THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR - NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE BY: FRANCIS T, SIGISMONTI On February 18, 1898 the USS Maine was torpedoed and sunk with a loss of over two hundred men.

Realizing war was imminent the American Fleet had started prep- arations for a conflict as early as January. After the sinking of the Maine, the fleet was ordered to , Florida under the command of William T. Sampson.

Two months later, April twenty-second, President McKinley or- dered a blockade of all major Cuban ports which two days later the Spanish answered with a declaration of war. We reciprocated the next day.

The prime objective of the Navy was the Spanish Fleet under Ad- miral . This Spanish Fleet prevented any sort of force from crossing the ninety mile span from Florida to Cuba to engage the Spanish land forces then occupying the area known as the Province of which included .

Another reason for the ’ concern over Cervera’s fleet was the fact that the entire east coast of the United States was open to attack. In this case they were mistaken as the south- ern portion was closely guarded by the Flying Squadron under Com- modore Schley and the northern portion was too far to travel with- out a suitable means of refueling. An attack on for instance would have been suicide as all their coal would have been expended just getting there.

Soon after the blockade was set up in Havana harbor, Schley met Admiral Sampson to discuss such matters as the disper- sion of ships, blockade procedures and the necessary communications with the Cuban insurgents. .While Sampson’s ships, twenty-eight in all, remained at Havana harbor Commodore Schley was sent out with his Flying Squadron to try to locate Admiral Cervera’s Spanish Fleet.

During the first half of May, Schley searched in vain all over the Caribbean for the elusive Cervera. Finally, on May 21, 1898 he received a message from Sampson stating: Sir: Spanish squadron probably at .... Proceed with all dispatch and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port.*l The hopes that this message revived was short lived when on May twenty-third Admiral Sampson sent him another message saying: "The information of the (Navy) department all goes to indicate the principal aim of the Spanish fleet and the government is to introduce a supply of munitions of war and of food to Blanco and Havana by Cienfuegos."*2 The two letters received by Schley on the twenty-first and the twenty-third only tended to confuse him instead of helping. One stated the were in Cienfuegos in the north and the other at Santiago on the other side of Cuba, almost three hundred nauti- cal miles away.

After another series of messages from the Cuban insurgents at Cienfuegos, the Flying Squadron left for Santiago on May twenty-

*i Schley, Forty-five Years Under the Flag. (New York, 1904) p270 *2 Ibid., p273 19 fourth. Up to this point neither Schley nor Sampson knew what to do about the fortifications at Santiago. Instructions from the Navy department stated that no action was to be taken against these for- tifications until the Spanish fleet had been dealt with, yet the Spaniards were anchored beyond the fortifications, out of reach of any of the American guns.

On June first, Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago with his ships and a captured river pilot, Eduardo Nunez.

Nunez was captured off Cienfuegos a few days earlier while try- ing to run the blockade. Although working for the Spanish govern- ment he was sympathetic to the Cuban cause. On June second he ven- tured inland and with the help of the insurgents, confirmed the fact that the Spanish fleet was indeed at Santiago.*3 Upon Nunez’ confirmation, Admiral Sampson had the American fleet form up in a circular formation and blockade the port and harbor.

Santiago was a natural harbor, a small mouth opening to a larger bay. It was protected on both sides by forts and earthworks such as Morro Castle. Playing on the idea that the Americans ould not get to the Spanish fleet without being open to attack from the forts, Admiral Sampson ordered the collier Merrimae sunk in the entrance to keep the Spaniards from getting out.

On June third, eight men boarded the doomed ship and set out to scuttle her at the mouth of the harbor, thereby blocking the en- trance. In the light of subsequent events, it was a matter of for- tune, being no men were lost in the venture, that this attempt to block the harbor was aborted. If the attempt had been successful in closing the harbor against exit or entrance the war would prob- ably have taken a different turn. The ship was indeed sunk but to the right of the channel, leaving the entrance clear.

With the channel still clear, the ships had to remain at their blockade stations. Blockading was at best a monotonous experience, something had to be done to relieve the boredom of this duty. On June sixth the combined forces of Sampson and Schley took formation about Estrella Point and Morro Castle and for two hours bombarded the earthworks of these Spanish forts. The Spaniards fired back but not one shot landed on an American ship. The damage to the forts was not considerable, at least not what a few hours work could not repair.

After this little skirmish the fleet began probing at different spots along the coast to find a weak spot in the Spanish defenses. On June tenth a battalion of Marines were landed at Guantanamo Bay and after a few brief, sharp battles the area around the bay was occupied. This land hold became an important base for supplies, it also eliminated the necessity of having to coal ships at sea, a risky business at best.

To back up the Marines at Guantanamo and create new fronts the Army was called in and by the end of June had fought their way to within one mile of Santiago. As soon as this point was reached, fierce resistance was met and General Shafter of the United States Volunteers asked Admiral Sampson to provide a continuous bombard- ment of the forts at Santiago so that the Spandards would be kept busy while the Army tried to take the town from the rear.

The fleet moved into position and on the morning of July first began shelling the forts and town of Santiago and didn’t let up un-

*3 , Forty-five Years Under the Flag. (New York, 1904) p282 2O til the afternoon of the second.

As soon as the town came under siege, the governor of Cuba or- dered Cervera, who was under orders not to surrender, to try to run the blockade and save his ships and the honor of .

On the fateful day of July 3, 1898 at 9:35 AM, the Spanish squad- ron, despite the mines in the channel, began filing out of Santiago harbor. Upon making the open sea the Spanish fleet made a turn westward. This manuever proved~o be their downfall. Had they gone straight out to sea they could have outraced most of the American ships and would only have to contend with the USS and USS Oregan. By turning westward they closed up an avenue of escape. They could not manuever to starboard for fear of running aground, consequently the lines of Spanish and American ships ran parallel to the beach with the Spaniards in the middle. The Spanfards main ships consisted of Teresa, Viscaya, Colon and Oquendo with many smaller type craft. The American force consisted of the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, New York and the Brooklyn who had the honor of firing the first shot of the bat- tle. The Brooklyn in return received a bombardment from the four main Spanish ships as well as the shore batteries.

After exchanging fire for fifteen minutes the Oregon finally got up enough steam to come to the rescue, but not until the Brooklyn had severly damaged the Teresa, causing her to run aground. The Or- egon in the meantime had been firing on the Oquendo and soon after the Teresa’s demise, she followed her to the beach where she was abandoned. This left only the Viscaya and Colon to meet the entire Flying Squadron.

By now the smoke over the battle area was so intense, both from the smokestacks and the burning ships, that visibility was cut to less than a quarter mile. The Viscaya took advantage of this smoke, being close to Teresa and Oquendo she had received many hits and was limping badly. Making one last effort to escape she wheeled to port and attempted to ram the Brooklyn, but her speed had been re- duced because of the damage to her an& she only became an object for target practice for the Brooklyn and Oregon. One of the Cap- tains upon viewing this carnage enjoined his elated crew "Don’t cheer boys.., the poor fellows are dying."*4

The Spanish were not the only ones dying though. While fighting the Viscaya, achier Yeoman named Ellis was lookout aboard the Brooklyn. He had been giving bearings and ranges to the gunners when he moved over to an instrument to verify his ranges. A stray shell from the Spaniard caught him full in the face, killing him instantly.e5 This man was the only American to die in the entire battle.

Upon seeing this battle and the destruction of her sister ships the Colon simply ran aground and hauled her colors. The battle was officially over at one fifteen PM. The was defeated in three and a half hours.

That evening the Brooklyn was sent out to find a Spanish bat- tleship but when the report proved false she returned in time to see the Viscaya blow up. Commodore Schley then went aboard the Iowa and spoke with Cer- vera. The Spanish admiral told him that while the Oregon and Brook-

*4 D. Malone and Basil Rauch, Empire for Liberty (New York, 1960) *5 Winfield Scott Schley, Forty-five Years Under the Flag.(New York, 1904) p305 21