THE STOICS AND THE ACADEMICS ON THE APPREHENSIVE IMPRESSION by Pavle Stojanovic A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland September 2015 © 2015 Pavle Stojanovic All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT The debate between the Stoics and the Academics on the apprehensive impression (phantasia katalēptikē) was one of the longest in the history of epistemology, and is also one of the most discussed in contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period. The debate was initiated when Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, introduced the idea that there is a special kind of impression, the apprehensive impression, which is caused by an external object and which reliably captures the truth about that object, allowing us to attain knowledge about that object. Zeno’s idea was met with criticism by Plato’s successors in the Academy, most notably Arcesilaus and Carneades, who argued that such impressions do not exist because they are indistinguishable from non- apprehensive impressions. However, the details of the Stoic account of the apprehensive impression and its role in their epistemology, as well as the nature of the strategy the Academics employed against it have been highly controversial in modern scholarship. In the dissertation, I provide a careful analysis of the extant textual sources on the Stoic and the Academic positions in the debate, which yields several important results. First, it leads to a novel interpretation of the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression that better explains its distinctness from the non-apprehensive impressions. Unlike other scholars, I argue that according to the Stoics its distinctness consists in the fact that the apprehensive impression differs in terms of its representational content from all non-apprehensive impressions the subject is aware of, but that this representational difference is defeasible. Second, the results of my analysis confirm that the Stoics were epistemic externalists since they did not ii require that one be aware which among one’s impressions are and which are not apprehensive in order to attain knowledge (epistēmē). I then explain how the Stoics might have though apprehensive impressions about moral states of affairs lead to practical and moral perfection. Finally, I conclude by arguing that among the two main arguments from indistinguishability of apprehensive and non-apprehensive impressions used by the Academics, one argument did not rest on internalist assumptions, but was especially detrimental to the Stoics’ externalist epistemology. Dissertation Advisor: Richard Bett Second Reader: Michael Williams iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My greatest gratitude for the successful completion of this doctoral dissertation goes to my adviser, Professor Richard Bett. His patient guidance, passion for the philosophical puzzles I tried to solve, and critical suggestions, have helped me immensely in shaping the ideas presented in the text that follows. Similar help was also provided by my second reader, Professor Michael Williams. Over the years of my dissertation research, I was also inspired and influenced by the criticisms and suggestions of many senior and junior philosophers whom I met at various conferences and colloquia where I presented parts of my work. I hereby offer all of them my deepest thanks. I also thank my fellow philosophy graduate students at Johns Hopkins University for being a careful and patient audience for my ideas and a warm intellectual community that facilitated their development. Finally, I owe my gratitude to the members of my dissertation defense committee. Without my interaction with all of these individuals, this project would have not been the same. iv Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter 1: Defining the Apprehensive Impression 6 Chapter 2: Achieving Knowledge 71 Chapter 3: Achieving Moral Perfection 100 Chapter 4: The Academic Strategy against the Stoic Apprehension 130 APPENDICIES: Appendix A: Zeno vs. Plato on Perception in Cicero’s Academica 1.30-42 161 Appendix B: Non-Unified Objects as Proper Individuals in Stoicism 181 BIBLIOGRAPHY 193 CURRICULUM VITAE 199 v INTRODUCTION The debate between the Stoics and the Academics on the apprehensive impression (phantasia katalēptikē) was one of the longest in the history of epistemology. It is also one of the most discussed in contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period. The debate was initiated around 300 BCE when Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, introduced certain important innovations into epistemology, focusing mostly on the claim that although not all of our perceptual impressions are true, there is a special class of perceptual impressions that are capable of reliably capturing the truth about the external world. Zeno’s theory of the apprehensive impression was met with criticism by Plato’s successors in the Academy, most notably Arcesilaus and Carneades. Our sources testify that the dispute lasted with unceasing vigor at least until the time Cicero wrote his Academica (mid first century BCE), and continued to shape epistemology even after that— Sextus Empiricus in the second century CE felt the need to construct his own arguments against the apprehensive impression. Most scholars today believe that the Stoics thought that in order to achieve apprehension (katalēpsis), we do not have to be able to have direct cognitive access to our impressions’ apprehensiveness. Since it attributes to the Stoics a 1 position that bears some similarity to contemporary externalist approaches in epistemology, this interpretation has become known as the “externalist” interpretation. On the other hand, the standard interpretation of the Academic main argument is that apprehensive impressions do not exist as a class separate from other impressions because we are unable to directly recognize them as such. Furthermore, they argued that since we cannot recognize them, they cannot serve the role of the criteria of truth which the Stoics assigned to them. This interpretation thus portrays the Academic strategy against the apprehensive impression as “internalist.” These two interpretations, however, have given rise to an important problem for understanding the nature of the debate between the Stoics and the Academics. If the Stoics were indeed epistemic externalists, it seems that the Academic attack from the position of internalism misses its mark. Furthermore, if the parties in the dispute were indeed talking past each other, why did the debate last as long as it did? These questions have prompted various solutions from contemporary scholars. I intend to argue that none of these solutions is satisfactory, and to provide my own answers to the questions mentioned above, while focusing primarily on the most important and most sophisticated phase of the debate, from Zeno at the beginning of the 3rd, until the time of Carneades and Antipater in the late 2nd century BCE. In Chapter 1, I address the various problems in interpreting the Stoic definition of the apprehensive impression. Usually, contemporary scholars assume that the original Zeno’s definition consisted of two clauses, according to which the apprehensive impression is an impression that: 2 (1) Is from what is, (2) Is stamped and sealed in accordance with that very thing that is. However, in Cicero and Sextus we also find the apprehensive impression described as an impression that also satisfies an additional, third, clause: (3) Of such a kind it couldn’t be from what is not. According to Cicero, this third clause was added by Zeno in response to the objection of Arcesilaus, who suggested that an impression that satisfies the first two requirements could be just like a false impression, and hence it cannot be apprehensive. Interpreting what each of these three clauses precisely means, as well as what is the mutual relationship between them has been a subject of big controversy. The opinions are divided over what is the precise scope of the phrase ‘what is’ that occurs in all three clauses. According to one approach, “what is” should be understood as referring to what is true, or what is the fact, which results in a strong reading of the first clause. Other approaches, however, favor the sense of “real object.” Furthermore, the real intention of the third clause has been proven extremely controversial. Does it refer to some kind of special phenomenal character of the apprehensive impression, or to some feature that need not be directly accessible to the subject entertaining the impression? In Chapter 1, through a careful analysis of textual evidence, I will argue that by the phrase “what is” the Stoics had in mind something like “spatiotemporally present real object.” I will then offer an interpretation of the second clause of the definition that is consistent with this reading of the phrase “what 3 is.” Finally, I will argue that although the third clause does express a requirement related to the apprehensive impression’s representational character, this requirement is consistent with the externalist interpretation of the Stoic epistemology. My goal in Chapter 2 is providing a detailed analysis of the properties like clarity, plainness, and strikingness that the Stoics often associated with the apprehensive impression. This analysis is important because the Stoics believed that in virtue of possessing these properties, the apprehensive impression causes our mind’s assent, and thus leads to apprehension (katalēpsis),