field training or ducts an evaluative sampling. Their staff command post exercise. Are our forces that simply is not large enough to do a thorough good? Are exercises that easy? Are assess- job. To carry out this sampling, J-7 sends ob- ments overly generous? The last possibility is servers to real-world crises and major joint probably closest to the truth. It is not exercises even though evaluation criteria are enough for the Chairman to simply formu- undefined. Obviously, more needs to be late policies as required by Goldwater- done in this area, but what? Nichols. JCS-run CPXs would make much Other than looking to the newly formed better vehicles for evaluating joint readiness. JWFC for answers, the creation of a JMTG There seems to be no unanimity in arriv- warrants further consideration. Such a ing at a definition of joint readiness. As one group, based on the Army’s BCTP model, source has stated, “The Joint Staff is currently could run CPXs for CINCs. The BCTP staff attempting to define joint readiness.” 10 For relies heavily on computer simulation and purposes of this discussion, it is the integra- high quality senior personnel. However, to tion of ready forces and synchronization of be valuable a program must be able to be their activities to achieve taken to combatant CINCs and JTF com- is mission accomplishment mission accomplishment. manders. Establishing a JMTG would no How does one evaluate or as- the sole criterion for doubt require significant staffing and a flag sess integration and syn- officer to administer the program. success in a field or chronization? Is mission ac- In this regard taking stock of the BCTP’s command post exercise? complishment the sole mission statement is instructive: criterion for success in a field or command post exercise? Joint doc- Conducts realistic, stressful training for Army trine certainly must provide a base of knowl- corps and division commanders and their battle edge on which to build evaluations. Congres- staffs. Serves as a data source for the improvement of: doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, sional choice of the word evaluate in the materiel, and soldiers.12 context of preparedness suggests more careful study is required. Preparedness and readi- This is not a circumspect statement. It ness are synonymous. has teeth. The Army’s leadership is gen- The problem is substantial. The services uinely challenged in BCTP by realistic and train individuals and units for combatant stressful training that confronts them and CINCs. But who trains CINCs and their their battle staffs with a skilled opposing staffs to integrate and synchronize the ready force commander and a free-play scenario. forces provided by the services? Nobody. CINCs are responsible for A–10, FA/18, and F–16 their commands, but criteria for over northern Italy. evaluating joint preparedness are undefined. Each CINC has ideas on what is vital. Currently, the un- written evaluation criteria seem to be mainly derived from professional estimates by CINCs and CJCS, flag officers who must regularly report to the Secretary of De- fense and Congress on prepared- Combat Camera Imagery (Jamie Bowman)

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As the primary military advisor to the USS Lamore County National Command Authorities, the Chair- and a Coast Guard man must have the most current, objective, vessel during Agile Provider ’94 and comprehensive information on the warfighting readiness of all CINCs. He will not get this information through JWFC as it is currently tasked, manned, and organized. Congress would have to raise personnel au- thorization and funding levels for JMTG to become a reality. Potential taskings for this group would include: ▼ writing exercise scenarios based on the CINC’s OPLANs, CONPLANs, and contingency operations ▼ in coordination with CINCs, recommend- ing to CJCS which tasks to evaluate ▼ developing criteria based on the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) for evaluation teams (tasks, conditions, and standards) ▼ running exercises for CINCs and JTF commanders and performing evaluations ▼ reporting joint doctrine-based evaluation results to CINCs and CJCS. Obviously, the most important goal of a JMTG would be to improve readiness. Evaluating Preparedness The Joint Staff administers a uniform system to evaluate preparedness. Although uniform, the criteria are unfortunately general. In reality the uniform system has no teeth. One definition of preparedness is a state of adequate preparation in case of war. The term adequate is important. Is adequate

U.S. Navy (Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.) preparation the goal Congress had in mind for the Armed Forces, or should the goal be more demanding? Certainly congressional funding of adequate preparedness would be U.S. Marine Corps (P.S. Royston) Marines loading less costly than a more stringent criterion. vehicles at Cap Haitien. One synonym for adequate is sufficient. These are two elements almost impossible to What is sufficient in terms of joint prepared- duplicate in joint exercises involving troops. ness is anyone’s guess and would appear to There are significant differences between be more a result of budget in-fighting be- the proposed JMTG approach and JWFC. tween the executive branch and Congress The former must be JCS-administered, than careful study. Regardless, establishing a manned, and funded, and provide for evalu- JMTG capable of conducting and evaluating ations which respond to priorities set by the joint CPXs is a first logical step in develop- Secretary of Defense as well as those of ing more precise criteria for determining the CINCs. Evaluation is a better standard than preparedness of CINCs, JTF commanders, assessment. Again, the current thinking at and their respective staffs. Without such cri- JWFC is that CINCs can fund future JWFC teria, determining the proper level of pre- CPXs on an optional basis. If CINCs fund paredness will remain contentious and such JWFC exercises, then assessments re- largely unresolvable. sults will stay within the domains of the respective CINCs. Nobody likes to air dirty linen in public.

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To evaluate preparedness the Chairman implementing Goldwater-Nichols. The termi- must create a uniform system. A JMTG nology in that act must also be revised. Net would be one way of genuinely achieving assessments are not enough; evaluations set a that end. But here again there is a problem, higher standard. A JMTG composed of offi- one of credibility. Although cers from all services, under CJCS direction only former CINCs possess CJCS has the requisite and guidance, would be a far better approach the credibility to evaluate stature to conduct evalua- than the one envisioned by JWFC. Using for- tions, he simply lacks the mer CINCs as chief evaluators for a JMTG a current CINC’s joint time. Aside from him only would provide credibility. preparedness former CINCs possess the Students attending the Armed Forces credibility to evaluate a cur- Staff College are taught that future conflicts rent CINC’s joint preparedness. will be fought jointly. As the services grow It makes sense to call on retired CINCs to smaller, it is all the more critical to stress perform this function. While flag officers joint readiness as a combat multiplier. One of from any service could administer a JMTG, the best means of improving joint readiness write scenarios, conduct CPXs, and evaluate would be the creation of a JMTG. It is time to elements of a CINC’s staff, only former CINCs get serious about training and evaluating could be credible chief evaluators of currently combatant CINCs, JTF commanders, and serving CINCs. Retired CINCs should have their respective staffs as well as writing joint few axes to grind and could be counted on to doctrine and developing a rigorous system of be objective and candid with CINCs, CJCS, determining preparedness. The greatest chal- the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. A lenges to shaping the Armed Forces into a JMTG also would emulate the BCTP method- true joint warfighting body lie ahead. JFQ ology, using retired flag officers to evaluate and mentor division and corps commanders. NOTES The same kind of program can work with 1 U.S. Congress, Public Law 99–433, Goldwater- CINCs as well. Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of General Carl W. Stiner, USA (Ret.), the 1986, Section 201. 2 William E. Odom, America’s Military Revolution former Commander in Chief of Special Op- (Washington: The American University Press, 1993), p. erations Command, stated that a JMETL is a 139. logical point of departure for developing cri- 3 Joint Warfighting Center, command briefing, teria to evaluate the readiness of a CINC. May 1, 1994. But JMETLs must be translated into general 4 CDR Kent Kieselbach, USN, Joint Warfighting Cen- ter, Norfolk, Virginia, May 9, 1994. joint staff tasks, conditions, and standards, 5 Robert A. Doughty, “Reforming the Joint Doctrine as defined in the Universal Joint Task List Process,” Parameters, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 47. (MCM–147–93), to be evaluated—all of 6 Telephonic interview with Lt Col Robert J. Flem- which has yet to be accomplished. Estab- ing, USAF, Joint Warfighting Center, Norfolk, Virginia, lishing a JMTG would be a major step in May 11, 1994. 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1–02, Dictionary of that direction. Military and Associated Terms (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991). Our analysis suggests that the Chairman 8 William F. Furr, “Joint Doctrine,” Airpower Journal, cannot fully perform his functions as man- vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 39. dated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 9 Personal interview with Robert H. Clegg, Armed Forces Staff College, May 23, 1994. areas of doctrine, assessments, and prepared- 10 Telephonic interview with CDR Michael J. Vitale, ness (readiness) due to personnel and funding USN, Joint Doctrine Division (J-7), Joint Staff, May 11, shortages. Formulating policies for joint train- 1994. ing and creating a uniform system to evaluate 11 Joint Warfighting Center, command briefing, p. 1. preparedness is not sufficient. CJCS must con- 12 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Battle Com- mand Training Program Booklet, Fort Leavenworth, duct and evaluate the training of CINCs and Kans., January 13, 1994, p. 1. their staffs to offer the best possible advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and Congress. Funding these programs and raising the personnel cap on the Joint Staff are necessary if Congress is serious about fully

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Joint Intelligence and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY By THOMAS R. WILSON

n September 18, 1994 U.S. Atlantic adaptive joint force packaging, which facili- Command (ACOM) set in motion tated the overall plan. It was also due to ro- Operation Uphold Democracy, an bust joint intelligence support, which dra- O airborne, amphibious, and special matically demonstrated the progress of the operations invasion of Haiti. A few hours intelligence community in meeting the after the invasion started the Carter agree- needs of joint task force (JTF) commanders ment was signed in and components. Port au Prince, abruptly Much will appear in JFQ and other jour- halting the kick-in-the- nals on joint force packaging for Haiti. This door operation and ini- article focuses on lessons from the Persian tiating a dramatic tran- Gulf War and Somalia, and how those sition to a soft-landing lessons improved intelligence support for the option. This was flaw- joint warfighter. Specifically, it outlines how lessly executed the next ACOM and its Atlantic Intelligence Com- day as the 10th Moun- mand used training support, technology, and tain Division lifted off common tactics, techniques, and procedures USS Dwight D. Eisen- (TTP) to support four JTF commanders in var- Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis) Securing the hower and alit at Port ious Haiti contingencies. au Prince International Airport. A few days presidential palace, Background Port Au Prince. later marines launched an amphibious land- Contingency planning for Haiti started ing at Cap Haitien from USS Wasp. The strik- with the ouster of President Jean Bertrand ing success of this operation was based on Aristide in September 1991, and accelerated joint training, which contributed to the readiness and flexibility of our forces, and

Summary

The success of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was due to joint training, which contributed to the readiness of our forces, and adaptive joint force packaging, which facilitated the flexibility of our overall planning. It was also due to joint intelligence, which vividly demonstrated the progress that the intelligence community has made in meeting the needs of joint task force and component commanders in effective and efficient ways. The lessons learned from recent contingencies like the Gulf War and Somalia, and how these lessons have improved joint intelligence support, have made a deep impact on joint warfighting. In particular, the benefits that U.S. Atlantic Command and its Joint Intelligence Center (Atlantic Intelligence Command) have gained from technology, training, and common intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures yielded the outstanding support which joint task force commanders received during four Haitian contingencies.

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Amphibious Assault Ship USS Wasp off Haiti.

82d Airborne Division departing for JTF–180.

Special Boat Unit and SEALs doing recon off Cap Dame Marie, Haiti.

DOD (Gregory S. Cinelli)

DOD (Betty Tsosie) number of Haitian migrants. Com- manded by a brigadier general from Ma- U.S. Navy (John Sokolowski) rine Forces Atlantic, JTF–160 ultimately set up safe havens not only for some 15,000 as the de facto government of Lieutenant Haitians but also for 30,000 Cubans. General Raoul Cedras failed to comply with By Summer 1994, as it became apparent the terms of the Governors Island accord that political initiatives would not lead to the signed earlier that summer. JTF–120 was return of Aristide, ACOM expedited planning stood up on short notice in October 1993 to for various military options. Operation plans protect and evacuate American citizens and (OPLANS) for nonpermissive forced entry key Haitian nationals. Initially under Com- (kick-in-the-door) and semi-permissive ad- mander Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight, ministrative entry (soft-landing) were devel- JTF–120 had five commanders over the next oped. Both were planned as joint operations year and headquarters on four ships (USS with the former, JTF–180, under the com- Nassau, Saipan, Wasp, and Mount Whitney). mander of XVIII Airborne Corps and the lat- Beyond providing protection and evacuation ter, JTF–190, under the commander of the support, it was responsible for directing U.N. 10th Mountain Division. Plan excursions ex- maritime embargo operations around Haiti. isted for JTF–180 to be headquartered either The second JTF for the Haiti crisis was afloat on USS Mount Whitney or ashore in JTF–160, formed in June 1994 to handle the Port au Prince and for JTF–190 to be shore- flow of Haitian migrants generated by deteri- based. A combination of these plans was exe- orating conditions on the island and the cuted involving both commanders with U.S. Government’s suspension of direct repa- headquarters afloat and ashore. triation. First activated on the hospital ship From an intelligence perspective, the key USNS Comfort in Kingston, Jamaica, JTF–160 points are that all the JTFs described above quickly moved to Naval Station Guan- had the same joint intelligence architecture, tanamo Bay because of the overwhelming TTP manual, and interoperable dissemination system and equipment. This highlights the progress that has been made given past inter- Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, serves as operability problems that plagued intelligence Vice Director for Intelligence (J-2), Joint Staff; his dissemination and the fact that the four JTF previous assignments include Director, Fleet commanders (ranging from one- to three-star Intelligence, for U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Director rank) represented three services (each with of Intelligence for U.S. Atlantic Command.

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UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

different-sized staffs and capabilities). More- Atlantic, and Special Operations Command over, the commanders conducted planning Atlantic as ACOM components in 1993. and operations from varied locations in garri- Also, changes at the national level comple- son and deployed, and from land and sea- mented ACOM initiatives, allowing quick based facilities. and steady progress. Challenges and Initiatives Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures The above accomplishments take on The intelligence architecture used by greater significance when examined in the unified commands in supporting JTF com- context of contingencies over the last fifteen manders and component forces supported years and related intelligence shortcomings. each of the JTFs discussed earlier. It also pro- From Grenada to Panama, from the Persian vided the flexibility to accommodate JTFs Gulf to Somalia, the problems were often formed around different services in different similar: service stovepipes and resulting in- home base or deployed locations. The publi- consistent support, lack of interoperable cation of “Atlantic Tactics, Techniques, and equipment and procedures, and evidence Procedures (ATTP)” for joint intelligence sup- that dissemination was consistently the port served as the cookbook for successful in- biggest shortcoming. Frequently informa- telligence organization. Regardless of the size tion was collected in a or the type of the JTF staff, ATTP provide JTF intelligence architecture timely manner and analyzed J-2s with principles, concept of operations, provided flexibility to JTFs correctly only to get bogged and information to organize and operate JTF down in a dissemination J-2 staffs. Now in a third edition after testing formed around different system that failed to serve in rugged exercise and contingency environ- services customers. Desert Storm was ments, ATTP were widely used by eight dif- characterized by many intel- ferent J-2s directing intelligence operations ligence successes, not the least of which was in Haiti for JTF–120, –160, –180, and –190. capturing valuable lessons for the future. While addressing the entire intelligence spec- Those lessons included joint intelligence ar- trum, ATTP emphasize support from theater- chitecture solidified in doctrine and given level JIC to JTF. This is particularly useful in vitality by a standard TTP; equipment inter- determining joint and component augmen- operability (vice nine secondary imagery dis- tation requirements, organizing JTF-level semination systems that did not talk to each JICs, facilitating interoperability, and access- other); and an improved intelligence dissem- ing theater- and national-level data bases. ination system. ATTP fully complement national-level JTTP After the Gulf War ACOM pursued a se- and detailed component TTP being devel- ries of initiatives designed to meet intelli- oped. ACOM credits much of the intelligence gence challenges identified during that con- success for Haiti operations to the fact that tingency. The initiatives can be divided into JTFs used a common document like the intel- four major categories: ligence cookbook. ▼ theater-level joint TTP development Training and Augmentation ▼ training teams tailored for joint intelli- While the production, distribution, and gence operations at JTF-level wide utilization of intelligence TTPs is con- ▼ improved, flexible joint intelligence com- sidered an important contribution to success munications connectivity ▼ intelligence operations in joint exercises in Haiti, training assistance and augmenta- targeted at major failings. tion from the unified command level was even more critical. With the new ACOM While most of the initiatives had been missions of joint force packaging and joint begun, the shift in roles and missions under training, it was clear in 1993 that the mis- ACOM hastened progress. Intelligence oper- sion of the Atlantic Intelligence Command ations across service lines became easier as (AIC) also would change. Accordingly, as a Air Combat Command and Forces Com- result of internal and external reviews of mand joined Atlantic Fleet, Marine Forces products and customers, AIC diverted 15 percent of its personnel to establishing a field support directorate. That organization,

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with a primary mission of training and exer- lection management capabilities. Designed cise support, was formed coincident with the for deployment in support of contingency stand-up of ACOM. Personnel manning the operations, NISTs should be a feature of new directorate were drawn from within AIC every theater-level joint exercise. and are experts in areas such as JIC watch Extended Intelligence Connectivity standing, collections, targeting, order of bat- Since dissemination is a traditional in- tle analysis, automatic data processing (ADP) telligence weakness, extending improved in- systems, and communications. telligence connectivity was perhaps the most The AIC field support directorate pro- important new tool used for support of Haiti vided nearly fifty intelligence augmentees operations. Such connectivity is built for the four JTFs involved in the Haiti opera- around JWICS and JDISS which empower tions, as well as a few for component and the intelligence-pull concept by linking con- embassy support. This concept had been sumers to theater and national data bases tested with great success during Agile and capabilities via expanded communica- Provider in early 1994 and built on that tions bandwidth (JWICS) and interoperable foundation for Haiti. For example, a lesson dissemination equipment (JDISS). These two learned during the exercise was that data systems were developed after Desert Storm processing and communications technicians to address problems with service communi- were needed in greater numbers than some cations systems in theater which were ser- traditional specialties. Thus field support vice-oriented and lacked connectivity with teams deployed to Haiti were heavy in those either the other services or national level. capabilities, especially among the more than JWICS connects the National Military Joint thirty personnel who augmented JTF–180 on Intelligence Center (NMJIC) with combatant USS Mount Whitney and JTF–190 in Port au command JICs and a host of intelligence or- Prince. It is clear from exercises and the Haiti ganizations. The system handles all types of experience that theater augmentation for data, imagery, and graphics, and allows training and exercises pays intelligence divi- video broadcasting. In conjunction with dends and that these training teams are well JDISS, JWICS extends capabilities to fixed suited for operations. Even though a train- and deployed tactical units as occurred in ing role may detract from a theater JIC’s tra- Haiti. JDISS offers access to data bases as well ditional production capabilities, the benefits as voice, basic imagery analysis, and dissemi- are worth the cost. nation capabilities, and standard office au- The Haiti JTFs were all supported by Na- tomation and access to theater and national tional Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) resources. JWICS and JDISS were combined, drawn from the Defense Intelligence Agency, expanded, and sent down the chain of com- Central Intelligence Agency, and National mand via a video teleconferencing (VTC) Security Agency. NISTs can be requested by and data exchange network which is known joint force commanders from CJCS and—on as the ACOM Net. approval of the Secretary of Defense—tai- The ACOM Net was developed for and lored to meet operational re- published in the ACOM implementation improved intelligence quirements based on arrange- plan. It provides the theater with expanded, ments between theater J-2s connectivity was perhaps flexible connectivity with all components— and the Defense Intelligence Forces Command, Air Combat Command, the most important new Agency and J-2, Joint Staff. Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces Atlantic—as tool used for Haiti Teams have their own com- well as staffs identified for regular training as munications, access to the JTF commands, namely, XVIII Airborne Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communica- Corps, III Corps, Eighth Air Force, Twelfth Air tions Systems (JWICS), and generally have a Force, Second Fleet, and II Marine Expedi- Joint Deployable Intelligence Support Sys- tionary Force. This grew out of the USS George tem (JDISS) capability. In conjunction with Washington experiment in 1992 and Ocean theater JIC support teams, NISTs give JTF intelligence staffs access to national and theater-level analytical capabilities and data bases as well as their own analytical and col-

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Venture ’93, when leased commercial satel- commanders participating from their head- lite communications gave operational com- quarters. The next day the President made manders expanded communications band- the decision to launch Uphold Democracy. width in a tactical environment. In both The ACOM Net and JWICS provide the cases, sensitive compartmented information theater JIC and NMJIC with unique, interac- (SCI) and general service video teleconferenc- tive data and video connectivity with key ing and computer-to-computer data ex- commands farther down the chain of com- changes were facilitated. Moreover, deployed mand than before. Intelligence problems customers were able to manage the available and discrepancies are quickly sorted out, col- bandwidth and JDISS equipment to expand lection and analytical tasking is rapid and seamless interfaces which that equipment clear, and volumes of formal message traffic provides. The ACOM Net was being built are eliminated as intelligence consumers can along those lines as the Haiti contingencies easily reach to theater and national capabil- unfolded and JTFs were stood up. ity. ACOM JDISS and intelligence VTC From an intelligence perspective, the growth, from two and zero respectively in ACOM Net is completely interoperable with 1990 to 98 and 10 in 1994, permitted this the SCI JWICS network, providing an exten- extended connectivity—all significantly en- sion or “tree-down” of JWICS to tactical hanced by TTP work and the augmentation commanders. For ACOM Net subscribers, a capability previously discussed. JWICS hub has been established at ACOM, Joint Exercises along with other hubs for collateral video Annual joint exercises held in the years and data connectivity. Key operational com- following Operation Desert Storm were mar- velous proving grounds for equipment, procedures, and joint intelligence support concepts used for Haiti. For example, Ocean Venture ’92 was the first exercise in which ACOM used the intelligence-pull concept of operations with extensive deployment of JDISS equipment among JTF commanders and components. It was also the command’s maiden attempt at using a

U.S. Marine Corps (Robert W. Oliver) command-wide request for infor- Satellite communica- mation (RFI) management system. tions center. The experiment was not as successful as de- manders (such as JTF–180 and TF–185 on sired since it was manual, but it laid the USS Mount Whitney, JTF–190 in Port au basis for developing an automated RFI track- Prince, TF–186 at Pope Air Force Base/Fort ing system implemented in Ocean Venture Bragg, TG–185.2 on USS Wasp, and JTF–160 ’93. That system—an application of JDISS— in Guantanamo Bay), ACOM components, was a winner and the backbone for RFI man- and supporting commands (viz., Transporta- agement for JTFs and components in Haiti. tion Command and the Defense Intelligence It is used across ACOM, providing efficient Agency/National Military Joint Information RFI tracking and response as well as saving Center) were linked via SCI VTC. These net- thousands of messages annually. works provided communications for contin- Ocean Venture ’93, with a small island uous JDISS connectivity. A dramatic demon- campaign scenario, featured other joint in- stration of the JWICS/ACOM Net occurred telligence firsts which were routine proce- on September 17, 1994 when the President, dures by the time Uphold Democracy was Secretary of Defense, and Chairman con- executed. Among them were implementa- ducted a Haiti video teleconference from the tion of the ACOM on-line imagery bulletin NMJIC, together with CINCACOM and all operational, component, and supporting

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board, the shared imagery repository and As the situation developed over the dissemination system; successful mating of course of 1994, most of the early action was JDISS and the Army Warrior intelligence sys- afloat. As the commander of JTF–120 rotated tem; demonstration of directed imagery ex- among a series of amphibious ships, the JTF ploitation in which J-2 was continually linked with the theater exercises offer the best way to JTF targeteers deployed JIC, and ships engaged in embargo support “push the envelope” without on USS Mount Whitney provided the bulk of the collection capabil- viewed imagery ma- ity. The afloat C4I and intelligence capability fear of failing nipulated at AIC; and was multiplied as both JTF–180 and JTF–190 use of USS Mount Whit- deployed to the area. Situational awareness ney as a joint mobile command platform by the JTF commanders (supported by the with afloat JIC serving the JTF commander. afloat JIC) was equally high on September 18 In fact, the JTF intelligence package on USS and 19 as decisions were made to launch the Mount Whitney for Ocean Venture ’93 was kick-in-the-door operation, then to halt the largely duplicated (and enhanced) for invasion, and finally to switch to the soft JTF–180 on the same command platform. landing. Vigorous joint C4I and intelligence The only difference was that the commander capabilities were maintained afloat as forces, of Second Fleet was replaced as JTF comman- intelligence personnel, and equipment der by the commander of XVIII Airborne flowed to Haiti from CONUS. As capabilities Corps. Similar joint intelligence enhance- ashore were built up and the JTF–190 JIC be- ments were exercised during Agile Provider came fully operational, the bulk of intelli- ’94, including the maiden use of AIC field gence support responsibility gradually support teams. All three exercises featured shifted ashore. The JTF intelligence back- continued interactive enhancement of ATTP bone (built around Navy C4I equipment for joint intelligence support. Most impor- with joint and component personnel and tantly, over the three-year period comman- augmented by joint equipment) was re- ders of Second Fleet, XVIII Airborne Corps, placed by an intelligence backbone built and II Marine Expeditionary Force had the around Army C4I equipment (also staffed by opportunity to exercise as the JTF comman- joint and component personnel and aug- der. The interaction of J-2 staffs in setting up mented by joint capability). JTF intelligence architecture and working It is a tribute to the strides in joint intel- with the theater JIC were valuable prepara- ligence that these transitions were made tion for the Haiti operations. with relative ease. The training, dedication, The lesson to be learned is that exercises and skill of intelligence professionals were offer the best way to “push the envelope” responsible for success. Unlike contingencies without fear of failing. Joint and component in the past, intelligence personnel had the intelligence enhancements should be tried in benefit of documentation on joint tactics, exercises first, reaching out to technology and techniques, and procedures, and were very advanced ideas that may not work perfectly familiar with service intelligence organiza- but lay the groundwork for tremendous im- tions. Moreover, when called to serve on provements when the stakes are high. joint intelligence staffs, they could rely on joint training support and joint personnel Many aspects of Uphold Democracy dif- and equipment augmentation. In addition, fered from past contingencies: employing improved equipment interoperability and a the 10th Mountain Division from USS Eisen- dynamic, flexible intelligence data and video hower, Special Operations Forces from USS network should tremendously encourage op- America, and the commander of XVIII Air- erational commanders on the great potential borne Corps as a JTF commander with a for continued improvement in joint intelli- command post on board USS Mount Whitney. gence support. JFQ Adaptive force packages offered operational commanders exceptional flexibility. They also facilitated strong C4I and intelligence capabilities as well as flexibility and redun- dancy as operations transitioned from afloat to ashore.

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NEXT STEP Taking the JFACCBy MARCUS HURLEY The JFACC Role Once a theater CINC or JFC develops a he services accept and joint doctrine concept of operations and designates a codifies the fact that a Joint Force Air JFACC, the air component staff translates it T Component Commander (JFACC) into a cohesive joint air operations plan. In represents the best way to command and coordination with planners from other as- control airpower in support of a joint force signed functional components (land, sea, commander’s (JFC’s) campaign plan. While space, and special operations), air component there may be differences among the services planners design a comprehensive master at- on the degree of command or control, all ac- tack plan to meet the overall objectives of the knowledge the importance of, and support, campaign plan. Air operations (which might centralized planning and decentralized ap- include deep-strike helicopter missions, Tom- plication of air assets to implement a JFC’s ahawk cruise missiles, and Army tactical mis- concept of operations. The inherent flexibil- sile strikes beyond the fire support coordina- ity of airpower makes it a powerful but not tion line) are then phased and sequenced in infinite theater asset. It would be a grave an overall campaign plan to affect enemy op- error to squander this valuable tool by using erational and strategic centers of gravity. As it in the wrong place or at the wrong time. with all operational-level planning and exe- Desert Storm was a true test of the JFACC cution mechanisms, a JFACC provides the concept. In contrast to the fragmented appli- linkage between strategic objectives and the cation of airpower in Vietnam, Desert Storm tactical application of combat power. showed the benefits of centrally controlled General William Momyer, commander airpower. Since the Gulf War we have seen of 7th Air Force during the Vietnam War, continual improvements in the concept. But noted that airpower can decide battles or we can do better. This article examines these win campaigns. The commander’s dilemma, improvements and discusses where we he said, is determining the proper balance should go with JFACC. among competing demands, strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support. All are necessary elements and it is a JFC, with advice from a JFACC and functional commanders, who decides the level of effort he wants

Summary

Designating a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has rapidly become the customary procedure for exercising command and control of airpower in support of joint force commanders. This approach enables JFACCs and air component staffs to develop joint operations plans together with staffs from other assigned components. Though limited resources preclude maintaining large standing air component staff for every contingency, it makes sense to have a small, trained cadre augmented by liaison officers from each component as well as trained personnel seconded in times of crisis. Such a mix can foster mutual trust, ensure the correct blend of capabilities, and furnish air assets to implement myriad requirements of the joint force commander’s concept of operations. A review of the improvements made in the JFACC concept since the Persian Gulf War points the way to a new age of centrally controlled airpower.

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a JFACC and his staff to dedicate to each element by and sequence the different operations which plan and execute the air phase of the campaign plan. make up theater campaign plans, maximiz- This apportionment of air as- ing the potential of airpower to achieve cam- operations necessary sets tells a JFACC what to plan paign objectives. Students learn and practice to achieve campaign and tells other functional com- fundamental concepts, principles, and proce- objectives manders what sort of air sup- dures needed to plan and execute joint and port they can expect. multinational theater air operations. The After a JFC’s apportion- course stresses center-of-gravity analysis, air ment decision is made, a JFACC and his staff objectives, and force apportionment. plan and execute the air operations necessary Officers attending the Air Command to achieve campaign objectives. The air com- and Staff College receive a more in-depth ed- ponent staff is made up of trained and ready ucation in campaign planning and execu- men and women who develop and execute a tion. They use the air campaign planning JFACC’s strategic and operational-level plans. tool to build comprehensive theater air oper- Being an effective JFACC or air component ations plans and, by wargaming tactical and staff member, however, requires theater-wide operational-level scenarios, they design and vision and rigorous study and practice. The phase independent and supporting air oper- Air Force has taken the lead in developing ations to achieve a JFC’s objectives. The stu- the training, education, and exercise pro- dents must try to resolve the dilemma Gen- grams that airmen from all services need to eral Momyer posed. In an academic setting become JFACCs and effective air component these officers deal with the tough apportion- staff members. ment issues that bedevil JFACCs who they will serve after graduation. JFACC Training After spending a year at Air Command Training people is as important as giving and Staff College, a small group of officers is them the proper tools. General Colin L. then selected to spend another year at the Powell, USA, indicated in Joint Pub 1, Joint School of Advanced Airpower Studies Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, that training (SAAS). The students (including 25 Air Force the team as they will fight helps build the officers and one Army officer in academic bonds of trust which are absolutely critical year 1994–95) take an intensive course on in joint operations. Each functional compo- the operational-strategic levels of war. SAAS nent (land, sea, air, space, and special opera- combines theory, history, and wargaming to tions) must understand and believe that air- train and exercise a cadre of air strategists power will be used where and when it is who can develop effective theater air opera- needed to achieve a CINC’s or JFC’s objections plans. These officers will become air tives. That is the promise which we airmen, planners for theater CINCs and air compo- regardless of our service, must keep. We nent commanders. begin by training to a common standard and The Air Warfare Center conducts bat- then maximizing airpower during contin- tlestaff exercises for numbered Air Force gencies and exercises. commanders and their assembled joint staffs The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course in the command, control, and intelligence (JDACC) taught by Air University is a special- procedures of JFACCs. The computer-based ized course in air operations planning for exercises, known as Blue Flag, replicate the- company and field grade officers from all ser- ater conditions by using friendly and enemy vices who serve on theater and service air orders of battle, war plans, and theater oper- component staffs. JDACC addresses the sup- ating procedures. Participants regularly in- porting and supported roles of a JFACC and clude members of other services and allied integrating airpower into a CINC’s or JFC’s nations to provide a realistic employment campaign plan. It teaches officers to develop experience. State-of-the-art computer technology allows ground, enemy air defense, and maritime simulations to run simultane- Major General Marcus Hurley, USAF, is Director ously with offensive and defensive air opera- of Plans and Policy at Air Combat Command. tions. Distributed wargaming makes it possi- A fighter pilot who has commanded an F–4 squadron and an F–16 wing, he also has served as the ble to direct exercises from other sites and commander of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia. include geographically separated units as

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players. Blue Flag is a world class opportu- In the Gulf War, U.S. Central Command nity for joint and combined air forces to Air Forces (CENTAF) used the 72-hour plan- train as they will fight. ning and 48-hour tasking cycles outlined in The crown jewel in JFACC training will Joint Pub 3–56.1, Command and Control for be the JFACC Theater Air Strategy Sympo- Joint Air Operations. While air operations sium, a week-long event that will introduce were driven by the JFC’s intent, mission general and flag officers who serve or may guidance, and combat assessment, the critics serve as JFACCs to the available air opera- of the ATO process viewed the air operations tions planning tools. It will prepare partici- plan as too inflexible. They claimed the ATO pants to seek and exploit synergism through could not adjust to changes based on re- centralized planning and decentralized exe- ported battle damage assessments (BDA), in- cution of joint air operations. They will flight reports, or the ground commander’s study service-unique capabilities and the requirements. But every night during Desert means of integrating them to maximize Storm CINCCENT personally reviewed and available combat power. This course will be revised the next day’s air operations plan to JFACCing from a warfighter’s perspective. address changes in the enemy order of battle. Moreover, he adjusted the next two days’ Air Tasking Order targeting priorities as well as apportionment The central tenet of airpower is that totals to meet new threat assessments and planning (control) must be centralized and revised target lists. execution decentralized. Centralized plan- It is understandable how one might per- ning is key to coordinating efforts among all ceive an ATO as being too rigid. The docu- available air forces. Decentralized execution ment is a theater-wide tasker to strike as makes it possible to generate the tempo of many targets as possible in a 24-hour period operations required and to cope with the un- and achieve a CINC’s or JFC’s campaign ob- certainty and disorder of air combat in bat- jectives. Air component staffs usually work tle. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, three ATOs simultaneously: one being exe- who commanded Allied ground forces at cuted (today’s), one in production (tomor- Normandy, noted: “Airpower is indivisible. row’s), and one in planning (for the day If you split it up into compartments, you after tomorrow). Differences in intelligence merely pull it to pieces and destroy its great- and post-mission reporting which are avail- est asset—its flexibility.” Airpower’s speed, able to functional components and subuni- range, and flexibility give it the ability to fied commands mean that many targets mass combat power throughout a theater of nominated by one component may not be operations. Massing combat power is the serviced when requested since they have goal of all commanders. Compartmentaliz- been hit previously or are no longer viable ing or dividing command and control re- targets (though the component’s intelligence sponsibilities for airpower degrades the abil- organization does not know it). With hun- ity to mass. dreds of targets and thousands of sorties to One difficulty in achieving centralized schedule, deconflict, recover, regenerate, and control of theater-wide air operations arises relaunch, the ATO is large, comprehensive, from the fact that command and control and imposing. Today, with the command, structure has not been responsive enough control, and communications systems for centralized planning and rapid execu- fielded since the Gulf War, the current ATO tion. In Desert Storm advanced technology process allows greater flexibility. We have offered this ability. Linking computers with worked on the training, now we need to give theater planning, communications, intelli- our people better tools. gence, reconnaissance, and targeting systems gave the air component commander the Contingency Planning ability to use the intent of the Commander As in Desert Storm ATOs can and will be in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINC- changed during daily targeting reviews con- CENT) to produce a comprehensive air oper- ducted prior to their execution. A new com- ations plan, adjust the air tasking order mand and control tool, the Contingency (ATO) if retargeting was necessary, and execute the plan via the ATO.

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F–14 being launched The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the Adriatic during have expended tremendous efforts to ensure Deny Flight. that CTAPS meets the needs of theater air component commanders—regardless of a JFACC’s service. The system has been designated the joint standard for ATO generation and dissemination by the Joint Staff. In addition, the software used to develop, transmit, and execute the ATO meets DOD common user standards. While the hardware may be different, both ATO inputs and the products available will be the same among all forces participating in theater air operations. Initial versions of CTAPS hardware and

Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway) software have been fielded. The services use the system for exercises and actual deploy- Theater Automated Plan- ments. Interoperability and system connec- ning System (CTAPS), re- tivity simplifies the job of air component places the automated staffs and intensifies the effectiveness of air- system used in the Gulf power. CTAPS represents a great leap forward War. CTAPS makes it eas- in technology, ease of operation, communi- ier for a JFACC to redi- cations flow, and customer support. Modern technology has enhanced the ability of a U.S. Army (Gil High) rect sorties and missions JFACC to support a theater campaign strat- AH–64 Apache at even after the ATO is Saudi port. published and distributed since it allows egy. These tools will undergo refinement as real-time communications among opera- technology and combat change. tions staffs, including naval aviation aboard Standing Organization carriers. Additionally, by assigning primary CENTAF planning and execution staffs and secondary taskings in the ATO, sorties during the Gulf War were augmented by can be redirected to hit assigned secondary hundreds of Air Force planners and liaison targets or diverted to address unexpected officers from other services. Since then, battlefield situations. Procedural and sys- CINCs and JFCs have used ad hoc joint staffs temic changes allow a JFC to add or shift to plan and execute air operations in contin- combat airpower to main or gency and exercise scenarios. This puts a CTAPS allows real-time supporting efforts and af- tremendous training burden on air compo- ford unprecedented flexibil- nent commanders who are assigned JFACC communications among ity to meet sudden changes responsibilities. In a crisis training time may operations staffs, including on the modern, dynamic be unavailable or inappropriate because of naval aviation aboard battlefield. operational security concerns. An even Air Force computer sys- tougher problem occurs if a CINC requires a carriers tems used to plan and exe- JFACC to execute initial air operations and cute air operations in the plan others while the staff is deploying. This Gulf War were incompatible with those of is extremely difficult for a trained and ready other services and coalition air forces. The air component staff and nearly impossible systems were not intended to address unique for an ad hoc group. requirements of joint and multinational air We can overcome such problems by as- operations in a contingency theater. To over- signing members of all services to a theater come the systemic obstacles to a single inte- CINC’s air component staff full time. This grated air operation, paper copies of the ATO joint staff would live together and work as a being executed were hand delivered to ships team every day, most likely at the air compo- and certain coalition forces. This was a great nent commander’s headquarters. The staff source of frustration for planners, operations would then be a trained and ready core controllers on the CENTAF staff, and squadrons tasked with flying missions.

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around which a full JFACC staff could be Central Command, and Commander, U.S. formed in crises. This requires training more Central Command Air Forces. This arrange- people from all services to act as members of ment gives the JTF–SWA commander local di- air component staffs. Even if they are not ac- rection and control of sorties. In addition, he tively serving on a joint air component staff, ensures airspace is laid out in a coordinated, they will be available to augment the as- disciplined manner. By articulating the level signed staff. of effort required and focusing all players on Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) have several the mission requirements, the JTF–SWA com- hundred people assigned to form an Air Force mander is able to execute the air operations core around which a theater air component required to achieve CINCCENT objectives. staff can be built. NAF commanders train and While it may be desirable, fiscal reality exercise assigned Air Force people to build an prevents us from forming large, new air com- air operations plan, coordinate plans and opponent staffs in each theater. The JTF–SWA erations between service components, and ex- experience has shown that a small, trained, ecute initial and subsequent ATOs in the and ready cadre, augmented by quality liai- event of crisis. This capability has been tested son officers from each component and successfully in real-world contingencies, the- trained augmentees, can transform the com- ater exercises, and at Blue Flag with liaison mander’s objectives into a comprehensive air personnel from other services and some allies. operations plan and an executable ATO. What is missing is full-time representatives Effective airpower, capable of meeting from other service components who will pro- the strategic needs of a JFC and addressing vide airpower in response to a regional con- direct air support requirements of land and tingency. JFACCs need this full-time service maritime component commanders, depends expertise to wage the joint warfare which on a solid foundation of communications General Powell said is essential to victory. It is and trust. When a JFACC clearly articulates up to the services to recognize the need and his goals and focuses components and his assign the right people. joint staff to achieve them, we can be suc- In the ongoing commitment to South- cessful. As seen in Southern Watch and west Asia, Operation Southern Watch, 150 Air other contingencies, properly trained, FA–18s taking off from Force and Navy officers augment CENTCOM equipped, and motivated personnel (as- Aviano Air Base. and CENTAF staffs. signed or augmenting) can become a Personnel on tem- formidable JFACC team when trust is estab- porary duty with lished and communications are maintained. the joint task force The Future staff plan and exe- While the nature of future conflict is cute air operations uncertain, U.S. participation in it and the in support of U.N. need for responsive and flexible airpower is Resolutions 687 not. Operations other than war (OOTW) and 688. In return, constitute a growth industry in which the they are practicing Nation will be involved. Thus airpower will their skills in an also be involved in some form. Ongoing op- operational setting. erations in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, the Horn The JFACC for

Combat Camera Imagery (Steve Thurow) of Africa, Haiti, and other regions are be- Southern Watch is coming the norm rather than the exception. also the Joint Task Experiences in these and other crises are Force-Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA) commander, helping us transform the lessons of Desert the Area Air Defense commander, and the Storm into experience for present and future Airspace Control Authority. Operational con- air commanders. trol over Navy and Air Force flying units as We are witnessing the first steps towards well as Army Patriot missile batteries in the controlling all theater air operations via the theater is retained by the respective service ATO. The Chairman recently changed Joint component commanders. The JTF–SWA com- Pub 3–56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air mander exercises tactical control over Navy Operations, to require positive control of all and Air Force sorties made available for planning through Commander, U.S. Naval Forces

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air operations in a the- personnel could serve as deputy JFACC and ater, including Army heli- in liaison functions, providing expertise in copters, on the ATO or a areas such as space warfare, airlift, and strate- flight plan. Special Opera- gic attack. Another possibility is to structure tions Forces have demon- theater exercises to provide for an Air Force strated that they can JFACC afloat with a predominantly Navy make significant contri- staff. Linking and sequencing service training butions to the deep bat- simulations such as the Navy’s Fleetex and tle. We have the ability to the Army’s Battle Training Program with Blue regularly include special Flag to accomplish a CINC’s joint training operations missions on objectives is yet another area with tremen- the ATO. During OOTW, dous potential. Phased simulations, keeping the consequences of not key players in their respective roles, more exercising positive con- closely approximates the real execution of a trol over all air operations campaign plan. With other innovations like could be disastrous. Posi- the distributed wargaming system, we can tive control helps avoid and will do more to simulate and exercise fratricide by giving all joint procedures that will be in use should team members a copy of we go to war. the game plan. The con- The future of airpower is optimistic for U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway) F–16 returning from tention that doing so both airmen and other functional compo- Cope North 94–1 makes a cumbersome document even more nents. The new tools and training we are mission off Japan. unwieldy fails to take into account CTAPS giving to JFACCs and their staffs will make and future command and control systems. airpower more capable and flexible. Short- We should also expect to encounter and comings identified during and after the Gulf exercise more frequently with JFACCs who War are being addressed and initial results are not Air Force officers or who have a mo- are very promising. As new systems and bility rather than a combat background. A training programs mature we will see better primary reason for such joint training pro- and more responsive air operations to sup- grams is to prepare for scenarios when a non- port a JFC’s concept of operations. Air Force service will have the preponderance With newly acquired capabilities, how- of air assets and the command and control ever, come responsibilities to act as an equal mechanisms to plan and execute theater air partner beside both land and maritime com- operations. It is not difficult to imagine a sce- ponents as a supporting as well as supported nario when a Navy admiral is the initial component. This means seeking innovative JFACC in a contingency and ways to sequence and phase air operations new tools we are giving then passes his responsibility to achieve theater objectives. It also means JFACCs will make air- to an Air Force or a Marine massing airpower to delay, disrupt, and de- general as operations move stroy enemy combat forces before they close power more capable and ashore. As the commitment to with ground and naval forces. And finally, it flexible a particular contingency ma- means being available to put steel on target tures, the JFACC may again be when a JFC needs to add or shift weight to a an admiral or general responsible for plan- main or supporting effort. ning and executing mobility and sustain- Future JFACCs will wield more control ment activities. This would be difficult to ac- and provide better airpower capability to complish in a large operation today, but JFCs and other components of a joint force. standardized planning and execution tools In the past centrally planning the execution and joint training programs will make the of limited air assets has been a difficulty, but hand-off easier in the future. Now we need enhanced training and enhanced command, practice. control, and planning systems will help us It is possible and advisable to test this realize the theater-wide benefits of flexible, concept. Under different funding and spon- responsive, and lethal airpower. JFQ sorship Blue Flag could be run with a non-Air Force JFACC and his principle staff. Air Force

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UNAMIRMission to Rwanda By R. A. DALLAIRE and B. POULIN

n early 1993, the U.N. Secretary General goals were intended to culminate in elec- drew attention to the tragedy befalling tions some twenty-two months later. Rwanda. In June the Security Council Unfortunately, the UNOMUR mandate Ipassed resolution 846 authorizing a U.N. to prevent weapons from entering the coun- Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNO- try did little to abate human suffering. In MUR) which began operations in July with fact, the situation continued to deteriorate approximately a hundred military and civil- because of the massive displaced population, ian personnel. Its primary task was to ensure drought, famine, poor public health, and de- that no military assistance reached the clining national revenues. Large refugee in- Rwandan rebels—the Front Patriotique fluxes from Rwanda into neighboring Bu- Rwandais—across the Uganda border. In Au- rundi were also a chief concern. Accordingly, gust, the belligerents signed the Arusha the Security Council adopted resolution 872 peace agreement which, it was hoped, would in October 1993 authorizing a contingent bring peace. Its goals included installing a consisting of some 2,500 military personnel broad-based transitional government known as the U.N. Assistance Mission for (BBTG); establishing transitional institu- Rwanda (UNAMIR).1 tions; deploying a neutral international UNAMIR had a multifaceted mandate force; withdrawing all foreign troops; inte- and a concept of operations with four phases. grating the gendarmerie; disengaging, dis- The first phase (October 5, 1993–January 4, arming, and demobilizing both parties; and 1994) promoted the installation and opera- protecting the expatriate community. The

Summary

Efforts by the United Nations to intervene in Rwanda illustrate how hesitancy and impotence on the part of some sovereign nations leave victims of many humanitarian disasters contemptuous of the international community. The U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) braved a disintegrating political situation that generated masses of refugees and fueled deep ethnic tensions compounded by drought and famine. A new mandate established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) which achieved some of its goals, especially in coordinating humanitarian aid with civilian agencies. But the late arrival of personnel, scant resources, and a lack of international resolve led to a view of the United Nations as a paper tiger and contributed to the death of a half million people. While withdrawal would have been tantamount to endors- ing genocide, the lesson of Rwanda is too-little-too-late from a world organization with serious faults.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Canadian Government, or any agency of the United Nations.

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the mission and the Rwandans fell victim to inflated expectations that the United Nations could not fulfill

The Globe and Mail, Toronto (Corrine Dufta) Maj Gen Dallaire (right) with fellow peacekeepers and tion of a BBTG. Specifically, it assisted in en- forces. The third phase (January 5–April 4, friends. suring the security of Kigali as well as demili- 1995) was to be characterized by the actual tarizing the area in and around the city, help- disengagement, demobilization, and integra- ing in mine clearance, providing security for tion of both parties. The last phase (January 5– repatriation of Rwandan refugees and dis- November 4, 1995) called for providing secu- placed persons, coordinating humanitarian as- rity in the run up to elections. Interestingly, sistance in conjunction with relief operations, the operation also saw an unprecedented de- investigating alleged noncompliance with gree of cooperation with civilian agencies that provisions of the peace accord, and monitor- had the front-line job of providing humanitar- ing security leading to democratic elections. ian aid which resulted in an attractive and The second phase (January 5–April 4, 1994) cost-effective way of facilitating the operation involved preparations to disengage, demobi- and advancing the spirit of Arusha. lize, and integrate government and rebel The Mission At first glance the UNAMIR mandate seemed feasible, and the force did acquit it- Major General R. A. Dallaire is Deputy Commander self well, all things considered. Several con- of the Canadian Army; he was chief military straints made it clear, however, that the man- observer for UNOMUR and commanded UNAMIR; date and timetable jeopardized the ability of Captain B. Poulin serves as African regional officer UNAMIR to fulfil its mission as originally en- in the Directorate of International Policy, Canadian Department of National Defence.

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M–113A2 rolling onto ramp at Entebbe, Uganda. Combat Camera Imagery (Lemuel Cassilas) The Chairman visiting U.N. contingent.

Combat Camera Imagery (Chris U. Putnam)

in mediating as well as reconciling differences among the two parties and also pre- cluded developing and implementing a structured peace process. In other words, the mission and the Rwandans which the operation was intended to secure fell victim to inflated expectations that the United Nations

Combat Camera Imagery (Marvin Krause) could not fulfil. This explains in part how a Canadians arriving classical peacekeeping mission degenerated via Air National Guard into a resumption of the conflict and how visaged. For example, the October 4 resolu- C–5 Galaxy. new human rights abuses based on political tion called for some 2,500 U.N. personnel, decapitation degenerated into genocide. yet the force did not completely arrive until late February. To further complicate matters, Raising the Stakes some arrived without minimum equipment. The first signs of this crisis surfaced in This problem was partly due to the over- April 1994 when the Rwandan president died all pressure under which the United Nations under mysterious circumstances in a plane had to respond to a number of international crash. Fighting broke out among government crises during 1992–93 without a commensu- forces followed by murders as the situation rate expansion of resources from member rapidly gave way to increasing lawlessness, states, and also due to the limited field oper- violence, and mass killing across most of the ations staff in the Department of Peacekeep- country. The hands of the United Nations ing Operations (DPKO) at the United Na- were also tied; and since it possessed no tions. In the case of Rwanda, this resulted in power akin to that of a sovereign state, it problems over deployment time and budget, could only act with the consent of the inter- not to mention the paucity of air transport national community under the auspices of (both fixed-wing and rotary). Such deficiencies weakened the effectiveness of UNAMIR

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were engaged in a civil war and UNAMIR had Rwanda: The Rebel Advance only 2,500 poorly trained troops. At best, U.N. presence provided local security for the roughly 20,000 Rwandans caught between the lines, helped preserve truces and cease- fires, assisted both civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), held ground, and prepared the way for a new force and an increased humanitarian effort. The situation was also exacerbated by decisions on the part of some contributing countries to either withdraw military personnel from UNAMIR unilaterally or not amend the mandate under what were significantly Combat Camera Imagery (Lemuel Cassilas) changed circumstances, namely a state of war instead of peace. Thus as the United Nations debated a new mandate and increases in personnel, the UNAMIR force—with little or no ammunition and barely a third of the minimum operational equipment needed in theater, hardly any defense stores, and one of its major contingents (Belgians) deliberately being targeted by one of the warring factions—actually decreased from 2,500 to 450 Source: Canadian National Defence Headquarters troops through a decision by the Security Council which reinforced the impression of Refugee/Displaced Persons Camps the United Nations as a paper tiger. Despite these setbacks, a complete withdrawal from Rwanda was out of the question since the belligerents would have perceived it as a green light for a more deliberate, intoler- able escalation of hostilities. It became clear that the term international community had become a pejorative for both sides. Ironically, while U.N. credibility was being eroded daily by its ineffectiveness in the face of massacres and ongoing fighting, it remained the only conduit for the two sides to communicate and for an objective projection of the Rwan- dan situation around the world. Also, unlike other international organizations, the United Nations and the International Committee of

Source: Canadian National Defence Headquarters the Red Cross held firm. The Response The international community finally responded to the request by the Secretary Gen- the Security Council. As long as the individ- eral and approved expansion of the U.N. ual members of this body procrastinated and mandate and operations in Rwanda. The Se- pursued national agendas, the organization curity Council passed resolution 918 in May remained relatively powerless. Consequently, followed by resolution 955 in June which au- little could be done to deter fighting from thorized a UNAMIR force of 5,500 troops with spreading throughout the country given that some 60,000 government and rebel soldiers

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a more proactive humanitarian protection French soldiers and support mandate. In fact, the mandate watching materiel provided for creating secure areas to protect being unloaded. refugees and displaced persons, supporting and securing the distribution of relief supplies, and imposing an arms embargo against Rwanda. It also called for an immediate cease- fire and end to violence. But once again the required personnel and equipment were not forthcoming. For instance, the United Nations was not given assets to counter the inflammatory broadcasts from the nominally independent Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines which was controlled by the so-called interim government. These broadcasts were largely responsible for spreading panic that, in turn, drove large numbers of people to refugee camps in neighboring states, thereby spreading instability throughout the region. The broadcasts also excited the Hutu population to take up arms against Tutsis and Hutu moderates to exterminate them and, also, regularly targeted UNAMIR in general and its senior officials in particular. This last development Combat Camera Imagery (Andy Dunaway) raised tensions between U.N. personnel and the large Hutu population, which complicated the mediation process. It also should be pointed out that the broadcasts discouraged bilizing Rwanda spread the word that one survivors from returning to their homes in must flee the country to obtain the means to Rwanda and should have been jammed. The survive, from food to medical care. United Nations should have aired counter- Ironically, the net effect of providing aid broadcasts to give the population a clear ac- to this area was a continual increase in the count of what was actually happening as it already large numbers of refugees arriving did in Cambodia. Yet, unlike Cambodia, no there and considerable tension in the south- country came forward to offer jamming or west that could have resulted in another ex- broadcasting assets. odus of more than a million Rwandans to- Another example of the lack of resources wards Bukavu. Needless to say, these was the refugee camps. There was no con- developments further strained the already certed effort by the international commu- scant resources. Finally, this concentration nity to disarm refugees or segregate extrem- of aid hampered the U.N. effort to convince ists from the general population which the same refugees to go home and displaced moved across the border into the camps. It persons to stay. was clear that aside from refugees in and French-led coalition forces did stabilize around Goma, most refugees and certainly a the southwest; but that temporary interven- majority of displaced persons in the south- tion must be compared with the lack of sup- west were victims of world apathy. This be- port which the U.N. mission received in at- nign neglect was caused by the media which tempting to get the revised UNAMIR as a whole opted to dispatch their reporters operation off the ground for a second time. to Goma, which helped alleviate the misery It would have been preferable to see these ef- there at the expense of the rest of the coun- forts channelled differently, say towards the try. Second, with only aid to Goma being UNAMIR mission itself. If this had occurred, publicized, protagonists interested in desta- the entire operation would have been shorter and more effective.

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In hindsight the international commu- earmarked forces that have undergone com- nity reacted too late to the burgeoning bined exercises with integrated communica- refugee situation and too late to stop geno- tions equipment. cide. Moreover, the refugee camps, concen- U.N. headquarters, for its part, needs au- trated in extremely precarious locations and thority to rapidly respond to crises with a replete with extremists, will play a key role mission-specific implementation plan devel- in Rwanda’s future. They will hinder the oped by an adroit, reconstituted political Rwandan government from re-establishing staff. The bottom line is that sovereign na- itself to the point where it can deal with the tions must adapt to the new world by allow- challenges of the present, let alone those of ing the United Nations to do things that the future. they do not or cannot do individually for In August 1994 a cease-fire was declared, various geopolitical reasons. This would fa- albeit unilaterally by the rebel side. Contin- cilitate a response to an unfolding crisis in ued reluctance by the international commu- weeks rather than months. By the same nity, however, either to help or to direct the token, this approach would help preclude re- United Nations to be more proactive in areas peating the lesson of Rwanda, where a terri- surrounding Rwanda will be disastrous. The ble price was extracted because the response inability of various commissions (for exam- had to be improvised. JFQ ple, genocide and human NOTES the international community rights) to safely conduct a balanced investigation 1 UNOMUR was administratively integrated into UN- must be capable of respond- of the camps akin to that AMIR at that time; it was disbanded in September 1994 ing to humanitarian crises inside Rwanda, and a with most of its personnel and equipment transferred to UNAMIR. rapidly and effectively lack of technical and fi- nancial support for the Combat Camera Imagery (Andy Dunaway) new government to create a semblance of a judicial process, gendarmerie, civil service, and schools, will only increase the chances of failure and suffering. The major difference this time, however, is that if the situation is not rectified the whole region will be affected as opposed to only Rwanda. The international community must be capable of responding operationally, administratively, and logistically to humanitarian crises like Rwanda rapidly and effectively. Organizing a plans and policy branch within the United Nations to conduct forward planning and providing the staff for contingency planning would be useful. One should bear in mind that an embryonic cell exists in DPKO with many similar features, and it might fit the bill if expanded. Along with these measures, the United Nations needs greater access to resources for field operations, possibly through something similar to a NATO mobile force to which member countries contribute troops on a rotational basis for one or two years. A small permanent headquarters staff could be deployed to the field with standard operating procedures and contingency planning, together with

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Joint Education for the

st U.S. Navy (Paul J. Salesi) Naval War College, Newport. 21 Century By ROBERT B. KUPISZEWSKI

he Armed Forces must educate of- of education based upon unity of command, ficers in the same way that they a joint learning environment, and consoli- plan to fight—jointly. This calls dated assets. Education, like other aspects of T for an educational structure that is preparing for war, should be accomplished in more economical but that continues to pro- a joint setting. duce leaders who are able to perform on an The services are reviewing how to meet increasingly complex battlefield. With the future education requirements. Their empha- exception of the National Defense University sis is on developing the classroom of the 21st (NDU), military education is conducted by century and curtailing redundant programs. the individual services. There is no DOD or Consideration is also being given to consoli- joint agency charged with integrating re- dating programs to conserve resources, but sources, manpower, and academic programs these efforts are largely focused on unilateral for the efficient and cost-effective operation needs. There is no effort underway to consol- of the educational system. Though this sys- idate service programs. A joint command is tem has served the military well, it may not needed to oversee and integrate doctrine as be suited for the tremendous changes that well as education. In essence, education—like education will face in the next century. Tech- operations—should be a joint rather than a nological advances, budgetary constraints, service responsibility. While it is impossible and enhanced jointness will call for new to offer a detailed plan on making education ways of doing business. We require a vision more efficient and cost-effective, this article includes a concept to stimulate thinking on the development and implementation of a Robert B. Kupiszewski is Chief of the Curriculum better educational system. Affairs Division at the U.S. Army Command and The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorgani- General Staff College. His article entitled “Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?” (with zation Act upheld the relevance of service William M. Steele) appeared in issue 3 of JFQ. education but stressed joint education.

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Through the efforts of the House Panel on leaner, and adaptable to change. When in- Military Education, Joint Staff, and services a troducing a concept, one must postulate a new approach has emerged on how to train point of departure. These then are the as- and educate the total force for the future. sumptions on which I base this proposal: Goldwater-Nichols brought about innova- ▼ all services must move toward greater tions that hint at a structure for military ed- jointness in education ucation. The Chairman, for example, is re- ▼ Congress will continue to drive consoli- sponsible for formulating policy on military dations across all services education.1 As part of that responsibility, he ▼ limited resources will force radical formed a Military Education Division (J-7) changes in the DOD infrastructure resulting in on the Joint Staff and re- multipurpose, efficient installations ▼ the Armed Forces are grad- leased CM–1618–93, Mili- joint doctrine will eventually replace tary Education Policy Docu- most service doctrine ually accepting a more ▼ the classroom will remain the focal point ment, which provides a unified notion of PME of training and education comprehensive framework ▼ technology will reduce classroom instruc- for Professional Military Ed- tion time and expand opportunities for self-devel- ucation (PME). Placing responsibility for opment and operational assignments PME under the Chairman is a major step to- ▼ technology will foster greater interaction ward unity of command over a complex, di- among industry, government, and educational in- verse, and somewhat redundant system. stitutions ▼ learning through resident faculty-student U.S. Navy (Paul J. Salesi) The Armed Forces are gradually accepting a more unified notion of PME. Service interaction will remain important. colleges are conducting joint wargames and Some of my assumptions are controver- planning to link their library systems and sial and speculative. While many may find it automated networks. The trend since Gold- hard to accept the idea that joint doctrine water-Nichols has been toward joint educa- will replace service doctrine, doctrinal devel- tional planning and greater sharing of re- opment does seem to be moving in that di- sources by the services. Much credit for these rection. And as joint doctrine takes the place initiatives must go to the Military Education of service doctrine it requires an educational Coordination Conference (MECC) which is system that fosters a joint learning environ- chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff. Re- ment. That the classroom will remain the cently the MECC has recommended signifi- focus of education, with learning relying on cant improvements. But despite this progress faculty-student interaction, is debatable. more must be done. Congress advocates Many feel that interactive learning utilizing more consolidation of service educational computers will replace classrooms as we functions, resources, and facilities. One know them. In that case continued need for member of the House, for instance, called universities with multi-purpose facilities for a study on collocating the service col- would diminish. But such a proposal envi- leges with service academies.2 Similarly, the sions a requirement for the classroom—with Senate directed DOD to report on “potential faculty members and students engaged in cost savings from consolidation of military face-to-face dialogue—which sustains the command and staff and war colleges, and need for multipurpose facilities. their administration.” 3 It seems that Con- An Organizational Approach gress is clearly proposing a more efficient and cost-effective educational system. As stated above, I propose forming a joint command to oversee every aspect of Some Assumptions education under a four-star general or flag My proposal for a joint education com- officer who is nominated on a rotational mand visualizes a system comprised of uni- basis from the services and reports to the versities that provide a joint environment Secretary of Defense. Oversight for educa- for developing doctrine and teaching while tion policy, however, would still rest with offering service-unique curricula. This uni- the Chairman. Universities would serve as versity system would be interconnected, the operating elements of this command. Separate universities would be formed at each distinct level of military education. For

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example, universities would be created for students is partially based on seating capac- initial entry-level training as well as interme- ity, the size of the student body would have diate- and senior-level education. Addition- to be resolved before creating an intermedi- ally, functional universities could be formed ate university. The Air Force, for example, to conduct instruction in specialized areas sends only about 20 percent of its officers to like integrating battlefield transportation intermediate college in residence. Given a from the tactical to strategic level. In carry- larger facility, it and the other services may ing out its mission, the university system increase enrollment levels. Student capaci- would offer individual training and educa- ties and service needs must drive the design, tion from accession to retirement. Even ser- composition, and operation of an intermedi- vice academies, Reserve officer training pro- ate university. grams, and officer candidate schools would Some advantages of a single intermedi- come under a university. ate university are obvious. Foremost, it Each university would teach a joint core would allow both service and truly joint curriculum as well as service specific instruc- learning to be carried out in one place. Stu- tion. In the case of intermediate-level educa- dents would no longer have to go on tempo- tion I envision a university with a single rary duty for joint instruction as they do campus but separate Army, Navy, Marine under the PJE phase I and phase II system. Corps, and Air Force colleges. Like the cur- Also, all students could undergo advanced rent system, residency would be about a joint education, not just a small number like year; students would be majors or lieutenant those who now attend phase II at the Armed commanders as well as equivalent rank civil- Forces Staff College. Another advantage is a ians. Curricula could be configured in vari- joint faculty on one campus that teaches ous ways. One model would devote the ini- comprehensive service and joint curricula. tial phase of the course to service-specific This would rapidly lead to faculties highly instruction followed by talented in service and joint matters. And fi- forming universities to consol- joint instruction similar nally, a single location would have a tremen- to that offered in the dous impact on resources and costs by con- idate educational activities is Program for Joint Edu- solidating facilities and support required to a natural development cation (PJE) at the operate the present system of five joint and Armed Forces Staff Col- service intermediate-level colleges. lege (four months of The Under Secretary of Defense for Per- hands-on application in a joint learning en- sonnel and Readiness sent a report to vironment). Devoting the first eight months Congress in March 1994 which discussed of the course to service-unique instruction various consolidation initiatives including would enable students to bring that exper- relocation of all intermediate-level education tise to the joint learning experience during to Fort Leavenworth.4 The report concluded the latter part of the course. that consolidation would not be cost-effec- More than 2,250 officers currently at- tive. While that may be the case today, will tend the four service intermediate-level col- it be true twenty years from now? Probably leges which is approximately the enrollment not. The answer is to develop an educational at a small liberal arts college. Given that plan and system that would make it cost-ef- total, the students eligible to attend an inter- fective to move intermediate-level education mediate university could be situated in one to Fort Leavenworth by the year 2015. complex with common areas for joint in- Forming universities to consolidate edu- struction and individual Army, Navy, Marine cational activities is a natural development Corps, and Air Force faculties and halls for and has a number of precedents. NDU con- individual service instruction. The university solidated several colleges in the late 1970s might include the Coast Guard which in the under one president. Likewise, the Navy, next century may have missions closely Marine Corps, and Air Force collocated their aligned to those of the other services. Since senior and intermediate colleges at Newport, the number of resident intermediate-level Quantico, and Maxwell, respectively. The Army recently formed the Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee to consolidate

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small and mission-focused. The worst approach would be to establish a large headquarters that stifles the innovation and initiative needed at the university level. The principal focus of the universities must be on warfighting and operations other than war. DOD and the services will not be able to expend resources on programs that only marginally relate to military operations. Courses that teach such subjects as executive skills should be offered outside the university system, possibly in partnership with civilian institutions or industry. The system must be structured to nurture joint attitudes and perspectives from initial entry training through senior-level DOD Armed Forces Staff education. As farfetched as it may seem, the College, Norfolk. day could come when all accessions to the education related to battlefield support. But Armed Forces undergo basic instruction on what is required for the 21st century is to warfighting at one location. Planning for take these initiatives to another stage— that should occur as part of the transition to across service lines—with a dual aim of real- a joint command. izing greater economies through consolida- Educational resources will become more tion and enriching the learning process by scarce in the next century. Therefore the offering education in a joint environment planning for and use of facilities will be criti- which corresponds to the way we will fight. cal. DOD must use installations wisely to take advantage of the superb facilities at Key Decisions places like Carlisle, Newport, Quantico, and One critical planning consideration is Maxwell. However, those that are no longer that a joint education command and uni- cost-effective must be closed and new ones versity system should be designed to main- constructed when needed. The goal must be tain the same level of excellence for all to create an education system that is second members of the Armed Forces. It must en- to none at all levels. sure that the Reserve force and DOD civil- Planners must thoroughly address the ians are afforded educational opportunities issue of resident versus nonresident educa- that are comparable to those of the active tion before changing the current system. force. This is important since the Reserve, Based on technology alone, it is highly likely National Guard, and civilian work force are that nonresident and distant learning will in- likely to have enhanced roles within DOD crease considerably in the 21st century. Since in the 21st century. Likewise, because of the this impacts on the number and size of facili- increased emphasis on coalition warfare, the ties, careful planning must ensure balanced system must afford allies and partners resident to nonresident student ratios. greater opportunities to share in our educa- Such a university system will not suc- tional facilities. Too often, the services have ceed unless it has “world class” faculties se- not had a coherent policy on integrating lected by rigorous screening processes to ac- the total force and international commu- quire the operational, technical, and nity into the learning process. This educa- educational skills needed for the 21st century tional structure must change that by having classroom. Once recruited, faculties must a combined as well as joint perspective. undergo intensive preparation followed by The new system must also be devoid of professional development to ensure sus- bureaucratic layers. It should eliminate un- tained performance. Carefully selected and needed headquarters and staffs that dupli- well trained faculties would be the most im- cate functions or merely coordinate activi- portant aspect of a new university system ties. A joint education command should be and the services should equate faculty positions to key operational assignments in

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terms of promotion potential and other demands of warfare in the next century. forms of advancement. Teaching in such a That vision should include a joint command university system must be a premier assign- and university system which comprises ment for military personnel of all specialties, every level of education. If the Armed Forces grades, and services. fail to seize the initiative and create a more efficient, cost-effective system, Congress is Blueprint for Change likely to step into the picture and legislate Creating an education command re- one. JFQ quires deliberate planning to transfer responsibility from the individual services to joint NOTES universities and could take as long as twenty 1 Chapter 5, paragraph 153, Public Law 99–433, years. A hypothetical phased plan to execute Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- such a decision might unfold as follows: tion Act, October 1, 1986. ▼ Phase I—Planning (1995–2000). The ser- 2 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Military Educa- vices consolidate educational assets to achieve tion: Information on Service Academies and Schools,” greater economies and efficiencies. As internal re- September 1993. 3 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and organizations occur, DOD establishes criteria for Readiness, “Consolidation of War and Staff Colleges designating installations for multi-purpose, cross- Study,” March 1994. service applications. The key event is tasking the 4 Ibid. Joint Staff to develop a campaign plan for a joint education command and a university system for DOD approval. ▼ Phase II—Transition (2000–10). A joint education command replaces service-unique activities under a campaign plan developed by the Joint Staff. DOD begins construction projects, up- grades facilities, and creates a command and control system. During this phase the colleges are initially reconfigured into consortia. For example, senior-level colleges form a consortium to share overhead costs and conduct joint curriculum planning (as found in the Defense Acquisition University). Converting to the new system requires an extraordinary effort by all services and takes a full ten years. ▼ Phase III—Execution (2010–15). A joint education command assumes command and control of all doctrinal development and education activities. The result is a single organization dedicated to integrating joint doctrine and educational programs, resources, and facilities.

This proposal for a new organizational structure for education in the 21st century is based on the premise that the services must train and educate in the same way they will fight. Trends in jointness the services must train and indicate significant movement in that direction. The educate in the same way services are consolidating they will fight training facilities and col- laborating in projects of mutual benefit to realize economies of scale and operating efficiencies, developments that will continue. But we must accelerate the process by rejecting the status quo and outlining a vision for education to meet the

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When Waves Collide: Future Conflict By RICHARD SZAFRANSKI

...we may eventually come to agree that a threat to and forecasts often nothing more than co- national security means anything on the globe which herent fiction masquerading as fact.2 Trends challenges a people’s health, economic well-being, and megatrends, which are linear extrapola- social stability, and political peace. tions, defy the reality of a world characterized by nonlinearity and exponential —Paul Kennedy 1 change. No one knows with certainty what surprises may lurk in the waves of the nyone who has witnessed a fist future.3 Yet, domestic and international in- fight, attended a hockey game, terests compel us to stretch, look ahead, try or read history knows that to thwart surprise, and be prepared. This ar- A mankind will never attain peace ticle dares to think aloud about conflict in and unity. On the contrary, rivalry, con- the next millennium. frontation, and conflict are constants of the Visions of the Future human state. Even advocates of information After decades of confrontation with the war, cyberwar, and psychological warfare Soviet Union, each service announced its vi- admit that friendly data, controllers, and sion of the post-Cold War world.4 Moreover, minds must be protected by the use of force. stirred by a speech that Sam Nunn delivered Future events are unknown and un- knowable, predictions merely guesswork,

Summary

What eventualities await the Armed Forces now that myriad dangers have replaced a monolithic threat are unknown. While old habits die hard, the weapons systems of the Gulf War will be relegated to the Reserve components. Naval forces will assume center stage, calling on enhanced airpower and spacepower. Ground forces will be smaller but highly mobile. The Air Force will turn to space or run the risk of extinction. New weapons will be smarter, but some ancient varieties will survive. The United Nations will succeed because it must, and the military may be earmarked for exclusive duty as peacekeepers. Special Operations Forces will bear the brunt of the Nation’s violent encounters, but precisely how will remain a mystery. Conflict will be keyed on the behavior that we attempt to ensure or expunge, the precise conditions of combat cessation, and the attributes that we want to prevail in a post-conflict world when waves collide.

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on the Senate floor about military redun- be. Some unarmed personnel may be trained dancy and waste—impelled by rapidly de- in martial arts. They would exercise choice, clining budgets and in the wake of the an essential part of recruiting in a segmented Chairman’s assessment of roles, missions, society. All forces deployed outside the and functions—Secretary of Defense Les United States would be guests and their hosts Aspin ordered a bottom-to-top evaluation.5 would fully grasp the consequences of acting The resulting Report on the Bottom-Up Review: inhospitably. For the Nation, access will be New Forces for a New Era described the forces global and electronic while presence will be required by the services until the end of the virtual in every major market or forum and century.6 If there is a unifying thread run- real when America so chooses. ning through these visionary documents, it Forces of the Future is the incredible notion that even in an era Naval forces may well become the cen- of exponential change the future will closely terpiece of the military. Extraterritorial and resemble the present or recent past. In other mobile, they will remain relatively large as a words, it appears that the dinosaur that we hedge against congressional limits on execu- know as the Armed Forces hopes to escape tive power. This body, the Nation’s founda- extinction or radical alteration by becoming tion force, will necessarily rely more on air- a minidinosaur.7 It is unlikely that this ap- power and spacepower than it does today. proach will succeed. The introduction of stealthy aircraft as well Things will change. The Armed Forces as long-range remotely-piloted and self-de- are likely to destroy, sell, retire, or slowly fensive atmospheric and stratospheric assets give the Reserve components much of their for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and Desert Storm-vintage weapons and equip- ground attack join new long-range, preci- ment. The Reserve and National Guard will sion-guided, beyond-visual-range, ship-to-air preserve and train with them in peacetime and ship-to-ground hypersonic missiles that employing antiquated tactics to the extent could capitalize on tactical satellites and that obsolete materiel, tracking and targeting capabilities available the Nation may complement reduced funding, and to carrier battle groups and flotillas of the fu- piecemeal formations armed members of the military ture. Embarked Fleet Marine Forces likely permit. Adversaries, with unarmed trainers and will be the instrument of choice for threat- sometimes-friends, ening to open and close many, but not all, technocrats and sometimes-allies of the very few public fights. The threat that, will take stock of this when pressed, the United States will “send situation and factor it into scenarios and de- in the Marines” will still be as compelling in fense budgets. The threat is gone. We now 2020 as it was in 1820 and 1920. The Semper face only dangers.8 Fi force will always be faithful, always hang- Will the United States maintain large ing on the wall, always ready to face “the forces if there is no urgent threat to national barbarians at the gate.” survival? It is likely that the American people Other ground forces, a small standing will eventually think otherwise. Congress army,10 will be built around the mobility and may even pass laws limiting the President’s relative ease of movement of light infantry to authority as Commander in Chief.9 The Na- facilitate foreign and domestic missions. tion may complement armed members of the Even tomorrow’s organic artillery and tanks military with unarmed ones such as teachers, will be light enough to be air-deliverable. Ar- trainers, technicians, and technocrats plus tillery will be largely smart rockets or smarter young people either repaying college loans by missiles. Tanks will be small, low, compact, national service or striving to be all they can autonomated,11 unmanned mobile gun platforms. Air defense weapons organic at the division level will include antitactical ballistic Colonel Richard Szafranski, USAF, is professor of missile defensive systems and counter-bat- national security studies at the Air War College tery engagement systems. Ground defenses and research director for Spacecast 2020, an Air will offer defensive counter-air, and air supe- University study on future military space require- riority will be organic to ground forces. Smart ments. His former assignments include command weapons, launched from the ground or of a bomb wing.

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that survives will meet itself going and com- Stealth fighter. ing from deployments that keep the United States engaged in the world. Some of our best forces—though not the very best—may serve with the United Na- tions as there will be no alternative to making the current ineffective unifying architecture effective. If there is large-scale conflict, it will almost certainly involve coalition warfare. Day-to-day experience in smaller, less violent coalition operations will help insure the success of larger, more violent ones. Member nations will charge multinational, multifunctional U.N. forces with counterproliferation, transportation, on-site inspection, and environmental cleanup—including radi- ological, chemical, and biological—as well as enforcement of the peacekeeping dictates of the family of nations. Their existence will evolve as America comes to understand and accept the big needs for the management of collective security on a small planet. U.S. Air Force What of the Air Force? Airpower and spacepower are at the heart of the roles, mis- standoff Army sions, and functions debate.12 Some observers aircraft, will pro- warn that the Air Force as the only service vide what today without any pre-Cold War experience may is understood as not survive.13 It was founded to help contain close air support, Soviet expansion by threatening long-range with antiaircraft nuclear bombardment.14 The Soviet Union is

DOD (R.D. Ward) defenses render- gone. Containment by threat of nuclear The Secretary being ing the air nearly weapons is also gone. What perhaps has briefed at SIMNET too lethal or confusing for pilots. The Army gone as well is the raison d’être for a separate Warfighting Complex. will draw on generations of mind-nimble air force. Small aircraft with a tactical func- (not necessarily literate), fingertip-quick tion and bombers designed to deliver nuclear youth and their years of experience as heroes weapons may be reorganized into non-nu- and killers in violent, virtually real interac- clear composite wings that mimic smaller air tive videos. The multifunctional squad will wings of carrier battle groups. But it is no be a production unit of lethality on the longer apparent that the Air Force—with its ground. All-weather day and night multi- unshakable dependence on and preference spectral sensors and precision-guided rounds for human fighter pilots and jet-delivered air will replace the iron gunsight and mass-pro- supremacy—has irreplaceable utility. The duced rifle of the old paradigm. Nothing will transport and aerial refueling functions must replace the knife, wielded by a cohort of and will survive, but it is arguable whether young, hot-blooded killers. these alone can provide sufficient justifica- As forces shrink so will the number of tion for preserving a separate air force. Long- bases. Loss of housing, commissaries, ex- range naval airpower can protect air-deliv- changes, hospitals, etc., is likely. The bases ered forces in transit. Unless the Air Force that survive closure and realignment will becomes the space force, it may not survive evolve. Conversion and consolidation will beyond 2010. Since a better organized space cause functions like administration, finance, force is required, the window of opportunity law, education, maintenance, transport, etc., for the survival of the Air Force may be fleet- to be automated, privatized, or done by ing. Will it grasp the opportunity? prison labor. Out-sourcing and downsizing will be the buzzwords of the day. The force

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Performance may be a good—though not appear to be disagreeable to the Navy, as not flawless—indicator of future prospects. Sonata—the service’s space and electronic Aircraft acquisition has a checkered record warfare vision for the future—seems to indi- since the development of the F–16. Procure- cate.15 Both the Army and Navy could ment problems with the C–17 program, the launch smaller “tactical” satellites on de- cost of the B–2, the always-under-modifica- mand. It is unlikely that Congress or the in- tion B–1B, depots that compete with a pri- ternational community will assent to build- vate aerospace industry at a time of defense ing, let alone deploying, space-to-earth strike conversion, and the beyond-air-supremacy weapons. Armaments may leave the earth F–22 have drawn much and transit space, but the United States will military, civil, and commercial attention. None of it probably never find the resolve to station space assets will be combined seems favorable. The arms in space. Navigation, communications, Army wants more pre- and surveillance activities will likely remain to command the electromag- dictable, better coordi- the limits of space-based capabilities. Even netic spectrum nated close air support. though we are nowhere near the limits of Some Navy and Marine those capabilities, the boundaries are not aviators have their own views on the Joint being pushed by the Air Force or any of the Force Air Component Commander. The suc- military space commands, but instead by in- cess of the Desert Storm air campaign threat- dustry. There is money to be made by pro- ens to become a liability to the Air Force as viding communications, navigational infor- brilliant but seemingly thoughtless “air mation, and products of space-based alone” airpower advocates take up their pens surveillance. The private sector, with its abil- or speak out. Their arguments sound increas- ity to satisfy customer demands and turn a ingly desperate. To the other services, per- profit, may ultimately provide most of the haps only the Air Force Air Mobility Com- “space command” the United States needs. mand has lasting value. The most likely course is that military, Critics also portray military spacecraft civil, and commercial space assets will be acquisition and launch functions as disap- combined to command the electromagnetic pointing. Parochial blue ribbon panels and spectrum. Such a partnership would create a special studies have done little beyond adding more arrows to the quivers of skeptics. Wonderful satellites have not been complemented by equally wonderful data distribution systems. Military space customers in an era of quality cannot all be called satis- fied. Moreover, they do not even know to which command to register complaints. Do they take them, they wonder, to the Air Force space command in Los Angeles that does acquisition, the one in Dayton that does procurement, or perhaps the one in Colorado Springs that does planning and some (by no means all) operations? It depends, they learn, on the specific spacecraft or problem. This is not just an Air Force issue. It appears there are as many space forces as there are air arms. Yet the time to abandon much of the air and contentious “aerospace” for space may be now for the Air Force. The Air Force may, for whatever reason, let this opportunity get away. Then what? Since the Army has the longest association with rockets and missiles, it can together with NASA and the private sector place large satellites in orbit on schedule. This would

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virtual, interactive space-to-earth and earth- tactics, SOF still will be able to effectively to-space data- or infosphere.16 Micro-minia- conduct the age-old tradition of hand-to- turization, nano-technology, advances in hand combat. Suitable for nonlethal use super-computing, artificial intelligence, fu- against a high-tech foe, SOF will also employ ture lasers and fiber optics, and computer- tremendous violence to deal with terrorists, graphic integration would make cyberwar brigands, drug-traffickers, and pirates. They and information war the distinguishing fea- will be compensated generously for the abil- tures of future conflict.17 It would be possible ity to kill reliably and the repeated willing- to construct an alternative truth from the in- ness to take calculated risks. They will form finite combinations that zeroes, ones, and an indistinct image of terror looming just pixels allow. Knowing the real truth would below the level of consciousness of a political require access to, and verification by, multi- adversary. The United States will use them to ple phenomena. Targeteers and combatants solve small problems rapidly and bring big- would both need topsight to confirm that a ger ones to closure suddenly. SOCOM will tank or building is neither a hologram nor continue to have its small, highly specialized, visual consequence of an adversary’s inser- and forever-out-of-the-mainstream air force. tion into our data stream. That technologies What SOF do and how they do it will remain and discoveries fail to come together before a mystery to many Americans including the realization that our guess about major members of the Armed Forces. regional contingencies was wrong (albeit po- Beyond the Horizon or Over the Edge? litically necessary) does not mean that they If you are a military realist it should not will not follow apace. We may have to fight seem odd to define forces and discuss them before they come together. before determining the conflicts which they The jewel in the military’s crown will be will face. If you are not a realist, however, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). consider the facts. America usually defines It will perform international housekeeping the functions of forces after fixing their size and wet-work. Special Operations Forces and form. Strategy—or what passes for it— (SOF) are the first truly joint and combined also follows the budget determinations on forces and the most elite in the Nation, per- the size of forces which the services then try haps the world. Capable of precisely applying to shape separately. It is illusory to expect technologically superior weapons and novel anything else. But in the future the United States must better rationalize its forces because of the different kinds of conflict that Air Force SWAT Team. will arise. What forces will affect nations? There will be a wider gap between rich and comfortable, on the one hand, and poor and miserable, on the other. Acquisitiveness will drive the world, the rich seeking a con- stantly improving quality of life and the less-rich seeking the means for greater wealth. Theft will be a problem. The biomass will move toward depletion as more and more people crowd the planet. We will not leave earth for life elsewhere. We dwell on a rather comfortable and certainly habitable rock spinning in deep space. Unless there is the promise of acquiring greater wealth on another rock, we will stay on this one.18 As we become more crowded and compete for resources and the means of production, we U.S. Air Force (Robert Wickley)

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will continue to affect the weather and pol- are the enabling media. SOF are expert at lute the air and water. Failed nuclear reac- “getting in, getting done.” If, however, they tors, episodes of serious cross-border envi- are frustrated and we are unwilling to let ronmental pollution, and squabbles over them die in place or be tried in foreign lands water rights in the Indus Valley and along as criminals (before the eyes of CNN), it will the Tigris and Euphrates will fuel some take heavier regular forces to bail them out. fights. Extremist factions will have many op- SOF very likely will have to learn to bail portunities to do battle. If cold fusion re- themselves out. places fossil and nuclear fuels, many will There are three paramount questions covet the discovery, and the definition of about future conflict: What is the specific be- “have not” could change overnight. What havior we want to compel or prevent? What will the Gulf Cooperation Council find to are the specific criteria for conflict termina- cooperate about if oil is less valuable or tion? What specific characteristics do we de- nearly worthless? When that possibility sire a post-conflict environment to have? dawns on them, will they more actively pur- While the answers determine the targets, re- sue the celebrity status that acquisition of versibility of means employed, and limits of nuclear weapons allows? Will they seek force needed, they are not posed in national big—maybe even too big to tolerate—oil military strategy. Unless these political ques- profits in the near term, expecting devastat- tions are answered for the military leader- ing losses later? Are there not already some ship, killing and destruction are likely to do sources of conflict in that region? more harm than good. That it would be If one believes, as Martin van Creveld foolhardy to undertake any combat without does, that the era of trinitarian warfare has clear objectives and an unclouded vision of ended, or that hyperwar, parallel war, or the the post-conflict environment does not sug- revolution in military affairs will deter large- gest that the United States will suddenly be- scale warfare, it is wise to anticipate different come immune to episodes of stupidity. It kinds of conflict.19 In addition to war on the suggests, however, that indiscreet behavior mind, future conflict is likely to be more could be catastrophic. Whatever we give up homeopathic or antidotal. This means that a or fail to acquire, our forces must maintain small, standing, hyperprofessional force will and enhance the capability for coordinated in actuality be the Nation’s first and last line action inside an adversary’s “decision of defense. A militia is a fine tradition, but loop.” 21 Some military actions in the future the cost of training and technology along may be as difficult as they are chilling. with difficulties in mobilizing and main- It is especially difficult to ponder actions streaming such a politically-potent force will that are anti-traditional. Might not Ameri- insure their obsolescence for extraterritorial cans harden their hearts further if they are combat.20 Consequently, U.S. forces must convinced that their wealth or their quality fight earlier, more covertly, and more often of life are at risk? 22 Will they be hardened to than in the past. Moreover, combat may be, the point of sealing borders to keep out the as van Creveld implies, more against non- starving, confine cannibalism or internecine state groups than with states. As the world warfare to hungry or warring states, or vio- gets smaller and more crowded, armed ele- late another nation’s sovereignty, maybe ments of both the United Nations and even seizing nuclear weapons or the means SOCOM may intervene more quickly to pre- of producing weapons of mass destruction as vent catalytic conflict. (Hence, the terms part of a counterproliferation strategy? Many homeopathic and antidotal.) Many, perhaps would probably decline to participate in most, engagements will be small and aimed such actions while some would take part. at group leaders and elite guards surround- Given lawful orders, members of the Armed ing them. These engagements will be risky Forces must do as ordered. Even so, this and ferocious. They will be won or lost in might not be work for amateurs or citizen- darkness or bad weather. If the United States, soldiers who are much more citizen than sol- alone or with partners, is unable to use less dier. It might be more suited to mercenaries violent political and economic instruments to compel good behavior, the next action will come from the sea, even if air and space

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Szafranski

or hyper-professionals. Given a choice be- What are the limits of optimism? It is re- tween those two terms, citizens probably stricted by awareness that though humans will call such forces hyper-professionals. may be, in Shakespeare’s words, the paragon Comforting as the term sounds, it may epit- of animals, they do have an animal side omize a distinction without much differ- nonetheless. What are the limits of cynicism? ence. But since the Nation could command At the extreme are three thoughts. First, the the future’s datasphere, it could also portray Nation will not intentionally render itself unsavory realities any way it likes. militarily impotent. Plato’s observation that Arthur Clarke takes a rather more opti- only the dead have seen the end of war is no mistic view. Proliferation of global informa- doubt true. Second is the awareness that the tion and communications, United States is more often smart than stupid. America will not need vast the sub-meter resolution Lastly, we can possess the certain knowledge forces to protect the Nation in Peacesat pictures of the that nothing is ever as good as it seems or as earth, and awareness that bad as it might be. Things could turn out or police planet Earth conflict is self-destructive fine. No one knows. But waves will collide could enlighten the minds and we will be transformed in the process. of the world.23 If so, America will not need Thinking about how to cope now is prefer- vast forces to protect the Nation or police able to being surprised later. In the end, the planet Earth. But even though the future biggest conflict in the next century is likely to may transform war, it will not likely elimi- be the one within ourselves. JFQ nate it.24 People are not moving toward en- lightenment in lockstep. While the United NOTES States may be alert to the danger of environ- 1 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century mental pollution, for example, slash-and- (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 129–30. burn developing nations appear to have few 2 Charles W. Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, such concerns. Thus this country will face U.S. Army War College, 1992). The documentation on others who are, or who are trying to be, the pages 79–90 suggests that such unanalytical forecasting mirror-image of the Nation ten, twenty, is guesswork. thirty, or more years ago. America developed 3 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: William nuclear weapons and then used them in Morrow and Company, 1980). The idea of waves or rip- ples emanating from different societies is quite descriptive combat. It became a great power. Even and has great diagnostic value. See also Alvin and Heidi though the linkage is coincidental and not Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st causal, might not others see arms as paving Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). the way to greatness, or at least to greater 4 These were Land Warfare in the 21st Century for the self-determination? When these waves col- Army, ...From the Sea for the Navy, and Global Reach- 25 Global Power for the Air Force. See also Tom Donnelly, lide, what will be the consequences? “Services Outline Their Futures in High-Stakes Era,” Wild cards fill the deck. America appears Army Times, April 26, 1993, p. 25. to lack the political will to name the trump 5 Sam Nunn, “The Defense Department Must Thor- suit. Indeed, it is doubtful that it could any oughly Overhaul the Services’ Roles and Missions,” Vital longer even if it did have the will. Demo- Speeches, vol. 20 (August 1, 1992), pp. 717–24. See also Barton Gellman, “Senator Nunn Questions Military Du- graphic shifts and changes in the United plication,” The Washington Post, July 3, 1993; “Aspin Gen- States will make the House of Representatives tly Criticizes Powell Report,” The Washington Post, March in the year 2020 far different from the group 30, 1993, p. 6; and Les Aspin, “Chairman’s Report: A First of middle-aged Caucasian males that for- Step,” Defense 93, issue no. 2 (July 1993), pp. 24–25. merly governed or sought to govern. How 6 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom- Up Review: Forces for a New Era (Washington: Depart- these yet-to-be-elected members will vote on ment of Defense, September 1, 1993). North-South or East-West issues makes the course of policymaking and lawmaking difficult to predict from the vantage point of 1995. How these future representatives of the people will constitute or employ the Armed Internet users who want to share Forces may differ in ways no one can antici- their thoughts on “When Waves pate. This is not to lament change, merely to Collide” with the author can forward note that it is likely to affect the military. them to: [email protected]

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FUTURE CONFLICT

7 This description of inappropriate responses to 17 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is change demanded at “the bifurcation point” is used by Coming!” Comparative Strategy, vol. 12, no. 2 (April– Alvin and Heidi Toffler. See also Ilya Prigogine and Is- June 1993), pp. 141–65. The great threat of strategic cy- abelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue berwar is its dependence on successfully creating and with Nature (Boulder, Colo.: New Science Library, 1984), sustaining lies. If a democracy uses cyber-weapons and pp. 171–76, 297–313. information warriors, its citizens may never again be 8 Bottom-Up Review. See also Les Aspin, “Four Chal- confident in their relationship with the government. lenges to the New World Order,” Defense Issues, vol. 8 See Gregory Bateson, “The Cybernetics of ‘Self’: A The- (February 1, 1993), p. 2. Dangers have now replaced ory of Alcoholism,” Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New threats; and peace operations, engagement, and enlargement York: Random House, Ballantine Books, 1972), pp. 314– must be added to the strategic lexicon. 20. See also Eric Voegelin, “Necessary Moral Bases for 9 Carroll J. Doherty, “Clinton Calms Rebellion on Communication in a Democracy,” Problems of Commu- Hill by Retooling Somalia Mission,” Congressional Quar- nication in a Pluralistic Society (Milwaukee: Marquette terly Weekly Report, vol. 40 (October 9, 1993), pp. University Press, 1956), pp. 53–68. 2750–51; Pat Towell, “Behind Solid Vote on Somalia: A 18 Bill Wisher, the screenwriter for Terminator 2, Hollow Victory for Clinton,” Congressional Quarterly shared this insight: unless this planet becomes unin- Weekly Report, vol. 41 (October 16, 1993), pp. 2823–27; habitable or space offers sources of wealth unavailable and “Clinton’s Policy Is Battered, But His Powers Are In- on earth, there is no reason to abandon our home. tact,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 42 (Oc- 19 Both Martin van Creveld, Transformation of War tober 23, 1993), pp. 2896, 98. For a discussion of the (New York: The Free Press, 1991), and the Tofflers, War War Powers Act, see Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Hal- and Anti-War, see conflict with non-state groups as an perin, editors, The U.S. Constitution and the Power To Go emerging threat or danger. Trinitarian warfare is based to War: Historical and Current Perspectives (Westport, on Clausewitz’s notion of the “remarkable trinity” of Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994). government, military, and people. 10 In a dinner speech at the Air War College Class of 20 To be effective the Reserve components must be 1994 Dining Out on October 22, 1993, General Ronald organized, trained, and equipped with the same rigor as A. Fogleman, then Commander in Chief of U.S. Trans- the active components. portation Command, pointed out that large standing 21 John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Los- forces are an anomaly in America. ing,” August 1987. This analysis of strategy, tactics, and 11 Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production System: Beyond the operational art led to the so-called OODA loop—a Large-Scale Production (Cambridge, Mass.: Productivity cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action. Press, 1988). Autonomated machines are both auto- 22 Linda Kleindienst and Bill Gibson, “Chiles Plans to mated and semi-autonomous, with some level of artifi- Sue U.S. Over Immigrants’ Impact,” The Orlando Sentinel, cial intelligence built in. December 29, 1993, pp. A–1, 4. 12 Richard Szafranski, “Annulling Marriages: Refram- 23 Arthur C. Clarke, How the World Was One: Beyond ing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Debate,” Air- the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1992). power Journal, vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 55–67. 24 Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study 13 Lowell Wood, “The U.S. Air Force in 2020,” writ- of the Human Animal (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). See ten address, October 27, 1993, pp. 16–25. also Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons of History (New 14 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), and Robert L. O’Con- The Free Press, 1989), pp. 7, 11–25, 35–37. nell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Ag- 15 Jerry O. Tuttle, Sonata (Washington: Department gression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). of the Navy, 1993), p. 1. The author proclaims the ar- 25 Richard Eckersley, “The West’s Deepening Cultural rival of a new kind of warfare called space and elec- Crisis,” The Futurist, vol. 6 (November–December 1993), tronic warfare (SEW). Sonata assumes the availability of pp. 8–12. See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti- space lift to enable its vision of SEW. War, pp. 248–52. 16 Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett, “Do We Need an Information Corps?” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 88–97. This corps may be an attempt to inflict a new idea on force-structuring. Infor- mation war may ultimately prove to have more dire consequences than nuclear weapons.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON THE Revolution in Military Affairs

o encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of war, JFQ is pleased to announce the first annual “Essay T Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc. The contest solicits innovative concepts for Contest Rules operational doctrine and organizations by which the 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians Armed Forces can exploit existing and emerging (from the public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays written by individual authors or technologies. Entries that most rigorously address one groups of authors are eligible. or more of the following questions will be considered 2. Entries must be original and not previously published (nor under consideration for publication for a cash award: elsewhere). Essays that originate from work carried ▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. How and other educational institutions are eligible. might emerging technologies—and the integration of such 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length technologies—result in a revolution in conducting warfare in the and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount coming decades? What will be the key measures of that change? at the end. Documentation may follow any standard ▼ academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than Exploiting new and emerging technologies is dependent footnotes are preferred. on the development of innovative operational concepts and 4. Entries must be submitted with (1) a letter organizational structures. What specific doctrinal concepts and clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author’s name, social security organizations will be required to fully realize the revolutionary account number (or passport number in the case of potential of critical military technologies? non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone number, and FAX number (if available); (2) a cover ▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies in sheet containing the contestant’s full name and innovative ways to gain significant military leverage against U.S. essay title; (3) a summary of the essay which is no more than 200 words; and (4) a brief biographical systems and doctrine? sketch of the author. 5. Entries must be mailed to the following address Contest Prizes (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 Contest, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of $500 will 6. Entries must be postmarked no later than be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer August 31, 1995 to be considered in the 1994-95 contest. candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of major/ 7. JFQ will hold first rights to the publication of lieutenant commander or below (or equivalent grades). A all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays entered in the contest may be published in JFQ. selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with various 8. Winners’ names will appear in JFQ and the aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be presented prizes will be presented by the President of the to each winner. JFQ National Defense University at an appropriate ceremony in Washington, D.C.

U.S. Army

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Struggle for the Marianas By BERNARD D. COLE

ast year witnessed a wide range of ceremonies to commemorate Summary the 50th anniversary of Allied landings at Normandy, and In June 1944 the Armed Forces executed Operation Forager— L th rightly so: June 6 has great significance the capture of the Marianas (namely, the islands of Saipan, in the history of this century and defined Tinian, and Guam)—and destroyed Japanese airpower in the America’s post-war role. But little atten- Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Marianas were secured by tion was paid on this anniversary to the both marines and soldiers backed by naval gunfire and close fact that fifty years earlier on the same air support from all services. American success in the battle date and half a world away, U.S. task on and around these islands doomed the fortunes of the groups had made their way toward an ob- Japanese empire by severing its sea lines of communication jective in the western Pacific almost as over which the resources of Southeast Asia transitted and by important to the Nation as Normandy. establishing B–29 bases within striking distance of Japan’s Operation Forager, the assault on the home islands. This victory was executed by Army, Marianas, was very similar in two ways to Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Force units Operation Neptune, the assault landings who set the pattern for the further develop- on the Normandy coast. Both had been ment of joint operations. two years in the making and were starting points for even greater efforts. Just as Nep- tune opened the campaign in northwest Europe, so the campaign to secure Saipan, USS Lexington launching Tinian, and Guam set the stage for a strate- F–6F Hellcat with USS North Carolina, USS gic bombing campaign against Japan’s Enterprise, and other home islands and further amphibious oper- ships in the distance. ations in the western Pacific. Both opera- U.S. Navy tions also had been plagued by issues of operational concept, available resources, and

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Cole

organization; but Forager, in contrast to Nep- held at Quebec in August 1943: the Pacific tune, raises a relevant issue given the current Fleet under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz would stress on joint warfighting. The war in the strike Japan’s empire through the Central Pa- Pacific represented a failure to adopt joint cific, while the Southwest Pacific Command warfare at the strategic and theater level. At under General Douglas A. MacArthur contin- the operational and tactical levels, however, ued its Army-orientated campaign along the the cooperative efforts of the Army, Navy- northern coast of New Guinea. This basic Marine team, and Army Air plan, which involved building airfields in the the war in the Pacific Force yielded results which Marianas for the strategic bombing of Japan, represented a failure to epitomize the benefit of joint was reaffirmed at the Sextant conference at warfare. Cairo in November–December 1943. But in adopt joint warfare at the The concept of jointness the wake of the Gilberts campaign, and as a strategic and theater level suggests an equality of service result of the shock received at Tarawa, Nimitz effort and a common plan, in January 1944 backed MacArthur’s claim for but our endeavor in the Pacific was marked primacy for a campaign across the Pacific to by the lack of these joint attributes. Interser- the Philippines. vice strife assured that the principle of unity This unusual accord between the two of command was set aside, and for the Army Pacific commands was promptly rejected by and Navy in their separate areas of responsi- an angry King. He understood that the Caro- bility offensive operations guaranteed the pri- lines and the Marianas had to be taken to macy of separate efforts, either by evading eliminate the Japanese threat to the flank of joint warfare or ensuring that it was con- an offensive from the Southwest Pacific and ducted on their own terms. Moreover, even at that there could be no advance to the Philip- the time of Forager the high command was pines while Japanese power in the Central deeply divided over an essential aspect of the Pacific archipelagos remained unreduced. war, namely, whether Japan would be block- Moreover, King realized that possession of aded and bombarded or invaded, and correla- the southern Marianas would place a thumb tively, which senior officer—and hence which on Japan’s windpipe and give the Navy’s service—would command as the war was car- Central Pacific drive priority over Mac- ried to Japan’s shores. Along the way the Arthur’s campaign in the Southwest Pacific. claims of the Central and Southwest Pacific For sound strategic and institutional reasons, offensives were never defined. King was not prepared to agree to a South- The resources available in the Pacific west Pacific priority that effectively subordi- during 1944 and 1945 allowed the United nated the Navy to MacArthur’s command, States to prosecute both offensives simulta- especially just when the Navy had come into neously. This aspect of the conduct of opera- possession of the means to dominate in the tions is significant: American success in For- Pacific: American shipyards had by January ager and fleet action provoked by landings 1944 produced a carrier force of unprece- on Saipan were results of overwhelming dented strength and capability. For the first force. As in Operations Desert Shield/Desert 21 months of the Pacific war American car- Storm, supremacy in numbers, quality, and rier operations had been both small in num- technique over the enemy provided victory ber and short in duration, but by January at relatively low cost. 1944 the Pacific Fleet possessed the means of overwhelming not just a single enemy base American Blitzkrieg or number of bases within a single island Forager was a brainchild of Admiral group, but a number of groups of bases si- Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. multaneously. The depth of American power Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. King was allowed a campaign across a broad strategic the principal architect of the strategic plan front—to launch masses of naval forces that emerged after the Quadrant conference against the enemy, a series of attacks that may be thought of as blitzkrieg against the Captain Bernard D. Cole, USN, is professor of Japanese Maginot Line of fortified islands. strategy at the National War College. A surface At Guadalcanal in 1942, the Navy had warfare officer, he has commanded a frigate and been barely able to land and support a destroyer squadron. marines and Army troops on the beach. By

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June 1944—less than two years after Guadal- regular, Reserve, and National Guard—were canal—the fleet had achieved overwhelming potent. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea in strength in numbers and power. In 1943 March 1943 was the first occasion when alone, the United States commissioned shore-based Army bombers made a strategi- enough warship tonnage to almost equal the cally significant contribution to the war in Japanese navy at its strongest. Massive car- the Pacific, but thereafter it was a major fac- rier and amphibious forces tor. Losses inflicted by submarines and losses inflicted by were supported by large bombers illustrated the effectiveness of inter- submarines and bombers numbers of battleships service cooperation and jeopardized the and cruisers; destroyers enemy’s plan to fight on the Saipan-Palaus- illustrated the effectiveness provided efficient anti- western New Guinea defense line. of interservice cooperation submarine defense; our Theory into Application submarines were isolating The Central Pacific campaign was made Japan and sinking many crucial fleet units, possible by tactics and equipment conceived especially oilers and destroyers (by mid-1944 during the 1920s and 1930s, when the Ma- the enemy was unable to defend their sur- rine Corps developed amphibious warfare face forces against our submarines). doctrine and the Army Air Corps refined the Our Navy in 1944 was a modern war- principles of bombing and air interdiction. time force, while Japanese naval forces were The Marines were searching for a role after products of the 1930s. American carriers were World War I; seizing advanced bases would bigger, more durable, and able to operate for support War Plan Orange, the central Navy longer periods of time than those of the war plan of the day. Commandant John A. enemy. American naval aviation produced Lejeune and other Marine leaders correctly more and better trained pilots. The Japanese saw this mission, which would guarantee a were unable to modernize and increase their major role in the war against Japan as the navy to maintain even their 1941 status in way to ensure the Corps’ existence. Hence, relative terms; nor were they able to train the in the 1920s the Marines defined amphibi- pilots needed to replace veteran flyers of the ous assault in the context of ongoing de- 1930s. The fleet would go to the Marianas, as fense planning and began seeking ways to the suitably chastened Nimitz, who could no carry it out. By the late 1930s they had made more than any other naval officer of his day extensive progress in doctrine and equip- stand up to King, quickly agreed. ment, testing them in exercises in the At- The war in the Central Pacific was marked lantic and Caribbean. Most significantly, at- by successes in the Gilberts (Operation Gal- tention had been directed to the islands of vanic, November 1943) and the Marshalls the Central Pacific as the most likely area for (Operations Flintlock and Catchpole, January– amphibious warfare. February 1944), both won by the Fifth Fleet The Air Force worked hard at this time under Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance. The to refine the theories of visionaries like campaign was complex, however, with anti- Douhet and Mitchell. Many Army Air Force shipping operations by submarines and vast leaders of the war, including Kenney, Army Air Force bombing strikes. Hansell, Whitehead, and LeMay, had cut By late spring 1944, submarines had gone their teeth in those years in both the class- a fair way toward sweeping Japanese shipping room and the air, developing tactics and sys- from the high seas. They later wreaked similar tems to translate theory into application. havoc on coastal trade, even penetrating The doctrine and performance of marines Japanese harbors. The effectiveness of the and airmen matured in Pacific campaigns as submarine effort is supported by the fact that the hesitancy and missteps of Guadalcanal, whereas between March and October 1943 New Guinea, and Tarawa were heeded. Coor- the Japanese lost 354 ships (over one million dinated amphibious assault and air warfare tons) to all causes and in all theaters, between became irrepressible. November 1943 and May 1944 they lost 642 Nimitz ordered the Fifth Fleet to carry ships (over two million tons). out the amphibious assault on the Marianas Moreover, the attacks of American in June 1944. Spruance, now a four-star, still medium and heavy bombers flying from islands taken by marines and Army troops—

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Rockets covering landing in the Palaus.

Roosevelt flanked by MacArthur and Leahy with Nimitz (at map).

U.S. Navy U.S. Navy

commanded. The fleet’s aircraft carriers, Task lines of supply to Southeast Asia. These is- Force 58, were led by Vice Admiral Marc lands—Saipan, Tinian, and Guam—lay 1,200 Mitscher and its amphibious forces by miles southeast of Japan and stretched along Vice Admiral R.K. Turner. If challenged a northeast-southwest axis for 425 miles. The Marianas by the Japanese, Spruance would engage They had a significant Japanese civilian pop- (Distances from Saipan shown in nautical miles) in what the Americans hoped would be ulation and were heavily garrisoned. Saipan Guadalcanal 1,720 the decisive Central Pacific fleet battle was seventy square miles in area, with geog- Guam 101 so often wargamed at the Naval War raphy more like that of New Guinea than Kwajalein 1,355 College in the 1920s and 1930s. The the small coral and sand atolls of the Manila 1,500 Midway 2,210 plan was ambitious: the late Japanese Gilberts and Marshalls. While Tinian offered Palau 840 fleet commander, Admiral Yamamoto the best terrain for the large bomber airfields Rabaul 1,230 Isoroku, had tried to follow the same that were the chief reason for the islands’ Tarawa 1,810 Tinian 3 scheme at Midway in 1942 by having capture, Saipan had to be secured first since Yokohama 1,285 amphibious forces capture the island it allowed Japanese artillery to cover Tinian;

Source: Carl W. Hoffman, while he destroyed the U.S. fleet when it hence, its capture would allow American ar- Saipan: The Beginning of the deployed in defense of the island. Ya- tillery to support the assault on that island. End (Washington: Histori- cal Division, Headquarters, mamoto had failed (much as Halsey Guam was less valuable in military terms U.S. Marine Corps, 1950). would fail in this difficult dual mission than either Saipan or Tinian, but as capital in October 1944 at Leyte Gulf), his plan of the Marianas and an American territory being too complex and his intentions before the war, it was politically important being compromised by our ability to read and would be the object of a separate am- the Japanese codes. phibious task force. Hence, Spruance had a difficult task. Opposing Spruance was a still formida- And while he hoped that Operation Forager ble enemy but one whose strategic position would result in a double stroke against the and purpose was marked by weakness and enemy—capture of the islands and destruc- over-commitment. As the Japanese situation tion of the Japanese fleet—his priorities were firmly established on the former. Loss of the Marianas would completely expose enemy

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worsened in 1943, plans were recast and am- control of the battleships to his carrier com- bitions checked by the inauguration of the mander, Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, and New Operational Policy on September 1943. appointed him Mobile Fleet Commander, By writing off eastern New Guinea and the urged surprise attack, and wanted to lure the Solomons the Japanese sought to concentrate American fleet into a position where it could future attention on the defense of the be attacked both by carrier- and land-based Kuriles, Bonins, Marianas, Carolines, and aircraft—preferably in the American South- East Indies, a line extending through Saipan, west Pacific theater, near the Japanese Truk, and central New Guinea that enclosed sources of fuel in the East Indies. This plan the positions on which the Japanese in- was further flawed by depending on the tended to meet further offensives. The de- enemy’s cooperation. feats of early 1944, however, Japan’s Fatal Predicament forced the Japanese high the United States deployed In June 1944 the United States deployed command to further limit its a massive joint force with a massive joint force with both a coherent defensive liabilities to west- plan and an integrated strategy against a both a coherent plan and ern New Guinea. This weakened Japanese defense operating with yielded Plan Z, an operation an integrated strategy an inexecutable plan and confused strategy. plan with which Admiral The individual campaigns in the Southwest Koga Mineichi, Commander and Central Pacific had placed our forces in in Chief Combined Fleet, proposed to give position for a major advance against the battle. An American move against western Japanese: MacArthur was pushing towards New Guinea would be countered by Japanese the Philippines while the Marianas were the carrier forces supported by land-based air- logical next step for Nimitz. craft, but a move against the Marianas would Carrier planes first bombed the Mari- be opposed by shore-based aircraft supported anas on February 23, 1944, destroying 168 by the carriers. With this attempt at joint Japanese aircraft at a cost of just five U.S. warfare, Koga hoped to minimize the weak- planes. Further carrier strikes were con- nesses of both his land-based and carrier air ducted during the month preceding the in- forces and to offer battle on equal terms to a vasion to soften up the islands, while Army superior enemy carrier force. Air Force B–24s bombed Guam five times in Plan Z was probably the best plan avail- late April through June. These Army and able to the Japanese in early 1944 but was Navy air attacks were only marginally effec- flawed on three counts. First, it called for a tive against Saipan’s beach defenses but did coordinated joint employment of land-based neutralize Japan’s land-based airpower. Al- and carrier air power that had proven far be- though the 32,000 Japanese on Saipan were yond Japanese capability to date. Second, twice the American estimate, submarine and success would depend on timing and con- air interdiction had prevented the arrival of centration, specifically in terms of feeding most of the heavy weapons and supplies land-based airpower into the battle; but by planned for the island’s defense. definition a defensive battle could not be MacArthur’s victories in western New fought with the assurance or either or both. Guinea in April and May 1944 did not imme- Third, by June 1944 the basic Japanese strate- diately elicit a major challenge from the gic intention depended on a carrier force no Japanese navy since the enemy was waiting longer capable of registering even the partial for the U.S. fleet to move closer to the South- successes that had come its way in the sec- west Pacific area. And when a significant ond half of 1942. Its pilots were inexperi- move was made toward New Guinea in early enced and inadequately trained, its aircraft June, it was quickly diverted toward the Mari- were no longer a match for American planes, anas. Once Toyoda was certain that Spruance and its carrier air groups were smaller and was headed for those islands, he ordered weaker than their enemy counterparts. Ozawa to attack in the Marianas area and an- Koga died in a plane crash on March 31, nihilate the invasion force, to activate Opera- 1944. His successor, Toyoda Soemu, revised tion A-Go for decisive battle. Plan Z, issuing it as A-Go Plan on May 3. Toyoda intended to concentrate all his strength against the U.S. fleet. He transferred

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Toyoda’s rudder swing from the Ameri- ordered the reserve force, the Army’s 27th Di- can Southwest to Central Pacific theaters ac- vision, to land at once. The stiff Japanese re- cented Japan’s fatal predicament. The dual sistance on Saipan and the approach of the campaigns by MacArthur and Nimitz left the enemy fleet led Spruance to postpone the as- Imperial Fleet between a rock and a hard sault against Guam from June 18 to 21. place: it had to resist both American thrusts At the outset, Spruance positioned the at the same time and hence could success- bulk of the fleet just west of the islands to fully counter neither. Ozawa got underway maximize defense of the assault force. He in- from his fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi in the tended to let his commanders fight the battle. southern Philippines on June 13, hoping to His order to Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, destroy Spruance with long range attacks by commander of carriers and battleships, and to land-based airpower from airfields in the Vice Admiral R.K. Turner, commander of the Marianas and the Bonins, supported by amphibious force, was simple: “Desire you naval aircraft. He also expected to use the proceed at your discretion selecting disposi- Mariana airfields as staging points: his air- tions and movements best calculated to meet craft would launch from their carriers, attack the enemy under the most advantageous con- the U.S. fleet, land ashore to rearm and re- ditions. I shall issue general directives when fuel, then attack again as American planes necessary and leave details to you.” returned to their ships. Ozawa’s force in- In fact Spruance kept a firm hand on cluded nine carriers and six battleships. Mitscher’s movements. He was very conserv- Moreover, about 540 land-based aircraft were ative by disposition and hesitant to let positioned to support the fleet. Mitscher move westward away from the am- Ozawa’s intentions were compromised phibious area. Spruance was determined to on at least three counts. First, we could read protect the Saipan assault force and perhaps coded Japanese messages. Second, our sub- overly fearful that the enemy would make an marines had success finding and tracking end run around the fleet to attack amphibi- the Japanese fleet, sinking two of Ozawa’s ous and support forces off Saipan. He knew oilers and four destroyers before he even left of the approach thanks to submarines which Tawi Tawi. Third, American airpower de- located the enemy departing Tawi Tawi an- stroyed so many Japanese shore-based planes chorage in the Philippines on June 13 and that by mid-June the enemy fleet was left made further reports on elements of Ozawa’s pretty much on its own. Ozawa never under- forces on June 15–19, but on June 17–18 he stood this last factor; indeed, he was misled rejected Mitscher’s suggestion to move west- by deliberately false claims of successes by ward to meet the enemy. And neither Spru- land-based aircraft. ance nor Mitscher ordered an aggressive American forces in Operation Forager in- search policy to fix the Japanese position. cluded 128,000 troops—five Marine and As a result, the Japanese made the first Army divisions—and a fleet of no fewer than contact, spotting American carriers at about 26 aircraft carriers and 14 battleships. The 1530 on June 18. But Ozawa did not want to Japanese were seriously outnumbered in attack late in the day when darkness would every category of warship, and more impor- further challenge his inexperienced airmen. tantly they trailed two-to-one in the number He launched an initial strike at first light on of carrier aircraft. Some 20,000 marines were June 19, at a range of about 300 miles from ashore on Saipan by the end of D-Day, June the American flagship, the carrier USS Lexing- 15. Their initial surge carried them across the ton, which was 90 miles northwest of Guam landing beaches, but only half of the planned and 110 miles southwest of Saipan. Even beachhead was secured. In conjunction with when he was certain of the Japanese posi- the tanks and artillery that had been landed, tion, Mitscher was hindered in closing with however, this was enough to ensure that the the enemy because the wind was from the armor-led Japanese counterattack on that first east, forcing his carriers to steam in that di- night was repelled with the key support of rection, away from the Japanese, to launch naval gunfire from ships stationed just off and recover planes. This was an interesting shore. Supplies and more troops poured ashore during the following days. Spruance

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change from the days of sail, when the wind- long range and nightfall, American flyers had ward position was the more desirable as it al- difficulty finding their carriers. In a dramatic lowed a fleet to choose the moment of en- event of the war, Mitscher had his ships turn gaging as enemy. But with an aircraft carrier on their lights—despite the danger of enemy force, the windward position meant that submarines—to guide the pilots home. Al- Spruance had to yield the initiative to though 82 planes ran out of fuel and ditched, Ozawa. This did not mean that the Ameri- almost all air crews were rescued. cans simply waited to be attacked: on June Once he realized he could not catch the 17 the fleet commander coolly allowed a pre- retreating Japanese, Spruance called off the planned air strike against Iwo Jima which pursuit and returned to a defensive position claimed 63 Japanese planes. On June 19, he near the Marianas. Although bitterly criti- ordered a strike at Guam which destroyed an- cized by Mitscher and others then and since other 35. These strikes put a fatal crimp in for not more aggressively seeking out and at- Ozawa’s plans: lacking the support of their tacking the Japanese, Spruance had accom- land-based brethren, Japanese carrier pilots plished not only his main goal of safeguard- were doomed to failure. ing forces attacking Saipan, but by winning the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19– A Gamble Pays Off 20 he had defeated the Japanese in a major The nine Japanese carriers launched four fleet action. The failure to sink more Japan- strikes at the 15 U.S. flattops which formed ese ships was relatively unimportant in light Task Force 58. The first was spotted when it of the devastating destruction of Japanese was 160 miles away, at about 0900—when planes and the irreplaceable loss of pilots: USS Albacore torpedoed the newest and Ozawa finished the fight with only 35 of his largest enemy carrier, Taiho, which sank six original 430 carrier aircraft. Severe losses hours later. Shokaku, one of the carriers that were also suffered by Japanese air forces had launched the attack on Pearl Harbor, was based in the Marianas and the Bonins. sunk by another submarine, USS Cavalla. The The overwhelming American superiority first Japanese strike was intercepted by fight- in the Marianas contributed to victory at rel- ers from at least four U.S. atively moderate cost, when the number of the fight on Saipan was one carriers and 45 of the 69 casualties is compared to those suffered in Japanese planes were shot of slow advances by marines the European theater (especially on the East- down. The second strike and Army troops supported ern Front). The fight on Saipan was one of cost the enemy 98 of 130 slow advances by marines and Army troops by naval gunfire aircraft; the third got lost supported by naval gunfire, Marine and and returned to their carri- Navy aviators flying from escort carriers, and ers without engaging American planes; and Army Air Force flyers launching from the of the fourth, an 82-plane strike, only nine first rudimentary fields on Saipan itself. It survived. This slaughter—Japan lost two car- was an exhausting battle against well dug in riers and 346 planes as compared to 30 Amer- enemy forces resolved not to surrender—a ican losses—was justifiably dubbed the facet of Japanese character underlined at the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.” end of the campaign, when thousands of Ozawa began withdrawing to the north- Japanese civilians committed suicide by west after June 19, not because he thought he throwing themselves and their children had lost the fight, but to reposition and re- from cliffs at the northern end of the island. cover the carrier aircraft he assumed had Over 15,000 marines landed on Tinian landed on Guam to refuel and rearm. Mit- on the 24th, moved rapidly, and cleared the is- scher’s patrols did not locate the Japanese car- land by August 1. Engineers began construc- riers until 1540 on the 20th. Despite ap- tion of airfields capable of handling B–29s proaching darkness, he boldly decided to even before the island was captured. Tinian, launch at long range, 300 miles. This gamble strategically the most important of the islands paid off, as American strikes found the Japan- because it was suitable for large airfields, was ese force, sank two oilers and a carrier, and also the easiest seized: casualties included 290 downed 65 of Ozawa’s remaining 100 planes, Marine dead against 6,050 Japanese—one of with a loss of 17 U.S. aircraft. Because of the the more skillful victories of the war. Saipan was finally secured on July 21, the same day

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Guam was assaulted. In view of the toughness more than matched by other officials deter- of the fight for Saipan, Spruance wanted to mined to fight on. increase the number of divisions assaulting The victory in the Central Pacific cam- Guam. Hence, the Army’s 77th Division was paign was a major strategic step: it enabled lifted from Hawaii to join the attack. The massive bomber raids, which in conjunction delay in landing to the July 21 gave the 77th with the submarine campaign would isolate time to arrive and allowed the assault force to Japan and destroy its industry and infra- conduct an extended prelanding bombard- structure. Although the Pacific was the scene ment by naval gunfire and by Army, Navy, of much hard fighting after the Marianas and Marine aircraft. were secured, Japan had lost the war by the The landings on Guam went smoothly— end of July 1944. the island having been prepped by gunfire Was victory in the Marianas and the and air strikes since July 8—and Marine and Philippine Sea really joint? It certainly in- Army troops made steady progress against volved all the services, but it was part of the well-entrenched Japanese resistance. Casual- Navy-dominated Central Pacific campaign. ties were only half those of Saipan—7,081 The Battle of the Philippine Sea was strictly a Americans (1,435 dead) against 18,500 Japa- Navy affair, while Saipan was marked by nese (most of whom died). Ground opera- Army-Marine disharmony of epic propor- tions benefitted from an extensive, centrally tions, with the ground commander, Lieu- controlled joint air support operation, as tenant General H.M. Smith, USMC, firing Army Air Force, Navy, and Marine planes the 27th Division commander, Major General flew close air support for the infantry. Ralph Smith, USA, because the latter’s troops A total of 5,000 Americans and over were not moving as quickly as marines. This 50,000 Japanese died in the Marianas in the incident caused a debate that rages to this summer of 1944. These islands provided for- day. On Guam, however, the Army (77th Di- ward fleet, submarine, and logistics bases; vision) and the Marines (3rd Division and 1st the 20th Air Force launched B–29 raids Provisional Brigade) operated together re- against Japan from airfields built on Tinian markably well. Throughout the Marianas, and Guam; and Nimitz moved his headquar- Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft flew coordi- ters to the latter island in early 1945. The nated strikes in support of land forces. entire American effort against Japan thereafter moved to a higher pitch. The Central The battles in the Central Pacific during Pacific campaign, highlighted by victory in June–July 1944 were not joint in terms of the Marianas, was the mainspring of the vic- strategic formulation or command arrange- tory over Japan. ments. The victory did demonstrate, how- An important political result of the cap- ever, the effectiveness of the services operat- ture of the Marianas was the fall of the gov- ing together and fighting tactically as a ernment then ruling Japan. Under General unified force. The Navy provided the strate- Hidecki Tojo, this government dominated gic plan and bases from which land- and the military that had led Japan into war, in- shore-based air forces secured success. The cluding the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Pacific campaigns of 1944 were joint in a accompanying assaults across the Pacific. On nascent sense—effective in warfighting and July 18, 1944 the Japanese supreme military setting a pattern that has finally been real- headquarters took the almost unprecedented ized today. Victory was the outcome of step of announcing a major defeat—the fall many efforts: logistic resources and acumen, of Saipan—all the more unusual since the is- inspired leadership in a joint environment, land was often described as a “home island” and above all the fighting ability—intelli- despite its 1,200-mile distance from Japan gence and bravery—of soldiers, sailors, ma- proper. Tojo apologized for the loss and re- rines, and airmen who fought their way up signed as prime minister. The defeat in and Mount Topatchu, vanquished the enemy’s around the Marianas and Tojo’s resignation fleet in the Philippine Sea, and cleared the brought home to many senior Japanese civil- skies overhead. JFQ ian and military leaders the hopelessness of their position. Unfortunately, they were

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C–130 (top) with C–141 transport. Documentation

Special: The Air Force White Paper U.S. Air Force Global Presence By SHEILA E. WIDNALL and RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

EDITOR’S NOTE: This white paper was released by the Air Force in late February. Global Presence follows an established custom whereby the services routinely issue papers that outline a conceptual framework for rationalizing missions, developing doctrine, etc. Such strategic documents have appeared with some frequency since the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. The Army brought out Land Warfare in the 21st Century while the strategic vision of the Navy-Marine Corps team was presented in a 1992 paper entitled ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century and has recently been reformulated in Forward...From the Sea. Now an earlier Air Force paper, Global Reach-Global Power, is being superseded by Global Presence.

s America approaches the next core responsibility in terms of how America’s century, we face both an uncer- military forces actually project power. tain world and a promising fu- At the foundation of this approach is A ture. Our challenge, as a service power projection. Power projection is a means and as a Nation, is to sustain that promise to influence actors or affect situations or and secure the future. events in America’s national interest. It has In the years to come, America’s military two components: warfighting and presence. will continue to play a pivotal role. That role Warfighting is the direct application of mili- will be a stabilizing one, founded on the tary force to compel an adversary. Presence is shared principles and traditions of all the the posturing of military capability, includ- services. Increased cooperation is the corner- ing nonbelligerent applications, and/or the stone for success. leveraging of information to deter or compel The primary responsibility of America’s an actor or affect a situation. A sound na- military is to deter potential adversaries or tional military strategy depends on coherent fight and win wars decisively. To improve the warfighting and presence strategies. way we do business, we must reconsider this

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Changes in the international security our Nation’s continued commitment to their environment, advances in technology, and security while responding to the reality of reductions in America’s military force struc- the decreasing threat to America’s national ture require a fresh consideration of Amer- existence. ica’s presence strategy. Today, the global international system This document provides a recon- has become a more diverse panorama of po- ceptualization of presence. It expands tradi- litical, military, and economic concerns con- tional notions of presence to correspond with fronting the United States. Consequently, it the emerging international security picture is more difficult to achieve consensus on and to match current and future applications. what Americans consider “vital” national interests. Despite this, America’s military forces A New Approach are involved in more operations of greater America’s approach to evolving national duration than at any time in the past 20 security concerns has changed over the years years; and these operations have been con- Documentation to meet the needs of a shifting geopolitical ducted with 25 percent of the total force and environment. 40 percent fewer forward deployed forces During the Cold War, America’s vital na- than the services possessed in 1989. tional interests seemed to be more easily de- In the face of increasing demands on fined. Our Nation faced a monolithic threat U.S. military forces, smaller force structures, to its national security and our political and and shrinking defense budgets, we can no U.S. Air Force military leaders were able to contain and longer afford to physically deploy forces in counter that threat with effective strategies every region of concern. for ensuring America’s security. Forward de- Concurrent with changes in the interna- fense was a key component of our contain- tional security environment are significant ment strategy and amounted to what today advances in technology, most notably infor- is called presence. mation technologies. The ability to create, The thrust of forward defense was to disseminate, access, and manipulate informa- deter potential aggressors, and if that failed, tion for one’s own ends and to control infor- to engage those aggressors’ forces close to mation available to competitors or adversaries their borders, halting and repelling the ag- produces a potential for decisive advantage. gression. As such, presence equated to and Much as the introduction of the airplane was assured by bipolar alliances, heavy over- moved us into the three-dimensional battle- seas troop commitments, frequent political field, information technologies lead us to and military-to-military interaction with consider the potential of operations in a four- America’s allies, and the continual courting dimensional, virtual battlespace. This bat- of “on-the-fence” nations. In short, part of tlespace is not defined in terms of traditional, America’s Cold War strategy was “being centralized, geopolitical boundaries, but in there.” It was a strategy most Americans un- terms of a decentralized, global web of net- derstood. works. As a result, we must examine new As the 1980s ended and the Cold War methods of characterizing the threat—includ- subsided, the basis for the traditional defini- ing the use of technology-based analysis— tion of presence began to dissolve. America and determine appropriate responses. moved from the Cold War’s bipolar arrange- To use an analogy, during the Cold War, ment toward what was perceived to be a America was like a cop permanently guarding new, less threatening political environment. the door of every bank around the globe. As forward defense lost its rationale, forward Changes in the security environment cou- presence and overseas presence emerged. The pled with technological improvements and goal of each was to assure America’s allies of force reductions altered America’s need to continue in this role. Hence, America re- The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall is Secretary of placed “the cop on the beat” with “video the Air Force and formerly was Associate Provost monitoring and alarm systems” linked to at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; joint military capabilities that can be brought General Ronald R. Fogleman is Chief of Staff, U.S. to bear wherever and whenever necessary. Air Force, and previously served as Commander in This monitoring and alarm network consists Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

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of space-based and air-breathing platform U.S. efforts to persuade Israel not to re- sensors and other information gathering sys- spond to Iraqi Scud attacks during the Per- tems. In most instances, information, com- sian Gulf War can help illustrate these con- bined with forces that can rapidly respond ditions. America’s objective was to preserve with the right mix of capabilities, can the political and military coalition opposing achieve U.S. goals. On occasion, information Iraq. To accomplish this objective, the alone may be enough to attain U.S. objec- United States had to satisfy the four condi- tives. Of course, in some regions of the world tions mentioned above. a physical presence is imperative; however, First, to ensure Israel understood and there may be circumstances when such a appreciated American interests, which in- presence is counterproductive. In instances cluded Israeli security, the Deputy Secretary where a physical presence is not preferred, of State and Under Secretary of Defense for information capabilities provide America the Policy delivered personal assurances from

Documentation option to visit the “bank” as often as it the President of the United States to the Is- wishes to check the integrity of the system. raeli Prime Minister. Thereafter, the Depart- In an environment influenced by so ment of Defense established a secure com- many variables, how should America best munication link with the Israeli Ministry of pursue the continuing need for presence? Defense to enable immediate and frequent One way is through global presence. contact between U.S. and Israeli officials. Global presence expands the definition Second, to ensure Israel understood of presence to include the advantages of America intended to support those interests, physical and virtual means. Global presence the President ordered the immediate transfer considers the full range of potential activities of two Patriot air defense missile batteries to from the physical interaction of military Israel and the training of Israeli crews for forces to the virtual interaction achieved with their operation. America’s information-based capabilities. Third, to assure Israel that America could monitor and assess activities throughout the Fundamentals region, the United States provided near-real- Three tenets are key to moving beyond time warning of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on traditional conceptions of presence: Israel. Near-real-time warning offered the Is- ▼ all military forces can exert presence ▼ raeli populace as much as five minutes to forces have unique attributes that affect take shelter before missile impact. the scope and quality of the presence they exert Fourth, to assure the Israeli leadership and complement each other when appropriately applied that America had sufficient force to achieve ▼ technological advances are enhancing its objectives, the President offered four ad- the contributions of military forces to presence ditional Patriot batteries to be operated by missions. U.S. troops. Likewise, U.S. Central Com- mand devoted a substantial amount of its All Forces Can Exert Presence air, space, and special operations assets to The suitability of forces to exert pres- combat the Scud threat. ence is conditional. The task is to match the In this instance, America succeeded by right combination of capabilities to achieve ensuring U.S. objectives were clearly under- the desired objective. For forces to exert stood, by demonstrating U.S. commitment presence, the actors we wish to influence to Israel’s security, and by coordinating a must understand that we: common response to the crisis. Space-based ▼ have national interests involved assets aided this response. These space- ▼ have the political will to support or de- based assets were part of the process that fend those interests included all four conditions for exerting ▼ can monitor and assess their actions ac- presence. These four conditions are endur- cordingly ▼ have sufficient force to achieve our objec- ing requirements, guiding America’s politi- tives. cal and military leaders when considering Without fulfilling these conditions, mili- presence operations. Because every opera- tary forces are likely not to influence an actor. tion is fundamentally different, political

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Air Force B–2 Stealth, B–52, and B–1 bombers. Documentation U.S. Air Force

and military lead- The possibility of a resurgent Iraqi threat ers should choose posed a serious danger to the region’s stabil- forces with the at- ity and America’s interests in the Persian

U.S. Air Force tributes each case Gulf. This required more than just a physical C–5A transport. warrants. presence, it required a global presence, combined with diplomatic initiatives, to contain Forces Emphasize Different Attributes Iraqi adventurism. When Iraq mobilized a America’s military forces emphasize differ- significant ground force near Kuwait’s bor- ent qualities based on the medium in which der, the United States quickly responded they operate. These attributes magnify a the- with Operation Vigilant Warrior. On short ater commander’s ability to exert presence in notice, air and ground forces deployed from accordance with the principles of war. They the United States to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also enable theater commanders to develop al- to deter incursions into these territories. ternative joint force packages. These attributes Likewise, naval forces moved from the include: Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean into ▼ responsiveness—the ability to arrive the Persian Gulf. Space forces and other in- quickly where needed ▼ formation-based capabilities enabled air, persistence—the ability to maintain or ground, and naval force operations and pro- adjust operational tempos over an extended pe- vided American, coalition, and other world riod of time ▼ flexibility (versatility)—the ability to con- leaders a window through which they could figure forces for a particular set of conditions monitor, assess, and, with a variety of ▼ survivability—the ability to limit risks means, attempt to manipulate behaviors. when employing forces Concurrently, global media coverage of ▼ economy—the ability to efficiently allo- America’s military mobilization and deploy- cate resources required to deploy and employ ca- ment presented Saddam Hussein and the pabilities. world with an unmistakable statement of Employing the proper alternative joint U.S. intentions and resolve. In this case, U.S. force package depends on numerous factors, efforts capitalized upon the complementary beginning with an assessment of national se- attributes of air, ground, sea, and space curity objectives. An example of this can be drawn from the situation in Kuwait in 1994.

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F–15s and F–16s in formation. Documentation U.S. Air Force

forces to successfully secure U.S. objectives. in space-based and air-breathing platform In the future, when demonstrating similar sensors and other information-based systems resolve, our Nation’s leaders will benefit deployed around the globe. These forces are from forces increasingly influenced by tech- an increasingly vital component of national nological innovations. policy implementation. For example, these capabilities were critically important Technological Innovations during 1994, when determining and execut- Technological advances enhance the ing appropriate responses to events in Korea, role of all military forces in exerting pres- Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. ence. Improvements in three specific areas Situational awareness gives America an enable forces to influence with less political ability to anticipate crises and prepare ap- and military risk. propriate responses to them. Improvements ▼ Situational Awareness. Advances in infor- in space-based and air-breathing platform mation-based technologies allow military forces sensors and information-based systems in to monitor and assess most global conditions the coming years will steadily increase the rapidly and efficiently. situational awareness of military leaders and ▼ Strategic Agility. Improvements in transport technologies enable rapid responses with a military forces at all echelons. Today, situa- variety of military forces to distant locations. tional awareness improves our ability to gen- ▼ Lethality. Enhancements in weapon sys- erate military options before crises erupt. tem technologies make it possible to achieve de- Once the use of military capabilities is neces- sired effects more quickly and at less cost. sary, the full range of recent technological Situational awareness results from ad- advances comes into play. vances in information-based technologies Improvements in transport technologies that allow military forces to monitor and as- enable the United States to respond rapidly sess global conditions rapidly and efficiently. to national security concerns anywhere in This is more than hitching a ride on the in- the world with a variety of military capabili- formation highway. Political and military ties. This is strategic agility. With strategic leaders have come to depend upon advances

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agility, U.S. military forces can operate un- Like warfighting, presence is a team ef- constrained by geographic barriers and can fort. Just as theater commanders define their reach 100 percent of the world’s population. warfighting requirements, they have the re- We gain strategic agility with such national sponsibility to determine presence require- assets as our air mobility fleet, that is, our ments as well. As such, they must retain ac- airlift and air refueling forces. When these cess to the military means that enable them assets are combined with Army civil affairs to obtain the balance of forces and capabili- units, for instance, air mobility becomes a ties needed to exert presence. Global pres- means for demonstrating U.S. benevolence. ence facilitates that process. When combined with the 82d Airborne, air Global presence acknowledges that all mobility becomes a means for demonstrat- military capabilities contribute to presence ing U.S. resolve. with physical and virtual means. Strategic agility also gives us the ability

to anchor forces in one location and rapidly Whether forces operate globally or from Documentation swing them, if needed, to other locations. forward areas, they operate as a team. To- This enables military forces, far removed gether, they offer America’s leadership a from any target, to deliver aid or combat ca- mechanism for modulating responses to pabilities within minutes or hours of a na- global, regional, or local situations to achieve tional decision to act. national objectives while controlling risk. Enhancements in weapon systems and Global presence acknowledges this interde- related technologies make it possible to pendency. It reconceptualizes presence to achieve desired effects more quickly and at correspond with the emerging international less cost. For example, Gulf War Air Power security picture and expands presence to Survey analysis revealed precision munitions match current and future applications.

U.S. Air Force were 12 times more effective than non-preci- Today, America’s military forces are sion munitions. As a result, air forces mini- more mobile, more lethal, and more om- mized their exposure to enemy defenses and nipresent than ever before. These features experienced significantly fewer aircraft enhance traditional conceptions of military losses. At the same time, the use of precision presence by allowing theater commanders to weapons significantly decreased collateral employ the advantages of all military op- damage. When combined with the advan- tions, forces, and capabilities. tages of stealth technologies, precision mu- As we peer into the future, we should nitions become even more potent. Conse- view global presence as one route the ser- quently, increased lethality enables America vices can take to achieve our country’s ever to maintain a credible deterrent threat with evolving national security objectives. We in a reduced force structure. the military possess the means, physical and The synergistic benefits achieved when virtual, to provide America continuous combining situational awareness and strate- awareness of world events and a force capa- gic agility with lethality allow America to ble of projecting military power worldwide, consider a wide range of military responses in minutes or hours, with little or no warn- to worldwide circumstances. These capabili- ing. In so doing, we accomplish our respon- ties, inherent in our warfighting forces sibility to our civilian leadership and the (forces that possess the attributes of respon- American people to deter potential adver- siveness, persistence, flexibility, survivability, saries or fight and win wars decisively. JFQ and economy) form the cornerstone of global presence. Presence Is a Team Effort America’s military services have always fought as a team. Goldwater-Nichols codi- fied this and historical trends clearly signaled this. Today, few would dispute the effi- cacy of joint warfighting, which Desert Storm clearly validated.

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz (1885–1966) Chief of Naval Operations

VITA

orn in Fredericksburg, Texas; graduated from Naval Academy (1905); on China station (1907); commanded Atlantic submarine flotilla (1912); studied diesels in Germany and BBelgium (1913); oversaw construction of first Navy diesel engine; chief of staff to commander of Atlantic Fleet submarine division (1917–19); Naval War Col- lege (1922–23); on staff of commander in chief, Battle Fleet (1923–25), and of commander in chief, U.S. Fleet (1925–26); organized Naval Reserve officers training at University of California (1926–29); commanded submarine division 20 and USS Augusta (1929–35); assistant chief of Bureau of Navigation (1935–38); led cruiser and battleship divisions (1938–39); chief of Bu- reau of Navigation (1939); commander in chief, Pa- cific Fleet (1941); organized defenses of Hawaiian Islands and Our people must be shown that a single commanded naval, sea, and air department will improve upon the record forces in Pacific Ocean Area; de- of the past year’s operations in the Pa- Naval Historical Center feated Japanese in battles of Coral cific. For my part, I am convinced that a Portrait of Fleet Admi- Sea and Midway (1942); helped single department will not work as effi- ral Chester W. Nimitz by Adrian Lamb. ciently as two separate departments have plan strategy for Pacific theater and provided direc- proved they can work in producing the tion for major offensives in Central Pacific; directed kinds of forces required for modern war. I campaigns in the Gilberts (1943) and in the Mar- am also convinced that the merging of the shalls, Marianas, and Palaus (1944); invaded the War and Navy Departments into a single Philippines (1944); promoted to fleet admiral (1944); department cannot help, and may hinder, directed capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and opera- the adequate provision and efficient use tions against Japan; present at surrender in Tokyo Bay of our seapower. on board flagship, USS Missouri (1945); Chief of Naval —Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN Operations (1945–47); special assistant to Secretary of Testimony before the Senate Navy (1948–49); U.S. commissioner for Kashmir Military Affairs Committee (1949–51); died near San Francisco. (November 17, 1945) Source: Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography (New York: Harper- Collins, 1992), pp. 546–47.

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

helps. That framework, supported by mutual The discussion of apportionment correctly awareness, avoids food fights and leads to deci- condemns the emphasis on percentage alloca- sive victory. tion of air assets. The JFACC should receive and Letters... Finally, Col Whitlow simply reignites the issue mission-type orders to air forces. But the age-old debate over who controls the battlefield idea that air superiority and close air support op- effects of a system—whether it is an Air Force erations require constant levels of support is air-to-ground platform or the Army Tactical Mis- nonsense since both enemy force composition Interservice Food Fights sile System with its ability to fire at operational and the level of ground engagement vary To the Editor—Bravo to Col Whitlow and depths. Is close air support a responsibility of a greatly. In addition, the article fails to address Joint Force Quarterly for publishing “JFACC: land force commander? Is the Marine Air-Ground how strategic attack sorties figure in apportion- Who’s in Charge?” (JFQ, Summer 1994). This Task Force the real model for fighting fires on the ment. The bottom line is that emphasis in air op- treatment of a highly volatile issue reveals the 21st century battlefield? How this issue is re- erations depends on phases of a campaign, with interservice food fights which are motivated by solved will determine whether the adage “joint more or less emphasis on certain types of mis- parochialism rather than enhancing jointness. warfare is team warfare” is real or just a bunch sions (viz., strategic attack, air superiority, inter- We were snared by this issue during of empty words. We look forward to future arti- diction, and close air support) resulting in a shift Desert Storm, one of us with CENTAF/Special cles in JFQ on this and other joint issues. in the number of sorties. As Whitlow points out, Plans (Black Hole) in Riyadh and the other with a —Maj James R. Hawkins, USAF CAS should be a given, but not by dictating a cavalry squadron in the 24th Infantry Division U.S. Strategic Command constant percentage as he thinks necessary. (Mech). Later, as students at the Armed Forces —LTC Joseph C. Barto III, USA Airpower always provided ground commanders Staff College, we learned that no effective sys- Joint Warfighting Center with CAS when needed. It always will and with tem exists to communicate requirements and all aircraft in theater if required. It is better to capabilities in a timely way. The target nomina- To the Editor—While I read Col Whitlow’s use airpower in ways that will eliminate the call tion system implies that someone else under- article entitled “JFACC: Who’s in Charge?” (JFQ, for CAS. To accomplish that, airpower must be stands battlefield requirements better than the Summer 1994) with interest, its flaws gave me commanded by a single air-minded comman- commander. The tactical air control center des- concern. It contains false assertions about der—the JFACC. Complicating this job by creat- perately tries to grasp what is happening on the JFACC operations that reveal an unwillingness to ing a separate target planning system for a battlefield while those in the field desperately try accept the maturing character of the JFACC corps commander’s AO and depleting resources to communicate the situation up the chain of concept and a single-service focus that is the by dedicating aircraft to the corps only reduces command. The outcome is diminished confi- antithesis of operating in a joint environment. the effectiveness of airpower. dence in the ability to either communicate or ful- The author starts off with the old argument I also take exception to the claim that the fill requirements. The solution is a system that over the JFACC as commander or coordinator JFACC does not have a purple perspective. This allows communication without the unbelievable and suggests that this is an issue on which assumes that because the JFACC is normally a component commander he will emphasize the

Naval Historical Center number of filters we now have, empowering many disagree. This is not the case. The JFACC commanders to fight with the joint force com- is a commander except in those reticent circles needs of his service to the detriment of other mander’s intent. A shared situational awareness of the Marine Corps where the concern is over components and services. What is the basis of is the challenge since once it is accomplished keeping Marine aircraft under Marine control this claim? There is no suggestion that the joint everything else is moot. rather than ensuring the effective use of air- force commander is parochial because he be- Col Whitlow correctly points out that perpower throughout the theater of operations. (The longs to a specific service. Is a joint force land centages reflect a fundamental misunderstand- Army-Air Force AirLand Battle concept, it should component commander parochial because he ing of airpower. All airframes cannot do all be noted, is not now nor has it ever been Air comes from the service with a preponderance of things. A–10s are not the same as F–15s, so Force doctrine as the article suggests, but is an land assets? Then why make similar assertions why are they included in some percentage allo- Army concept employed for corps operations on about the air component commander? The deci- cating sorties? It is as simple as this: the joint a conventional, linear battlefield.) Fortunately, sion on what to do will be based on operational force commander indicates the main effort and Whitlow then makes a very important point. A needs in the theater, not on the JFACC’s service. supporting efforts by assigning areas of respon- commander must have the authority to direct the Anyone in a joint position must inherently act in sibility and designates supported and supporting actions needed to accomplish the mission. If the a purple way. commanders. After that subordinate comman- JFACC was a coordinator he would lack the au- The dream of independent service opera- ders assist the supported commander in his thority required to use airpower to accomplish tions in a notional scenario at the end of the arti- mission. Victory—on land, at sea, or in the the joint force commander’s objectives. As a cle is fantasy—an entirely Navy/Marine air war, air—is the focus, not competition between com- joint component commander, the JFACC must with strategic bombing by B–52s as an af- ponents. Though there is a difference of opinion understand airpower as well as land and naval terthought. On land, of course, marines storm over Battlefield Air Interdiction, the fundamental forces so that those capabilities work in a cohe- the beaches—something that has not been premise in the article about “givens, main effort, sive way. To get the best results from airpower, done in forty years. Miraculously, the “Army and priorities” is right on. the JFACC must be a commander. forces are present in theater and operational.” Who’s in charge? The person assigned the No mention of how they got there. Where is the main effort by the joint force commander, the joint forces land component commander? Quite one on the scene with the best information who naturally, “boundaries are drawn and separate is held responsible for success. Everyone else AOs for land forces unfold.” One wonders if this is for span of control or to ensure that each land service gets a “fair share.” This scenario needs

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

to come to grips with reality. Col Whitlow “talks A caution on touting the Program Objec- prospect of using the game to explore alterna- the talk,” but his vision of combat is all too tive Memorandum Wargame: that game is tive options. An elaborate game played over familiar and service-oriented. viewed by the executors (galley slaves) as a days or weeks with numerous personnel of vari- —Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF charade used to justify various N- programs. ous ranks is driven by a training imperative and Chief, Military Doctrine Research But Perla must be commended for trying to soon falls into step with approved doctrine. Airpower Research Institute keep wargaming honest. Such an authority There is nothing wrong with this development as should not be ignored. long as everyone knows what is going on. But The Fog of Wargaming —CDR M.K. Murray, USN there is a tendency to gussy up exercises with a To the Editor—Peter Perla did us a great Naval War College “policy analysis and exploration” label. service by brilliantly summarizing the advan- Secondly, in exercises involving extensive tages and the disadvantages of wargaming To the Editor—As a wargamer for ten resources, utilizing them dictates game play and (“Future Directions for Wargaming,” JFQ, years, I found Peter Perla’s article excellent in control decisions. This parallels the pressure of Summer 1994). One hesitates to challenge such almost every respect. But I disagree with his as- doctrine controlling play. Presumably the assets an expert, but the article does prompt one sessment of the Navy’s BFTT program as a su- for a game are chosen because doctrine indi- question and two objections. perior wargaming venue. My problem is the phe- cates that they may be required. Marines sailed Where is the evidence that military nomenon described as “the fog of war,” which around without being landed during Desert wargamers are enamored of virtual reality and accounts for basing decisions on incorrect as- Storm, and in the Caribbean other marines went other high-tech “gee whiz” gadgetry? At the sumptions and incomplete or erroneous data. home without invading Haiti. In a game, political Naval War College—which holds over fifty When participants use actual equipment for tac- decisions of this type—no military deployment events a year—this is not the case. But even if tical applications, wargame controllers cannot in or action—are not permitted. The lesson is that we were so enamored, consider this. The mili- good conscience allow the fog of war to fall too everyone who shows up gets to play. tary was accused in the early 1980s of gold thickly since the result would be incorrect and Yet in political-military situations military plating weapons to the detriment of operators invalid operational training, wasted time and re- deployments depend on political decisions and and mission accomplishment. But the same sources, and even the wrong lesson for players. do not automatically follow from them. But the Desert Storm which Perla trumpets as a success In a wargaming facility, however, with the exercises in which I participate treat political de- demonstrated that those gold plated weapons congruent displays and effective interfaces, the cisions as a prefatory task to be performed were a success. Thus my skepticism that the players are free to make critical errors and play quickly and perfunctorily in order to get on to the military, by relying on (if in fact they were) high them out to their conclusions. In debriefs, players military game (the real game). While this proc- tech gadgetry and “gee whiz” systems, would can be apprised of their options, successes, and ess is understandable in terms of play, and jeopardize the value of wargames. failures, as well as the influence of the fog of game organizers make it clear that it is part of During the July 1994 Global War Game— war. The post-Cold War environment facing deci- the artificiality of simulations, the fact is that it an annual event at the Naval War College—sev- sionmakers is ambiguous enough to keep the fog reinforces anti- or unpolitical attitudes on the eral advanced models were used to assess two of war issue relevant for the foreseeable future. part of many military professionals. A recent large-scale game that I attended nearly simultaneous MRCs. At one point, data —William R. Cooper demonstrated all these problems. The dynamics from an extremely sophisticated air-to-ground Pacer Systems, Inc. attrition model rendered enemy losses in excess of doctrine and the devoted resources exacerbated by the senior rank of major participants of 80 percent during one early 24-hour engage- Peter Perla’s article was in- To the Editor— produced a game scenario in which the players ment. The assessors, to the doubtless pleasure teresting, though it reminded me of some dis- embraced mission creep. Possibilities for explor- of Perla, greatly tempered what they saw as er- quieting facts about wargaming. In my limited ing discreet, small-scale, combined political- roneous data. Skeptical military players in the experience games are counterproductive, at diplomatic-military operations were discarded game, again to Perla’s probable delight, de- least in the case of those dealing with multina- impatiently by control and senior players in a manded explanations from the assessors. An tional peacekeeping, since they teach the wrong rush to deploy the “big battalions.” In one sense admiral in one cell wanted to know who was lessons—not wrong by design, but rather be- that game may have only hinted at a more fun- “smarter than the CINC.” These examples cause of the law of unintended consequences. damental problem, that wargaming is inappro- demonstrate a healthy tension between players I participate in many military-run peace- priate to multinational operations. Wargames and assessors. keeping operations simulation exercises, usually deal with national crises that require mobilizing The article’s comment that “the services as part of the control or “political” team. By and resources to obtain a specific, concrete out- cannot remain introspective as in the past” ig- large, I find these exercises to be well designed come. They are about controlling a battlefield. nores current efforts. Last year the Naval War and sophisticated—serious attempts to deal College gamed events across the spectrum from with the ambiguities of multinational operations. a relief mission in Nigeria to coalitions with 16 But I also find them disappointing. The unavoid- navies in the Western Hemisphere, Partnership able contradiction between training and policy for Peace initiatives in the Baltic, U.S.-Japanese leads to the subtle dominance of the former over JFQ welcomes your actions, and two MRCs. All creatures great and the latter. Conventional wisdom (doctrine) gov- letters and comments. Write or small, therefore, are subject to gaming. erns the play, since control teams and senior of- FAX your communications to ficers who sponsor games insist on conformity (202) 475–1012/DSN 335–1012 with doctrine. This is perfectly sensible in re- or send them via Internet to spect to training players but it quickly kills any [email protected]

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

Multinational peace operations are not. Instead A Fallow Challenge to Mogadishu in October 1993, the Secretary of they are concerned with real but limited national Civilian Control? Defense was soon forced to resign. interests which we determine to pursue with Vietnam also complicated civilian control To the Editor—The superb essays by A.J. other nations. This is not just a consideration: it by altering the self-image of the American officer. Bacevich and Mackubin Thomas Owens pub- is the defining quality. No longer prepared to leave policy decisions to lished in Out of Joint (“The State of Civil-Military My experience may be atypical. But civilians of uncertain competence, many officers Relations: Two Views,” JFQ, Autumn/Winter wargames on multinational peacekeeping seem now see their responsibilities as extending be- 1994–95) demonstrate that serious minds are to me to be teaching the wrong lessons: unilater- yond purely military matters to a very broadly de- concerned about civilian control of the military. alism rather than multilateralism; strict military fined notion of national security. Indeed, they But like Kohn, Luttwak, Weigley, et al. analysts solutions rather than political-military integration; consider themselves as much national leaders as assume that strong civilian control is universally and the virtue of quick answers rather than cop- military commanders. While many might agree accepted as an unqualified civic virtue. Increas- ing with the ambiguities of peace operations. The with Bacevich that George Marshall’s apolitical ingly, however, it appears that a number of tragedy is that the outcome may be the exact op- deference to civilian authority remains an exem- Americans aren’t so sure. posite of what is needed. I leave it to wargamers plar, they would nevertheless likely argue that a Poll after poll indicates a growing antipa- to decide if this result can be avoided. dearth of able civilian leaders leaves senior mili- thy towards elected officials, including those tary officers little choice but to fill the void. —Ambassador Edward Marks who exercise civilian control. Most of govern- With a sophisticated war-college education Visiting Fellow ment is seen as bloated, scandal-ridden, and in- which Owens describes as heavy in politics and National Defense University effectual. In contrast, the Armed Forces in the economics, officers in the late 1990s are well wake of the Gulf War, with approval ratings at armed to challenge civilian leaders in many are- On the Software Front all-time highs, succeeded in gaining the atten- nas. When the still-sizable charter of the military To the Editor—Being a software expert I tion of a public looking for government that ac- is broadened to include nontraditional operations found fault with Peter Emmett’s “Software War- tually works. Indeed, traditional antimilitarism other than war, the insinuation of the Armed fare” (JFQ, Summer 1994). He implies there is a that underpinned civilian control since the Revo- Forces into highly-political policy matters is un- difference between software complexity and lution has not only ended, it has been replaced surprising. Abetting that development are bitter software functionality. As a rule, the more func- by what might be called postmodern militarism. partisan battles that fragment political power tionality in a system, the more complex the soft- This does not mean that our society is mil- and undermine the moral authority of civilian ware. The design of a battlefield system that itarizing, nor that Americans are adopting martial leaders. This allows the military to exert consid- meets all the needs of a user would be incredi- virtues. Rather, it reflects a conviction that the erable influence while appearing to remain bly complex. For a soldier on the ground to mod- Armed Forces are the only public institutions above the fray. ify, on the fly, the code needed to manage the that altruistically and productively work for the The shift in attitude by so many officers battlefield, it must have the requisite logic built national good. Predictably, the military is becom- from military affairs to broader national concerns in and thus simply provide the interface for a ing the agent of first recourse for the U.S. undermines Owens’ contention that purported user to choose what change to make. Even with Government’s thorniest problems both at home policy setbacks are proof of the vitality of the highly trained programmers on the front line, the and abroad. current state of civilian control. Almost all mili- time needed to modify and test software does The Armed Forces remedied—with tary leaders, for example, believe that defense not lend itself to a rapidly changing battlefield. startling effectiveness and speed—diplomatic budgets well below the heyday of the 1980s are Another concept Emmett raises—that of disasters around the globe, from Panama to the necessary for the Nation’s economic health. AI working tactical problems on top of a Persian Gulf, Rwanda to Haiti. Domestically, the Thus, interservice squabbling over allocating re- database containing operational doctrine and military succeeds at myriad tasks that befuddle sources should not be mistaken for opposition to scheme of maneuver—sets us up to become civilian leaders. Be it performing disaster relief, budget reductions. And who can say that resolv- predictable. If the software reads and interprets conducting counterdrug operations, quelling civil ing issues such as women in combat and gays the battlefield and database correctly, the gener- disorder, providing medical care to disadvan- in the military means defeat for the military? ated reaction will either be the same or follow taged localities, counseling troubled teens, build- Might it not be argued that the real stratagem all the same operational concept for every similar ing playgrounds, or tutoring failing students, a along was to merely slow the pace of social engagement. can-do military gets the job done. So striking are change in the Armed Forces to a more palatable But there are valid points in the article. the achievements of the Armed Forces that their rate? The point is that in the era of postmodern Imbedded systems and software must be capable reputation remains untarnished despite a variety militarism it is unwise to underrate the poise and of surviving on a battlefield that operators cannot of controversies and embarrassments. sagacity of senior military officers. see with their eyes. The electromagnetic spec- Many current issues concerning civilian Americans do not realize that the Armed trum will be an area for future conflicts. Launch- control can be traced to the Vietnam era. Collec- Forces are fundamentally unlike other institu- ing TLAMs against a target, only to have them tive national guilt over the appalling post-war tions. The military is an unapologetically authori- rendered useless by high energy radio frequency treatment of Southeast Asian veterans helped to tarian establishment uniquely designed to weapons that damage the critical electronic cir- transform the popular image of the conflict from counter man’s darker impulses with savage fury cuitry, makes the software issue meaningless. a military fiasco to a virtual betrayal of the when required. Its professional focus on violence —1 Lt Chris A. Golden, USAF Armed Forces by incompetent officials. That and its effects creates fewer synergies with civil- Air Force Materiel Command memory of ineptitude by those who exercised ian society than those in the thrall of postmodern civilian control lingers on today: when the public militarism may suppose. Since order and control sensed that denying armored vehicles to Ameri- cans led to a disaster in the back alleys of

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

are quite literally life or death matters in war, the To the Editor—A.J. Bacevich’s article, however, if one accepts that the military leader- military loathes permissive individualism which “Civilian Control: Still a Useful Fiction,” only fans ship has an obligation to provide candid advice. in civilian settings stimulates creative social evo- the embers of a misguided debate over civilian Did the military bypass the chain of com- lution. Likewise, because instantaneous and un- control of the military. If there is an underlying mand? Absolutely not. The established chain questioned obedience is imperative in combat, theme in this debate, it seems not to be civil-mil- was followed. Civilians made the ultimate policy the military is deeply distrustful of the intellec- itary relations but some distress over leadership decisions. Military leaders did exactly what the tual entrepreneurship that fuels advanced demo- traits and a redistribution of power in the defense law requires: provide advice to civilian leaders cratic societies. establishment. Bacevich chides Washington “ex- and carry out the resulting decisions. As far as The paradox of postmodern militarism is perts” for concluding that “nothing of substance contact with members of Congress is con- that it is ascendant as society’s familiarity with had changed,” which makes it all the more nec- cerned, there is confusion between acceptable, all things military is diminishing. The lack of a essary to learn what, if anything, in fact has often mandated contacts and subversive at- draft along with downsizing and expulsion of changed to incite a crisis in civilian control. There tempts to wrest control from civilians. ROTC from the campus have conspired to leave is no constitutional cause for alarm. The Consti- Bacevich turns to George Marshall to ex- most Americans with little if any first-hand tution still empowers Congress to declare war emplify how things ought to be, but ignores knowledge of people in uniform. Thus few grasp and to control the purse. And the President other examples of threats to civilian control. The the potentially nefarious implications of reliance clearly remains the Commander in Chief. Truman-MacArthur row and the firing of a Chief on military-derived solutions. Postmodern There have been legislative changes in the of Naval Operations offer relevant precedents. militarism celebrates the military without really military. Indeed, much of the distress expressed Recently a Secretary of Defense—after consul- understanding it. in this debate suggests that Congress, by enact- tation with the President—dismissed an Air The challenge to those who seek to rein- ing Goldwater-Nichols, abdicated civilian control Force Chief of Staff for exceeding his authority. vigorate civilian control of the military is to as- to the Chairman and Joint Staff. Nothing in the Moreover, the President did not follow the ad- sure a politically alienated public that it is desir- letter or spirit of this law suggests such a con- vice, according to some accounts, of CJCS and able to do so. They must develop and articulate clusion. The preamble to the DOD Reorganiza- CINCCENT in the early days of the Iraqi invasion practical as well as philosophical arguments in tion Act of 1986 (PL 99–433) states as its pur- of Kuwait because he thought it overly-cautious. support of civilian control. Given the American pose and intent: “To reorganize the Department Observing the military, we do find change. penchant for short-term thinking, the power of of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in Arguably the political power of the military is a postmodern militarism, and apparent intractabil- the Department of Defense, to improve the mili- zero sum game: constitutional and legislative ity of resentment borne by the public toward tary advice provided to the President, the Na- constraints have not forfeited civilian control, nor government, this challenge is profound indeed. tional Security Council, and the Secretary of are they likely to. What has changed is the bal- —Col Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF Defense . . .” [emphasis added]. While the Gold- ance of power within the military. Goldwater- U.S. Strategic Command water-Nichols Act consolidates a lot of military Nichols intentionally consolidated many service authority in CJCS which arguably abraded the prerogatives under the Chairman. Prior to that influence of the services, it in no way altered the act, in times of growing or stable budgets, one principle of civilian control. could divide resources among the three military The core of this so-called crisis appears to departments and make the best of it. In times of be not in the law but in its application, and in the shrinking budgets and a strong CJCS who, by dynamic manner in which both Colin Powell and enhancing the Joint Requirements Oversight John Shalikashvili have functioned as chairmen. Council process, has further consolidated the Here some will point to policies on homosexuals statutory powers that Goldwater-Nichols in- in the military and U.S. intervention in Bosnia as tended, the services (and entire communities cases of the military overstepping its authority. within them) feel threatened. Thus, the true The gays-in-uniform issue was resolved only debate today is along inter-service and after lengthy discussions among the President, intra-military lines, not civil-military lines. Chairman, and service chiefs. And having lis- We agree with those experts who summar- tened to his military advisors, Congress, and the ily dismissed Kohn’s argument. In fact, nothing of public, President Clinton adopted a policy at substance has changed. The issues which Bace- variance with his position during the 1992 cam- vich raised are not difficulties of civilian control. paign. Similarly, the administration’s posture on They are criticisms of decisions made by civilian Bosnia was formed after consulting with military leaders or a misguided perception of the authority Missing an Issue? leaders, again despite Clinton’s statements on vested in the Chairman and Joint Staff. Although Copies of back numbers of JFQ the campaign trail. these are absorbing and provocative subjects, the are available in limited quan- Politicians often find it wise, once elected, military remains firmly under civilian control. to modify their previous positions. This should be tities to members of the Armed —CDR Timothy C. Young, USN no surprise to anyone familiar with electoral poli- Forces and institutions. Please Office of the Judge Advocate General tics. The fact that positions on defense matters Department of the Navy send your request to the Editor are changed after consulting the military is reas- at the address or FAX number —Col John S. Burkhart, USAF suring. Were senior military officers guilty, under National Defense University listed on the masthead. JFQ these conditions, of subverting presidential intentions? Yes, if one defines subversion as trying to change the President’s mind. Clearly not,

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IN BRIEF Learning from Rwanda By STEVEN METZ and JAMES KIEVIT

Rwanda will not be the last dis- Rwandan refugee camp at Kitali. aster to require military intervention. Many African states have the requisite mix of primal conflict, political elites, and fragile institutions that frustrate efforts to seek nonviolent solutions to their problems. They are buffeted by economic disintegration or stagnation, population strains, ecological decay, and regional conflict. And with the capabilities of the United States, United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations to respond to disasters on the rise as the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa gets worse, life in refugee camps will become more attractive to the belea- guered peoples of Africa. It is an irony that demand grows in propor- tion to competence. The Nation will Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis) soon find that this holds for disaster relief: the better we become, the more we will be asked to do. hile many Americans may historic, economic, social, and polit- Rejecting calls for help can be be numbed by the vio- ical context of each event. Moreover, unethical or politically infeasible. W lence and human suffering an assessment of the proper re- Americans want quick and effective that plagues Sub-Saharan Africa, the sponse must be placed in the wider response to disasters. Only the horror of Rwanda was so acute that framework of an emerging post-Cold Armed Forces have the training, as- it moved all save the most hardened War national security strategy. What sets, and experience to respond observers. Moreover, coming on the happens in Africa will affect the rapidly to such events when public heels of the debacle in Somalia, image, credibility, and moral stand- order and services collapse. More- Rwanda raised the prospect of a ing of the United States around the over, our military can make a major mounting series of events across world. It will also influence public contribution to a multinational ap- Africa which might require U.S. or attitudes on the appropriate extent proach to controlling disaster. multinational responses. In addition of our involvement in the Third Whether because of political or re- to easing the plight of the Rwandan World. The level of global attention source constraints, African states are people, we must draw strategic that Rwanda received makes this unable to react to large-scale disas- lessons from this crisis in order to event a critical albeit unintended ters without outside aid. This means mitigate the impact of similar disas- factor in determining American pol- that the Armed Forces—together ters in the future. icy toward the Third World. If the with international bodies like the Several lessons are clear. Effi- United States is incapable of re- United Nations, nongovernmental cient and effective responses to sponding to disasters in Africa, isola- organizations, and other states—will African disasters must escape the tionism will be strengthened. We remain involved in African relief ef- clumsiness of past U.S. policies and can rebound from one Somalia but forts. Our competency must stay one be based on an understanding of the probably not from two. The symbol- step ahead of rising demands. ism of Rwanda in strategic terms When the United States takes may outweigh its immediate signifi- part in relief operations in Sub-Saha- cance. By examining this situation, ran Africa, its objectives must be Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James we may develop the insights and limited. We do not have pressing Kievit, USA, are analysts in the Strategic means to make maximum use of geostrategic or tangible interests at Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War scarce resources when the next stake. Our concerns are moral and College. This article is excerpted from a African disaster explodes. longer study entitled Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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symbolic. The limitations on our in- the public and in Congress for any- trolled or uncontrolled. If it is con- terests should fashion our goals: thing more than diplomatic action. trolled we should pressure the regime when we get involved the immedi- However much they were moved by engineering that disaster directly or ate objective is to ameliorate the the tragedy, few Americans sup- by mobilizing international support. catastrophe and meet basic human ported putting our troops in harm’s If the regime alters its policy we needs. Our long-term objective is to way when Rwandans themselves ap- should support multinational relief create or reestablish minimum stan- peared unwilling to stop the killing. efforts. If a regime does not respond, dards of human rights. This problem Furthermore, the notion of a con- America can attempt to build a coali- may occur under national authori- flict being ripe for resolution is rele- tion for coercive intervention and re- ties or international organizations. vant when contemplating interven- lief or even contribute military Those who argue that such an ap- tion.4 As morally painful as it may forces, but in peripheral areas the Na- proach leaves the root causes of dis- be, there are conflicts in which hate tion will not act alone. For clearly asters untouched and that the ulti- and violence must subside before uncontrolled disasters, relief must mate solution is establishing viable any settlement can be reached. Just come first and political efforts to pass democracies or economies are cor- as the horrors of World War II made control to civilian authorities sec- rect but naive. The limits of our in- the conflict in Europe open to a res- ond. The major problem, however, terests and extent of our global com- olution, the bloodbath in Rwanda will come when disasters cannot be mitments simply will not permit may set the stage for an ultimate set- classified as controlled or uncon- sustained, expensive engagement in tlement to that nation’s problems. If trolled. As always, gray areas are very Africa. Memories of Somalia are still the United States or some multina- complex. When they appear, we fresh. We will support long-term so- tional force had stopped the conflict must decide on a case-by-case basis lutions but seldom if ever assume before one side triumphed, a reser- whether political pressure or imme- sole responsibility. The key to in- voir of ethnic hatred might have diate relief should take priority. creased efficiency and effectiveness continued to simmer only to boil Decisions to intervene are not in disaster intervention lies in the over again. made in a vacuum. Intervention in process of establishing and refining The distinction between con- Somalia must be viewed in a broader concepts and procedures to deal trolled and uncontrolled disasters framework of attempts to create a with it. also suggests a real strategic new world order; intervening in dilemma. Controlled disasters Rwanda may have been directly re- When to Intervene should be easier to resolve because lated to American frustration over No decision is harder yet more they are normally engineered by Haiti at the time. In a perfect world critical than the timing of an inter- regimes and are more limited in transitory public opinion would not vention. Many analysts take an scope. This implies that if the determine policy, but in peripheral early-is-better approach. To limit suf- United States is unwilling to stop or regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, fering, they argue, one must pre- prevent disasters, the next best solu- with no tangible national interests empt disaster. If that is not viable, tion may be assuring control over at stake, it is opinion that will pri- intervene as early as possible.1 Ac- them, even if this results in main- marily determine policy. cording to the Administrator of the taining the status quo. This is an in- U.S. Agency for International Devel- Multi-Dimensional Conflict escapable dilemma of security pol- opment, the 1994 mission under- When Americans try to grapple icy. Some argue that it is best to taken in East Africa to organize in- with African conflicts, they often retain influence over repressive ternational support for preventing a overemphasize the primal dimen- regimes in order to ultimately drought from triggering famine sion. Tribes, clans, and elites are rele- change their conduct. This, for in- probably saved more lives than par- vant but are not the only determi- stance, was the basis of the Reagan allel efforts in Rwanda.2 Similarly, nants of conflict and often not even administration’s policy on construc- the DOD relief coordinator has the most important. In African con- tive engagement with regard to the stated: “The most important thing flicts primalism often begins as a minority government of South for all of us is to get better at creat- secondary consideration and only Africa. While that argument had ing an early-warning system, not grows as it is manipulated in a some validity during the Cold War just for famines but [for] man-made power struggle. Since this also oc- when global geostrategic interests regional conflicts.”3 curred in the Southern part of the overrode other issues, it makes little While the early-is-better ap- United States in the 1950s and 1960s sense today. A regime that orches- proach sounds rational, it underesti- when some politicians fanned the trates a human disaster, even if con- mates the severe constraints placed flames of racial hatred to advance trolled, is beyond the moral pale. on U.S. policymakers and strategists. their careers, Americans should un- The risk of unleashing larger disas- We did not, after all, delay involve- derstand it. In Sub-Saharan Africa, ters must be taken to change the ment in Rwanda because of amoral- the tendency to manipulate tribal, conduct of repressive regimes. ity or incompetence. Absent a clear, ethnic, and other differences for U.S. policy will generally be ap- unmitigated disaster, it is often diffi- personal power is even more pro- parent when a disaster is either con- cult to generate a consensus among nounced precisely because the politi-

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cal stakes are so high. Winners not this dimension. But politics in Africa Operational Considerations only gain power to govern but also are often characterized by “a per- Given limited national interests wrest control over a country’s econ- sonal or factional struggle to control in Africa, the impact of our actions omy and patronage associated with the national government or to influ- on wider perceptions is central. This jobs, contracts, and national trea- ence it, a contest restrained by pri- implies that the ultimate success of sure. Defeat often means losing ev- vate and tacit agreements, prudential an operation will be determined as erything. This makes competitors in concerns, and personal ties and de- much by how America and the the political arena willing to stoop pendencies rather than public rules world community perceive it as by to anything, even patent manipula- and institutions.”6 Thus policymak- what unfolds on the ground. Soma- tion of tribal or ethnic distrust. ers and strategists should frame their lia serves to illustrate this phe- Regional factors are equally crit- approach with due regard for key nomenon. In ameliorating suffering ical. Disasters are shaped, sometimes personalities rather than using over- and staving off a mass disaster, the caused, by what goes on beyond na- simplified notions of tribal conflict. effort by the United States was a suc- tional frontiers. Conflict in neigh- Finally, in cases where limited cess, although it is often portrayed boring states, for instance, often cre- national interests are at risk, the as a failure. Similarly, the limits of ates refugees. When political United States is unlikely to preempt our interests in Africa mean there boundaries bear little resemblance to a conflict or intervene to stop a war. will be little support for sustained, ethnic or tribal dividing lines and vi- Rwanda suggests that we will inter- expensive operations. This makes a olence is endemic, refugees become vene when there is a natural disaster quick hand-off to civilians all the a permanent fact of life. Thus few but not in order to halt violence. more vital. conflicts are strictly internal. Events There is no consensus among Ameri- Coherent military planning de- in Rwanda were affected by violent cans to support armed intervention pends upon a clear notion of the de- repression in Burundi and Uganda in internal conflicts. The public can sired outcome. This is surely true of that led to a refugee exodus which tolerate violence in peripheral areas military participation in disaster re- altered migrant communities. Fur- (or at least considers the cost of lief. Most often success will be de- thermore, conflicts in neighboring stopping it too great). We have fined in terms of bringing a disaster states sometimes breed antagonisms grown accustomed to human evil. under control and passing responsi- that generate external support for But the public will not abide human bility for relief operations over to rebel and insurgent groups.5 suffering from natural or pre- civilians, either under multinational Rwanda also demonstrated the ventable causes. Preemption may be or national auspices. Determining significance of personalities in the realistic in regions of strategic im- indicators of unresolvability is more politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ameri- portance but not in areas like Sub- difficult. Once forces are in place, cans, accustomed to perceiving Saharan Africa. In sum, we appear there is a possibility of succumbing things in terms of institutions, par- doomed to react to disasters rather to mission creep. Disasters involve a ties, movements, et al., can overlook than prevent them. multitude of tasks, some directly connected to relief operations and

nSymposium onn Command and Control in Joint Operations

The National Defense University will convene a symposium on June 27–28, 1995, in Washington, D.C., on aspects of command and control in the conduct of joint operations to include joint planning, training, doctrine, and infrastructure. For information, contact: National Defense University Telephone: (202) 287–9230 / DSN 667–9230 Institute for National Strategic Studies (Symposia) FAX: (202) 287–9239 / DSN 667–9239 Fort Lesley J. McNair Internet: [email protected] Washington D.C. 20319–6000

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others subsidiary. The desire of the and the less stable a region, the strained active forces or mobilize Re- Armed Forces to be efficient and ef- greater our military role. This is es- serve units, a decision that has long- fective leads to assuming responsi- pecially true when relief operations term implications for recruitment bility for tasks rather than leaving are subjected to threats of violence. and retention. There is no easy solu- them undone or in what may be As a rule of thumb, civil agencies tion to such issues, but they must be seen as incompetent hands. Estab- should exercise the maximum de- tackled head-on and resolved. lishing security is especially tempt- gree of responsibility possible for It would be easy for the Armed ing. Disasters are disorderly by their disaster relief. This will minimize the Forces to view humanitarian relief in nature. Armed men abound, be they diversion of military resources and Sub-Saharan Africa as a distraction. regular soldiers, militiamen, or sim- reflects the fact that civilian organi- No doubt such operations are costly ple thugs. In fact, these categories zations are better equipped to sus- for forces hard-pressed to retain pro- are often blurred in Sub-Saharan tain the efforts needed to bring a ficiency in primary warfighting Africa. But when security degener- disaster-ridden area to some sem- skills. But three facts remain clear. ates, operations become peace en- blance of normalcy. Within the U.S. First, human disasters born of con- military, combat forces in particular flict will continue to plague the re- should be kept to the lowest possible gion. Second, Americans will con- level. Those forces would play a tinue to demand engagement. And major role only in coercive interven- finally, only the military can re- tion to stop a controlled disaster. spond efficiently and effectively When there is little threat of vio- when order collapses or authorities lence, only combat support and resist relief efforts. The more joint combat services support forces planners and commanders appreci- might be involved. ate the nature of African strife and Stepped-up training and exercis- the more they prepare before con- ing of JTFs for humanitarian relief flicts occur, the greater the likeli- Americans convoying should be explored even at the ex- hood of fulfilling expectations with water during Support pense of diminished time and re- minimum cost to other efforts. JFQ Hope. sources for combat training. No ser- NOTES

Combat Camera Imagery (Marv Krause) vice should consider humanitarian relief its primary mission, but such 1 This is the theme, for instance, of operations will be an important sec- Douglas Jehl in “U.S. Policy: A Mistake?” forcement rather than disaster relief. ondary one for the foreseeable fu- The New York Times, July 31, 1994, p. E15, At that point, the rules change. ture. The goal should be to provide and Milton Leitenberg in “Anatomy of a In peripheral areas like Sub-Sa- appropriate time and money to Massacre,” The New York Times, July 31, haran Africa, it is vital for the U.S. training and planning for these sorts 1994, p. E15. military to avoid mission creep and of operations—neither too much 2 J. Brian Atwood, “Suddenly, Chaos,” for policymakers to accept the in- nor too little. The Washington Post, July 31, 1994, p. C9. 3 tractability of some situations and Although the Marines did a su- Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Military’s Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts resist urges to assume responsibility perb job in Somalia, Bangladesh, et Concerns,” The New York Times, July 31, for peace enforcement. We should al., the Army will likely play the 1994, p. 3. not automatically eschew involve- principal role in future African disas- 4 For an elaboration of this subject, see ment in peace enforcement in areas ters. The Marine Corps is hard I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: where national interests are mini- pressed to maintain its warfighting Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: mal, but we should limit our contri- proficiency and, in addition, it lacks Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 220–51. butions to air transport, logistical some resources that the Army has, 5 Earl Conteh-Morgan, “Conflict and support, and intelligence. Finally, particularly for conducting sustained Militarization in Africa: Past Trends and determining how to hand relief ac- operations inland and psychological New Scenarios,” Conflict Quarterly, vol. 13, tivities over to civil authorities is a operations. The likelihood of large- no. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 33. 6 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, vital strategic decision that must be scale disaster relief requires a serious, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, worked out early. zero-based approach to force struc- Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of Because time is so precious in ture issues. A shortfall exists in active California Press, 1982), p. 1. responding to disasters, the proper Army combat support and combat chain of command will probably service support units which is made only be clarified as each operation up by the Reserve component in progresses. It would be immoral and wartime. In operations other than politically inept to argue over lines war, such as humanitarian relief, the of authority as innocent people die. Army will have to either overtax Force mixture requires somewhat greater attention. The less developed the infrastructure in a disaster area,

108 JFQ / Spring 1995 2207 InBrief 3/26/04 1:06 PM Page 109

IN BRIEF Writing Joint Doctrine By CHARLES M. EDMONDSON

asked with the distribution verbatim; changes to previously Land, Sea Application (ALSA) Center. and review of joint doctrine approved language resulting from A four-service, major command-level T publications at the Naval Doc- developing joint doctrine will be agency that develops multiservice trine Command, I quickly learned highlighted for consideration during concepts, tactics, techniques, and they fall into two categories. One the staffing process procedures, ALSA was chartered by consists of well written pubs that ▼ employ previously approved the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine truly present joint principles and terminology contained in JCS Pub Command, Naval Doctrine Com- precepts, the other of thinly veiled 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and mand, Marine Corps Combat Devel- service works masquerading as joint Associated Terms, to the greatest extent opment Command, and Air Combat doctrine. The latter are not always as possible. Command. The center is governed patently self-serving as one might Along with those responsibili- by the Joint Actions Steering Com- suspect. One-sided, provincial publi- ties a PRA is encouraged to conduct mittee comprised of general and flag cations are a result of the process coordination meetings to initiate officers who represent the chartering used to write them rather than in- early dialog with combatant com- commands. The ALSA process is cen- tentional efforts to force particular mand and service coordinating re- tered on multiservice working views on other services. It is my in- view authorities (CRAs). These meet- groups which identify similarities tention to briefly outline a system- ings also highlight perspectives and differences in service doctrine atic process for writing joint doc- and/or doctrinal differences that and facilitate the means to resolve trine which offers equitable should be considered in developing differences. The groups are con- representation for all services. the initial draft. But the point is that ducted in series and last three to five The current process of writing coordination meetings or joint days depending on the complexity joint doctrine formally begins with working groups are not required. Un- of the task. This results in a product the designation of a lead agent by fortunately, this means that a draft that is forwarded to service doctrine the Joint Staff. An agent might be an pub can be developed without joint commands for review and comment. individual service, combatant com- input. Based on this review, ALSA may ei- mand, or Joint Staff element charged Often a PRA will simply assign ther reconvene a working group to with developing, coordinating, re- the writing to an action officer with resolve any conflicts or incorporate viewing, and maintaining doctrine. a warfare specialty that relates to the minor changes in the pub for final Few rules or strictures obtain espe- subject at hand or at least some approval. While ALSA pubs are not cially in the development stage. An background knowledge. The worst subject to Joint Staff or CINC review, agent may decide to write a pub or case is assigning it to an officer with its products are uniquely joint. assign it to a primary review author- little knowledge or practical experi- ALSA has proven to be quite ity (PRA). In either case, however, ence of the subject. Either way, the productive and, in mediating among Joint Pub 1–01, Joint Publication Sys- process from then on is usually left the services, it has been used partly tem—Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, up to the action officer who begins as the PRA for Joint Pub 3–09.3, Techniques, and Procedures Develop- with a program directive (require- JTTP for Close Air Support. While not ment Program, sets out responsibili- ment) under one arm and a deadline chartered to write joint doctrine, ties to be followed by an authority under the other, and who deter- ALSA has been successful at it largely in writing a doctrinal pub: mines the methodology and can: through an effective use of multiservice working groups. Time and re- ▼ consider existing joint and ▼ sit at a computer and write the sources can be saved in this way by combined as well as service doctrine to pub alone offering the best joint product in an ensure the draft reflects service and ▼ hire a contractor to write the expeditious and efficient way. Con- combatant command perspectives pub tentious issues will arise in dealing ▼ ensure that all sentences, para- ▼ hold a series of joint working with the complexities of certain sub- graphs, and passages taken from previ- groups with subject matter experts from jects and divergent service perspec- ously approved pubs are quoted the services to jointly develop the pub tives; such problems, however, are ▼ undertake a combination of best dealt with if identified early in the above actions. the process and resolved at the ac- Lieutenant Commander Charles M. In fact, the joint working group tion officer level. Edmondson, USN, is a radar intercept is the best approach. A number of points should be officer currently assigned to the A good illustration of an agency considered in forming working Joint/Combined Doctrine Division at that uses working groups is the Air, groups to develop joint pubs: the Naval Doctrine Command.

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▼ work through service doctrine ▼ PRAs must act as honest bro- there is frequently more common centers—identify points of contact and kers and avoid parochialism—attempt ground among the services than may subject matter experts from various to reduce acrimony within a working be apparent at first. Face-to-face arbi- commands (a mix of 20–25 action group (prior liaison with all members tration, negotiation, and explanation officers at the O4/O5 level with all helps to clarify goals, schedule brief- will help dispel distrust and paroch- services equally represented and CINC ings, encourage parties to bring rele- ialism. There are admittedly some participation constitutes a highly de- vant material to the table which sets issues that working groups cannot sirable working group) stage for productive work) resolve and that must be tackled at ▼ research prior efforts on the ▼ the host should provide the higher levels, which is to be ex- subject—build on extant material, avoid best computer assets possible—all pected. But most can be addressed at duplication, and remember that plagia- working group members should leave the working group level in a manner rism is a form of flattery but that earlier with at least a written outline of the that is satisfactory to all members. efforts must be properly acknowledged pub’s direction (this allows them to Starting with a genuinely joint effort ▼ ensure that follow-up meetings adequately brief their chains of com- in writing a doctrinal pub not only include the same participants—conti- mand on progress, receive responses communicates the appropriate intent nuity is important on contentious issues, and identify to the consumer, it gives each service ▼ PRAs must exercise control of portions of the pub that may be show- pride of ownership in the resulting groups—entertain all views, but when stoppers in the review process). product. That approach goes far to impasses occur, note them and press The above recommendations are ensure the eventual approval of the on; facilitate compromise (using differ- not all-inclusive, but they offer a draft document as a full-fledged ent phrasing sometimes can satisfy all starting point for forming joint work- joint publication. JFQ parties, but in the worst case take the ing groups. Experience shows that contributions of all sides into account)

...new from INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Strategic Assessment 1995 U. S. Security Challenges in Transition

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110 JFQ / Spring 1995 2207 InBrief 3/26/04 1:06 PM Page 111

IN BRIEF JTFs: Some Practical Implications By SUSAN J. FLORES

ast summer the Institute for National Strategic L Studies at the National Defense University held a symposium on “Standing Up a Joint Task Force” which focused on establishing, tailoring, training, and employing a joint task force (JTF). The dis- U.S. Marine Corps (Timothy E. LeMaster) cussions dealt with the services, CINCs, and Joint Staff as well as the role of U.S. Atlantic Com- mand (ACOM) as the joint force integrator. What are the key functional areas to address in standing up a JTF? How does planning and executing tasks in these areas impact on the outcome of a JTF mission? How do the areas interact? The functional areas consist of intelligence, planning, logistics, medical, C4, training, personnel, resources, force management, and interfaces. The issues con-

sidered by symposium participants U.S. Navy to be pivotal in the successful accomplishment of a JTF mission fell training cannot supplant real train- under six categories: command and ing with actual participants. control, doctrine, information man- There are some difficulties in agement, interfaces, JTF missions, defining a proper chain of command and training/education. today. When operations involve U.S. Air Force (Conrad M. Evans II) Command and Control other nations or agencies unity of The area of command and con- command is more difficult. JTF com- ance to leaders of JTFs. Some com- trol is undoubtedly at the center of manders should not only be con- plained that there is too much doc- mission accomplishment. To de- scious of mission responsibilities, trine and others too little. Between velop these capabilities in a JTF, but also of the duty to translate the these two extremes were those who headquarters must use real partici- risks and options identified in the indicated that the scope and the pants in training evolution when planning process up the chain so specificity of doctrine needs work. possible. Links between billet-hold- that nonmilitary leaders understand There was a sense that significant ers and their counterparts build the military implications of their ac- voids exist in doctrine and that a teamwork which cannot be devel- tions. Specifically, if JTF comman- better framework with common def- oped if stand-ins are used in train- ders translate risks into potential initions and procedural recommen- ing. The most cost-effective and per- losses and expenditure of resources, dations is required. Comments also formance-oriented scenarios include this information should be passed to pointed to the need to integrate real staff members and JTF players the leadership. such information into planning and developing relationships required for Doctrine executing missions. mission accomplishment. Virtual The subject of doctrine attracted Participants were reminded that a good deal of attention during the CINCs vote on doctrinal topics so symposium, particularly its role in the resulting pubs reflect their input. Lieutenant Colonel Susan J. Flores, USMC, is the training cycle. There was little In the discussion one participant as- a senior fellow in the Institute for National agreement on those adjustments serted that there was no need for Strategic Studies at the National Defense needed to offer better doctrinal guid- University.

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C–130s, F–16s, and C–141s on flight line for JTF–180.

U.S. Air Force (Betty Tsosie)

Joint Pub 4–06, JTTP for Mortuary and execution and strengthen the Affairs in Joint Operations, while an- interfaces and integration processes other stated that in Desert Storm in all functional areas. there was such a need. But since it is UH–60 Blackhawk Information dropping off scouts.

a CINC’s responsibility to return U.S. Air Force (Russ Pollanen) bodies from the theater, and service Proper receipt, tailoring, and use logistics channels must be used, this of information affects how well the publication deconflicts roles and JTF commander can influence ac- level. All channels want to exert pro- provides a sound framework to en- tions in the conduct of his mission. prietary control over a commander’s sure the smooth transportation of Information impacts on command information and input. Finally, this deceased Americans back home. and control as well as on interfaces. situation could tempt a JTF com- Other publications identified as And as handled by the media it also mander to consider not forwarding being in need of improvement are impacts on mission accomplishment. information up the chain of com- Joint Pub 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Oper- Passing ever larger amounts of infor- mand. Though blasphemy, there are ations, and Joint Pub 5–0, Doctrine for mation begets command and con- advantages to not having direct con- Planning Joint Operations. Some par- trol-interface burdens. In the infor- nectivity to the NCA. ticipants felt that Joint Pub 3–0 was mation age, there is such a thing as The JTF commander does not cobbled together and offers little too much data, a glut that over- usually have command and control guidance on interfaces and integra- whelms JTF ability to filter input to over all the governmental and non- tion. The discussion of the time- determine what is mission essential. governmental organizations in his phased force deployment data There were differing views ex- area of responsibility. He has no (TPFDD) in Joint Pub 5–0 also was pressed on what information should tasking authority and little ability to cited as needing improvement. This be passed up the chain of command, influence these players. One of his document is normally sponsored how much should be provided, and strongest tools is the power of infor- and prepared by the J-5 in a joint what channels to follow. For exam- mation. It is through the coordina- command; yet it is logisticians who ple, a JTF surgeon has functional re- tion process that players are brought must execute much of it. And it is sponsibilities to pass medical infor- together to share useful information logisticians who suffer most of the mation that may conflict with and that the commander gains a criticism if materiel does not flow to certain prerogatives of the comman- level of influence and cooperation a theater in the proper priorities. der. Does a surgeon pass this infor- among many of these entities. Again, interfaces and integration are mation through his own functional channels? Should he always clear it Interfaces vital in managing this important Most participants thought the planning tool. through the commander first? Should it all go up through the com- term interfaces meant all interfaces— Finally, there was a discussion with multinational forces as well as of joint doctrine as a catalyst in gen- mand channels vice functional channels to ensure unity of purpose both governmental and nongovern- erating a joint culture. Many felt mental agencies, up and down the that the actual development of such and reporting in the JTF? Many functional managers find themselves chain of command, across organiza- a culture is key to the better plan- tional lines to parallel commands, ning and execution of JTFs. Al- in this dilemma. The issue is compounded if the force is multinational and among staffs within various though service cultures are impor- commands. tant to successful mission execution and the event political, since there are several chains—multinational, In training JTF headquarters, by components, it is a joint culture particular attention must be paid to that will enhance joint planning national level politico-military including the National Command Au- thorities (NCA), and national theater

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IN BRIEF

staff positions that require an inter- pejorative term suggesting a lack of the JTF staff. Again, interface points face, since it is interface points and planning and preparation, that vari- are critical in effective mission plan- the management of information ous elements of a JTF had been ning. To train to plan well, the staff through them that often cause prob- thrown together at the last minute. must actually plan in training. lems and inefficiencies in conduct- Others thought it was synonymous Whatever training system is ul- ing JTF missions. Responsibility for with flexibility, the way in which el- timately designed for JTFs, it must positions should be identified, and ements of a JTF can be rapidly tai- be mission-focused since training re- individuals involved should be regu- lored to fit a specific mission. These sponds to operational requirements. larly trained and exercised. Where individuals said that new concepts If mission requirements are identi- possible, they should be familiar such as adaptive joint force packag- fied then the focus can be put on with their counterparts in other staff ing were merely the further develop- tasks, conditions, and standards to elements, commands, and agencies. ment of a process of providing flexi- be established. As the force integra- Assignments should be made with bility in the tailoring of a force for a tor ACOM will be intimately in- continuity and stability in mind, mission. volved in this process. and individuals should not be fre- Planners also need to think quently moved. Personnel turbu- about JTF mission planning and exe- Each of these themes impacted lence at interface points hurts effi- cution in nontraditional or nonstan- on the functional areas raised during ciency and effectiveness. dard ways. There are many missions the symposium. There was consider- In terms of logistics, it is not that do not fit into the traditional able cross-discussion among the only interfaces that matter; more mold and cannot be planned and panelists on these topics, which U.S. Air Force (Russ Pollanen) important is the integration of oper- executed using traditional norms. would suggest the close relationship ational plans and other information For example, it may be helpful to and interconnectivity that func- into logistic plans that provides the think of interagency task forces as a tional areas have on each other. In best logistic support. Further, a key JTF variant in any operation where addition, there are also several fairly interface point for this support is at other governmental agencies have clear messages that can be derived. the theater/strategic level, where large roles. JTF planning routinely The more complexity that is joint theater logistic planners must excludes other agencies because it is built into a chain of command, the be able to coordinate with service lo- not customary to open the planning more difficult successful command gistic providers. The greatest suc- process to outsiders, a reluctance and control becomes. Training that cesses or failures in logistic support that must be overcome if JTFs are to uses real billetholders in actual plan- are determined here. If the JTF logis- succeed in interagency and multina- ning exercises is most effective in tics function cannot tap into the tional environments. finding successful means of dealing theater/strategic logistic interface, it with complex command structures. loses what can be mission-essential Training and Education Further doctrine development and support. Both service and joint re- It is through joint training and integration is required, along with sponsibilities are vital to a healthy education that a viable joint culture continued development of a distinc- interface. will be developed. The education tive joint culture to facilitate community should start at the inter- through informal cultural channels Cautionary Notes mediate college level teaching doc- those tasks that must be done The NCA need not stand up a trine in curricula that are systemic through formal working channels. JTF for every contingency. There are versus single service in focus. It is es- With the advent of the information occasions when one service or de- tablishing doctrine as the framework age, managing voluminous amounts partment can handle a crisis, and for joint operations that will incul- of information available to the JTF forming a JTF simply for the sake of cate joint culture in the minds of all commander is vital. Working inter- jointness violates the principle of personnel. But there is a caution faces are crucial at all levels. While simplicity. Forming JTFs with service here. Many members of the joint flexibility can be beneficial, training components as foundations means community believe that one cannot and exercising the functional areas changing the mindset of component be an effective joint officer without with their interfaces enhances a JTF’s staff members, which normally does first being proficient in the core ca- ability to perform missions. There not occur easily or rapidly. Once a pabilities of one’s own service. In are a number of creative approaches decision is made to stand up a JTF, other words, how can service exper- in use to accomplish JTF training the commander needs to rapidly tise be provided in a joint planning and exercises. There is no right way. promote a joint focus, and the staff framework without knowledge of CINCs who have developed useful needs to be promptly peopled with service capabilities? training procedures for JTFs should multiservice expertise. Many JTFs are stood up to re- employ them. And there is still The term ad hoc can have nega- spond to international crises that re- plenty of room to engage the joint tive and positive meanings. Some quire a quick reaction, the first 16 to force integrator, ACOM. Every suc- participants thought that it was a 72 hours being critical in planning. cessful training plan increases JTF The key to quick mission execution effectiveness. JFQ is the level of training reached by

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survey of the primary publications. Weapons Systems (information which Doctrine Third, a proposal to improve distri- is found in other doctrinal pubs). bution of joint publications is cur- Information briefings were pre- JOINT PUBS UPDATE rently in staffing. Finally, the entire sented on reorganizing joint pubs The following joint publications system of publications may be re- within the 2 series; Joint Special Op- have recently been approved: vised to reflect the changes in priori- erations Forces Institute (see item ties on certain topics. below); Joint Targeting Coordination ▼ Joint Pub 3–56.1, Tactical Com- JDWP voted to develop Joint Board; British and NATO approaches mand and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations (Pro- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for to peacekeeping; Joint Warfighting cedures and Formats), offers basic prin- Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy in the Center peace operations initiative; ciples and doctrine for command and 2 series (Joint Staff sponsor: J-2, lead and Joint Pub 3–07 series on opera- control (C2) of joint air operations agent: ACOM). Action also was taken tions other than war. which apply across a range of military in favor of accelerating revision of The next JDWP will be hosted operations—in war and operations Joint Pub 3–01.5 through publication by U.S. Space Command in April other than war (OOTW)—to ensure of Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- 1995. JFQ unity of effort for the benefit of a joint dures for Theater Missile Defense. The force as a whole; addresses operational information now contained in Joint relationships, policies, procedures, and Pub 3–01.5 will be included in Joint options for C2 of joint air operations NEW NAVAL PUBS by designating a JFACC or using the Pub 3–01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, which is A year in the making, the sec- joint force commander’s staff (Novem- ond in the series of six naval doctri- ber 14, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-7, under development (Joint Staff spon- nal publications has been issued as lead agent: Air Force). sor: J-3, lead agent: Army, technical ▼ Joint Pub 4–02, Doctrine for review authorities: Air Force, U.S. four others near completion. The se- Health Service Support in Joint Central Command, and U.S. Special ries is issued by the Naval Doctrine Operations, establishes doctrine for Operations Command). Command which was established in planning and employing health ser- Another revision that was ap- 1993 to codify naval doctrine and vice support to joint forces and con- proved involves developing guidance bridge the gap between the refocused tains chapters on the health service on the joint operation of lines of strategy laid out in the white paper, support system, support planning, ...From the Sea, and tactics, tech- support in special operations, and sup- communications which will be included in the next edition of Joint niques, and procedures. With the port in OOTW; contains appendixes end of the Cold War with its focus on medical threat, medical intelli- Pub 4–0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of on a monolithic adversary, naval gence, and references (November 15, Joint Operations; the Joint Staff (J-4) 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-4, lead will incorporate this requirement into leaders made a shift in strategy to ad- agent: Army). JFQ the program directive for the revision. dress the threats posed by regional Finally, the Army proposed deconflicts. The publications spell out veloping doctrine for information the concept that naval doctrine must JOINT DOCTRINE operations, although there was dis- fully support and be a logical exten- cussion on delaying work in this sion of joint doctrine, and that the WORKING PARTY area until more guidance is available Navy/Marine team is committed to a and a joint warfare capability assess- full partnership in joint operations. The Joint Warfighting Center The first title which appeared in th ment is completed on information hosted the 14 Joint Doctrine Work- the series, Naval Doctrine Publica- ing Party (JDWP) at the Naval Air warfare. But JDWP decided that information warfare doctrine was im- tion 1, Naval Warfare, reasserts the Station in Norfolk on October Navy/Marine team as the primary 25–26, 1994. Sponsored by the Di- portant and an opportunity existed to incorporate it in Joint Pub 3–13, forward deployed mobile force pro- rector for Operational Plans and In- jection resource available to the Na- teroperability (J-7), Joint Staff, semi- Joint Doctrine for Command and Con- trol Warfare Operations, which is tion. While naval forces are orga- annual working party meetings nized to fight and win wars, perhaps include representatives of combatant under development. The Army was invited to provide information war- equally important is their contribu- commands and services as well as tion to deterrence. Naval doctrine the Joint Staff. fare input to be considered for inclu- sion in the next draft of Joint Pub places great emphasis on preventing The Chairman’s interest in doc- conflict and controlling crises trine has resulted in several initia- 3–13 which will be retitled Joint Doc- trine for Information Warfare. through its forward deployment and tives. First, joint pubs are being re- engaged presence. vised and recast in a more readable 6 Moreover, JDWP deleted two titles from the Joint Doctrine Publica- Naval Doctrine Publication 2, x 9-inch full-color format. Second, a Naval Intelligence, addresses the shift Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone tion System, namely, Joint Pub 1–06, Primer has been developed to offer a Joint Symbols and Graphics (with the information to be included in non- doctrinal publications), and Joint Pub 1–09, Employment of Selected

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in focus to operations in littoral re- special operations, and support operations at Guantanamo exceed gions, where outcomes can be con- SOCOM participation in national se- the scope of the 1991–93 Operation trolled or influenced from the sea. curity fora and symposia. JFQ GTMO by receiving over 20,000 The new focus of national strategy Cubans and involving two battal- leaves the nature of potential threats ions, a brigade headquarters, and a more difficult to predict, thereby CLEARINGHOUSE combat arms battalion to support making naval intelligence perhaps migrant movement. Another 8,000 more needed than ever before. FOR SOF IDEAS Cubans in Panama required two bat- These publications may be ob- To help keep pace with a com- talions to augment security. The tained from the Navy Publications plex world, U.S. Special Operations joint issues which surfaced at the and Forms Directorate, 5801 Tabor Command (SOCOM) is seeking in- strategic and operational levels dur- Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania novative ideas from those who think ing these operations include intera- 19120 (cite SN 0700LP0000100 for that they have a better way. Accord- gency processes, funding, public af- NDP 1 and SN 0700LP0000200 ingly, SOCOM has established a Spe- fairs, rules of engagement, selective for NDP 2). All comments should be cial Operations Forces Clearinghouse Reserve call-up, personnel account- sent to the Commander, Naval to identify, nurture, and institution- ing, airlift of non-DOD personnel, Doctrine Command, 1540 Gilbert alize innovative ideas on organiza- linguist support, C4I, and availability Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23511. JFQ tional structure, roles and missions, of both the Joint Worldwide Intelli- training, education, employment gence Communications System concepts, personnel policies, and (JWICS) and the Joint Deployable SOF INSTITUTE command relationships within the Intelligence Support System (JDISS). special operations community. The U.S. Atlantic Command interim U.S. Special Operations Com- Ideas do not have to be submit- joint after action report (AAR), due mand (SOCOM) created the Joint Spe- ted in any particular format. And, 90 days after the start of sustained cial Operations Forces Institute though encouraged, it is not neces- operations, will yield many OOTW (JSOFI) in 1994 to develop and inte- sary to forward them up the chain of lessons from ongoing Haiti and mi- grate joint special operations doctrine, command. Unfiltered ideas are often grant operations. training, and education and research. more valuable than those that have Southwest Asia. Iraq’s position- JSOFI reviews joint doctrine and joint had their controversial aspects fi- ing of forces on Kuwait’s border last tactics, techniques, and procedures nessed. But classified material or autumn resulted in Operation Vigi- (TTP) for special operations, psycho- suggestions relating to current oper- lant Warrior, which raised familiar logical operations, and civil affairs. It ations should not be forwarded. Any issues such as deliberate versus crisis is coordinating review authority for ideas submitted with the intention planning, intelligence support, joint doctrine and TTP and assigns to contract for goods or services prepositioning, funding, coalition technical review authority for special- must be sent to the SOCOM Compe- agreements, C4I, transportation ized expertise within SOCOM. It also tition Advocate General. planning, and Reserve call-up. The ensures that joint special operations All proposals will be acknowl- Exercise and Analysis Division, Di- doctrine and TTP are consistent with edged and sent to the appropriate rectorate for Operational Plans and both other current joint and service agency for appraisal. Send ideas to Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, as- doctrine and TTP. SOF Clearinghouse, Headquarters, sessed air operations in Operations The institute, which is located U.S. Special Operations Command, Provide Promise/Deny Flight. Under at Fort Bragg, also monitors develop- ATTN: SOCC–CIG, 7701 Tampa a combined task force (CTF), Joint ment of joint training, participation Point Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Force Air Component Commander in training exercises, and use of Base, Florida, 33621–5323; FAX (JFACC) operations feature complex training facilities. It coordinates spe- (813) 840–5109/DSN 299–5109. For planning, command lines, and coor- cial operations simulations and pro- further information call (813) dination procedures under a multi- grams as well as courses for quotas 828–2646/DSN 968–2646. JFQ national organization. Despite these offered at component and national factors, both operations were suc- agency schools which are joint or cessful and benefitted from strong common in nature. In addition, Lessons Learned leadership and orientation. Such JSOFI is the proponent for Profes- OOTW missions have political ob- sional Military Education (PME) and RECENT jectives with restrictive rules of en- integrates special operations-unique gagement and heavy, top-down con- instruction at intermediate and se- OPERATIONS AND trol—problems exacerbated by a nior-level colleges. It serves as the EXERCISES confusing United Nations, NATO, proponent for SOCOM-sponsored and American command structure curricula and fellowships. It will also Haiti. Operations Support, Up- that is seemingly contrary to the direct a library and research center, hold, and Sustain Democracy have principle of unity of command. facilitate publication of literature on taken center stage among operations other than war (OOTW). Moreover,

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Lessons include the previously iden- service component commander) on and evaluation to CINC Combined tified need for the services to offer USS Kitty Hawk, which released a Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea. component forces OOTW training roughly 200-sortie per day air task- The areas observed were war plan- and the requirement to provide re- ing order with a 50-target set. While ning, exercise execution and design, deployed aircrews refresher training Ocean Venture ’93 and Tandem combined air operations, C4I/GCCS, in order to maintain proficiency in Thrust ’93 utilized sea-based JFACCs theater missile defense, logistics, and normal combat skills. Other con- with their CJTFs aboard USS Mount compliance with joint doctrine. The cerns include the fact that systems Whitney and USS Blue Ridge, respec- joint issues addressed in a secret like the Contingency Theater Auto- tively, putting JFACCs on carriers CJCS Summary Observation Report mated Planning System are not em- raises questions of connectivity, include exercise simulations, Patriot ployed in the NATO environment, a berthing, and synergy because they fire unit employment, Contingency lack of joint doctrine for reference, are not collocated with the CJTF and Tactical Air Control Automated Plan- and the impact of indefinite sus- Joint Targeting Coordination Board ning System terminals and operator tained operations on the character (the naval forces component com- training, and the Combined Air of JTFs. Recommendations include mander was also embarked on USS Component Command’s use of draft reviewing Deny Flight/Provide Kitty Hawk). standard operating procedures. Promise in the course of developing For the JFACC, operating from a Again joint doctrine publications mulitinational and combined carrier was successful and high- were largely unavailable at various doctrine. lighted the importance of functional headquarters. Though force com- Rwanda. The U.S. European component commanders maintain- manders operating as part of a Command (EUCOM) AAR for Opera- ing independence by not blurring multinational command should fol- tion Distant Runner, the Rwandan the responsibilities associated with low doctrine and guidance ratified noncombatant evacuation operation dual-hatting service component by the United States, the use of (NEO), is a superb example of com- staffs. Overall, C4I aspects of the ex- terms and procedures that deviate prehensive, useful, and timely ercise went smoothly and, though from joint doctrine causes confusion lessons learned. In addition to the some off-loading occurred, berthing for non-theater personnel augment- AAR required by the Joint Staff, did not pose a significant problem. ing theater forces. Since most con- EUCOM published a booklet con- While most off-loading was done for tingencies require augmenting taining an executive summary of the convenience of the exercise, in a forces, many of the benefits of stan- major lessons, chronology of events, large-scale operation alternate dardized joint training are negated and listing of the eight Joint Univer- berthing arrangements may be when commands employ non-joint sal Lessons Learned (JULLs) through needed to accommodate added staff terminology and procedures. Under both the EUCOM Center for Lessons and a full air wing. Other joint issues CJCS statutory authority, guidance Learned and CJCS JULLS database. raised during Tandem Thrust ’95 in- contained in joint doctrine is au- In addition to mission statements cluded synchronizing the air tasking thoritative and will be followed T the report presents key NEO actions order cycle with a CJTF apportion- unless, in the judgment of a com- and participants. Lesson topics in- ment decision, ensuring full input mander, exceptional circumstances clude satellite communications with from component commanders, and dictate otherwise. embassy staff, diplomatic clearance, operating in a real-world environ- — Contributed by liaison officers, USKAT 1949 keymat ment for effective joint training. CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN for deployed units, shipboard mate- As in Provide Promise/Deny Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7) W rial such as maps, and joint crisis ac- Flight, joint pubs were generally un- Joint Staff JFQ tion planning methodology. available for reference, compound- Asia-Pacific. In December 1994 a ing the situation found across team fielded by the Exercise and warfighting CINCs that joint doc- Education Analysis Division (J-7) helped U.S. trine often does not reach service Pacific Command (PACOM) evaluate component staffs—although this is SUN TZU joint exercises and observe JFACC the level from which combatant operations aboard a carrier. While commanders normally draw their WANTS YOU! this was the second time a Tandem CJTFs and core staffs. (To counter To stimulate innovative think- Thrust exercise placed the JFACC on this problem the Joint Staff is imple- ing on information warfare, the Na- a carrier, it was the first comprehen- menting a push-down distribution tional Defense University Founda- sive test during a fully developed system to ensure that warfighters get tion is sponsoring the Sun Tzu Art of field training exercise. Part of a well joint pubs.) War Award for writing on all aspects established PACOM JTF training pro- Under the FY94 CJCS Evalua- of information warfare. Topics can gram, Tandem Thrust ’95 had an in- tion Program, the Exercise and Anal- range from measures that prohibit dependent JFACC (not a dual-hatted ysis Division (J-7) also observed ULCHI Focus Lens ’94, a major command post exercise. CINCPAC dele- gated exercise planning, execution,

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adversaries from exploiting information to those that ensure integrity, CALL FOR AUTHORS JFQuarterly Survey availability, and interoperability of Acquisition Review Quarterly, the friendly information assets. Entries of Joint Literature professional journal of the acquisi- with a strategic or operational em- tion corps, is soliciting papers re- phasis are particularly encouraged. BOOKS flecting scholarly examination, disci- The competition is open inter- plined research, or supported Michael D. Doubler. Closing with the nationally to military personnel and empirical experience in the field of Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in civilians. Unclassified as well as clas- defense acquisition. In addition, arti- Europe, 1944–1945. Lawrence: Uni- sified entries are accepted. Winners cles on defense acquisition policy versity Press of Kansas, 1994. 354 will receive prizes of $500 for papers will be accepted. Consult the journal pp. $40.00. [ISBN 0–7006–0675–0] and $1,000 for monographs. Entries for style guidelines or contact the Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. in this year’s competition must be Defense Systems Management Col- Trainor. The Generals’ War: The In- received no later than April 15. lege Press directly at (703) 805–2892 side Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. For further details contact [FAX: (703) 805–3856] for a copy of Boston: Little, Brown and Com- Robert E. Neilson at (202) 287–9330 the guidelines. pany, 1995. 551 pp. $27.95. or on Internet at [email protected] The journal also is seeking refer- [ISBN 0–316–32172–9] or by writing the Information ees. Interested parties should for- Resources Management College, Dennis S. Ippolito. Blunting the Sword: ward a short biography citing cre- National Defense University, Fort Budget Policy and the Future of De- dentials in acquisition, publications, Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. fense. Institute for National Strate- and research together with name, 20319–6000. JFQ gic Studies. Washington: National address, telephone and FAX num- Defense University Press, 1994. bers, and Internet address to Acquisi- 185 pp. $7.00. tion Review Quarterly, Defense Acqui- [ISBN 0–16–045229–5] sition University, 2001 North Beauregard Street (Room 420), Alexandria, Virginia 22311. JFQ

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee are cosponsoring a symposium on wartime logistics on June 13, 1995 at the National Defense University, The Big Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Papers will be presented by scholars and specialists on issues relating to industrial mobilization, acquisition, national economic policy, infrastructure construction, Lend-Lease, and “L” in joint logistics at the theater level. This event will focus on the pivotal role of logistics in the grand strategy of World War II. For details on registration, please contact COL Ross at World War II (202) 475-0986/DSN 335-0986.

The Dock (Port of Spain, West Indies, 1943).

Painting by James Turnbull (Courtesy of U.S. Army Art Collection)

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Paul D. Mather. M.I.A.: Accounting for National Defense University and Terry J. McKearney, “Rethinking the the Missing in Southeast Asia. Insti- Norwich University. Washington: Joint Task Force,” U.S. Naval Insti- tute for National Strategic Studies. Institute for National Strategic tute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 11 Washington: National Defense Studies, National Defense Univer- (November 1994), pp. 54–57. University Press, 1994. 207 pp. sity, 1994. 293 pp. Jeffrey McManus, “Develop a Joint $9.50. [ISBN 0–16–036391–8] Data Link,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro- ARTICLES Stephen J. McNamara. Air Power’s ceedings, vol. 121, no. 1 (January Gordian Knot: Centralized versus A.J. Bacevich, “The Use of Force in 1995), pp. 64–66. Organic Control. Maxwell Air Force Our Time,” The Wilson Quarterly, Paul David Miller, “U.S. Atlantic Base, Ala.: Air University Press, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1995), Command: Focusing on the Fu- August 1994. 191 pp. pp. 50–63. ture,” Military Review, vol. 74, no. Williamson Murray, MacGregor John R. Ballard, “Marines Can Be 9 (September 1994), pp. 5–11. Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein, edi- Joint to the Core,” U.S. Naval Insti- Allan R. Millett, “Why the Army and tors. The Making of Strategy: Rulers, tute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 11 the Marine Corps Should Be States, and War. Cambridge: Cam- (November 1994), pp. 30–33. Friends,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4 bridge University Press, 1994. 680 Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of (Winter 1994–95), pp. 30–40. pp. $34.95. [ISBN 0–521–45389–5] Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Robert J. Muise, “Cleansing Maneu- James H. Toner. True Faith and Alle- Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6 (November/ ver Warfare Doctrine,” U.S. Naval giance: The Burden of Military December 1994), pp. 20–33. Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. Ethics. Lexington: The University John L. Clarke, “Which Forces for 11 (November 1994), pp. 47–49. of Kentucky Press, 1995. 202 pp. What Peace Ops?” U.S. Naval Insti- Juan C. Neves, “Interoperability in $25.00. [ISBN 0–8131–1881–6] tute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 2 Multinational Coalitions: Lessons (February 1995), pp. 46–48. MONOGRAPHS AND from the Persian Gulf War,” Naval Eliot A. Cohen, “What To Do About PROCEEDINGS War College Review, vol. 48, no. 1 National Defense,” Commentary, (Winter 1995), pp. 50–62. Center for Advanced Command vol. 98, no. 5 (November 1994), Kevin E. Pollock, “Desert Storm Concepts and Technology. pp. 21–32. Taught Us Something,” U.S. Naval Command and Control in Peace John H. Dalton et al., “Forward... Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 1 Operations. Workshop no. 2. From the Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute (January 1995), pp. 68–69. Institute for National Strategic Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 12 James J. Schneider, “War Plan Studies. Washington: National De- (December 1994), pp. 46–49. fense University Press, December Rainbow 5,” Defense Analysis, Wayne Danzig, “Coalition Forces in 1994. 12 pp. vol. 10, no. 3 (December 1994), the Korean War,” Naval War Col- pp. 285–304. Norman B. Hutcherson. Command lege Review, vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter Martin N. Stanton, “Task Force 2–87, and Control Warfare: Putting 1995), pp. 25–39. Another Tool in the War-Fighter’s Lessons from Restore Hope,” Jonathan T. Dworken, “Rules of En- Data Base. Research report no. Military Review, vol. 74, no. 9 gagement: Lessons from Restore AU–ARI–94–1. Maxwell Air Force (September 1994), pp. 35–41. Hope,” Military Review, vol. 74, no. Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 9 (September 1994), pp. 26–34. DOCUMENTS September 1994. 63 pp. ———, “What’s So Special about Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine James G. Lee. Counterspace Operations Humanitarian Operations?” Capstone and Keystone Primer. for Information Dominance. Max- Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, Washington: Government Printing well Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Uni- no. 4 (October–December 1994), Office, July 15, 1994. 56 pp. versity Press, October 1994. 43 pp. pp. 391–99. Joint Chiefs of Staff. User’s Guide for Ralph E. McDonald. Cohesion: The Donald D. Gabrielson, “We Need Joint Operation Planning. Washing- Key to Special Operations Teamwork. Joint Data Fusion Centers,” U.S. ton: Government Printing Office, Research report no. AU–ARI–94–2. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, September 11, 1994. 33 pp. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 66–68. University Press, October 1994. Naval Doctrine Command. Naval 90 pp. Stephen T. Ganyard, “Where Air Doctrine Publication 2. Naval Intel- Power Fails,” U.S. Naval Institute ligence. Washington: Government Fariborz L. Mokhtari, editor. Peace- Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 1 Printing Office, September 1994. making, Peacekeeping and Coalition (January 1995), pp. 36–39. 68 pp. JFQ Warfare: The Future Role of the United Nations. Proceedings of a Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, conference cosponsored by the “Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the De- bate,” The Washington Quarterly, JFQ lists recent selected titles of interest vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), to its readers. Publishers are asked to pp. 197–213. forward new works to the Editor.

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A READER’S GUIDE TO THE KOREAN WAR A Review Essay by ALLAN R. MILLETT

ust which Korean War one reads Jabout depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. President-elect For an indictment of American and Eisenhower in Korea, 1952. United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday U.S. Army Military History Institute and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War: Korea (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight matters and sharp characterization. Credibility, and Command (Philadel- of Korea is justified, but their bias The two books in question are John phia: Temple University Press, 1986), toward the communists is much less Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, is a measured study of the Truman compelling. British authors have 1950–1953 (New York: Morrow, administration’s conduct of the war. written significant books: David Rees, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten Anthologies of informed, schol- Korea: The Limited War (London: War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 arly essays (sometimes mixed with Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. (New York: Times Books, 1987). good oral history) offer easy entrée MacDonald, Korea: The War before Works by disgruntled critics of to the issues. The best of a full field Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, America, the Truman administra- are edited by Francis H. Heller, The 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean tion, and the Army have a place in a Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective War (New York: Simon and Schuster, Korean War library. The key political (Lawrence: Regent’s Press of Kansas 1987). These authors give short shrift jeremiad is I.F. Stone, The Hidden for the Harry S. Truman Library, to politics, but offer historical perspec- History of the Korean War, 1950–1951 1977); Bruce Cumings, Child of Con- tive and emotional distance. After (Boston: Little Brown, 1952), which flict: The Korean-American Relation- publishing the above work, however, portrays Truman as the dupe of the ship, 1943–1953 (Seattle: University MacDonald drifted into the Halliday- sinister Asia First partisans at home of Washington Press, 1983); William Cumings camp of anti-American criti- and abroad, led by John Foster J. Williams, A Revolutionary War: cism in his subsequent articles. Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek. The Korea and the Transformation of the John Toland and Clay Blair, two military counterpart of Stone is T.R. Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint of America’s most popular (in both Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Publications, 1993); James I. Matray senses of the term) military historians, Study of Unpreparedness (New York: and Kim Chull-Baum, Korea and the have few reservations about the legiti- Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina macy of intervention or the Republic American culture’s weakening effect Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and of Korea’s right of self-defense. They on soldiers and politics which was Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Cold are more interested in assessing U.S. reprinted by the Army in 1993. A War in Asia (New York: Columbia military performance, however, indi- more recent book in the same genre University Press, 1977); Korean War vidual as well as collective. Although is Bevan Alexander, Korea: The First Research Committee, War Memorial Toland integrates South Korean and War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumi- Chinese interviews to great effect, his 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: nation of the Korean War (Seoul: War focus is on the American effort. Blair’s The Untold Story (New York: Times Memorial Service, 1990); and James strengths are a knowledge of the 8th Books, 1982), which is short on orig- Cotton and Ian Neary, The Korean Army and a keen eye for operational inal information and insight. Robert War as History (Atlantic Highlands, Leckie’s Conflict: The History of the N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989). Korean War (New York: Putnam, Allan R. Millett is professor of history and 1962) reflects an admiration for the Causes of the War Associate Director of the Mershon Center at American infantryman and support A Civil war—as Korea surely The Ohio State University; he is the author for the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The was—has internal and international of Semper Fidelis: The History of the U.S. Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, dynamics and its own shifting sets Marine Corps and is working on a history of of political actors, all of whom have the Korean War. agendas of their own. The Korean

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War is no exception. It was one of tainted legitimacy, authoritarian in- South Korea, and he ignores the many such wars in this century in stincts, romantic economic dreams, power of organized Christianity in which the “great powers” chose to and a dedication to political victory the struggle for the soul of Korea. make a smaller nation a battle- and control over a unified Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited under- ground. Of course, small nations Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would standing of the Armed Forces, so he (often plagued with politicians with have felt comfortable on the throne often finds a malevolent purpose in large ambitions and imaginations) of the kings of Unified Shilla at simple bungling. While he writes too are perfectly capable of enticing Kyong-ju. For perspective on the tri- much, most of it is required reading. larger nations to help sway the local als before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, The convoluted course of Amer- political balance against domestic ri- John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung, and ican diplomacy did not change in vals or other great powers. The Yi Shannon McCune, editors, U.S.- 1950. Arguments on the political dynasty in Korea, for example, strug- Korean Relations, 1882–1982 (Seoul: direction of the war are found in gled to maintain its isolation and in- Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: dependence by playing the Chinese Kyungnam University, 1982). American Policy and the Dimensions of off against the Japanese, then ap- Works notable for their success- the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: pealed to Czarist Russia and the ful effort to link U.S. foreign policy Cornell University Press, 1985), as United States to protect it from its with Korean political history include well as in A Substitute for Victory: The patrons. This too-clever but desper- James I. Matray, The Reluctant Cru- Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean ate bit of diplomacy resulted in two sade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell wars, the annexation of Korea by 1941–1950 (Honolulu: University University Press, 1990). Stueck’s Japan in 1910, and thirty-five years of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory work on this aspect of the war is The of misery. Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Necessary War: Korea, An International Just how much background one Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- History (Princeton: Princeton Univer- seeks is a matter of taste and time. sity Press, 1968); James Merrill, sity Press, forthcoming 1995). There is ample reading: Carter J. Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the A major work by a Japanese Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, War (Newark: University of Delaware scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., who covered North Korean politics Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: The Road to Confrontation: American for a Japanese communist newspa- Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea In- Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947– per, places the onus for initiating stitute, Harvard University, 1990); 1950 (Chapel Hill: University of the 1950 invasion to Kim Il Sung. George M. McCune and Arthur L. North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles In The Korean War: The Conspiracies Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge: Har- M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur vard University Press, 1950); Choi American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rut- and Korea, 1945–1950 (Kent, Ohio: he concluded that Pyongyang pur- land, Vt.: C.E. Tuttle Company, Kent State University Press, 1981); sued a course of risky opportunism 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The that assumed reluctant support Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview United States and the Struggle for Asia, from China and Russia. Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, 1945–1953 (Westport, Conn.: Green- Assessments of the literature are Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A wood Press, 1976). found in Rosemary Foot, “Making History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, Whether regarded with awe or Known the Unknown War: Policy N.J.: Holly International, 1988). dismay (or both), an inquiry that Analysis of the Korean Conflict in Literature on Korean-American stands alone for its ability to define the Last Decade,” Diplomatic History, relations before 1950 stands as a the causes of the conflict is Bruce vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. monument to the power of after- Cumings, The Origins of the Korean 411–31, and Judith Munro-Leighton, the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emer- “A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of Amer- idea of a communist plot, orches- gence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 ica’s Role in the Cold War in Asia, trated by Moscow, that fell on an in- (Princeton: Princeton University 1945–1950,” Journal of American-East nocent South Korea basking in peace Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of Asian Relations, vol. 1 (Spring 1992), and prosperity, must be relegated to the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton: pp. 73–98. In addition, see Keith D. the dustbin of history. Ravaged by Princeton University Press, 1990). McFarland, The Korean War: An An- forced participation in World War II, While Cumings may see wheels notated Bibliography (New York: with an elite compromised by two within wheels where none exist, and Garland, 1986). Two other valuable generations which survived under be a master of inference, he knows references are James I. Matray, edi- Japanese rule, Korea was divided by Korean politics and recoils from the tor, Historical Dictionary of the Korean more than occupying armies and the cant of American politicians, gener- War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 38th Parallel. It was caught between als, and diplomats. He is no admirer Press, 1991), and Harry G. Summers, two modernizing movements, of the communists and especially Korean War Almanac (New York: Kim Il Sung, but his political bias pre- Facts-on-File, 1990). vents him from seeing any legitimacy in the anticommunist leadership in

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U.S. Political Direction (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an The basic study on American in- After presiding over the end of abridged account, The Korean War tervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Ko- World War II as an accidental Presi- (New York: Norton, 1971). The stan- rean Decision, June 24–30 (New York: dent, Harry S. Truman certainlydid dard biography of Acheson is Gaddis The Free Press, 1968). Distressed by not need another war but got one. Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: postwar Korean politics, Paige later His version of events is found in his Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the denounced the book as too sympa- two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, American Secretaries of State and thetic to Truman and Acheson, but N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955–56), a selec- their Diplomacy series; see also it remains a good work. tive but vital account to understand- Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling ing problems at home and abroad. the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Koreans on the War Truman biographies abound in un- Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Nor- Treatments of the war written by even quality: David McCullough, ton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, Koreans and translated into English Truman (New York: Simon and editor, Dean Acheson and the Making reflect a wide range of perspectives— Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. except of course in official (there is Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Martin’s Press, 1993). no other) accounts by North Korea. Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, Accounts by other participants Among the South Korean sources, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awe- include U. Alexis Johnson and J. however, one can find various de- some Power: Harry S. Truman as Com- Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand grees of outrage over intervention, mander in Chief (Baton Rouge: of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: remorse over the role of the Koreans Louisiana State University Press, Prentice-Hall, 1984), and Harold J. themselves in encouraging foreign 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: Uni- intervention, deep sadness over the Truman and the Modern American versity of Washington Press, 1975). consequences of the war, pride and Presidency (Boston: Little Brown, The institutional participation of the contempt over the military perfor- 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presi- Department of State must be gleaned mance of Koreans, a tendency to see dency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: from documents published in The conspiracy everywhere, and a yearn- University Press of Kansas, 1984); Foreign Relations of the United States of ing for eventual unification, peace, Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the America, a standard though contro- economic well-being, and social jus- Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk versial publications program; vol- tice. There is no consensus on how and Wagnalls, 1973); and William E. umes covering the period of 1950 to to accomplish these goals, only the Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair 1953 total 29 and were published certainty that war ruined hope of a Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: between 1976 and 1984. (National better Korea for the balance of the Twayne Publishers, 1989). Security Council documents are con- century. The literature also reflects a Secretary of State Dean Acheson tained in the National Security search for innate order and the rule provided a personal interpretation of Archive.) of law, against a pessimistic conclu- the war in Present at the Creation sion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi- Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960 (Seoul: National Univer- sity Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, “Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945–1950” (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950– 1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won A., Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945– 1972 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, For- eign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Poli- tics, 1940–1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in U.S. Army Military History Institute

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not exactly a “black hole” in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, KMAG in War and Peace (Washing- ton: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence in the ROK officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950–53 period and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROK army units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROK army to resist the Koren People’s Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROK division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm how- U.S. Army Military History Institute itzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paik Sun-Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washing- Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The His- California Press, 1963), and Kim Se- ton: Brassey’s, 1992), the memoirs of tory of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin- Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolu- an outstanding corps and division sa, 1976). tion in Korea (Chapel Hill: University commander. Paik, however, and his Syngman Rhee is mythic in the of North Carolina Press, 1971). brother Colonel Paik In-Yup are depth of his failure and the height The Democratic People’s Repub- quiet on their past in the Japanese of his success, including keeping lic of Korea’s account is The U.S. army and their dogged pursuit of the America involved in Korea, more or Imperialists Started the Korean War communist guerrillas in the South, less on his terms. He succeeded (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Pub- 1948–1950. The late Chung Il-Kwon, where Chiang Kai-shek, Ferdinand lishing House, 1977). For general another ROK army founder, left ex- Marcos, and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. background, see Robert A. Scalapino tensive but untranslated memoirs. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee’s American ad- and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Frustrations over nation-building are visor and information agent, wrote Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of more directly addressed in Gene M. two admiring books noted for their California Press, 1973), and Suh Lyons, Military Policy and Economic conversations and speeches: Robert Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Aid: The Korean Case, 1950–1953 T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Movement, 1918–1948 (Princeton: (Columbus: Ohio State University Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Princeton University Press, 1967). Press, 1961). Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and For a biography of the late Great The American military of 1950– American Involvement in Korea, Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, 53, absorbed with its own problems 1942–1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader of survival, showed little under- 1978). A less sympathetic view is (New York: Columbia University standing of the greater agony of found in Richard C. Allen, Korea’s Press, 1988) which is rich in data Korea, including a much-maligned Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Por- and insight. Expatriate North Korean South Korean army. But there is no trait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). officers discuss the war in Kim Chull longer any excuse for such insensi- Rhee’s political contemporaries, who Baum, editor, The Truth About the tivity. A novel by Richard Kim and often shifted between being rivals Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publish- Donald K. Chung, The Three Day and supporters, left extensive but ing, 1991) along with Russian and Promise (Tallahassee, Florida: Father untranslated memoirs. An exception Chinese participants. and Son Publishing, 1989), relates a is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for heart-rending story of family separa- Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Col- Military Allies, Political Doubters The study of political and mili- tion and ravaged dreams. The war is lective portraits of Korea’s civilian summarized in a work published by and military leaders are found in Lee tary relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is the Korean Ministry of National De- Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean fense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Nationalism (Berkeley: University of Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and

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Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of November 1950, and Walter Hermes, and livelier account: Malcolm W. the 8th Army could not avoid dealing Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea with Koreans since many served in on the “stalemate” period from Octo- War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Insti- American units under the Korean ber 1951 to July 1953. The much-de- tute Press, 1957). Naval aviation re- Army Training with the U.S. Army layed tome by Billy Mossman, Ebb ceives special treatment in Richard P. (KATUSA) program, still in effect and Flow (1990), plugged the chrono- Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea today, but often a haven for well- logical gap from November 1950 to (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation born conscripts who speak some July 1951. The candor void is filled by Publishing, 1986). English. An official history of the Roy Appleman who dedicated his The Air Force published one KATUSA program prepared by later years to writing tough-minded large monograph on the Korean War, Richard Weinert and later revised by critiques, all published by the Texas the literary equivalent of a one- David C. Skaggs was published as A&M University Press: East of Chosin: megaton blast with endless fallout: “The KATUSA Experiment: The Inte- Entrapment and Breakout in Korea Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air gration of Korean Nationals into the (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Force in Korea, 1950–1953, revised U.S. Army, 1950–1965,” in Military Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); edition (Washington: Office of the Affairs, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1974), Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront Chief of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 53–58. MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels which is encyclopedic on the Air for Korea (1990). His work is required Force’s effort to win the war alone The Armed Forces reading for anyone interested in tacti- and too coy about the actual results. The body of literature on the cal expertise on cold weather and Recent anthologies from the Office strategic and operational perfor- night operations. While Appleman of Air Force History on the uses of mance of the Armed Forces in the does not quite supersede S.L.A. combat aviation include essays on air Korean War is substantial and de- Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet superiority, strategic bombing, and pendable, at least for operational (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork close air support in Korea, but their concerns. Building on its commit- Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), modification of Futrell will be slow. ment to a critical history in World he shares the battlefield. So does Books by or about senior Ameri- War II, the military establishment Shelby Stanton with America’s Tenth can leaders are generally well done worked with the same stubborn con- Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (No- and show how wedded these officers viction that both the public and fu- vato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), were to World War II norms. Two ture generations deserved to know which resurrects the reputation of Army officers of high repute wrote what happened in Korea and why. LTG Edward M. Almond, USA, a com- histories of the war: J. Lawton The products are generally ad- mander who was endowed with intel- Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: mirable. For a big picture start with ligence and skill yet cursed by a Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950– wretched personality. Battle books of Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War 1953 (Washington: Historical Office, the coffeetable variety abound. For a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Office of the Secretary of Defense, detached analysis, see Russell A. 1967). But larger shadows blur the 1988), the second volume in the Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. History of the Office of the Secretary (Washington: Office of the Chief of Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, of Defense series. For the perspective Military History, 1954; reissued in 1945–1959 (New York: Viking, on the Joint Chiefs see James F. 1970 and 1987). 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The The official Marine history is MacArthur, Triumph and Disaster, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Pol- Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. 1945–1964 (Boston: Houghton Mif- icy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilming- Marine Operations in Korea, 1950– flin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley ton, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979). 1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New As one might expect, the Depart- Branch, G–3, Headquarters, Marine York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. ment of the Army went to work with Corps, 1954–1972), which covers the Clayton James with Anne Sharp a vengeance on the Korean War, but experience of the 1st Marine Division Wells, Refighting the Last War: Com- faded in the stretch. It produced an and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet mand and Crises in Korea, 1950–1953 important policy volume: James F. Marine Force Pacific. Of other semi- (New York: The Free Press, 1993), ar- Schnabel, United States Army in the official Marine Corps books the best gues that World War II spoiled gen- Korean War: Policy and Direction: The is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High erals and distorted understanding of First Year (Washington: Office of the Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign such concepts as proportionality and Chief of Military History, 1972). It (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968). the relationship between ends and published two theater-level opera- The Navy published a one- means. Limited war did not suit the tional titles: Roy E. Appleman, South volume official history: James A. high commanders of the 1950s, but to the Naktong, North to the Yalu Field, Jr., History of United States only MacArthur challenged Truman’s th (1961), which covered the 8 Army Naval Operations Korea (Washington: policy. This cautionary tale remains and X Corps from June until late Director of Naval History, 1962); but best told in John W. Spanier, The two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier

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Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., editor, The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). Logistics and Coalition Warfare Korea provided an early test of whether the Armed Forces could support a limited war coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same au- forces from fourteen countries ex- Since the limited size of non- thor is Guns and Butter, Powder and cluding the United States. Nineteen U.S. and non-ROK contingents pre- Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean nations offered to send ground com- cluded them from having a great im- War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna bat units as part of the U.S. 8th Army, pact on the operational course of the University Press, 1989). An earlier but four proposed contributions war, their participation has been study is John G. Westover, Combat were too little, too late. Three in- largely ignored in the United States. Support in Korea (Washington: Office fantry divisions offered by the Chi- The exception is the dramatic partic- of the Chief of Military History, nese Nationalist government fell in ipation of one or other units in a 1955). The best place to start the another category: too large, too con- specific battle, for example, 1st Bat- study of Korean War manpower and troversial. The largest non-U.S. con- talion, Gloucestershire Regiment, materiel mobilization is Terrence J. tribution was the Commonwealth which fought to the last bullet and Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Division, organized in 1951 from trumpet call on the Imjin River in Logistics in the Korean War (Washing- British army battalions and similar April 1951. This approach overlooks ton: U.S. Army Center for Military units from Canada, Australia, and the potential lessons about coalition History, 1987). There are no compa- New Zealand. The smallest were warfare represented in U.N. Com- rable separate logistical histories for companies from Luxembourg and mand. It also ignores the useful exer- other services whose historians dealt Cuba. The ground forces included a cise of seeing one’s military practices with such matters as part of opera- Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, through the eyes of allies, in this tional histories. New Zealand artillery regiment, and case nations that sent their best and reinforced battalions from France, toughest soldiers to Korea for experi- The Allies Thailand, Ethiopia, Belgium, Aus- ence. To honor them Korea pub- The political environment on tralia, Colombia, and the Nether- lished short accounts in English of Korean affairs at the United Nations lands. The force reveals a careful these national military contingents: is found in the works of Stueck (see political and geographic balance: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Na- above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean contingents from Europe, Latin tional Defense, The History of the War and the United Nations (Louvain, America, Africa, and Asia. Air and United Nations Forces in the Korean Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); naval forces were similarly rein- War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History and Leon Gordenker, The United forced. Eight navies and four air Compilation Commission, 1975). Nations and the Peaceful Unification of arms deployed combat elements The battlefields of Korea also have Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, while eight nations sent air and sea excellent monuments (many erected 1947–1950 (The Hague: Martinus transport. Six nations sent medical by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United Nijhoff, 1959). units, five of which (Denmark, States has made no comparable ef- At the height of the war the India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden) fort to recognize these forces, many U.N. Command included ground provided only medical assistance. of which were more effective given their size than comparable American

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units. (For example, the most vul- 1966); Historical Section, General Union has reopened the issue of Rus- nerable corridor into the Han River Staff, Canadian Army, Canada’s Army sian connivance and collaboration, valley was defended in 1952 and in Korea (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: the communist internally-oriented histo- Commonwealth Division.) Most Commonwealth at War (London: Cas- ries and supporting documents. Re- American treatments of foreign con- sell, 1967). For an insightful review, tired Russian generals and diplomats tributions, such as they are, are in- see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth have become regular participants in corporated in U.S. organizational Armies and the Korean War (Man- Korean War conferences, but Russian histories. chester: Manchester University Press, histories are not translated or widely The Commonwealth Division 1988). An ambitious effort to inte- available to Western scholars with experience provides the most acces- grate national history and the war is the requisite language skills. Never- sible account of service with the 8th Ian McGibbon’s New Zealand and the theless, the Russian role as sponsor Army and only muted criticism of Korean War, vol. I, Politics and Diplo- continues to receive clarification and the high command. The British macy (Auckland: Oxford University is not diminished. Early plans history was written by a member of Press, 1992) with a volume on opera- emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in 1st Glousters, an esteemed general tions to follow. Dennis Stairs, The One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, and able historian, Sir Anthony Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the 1945–1947 (Oxford: Oxford Univer- Farrar-Hockley. His books are The Korean War and the United States sity Press, 1988). Most recent admis- British Part in the Korean War, vol. I, (Toronto: University of Toronto sions and revelations come from So- A Distant Obligation (London: Her Press, 1974) is a comparable work. viet veterans who have talked to the Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1990) On naval cooperation, see Thor media or participated in interna- and vol. II, An Honourable Discharge Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, tional conferences, including pilots

U.S. Army Military History Institute (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Canadian Naval Operations in Korean and air defense specialists. Documen- Office, 1994). They supersede C.N. Waters, 1950–1953 (Ottawa: Queen’s tary evidence has come primarily Barclay’s The First Commonwealth Printer, 1965). from Communist Party and foreign Division: The Story of British Common- ministry archives. Material from the wealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950– Russia and the War armed forces and KGB has been lim- 1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and From the beginning there were ited. Few documents have been Polden, 1954). Other accounts in- the Soviets—until they were written translated and published, although clude Norman Bartlett, With the out of the history of the Korean War Kathryn Weathersby, a Russian histo- Australians in Korea (Canberra: Aus- by their own hand and by those rian at Florida State University, has tralian War Memorial, 1954); Robert Western historians who could not taken up the grail of translation and O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, identify a bear even if he was eating interpretation through the Bulletin of 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War out of one’s garbage can. The Soviet the Cold War International History Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Union may not have started the war, Project and working papers which Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: but it certainly gave it a big bear hug have been issued by Woodrow Wil- The Official History of the Canadian and embraced it past Stalin’s death son Center for Scholars in Washing- Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen’s and a period of détente in the mid- ton. The British scholar Jon Halliday Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1950s. The collapse of the Soviet has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans. Much of Moscow’s involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet rela- LTG Matthew B. Ridgway, USA. tions primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Py- ongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). China and the War The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of schol- arship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, U.S. Army Military History Institute

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GETTING TO KNOW JOMINI

F–86 Sabre fighters A Book Review by saw their first action MICHAEL D. KRAUSE in December 1950.

The Art of War by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, with a new introduction by Charles Messenger Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992. 410 pp. $35.00 [ISBN 1–85367–119–3]

f one sampled a group of officers today about the influence of U.S. Air Force I Jomini, few would respond with any real insight. This is peculiar since Chen Jian, and Michael Hunt in PLA struggles in the winter of 1950– many concepts and terms (such as lo- both article and essay form. These 51, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: gistics, lines of communication, and scholars add texture to such earlier China’s Undeclared War Against the structure of military organization) are works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese U.S. in Korea, 1950–1951 (New York: based on his work. By contrast, the Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on name of Clausewitz is instantly recog- Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, interviews with veterans. nized, and his trinity—government, 1980); Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in military, and people—as well as the Aftermath China: 1941–1950 (Chicago: Univer- center of gravity, friction, and fog of Finally, the impact of the war is sity of Chicago Press, 1963); and war are widely held tenets of military discussed with care in the antholo- Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mao theory. Moreover, his views on the gies by Heller and Williams cited Hwang, China under Threat: The Poli- objectives and conduct of war are earlier. Also see the work edited by tics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Balti- well known. One can readily discern Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40- more: The Johns Hopkins University the Clausewitzian hand in the con- Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Press, 1980). cept of defense over offense as well as Keck Center for International and One result of international colin the culminating point of offensive Strategic Studies, 1991). One benefi- laboration on exploring the conflict operations. The aphorism “war is the ciary of the war was Japan—or at between the United States and China continuation of policy by other least those Japanese political groups is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, edi- means” is a widely held article of allied to America, capitalism, and tors, Sino-American Relations, 1945– faith. All of this makes Clausewitz the the social status quo. War-fueled 1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly leading theorist of war in American prosperity and the diminished ardor Resources, 1989). A critical view of military circles. for social reform is captured in the People’s Liberation Army is found Jomini, however, is relatively Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of in Zhang Shu-gang, Military Romanti- unknown despite the fact that his War: Americans and the Remaking of cism: China and the Korean War, 1950– ideas are implicit in military struc- Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent 1953 (Lawrence: University Press of ture and doctrine. Précis de l’Art de State University Press, 1989), and Kansas, forthcoming 1995), based Guerre (The Art of War) appeared in Michael Schaller, The American Occu- largely on a self-assessment. Three Paris in 1838 and was reprinted aug- pation of Japan: The Origins of the Western works of lasting value are mentee d’un appendice in 1855. The Cold War (New York: Oxford Univer- Alexander L. George, The Chinese English translation under review sity Press, 1985). The Journal of Amer- Communist Army in Action: The Korean here, which has an introduction by ican-East Asian Relations, vol. 2 War and Its Aftermath (New York: Charles Messenger, is a facsimile edi- (Spring 1993), is dedicated to “The Columbia University Press, 1967); tion. When it was first published in Impact of the Korean War” with es- Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the 1862 tactics as taught at West Point Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean says on Korea, China, Japan, and the War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); United States. JFQ and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Inter- Colonel Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.), is vention in the Korean War (Los Ange- a defense analyst and has taught military les: University of California Press, history at both the National War College 1967). For a face of battle account of and the U.S. Military Academy.

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were largely derived from this book tory of war into practical principles. not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a and it was said that every Union and Moreover, his ideas on the military great element of success.” Confederate commander rode into instrument were adopted in the Another condition for an effec- battle with a sword in one hand and United States. Like Sun Tzu’s five tive military is doctrine, which a copy of Jomini in the other. conditions for victory, Jomini identi- Jomini characterized as “good com- Antoine de Jomini (1779–1869), fied twelve for an effective military bat, staff, and administrative instruc- a Swiss of French extraction, joined instrument. He wrote at a time of in- tions.” He grounded his ideas about Napoleon’s army as a volunteer aide- tense upheaval as the French Revo- doctrine in history. In addition, he de-camp to Marshal Ney during the lution and Napoleonic era spawned indicated that engineers and ar- Austerlitz campaign. He had earlier the start of modern war. Europe re- tillerymen needed to interact on served on the Swiss general staff and mained continuously in conflict be- doctrinal matters and recognized the commanded a brigade. His four-vol- tween 1789 and 1815. Empires and technological complexity of engi- ume Traité des Grandes Opérations kingdoms rose and fell; millions neering and gunnery. Militaires brought him to Ney’s at- fought and tens of thousands died. Jomini viewed a general staff— tention. Appointed a colonel by New means of harnessing military though not the German model—as Napoleon, Jomini earned many hon- power were forged and states that applying principles on the battle- ors including a barony. He was Ney’s failed to grasp them were destroyed. field. Inherent in his approach was a chief of staff in Spain and gained the Jomini and Clausewitz witnessed staff officer well versed in both the- rank of general in the French and these events and contrasted Napole- ory and practice, a concept that runs Russian armies, a conflict of interest onic warfare with the limitations of throughout his work and that influ- that excused him from the disas- the Frederican style of war. enced many military institutions. trous Russian campaign. Later he In his treatise on practical appli- On the functions of a general staff was made an aide-de-camp to the cation, The Art of War, Jomini stipu- he stated: “In times of peace [it] Czar and devoted himself to estab- lates that an effective military must should be employed in labor prepar- lishing a staff college in Moscow be- have a good recruiting system, orga- atory for all possible contingencies fore retiring to write. He was recalled nization, and national reserves. Re- of war. Its archives should be fur- to St. Petersburg as an advisor to the serves should be able to double as nished with all statistical, geographi- Czar during the Crimean War and standing forces. Increases in poten- cal, topographical, and strategic trea- subsequently returned to France tial necessitate quick and dramatic tises and papers for the present and where he lived out his days. means of organization vis-à-vis order future.” Operational plans must be When rumors of renewed war of battle—from company level to drawn up to prepare for all possible with Prussia spread in 1806, Jomini corps—and a structure to govern and contingencies. In short, nothing had predicted that the enemy would support forces. There also must be a should be omitted by the general advance through the Erzgebirge pass recruitment system, either voluntary staff in readying for conflict. Jomini at Hof. He advised Napoleon to or compulsory, based on a na- refers to a chain of “command... concentrate his forces at Bam- tional consensus and a com- directing the principle operations of berg, a short distance away, mitment to defend the state. war.” He also outlined a system for and prepare for a counterof- The military must be provi- selecting theater commanders. fensive. When Napoleon sioned and then sustained In sum, his conditions for an ef- asked how he could be certain in battle. Jomini’s term for fective military instrument call for: of the enemy’s intentions, Jo- this, logistic support, is fa- ▼ thorough recruitment mini reputedly said that he miliar. By contrast, Clausewitz ▼ sound organization had studied the map divorced logistics from the ▼ national reserves of Europe and read conduct of war. ▼ combat, staff, and administra- history. This advice One basic aspect of tive instructions (doctrine) aroused Bonaparte an effective military is ▼ discipline, punctuality, and to amass his troops, superiority in weap- subordination based on conviction ▼ take the offensive, onry: “. . . armament is well developed rewards ▼ thoroughly trained engineers catch the Prussians be- Antoine de Jomini still susceptible of and artillery fore they could assemble, great improvement; ▼ superior armaments and crush them at Jena and the state which takes the ▼ general staff officers with a Auerstadt. Jomini was at Jena as was lead in making them will se- theoretical and practical education Karl von Clausewitz; the former epit- cure great advantage. The means of ▼ commissaries, hospitals, and omized the practical and scientific destruction are approaching perfec- general administration approach to war and the latter repre- tion with frightful rapidity.” Jomini ▼ a system of assigning com- sented the theoretical. warned that the quantity-quality mand and directing principle opera- Jomini gained wide acceptance equation might offer advantages but tions of war ▼ because of his distillation of the his- cannot assure victory: “The superior- means “to excite and keep alive the military spirit of the people.” ity of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does

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nal, educational, theoretical, and rank “among the most difficult in right and Clausewitz was wrong on leadership development in our view war when in presence of a well pre- key issues is to suggest that one man’s of military history. There is also a pared enemy.” He also points out theory bested the other’s. Clausewitz strong case to be made for the pri- the joint nature of this effort: “Since was indeed wrong to divorce the con- macy of Jomini’s ideas in all areas of the invention of gunpowder and the duct of war from logistics. Jomini saw our military in theory and practice. changes effected by it in navies... logistics—getting forces to a theater Jomini originated the idea of an army can make descent only with or battle—as vital to commanders principles of war that were adapted by the assistance of a numerous fleet of and the outcome. In coining the the American military. He said that if ships of war which command the term logistics he asked if it was sim- force is applied at the right time, in sea, at least until the debarkation of ply a science of detail. In discussing the right place, and in the right way, the army takes place.” Such advice what logistics meant previously success follows. One principle under- must have influenced the selection (march orders, laying out camps), he pins operations: “. . . [throwing] by of beachheads in World War II. “De- provided an all-encompassing way to strategic movement the mass of one’s ceive the enemy as to the point of set an army in motion, and to get it army at the decisive point of a theater landing, choose a spot where the to a new location, while maintaining of war; and also upon the communi- vessels may anchor in safety and the maneuver momentum. He cited what cations of the enemy and as much as troops land together; infuse as much must be done “in harmony and con- possible without compromising one’s activity as possible into the opera- cert” to support a commander’s con- own...to engage a fraction of the tion, and take possession of some cept of operations. Jomini brought enemy army with the mass of one’s strong point to cover the develop- together logistics and operations in a own...to engage the enemy line at ment of the troops as they land; put revolutionary way so that today de- the most critical juncture [and] criti- on shore at once a part of the ar- ploying and sustaining forces are cen- cal time and with ample energy.” This tillery.” For the German defenders of tral to a successful campaign. Jomini work makes a practical appeal to mili- Normandy he seems to have added: conceived of national military orga- tary history. “I can only advise the party on the nizations in practical terms while Jomini and Clausewitz wit- defensive not to divide his forces too Clausewitz advanced his trinity. Both nessed a revolution in military af- much by attempting to cover every men used history and recognized the fairs (RMA), change in military point....Signals should be ar- RMA of their day as fundamental to structure that harnessed the people ranged for giving prompt notice of the conduct of war. Jomini was not in defense of the nation. Further- the point where the enemy is land- a philosopher but his views are im- more, Napoleon’s contribution in ing, and all the disposable force bedded in American military culture terms of organization was the corps. should be rapidly concentrated whereas Clausewitz has only recently This was revolutionary because a there, to prevent his gaining a firm gained ascendancy in this country. It corps included infantry, cavalry, ar- foothold...an army landing upon is therefore an irony that Clausewitz tillery, and support elements in a co- a coast should always keep its princi- is well known and Jomini remains herent organization that could fight pal mass in communication with the virtually obscure. unaided against superior forces and shore...first care should be to In sum Jomini is practical in the march 15–20 miles a day. A corps make sure of the possession of one way he advocates art in war. His moved from one location to another fortified harbor, or at least of a basic principle is to mass force at the with alacrity and assurance. This en- tongue of land which is convenient right point, at the right time, and in abled Napoleon to plan operations to a good anchorage. . . .” the right way so that the outcome and then campaign with mutually Clausewitz, who was chief of will be decisive. Logistics is an inte- supporting forces for simultaneous staff to General Scharnhorst at Jena gral part of the military equation. If action at points of concentration when Jomini faced him, foresaw dis- you read Clausewitz, do not neglect which yielded decisive results. Re- aster in the Prussian campaign plan Jomini. He is a must for every stu- cruiting, training, and equipping with its lack of unity of effort and dent of joint warfighting. Invest in were based on levee en masse. These command. He was resolved to dis- The Art of War. JFQ organizational changes revolution- cover why Prussia was so severely ized the conduct of operations. The defeated by France and, in so doing, dominance of maneuver was re- he wrote On War, which was pub- stored to accomplish decisive results lished as an incomplete work by his in battle. And battles won cam- widow in 1831. But Jomini wrote for paigns which, in turn, gained the another thirty years and became the objective of war: an opponent’s will. more practical thinker, which ap- Both Jomini and Clausewitz wrote pealed to American military minds. guides to this RMA. Why is Jomini almost eclipsed Amphibious operations are cate- by Clausewitz? To claim that he was gorized by Jomini as descents, which

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SH–3 Sea King landing JOINT IN SPITE OF on USS Barry in the THEMSELVES Arabian Gulf. A Book Review by BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

ost Americans would agree that Mthe Nation needs a powerful Navy. But even advocates disagree sharply over its size, shape, and functions. For a century, such disputes involved more than academic arguments or bureaucratic squabbles. They ultimately determined the One Hundred Years of Sea Power: way the Navy prepared for war and The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 the outcome of battles waged by its by George W. Baer sailors and their ships. In One Hun- Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 553 pp. $42.50 dred Years of Sea Power, George Baer [ISBN 0–8047–2273–0] tells the story of the modern Navy U.S. Navy (Craig McClure) by explaining the theories on which it was built and the consequences of those theories in the six major wars the public and Congress, he wrote theories seemed vindicated by suc- since 1898. The Influence of Sea Power upon His- cess in war. The author is an eminent histo- tory, 1660–1783, which was pub- After former Assistant Secretary rian and a fine writer; but One Hun- lished in 1890. It became the most of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt en- dred Years of Sea Power benefits in powerful work written on the pur- tered the White House in September particular from what he has learned pose of naval forces. While the book 1901, Mahan’s thought became gov- as chairman of the Strategy and Pol- appeared to be a history of Britain’s ernment policy. While disagreeing icy Department at the Naval War rise to world primacy through with Mahan over details, the new College, where so much of our naval seapower, Mahan used the story of President agreed on the prime im- theory has been developed and the Royal Navy in the age of sail to portance of battleships, the need to tested. The book not only demon- argue for an American naval policy keep the battle fleet concentrated in strates a deep understanding of the in the age of steam. To be a global war, and its use as an offensive thinking that has propelled the power, he strongly suggested, the weapon. Indeed, as Baer points out, Navy over the last century but does Nation needed a large force of battle- Roosevelt’s major motivation to so in a vivid, clear, and exciting way. ships to defend its shores. In time of build the Panama Canal was to Despite his evident sympathy for the war, this concentrated battle fleet allow the unification of the battle men who charted the Navy’s course, would take offensive action against fleet for war, since in peace it was di- however, Baer does not hesitate to an enemy fleet, defeat it or drive it vided as a precaution between the point out the failures in their theory. into harbor, and control the sea. Ob- Atlantic and Pacific. In fact, the core of the book is a cri- viously, that required the building The American emphasis on bat- tique of the patron saint of the and maintenance of a battle fleet in tleships increased as a result of the Naval War College as well as the in- peacetime. Royal Navy’s creation of the all-big- tellectual father of the modern Navy, The Influence of Sea Power ap- gun Dreadnought in 1905–06. In fact, Alfred Thayer Mahan. pealed to a readership ready to be the Navy had already considered Mahan was not an intellectual persuaded. Congress had already ap- such a ship but delayed construction cast among sea dogs, but an articu- proved the first two modern Ameri- until plans were perfected. When late advocate of commonly-held can battleships in 1886 and it autho- Roosevelt left office, the United ideas on seapower shared by senior rized construction of another three States had laid down six dread- officers and Navy Department offi- even more powerful ships in 1890. noughts and set a pattern of autho- cials in the late 1880s. To sway both These and the cruisers ordered with rizing two battleships per year indef- them gave the Navy the force it initely. By the outbreak of World needed to smash the Spanish fleets War I, America had the world’s third in Manila Bay and outside Santiago largest battleship fleet. Brian R. Sullivan is a member of the harbor in 1898. As a result, the President Woodrow Wilson’s in- Institute for National Strategic Studies at United States acquired an empire sistence on strict neutrality con- the National Defense University. He has and status as a world power. Mahan’s flicted with the desire of the naval taught military history at the Naval War leadership for readiness. But the College and Yale University.

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President, naval leaders, and for similar reductions by foreign Both types of ships won notable vic- Congress agreed to the Naval Act of powers. The Army was far too small tories, carriers earlier and spectacu- 1916 as the best way to protect free- for such a pledge to have meaning; larly, starting at Midway; submarines dom of the seas, regardless of the but the Navy was large and growing. later but just as importantly by outcome of the war. The 1916 act Hughes opened the Washington strangling Japan’s home islands in projected a gigantic five-year build- disarmament conference in 1921 by 1944–45. In the Atlantic, the Navy ing program of 156 ships, including advocating that most battleships helped win a second, longer struggle sixteen huge battleships and battle should be scrapped, plans for new against German U-boats. But in the cruisers, to make the Navy the most battleship construction canceled, par- Atlantic as well as the Pacific, the powerful in the world by 1922–23. ity in British and U.S. battleships es- war showed that American naval ex- Mahan’s stress on the primacy tablished, and smaller ratios for other periences in 1917–18 were not an of the battleship had been criticized powers set. The conference agreed aberration. Contrary to Mahan’s by other naval thinkers for years. and the Washington Treaty followed. ideas, the Navy conducted joint Critics said that the Navy needed But the accord did not restrict sub- campaigns in both oceans, particu- light craft, especially for operations marines and America held the right larly in support of gigantic amphibi- in the Caribbean, but that Congress to build 135,000 tons of aircraft carri- ous operations. It was the Japanese had been mistakenly convinced by ers. Over the next sixteen years, the navy that fought an independent Mahan to fund a navy top heavy Navy received little funding for con- naval war based on Mahan’s princi- with capital ships. Experience during struction because of treaty limits, iso- ples and suffered crushing defeats. World War I seemed to support such lationism, lack of a perceived threat, Among other reasons, it was the criticism. The struggle the Navy ac- and the Great Depression. But it built extraordinary flexibility of aircraft tually had to wage bore no resem- two large aircraft carriers in the carriers that persuaded the naval blance to that envisioned by Mahan. 1920s, USS Lexington and USS Sara- leadership to make them the center- The German High Seas Fleet had al- toga, based on the hulls of uncom- piece of the post-war Navy. Carrier ready been driven into port by the pleted battle cruisers. The fleet prob- air could attack enemy fleets, as at Royal Navy. As a result, no American lems of 1929 and 1930 proved the Coral or Philippine Seas, and battleship fired a single broadside in carriers to be more versatile than bat- they could sink submarines, protect anger in 1917–18. tleships. Taking advantage of the bal- convoys, support amphibious land- Germany contested control of ance of the 135,000 tons allowed for ings, strike land targets, shoot down the Atlantic with U-boats. Instead of carrier construction, Congress autho- planes, and provide reconnaissance, offensive fleet actions, the Navy rized four more by 1935. all at ranges and speeds beyond any- fought to gain sea control in partner- The Navy probably had its thing possible for battleships. These ship with the Royal Navy by defen- greatest friend ever in Franklin Roo- capabilities also assumed political sive troop convoy protection, pa- sevelt, who like his cousin Theodore importance since no enemy navies trolling by light anti-submarine craft, also had been an Assistant Secretary survived the war. At the time, the and mine laying. It had not occurred of the Navy. But it was not until Soviet navy could offer only feeble to Mahan that, despite defeating its 1938 that Japan’s aggression in coastal defense and other navies of surface fleet, an enemy might con- China combined with rejection of significance were allied to the test control of the seas by other the Washington Treaty persuaded United States. Under such circum- means. Yet advances in technology the President and Congress to au- stances, control of the seas by Amer- made ideas about seapower based on thorize a larger navy. In response to ica and its allies seemed a given even 18th century models obsolete. a growing sense of danger, three after the start of the Cold War. But Just before the November 1918 construction bills passed in 1938–40. carriers could perform many tasks armistice, Wilson and his naval advi- As planners designed a balanced besides sea control. sors agreed to augment the battle fleet, the emphasis was on battle- The Navy struggled through a fleet by an additional 16 capital ships and carriers. But the Navy also difficult period between World War ships. They considered the naval ordered over a hundred fleet sub- II and Korea, however, thanks to the events of 1917–18 an aberration. marines, designed to attack large advent of the atomic bomb and long The goal of the new building pro- warships. With these appropriations, range jet bombers. With no serious gram was to ensure American strate- the Navy was able to get about any naval rival to prepare against, and gic independence in the postwar type of ship it wanted. pushed aside in perceived impor- world through battleship superiority The Japanese attack on Pearl tance by the Air Force, the Navy at- over Britain and Japan. Such plans Harbor crippled much of the battle tempted to define a role around did not long survive. In 1921, Presi- fleet that had survived the Washing- atomic weapons. Naval leaders pro- dent Warren Harding and Secretary ton Treaty. Out of necessity the posed supercarriers large enough to of State Charles Evans Hughes de- Navy turned to carriers and sub- launch bombers on nuclear strikes cided to avoid a post-war arms race marines for offensive operations. against Soviet targets. But President by proposing world disarmament. Harry Truman denied the Navy su- They could hardly offer to reduce percarrier. To add insult to injury, American land armaments in return

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Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson Vietnam War deprived riverine and Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein- proclaimed amphibious operations coastal interdiction operations of the berger, Secretary of the Navy John obsolete. In the first years of Tru- requisite support. Naval activities in Lehman asked Congress for a 600- man’s administration, the Navy Vietnam bore little resemblance to ship navy with heavy emphasis on shrank to one-fifth of its size on V–J Mahan’s notions about the proper carriers, attack submarines, and am- Day. In 1950, what did the United use of American seapower; but his phibious ships to back maritime States need a Navy for? influence lived on in the Navy’s em- strategy. Congress gave Lehman The Korean War provided the an- phasis on capital ship operations. most of the ships he requested. swer by indicating the effectiveness of The Soviet navy expanded sig- In effect, the Navy reintroduced naval operations in limited conflicts nificantly in the 1970s and 1980s. the ideas of Mahan with the capabil- against allies of continental powers After Vietnam, the Navy focused on ities of the late 1980s. It presented like the Soviet Union and China. In that threat. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Nation a strategic plan that, if particular, the Korean peninsula, sur- the Chief of Naval Operations in accepted, would have made the rounded on three sides by water, al- 1970–74, tried to reorient the service Navy the foremost service, free to lowed carrier air to strike anywhere from carriers and submarines to a wage independent war as advanced that land-based air could. The land- mixture of frigates, light helicopter in the era of Theodore Roosevelt. ings at Inchon and Wonsan and the carriers, patrol boats, and air-cush- But though the service got the ma- evacuation from Hungnam proved ion skimmers to deal with the grow- jority of ships it wanted and re- that amphibious operations were not ing Soviet submarine fleet. Zumwalt gained public support, it ultimately only feasible but effectual. The success believed the eighty year-old doctri- failed to persuade national leaders of of carriers created increased support nal stress on offensive strikes into the wisdom of maritime strategy. To for supercarriers. USS Forrestal, autho- enemy waters by capital ships had replace nuclear deterrence with a rized in 1952, was the first in a line of been rendered obsolete by missiles, doctrine based on a war of attrition huge carriers that the Navy will re- tactical nuclear weapons, and high- that could escalate into nuclear war ceive into the next century. performance aircraft. He proposed seemed much too risky. In any Developments in submarine cruise missiles for strike operations event, as the Soviet threat collapsed technology provided the Navy with but failed to get support from inside in 1989–91, so did the rationale for another purpose. In 1955, the first or outside the Navy. Instead, during maritime strategy. nuclear submarine, USS Nautilus, be- the Nixon, Ford, and Carter admin- The Persian Gulf War allowed came operational. Able to remain istrations, the Navy scrapped its last the Navy to play an important if sec- under water for months rather than World War II construction but laid ondary role. The crisis presented it hours, nuclear submarines provided down few replacements. Successive with a mission to justify its existence enormous potential for undersea Presidents expected a war with the after the virtual disappearance of its warfare. For example, as USS Nautilus Soviets to be either a strategic nu- Soviet rival from the high seas. The went into service, the Navy began clear exchange or a short, intense following year the Navy issued a work on larger submarines capable of land war in Europe. Aside from bal- white paper entitled ...From the launching intermediate range ballis- listic missile submarines, the Navy Sea, a basic shift from open-ocean tic missiles. The first Polaris entered could play little role in either case. warfighting on the sea toward joint service in 1960 and the Navy gained For the first time since Mahan, the operations conducted from the sea. a central role in strategic nuclear de- Navy had lost the support of both As Baer observes: “In 1992 the U.S. terrence. By the end of the Eisen- the public and politicians. Navy, after one hundred years, hower administration, the Navy had In the late 1970s, naval leader- closed its book on seapower doctrine undergone a great revival, with two ship developed a concept for em- in the image of Mahan. For how types of warships contending for the ployment in a war against the Soviet long remained to be seen.” central role of capital ship. Union known as maritime strategy. One Hundred Years of Sea Power For reasons of sea control, su- As Baer notes, its purpose was to cre- tells a complex story in an exciting percarriers—not ballistic missile sub- ate a coherent war plan, build a conway. By examining the history of the marines—provided the Navy’s capi- sensus in the Navy, and regain pub- modern Navy in detail, it explains tal ships. By the 1960s aviators had lic support. In 1985 maritime how and why the service struggled come to dominate the service. Naval strategy was presented to Congress so hard to preserve its indepen- participation in Vietnam accentu- and made public the next year. This dence. Baer’s book makes equally ated this trend by giving promi- strategy proposed an immediate clear why the Navy has finally em- nence to carrier strike operations naval offensive against the Soviets if braced jointness. Naval officers over the North. Using tactical naval war broke out to shape the conflict should read this book for a better aviation to carry out a strategic into a protracted, non-nuclear strug- appreciation of their service; officers bombing campaign created enor- gle on a global scale. With the sup- of other services should read it to mous strains on the Navy’s air wing. port of President Ronald Reagan and understand why the United States Furthermore, the commitment of needs a navy. JFQ naval resources to that aspect of the

Spring 1995 / JFQ 131 2507 Postscript 3/26/04 1:09 PM Page 132

POSTSCRIPT

Defense, defense agencies, Joint Staff, of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appro- A NOTE TO unified commands, service colleges, priate. Other submissions, however, and other selected activities. Changes to include letters to the editor, items READERS AND of address for these copies must be of commentary, and brief essays are CONTRIBUTORS communicated to the Editor. invited. Reproductions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is published SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available should be submitted with manu- four times each year for officers by subscription from the Govern- scripts citing the source and indicat- of the Armed Forces. One copy is ment Printing Office (see the order ing their availability; do not send distributed for every two officers on blank in this issue). To order for one originals. active duty assigned to joint billets year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) and one copy for every four majors/ on the order and mail with a check lieutenant commanders and for $19.00 ($23.75 foreign) or pro- lieutenant colonels/commanders vide a VISA or MasterCard account across all the services. number with expiration date to the Copies are distributed to the Superintendent of Documents, field and fleet through respective P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Penn- service channels. Corrections in sylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the shipping instructions, quantities order to: (202) 512–2233. received, and addresses for service distribution should be directed to CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes the appropriate activity listed below. submissions on all aspects of joint and combined warfare from mem- ▼ ARMY—Contact the installation bers of the Armed Forces as well as Publications Control Officer or write from defense analysts and academic to the U.S. Army Publications Distribu- specialists from both this country tion Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, and abroad, including foreign mili- Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (ref- tary personnel. There is no standard erence Misc. Publication 71–1). length for articles, but contributions ▼ NAVY—Contact the Aviation Supply Office, Navy Publications and Forms Directorate (Code 10363), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120–5000; FAX: CHARIVARI (215) 697–2601/DSN 442–2601. Clark Murdock—the author of ▼ MARINE CORPS—Contact the “Mission-Pull and Long-Range Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Planning” which appeared in JFQ, Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994– Georgia 31704. 95)—wishes to acknowledge the ▼ AIR FORCE—Contact the base efforts of a number of his former Publishing Distribution Office to colleagues on the Policy Planning establish requirements. Service-wide Staff in the Office of the Secretary functional distribution is then made of Defense who developed the by the Air Force Distribution Center, mission-pull planning concept 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, and contributed to the article: Maryland 21220–2896. Col Donald Selvage, USMC, Wade ▼ COAST GUARD—Contact the Hinkle, Mark Sawoski, Seth Carus, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic and LTC Robert Johnson, USA. Coast Area (AO), Governor’s Island, One of the citations in the New York, New York 10004–5098, or JFQuarterly Review of Joint Litera- Commander, Coast Guard Pacific ture on page 120 of number 6 (Au- Area (PO), Coast Guard Island, tumn/Winter 1994–95) contained Alameda, California 94501–5100; or typographical errors in both the write to U.S. Coast Guard Headquar- author’s name and the title. The ters, ATTN: Defense Operations Divi- correct cite is: Jon T. Hoffman, sion, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washing- Once A Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of ton, D.C. 20593–0001. the Marine Raiders. In addition, distribution is made —The Editor to the Office of the Secretary of

132 JFQ / Spring 1995 2507 Postscript 3/26/04 1:09 PM Page 133

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