The Stoics and the Academics on the Apprehensive Impression

THE STOICS AND THE ACADEMICS

ON THE APPREHENSIVE IMPRESSION

by Pavle Stojanovic

A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Baltimore, Maryland

September 2015

ABSTRACT

The debate between the Stoics and the Academics on the apprehensive impression

(phantasia katalēptikē) was one of the longest in the history of epistemology, and is also

one of the most discussed in contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of the Hellenistic

period. The debate was initiated when Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, introduced

the idea that there is a special kind of impression, the apprehensive impression, which is

caused by an external object and which reliably captures the truth about that object,

allowing us to attain knowledge about that object. Zeno’s idea was met with criticism by

Plato’s successors in the Academy, most notably Arcesilaus and Carneades, who argued

that such impressions do not exist because they are indistinguishable from non-

apprehensive impressions.

However, the details of the Stoic account of the apprehensive impression and its

role in their epistemology, as well as the nature of the strategy the Academics employed

against it have been highly controversial in modern scholarship. In the dissertation, I

provide a careful analysis of the extant textual sources on the Stoic and the Academic

positions in the debate, which yields several important results. First, it leads to a novel interpretation of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression that better explains its distinctness from the non-apprehensive impressions. Unlike other scholars, I argue that according to the Stoics its distinctness consists in the fact that the apprehensive impression differs in terms of its representational content from all non-apprehensive impressions the subject is aware of, but that this representational difference is defeasible. Second, the results of my analysis confirm that the Stoics were epistemic externalists since they did not

ii require that one be aware which among one’s impressions are and which are not apprehensive in order to attain knowledge (epistēmē). I then explain how the Stoics might have though apprehensive impressions about moral states of affairs lead to practical and moral perfection. Finally, I conclude by arguing that among the two main arguments from indistinguishability of apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions used by the

Academics, one argument did not rest on internalist assumptions, but was especially detrimental to the Stoics’ externalist epistemology.

Dissertation Advisor: Richard Bett

Second Reader: Michael Williams

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My greatest gratitude for the successful completion of this doctoral dissertation goes to my

adviser, Professor Richard Bett. His patient guidance, passion for the philosophical puzzles

I tried to solve, and critical suggestions, have helped me immensely in shaping the ideas presented in the text that follows. Similar help was also provided by my second reader,

Professor Michael Williams. Over the years of my dissertation research, I was also inspired and influenced by the criticisms and suggestions of many senior and junior philosophers

whom I met at various conferences and colloquia where I presented parts of my work. I

hereby offer all of them my deepest thanks. I also thank my fellow philosophy graduate

students at Johns Hopkins University for being a careful and patient audience for my ideas

and a warm intellectual community that facilitated their development. Finally, I owe my

gratitude to the members of my dissertation defense committee. Without my interaction

with all of these individuals, this project would have not been the same.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter 1: Defining the Apprehensive Impression 6

Chapter 2: Achieving Knowledge 71

Chapter 3: Achieving Moral Perfection 100

Chapter 4: The Academic Strategy against the Stoic Apprehension 130

APPENDICIES:

Appendix A: Zeno vs. Plato on Perception in Cicero’s Academica 1.30-42 161

Appendix B: Non-Unified Objects as Proper Individuals in Stoicism 181

BIBLIOGRAPHY 193

CURRICULUM VITAE 199

INTRODUCTION

The debate between the Stoics and the Academics on the apprehensive impression

(phantasia katalēptikē) was one of the longest in the history of epistemology. It is also one

of the most discussed in contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of the Hellenistic

period. The debate was initiated around 300 BCE when Zeno of Citium, the founder of the

Stoic school, introduced certain important innovations into epistemology, focusing mostly

on the claim that although not all of our perceptual impressions are true, there is a special

class of perceptual impressions that are capable of reliably capturing the truth about the

external world. Zeno’s theory of the apprehensive impression was met with criticism by

Plato’s successors in the Academy, most notably Arcesilaus and Carneades. Our sources

testify that the dispute lasted with unceasing vigor at least until the time Cicero wrote his

Academica (mid first century BCE), and continued to shape epistemology even after that—

Sextus Empiricus in the second century CE felt the need to construct his own arguments

against the apprehensive impression. Most scholars today believe that the Stoics thought that in order to achieve apprehension (katalēpsis), we do not have to be able to have direct cognitive access to our impressions’ apprehensiveness. Since it attributes to the Stoics a

position that bears some similarity to contemporary externalist approaches in

epistemology, this interpretation has become known as the “externalist” interpretation. On

the other hand, the standard interpretation of the Academic main argument is that

apprehensive impressions do not exist as a class separate from other impressions because

we are unable to directly recognize them as such. Furthermore, they argued that since we

cannot recognize them, they cannot serve the role of the criteria of truth which the Stoics

assigned to them. This interpretation thus portrays the Academic strategy against the

apprehensive impression as “internalist.”

These two interpretations, however, have given rise to an important problem for

understanding the nature of the debate between the Stoics and the Academics. If the Stoics

were indeed epistemic externalists, it seems that the Academic attack from the position of

internalism misses its mark. Furthermore, if the parties in the dispute were indeed talking

past each other, why did the debate last as long as it did? These questions have prompted

various solutions from contemporary scholars. I intend to argue that none of these solutions

is satisfactory, and to provide my own answers to the questions mentioned above, while

focusing primarily on the most important and most sophisticated phase of the debate, from

Zeno at the beginning of the 3rd, until the time of Carneades and Antipater in the late 2nd

century BCE.

In Chapter 1, I address the various problems in interpreting the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression. Usually, contemporary scholars assume that the original

Zeno’s definition consisted of two clauses, according to which the apprehensive impression is an impression that:

(1) Is from what is,

(2) Is stamped and sealed in accordance with that very thing that is.

However, in Cicero and Sextus we also find the apprehensive impression described as an impression that also satisfies an additional, third, clause:

(3) Of such a kind it couldn’t be from what is not.

According to Cicero, this third clause was added by Zeno in response to the objection of

Arcesilaus, who suggested that an impression that satisfies the first two requirements could be just like a false impression, and hence it cannot be apprehensive.

Interpreting what each of these three clauses precisely means, as well as what is the mutual relationship between them has been a subject of big controversy. The opinions are divided over what is the precise scope of the phrase ‘what is’ that occurs in all three clauses.

According to one approach, “what is” should be understood as referring to what is true, or what is the fact, which results in a strong reading of the first clause. Other approaches, however, favor the sense of “real object.” Furthermore, the real intention of the third clause has been proven extremely controversial. Does it refer to some kind of special phenomenal character of the apprehensive impression, or to some feature that need not be directly accessible to the subject entertaining the impression? In Chapter 1, through a careful analysis of textual evidence, I will argue that by the phrase “what is” the Stoics had in mind something like “spatiotemporally present real object.” I will then offer an interpretation of the second clause of the definition that is consistent with this reading of the phrase “what

3 is.” Finally, I will argue that although the third clause does express a requirement related to the apprehensive impression’s representational character, this requirement is consistent with the externalist interpretation of the Stoic epistemology.

My goal in Chapter 2 is providing a detailed analysis of the properties like clarity, plainness, and strikingness that the Stoics often associated with the apprehensive impression. This analysis is important because the Stoics believed that in virtue of possessing these properties, the apprehensive impression causes our mind’s assent, and thus leads to apprehension (katalēpsis), a state of unmistakable grasp of the object that caused the impression. I argue that although the properties of plainness and strikingness are important for achieving apprehension, the apprehensive impression does not differ categorically from non-apprehensive impressions in terms of possessing them. Finally, I provide my own externalist account of apprehension, and explain how despite the fact that one is often unaware which among his impressions are and which are not apprehensive, one could still achieve knowledge (epistēmē), which the Stoics defined as firm and stable assent to an apprehensive impression.

The focus of the next chapter is an examination of the role the apprehensive impression has in the acquisition of moral knowledge and the achievement of practical perfection. Although it is clear that the Stoics considered the apprehensive impression’s role is crucial for both of these achievements, the extant textual sources are silent regarding the exact details. Thus, I attempt a detailed reconstruction of the Stoic view on moral apprehensive impressions. I argue that there are reasons to think that the Stoics viewed moral apprehensive impressions as performing both descriptive and evaluative role, and that their evaluative role was crucial for achieving moral perfection. I explain how moral

apprehensive impressions help facilitate morally correct action according to the Stoics, and discuss how they make a difference between the actions of ordinary people and the Sage, the ideal person whom the Stoics used as a paradigm of virtue and wisdom.

In Chapter 4, I address the strategy behind the Academic attack on the apprehensive impression by focusing primarily on arguments that are attributed to Carneades. The main objection of the Academics was that apprehensive impressions do not exist as a separate class because every true impression (including the alleged apprehensive ones) could be

“just like” a false impression, or in other words, that true and false impressions are representationally indistinguishable. Carneades is credited with formulating two such indistinguishability arguments, one focusing on the cases of abnormal mental states like dreams and madness, and the other focusing on examples involving cases of two numerically distinct but qualitatively extremely similar objects like twin brothers. While I agree with the standard interpretation that the assumptions behind the first of these two arguments are internalist, I argue that the second indistinguishability argument focused primarily on pointing out certain inconsistencies between Stoic metaphysics and their theory of perception. I conclude by showing that although the Stoics, would have been able to defend their externalist epistemology from the first indistinguishability argument with success, the second indistinguishability argument presented a much more serious challenge, from which they would probably not be able to recover.

The dissertation ends with two appendices which represent two shorter studies of two problems related to the main discussion. In Appendix A, I address the problem of the apparent inconsistency between the reports of our two main sources on the epistemological debate between the Stoics and the Academics, Sextus Empiricus and Cicero, on the range

of properties that the Stoics believed that impressions have to capture in order to count as

apprehensive. While Sextus’ report suggests that this included all properties of the object,

Cicero seems to say that this range was limited only to all properties belonging to a single

sensory modality (e.g. that a visual apprehensive impression should capture all visual

properties of its object). I argue that a careful interpretation and translation of Cicero’s text

suggests that the contradiction is merely apparent. Appendix B focuses on a puzzle from

the Stoic metaphysics. Namely, certain texts suggest that the Stoics though that non-unified

objects or objects composed of a number of individual non-composite objects (e.g. ships

or armies) cannot be proper individuals. Most contemporary scholars have agreed with this.

However, if correct, this conclusion would make it difficult for the Stoics to maintain that we could ever have apprehension of these objects because their epistemology admits only of apprehension of proper individuals. I argue that we do not need to accept this conclusion because there are good reasons to think that the Stoics believed that non-unified objects can be proper individuals.

It is my hope that, after going through chapters of this dissertation, the reader will develop a strong appreciation for the complexity, sophistication, and universal philosophical value of both Stoic epistemology, as well as the criticism levied against it by the leading members of post-Platonic Academy.

CHAPTER 1

DEFINING THE APPREHENSIVE IMPRESSION

The Stoics argued that our capacity to achieve knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) crucially depends on

the existence of a special kind of impression (φαντασία), which they called the

“apprehensive impression” (φαντασία καταληπτική).1 According to the formulation found

most frequently in the extant sources, the Stoics defined the apprehensive impression as:

One that is from what is huparchon, and molded-in-from and sealed-in-from in

accordance with that huparchon itself, such that it could not come from what is not

huparchon

ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ

ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος2

1 Greek expression φαντασία καταληπτική has been translated and transliterated in various ways, some of the most common being “cognitive impression” (Frede; Long & Sedley), “apprehensive appearance” (Annas; Bett), “cataleptic impression” (Hankinson). For a keen discussion of the merits and flaws of these and other renderings, see Hankinson (2003: 60, n. 1). 2 SE M 7.248; cf. M 7.402, 410, 426; PH 2.4; DL 7.50.

That our understanding of this definition has been greatly improved over the past several

decades can hardly be denied. There is a clear consensus among scholars that the Stoics

thought that the apprehensive impression is, as Sextus reports, “true and such that it cannot

be false” (SE M 7.152), and that this is due to its ability to provide an unmistakable grasp

of its intentional object. Despite this consensus, however, several controversies have

managed to resist satisfactory resolution. These controversies range from disagreements

on how some of the key terms in the definition should be understood and translated, to

differences in understanding the precise nature of the requirements expressed by the

clauses of the definition and their mutual logical relationships. Perhaps the most

fundamental of these controversies is related to what is usually regarded as the first clause

of the definition, the requirement that the apprehensive impression must be “from what is

existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος). Following a disagreement between our two most detailed

sources on the definition, Sextus Empiricus and Cicero, some scholars have interpreted this

to express what we may call the Causality Requirement—that the apprehensive impression

must causally originate in a real external object—while others have argued that it amounts

to the Veridicality Requirement—that the impression must be true.3 These two

interpretations yield requirements that obviously differ significantly in epistemic force, and leaving such ambiguity unresolved is unacceptable. Moreover, deciding between these two

3 For interpretations arguing that ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος formulates a causal requirement referring to real external objects, see e.g. Rist (1969: 136-8), Hankinson (1991: 282-4; 1995: 81-2; 1997: 169; 2003). The interpretation that claims that ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος expresses the requirement that impression be true has been first formulated by Frede (1983/87), who has subsequently influenced a number of scholars, e.g. Allen (1997: 232), Brittain (2001: 18-19), Brennan (2005: 67), Perin (2005a: 385; 2005b: 496). Backhouse (2000: 29) and Sedley (2002) also belong to this second group, although their interpretation of the meaning of ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, as we will see, is driven by considerations that are different from those in Frede (1983/7). Frede (1999) later altered his position in a direction that comes much closer to the causal interpretation, although it seems that most scholars continued to follow in the wake of his earlier study.

interpretations would also help in understanding the precise meaning and role of what is

usually considered the third clause of the definition, “such that it cannot come from what

is not existent” (ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος). According to both Sextus and

Cicero, the Stoics added the third clause to the definition in order to defend the

apprehensive impression from the criticism of the Academics. However, the exact way in

which the third clause was supposed to fulfill this goal is not clear. The widely accepted

interpretation is that it is logically redundant, i.e. that it does not add any new requirements

to the ones already expressed in the first two clauses. In addition, difficulties in explaining

the role of the third clause have led scholars to propose developmental accounts which

assume that the Stoic position it must have undergone some kind of shift over time.4

My primary goal in this chapter will be to argue that the phrase “from what is

existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος) in the first clause of the definition expresses the Causality

Requirement and not the Veridical Requirement. Although the former interpretation is not

new, its previous proponents did not engage in detail the evidence usually cited in support of the veridicality reading, which is why this interpretation has continued to dominate contemporary accounts of the definition of the apprehensive impression. I will show that this evidence, which mostly derives from Cicero, is problematic and that it probably rests on mistaken understanding or sloppy reporting of the Stoic technical language. At the same time, I will try to vindicate Sextus as a source on the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression that is much more reliable than it is often thought. I will then offer an interpretation of the second and the third clauses that is in accordance with the causal

4 For examples of various developmental accounts inspired by the difficulties in interpreting the meaning of ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος in the first and the third clauses, see e.g. Annas (1990: 193-203), Striker (1997: 265-72), Backhouse (2000: 30), Sedley (2002: 149) and Reed (2002: 178, n. 53).

reading of the phrase “from what is existent”, and argue that this interpretation reveals the

Stoics’ understanding of the apprehensive impression’s true character more clearly than

the veridical interpretation. Finally, I hope that my interpretation will demonstrate that

there is no real evidence that the Stoics’ understanding of the definition changed over time.

On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that their view of the apprehensive

impression as one that distinguishes itself from other impressions by the complete grasp of

the real external object from which it causally originates has essentially remained the same

from Zeno to the time of Antipater, and probably even beyond.

We can say with relative certainty that the language of the first clause, “from what is

existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος), as well as that of the whole definition, originates from Zeno

himself.5 The phrase “from what is existent” is often found in our sources with the addition

of the verb “to come/to be produced” (γίγνεσθαι, SE M 11.183; Aet. 4.12.1–5 = T2 below; cf. DL 7.46), implying that apprehensive impression “comes from what is existent” or that it “is produced from what is existent.” Despite its brevity, the first clause has posed several

5 There are several reasons to think that the expression ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος comes from Zeno. First, the expression occurs most frequently as the formulation of the first clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression, and Cicero credits Zeno as the inventor of the notions “apprehensive impression” (visum comprehendibile) and “apprehension” (comprehensio, Cic. Acad. 1.41 = LS 40B2−3). Second, the same phrase is directly attributed to Zeno by Cicero in Acad. 2.77, where ex eo quod esset looks like a direct Latin translation of the Greek ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος (cf. Long 2002: 119; Backhouse 2000: 23). Finally, a fragment by Arius Didymus (Eus. Prep. ev. 15.20.3 = T1 below) explicitly attributes the phrase ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος to Zeno in a context that is related to his theory of perception. As far as the rest of the definition goes, Cicero (Acad. 2.77–8 = T14 below) reports that the third clause was added by Zeno in response to an objection raised by Arcesilaus; in section III below, I will argue that this report is probably reliable. The same text from Cicero also seems to attest the second clause as originating from Zeno; see section II below.

difficult exegetical problems and has been the subject of considerable controversy in

contemporary discussions of the definition of the apprehensive impression. Namely, in what sense does the apprehensive impression come “from” (ἀπὸ) what is existent? What does “what is existent” (ὑπάρχον) refer to here and in the other two clauses? What is the precise nature of the requirement expressed by the first clause? These questions are crucial for proper understanding of the definition, and must be addressed in this section.

Let us begin with the word “from” (ἀπὸ). According to Arius Didymus, a first century BCE Stoic, Zeno claimed that:

[T1:] [The soul] is perceptive because its ruling part is capable of being imprinted from the beings

and existents through the sense organs, and of receiving their imprints. For these are the peculiarities

of the soul.6

We know from elsewhere that Zeno defined impression (φαντασία) as “an imprint in the

soul” (τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ),7 which he apparently understood quite literally as hollows and projections, inspired by the way seals leave their imprints on wax.8 Despite some serious

disagreement within the Stoic school about how literally this metaphor of seal and wax

should be taken,9 Zeno’s original idea that impressions are first and foremost physical

6 Arius Didymus apud. Eus. Prep. ev.15.20.3: αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστι. 7 SE M 7.236. Cf. ibid. 230; DL 7.50 = LS 39A3. 8 At least that is how Cleanthes, Zeno’s pupil and his successor as the head of the Stoic school, understood his teacher’s definition of impression (SE M 7.228; 372−3). For Platonic origins of understanding φαντασία through the metaphor of imprints on wax, see Long (2002). 9 A relatively extensive report on the debate within the Stoic school about how to understand Zeno’s definition of impressions as imprints in the soul can be found in SE M 7.227−41.

structures in the corporeal soul10 has remained the official position of the school. According

to T1, Zeno thought that the corporeal soul’s capacity of sense perception consists in its ability to be imprinted (τυποῦσθαί) through the sense organs “from the beings and existents” (ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων). The meaning of the first part of this phrase,

“from the beings” (ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων), can readily be explained.11 The Stoic school

distinguished sharply between bodies (σώματα) and incorporeals (ἀσώματα), and in the

light of this distinction, it reserved the word “beings” (ὄντα) exclusively for bodies, while

incorporeals were not considered beings.12 Presumably, the reason for this—at least

according to Plutarch—was that the Stoics thought that only bodies can affect and be

affected.13 There is no reason to assume that Zeno’s own understanding of the concept of

beings was any different. Thus, for Zeno, perceptual impressions as imprints “from the beings” on the soul were physical structures resulting from the causal interaction between

two bodies, the corporeal beings and the corporeal soul of the perceiver.

A more detailed account of how impressions can be produced “from” something is

attributed to Chrysippus:

[T2:] Impression is affection that comes about in the soul, which reveals itself and that which made

it. For example, when through sight we observe the white [thing], the affection is what is engendered

in the soul through vision; and this affection enables us to say that there is some underlying white

[thing] that activates us. And similarly for touch and smell. […] Impressor is that which makes the

10 According to DL 7.157, Zeno thought that, being warm “breath” (πνεῦμα), soul is corporeal, which became the official doctrine of the school (cf. Nem. 78,7−78,2 = LS 45 C; 81,6−10 = LS 45 D). We will see below, however, that while being corporeal entities, impressions are nevertheless accompanied by incorporeal semantic content. 11 The second part of the phrase, ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων, will be discussed below in more detail. 12 Cf. Alex. In Ar. top. 301,19−25 = LS 27B. 13 Plut. Com. not. 1073E: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν. ἔπειτα δ’ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν.

impression; the white [thing] or the cold [thing], or anything capable of activating the soul, is an

impressor. Imagination is empty attraction, affection in the soul that comes from no impressor as in

the case of people who fight with shadows and punch at thin air. For an impression has some

underlying impressor, while imagination has none. A phantasm is that towards which we are

attracted in the empty attraction of imagination. This occurs in the melancholic and mad people. At

any rate, when Orestes in the tragedy says “Mother, I beg you, do not set upon me those bloody-

looking, dragon-shaped girls! They, they are attacking me!”, he says this as a madman, and sees

nothing, but merely thinks that he does. That is why Electra says to him “Stay, poor wretch,

peacefully in your bed; for you see none of those things you think you clearly know”14

According to Chrysippus, imagination (φανταστικὸν) is affection (πάθος) in the soul that

“comes from no impressor” (ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον), implying that impression

(φαντασία) comes from an impressor (ἀπὸ φανταστοῦ γινόμενον)—for example, from “the white [thing]” (τὸ λευκόν), or “the cold [thing]” (τὸ ψυχρὸν), which are corporeal things capable of “activating” (κινεῖν) the soul. Imagination is defined as “empty attraction”

(διάκενος ἑλκυσμός; cf. “empty impression”, visum inane in Cic. Acad., 2.49, 51) which

although not coming from a corporeal impressor, still has a “phantasm” (φάντασμα) as its intentional object. From Sextus, M 7.241, we know that the Stoics thought that “empty

14 Aetius 4.12.1−5 (cf. LS 39B): φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· οἷον, ἐπειδὰν δι’ ὄψεως θεωρῶμέν τι λευκόν, ἔστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγεγενημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· καὶ <κατὰ> τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι ὑπόκειται λευκὸν κινοῦν ἡμᾶς. ὁμοίως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως. […] φανταστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, τοῦτ’ ἔστι φανταστόν. φανταστικὸν δ’ ἐστὶ διάκενος ἑλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκιαμαχοῦντος καὶ κενοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τὰς χεῖρας· τῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ ὑπόκειταί τι φανταστόν, τῷ δὲ φανταστικῷ οὐδέν. φάντασμα δ’ ἐστίν, ἐφ’ ὃ ἑλκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν· ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν μελαγχολώντων καὶ μεμηνότων. ὁ γοῦν τραγικὸς Ὀρέστης ὅταν λέγῃ· ‘ὦ μῆτερ, ἱκετεύω σε, μὴ ’πίσειέ μοι τὰς αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας· αὗται γάρ, αὗται πλησίον θρώσκουσί μου’ λέγει μὲν αὐτὰ ὡς μεμηνὼς ὁρᾷ δ’ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μόνον· διὸ καί φησιν αὐτῷ Ἠλέκτρα· ‘μέν’, ὦ ταλαίπωρ’, ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις· ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ’ εἰδέναι’. A similar account occurs in Nemesius 55 (that draws from the same common source as Aetius), though less detailed and with slight differences which need not concern us here; cf. also DL 7.50.

12 attractions” are “produced by affections in us” (γίνεται τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν), and that such affections often occur in abnormal psychic states like dreams (M 7.245; cf. 403). In the same passage, Sextus also distinguishes empty attractions from other impressions15 that come from without (τῶν ἐκτὸς). A similar contrast between phantasms as mental states whose origin is internal and impressions whose origin is external to the soul is attributed to Chrysippus by Diocles of Magnesia: “A phantasm is a semblance in the thought that occurs in sleep, and impression is an imprint in the soul.”16 Thus, some impressions are affections that come from external impressors, while others that come from no impressors are to be understood as affections coming from other affections within us, or more precisely, from our soul itself. The Stoics apparently believed that there is no third way in which impressions could arise. Thus, Chrysippus focus in T2 are impressions that, unlike empty attractions, come from corporeal objects that are external to the mind, for example, from a white object (τὸ λευκόν), or a cold object (τὸ ψυχρὸν).

15 In M 7.241 and 245 Sextus talks as though the Stoics classified empty attractions among impressions (φαντασίαι), and in M 8.67 he says that the Stoics agreed to call some φαντασίαι “empty” (διάκενοι). Cicero too suggests that the Stoics talked about “empty impressions” (visa inania, Acad. 2.51). Finally, in 7.51 (= LS 39 A5), Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics thought that “there are also impressions and reflections that are produced as if from existents” (εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι; cf. DL 7.48−9). All this seems to be in conflict with Chrysippus’ careful distinction between impression (φαντασία) and imagination (φανταστικὸν) in T2 above. The conflict, however, could be merely apparent. Namely, perhaps Chrysippus distinction between imagination and impression in T2 was made with having in mind not impressions in general, but specifically apprehensive impressions. The impression (φαντασία) that is contrasted to phantasm (φάντασμα)—which is the intentional object of imagination (φανταστικὸν) according to T2—in DL 7.50, which seems to quote from Chrysippus’ book On the soul, turns out to be not just any impression, but the apprehensive one. Perhaps Chrysippus’ idea was to emphasize that although both empty attractions and mental states caused by external objects are loosely called “impressions”, only the latter should be taken as φαντασίαι in the strict sense of the word. 16 DL 7.50: φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The rest of the same paragraph that seems to be a quote from Chrysippus’ book On the soul goes on to emphasize that “imprint” (τύπωσις) should not be taken literally as that of a seal—i.e. consisting in protrusions and depressions in the corporeal soul—but as an alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) as a different type of modification. Nevertheless, it is clear that Chrysippus remained completely loyal to Zeno’s idea that impressions are imprints on the soul from something that is external to it.

Texts [T1] and [T2] suggest the following conclusions. Zeno thought that impressions are imprinted (τυποῦσθαί) on the corporeal soul “from the beings” (ἀπὸ τῶν

ὄντων), which are corporeal objects. The essential features of this account were taken over by Chrysippus17 who explained that unlike empty attractions, impressions in the strict sense of the word “come from” (γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ) external corporeal objects, which are able “to activate” (κινεῖν) and “to make” (ποιεῖν) impressions, and thus leave what Zeno called

“imprints” (τυπώσεις) on the soul.18 Furthermore, it seems that certain later authors that either belonged to Stoa or were at least inspired by it used expressions like “from being”

(ἀπὸ ὄντος) and “from objects” (ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων) to describe how apprehensive impressions come about.19 All this clearly suggests that “from” (ἀπὸ) in the first clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression should be understood as indicating a causal relationship between two corporeal things, the impression, which is a physical structure in the perceiver’s soul, and the impressor, an external corporeal object.

17 In fact, DL 7.50 seems to suggest that Chrysippus took over verbatim Zeno’s three-clause definition of the apprehensive impression. 18 An account of voice (φωνή) in Aetius 4.20.2 = IG 59 demonstrates the Stoic use of the verbs “to activate” (κινεῖν) and “to make/affect” (ποιεῖν) and their relation to “imprints” (τυπώσεις) in the context of perception: “The Stoics say that voice is a body. For everything that does [τὸ δρῶν] or affects [ποιοῦν] something is a body. And voice affects and does [ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ]. For we hear it and perceive it striking our ears and thoroughly imprinting [ἐκτυπούσης] like a signet ring on wax. Again, everything that activates [τὸ κινοῦν] or disturbs something is a body” (cf. also DL 7.55−6 = LS 33 H partially). The ability of bodies to activate impressions was a consequence of the general metaphysical assumption that only bodies are things that “affect and can be affected” (τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον), which was put forth by Zeno (Arist. apud. Euseb. Pr. ev. 15.14.1 = LS 45G; Cic. Acad. 1.39 = LS 45A) and became the orthodoxy of the school. 19 In addition to Zeno’s fragment T1 above, the expression ἀπὸ ὄντος also appears in De Anima, 70,22–71,4 by Alexander of Aphrodisias, a second century CE Peripatetic philosopher. The passage is a part of a section that seems to be inspired by the Stoic theory of the apprehensive impression (70,22–71,20). Since both extant reconstructions of PBeorl inv. 16545, Szymański (1990) and Backhouse (2000), attribute to Antipater the expression ἀπό τινος where τινος seems to refer to τό ὄν (see T11 in section II below), it is possible that some Stoics around Antipater also used the expression ἀπὸ ὄντος or ἀπό τινος ὄντος in discussing apprehensive impressions. The expression ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων, “from external objects”, is attributed to the Stoics in Sextus M 8.67, a passage that discusses “fraudulent” (παρατυπωτικαί) impressions which could perhaps also be linked to Antipater (see section II below), and occurs again in Philo, Her. 119 in a passage that seems to be inspired by Stoic theory of the apprehensive impressions. This strongly suggests that in the context of their theory of the apprehensive impressions, the Stoics from Zeno to Antipater treated all these expressions as practically synonymous to ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος.

It has been argued, however, that “from” in the definition need not always refer to

a causal relationship. It seems that the Stoics also used “from” (ἀπὸ) in the context of

impressions about objects that are real but not presently perceived, as well as in the context

of impressions about entities that are altogether fictional. Impressions like these obviously

cannot be the result of immediate causal interaction between an external corporeal object

and the subject’s soul. This was noticed by Sedley,20 who suggests that because of this

problem, “from” in the first clause of the definition should not be taken to have causal, but

representational sense. According to this sense of “from”, an impression that is “from A”

is to be taken not as an impression caused by A, but as an impression that represents A—

that is, as an impression of A. Thus, if A is a real object that is absent from perception at

the time the impression is entertained, or a fictional object that is incapable of causing

impressions, an impression about A could still be “from A” if ἀπὸ is taken in the sense of

representing A.

Sedley cites two texts as support for Stoic representational ἀπὸ, SE M 7.245 and

8.67. According to M 7.244-5:

[T3:] True and false ones [viz. impressions] are like those [a] from Electra that struck Orestes in his

madness – for insofar as it struck him as from an existent something, it was true (for Electra existed),

but insofar as it struck him as from a Fury, it was false (for there was no Fury) – or again [b] if

someone in sleep dreams up from living Dion a false and empty attraction as from [someone] having

been present.21

20 Sedley (2002: 142−6); cf. also Backhouse (2000: 13, n. 16). 21 ἀληθεῖς δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς, ὁποία προσέπιπτεν Ὀρέστῃ κατὰ μανίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἠλέκτρας (καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τινος προσέπιπτεν, ἦν ἀληθής, ὑπῆρχε γὰρ Ἠλέκτρα, καθὸ δ’ ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, ψευδής, οὐκ ἦν γὰρ Ἐρινύς), καὶ πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπὸ Δίωνος ζῶντος κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος ὀνειροπολεῖται ψευδῆ καὶ διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν.

Sextus uses two examples, [a] and [b],22 to illustrate impressions that are, according to the

Stoics, simultaneously true and false.23 Sedley (2002: 142−3) believes that while the apo in the first example is causal, in the second example it is representational. In this example, we are told about a person who in his sleep dreams up the impression that is “from living

Dion” (ἀπὸ Δίωνος ζῶντος) but is “as from [someone] having been present” (ὡς ἀπὸ

παρεστῶτος), that is, as from Dion who was presently standing next to the dreamer.24 Since

Dion is not present at the time the dreamer entertains the impression, we are told that the impression is false and a case of empty attraction. Sedley thus concludes that ἀπὸ in ἀπὸ

Δίωνος ζῶντος cannot be causal because the impression in question was empty and because of that could not have been caused by Dion, but that instead it must have representational sense because we are told that Dion is a real person that exists at the time the impression is entertained.

Despite the initial plausibility of this proposal, it is highly unlikely that representational reading of ἀπὸ can be attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus in the context of the definition of the apprehensive impression. We have already seen that Zeno and

Chrysippus did use ἀπὸ in a causal sense when describing the way impressions arise. In T1

22 Henry Dyson has suggested to me that the examples here might not be Stoic, but Sextus’ own illustrations used to explain his interpretation of Stoic position. However, two texts attest that Chrysippus used Orestes and Electra as examples in his arguments, Aetius 4.12.5 = T2 (where the example makes a very similar point as in T3), and Lucian, Vit. auct. 22 (where the example makes a different point). In addition, although it serves to illustrate a very different point, an example involving Dion who is alive is attributed to Chrysippus in Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Ar. An. Pr. 177,29–178,5. All this makes it highly likely that the examples Sextus uses here are authentically Stoic. 23 The Stoics believed that, strictly speaking, only propositions (ἀξιώματα) can be true or false (DL 7.65 = LS 34 A; SE M 8.74 = LS 34 B). However, they thought that rational impressions, as corporeal psychic structures, could also be said to be true or false, but only indirectly, in virtue of propositions that are “things that lie beside” (τὰ παρακείμενα, SE M 8.10) them or “things that subsist in accordance with” them (cf. SE M 8.70 = LS 33 C: τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον); for a detailed discussion, see Shields (1993). 24 That the impression in question is something like “Dion is standing by” is suggested by the symmetry between the participles ζῶντος and παρεστῶτος, which both seem to be the attributes of Dion.

above, Zeno’s ἀπὸ in ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων is clearly causal since ὄντα and

ὑπάρχοντα are said to imprint the soul through the sense organs. Chrysippus’ use of ἀπὸ in

T2 cannot have representational sense, because if it did, then his formulation that empty

attraction is “produced from no impressor” (ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον) would mean that such an impression represents nothing, i.e. that it has no intentional object; but

Chrysippus clearly says that empty attractions do have intentional objects, namely,

phantasms (φαντάσματα). Despite this, it could still be the case that Zeno and Chrysippus

used ἀπὸ in a representational sense when referring to impressions involving phantasms.

This, however, is also unlikely. Namely, we know from Diogenes that the Stoics thought that phantasm is “neither some being nor some qualified thing, but ‘as if’ some being and

‘as if’ some qualified thing, like when a mental image of a horse is produced though there is none present.”25 In 7.51 = LS 39 A5,26 Diogenes also reports that the Stoics thought that

there are impressions called “reflections” (ἐμφάσεις) that, unlike perceptual (αἰσθητικαί)

impressions do not arise “from existents” (ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων) but are “as if produced from

existents” (ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι). This use of the modifiers “as if” (ὡσανεὶ)

and “as” (ὡς) before “from” (ἀπὸ) looks precisely like an effort on the part of the Stoics to

preserve the causal sense of ἀπὸ even in cases when there are no external objects that cause

25 DL 7.61 = LS 30 C2: οὔτε τὶ ὂν οὔτε ποιόν, ὡσανεὶ δέ τι ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος. A slightly different characterization, “neither somethings nor qualified but as if somethings and as if qualified” (μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δέ τινα καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ), is found in Stobaeus (1.136,21−23 = LS 30 A1). The context of both passages is the Stoic classification of concepts (ἐννοήματα) as phantasms. I agree with Caston 1999: 168-71 that, rather than assuming that Stobaeus’ report implies that the Stoics thought that concepts belong to some independent ontological category of “not- somethings”, it is more likely that ὂν has been omitted in Stobaeus’ phrase μήτε τινὰ εἶναι (although nothing in my discussion here depends on the truth of this assumption). There is some controversy, however, over whether the Stoics thought that all phantasms of the rational mind are concepts. This controversy is relevant for us here, and I will address it in note 118 below. For now, it is sufficient to say that the Stoics thought that at least some phantasms are “as if” beings and “as if” qualified things, and that this characterization can plausibly attributed to Zeno. 26 εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι.

impressions at the time they are entertained. The reason for this could be that as strong

empiricists, they viewed all φαντασίαι, even the non-sensory ones (οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ, DL

7.51), through the paradigm of sense perception, which is why they analyzed them in terms

of scenarios, hypothetical or actual, of sensation—scenarios in which real external objects

immediately cause impressions that represent them. Thus, even impressions like those

about phantasms are understood in terms of hypothetical scenarios threating them “as if”

they were impressions caused by present external objects. In other words, it seems that the

Stoics were ready to talk about an impression being produced from some phantasm Φ as

long as it is understood that the impression is merely as if it were presently caused by a real

object Φ.27 Therefore, the Stoics thought that some impressions are produced by external

impressors and are “from” external impressors, and some are produced by affections in us,

that is, by our corporeal soul, in which case the Stoics paradigmatically described them “as

if from” (ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ) or “as from” (ὡς ἀπὸ) something external. In both cases “from”

(ἀπὸ) indicates a causal relationship, whether this relationship is actually realized or not.

Furthermore, a close analysis of the texts Sedley cites as instances of Stoic

representational ἀπὸ reveals that they constitute weak and unreliable evidence in support of this hypothesis. The first thing to note is that a representational reading of ἀπὸ in T3b

would render the illustration unintelligible. According to this reading, the person dreams

up the impression that represents living Dion, but since this impression is “as from [Dion]

27 Although phantasms in Stoicism have a deprived ontological status, they are nevertheless products of real physical processes. Phantasms like the Furies, or the Hippocentaur, are formed “by way of composition” (M 8.58: κατ’ ἐπισύνθεσιν; DL 7.53: κατὰ σύνθεσιν). They are “composed” (σύνθετον, M 8.57) by our mind, which uses past sensations of real external objects to put together a shape (μορφή) of something that is presently not affecting the senses. These mental constructs may sometimes even correspond to some existing external object. For example, the dreamer’s phantasm of Dion in T3b at least partially corresponds to the real, living Dion. On the other hand, phantasms could also match real external objects exactly, which is clear from SE M 7.247 (= T9 below).

having been present”, it is an empty attraction and hence false. The problem is that it is

difficult to see which impression exactly is supposed to serve as one that is simultaneously

true and false. If the dreamer’s impression represents Dion as living and Dion is indeed

alive, then the impression is true without simultaneously being false. On the other hand, if

the impression in question represents Dion as being present while Dion is not present, then the impression is false without simultaneously being true. The only way to render the example [b] intelligible is to read it in close parallel to the example in [a], which makes perfect sense since they both serve to illustrate the same point.28 Accordingly, the dreamer’s impression is true insofar as it is “as from living Dion”, presumably because

Dion is presently alive, but false insofar as it is “as from [Dion] having been present” (ὡς

ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος)29 because Dion was not present.30 Since ὡς before ἀπὸ Δίωνος ζῶντος is

missing in the manuscript, it seems that either it is assumed or the text here is corrupt.31

This explanation seems more plausible than the assumption that ἀπὸ has shifted its meaning

from causal in T3a to representational in T3b.

The second instance of Sedley’s purported representational ἀπὸ in M 8.67 can also

be explained away by our analysis of the Stoic use of “as” (ὡς). Unlike in T3a, this time

Orestes has an empty attraction, an impression of the Furies as “bloody-looking, dragon-

28 It seems that the two examples intend to show that impressions that are simultaneously true and false can occur both among the fraudulent as well as among the empty impressions. For fraudulent impressions see below, especially section II. 29 Note the close similarity between this example where an impression about Dion is formed ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος although Dion is in fact not standing by, and the one from DL 7.61, where a mental image of a horse is created although no horse is παρόντος. 30 In other words, had the propositional content of the dreamer’s impression been “Dion is alive”, the impression would have been true, but since it was “Dion is present”, it was false. The impression itself, which is a physical structure in the soul, is both true and false precisely because it can give rise to both of these propositions. We will discuss the relationship between impressions and propositions more below. 31 Another alternative suggested by Bett (2005: 50, n. 97), who follows Heintz (1932: 113−116), is that ἀπὸ before Dion’s name was mistakenly added by Sextus or perhaps later in the process of copying the manuscript.

shaped girls”, which he entertains in a dream (see M 8.57; cf. T2 above). Although the impression is not caused by the Furies, Sextus still calls it “from the Furies” (ἀπὸ τῶν

Ἐρινύων). However, rather than supposing that ἀπὸ here is non-causal, it seems more likely given everything we have said so far that ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐρινύων should be understood with assumed ὡς before it, implying that although the impression was not really caused by the

Furies—who are, after all, just phantasms and not real—it was as if it were caused by the

hypothetical real Furies. Therefore, we can safely conclude that for Zeno and Chrysippus

“from” (ἀπὸ) used in the context of discussing impressions indicates a causal relationship,

actual or hypothetical, between the impression and its intentional object.

This brings us to the second key concept in the first clause, huparchon (ὑπάρχον).

This word, as well as the related verb huparchein (ὑπάρχειν), was a Stoic technical term

that they apparently used in several different ways.32 In paradigmatic contexts where

Sextus specifically discusses the apprehensive impression, like for instance in M 7.249 (=

LS 40E4), it seems that huparchon means the same thing that Chrysippus defined as an

impressor (φανταστόν), namely a corporeal external object, and it is rendered as such by

some translations. However, according to the interpretation formulated by Michael Frede33

that has become widely accepted, instead of requiring a relation between the impression

and the external object that caused it, the clause “from what is existent” in Zeno’s definition

of the apprehensive impression should be taken to refer to a relationship between the

impression and “what is true” (that is, a true proposition), or “what is the case”, or a fact.

Thus, Frede argues that “the first clause was not meant to amount to the requirement that

the impression should have its origin in a real object, but to the stronger requirement that

32 See Long 1971, especially p. 89. 33 Frede 1983 (especially pp. 164−5); 1999 (especially pp. 302−3).

it be altogether true.”34 In other words, according to Frede the first clause does not express

(what we may call) the Causal Requirement, but a much stronger Veridicality Requirement.

This interpretation of ὑπάρχον in the first clause, however, faces a serious

problem.35 According to the Stoics, propositions (ἀξιώματα) and facts (πράγματα), are

incorporeal,36 and since they thought that incorporeals are not of a nature to affect (ποιεῖν)

or to activate (κινεῖν) anything,37 it is highly doubtful that the Stoics would have thought

that impressions can “come from” (γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ) propositions and facts. In his later study,

Frede seems to be aware of this problem, and in a later study he amends his original position by arguing that “the point of the first clause would be, not that a cognitive impression has its origin in a real object, but in a fact. For the impression A is F to be cognitive it must have its origin in the fact that A is F.”38 The change consists in moving away from the

Veridicality and towards a version of the Causal Requirement, since the first clause now

requires only that the impression must originate in a fact, while the impression’s

veridicality is associated with the second clause.39 The move is in the right direction, but

still falls short of solving the problem. Although Frede acknowledges that the origin

referred to in the first clause is causal,40 he does not say how corporeal entities like

impressions could be causally affected by incorporeal facts and propositions within the

Stoic theory. Leaving this issue unexplained is unsatisfactory because it does not specify

what the difference between causal originating in a fact and casual originating in a real

34 Frede 1983/7: 164. 35 I am grateful to Henry Dyson for an insightful discussion of this problem. 36 Cf. Seneca Epist. 117.13 = LS 33E; SE M 8.11−12 = LS 33B. 37 On the other hand, “according to them, the incorporeal cannot affect or be affected” (τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν, SE M 8.263 = LS 45B; cf. 8.404), which would imply that an incorporeal cannot “activate” (κινεῖν) impressions either (cf. SE M 8.402−410). 38 Frede 1999: 302. 39 Ibid., p. 304. 40 Ibid., p. 303.

object would consist in for an impression. Furthermore, it can also be misleading because

the difference between originating in a fact and being true remains unclear, and many

scholars have continued to maintain that the first clause expresses the Veridicality

requirement.41

Let us, then, examine closer the texts Frede cites in support of his interpretation of

ὑπάρχον in the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression. The strongest evidence in favor of this reading is the way Cicero sometimes renders the third clause of the definition and an objection related to it in Lucullus, the second book of his Academica. According to

Cicero Acad. 2.77 = T14, Zeno added the third clause in response to Arcesilaus’ objection

(which has since become the central point of the Academics’ attack on the Stoic theory of the apprehensive impression) that every true impression is such that there could be a false

impression just like it, or—in other words—indistinguishable (ἀπαράλλακτος) from it.42

Now, from 2.41, it seems that the Academics understood this to mean that “every

impression that is from something true is such that it could also be from something false”

(omne visum quod sit a vero tale esse quale etiam a falso possit esse).43 Along the same

lines, Cicero in 2.112 formulates the third clause of the definition as “in a way it could not

be from something false” (quo modo imprimi non posset a falso).44

There are, however, at least three reasons to think that Cicero’s formulations here do not reflect Stoic language.45 First, Cicero’s Latin translations of the first and third

clauses in 2.77 = T14b, the place where he cites the definition of the apprehensive

41 Cf. Brittain (2001: 18−19); Brennan (2005: 67); Perin (2005a: 385; 2005b: 496). 42 Cf. Cic. Acad. 2.33, 40−41, 83, 112; SE M 7.154, 164, 252. See section III below. 43 Cf. also Cic. Acad. 2.77: nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 44 “Stamped from something true” (impressum e vero) appears in the same paragraph as what seems to be Cicero’s rendering of the first clause. 45 The problematic nature of using these Cicero’s formulations as reliable evidence for the Stoic doctrines on the apprehensive impression has gone largely unnoticed. For one exception, see von Staden 1978: 104−105.

impression as it was formulated by Zeno, is different from his formulations in 2.112. In

2.77, the first clause reads “from what was” (ex eo quod esset), and the third “such that it

could [not] be of the same manner as one from what is not” (ut eisudem modi ab eo quod

non est [non] posset esse). These formulations, which are explicitly attributed to Zeno,

seem to be Cicero’s verbatim translations of Greek ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος and ὁποία οὐκ ἂν

γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. Thus, when he seems to be quoting Zeno’s own formulation

of the definition, Cicero uses the phrases “from what is” and “from what is not”, and not

the phrases “from what is true” (a vero) or “from what is false” (a falso). Furthermore, no

source in Greek suggests that the Stoics ever talked about impressions as coming from

something true or false (ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς/ψεύδους γίγνεσθαι).46 This should not be surprising,

since the Stoics thought that impressions are physical structures in the corporeal soul

caused by external corporeal objects, while things that are true or false—that is, the bearers

of truth-value—are propositions (ἀξιώματα)47 which are, as we have seen, incorporeals,

and incorporeals are incapable of causally affecting bodies.48 Finally, for the Stoics,

phrases “from an existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος) and “from a non-existent” (ἀπὸ μὴ

ὑπάρχοντος) cannot be equivalent to “true” (ἀληθής) and “false” (ψεύδης), respectively, because they were well aware not only that impressions “from what is existent” (ἀπὸ

ὑπάρχοντος) can be false, but also that impressions “from what is not existent” (ἀπὸ μὴ

46 The only places where “from” (ἀπὸ) occurs together with the words “true/false” (ἀληθοῦς/ψεύδους) in a Stoic context is in their discussion of the conditional proposition (τὸ συνημμένον), like e.g. in SE PH 2.104−106 (= LS 35C). In these places, however, the Stoics do not use the verb “to come” (γίγνεσθαι) with ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς/ψεύδους, but the verb “to begin/originate” (ἄρχεται), in the sense “to begin/originate from a true/false” proposition (ἀξίωμα). 47 SE M 8.74 = LS 34B, 8.10; DL 7.65 = LS 34A. 48 Cf. also SE M 8.400−410, where Sextus discusses the objection against the Stoics that exploits the complicated relationship between corporeal impressions and incorporeal propositions, and provides a Stoic reply to the objection.

ὑπάρχοντος) can be true.49 Therefore, it is unlikely that Cicero’s talk of impressions

“coming from something true/false” represents the way Zeno and Chrysippus understood

the phrases ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος and ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος in the definition of the apprehensive

impression.

What is worse, it is not even clear that this language of “coming from something

true/false” reflects the terminology used by the Academics such as Arcesilaus and

Carneades. Namely, in Acad. 2.77 = T14d, Cicero reports that Arcesilaus’ objection to

Zeno was that “no impression from something true is such that there could not be one just

like it from something false” (nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a

falso possit esse). However, according to our second main source, Sextus, Arcesilaus’

objection was that “no true impression is found to be such that it could not be false”

(οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθὴς φαντασία εὑρίσκεται οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής, M 7.154), and

almost the same formulation of the objection is attributed to Carneades: “there is no true

one of such a kind as could not become false” (οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη οἵα οὐκ ἂν

γένοιτο ψευδής, M 7.164). Thus, according to Sextus, neither Arcesilaus nor Carneades

used Cicero’s expression “from something true/false” in formulating their objections,

staying much closer to the original Stoic technical language about impressions we find in

Greek sources. This casts considerable doubt on the assumption that Arcesilaus and

Carneades themselves understood the phrases ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος and ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος to

49 This seems to follow from the Stoic analysis of simultaneously true and false impressions described in SE M 244−5 (see T3 above). Orestes’ impression of Electra is true insofar it is ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός, but false insofar as it is ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος. In other words, Orestes’ impression from Electra would have been true (without simultaneously being false) if it was “as if from Electra”, that is, if its propositional content was something like “This is Electra”. The false component is there because the impression, although being caused by an existent, is not in accordance with that existent (i.e. because it fails to satisfy the second clause of the definition), as Sextus clarifies several paragraphs below in M 7.249. Thus, there are false impressions that are ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός. For true impressions that are ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, see T9 below and the accompanying discussion.

24 be equivalent to ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς and ἀπὸ ψεύδους, respectively. If they did not, then the talk of impressions as coming from something true/false must have been an invention (or a misunderstanding) of some post-Carneadean Academic, maybe even Cicero himself. At any rate, Cicero’s talk of impressions as “coming from something true/false” most likely does not reflect accurately the Stoic language.

The second main piece of textual evidence that apparently supports Frede’s reading of ὑπάρχον is one of the Stoic definitions of true and false propositions reported by Sextus in M 8.85 (= LS 34D):

[T4] For they say that true is a proposition that exists and contradicts something, while false is one

that does not exist and contradicts something. And when they are asked “What is the existent?” they

say “That which sets an apprehensive impression in motion”50

Since it defines a true proposition (ἀληθὲς ἀξίωμα) as the proposition that “exists”

(ὑπάρχει), it seems that the paragraph says that “the existent” (τὸ ὑπάρχον) in the definition of the apprehensive impression is equivalent to the true proposition. Accordingly, the first clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression would then imply that the apprehensive impression “comes from” (γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ) a true proposition, and that what

“activates” (κινεῖν) the impression is a true proposition. For example, if we assume that

Orestes’ receives an apprehensive impression from Electra, this would mean that Orestes’ impression does not come from Electra (the actual woman), but from the true proposition

“This is Electra”.

50 φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειταί τινι, ψεῦδος δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δέ τινι. ἐρωτώμενοι δέ, τί ἐστι τὸ ὑπάρχον, λέγουσι τὸ καταληπτικὴν κινοῦν φαντασίαν.

The problem with this analysis is that it contradicts other evidence we have on the

Stoics’ understanding of how impressions come about. Namely, according to T3a above, the ὑπάρχον that Orestes’ impression is from seems to be Electra (because ὑπῆρχε

Ἠλέκτρα), and not the proposition “This is Electra”. In addition, Chrysippus in T2 clearly explains that impressions are “activated” by impressors, which are external corporeal objects like “the white” or “the cold”. A closer analysis of Sextus’ report in M 8.85, however, reveals that there is no real contradiction. Namely, according to Arius Didymus:

[T5] Zeno says that a cause is ‘that because of which’, while that of which it is the cause is an

attribute; and that the cause is a body, while that of which it is the cause is a predicate. It is impossible

that the cause be present yet that of which it is the cause not to exist. This thesis has the following

force. A cause is that because of which something comes about, as, for example, it is because of

prudence that “to be prudent”51 comes about, because of soul that “to be alive” comes about, and

because of temperance that “to be temperate” comes about. For it is impossible for one who has

51 The Stoics thought that predicates are paradigmatically expressed by verbs (cf. DL 7.58; Ammon. In Ar. De int. 44.19−45.6). From the summary account of Stoic logic in DL 7.49−83 where a number of examples of propositions occurs, it seems that they made a conscious effort to avoid expressing predicates in the form of copula + adjective or copula + noun (for speculations regarding their motivation for this, see e.g. Pinborg 1975: 88). However, a few examples that seem like propositions with such predicates do occur in Stoic contexts; some examples are propositions “This [man] is kind” (φιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος, DL 7.70), “Dion is a horse”, “Dion is an animal” (ἵππος ἐστὶ Δίων, ζῷόν ἐστι Δίων, DL 7.78 ), “Something is a man” (τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, SE M 11.8). No surviving source reports on how the Stoics understood predicates in such propositions. If they strictly held to the doctrine that predicates should be expressed only by verbs, then perhaps they thought that every expression of the form copula + adjective or copula + noun is only a loose paraphrase of the corresponding verbal form. Such an approach, however, would result in expressions that would look unnatural not only in English, but also in Greek. For example, if λευκή ἐστι in the expression λευκή ἐστι χιών (“snow is white”) is only a paraphrase of the verb λευκοῦσθαι (“to whiten oneself”), then the proper expression of the proposition “Snow is white” would in fact be χιών λευκοῦται. From the examples cited above, it seems that not even the Stoics were willing to pursue rigorously such a language reform. Because of this, in the remainder of this chapter and throughout the whole dissertation, I will continue to translate all examples of Stoic predicates by using the copula in combination with a noun, adjective, or verb, with the proviso that it is possible that the Stoics thought that these are only paraphrases of verbal forms without the copula.

temperance not to be temperate, or for one who has soul not to be alive, or for one who has prudence

not to be prudent.52

Zeno thought that causes (αἴτια) are bodies, but that the effects of bodily causes are attributes (συμβεβηκότα), or more precisely predicates (κατηγορήματα), which are not corporeal, but incorporeal.53 For example, prudence (φρόνησις), as a body,54 is the cause of the incorporeal predicate “to be prudent” (τὸ φρονεῖν). Most importantly for our present discussion, however, according to Zeno bodies cause incorporeal predicates to “exist”

(ὑπάρχειν). The same idea was adopted by Chrysippus:

[T6] [O]nly those predicates that are actual attributes are said to huparchei, for instance, ‘to walk’

huparchei for me when I am walking, but it does not huparchei for me when I am lying or sitting.”55

52 Stob. 1.138,14−22 = LS 55A1−3: Αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὅ· οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα· ἀδύνατον δ’ εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρεῖναι, οὗ δέ ἐστιν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. Τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἴτιόν ἐστι δι’ ὃ γίνεταί τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περί τινα οὔσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν. 53 The text T4 does not explicitly state that predicates are incorporeal, but I think we can safely conclude that Zeno thought this based on the following two reasons. First, this is suggested by the contrastive structure of the phrase “the cause is a body, while that of which it is the cause is a predicate”. Second, the essence of Zeno’ account of causal origin of predicates described here, including the basic idea that corporeals cause incorporeal predicates, became a Stoic orthodoxy, with only a few minor developments. Cleanthes is the earliest Stoics to whom our sources attribute the classification of predicates as “sayables” (λεκτά, Clem. Strom. 8.9.26.3−4 = LS 55C), although I think that this makes it quite possible that Zeno also used the term. (Thus I disagree with Rist 1978: 396−8, who suggested that λεκτὰ were probably not classified among the incorporeals before Chrysippus. If Zeno already thought that predicates are incorporeal, then it seems likely that Cleanthes thought that sayables are incorporeal too.) Chrysippus position (cf. Stob. 138,23–139,2 = LS 55 A4; T6) was virtually identical to Zeno’s, while Archedemus (Antipater’s younger contemporary) seems to have added the idea that bodies cause not just predicates, but whole propositions (ἀξιώματα, Clement, ibid.). In all these versions, predicates are always classified among incorporeals, typically expressed by verbs in infinitive, and contrasted with corporeals that caused them, just like in the original Zeno’s account. 54 The Stoics thought that virtues, like prudence or temperance, are bodies because they are dispositions of the corporeal soul of those who possess them (cf. SE M 11.23 = LS 60G2; Sen. Epist. 117.2−3). 55 Arius Did. apud. Stob. 1.106,18−23 = LS 51B4: κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

The relationship between the predicates that “exist” (ὑπάρχειν)—that is, those predicates that are actual attributes, τὰ συμβεβηκότα—and the corporeal qualities that caused them on the one hand, and true impressions and propositions on the other, is further established by the following texts:

[T7] True [impressions] are those out of which it is possible to make a true predication,56 for

example, “it is day”, at present moment, or “it is light”; false ones are those out of which it is possible

to make a false predication, like of the oar under water being bent or the colonnade narrowing.57

56 Some scholars (e.g. Graeser 1978: 201) have suggested that κατηγορία here should be taken as an equivalent of a proposition (ἀξίωμα); thus, along the same lines Long & Sedley translate κατηγορία as “affirmation”. I have decided to follow Bett (2005) and translate it as “predication” for the following reason. The Stoics made a technical distinction between “conception” (ἔννοια) and “concept” (ἐννόημα). According to them, ἔννοια refers to the physical processes in the corporeal soul that occurs when we think of something (cf. Aet. 4.11.1−5 = IG 21; Plut. Com. not. 1084F−1085A = LS 39F), while ἐννόημα is the result of that process, which—being a phantasm—has a lesser ontological status than ἔννοια. Perhaps κατηγορία should be viewed in parallel with ἔννοια, i.e. as the physical process of predication that occurs in the corporeal soul. If so, however, the result of κατηγορία would not be a predicate (κατηγόρημα), but a proposition (ἀξίωμα). Namely, since the Stoics thought (DL 7.63−4) that proposition, as a “complete sayable” (αὐτοτελές λεκτόν), is paradigmatically the combination of two components, a predicate (κατηγόρημα) and a subject in the nominative case (ὀρθή πτῶσις), it seems that predication (κατηγορία) is the process that consists in combining the corporeal analogues of a subject and a predicate. Accordingly, the result of the corporeal process of predication would be a corporeal impression that is isomorphic with a complete incorporeal proposition. 57 SE M 7.244 (= LS 39 G7−8): ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσιν ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἢ τοῦ “φῶς ἐστι,” ψευδεῖς δὲ ὧν ἔστι ψευδῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ κεκλάσθαι τὴν κατὰ βυθοῦ κώπην ἢ μείουρον εἶναι τὴν στοάν. The meaning here must be that true impressions are those out of which it is possible to make only a true predication, and false those out of which it is possible to make only a false impression because the Stoics, as we have seen above in T3, recognized a third class of impressions, those that are simultaneously true and false. Accordingly, impressions that are simultaneously true and false would be those out of which it is possible to make both a true and a false predication. This point is important because it could help us understand what the Stoics meant by saying that the apprehensive impression is “one that is true and such that it could not be false” (ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τοιαύτη οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής, SE M 7.152). If my interpretation of their definition of true and false impressions is correct, then it seems that by saying that the apprehensive impression is “true and such that it could not be false” they meant that based on an apprehensive impression, it is possible to make only a true predication, i.e. that the apprehensive impression belongs to the category of impressions that are only true, and not false or both true and false.

[T8] And they say that the definite proposition, such as “this one is sitting” or “this one is walking”,

exists as true whenever the predicate, like “to sit” or “to walk”, is the actual attribute of the thing

that falls under the demonstrative reference.58

The following picture seems to emerge from combining texts T2 and T4−T7. When external objects interact with a corporeal soul, affection (πάθος) called impression is formed in the soul. In case of true impressions, the interaction between the impressor’s corporeal properties and the corporeal soul causes those incorporeal predicates that are the impressor’s actual attributes to “exist” (ὑπάρχειν). The process of predication (κατηγορία) occurs in the soul, during which these predicates are combined with a subject, and a true proposition is formed. Consequentially, the resulting true proposition also gets to “exist”

(ὑπάρχειν).59

It is crucial to note, however, that the Stoics did not consider “existence” (ὕπαρξις), to be the default ontological modus of incorporeals like predicates and propositions. As

“sayables” (λεκτά), they are “what subsists [ὑφιστάμενον] in accordance with a rational

impression” (SE M 8.70 = LS 33C),60 and “what we grasp as co-subsisting

[παρυφισταμένου] in accordance with our thought” (SE M 8.12 = LS 33B2). According to strict Stoic division, they normally do not “exist” (ὑπάρχειν), but “subsist” (ὑφίστασθαι),

58 SE M 8.100: καὶ δὴ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ “οὗτος κάθηται” ἢ “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”, τότε φασὶν ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκῃ τὸ κατηγόρημα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν. 59 In addition, since predicates and propositions are sometimes described in our sources as signifying “states of affairs” or “facts” (πράγματα), it would follow that (true) facts also get to “exist” (ὑπάρχειν) as a result of the process described above. From SE M 8.12 (= LS 33 B3), it seems that πρᾶγμα is equivalent to a proposition, i.e. a complete sayable. In DL 7.64 (= LS 33G), however, Apollodorus says that predicates too are πράγματα. Perhaps he was implying that predicates should be understood as some kind of “incomplete” facts. 60 SE M 8.70: λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον. Cf. SE M 8.12, where sayables are things “we grasp as co-subsisting in accordance with our thought” (οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ).

29 where subsistence implies a lower ontological status than existence, which should strictly be attributed only to bodies. Nevertheless, since Zeno and Chrysippus clearly thought that some incorporeals like certain predicates and propositions can also get to “exist”—namely, when they are caused by bodies and their corporeal qualities—perhaps we should understand this as a form of derived existence,61 or perhaps existence only in a broad sense of the word.62

All this sheds a different light on Sextus’ testimony in T4 and its apparent suggestion that ὑπάρχον in the definition of the apprehensive impression is a true proposition. Namely, it seems that Sextus is conflating two different senses of the word

ὑπάρχειν, one that refers to a form of derived existence (or existence in a broad sense of the word), and another that refers to the strict, non-derived existence.63 Since according to

61 Long (1971: 91−3) arrives at similar conclusions, and my interpretation is very much indebted to his discussion. 62 A similar distinction between the verbs ὑφεστάναι and ὑπάρχειν is drawn by Chrysippus in the context of discussing another canonical incorporeal entity, time (for time as one of the incorporeals, see SE M 10.218 = LS 27 D), in Arius Didymus’ text immediately preceding T5 (Arius Did. apud. Stob. 1.106,17−19 = LS 51B3−4). There, he says that only the present time exists (ὑπάρχειν), while the past and the future do not exist, but merely subsist (ὑφεστάναι). However, according to Plutarch, Chrysippus also thought that the present consists completely of future and past time (Plut. 1081F = LS 51C5-6), which would imply that something existent (viz. present time) consists completely of parts (viz. past and future) that do not exist, but merely subsist. In his usual vein, Plutarch concludes that Chrysippus is talking absurdities. However, according to Arius Didymus, Chrysippus in addition says that no time is present “exactly” (κατ’ ἀπαρτισμὸν), but that we talk of present time only “broadly” (κατὰ πλάτος). Perhaps his point was that, although time is an incorporeal that by default merely subsists, the present time could be said to “exist” (ὑπάρχειν), but only in a broad sense of the word “exist”. If so, then the ὕπαρξις of incorporeals like actual predicates and true propositions should also be understood only in a broad sense of the word “existence”. Accordingly, when the Stoic Basileides denied the ὕπαρξις of incorporeal sayables (SE M 8.258), perhaps he was reacting against the broad application of the word “exist” to incorporeals like sayables, and trying to emphasize that only bodies can properly be said to exist. 63 In fact, there is reason to doubt the reliability of Sextus’ report in M 8.85 (= T3). First, nothing similar to it appears in otherwise relatively comprehensive account of Stoic logic in Diogenes Laertius. Second, it is quite possible that this report does not reflect a single Stoic statement, but a juxtaposition of two separate statements taken out of their original contexts. Namely, the statement that a true proposition is τὸ ὑπάρχον that contradicts something is also attributed to the Stoics in M 8.10 in a context of general discussion of the locus of the true (which is where T3 also generally belongs), and in M 11.220 where Sextus argues that the “skill relating to life” (περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη) cannot be taught. However, the report that τὸ ὑπάρχον is what activates the apprehensive impression occurs in several places separately from the definition of a true proposition. For example, in M 7.426−9, Sextus uses it to argue that because of defining τὸ ὑπάρχον as what activates an apprehensive impression and the apprehensive impression as what is activated by a ὑπάρχον, the

the Stoics the former is the kind of existence that can sometimes be attributed to certain

incorporeals like actual predicates and true propositions, and the latter the kind of existence

that can be properly attributed only to bodies—which, as authentic beings (ὄντα) are the

only things capable of activating impressions—these two forms of existence were never

meant to be understood as identical.64 Because of this conflation, Sextus’ report in T3,

therefore, does not constitute good evidence that ὑπάρχον in the Stoic definition of the

apprehensive impression refers to a true proposition or a fact. Moreover, this clarification

of the details of Stoic theory of predicates, propositions, and facts sheds better light on

Frede’s proposal that apprehensive impressions causally originate in true propositions or

facts. We see that texts T4−7 suggest that the Stoics thought that actual predicates, true

propositions and facts all causally depend on external corporeal objects to supply them

with their derived form of existence (ὕπαρξις), which is why it would be inaccurate to say

that impressions, including the apprehensive ones, originate in facts and propositions.

Rather, it would be more in the spirit of the Stoic theory to say that both impressions as

corporeal physical structures in the soul as well as incorporeals like actual predicates, facts,

and true propositions, which subsist in accordance with these impressions, originate

causally in external corporeal objects.

Stoics’ argument is circular and therefore the apprehensive impression cannot be the criterion of what is apprehensive. In M 11.183 and PH 3.242, he seems to repeat the same point from M 7.426−9, but places it in the larger context of arguing against the existence of the “skill relating to life.” All this suggests that, in accordance with his Pyrrhonist method of putting different philosophical statements in opposition, Sextus might have been cherry-picking the material from Stoic claims made in different contexts in order to construct contradictions among them that originally weren’t there. 64 That such confusion would not have been difficult to make, both intentionally and unintentionally, is suggested by Galen. In Institutio Logica 3.2, he says that “For all Greeks, of the present or the past, saying ‘to be’ [εἶναι], or ‘to exist’ [ὑπάρχειν] implies no difference in meaning, and neither does ‘to subsist’ [ὑφεστηκέναι]”. Accordingly, he felt no obligation to respect Stoic technical distinctions like, for example, the one between “being” (τό ὂν) and “subsistent” (ὑφεστός), which he characterizes as excessive linguistic quibbling (De meth. med., 10.155,1−8 = LS 27G).

Thus, careful analysis of evidence suggests that the expression huparchon in the

definition does not mean “fact” or “what is true.” Still, Frede is right in thinking that it

cannot mean “external object” or “real object” either—or at least not simpliciter. Namely,

in T3b, one of the impressions used as an illustration is of Dion standing by. Now, the

impression is explicitly called “empty,” and according to T2, empty impressions have

phantasms as their intentional objects. The Stoics thought that phantasms are concepts, and

concepts are sometimes classified as anuparktoi, things that do not huparchousin (see n.

115 below). In other words, the impression of Dion standing by is an impression from

something that does not huparchein, i.e. something that is not huparchon. If huparchon

simply means “real object,” then this impression would count as being from an object that

is not real. However, we are also told that Dion is alive, i.e. that he is a real object, which

implies that huparchon cannot mean “real object” simpliciter. Rather, it seems that, in

addition to referring to a real, external corporeal object, huparchon for the Stoics also

conveys the meaning of presence in both spatial and temporal sense.65 Therefore, in the context of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression, we should take the word huparchon to convey the meaning of “actually present real external object.”66 Accordingly,

its negation “what is not huparchon” (mē huparchon) should be taken to include both

65 The temporal aspect of huparchein is clearly recognizable in Chrysippus discussion of predicates in T6 above, when he says that the predicate “to walk” huparchei for me when I am walking, but does not huparchei for me when I am lying or sitting. As far as I know, there is no text that directly exemplifies a spatial sense of huparchein, but I think it can be safely inferred from examples such as the one about Dion mentioned above. 66 This perhaps explains why Zeno decided to use the formulation “from an existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος) in the definition when had could have, for example, chosen to say that the apprehensive impression comes “from a being” (ἀπὸ ὄντος) or “from an external object” (ἀπὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου) instead. The latter two expressions lack the sense of spatiotemporal presence that huparchon has. In addition, since there is unfortunately no single word in English that conveys a meaning sufficiently similar to “actually present real external object,” instead of translating ὑπάρχον, I shall continue to use transliteration.

32 objects that are real but not spatiotemporally present, as well as objects that are altogether fictional.

After clarifying the meanings of the words “from” and huparchon, we are finally ready to discuss the nature of the requirement expressed by the first clause of the definition.

We have already mentioned above that, according to some influential interpretations, the first clause expresses the Veridicality Requirement, implying that the impression satisfying the first clause is already true. We have also argued that the key assumptions behind this interpretation do not seem to be justified by the textual evidence usually cited in its support.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that our most detailed source, Sextus, reports that the Stoics did not think that the first clause expresses the Veridicality requirement.67

Namely, in several places Sextus cites Stoic examples that are clearly cases of impressions that come “from what is existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος)—that is, impressions that satisfy the

first clause—but that are nevertheless false. The paradigmatic example of such an

impression is Orestes’ impression that mistakes Electra for a Fury referred to in M 7.249.68

67 In fact, what is surprising is the persistence of the Veridicality interpretation of the first clause in light of the fact that our most detailed source on the Stoic account of the apprehensive impression consistently portrays them as insisting that there are impressions that satisfy the first clause, but are false. 68 Sextus says that an example of the impression that comes from an existent, but is not in accordance with that existent itself is Orestes’ impression discussed “a little earlier”. Presumably, he is referring back to M 7.170 and M 7.244−5 (see T3a above). In M 7.170, Orestes’ impression from Electra that misrepresents her as a Fury is classified as being “from what is existent, but discordant with that existent and not in accordance with that existent itself” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μέν, διαφώνως δὲ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον). (Although some scholars, like e.g. Bett 2005: 36 n. 74 and LS 2.446−7, think that the Orestes’ example in M 7.170 is an intrusion in the text, even they agree that the example is authentically Stoic.) In M 7.244−5, the same impression is true insofar as it came from something existent (viz. Electra) but false insofar as it came from something non-existent (viz. a Fury). We must be cautious, however, with the way Sextus uses this example, because a different version of it occurs in M 8.67, illustrating a case of an “empty” impression. Unlike in M 7.170, 244−5 and 249, where Sextus says that Orestes’ impression is from Electra (ἀπὸ Ἠλέκτρας), in M 8.67 Orestes’ impression is “from the Furies” (ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐρινύων), and since the Furies are fictional beings, this impression would not count as ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος. This version of the Orestes example is apparently referring back to the discussion in M 8.57, where a person (which Sextus does not name but is obviously Orestes) forms the impression of the Furies as women with bloody eyes and snake-like hair (cf. Eurip. Orest. 256). The example in M 8.57 is meant to illustrate the point that impressions that are not formed through the senses can nevertheless be put together from elements received earlier through sense experience, which implies that this is a case of an empty impression. In addition, I take Heracles’ impression that mistakes

Sextus explains that, although coming “from what is existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος), Orestes’

impression is false because it fails to be in accordance with the “existent” that produced

the impression—in other words, because it fails to satisfy the second clause.69 It seems that

the Stoics even had a special name for such impressions—they called them “fraudulent”

(παρατυπωτικαί), and distinguished them clearly from “empty” (διάκενοι) impressions,

those that are coming from a non-existent (SE M 8.67). Thus, since the Stoics thought that impressions coming “from an existent” (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος) can be false, the requirement

expressed by the first clause cannot be the Veridicality requirement.

From all we have said so far, it should be clear that the first clause of the definition

states that impressions that are apprehensive cannot be “empty” or produced by phantasms,

but must be caused by external qualified objects instead. In other words, the first clause of

the definition expresses what we have called the Causality Requirement: in order to count

as apprehensive, an impression must be caused by what is existent, which, as I have argued,

means by a real, external corporeal object. It may appear that the epistemological

significance of such a requirement is not particularly strong. This appearance, however,

would be gravely mistaken. According to the Stoics, empty impressions include not only

those about fictional entities like Centaurs, giants, etc., but also certain impressions that

may have real external things as their intentional objects, and even represent those objects

his own children as that of Eurystheus in M 7.405−406 (= LS 40H2) to be another paradigmatic Stoic example of an impression that satisfies the first clause but is false because it fails to satisfy the second clause of the definition. The Heracles example occurs again in M 8.67 alongside the second version of the Orestes example as an illustration of an impression that satisfies the first but fails to satisfy the second clause. 69 It is important to note that although the Orestes’ impression identified Electra as a Fury and the Furies are fictional entities, this does not imply that the impression was empty. In fact, it seems that Orestes’ impression was something like “This bloody-looking, dragon-shaped woman is a Fury” (cf. SE M 8.57), which implies that Orestes identified Electra as a Fury based on the impression “This is a bloody-looking and dragon-shaped woman”. The latter impression is the one that is fraudulent because its predicate “is bloody-looking and dragon-shaped” misrepresents the actual properties of the external object that caused the impression, Electra, whose body was not bloody-looking and dragon-shaped. See section II below for a more detailed discussion.

34 accurately. An example the former we have already encountered in T3—the empty

impression entertained in a dream that Dion is present. According to Sextus, the Stoics

considered this impression to be both true and false, true insofar as its intentional object

was a real thing, Dion, false insofar as it represented Dion as present while Dion was not

present at the time. The Stoics, however, also thought that certain empty impressions could

be true (without simultaneously being false):

[T9] Of true impressions, some are apprehensive and some are not. Non-apprehensive ones are those

that strike people when they are in [a state of] affection. For millions of people when delirious or

melancholic draw in an impression that is true, yet not apprehensive, but occurring in this way

externally and by chance; hence they often are not confident about it and do not assent to it.70

According Stoic definition of true impressions in T7,71 an impression is true when based on it we can construct (only) a true proposition. Thus, the dreamer’s impression from T3 that Dion is present would have been true (without simultaneously being false) if Dion had indeed been present at the time the impression was entertained. The Stoics, however,

70 SE M 7.247: τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὔ, οὐ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἱ προσπίπτουσαί τισι κατὰ πάθος· μυρίοι γὰρ φρενιτίζοντες καὶ μελαγχολῶντες ἀληθῆ μὲν ἕλκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ ἀλλ’ ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσοῦσαν, ὅθεν οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ συγκατατίθενται αὐτῇ. Although Sextus does not say explicitly that he is talking about empty impressions, three things suggest this. First, he says that the impressions in question occur to “delirious and melancholic” people; in PH 1.101 and 2.52 Sextus says that delirious people hear voices of demons, and Chrysippus also says in T2 that phantasms, as empty attractions, “arise in those that are melancholic” (γίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν μελαγχολώντων). Second, if non-apprehensive impressions discussed here do not include empty ones, then it follows that some fraudulent impressions can be true by chance. But, while fraudulent impressions certainly are not apprehensive, it is difficult to see how such impressions—which, as we shall see in section II, are called fraudulent precisely because they misrepresent the qualities of their impressors—could ever be considered true; rather, they can at best be simultaneously true and false, and are usually explicitly classified as such. Finally, the verb ἕλκουσι used by Sextus here is the same Chrysippus uses in the phrase “empty attraction” (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός) in T2. 71 Cf. DL 7.65: “Indeed, when it is day, the proposition before us [viz. ‘It is day’] is true; and when it is not [day], false” (οὔσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθὲς γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὔσης δέ, ψεῦδος).

thought that this impression, although true, would nevertheless be non-apprehensive

because it would have been true merely “externally and by chance”. Presumably, the reason why such impressions are considered non-apprehensive is that the truth of such impressions does not result from the causal interaction of their impressors with our sense organs.

Because of this, the crucial epistemological work performed by the first clause is the

elimination from the list of potential candidates for apprehension of impressions that are

true by chance. By introducing the Causal requirement, the Stoics offered a solution to the

problem of epistemic luck that firmly placed apprehensive impressions at the center of a

framework that emphasizes the possession of appropriate causal origin as one of the key

features of impressions that provide the basis for knowledge. The fact that another

influential epistemological definition, “knowledge is justified true belief”, has been

notoriously criticized in the recent decades for failing to be impervious to counterexamples involving epistemic luck, and has produced responses focusing on the causal origin of beliefs pretending to knowledge,72 testifies clearly about the epistemological

sophistication of the first clause of Zeno’s definition of apprehensive impression.

II.

Our sources on the definition report that Zeno thought that, in addition to coming from

something existent, the apprehensive impression must also be “molded-in-from and sealed-

72 I am referring, of course, to the intense epistemological debate initiated by Gettier’s (1963) objection to the standard definition of knowledge, and the type of responses exemplified by Goldman (1967; 1976).

36 in-from in accordance with that existent thing itself”.73 Apparently, what is required by this clause is some sort of accordance relation between the impression and the existent object that caused it. It would be useful to start by distinguishing between two types of such accordance relationship. On the one hand, an impression can be in accordance with its impressor if it correctly identifies its impressor. For example, an impression caused by

Electra would be in accordance with its impressor if it identifies Electra as its intentional object, and would not be in accordance if it identifies it as, say, her sister Iphigenia. On the other hand, an impression can be in accordance with its impressor if it correctly associates a predicate to it. For example, an impression caused by a person who is sitting would be in accordance with the impressor if it represents that person as sitting, and would not be if it represents that person as standing. With this distinction in mind, we can turn to Sextus’ explanation of the second clause:

[T10:] Second, being both from an existent and in accordance with that existent thing itself; [a] for

again, some [impressions] are from something existent, yet do not resemble just that existent thing,

as we showed a little earlier in the case of Orestes in his madness. For he drew in an appearance

from an existent, Electra, but not in accordance with that existent thing itself; for he supposed her

to be one of the Furies, and so pushes her away as she approaches eager to take care of him, saying

“Leave off! You are one of my Furies.” And Heracles was activated from something existent,

73 SE M 7.248: κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη; cf. SE; M 7.402, 410, 426; M 11.183; PH 2.4; DL 7.46. “Molded-in-from” and “sealed-in-from” are my renderings of composite participles ἐναπομεμαγμένη and ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, respectively. Each of them contains a pair of prepositions, ἐν (“in”) and απο (“from”) plus a participle. DL 7.50 deviates slightly from the standard formulation by adding the participle ἐναποτετυπωμένη (“carved-in-from”), and by having κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον instead of κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον; but these deviations seem to contribute nothing new. In Acad. 2.77, Cicero renders Zeno’s second clause as sicut esset inpressum et signatum et effictum (“stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is”); cf. 2.18.

Thebes,74 but not in accordance with that existent thing itself; for the apprehensive appearance also

has to come about in accordance with that existent thing itself. [b] Not to mention its being molded-

in-from and sealed-in-from, so that all the peculiarities of the impressors are skillfully stamped on.

For just as carvers tackle all the parts of the things they are completing, and in the same way as seals

on signet rings always stamp all their characters precisely on the wax, so too those who get an

apprehension of the objects ought to focus on all their peculiarities.75

According to [a], an example of impression that is not in accordance with its impressor is

Orestes’ impression about Electra (cf. SE M 7.244-5 = T3 above). As we have already seen in section I, although Orestes receives an impression from Electra, due to his madness the impression is “as from a Fury”, that is, it misidentifies Electra as a Fury. In M 8.67 (cf. also

M 7.405), Sextus gives another example, the impression mad Heracles received “from his own children as Eurystheus’” (ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παίδων ὡς Εὐρυσθέως). Both examples seem to suggest that the accordance required by the second clause focuses primarily to correct identification of the impressor, and not to the correct association of predicates to the object.

Sextus’ account, however, continues in [b] by stating that the impression must be

“molded-in-from and sealed-in-from” the impressor and that in virtue of this, all the

74 Bury (1935: 135) thinks that Sextus has mistakenly substituted Heracles for Pentheus here, who in his madness saw doubled Thebes and doubled sun (Eurip. Bacch. 918; cf. SE M 7.192). But, it is more likely that Sextus has in mind Heracles who in his madness imagines that he has gone to Mycenae, looking to kill Eurystheus’ children, while he is actually still in Thebes (Eurip., Hercules 948-70); cf. SE M 7.405-7. 75 M 7.249-51: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον· ἔνιαι γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰνδάλλονται, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμηνότος Ὀρέστου μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν. εἷλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, τῆς Ἠλέκτρας, οὐ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μίαν γὰρ τῶν Ἐρινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθὸ καὶ προσιοῦσαν καὶ τημελεῖν αὐτὸν σπουδάζουσαν ἀπωθεῖται λέγων: “μέθες· μί’ οὖσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.” καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν ἐκινεῖτο τῶν Θηβῶν, οὐ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· καὶ γὰρ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ἰδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν ἀναμάττηται. ὡς γὰρ οἱ γλυφεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελουμένων, καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες ἀεὶ πάντας ἐπ’ ἀκριβὲς τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσιν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν.

“peculiarities” of its impressor are stamped “skillfully” (τεχνικῶς).76 Several important things here need to be clarified. First, the word “peculiarity” (ἰδίωμα) can be ambiguous.

It could mean simply an attribute (συμβεβηκός), any property that is possessed by something, or more narrowly, a distinctive feature, that which distinguishes something from other things and defines it as a member of a class. Since throughout M 7 and 8 Sextus mostly uses ἰδίωμα in the latter sense,77 we can assume that it has the same meaning here.

If so, it follows that the impression that is “molded-in-from and sealed-in-from” its impressor grasps everything that makes the impressor distinctive, whether that consists in a single property, or a combination of properties.78

Second, Zeno’s use of the participles “molded-in-from” and “sealed-in-from” that contain the preposition “from” (ἀπὸ) strongly suggests that the process of grasping the impressor’s peculiarities has something to do with the causal relationship between the

76 Hankinson (1991: 283; 1995: 80; 2003: 61) has argued that what is standardly taken as the second clause in fact consists of two separate clauses, (1) “in accordance with that existent thing itself” and (2) “molded- in-from and sealed-in-from”. He argues persuasively that an impression could correctly represent the object from which it causally originated (i.e. satisfy 1) but still fail to have the right kind of causal connection with it (i.e. fail to satisfy 2). Indeed, the structure of Sextus’ report in T10 seems to suggest such a division. Although I agree wholeheartedly with Hankinson’s emphasis of the causal elements in the second clause, I can find no evidence of either the Stoics or the Academics discussing cases where an impression is caused by a real object and is in accordance with that object, but fails to have the right kind of causal connection with that object. Furthermore, it is not clear what new logical work would separating these requirements into independent clauses do in the context of the definition. Because of this, I think it is simpler to treat “molded- in-from and sealed-in-from in accordance with that existent thing itself” as a single clause. 77 Cf. M 7.55, 240; 8.425. 78 Cf. Frede 1999: 307–8. For example, the single property of having three angles would thus be the ἰδίωμα of all triangles. The properties of being rational, being mortal and being an animal would be the ἰδιώματα of all humans. Along the same lines, “a particular human being is a combination of color with size and shape and other such peculiarities” (SE M 7.346: χρώματος γὰρ μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). Thus, I have to disagree with those who interpret Sextus’ phrase πάντα ἰδιώματα as meaning simply “all properties” (cf. Annas 1990: 198–200) or “all properties belonging to a single sensory modality” (something like the latter view seems to be attributed to Sextus by LS 2.255, comm. on 41B, line 8), and see it as conflicting Cicero’s report in Acad. 1.42. Although the range of properties that makes a particular object distinct can be extensive, it is certainly smaller that the set of all properties that the object might have. On the other hand, I think that Sphaerus’ wax replica case (cf. DL 7.177) proves that the apprehensive impression must grasp properties of the impressor across different sensory modalities. For an alternative translation and interpretation of Cic. Acad. 1.42 which does not conflict with Sextus’ report in T10b, see Appendix A.

39 impression and the impressor established in the first clause. Our sources have preserved no detailed account of how this causal process is supposed to work. The best evidence we have is Arius Didymus’ report mentioned in section I, T5, that Zeno held that the impressor’s corporeal qualities cause those predicates (κατηγορήματα) that are the impressor’s actual attributes, a position that was adopted and maintained from Cleanthes to the time of Antipater. According to this account, when a subject entertains, for example, an impression caused by a white object, the impressor’s corporeal quality of whiteness is the cause of the predicate “is white” to become part of the predicative content79 of the impression.80 I suspect that, by using the words “molded-in-from” and “sealed-in-from”,

Zeno wanted to point out that the process of capturing the impressor’s peculiarities consists in this causal effect of the impressor’s qualities on the subject’s soul.

Indeed, a number of texts that can be associated with later Stoics seem to confirm this interpretation, albeit indirectly. Consider, for example, the following fragment that reports Antipater’s position:

[T11:] And the ones that are of the sort we have just outlined [viz. the impressions that are not from

something, οὐκ ἀπό τινος], Antipater calls these “empty”, although “not quite full” is given in some

manuscripts, such as those of a centaur or Charybdis. All these, then, are false, but of those that

come from something, some are in accordance with the beings themselves and convey their

79 By “predicative content” I mean that part of the rational impression’s semantic content that contains one or more predicates that are attached to the impressor. Although Zeno, as we have seen, probably understood impressions to be quite literal imprints in the soul produced by external objects, I think that in his understanding of predicates as incorporeals that have their causal origin in something corporeal we can already clearly see the seeds of the later Stoic theory rational impressions (λογικαί φαντασίαι, cf. DL 7.51). Fully developed, this theory claimed that every rational impression, although primarily a physical structure in the soul, is always accompanied by sayables (λεκτά), an incorporeal semantic items that include predicates (κατηγορήματα) and propositions (ἀξιώματα) that “subsist” in accordance with it (SE M 8.70; DL 7.43). 80 For reasons I cannot elaborate here, I disagree with Totschnig (2013: 139) who thinks that certain predicates can “exist” independently from being part of the semantic content on someone’s impression. On this issue, I side with Long 1971: 97.

character, others are misinscribed. We call the latter fraudulent, and classify them as false, but the

others true […]81

If the reconstruction is correct, the fragment confirms several of the main points already established in section I. The text contrasts impressions that are “not from something” (οὐκ

ἀπό τινος) with those that “come from something” (ἀπό τινος γινομένων), where

“something” seems to be understood as a being (ὄν), which for the Stoic means a corporeal

object. Impressions that do not come from bodies are classified as “empty”, while those

that do come from bodies are divided into two groups. The first group comprises those that

are “misinscribed” (παραγεγραμμέναι) or “fraudulent” (παρατυπωτικαί), and the second

those that are “in accordance with the bodies themselves” (κατ’ αὐτὰ τά ὄντα). The latter

seem to be impressions that satisfy the second clause of the definition of the apprehensive

impression. The text, however, adds a new element, reporting that Antipater thought that

the impression that satisfies the second clause conveys the “character” (χαρακτήρ) of the

corporeal impressor that produced it. Along the similar lines, Philo of Alexandria says:

[T12:] Impression is an imprint in the soul; like a signet ring or seal, each of the senses impressed

the intrinsic character of what it brought in. And like wax, the mind receives the mold and retains it

perfectly, until forgetfulness, the opponent of memory, levels out the imprint and makes it faint or

entirely effaces it.82

81 PBeorl inv. 16545: καὶ [ο]ἵας νῦν ὑπεγράψαμεν [δια]κένους ταύτας φησὶν ὁ [Ἀντ]ίπατρος, έν δέ τισιν ἀν[τιγρ]άφοις άποκένους, ὁποῖ[αί τι]νές εἰσιν Ἱπποκενταύ[ρου ἢ] Χαρύβδεως. αὗται μὲν [οὖν ἅ]πασαι ψευδεῖς ὑπάρχου[σι, τῶ]ν δὲ ἀπό τινος γιν[ομένων] αἱ μέν εἰσι κατ’ αὐτὰ [τά ὄντα κἀ]κείνων ἀναφέρουσι χα[ρακτ]ῆρα, αἱ δὲ παραγεγραμ[μέν]αι. καλοῦμεν δὲ ταύτας [παρ]ατυπωτικάς, και ταύ[τας μ]ὲν ἐν τῶ[ι] τῶν ψευδῶν [γένει,] τὰς δ’ [ἄλλα]ς ἀληθεῖς […]. The reconstructed text here is quoted from Backhouse (2000), which differs slightly from the one in Szymański (1990). 82 Philo, Quod deus sit immutabilis 43: φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ· ὧν γὰρ εἰσήγαγεν ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὥσπερ δακτύλιός τις ἢ σφραγὶς ἐναπεμάξατο τὸν οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα· κηρῷ δὲ ἐοικὼς ὁ νοῦς τὸ ἐκμαγεῖον δεξάμενος ἄκρως παρ’ ἑαυτῷ φυλάττει, μέχρις ἂν ἡ ἀντίπαλος μνήμης τὸν τύπον λεάνασα λήθη

The passage, obviously influenced heavily by the Stoic theory of impression, says that

through each of the senses, the perceived thing impresses83 its “intrinsic character” (οἰκεῖος

χαρακτήρ) on the soul. The phrase “intrinsic character” is attested as Stoic in Simplicius’

discussion in In Ar. cat. 165,32–167,35. The phrase seems to have been used by Boethus,

which gives us good reason to think that it has the same meaning as for Antipater, because both were students of Diogenes of Babylon. For Boethus, the word “character” refers to that in virtue of which bodies are differentiated (κατὰ διαφοράν), which for the Stoics are the qualities of corporeal objects. A similar idea seems to be echoed by Sextus’ report that

“one who has the apprehensive impression skillfully fastens on the underlying differentiation in the things [ὑπούσῃ τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾷ]” (SE M 7.252 = T13 below).

Since the Stoics thought that objects are differentiated in virtue of their intrinsic character or qualities, skillfully grasping the underlying differentiation in things would consist in skillfully capturing this intrinsic character by capturing the object’s qualities through the causal process described by Zeno in T5.

It is important, however, to distinguish the following two aspects of the character in virtue of which the Stoics thought objects can be differentiated. On the one hand, all objects belonging to a certain class “share the character of their genus” (μέτεστι ὁ γενικὸς

χαρακτήρ), that is, the common quality or qualities in virtue of which they belong to that class (Simpl. In Ar. cat. 238,15–20 = LS 47 S5). Thus, an impression that satisfies the

ἀμυδρὸν ἐργάσηται ἢ παντελῶς ἀφανίσῃ. (Reading ὧν with Colson & Whitaker (1988: 30) instead of ἃ in Teubner). 83 More precisely, the verb used is ἐναπεμάξατο, “impresses-in-from”, which strikingly resembles the complex participles ἐναπομεμαγμένη and ἐναπεσφραγισμένη that appear in Zeno’s version of the second clause.

second clause and thus conveys the character of the impressor’s genus will skillfully grasp

the properties caused by those qualities that define the class to which the impressor belongs.

For example, if such an impression were caused by a Molossian dog, it would skillfully grasp those common qualities in virtue of which the dog belongs to the genus of Molossian dogs.84 On the other hand, however, one of the central principles of Stoic ontology was

that no two particular existent objects are qualitatively identical even if they belong to some

common genus—or, in other words, that each particular object is ontologically unique—

which is often in contemporary literature equated with the principle of the identity of

indiscernibles.85 Some of the Academics’ objections attacked the apprehensive impression by trying to show that it could fail to distinguish between extremely similar objects, and this indicates that Zeno though that it can. Since the Stoic understood this principle to imply that each thing also belongs to its own genus (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.50), we should expect of an impression that is “skillful” (τεχνικῶς) and, as Sextus also says,86 “perfect” (ἄκρως) in

grasping that which differentiates things to capture both the qualities in virtue of which the impressor belongs to some broader genus as well as those that make it ontologically unique, that is, those qualities in virtue of which it belongs to its own genus.

Grasping that which makes an object ontologically unique, however, might not be sufficient for its correct identification, which, as we have seen, is demanded by the accordance relationship described in T10a. Consider the following example. Let us say that yesterday I have received an impression of Socrates that grasped a unique set of Socrates’

84 The example with the Molossian dog is used by Simplicius’ as illustration of Stoic generic character, although he does not discuss it in the context of Stoic apprehension. 85 Plut. Com. not. 1077C = LS 28 O1; Cic. Acad. 2.50, 54-6. 86 SE M 7.248 = LS 40E3: “they [viz. the Stoics] believe that this [viz. the apprehensive] impression is capable of grasping the external objects perfectly, and is stamped skillfully with all the peculiarities that pertain to them” (ἄκρως γὰρ πιστούμενοι ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς ἰδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην).

properties {P1, P2, …, Pn}. This impression was sufficient to enable me to distinguish

Socrates from Plato, who has the unique set of properties {Q1, Q2, …, Qn}. However, let

us say that today I encounter Socrates again, but in the meantime, he has shaved his beard

and now has a new unique set of properties {P1, P2, …, Pn-1}. If I receive an impression

grasping an object with the set of properties {P1, P2, …, Pn-1}, I would still be able to

distinguish this object from Plato. My impression, however, would not guarantee that I

would be able to recognize and identify that object as the shaved Socrates, and not a new

person with the unique set of properties {P1, P2, …, Pn-1}. Thus, in order to be able to

identify or recognize a particular object as that object, my impression must not only be able

to grasp that which makes that object different from all other objects, but also that which

makes that object diachronically identical to itself. Fortunately, this problem does not arise

for the Stoics, since the same theory in their ontology—the theory of the “peculiarly

qualified individual” (ἰδίως ποιὸν)—that establishes each object as unique is the one that

also establishes each object a diachronically self-identical individual. According to them,

each object is a peculiarly qualified individual that both lasts unchanged from the moment

of generation to the moment of the destruction of the individual, and is different from all

other objects currently existing in the world because it possesses a “peculiar quality” (ἴδιος

ποιότης).87 We should assume, therefore, that the predicates grasped by the impression that

is “molded-in-from and sealed-in-from in accordance with the existent thing itself”, must

87 Cf. Plut. Comm. not. 1083C–D = LS 28 A3-4 and Stob. 1.177,21–179,17 = LS 28 D. The former seems to represent Chrysippus’ position, while the latter is explicitly attributed to Posidonius. I see no reason not to attribute the same essential position to Zeno. It is not clear whether the Stoics though that any corporeal object whatsoever is a peculiarly qualified individual, or only some limited class of objects (e.g. ensouled beings). Plutarch (ibid. 1083E–F = LS 28 A7) suggests the former (although he might be mocking the Stoics), while some contemporary scholars have argued the latter (e.g. Lewis 1995; Irwin 1996). For the reasons that are too extensive to discuss here, I lean towards the former position.

44 include those that are caused by the quality or qualities88 that make the impressor peculiarly qualified, in addition to other qualities.89 By grasping the predicates caused by the qualities that make the impressor peculiarly qualified, the impression would allow the subject to form the conception (ἔννοια) of that object, which Zeno thought was one of the central roles of the apprehensive impression.90 Furthermore, it would also allow us to use that conception later to recall from the memory the previous instances of perceiving the object

with those same attributes.91 This would enable the subject to learn to identify particular objects, and to recognize them during subsequent encounters.92 Indeed, this ability of the

impression that satisfies the second clause to skillfully and perfectly grasp the actual

qualities of its impressor—including its peculiar quality—and allow the subject to identify

88 It is not clear what exactly the peculiar quality of objects consists in according to the Stoics. Dexippus (In Ar. cat. 30,20–6 = LS 28J) suggests that the Stoics thought that an object is peculiarly qualified in virtue of a combination of qualities; thus “one individual is marked off by ‘hooknosedness’ or ‘fairhairedness’ or some other combination of qualities [συνδρομῇ ποιοτήτων], another by ‘snubnosedness’ or ‘baldness’ or ‘grayeyedness’, and another again by some other [combination]”. Something like this view is sometimes discussed by Sextus, although without attributing it to the Stoics (e.g. M 7.346). Dexippus’ report suggests that each peculiar quality consists of a unique and stable combination of common qualities (κοιναί ποιότητες). However, as Long & Sedley note (2.174), this approach is unsatisfactory because a peculiarly qualified individual could arguably lose most of these qualities while remaining the same individual. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Stoics thought that each object does possess a peculiar quality that makes it both ontologically unique and diachronically self-identical. 89 According to what we have seen, the apprehensive impression is able to capture any property that can be caused by the object’s peculiar quality, its common qualities, as well as those belonging to the third Stoic category, “dispositions” (πρός τι, cf. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 166,15-29 = LS 28C). It is possible that the properties belonging to the fourth category, the “relatively disposed” (πρός τί πως ἔχον), i.e. extrinsic relations, could also be included if they are caused by the object’s character (χαρακτῆρ), as Boethus seems to think (cf. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 167,2–4). 90 According to Cic. Acad 1.42, Zeno thought that “nature had given apprehension as a standard and starting point of knowledge of the world; it was the source from which our conceptions [notionem] of things were later stamped on our minds”. The Latin notio here obviously translates the Stoic term ἔννοια, “conception” (cf. his Top. 31), although elsewhere Cicero also uses notitia, as for example in Acad. 2.22. 91 Here I agree with Crivelli (2010: 400) who also argues that the peculiar quality is the foundation of our ability to identify, form memories, and recognize particular objects. 92 This recognitional ability is crucial, because one of the main lines of the Academics’ attack on the apprehensive impression was the challenge to recognize whether the object perceived at time t is the same or different one from another similar object perceived at some later time tʹ (cf. SE M 7.409–10 = T15 below).

the impressor unmistakably is probably what the Stoics meant by the apprehensive

impression’s property of being “thoroughly imprinted” (ἔκτυπος).93

The next thing to consider is how an impression that is caused by an existent object can fail to satisfy the second clause according to the Stoics. Based on Sextus’ examples, the obvious answer would be if it misidentifies its impressor as something else, for example, Electra as a Fury, or Heracles’ children as that of Eurystheus. But how exactly could that happen according to the Stoics? Our sources are not explicit about this. It seems,

however, that the Stoics around Antipater had a technical term for such impressions,

“fraudulent” (παρατυπωτικάς, T11), which is also attested in Sextus (M 8.67). Although

Sextus does not explain in detail how impressions get to be fraudulent, perhaps Galen, the

only other author who uses the term, could offer a clue. He describes fraudulent

impressions as the result of defects in the process of sensation. Fraudulent sensation occurs

“whenever people happen to see colors, shapes, magnitudes or dispositions altered” (ὅταν

ὑπηλλαγμένα ταῖς χρόαις ἢ τοῖς σχήμασιν ἢ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἢ ταῖς σχέσεσιν ὁρῶντες

τύχωσιν) and provides a detailed description of physiological defects that cause it for each

sense.94 Perhaps the same basic idea of defective sense perception is behind Sextus’

examples of fraudulent impressions, which involve perception occurring in a temporarily

deranged mind. If so, then impressions that fail to satisfy the second clause are fraudulent

because they misrepresent, or as Antipater would say, “misinscribe” some of the qualities

of their impressors. Given how the process of recognizing objects works according to

Stoics, it is not hard to see how misrepresentation of its qualities could lead to the

93 DL 7.46; the other property that is attributed to the apprehensive impression in this passage, that of being “clear” (τρανής), will be discussed in section III below. 94 Galen, Caus. Symp. 1.4.1-2 [K 7.104−7]. Interestingly, in Diff. symp. 3.1 [K 7.56] Galen distinguishes fraudulent from “faint” (ἀμυδρῶς) sensation.

misidentification of the impressor. Namely, if Orestes’ impression, which is caused by

Electra, due to his temporary madness misrepresents certain qualities of her body and

depicts her as a “bloody-looking, dragon-shaped girl”,95 it can easily trigger the thought of

a Fury in Orestes’ mind, thus leading him to misidentify Electra as Fury. Similarly,

Heracles’ impression that was caused by his own children but misrepresented some of their

properties so that they corresponded to the properties of Eurystheus’ children, can easily

trigger the conception of Eurystheus’ children previously stored in his memory, and lead

Heracles to the misidentify his own children as that of Eurystheus. Still, the most important

aspect of fraudulent impressions is that they lead to the misidentification of the impressor.

Because of this, although fraudulent impressions do come from what is huparchon, since

they are caused by a spatiotemporally present real object, they are also as from what is not

huparchon: Orestes’ impression from Electra is “as from a Fury” (ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, SE M

7.245), and Heracles’ impression from his own children represents them “as Eurystheus’”

(ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, SE M 7.405). This will become important later for understanding the third

clause of the definition, because it will enable Zeno to include fraudulent impressions under

those which are “such that they could come from what is not huparchon” even though they

do in fact come from what is huparchon.

Based on everything we said, the requirement of the second clause of the definition

can therefore be formulated in the following way; an impression satisfies the second clause

if and only if:

95 Cf. SE M 8.57; Eurip. Orestes 256.

A(1) All predicates P1, P2, …, Pn contained in the impression’s predicative

content are actual attributes (συμβεβηκότα) of the impressor, that is,

they are caused by and accurately represent (i.e. do not misinscribe) the

present qualities Q1, Q2, …, Qn of the impressor, and

A(2) The impressions’ predicative content must contain predicates that are

caused by those qualities that make the impressor peculiarly qualified.

Although it does not explicitly mention truth, this formulation makes it clear that the second clause expresses a form of the Veridicality Requirement discussed in section I above.

Namely, the Stoics, as we have seen in T7 & T8, thought that true impression is one based

on which we can make only a true proposition, and that true proposition is one in which

the predicate is an actual attribute (συμβεβηκός) of the impressor. If all predicates in an

impression are caused by the qualities presently possessed by the impressor and if the

impression misrepresents none of these qualities, then the impression could never

misidentify its impressor or attach an incorrect predicate to it, and would thus be true

according to the Stoic definition from T7.

Before concluding this section, one final question needs to be addressed regarding the Stoic distinction between fraudulent and empty impressions, and the difference between the second and the first clause of the definition. Namely, why is Orestes’ impression, which was caused by Electra but which misidentified her as a Fury, classified as fraudulent and not as empty? If the impression represents a Fury as its intentional object, and the Furies are fictional entities, then shouldn’t Orestes’ impression be ἀπὸ μὴ

ὑπάρχοντος, that is, shouldn’t it count as coming from something non-existent?96 This question points to a larger problem that could arise for the interpretation I am proposing here regarding the difference between the requirements of the first and the second clauses.97

Consider, for example, the following two impressions, the impression that Centaur is walking coming from the phantasm of Centaur, and the impression that Dion is yellow- haired coming from real Dion who in fact has white hair.98 According to the Stoic classification, the first impression, that Centaur is walking, would be empty—it fails to satisfy the first clause because Centaur is a pure fabrication of the mind, and counts as an impression “from what is not existent” (ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος). The second impression, that

Dion is yellow-haired, would be fraudulent—it comes from an existent object, Dion, but it is not in accordance with Dion, because it misrepresents the white color of Dion’s hair as yellow and thus fails to satisfy the second clause. However, according to Zeno and

Chrysippus’ causal theory of predicates discussed above in T5 and T6, it seems that in this impression the predicate “is yellow-haired” caused by Dion’s white hair does not exist (οὐχ

ὑπάρχει) because it is not an actual attribute (συμβεβηκός) of the impressor, Dion. In other

96 Answering this question is important because the second clause can easily become a source of confusion. Examples of such confusion are Frede (1986: 164-5; 1999: 302) and Backhouse (2000: 29), who interpret Heracles’ impression in SE M 7.405-7, which misrepresents Heracles’ children as that of Eurystheus, as an impression ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, although the impression is caused by something real, Heracles’ children. They both take this as evidence that, for the Stoics, ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος cannot mean “from a real object”. However, this interpretation does not stand for the following two reasons: first, in M 7.405-7, Sextus never uses ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος in connection to Heracles’ impression—he only says that the impression is false (ψεύδης); second, in M 8.67 he explicitly says that the Stoics classified this impression as fraudulent because it is ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος but not κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον. As I have already argued in section I, the Stoics thought that impressions ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος can be false, and we now see that the typical examples of such impressions are those that are classified as fraudulent. Although in Sextus this idea perhaps does not come across clearly enough, it is explicitly stated in Antipater’s fragment quoted above (T11). 97 I am grateful to Richard Bett for pointing out this potential problem to me. 98 These examples are my own and do not occur in our sources. However, they are designed to comply completely with the language of those examples that are found in our sources and that we have discussed so far. Thus, the impression “Centaur is walking” would be ἱπποκένταυρος περιπατεῖ, and the impression “Dion is yellow-haired” would be Δίων ξανθοτριχεῖ that is ἀπὸ Δίωνος λευκότριχος. (For an attestation of the rare verbs ξανθοτριχεῖν and λευκοτριχεῖν, see Strabo, Geo. 6.1.13)

words, it seems that both impressions involve something that is not existent (μὴ ὑπάρχον).

Does not that mean that they both fail to satisfy the first clause? If it does, then that would obviously make the second clause redundant.

The fact that the Stoics distinguished between empty and fraudulent impressions suggests that the answer to this question must be negative. None of our sources, however, offers an explicit explanation why. Given everything said above, however, it seems that

their answer would have to be something along the following lines. In order to appreciate

fully the distinction between empty and fraudulent impressions, it is crucial to keep in mind

that the causal origins of predicates attributed to the impressor are different. In the case of

empty impressions, the predicates originate from a phantasm, a mere figment of the mind, and not from the qualities of a real external object. For example, in the impression “Centaur is walking”, the predicate “is walking” is not caused by Centaur’s actual quality of walking, but comes from a quasi-quality of a phantasm that is a fabrication of the mind.99 On the

other hand, in a fraudulent impression, the predicates are caused by actual properties of the

external corporeal object, but they misrepresent these qualities. In other words, while

nothing in an empty impression has its immediate causal correlate in the external world,

the predicates in a fraudulent impression do have such causal correlates—they causally

originate in the external object’s corporeal qualities. In the impression “Dion is yellow-

haired” caused by Dion who is white-haired, the predicate “is yellow-haired” has its causal

origin in something external—namely, Dion’s actual hair. The problem with fraudulent

impressions that fail to satisfy the second clause is not that their predicates do not originate

99 As we have seen in n. 25 above, the Stoics thought that phantasms are not really qualified, but only “as if qualified”, which seems to mean that their qualities are purely imaginary. Although the Centaur’s imaginary qualities are products of something corporeal—namely, our soul—they have no physical correlates in the external world.

50 causally in something external, but that these predicates misrepresent their origins due to a distortion occurring in the perceiver’s mind.100 Thus, even though—according to texts T5

and T6—the predicate “is yellow-haired” as attributed to Dion does not ὑπάρχει in what

we called the derived sense of ὑπάρχειν in section I, the impression that Dion is yellow-

haired caused by Dion who is white-haired still counts as an impression ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος

because Dion ὑπάρχει in the non-derived sense of ὑπάρχειν. This distinction revels the how

the Stoics might have seen the difference between impressions that fail to satisfy the first

and those that fail to satisfy the second clause of the definition of the apprehensive

impression.

III.

Both of our most detailed sources, Cicero and Sextus, suggest that the Stoics added a third

clause to the definition of the apprehensive impression in reaction to criticisms raised by

the Academics. In fact, Cicero reports101 that the third clause was added by Zeno himself in response to an objection first put forward by Arcesilaus:

100 We should not be deceived by the fact that the Stoics though that both the empty and the fraudulent impressions occur in abnormal states of mind. In our sources, empty impressions are most commonly associated with mental states such as dreaming or divine revelations produced in some form of trance (cf. the impression about Dion in SE M 7.245; Cic. Acad. 2.47). Fraudulent impressions, on the other hand, are usually associated with pathological states of the mind (like Orestes’ madness in SE M 7.244−5 and 8.57). However, from the discussion that looks like an expansion on the Stoic fraudulent impressions in Galen’s Caus. Symp. 1.4.1 [K 7.104−7], it seems that these most commonly arise from the pathology of the sense organs themselves. 101 There may be reasons to doubt that this report describes an actual exchange between Zeno and Arcesilaus (I am thankful to Henry Dyson for pointing this out to me). First, Zeno was almost twenty years older than Arcesilaus, and the latter become scholarch of the Academy only two years before Zeno died. Second, Cicero’s use of the word portasse (“perhaps” or “possibly”) near the beginning of his report in Acad. 2.77 suggests that the exchange was merely hypothetical. However, it is entirely possible that Arcesilaus started arguing against Zeno’s theory of the apprehensive impression long before becoming scholarch. In addition,

[T13:] He [Zeno] then defined it [viz. the apprehensive impression] in the following manner: an

impression from what is, stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is. After that, [a] Arcesilaus

went on to ask what would happen if a true impression was just like a false one. At this point, [b]

Zeno was sharp enough to see that no impression would be apprehensive if one that came from what

is was such that there could be one just like it from what is not. [c] Arcesilaus agreed that this was

a good addition to the definition, since neither a false impression, nor a true impression just like a

false one, was apprehensive. [d] So then he set to work with his arguments, to show that there is no

impression from something true such that there could not be one just like it from something false.102

Arcesilaus’ objection to Zeno’s first two clauses of the definition consisted in two premises. First, the claim that if a true impression can be “just like” a false one, then neither of the two is apprehensive, and second that no true impression is such that there could not be a false one just like it, with the intended conclusion that there are no apprehensive impressions. The same version of Arcesilaus’ second premise is attested in Sextus, who reports that Arcesilaus argued that apprehension does not exist because “no true impression

at least one other source, Numenius (in Eusebius, Prep. ev. 14.5.11-6.14; cf. LS 68 G), offers a lengthy report describing Zeno and Arcesilaus’ serious philosophical dispute over the apprehensive impression. Because of this, I believe that Cicero’s report, although perhaps not describing a particular single conversation between Zeno and Arcesilaus that actually took place, nevertheless makes it very likely that Zeno indeed forged the definition of the apprehensive impression under the influence of Arcesilaus’ criticism. This implies that the third clause of the definition was added by Zeno himself, and not by some later Stoic (e.g. by Chrysippus, as Hankinson 1991: 284 suggests; Hankinson seems to change his mind later and in 2003: 68 attributes the third clause to Zeno). 102 Acad. 2.77-8 = LS 40 D: tum illum ita definisse: ex eo quod esset sicut esset inpressum et signatum et effictum. post requisitum etiamne si eius modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum. hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est cuius modi ab eo quod non est posset esse. recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum, neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eius modi etiam a falso possit esse.

52 is found to be such that it could not be false” (M 7.154: οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθὴς φαντασία

εὑρίσκεται οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής).103 Sextus further reports:

[T14] [a] “Such that it would not come from what is not huparchon” they [viz. the Stoics] added [to

the definition] because the Academics did not suppose, as the Stoics did, that it would be impossible

for one that was in all respects indistinguishable to be found. [b] For they [the Stoics] say that the

person who has the apprehensive impression skillfully gets in touch with the underlying difference

in the things, since this kind of impression has a certain peculiarity, compared with other

impressions, like what horned snakes have compared with other snakes.104

The report confirms Cicero’s testimony that the addition of the third clause was motivated by the Stoics’ disagreement with the Academics. It explains that the Academics claimed

that all true impressions are indistinguishable (ἀπαράλλακτοι) from false ones, while the

Stoics denied this by claiming that there is one kind of true impression, the apprehensive

impression, which is οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, “such that it could not come

103 Strictly speaking, the two versions of Arcesilaus’ objection are not identical. Cicero’s version says that for every true impression, there is another false impression that is just like the first one, while Sextus’ suggests that for every true impression, that same impression could be false. The second version might seem especially confusing since it suggests that there is a way in which a true impression can at the same time be false, or that it can become false. This, no doubt, should be understood in the light of Stoic category of impressions that are simultaneously true and false (SE M 7.244-5). As we have seen in section I above, both “empty” (e.g. the impression entertained in a dream that Dion is present, while real Dion is not present) and “fraudulent” (e.g. Orestes’ impression that this is a Fury caused by real Electra who is not a Fury) can belong to the category if impressions that are “both true and false” because the subject could make both a true and a false predication based on each impression. Thus, the second version of Arcesilaus’ objection, “no true impression is found to be such that it could not be false”, can be understood as the claim that every impression allegedly belonging to the category of true impressions in fact belongs to the category of impressions that are both true and false, i.e. that there is no category of impressions that are true simpliciter. It seems, however, that in the context of their dispute over the apprehensive impressions both Arcesilaus and Zeno took these two versions of the objection to be equivalent, which is further confirmed by Carneades who combines both versions into a single objection (SE M 7.164). 104 M 7.252: τὸ δὲ “οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος” προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασι κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὑρεθήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γάρ φασιν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπούσῃ τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾷ, ἐπείπερ καὶ εἶχέ τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἡ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κεράσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις·

from what is not huparchon.” It further suggests that the Stoics believed that apprehensive

impressions have a “peculiarity” (ἰδίωμα) that distinguishes them from other impressions.

In M 1.225-7, Sextus uses horned snakes to illustrate how even though all snakes may share

an attribute (συμβεβηκός) because they are similar in kind (ὁμοειδής), the horned ones,

being of a single kind (μονοειδής), may still have another attribute that is peculiar (ἴδιον)

just to them. If his point with the horned snake example in T14 is similar as in M 1, then

Sextus and his sources105 thought that the Stoics believed that apprehensive impressions,

although belonging to the genus of impressions, still compose a special class characterized

by some peculiar attribute, or distinctive feature, and that this feature is somehow related

to the third clause of the definition. But, what exactly is this “peculiarity” (ἰδίωμα) supposed to consist in? How is the fact that the apprehensive impression is such that it could not come from a huparchon related to this ἰδίωμα, if at all? Finally, what is the relationship between the third and the first two clauses?

In order to answer these questions, we have to look more closely at Arcesilaus’ objection to Zeno’s definition. We have seen in T13 that the essence of this objection was that the first two clauses do not ensure that the impression satisfying their conditions will not be “just like” another false impression. The idea is echoed again in the general

Academic argument summarized in Acad. 2.40-1, where we are told that by saying that one impression is “just like” another, the Academics had in mind the sense of “to not differ at all” (nihil interesse), which is further described as “when not only they are just like each

105 Sextus’ sources were probably Academic: compare his conclusion in M 7.411 after expounding Carneades’ arguments against the apprehensive impression: “The apprehensive impression, then, does not have any peculiarity by which it differs from false and non-apprehensive impressions.” Cf. Lucullus’ discussion in Cic. Acad. 2.50, 52.

other in every respect, but also when they cannot be discriminated.”106 Thus, by arguing

that true impressions are “just like” or “indistinguishable” (ἀπαράλλακτοι) from false ones,

they meant this to refer to identity in their representational content and phenomenal quality

in the subject’s mind. Sextus provides further details—which are paralleled in Cicero—on

how the Academics argued for the representational identity of true and false impressions.

Apparently, Carneades used two main arguments aimed specifically at showing that

apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions are indistinguishable and that, therefore,

the apprehensive impression does not possess an ἰδίωμα, a distinctive feature (SE M 7.411).

Since Carneades’ main claim about the apprehensive impression was identical to that of

Arcesilaus—that no true impression is such that it could not be false107—we can assume

that Carneades’ arguments at least to some extent originate in the debate between

Arcesilaus and Zeno. The first of these arguments (SE M 7.403-7; cf. Cic. Acad. 2.47-52

and 87-90) focuses on the indistinguishability between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions in terms of being “plain” (ἐναργεῖς), “striking” (πληκτικαί), and “intense”

(ἔντονοι)108 by relying on examples of impressions entertained in abnormal mental states

like dreams and madness. It is not entirely clear what the difference between these properties, if any, was supposed to consist in according to the Stoics, but it seems that they

were related to the accuracy with which an impression represents the impressor, and the

degree of convincingness with which the impression causes the subject’s assent (SE M

7.257-8, 402-8; cf. Cic. Acad. 2.34, 38). The second argument (SE M 7.408-11; cf. Cic.

106 non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint sed etiam si discerni non possint. 107 SE M 7.164: οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής (“no true [impression] is such that it could not be false”). 108 For a more detailed discussion of the Stoic position on these and other properties of impressions, see Chapter 2.

Acad. 2.54-6 and 84-5) aimed at establishing the indistinguishability between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions in terms of their “mark” (χαρακτήρ) and “imprint”

(τύπος) by invoking cases of impressions about twin objects, i.e. impressions caused by real objects that are numerically distinct but qualitatively identical or at least extremely similar. From Carneades’ examples, it seems that the Stoics understood the apprehensive impression’s “mark” and “imprint” to be related to the fact that it is “thoroughly imprinted”

(ἔκτυπος), i.e. that it not only captures the impressor’s qualities correctly, but with completeness that allows the unmistakable identification of the impressor.

A number of texts suggest that the Stoics indeed thought that there is an important link between these properties and apprehensive impressions. We have seen that for the

Stoics paradigmatic cases of non-apprehensive impressions are “empty” impressions occurring in abnormal mental states like dreams, madness, etc. A number of texts describe the Academics arguing that such impressions can be equally “plain”, “clear” and “striking” as those coming from real objects and entertained in normal mental states (cf. e.g. SE M

7.403-8 and Cic. Acad. 2.88-9), which suggests that the Stoics argued that apprehensive impressions possess some kind of exceptional plainness and strikingness. Furthermore,

Antiochus, whom Cicero portrays as an advocate of epistemology especially influenced by the Stoic Antipater and his followers,109 seems to defend the view that plainness (ἐνάργεια, perspicuitas, evidentia, Acad. 2.17) is the distinctive feature of the apprehensive impression alluded to in the third clause.110 Other texts also suggest that Antipater and his followers

109 Cf. Brittain 2012: 105. 110 The most telling text in this respect is Cic. Acad. 2.32-5. There, Lucullus, who represents Antiochus’ views in the discussion, criticizes the Academics for making a distinction between plain and apprehensive impressions, implying that apprehensive impressions must be plain. He also mentions that the apprehensive impression possesses a “peculiar mark” (propria nota, 35) that distinguishes it from false impressions.

associated plainness and strikingness with apprehensive impressions.111 Similarly, they

often say that apprehensive impressions possess properties that should be understood as

related to a special “mark” and “imprint.” For example, Sextus’ report in M 7.252 (= T13)

makes it sound like the apprehensive impression’s ἰδίωμα is related to the fact that it

“skillfully gets in touch with the underlying difference in the things,” and that this

“skillfulness” consists in its ability to capture all peculiarities of the impressor (M 7.215 =

T10b). In 7.46, Diogenes says that the Stoics thought that the apprehensive impression is

“thoroughly imprinted” (ἔκτυπος). In T11 above, Antipater emphasizes that apprehensive

impressions are “in accordance with the beings themselves and convey their character.” It

is, therefore, reasonable to assume that Zeno and his followers thought that the

apprehensive impression’s distinctive feature has something to do with one or both of these

groups of properties, and that the third clause of the definition somehow refers to them.

The first thing to note, however, is that all the properties of impressions mentioned

above are related to meeting the requirements of the first two clauses, not the third.112 In section II we have established that an impression satisfying the second clause has the ability

to grasp its impressor and its properties skillfully and precisely. If an impression’s

plainness and strikingness, as our sources suggest,113 depend on this ability then it possess

these properties because it satisfies the second, not the third clause of the definition. The

same is true of the apprehensive impression’s special “mark” and “imprint” which is related

to the representational accuracy and completeness that enables it to provide correct

111 The chief text is SE M 7.257-8 ascribed to “younger Stoics.” See also Plutarch, who calls the Stoics advocates of plainness (Comm. not. 1083C), and cites a passage from Antipater that mentions the term ἐνάργεια (Sto. rep. 1051E). 112 Cf. Frede 1999: 312. 113 E.g. SE M 7.258; cf. also Cic. Acad. 2.34: “but how could you say that something is plainly (perspicue) white when it is possible that something black is giving rise to the impression that it is white?”

identification of the impressor. Although it may seem attractive to suppose that the second clause only establishes the impression’s accuracy, while the third adds the kind of completeness that ensures the correct grasp of the object’s identity, the texts do not support this interpretation. It is true that our most detailed clause-by-clause report on the definition,

Sextus M 7.249-52 (= T10 + T13), could perhaps be read in a way that implies such an interpretation. For example, one could argue that Sextus’ account of the second clause is contained to section 249 (= T10a), while the account of the third clause begins already with section 250 (= T10b) and continues until the end of section 252 (= T13). Accordingly, satisfying the second clause would merely establish that the properties of the impressor that have been captured are represented correctly (thereby satisfying only our condition

A(1) from section II), but not that the range of these captured properties is complete enough to ensure the inclusion of all the relevant properties of the impressor required for apprehension, that Sextus talks about in 250-1 (= T10b) and mentions again in 252. But, the problem with this proposal is that the examples in Sextus’ reports suggest that the Stoics thought that correct identification of the impressor, which is supposed to be the result of precision and “skillfulness,” is already secured if the impression satisfies the first two clauses. Orestes’ impression of Electra as a Fury and Heracles’ impression of Thebes as

Mycenae in M 7.249 (= T10a) both come from a huparchon, but misidentify it because they are “not in accordance with that huparchon itself” (οὐ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον). In

Carneades’ example with Castor and Polydeuces (M 7.410), the subject’s impression correctly identifies Castor even though the impression satisfies the first two clauses but is not “such that it could not come from what is not huparchon,” as it’s pointed out earlier in

58 section 402. Thus, an impression’s “mark” and “imprint” is also related to satisfying the second, and not the third clause.

This link between meeting the conditions of the first two clauses of the definition and the properties of plainness, strikingness, clarity, and thorough imprintedness has been well recognized by modern scholars. In fact, it is the reason why many have argued that

the third clause is logically redundant, i.e. that it does not introduce a further condition an

impression has to meet in addition to the first two in order to count as apprehensive. For

example, according to Frede, “the Stoics think that any impression which satisfies the first

two conditions will in fact also satisfy the third condition but that they add the third clause because this implication is denied by the Academics, though both agree that cognitive impressions, in order to play the role assigned to them by the Stoics, would have to satisfy the third condition, too” (1983/7: 165-6; cf. 1999: 312). This view has become the standard interpretation of the third clause.114

There are, however, good reasons to think that this interpretation of the role of the third clause is wrong. Namely, it implies that Zeno believed that every impression that comes from something huparchon and is in accordance with that huparchon, is

114 Cf. LS 2.246, comm. on 40E; Allen 1997: 232; Striker concludes that Zeno understood the third clause as logically redundant (1997: 266). Reed (2002: 161) also agrees that the third clause does not introduce a new requirement, although his interpretation of the third clause is “non-standard.” Namely, he argues that while Zeno was probably an indirect realist, Chrysippus and the later Stoics shifted their view on perceptual experience towards a form of disjunctivist direct realism, and that the addition of the third clause to the definition indicates this shift (ibid. 167-80). Although inspiring, the interpretation is problematic because it finds little support in the texts. Reed’s chief piece of textual evidence is Aetius 4.12.1-5 (=T2), where Chrysippus makes a strong distinction between impression (φαντασία), which is caused by an external object provides to the subject direct awareness of that object, and imagination (φανταστικὸν) or “empty attraction” (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός), which does not provide awareness of external objects although it can sometimes produce subjective experience that is identical to impression. The fact that Chrysippus refuses to characterize imagination as simply another sub-class of impression (one that “comes from no impressor,” ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον) and the sharp difference in their respective causal explanations suggests to Reed that Chrysippus was a disjunctivist direct realist. However, there is overwhelming evidence that other Stoics classified “empty attractions”—i.e. imaginations—among φαντασίαι, and a lot of this evidence comes precisely from the later Stoics like Antipater (cf. T11 above).

59 automatically such that it could not come from what is not huparchon. Combining the

results of our discussion so far, this would mean that Zeno believed that impressions that

satisfy the first two clauses cannot be representationally identical—i.e. identical in terms

of plainness, strikingness, clarity, mark or imprint—to impressions coming from what is

not a spatiotemporally present object. But, there are three reasons to think that neither Zeno

nor the later Stoics would have believed this. First, the Stoics thought that normally

functioning human mind regularly uses concepts (ἐννοήματά). However, they classified

concepts among phantasms (φαντάσματα), and evidence suggests that this classification,

as well as many important aspects of their theory of concepts, originated with Zeno

himself.115 A concept is the intentional object of “conception” (ἔννοια), a mental process like impression (φαντασία), but with the difference that conceptions consist in memory of

past sensations.116 Because of this, (at least some) impressions coming purely from concepts would belong to the class of impressions coming from what is not huparchon.117

Now, if Zeno believed that impressions coming from phantasms could not rival

impressions that satisfy the first two clauses in terms of the quality of their “imprint,” this

would mean no impression coming purely from a concept of an object could rival an

115 For the classification of concepts as φαντάσματα, see DL 7.61 and Aetius 4.11.4-5. When I say that this classification originates with Zeno, I primarily have in mind the passage in Stobaeus 1.136,21-137,6 which begins with Zeno’s name. More generally, it seems clear that Zeno and his immediate followers like Cleanthes (cf. Syrianus, In Ar. met. 105,28) attacked Plato for his hypostatization of Forms. Thus, the claim that the Forms are “nonexsitent” (ἀνύπαρκτοι—something that is not huparktos) and nothing more than our concepts can plausibly be traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes’ attack on Platonic Forms, together with the characterization that a concept is a phantasm of the (rational) soul and thought (διανοία) that is neither “some being” (τὶ ὂν) nor a “qualified thing” (ποιόν), but only “as-if” (ὡσανεὶ) some being and “as-if” a qualified thing (see n. 25 above). 116 Aetius 4.11.1-2; cf. Plut. Com. not. 1085 A-B, who reports that the Stoics called memories “permanent and static imprints” (τυπώσεις). 117 By this impressions coming purely from concepts I mean impressions about a real object that arise in the absence of that object, like for example an impression about a horse that arises when no horse is present (DL 7.61). I do not mean to say that the Stoics thought that impressions caused by real present objects do not involve concepts; on the contrary, I believe that they thought that the use of concepts in such cases is crucial for the recognition and identification of the object, as I have argued in section II above.

60 impression that is presently caused by that object in terms of representation of that object’s peculiar quality. However, while saying that, for example, recalling Dion118 from memory is different from actually perceiving Dion could make sense in certain psychologies, it seems that such a claim would be especially problematic for Zeno’s theory of concepts.

This is because if one’s conception did not include the memory of Dion’s peculiar quality, it is hard to see how one, while perceiving Dion, would be able to recognize him as Dion and not just as another lump of matter, even if it is uniquely qualified. It seems that for our ability to perceptually recognize particular object O as O based on instances of past perceptions of O stored in our memory, the minimal necessary requirement is that our concept of O must somehow include the representation of that which makes O peculiarly qualified. In other words, as far as an impression represents, for example, Dion and not merely some unrecognized shape, it seems that even an empty impression about Dion entertained in a dream must somehow include the concept of Dion and, with it, a correct

118 Some (e.g. Sedley 1985: 91, n. 19; cf. LS 2.185) have argued that although the Stoics though that all concepts are phantasms, they did not think that all phantasms are concepts. According to this approach, concepts can only include phantasms about universals, and not phantasms of particulars. Thus, criticizing Aetius’ report in 4.11.4-5 (= LS 30 j) which suggests that the Stoics believed that all phantasms (φαντάσματα) of the rational thought are concepts, Long and Sedley (2.185) claim that this is “completely out of step with all the other evidence on ἐννοήματα” and must be a mistake (cf. also Brittain 2005: 173, n. 38). Presumably, this mistake has arisen because Aetius misunderstood that the Stoics classified ἐννοήματά as φαντάσματα only to emphasize the demoted ontological status of universals. However, I think that the claim that Aetius’ report is completely out of step with other evidence on concepts is an overstatement. There is not enough evidence to support this claim, while on the other hand there are some good reasons to include phantasms of particulars among concepts. As Sedley himself acknowledges (1985: 91, n. 19), based on DL 7.61 it seems that the Stoics understood a concept to be equivalent to a species (εἶδος), and that they believed that the most specific is a species that includes no further species, for example, Socrates. This at least suggests that there are concepts of existent particulars like Socrates (and, consequently, perhaps even concepts of fictional particulars like Pegasus), and should not be easily dismissed. Furthermore, any interpretation denying the existence of concepts about particulars would have to explain why a common quality like whiteness gives rise to the concept of withe through sensation and memory, while the peculiar quality of Socrates does not, especially if the Stoic believed that peculiar qualities consist in a specific combination of common qualities. Finally, as I argue above, it would be very difficult to see what would the process of recognizing particular object as that object and not just a lump of qualified matter consist in if that process did not involve remembering past sensations of that object and subsuming them under a single concept.

61 and complete representation of Dion’s peculiar quality (cf. SE M 7.245 = T3).119 Thus,

Zeno’s own theory of concepts would have prevented him from holding that impressions satisfying the first two clauses crucially differ from all impressions coming from what is

not huparchon in terms of the quality of their “mark” and “imprint.”

Second, and relatedly, if Zeno meant the first two clauses to imply that the

impression satisfying them is automatically such that it could not be representationally

identical to an impression coming from what is not huparchon, then the Stoics could not

really hope to have an answer to the Academic argument from twins even if we grant that

no two numerically distinct real objects could be qualitatively identical—which was one

of the key tenets of Stoic ontology that they often invoked when faced with such

counterexamples (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.54-6, 84-6).120 Namely, imagine two perceptual impressions, I1 and I2, caused respectively by two distinct but similar objects, O1 and O2, that are both huparchonta, objects that are spatiotemporally present at the time they are

119 One way of attempting to avoid this difficulty could be to understand the causal origin required by the first clause in a broader, non-immediate sense. For example, in order for an impression to count as being ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, it is sufficient that the subject has had past causal interactions with the object represented, but not necessarily that the causal connection exists at the moment of entertaining the impression. Thus, an impression entertained while I remember or dream of Dion who is not present at the time would count as being “from what is existent” if my impression is based on previous instances where I perceived Dion while he was present. (Accordingly, the only instance in which an impression would fail to satisfy the first clause would be if Dion were a completely made-up object that has never existed, and thus never affected causally my sense organs.) Thus, the epistemic deficiency of this impression would be not that it is ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, but that it is not in accordance with the fact that Dion is not present. Understood in this way, ἀπὸ would remain causal, but also gain some sort of representational sense as well, and thus come close to Sedley’s (2002) interpretation (although it seems that Sedley would not accept a dual causal/representational sense of ἀπὸ, cf. p. 149, n. 14). The major problem with this approach is that the Stoics seem to think that even impressions about real objects that are not caused by real objects at the time they are entertained count as empty—for example, the dreamt-up impression about real Dion in SE M 7.245 is explicitly classified as empty, and although the word διάκενος is not mentioned, I believe that the impression involving the ἀνατύπωμα of a horse in DL 7.61 would also count as such—and it is quite clear that the Stoics thought that empty impressions do to count as ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος. Because of this, even though Dion is a real object and a ὕπαρχον, any impression about Dion arising in a dream or purely from memory would count as ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος because it is not presently caused by Dion-the-real-object, but by Dion-the-concept, who is a phantasm. 120 This was rightly pointed out by Reed (2002: 152).

62 perceived. According to the standard interpretation, it is perfectly possible for the impression I1, which is from a huparchon O1 and is in accordance with that huparchon, to be representationally identical to I2, which is from a different huparchon, O2, but which misrepresents O2 as O1 due to being fraudulent. Even though the impression I1 satisfies the first two clauses of the definition, it is still not “such that it could not come from what is not huparchon” because it is representationally identical to I2, impression which at the time I1 is perceived counts as being from what is not huparchon (namely, the object O2).

Finally, a similar case can be made regarding the properties of plainness and strikingness. In Chapter 2, I will provide a more detailed argument that the Stoics accepted that non-apprehensive impressions can sometimes rival apprehensive impressions in terms of plainness and strikingness. Right now, we can briefly point to the fact that according to

Antipater and his followers, Menelaus did not assent to the impression that Helen is before him even though the impression satisfied the first two clauses of the definition, because he previously assented to an impression that Helen stayed behind on the ship—impression produced by Helen’s double—which, as we have seen, would count as an impression from what is not huparchon.121 Since, as we saw above, Antipater and his followers thought that plainness and strikingness of impressions are importantly related to the impression’s ability to cause assent, this suggests that they thought of Menelaus’ impression from the fake

Helen as more plain and striking than his impression from the real Helen. Although there are no extant texts attributing such a positon to Zeno, I see no reason to doubt that he too

121 SE M 7.253-6 = T18. The example refers to the story that the Trojan War was in fact not fought over real Helen, but over her doppelgänger, while the real Helen has been secretly snatched by the gods and taken to Egypt, where she stayed until Menelaus arrived there after the war was over (cf. Eurip. Helen).

believed that impressions from what is not huparchon can sometimes rival impressions that

satisfy the first two clauses in plainness and strikingness.

All this makes it unlikely that Zeno understood the third clause of the definition as

something that is implied by the first two clauses, a logically redundant clause that serves

merely to emphasize that every impression satisfying the first two clauses is automatically

representationally different from any impression coming from what is not huparchon.122

Indeed, if Zeno and his successors did accept that in certain circumstances even an

impression from what is not huparchon could be representationally identical to an

impression that satisfies the first two clauses, then unless no further requirements are introduced, the definition would obviously fail to establish apprehensive impressions as a separate class of impressions characterized by an ἰδίωμα, which is something that the Stoics ardently insisted throughout their long debate with the Academics. Therefore, we should

try to formulate an interpretation that takes the third clause as introducing a new

requirement into the definition.

The natural place to start is to assume that by adding the third clause Zeno somehow intended to limit apprehensive impressions to only those that are not “just like” the impressions coming from what is not huparchon, i.e. those that are representationally

different from impressions coming from what it not huparchon. Accordingly, for the

subject S entertaining the impression I, I will be apprehensive if and only if I comes from

122 This also casts doubt on the proposal that the Stoics had two versions of the definition of the apprehensive impression, the shorter consisting of the first two clauses and the longer that included the third, and that they continued to use the shorter version even after the longer was introduced (see Frede 1999: 308). It is true that the apprehensive impression is referred to with the two-clause version in a number of texts (DL 7.46; SE M 7.255, 8.86, 11.183); but, it is also sometimes referred to with the first clause only (DL 7.54; SE PH 3.242) which does not mean that there was also a one-clause version of the definition. The three-clause version is clearly the most frequent formulation in the extant texts, so the shorter two versions are probably just its abbreviations.

a huparchon, is in accordance with that huparchon itself, and is in addition

representationally different—that is, different in terms of plainness, strikingness, clarity,

or imprintedness—from any other impression from what is not huparchon of which S is aware. For example, if S receives an impression I1 that Dion is sitting which satisfies the

first two clauses (i.e. which is actually caused by Dion and in accordance with Dion who

is sitting), I1 will be apprehensive only if S is not aware of any other impression that about

Dion that matches I1 in plainness, strikingness, clarity, and imprintedness, but does not actually come from the real, present Dion. On the other hand, imagine that S had just woke up after having an extremely vivid dream which included the impression I2 that Dion is

sitting which was empty; if I2 was equally plain and striking as I1, I1 would not be apprehensive regardless of the fact that it comes from the real present Dion who is sitting.

Or, imagine that S entertains I1, and then after some time sees Dion’s twin brother Theon,

and due to their extreme similarity, receives the fraudulent impression I3 that Dion is sitting

which is caused by Theon who is sitting. Again, if I3 rivals I2 in plainness, strikingness and

imprintedness, I1 would not be apprehensive because it would be representationally

indistinguishable from I3, an impression that came from what was not huparchon (Theon

who was not actually present). According to this interpretation, the apprehensive impression’s distinctive feature or idiōma would thus consist in the fact that it differs representationally from all impressions about the impressor of which the subject is aware.123

123 More precisely, that would be the feature which distinguishes the apprehensive impression from other impressions that satisfy the first two clauses of the definition. The feature that distinguishes the apprehensive impression from other impressions in general would be a composite feature comprised of all three requirements.

Can the formulation “such that it could not come from what is not huparchon” be

interpreted to imply the condition of representational difference I outlined above? It seems

that the word “such” (hopoia; in some sources hoia) refers to the quality of the impression’s

representational content which is defined by the second clause. We have seen above that

the Stoics considered the properties like clarity, plainness, strikingness, and thorough

imprintedness to be relevant for how an impression represents its impressor. Furthermore,

it seems that the modality in the formulation “such that it could not come from what is not

huparchon” should be interpreted as expressing the following counterfactual conditional:

if the same representational content were coming from what is not huparchon, the

impression would not have been apprehensive. The point is that an impression I whose representational content R portrays certain object O is apprehensive only if R is actually caused by O. There is a possible scenario in which the same representational content R results from a different causal history and is not caused by O; and in that scenario the same impression I with the same representational content R is not apprehensive. But, as long as that possible scenario does not obtain, I is apprehensive.

What are the reasons to think this was what Zeno had in mind when he introduced the clause “such that it could not come from what is not huparchon” into the definition?

First, this reading of the third clause allows the Stoics to have a meaningful reply to the

Academic argument from similar twin objects. Satisfying the condition of representational difference in addition to the first two clauses would make possible for subjects with expert recognitional knowledge and ability to receive apprehensive impressions at least in some situations when they are faced with extremely similar but distinct impressors (Cic. Acad.

2.56-7). Second, it is consistent with the fact that the Stoics grant that even the subject with

the highest level of expert recognitional ability and epistemic discipline—such as their paradigmatic Sage—can sometimes fail to receive apprehensive impressions:

[T15:] I will even concede that the Sage himself—the subject of our whole discussion—will suspend

his assent when confronted by similar things that he does not have marked off; and that he will never

assent to any impression except one such that it could not be false.124

According to the Stoics, one of the chief characteristics of the Sage is that he never assents

to non-apprehensive impressions.125 If they indeed thought that every impression that

satisfies the first two clauses of the definition is already such that it could not come from

what is not huparchon, as the standard interpretation assumes, the concession in Cicero’s

report would make little sense. According to the standard interpretation, in order to be able

to “mark off” similar objects and be apprehensive, it is sufficient that the impression is

caused by a huparchon and in accordance with that huparchon. Thus, as long as at least

one of the similar objects is real and present, and the Sage receives an impression from that object and in accordance with that object, his impression could not possibly fail to be apprehensive, so there would be no reason for him to suspend assent. Instead, we are told that the Stoics thought that in such situations the Sage will suspend assent despite the fact that one of the impressions about the similar things satisfies the first two clauses of the definition.

124 Cic. Acad. 2.57: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum nisi quod tale fuerit quale falsum esse non possit. Cf. also 2.53. 125 Stob. 2.111,18-112,8 = LS 41G.

Finally, Chrysippus’ reply to the Academic “heap” argument against the

apprehensive impression seems to confirm the reading of the third clause as referring to

the condition of representational difference outlined above. According to a version reported

by Sextus (M 7.418-21),126 the argument went something like the following. Let us imagine

that the Sage receives two impressions, “fifty is few” which is apprehensive, and “ten

thousand is few” which is non-apprehensive. Since the Sage only assents to apprehensive

and never to non-apprehensive impressions, he will assent to the former and not assent to

the latter. But, if the Sage assents to the apprehensive impression “fifty is few,” he will also

assent to the impression “fifty-one is few” because of the extremely small difference between these two impressions. Assuming that fifty is the largest quantity that can truly be called few, by assenting to “fifty-one is true” the Sage would be assenting to a false and

non-apprehensive impression. Sextus also preserves Chrysippus’ reply:

[T16:] For in the case of the “heap” problem, since the last apprehensive impression lies next to the

first non-apprehensive one, and is just about impossible to distinguish from it, Chrysippus says that,

in the case of impressions where the difference between them is so small, the wise person will hold

fast and keep quiet, whereas in cases where a greater difference strikes him, he will assent to one of

them as true.127

Chrysippus’ reply invokes the principle already encountered in T15 above: when the Sage

cannot distinguish between two impressions because the difference between them is

126 For similar versions of the Academic heap argument employed in the context of the debate with the Stoics over the apprehensive impression, see Cic. Acad. 2.49, 92-4. 127 M 7.416: ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ σωρίτου τῆς ἐσχάτης καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῇ πρώτῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ παρακειμένης καὶ δυσδιορίστου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον, ὅτι ἐφ’ ὧν μὲν φαντασιῶν ὀλίγη τις οὕτως ἐστὶ διαφορά, στήσεται ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἡσυχάσει, ἐφ’ ὧν δὲ πλείων προσπίπτει, ἐπὶ τούτων συγκαταθήσεται τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ὡς ἀληθεῖ.

extremely small, the Sage will “hold fast and keep quiet” (στήσεται καὶ ἡσυχάσει) that is, suspend his assent. Thus, when entertaining the impressions “fifty is few” and “ten thousand is few,” the Sage will assent to the former and suspend assent to the latter because there is a significant difference between them. But, when entertaining the impressions

“fifty is few” and “fifty-one is few,” the Sage will suspend assent to both of them because

of their extreme similarity.128 Since the Sage suspends assent to impressions when they are

non-apprehensive, neither of the impressions in the second case will count as apprehensive,

even though one of them, “fifty is few,” is in fact true. And the reason why the latter impression was not apprehensive even though it was true is because it did not sufficiently differ representationally from the false one, i.e. because it did not satisfy the third clause of the definition.

In conclusion of our discussion of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression, we should note two things. First, this interpretation entails that the apprehensive impression is defeasible. Certain impressions which the subject has entertained in the past can sometimes prevent other subsequently entertained impressions

from being apprehensive (like in the above case of the subject who dreams that Dion is sitting and then wakes up and sees Dion sitting). In addition, impressions that are apprehensive now can sometimes stop being apprehensive in the future if the subject entertains other impressions (like in the above case of the subject who first sees Dion and then sees Theon). In both situations, impressions that come from what is not huparchon

128 Thus in M 7.419-21 Sextus wrongly assumes that the impression “fifty is few” is apprehensive when directly compared to the impression “fifty-one is few.” The impression “fifty is few” may be true, but if in the Sage’s mind the false impression “fifty-one is few” is sufficiently representationally similar to it, it would not apprehensive.

69 can serve as mental state defeaters for the impression that satisfies the first two clauses of the definition.

Second, even though my interpretation grants that plainness, strikingness, clarity, and imprintedness are representational properties of impressions to which the subject has direct epistemic access, it does not entail that the subject has the same access to the fact that an impression is apprehensive. In other words, while the subject can easily recognize which among his impressions is exceptionally clear, plain and striking, he cannot use that recognition to infer that that impression is in fact apprehensive. This conclusion will put the interpretation of the definition I have proposed here into the camp of so-called externalist accounts of Stoic apprehension, which will be discussed in more detail in

Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

ACHIEVING KNOWLEDGE

In Chapter 1, we have seen that the Stoics often associated properties like plainness, strikingness, clarity, and thorough imprintedness with the apprehensive impressions.

However, I have suggested that the Stoics did not believe that these properties are uniquely possessed by the apprehensive impression. In this chapter, I will provide a more detailed analysis of these properties and provide detailed support for my claim. I will argue that despite the fact that the Stoics did not thing that these properties are distinctive of apprehensive impressions, they did believe that they nevertheless play a crucial role in achieving apprehension (katalēpsis), and ultimately, knowledge (epistēmē). Finally, I will explain how one can achieve apprehension and knowledge according to my account.

We begin with Sextus’ report on Carneades’ distinction between “apparently true”

(phainomenē alēthēs) and “not apparently true” impressions. The distinction occurs in the context of Carneades’ proposal that—due to the nonexistence of Stoic apprehensive impressions which he thought the Academics have proved—one should use the “persuasive impression” (pithanē phantasia) as the criterion of action:

[T17:] [a] Of these, the apparently true [impression] is called by the Academics “reflection” and “persuasiveness” and “persuasive impression,” while the not apparently true one is named “non- reflection” and “not persuasive” and “unpersuasive impression”; for neither what immediately appears false, nor what is true but does not appear so, is of a nature to persuade us. And of these impressions the one that is manifestly false and not apparently true is subject to objections and is not a criterion. [. . .] [b] Of the apparently true kind, one is faint, as in the case of those who, because of the smallness of the thing being observed or because of the sizeable distance or even because of the weakness of their eyesight, grasp something in a way that is mixed-up way and not thoroughly imprinted. The other, in addition to appearing true, also has a strong appearance of being true. [c] Of these, again, the faint and weak impression could not be a criterion; for because of its not exhibiting clearly either itself or the thing that produced it, it is not of a nature to persuade us or to draw us to assent. But the one that is apparently true and makes itself sufficiently apparent is the criterion […] And being the criterion, it has a sizeable breadth, and since it is extended, one has an impression that is more persuasive and more striking in form than another. […] The first and general criterion, then, according to Carneades, is like this. [d] But since an impression is never monadic – rather, one hangs on another, like a chain – there will be added as a second criterion the impression that is persuasive as well as not turned away. For example, someone who catches an impression of a human being necessarily also grasps an impression of features that attach to him and of external features: features that attach to him, such as color, size, shape, movement, talk, clothing, footwear, and external features, such as atmosphere, light, day, sky, earth, friends, and all the rest. Whenever none of these impressions distracts us by appearing false, but all of them in unison appear true, our trust is greater. […] For when he [Menelaus] left on the ship the phantom Helen, which he brought from Troy thinking that it was Helen, and set foot on the island of Pharos, he saw the true Helen. But while he caught a true impression from her, nevertheless he did not trust such an impression on account of its being turned away by another one, the one in virtue of which he knew he had left Helen on the ship. So the impression that is not turned away is like this; and it too seems to have breadth in view of the fact that one impression is found to be not turned away to a greater degree than another.1

1 SE M 7.169-81: ὧν ἡ μὲν φαινομένη ἀληθὴς ἔμφασις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία, ἡ δ’ οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς ἀπέμφασίς τε προσαγορεύεται καὶ ἀπειθὴς καὶ ἀπίθανος φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον ψευδὲς οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς μέν, μὴ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν. τούτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ μὲν φανερῶς ψευδὴς καὶ μὴ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς παραγράψιμός ἐστι καὶ οὐ κριτήριον […] τῆς δὲ φαινομένης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μέν τίς ἐστιν ἀμυδρά, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικρότητα τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἢ παρὰ ἱκανὸν διάστημα ἢ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ὄψεως συγκεχυμένως καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύπως τι λαμβανόντων, ἡ δέ τις ἦν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθὴς ἔτι καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ. ὧν πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἀμυδρὰ καὶ ἔκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ μήτε αὑτὴν μήτε τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτὴν τρανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ

The text begins by equating the “apparently true” impression with the “persuasive impression.” Impressions that are not apparently true or that are apparently false are not persuasive, and are rejected as the candidates for the criterion because they are unable to persuade us and cause our assent. However, among the apparently true, there are also two kinds of impressions, those that are “faint” (amudrai) and those that not only appear true, but whose appearance of being true is “strong” (sphodron). We are told that an impression is faint when it grasps something in a way that is “mixed-up” (sunkechumenōs) and “not thoroughly imprinted” (ouk ektupōs), like for instance when we observe something from afar, or something that is very small, etc. Just like the impressions that are not apparently true, those that are faint are unlikely to persuade us and cause our assent. On the other hand, the “strong” impression can serve as the criterion because it is more persuasive and more striking (plēktikōtera) than others. In both cases, however, the impression’s ability to produce assent seems to be related to the way it represents its object, i.e. to its internal representational qualities.

πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς πείθειν οὐδ’ εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπᾶσθαι. ἡ δὲ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐμφαινομένη κριτήριόν ἐστι […] κριτήριον δὲ οὖσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἱκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτεινομένης αὐτῆς ἄλλη ἄλλης ἐν εἴδει πιθανωτέραν τε καὶ πληκτικωτέραν ἴσχει φαντασίαν. […] Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ κοινὸν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδὴς ὑφίσταται ἀλλ’ ἁλύσεως τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἤρτηται, δεύτερον προσγενήσεται κριτήριον ἡ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου σπῶν φαντασίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λαμβάνει φαντασίαν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, τῶν μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν <ὡς> χρόας μεγέθους σχήματος κινήσεως λαλιᾶς ἐσθῆτος ὑποδέσεως, τῶν δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς ἀέρος φωτὸς ἡμέρας οὐρανοῦ γῆς φίλων, τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. ὅταν οὖν μηδεμία τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν περιέλκῃ ἡμᾶς τῷ φαίνεσθαι ψευδής, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι συμφώνως φαίνωνται ἀληθεῖς, μᾶλλον πιστεύομεν. […] καταλιπὼν γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὸ εἴδωλον τῆς Ἑλένης, ὅπερ ἀπὸ Τροίας ἐπήγετο ὡς Ἑλένην, καὶ ἐπιβὰς τῆς Φάρου νήσου ὁρᾷ τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην, σπῶν τε ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν ὅμως οὐ πιστεύει τῇ τοιαύτῃ φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὸ ὑπ’ ἄλλης περισπᾶσθαι, καθ’ ἣν ᾔδει ἀπολελοιπὼς ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὴν Ἑλένην. τοιαύτη γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία· ἥτις καὶ αὐτὴ πλάτος ἔχειν ἔοικε διὰ τὸ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον ἀπερίσπαστον εὑρίσκεσθαι.

In [d], Carneades introduces a further species of the persuasive impression, the

impression that is persuasive and also “not turned away” (aperispastos). The idea is that

since impressions do not occur in isolation but are entertained together with other impressions, our trust in an impression that appears true can be affected by the level of persuasiveness of these other impressions. Carneades explicitly names two ways this can happen, first, the persuasiveness of an impression can be “turned away” or diminished if

other related impressions appear false, and second, it can be increased if all of them appear

true “in unison” (sumphōnōs). The passage ends with an example that is supposed to illustrate a persuasive impression that is “turned away.” The example refers to the story that the Trojan War was in fact not fought over real Helen but over her phantom look-a-

like, while the real Helen has been secretly snatched away by the gods and taken to Egypt, where she stayed until Menelaus arrived there after the war was over (cf. Eurip. Helen).

Upon disembarking and seeing the real Helen, Menelaus receives a true impression, but this impression is turned away by the false impression that Helen was left behind on the ship. The example is odd, however, because it does not seem to illustrate a case where a persuasive impression which by definition appears true is turned away by another related impression which appears false. Rather, it seems that the impression from the real Helen,

which is supposed to be persuasive but turned away, was turned away by the impression

from the fake Helen because the latter, even though it was in fact false, appeared true to

Menelaus more strongly than the former. In any case, the example does provide an

illustration for the general point Carneades was trying to make, that in addition to its

internal representational qualities, the persuasiveness of individual impressions also

depends on its external relations with other relevant impressions.

Compare this with the following passage about the “younger Stoics:”

[T18:] [a] Now, the older Stoics say that this apprehensive impression is the criterion of truth. The younger Stoics, on the other hand, added “if it has no obstacle”. For there are times when an apprehensive impression does strike us, but is not trusted because of the external circumstances. [b] For example, when Heracles stood by Admetus, having brought Alcestis up from below the earth, Admetus did catch an apprehensive impression from Alcestis, yet did not trust it. And when Menelaus having come back from Troy saw the true Helen at Proteus’ place (when he had left on the ship her phantom, over whom a ten-year war had been fought), he grasped an impression that was from a huparchon and in accordance with that huparchon itself, and molded-in-from and sealed- in-from, but he did not have trust in it. [c] So that the apprehensive impression is the criterion when it has no obstacle; these ones were apprehensive, but had obstacles. For Admetus figured that Alcestis was dead and that a dead person does not rise up, though certain spirits do sometimes wander around. And Menelaus observed that he had left Helen under guard on the ship, and that it was not unlikely that the one found on Pharos was not Helen, but some phantom or spirit. [d] Hence the apprehensive impression becomes the criterion of truth not simpliciter, but when it has no obstacle. For this one, they say, being plain and striking, all but grabs us by the hair, and draws us into assent, needing nothing else to strike us in this way or to suggest its difference from the others. [e] And this is why everyone, when eager to apprehend something with precision, seems spontaneously to go after an impression of this kind – such as in the case of visible things, when the impression he grasps of the underlying thing is faint. For he strains his sight and goes close up to the thing he is looking at, so as to be completely free of error; he rubs his eyes and in general does everything until he catches an impression of the thing being judged that is clear and striking, as if considering that the trustworthiness of the apprehension lies in this.2

2 SE M 7.253-8: Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα. ἔσθ’ ὅτε γὰρ καταληπτικὴ μὲν προσπίπτει φαντασία, ἄπιστος δὲ διὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν περίστασιν. οἷον ὅτε Ἀδμήτῳ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς τὴν Ἄλκηστιν γῆθεν ἀναγαγὼν παρέστησε, τότε ὁ Ἄδμητος ἔσπασε μὲν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος, ἠπίστει δ’ αὐτῇ· καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ Τροίας ὁ Μενέλαος ἀνακομισθεὶς ἑώρα τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην παρὰ τῷ Πρωτεῖ, [καὶ] καταλιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς νεὼς τὸ ἐκείνης εἴδωλον, περὶ οὗ δεκαετὴς συνέστη πόλεμος, ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν, οὐκ εἶκε δὲ αὐτήν. ὥσθ’ ἡ μὲν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνστημα, αὗται δὲ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν, εἶχον δὲ ἐνστάσεις· ὅ τε γὰρ Ἄδμητος ἐλογίζετο ὅτι τέθνηκεν ἡ Ἄλκηστις καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιά τινά ποτε ἐπιφοιτᾷ· ὅ τε Μενέλαος συνεώρα ὅτι ἀπολέλοιπεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ φυλαττομένην τὴν Ἑλένην, καὶ οὐκ ἀπίθανον μέν ἐστιν Ἑλένην μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φάρου εὑρεθεῖσαν, φάντασμα δέ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον. ἐνθένδε οὐχ ἁπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μηδὲν ἔνστημα ἔχῃ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὴν τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μεταδιώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, ὅταν ἀμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν. ἐντείνει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὡς τέλεον μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, παρατρίβει τε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ, μέχρις ἂν τρανὴν καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς καταλήψεως πίστιν.

The “younger Stoics,” who are probably Antipater and his followers,3 say that the

apprehensive impression is the criterion of truth not simpliciter (ouch haplōs), but when it has no “obstacle” (enstēma). Using two examples, one of which is virtually identical to

Carneades’ example with Menelaus from T17, the younger Stoics argue that one could entertain an apprehensive impression but still fail to assent to it if there is an obstacle

present in the form of other conflicting non-apprehensive impressions previously assented

to by the subject. The apprehensive impression without obstacles is characterized as “plain”

(enargēs) and “striking” (plēktikē) and such that it produces assent. It is also characterized

as precise (akribēs) and “clear” (tranēs) and contrasted with an impression that is faint

(amudra).

Since this text is going to be central for our discussion in this chapter, we should stop for a moment to examine its authenticity. A number of scholars have suggested that the position it portrays could not represent the views of the older Stoics like Zeno and

Chrysippus, but are rather a deviation from the orthodoxy possibly caused by the

Carneades’ attack on the apprehensive impression.4 Contrary to this, I would like to argue

that this passage is not a deviation but that the position can be, in its essence, tracked back

to Zeno. Namely, we know that Zeno defined knowledge (scientia, epistēmē) as assent to apprehensive impressions that could not be disrupted by reason.5 A typical case of assent

to some apprehensive impression I1 being disrupted by reason would be if some argument,

in the form of a non-apprehensive impression I2, causes the subject S to suspend assent to

I1. However, it is hard to see any other way that this could happen unless the non-

3 See Cic. Acad. 2.19. 4 See Striker (1990: 152, n. 14); cf. Annas (1990: 200-2). 5 Cic. Acad. 1.41 = LS 41 B1; T22 and T23 below.

76 apprehensive impression I2 has a greater power to cause assent than the apprehensive impression I1. In other words, if plainness and strikingness are the properties of an impression in virtue of which it causes the subject’s assent, it seems that the subject S can

fail to assent to the apprehensive impression I1—which by definition has some initial power to cause assent in virtue of its clarity and plainness—only if another non- apprehensive impression I2 is more plain and striking than I1. Therefore, Zeno too probably thought that the apprehensive impression’s power to cause assent could be rivaled and even surpassed by the relevant non-apprehensive impression’s power to cause assent, and this was not an invention of the later Stoics.

Finally, here is an excerpt from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De anima which seems to be strongly influenced by the Stoic theory of impressions:

[T19:] [a] Of impressions, some are faint [ἀμυδραί] and some strong, just like in the case of sensations. Faint impressions are superficial [ἐπιπόλαιοι] and cannot be apprehensive, nor do they reveal clearly any differences in the impressor. [b] Strong ones are the opposite of this, but they too can be false as well as true. For being strong is not the peculiarity of the true, as being faint [is not the peculiarity] of the false, since truth and falsity are found in impressions of both kinds. [c] It is customary to refer to impressions that are both true and strong as apprehensive, since the assent given to impressions of this kind constitutes apprehension; whereas an impression that is false, or those true ones that are faint, we call non-apprehensive. [d] The term “plain” [ἐναργὴς] is applied sometimes to the impression that is both true and strong—that is, to the apprehensive impression— but occasionally also to those that are simply strong, as opposed to weak. [e] A strong impression carries assent with it, unless it should have been discovered to be false through other means: for instance, the impression that the stars are not moving, or that one figure in a painting is closer than another, or in the case of a reflection in a mirror. We distrust such impressions not because they are not strong, but because they are discredited by other things; and indeed it often happens that we distrust even strong impressions that are true, if we should somehow have come to be suspicious of them in advance.6

6 Alexander of Aph. De anima, 71,5-21: τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀμυδραί, αἱ δὲ σφοδραί, ὥσπερ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ἀμυδραὶ μὲν αἱ ἐπιπόλαιοι καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαι καταληπτικόν, μηδὲ τρανῶς τὰς διαφορὰς τοῦ φανταστοῦ μηνύουσαι, σφοδραὶ δὲ αἱ ἐναντίως ἔχουσαι. γίνονται δὲ τοιαῦται ὁμοίως καὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς, οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἴδιον τὸ σφοδρόν, οὔτε τῆς ψευδοῦς τὸ ἀμυδρόν, ἀλλὰ ἐναλλάττουσιν αὐτῶν αἱ διαφοραί. τὰς δὴ ἀληθεῖς τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ σφοδρὰς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν καὶ καταληπτικὰς τῷ κατάληψιν εἶναι τὴν ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις συγκατάθεσιν, ἀκατάληπτον δὲ φαντασίαν καλοῦμεν τήν τε ψευδῆ καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰς ἀμυδράς. ἐναργὴς δὲ φαντασία λέγεται ποτὲ μὲν ἥ τε ἀληθὴς καὶ σφοδρά (τουτέστιν ἡ καταληπτική), ποτὲ δὲ ἡ σφοδρὰ μόνον ἡ τῇ ἀμυδρᾷ ἀντιτιθεμένη. ἕπεται δὲ τῇ σφοδρᾷ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις, εἰ μὴ εἴη δι’ ἄλλων τινῶν πεφωραμένη ψευδὴς οὖσα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς φαντασίας τῆς τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας

Just like Carneades, Alexander too makes a distinction between faint (amudrai) and strong

(sphodrai) impressions. According to Alexander, faint impressions are those that do not reveal “clearly” (tranōs) the “differences in the impressor” (tas diaphoras tou phantastou), while strong are those that do clearly reveal such differences. Despite this, both faint and strong impressions are capable of being true or false—being faint is not the exclusive property of false impressions, nor is being strong the exclusive property of true impressions. Furthermore, Alexander says that those impressions that are at same time true and strong are called apprehensive (katalēptikai), while non-apprehensive (akatalēpton) impression is that which is false and those among true ones that are faint. He adds that the term “plain” (enargēs) is sometimes used to refer to impressions that are both true and strong (and thus apprehensive), but sometimes to those that are simply strong (but not necessarily true and apprehensive). The text ends by explaining that strong impressions usually produce assent, but not always; we can fail to assent to a strong impression if we have previously discovered that it is false. What is more, we can sometimes fail to assent even to an impression that is both strong and true—that is, even to an apprehensive impression—if we have previously became suspicious of it.

The parallels between T17, T18, and T19 are remarkable. All three texts describe how certain impressions have the ability to produce assent due to their internal representational qualities like strength, plainness, strikingness, clearness, etc. They also explain that this ability can be adversely affected by other impressions that the subject has previously assented to. Sextus’ report in T18 is of undoubtable Stoic provenance, at least

πάσχομεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γραφῶν κατὰ τὰς εἰσοχάς τε καὶ ἐξοχάς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφαινομένων τοῖς κατόπτροις. οὐ γὰρ διότι μή εἰσι σφοδραὶ ἀπιστοῦμεν αὐταῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι διαβέβληται δι’ ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθέσι τισὶ καὶ σφοδραῖς πολλάκις ἀπιστοῦμεν, ἂν ὦμεν προδιαβεβλημένοι.

as a testimony about the views of Antipater and his followers. Although neither Carneades

nor Alexander of Aphrodisias were Stoics, there are good reasons to think that T17 and

T19 rely heavily on Stoic views on impressions. In formulating his own criterion,

Carneades was probably borrowing the concept of persuasive impressions from the Stoics

who defined them as “those that produce a smooth movement in the soul,” i.e. those that

produce assent (SE M 7.242-3). Virtually all of the terms Carneades uses to explain the

difference between faint impressions and those that are not such also attested in Stoic

contexts.7 Finally, Carneades’ criterion, the persuasive impression that is not “turned

away” looks astonishingly similar to Antipater’s apprehensive impression that has no

obstacle, where the apprehensive is replaced with the persuasive impression because

Carneades believed that there are no apprehensive impressions (cf. SE M 7.164). On the

other hand, even though Alexander of Aphrodisias was a 2nd century CE Peripatetic, the text quoted in T19 above itself clearly reveals the extent of Stoic influence. He too employs terms such as “faint” (amudra), “clearly” (tranōs), and “plain” (enargēs) in a way that seems consistent with the Stoic use in T18. More importantly, he explicitly discusses the apprehensive impression, and even cites the Stoic definition of apprehension (katalēpsis) as assent to an apprehensive impression (cf. SE M 7.151). Finally, just like Antipater’s

“younger Stoics,” he suggests that there are situations when the apprehensive impression can fail to produce assent even though it is plain and strong (sphodra) if the subject has previously assented to other conflicting impressions.

7 “Faint” (amudra): SE M 7.258 (= T18e); “thoroughly imprinted” (ektupos): DL 7.46, Hierocl. VII.1; “mixed-up” (sunkechumenōs): Hierocl. VII.60; “clearly” (tranōs): SE M 7.258 (= T18e), DL 7.46, Hieroc. VII.54-5; “striking” (plēktikē): SE M 7.258 (= T18e), 7.403.

If T17 and T19 are indeed influenced by the Stoic views about impressions, we can

attempt a reconstruction the meaning of some of the individual technical terms that describe

the properties of impressions mentioned above. We have seen in Chapter I that the Stoics

probably took the property of being “thoroughly imprinted” (ektupos) to refer to the

precision and completeness with which an impression captures the properties of its

impressor and enables its correct identification. In T17, Carneades say that an impression

that is not thoroughly imprinted is “faint” (amudra) and provides a mixed-up

(sunkechumenōs) grasp of the object; in T19 Alexander says that faint impressions “do not reveal clearly [tranōs] the differences in the impressor,” which seems to echo Sextus’ report that the apprehensive impression, which is not faint, “skillfully gets in touch with the hidden difference in the objects” (M 7.252 = T14). Alexander’s use of the adverb

“clearly” also suggest that the property of being “clear” (tranēs) has something to do with thorough imprintedness. The properties of thorough imprintedness and clearness thus seem to pertain to the representational accuracy of an impression. But these are also crucially related to another group of properties that seem to focus more on the effect of an impression on the mind’s assent—that is, its power to induce assent—such as strength, faintness, plainness, strikingness, and persuasiveness. An impression is strong (sphodra) if it is thoroughly imprinted and clear (T17b; T19a). The property of being plain (enargēs) depends on the impression’s strength (T19d), and the same probably goes for being

“striking” (plektikē) and “persuasive” (pithanē) as well.

Texts T18 and T19 confirm that the Stoics believed that the apprehensive impression is plain, striking and strong, i.e. that its power to induce assent is relatively high. However, as I suggested in Chapter I, there is no real evidence that the Stoics though

80 that this power is special in the sense that it is impossible for non-apprehensive impressions to rival apprehensive ones in respect to the ability of causing assent and in possessing these

representational properties. Indeed, T18 and T19 provide some compelling evidence to the

contrary. In T18, as we have seen, the “younger Stoics” suggest that even though the

apprehensive impressions is plain and striking, one can nevertheless fail to assent to it if

there is an “obstacle” in the form of other impressions the subject has previously assented

to which are inconsistent with the apprehensive impression. For example, Menelaus had

an apprehensive impression that Helen is before him, but the impression failed to cause his

assent because Menelaus had previously assented to other non-apprehensive impressions,

such as “Helen is on the ship” and “The woman on Pharos is likely not Helen but some

phantasm or spirit.”8 The ability of these two non-apprehensive impressions to override

Menelaus’ assent to the apprehensive impression suggests that the Stoics accepted that non- apprehensive impressions can sometimes rival—or even surpass—apprehensive ones in

8 The two examples used in T18 are not very fortunate because the exact content of the impressions that function as obstacles is not clear. This has been noticed by Striker (1990: 152, n. 14) who suggests that the younger Stoics make a grave mistake by allowing that the impressions of Admetus and Menelaus are apprehensive in the first place (cf. also Annas 1990: 201, who says that in cases like these obstacles turn apprehensive into non-apprehensive impressions). She argues that they should have never allowed this, because their respective impressions were false, since Menelaus’ impression was something like “This cannot be the real Helen, but must be a ghost” (cf. Eurip. Helen 569) and presumably Admetus’ was something like “This cannot be Alcestis, but is some delusion” (cf. Eurip. Alc. 1123-5). With these corrections, Striker thinks this passage does not show that we can fail to assent to an apprehensive impression when we receive it, but only that false beliefs can sometimes prevent people from forming apprehensive impressions. But this is not the only possible reading of the text. In fact, it seems that the text’s point is that after seeing Alcestis, Admetus suspended assent about the apprehensive impression “This is Alcestis” because he had previously assented to the impressions “Alcestis is dead” and “A dead person does not rise up.” Similarly, it seems that Menelaus suspended assent to the apprehensive impression “This is Helen” because he had previously assented to the impression “Helen is on the ship” and “The woman on Pharos is likely not Helen but some phantasm or spirit.” This reading is more likely because Sextus explicitly says more than once that Admetus and Menelaus’ impressions were apprehensive, and because assuming that Admetus and Menelaus originally entertained non-apprehensive impressions would contradict the whole structure of the text, since the text clearly says that they did not assent to their original impressions. Furthermore, a point very similar to the one in T18 is made in Cic. Acad. 2.19, which lends further support to the claim that at least some Stoics thought that we can sometimes fail to assent to apprehensive impressions even though they are plain, clear and striking.

plainness and strikingness. The same point is made by Alexander. He succinctly puts it that

being faint (amudra) is not the exclusive property of false impressions, nor is being strong

(sphodra) the exclusive property of true impressions, and since plainness is closely related

to an impression’s strength, this means that being plain is not the exclusive property of true

impressions either. Thus, even the apprehensive impression, which according to the Stoics

are plain, can sometimes fail to cause assent if we have previously became suspicious of it

for some reason, presumably due to assenting to other non-apprehensive impressions whose contents are inconsistent with the content of the apprehensive impression.

Still, the Stoics did think that, because of being clear and thoroughly imprinted, apprehensive impressions viewed individually will usually be more plain, strong and striking than other impressions. It is in virtue of this fact that the Stoics thought the apprehensive impression facilitates the achievement of apprehension (katalēpsis), which

as we have seen they defined as assent to an apprehensive impression. First, they believed that when we receive faint impressions, we are naturally driven to make efforts to increase

their clearness: we try to get closer to the object, to examine it more closely, and take many

other steps to improve our grasp of the object (T18e). Second, they also believed that our

minds are naturally predisposed to assent to plain impressions:

[T20:] For just as the balance of a scale must sink down when weights are placed on it, so the mind

must yield to perspicuous [impressions]; just as an animal can’t fail to have an impulse towards

something that appears suited to its nature (what the Greeks call oikeion), it can’t fail to approve a

perspicuous thing it is presented with.9

9 Cic. Acad. 2.38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libram ponderibus inpositis deprimi sic animum perspicuis cedere. nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod adcommodatum ad naturam adpareat (Graeci id οἰκεῖον appellant), sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non

Because of these two natural propensities of our mind, a vast majority of impressions

received during the normal course of life will in fact be apprehensive: impressions that are

caused by real external objects, which represent those objects with high degrees of

accuracy and detail, and which represent them as clearly distinct form other objects we

perceived, with high degree of plainness and strikingness. And since we are naturally drawn to assent to clear, plain and striking impressions, most impression we do assent to will in fact be apprehensive, since these are usually more plain and striking than other

impressions. This would allow the normal human mind to develop conceptions (notions,

ἔννοιαι), which according to the Stoics are stamped on the mind through apprehensive impressions, and pave the way for the development of higher capacities of the rational soul.10 It turns out that achieving apprehension (katalēpsis) does not require the subject to

possess any kind of exceptional epistemic ability. One does not need to be an epistemic

agent with perfect epistemic discipline and extraordinary recognitional abilities in order to

have a large number of apprehensive impressions and to assent to them. And this is

perfectly consistent with Zeno’s view that apprehension is widely available to ordinary

people (Cic. Acad. 1.42 = LS 41 B2; SE M 7.151-2 = LS 41 C1-5).

adprobare. Earlier in 2.17, Cicero has said that by perspicuitatem he renders the Greek ἐναργεία. In addition, given what is said in T18, the “necessity of assenting” here should not be taken as unconditional but in the sense of natural propensity to assent to plain impressions unless there are obstacles, i.e. conflicting impressions to which we have previously assented. 10 Cf. Cic. Acad. 1.42. For the Stoic claim that conception require apprehensive impressions, cf. Acad. 2.21-2.

The results of our discussion of the definition of the apprehensive impression in Chapter 1

and of its representational properties in this chapter show that the Stoics did not think that

apprehensive impressions can directly be recognized as such by the subject, nor that such

recognition is necessary in order for the subject to assent to the apprehensive impression

and achieve apprehension. In other words, it follows that the Stoics subscribed to the

following principle of apprehension:

(PA) The subject S can achieve apprehension by assenting to an apprehensive

impression I without being aware of (i.e. without having cognitive access to) the

fact that I is apprehensive.

Taking that the Stoics held something like the PA has recently been dubbed in the scholarly

literature as the “externalist” interpretation due to the PA’s similarity with the basic ideas

associated with contemporary epistemic externalism.11 This approach has been contrasted

with the so called “internalist” interpretation of the Stoic position, according to which in

order to achieve apprehension it is not enough that the impression S is assenting to is

apprehensive, but S in addition must have some kind of awareness of or cognitive access

to the fact that the impression is apprehensive.

11 Cf. Reed 2002; Perin 2005. Cf. Annas 1990: 196-7.

Interpreting Stoic epistemology along the externalist lines has become widely

accepted since a version of it was first formulated by Michael Frede.12 The externalist

approach, however, has recently been challenged by Reed (2002) and Perin (2005b). Their

objections roughly fall under the following three headings: (1) problems in explaining the

difference between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions, (2) problems in

explaining how one can progress from apprehension to knowledge (epistēmē) if the Stoics

were externalists about apprehension, and (3) reconciling the externalist interpretation of

Stoic epistemology with the Academic criticism, which most scholars take to be based on

internalist assumptions about apprehension. In the remainder of this chapter, I will offer a defense of my externalist reading from the first two objections, while the third objection

will be dealt with in Chapter 4.

The first set of objections to previous versions of the externalist interpretation

revolves around the difficulties in explaining how apprehensive impressions are supposed to differ from non-apprehensive ones and how the third clause of the definition is supposed to refer to this difference.13 As we have seen in Chapter 1, according to these versions of the externalist approach, the third clause is logically redundant and was introduced by the

Stoics merely to emphasize certain causal aspects of the apprehensive impression to which the subject need not have cognitive access. Thus Frede (1983: 83-4), for example, claims that the property that distinguishes apprehensive impressions from non-apprehensive ones and that is referenced by the third clause is “a causal feature of impressions that makes the mind react in a distinctive way”, i.e. that makes apprehensive impressions “cause the mind

12 Frede 1983/7; see also Frede (1999). Versions of the externalist interpretation are also proposed by Annas (1990), Striker (1990). 13 Reed 2002: 157-60; cf. Perin 2005b: 384, n. 4.

to accept them” without the mediation of the subject’s awareness because according to

Frede, “the awareness of the feature on the part of the person is not an essential part of the

causal chain.” Striker (1990: 152-3) also takes that the apprehensive impression’s

distinctive feature is that it automatically and irresistibly causes assent. There are, however,

several problems with this approach. First, the Stoics did not think that apprehensive impressions are the only ones that compel assent. As we have seen in section I above, the properties in virtue of which impressions cause assent are plainness, strength and

strikingness. But, we have also seen that the Stoics did not believe that these properties

necessarily distinguish apprehensive from non-apprehensive impressions; on the contrary,

they accepted that certain non-apprehensive impressions can sometimes match or even surpass apprehensive impressions in plainness, strength and strikingness.14 Second, although it is perhaps not absurd to think, as Frede does, that my impressions can cause my

assent without me necessarily being aware that they possess the feature in virtue of which

they are capable of causing my assent,15 it does not seem that this was the Stoic view.

Rather, it seems that they thought that the properties like plainness, strength and

strikingness are quintessential phenomenal properties of impressions. Finally, as I have

argued in Chapter 1, the distinctive feature of the apprehensive impression does not consist

in some causal effect the impression has on the mind, but in a representational property:

the fact that the impression’s representational content differs in clarity, plainness and

strikingness from the representational content of any other impression about the same

object the subject has previously entertained.

14 A similar criticism of Frede’s causal account is offered by Reed (2002: 160-1). 15 See Reed 2002: 158-9.

Annas (1990: 195-7) offers a different characterization of Stoic externalism.

According to her, the externalist element consists in the fact that “apprehension requires that the person is in the right relation to the object known” (197) and that “the apprehensive

appearance is distinguished by its causal history – the fact that it is produced in a normal

[mental] state” (195). This account is on the right track in so far as it emphasizes the

apprehensive impression’s causal history, but misleading in so far as it takes originating in

a normal mental state as the relevant causal history. Namely, the Academic examples

relying on the indistinguishability of two extremely similar real objects usually assume that

the perceiving subject is in a normal mental state and that his impressions are produced

under normal perceptual conditions. The Stoic response to such examples did not rely on

trying to argue that there is something problematic with the state of the subject’s mind,

which suggests that they accepted that false impressions can be produced even when the

subject is in a normal mental state. Therefore, according to the Stoics, the fact that some

impression is produced in the mind in a normal state is not sufficient to make it

apprehensive. Nevertheless, Annas’ general point is right: the apprehensive impression

does have a particular causal history—it causally originates from a real spatiotemporally

present object, and the predicates that are included in its semantic content causally originate

in that object’s actual qualities. And although having this type of history is not exclusive

to the apprehensive impression, it does secure its truth and thus realizes one important

aspect of apprehension.

The externalist aspect of Stoic apprehension is thus best understood by realizing which properties of our impressions need and which need not be accessible to us in order to achieve the state of katalēpsis. While important representational properties of the

apprehensive impression like clarity, strength, plainness and strikingness are directly

accessible to us, our awareness that a particular impression has these properties does not

guarantee that the impression is indeed apprehensive because the possession of these

properties does not entail that the impression has a particular causal history. Nor do we really need to take the awareness of these properties as indicative of the impression’s apprehensiveness in order to achieve apprehension; all we need is to be able to recognize which among our impressions are clear, strong, plain and striking, and this recognition will automatically lead to assenting to a number of apprehensive impressions. All this is made possible by an important aspect of Stoic epistemology, the belief that our apprehension of the external world is ultimately secured by the fact that our minds are naturally predisposed to achieve it:

[T21:] So since the human mind is wholly adapted for knowledge of the world and for constancy of

life, it welcomes knowledge beyond all else; and it loves katalêpsis (which, as I said, translates

literally as a ‘grasp’) both on its own account—nothing is dearer to the mind than the light of truth—

and for its use.16

16 Cic. Acad. 2.31: ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam κατάλημψιν, quam ut dixi verbum e verbo exprimentes conprensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat (nihil enim est ei veritatis luce dulcius) tum etiam propter usum.

III

We have seen in the previous section that one of the objections to externalist readings of

Stoic epistemology is that they cannot properly explain knowledge that characterizes the

Stoic Sage, as well as the ordinary person’s progress from apprehension to knowledge. In order to understand the significance of this objection, let us look at the following Stoic classification:

[T22:] [a] For the Stoics say that there are three interconnected things: knowledge, opinion, and the

one positioned between these, apprehension. [b] Of these knowledge is apprehension that is secure

and firm and immutable by reason, opinion is weak and false assent, and apprehension is the one

between these, namely assent to an apprehensive impression. And according to them, an

apprehensive impression is one that is true and such as could not be false. [c] Of these, knowledge

subsists only in the wise, opinion only in the inferior, and apprehension is common to both; and this

is the criterion of truth.17

According to the text, knowledge (epistēmē) is defined as apprehension that is “secure”

(asphalē), “firm” (bebaian), and “immutable by reason” (ametatheton hupo logou), and opinion (doxa) as weak (asthenē) and false assent. Apprehension is defined, as we have

already seen, as assent to an apprehensive impression. Accordingly, we should understand

17 SE M 7.151-2 (= LS 41 C1-5): τρία γὰρ εἶναί φασιν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ συζυγοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίῳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν, ὧν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατάθεσιν, κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων, ἥτις ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· καταληπτικὴ δὲ φαντασία κατὰ τούτους ἐτύγχανεν ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τοιαύτη οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής. ὧν τὴν <μὲν> ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις, τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι.

89 the adjectives “unshaken,” “firm,” and “immutable” as referring to the kind of assent required for knowledge. Thus, opinion includes both assent to non-apprehensive as well as weak assent to apprehensive impressions. Weak assent to apprehensive impressions reveals one aspect in which apprehension is “between” knowledge and opinion. The Stoics also say that knowledge only exists in the wise, or the Sages, while the opinion exists only in the “inferior” or ordinary people.18 In other words, the Sage only assents to apprehensive impressions, and does so firmly, while ordinary people assent to both false and apprehensive impressions, but even the latter count as opinions because the assent is weak.

Stobaeus offers a very similar report:

[T23:] [a] They [the Stoics] say that the Sage never supposes something false, and that he absolutely

does not assent to anything non-apprehensive, since he neither opines nor is ignorant in any respect.

[b] For ignorance is changeable and weak assent. [c] But the Sage supposes nothing weakly, but

rather, securely and firmly; and so he does not opine either. [d] For there are two kinds of opinion,

assent to the non-apprehensive, and weak supposition, and these are alien to the Sage’s disposition.

[e] So, being precipitant and assenting before apprehension belong to the precipitate and inferior

man, whereas they do not befall the man who is well-natured and perfect and virtuous.19

18 The Stoics were often criticized for their concept of wisdom that was so strict that it seemed practically unachievable. For example, Alexander of Aphrodisias claimed that the Stoic Sage is “like some absurd and unnatural creature rarer than the Ethiopians’ Phoenix” (De fato 199.14,-22 = LS 61 N). It seems that the Stoics acknowledged the rarity of their Sage since they agreed that “up till now the Sage has not been found” (SE M 7.432). (For a detailed study of textual evidence on the Stoic Sage resulting in the conclusion that the Stoics considered wisdom to be practically unachievable, see Brouwer 2002.) However, since they used the figure of the Sage in many of their ethical and epistemological discussions, we can take their Sage as a theoretical model, a paradigm that is worth aiming for and achievable at least in principle. 19 Stob. 2.111,18-112,8 (= LS 41G): Ψεῦδος δ’ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτέ φασι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκαταλήπτῳ τινὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτόν, μηδ’ ἀγνοεῖν μηδέν. Τὴν γὰρ ἄγνοιαν μεταπτωτὴν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ. Μηδὲν δ’ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. Διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας <δ’> ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸ προπίπτειν πρὸ καταλήψεως <καὶ> συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προπετῆ φαῦλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν εἰς τὸν εὐφυῆ καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ σπουδαῖον.

The report confirms what was said in relation to T22, with the further suggestion that the

Stoics equated opinion with ignorance (agnoia), and that they related it to the fact that ordinary people are prone to “precipitate” (propiptein) and to “assent before apprehension”

(pro katalēpseōs sunkatatithesthai).

Despite these sharp distinctions, the Stoics believed that ordinary people can progress towards knowledge and eventually become Sages, which is another sense in which apprehension is “between” opinion and knowledge. But, if the goal of an ordinary person is not to assent to non-apprehensive impressions in order to achieve knowledge and become wise, how can he hope to achieve this if according to our externalist interpretation he cannot use clarity, strength, plainness and strikingness as evidence of the impression’s apprehensiveness? Moreover, if the Sage not only assents exclusively to apprehensive impressions but does so firmly and securely, where is this extraordinary strength of his assent going to come from if not from the recognition that those of his impressions that are clear, plain and striking are in fact apprehensive?

According to the interpretation I have been defending in this chapter, achieving apprehension is relatively easy; we can recognize which among out impressions are clear, plain and striking and are naturally predisposed to assent to such impressions, and in the normal course of life many of impression that have these properties will, as a matter of fact, be apprehensive. What is not easy according to this interpretation, however, is to avoid assenting to a number of impressions that are not apprehensive along with those that are, since as I have argued apprehensive impressions do not possess directly accessible features that guarantee their apprehensiveness. Nevertheless, to help prevent this from happening,

91 the ordinary person who is progressing towards knowledge can rely on the virtue of dialectic, which according to Diogenes Laertius the Stoics understood to be composed of several specific virtues. To be sure, since they held that only the Sage is truly virtuous, the ordinary person cannot really have these virtues until he achieves his goal and actually becomes a Sage; but, by honing them carefully and by making diligent effort to adopt the epistemic practices they promote, one can arguably progress towards his goal. Let us then look at Diogenes Laertius’ report on Stoic virtues of dialectic:

[T24:] [a] Non-precipitancy is knowledge of when one should and should not assent. [b]

Uncarelessness is a strong-mindedness with respect to what is likely, so that one does not give in to

it. [c] Irrefutability is strength in argument, so that one is not swept away by the contrary [argument].

[d] Non-randomness is a disposition which refers presentations to right reason. [e] Knowledge itself,

they say, is either a secure grasp or a disposition in the reception of presentations not reversible by

argument. [f] Without the study of dialectic, the wise man will not be free of error in argument since

dialectic distinguishes the true from the false, and clarifies persuasive and ambiguous statements.

Without it, it is impossible to ask and answer questions methodically. [g] Precipitancy in assertions

has an impact on what happens, so that those who are not well exercised in handling presentations

turn to disorder and carelessness.20

20 DL 7.46-8 (= LS 31 B): [a] τήν τ’ ἀπροπτωσίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή· [b] τὴν δ’ ἀνεικαιότητα ἰσχυρὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ· [c] τὴν δ’ ἀνελεγξίαν ἰσχὺν ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον· [d] τὴν δ’ ἀματαιότητα ἕξιν ἀναφέρουσαν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. [e] αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. [f] οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος διαγινώσκεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν τό τ’ ἀμφιβόλως λεγόμενον διευκρινεῖσθαι· χωρίς τ’ αὐτῆς οὐκ εἶναι ὁδῷ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. [g] Διατείνειν δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι προπέτειαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γινόμενα, ὥστ’ εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκαιότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγυμνάστους ἔχοντας τὰς φαντασίας. Cf. also Anon. Stoic. P. Herc 1020 (= LS 41D).

Diogenes mentions four specific virtues of dialectic: “non-precipitancy” (aproptōsia),

“uncarelessness” (aneikaiotēs), “irrefutability” (anelenxia), and “non-randomness”

(amataiotēs).21 The virtue of non-precipitancy is mentioned several times in extant sources.

According to T24a, non-precipitancy is defined as knowledge of when to assent and not to

assent, , while other sources characterize it as involving control over one’s assents, while

its opposite, precipitancy, as “assenting before apprehension” and yielding to non- apprehensive impressions.22 Uncarelessness was defined as “strong-mindedness with

respect to what is likely (ischuron logon pros to eikos) so as not to give in to it.” It seems that by “what is likely” (to eikos) the Stoics understood impressions that have more chances of being true than false.23 These impressions are not apprehensive because they can be

false, but they are persuasive and can cause one to assent. Unfortunately, our sources do

not offer any explicit examples of the application of the virtues of non-precipitancy and

uncarelessness. Perhaps this application relied on a method similar to what Epictetus calls

“the correct use of impressions,”24 which consisted in deliberately confronting an initially likely or persuasive impression with another conflicting impression in order to produce temporary suspension of judgment in the subject,25 i.e. to ensure that he does not “give in”

and assent to the initial impression too quickly. In any case, both of these virtues are

apparently related to preventing one from assenting to non-apprehensive impressions.

The purpose of the virtue of irrefutability, which was defined as “strength in argument, so that one is not swept away by the contrary,” was perhaps aimed at preventing

21 See Long 1978 for a more detailed discussion of Stoic dialectic. 22 T23e; Anon. Stoic., P. Herc. 1020 (= LS 41 D1). 23 Philodemus, Sign. 7.32-8 = LS 42 J. 24 Epict. Diss.1.1.7 = LS 62 K1-2; 2.1.4, 2.22.9; 4.6.34. 25 Epict. Diss. 2.18.8 and 2.18.23-7.

one’s assent to apprehensive impressions from being thwarted by logical paradoxes and

other arguments that might rely on non-perceptual impressions.26 We know from Plutarch

that Chrysippus was well aware of such cases.27 Perhaps this virtue could have helped

Admetus in the example described in T18 above. Admetus’ assent to the perceptual

impression that Alcestis is before him was blocked by his assent to the impression that

people do not rise from the dead in conjunction with the impression that Alcestis is dead.

Admetus’ impression that people do not rise from the dead would count as an impression

derived through the so-called “similarity method” of sign-inference, an inductive reasoning

from the fact that no human Admetus has observed so far has risen from the dead to the

fact that no humans rise from the dead.28 Had Admetus possessed the epistemic virtue of irrefutability, perhaps his awareness of the fact that impressions generated thorough the similarity method of sign-inference do not always yield true impressions would have

prevented him from assenting to the impression that no people rise from the dead, and he would have assented to the original apprehensive impression that Alcestis is standing

before him. Finally, the fourth virtue, non-randomness, seems to point towards the ethical

significance of assenting to the right kind of impressions, because for the Stoics living in

accordance with right reason (orthos logos) was identical to living in accordance with

26 The Stoics thought that all impressions except preconceptions are in a general sense dependent on perception since the conceptions they consist in are developed through perception. However, my notion of non-perceptual here is not in this sense general, but refers specifically to all impressions that are not the immediate result of the process of sense perception, like impressions produced by sign-inference. 27 Plut. 1036D-E (= LS 31 P3; transl. LS with minor adjustments): “The opposite arguments and the plausibilities of the opposite case must not be produced in a casual way but cautiously, lest people be diverted by them and give up their apprehensions through not being able to understand the solutions [to the arguments] adequately and through the instability of their apprehensions; for those who base their apprehensions on common sense and sense-objects and the other things that derive from the senses easily let these go when diverted by the puzzles of the Megarians and by a good many others which are more effective.” 28 Cf. Philodemus, Sign. 1.2-4.13 = LS 42 G.

virtue, and is what ensures that the Sage does everything well (Stob. 2.66,14-67,4 = LS 61

G).

The crucial thing to note about the Stoic virtues of dialectic is that most of them consist in practices of preventing assent to non-apprehensive impressions. Their nature is primarily defensive and passive. They do not seem to describe strategies we are meant to use to recognize which among our impressions are apprehensive so that we can then assent to them. On the contrary, they are tools that are meant to help us avoid assent to those impressions that are likely to be non-apprehensive. This fact, I think, confirms that the

Stoics envisaged the achievement of knowledge as something compatible with their externalist concept of apprehension. Otherwise, at least some of these epistemic virtues would be related to some kind of ability to directly distinguish between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions. On the contrary, these virtues seem to describe an indirect method of arriving at knowledge that only makes sense if the Stoics thought that the subject does not have direct access to which impressions he is entertaining are apprehensive. This indirect and defensive approach is exactly the strategy one would expect from the Stoics to adopt, because although being clear, plain, and striking does not guarantee that the impression is apprehensive, being the opposite—i.e. mixed-up and faint—does guarantee that an impression is not apprehensive, according to my interpretation.29 It is by relying on

29 Perin (2005b: 395) points out two places in Diogenes (DL 7.42 = LS 31 A5 and T24f above) where according to the Stoics dialectic includes the ability to “distinguish” (diaginōskesthai) the true from the false. Note, however, the following two things. First, the statement in T24f occurs in the context of allowing the Sage to be free from error “in argument” (en logō), not in dealing with his perceptual impressions. Second, it talks about distinguishing between true and false, and not apprehensive and non-apprehensive. Also, the claim about the ability of dialectic to distinguish between true and false seems to be related specifically to irrefutability, the virtue due to which we can distinguish between what we today would call logically valid arguments from invalid ones, fallacies and paradoxes, and not between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions. Thus, 24f does not really support Perin’s internalist interpretation of the apprehensive impression. It is not clear what part of DL 7.42 Perin thinks mentions dialectic in the context of distinguishing what is true from what is false. Either

such strategy that one who desires to progress towards knowledge can hope to avoid

assenting to non-apprehensive impressions. It is at least in principle possible that someone who practices the epistemic virtues we described above would manage, by preventing himself from assenting to impressions that seem unlikely to be apprehensive and by assenting to those that seem likely to be apprehensive impressions, to arrive at the state in which all impressions he assents to—although unbeknownst to him—are indeed apprehensive while all those that aren’t are impressions he does not assent to.

This can also help in solving another objection raised against externalist readings of Stoic apprehension, that even if one could achieve knowledge and wisdom in this way, this would be the result of luck or chance, and according to Perin (2005b: 393-6), this is

contrary to certain points of Stoic philosophy. Prima facie, the objection does not seem

very powerful because achieving knowledge is, as we have seen, the result of one’s

possession and application of certain epistemic virtues. Thus, if one achieves knowledge,

it is not the result of chance, but the result of one’s practice of epistemic virtues. Perin,

however, suggests another related objection that is more challenging. Namely, he says that

if the Stoic conception of knowledge is externalist, then it could happen that, if we have

two persons who both possess epistemic virtues of dialectic, one ends up not achieving

knowledge while another ends up achieving it, from which it follows that the second person

will have achieved knowledge fortuitously. But this objection is misleading. It is true that

two persons could end up differently with respect to knowledge even if they both equally

possess and practice epistemic virtues. However, it does not follow that the one who has

achieved knowledge in this case has done so fortuitously, at least not in any sense of the

way, Perin mentions no direct textual evidence that the Stoic dialectic included some virtue of directly distinguishing apprehensive from non-apprehensive impressions.

word that would be inconsistent with the rest of the Stoic philosophy. Namely, the Stoics

believed that all events are predetermined by fate.30 However, they distinguished between

simple and complex fated events. For example, on the one hand, the fact that you will die

on a certain date is a simple event because it does not depend on what you do; on the other,

the fact that Oedipus will be born to Laius is a complex event, because it is absurd to say

that this will happen whether or not Laius has sex with a woman. Accordingly, in his reply

to the Lazy Argument (Cic. De fato 28-30 = LS 55 S), Chrysippus says that saying that one

will recover from his illness whether or not one goes to the doctor is absurd, because the

patient’s recovery is a complex event; it depends both on the causes that are independent

from the patient’s actions as well as on his actions, and hence is a “co-fated” (confatalis)

event. Likewise, achieving knowledge would also count as a co-fated event, since it depends both on the agent’s contribution (his practice of epistemic virtues) as well as on things that are not up to him (e.g. which impressions he will be exposed to and when).

Because one part of the causal chain that leads to the achievement of knowledge does not depend on the agent’s actions, the end-result could be different for two different agents even if they have identical epistemic discipline and dispositions, in the same way in which one patient who is ill and goes to the doctor could recover, while another with the same illness could get worse and die even if he does see the doctor. Although one might not be completely satisfied with this result, one certainly cannot say that it is inconsistent with the

Stoic views on causality and fate.

30 E.g. Aetius 1.28.4 = LS 55 J; Gellius 7.2.3 = LS 55 K; Cic. Div. 1.125-6 = LS 55 L.

IV.

We end this chapter by addressing the final potential problem for our externalist

interpretation, namely, the explanation of the extraordinarily firm and stable assent that

characterizes the Sage’s apprehension and turns it into knowledge. If in order to achieve

apprehension one does not have to be able to directly recognize one’s apprehensive

impressions as such, where is the exceptional firmness and stability of assent that

distinguishes knowledge from ordinary apprehension going to come from? In order to

answer this question, we have to begin by pointing out that the Stoics viewed knowledge

as a “system” (sustēma) of individual apprehensions. Namely, we saw in the previous

section that practicing the virtues of dialectic could make one’s assents to apprehensive

impressions impervious to being overridden by arguments, i.e. impressions that are not directly perceptual, like for example logical paradoxes. But there seems to be more to the

systematic aspect of Stoic knowledge than this. According to T18 above, the Stoics

accepted that our assent to an apprehensive impression can encounter obstacles. These

obstacles are false and non-apprehensive impressions we have previously assented to

which do not cohere with the apprehensive impression. But, our assent to the apprehensive

impression would not encounter such obstacles if all other relevant impressions were also

apprehensive since in that case the incoherence would not occur. Thus, by increasing the

number of apprehensive impressions to which we assent to we are, we are decreasing the

chances for new apprehensive impressions we entertain to encounter obstacles because the

coherence of our whole system of beliefs will increase as well.

Furthermore, if I am right in claiming that Carneades’ discussion of persuasive

impressions in T17 is of Stoic origin, then perhaps the Stoics believed that with the increase

of the coherence of all the impressions we assent to the strength and stability of these

assents would also become enhanced. Namely, according to T17d, Carneades thought that

when all impressions in a cluster of interrelated impressions appear true “in unison”

(sumphōnōs), our trust in individual impressions in the cluster increases. If something like this view was also shared by the Stoics, it would mean that coherence of individual

apprehensions that form a system would add further strength and stability to the assent, and

turn all these apprehensions into instances of knowledge. Eventually, one could end up with a set of beliefs comprised only of apprehensive impressions that is perfectly coherent and, in virtue of this coherency, characterized with exceptionally strong and stable assent.

At that moment, one would achieve epistēmē and become a Sage. And since all the impressions to which the Sage assents to are apprehensive and none of them is non- apprehensive, the overall strength and stability of his assent would be much greater than the strength and stability of assent that ordinary people give to their apprehensive impressions.

CHAPTER 3

ACHEIVING MORAL PERFECTION1

According to the Stoics, the only person who possesses knowledge (epistēmē) is the Sage.

In chapter 2, I have explained how one can achieve knowledge according to my

interpretation of Stoic apprehension. However, the Stoics also thought that the Sage is the

only person who is virtuous and whose every actions are always morally right. The foundation for the Sage’s epistemic perfection was the apprehensive impression, the only type of impression that according to the Stoics unmistakably represents the thing that caused the impression. As we have seen, our sources have preserved relatively elaborate accounts of how the Stoics thought apprehensive impressions could lead to knowledge about nonmoral situations. However, our sources are far less explicit about the following two questions. First, did the Stoics think that there are moral apprehensive impressions?

Second, if they did, then are there any similarities and differences between them and nonmoral apprehensive impressions? Finally, how is the moral apprehensive impression

1 This chapter is to a large extent based on a previously published text Stojanovic 2014. My interpretation of the moral apprehensive impression there is somewhat different than here, and the interpretation offered in this chapter supersedes the older one.

100 supposed to contribute to the moral and practical perfection of the Sage? In this chapter, I will argue that there is some textual evidence in Epictetus that suggests that the answer to the first question is positive, although neither Epictetus nor any other source offers a detailed account of moral apprehensive impressions. Thus in answer to the second question, I will try to present a possible reconstruction of how the Stoics might have understood moral apprehensive impressions and their relationship to nonmoral apprehensive impressions. Finally, I will attempt to explain how moral apprehensive impressions might provide foundation for morally perfect action.

In the surviving texts about Stoicism, a vast majority of examples of apprehensive impressions are of those that describe morally neutral states of affairs. Typically, they rely on cases of discriminating between extremely similar but distinct objects we have mentioned in the previous section. Apprehensive impressions are also mentioned in

Arrian’s report on Epictetus philosophy, although only a few times.2 One place in particular, however, suggests that Epictetus thought that apprehensive impressions that describe moral states of affairs exist, and that they are necessary for the achievement of moral and practical perfection. In Diss. 3.8.1–4, Epictetus is reported as saying:

2 As far as I can see there are only three occurrences: Diss. 3.8.5, 4.4.13, and Ench. 45.

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[T25:] In the same way as we exercise ourselves to deal with sophistical questionings, we should

exercise ourselves daily to deal with impressions [phantasias], for these too face us with questions.

So-and-so’s son is dead. Answer, “That lies outside the sphere of choice, it is not a bad thing

[kakon].” So-and-so has been disinherited by his father; what do you think of that? “That lies outside

the sphere of choice, it is not a bad thing.” Caesar has condemned him. “That lies outside the sphere

of choice, it is not a bad thing.” He was grieved by all this. “That lies outside the sphere of choice,

it is not a bad thing.” He has borne it nobly. “That lies within the sphere of choice, it is a good thing

[agathon].” If we acquire this habit, we shall make progress [prokopsomen]; for we shall never

assent to anything unless we get an apprehensive impression [phantasia katalēptikē] of it.

Impressions that Epictetus talks about here are the ones that attribute moral predicates, for example “good” and “bad”, to things like someone’s death, someone’s disinheritance by his own father, someone’s condemnation by a powerful person such as Caesar, someone’s

distress about these calamities, and someone’s endurance in the face of them. According

to him, one could achieve moral progress (prokopē) only if one acquires the habit of

assenting to apprehensive impressions about morally relevant things, which means

impressions that correctly and unmistakably attribute moral predicates to their impressors.

Correct attribution of predicates to impressors, or “the application of preconceptions to

particulars” as Epictetus often calls it, is one of the central themes in his philosophy. In several places (Diss. 1.2.6, 22.2–9; 2.11.3–12, 17.6–16; 4.1.41–45) he discusses the application of moral “preconceptions” (prolēpseis) such as good (agathon), bad (kakon), advantageous (sumpheron), disadvantageous (asumphoron), just (dikaion), courageous

(andreios), etc. to particular actions.3 They were called “preconceptions” because

3 Epictetus sometimes also talks about nonmoral preconceptions, for example about the preconception of the philosopher, the carpenter, the musician, etc. (Diss. 4.8.6–10). However, most contexts where he discusses the correct application of preconceptions to particulars are cases of moral preconceptions.

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Epictetus, as an orthodox Stoic, believed that, unlike typically nonmoral concepts such as, e.g., “white”, that are acquired through instruction and attention,4 moral concepts develop

from our natural inborn tendencies to pursue things that are in accordance with our nature,

and to stay away from the things that are not.5 In keeping with the Stoic orthodoxy,

Epictetus also calls them “innate concepts” (emphutoi ennoiai, Diss. 2.11.3) and claims

that, because of their innateness:

[T26:] Preconceptions are common to all men, and one preconception does not contradict another.

For who among us does not assume that the good [agathon] is profitable and something to be chosen

[haireton], and that in every circumstance we ought to seek and pursue it? (Diss. 1.22.1 = LS 40S1)

[T27:] For who does not have a preconception of bad [kakou], that it is harmful, that it is to be

avoided [pheukton], that it is something to get rid of in every way? (Diss. 4.1.44)

However, although moral preconceptions do not contradict each other, conflicts often arise when we try to apply them to particulars. For example, members of different cultures have

the same preconception of piety, that it is something that should be put above all else and

pursued in all circumstances. The conflict arises when people try to apply the

preconception of piety to particulars such as someone’s act of eating pork: one believes that someone’s act of eating pork is pious, another that it impious (Diss. 1.22.4). Since these conflicting beliefs cannot both be true, Epictetus argues that, just as in the case of deciding whether some object is black or soft we use a criterion to determine the truth, we

4 Cf. Aet. 4.11.1–4 = LS 39E. 5 Although this has been subject to controversy (see, e.g., Sandbach 1930), I think that Jackson-McCabe (2004) has persuasively argued that Epictetus’s position on the innateness of moral preconceptions was fully in agreement with the doctrines of the early Stoics.

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should have a criterion for deciding which of our moral beliefs are true (Diss. 1.11.9–15).

This criterion cannot be mere opining (dokein), but something higher (anōteros) than mere

opining (Diss. 2.11.11–12). Although Epictetus does not explicitly name it, he does think

that such a criterion exists (Diss. 2.11.17). Since the Stoics thought that the apprehensive

impression is the criterion of truth,6 and since Epictetus believed that moral apprehensive

impressions are possible, I think we can conclude that the criterion Epictetus had in mind

here was the moral apprehensive impression.

In addition to the evidence that Epictetus might have thought that apprehensive moral

impressions exist, there is some indirect evidence this idea was not Epictetus’s own

invention, but a part of the orthodox Stoic doctrine. The well-attested orthodox Stoic

approach to defining virtues and vices as instances of knowledge and ignorance,7 which

was a part of the doctrine from the very beginning, suggests that the early Stoics too thought

that moral impressions could be apprehensive. They defined prudence as knowledge

(epistēmē) of what is good, bad, indifferent, or neither of these,8 and thought that this

knowledge is related to how kathēkonta, or befitting actions, come into being.9 We know

that for the Stoics, epistēmē is not only a system of beliefs that are firm and unshakable,

but also a system of beliefs composed of assents to only one type of impressions: those that

are apprehensive.10 It follows then that prudence is a system of firm assents to impressions

about what things are good, bad, indifferent or neither, i.e. of assents to moral impressions

6 DL 7.54 = LS 40A; SE M 7.152 = LS 41C5. 7 Stob. 2.59,4–60,8 = LS 61H1–5 (partially) = IG 102.5b1; cf. DL 7.92–93, which, despite the lacuna in 92, undoubtedly reports virtues as being defined in terms of knowledge and vices in terms of ignorance. 8 DL 7.92; Stob. 2.59,4–7 = LS 61H1 = IG 102.5b1. 9 ten men phronēsin peri ta kathēkonta ginesthai, Stob. 2.60,12 = IG 2.102.5b2. 10 Stob. 2.73,16–74,13 = LS 41H = IG 102.5l.

104 about good, bad, etc. things that must be apprehensive.11 Therefore, it seems that there are some reasons to think that the existence of moral apprehensive impressions and their importance for moral action was not Epictetus’s invention, but part of Stoic orthodoxy.

II.

Unfortunately, even though it seems that the Stoics believed that moral apprehensive impressions exist, no detailed accounts of these impressions have been preserved in the surviving texts. In the remainder of this essay, I will attempt to provide a reconstruction of how the Stoics might have understood moral apprehensive impressions by relying on their theory of nonmoral apprehensive impressions and other relevant parts of their philosophical doctrine. However, the reader should keep in mind that, because of the lack of direct textual evidence, this reconstruction will necessarily have to involve some level of speculation.

11 Apparently, for the Stoics, prudence occupied a special place among the virtues. For example, it seems that Zeno used to define the other three virtues in terms of prudence (Plut. Virt. mor. 441A = LS 61B5; St. rep. 1034C = LS 61C1–2), and Apollophanes even went so far as to claim that prudence is the only virtue (DL 7.92). This is not surprising given that the Stoics thought that all cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, justice, and courage) are physically inseparable and that they differ only in their respective topics (Stob. 2.63,6–64,12 = LS 61D & 63G = IG 102.5b5; DL 7.125–126). Namely, they defined temperance as a virtue primarily concerned with impulses (Stob. 2.60,13 = IG 2.102.5b2), which consists in knowledge of what is worth choosing (haireton), what is worth avoiding (pheukton), and what is indifferent (oudeteron) (Stob. 2.59,8–9 = LS 61H2 = IG 102.5b1); also, they defined courage as the virtue that concerns instances of standing firm (peri tas hupomonas, Stob. 2.60,14). It is not hard to see how temperance and courage can both be based on prudence, i.e. on judgments that something is good, bad, or indifferent, because the Stoics defined good things as those that are worth choosing (haireta) and worth standing firmly by (hupomeneta), and bad things as the opposites of these (Stob. 2.78,7–17 = IG 102.6f). Consequentially, this would mean that they thought that all virtues depended on the knowledge of what is good, bad, indifferent or neither, i.e. on apprehensive impressions of the form “x is M”.

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In the previous section, we have suggested that moral apprehensive impressions are

impressions that correctly and unmistakably predicate some moral property of some object.

In other words, the paradigmatic form of the moral apprehensive impression would be “x

is M”, where x is some particular corporeal object and M is a predicate corresponding to

some moral property possessed by the object. If so, then moral apprehensive impressions

are very similar to nonmoral apprehensive impressions. This should not be very surprising

since according to the Stoics moral objects and moral properties are an integral part of the

corporeal world, and the location problem for moral properties does not arise in their

metaphysics.12 They claimed that all moral objects, for example, particular instances of prudence, temperance, courage, etc., are corporeal,13 and that everything that is good is a

body.14 Furthermore, since actions as dispositions of the agent’s corporeal soul are also

corporeal objects, they are properties of the agent’s corporeal substance. Because of this,

the Stoics say that, just like nonmoral properties, moral properties such as being good and

being bad huparchein15 and thus provide basis for truthful, substantial predication of moral

predicates to particular objects.16 Consequently, moral apprehensive impressions, just like

nonmoral ones, are caused by huparchonta, i.e. by real, spatiotemporally present corporeal

objects, which is confirmed by many impressions offered by Epictetus as illustrations in

his discussion of the correct application of preconceptions to particulars—for example,

“So-and-so’s son’s death is not bad”, “So-and-so’s disinheritance is not bad”, “His grief because of all this is bad”, “His standing firm in the face of all this is good”, etc.17 For this

12 For one example of an influential discussion of the location problem for ethics, see Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, especially chapters 1 and 5. 13 Stob. 2.64,20–22 = IG 102.5b7. 14 Sen. Ep. 117.2 = LS 60S. 15 Stob. 2.68,24–25 = IG 102.5c. 16 Cf. Stob. 2.97,19–21 = LS 33J1 = IG 102.11f. 17 Cf. Diss. 3.8.1–4.

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reason, moral apprehensive impressions of the form “x is M” would have no problem

meeting the first clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression discussed in

Chapter 1, which requires that apprehensive impressions must be caused by something

huparchon. In addition, since the Stoics thought that sayables (lekta) that correspond to apprehensive impressions express states of affairs or facts (pragmata), they probably also thought that moral apprehensive impressions express moral states of affairs or moral facts.

In other words, for the Stoics, that Dion’s prudence is good is a fact in the same way in which it is a fact that Dion’s hair is brown.

On the other hand, even if some impressions of the form “x is M” have the capacity of being apprehensive this does not imply that all moral impressions have the same capacity.

Obviously, moral impressions that falsely attribute some moral property to their impressors—such as, for example, the impression that Dion’s cowardice is good—cannot be apprehensive.18 What is less obvious but very important for our present discussion, however, is that since according to the Stoics no universal impression can be apprehensive, no universal moral impression can be apprehensive either. This point may seem surprisingly strong given the abundance and the importance of universal moral statements in the extant texts on Stoic ethics. Nevertheless, our evidence clearly suggests that the

Stoics thought that universals are concepts (ennoēmata) and that concepts are not actual things or huparchonta, only mere figments (phantasmata) of our mind,19 so as such they

cannot cause apprehensive impressions. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the first clause of

the definition clearly prevents any impression that is caused by “empty attraction” from

18 In section IV below we will discuss another class of moral impressions that are true, but nevertheless fail to be apprehensive. 19 Aet. 1.10.5 = LS 30B; Stob. 1.136,21–137,6 = LS 30A; DL 7.61 = LS 30C2.

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being apprehensive, and according to the Stoics, figments are things we are attracted to in

empty attractions.20 Accordingly, unlike impressions of the form “x is M” (for example,

“Dion’s prudence is good”), which are impressions about corporeal particulars (in our

example, Dion’s prudence), impressions of the form “X is M” (for example, “Prudence is

good”), which are impressions about universals (in our example, the generic Prudence),

cannot be apprehensive because they are impressions caused by figments of the mind. In

other words, although particular moral facts exist in the Stoic universe, universal moral

facts do not.

This, of course, does not imply that impressions about universals are superfluous and

useless. On the contrary, since all definitions and divisions have the form of universal impressions, they are basic tools in Stoic logic and dialectic, and ultimately provide foundations for the Sage’s knowledge.21 Namely, the Stoics considered universal

impressions to be useful paraphrases of conditionals that involve impressions about

particulars. According to them, all universal moral impressions of the form “X is M” are

generalized impressions (katholika) that stand for impressions expressing conditionals “if

x is X, then x is M,” where x is a particular object, X genus which x belongs to, and M a

moral predicate.22 For example, the universal impression “prudence is good” would stand for the impression “if some particular thing is prudent, then that thing is good”.

Furthermore, they thought that universal impressions can be true, and that their truth depends on the truth of the impressions about particulars over which they range; for example, “Prudence is good” is true if and only if all particular prudent things are good.

20 Aet. 4.12.1–5 = LS 39B; cf. DL 7.49–50 = LS 39A1–3. 21 See, e.g., DL 7.60–62 = LS 32C and Aug. Civ. dei 8.7 = LS 32F; cf. Long, “Dialectic and the Stoic Sage”. 22 SE M 11.8–11 = LS 30I.

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Thus, although themselves nonapprehensive, universal moral impressions of the form “X

is M” and their truth-values crucially depend on particular moral impressions of the form

“x is M”, and the latter, as we have seen, are capable of being apprehensive. Consequently,

knowledge of universal moral truths can be secured through the apprehension of particular

moral truths, that is, through moral apprehensive impressions of the form “x is M”. The importance of this point will become obvious later in our discussion of the so-called

“impulsive impression.”

III.

In the previous section, I have argued that Epictetus and the Stoics would have probably thought that the moral apprehensive impression shares some important similarities with the

nonmoral apprehensive impression: they are both caused by existent objects, and they are

both perceptual impressions about corporeal objects. In this section, I would like to suggest

that there is one crucial difference between moral and nonmoral apprehensive impressions.

Namely it seems that the Stoics thought that, unlike nonmoral apprehensive impressions

that are merely descriptions of their impressors, moral apprehensive impressions are not only descriptions of corporeal objects, but also their evaluations.23 This dual nature of

moral impressions is the result of the Stoic theory of the innate origin of moral concepts

23 Accepting this dual nature of moral impressions might cause some reluctance among those contemporary meta-ethicists used to sharp distinctions between descriptions and evaluations. However, I see no reason to attribute some form of such distinction to the Stoics. This is not a sign that, unlike contemporary ethicists, they did not understand the importance of this distinction. On the contrary, I think that their idea that some descriptions are also at the same time evaluations was a sophisticated philosophical maneuver that (if successful) would allow them to avoid many problems that plague contemporary meta-ethicists participating in the debate about ethical cognitivism and noncognitivism.

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we have already mentioned. Although they refer to corporeal moral properties of objects,

there is some evidence that the Stoics thought that moral predicates also carry meanings24

that indicate the agent’s potential pursuit-type or evasion-type stance towards corporeal

objects that possess these properties. In other words, it seems that according to the Stoics,

every moral predicate is not only a descriptive predicate, but also an evaluative predicate.

That’s why they say that, for example, everything that is good (agathon) is also “worth

choosing” (haireton), and everything that is bad (kakon) is worth avoiding (pheukton),25

and, accordingly, that everything that has some non-absolute value (axia) is also “worth taking” (lēpton), and everything that has some disvalue (apaxia) is “worth not taking”

(alēpton).26 The general idea behind this dual function of evaluative predicates is that some

object is, for example, valuable to us not simply because we think of it as being worthy of

taking, but because it really possesses properties that contribute to our nature and well-

being, just as, for example, food satisfies our hunger not simply because we think so, but

because of the nutrients that are really contained in it. Thus, since moral predicates are both descriptive and evaluative, the Stoics thought that the impression that, for example, some x is good not only describes x as being good, but also at the same time evaluates x as being worth choosing, i.e. as the potential object of some agent’s choice.27 It is by virtue of this

dual function of moral predicates that moral impressions provide the basis for action, which

will be discussed in section IV below.

24 The Stoics did make the distinction between the meaning of a word, “the signification” (sēmainomenon), and the corporeal thing it refers to, “the name-bearer” (tunchanon); see, for example, in M 8.11–12 = LS 33B. 25 Stob. 2.72,19–20 = IG 102.5i. 26 Stob. 2.79,18–80,21 = IG 102.7a–b; 82,20–84,3 = IG 102.7e–f; 84,18–85,11 = IG 102.7g. 27 Stob. 2.75,1–6 = IG 102.5o; 80,14–21 = IG 102.7b; 82,20–83,9 = IG 102.7e. That concepts like haireton and pheukton represent parts of the meanings of preconceptions “good” and “bad” is suggested by Epict. Diss. 1.22.1 = LS 40S1 and 4.1.44 (quoted above).

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The evaluative nature of moral impressions in Stoicism and the possibility of moral

apprehensive impressions have recently caused considerable controversies in interpreting

the Stoic position, so I will devote the rest of this section to solving some of these controversies. Gisele Striker (1980: 70-2) has argued that for the Stoics, evaluative predicates are not perceptual, and that apprehensive impressions must be perceptual

(Striker 1974: 73-6), from which she concluded that moral/evaluative impressions cannot be apprehensive. Brennan (2005: 75-9) accepts Striker’s first premise (that moral/evaluative impressions are nonperceptual), but disagrees with her conclusion (that all moral/evaluative impressions are nonapprehensive), so he is led to deny Striker’s second premise, that all apprehensive impressions must be perceptual. Both views get something right about the Stoic position, but ultimately rely on the premise that the Stoics thought that impressions cannot be both perceptual and evaluative. This premise is, as I will argue, false.

Namely, according to Plutarch:

[T28:] [Chrysippus] says that goods and bads [tagatha kai ta kaka] are perceptible [aisthēta], writing

as follows in On the end book I: ‘[…] Not only are the passions [pathē], grief and fear and the like,

perceptible along with [people’s] appearances, but also it is possible to perceive theft and adultery

and similar things, and in general, folly and cowardice and many other vices, and not only joy and

benefactions and many other instances of right conduct [katorthōseōn] but also prudence and

courage and the remaining virtues.’28

The passage clearly states that Chrysippus thought that moral properties of corporeal objects, such as being good or being bad, are perceptible.29 Furthermore, it seems that he

28 Plut. St. rep. 1042E–F = LS 60R. 29 Contra Brennan (2005: 76), who seems to think that being good is a property that is nonperceptual.

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also thought that particular instantiations of actions, such as right actions (katorthōmata),

are perceptible as well. It is important to note that Chrysippus does not say only that actions

in general (energeia) are perceptible, but also that right actions are perceived as right and

vicious actions as vicious, which implies that they are perceived in an evaluative way. In

addition, at another place Chrysippus is cited as saying that “appropriation” (oikeiōsis),

another important Stoic evaluative concept, is perception (aisthēsis) of what is

appropriate.30

All this suggests that the Stoics thought that impressions attributing evaluative

predicates to corporeal objects are perceptual. In fact, this is not surprising given the Stoics’

position on the relationship between properties of some corporeal objects and predicates in

perceptual impressions about the objects. Namely, according to them, moral properties of

the corporeal object cause evaluative predicates in the perceptual impression about the

object in exactly the same way in which nonmoral properties of the corporeal object cause

descriptive predicates in the descriptive impression about the object. For example, Zeno is

reported as saying that corporeal instantiations of prudence (phronēsis) and temperance

(sōphrosunē) in objects cause moral predicates “being prudent” (phronein) and “being

temperate” (sōphronein) in impressions about these objects.31 Since moral impressions of the form “x is M”—which are, as we have seen, at the same time evaluative—are caused

by properties of corporeal objects, there is no reason to assume that the Stoics thought that

they cannot be perceptual.

30 Plut. St. rep. 1038C; this is in direct contradiction with Brennan’s claim (2005: 324) that the property of being oikeion is a nonperceptual property. For the Stoic concept of oikeiōsis, see e.g. DL 7.85–86 = LS 57A. 31 Stob. 1.138,14–139,4 = LS 55A. In SE M 9.211 = LS 55B and Clem. Strom. 8.9.26.3–4 = LS 55C, the same explanation is offered for the causal origin of purely descriptive predicates such as “being cut”, “being burnt”, etc. There is no indication that the Stoics thought that the causal origin of moral predicates is in any way different from that of nonmoral predicates.

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The likely motivation behind the resistance towards the idea that evaluative predicates

are perceptual might lay in certain elements of the Stoic theory of the origin of moral

concepts. Namely, according to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics thought that all impressions

obtained through sense organs are perceptual (aisthētikai), while nonperceptual (ouk

aisthētikai) impressions are those obtained through thought, i.e. impressions about

“incorporeals and other things acquired by reason”.32 Although moral impressions of the

form “x is M” are impressions about corporeal objects obtained through sense organs, it is

not hard to assume that all impressions that involve moral concepts nevertheless fall into

the category of nonperceptual because the Stoics thought that moral concepts, unlike descriptive ones such as “white”, are innate, formed from the principles within us,33 and acquired spontaneously.34 The fact that the meanings of evaluative concepts possess an

element that does not come from the senses, however, does not imply that evaluative

concepts are nonperceptual, at least not in any sense of the notion of “non-perceptual” that

the Stoics would use. Although evaluative concepts partially originate from the innate

principles in us, the Stoics thought that their purpose and applications are inseparable from

perceptual objects.35 In fact, as Diogenes himself reveals later,36 by “other things acquired

by reason” the Stoics most likely had in mind nonevident things (adēla) that are conceived

through “transition” (metabasis) from perceptual things via sign inference or

demonstration, for example, like when by perceiving sweat we conceive unperceivable

32 DL 7.51 = LS 39A4. 33 Plut. Comm. not. 1070C. 34 Aet. 4.11.1–4 = LS 39E. 35 In Fin. 3.20–22 = LS 59D, for example, Cicero explains how the function of the concepts such as “valuable” (aestimabile, Gr. axian) and “befitting” (officium, Gr. kathēkon), after they develop from the “starting-points of nature”, is to enable us to actually select objects that are valuable and to perform befitting actions. Indeed, it is hard to see how one could even develop the concept of something valuable without perceiving valuable objects. 36 DL 7.53 = LS 39D7.

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pores in the skin.37 Because of this, I think it is best to conclude that the Stoics thought that

nonperceptual impressions are only those impressions that are about nonevident things and

incorporeal objects. However, as we have seen above, the Stoics understood moral

apprehensive impressions as impressions about particular corporeal objects, and moral

properties as perceivable corporeal properties of those objects. Therefore, it seems that they

would classify moral apprehensive impressions among the perceptual impressions.

IV.

So far, we have argued that there is evidence that the Stoics thought that moral impressions

are both descriptions and evaluations of corporeal objects, and that there are no obstacles

to assuming that the Stoics classified them as perceptual impressions. In this section, we

will discuss another group of evaluative impressions––those that have the form “it befits A

to do K” or “K is befitting for A”, that is, impressions that some particular action K is kathēkon for the agent A–– because the Stoics thought that a subclass of impressions of this form, called “impulsive impressions”, provides the basis for rational action. First of all, let me say that given everything we have said so far, there is nothing in the Stoic system that prevents at least some impressions of the form “it befits A to do K” or “K is befitting for

A”, that is, impressions that some particular action K is kathēkon for the agent A, from being apprehensive. Several places in Epictetus mention such impressions, for example, “it

37 See, for example, SE M 9.393–394; the Stoic origin is suggested by mentioning the same methods of conceiving things (similarity, composition, analogy, transposition) listed in DL 7.53. On conceiving nonevident things from perceptual things via sign inference and demonstration, see e.g. SE PH 2.104–106 = LS 35C, 2.140 = LS 36B7.

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will befit it [viz. the foot] to step into mud”,38 or “it befits you now to be sick, and now to

make a voyage and run risks, and now to be in want, and on occasion to die before your

time”.39 They are all examples of impressions that evaluate some corporeal thing, that is, a

particular action of some agent, as being befitting. For example, in the impression “it befits

Dion to make a voyage”, Dion’s act of making the voyage is a corporeal object that is being evaluated as something befitting for Dion. In this respect, impressions that state that some action of the agent is befitting are a species of the genus of moral impressions of the form

“x is M”, so there is no reason to assume that the Stoics would have thought that they are

incapable of being apprehensive.

Does this mean that for the Stoics, impulsive impressions, as a species of the genus of

impressions of the form “it befits A to do K”, are also capable of being apprehensive?

Unfortunately, the answer to this question is much harder to discern, but it seems that there

are reasons to think that they aren’t. According to Stobaeus, the Stoics thought that all

rational action is initiated by “an impulsive impression [phantasia hormētikē] of something

immediately befitting [kathēkontos]”,40 i.e. by assent to such an impression, which

activates the agent’s impulse (hormē) towards the befitting action. The befitting action

mentioned in the impulsive impression is expressed in the form of a predicate

(katēgorēma), always as a verb in infinitive, for example, “being prudent” (phronein) or

“going on an embassy” (presbeuiein).41 Presumably, the role of the word “immediately”

38 Diss. 2.5.24: kathēxei auton eis pēlon embainein. 39 Diss. 2.5.25: nun men soi nosēsai kathēkei, nun de pleusai kai kinduneusai, nun d’ aporēthēnai, pro hōras d’ estin hot’ apothanein. Cf. also Ench. 42. 40 phantasian homētikēn tou kathēkontos autothen, Stob. 2.86,17–8 = LS 53 Q1 = IG 102.9. This formulation has inspired Brennan (2003: 268) to argue that impulsive impressions typically have the form “it is K that p”, where K stands for kathēkon (or other relevant terms such as oikeion, eulogon, or sumpheron), and p stands for some candidate action. 41 Cf. Stob. 2.86,1–7 = IG 102.8–8a.

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(autothen) in Stobaeus’s report indicates that the Stoics thought that the impulsive impression also contains an indexical element (something like “for me, now”), whose

function is to associate the kathēkon in the impulsive impression with the particular agent entertaining the impression and the practical context in which his action is to be executed.42

Thus, for the Stoics, impulsive impressions most likely had the form “it befits me to K

now”, where K is the agent’s potential action expressed as a predicate. Note that impulsive

impressions are very similar to the impressions of the form “it befits A to do K”, i.e. that

some agent’s action is befitting, which we’ve discussed in the previous paragraph. The

difference between these and impulsive impressions is that the latter are always entertained

in the agent’s first-person perspective. For example, the impression “it befits me to be sick”

(kathēkei moi nosēsai)43 is impulsive, while the impression “it befits you to be sick” or

“being sick is befitting” isn’t. The reason is that my assent to the impressions “it befits to

be sick” or “it befits you to be sick now” will not cause me to do anything, because the

former would be an impression about an objective, universal fact that it kathēkei to be sick

in general, while the latter would be an impression of what kathēkei for you, but not of

what kathēkei for me. Stobaeus reports that the Stoics thought that the impulsive impression

is an impression “of something immediately kathēkon”, which, as we have seen, means

42 See LS 2.318, comm. on 53Q. Cf. section VI below. 43 This move seems to be supported by another set of Epictetus’s examples. In Diss. 1.22.14, he mentions several impressions linked in a conditional: “if it profits me to have a farm [sumpherei moi agron echein], then it profits me to take it away from my neighbor [sumpherei moi kai aphelesthai auton tou plēsion]; if it profits me to have a cloak [sumpherei moi himation echein], then it profits me to steal it from a bath [sumpherei moi kai klepsai auto ek balaneiou]”. For Epictetus, impressions that something is profitable (sumpheron) have the same motivational function as impressions that something is kathēkon (Diss. 1.18.1; 1.28.5; cf. Brennan, 2003: 268). If every action that is sumpheron is also kathēkon, then it seems that Epictetus thought that impulsive impressions in Greek have the form kathēkei moi + action that is to be performed. This is also confirmed by certain instances in Seneca, for example, in Ep. 113.18: “It befits me to walk” (oportet me ambulare) and “it befits me to sit” (oportet me sedere).

116 that it necessarily has to be an impression of what is kathēkon to me as the agent who is

performing the action.

However, this difference in perspective that distinguishes impulsive impressions from

non-impulsive impressions that something is kathēkon seems to prevent impulsive

impressions as a class from being apprehensive. Namely, we have already mentioned that

my impulse towards some potential action is stimulated by my assent to the impulsive impression that some action is befitting.44 According to the Stoics, my impulse is directed towards the predicate in the impulsive impression identified as being kathēkon,45 and eo ipso results in my acquiring the property that corresponds to the action expressed by the

predicate.46 For example, my assent to the impulsive impression “it befits me to walk” initiates impulse towards the predicate “to walk”, and the corresponding action, walking, and thus results in my having the property of walking. But, then it seems to follow that befitting actions mentioned in impulsive impressions cannot be huparchonta. Namely, according to Chrysippus (T6), “only those predicates that are actual attributes are said to huparchei, for instance, ‘to walk’ huparchei for me when I am walking, but it does not huparchei to me when I am lying down or sitting.” In other words, some predicate

44 Stob. 2.88,1–7 = LS 331 = IG 102.9b. Here, I follow the standard interpretation exemplified by Inwood 1985: 56–66 (cf. LS 2.200; Brennan 2005: 87–88). 45 I think that this follows from Stob. 2.97,15–98,6 (= LS 33J = IG 102.11f). There, we are told that advantages (ōphelēmata) are “to be chosen” (hairetea), and that they are predicates corresponding to good things. Hairetea, or things that are “to be chosen”, are directed at predicates, just as impulses are. From Stob. 2.86,2–3, it is clear that the Stoics thought that ōphelēmata are one species of the genus of kathēkonta. If we assume that this means that hairetea are directed at the same predicates as impulses, it follows that impulse is directed at the predicate describing the kathēkon. In other words, while prudence (phronēsis) is a good thing, the predicate “being prudent” (phronein) is a kathēkon, and in an impulsive impression involving this kathēkon, impulse would be directed toward the agent’s possession of prudence, i.e. achieving the state in which the predicate “being prudent” can be truthfully applied to him. I see no reason to assume that the Stoics thought that the same does not also hold for kathēkonta that are not ōphelēmata, for example for the so-called intermediate proper functions (mesa kathēkonta), such as “walking” (peripatein, cf. Stob. 2.97,4–5 = LS 59M4) or “getting married” (gamein, cf. Stob. 2.86,3), and thus for the whole genus of kathēkonta. 46 For arguments that the phrase “directed at” (hormē/horman epi + acc.) in this context applies here both to the corporeal action and the incorporeal predicate describing the action, see Inwood 1985: 272, n. 53.

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huparchei for me, i.e. refers to something huparchon, only when it is my actual attribute

(sumbebēkos), i.e. when it is indeed a property of my body. Because of this, the predicate

“to walk” (peripatein) huparchei for me only when I am actually walking, that is, when “I

am walking (peripatō)” actually corresponds to the reality. During the time when I am not

walking, the predicate “to walk” is not something that huparchei moi. Accordingly, the

predicate “to walk” in the impulsive impression “it befits me to walk (kathēkei moi

peripatein)” cannot huparchei moi unless walking is one of my actual attributes, that is,

unless I am actually walking. However, according to the Stoic theory of impulse, my

walking is initiated only at the moment I assent to the impulsive impression “it befits me

to walk”, which is when walking becomes my attribute and thus something that huparchei

moi. But, at the time I am entertaining the impression and before I assent to it, walking is

not one of my actual attributes and, therefore, my walking is not something huparchon.

Because of this, it seems that no impulsive impression “it befits me to K” can be caused by

something huparchon, since the action K is the effect of my assent to the impulsive

impression, i.e. because K becomes something huparchon only after I assent to the

impulsive impression.47 But, if impulsive impressions cannot be caused by huparchonta, then it seems that they cannot meet the requirement of the first clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression.

47 This problem remains even if huparchein here is understood in the sense that applies to incorporeal propositions, in which it means “to be true” or “to be the case” (for this sense of huparchein, see Long 1971: 91). Before my impulse to walk occurs, it is not yet true or the case that I am walking; “I am walking” becomes the case only after I assent to the impulsive impression “it befits me to walk”. That is why the solution proposed by Brennan (2005: 78–79) to the problem of apprehensive impressions caused by other impressions does not apply to the impulsive impressions. Even if we grant that some apprehensive impressions could be caused by incorporeal sayables that are huparchonta in the sense of “being true” or “being the case” (which is, as noted in Striker 1974: 73–76, by no means uncontroversial), an impulsive impression of the form kathēkei moi K by definition cannot be caused by such huparchonta, because K in the impulsive impression is not true (or the case) before the agent assents to the impulsive impression.

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One obvious problem of this result is that the claim that impulsive impressions cannot be apprehensive seems to imply that the practical perfection of the Sage is based on

nonapprehensive impressions, or in other words, that there is nothing to distinguish morally

perfect actions of the Sage from morally imperfect actions of the non-Sage. But this

conclusion need not follow. Namely, we have seen at the end of section II above that the

Stoics thought that it is possible to construct universalized impressions, which cannot be

apprehensive, from sets of impressions about particulars, which can be apprehensive.

Accordingly, from a set of apprehensive impressions that evaluate someone’s walking in a particular practical context, for example “Dion’s walking is befitting in the practical

context C”, “Theon’s walking is befitting in C”, etc., the agent could form a universalized

(non-apprehensive) impression “walking is befitting in C” or “it befits to walk in C,”48 and

then, when in circumstances sufficiently similar to C, the agent could deduce the impulsive

impression “it befits me to walk now.” Examples of such universalized impressions about

kathēkonta are abundant in our sources; in fact, various lists of befitting actions that we find in preserved accounts of Stoic ethics seem to consist precisely of such universalized

propositions. For example, Diogenes Laertius says that (in most contexts) honoring one’s

parents, or brother, or the fatherland is befitting, that spending time with friends is befitting,

while neglecting parents is not befitting, and so on (DL 7.108–109 = LS 59E.). Thus, even

if impulsive impressions cannot be apprehensive, they can be deduced from the agent’s

knowledge of true universal facts about which actions are befitting, which was in turn based

48 I take it that the Stoics thought that impressions such as “walking is befitting” and “it befits to walk” are interchangeable, i.e. that they differ only in syntax; in the former, the evaluative element “is befitting” is expressed as a participle (kathekon) and the action as the corresponding noun (peripatēsis), while in the latter the action is expressed in the form of infinitive (peripatein) and the evaluative element “it befits” in its verbal form (kathēkei).

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on the apprehension (katalēpsis) of particular befitting actions of other agents. Obviously,

if the agent is not a Sage, at least some of his impulsive impressions would be deduced

from false universal moral impressions, i.e. those that are based on nonapprehensive moral

impressions about particulars. Therefore, it does not follow that, if impulsive impressions

are incapable of being apprehensive, there would be nothing to distinguish between the

morally perfect actions of the Sage and the morally imperfect actions of the ordinary

person. On the contrary, they would be distinguished by the fact that the former’s actions

would be based on apprehension of particular moral objects, while the latter’s actions

would be based on a set of impressions which would contain at least some nonapprehensive

moral/evaluative impressions about particulars.

In sections I and II above, I have argued that Epictetus thought that certain moral

impressions are capable of being apprehensive, and that these impressions, as perceptual

impressions about particular corporeal objects, would have been capable of meeting the

first clause of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression. In section III, I have

suggested that the Stoics thought that moral impressions are both descriptions and

evaluations, and in section IV that there are no obstacles in assuming that certain evaluative

impressions that are relevant for action can also be apprehensive. What remains to be

discussed, however, is whether there are moral/evaluative impressions that could meet the

other two requirements of the definition of the apprehensive impression.

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Let us start with the second clause. In case of the nonmoral impression, this

requirement is met if and only if the impression correctly grasps the actual properties of

the impressor, including those properties that make the impressor peculiarly qualified. By

analogy, it is natural to assume that in the case of the moral/evaluative impression, the

second clause is met if and only if the impression correctly grasps the actual moral properties of the impressor, including those that make the impressor peculiarly qualified

(in case there are such properties).49

It seems, however, that the picture is more complicated than this. As we have seen in

section III above, moral impressions are not only descriptions of their impressors, but also

their evaluations. The meanings of evaluative predicates indicate a certain type of pursuit

or evasion stance, and this must be taken into account when considering how moral impressions meet the second clause. One way of doing this would be assuming that just as a nonmoral impression is in accordance with its impressor when the nonmoral predicates contained in it correspond to the nonmoral properties of the impressor, a moral/evaluative impression is in accordance with its impressor when the moral/evaluative predicates contained in it also indicate a correct stance towards the impressor. Because of their evaluative role, it seems that the chief criterion of success for a moral/evaluative impression should not be its being true as in the case of purely descriptive impressions, but

(also) its correctness as an evaluation. If this assumption is correct, then in order to meet the requirement of the second clause, it is crucial that the moral/evaluative impression is

49 According to the Stoics, moral properties could perhaps be part of an object’s peculiar quality. As we will see in Chapter 4, Socrates’ prudence for example could be Socrates’ essential property, especially according to the approach that takes a person’s soul as that which makes a person peculiarly qualified.

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above all a correct evaluation of its object, which means that it associates the correct agent’s

stance to its object.

How is this association of correct stances to objects supposed to work? In order to see

this, we have to understand how to Stoics classified evaluable objects and possible

evaluative stances the agent can take towards them. On the one hand, they distinguished

between four types of evaluable impressors classified in two general categories. In the first category they placed two general classes of things that are morally relevant, which they called goods (agatha) and bads (kaka), and in the second two general classes of things that are morally indifferent but practically relevant, which they called preferred indifferents

(proēgmena adiaphora) and dispreferred indifferents (apoproēgmena adiaphora).50

Unlike good and bad things, morally indifferent things are those that in themselves neither

benefit nor harm because they can be used both well and badly, depending on the context.51

Those indifferents that are in accordance with our nature,52 like life, health, pleasure,

wealth, etc. have value (axia) and are thus preferred, while those that are not in accordance

with our nature, like death, illness, pain, poverty, etc. have disvalue (apaxia) and are thus

dispreferred.53 In virtue of having value or disvalue, indifferents too are capable of stimulating action.

50 The distinction between good and bad things on the one hand and preferred and dispreferred indifferents on the other originated with Zeno (see Stob. 2.57,18–20 = IG 102.5a and 2.84,18–24 = LS 58E1–2 = IG 102.7g). Despite dissenting views from some of the members, such as Aristo (see e.g. SE M 11.64–67 = LS 58F and commentary on LS 1.358–359), it remained the orthodox doctrine of the Stoic school. Nevertheless, Aristo’s arguments could have been the motivation for Chrysippus to acknowledge the usage of agathon and kakon in the loose sense of these words; see section V below. 51 DL 7.103 = LS 58A5–6. For example, a preferred indifferent like wealth can be used in a vicious way; also, it is sometimes virtuous to give up your own life (a preferred indifferent) for your country or friends, or if suffering from an incurable disease (DL 7.130 = LS 66H). 52 See Stob. 2.79,18–80,13 = LS 58C1–3 = IG 102.7a; cf. DL 7.102–103 = LS 58A4 for a list of indifferents. 53 Stob. 2.83,10–11 = LS 58D1 = IG 102.7f. The difference in terms of value between goods and bads on the one hand and indifferents on the other is that goods and bads have absolute value and disvalue, while indifferents have relative value and disvalue (Stob. 2.84,18–85,11 = LS 58E = IG 102.7g).

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On the other hand, the Stoics thought that each of these four types of objects has an

appropriate stance that is appropriately associated with it. We have already mentioned these

four stances in section III above: goods are worth choosing, bads are worth avoiding,

preferred indifferents are worth taking, and dispreferred indifferents are worth not taking.

Evaluating objects by associating correct stances to them was important for the Stoics

because they thought that different stances involve different kinds of impulse. Although

goods and preferred indifferents both stimulate the same general pursuit-type behavior,

they thought that preferred indifferents are pursued conditionally because they stimulate

conditional impulse towards them, while goods are pursued unconditionally because they

stimulate unconditional impulse towards them.54 Analogously, bads stimulate unconditional impulse away from them, while dispreferred indifferents stimulate

conditional impulse away from them. Therefore, it could be said that a moral/evaluative impression meets the second clause if it correctly evaluates its impressor by associating choosing with a good object, avoiding with a bad object, taking with an object that is a preferred indifferent, or not taking with an object that is a dispreferred indifferent. This would ensure that the impression correctly stimulates an unconditional impulse towards a good object, an unconditional impulse away from a bad object, a conditional impulse towards a preferred indifferent, or a conditional impulse away from a dispreferred indifferent. For example, the impression “Dion’s prudence is a good thing” would be a

correct evaluation of Dion’s prudence insofar as it indicates that prudence is worth

choosing for Dion, and thus associates the proper kind of impulse—an unconditional

impulse—with a thing that is genuinely good.

54 Cf. Stob. 2.75,1–3 = IG 102.5o.

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What would mean for a moral impression to meet the requirement of the third clause

of the definition? We have seen in Chapter 1 that the third clause was introduced in

response to the Academic objection that a true impression could be just like a false one,

where “just like” refers to identity in the manner in which impressions represents its object.

But how is this supposed to work in the case of moral/evaluative impressions? One quote from Chrysippus’ book On good things perhaps offers some clue:

[T29:] If someone in accordance with such differences [i.e. between the preferred and dispreferred]

wishes to call the one class of them good and the other bad, and he is referring to these things [i.e.

the preferred or the dispreferred] and not committing an idle aberration, his usage must be accepted

on the grounds that he is not wrong on the matter of meanings [sēmainomenois] and in other respects

is aiming at the normal use of terms.55

The text here suggests that Chrysippus thought that those who apply the concept “good” to

preferred indifferents and the concept “bad” to dispreferred indifferents are not completely

mistaken, i.e. that their language usage does not involve a mistake in “the matter of

meanings”. However, we saw above that the Stoics distinguished sharply between things

that are genuinely good and bad and things that are only preferred and dispreferred

indifferents, as well as between stances that should be appropriately associated with them.

So, what could have Chrysippus meant by saying that calling preferred indifferents good

and dispreferred indifferents bad is not an error but something consistent with the meanings

55 Plut. St. rep. 1048A, transl. by LS, 58H. Although the text has been the subject of many proposals for editorial emendations (cf. Cherniss, Plutarch: Moralia XIII: II, 530, ns. 10–18), it is reasonably clear that Chrysippus here states that, although this is not strictly speaking correct according to the Stoic doctrine, those who apply “good” (agathon) and “bad” (kakon) to preferred and dispreferred indifferents do not err in respect to the meanings of these moral concepts and are in general following the loose, everyday linguistic sense of these terms.

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of these respective pairs of terms? It seems that Chrysippus is referring here to potential

agent’s stances, which, as we have argued in section III above, constitute parts of the meaning of moral/evaluative predicates. Indeed, there is a connection between goods and preferred indifferents, as well as between bads and dispreferred indifferents in respect to stances: goods and preferred indifferents are properly associated with a general pursuit-

type of behavior (choosing and taking), while bads and dispreferred indifferents are

associated with a general evasion-type behavior (avoiding and not taking). After all, this

connection is not surprising given the fact that the Stoics thought that our conception of

the good develops through analogy from our conception of the valuable, i.e. from our

conception of the preferred indifferents.56 Because of this, it is possible that Chrysippus

was trying to say that those who evaluate preferred indifferents as good and dispreferred indifferents as bad will not be completely wrong in respect to what kind of general behavior they associate with the evaluated objects.57 For example, someone who assents to the

impression “My health is something good” would be evaluating his own health as

something that should generally be pursued, and this evaluation would in most cases be

correct because the Stoics thought that health is an indifferent that is preferred, i.e.

56 Cic. Fin. 3.20–21 = LS 59D2–4; 3.33 = LS 60D1–2; cf. Jackson-McCabe 2004: 334–339. 57 It remains unclear what would Chrysippus’ position be on the truth-value of moral impressions that evaluate a preferred indifferent as something good or a dispreferred indifferent as something bad. Namely, if moral impressions have dual descriptive-evaluative function, then it seems that as descriptions, such impressions would be false. There is, perhaps, one way to avoid this conclusion. Arguably, moral concepts of an agent entertaining such impressions has not yet reached the level of development where they can track the Stoic distinction between genuine goods and bads, and preferred and dispreferred indifferents. Accordingly, when such an agent entertains an impression that some preferred indifferent impressor is good, perhaps his conception of good does correctly capture a corporeal element in the impressor that is in fact shared both by objects that are preferred indifferents and objects that are genuinely good. If so, then it seems that this agent’s impression would be a true description after all. In any case, one could still say that, at least in most cases, such impressions are “in accordance with the impressor” in a substantial sense of this phrase.

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something that is generally in accordance with our nature and, as such, has a significant

amount of (non-absolute) value and worth pursuing in general.

If our interpretation of what Chrysippus had in mind above is correct, then (at least some of) the Stoics would have been inclined to understand the accordance requirement of the second clause as a considerably weaker condition than the one we discussed couple of paragraphs above. Instead of securing that each of the four types of evaluable objects

(goods, bads, preferred and dispreferred indifferents) is associated with exactly one of the possible agent’s stances (choosing, avoiding, taking and not taking), this weaker version of the accordance requirement would be satisfied by simply assigning the correct kind of general behavior (pursuit or evasion) to objects belonging to one of the two general groups of evaluable impressors (goods and preferred indifferents, or bads and dispreferred indifferents). It should immediately be clear that meeting this weaker requirement would not be sufficient to make a moral/evaluative impression apprehensive. Although the agent

assenting to impressions that meet only the causal and the weak accordance requirements would have evaluations that are in most situations correct, his evaluations would not be such that they could not turn out incorrect. There would still be situations in which such an agent’s evaluations would be incorrect. For example, someone who assents to the impression “My health is something good” and is hence evaluating his health is an object of general pursuit-kind behavior, in most cases may be actually correct in his evaluation of health because in most cases health should properly be pursued. In fact, if he never actually encounters a situation in which it would be befitting for him to harm himself,58 this agent

58 One example of such a situation is reported by Sextus in M 11.66 (= LS 58F4): “At any rate, if healthy people have to serve the tyrant and for this reason be destroyed, while the sick are exempted from this service and thereby also exempted from destruction, the sage will choose being sick on this occasion rather than being healthy. And thus neither is health invariably a thing preferred nor sickness a thing dispreferred.”

126 may even spend his whole life pursuing health and remain loosely correct in his original evaluation.59 Nevertheless, his original evaluation of health would not be such that it could not turn out incorrect, because had the agent been in a situation in which it would have been befitting for him to give up his health, he would not have done it. His impression “My health is something good” would evaluate his health as something worth choosing, and since choosing is a stance that involves unconditional impulse, it would have prevented him from giving up his health in this situation.60 In other words, a moral/evaluative impression that meets the requirements of the first and the second clause understood in this weak sense would not enable the agent to discriminate between actual situations in which his evaluation is correct and counterfactual situation in which his evaluation would have been incorrect, and the ability to make such discriminations is, as we have seen, crucial for making a moral/evaluative impression apprehensive.61

Therefore, in order to be apprehensive, a moral/evaluative impression would have to meet an additional requirement, which would be parallel to the requirement of the third

59 Indeed, it seems that the “moral progressor” (prokoptōn), a non-Sage who has progressed to the furthest point short of becoming the Sage, mentioned by Chrysippus in Stob. 5.906,18–907,5 (= LS 59I) is precisely such an agent––a person whose all moral/evaluative impressions he has assented to so far have actually turned out correct, but least some of these impressions are nevertheless nonapprehensive. As Chrysippus says, even though all of this person’s actual actions are based on correct evaluations (because they are all befitting), he has not yet achieved happiness and wisdom because his actions have not yet acquired firmness and fixity that characterizes the actions of the Sage. I take this to mean that regardless of the fact that this person actually acts correctly, at least some of his actions are based on moral impressions that could turn out to be incorrect evaluations. That is why his actions have not yet achieved the firmness and fixity of the Sage’s actions. 60 In explaining the difference between the moral disposition of the Sage and the non-Sage, the preserved texts suggest that the Stoics invested more effort in focusing on the cases of mistaking preferred indifferents for genuine goods than on, for example, mistaking genuine goods for preferred indifferents (see, for example, DL 7.101–3 = LS 58A; SE M 11.200–1 = LS 59G). This is to be expected, because most of ordinary people as well as non-Stoic philosophers consider moral indifferents to be geniune goods or bads. After all, even the Stoics themselves believed, as we have seen above, that the conception of relative value of things that they classified as preferred indifferents is developmentally prior to the conception of the genuine good. I do not think, however, that this means that their approach to analyzing evaluations that mistake genuine goods and bads for objects of conditional impulse would have been any different. 61 Here I agree with Brennan (2005: 178) and his emphasis on the importance of the correctness of evaluations in not only actual, but counterfactual situations as well for the moral and practical perfection of the Sage and his distinction from the non-Sage.

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clause of the definition of the apprehensive impression discussed in Chapter 1. The role of this additional requirement is to ensure that the agent’s evaluation of the object is not only generally or loosely correct, but such that it could not turn out incorrect. From our discussion so far, it should be clear that meeting this requirement would ensure strict correct association of stances that involve conditional and unconditional impulses to corresponding evaluable objects. More precisely, a moral/evaluative impression that meets this requirement would be the impression that correctly associates stances involving unconditional impulse with genuine good and bad objects, and stances involving conditional impulse to preferred and dispreferred indifferents. The way in which this strictly correct evaluation would work can be represented by the following table:

Accordance Requirement

General Pursuit General Evasion

Behavior Behavior

Unconditional Choosing (Goods) Avoiding (Bads) Impulse Discrimination Requirement Not Taking Taking (Preferred Conditional Impulse (Dispreferred Indifferents) Indifferents)

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that although the mechanisms enabling nonmoral

and moral impressions to meet the conditions required for apprehension are different, they

nevertheless in both cases rely on special discriminatory power that characterizes all

apprehensive impressions. In the case of the non-moral apprehensive impression, this

mechanism, as we have seen in section I above, relies on the ability of the impression to

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discriminate between extremely similar but distinct impressors because confusing such

objects is the chief obstacle to achieving nonmoral apprehension. In the case of

moral/evaluative apprehensive impressions, this mechanism relies on the ability of the

impression to discriminate between genuine goods and preferred indifferents, or genuine

bads and dispreferred indifferents because confusing these impressors is the chief obstacle

to achieving moral apprehension. Still, in both cases, the person who assents only to true

impressions that distinguish between extremely similar but distinct objects and correct

evaluations that distinguish between genuinely morally relevant objects and indifferents

will be capable of achieving epistemic, moral, and practical perfection worthy of a Stoic

Sage.62

62 Of course, just like in the case of descriptive apprehensive impressions and knowledge, entertaining apprehensive moral/evaluative impressions is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving moral and practical perfection. In addition, the agent needs to achieve the state in which he assents only to moral/evaluative impressions that are apprehensive, and never to moral/evaluative impressions that are nonapprehensive.

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CHAPTER 4

THE ACADEMIC STRATEGY AGAINST THE STOIC APPREHENSION

In Chapter 2, I have argued that the Stoics did not require that in order to achieve

apprehension and knowledge we have to be able to recognize which among our impressions

are and which are not apprehensive, and that they were in this sense epistemic externalists.

On the other hand, the standard interpretation of the Academics’ arguments against the

Stoic apprehension, accepted explicitly or implicitly by virtually all contemporary scholars,1 is that they attacked the Stoics from the position characterized by some

internalist assumptions. According to this interpretation, Academic strategy consisted in two steps. The first step was to insist that in order for the subject S to achieve apprehension and knowledge, it is necessary that S have an apprehensive impression A and that S is able to somehow recognize that A indeed is apprehensive and be able to directly distinguish A from competing non-apprehensive impressions. The only way the alleged apprehensive

1 E.g. Frede 1983 and 1999; Annas 1990: 184-203; Striker 1990: 153-4, and 1997: 270-2; Hankinson 1995: 79-83 and 105-113; Schofield 1999; Reed 2002; Perin 2005a and 2005b; Baltzly 2010; Thorsrud 2012.

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impressions would be able to serve their role as the criteria of truth is if they can be

recognized as such. The tactics behind this step has some obvious internalist overtones.

The second step of the Academic strategy according to this approach consisted in employing the so-called Indistinguishability (aparallaxia) arguments.2 The aim of these arguments was to show that for every alleged apprehensive impression A, there is always

at least one competing non-apprehensive impression N that is representationally indistinguishable (aparallaktos) from A by the subject S. Based on this, the Academics concluded that there are no impressions that can serve the function of the Stoic criterion of truth and thus that there are no impressions that are apprehensive.3

According to the proponents of the standard interpretation, in arguing for

aparallaxia the Academics used two general types of counterexamples. The first set of

examples, which relied on abnormal psychological states like dreams and madness, was

aimed at showing that, while we are dreaming or mentally deranged, we are unable to

recognize immediately that our impressions are false (SE M 7.402-8 = LS 40H1-3; Cic.

Acad. 2.47-54). The second set of examples, which relied on cases of perceiving two

numerically distinct but qualitatively identical or extremely similar objects like twins or

eggs, was introduced to show that even when our mind is working properly and our

impressions are accurate, it is always possible that our impressions are being caused by

another, similar but distinct object (Cic. Acad. 2.54-57; SE M 7.408-11 = LS 40H4). Thus,

according to this approach, the goal of both aparallaxia arguments was to argue that, since

one is unable to distinguish directly apprehensive from non-apprehensive impressions,

2 The Indistinguishability arguments were used by both Arcesilaus (Cic. Acad. 2.77 = LS 40D5-8; SE M 7.153-5 = LS 41C6-9) and Carneades (SE M 7.402-11 = LS 40H). 3 Cf. Annas 1990: 196-7.

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apprehensive impressions do not exist as a separate class, and one cannot achieve apprehension.

The internalist interpretation of the Academic strategy has recently been used to

present a serious challenge to externalist approaches to Stoic epistemology. As we have

mentioned in Chapter 2, Reed (2002) and Perin (2005a) have argued that if the Stoic

position was indeed externalist, then the Academic arguments seem to miss their mark, and

it becomes difficult to explain the length and the complexity of their exchange which is

reported in our sources.4 Namely, if the Stoics were indeed externalists, the Academics’

insisting on the point that the Stoics’ account cannot satisfy certain internalist epistemic

requirements seems like a strategy that is ultimately weak and irrelevant. The Stoics could

have easily avoided the Academic objection by simply rejecting the internalist requirements that in order for apprehensive impressions to exist they have to be immediately distinguishable by the subject, and that in order to have apprehension one must be able to recognize which among his impressions are apprehensive. However, our sources testify that this is not how the Stoics reacted. Based on this, Reed and Perin have concluded that the Stoics were probably not externalists.

In addition, interpreting the Academic strategy as internalist poses a problem even if the Stoics were externalists. As many scholars have argued, the general skeptical method of the Academics was dialectical, in the sense that it consisted in arguing against the views of their opponents solely on the grounds of their opponents’ own dogmatic assumptions.5

4 Annas (1990: 195-8) has proposed an alternative, reconciliatory interpretation. According to her, the debate between the Stoics and the Academics has lasted so long precisely because by they were both insisting on aspects that are important for our understanding of knowledge. Although her idea is brilliant, its problem is that it presupposes that the Academic strategy was exclusively internalist, which I hope my paper will disprove. 5 The dialectical interpretation of Academic skepticism has been first formulated in 1929 by Couissin 1983.

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However, if the internalist interpretation of Academic strategy against Stoic epistemology

is correct, it would represent a serious deviation from their dialectical method because it

would require some sort of commitment to an epistemic position that was not shared by

their opponents, the Stoics. Finally, as Frede (1893) and Baltzly (2010) have argued, if the

Academic criticism was based on internalist objections, we seem to be forced to accept that the Academic strategy was unable to seriously challenge the Stoic position.

In this chapter, I will argue that the standard interpretation of Academic skepticism is problematic because the Academic strategy against the Stoics did not rely exclusively

on internalist assumptions. More precisely, I will show that the Academic strategy employed two different aparallaxia arguments, and that while one of them can be seen as arguing from the position of epistemic internalism, the other represented a much more

serious objection to the externalist aspects of the Stoic epistemology. If my interpretation

of the Academic indistinguishability arguments is correct, Perin and Reed’s claim that the internalist character of the Academic strategy suggests that the Stoics were not externalists loses much of its force. Finally, if correct, my interpretation of the Academic strategy will help vindicate the dialectical interpretation of the Academic skepticism, and show that at least one of their indistinguishability arguments had the potential to seriously undermine the Stoic position.

The best and most complete source for two of the two aparallaxia arguments is the report on Carneades given by Sextus (M 7.402-411 = LS 40H), although Cicero’s account in

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Academica is quite informative too. The goal of the first of these arguments was to show

that apprehensive impressions cannot be distinguished from non-apprehensive ones in

terms of psychological effects they have on the subject’s mind:

[T29:] For impressions come about from both what is huparchon and from what is not huparchon.

And an indication of their indistinguishability (aparallaxias) is their being found equally plain and

striking, while an indication of their being equally striking and plain is the fact that the

corresponding actions are connected with them. For just as in waking life the thirsty person who is

taking in drink is pleased, and the person who is fleeing a wild animal or some other horror shouts

and yells, so too in dreams people who are thirsty and think they are drinking from a spring have

relief, and likewise people facing horrors have fear: “Achilles leapt up amazed, clapped his hands,

and spoke a sorrowful word.” And just as, in a healthy condition, we trust and assent to very clearly

apparent things – for example, we relate to Dion as Dion and Theon as Theon – so too in madness

some people are affected in a similar way. At any rate Hercules in madness, after grasping an

impression from his own children as if they were Eurystheus’, put the corresponding action together

with this impression. The corresponding action was doing away with his enemy’s children – which

he did. So if certain impressions are apprehensive in so far as they lead us on to assent and to putting

the corresponding action together with them, then since there have also appeared false ones of this

kind, it has to be said that non-apprehensive impressions are indistinguishable from apprehensive

ones. 6

6 SE M 7.402-405 (= LS 40H1-3; transl. Bett 2005 with minor changes): γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων. καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλλαξίας τὸ ἐπ’ ἴσης ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὑρίσκεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ’ ἴσης πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολούθους πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀρυόμενος ποτὸν ἥδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δειμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἡ μὲν διάχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς δειματουμένοις· “ταφὼν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς, χερσί τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ’ ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν.” καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν <ὑγιεῖ> καταστάσει τοῖς τρανότατα φαινομένοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, οἷον Δίωνι μὲν ὡς Δίωνι, Θέωνι δὲ ὡς Θέωνι προσφερόμενοι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσί τινες. ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανείς, καὶ λαβὼν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παίδων ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκόλουθον πρᾶξιν ταύτῃ τῇ φαντασίᾳ συνῆψεν. ἀκόλουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας ἀνελεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαί τινές εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πρᾶξιν συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ

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Here, Carneades says that, since both apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions are capable of causing actions, they must be indistinguishable in respect to being plain

(enargeis) and striking (plēktikas). We have seen in Chapter 2 that the Stoics used the properties of being plain and striking to explain a causal effect that impressions have on our minds. They thought that an impression causes the subject to assent to it in virtue of being plain and striking. These properties are related to the subject’s actions precisely via the ability of the impression that possesses them to cause the mind to assent to it. As we have seen in Chapter 3, according to the Stoics each action is a result of the subject’s assent to an ‘impulsive impression’ (phantasia hormetikē), an impression that certain action ought to be performed. Therefore, the first Carneades’ aparallaxia argument states that since apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions are indistinguishable in respect to their ability to cause assent and initiate action, they also must be indistinguishable in respect to their plainness and strikingness.

The indistinguishability in question here is of the kind that should naturally be in the focus of the internalist interpretation. We have seen that the Stoics understood plainness and strikingness as properties of impressions to which we have immediate access because we can easily recognize which among our impressions are plain and striking. Thus, the strategy behind the this indistinguishability argument was to show that since non- apprehensive impressions can be equally plain and striking as the alleged apprehensive ones, plainness and strikingness cannot be properties that categorically distinguish apprehensive from non-apprehensive impressions. In other words, a separate class of

ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφήνασι, λεκτέον ἀπαραλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους.

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impression such as the alleged apprehensive impression does not exist since the these

impressions do not differ categorically from non-apprehensive impressions in terms of how they represent their impressors, i.e. in terms of that which is directly accessible to the subject. Because of its focus on the properties of impressions of which we are directly aware, the standard interpretation of the Academics assumes that this aparallaxia argument represented their main weapon against the Stoics. However, if the Stoics were externalists and did not believe that the apprehensive impression possesses some special directly accessible representational quality that distinguishes it from non-apprehensive impressions, it seems that Carneades’ first aparallaxia argument is arguing against a position that the Stoics did not hold.7 Accordingly, the Academic strategy would indeed seem quite powerless against the Stoic externalism, unless the Stoics cede that the

distinctive character of the apprehensive impression must be something directly accessible to the subject, which they were probably not willing to do, as I argued in Chapter 2.

It is worth noting, however, that there are reasons why Carneades might have

insisted on the phenomenal indistinguishability of apprehensive and non-apprehensive

impressions in the first aparallaxia argument even if he was aware that the Stoics were

externalists. First, there is evidence that Carneades’ skeptical ambition was much greater

than arguing solely against the Stoic epistemology. Sextus says that he intended to argue against all previous (and future) philosophers’ attempts at defining the criterion of truth, not only the Stoics’ (M 7.159; cf. Schofield 1999: 338-341). At least two major philosophical schools, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans,8 argued that plainness is the

crucial property that guarantees the truth of impressions, and an argument like this might

7 Cf. Frede 1983: 84-5; Striker 1990: 153; cf. Annas 1990: 194-8. 8 For the Peripatetics, cf. SE M 7.218; for the Epicureans, cf. SE M 7.203.

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have been intended at least partially as a rebuttal of their positions. Second, Carneades

might have done it for the sake of methodological completeness, i.e. to show that

aparallaxia between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions holds in every

possible respect that the Stoics considered relevant.

Still, given the contexts in which it occurs in Sextus and Cicero, the argument was

most likely directly responding to the third clause of the Stoic definition of the

apprehensive impression. Let us then analyze the above aparallaxia argument in that

context and assess its force. I have argued in Chapter 1 that the third clause amounts to the

requirement that in addition to satisfying the first two clauses—that is, in addition to

coming from a huparchon and molded-in-from and sealed-in-from in accordance with that

huparchon itself—an impression must also be representationally different from any other

impression from what is not huparchon that the subject is aware of. In other words, the

formulation “such that it could not come from what is not huparchon” should be interpreted

in the form of the following counterfactual conditional:

(1) If the same representational content were coming from what is not huparchon,

the impression would not have been apprehensive.

The point made by (1) is that an impression I whose representational content R portrays

certain object O is apprehensive only if it is actually caused by O. There is a possible

scenario in which the same representational content R results from a different causal history

and is not caused by O; and in that scenario the same impression I with the same representational content R is not apprehensive. But, as long as that possible scenario does

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not obtain, I is apprehensive. The first aparallaxia argument should accordingly be

understood as providing support to the general Academics’ claim that:

(2) Every true impression is such that it could be coming from what is not

huparchon.

The word “such” in (2) refers to the impression’s representational content, as we have seen in Chapter 1. Thus, the idea behind the first aparallaxia argument is that since the representational contents of impressions entertained in a dream or in a state of madness do not categorically differ in terms of plainness and strikingness from the representational

contents of impressions that are caused by real objects, then every impression that is plain

and striking is such that it could be a result of dreaming or madness, including apprehensive

impressions which are paradigmatically plain and striking. However, if this was its

intention, then the first aparallaxia argument fails as a serious challenge to the Stoic

position. Namely, the modality of the main Academic claim (2) seems to be epistemic:

every plain and striking impression is such that, for all we know, it is possible that it is

coming from what is not huparchon. Specifically, for all I know it is possible that, for

example, my plain and striking impression that this is Dion is the result of a very vivid

dream I am having, even if the impression is as a matter of fact being caused by real, present

Dion. But, if what I argued in Chapter 2 is right, the Stoics can easily admit this epistemic possibility. Viewed in isolation, every plain and striking impression I am aware of could— for all I know—be the result of dreaming or some other abnormal mental state because, according to the Stoics, impressions coming from what is not huparchon can sometimes

138 rival apprehensive impressions in terms of their representational qualities, including plainness and strikingness. But, that does not imply that all plain and striking impressions

I am aware of actually are the result of dreaming or madness. In fact, since I am presumably not completely mad or immersed in some kind of perpetual dreaming state, most of my plain and striking impressions are actually caused by the huparchonta they represent. In order for these plain and striking impressions to be apprehensive, it is sufficient that they as a matter of fact have a particular causal history. My additional knowledge—or any other kind of cognitive awareness—that they indeed have this causal history is unnecessary.

Consequently, the most that the first Academic argument from indistinguishability can hope to establish is that we cannot know or be aware whether our plain and striking impressions indeed have a causal history that leads back to the objects that they represent.

In this sense, it is an argument that can be characterized as internalist. But, since the Stoics were not internalists, the argument does not represent a real problem.

II.

The second Carneades’ aparallaxia argument is summarized in the following Sextus’ report:

[T30:] [a] But the Academics show equally well their [i.e. apprehensive and non-apprehensive

impressions’] indistinguishability in terms of stamp (charaktēra) and imprint (tupon). They bring

the Stoics up against things that are apparent. [b] For in the case of things that are similar in shape,

but differ in respect to substance, it is impossible to distinguish the apprehensive impression from

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the false and non-apprehensive one. [c] For example, if there are two eggs exactly alike, and I give

them to the Stoic one after the other, will the wise person, after fastening upon them, have the

capacity to say infallibly whether the egg he is being shown is a single one, or the one and then the

other? [d] The same argument also applies in the case of twins. For the earnest person will grasp a

false impression, albeit one from a huparchon and molded and sealed in accordance with that

huparchon itself, if he gets an impression from Castor as from Polydeuces. [e] From here, too, came

the “veiled” argument. When a snake has poked its head out, if we want to give our attention to the

underlying object, we will fall into a great deal of impasse, and will not be able to say whether it is

the same snake that poked its head out before or another one, since many snakes are coiled up in the

same hole. The apprehensive impression, then, does not have any peculiarity by which it differs

from false and non-apprehensive impressions.9

This Carneades’ argument relies on examples of pairs of real objects—two eggs, the mythical twin brothers Castor and Polydeuces, two snakes, etc.—that “differ in underlying substances” but are “identical in shape”—or in other words, that are two numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects10—and a subject whose knowledge of both of

9 SE M 7.408-411 (= LS 40 H4 partially; transl. Bett 2005 with minor adjustments): οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ [ἡ] κατὰ τύπον. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς Στωικούς. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν, διαφερόντων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀμήχανόν ἐστι διορίζειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου· οἷον δυεῖν ᾠῶν ἄκρως ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων ἐναλλὰξ τῷ Στωικῷ δίδωμι πρὸς διάκρισιν, εἰ ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἰσχύσει λέγειν ἀδιαπτώτως, πότερον ἕν ἐστι τὸ δεικνύμενον ᾠὸν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῆ φαντασίαν ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἐὰν ἀπὸ Κάστορος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκους φαντασιωθῇ. ἐντεῦθεν γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος συνέστη λόγος· ἐὰν γὰρ προκύψαντος δράκοντος θέλωμεν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἐπιστῆναι, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσούμεθα, καὶ οὐχ ἕξομεν λέγειν, πότερον ὁ αὐτός ἐστι δράκων τῷ πρότερον προκύψαντι ἢ ἕτερος, πολλῶν ἐνεσπειραμένων τῷ αὐτῷ φωλεῷ δρακόντων. οὐ τοίνυν ἔχει τι ἰδίωμα ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν ψευδῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταλήπτων φαντασιῶν. 10 This type of the example from twin objects could be understood in two ways, weakly and strongly. According to the weak version, the twin objects do not have to be qualitatively identical, only sufficiently similar to cause impressions unable to keep the objects apart. I take the story about Sphaerus (DL 7.177) to represent such a version of the argument from twin objects. Namely, during a royal banquet, Sphaerus is presented with a realistic wax replica of a pomegranate, which he mistakes for a real one. Obviously, the wax replica is not qualitatively identical to the real pomegranate; at the very least, it differs in being composed of a different material than the real pomegranate. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently similar to cause an impression in Sphaerus that

140 them is as good as anyone else’s is.11 Let us focus on Castor and Polydeuces as a paradigm case. The example invites us to imagine our subject perceiving Castor under normal perceptual circumstances. The subject would receive the impression—let’s call it I1—that satisfies the first two clauses of Zeno’s definition: it is caused by something existent,

Castor, and stamped and molded in accordance with that existent itself, namely Castor.

According to our discussion of the second clause in Chapter 1, this means that impression

I1’s predicative content correctly represents Castor’s qualities, including those that make

Castor peculiarly qualified. The impression I1, however, is “as from” (hōs apo)

Polydeuces, which means that it is as from something that is not huparchon. The idea is that since Castor and Polydeuces are extremely qualitatively similar, the impression I1

could be indistinguishable from another impression, I2, also entertained under normal

perceptual conditions, which is caused by Polydeuces and in accordance with Polydeuces.

More specifically, the impression I1 would be molded and sealed in the identical way as

the impression I2, and it seems that this is the indistinguishability in terms of “mark”

mistakenly represents it as a real one. Arguably, since this happens due to a misdepiction of some of the wax replica’s qualities (e.g. the quality of its material that could have only been perceived by touch), this impression would count as fraudulent. The problem with the weak version is that it provides the Stoics with a relatively easy way out. Sphaerus could admit (which he did) that the particular impression he entertained was not apprehensive—for example, because it was not precise enough—but continue to maintain that other impressions could be precise enough to be apprehensive. His fault would have been only that he rashly assented to a non-apprehensive impression, something that the Sage would never do (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.57). The strong version of the twin objects example does not allow for such an easy solution. If the twin objects are indeed qualitatively identical, then no matter how precise one’s impressions get, entertaining the impression caused by one object that is identical to the impression caused by another object would always remain possible. One way out for the Stoics would be to deny that qualitatively identical twin objects really exist, which it seems was exactly what the Stoics did in response to cases like these (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.54-6 and 84-5). But adopting this tactic exposes the Stoics to new problems which are discussed in more detail below. 11 In M 7.410, the subject in question is referred to as σπουδαῖος (“earnest”, “serious”, “excellent”), which is Sextus’ standard way of referring to the Stoic Sage (cf. e.g. PH 2.83; 3.169-72, 181; M 7.418-9, etc.). Thus, the subject in the example possesses perfect knowledge of the objects in question—the eggs, Castor and Polydeuces, and the snakes—and perfect ability to recognize and distinguish them.

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(χαρακτήρ)12 and “print” (τύπος) Carneades is referring to. However, even though the

subject is perceiving Castor and entertaining the impression I1 that is in accordance with

Castor, due to Castor’s extreme similarity to Polydeuces, the I1’s “mark” and “print” is identical to the mark and print of the impression I2 with the propositional content “This is

Polydeuces” which is false at the time the subject entertains I1. From this, Carneades

concludes that the (alleged) apprehensive impressions do not have an idiōma, a peculiarity

that distinguishes them from non-apprehensive impressions.

The standard interpretation of this aparallaxia argument is that it is of secondary

importance because it does not seem to argue for anything new. Instead, it only illustrates

a further category of examples meant to prove that the general point already argued for by

the first aparallaxia argument, that the subject’s inability to distinguish between

apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions also holds in the cases where the subject

is not only in a normal psychic state, but in fact possesses the exceptional epistemic powers

of the Sage.13 This assessment of the role of the second aparallaxia argument, however, is

problematic. Although in Sextus’ report in T29 Carneades does primarily use cases of

subjects in abnormal mental states (SE M 7.403-7 = LS 40H2-3), the scope of the first aparallaxia argument need not be understood as being limited only to such cases. Namely,

a plain and striking non-apprehensive impression can cause even a person in a normal state of mind to assent and act in a particular way as much as an apprehensive impression can.

12 We have already encountered the term χαρακτήρ in our discussion of the second clause in section II, and saw that the Stoics used it to refer to qualities of bodies. Here, however, Sextus is talking about the χαρακτήρ of impressions, so the word must have a different sense. It could either be some kind of attempt at word play on Sextus’ part—making a reference to Stoic claim that the apprehensive impression grasps the impressor’s χαρακτήρ—or it could refer to the metaphor of signet rings leaving their markings (χαρακτῆρες) on the wax from SE M 7.251 = T10b. 13 This interpretation, for example, is held by Annas 1990: 199 and Schofield 1999: 344-5; that this part of the aparallaxia argument is of secondary importance compared to the first part is claimed by Frede 1983: 91, and Schofield 1999: 342.

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For example, if one is very thirsty and sees two cups in front of him, one filled with water

and the other with transparent poisonous liquid, one would probably drink both from the

cup filled with water as well as from the cup filled with poison. The act of drinking from

the cup of water would be based on the assent to the apprehensive impression that the cup

is filled with water, while the act of drinking from the cup of poison would be based on the

assent to a false and non-apprehensive impression that the second cup is also filled with

water.14 Therefore, the scope of the conclusion of the first aparallaxia argument does not

need to be interpreted as being limited only to cases involving subjects in abnormal states of mind; it can extended to cases involving subjects in normal states of mind as well.

Because of this, grounding the contrast between the first and the second aparallaxia arguments which is clearly present in both Sextus and Cicero’s texts in the difference

between subjects in abnormal and those in normal perceptual states does not seem to reveal much about Carneades’ strategy.

Instead, it seems that the contrast Carneades’ was aiming at here is between apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions’ indistinguishability in terms of another

group of representational properties of impressions. Namely, the second aparallaxia

argument begins with Carneades’ statement that its aim is to establish that apprehensive

and non-apprehensive impressions are indistinguishable in terms of their character

(charaktēr) and imprint (tupos). As we have seen, the Stoics envisaged perceptual impressions grasping their objects in a process that is similar to imprinting a seal on the wax: just as a seal leaves the imprint (tupōsis) of its stamp on the wax, the object leaves

14 A similar point can be made in the case of the story about Sphaerus (D.L. 7.177 = LS 40F). The story portrays Sphaerus, who was in a normal state of mind and in favorable perceptual circumstances, as reaching for the wax replica of a pomegranate even though by his own admission the impression of the pomegranate that initiated his action was not apprehensive.

143 the imprint of its properties on the soul and produces an impression of itself (D.L. 7.50 =

LS 39A3; cf. SE M 7.228-36). However, they also thought that the apprehensive impression

is distinguished from non-apprehensive impressions by its ability to grasp its object and its

qualities with exceptional precision. They thought that in addition to being a “commonly

qualified thing” (koinōs poion) each corporeal object is also a “peculiarly qualified thing”

(idiōs poion).15 In other words, they believed that although certain qualities or properties can be common to distinct objects, each object possesses a property that is not shared by

any other existent corporeal object. For example, while he can share the property of baldness with many other persons, Socrates also possess a distinctive property that he shares with no other person and in virtue of which Socrates is a peculiarly qualified

individual, or an ontologically unique object. In virtue of holding this view, the Stoics subscribed to what we may call the principle of the ontological distinguishability of non- identicals.

In addition to this principle, it seems that the Stoics also subscribed to the principle

of perceptual distinguishability of non-identicals. They thought that qualities that make objects ontologically unique are always at least in principle perceivable.16 Thus, as a kind

15 Syrianus In Ar. Met. 28,18-19 = LS 28G; Plut. Comm. not. 1083A-1084A = LS 28A; Simpl. In Ar. Cat. 222,30-3 = LS 28H; In Ar. De an. 217,36-218,2 = LS 28I; Stob. 1.177-21-179,17 = LS 28D; cf. DL 7.58 = LS 33M. 16 Cic. Acad. 2.56-7. Some advocates of the internalist interpretation of the Academic strategy like notably Striker (1990: 154) and Perin (2005b) have claimed that the point of the second aparallaxia argument is precisely to force the Stoics to admit that, in order to make their epistemology work, they have to hold not only the principle of the ontological uniqueness of objects, but also a stronger and potentially problematic position, that objects are perceptually unique. Because of this, Perin thinks (2005b: 517, n. 39) that this principle was adopted by the Stoics as an ad hoc maneuver under the pressure from the Academics. However, this interpretation of the second aparallaxia argument is problematic. Namely, as Perin (2005b: 511) acknowledges, there is textual evidence that suggests that the Stoics subscribed to the principle of perceptual uniqueness of objects. But unlike him, I think that the principle is not problematic for the Stoics. On the contrary, it seems that this principle is a natural consequence of Stoic metaphysics. Namely, Zeno claimed that properties of an object’s corporeal substance are causes of predicates captured by impressions, and that it is “impossible that the cause be present yet that of which it is the cause not huparchein” (Stob. 1.138,15-17 = LS 55

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of impression that is ektupos, or literally “thoroughly imprinted” (D.L. 7.46 = LS 40C), the

apprehensive impression necessarily captures the actual qualities of its impressor,

including those that make the impressor a peculiarly qualified individual. Moreover, they

also thought that, in virtue of being thoroughly imprinted, every apprehensive impression

differs from every other apprehensive impression in terms of mark and print. But, this does

not imply that every apprehensive impression necessarily differs in mark and print from

every non-apprehensive impression. Namely, precisely because it is not thoroughly

imprinted, a non-apprehensive impression could still have a print that is identical to the

print of some apprehensive impression. For example, if Castor and Polydeuces are exactly

the same except that Polydeuces has a birthmark on his belly, by looking at Polydeuces I

could entertain an impression whose mark and print captures all of Polydeuces’ qualities

except for the birthmark which was not visible to me because it was covered by

Polydeuces’ clothes. Although this impression from Polydeuces is not caused by Castor,

its mark and print would be identical to the the mark and print of the thoroughly imprinted

impression that was caused by Castor. In other words, mark and print of the apprehensive

impression does not categorically differ from the mark and print of impressions coming

from what is not huparchon. And this point seems to be exactly what Carneades’ second aparallaxia argument seeks to exploit.

A2). I take this to mean that it is impossible for the object to possess a property and that the predicate corresponding to that property does not huparchein. Therefore, if some property is present in the object, there must be a predicate that corresponds to that property. If all properties of an object’s corporeal substance are causes of corresponding predicates, and if it is impossible for a cause to be present and not to have a corresponding predicate, then each property can produce, at least in principle, an impression that represents that huparchon. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Stoics believed that substances of objects could have properties that are in principle unperceivable. If somebody’s impression is not complete enough to capture the huparchon that corresponds to the object’s distinctive property, then this impression simply wouldn’t be apprehensive, and an epistemically responsible person would in that case simply withhold his assent to that impression (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.57).

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Now, the second argument from indistinguishability could be viewed as being

similar to the first argument. We could assume that the Academics intend to use it to

support the claim (2) that every true impression’s representational content is such that it

could be coming from what is not huparchon. More specifically, the argument could be seen as attempting to show that for every impression from what is huparchon, it is possible that its mark and print are coming from what is not huparchon. If this were indeed the intention of the argument, the Stoic reply would have been the same: although this is an epistemic possibility, all that is required for an impression to be apprehensive is that its mark and print actually is different from the mark and print of any impression from what is not huparchon that the subject is aware of. Thus, the Stoics seem to come out victorious

once again.

But this does not seem to be the whole story about the second aparallaxia argument.

Namely, Carneades’ examples rely not only on the possibility that, when presented with

two different but extremely similar objects, we would not be able to distinguish between

our impressions of them even if one the impressions is thoroughly imprinted; more

importantly, they also rely on the possibility that if we are shown one object, and then the

same object again, we would not be able to apprehend whether we are seeing the same

object twice or two distinct objects. For example, if we are looking at a basket full of snakes, and first see one snake poke its head and then another, I will not be able to tell

whether the second snake I observed was the same as the first one, or a different snake.

The point can be understood as providing yet another example of indistinguishability of

apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions in terms of mark and print if we take that

we perceiving two numerically distinct by extremely similar snakes. But, Carneades

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explicitly mentions the possibility of perceiving one and the same snake, i.e. same object

on two separate occasions. The difference seems small, but could be extremely significant.

Namely, we have some evidence that suggests that the Academics also used

“indistinguishabilities” in their debate with the Stoics on the so-called “Growing

Argument,” which dealt with the metaphysical problem of maintaining identity through

change.17 If Carneades’ second indistinguishability argument is to be read with this background in mind, then it can be construed as saying not only that two numerically

distinct objects can give rise to two representationally identical impressions of which one

is apprehensive and the other is not, but also that the same object can give rise to two

representationally distinct apprehensive impressions.

Let me illustrate the latter possibility with the following example. Imagine two

objects O1 and O2, and assume that they share all properties, except that O1 possesses some

non-essential property F, which O2 doesn’t share (or in other words, O1 = O2 + F).

Furthermore, imagine that there are two impressions, I1 and I2, received at two different

times, t1 and t2, separated by some period d during which neither of the two objects O1 and

O2 is being perceived. Say that at t1, I am perceiving object O1 and receiving the

impression I1 which satisfies all three clauses of the definition of the apprehensive impression—i.e. which is caused by a huparchon, O1, thoroughly imprinted in accordance

with O1 and representationally different from all other impressions not coming from O1

that I am aware of. Similarly, say that at t2, I am perceiving object O2 and receiving the

impression I2 which also satisfies all three clauses of the definition of the apprehensive

17 Plut. Com. not. 1077C-E (= LS 28 O); for the Growing Argument, see Philo, Aet. mundi 48 (= LS 28 P). For some recent discussions of the debate between the Stoics and the Academics on the problem of identity and change, see Sedley 1982:, 255-275; Lewis 1995: 89-108; Armato 2005: 129-154.

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impression. But, imagine that during the period d which separates t1 and t2, O1 loses its

property F. This is perfectly consistent with Stoic metaphysics, because they believed both

that corporeal objects are in constant motion and flux, as well as that the identity of objects

18 is preserved through some of these changes. Thus, at t2 I will receive the apprehensive

impression I2 which represents O2 as its impressor. But, the object O2 that I2 has as its

impressor is in fact the object O1 that has lost one of its non-essential properties. Thus, at

two separate times, I will be entertaining two representationally distinct apprehensive

impressions about one and the same object. To make matters even worse for the Stoics, during d, the object O2 could gain the same non-essential property F, in which case in t2

my impression I2 will be representationally identical to the impression I1 at t1. In this case,

I will be perceiving two numerically distinct objects as one and the same object.

If something like this is what Carneades and other Academics had intended with

their aparallaxia argument based on twin objects, then the outcome would have been

extremely undesirable for the Stoics. Namely, if we can entertain two apprehensive

impressions about the same object which represent that object as two distinct objects or

one apprehensive impression that represents two distinct objects as one and the same

object, then even if impressions that satisfy the Stoic definition of the apprehensive

impression exist, they will not be able to serve as criteria of truth and as foundations for

the development of concepts and other higher rational mental functions. What’s worse,

certain basic principles of Stoic metaphysis would prevent them from mounting a

successful defense from an argument like the one outlined above. To see why this is so, we

have to look at three assumptions of Stoic metaphysics that are of particular importance for

18 Cf. Stob. 1.177,21-178,21 = LS 28D1-8 and Simpl. In Ar. De an. 217,36-218,2 = LS 28I.

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us here. First, the Stoics thought that that all corporeal objects are ontologically unique, as

we have already explained earlier. Second, the Stoics thought that, from its generation to

its destruction, every corporeal object maintains its identity. They argued that while the

object’s constituent substance admits change, the object itself does not change until it

perishes, i.e. until it stops being the same object. In order to explain how objects preserve

their identity while undergoing apparent changes, the Stoics relied on the notion of the

peculiarly qualified we have already encountered before. They argued that while objects

can gain and lose some of their common qualities, they always retain the property that

makes them peculiarly qualified (Plut. Comm. not. 1083B-C = LS 28A2; Stob. 1.177,21-

178,21 = LS 28D1-8). Finally, the Stoics’ ability to solve the problems of identity of objects

in the light of their changes depended crucially on the distinction between what makes the

object peculiarly qualified and the object’s substance. They thought that, while the object’s

substance alters through addition and subtraction, properties that make it peculiarly

qualified remain the same until the destruction of the object itself. Similarly, while the

object’s substance can exist before the generation of the object and after its destruction, the

object itself exists only during the time the properties that make it peculiarly qualified

occupy the substance. Because of this, the Stoics firmly held that, although the object’s

substance is a part of the peculiarly qualified object and occupies the same place as the

peculiarly qualified object, what makes the object peculiarly qualified is not identical to its

constituent substance (Stob. 1.178,21-179,17 = LS 28D9-12).

There is some evidence that in attacking the Stoic position, the Academics focused the Stoic distinction between the object’s substance and that which makes the object

149 peculiarly qualified. Two passages in particular suggest this, one from Plutarch and another from an anonymous Academic:

[T31:] But these men alone [viz. the Stoics] have seen this combination, this duplicity, this

ambiguity, that each of us is two substrates, the one substance, the other

qualified individual>; and that the one is always in flux and motion, neither growing nor

diminishing nor remaining as it is at all, while the other remains and grows and diminishes

and undergoes all the opposite affections to the first one—although it is its natural partner,

combined and fused with it, and nowhere providing sense perception with a grasp of a

difference. […] Yet this difference and distinction in us no one has marked off or

discriminated, nor have we perceived that we are born double, always in flux with one part

of ourselves, while remaining the same people from birth to death with the other.19

[T32] . . . since the duality which they say belongs to each body is differentiated in a way

unrecognizable by sense-perception. For if a peculiarly qualified thing like Plato is a body,

and Plato’s substance is a body, and there is no apparent difference between these in shape,

color, size and appearance, but both have equal weight and the same outline, by what

definition and mark shell we distinguish them and say that now we are grasping Plato

himself, now Plato’s substance? For if there is some difference, let it be stated and

demonstrated. But if [they can]not even say…20

19 Plut. Comm. not. 1083C-E (= LS 28A4-5): ἀλλ’ οὗτοι μόνοι εἶδον τὴν σύνθεσιν ταύτην καὶ διπλόην καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν, ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ <ποιότης>· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον, μήθ’ ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται, καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θατέρῳ, συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. […] ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἑτερότητα καὶ <δια>φορὰν οὐδεὶς διεῖλεν οὐδὲ διέστησεν, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ᾐσθόμεθα διττοὶ γεγονότες καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥέοντες μέρει τῷ δ’ ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι τελευτῆς οἱ αὐτοὶ διαμένοντες. 20 Anon. Oxyrh. pap. 3008 = LS 28C.

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Both texts are very dense and, to make matters worse, one of them, T32, is only a short and incomplete fragment that has been reconstructed. Fortunately, they are relatively clear on the crucial point that is important for our present discussion. In T31, Plutarch attacks the

Stoic distinction between an object’s substance and its peculiar quality and their claim that while the former undergoes changes like growth and diminution, the latter remains unchanged. He objects that our sense perception is unable to grasp the difference between the object’s substance and its peculiar quality. The same point is made in T32 with even more detail. The Academic objection here is that since the Stoics claim that both an object’s substance and its peculiar quality are corporeal, the difference between the two is unrecognizable (adiagnōston) to sense-perception. Because of this, when perceiving an object like Plato, we are unable to distinguish whether Plato’s shape, color, size, etc. belong to Plato’s substance—which, as we have seen, can change—or to Plato’s peculiar quality— which necessarily remains unchanged throughout Plato’s existence.

The objection is powerful because if the Stoics think that perceptual apprehension occurs through the process in which the impressor’s corporeal qualities causally affect our mind in the way described in the definition of the apprehensive impression, then our perceptual impressions will not be able to grasp the difference between those properties of the impressor that are non-essential and those that comprise the impressor’s peculiar quality. And if our impressions are unable to reflect this difference, then it is hard to see how we can avoid situations described above, where the same impressor can cause two apprehensive impressions with distinct representational contents, or where an apprehensive impression can portray its impressor as two distinct objects. The general Academic strategy

151 can thus be seen as insisting that, in order for the Stoic apprehension to fulfil its intended role, the following three requirements must be met:

(R1) The Uniqueness Requirement: each object of perception must be

ontologically unique, i.e. different at least in some aspect from any other

existent object;

(R2) The Identity Requirement: each object of perception must be such that it

preserves its identity during its existence;

(R3) The Perceptual Accessibility Requirement: (a) whatever establishes the

ontological uniqueness of the object must be accessible to perception in a

way that preserves the object’s ontological uniqueness; and (b) whatever

establishes the ontological identity of the object must be accessible to

perception in a way that preserves the object’s diachronic identity.21

Accordingly, the indistinguishability argument from twin objects can be interpreted as showing that given the Stoic’s theory of peculiar quality, which is supposed to provide foundation for uniqueness and identity of objects, and their theory of perceptual apprehension, the three requirements cannot be met.

21 This is not a list of requirements that the Academics tried to impose on the Stoics, but a set of conditions that logically follow from Stoics’ own metaphysical and epistemological commitments. Lewis (1995: 91) offers a similar list of requirements for Stoic apprehension. His list assumes that the three conditions must be satisfied by the Stoic theory of peculiar quality. My list is different because I want to leave open the possibility that the Stoics thought that objects that are qualified without a quality could nevertheless be peculiarly qualified; for a detailed discussion of this possibility, see Appendix B.

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Unfortunately, the details of the Academics’ argument cannot be verified with

certainty because either the Stoics ultimately failed to provide a clear and consistent account of what exactly makes objects peculiarly qualified, or at least no such account has been preserved in our sources. In the final section of this Chapter, I will attempt a reconstruction of this argument by analyzing possible accounts of the Stoic peculiar quality.

III.

Two prominent candidates for what could have played the role of establishing the peculiarly qualified according to the Stoics have been suggested. We will discuss them in turn and show how the second aparallaxia argument can prove that neither meets the Stoic requirements of apprehension (R1)-(R3). Perhaps the most obvious candidate for what makes an object peculiarly qualified is the combination of all qualities of its corporeal substance, which is suggested by Dexippus (In Ar. Cat. 30,20-6 = LS 28J).22 According to

this approach, an object is peculiarly qualified because it can be uniquely described by the combination of all common properties of its substance. For example, Socrates is peculiarly

qualified because he is blue-eyed, snub-nosed, bold, bearded, man, and so on until we

arrive at the complete list of Socrates’ common qualities. This approach clearly meets the first part of the Perceptual Accessibility Requirement (R3a) because, as we have seen

22 To be precise, Dexippus does not explicitly talk about the combination of all properties of the object’s substance. However, in M 7.248-251 = LS 40E3-6, Sextus seems to imply this position. I have decided to discuss the ‘all-properties’ option here because it is a stronger version of the approach of defining the peculiarly qualified through some combination of the properties of the object’s substance. For problems with weaker versions of this approach, see Reed 2002: 151, n. 11.

153 above, the Stoics thought that all properties of an object’s substance are at least in principle perceivable. In addition, it is possible (although not necessary) that such combination of common properties could meet the Uniqueness Requirement (R1), because a list of all common properties of an object could at least in principle be long enough to be different from the lists of common properties of all other existent corporeal objects in the world.

However, the problem is that if the peculiarly qualified were defined in this way, it would not be able to meet the Identity Requirement (R2). The reason is simple: the Stoics thought that the object could easily lose one of its non-essential common properties (e.g. Socrates could shave his beard, lose his nose or arm, etc.) and nevertheless remain the same object

(Stob. 1.177,21-178,21 = LS 28D1-8).23 Therefore, the Academics would have no trouble showing that if the Stoics defined the peculiarly qualified as some combination of all

common properties of its substance, then perceptual apprehension of objects would be impossible because perceiving the properties of the object’s substance does not guarantee that the same object will always be perceived as that particular object, and not some other object.

Another24 seemingly more promising candidate that has been proposed is that objects are peculiarly qualified via their constitutive “breath” (pneuma) in the form of soul,

23 Cf. Lewis 1995: 95. The same problem equally applies if we take the range of common properties that constitute the peculiar quality of the object to be individually instantiated, trope-like properties, e.g. ‘bold in this specific way’, or ‘snub-nosed in this specific way’ (cf. Lewis, ibid., 96). The object could still lose one of its trope-like properties and remain the same object. This is the reason why relying on the claim that the apprehensive impression’s distinctness is related to the fact that its perceptual content is non-conceptual (and hence contains more information than our concepts can process) is unable to solve the problem posed by the Academic aparallaxia argument (for an interpretation that attributes this to the Stoics, see Reinhardt 2011. Even if the apprehensive impression were capable of capturing properties of objects with more accuracy than concepts contained in its propositional content, it would still possible for the object to lose one of its trope- like properties and remain the same object that would be perceived as a different object. 24 A third option is also possible. Namely, the Stoics might have thought that objects are peculiarly qualified in terms of some essential common property or a combination of several essential common properties. For example, Socrates could be peculiarly qualified through being a man; in that case,

154 or psuchē (Lewis 1995; Irwin 1996; Armato 2005). The Stoics accepted that Socrates

could, for example, lose his left arm and nevertheless remain Socrates because his soul

remained unchanged.25 In addition, Socrates is arguably different from all other people because his soul contains a unique set of beliefs, desires, memories, emotions, and a unique moral character and disposition to act. Hence, despite some suggestions to the contrary,26

I think that this approach could successfully meet the Requirements of Uniqueness (R1)

and Identity (R2).

being a man is (1) a common property because Socrates shares it with all other man and (2) an essential property because, presumably, Socrates could not stop being a man and remain being Socrates. There is no clear textual evidence that the Stoics entertained this idea. Perhaps something like this is behind Syrianus’ report in In. Ar. Met. 28,18-19 = LS 28G, but there is simply not enough information to be certain. Namely, Syrianus says that ‘even the Stoics place the commonly qualified individuals before the peculiarly qualified individuals’, which could suggest that the Stoics accepted that certain common qualities (like being a man) are necessary ontological prerequisites for the existence and identity of objects. The problem with this option is that meeting the Uniqueness Requirement (R1) and the first part of the Perceptual Accessibility Requirement (R3a) would be difficult. Namely, even though Socrates’ being a man could meet the Identity Requirement (R2) (as well as R3b), it is hard to see how it could establish Socrates’ ontological and perceptual uniqueness in relation to other objects that share the property of being a man without collapsing either into Dexippus’ position, or into the position I discuss next, that objects are peculiarly qualified in virtue of their soul. In order for the property of being a man to establish Socrates as a unique object, Socrates’ being a man would have to be different from anybody else’s property of being a man, and it seems that this difference can only be based either on other non-essential properties of Socrates’ body, or on the unique characteristics of his soul. 25 Cf. Philo Aet. mundi 48 = LS 28P. A part of Socrates’ pneuma which was contained in his left arm would have been removed, but that chunk of pneuma would be breath in the form of Socrates’ “physique” (phusis), and would not affect his psychic pneuma; cf. Armato 2005: 141 n. 34. 26 Irwin (1996: 471-3) suggests that a person may equally be susceptible to the argument that his soul can lose or gain one of its traits but still arguably remain the same person. For example, Socrates can stop being a coward, of become wise, or believe that virtue is knowledge and then stop believing this, or remember his early childhood and then forget about it, but remain Socrates amidst all this changes in his soul. But the Stoics have a ready reply to this objection. An individual soul’s quality is constituted by a specific disposition to assent and act (Anon. Herc. pap. 1020, col. 4, col. 1 = LS 41D; Stob. 2.68,18-23 = LS 41I; Alex. De an. 2.118,6-8 = LS 29A; Seneca Ep. 113.2 = LS 29B; SE M 11.23 = LS 60G2). Since the Stoics were determinists, it is consistent to ascribe to them an assumption that every person is born with a unique disposition to assent and act whose total description is equal to the set of all assents and actions that person will perform until the moment of his death. If this is true, then the fact that, for example, Socrates acted cowardly at the battle of Potidaea and then bravely at the battle of Delium, or assented to some false impressions in his youth and then assented only to true impressions after becoming wise, would not constitute a change in his specific disposition to act and assent. Or, at least it would not constitute a type of change that implies generation or destruction, but perhaps growth, a type of change that preserves the identity of the individual (cf. Stob. 178,7-21 = LS 28D4-8). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the approach that someone’s peculiar quality is his soul is able to satisfy the requirements of Identity and Uniqueness.

155

However, this approach would fail to meet the Perceptual Accessibility

Requirement (R3). Lewis (1996: 91, n. 7) offers several reasons why, according to the

Stoics psychology and metaphysics, soul must be perceivable indirectly, through

perceiving the actions of the ensouled being.27 The principle behind the assumption that the soul is perceivable through actions of the agent is the Stoic assumption that if a person’s soul possesses certain properties like being temperate or prudent, then that person necessarily acts temperately and prudently (Stob. 177,17-22 = LS 55A3), and we can

observe his soul indirectly, through observing the specific character of his actions. This is

further supported by Sextus’ reports that some philosophers thought that soul is a non-

evident thing that can only be inferred through signs provided by the observed behavior

(PH 2.101; M 8.155). Based on this, we can say that, through observing actions of a person, we could indirectly perceive his disposition to act, and hence the peculiar quality of his soul. Accordingly, Lewis concludes: ‘Socrates, on this account, cannot but act in a

“Socratic” way, and knowledge of this “Socratic” way of acting would just be knowledge which would allow one to infallibly recognize Socrates.’

Obviously, defining peculiarly qualified via breath in the form of soul has one devastating consequence for Stoic epistemology: the Stoics would have to admit that the only knowledge that is possible is the knowledge of ensouled objects, and that would severely limit its scope. However, even if the Stoics bite the bullet and accept this consequence, they would face the following set of problems. Observing that a person has performed one type of action at t1 simply cannot provide us with the means to reliably

27 That the Stoics thought that souls could be perceived indirectly, through observing agent’s actions, is well supported by our sources; e.g. Plut. St. rep. 1042E-F = LS 60R; cf. also Cic. ND 2.145; Plut., Comm. not. 1062C.

156 recognize that the person performing the same type of action at t2 is the same person. For example, if we saw Socrates fight bravely at the battle of Potidaea at 432 BC, and observed another person fighting bravely at the battle of Delium at 424 BC, we could not reliably recognize the latter person as Socrates. The reason for this is twofold: (a) same types of actions (e.g. brave, cowardly, prudent, etc.) can be (and indeed are) performed by many different agents, and (b) the same person can perform different types of actions in similar types of situations. Unless one is a Sage, according to the Stoics, one will inevitably act cowardly at some point even if most of the time he acts bravely. If, however, one were a

Sage who always acts bravely, then that person’s actions would be perceptually indistinguishable from the actions of all other Sages. In both cases, we could not recognize the soul of that particular person by observing that that person has performed a certain type of action. Therefore, it seems that perceiving an individual soul through the types of actions of the ensouled agent cannot meet the Stoic requirements for apprehension. Perhaps someone might suggest that this problem could be solved by shifting from types of actions to specific, individual actions. For example, perhaps we could recognize Socrates as the man whose disposition to act is such that in 432 BC he will fight in this particular way, and in 424 BC will fight in that particular way. This maneuver, however, is only capable of eliminating problem (a), while problem (b) remains. Namely, it is still impossible to see how observing that a man has fought in this particular way in 432 BC could help me recognize that a man who fought in 424 BC in that particular way is the same man.

Furthermore, someone might think that the problem of perceiving a person’s soul through his actions could be solved by assuming that one can come to know the complete list of particular actions that that person has performed during his life. For example, it is

157 conceivable that I could observe all Socrates’ actions from his birth to his death. If such knowledge were possible, it would indeed constitute indirect perception of Socrates’ peculiar quality, since Socrates’ disposition to act would be completely described by the list of all the particular things he did. Obviously, this would severely limit the scope of our recognitional capacity, making it applicable only to those individuals who were born after us and died before us. Nevertheless, even arguing for this kind of limited apprehension would be a hopeless case for the Stoics. Namely, creating the list of all actions of one person is impossible because, in order to attribute a newly observed action to the list, we first have to recognize that person who has performed the action is the same person as the one whose previous actions are already on the list. For example, let’s say that Socrates is the man I saw yesterday discussing philosophy at the Agora and then walking down the

Panathenaic Way toward the Acropolis. If I observed a man drinking water from a fountain today at the Agora and wanted to add this new action to the list of Socrates’ actions, I would first need to identify reliably that the man whose action I am observing today indeed is the same man from yesterday, i.e. Socrates. In other words, in order to create the complete list of Socrates’ actions, I already have to possess some means of recognizing

Socrates. But this is absurd, because having the complete list of Socrates’ actions is the only way of recognizing Socrates in the first place. Hence, it turns out that if the Stoics thought that soul is what makes ensouled beings peculiarly qualified, it cannot be perceived in a way that would satisfy the second part of the Perceptual Accessibility Requirement

(R3b).

Thus, it seems that the Stoic theory of the peculiarly qualified fails to meet the requirements for apprehension. The Academics seem to present the Stoics with the

158

following dilemma. Either what makes each object a peculiarly qualified is identical to the

object’s substance and its perceivable properties, or it isn’t. If it is, then Stoic metaphysics fails to account how objects maintain their identity while their substance undergoes change.

If it isn’t, then the Stoic metaphysical account of identity of objects is saved, but their

epistemology is sacrificed. In other words, if the Stoics insist on meeting the requirements

of Perceptual Accessibility and Uniqueness, they have to abandon the hope of meeting the

Identity Requirement; if on the other hand they insist on meeting the requirements of

Identity and Uniqueness, they have to abandon hope of satisfying the Perceptual

Accessibility Requirement, or more precisely its second part (R3b). Either way, based on

the key assumptions of Stoic metaphysics and theory or perception, it seems that the three

requirements for perceptual apprehension cannot all be met at the same time.

If considerations like these were indeed in the background of Carneades’

indistinguishability argument from twin objects, then the Academic challenge to Stoics

epistemology was very serious. Furthermore, if my reading is correct, then the aparallaxia

argument from twin objects did not ultimately rely on attacking the Stoics from the position

of epistemic internalism, but on showing that apprehension is impossible because of the

internal problems of Stoic metaphysics and theory of perception. Because of this, the

general method behind at least one of the main arguments against Stoic epistemology was

dialectical. Finally, if the Academics indeed pursued a strategy like the one described

above, they should have emerged victorious from the epistemological debate with the

Stoics.

159

APPENDICES

160

APPENDIX A

ZENO VS. PLATO ON PERCEPTION IN CICERO’S ACADEMICA 1.30-42

In this Appendix, I propose a new translation and interpretation of Cicero’s report in

Academica 1.42 about Zeno’s concept of apprehension (comprehensio; κατάληψις). If correct, it sheds some new important light on the novelty of Zeno’s ideas about perception in relation to Plato’s epistemology. In addition, the new translation and interpretation of

Academica 1.42 eliminates the apparent conflict with Sextus Empiricus’ report in Adversus

Mathematicos 7.248 about the Stoic position on the range of properties of the object that an impression has to capture in order to be apprehensive.

Most of the extant Book 1 of the Academica (1.15-42) is occupied by a long exposition of history of philosophy after Plato, delivered by one of the interlocutors, Varro, who

161 represents the position of Antiochus of Ascalon.1 Varro’s speech covers the three classical divisions of philosophy, ethics, physics and logic (which traditionally covered what we today call logic, epistemology, and rhetoric), and describes how the Academics, the

Peripatetics, and Zeno in each of these three fields further developed Plato’s initial ideas.

In Varro’s speech, epistemology is dealt with in sections 30-3 and 40-42.2 In sections 40-

2, the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno of Citium, is credited with introducing several novel expressions and ideas into the epistemology of his time:3

‘The alterations he [viz. Zeno] made in the third part of philosophy [viz.

epistemology] were more extensive. The first change here was his innovative set of

claims about sense-perception itself. He considered sense-perceptions to be

compounds of a kind of externally introduced “impact”–he called this a φαντασίαν,

but we can call it an impression [...]. But, as I was saying, he conjoined these–the

impressions “received” by the senses, so to speak–with the assent of our minds,

which he took to be voluntary and have its source in us.

He didn’t put his trust in all impressions but only in those that revealed their

objects in a special way. Since this kind of impression could be discerned just by

1 For the evidence that Varro’s historical account in Acad. 1.15-42 is Antiochean in origin, see Acad. 1.14. 2 The first part of Varro’s account of epistemology in 1.30-3 is very brief and peculiar. After explaining Plato’s initial misgivings about the ability of perception to lead to truth and knowledge in 1.30-2, it does not discuss the views of Plato’s successors on perception. The account barely mentions Aristotle, as Brittain (C. Brittain, Cicero: On Academic Scepticism (Indianapolis, 2006), 99, n. 29) acknowledges, except for his rejection of Platonic Forms in 33, and then discusses Theophrastus’ ethical views without mentioning his detailed analysis of perception exemplified by De Sensu. Sections 34-39 represent a digression in Varro’s account of epistemology. Section 34 briefly mentions the Peripatetic Strato’s abandonment of ethics in favor of the philosophy of nature, and the general acceptance of Plato’s philosophy by the early Academics (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates and Crantor), and sections 35-39 are devoted entirely to Zeno’s views on ethics and nature. 3 Cf. also Cic. Acad. 2.145 = LS 41A.

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itself, he called it “apprehensive” (καταληπτόν). [...] But once it had been received

and approved, he called it an “apprehension” or “grasp”, like something grasped by

one’s hand. [...] He called an impression that had been apprehended by one of the

senses a “perception” itself. And if it had been apprehended in such a way that it

couldn’t be dislodged by reason, he called it “knowledge” [scientia], if not,

“ignorance”.’ (Cic. Academica 1.40-1; transl. Brittain 2006 with minor

adjustments)

According to this report, Zeno’s novelty was the concept of ‘apprehension’ (comprehensio;

κατάληψις). Zeno thought that apprehension is a type of perception that enables us to attain the truth about external objects, and hence a crucial step towards achieving knowledge about reality. He defined apprehension as an assent to a special kind of impression, the

‘apprehensive impression’ (φαντασία καταληπτική, SE M 7.152 = LS4 41C4), which is a uniquely reliable type of impression that is always different from false impressions and hence cannot fail to be true.5 Zeno claimed that the source of this exceptional reliability of apprehension lies in the fact that apprehensive impressions ‘reveal their objects in a special way’. We will discuss in more detail what Zeno meant by this shortly. For now, it is important to emphasize that he argued that a kind of sense perception that is reliable exists, and that it can grasp the truth about the world.

Varro explains the novelty of Zeno’s approach to the reliability of perception in the context of the contrast with the Platonic epistemological background. At the beginning of his account of the development of epistemology, in 1.30-1, Varro reports:

4 LS = A. Long, and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge UK, 1987). 5 Cic. Acad. 2.77-8 = LS 40D; SE M 7.247-52 = LS 40E.

163

‘The criterion of truth was not in the senses, they [viz. Plato’s immediate

successors] maintained, although it took its start from the senses: the mind was the

judge of things. They believed that this was the only faculty deserving our trust,

because it alone discerned what was always simple, uniform, and same as itself.

(Idea was the term they used for this, the name Plato had already given it; but we

can rightly call it a “Form”.) The senses were all blunt and feeble, in their view,

and quite unable to apprehend the things people thought were subject to perception,

because the latter were either so small that they were undetectable by the senses or

moving so rapidly that nothing was one or constant or even self-identical because

everything was continually slipping or flowing away.’6

Here, the verdict on the ability of the senses to be reliable in grasping the truth is negative, and it is presented as the consequence of a metaphysical fact that the objects of perception are either constantly changing, or that they are too small to be perceived. The suggestion that sense perception is deficient because its objects are constantly changing has strong

Platonic credentials. In several of his dialogues, Plato suggests that the sensible world is in constant flux and that because of that perception (αἴσθησις) cannot lead to truth and knowledge (e.g. Theaetetus 151d-186e; cf. Republic 477a-479a). In the Timaeus, Plato says that thought (νόησις) grasps that which is unchangeable and self-identical, that is, the world that always is and is not becoming (τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον), and that opinion (δόξα) grasps that which is constantly changing, that is, the world that is always becoming and

6 Translation by Brittain (n. 2), 99.

164 never is (τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε, Timaeus 27d-28a). Another important reason for Plato’s misgivings about the ability of sense perception to grasp the truth is his general analysis of perception as a cognitive ability. In the Timaeus, Plato says that perception (αἴσθησις) is non-rational (ἄλογος). The reason why perception is irrational is explained in more detail in the Theaetetus, 184b-186e, where Plato seems to suggest that perception cannot grasp being (οὐσία) and the truth (ἀλήθεια) about being. In other words, although perception is capable of grasping some perceptible property F, for example red color, it cannot grasp that X is F, that particular object is red, which implies that perceptions are incapable of having propositional structure. Propositional structure is formed only at the level of opinion and thought, where perceptions (αἴσθησεις) are interpreted by the rational soul.7 Because of this, Plato probably thought that perceptions are incapable of having truth-value, that is, that they could not be properly said to be either true or false.8

Given the contrast between the Platonic analysis of perception’s inability to deliver the truth and Zeno’s claims to the contrary, it will be our task in the remainder of this paper to closely analyze the text in order to arrive at a detailed account of how Zeno thought that apprehension as a special kind of perception can lead to the truth about the world.

7 Although Plato says in the Timaeus that opinion is aided by the irrational perception, this does not mean that opinion is also irrational; on the contrary, Plato thinks that opinion is when ‘the mind is occupied with things by itself’ (Theaetetus, 187a). Opinion, although a rational activity, is aided by perception in the sense that the content of opinion originates from perception. 8 The interpretation of Theaetetus and Timaeus according to which Plato thought that αἴσθησις is incapable of having propositional structure is laid out in detail in e.g. A. Silverman, ‘Plato on Phantasia’, ClAnt 10/1 (1991), 123-47 at 125-34; see also M. Burnyeat, ‘Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving’, CQ 26 (1976), 29-51 at 47.

165

The clue why Zeno thought that perception is reliable is given in 1.42. There, Varro explains:

‘[A] e quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta

sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, [B1] non quod omnia quae essent in

re comprehenderet, [B2] sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret [...]’

(the division into parts A, B1, and B2 is mine)

Major translations of Academica render this sentence in approximately the following way:9

‘[A] he [Zeno] also attributed reliability to the senses, because, as I said above, he

regarded apprehension produced by the senses both true and reliable, [B1] not

because it grasped all of an object’s properties, [B2] but because it [viz.

apprehension mention in A] left out nothing that could fall within its [viz.

apprehension’s] scope [...]’

However, another translation of this paragraph is possible, one that in my opinion better reveals the deep metaphysical background of Zeno’s epistemological innovations, which will be discussed in section III below. According to the text, Zeno claims in A that apprehension produced by the senses is true and reliable, and in B sets out to explain why.

9 E.g. H. Rackham, Cicero: De Natura Deorum, Academica (Cambridge, MA, 1933/2000), 451; LS 41B3; Brittain (n. 2), 104-5.

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In B1, Zeno says that perceptual apprehension is true and reliable non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, which is, as we have seen, usually translated as ‘not because it grasped all of a thing’s properties’. However, what B1 literally says is ‘not because it apprehended all [things] that are in an object’. No Latin word for ‘property’ is actually mentioned.10 The meaning of what Zeno does say, though, that is, the meaning of the phrase ‘all [things] that are in an object’, is unclear and in the absence of a viable alternative interpretation, it was natural for most translators to assume that the phrase ‘all [things] that are in an object’ refers to the properties of the object. We will explain what Zeno might have meant here shortly. For now, it is important to emphasize that B1 states is that Zeno thought that the reason why perceptual apprehension is true and reliable is not that it is capable of apprehending ‘all [things] that are in an object’. Clearly, Zeno thought that apprehension is true and reliable for some other reason.

In fact, this other reason is spelled out in B2. Here, Zeno says that perceptual apprehension is true and reliable because nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret. As we have seen, this is usually translated as ‘because it left out nothing that could fall within its scope’, and interpreted as saying ‘because perceptual apprehension left out nothing that could fall within the perceptual apprehension’s scope.’ Textual justification for this interpretation consists in taking that the pronoun eam refers back to comprehensio facta sensibus in A, which implies that the expression cadere in is related to perceptual apprehension. However, another reading of eam is grammatically possible here. Since eam

10 Cicero here employs none of the words (e.g. nota, proprium or proprietas) he most likely used in Academica as Latin translations of Greek cognates ἰδίωμα, ἴδιον, and ἰδῐότ ης (see English-Latin- Greek Glossary in Brittain (n. 2), 140 under ‘mark’, and 141 under ‘property’; Index in O. Plasberg, M Tullius Cicero Fasc. 42 Academicorum Reliquiae Cum Lucullo (Stuttgart, 1922), 117 under nota, 120 under propria, proprietas; cf. J. Reid, M Tulli Ciceronis Academica (London, 1885), 218-9, n. on line 7; 244, n. on line 5.

167 is feminine singular, it could instead refer back to re, ‘thing’ or ‘object’, in B1. If so, the meaning of the expression cadere in eam would change from ‘fall within the scope of apprehension’ to ‘fit the object’. This sense of cado in + acc. as describing something that fits, that is consistent with, or that suits something is well attested in the surviving Latin texts. Cicero himself often uses it to state how certain traits (e.g. Tusc. 3.14: Non cadunt autem haec in virum fortem; cf. ibid. 19; Pro Sulla, 75; De off. 81), actions (Philippicae

5.6: At non cadunt haec in Antonium; cf. Pro Caelio 69) or topics of discussion (Att.

13.19.5: sane in personas non cadebant) do or do not apply fittingly to persons.11 This leads us to the following translation of Academica 1.42:

‘[A] Accordingly, he [Zeno] also attributed reliability to the senses, because, as I

said above, he regarded apprehension produced by the senses both true and reliable,

[B1] not because it grasped all [things] that are in an object, [B2] but because it left

out nothing that could fit the object [...]’

This new translation of B2 opens up a possibility for a different interpretation of the whole sentence. I think that it is reasonable to assume that, by things that can ‘fit the object’ in

B2, Cicero in fact has in mind attributes of the object. All instances of Cicero’s usage of the phrase cado in + acc. mentioned above are examples of different attributes that can or cannot truthfully be predicated of their respective objects. For example, when Cicero says in Tusc. 3.14 that fear and cowardice do not fit brave men, he is in fact saying that predicates ‘afraid’ and ‘cowardly’ cannot truthfully be predicated of brave men. If my

11 For similar usage of cado in + acc. in other authors, see e.g. Quint. Inst. or. 2.32; 6. proo. 5; 8.29; also compare other references listed in The Oxford Latin Dictionary under cado 22.

168 interpretation of Cicero’s usage of the phrase cadere in here is correct, then we can interpret

B2 as saying that the reason why Zeno thought that perceptual apprehension is both true and reliable is because it leaves out no properties that could truthfully be predicated of the object.

III

If our new translation of B2 in Academica 1.42 is correct, and if Zeno indeed thought that the foundation for perception’s ability to grasp the truth about objects lies in capturing the predicates corresponding to the object’s properties, it still leaves the general structure of B unclear. Namely, what is the motivation for the emphasis placed on the claim that the reason perceptual apprehension is true and reliable is not that it is somehow capable of capturing ‘all [things] that are in an object’? In other words, what is Cicero contrasting here? I think that the answer lies in Academica 1.30-1, the passage in which Varro explains the misgivings of Plato about perception’s ability to attain truth.

As we have seen in section I, according to Varro, Plato’s position implies the requirement that in order to be trustworthy in capturing the truth, perception has to be capable of grasping that which is ‘always simple, uniform, and same as itself’. We are told by Varro that, for Plato, what is always simple, uniform and self-identical, or unchanging, are the intelligible Forms (cf. Phaedo, 78c-d). Plato, as we have seen, calls the intelligible world ‘what always is’ (τὸ ὂν ἀεί, Timaeus, 27d-28a). In addition, we saw in section I above that Plato thought that the proper way to capture the intelligible Forms is directly

169 through thought (νόησις), not through perception (αἴσθησις). Hence, we can formulate

Plato’s requirement for the reliability of perception from 1.30-1 in the following way:

(P) Perception (αἴσθησις, sensus) is a faculty that grasps the truth and deserves our

trust only if it directly captures ‘what is’, or ‘what is in things’.

I propose that we take the expression from Academica 1.42 ‘all [things] that are in an object’ (omnia quae essent in re) to refer to the principle of defining “X is F” as a truthful predication of property F to object X when F-ness is present in X. This principle has been formulated by Menn, who ascribes it to a long tradition of philosophers that also includes

Plato.12 Menn argues that Plato thought that an F-ness exists in objects as the Form of F- ness (cf. Plato, Sophist, 247A5; Hippias Major 289D2-4), in which case it is said that the object participates (μετέχειν) in the Form of F-ness. If this is correct, then Plato’s requirement (P) sets a requirement that in order to be able to grasp the truth and be reliable, perception must be able to capture the Forms that exist in the object. In other words, for

Plato, grasping the truth about an object amounts to grasping its being through directly grasping what is in the object. As we have seen above in section I, Plato and his immediate successors thought that perception is in principle unable to do this, and hence it cannot meet the requirement (P). That is why they concluded, according to Academica 1.30-1, that the senses are blunt and feeble, and the criterion of truth is not in sense perception, but in the mind.

12 S. Menn, ‘The Stoic Theory of Categories’, OSAPh 18 (1999), 215-47 at 217-8.

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In Academica 1.42 Zeno argues that at least one form of reliable perception, apprehension, does exist. However, this positive verdict on perception is the result of the fact that Zeno thinks that perception does not have to meet Plato’s requirement (P). When

Zeno says that perceptual apprehension is not true and reliable because it grasps ‘what is in the object’ but for some other reasons, he is in fact rejecting Plato’s requirement (P).

There are two deep metaphysical motivations for this rejection. First, Zeno and his followers thought that:

‘Concepts are neither somethings [τινὰ ] nor qualified [ποιά], but figments

[φαντάσματα] of the soul which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified. These,

they say, are what the old philosophers called Ideas [viz. Forms]. For the Ideas are

of the things which are classified under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in

general all the animals and other things of which they say that there are Ideas. The

Stoic philosophers say that there are no Ideas, and that we “participate in” the

concepts, while what we “bear” is those cases which they call “appellatives”.’

(Stobaeus 1.136,21-1.137,6 = LS 30A; cf. Aetius 1.10.5 = LS 30B)

As an uncompromising corporealist, Zeno thought that only bodies can be in bodies. Since, according to Zeno, Forms are not bodies but ‘figments of the soul’, or concepts, they could not be ‘in the object’.13 For Zeno, an F-ness, for example ‘whiteness’, is not strictly speaking in the corporeal object that is white. Although the Stoics would say that the white object is white because it possesses certain quality (ποιότης) that corresponds to our

13 Cf. Menn (n. 12), 218-19.

171 concept of whiteness, this is not some kind of ‘whiteness itself’ or ‘the whiteness’ of the

Platonic Form of whiteness, but a single corporeal element14 that, due to its different states, gives rise to what we conceptualize as different qualities. Since concepts are not in the objects, the requirement for perception’s ability to grasp the truth about objects cannot be capturing what is in the objects. Second and more importantly, since perceptual impressions are rational, that is, consist of incorporeal predicates,15 but perceptual objects are corporeal, the method by which perception is supposed to grasp perceptual objects cannot be direct. Therefore, since Zeno thought that F-nesses as concepts cannot be in objects and that rational perception cannot grasp corporeal objects directly, it is understandable that he rejected (P) as the requirement for the truth and reliability of perception.

So, how did Zeno think that perceptual apprehension grasps the truth about objects?

At the end of section II, we have suggested that it does so by not leaving out anything that can ‘fit the object’, and that what fits the object are its attributes, or incorporeal predicates that correspond to the object’s corporeal qualities. Unlike Plato, the Stoics thought that all impressions, including perceptual ones, of mature humans are rational (λογικαί, DL 7.51 =

LS 39A6; cf. Aetius 4.11.1-4 = LS 39E). Among rational impressions, those that can

14 It seems that Chrysippus thought that different qualities, for example the whiteness of silver, the hardness of iron, the density of stone, are all due to ‘breath’ (πνεῦμα), an active element that pervades all matter (cf. Plutarch St. rep. 1053F-1054B = LS 47M). From the textual evidence that has survived, it is hard to ascribe this position to Zeno himself. However, it seems that Cleanthes, Zeno’s direct successor, has used ‘heat’ in a sense similar to Chrysippus ‘breath’ (Cicero ND 2.23- 30 = LS 47C). Since according to this picture the corporeal basis of different qualities is ultimately a single element, one could say that ‘whiteness’ of an object is in the object only in a very loose sense, in which the corporeal basis of whiteness would be the same as the corporeal basis of many other F-nessess, e.g. hardness, density, etc. 15 The Stoics thought that ‘sayables’ (λεκτά) are incorporeal (SE M 10.218 = LS 27D), and that predicates as incomplete sayables (DL 7.63 = LS 33F) are incorporeal as well (cf. SE M 9.211 = LS 55B). I take Stobaeus 1.138,14-22 = LS 55A1-4 to be the chief evidence that Zeno was the originator of this Stoic view about predicates.

172 possess truth-value they called propositions (ἀξιώματα), and consist in two elements, a concept functioning as a grammatical subject, and at least one predicate (κατηγόρημα) (DL

7.63-4 = LS 33F, G). Zeno thought that perception grasps the qualities of objects through the process in which the qualities of an object cause predicates in the impression.16 For example, in the course of perceiving a white object, the breath in the object in virtue of which that object is white causes the predicate ‘... is white’ in the impression about the object. If the object indeed possesses the quality that corresponds to the predicate, the resulting impression is true. If my reading of Academica 1.42 is correct, then it follows that an apprehensive impression is always true because it grasps the actual properties of its object in the form of attributes that fit that object, that is, that can be truthfully predicated of that object.

Before we move on to the final section, let me address a potential problem to the new translation and interpretation of Academica 1.42 I am proposing. Namely, my proposal ascribes the usage of a highly technical language and a considerable level of philosophical precision and sophistication to Cicero, a level that perhaps surpasses Cicero’s ability as a writer of philosophy. In addition, to my knowledge, there are no other places in Cicero’s texts in which he talks about the Platonic Forms in the language similar to the one he uses here.17 These concerns obviously raise the following question: does Cicero indeed have the contrast between Plato and Zeno in mind in Academica 1.42?

I am afraid that there is no conclusive answer to this question. However, I would like to emphasize two reasons why I think that my rendering of this passage is at least possible. First, as we have already seen in section I above, the structure of the text naturally

16 Stob. 1.138,14-139,4 = LS 55A; cf. SE M 9.211 = LS 55B. 17 I am grateful to Christina Hoening for drawing these two objections to my attention.

173 suggests that Zeno’s innovations in epistemology described in 1.40-2 are to be understood in the context of the traditional epistemological views of Plato and his followers described earlier in 1.30-1. Second, it has already been noted that in using Varro in Academica as the spokesperson for the philosophical positions of Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero was probably relying heavily on a text authored by Antiochus himself which is now lost. For example,

Glucker has argued that Cicero’s source for Academica 1.15-42 was Antiochus’ lost

Sosus.18 If in Academica 1.42 Cicero was indeed paraphrasing a text written by Antiochus, this fact could explain Cicero’s highly technical and philosophically sophisticated terminology in this passage, as well as why similar language does not frequently occur in other Cicero’s texts. In addition, this opens up a possibility of comparing Cicero’s report about the epistemological problem of perception with certain places in Sextus’ Against the

Logicians (Adversus Mathematicos 7-8) because it seems that Sextus also used Antiochus as one of his sources.19 In fact, in the section about Carneades’ critique of sense perception as the criterion of truth (M 7.159-89) that probably relies on a text written by Antiochus,

Sextus in §§176-7 uses the phrase τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν— “things that attach to,” “things to do with”, “things that pertain to” something—to refer to attributes such as color, size, shape, etc. that belong to an object. The expression τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν with the same meaning occurs

18 J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, (Göttingen, 1978), 419. 19 Sextus mentions Antiochus by name twice; in M 7.162 in the context of reporting on Carneades’ arguments against the possibility of using perception as the criterion of truth which is at least in part aimed against Stoic epistemology (see §164 where impressions that are ‘of such a kind as could not be false’ are mentioned, a clear reference to one of the clauses of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression), and in 7.201-2 Sextus directly quotes from Antiochus’ lost text On Rules, where the topic is also sense perception, although in a non-Stoic context. I think that it is likely that these two places are not the only ones in Against the Logicians that draw on Antiochus, and that On Rules was not the only Antiochus’ text Sextus used as a source.

174 again in M 7.24820 (discussed in detail in section IV below) in the context describing the

Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression. This sense of τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν remarkably resembles the sense of the expression cadere in I proposed as the correct rendering in

Academica 1.42. In fact, if Cicero and Sextus were both relying on Antiochus’ texts, it is possible that cadere in is Cicero’s translation of the phrase τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν he found in the same (or similar) Antiochus’ report on Stoic epistemology Sextus’ was using when he was composing Against the Logicians.

If correct, our analysis shows the real nature of the epistemological novelty of Zeno’s concept of apprehension in relation to Plato’s negative diagnosis of perception. It offers a persuasive account of how it is possible to achieve knowledge about the corporeal world through sense perception capable of revealing the truth about the objects by grasping them not through capturing what is in them directly, but by indirectly capturing predicates that are true of them. Namely, as we have seen, Plato believed that sense perception is a defective faculty for grasping the truth about reality because reality itself is intelligible, and the only way to grasp what is intelligible is directly through thought (νόησις). Zeno, on the other hand, who believed that reality is corporeal, faced the problem of explaining how perceptual propositions and predicates contained in them, which are incorporeal, could

20 Long & Sedley’s translation of this passage (LS 40 E3) is not precise enough to reflect Sextus’ use of τῶ ν περὶ αὐτὸν here; Bett’s translation (R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (New York, 2006)) is much closer to the original text here.

175 be capable of grasping the truth about the corporeal reality. His solution was to propose that perception (αἴσθησις) is capable of achieving this goal through an indirect method that relies on corporeal objects and their actual properties causing incorporeal predicates in propositions. If particular instance of perception is thorough enough as to leave out

‘nothing that could fit the object’, that is, none of the predicates that could truthfully be predicated of the object, then that instance of perception is apprehension, the most reliable form of sense perception.

Our new translation yields another result of philosophical significance for interpreting the Stoic concept of apprehension. Namely, it can help reconcile Academica

1.42 with another apparently conflicting report on the range of attributes that an impression needs to capture in order to be apprehensive, the report by Sextus in M 7.248 we have already mentioned at the end of section III above. Sextus says that:

‘They [the Stoics] trust this impression [viz. the apprehensive impression] to be

capable of perfectly grasping the underlying difference in things and to be skillfully

stamped with all the peculiarities attaching to them [πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς

ἰδιώματα]’21

Based on the old translation of Academica 1.42, most scholars22 have assumed that Sextus’ report here must be unreliable because it requires that the apprehensive impression capture

21 Translation by Bett (n. 20), 50. 22 M. Frede, ‘Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions’, in M. Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley, 1983), 65-93 at 76; LS (n. 4), vol. 2, page 255, comment. on 41B, line 8; J. Annas ‘Stoic epistemology’, in S. Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (Cambridge, 1990), 184-203 at 191 and 198-9; M. Frede, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (edd.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (New York, 1999), 295-322 at 305-8; Brittain (n. 2), 105 n. 55.

176 all attributes that could be predicated of its object, as opposed to a limited set of them. The apparent conflict between Cicero and Sextus’ reports has presented contemporary scholars with such a difficult puzzle that it has been claimed that ‘There is no way of reconciling

Cicero’s claim that the apprehensive appearance represents its object only in part with

Sextus’ claim that it represents the object in every detail’.23 Some, like M. Frede24, and

Long and Sedley,25 have argued based on Cicero’s report in Academica 1.42 that Zeno thought that apprehension is supposed to capture all properties of the object that fall within the scope of a single sense modality, not all properties in general. For example, according to their suggestion, a visual apprehensive impression is supposed to capture all visual properties of its object (e.g. color, shape, etc.), but not those properties that fall within the scope of other senses, for instance the object’s olfactory properties. In an effort to understand what Zeno meant here, others, like J. Annas, have proposed a developmental account. According to her, Zeno’s original position was that the apprehensive impression is supposed to capture not all, but only those properties of the object that are relevant for the apprehension of that object.26 Accordingly, she has speculated that Zeno’s original position later evolved towards the stronger position mentioned by Sextus due to the pressure of the Academic skeptical arguments against the apprehensive impression.27

Both interpretations, however, are subject to serious problems. The suggestion made by Frede, and Long and Sedley that Zeno thought that apprehension captures only

23 Annas (n. 22), 191. 24 In both places cited in n. 22 above. 25 Place cited in n. 22 above. 26 Annas (n. 22), 191. This option is also suggested as a possibility by M. Frede, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (edd.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (New York, 1999), 295-322 at 308, Brittain (n. 2), 105, n. 55, and C. Perin, ‘Stoic Epistemology and the Limits of Externalism’, AncPhil 25 (2005), 383-401 at 396-7. 27 Annas (n. 22), 194 and 198-9.

177 those properties that belong to one sensory modality seems highly speculative. There is no evidence, in Cicero or in any other source, suggesting that the Stoics held such a restrictive classification of apprehensive impressions according to their sensory modalities. Only one place (DL 7.51 = LS 39A4) mentions a Stoic classification of perceptual impressions according to sense organs through which they are obtained. However, Diogenes here talks about perceptual impressions in general, not specifically about apprehensive impressions.

This still leaves open the possibility that, although there are sense impressions that are limited to only one sensory modality, apprehensive impressions are not meant to be limited in such a way. On the other hand, if they are supposed to be limited to only one sensory modality, it is hard to see how the apprehensive impression could be capable of distinguishing between objects that share all properties that belong to one sensory modality but differ in properties belonging to other sensory modalities. For example, according to this view, a visual apprehensive impression would arguably be unable to discriminate between a real pomegranate and its perfect wax replica because it would not include properties like hardness, taste, etc. that distinguish real from wax pomegranates.28 It seems clear, however, that the Stoics expected of apprehensive impressions to be capable of making such discriminations.

Annas’ interpretation, on the other hand, is problematic because it does not explain what is, according to Zeno, relevant for apprehension of the object, given that it is not the sum of all its actual properties. Namely, it seems that Zeno was the first to suggest that the apprehensive impression must be capable of distinguishing between similar but different objects, i.e. objects that share some but not all of their properties (Cic. Academica 2.77-8

28 Cf. the story about Sphaerus and king Ptolemy reported in DL 7.177 and Athen. 354E = LS 40F.

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= LS 40D; SE M 7.249-52 = LS 40E3-7). However, for any individual property F1 belonging to object O1 we choose as Annas’ property that is ‘relevant for apprehension’ of

O1, there could easily be an object O2 that shares F1 with O1, but differs from O1 in properties F2, F3, ..., Fn. Therefore, the apprehensive impression that captures only one of the object’s perceivable properties cannot necessarily distinguish between similar but different objects. The same seems to apply to any combination of O1’s properties F1, F2,

..., Fa where a < n (n being the number of all object’s properties), since Stoic metaphysics does not exclude the possibility of the existence of an object O2 that shares properties F1,

F2, ..., Fa with O1, but differs in properties Fa+1, F a+2, ..., Fn from O1. Because of this, it is hard to see how the range of properties grasped by apprehension could be anything less than the total number of all of the object’s actual perceptual properties.

The advantage of the new translation of Academica 1.42 proposed in section II above effectively eliminates the apparent conflict between Cicero and Sextus. If correct, it shows that both reports claim that apprehension is a form of perception that captures all attributes that could truthfully be predicated of the object, and that this view originated with Zeno himself. It has textual support and shows promise in avoiding the problems that plague competing interpretations. It does leave some important questions open, for example, what would capturing all of the object’s attributes exactly mean for the Stoics, and whether Zeno set a standard of apprehension that seems unrealistically high, at least for normal persons in normal circumstances. In Chapter 1, I suggest that the answer is that

Sextus’ phrase πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς ἰδιώματα refers not to all of an object’s properties tout court, but to those that make the object distinct from other objects. If this is correct, then

179 the standard of apprehension is not too high because the number of properties that make an object distinct from other object need not be large.

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APPENDIX B

NON-UNIFIED OBJECTS AS PROPER INDIVIDUALS IN STOICISM

The Stoics distinguished between objects that are unified in virtue of possessing a ‘holding’

(hexis), and non-unified objects, those that exist by contact (e.g. a ship) or by separation

(e.g. an army) and do not possess a hexis. Although our sources are not explicit about the

Stoic position on this, it has been argued recently that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects cannot be proper individuals, i.e. that they cannot be peculiarly qualified. In this appendix, I will argue that accepting that things without hexis can be peculiarly qualified,

and thus proper individuals, is not contradictory for the Stoics and that some evidence found in Simplicius suggests that they indeed might have held such a view.

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According to a division that Sextus attributes to the Pythagoreans, bodies can be divided in the following three categories:

[S]ome bodies are from things fastened together [sunaptomenōn], like ships and chains and cabinets,

others from unified things [hēnōmenōn], which are held together by a single holding [hexeōs], like

plants and animals, and others from things standing apart [diestōtōn], like choruses and armies and

flocks1

The division in this passage is remarkably similar to a Stoic classification of bodies reported by Simplicius:

For they call qualities [poiotētas] ‘holdings’ [hekta], and allow holding to exist only in the case of

unified things [hēnōmenōn]; whereas in the case of things which exist by contact [kata sunaphēn],

like a ship, or by separation [kata diastasin], like an army, they rule out there being anything like a

holding, or there being found in their case any single thing consisting of breath or possessing a single

principle, such as to achieve a realization of a single holding.2

According to Simplicius, the Stoics thought that all bodies can be divided into two basic classes, those that are unified (henōmena), and those that are non-unified, with the class of the non-unified things further subdivided into those that exist by contact and those that exist by separation. Unified bodies are unified in virtue of possessing a single “holding”

1 SE M 7.102. 2 Simpl. In Ar. Cat. 214,26-30 = LS 28M2-3; translation is LS, except that I use “holding” for hexis, instead of their “havable” and “tenor”.

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(hexis). On the other hand, a non-unified body is composed of individual elements and while these elements are themselves unified bodies that possess their own individual

“holdings”, the non-unified body itself does not possess a single “holding”. The importance of hexis for the unity of bodies lays in the fact that, according to the Stoics, holdings sustain bodies through a form of a tensile motion that moves simultaneously inwards and outwards, and that the inward movement is responsible for the body’s unity, while the outward is responsible for the body’s qualities (poiotētes).3 For example, an individual piece of rock

is a unified object in virtue of its hexis, and because of this hexis it also possesses the quality of being dense.4 At least from Chrysippus on, holdings were understood to be currents of

air,5 one of the two elements (the other being fire) that in Stoic physics represent the active principle capable of sustaining and enforming passive matter.6

In virtue of providing the basis for their qualities, hexis is often seen by contemporary scholars as a necessary condition for the identity and persistence of corporeal objects. Namely, the Stoics thought that all qualities can be divided into two types, common qualities and peculiar qualities. A common quality (koinē poiotēs), for example, being human, is a quality that is shared by all objects that are human; on the other hand, each individual object possesses its own peculiar quality (idia poiotēs), a quality that is not shared with any other existent object. It is in virtue of its peculiar quality that the object establishes its identity and persistence through time and all types of changes that do not amount to the object’s destruction.7 In addition to being used to explain the ontology of

3 Nem. 2.18.5-10 = LS 47J3. 4 Plut. St. rep. 1053F = LS 47M1. 5 Ibid. 6 Plut. Com. not. 1085C-D = LS 47G. 7 Stob. 177,21-179,5 = LS 28D1-8.

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persistence through change, the thesis that peculiar qualities enable each object to be

ontologically unique and self-identical has been crucial for the Stoic epistemology.

Namely, they argued that nature has endowed us with a special kind of perceptual impression, the so-called apprehensive impression (phantasia katalēptikē), which grasps its object unmistakably and thus provides the foundation for the achievement of knowledge

(epistēmē).8

Recently, it has been argued that the Stoics did not consider non-unified objects to

be proper individuals.9 The argument to this effect is roughly the following. Only objects

that possess a peculiar quality can be peculiarly qualified, i.e. ontologically unique and

self-identical individual objects. The Stoics thought that non-unified objects cannot possess

peculiar qualities because, as we have seen, they do not possess a hexis. Therefore, non-

unified objects cannot be peculiarly qualified, i.e. they cannot be proper individuals. I find

this position to be problematic for the following three reasons. First, there is no evidence that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects cannot be peculiarly qualified even though they do not possess a hexis. Second, there is some evidence that they thought that non- unified objects can be peculiarly qualified. For example, at least in one place Plutarch speaks as though the Stoics believed that a city, furniture, instruments, and clothes can be peculiarly qualified.10 Of course, this evidence is circumstantial and comes from a very

hostile source, so it is quite possible that Plutarch is simply making fun of the Stoic doctrine

of the peculiarly qualified. Nevertheless, in combination with the first reason above, I think

8 SE M 7.247-53 = LS 40E; Stob. 2.73,19-23 = LS 41H1-2. 9 Although they do not state it in this form, something like this position is endorsed by Eric Lewis (“The Stoics on Identity and Individuation”, Phronesis 40/1, 1995, pp. 89-108, at p. 90) and Terence Irwin (“Stoic Individuals”, Nous 30, Supplement: Philosophical perspectives 10, Metaphysics, 1996, pp. 459-80, at p. 476). 10 Plut. Com. not. 1083F = LS 28A7.

184 that the possibility that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects can be peculiarly qualified merits serious consideration. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, denying that non-unified objects can be peculiarly qualified would make any apprehension (katalēpsis) of them impossible, since apprehension consists in capturing that which makes the object peculiarly qualified. This would mean that the scope of Stoic apprehension would be limited only to unified objects. However, nothing in our extant sources suggests that the

Stoics conceived of apprehension as being limited in this way. Because of this, in the remainder of this appendix, I will try to explore the possibility that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects can be peculiarly qualified despite the fact that they do not possess a unifying hexis.

At least one conclusion important for our discussion can immediately be drawn. Namely, continuing his report about the Stoic view on unified and non-unified objects, Simplicius says:

The qualified [to poion], however, is seen even in things whose constituents are in contact or

separated. For just as a single grammarian is enduringly differentiated as a result of a qualified study

and education, likewise the chorus is enduringly differentiated [diaphoran] as a result of a qualified

training. So non-unified things are qualified on account of their organization and their cooperation

towards the fulfillment of a single function [tēn pros hen ergon sunergian]. But, they are qualified

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things [poia] which lack a quality [poiotētos]. For there is no holding in them, since a quality or a

holding is never found in separated substances which have no inherent union with each other.11

According to this, the Stoics thought that even things that lack a quality (poiotēs), which non-unified objects lack because they are not held together by a hexis, can nevertheless be qualified things (poia). A chorus, a non-unified object, can be a qualified thing just like a grammarian, who is a unified object. For example, a chorus can gain the property of singing well through extensive rehearsals just as a grammarian can gain the property of analyzing syntax well through extensive study. Thus, non-unified objects are capable of being qualified things just as unified objects are.

The passage offers another important insight. Namely, the Stoics distinguished between things that are disposed in a certain way (pros ti) according to their intrinsic character (oikeios charactēr) and things that are disposed only in relation to something else

(pros ti pōs echon).12 For example, although the sweetness of the honey is a disposition, i.e. a quality that the honey has in relation to the sense of taste through which it is perceived, it is nevertheless a genuine intrinsic property of the honey, something that honey has in virtue of being differentiated (kata diaphoran) and not a property that exists only when it is perceived. Relative dispositions, on the other hand, are properties that objects have not in virtue of being differentiated, but solely in virtue of standing in some extrinsic relation to other things. For example, when Dion is on the left in relation to Theon, Dion does not possess the property of being on the left because of some inherent differentiation of his substance, but solely in virtue of the fact that he is currently on the left in relation to Theon.

11 Simpl. In Ar. Cat. 214,30-34 = LS 28M4. 12 Simpl. In Ar. Cat. 166,15-29 = LS 29C.

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Dion could change his relative position to Theon and lose this property without undergoing

any change in his substance. According to Simplicius’ passage quoted above, the Stoics

clearly thought that non-unified objects, although lacking a unifying hexis, nevertheless can possess properties that are due to their internal differentiation (kata diaphoran), i.e. properties that are intrinsic. This is an important point, because it implies that non-unified objects are not qualified only relation to something else but inherently. Just as the sweetness is actually in the honey even when there is no sense of taste that perceives it, so is the good singing of the choir in the choir even when there is no one that hears it sing well.

Moreover, the passage suggests that non-unified objects can be enduringly

(emmonōs) differentiated. The Stoics argued13 that the qualified, in the most general sense,

refers to anything that is differentiated, that is, to processes, states, enduring and non-

enduring properties of objects. In the second more specific sense, processes (e.g.

someone’s running) are excluded, and only states are qualified (someone’s fist sticking

out). In the third and the most specific sense, even mere (or non-enduring) states are

excluded, and qualified things are only those that are in enduring states. Simplicius’

passage clearly states that non-unified objects are capable of being enduringly differentiated, so non-unified objects are capable of belonging to the most specific of the three Stoic senses of the poion. A note of caution is required here. Simplicius says that the

Stoics actually divided this third sense of poion into two sub-classes, things that are merely enduringly differentiated and things that are enduringly differentiated and that “match the expression and the notion of them”. The point of the clause “matching the expression” is

13 Simpl. In Ar. Cat. 212,12-213,1 = LS 28N.

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to say that some things are qualified in virtue of possessing a quality, so non-unified objects

that by definition do not possess a quality cannot be qualified things in this sense.

Therefore, our discussion so far has led us to the following conclusions. First, non-

unified objects can be qualified things. Second, they are qualified without a corresponding

quality. Third, even though they do not possess a quality, they can be enduringly

differentiated and possess intrinsic properties. We are now ready to address the central question of our discussion, namely, whether non-unified objects can be proper individuals,

i.e. whether they can be peculiarly qualified.

III

The first point that follows from our discussion so far is that since they do not possess a

quality, non-unified objects also cannot possess a peculiar quality. This, however, does not necessarily imply that they cannot be peculiarly qualified things. Namely, as we have seen,

the Stoics thought that objects without a quality can be qualified, so perhaps they also

thought that they can be peculiarly qualified as well.

Determining the Stoic position on this question is difficult because not only that

our textual evidence does not offer enough clues on whether they thought that non-unified

objects can be peculiarly qualified, but because it does not even offer a clear picture about

what the thing that makes unified objects peculiarly qualified – namely, peculiar quality –

is supposed to consist in. What is certain is that the concept of the peculiarly qualified

things was developed by the Stoics in order to explain how certain objects can maintain

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their identity while undergoing certain types of changes. For example, a peculiarly

qualified object like Dion remains Dion even though his substance changes through time.14

Dion’s body can grow in size but it will nevertheless remain an object identifiable as Dion.

Likewise, the substance that constitutes Dion’s body will remain even after Dion’s death, although it could no longer be identified as Dion. More generally,

The peculiarly qualified thing is not the same as its constituent substance. Nor on the other hand is

it different from it, but is merely not the same, in that the substance is both a part of it and occupies

the same place as it15

This duality between the peculiarly qualified thing and its corporeal substance, which was

often ridiculed by their opponents,16 was crucial for the success of the Stoic goal of

explaining the preservation of identity through change. They had to suppose that each

peculiarly qualified object consists of one substrate that enables change, and another that

preserves identity of the object.

Are non-unified objects capable of meeting the same conditions for maintaining

identity through change? According to Simplicius, as we have seen, non-unified objects

are enduringly differentiated in virtue of the co-operation of their parts towards a single

function. For example, an army could gain the property of being brave through intensive

drills and battle experience, and this property can be enduring, i.e. can be the property that

the army has until the moment until it is disbanded (i.e. destroyed). Certain soldiers that an

army was composed of could survive the army’s disbandment and become parts of another

14 Stob. 1.178,13-17 = LS 28D6-7. 15 Stob. 1.178,21-179,3 = LS 28D9. 16 Cf. Plut. Com. not. 1083C-E = LS 28A4-6; Anon. Oxyr. pap. 3008 = LS 28C.

189 army, but it would no longer be possible to identify them as the original army. An army that was enduringly qualified by particular training, command structure, and drills is not the same as the mere sum of its soldiers. It is not different from its soldiers and they are a part of it, but what makes it that particular army capable of fighting in that particular

(brave) way is precisely the specific functional organization of its parts, which is the result of its particular doctrine, training, command structure, etc. I see no reason to assume that the Stoics denied that, for example, the Spartan army led by Leonidas in the Battle of

Thermopylae was still the same army even after a certain number of its soldiers were killed in battle. Of course, after a sufficient number of soldiers are killed its particular functional organization will become untenable, but that is not a problem because this can simply be seen as the moment of the destruction of Leonidas’ army. If this is correct, then it seems that non-unified objects that are enduringly differentiated according to their particular functional organization are capable of solving the problem of the persistence of identity thorough change. Consequently, it seems that this principle is sufficient for enabling a non-unified object to be particularly qualified, and there seems to be nothing in the Stoic doctrine that contradicts this conclusion.

Before concluding our discussion, however, it is necessary to address two possible objections to my proposal. Namely, non-unified objects are composed of other unified objects that stand in some specific functional relation. However, this relation is a sum of relative dispositions (belonging to the category of pros ti pōs echon), which the Stoics, as we have seen, considered to be extrinsic relational properties. For example, in a car, one lump of matter that has specific shape is the alternator, and this lump of matter stands in an extrinsic relation with another lump of matter called the battery. Presumably, their

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mutual relationship is a relative disposition because if I, say, take out the battery from the car, this relationship could cease to exist without the alternator and the battery undergoing any intrinsic change. This means that the particular functional organization of the car is constituted by the sum of extrinsic relations between its parts. But, as we have seen, the

Stoics thought that extrinsic relations cannot provide the basis for something to be peculiarly qualified.

The second potential problem has been formulated in Barrie Fleet’s summarization of Simplicius’ reply to the Stoic idea that non-unified objects can be qualified even though they lack a quality:

What is it, then, that makes it [viz. a non-unified object] a qualified entity? It cannot be anything

incorporeal like a relationship, since a substance, even a qualified substance, cannot get its being

from something incorporeal, according to Stoic belief.17

The solution to both problems, I think, becomes apparent if we assume that the mysterious

Stoic phrase that “non-unified things are qualified on account of their organization and

their cooperation towards the fulfillment of a single function” actually refers to causal

relationship between individual elements that constitute the non-unified thing. This

assumption finds some support in the existence of the so-called “cooperative cause”

(sunergon aition), which is sometimes mentioned in contexts that can be related to the

Stoics.18 In the example with an army mentioned above, the particular functional role that

17 Fleet, B., Simplicius: On Aristotle’s “Categories 7-8”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 2002, p. 173, n. 276. 18 E.g. Clem. Alex. Strom. 8.9, partially translated in LS 55I. Cf. Plut. St. rep. 1075D, where Cleanthes is reported saying that “stars contribute to their own destruction by giving the sun some cooperation towads the conflagration [sunergountes ti pros tēn ekpurōsin]”.

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each single soldier has causes the army as a whole to fulfill its function. For example, the commander has the skill to lead the battle on the strategic level, which causes the individual soldiers to act in a certain way on the tactical level, and their collective action constitutes the particular way in which that army fights. The change in this causal relationship between the commander and his soldiers would not only produce change in the way in which the army fights, but also a change in the way in which individual soldiers would behave.

Therefore, it seems that causal relationships of this kind are not purely extrinsic. In addition, contra Fleet, causal relationships between corporeal objects are not incorporeal, at least not in any Stoic sense of the word. The Stoics firmly held that only bodies can act and be acted upon.19 Therefore, it seems that there are no obstacles in Stoic doctrine to assuming that non-unified objects, which are qualified in virtue of the functional organization of their corporeal parts which stand in mutual causal relations, can be peculiarly qualified, i.e. proper individuals.

19 Cf. Cic. Acad. 1.39 = LS 45A. According to the Stoics, corporeal things can also cause incorporeal predicates in propositions (cf. LS 55A, B, C), but even in those cases the causal relationship is always a relationship between two bodies, the object that causes the predicate and the soul of the person entertaining the proposition containing the predicate.

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Pavle Stojanovic Curriculum Vitae

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

October 13, 1979 Niš, Republic of Serbia

AREA OF SPECIALTY:

Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

Epistemology Ethics and Applied Ethics (Bioethics, Peace & Justice Studies) Philosophy of Religion and Science

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

2015–16 Lecturer, Department of Philosophy and Religion Towson University, Towson, MD

2014–15 Visiting Fellow in Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA

2014–15 Instructor in the Program in Expository Writing, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD

EDUCATION

2015 PhD degree in Philosophy Johns Hopkins University, Department of Philosophy Dissertation title: “The Stoics and the Academics on the Apprehensive Impression”

2011 M.A. degree in Philosophy Johns Hopkins University, Department of Philosophy

2008 B.A. degree in Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy University of Belgrade, Serbia

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PUBLICATIONS

“Epictetus and Moral Apprehensive Impressions in Stoicism”, in Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance, edited by Suits, D., and Gordon, D., Rochester Institute of Technology Press, 2014, pp. 165-194.

REFEREED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, October 2014. Conference title: 32nd Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) and the Soc. for the Study of Islamic Phil. and Science (SSIPS) Paper title: “Two Notions of Eulogos in Stoicism”

American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 2014. Conference title: 88th Annual Pacific Division Meeting Paper title: "Non-unified Objects As Proper Individuals in Stoicism," (submitted colloquium paper)

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, October 2013. Conference title: 31th Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) and the Soc. for the Study of Islamic Phil. and Science (SSIPS) Paper title: “Carneades’ pithanon and Sextus’ isostheneia: is there really a conflict?”

American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 2013. Conference title: 87th Annual Pacific Division Meeting Paper title: “The Stoics on Clarity and Distinctness of Impressions” (submitted symposium paper)

University of Texas at Austin, Departments of Philosophy and Classics, March 2013. Conference title: 36th Annual Workshop in Ancient Philosophy Paper title: “Moral phantasia katalēptikē in Stoicism”

American Philosophical Association, Atlanta, December 2012. Conference title: 109th Annual Eastern Division Meeting Paper title: “Skepticism and Externalism in Ancient Philosophy: The Academics vs. The Stoics” (submitted colloquium paper)

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, October 2012. Conference title: 30th Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) and the Soc. for the Study of Islamic Phil. and Science (SSIPS) Paper title: “Can non-unified objects be peculiarly qualified in Stoicism?”

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University of Cambridge UK, Faculty of Classics, April 2012. Conference title: Truth, Falsehood and Deception in Ancient Philosophy Paper title: “Zeno of Citium versus Plato on perceptual truth and falsehood in Cicero's Academica 1.30-42”

American Philosophical Association, Seattle, April 2012. Conference title: 86th Annual Pacific Division Meeting Paper title: “Zeno’s Definition of the Apprehensive Impression” (submitted symposium paper)

OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

American Philosophical Association, Baltimore, December 2013. Conference title: 110th Annual Eastern Division Meeting Role: Chair Session: Colloquium on Aristotle

SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS, GRANTS

2014 Dean’s Teaching Fellowship for Spring 2014 Designed to foster innovation in the undergraduate curriculum, to give advanced graduate students experience teaching their own undergraduate courses, and to provide funding for graduate research. Course title: “The Epicureans, the Stoics and the Skeptics on How to Live”.

2013−2014 Open Society Foundations' 2013 Global Supplementary Grant Awarded to PhD students in Humanities from select countries in Southeastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Mongolia, the Middle East/North Africa, and South Asia.

2013 Sachs Fellowship for Spring 2013 Fellowship awarded by the JHU Department of Philosophy for intensive dissertation work

2013 APA Graduate Student Travel Stipend (March) Awarded by the American Philosophical Association for graduate student papers accepted for presentation at annual meetings

2012 APA Graduate Student Travel Stipend (April & Awarded by the American Philosophical Association for graduate December) student papers accepted for presentation at annual meetings

2011 Miller Essay Prize Annual award for the best essay, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University Essay title: “The Stoic Definition of the Apprehensive Impression”

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COURSES TAUGHT (in descending chronological order):

Introduction to Ancient Greek Philosophy, Towson University Introduction to Philosophy, Towson University Introduction to Ethics, Towson University Philosophical Perspectives on Justice, Gettysburg College Contemporary Moral Issues, Gettysburg College Philosophy of Resistance, Gettysburg College The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Questions (Dean’s Prize Freshman Seminar), Johns Hopkins University Expository Writing: Life, the Cosmos, and Intelligent Design, Johns Hopkins University The Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Skeptics on How to Live (Dean’s Teaching Fellowship), Johns Hopkins University Plato on Knowledge, Johns Hopkins University Neuroethics, Johns Hopkins University Do We Know What We Think We Know?, Johns Hopkins University Religion and/or Science?, Johns Hopkins University

MEMBERSHIPS IN PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Member of the American Philosophical Association (APA). Member of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP).

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