l he Soxiei Union faces a range of Reflections on KAL 007—page 29 TheSoviet Union's Special Purposé social, economic, and political prob- Forces—page 63 lems in the years ahead—page 2

The Air University Review, published bimonthly in English and quarterly in Spanish and Portuguese, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other nationai defense matters. The views and opinions ex- pressed or implied in the Review are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the U.S. government.

A I R UNIVERSITY

November-December 1986 Vol. XXXVIII No 1 AFR 50-2

2 The Soviet Union: Crisis, Stability, or Renewal? Dr. Ralph S. Ciem 14 Know H istory . . . o r Become History Fdilorial 16 Education and Training of Soviet Air Forces Officers Dr. William F. Scolt Harriei Fasi Scott 29 Soviet Concepts of Security: Reflections on KAL Flight 007 Dr. David R. Jones 40 Launch on YVarning in Soviet Nuclear Strategy Capt. John D. Williams. USMG 52 The Strategy of the Indirect Approach Applied to NATO Ll. Ciol. William J. Dalecky. USAF 63 SPETSNAZ: Soviet Innovation in Special Forces Roberi S. Boyd 70 Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition YVinners

In My Opinion 72 The Human Factor: The United States versus the Soviet Fighter Pilot Col. Mike Press, USAF

The Classic Approach 79 Train Hard, Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His “Art of Victory” Dr. Bruce W. Menning

89 You’ve Got the Stick Letters

Books, Images, and Ideas 93 From Stalingrad to Berlin: Stalin’s War Dr. John T. Greenwood

98 Short Bursts

103 Contributors THE SOVIET UNION: CRISIS, STABILITY, OR RE

1)R RALPH S. C lkm N lhe titleoí his provocalive book. Will the toward lhe Soviei Union should be moreasser- Soviei Union Suwive until 1984? lhe laie live, laking inloaccount weaknesses in the So- ISoviei dissideni Andrei Amalrik posed spe- viei economy and society.1 ciíically a queslion aboul lhe longeviiy of lhe l he only problem wilh ihis noiion—and it Soviei Union, a subjecl thai has intrigued is a potemially dangerous problem—is thai it Western analysisof ihai country íor some lime. is based on a false premise and a queslionable and aboul which there has recenily been con- corollary: it is ceriainly wrong lo view the So- siderable speculalion.1 Reflecling for a mo- viei Union as beset wilh crises of sut h magni- inem on lhe fact thai lhe answer lo Amalrik s tude thai iis very existente is in doubt and query is now clear in lhe affirmaiive. ii is still probably wrong to ihink thai the problems lhe case thai many take seriously lhe notion confronting lhai couniry will in some way lhat lhe Soviei Union is in disiress and mighl make it more susceptible lo direct, unfriendly even collapse under lhe weighl of internai eco- pressure from lhe United States. This is noi lo nomic. social, and poliiical problems. Given suggesi thai the Soviei Union is wilhoul iis lheadversarial relationship between thesuper- diffitulties, or thai lhese difficulties do not powers. it is probably natural thai ihis issue present a serious t hallenge lo lhe Soviei politi- will be raised again by others in updated form, cal leadership. On thecontrary, lhat saine lead- and thai in mosí cases lhe responses will to ership has iiself taken an increasingly more some degree be biased by the ideological cli- candid and concerned view of lhe economit mate of the times and the personal views of and social situation in the Soviei Union and those involved. After all. if one perceives lhe calls for various reforms intended to correcí or Soviei Union as a militarv and political threat ai leasi lo amelioraie some of these problems to lhe Western democracies, then there is con- have received wide attention in the Soviet and siderable appeal in lhe idea thai our chief rival Western press. Likewise, the present circum- in the international arena might vanish of stance and near-term fuiure do offer certain iis own accord, or ai leasi become less menac- opportunities for an enhancemem of American ing. national interests vis-à-vis lhe Soviei Union, The issue of lhe condition of the Soviei sys- provided thai our initiatives are well grounded lem is not eniirely an academic one. The in lhe facts of the matter and are pursued in a sirength of lhe modem State is no longer a fashion calculated toavoid overt confrontation function solely of miliiary power, especially or outright hosiility. now lhat lhe awesome desirucliveness of lhat Wilh lhe seriousnessof these issues in mind. power places strong consiraints on iis use and it does seem thai the immediate past few years lhai unconventional forms of warfare (i.e., and ihe coming decade consti tule an especia 11 y guerrilla war and lerrorism) have proliferaied. imporiani transitional period foi lhe Soviei 1'lius. lhe long-term influente of lhe Soviei Union and thereforedemands someassessmem Union in international aífairs, like lhat of and guarded forecasts from those trained to oiher countries, will be deiermined to a large evaluaie lhe Soviei condition. At this writing, extern by the cohesiveness of iis society and lhe we are ai an excelleni vaniage point from viialiiy of its economy, not only for lhe value which lo take siock of Soviei prospects and thai these factors mighl have in lhe competi- their implications. A relaiively young Ieader tion between ideologies but also because social has recenily acceded lo power. the economy is and economit forces directly and indireclly entering a new Five-Vear Plan (lhe Twelfih, shape militarv capabiliiies and nonmiliiary 1986-90), and the XXVII Pariy Congressfa ma- options. Recognizing this, Richard Pipes and jor political event heldevery five years) hasjusi others have suggesied lhat American policy concluded.

3 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW

However, reasonable people will disagree tries (e.g., iron and steel and machine building). aboui ihe dimensions arul imerpretations of Now, however, the Stalinisl model is expe- retem eventsand irends in. and parlicularly lhe riencing difficulties principally because the direction of, lhe Soviet economy, society, and Soviet economy has moved into an era where poliiical order during lhe near lerm. Accord- consumei goods and agriculture are given ingly, my discussion here will lót us on several higher priority, which means that productivity key issues m lerms of possibililies. However, counts for more than brute size; quality (or defini li ve stalemenisabout lhese queslionsand efficiency) has superseded quantity as lhe prime parlicularly lheir íuiure course are simply noi determinam of growth. James Millar has aplly feasible or prudeni. described this structural shift in the Soviet economy as requiring " ... changes in the lead- ership's long-standing preference for industry The Soviet Economy: over agric ulture, for the urban worker over the Problems and Prospects rural—for, in short, the hammer over the Ihere can be lillle doubl lhat Soviet eco- sickle."' nomit performance has experienced a down- More specifically, Soviet planning and con- lurn of serious proportions during lhe |>asi trolling agencies are no longer able to handle three det ades, a condilion lhal has worsened the tasks associated with a much largei and wiihin lhe lasi len years. This trend is evi- complex economy: thus, output largeis are deiued in lhe sleady drop in lheaverageannual often irrational and measuresof production are growth rate of lhe Soviet gross national prod- inaccurate. Prices are difficult toestablish; they uct (GNP) from 5.9 percent for the period 1956- are unrealistic and rarely adjusted, which fre- 60 to 5.0 percent for 1961-65, 5.2 percent for quently makes the allocation of resources per- 1966-70. 3.7 percent for 1971-75, and 2.7 per- verse. Perhaps most importam, ilu* technologi- cent for 1976-80.5 Although still respectable cal changes required to raise productivity seem by international siandardsflhe l ’.S. GNP grew very difficult for the Soviet system to generate ai an average rale of 3.1 percent betvveen 1975 internally. Some reasons for this difficulty are: and 1980), lhese figures are in dramalic conirasi • I here is lhe lack of innovation in Soviet to Soviet economic growih raies of from 6 to 11 enterprises because managers are reluctant to percent a year in lhe era prior to and imme- take risks for fear of failing to satisfy short-term diately after the Second World War. production quotas. Specialists on lhe Soviet economy by and • Research and development usually takes large concur on lhe causes for this secular de- place independem of the factories, so techno- (line iti growth rales. In general, lhe economic logical advances are difficult to integrate into developmeni siralegy adopted by the Soviet the production process. leadership (lhe ‘‘Stalinisl" model) in the late • The lack of competition among producers 1920s—which was to prove successful in im- and a chronic shortage of consumei goods plementing and sustai ning very high rates of (which perpetuates a seller’s market and redu- increase for about thirty years—is no longer ces vvorkers’ incentive) further inhibit inno- appropriate. The classic Stalinisl model, fea- vation. turing a centrally planned and tightly con- trolled system, was able to achieve impressive All of these reasons ha ve led toa steady deterio- economit residis by mobilizing cheap labor ration of both capital and labor productivity.' and abundam natural resources, by mandaling If there is general consensus on the dimen- a high levei of inveslment, and by devoting a sions of and reasons for the current Soviet eco- large share of capital to producer goods indus- nomic malaise, the course of events during the SOV1ET UNION TODAY AND TOMOÜHOW 5

coming years will be much more controvérsia!. estimates of Soviei military expenditures de- \\'e do know with some ceriainty that future rived by different inethods. Thus, it may be that Soviei economicgrowth will beconstrained by the Soviei military budget absorbs anywhere several factors. First, because of a long-term from 10 to 18 percent of GNP.1' Regardless of drop in the birthraie. the number of new en- what constitutes the ‘‘true" figure, the impor- irants imo the work force will shrink through tam poim is that with an economy only ap- the mid-1990s. which means that theprofligate proximately 60 percent of that of the United use of labor which Soviei economic planners States (which spends between 6 and 7 percent ol have taken advantage of in the past will no its GNP on defense), the economic burden of longer be possible: there are no large reserves of maintain mg a military establishment of rough- labor remaining, as the rural populalion has ly comparable size weighs mut h more hea\ il\ been drained of surplus workers. and women on the Soviei Union. Further, it is widely be- are already employed to the maximum. Aggra- lieved that Soviei defense industries are ac- vating this problem are pronounced interre- corded highest priority in the allocalion of gional differentials in the birihrate. which material and human inputs in both quamita- havecreated labor surpluses in the Asian areas tiveandqualitative terms, which acts lurther tMikhail Gorbachev, began for about 20 percent of GNP (as compared to giving clear signals that he intended to push less than 3 percent in the United States). His- for better platining; to raise labor produclix it\ torically, the agricultural sector has not re- through a carrot-and-stick approach, involv- ceived adecjuate investment (capital went pri- ing wage and consumei goods incentives and marily to industry), although recently this im- greater work discipline (including a < ainpaign balance has been largely corrected. Shortfalls against alcoholism and absenteeism); to dis- in agricultural production force the Soviei Un- miss aging bureaucrats and managers; and to ion imo the world market to purchase grain prornote a more open discussion ol economic and other commodities. usingabout 10 percent problems.10 The Twelfth Five-Yeai Plan, the of precious hard currency funds to maintain an blueprint for the Soviei economy for the period adequate diet for the Soviei citi/en.8 1986-90, bears the im prim of these Gorbachev By far the mosl importam constraint on eco- policies, including goals for significantly highei nomic prospects for the U.S.S.R. is military labor productivity, a moreefficieni useof capi- spending, which is the subject of lively debate tal investment, a doubling of consumei goods in the field of Soviei studies in the West. Be- production, greatly expanded medicai and so- cause the Soviei governmeni does not provide cial services(which account fora largeshareol complete details of its defense budget, there is the real income of Soviei cilizens), and major considerable disagreement regarding various increases in personal income. Under this plan, 6 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEIV

GNP growlh is projetied to rí se to 3.5-4.1 per- some òf the price revisionscontemplated—and cent yearly, fueled by the moderoization oí ex- necessary for real progress economically—will isting enterprises through an infusion of new prove impopular and may need to becurtailed industrial technologies, by greater autonomy for political reasons. A diversion of resourees foi factory managers, by improving the link- from the military to thec ivilian sector depends ages belween research and development and on externai considerations and thus will be produclion, and b\ ralionalizing piices to de- difficull to implement in the face of rising mand and costs. American defense spending and the stalled Kai ly indications are that the Gorbachev re- arms limitations talks. Although lhe influence forms ha ve had a positive impact on Soviet of the Soviet military in decisionmaking al the economic performance. Industrial production national levei is probably less than most in the and labor produt ti\ ii\ were both up in the lirst West imagine, lhe military leadership can be quarter of 1986, and oil production increased expected to oppose cuts in defense spending, th lis reversing a decline that began in 1983.11 making any shift from gutis to butter that I his lattei index isespecially important as the much more problematic. Petroleum industry was the lirst to be singled As Mi liar notes, “. . . the fundamental out b\ Gorbache\ for refonn (he fired the Min- slrength of the Soviet economy, like the Ameri- ister ol Petroleum, personally inspected the can, resides in its size, in theskillsof its popula- giant West Siberian oil fields and called for tion. in theextraordinary richnessof its natural greater imestmem in oil production); petro- resourees and in the proven ability of the lead- leum also accounts for less than 60 petcent of ership to respond effectively to problems new Soviet exports and hard currency earnings, and old.”12 Following this view, in my opinion vvhich they use to purchase grain and indus- it would be best tiot to overdramatize thediffi- trial technology from the West. Two counter- culties currently confronting the Soviet econ- vailing factors to this optimistic preliminary omy, which will for the foreseeable future con- assessment are the slump in world oil prices tinue to grow and to provide the Soviet Union (which reduees the value of Soviet petroleum with most, if not everything, of what they need exports) and the nuclear acc ident at Chernobyl to maintain their superpower status, both po- (whit h will curtail the produt tion of electricity I it ic al ly and militarily. and depending on the long-term effects from radiation might damage agricultural produc- Soviet Society: Ailing or Robust? tion in the Ukraine and require the Soviets to import additional foodstuífs). Over the last several years. in a wide variety Although in the Soviet contexl these mea- of scholarly and mass media public ations, sures are wide-ranging in sc ope, the basic struc - Western researchers and journalists have ture of the economy remains unchanged. l he painted an increasingly darker pictureof social large and powerful central planningapparatus, conditions in the Soviet Union and have hinted although somevvhat chastened by the Gorba- at even more difficult times to come. Nick chev initiatives (the long-time chiei ol Gos- Kberstadt, for example, stated that: “From plan. the state planning agency, was dismissed what I can makeout, the USSR is indeed in the and replaced bya Gorbachevappointee), isstill midsi of a soc ial and spiritual collapse lhe likes very tnuch a force to be reckoned with. Other of which we in the West have nevei seen, and in bureaucratic and ministerial fiefdoms in the fac t can scarcely imagine.”M F.berstadt. who government and the party will continue to was apparenlly sparetl lhe trauma ol the Great some extern to resist the proposed reforms out Depression in the United States, bases bis dire ol vested interests in the status quo. Further, forecast on what he perceives to bea debacle in Red Squarr dwring an anniversary celebralion loday and will coniinue lo be a faclor in lhe uf lhe Rusúan Revolution years ahead. Thequesiion in boih cases has uvo paris: lo whai exieni are lhe circumstances described real. and if lhey are—lo whalever degree—lhen health tare in lhe Soviet l'nion and a concom- whai do lhey mean for lhe Soviei system? itani increase in ihe morialiiy raie. Similarly, Again, such subjects are importam for olhei in a popular book wilh lhe arresling lide. De- than the grisi lhey provide for lhe acadernic ilme of an Empire: The Soviei Sonali.st He- mill. Al lhe exireme. if soc ial condilions in lhe publics in Keiiolí, lhe French auihor Helene Soviei Union are as badas some mainiain, lhen Carrere d Encausse described ai lengih various this may be symptomatic of a systemic break- aspetts of the elhnit situation in lhe Soviei down. Needless lo say, if lhe very fabric ol So- Union (including language, inigralion, imer- viet sotiety is tom ing undone, the polilical marriage, and socioeconomit inequalilies), consequentes would be enormous. whith she believes will prove especially vexa- Shori (if lhai, less cataclysmic — bui still se- liousfor lhe Soviei leadership.1' Leavingaside rious—problems, such as lhe deieriorating for lhe moment lhe íai i lhai lhe SovieiSocialist health standards menlioned by Ebersladt, 01 Republics are decidedly nol "in revoll," ii is the possibility of risingethnic lensions, as sug- neveriheless true lhai problems relaied 10 eth- gested by d hncausse, have implications for lhe nic group relalions exisi in the Soviei Union Soviet leadership and for lhe miliiary. As Ellen

7 8 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Jones has demonstrated, the Soviet armed for- nomic and military needs; as wasdiscussed ear- ces, likc military organizalionselsewhere. draw lier, this is one reason why the Soviet economy manpower from lhe larger society and are, is curremly in difficulty. therefore, toa significam extern microcosmsof Now, according to some authorities, the So- lhal society.1' Thus, manifesiations of social viet people may be experiencing another type infirmity in lhe Soviei l Tnion are germane lo of demographic adversily: an upturn in mor- our atiempí to assess lhe well-being of lhe So- tality caused by a deterioration in living stand- viei staie, noi only for their value as indicators ards, shorteomings in health care, and the ef- ol naiional viiality (oi lack ihereof) but also fects of smoking and alcoholism amongSoviei beca use ihese fat tors relate directly to military citizens.18 Kvidenceof this trend, which would power. In this section, lhere are l\vo issues be unique in the history of modem, industrial- whic h have emerged as poinis of contention in i/ed countries, is seen in indicators of infant lhe analysisof thecontemporary Soviei Union: mortality (whic h is rising) and adult longevity populalion trends and ethnii group relalions. (which is declining).19 Although these may ap- pear to be esoteric points, their importante, if true, cannot be overstated; such signs are omi- populalion trends nous indeed and would represem a genuine The demographic hisiory of lhe Soviet Union crisis in Soviet society. There is reason to be- is lhe inost tragic of any country in lhe twen- lieve, however, that the purported increase in lieihcentury in termsof lhescaleof populalion mortality is spurious, in that it can be attrib- losses, noi to mention huinan suffering. l he uted to technical factors associated with the enormitv of ihese caiastrophes is almost im- collection of population data. In this regard, possible to grasp; although precise figures are Robert Lewis hasshown that improvements in noi available, ii is estimaied that direct and the statistical reporting system in the Soviei indireca populalion decremenis due lo World Union created an artificial "rise” in mortality War I, revoluiion and civil war, lamines, indicators, because a higher percentage of purges, forced labor, c ollectivization, and World deaths is now captured by the registration net- War II amoum to between eigluy and ninety work than before.20 million people. World War II alone is be- Unforiunately, this question is all the more Iieved io have resulted in tweniy lo twenty-two difficult to resolve because the Soviet govern- million deaths; for purposes of comparison, ment ceased the publication of detailed mortal- the United States lost about 300,000 men and ity data in the mid-1970s (after the figures vvomen in that conflict.17 showed that the death rate was going up). The rhe most importam long-term consequence obvious connotation that most would give lo "I these disastrous events is theeffect they have that action is that "they have something to on populalion growth. Because war losses oc- hide." Although that certainly may be the case, cur latgely to men of military age and other it is also plausible that the Soviets panicked traumas also tend to be selectiveof adults, lhere when the more efficient reporting system gen- are huge gaps in the age strueture of the Soviet eraied a rising mortality index, and—having populalion, gaps vvhich ‘‘echo" from genera- publicly taken pride in earlier declines in the tion to generation, mocking the passage of death rate—decided to withhold the informa- time as a healer of past calamities. Combined tion thereafier. with the normal decline in fertility, which typ- It would seem prudent, in lighi of these con- itally accompanies modernization, the birth flicting interpretations of the data, to down- deficits owing to war casualties have greatly play the crisis implications of populalion reduced lhe manpower pool for civilian eco- trends in lhe Soviet Union. I noled earlier that SOVIET UNION TODAY AND TOMORROW 9

Gorbachev has addressed lhe need to make im- Richard Pipes, means lhat "... ethnic conílic is provemenis in healih care. which mighi bring in lhe USSR assume lhe foi m of a ballle ol wils aboui posiiive developmems in ihe qualiiy and . . . [wherein lhe non-Russians] . . . iry 10 lenglh of life for lhe Soviei people. Ahhough outsmart Moscow.”25 Beneath lhe sui face, how- all is noi well in ihaicounirv. it is probably nol ever, Pipes believes lhat "there smolders re- the case lhai ihis asped oí Soviei society will seniment and. in some areas, hatred lhai tan prove 10 be a major consideration in lhe calcu- quickly explode into genociilal fury should the lus oí Soviei power. heavy hand of Russian aulhority weaken."'1 Short of ihis catastrophic "genocidal fury," lhe ethnic factor there are some specific ethnic issues lhat mighi One oí lhe mosí common misconceptions influence lhe Soviei military and societv. Foi abom iheSo\ iet Union is lhai itscitizens are all example, much publicity has been given laiely "Russians.” Actually, ihe Soviei populaiion to the changing population balance between consisis of members of approximately lüü dif- the Russians and oihei European peoples ol ferem eihnic groups, each with iis own lan- the Soviet Union, on theone hand, and. on lhe guage and culiure, and with \arious com- other hand, the predominamlv Muslim peo- binaiions of religious affilialion and physical ples of lhe Caucasus and Central Asian regions appearance.-1 Not surprisingly, such a remark- of the country.25 Because of a considerably ableeihnicdiversiiy leads to social and political higher birthrateamong the latter, their shareol problems. These include discrimination and the Soviet population is growing; meanwhile, other forms of iniolerance, some hostiliiy on the percentage of Russians is declining (thev lhe pari of minorilies toward lhe Russians (who currently account for about 32 percent ol the are lhe majority and predominam group), as population). Some ol the consequent es oí this well as language, educaiion, and employmeni trendareobviousand importam: there will bea dispuies. steadily largei non-Russian component in the This ethnic factor in the Soviei Union lends Soviet armed Services and in the labor force. to be portrayed in ihe West as considerably However, the "crisis" labei that has been more negaiive and potemially more disjunc- attached lo this trend is probably undeserved. ii\e than similar cases elsewhere. Thus, sub- Ahhough some adjustments—such as moreat- jecis like language righis and bilingualism tention to Russian language training foi mi- (which are typical issues in multieihnic socie- nority draftees—will need to be made in both ties) are in lhe Soviet context often seen as pari the military and c ivilian sectors, Jones reminds of some sinister effort 10 force lhe assimilation us "... that the USSR is by no means the only of non-Russian eihnic groups into a Russian modem state whose military manpower man- cultural and linguistic norm. Likewise, the fact agement system must cope wilh ethnic, lingu- lhai over a pericxl of four centuries the eihnic istic, and regional diversity among its troops.”26 Russians expanded their stale lo control lhe Like most other issues relating to the study ol lands of numerous neighboring peoples—the the Soviet Union, an assessment ol the impor- borders of lhat State have remained largely in- tante of the ethnic factor depends mostly on the lact through lhe transition to Soviei power— degree to whi< h one is predisposed to view the resullsin thecharacterizationof the Soviei Un- Soviei Union in general. Whereas the basic ion as ". . . the world's last empire.”22 The structureof lhe Soviei state, created by Lenin in maintenance of this "Soviei empire” is lhen 1922, has endured these many years through said to be dependem on clever manipulaiion oí extremely difficult times, there are many who ihe political system and the pervasiveness of nevertheless see lhe entire thing as ready to lhe secret police. Such a situation, according to come apart ai the seams. Certainly, many íea- 10 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW

turesof lheSoviet political system are notwhat ministration. Grigory Romanov, former Len- thev purport to be, and there is genuine dis- ingrad Party chief and once believed the most content on the part of many minority group likely heir to Andropov and Ghernenko, vvas members because of their inclusion in the removed from the Politburo in disgrace over ‘‘fraternal socialist brotherhood of peoples.” A abuses of his position. Other prominent fig- rase can be rnade, however, that over the de- ures, suc h as Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov cades a certain legitimacy has been attached to and Moscovv Party head Viktor Grishin were the Soviet federation of ethnic political units; packed off into retirement. Perhaps most im- that most peopleat least acquiesce to its contin- portam, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko uation; and that a non-Russian political elite vvas “promoted" to the largely ceremonial post has learned how to operate within the system to of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme gain economic and social benelits foi their con- Soviet; his replacement, Eduard Shevãrdnadze, stituents.-’' As long as the Soviet leadership has no prior experient e of international affairs, manages to keep nationalist urges channelêd which suggests that Gorbachev intends to run within the existing political structure, such both foreign and domestic policy himself. New issues as bilingualism and lhec hangingethnit appointees to the Politburoor other high posi- composition of the country can probably be tions, such as Nikolai Ryzhkovfthe new Prime handled withoul serious trouble. Minister), Vegor Ligachev, Viktor Chebrikov, and Vitaly Vorotnikov, appear to be close Gor- The New Political Leadership bachev assoe iates. The reach of the Gorbachev personnel moves, "A iViVr Sniile, llut lroti Teeth”1* however, goes far beyond the highly publicized changes in the Politburo. portending a more It is probably safe to say that the composition fundamental restrueturing of the nomenklat- and outward appearance of the Soviet political urn. or listing of individuaisapproved for lead- leadership has undergone a more rapid and ership or managerial positions. Thus, headsof sweeping change than anyone would have variousagencies, regional government officials, thought likely, even as recently as two years ago. and members of the Party Secretariat have been More than representing a generational shift and fired or transferred to lesser duties; their re- an end to the succession of elderly, ailing leaders, placements adhere to the new line of efficiency theGorbachevera holdsat least thepossibility of and discipline. In one of Gorbachev’s early major reforms in the pariv and government ap- speeches, intended to set the tone for his admin- paratus, the revitalization of the economy, the istration, he told the audience: “Those who do invigoration of the political elite, and a more not intend to adjust and who are an obstacle to positive or hopeful íeeling about the prospects solving these new tasks must simply get out of for the Soviet system among its citizenry. the way.”50 The blatant cronyism, stagnation, l he sfML-ttac ular rise to power of Mikhail Gor- and corruption of the Brezhnev era. the “don t bachev apparently began earlier than we had rock the boat” mentality epitomized by the once thought; it now seemsclear that his route to “stability of cadres” job tenure policy may well the top vvas assured long before his formal as- be ending. sumption of the General Secretary’s post follow- These sorts of actions are typical of the new ing the death of Konstantin Ghernenko in March leadership, which seems to have a sense of ur- 198á. rh is partly explains theadroit consolida- gency about its mission to get a moribund tion of power and elimination of rivais at the economy, society, and political system moving upper leveis of the party and State which Gor- ahead again. This is represented by the vigor- bachev orchestrated in the first year of his ad- ous and highly v isible personal style of Gorba- SOI'!ET VNION TODAY AND TOMORROW il

chev, which is in dramatic comrast to Soviet michev. Minister of Culture since 1971 and a leaders of the past decade who had trouble meinber of lhe Bre/hnev clique, was shifted to walking unassisted. Using an approach remi- an insubstantial position; although Demic hevs niscent of an American political campaign, in replacement has yet to be narnetl at this writ- which he kisses babies, conducts meetings on ing, this move—togelhet with the shovving ol the Street with passersby. visits factories, and plays and films with political themes, and appears frequently on television. Gorbachev greater candor in the media—may herald a misses no opportunity to get his message more relaxed environment. across: dou n to the levei of lhe average Citizen, If Gorbac hev and his assoe iates are planning the Soviet people must dedicate themselves to and attempling to alter the Soviet politic al Sys- hard work and a higher standard of personal tem and society, the struggle will bea difficult conduct (e.g.. a curtailmeni of alcoholism, cor- one. As Cohen notes, Gorbachev "has reslored ruption, and absenteeism). the general secretaryship as an active leader- The kev question. of course. is how success- sliip position, relegitimizing the principie ol ful Gorbachev and hisallies uill be ineffec ting fundamental c hange and created a political real political reforms and in building a popu- atmosphere ol refonn. But faced with legions lar consensus for his programs. l he central of conservative and neo-Stalinist defendeis ol problem here is that the crucial economic initi- the status quo, Gorbachev is still fai from being atives, especially lhe need to acquire advanced the master of povver or policy."" technology, may ultimately come ai the ex- pense of social Services and price increases, a Trying to Understand move that vvould no doubt alienate many peo- ple. Likewise, attempts to streamline the labor the Soviet Union force could spell an end to the cherished job Given lhe obvious impor lance ofattempling security that Soviet workers enjoy (and whic h to understand the Soviet Union, present and contributes to low productiv ity). These u ill be future, it comes as somelhing ol a disappoint- difficult choices to make and may force Gorba- ment that our knovvledge of that c ountry today chev to slovv lhe pace of c hange. and our ability to forecasl guardedlv its course Finally, it is unclear to vvhat extern Gorba- are so limited. Muc h of this stateof affairs is, of chev is willing to relax Controls on the arts and course, attributable to the secretiveness ol the literature and to allovv open expression of dis- Soviet government; although more informa- sent. Two schools of thought exist in the West tion is available through open sources than is on this subject. First. Seweryn Bialer and others generally thought, theamount of data falis fai believe that the “technocratic" approach iden- short of that needed to make reasonably accu- tiíied with Gorbachev has nothing to do with rate judgments. Vet, ChurchilFs famousadage liberalism, but rather "stresses authoritarian that Rússia is a "riddle wrapped in mvstery rule. discipline, and predictable conformist inside an enigma" is to some extern of our own behavior." Furthermore, should Gorbachev making. It might be appropriate, in conclu- "prove successful in making the State more ef- sion, toconsider how vve might goaboul reduc - ficient, theextent of itsoppressiveness u ill also ing this aura of mystery that seems to shroud increase."’1 Stephen Cohen, on lheother hand, the Soviet Union, and in so doing perhaps to argues that Gorbachev's emphasis on order is coniribute loa more realistic vievv of our major designed to placate the conservative wing in competition. the party. while he proceeds cauliously to thaw First, vve should put an end to the exaggera- the cultural ice.}2 Cohen's viewpoint received tion of everything Soviet, from its military some reiníorcement recently when Pyotr De- power to its social and economic difficulties. 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Unforiunaiely, wriiingaboui lhe Soviei Union Soviet Union. How, for example, does lhe no- is ofien and easily given lo hyperbole, most of lorious Russian alcoholism problem compare which evemually shows iiselí lo be unfounded. to lhe proliferation of drug abuse in American In lhe meamime, however, lhe unwary can lx* society? Is lhe rising proportion of minorities misled and form a false piciure of lhe Soviei in the Soviet armed forces different in iis im- condition. l he besi recenl example of ihis len- pact from a similar trend in the American mil- dency immediately lo assume lhe worst aboui itary? An effort to see things in lhe two sysiems ihe Sovieis is lhe nevvs reporiing of lhe Cher- as more similar than not mighi provide better nobyl nuclear accideru. where headlines of insights into how the oiher side lives, worksj "ihousands dead" and “mass graves" caughl iries to deal wilh problems, and perceives and lhe aiieniion of lhe American public/4 VVilh- defends its interests. oui waming lo downplay lhe seriousness of fui Soviet Union is a large and highly com- ihis eveni (ii now appears lhal direcl dealhs plex society which, like other such couniries, owing lo lhe mishap vvill number about ihirty), faces a range of social, economic, and polilical oi loexcuse lhe Soviei governmeni's irrespon- problems in the years ahead. In areas where sible and unforihcoming handling of lhe inc i- cooperaiion and a reduction in tensions are deni, this episode shows how badly informed seen by lhe Soviet leadership to be advanta- vve are and our inclinalion lo oversiaie lhe case. geous, ihese problems will probably make In this regard, Lewis staied: them more recepiive to negotiation with the (àisis-mongeringand predic lionsof lhe collapse West. Failing lhat, however, wecan expecí ihat oi lhe Soviei Union have been put forih in lhe the Gorbachev administration will do what it West regularly sinte lhe founding of lhe siaie. deems necessary 10 maintain the Soviei Un- Froin lhe turrem Western liieraiure one derives ihe impression lhal here is a tounlry iharacter- ion^ status as a military, if not an economic, i/ed mainly by weaknesses and few strengths, and superpower. In so doing, the Soviet govern- yei ii appears lo be quite slable. Suth inlerprela- meni will no doubt have the support of its lions reveal more about lhe authors ihan about c iti/.ens. In my opinion, lo think otherwise is to lhe Soviei Union and involveconsiderable wish- run the risk of committing lhat most danger- ful thinking.” ous of mistakes, lhat of underestimating one’s Second, more emphasis must be given to a adversary. comparative perspective when analyzing the Florida International l niversity, Miami

Notes 1. Andrei Amalrik, Will lhe Soviei Vnion Survive until I9SI? Policy." in The Domestic Conlext of Soviet Foreign Poticy. edited (New York: Harpcr and Row. 1970). by Seweryn Bialer(Boulder. Colorado: Westview, 1981), pp. 227-55: 2. Rii hard Pipes. Survival Is Not Enough: Soviei Realities and Arthur W. Wright, "Soviet tconomic Planningand Performance." lmerica\ Future (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1984). See also in The Soviet Vnion since Stalin, edited by Slephen F. Cohen Dimitri K Simes. " l he New Soviet Challengeand America's New (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1980), pp. 113-34; and Kdge." in Soviet Foreign Rolicy in a Changmg World, edited by Marshall I. Goldman. V.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an F.co- Robbtn F. Laird and Krik P. Hofíman (New York: Aldine. 1986), nomie System (New York: Norton, 1983). pp. 1-62. pp 422-39: Seweryn Bialer. The Soviet Paradox: Fxlernal F.xpan- 6. Roberl A. Lewis, "Regional Manpower Resources and Re- ston. Internai Decline (New York: Knopf, 1986); and Theodor source Development in the USSR: 1970-90," in Soviet Natural Winkler, "The Totlering F.mpire: Problems Facing the USSR in Resources in the World F.conomy, edited by Robert G. Jensen. the 1980s," International Defense Review, No. 3, 1981. pp. 263-69. Theodore Shabad, and Arthur W. Wright (Chicago: University of 3. James R. Mi liar. "An FTonomic OverView." in The Soviet Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 72-96. Vnion Today: .4n Interpretive Guide, edited by James Cratraft 7. See Roberl G. Jensen. Theodore Shabad. and Arthur W. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1983). p. 175. Wright. editors. Soviet Natural Resources in the World F.conomy 4. Ibid. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1983), chapters2. 3. 11. and 5. See Morris Bornstetn. “Soviet tconomic Growth and Foreign 16. SOVIET UNION TODAY AND TOMORROW 13

8 D. Gale Johnson. "Agriculiure." in Cracrafi. op. cii.. pp. tality in the l 'SSH in lhe 1970's, II .S . Bureau of the Census, series 195-207. P-95, no. 74. June 1980; and Murray Feshbach. " The Age Siruciure 9. Various poinisoí viewon ihis subjecí are presenicd by Donald oí Soviei Population; Preliininary Analysisof Unpublished Dau." K Burton. "Esiimaiing Soviei Deíense .Spending." Problems o/ Soviet Economy, April-June 1985. pp. 177-93. Communism. July-Augusi 198-1. pp. 53-13: Sleven Rosefielde, False 20. Roberl A. Lewis, "The Universalily ol Demographic Pro- Science: Cnderestimating the Soviet Arms Butldup (New Bruns- cesses in lhe USSR." in (íeographu al Sludies on the Soviet I nion, wick. New Jersey: Transaclion Books. 1982); and Franklyn D. ediled by George J. Deinkoand Roland J. F'uchs(Chicago: Univer- Holzman, "Assessing Soviei Miiitary Spending." International Se- siiyof Chicago Press. 1984). pp. 109-30 Seealso Frt-d W. G ruppand cunly, Spring 1982. pp. 78-101. Ellen Jones. “Infant Morlality Trends in ■ he l !SSR." Population 10. Fyodor 1. Kushnirsky, "The Limiisol Soviei Economic Re- and Development Heview, June 1983, p. 224. íorm," Problems o/ Communism, July-Augusi 198-1. p p . 33-13: 21. See Ralph S. Ciem, " Tlu- Ethnic Dimension of lhe Soviei ScrgcSchmemann, "TheSoviei Economy: Gorbachev Faces Daunt- Union," in Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociulogicat Perspectives, ing Task oí Rousing Agriculiure. indusirv and lhe Bureautracy." ediled by Jerry G. Pankhursl and Michael Paul Sacks (New York: Xew York Times. 15 March 1985, p. I; Serge Schmemann. "Labor Praeger. 1980), pp. 11-62. Producliviiv Rise Stressed in Soviei Plans.” Xew York Times, 16 22. Pipes. p. 178. Ociober 1985, p. 29; P hilip Taubman, "Soviei Premier. al Con- 23. Ibid.. p. 184. gress. Faulis Economy." Xew York Times, -1 March 1986. p. 8; and 24. Ibid., p. 185. Leonard Silk. "Soviet Oil Troubles," Xew York Times, 5 June 25. Herbert E. Meyer, "The Corning Soviei Ethnic Crisis." For- 1985. p. 28. tune. 14 Augusl 1978, p. 158; “ T h e P opulation Tim e Bomb Filai 11. Marshall I. Goldman. "A Fhrcai io Soviei Economic Reform: kremlin Faces." I ’.S. News and World Heporl.Ft December 1982, p. TheGrimTolloíChemobyl,"New York Times,4 May 1986, p.2F. 28; and Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup. The Islamic 12. Millar, p. 179. Threal to the Soviet State (London: Croom Hc-lin, 1983), pp 124-52. 13. Nick Eberstadi. "The Soviei Union's Health Crisis." Wash- 26. Jones. p. xv. inglon Inqutrer. 1 April 1983. p. 7. 27. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. "The Dialec is of Nationalism H. Helene CarreredEncausse, Decline o) an t.mpire: Tlie Soviet in the USSR," Problems of Communism, May 1974. pp. 1-22. Sociahst Hepubhcs m Hevolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979). 28 A remark about Gorbachev atiributed lo Andrei Gromyko. 15. Ellen Jones. Ked Atmy andSoctely: A Soctology of the Soviet See Serge Schmemann. "In Gorbachev, A New Stari: Firsi 100 Miiitary (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). pp. xv-xvii. Days," New York Times, 17 June 1985. p. I. 16. Indirect losses are shorlíalls in births resuliing from lhe 29. Jerry F. Hough. "Gorbac hev sSiralegy," Foreign Affairs, Fali deathsoi poieniial parents. See Roberl A. Lewis. Richard Fl. Row- 1985. pp. 33-55. land. and Ralph S. Ciem. Xalionality and Population Change in 30. Schmemann. "In Gorbachev. A New Siart." Kussia and the l'SSH: An Evaluation of Census Data. 1897-1970 31. Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica. "Gorbachev’* Preference (New York: Praeger. 1976). pp. 275-76. for Techncxrals." Xew York Times, II February 1986. p. 31. 17. Ibid.. p. 276; and U.S., Bureau of the Census. Statistical 32. Siephen F. Ciohen, "Sovieiicus," The Natiori, 29 March 1986, Abstract of the I niled States, 1981 (Washington: Governmeni p. 448. Prinung Office, 1981), p. 364. lable 606. 33. Ibid. 18. Nick Ebersiadl, " The Health Crisis in lhe USSR," Xew York 34. In lheir anxieiy lo cover the Chernobyl accident. two of lhe Heview of Books, 19 February 1981, pp. 23-31. and "Ultimale Ver- major television nelworks were viaimized by a confidente inan dicton the Soviei Health Sysiem: Shorter Li ves," Xew York Times, who sold lhem whal he said was videoiape fcxnage oí lhe burning 11 Ociober 1981. p. 11: and Murray Feshbach. "Social Mainienance reaclor. lt was laier determined lhal the film actually showt-d a in lhe USSR: Demographic Morass." Washington Quarterly, cement faclory in Italy. Summer 1982. pp. 92-98. 35. Lewis, “ Universality of Demographic Processes in the 19. Chrisiopher Oavisand Murray Feshbach. fíismg Infant Mor- USSR." p. 114. EDITORIAL

K N O W H I S T O R Y . . . OR BECOME HISTORY

V every measuremeni, lhe Union of Soviet fielded by the Soviet air force are fineexamples Socialisi Republics is a world povver of of aeronautical accomplishment. In fact, lhey awesomeB dimensions. From the Ukraine to are nearly asgood as our best. \Vhat’s more, the Kamchatka, it is the world’s largest country, a Soviets produce th is very good stuff in extraor- distinclion Rússia lias held for four tenturies. dinary numbers. For quite some time now, Today the U.S.S.R. can stand aloneasa nation nearly thirty Backfires a year have been rolling self-sufficient in resources, and it can stand off Soviet production lines. Thechallenge is to with any nation in the sophisticalion of its prepare to fighi an enemy that outnumbers and diplomacy, in the levei of itsculture, and, more outguns us. Our best. indeed our only, chance pertinent toour interests, in its miliiary power. for success is tooutthink this worthy adversary. Any number of defense journals, DOD pub- Deterrence isa political philosophy. Our job is Iications, and official briefings remind us of to fight and to win. VVhile deterrence “works," the dimensions of “The Threat." In numbers we must constantly prepare to practice our ofdiv isions, ships, planes, and other hardware, profession. the U.S.S.R. stacks up as a leading military At the heart of the military profession is the power. H.ow we deal with that threat lies at the art of war. The Soviets seem to understand that very center of what professional officers are better tlum we do. By the time a Soviet officer about. advances to lhe higher ranks, he has spent far In the U.S. Air Force, we put too much em- more time in professional military schools phasison the hardware aspect of "TheThreat.” studying thisart than his American counterpart. Certainly, the MiGs, Tupolevs, and Sukhois This poses an intellectual threat that is as real

14 as the threat posed by wings of fighters and understanding of our past and present will bombers, and if \ve are going to meet that help us chart where we tnay be going in the threat. we have to do a better job of preparing future. our minds for war. The study of the art of war l he intellectual threat is one that must be must be at the heart of our military educalion, met and overcome. There are no aliernatives. pro\ iding the foundation for all that we study The Soviets have numerical superiority and and think about. Understanding the budget- technologital parily. Oui best chance lor win- ing. OER. promotion. and assignment Sys- ning does not lie in regaining the "technolog- tems is secondarv to mastering the art of war. ical high ground." Afterall, we held more than To thoroughly understand war, one has to a technological edge in Korea and Vietnam ... first understand historv. l he foundation of our and lost. If and when we go up against the profession is not to be found in engineering or Soviets, we had better have mastered the art of technology. It is our past that has determined war; otherwise history will beon their side, and what we are all about as an institulion. and an that is precisely what we will be—history. k .h . t

15 EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF SOVIET AIR FORCES OFFICERS DR WiLLIAM F. SCO I I H ARRIE I' FAST SCO I I

HF total number oíSoviet officers, their newspaper. “In lhe Hour of Trial" was lhe pay scales, and lhe size of studeni bodies headline.1 Under ihe rubric “Mililary Charac- in mililary schools are considered mili- ler," a special military correspondem pub- T tary secreis. F.ven a sketchy c areei profile of lishedan bis inierview with General Major of aciive-duiy sênior officer isseldom found in lhe Avialion (one-star rank) Nikolay Timofeyevich Soviei press. Anioshkin, chief of staff of Kiev Mililary Dis- One unexpecied falloui from lhe Chernobyl irict Air Forces. nuclear disasier vvas information aboui a So- The inierview appeared six vveeksafter lhe 25 viet Air Forces general, published in Krasnaya April explosion rippedoff theroofof ihebuild- V.vezda (Red Siar), lhedaily Ministry of Defense ing housing the Chernobyl nuclear plant. The PME IN THE SOEI ET A Ui FORCE 17

Sovieis. after noieven mentioning iheaccideni ices—Sirategic Rockei Forces, Ground Forces, in lhe press until 30 April. slovvly began 10 Troops oí Air Defense, Air Forces, and Navy. publish "success" siories. The firsi piciure ap- tach previously has compleied lhe three-year peared in Krasnaya Zvezda only on 15 May, academy oí his particular branch or Service. three weeks later. Anioshkins story was one oí The lengih oí ihis senior-level academy is a a ílood oí PR siories published to siem lhe mere iwo years. Colonel Anioshkin again was "falloui” lhai resulied írom lhe inilial Soviei an honor graduate. aiiempt to cover up lhe real falloui from lhe In 1984, Anioshkin, age íoriy-iwo, was pro- radioaciive cloud that spread over Furope. moied lo general. And suddenly, ii was 26 April 1986. Wiih his son Sergey, daughter Lena, and his wife, Nikolay Anioshkin waseaiingdinner B o RN in 1942, Nikolay Tim o- when lhe phone rang. He was lold lo repori íeye\ich Anioshkin was one oí eighl children. immediaiely lo lhe commanding general oí the In ihe“Greai Pairioiic War,” as lhe Sovieis cal 1 kiev Military Districi. General Lieuienant oí thai portion oí World War II in which they Avialion N. P. Kryukov, commander oí the participaied, his íather was severely wounded. district's avialion units, was already there. An- Young Nikolay was commissioned as an Air toshkin was ordered lo go lo Pripyat, near Force officer upon graduaiion írom lhe Oren- Chernobyl, and lake charge oí lhe helicopters burg Higher Military Avialion School íor Pi- that were to dump lons oí sand direcily on top lois, named íor I. S. Polbin. Oí the thirieen Air oí ihe burning reactor. The resi oí lhe inierview Force schools íor pilots, Orenburg is one oí lhe described this action. From 27 April to 2 May, best known. Yuriy Gagarin, the world s firsl 5000 tons oí sand and oiher material were man in space, was an alumnus. Anioshkin dropped “down the ihroat" oí the smoldering graduated near lhe lop oí his class. reactors before lhe fire was contained. Lieuienani Anioshkin's íirsi assignmeni as This brief sketch oí Antoshkinscareer high- an oííicer was in the Belorussian Miliiary Dis- lighted the minimum professional iraining irici. As a new piloi, he was lesied in boih and education requiremenis íor an oííicer mak- airplanesand helicopters. In 1969, ai the age oí ing general or admirai—íirst lhe four or five iweniy-seven, he was posied to the Far Fastern years ai a “higher military school," three years Military Disirici. While siationed ihere, he at a Service or branch academy, and another applied lo and subsequently passed lhe en- iwo years ai lhe Military Academy oí lhe Gen- trance examinaiions to auend lhe Gagarin eral Staíf. In addiiion to ihis professional edu- Military Air Academy near Moscow. Three years cation and iraining, an officer probably will laier, he graduaied wiih distinclion. auend one or more “courses,” which could last His nexí assignmeni was lo the Odessa Mili- íor an eniire year. tary Districi as a squadron commander. Two years laier, he was assigned to lhe Turkesian Military District lo command an air regiment. rH F. Soviei Union did not reach According lo the Krasnaya Zvezda wrile-up, iis miliiary superpower status wiih military each unil Anioshkin commanded became "out- equipmem and manpower alone. A highly sianding." His abilities were noticed and soon trained professional group oí oííicers was re- he was selecied lo auend lhe Military Academy quired lo recommend ihe weapon sysiems oí the General Staíf. This seleclion was a sure needed and lo help formulale lhe military doc- indication that he was being considered íor trine and strategy that have placed Soviei mili- even higher advancemenl. Oííicers, generally tary power and presence from Central America colonels in rank, come írom all the Soviei Serv- lo the Indian Ocean. These oííicers were edu- 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEIV

cated and trained in a professional military remain in the reserves, subject tocall-upatany school system that is more than double that of time, until they reach age fifty. Approximately any olher nation. three-quarters of a million officers are required Much is written in our pressabout thequan- to train and command this constantly chang- tity and quality of Soviet weapons, and com- ing military force. parisons are made with those of ourown. Some To provide lhe initial inputs into this mas- attention also is given to Soviet military organ- sive officer cadre, the Soviet Union has approx- ization and concepts and to numbers of mili- imately 135 "higher military schools,’’ which tary personnel. Less imerest is paid to lhe So- serve the same purpose as the three U.S. acade- viet officer corps. mies at West Point, Colorado Springs, and An- Some indication of a nation’s scientific and napolis. Graduates are commissioned as offi- technical capability can be determined by an cers and at the same time receive a "higher examination of its educational establishment, education” degree. in particular its universilies. In like manner, an For additional professional education and indication of thecompetenceof an officer corps training of officers, thereare seventeen military can be gained by examining the schools in academies. These stand somewhere between which they obtain their professional education our command and staff colleges and vvar col- and training. The Soviet military school sys- leges, insofar as rank of students is concerned. tem that supports those officers is as importam A major difference is that the course length of to the Soviet military buildup as are the MiG- these academies is three years, with but few 29 Fulerums and the SS-25s. exceptions. At Zhukovskiy Military Air Fngi- neering Academy, the course length is five A Problem of Making Comparisons years. At Voroshilov General Staff Academy, the course is two years, but there is one catch. l he U.S. Air Force equates to far more than Before being accepted at this academy, the of- just the Soviet Air Forces. TheStrategic Rocket ficer first must have completed oneof the three- Forces, part of the Troops of Air Defense, and year academies. The course of study at the near- portionsof theTroopsof the Tyl (Rear Services), est U.S. counterpart schools is one academic Building and Construction Troops, Chemical year. Defense Troops, Signal Troops, and Fngineer- In addition to these seventeen academies, ing Troops must also beconsidered. Any exam- there are numerous olher training facilities for ination of the Soviet officer counterpartsof the officers. At some, the course length is twelve USAF officer must take these Soviet Services months. and troops into account. There are other differences. The Soviet Armed Soviet Youth and Military Training Forces are a cadre force in which a large A nation’s officers are products of the social number of professional officers—supported by order. In a nation where military might is nota a lesser number of warrant officers and ex- major issue, the armed forces receive little at- tended-duty sergeants—prepare the manpower tention. This is not the case in lhe Soviet Union. of the nation for military dulies through com- There are few days when Soviet television does pulsory military Service. Fvery six months be- not show scenes from the Great Patriotic War. tween 800.000 to 900,000 eighteen-year-old From early childhood, Soviet youth are taught youths report for military Service and two years the glories of the Soviet Armed Forces. As Pio- later (or three years later, if sailors) are "dis- neers, the nationwide organization of youth tharged into the reserves," each receivinga new ages eight to fifteen, both boys and girls receive uniform as he returns to his home. They will rudimentary military training. In thesummer, RME IN THE SOI’IET AIR FORCE 19

beiween twelveand sixteen million Soviei Pio- nation only for one specific school. Auihorities neers participate in Zarnitsa, lheir major mil- woukl like to have a minimum of iwo servit e- itary-spori game.- Pari of lhe game requires men, or four civilians, compele for each va- wearing gas masks while Crossing “contami- cancy. For youlh on active military duty, troop naied" areas. l he Komsomol (Young Com- cadre agencies selecl candidates lo lake the ex- munisi League) sponsors another game, amination. For civilian youlh, lhe local mili- Orlenok, for boys and girls ages fifleen to sev- lary commissariat makes lhe initial selection, enteen.* This is a more advanced exercise, wilh a selection committee making the final which fealures small-arms firing and civil de- choice. fense work. Four toeight million vouih partic- Special preparatory iraining is recommended ipate in ihis game each year. for ihose taking the entrance examinaiions. From ages fifteen 10 sevemeen, young people For ihose on active miliiary dmy, special are required 10 lake 140 hours of “beginning classes of study are held ai officers' i lubs (dom miliiary iraining,” which covers basically the ofitserov). This facility also is open lo civilian same areas thai a U.S. recruii receives in lhe youlh in lhe viciniiy. For those living near a firsi few weeks afier induction. Males also are higher military school, special iwo-year “pa- supposed 10 aiiend two periods of suminer iriotic courses” are condiu ted to assist those camp. Ai age sevemeen, males are given an preparing to lake the examinaiions. The Oren- additional year of "specialisi” iraining by DO- burg sc hool, for example, ran a ‘‘Young Cos- SAAF. Someiimes this is as simple as driver’s monauis” program for boys to persuade them education bui may go as far as soloing in a lo become officers. irainer aircrafi. While this iraining is spoity, Officers in the U.S. Air Force come from a all male youlh have received some miliiary variety of sources: the Air Force Academy, iraining by lhe time lhey reach eiglueen years ROTC, OTS. and living schools. The Soviei of age. officer counterparts come primarily from lhe Rornsomol organizations and other groups Soviei higher military school system. Full in the Soviei rnionarecharged wilh identifying idemification ol the schools may give a beiter youlh who show an apiiiude for miliiary Ser- appreciation ol the scale of officer education vice and encouraging them to seek eniry into and iraining lhan merely listing lhenumberof one of the Soviei miliiary or higher miliiary schools in lhe various categories. Soviei ap- schools, roughly the counterparts of the U.S. proximate equivalenis of the U.S. Air Force miliiary academies. Academy are Strategic Roc ket Forces, Soviei Air Forces, atui Troops of Ait Defense. Sira- The Higher Military Schools tegic Rockei Forces has four higher military schools. (See Table 1.) In the U.S. Air Force, The higher military schools accepi civilians those Air Force Academy graduaies who elect and servicemen beiween ages sevemeen and to become pilots may atlend one of lhe six Air iweniy, exiended duly servicemen lo age twen- E'orce flying schools. In lhe Soviei Union, ihir- ty-ihree and warrant officers to age twenty- teen flying iraining sc hools (listed in I able II) fived Certain of lhe higher military engineer- under ihe administraiive control of the Air ing schools accepi officers for special courses. Forces provide pilois for boili lhe Air Forces, Civilian applicams for lhese schools musi have Navy, and possibly for a few pilots for lhe completed lheir secondary (eleven-year) educa- Troops of Air Defense as well. Course length at tion. Entrance is by competitive examination, lhese sc hools is four years. Soviei navigatorsare wiih a few exceptions. iraining in two schools. (See Table III.) The Applicams are permitied lo lake the exami- Air Forces have seven higher military avialion- 20 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW engineer schools, all with five-year courses. Navigators (named for Marshal of Aviation V. (See Table IV.) There is an Air Forces signals A. Sudets). school. (See Table V.) There are seven Air For- Radioelectronic sc hools of the Troops of Air ces mililary lechnical schools, vvhich are only Defense (listed in Table VII) have six higher three years in lengih. (SeeTable VI.) Graduaies mililary schools for "Zenith Rockets" (ground- are commissioned as aviation-technical oífi- to-air missiles), plus another five schools which rers and are avvarded a diploma, not a degree. were transferred from troops air defense of the Prior to 1981, the Troops oí Air Defense had Ground Forces in 1981. TheCherepovets Higher three flying training schools. I'wo of these Military Engineering School for Radioelec- uere transferred to the Air Forces. The one tronics and Kiev Higher Engineering Radio- remaining flying school for PVO is StavropoF technical School of Air Defense have five-year Higher Mililary AviationSchool for Pilotsand courses.

Table I. Strateglc Rocket Forces — Named for Lenin's Komsomol

Khar'kov Higher Military Command and Engineering Kacha Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for A. E. Myasnikov School of the Rocket Troops — Named for Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov Khar'kov Higher Military Aviation Schools for Pilots — Named for S. I. Gritsevets Perm’ Higher Military Command and Engineering School or the Rocket Troops — Named for Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov Orenburg Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for I. S. Polbin Rostov Higher Military Command and Engineering Saratov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots School of the Rocket Troops — Named for Chief Marshal of the Artillery M. I. Nedelin Syzran' Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for Sixtieth Anniversary of the U.S.S.R. Serpukhov Higher Military Command and Engi- neering School of the Rocket Troops — Named for Lenin's Komsomol Tambov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for M. M. Raskova

Yeysk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for Cosmonaut V. M. Komarov Table II. Soviet Air Forces Ufa Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots Armavir Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov

Balashov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots — Named for Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov Table III. Soviet Higher Military Schools Barnaul Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots for Navigators — Named for Chief Marshal of Aviation K. A. Vershinin Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation School for Navigators Pilots — Named for the Fiftieth Jubilee of the Komsomol — Named for V. P. Chkalov Voroshilovgrad Higher Military Aviation School for Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots Navigators PME IN THE SO li ET AIR FORCE 21

The Military Academies student put in more than 2000 hours of prepa- ratory work, which would be in addition to In order to auain the rank of colonel or normal duiies! higher. a Soviet officer musi first atiend lhe Officers graduating from a higher military appropriate Service or branch academy. (Those school withagold medal may beadmitted toan officers who are to make general or marshal academy by passing only one examinalion later must atiend the Academy oí the General with a ‘'good“ mark. Commanders of units Staff.) Since entrance to these academies is that have been given "good" or ‘■excellem,‘ primarily by competitive examinalion. the of- ratings may be selected by merely passing lhe ficer should begin studying for the examina- entrance examinalion. These modifications lo tions after only three to four years Service. Sên- the competitive examinalion process give a se- ior officers recommend that the prospeclive lection board considerable leeway.

Table IV. Soviet Air Forces Higher Military — Named for the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Komsomol Aviation-Engineer Schools Kaliningrad Military Aviation-Technical School Daugavpils Higher Military Aviation Engineering Kirov Military Aviation-Technical School School — Named for Yan Fabntsius Perm' Military Aviation-Technical School — Named for Lenin's Komsomol Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School — Named for the Fiftieth Jubilee of the Komsomol VasiTkov Military Aviation-Technical School — Named for the Fiftieth Jubilee of Lenin's Komsomol Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School Lomonosov Military Aviation-Technical School Khar'kov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School Table VII. Soviet Higher Military Schools Riga Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (Troops of Air Defense) — Named for Ya Alksnis Krasnoyarsk Higher Command School of Radio- Tambov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School electronics for Air Defense — Named for F E. Dzerzhmskiy Vifnius Higher Command School of Radioelec- Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering tronics for Air Defense School Pushkin Higher School of Radioelectronics for Air Defense Table V. Soviet Air Forces Slgnals School Zhitomir Higher School of Radioelectronics for Air Khar kov Higher Military Aviation School of Radio- Defense electromcs — Named for Lenins Komsomol — Named for Lenm s Komsomol of the Ukraine Cherepovets Higher Military Engineering School of Radioelectronics Table VI. Soviet Air Forces Military Technical Schools Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical School of Air Defense Achinsk Military Aviator-Technical School — Named for Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin 22 AIR UNtVERSITY REIIEW

Kxaminations are both written and oral. but preparalion of "command cadres of various all are in the Russian language. This makes ii aviation specialties and is a scientific centerfor more difficult íor an officer from a non-Slavic working out problems of operational art of the group, whose native language is noi Russian, Air Forces and tactics of branches and types of to gain admittance. At the Gagarin Military aviation.”6 Partof the course involves develop- Air Academy, written entry examinations are ing new techniques in the operational use of required íor Russian language and literature, the aircraft. with oral tests for mathematics and physics.’ The Gagarin Military Air Academy boasts Three tries for lhe entrance examinations are that more than 70 percent of academy graduates permitted. Reserve officers who have volun- are distinguished pilots of the U.S.S.R. and teered to become regular officers or who have distinguished navigators of the U.S.S.R. This had two or ihree years of active duty have the academy has played a major role in the devel- same rights as regular officers to take the opment of the Soviet Air Forces. In the 1960s, examination. vvhen the "third generation”7 of Soviet aircraft As USAF officers may receive credit for cer- first appeared, the academy was directed to tain schools by correspondence, Soviet officers study how the new equipment could best be may do the same fora military academy (except utilized. Basic air tactics, combined with the the Academy of the General Staff). Once per- theories of combat effectiveness and decision- mission is given to take the correspondence making, were made a separate discipline. Spe- course, the officer must be freed of after-hour ciali/ed studies were made of tactics for each duties in order to study. He is also authorized type of aircraft. In addition to providing the time ofí from regular duties to prepare for and basic three-year course for Soviet officers, the to take the required examination. academy also offers courses to prepare the It is expected that an officer seeking admis- teaching staffs of the various higher military sion toanacademy will beeitheram em berora aviation schools. Faculty members also write candidate member of the Communist Party. A many of the textbooks used throughout the pari of a Soviet officer’s effectiveness report is Soviet Air Forces.8 made by the unit’s political officer. Due atten- Much attention is given to correspondence tion to party affairs is one of the points noted. courses. This program is exactly the same as for Ihere are many assignments throughout the full-time students. One-third of the study time Soviet Armed Forces that can only be filled by must be spent at the academy at special sessions academy graduates. It is unlikely that an indi- while the other two-lhirds is done independ- vidual wilhout party credentials vvould be ently vvherever the officers are servi ng.9 This permitted to assume these nomenklatura posi- means that even for officers taking the course lions, that'is, positions on a special list, subject by correspondence, at least one year must be to party approval. spent at the academy. Soviet officers insist that, The academy attended will depend on the for career and promolioti purposes, complet- officer’s branch and service. The approximate ing the academy by correspondence counts as Soviet counterparts of the United States’ Air much as beinga full-time student. Thepresent War College and other courses of the Air Uni- head of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal of Avia- versity are the follovving. tion A. N. Yefimov, completed lhe course in The Gagarin Military Air Academy is lo- this manner. cated at Monino. northeast of Moscow, in an On the instructional staff of the Gagarin area closed to foreigners. Almost all the sênior Military Air Academy are 13 doctorsof science. officers in the Soviet Air Forces will have at- 233 candidates of science (a degree somewhat tended this academy. It is charged with the higher than the master’s degree in the United PME IN THI- SOITET AIR FORCE 23

States). 10 professors, and 170associate profes- approximate equivalents of Air University sors and sênior researchers. (The total would components. It is reasonable to assume that only be about 250 since most professors are many of the conditions at the other academies, doctors of Science and most associate professors such as award of advance degrees, are the saine. are candidates of Science). Its library has more The Zhukovskiy Military Air Engineering than 500,000 books. The academy is qualified to Academy is located in Moscow, on Leningrad award boih the advanced degree of candidate of Prospekt immedialely across from Central Air- Sciences and doctor of Sciences.10 (This degree field. Course length is five years. In addition to has no exact equivalem in the United States. being an institution of higher learning, it also Individuais receiving it are required to be a is a scientific center for working out problems recognized authority in their field and to have in the areas of aviation technology, its techni- defended a dissertation.) cal exploitation, and combat utilization. The academy is a leading scientific center of The Zhukov Military Command Academy of the Soviet Air Forces. Air Defense is located on the banks of the Volga Not a single problem, not a single complex River in Kalinin, a city between Moscow and theme connec ted with lhe combat use of aviation Leningrad. In addition to its educational and is decided without lhe active participation of the training tasks, this academy is a research center scientific strength of lhe academy. In most cases, itactsas the leading performerof complex research for studying problems of operational art and in the sphere of tactics and operational art of the tactics, as well as command, Communications, Air Forces." and control (C') on air defense matters. Research tasks are assigned by the Minister The Govorov Military Engineering-Radio- of Defense, the General Staff, the CINC Air technical Academy of Air Defense is located in Forces, or the Main Staff of the Air Forces. Khar’kov. As any tourist to the Soviet Union Joint research isconducted with theZhukovskiy can note, the nation appears blanketed with Military Air Engineering Academy, the Voro- radars and Communications facilities. This shilov Military Academy of the General Staff, academy prepares officers of the Troops of Air the Zhukov Air Defense Academy, the Frunze Defense in these twro areas. Faculty members Military Academy, the Malinovskiv Tank engage in research, and their technical publica- Academy, and similar bodies. Between 1975 tions are known throughout the Soviet Union. and 1980, “ the G agarin Academy participated The Dzerzhinskiy Rocket Forces Academy is in more than fifty scientific conferences and located next to the Rossiya Hotel on the em- about sixty exercises.”12 bankment near the Kremlin. Formerly the Ar- During the summer months, both faculty tillery Academy of the Red Army, it was moved members and students go to the field to partici- from Leningrad to Moscow in 1958, the year pate in maneuvers and exercises. Rated per- before the Strategic Rocket Forces were formed. sonnel are assigned on temporary duty to fly- Officers in command positions in the Strategic ing units or flying schools. Rocket Forces would seek admission to this The present head of the academy, Marshal of academy. All information about this academy Aviation N. M. Skomorokhov, graduated from is highly classified. Its two major faculties are the Academy of the General Staff with a gold “command" and “engineering." medal, earned the degree of doctor of military A rigorous schedule is maintained at all the Science, was an ace in World War II (forty-six academies. Classes start at 0800 and continue kills), and was twice awarded the gold star of until 1400. A two-hour lunchtime follows, but “Hero of the Soviet Union." there is little time for relaxation or study. Of- More information is available on the Ga- ficers eat in a cafeteria where they stand in long garin Military Air Academy than on the other lines. At 1600 students return to classrooms. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Leciure notes musi be emered imo notebooks, but also through war games and exercises on andpracticallyall material isconsideredclassi- maps to which is given more than one-third of lied. At 2000 they leave classrooms. During the their time. Nearly half their time remains for summer months they. together wilh their in- independem work. structors, take pari in field exercises and The armed forces of “capitalist" nations re- maneuvers. ceive considerable attention. At least one gen- All of the academies at th is levei are three eral officer lectures on this subject. Graduates years, except íor the Zhukovskiy Military Air go into nomenklatura slots that can be filled Engineering Academy, which is five years. only by those who have completed the Voro- Many officers enter in the grade of captain and shilov Academy. Generais and admirais may are majors when they graduate. return to the academy for refresher courses, Al ter completing the academy. officers later some of which last one year. may attend the ‘‘Higher Courses for Air Forces The Soviet military academies are much Officers" or the ‘‘Central Radiotechnical Of- more than institutions of higher learning. ficers' Courses of Troops of Air Defense.’’ They also are the Soviet military think tanks These courses are usually for one year. There and research centers. They do the type of re- probablv are classified higher courses for offi- search and studies for the Ministry of Defense cers in the Strategic Rocket Forces. that the Pentagon would contract out to re- The Voroshilov Academy of the General search institutes such as Rand, the Hudson Staff is located in Moscovv, on KhoFzunova Institute, or one of the dozens of other groups. Pereulok, Dom 14. not far from lhe Frunze The importance of the academies can be seen Mi li tar y Academy. The ‘' best and the brigh test’ ’ by the rank and prestige of their personnel. By officers of all the Soviet Armed Forces are se- Soviet law, heads of the academies are of the lected to attend this sênior and most presti- same rank as commanders of military districts. giousofall the Soviet academies. Most are colo- Their promotions appear j ust as frequent. The nels or newly promoted generais. Officers se- most importam academies are headed by mar- lected for this academy first will have attended shals, admiralsof the fleet, or four-star "generais the appropriate Service or branch academy. of thearmy." Regulationsstipulate thatdepart- Graduates who are not already generais or ad- ment heads at the military academies are equiv- mirais usually are promoted to this rank a short alem to division commanders, and they are pro- timeafter completing thecourse. Length of the moted to the appropriate rank. academy is only tvvo years, in contrast to the More than seventy generais, admirais, and three years for the branch and Service academies. marshals have been identified as serving at the Three of the primary kajedras (departments) Academy of lhe General Staff at one time, are the kafedra of strategy, kafedra of opera- which comes directly under the General Staff. lional art, and kafedra of history of wars and More than thirty generais have been on the military art.15 All three are headed by general faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. Num- lieutenants. Faculty members may be of one- bers of generais and marshals at the Gagarin star rank. Before admittance to this academy, it Air Academy are unknown, but in all probabil- is expected that the students will have a sound ily they are in excessof what might be expected. basis of military history, to include the writ- Soviet strategists may serve for years at one ings of strategists such as Clausewitz and Su- academy. For example, many of the coniribu- vorov. Students receive operational-strategic tors to Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy s Military training by studying strategic actions in theaters Strategy were on the General Staff or lhe fa- of military actions (TYDs), not just in theory culty of the Academy of the General Staff. The (about one-sixth of the time is given to leclures) first edition of this work appeared in 1962 and PME IN THE SOTIET Al li FORCt 25

the third in 1968.14Thecontributors listed were The connection of the chiefs of the Soviet the same, except for one who haddied. In 1966, cosmonaut program to the Gagarin Military the Tactics, written by faculty members of the Air Academy and the CINC, Soviet Air Forces, Frunze Military Academy. appeared as one oí should warrant serious study in the United the "Officers' Library” series of books. A sec- States. ond edition of this same work appeared in 198-4. At least fifteenof the Soviet cosmonauts have eighteen years later, also in another ' Officers’ completed the Gagarin Military Air Academy.17 Library" series, written by the same authors, all Some have completed the course by correspon- of whom were still at Frunze. dence, buteven ihismethodrequiredai least one General David Jones, former Chief of Staff. year "in-house” attendance. Military strategists USAF, and later Chairman of the Joint Chieis and tacticians, both faculty and students, can of Staff, stated that "if Clausewitz were alive work with the cosmonauts studying the role of today and living in the United States, he would man in military spacecraft. have retired as a colonel and then would have Another thirteen cosmonauts have attended gone to work in a think tank."15 The system is the five-year Zhukovskiy Military Air Engi- very different in the Soviet Armed Forces. In the neering Academy. The cosmonauts taking this Soviet Union, a Clausewitz would be a general course could be expected to work with scien- or marshal, serving either in the General Staff tists and engineers for the "military utiliza- or as department head in one of the academies. tion" of manned spacecraft as well. Practically all of the significam Soviet books Lieutenant General Richard C. Henry, a and articles on military matters are written by previous commander of the USAF Space Divi- members of the Military Science Administra* sion, once stated that the best way to discover tion of the General Staff or by faculty members the military application of man in space is to of the military academies. place a manned space station in orbil. The Soviets have been doing precisely that for well Soviet Academies over a decade, keeping men in orbit for months and the Military Role of Space at a time. General Henry might haveadded that A photograph in the Soviet book, Toyenno- follow-on steps also would be necessary. The Vozdushnaya Akademiya imeni Yu. A. Gagar- experience gained in manned space flight would ina (the Military Air Academy named for Yu. need to be related to military requirements. A. Gagarin) demonstrated an ínteresting rela- Cosmonauts attending the three-year Gagarin tionship. In the front row were Marshal of Avi- Air Academy or the five-year Zhukovskiy Mili- ation I. N. Koshedub (a leading World War II tary Air Fngineering Academy are placed in the ace); Marshal of Aviation A. N. Yefimov, at ideal Soviet environment to do just that. that timedepuiy CINC Air Forces; Colonel V'. V. The Kremlin leadership attempts to con- Tereshkova, first femalecosmonaut; and Chief vince foreigners that their space program is Marshal of Aviation of the Soviet Air Forces P. S. "for peaceful purposes only," directed by the Kutakhov, CINC Air Forces, now deceased. In Academy of Sciences. Facts tell a different slory. the rear row were General Lieutenam of Avia- Approximately 80 percent of Soviet space tion G. T. Beregovoy, cosmonaut and chief of launches have been for military needs. Details the Gagarin Center for Cosmonaut Training; of this program are among the Kremlin’s most Marshal of Aviation N. M. Skomorokhov, closely guarded secrets. All evidence suggests Commandant, Gagarin Military Air Academy; that the military academies are playing their and cosmonaut General Lieutenant of Avia- traditional role in "working out problems of tion V. A. Shatalov, Director of Training of operational art and tactics" for the military use Soviet Cosmonauts.16 of space. At the Academy of the General Staff, it 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIFAV should be expected lhat lhey also have studied produced by Voyenizdat, the Ministry of De- the role of space in military strategy. fense Publishing House. Its purpose was for Soviet cosmonauts are an integral part of the the "self-study" of officers. Books in the series, Air Forces. All remain on active duty. 'I'hree are based on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, were general lieutenants of aviation (two stars), not objective in any sense. Nevertheless, as seven are general majors of aviation (one star), military textbooks for explaining a concept of and at least twenty-iwo are colonels. They are war, they were unmatched by anything written on a fast promotion track. by active-duty military officers in the United Much of the use of unmanned space vehicles States. Another ‘‘Officers’ Library” series was in a defense role may be worked out in two of introduced in 1980. the military academies of the Troops of Air Officers are expected to read the professional Defense. TheZhukov Military Command Acad- journals of their particular Service. For lhe Air emy of Air Defense is charged with ‘‘working Forces, this is Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (Avia- out recommendations for building a modern tion and Cosmonautics); for the Troops of Air air defense.” This includes antimissile and an- Defense Vestnik Protwovozdushnoi Oborony tispace defense. As a previous eommandant of (Heraldof Air Defense). Voyenno-lstoricheskü this academy, Marshal of Aviation Georgiy V. Zhurnal (Military History Journal) is read Zimin, doctor of military Science, noted in throughout the Soviet Armed Forces and is 1976: perhaps the best written of the military publi- Now viclory or defeat in war will depend on cations. Voyennaya Mysi (Military Thought) how well the State will be able to reliably protect is the restricted journal of the Soviet General importam objectives on theirown territory from Staff. destruction by strikes from the air and from out of In certain cases, active debates and differen- space.'* ces of opinion are permitted in Soviet military The Govorov Military Engineering Radio- journals, and at times may be encouraged. For technical Academy is a major think tank for example, in the 1960s, Voyennaya Mysl’ carried determtning types and locations of radars and an article by a general officer on the tactical use related means of identifying and tracking both of nuclear weapons. A number of readers dis- missiles and spacecraft. Glose ties are main- agreed with his conclusions and their views tained between the academy’s faculty and the were published. One of those dissenting was a Academy of Sciences. colonel. Voyenniy Vestnik (Military Herald), the Soviet Ground Forces’ journal, at times calls for different pointsof view and debates on Self-Study Requirements specified themes. However, it should be recog- The Soviets do not have the up-or-out system nized that no open debates or differences of for officers. A captain, for example, may re- opinion are permitted on matters such as mili- main in lhat grade until age forty. But those tary doctrine, which is determined by the party who do get to the top are expected to have a leadership, or on military strategy. which is sound understanding of military fundamen- common to all of the Soviet Services. tais, from military strategy to tactics. Much of this is learned in the classroom. At the same The Unknown Equation time, the officer will not likely reach the class- room unless he has taken advantage of the In the United States, the focus is on weapon available professional military journals and systems. In comparison to the leadership of the books. Soviet Armed Forces, the Pentagon pays littlt In the 1960s an "Officers’ Library" series was attention to the professional military educa PME IN TIIE SOVIET AIR FORCE 27

tion and training of its officers. Emphasis at In the 1930s, much of the “ thinking” in the our military academies is on Science and engi- Army Air Corps was done at the Air Tactical neering. Only lip Service is given to teaching School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. There was military history. strategy. operational art, and some effort in the postwar period to revive this related military subjects. For further academic practice. Instead, however, civilian instituies training, officers are sem to civilian universi- w-ere established to chart the future develop- ties to study subjects ranging from business ment of the Air Force, to include matters of management to nuclear physics. VVhen na- strategy and force development. Alumni of the tional security issues are studied, the professors ‘‘think tanks" now occupy many of the mili- are most likely to be individuais whose knowl- tary decisionmaking posilions in the Pentagon edge of war is purely theoretical. and throughout the U.S. govemment. Even if the study of war vvere the primary In the Soviet Armed Forces, the purely mili- subject taught at the Air War College and the tary “thinking” is done by military personnel. Air Command and Staff College, only a bare Their professional military education has not startcould be made. One year simply is insuffi- made all their officers military geniuses. But cient for the topics that need to be covered. At Soviet colonels will have received a minimum present, military subjects must compete with a of three years in a branch or service academy variety of other courses, from personal finances and Soviet generais and sênior colonels an- to community relations. other two years at the Academy of the General On occasion. efforts are made to make the Staff. This education, with its emphasis on I .S. warcollegesascentersof military thought Marxism-Leninism, may leave much to be de- and to develop new military concepts. Some sired. However. it is this leadership that now progress has been achieved. The Army Com- Controls the world‘s largest military force. To mand and General Staff College at Fort Lea- judge their concepts and understandingof war, venworth, Kansas, now is experimenting with one need only read books such as Marshal So- a two-year course. In general, however, within kolovskiy’s Military Strategy, General Colonel the C.S. Armed Forces, serious top-level sup- Reznichenko’s Tactics, or some of the declassi- port is lacking for increased professional mili- fied editions of Military Thought, the official tary education of officers or for use of the war journal of lhe Soviet General Staff. colleges as military intellectual centers. In an effort to prevení the Soviet Union from Should studies be needed on matters of mili- achieving a position of military superiority, tary strategy or operational art, the civilian within the past few years the United States has hierarchy in the Pentagon would most likely spent hundreds of billions of dollars on new go to a “think tank” or perhaps to some ci- weapon systems. While these systemsare neces- vilian considered by them to bea military strate- sary, a primary aspect of the danger is being gist. As General Jones implied, there is little overlooked. The Soviet Union not only is requiremem within the U.S. military Services building up its weapon stockpiles, it also is for an officer interested in military concepts paying increased attention to the professional such as strategy. education and training of its officer corps. Ironically, the individuais in the United Courses are being lengthened, and the study of States today most qualified and concerned with war continues to be emphasized. The United military strategy may be such persons as Sena- States has not given equivalem attention to its tors John Warner and Sam Nunn, key staff military leadership. members on committees such as the Armed Forces Committee, and members of groups T hf.sk differeiues in professional education such as the Committee on the Present Danger. between U.S. officers and their Soviet counter- 28 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

parts should be of concern. In the final analy- m ilitary balance between the tvvo nations. sis, ihis could be the determining factor in the McLean, Virgínia

Notes 1. "In lhe Hour of Trial," Kratnaya /.vezda, 7 June 1986, p. 3. 9. Ibid., p. 173. 2. Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 June 1983. Also see Sovetskaya Voyennaya 10. Ibid., p. 178. F.ntúklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), vol. 3 (Moscow: 11. Ibid., p. 176. Voyenizdat, 1977). p. 109. 12. Ibid., p. 177. 3. Ihid., vol. 6. 1978, p. 115. Also see. t.. Pesierev. "It Is Not a 13. Gompilcd from V. G. Kulikov, editor. Akadfttuya General'- Vaeation in 'Orlenok'." l'uyennyyr Znatiiya #4, April 1975. noffo Shlaba (Aeademy of the General Slaíí) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1. I. A. Kainkovand V. M. Konoplyanik. l'oyennyye Akademu i 1976). l ’t hilishcha (Military Academies and Schools)(Moscow: Voyeniz- 14. See V. D. Sokolovskiy, editor, Soviet Military Stralegy. third dat, 1972), p. 16. edilion. with eominemary by Harriet Kast Scolt (New York: Grane, 5. A. G. Gornyy, etlilor, Spravot hntk po 7.akonodatel'slvu Dlya Kussak and Company, 1975), pp. xxiv-vii. Ofilserov Sovetskoy Armn i Flola (Handbook on Legislation for 15. Told by General David Jonesduringa reception hosted by Air Oíficersof the Soviet Armyand Navy) (Moscow: Voyenirdal, 1976), Force magazine on 2 Mareh 1982. p. 205. 16. N. M. Skomorokhov, p. 128. (Note: Pages containing photo- 6. N. M Skomorokhov, " l he Military Air Aeademy Named for graphs are not numbered. The photograph referenced is on lhe Yu. A. Gagarin," Sovelskaya Voyennaya h.nlstklopfdiya, vol. 2, p. page following p. 128.) 199. Emphasis added. 17. Gompiled from Avialsiya i Kosmonavtika (Aviation and 7. N. M. Skomorokhov, l'oyenno-1'ozduxhnaya Akadrmiya Gosmonautics), Mareh 1985, pp. 42-43, f 'oyenno-1'ozda.shnaya imrm Vu. A. Gagarma ( The Military Air Aeademy named for Yu. Akademiya imeni Yu. A. Gaganna and other files. A. G agarin)(M oscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), p. 161. 18. G. V. Zim in. Razvitiye Protivovozdushnoy Oborony (Devel- 8. Ibid.. p. 170. opment of Aniiair Defense) (Moscow: Voyenizilal, 1976), p. 191. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF SECURITY reflections onKAL flight

Dr . D avid R. J onks

N an era of rapidly moving events and be fired on without warning.” Nonetheless, the joumalisiic sensationalism, lhe furor roused Soviet air defense (PVO) authorities’ response— Iby lhe downing of Korean Air Lines (KAL) all 269 aboard perished—struck non-Soviet ob- Flight 007 on 1 September 1983 has largely servers as grossly brutal. dissipated. Many questionsremain withoutde- Some, of course, see this incidem—dubbed finitive answers. Perhaps lhe most obvious is "the Korean airline massacre” by an angry how lhe Korean airliner wandered so far off Presidem Reagan—as fitting well into the course. This quesiion is particularly perplex- pattern of behavior expected from the “empire ing when one recalls thai the same airline had of evil." For them the PVO’s behavior—like already violaied Soviei airspace in 1978 over the the Soviets’ invasion of Hungary, Czechoslo- Kola Península—again with disasirous resulis— vakia, and Afghanistan—was a typical act of “a and ihat the region over which Korean Air dispassionate, pragmatic, and cold-blooded Lines 007 now had strayed is marked clearly on superpower thai does not shrink ai any action navigation charts with the warning: “Aircraft thai would serve its political goals," regardless infringing upon nonfree flying territory may of cosí or adverse publicity.1 Even so, a number 30 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEW

of considerations make this judgment less lhan strict adherence to operational procedures in- compelling. troducedafter that 1978 incident. Although the In particular, lhe furor over KAL 007 dealt a local command undoubtedly kept the PVOs disastrous blow to Moscow’s “peace offensive” central headquarters in Moscow informed of and badly damaged efforts to forestall the de- their activities, it is almost certain that Ogar- ployment of new American missiles in Furope kov was truthful in ascribing the decision to by influencing Western European opinion. "slop" the flight to that local authority, pre- Further, the Kremlin’s initial eonfusion about sumably the PVO headquarters of the recently both the details of the action and the proper reestablished (1978) Far Fastern Command. response to Western charges suggested that the Apart from the standing procedures, the will- action did not result from any well-thought-out, ingnessof lhe local authorities toact decisively cold-blooded decision on the part of political probably was heightened by the unfortunate decisionmakers. There were other signs indi- coincidence of KAL 007’s intrusion with a So- cating that the Soviet leadership was less lhan viet IGBM test, and the fact that it took place happy with the vvay their military had handled over the strategically sensitive Sea of Okhotsk, lhe unanned Korean intruder. These included the intended wartime sanctuary for the Pacific rumors of a shake-up of the Far Fastern PVO Fleet’s ballistic missilesubmarines. Asa result, command, theadmission by Soviet delegates to the unwillingness of the Soviets to abandon a conference in Fdinburgh, Scotland, that the their version of events in part may have re- decision had been an error, and in January flected an attempt to protect the PVO's morale 1984, a veiled criticism of the procedures that and effective ‘‘combat readiness.”' followedon theprevious 1 September appeared To most Western readers, who until recently in theofficial journal/íj'ffl/.mí2 iKosmonavtika.2 paid little attention to the problemsof an active If many could not accept the extreme view of air defense, this last consideration may seem Soviet wickedness, lhey found Moscow’s "ex- somewhat unlikely. Yet such a conclusion planations” and countercharges even less con- would ignore the Soviets' frequent and re- vincing. Having reluctantly admitteddowning peated public exhortations that the Armed the airliner, the Soviet authorities ai first de- Forces in general and the Air Defense Troops nounced its intrusion as a deliberate American in particular rnust be ever ready to repel an provocation, and then labeled it as part of an aggressor. W riting in 1978, Marshal P. F. Ba- elaborate spy mission. These themes emerged titskii—then the PVO Commander-in-Chief— in thestatementsof such sênior Soviet military boasted that "in peacetime the National Air figures as the Chief of the PVO’s Main Staff, Defense Troops vigilantly and reliably pre- the late Colonel General S. F. Romanov, Mar- serve the security (bezopasnost’) of the home- shal of Aviation P. Kirsanovand, most notably, land of October and of thepeaceful labor of the the then-Ghief of lhe Armed Forces General Soviet people." He closed by insisting that his Staff Marshal N. V. Ogarkov.' But despitecon- Service "demonstrates thesteady fidelity" to the siderable technical elaboration, the Soviet sold- "sacred duty” allocated the Armed Forces by iers' arguments won few converts. Indeed, the the BrezhnevConstitution; that is, the duty "to very expenditure of so much technical compe- provide a reliable defense of the socialist Fa- tence in support of an apparent fabrication therland, and to be in a continuous State of only further damaged Soviet credibility. combat readiness that guarantees the imme- In retrospect, it seems clear that the PVO diate repulse of any aggressor.’"1 controllers did believe that they were tracking Behind these vague exhortations for "com- an American reconnaissance aircraft, and that bat readiness" lies a mentality that is even less the downing of Flight 007 resulted from their understood by most non-Soviets. It emerges REFLECTIONS ON KAL FLIGHT 007 31

clearly from a story by Ivan Chernykh. which own successful destruction of one such spy. appeared in 1973—iheera oí growingdétenie— However, it should be pointed out that this in lhe “Biblioteka yunogo patriota,” a series tale, along with the more theoretical justifica- devoied to stories "on lhe Homeland, on deeds, tions for the need for readiness. highlights an- and on honor." Published by lhe Minisiry of other theme of the Soviets’ response to Western Deíense in a printing of 65.000 copies. Cher- charges during the KAL affair. In discussions nvkh s book described "our military flyers and with Secretary of State George P. Shultz in lheir heroic and completely romaniic profes- Madrid on 8 September 1983, Foreign Minister sion." But his was not anoiher tale of the years Gromyko also underlined the "sacred duty" of of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Ralher, as defending the IJ.S.S.R.s frontiers. And Ogar- the publisher's note stressed, it dealt with kov. when asked if such protection was worth events of the 1960s. Then the hero in the story. 269 deaths, answered similarly. "Protection of "theyoungofficer Boris Vegin," developed his the sacred, inviolable border of our country, skills in "the friendly combat family of an avia- and of our political system," the marshal said, tion regiment." The high point of his career "was worth to us many, many millions of comes when he then tests these skills at "the lives."8 Although some dismissed such state- decisive moment. when a foreign aircraft vio- ments as meaningless rhetoric, this is precisely lates our frontiers" and Vegin "demonstraies the language used in the "Law on the Border of in practice his readiness to defend the the USSR" of 24 November 1982. "T h e protec- Homeland."6 tion of the USSR State border." reads the Equally unfamiliar to Western readers is the preamble, "is a very importam, inalienable world tnhabited by Vegin and presumably by part of the deíense of the socialist fatherland. the pilot who downed KAL 007. It is one in The USSR state border is inviolable. Any at- which. allegedly, “unidentified reconnaissance tempts to violate it are resolutely suppressed." aircraft cruise almost daily in the neutral zones Article27 gives responsibility for such suppres- over international waters along our frontiers.” sion to the Border Troops and PVO. while Equipped with the latest electronic equipment, Article 36 permits the "use of weapons and they "keep our military installations under ob- combat hardware . . . against violators of the servation from the frontier." But if they make USSR state border on land and wrater or in the especially close approaches to the Soviet border, air ... when lhe violation cannot be stopped or Chernykh s hero tells the reader, "they are met the violators detained by other means,”9 in the air by our interceptors.” On such occa- That these grim words are not mere rhetoric sions. the spy plane usually takes evasive action is clear from the fate of KAL 007 and its pas- and flies off. And then, he notes "we are forbid- sengers. However, the motives behind both the den to approach them to a distance in which law and the act are open to debate. In this on-board weapons can operate." The reason, regard, much has been said of the SovieVs al- our hero tells us, is that "on one occasion, leged paranóia. Such an explanation naturally when an interceptor from a neighboring aír- outrages extreme anti-Communists. They re- drome approached a spy plane, it fell into the ject the idea that the Soviets are particularly ocean. It was never recovered and the cause of suspicious or paranoid. Instead they argue that the pilot’s disaster remains unexplained. Pos- the Soviet Union is a tyranny, that tyrannies sibly the spy plane hit him, perhaps something are held together by fear, and that the Soviets else happened.”7 shot down the Korean airliner "to make other Fhere is no need to discuss at length the people afraid of them."10 Propotients of this debates between Vegin's fellowson how todeal view insist that such paranóia exists only in the with intruders or to recount the story of his minds of Western liberais who are unwilling to 32 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW face lhe realily of the Soviet Union. Such ideo- The Russian word therefore has a sense that logical flourishes need nol detain us, hui we perhaps is better expressed in English as "abso- should note ihai the paranóia theory is not lute security." It is, of course, virtually impos- solely the property of liberais. The Under Sec- sible for any nation to achieve this State in the retary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence international arena, bul the Russians have had Eagleburger, who is hardly knovvn for his le- a particularly difficult time in gaining even nient views of Soviet misbehavior, has ad- minimal leveis of "security." Ironically, the vanced it as vvell when he said: "There is this same geopolitical factors that created this sit- massive concern for security, there is massive uation naturally have increased a Soviet thirst paranóia, and I think this act was simply an for true security, to escape “out of harm’s way.” expression of those concerns, that excessive It is this State of affairs that explains lhe Rus- concern for security."11 sians' oft-cited "paranóia," and unfortunately In arguing that "the character of the Soviet Russian geography and history have given Union” partly explains the KAL incidem, Ea- them a good basis for such feelings. gleburger was merely reflecting one recent This view also assumes an essential conti- trend in Western strategic thought. A number nuity that bridges 1917 to make the Soviet U n - of st holars have stressed the importance of es- ion the direct heir of the czarist empire. Many, caping from ethnocentric constraints in our including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, have rejected assessments of other nations. They suggest that this notion and insisted that today's expan- differem countries have developed different sionist, despotic Communist State has little if "strategic cultures" to meet unique security any relationship to imperial Rússia.n In their problcms.and that in dealingwith these coun- opinion, the Soviet Union is more Marxist- tries, it is as vital to appreciate their percep- Leninist than it is Russian. In the security lions of their own needs as it is to define our sphere, however, Peter Vigor is quite correct in own.1’ Therefore. an examination of the Soviets’ maintaining that most initiatives and policies conception of security should providea context will not be adopted unless they please both the for better evaluating both the tragic end of "Soviet nationalists” and any "Marxist zea- Flight007 and their approaches to other issues. lots" who may remain on the Politburo.16 And, Korexample, in answeringquestionsabout the in retrospect, it seems inevitable that the Bol- Geneva arms negotiations, the late Defense sheviks’ initial "zealotry” would have been Minister I). F. Ustinov insisted that NATO transformed into a new nationalism with deep wants "us toagree toa direct weakeningof our roots in Russia’s past. After all, the Soviet security and lhe security of our allies."1' And State that emerged in theearly 1920s was merely even if this statement too isdismissedas postur- a truncated version of the empire Nicholas II ing, it rémains clear that serious negotiations had led into war in 1914, a fact that Stalin will have to consider just what security means tacitly acknowledged when he adopted the slo- to Ustinov and his colleagues. gan Socialism in One Country. As such, the young Soviet republic also inherited its prede- cessor’s geographical vulnerabilities, percep- w E should first note that bezo- tions of security or insecurity, and many of the pasnost'denotes somevvhat morethan theEng- policies adopted to deal with them.1' lish word security. For example, it can also My discussion here does not givea full exam- mean "safety," in the sense of "absence of ination of the geopolitical challenge that his- threat"; in a technical sense it translates as torically has faced Russian rulers. Suffice to "foolproof"; and the phrase v bezopasnosti say, they have had to overcome the problems means "in safety,” or "out of harm’s way."14 posed by poor Communications and the vast RFFLECTIONS ON KAL FLIGHT 007 83

expanses of lhe sieppe, and lhe lack of any also maintain that Russia’s wars have been easily defensible froniiers. In addition, lhe mainly offensive, expansionist, or imperialist miliiary advantages granted lo lhe sleppe in nature. Prominent among scholars making nomads by lhe "cavalry revolution” of lhe sev- this case have been the greai Polish historian enth ceniury B.C. meam ihai umil lhe mid- Oscar Halecki and, more recemly, Richard 1700s. Rússia faced a significam ihreal from Pipes. Halecki rejected any “claim lhat Rús- lhe Pontic Sleppe in lhe form of the Crimean sia^ expansion w-as nothing but a quest for Tatars. Meanwhile ihe siaie was consianily security." Rather, he saw it as being molivated threatened from lhe west by the Poles and Lith- by its rulers’ age-old belief that lhey were "des- uanians, iis rivais for control of the sleppe tined to rule the world as an universal em- frontier, as well as by lheTeutonic Knights, the pire.”21 For his pari, Pipes dismisses theories Swedes, andothers. Asa result, Russian hisiory based on "collective paranóia,” or on some has been one of almosí continuai conflict, often alleged “national” task of completing Russian in condiiions of a technological blockade im- unification with the caustic reminder that one posed by iis more advanced Western neighbors. does not become the world's largest state simply Thus most Western scholars incline lo Richard “by absorbingandrepelling invasions.” Rather, Hellie's judgmem thai lhe “basic continuous he points toa “relentless movement outwards" elements of Russian hisiory are the people. lhe driven by Rússia's scarce resources, economic Greai Russians. surrounded by real or im- poveriy, and rulers' ambitions.22 agined enemies in a couniry without suitable Since few ever happily accuse their own na- natural froniiers and withoui adequaie re- tion of outright aggression, Russian scholars— sources—maierial and human—for lheir own be lhey imperial or Soviet—naturally have in- defense.”18 clined toward a more defensive interpretation In ihis siiuation, ii is hardly surprising lo of their history. Fqually significam, apart from find that ofien Rússia has laken on the aspecí of Marxist-influenced revolutionaries before 1917, a garrison State. Furiher, many of its wars noi there has been surprisingly little diversity only have involved the majority of Russian among these civilians or military writers. And subjecis, lhey have been particularly bruial as since for our purposes, what is im portam is well and have demanded sacrifices and casual- Russian perceptions of the military pasl lhat ties unknown to most oiher European siaies have shaped their conceptions of security as lhat have managed to survive lhe vicissiiudes of well as military cullure developed to ensure it, hisiory. This reality most recemly was evident a brief review of these views is in order. in the some 20,000,000 casualties of the Greai Patrioiic War, 1941-45. More striking still is that in this struggle, the defense of the citv of w ITH regard to the nature and Leningrad alone cosí an estimated 1,650,000 place of wars in Russia's history, the presenta* soldiersandcivilians, a figure that hardly bears tion of S. M. Solov’ev is typical. Writing of the comparison with the 292,100 American mili- medieval period, he estimated that between tary dead of that same period.19 1055 and 1462 his nation suffered 245 ” at- Those arguing for the defensive nature of tacks,” 200 of which took place between 1240 Russia’s wars and the reality of Russian para- and 1426; that is, hardly a year passed without nóia quite rightly stress these íactors. However, an invasion or major raid of some kind.2' Or as others continue to insist that a “picture of the another historian of this period put it: “Each USSR dominated by anxieties of encirclemeni year one waited for an attack, spoke of w-ar.”2-' ... would appear to be of our own making.”20 Taking a longer view, imperial writers main- Many of those accepting this latter conclusion tained that from 1365 to 1893, their nation 34 AIR VNIVERSITY REV1EW waged war a total of 305 years, which includes a manner not unlike the respectable and patri- lhe Time of Troubles (1604-1613) when Mus- otic Solov’ev.29 covy nearly disintegrated.2' Ií one recalls the Since 1917 many émigré historians, both ci- intervention in China in 1900. the Russo-Jap- vilian and military, have continued the tradi- anese VVarof 1904-05, the years of World War I, lion of regarding old Rússia as essentially a Civil Warand ‘‘foreign intervention” (1914-21), defensive power.,0 More surprising is the fact the Manchurian-Soviet border incidents of that most Soviet writers have followed suit, 1929-39, the Finnish-Russian War (1939-40), both in works aimed at mass audiences and in and the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), the re- more scholarly studies. “Over the course of cord situe then is hardly more inspiring. many centuries,” wrote one local historian of In dealing with their conflicts, many impe- Russia’s north, “the Russian people havemain- rial writers. particularly those in the military, tained lhe integrity and independence of their tended tocast their interpretations in a heroic homeland in a desperate struggle with foreign mold. Even when expansion was admitted invaders.”'1 Oras a publication of the Ministry beyond the borders of the Great Russian heart- of Defense recently put it: "The processof put- land, it was justified in the besl traditions of ting the Russian state together went on indiffi- Yic torian Europe. The leading military theor- cult circumstances. The popular masses of Rus ist, G. A. Leer, for example, spoke of his na- had to wageconstant battle with foreign invad- tion’s dual "historie” political mission. This ers, and with weapons in hand defend the in- consisted of defending the rest of Europe from dependence of their native land."32 As for the Asiatií barbarism while simultaneously trans- record since 1917, Defense Minister Ustinov mitting European civilization to the less-devel- himself updated the Russians’ view of their oped Asiatics, tasks his nation undertook de- historical record in 1983 with the simple spite the hostility Rússia sooften encouniered statement: from its western neighbors. This mission, in The Soviet Union has never threatened and does Leer's view, explained why Rússia, since the not threaten anyone. By speculating on lhe "So- days of Peter the Great, had adopted a defensive viet threat” mylh, certain groups in the West are stance in the west and an offensive one in the trying to distracl people’s atiention avvay from east.26 Further, while the Russians' expansion the real military threat which is crealed by the in the latter direction was justified by their U.S. administration and a number oí its NATO allies." “civilizing" role, even their seemingly offen- sive struggles in Europe were waged because While such statements could be discounted "Russia’s mission is to be liberator of peo- as being intended for the general Soviet public, ples,”2' and especially Orthodox Christians the views of recognized Soviet scholars deserve living under Ottoman rule. In this same vein, more serious consideration. Thanks to their the Fleld Service Regulations of 27 April 1912, Marxist-Leninist ideological training, they reminded the czar's troops that ”a soldier is a cannot remain satisfied with such simplistic warrior of Christ and the Emperor, and that he expressions of patriotism. In analyzing impe- therefore musteonduet himself asa Christ-lov- rial Russian military policies at the end of the ing warrior.”28 And while such sentiments nineteenth century, for example, P. A. Zai- were to be expected from nationalists and mili- onchkovskii is careful to present a mosaic of tary men, their echo in a Socialist Revolution- motives. To this end, he takes "into account ary Party's ”people’s history," published in absolutism’s foreign policy goals, which were 1905, is more astonishing. Yet in spite of its not always in their nature purely defensive,” pronounced distaste for princes and czars, this and he admits that Russia’s preparations foi pamphlet chronicles Russia's defensive wars in war cannot be explained solelv by those of Eu- Kt.FLECTlONS ON KAL H.H.UT 007 35

rope’s other great powers.44 Eveu so, such ad- political ‘expansionism,’ and of a ‘continuity’ missions come only after he has outlined lhe between Soviet foreign policy and c/.ai ist Rús- mounting armamems programs of his coun- sia^ ‘old expansionist endeavors.’ " But he in- try’s possible opponenis, pariicularly that of sists that the wars of Peter I. Elizabeth. and Germany. A few yearsearlier L. G. Beskrovnyi, Catherine II have been ‘‘characterized by most another emineniSoviet military hisiorian, had bourgeois historians solely as predatory and aitempted to confront more direcily any appar- aggressive," only because these scholars "do ent internai coniradiction between the Marxist- not make the slightest effort tocarry through a Leninist view of old armies and a patrioiic dialecticalanalysisof these wars' social-polilical interpretation of Russia’s military heritage. He nature which would reveal their class essence first agreed with Lenin in seeing such an army and significante.’’57 In other words,even Marx- of an "exploiting” State as having as its first ism-Leninism can be a tool used to support a function the repression of the exploited, and view of Russia’s military past that in its essen- only as its second aim ‘the defense of this State tials differs little from that of Leer. from outside attacks or its own expansion ai The persistenceof this tradition in the Soviet the expense of neighboring lands." But when Union, as well as the wide circulation given it he turns to Rússia per se, his tone changes in both the scholarly and popular press, attests sharply. While he accepts that his nation's for- to its deep roots in the Russians' national ces of necessity reflected its general class struc- psyche. Inaddition, that discussion raises other ture. he nonetheless maintains that it waged points touching on their perceptions of na- war solely to repulse invaders who threatened tional security. In spite of Nekrasov’s anger, Russia’s political independence and national many Western scholars obviously are willing existence.51 to accept the validity of seeing, at least in pari, a In some ways Beskrovnyi and other Soviet large defensive element in Russian and Soviet scholars have brought the tradition of Russia’s policy. In this context, Tibor Szamuely once “defensive” conflicts to a new high. He. for pointed to the difficulties raisedby thefact that instance, tells readers that the "peoples of our Russia’s conflicts "do not come within lhe fa- country always have tried to live in peace with miliar categories of aggressive and defensive other peoples." That they have often fatled to wars. or fali into the snug pigeonholes of just do so. of course, is thanks to the aggression of and unjust wars. They can be called neither "foreignconquerors." Like his imperial prede- wars of territorial aggrandizement nor resist- cessors, he also maintains that Rússia fre- ance to aggression; neither colonial nor na- quently "saved the world [or Europe] from tional liberation wars; neither civil nor foreign barbarism and enslavement," to which headds wars; aimed neither at achieving unification a claim that his country never "entered battle nor at attaining natural frontiers.”18 Apart with pretentions to world dominance (gos- from this, almost all serious students oi Rússia podstvo)."ib Although these last statementsare admit that its history of cominuous conflicts intended for a mass, domestic audience, similar has left some mark on its society, and some claims have appeared in the more narrow stu- have even gone so far as to clear Rússia, or at dies of other scholars. Indeed, the hisiorian G. least Muscovy, of many charges of "imperial- A. Nekrasov even denies czarist imperialism ist" aggression.)9 In the conditions in which when he attacked the continuity thesis of Rus- the latter emerged, a "natural reaction to the sian expansionism. "As is well known.” he threats on all sides was to push the enemy wrote, "a basic position of foreign, reactionary farther and farther away" in the search for elu- htstoriography is the false thesis of Russia's sive security.40 Olhers have seen that state’s ex- age-old 'aggressiveness.' of its economic and pansion as being largely the result of a slow. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW gradual, and spontaneous process of peasant flict, combined with its "relative weakness and colonization, rather lhan of official policy.41 vulnerability," has convinced George Kennan Wiih regard to lhe laier Russian "threat" and that from the beginning, its rulers have been westward political expansion. one British concerned primarily with the "protection of scholar has argued thai it is “evident how very their own rule within Rússia and also the se- littleoutright combat with the Western powers curity of lhe Russian heartland."46 According had to do with Russia's territorial gains in to Dimitri K.. Simes, the same factorsexplain as Europe" in the 1700s. Noting that “Catherine’s well both a "preoccupation with security that realm pushed westwards vvithout resistance,” seems excessive to most foreigners,”47 and many he believes that many feared her empire "more aspects of military and political cultures deve- for what it rnight do lhan for vvhat it did"—a loped togain their aims. With regard toensur- comment not inapplicable to later periods as ing bezopasnost' in their sense, Russian rulers well.42 naturally would prefer an "absence of threat” In any case, even if one accepts that Russia's all along their far-flung frontiers. For this rea- expansion occurred largely through theassim- son, the Russian and Soviet leaders have as- ilation and military subjugation of often un- sumed “a need to remove from their immediate stable frontier regions, one can still accept that periphery any opposition that appears to be the frequent invasions launched by others left getting too strong.”48 More often than not, the C.reat Russians with deep-seated feelingsof however, such a solution is attended by un- suspicion and lack of security. On this basis, conscionable risks. The obvious alternative is for example, a British analyst recently con- to have on hand forces that are capable of deal- cluded that ‘‘insecurity and expansion were not ing with all probable foes simultaneously mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforc- along the state’s extensive borders. While this ing."H Another notes correctly that it "is very too usually remains the "impossible dream” of obvious, but often forgotten, that Russian fears Russian defense planners, it still explains their of the West... are far older and more deep-seated success in obtaining large budgetary alloca- lhan are Western fears of Rússia. Russians are tions. From 1815 to 1850, for example, an aver- more conscious of their own weaknesses than age of 37 to 47 percent of the state’s annual weare."44 More often than not, this conscious- expenditures went on the military and defense- ness (frequently allied to technological back- related items. Between 1862 and 1875, the fig- wardness) has been combined with an acute ure was 30 percent and although it subse- senseof hostile encirclement. In the 1200s, the quently fell to just over 20 percent, in 1909-10 it culprits were the Mongols, Teutonic Knights, rose again to a whopping 43 percent of both andSwedes; in the 1600s, the Poles and Turkish- regular and supplementary credits. In this supported Crimean Tatars; and in the 1920s, light, the 28 to 32 percent spent by the Soviets the Poles, British. French, and Japanese, who (according to the CIA) seems hardly as "un- in the late 1930s were replaced by a new coali- precedented” as some have claimed.49 tion of Nazi Germany and Japan. And while In calculating the balance of power, the So- the young Soviet State continually worried viets, like their czarist forebears, have sought about a "capitalist encirclement” that sought parity with other great or superpowers while to strangle the "Socialist Motherland,” Stalin simultaneously endeavoring to preserve a num- as its leader warned that "those who fali behind ber of interrelated regional balances. It is get beaten. . . . Old Russia's history is one within this context, for example. that we unbroken record of the beatings shesuffered for should view the deployment of SS-20s as re- falling behind, for her backwardness."4' placements for lhe aging SS-4s and SS-5s. Russia‘s almost continuous record of con- While strategic intercontinental ballistic mis- REFLF.CTIONS ON KAl. FUC.HT 007 37

siles counier the strategic threat, the SS-20 in- new grounds for insecurity arose to rob these lermediate-range ballisiic missiles—in Soviet gains of much of their value.” eyes—undoubiedly seemed needed to ensure parity with the nuclear assetsof China, France, THISanalysis is not meam to justify Moscow's Britain, and the forward-based theater Systems paranóia or Soviet policies. Rather, it argues of the United States. The same regional calcu- that stich paranóia is real, that it is based on a lations explain why today's Ground Forces are particular conception of security and history, deployed close to any future Central European and that lhe resulting “military culture" makes or Far Eastern battlegrounds. With an offen- certain responses to certain Western policies sive tactical and operational doctrine, they pre- probable. Some Soviet analysis—including sumably could move at a momenfs notice to Viktor Girshfeld—may bearguing for a system meet any threat. While these inassive deploy- of “sufficient defense” that would reduce the ments elicited fears in others, they have been military burden on the Soviet Union s lagging traditionally Russian since the 1500s. Then, economy. But as Girshfeld admits, the Soviet lhanks to distances and poor roads, large Mus- “generais are bound to insist that a certain covite forces were stationed continually along offensive capacity for counterattack be re- the Southern frontier to block Tatar inroads. In tained,"" a capability which undoubiedly Central Europe, the same factors have led to the would still be threatening to neighbors and deployment of strong field armies along Rus- permit border “interventions” in the sacred sia’s western borders since the ruid-HOOs.'0 name of security and stability. But even such There is no need here to outline the numer- limitations as he suggests seem unlikely in the ous other continuities that point to a distinc- near-term. Given their history and military tively Russian military culture. Enough has culture and the threat they perceive in iheStra- been said to suggest that as heirs to imperial tegic Defense Initiative(SDI), weshouldexpect traditions, Soviet defense planners are bound the Soviets to meet new Western programs with to be haunted by fears of technological inferior- continued high, if not increased, military ex- ity, geographical vulnerability, and the specter penditures in an effort to close the technology of encirclement, fears that may well be fed by gap, maintain high leveis of improved conven- their own suspicious intelligence network.'1 tional forces, and preserve the perceived parity Some argue that since 1978-79, these tradi- of nuclear forces. In this process, efforts to up- tional fears or paranóia have been heightened grade “combal readiness” and the institution by the Soviets’ perception that they may be of strict procedures to ensure the inviolability facing a new quadruple alliance of the United of Soviet frontiers—the very factors that doomed States, NATO, China, and Japan, and by the KAL Flight 007—will probably continue. For fact that the situation along their old Southern the short-term, Western policymakers must ac- tier—Iran and Afghanistan—was dangerously cept that they cannot “reeducate" their Soviet unstable. In this situation, NATO’s prograin counterparts in a new “military culture." Even of tactical nuclear forces modernization and so, they can take greater care to formulate and the Reagan administration's subsequent rhe- present their own requirements and policies in toric and policies must have seemed espe- such a way as not to increase Moscow’s insecur- cially unsettling to the Kremlin’s leaders. Sim- ity and paranóia. Otherwise, they only risk ilarly, the failure to restore stability in Afghan- further confirming the Soviets in their habit of istan must also trouble them. So paradoxically, translating the harsh reality of the Russian just when the Soviet Union at last seemed to be past, as they perceive it. into their conception growing in economic strength, and achieving of the present. And if the Soviets' sense of secur- military "parity" with its possible opponents, ity admitiedly depends at a minimum on a 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

corresponding insecurity among its oppo- Monica, Califórnia, September 1977); Robert Legvold, "Strategic DoctrineandSALT: Soviet and American \ icws," Survwal, Janua- ments,’4 then thereverseof thisaxiom isequally ry-February 1979. pp. 8-13; and David R. Jones," Russian Tradition true. and Soviet Military Policy," Currenl History, May 1983, pp. 197- Dalhousie University 200, 230-32, and "Russian Military Traditions and the Soviet Mili- tary Establishment." in TheSoviet Union: What Lies Aheadf Mili- Hall fax, Nova Scotia tary Political Aífairs in the 1980s edited by K. M. Currie and G. Varhall (Washington, 1985), pp. 21-47. 13. "Otvety Ministra oborony SSR Marshala Sovctskogo Soiuze D. F. Ustinova na voprosy korrespondenta TASS," Pravda. 31 July 1983,p. 4. Notes 14. These basic meanings are taken from standard dictionaries I William C. Green and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Soviet Priorilies such as A. I. Smirnitskii, editor, Russko-Anglnskn slovar, fourth and KAL Flighi 7," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, October edition (Moscow 1959), p. 52. 1983, p. 45. T he syndicaled columnist Charley Reese put this posi- 15. AleksandrSolzhenitsyn, "Misconceptionsaboui Rússia Area tion even inore bluntly in "Liberais Never Seem to Learn," Pensa- Threal to America," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1980, pp. 797-98. cola Journal, 5 October 1985, p. 6A. 16. P. H. Vigor. The Soviet l'iew oj War, Peace and Neutrahty 2. On rumors about and analyses of the PVO's performance, see (London and Boston. 1975), pp. 131-33. John F. Burns. "Jet Inctdent Cives Clues about Russian Military." 17.1 haveoutlined th is process in "Coniinuiiy and Change in the New York Times. 18 September 1983, p. 8 ,and "TheSoviet Military Russian Military Tradition." RUSI Journal. June 1975, pp. 31-32. Year in Review 1982-1983," David R Jones, editor, Sovirt Armed 18. Richard Hellie, "The Structureof Modern Russian History," Forces Review Annual 7.1982-1981 (Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1984), pp. Russian History (1977), no. 1. p. 11. Foran evaluation of thesteppe 26-28. For lhecommentsof thedelegates in Fdinburgh. see Colonel nomad's power. see William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. General S. V. Golubev, Air Forces' Deputy Commander-in-Chief Technology, Armed Force, and Society stnce A.O. 1000 (Chicago. for Cambai Training, "Soviel Delegate Admils Error in Plane Inci- 1982). pp. 15-18, 48-61. dem." New York Times, 22 September 1983, p. IE; see John F, 19. On casualty figures, see R. E. and T. N. Dupuy, The F.ncy- Burns, "Soviet Seems to Fault Pilot Who Downed Jet," New York clopedia of Military History from 7500 B.C. to the Present (New Times, 8 Januarv 1984. pp. I, 6. York. 1970), p. 1198. 3. See John F. Burns. "A Soviet General Implies Airliner Could 20. Uri Ra'anan. "The USSR and 'Encirclement' Fear; Soviet Be Taken For a Spy Plane," New York Times, 5 September 1983, Logic or Western Legend," Strategic Review, Winter 1980, p. 50. pp. 1.4; John F. Burns. "Soviet Says Order to Down Jet Carne at a 21. Oscar Halecki, "Imperialism in Slavic and East European Local Levei," ibid., 10 September 1983, pp. 1,4; the transcripl of History," Slavic and Fast European Review (1952), pp. 1-13. Ogarkov'sstatement in ibid., pp. 4-5;SergeSchmemann, "Reaction 22. Richard E. Pipes, "Mililarism and lhe Soviet State," Daeda- of Kremlin." ibid., 14 September 1983, p. 4; and P. Kirsanov, "Fakty lus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Fali uoblithaiut Vashington," Pravda, 20 September 1983, p. 4. Re- 1980, p. 2; Pipes. Rússia under the Old Regime (London. 1974), p. cently, some Western analysts have been more sympathetic to Mos- 118. cow's identification of KAL007's mission as one of espionage; see 23. S. M. Solov'ev, Istorua Rossn s drevntetshikh vremen, 23 David Pearson. "KAL 007: What the U.S. Knew and When We books in 15 volumes (Moscow, 1959-66), vol. 2. no. 4. pp. 514-15. Knew It,” The Nation, 18-25 August 1984, pp. 105-24. 24. N. Khlebnikov, O vliiani obshchestva na organizatsuu gosu- 4. Richard Halloran. “ U.S. General Galls Soviel's Air Defense darslva v tsarskn penod russkot isloru (St. Pelersburg, Rússia, fnflexible." New York Times, 18 September 1983, p. 7; Burns, "Jet 1869), p. 5. Incident Gives Clues about Russian Military," p. 8; Jones. op. cit., 25. Figures cited in V. I. Shaiditzkii, editor, Na sluzhbe Ote- pp. 26-28; and John F. Burns, "Soviet Army in Limelight," New chestva (San Francisco, Califórnia, 1963). pp. 516-17. York Times. II September 1983, pp. 1,7. 26. G. A. Leer, Opty" kntiko-istoncheskogo issledovanna za- 5. P. F Batitskii, Totska Protwovozdushnoi oborony strany kotiov iskusstva vedem ia voiny: PolozhileVnaia strategua (St. Pe- (Moscow, 1977), pp. 62-63. tersburg. Rússia, 1869). p. 472. 6. Ivan Chernykh, Idu na perekhval (Moscow, 1973), end paper. 27. Prince Flvgenii Trubetskoi.SmyífiíOjny (Moscow. 1914), p.9. 7. Ibid. 28. This had appeared earlier in General Dragomirov's famous 8. Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Confronts Gromyko Direclly on colleclions of axioms for soldiers; see his Momento du Soldai (Paris, Plane Incident," New York Times. 9 September 1983, pp. 1.8; John 1889), p. 9, and the associated proverbs on pp. 10 and 14. F Burns. "Soviet Confideni Furor Will Pass." ibid., 12 September 29. Razskazy tz russkot istorn (chast vtoraia). (n.p.. 1905). pas- 1983, p. 4; and the transcripl of Ogarkov's comments in ibid., 10 siin. but especially pp. 4-10. 29-34, 112-14. September 1983, pp. 4-5. T he Soviet press response is chronicled in 30. A. A. Kersnovskii, Istorua russkoi armn, 4 volumes(Belgrade. Larry Black, "KAL Disaster and the Soviet Press." International 1933-39), vol. I, p. 3-8 is lypical. Both he and Shaiditzkii. pp. 516-17, Perspectives, January February 1984, pp. 11-14. stress the Orthodox mission of the imperial armed forces. Anolher 9. Published in Izvestiia, 26 November 1982, and in English in émigréauthor whocelebrates the defense of Russia'ssacred borders John L. Scherer, editor. USSR Facts and Figures Annual 1: 1981 is Pavel Shaposhnikov, "Okhrana graniis Rossiiskikh." Poen- (Gulf Breeze, Florida. 1983), pp. 20-30. nnaia byT, May 1966. pp. 34-38. 10. Charley Reese in the Pensacola Journal, 5 October 1983, p. 31. K. D. Egorov, Za russkn sever—Iz istorua osvoenniia russkogo 6A. Also Green and Rivkin, pp. 44-46. severa i bor’ba s inozemnymi agressorami za sevemye morskie puti 11. "State Department Official Cites Soviet 'Massive Paranóia'," (Murmansk, 1957), p. 7. Pensacola Journal, 5 September 1983, p. II A. Also see Leslie H. 32. V. V. Kargalov, Narod-bogalyr (Moscow, 1971). p. 3, I his Gelb, "Outrage at Soviet Comes Easier Than Action," New York lheme pervades V. I. Buganov and A. I. Nazarets, editors, Stranitsy Times, 4 September 1984, p. 1E. boevogo proshlogo nashei strany /IX-XII w.h (Moscow. 1972), vol. 12. Most notably Kenneth Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentnsm I; I. Rostunov. "The Struggles of the Peoples of Rússia against (New York. 1979). Forattempts todefine the Russian Soviet "mil- Foreign Invaders (I3th-early I9th century)." Reviu Internationale ilary culture," see Jack L. Synder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: d'HisloireMilitaire(Moscow, 1979), no. 44, pp. 248-63; and numer- Implications for Limited Nuclear Options, Rand R-2154-AF (Santa ous other Soviet military histories. REFLECTIONS ON KAL FLIGHT 007 39

33. "Otvcty Ministra oborony .. . p. 4. and Sciences, Fali 1980. pp. 14-15. Also see conimenls in Derek 3A P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavte t. russkata armna na Derek Leebaeri, "The Context of Soviet Military Thinking," in rubezhe XIX- XX stolelti, 1881-1903 (Moscow, 1979). pp. 75-79. Mtltlary Thinking, ediled by D. Leebaert (London, 1981), p. 21. 35. L. G. Beskrovnyi, editor. Stranitsy boevogo proshlogo. 44. Bellamy, p. 42. Ocherkt voennot tsloru Rossn (Moscow. 1968), pp. 4-6. 45. J. V. Sialm, ProblemsoJ Lenintsm (Peking. 1976). p. 528. For 36. Ibid., p. 6. an example of early Soviet íears of encirclemenl, see L. Ivanov, 37. G. A. Nekrasov. "Mechdunarodnoe priznanie rossiiskogo SSSR t impcriatislicheskoe okruzhente (Moscow. 1928), veltkoderzhaviia v XVIII v." in Foedalnata Rosstta vo vsemtrno-ts- 46. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Uanger (Boston: Littlc, toncheskom protsesse: Sborntk sllet, posvtashchennyt L'vu l'ladi- Brown and Company, 1977). pp. 175-77. Hellie. pp. 14-15, accepts mtrovtchu Cherepntnyu. edited by V. T. Pashuloet al. (Moscow. this view with reservations. 1972). p. 382. 47. Dimiiri K. Simes. "Militarism in Soviet Society," Interna- 38. T ibor Szamuely. The Russtan Tradition, ediled by Robert tional Secunly. Winter 1981-1982. pp. 125-26. Conquest (London, 1974). p. 24. 48. L e e b a e rt . p p . 20-21: Jo n e s . " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Year . . . , " p p . 39. Forexample, Oswald P. Backuss III, "Was Muscovile Rússia 21-22. Imperialistic?"Síat'tr and East Furopean Revtew. I'll(1948). no. 3. 49. Jones, "R ussian T ra d itio n ," p. 198. pp. 197-213. 50. Ibid.. pp. 199. 230-32; "Soviet Military Year ...” pp. 19-25, 40. Chnsiopher D Bellamy. "Britísh Views oí Rússia: Russian presents this argument at greater length. Viewsoí Britain,” in F-stimating Foretgn Military Power, ediled by 51.Seecomment by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.. theformerInspec- Philip Towle (London, 1982). p. 44. tor General of lhe CIA, as quoted by Richard F. Slarr in Peter 41. This is lhe thesis oí lhe greai hislorian V. O. Kliuchevskii. In Duiganan and Alvin Rabashka. editors, The United States in lhe his influeniial Kurs russkot tsloru (Moscow, 1937). vol. 1, p. 20. he I980s (Stanford. Califórnia, 1980), p. 740. stated simply lhat the "history oí Rússia is lhe history oí a country 52. Leebaert, p. 20; Helmut Sonnenfeldt. "The Soviet Chal- coloniring tlselí.” This view is adopted by Pipes in "Miluarism." lenge." inSetting Sational Prionties: Agenda for the Eighttes, J. A. pp. 2-3. and Russtan under (he Old Regime, pp. 7-8, 115-16. lo Pechman, editor (Washington, 1980); W. G. Hyland, "The Sino- provide the impulse íor Russian expansionism. Soviei Securiiy Conflict: A Search for New Security Slrategies." 42. Chnsiopher Duffy, Russta s Military IVay to the West. On- Stralegic Revtew, Fali 1978. gtns and Sature of Russtan Mtltlary Power, 1700-1800 (London, 53. Stephcn Shenfield, "The USSR: Viktor Girshfeld and the 1981). p. 233. Concept of 'Suííii ient Defense'." ADIU Report, January-February 43. David Holloway. "Military Power and Polilical Purposes in 1984. no. 1, p. 10. Soviet Policy." Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy o/ A ris 54. Leebaert, p. 21. with crucial queslionsconcerning nuclear forces and doctrine. One possible solution 10 the growing vulnerability of lhe U.S. land-based ICBM force would be to adopt lhe strategy of launch on warning (LOW),1 in which the weapons ai risk would be fired once it is con- firmed that the enemy has fired a first strike. The U.S. response to the SS-20s in Kurope was the deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in NATO countries. Moscow has protested this move vehemently, particularly the stationing of Pershing IIs vvilhin short striking distance of the Soviet Union. Some Western observers feel that this deployment may force the Soviets to adopt a LOW strategy. í Launch on warning has always been viewed as a pariah in the United States because of the potential forerroneous indications in the warn- ing system that could lead to the accidental start of a nuclear war. The much-publicized false alerts generated by the U.S. Air Defense Com m and com puters in 1979 and 1980exacer- bated this feeling. U.S. policv has always been to maintain forces with the survivability toab- sorb a first strike and still retain the capability todeliveradevastatingcounterattack upon the LAUNCH enemy.2 Soviet policy is notenunciated in pub- 1 ic, so it must be interpreted from statements, ON WARNING IN writings, capabilities, and practices. The So- viets have not made any clear declarations of SOVIET NUCLEAR intention concerning a LOW posture. Never- theless, it is importam to attempt to discern STRATEGY how the Soviets regard launch on warning be- cause of the implications for nuclear strategy. C aptain J ohn D. W il l ia m s . USMC

UKSTIONS of nuclear strategy- oc- Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War cupy the key position in national se- Soviet altitudes toward LOW cannot be iso- curity policy today. The Soviet de- lated from their overall strategy for nuclear war; an examination of the general doctrine ptoymentQ of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic will lay the groundwork for consideration of missiles (IRBMs) largeted against Western Ku- specific postures. Much has been written in rope and their continued buildup of accurate recent years concerning the Soviet adoption of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a warfighting approach to nuclear strategy as which place the survivability of the Minute- opposed to a deterrence posture which has been man silos in jeopardy, has confronted the West 40

42 AIR VNIVERSÍTY REVIEW

the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy for lhe ods for reliably repelling a surprise nuclear past three decades. The goal of this doctrine, attack."8 which has been elaborated by theSoviet leader- ship ai the various Congresses of the Commu- nist Party of the Soviet Union and developed Avoiding Surprise more eloquently in the major vvorks Military There are three ways to escape the conse- Strategy and Scientific-Technical Progress and quences of a surprise nuc lear strike. The first is the Revolution in Military Affairs, is not to surprise the enemy before he can surprise merely to prevent a nuclear war but to be pre- you, i.e., to strike his forces preemptively once pared to achieve victory in one. Soviet Major you feel that he intends to launch an attack General M. I. Cherednichenko emphasized upon you. The second is to develop defenses that his nation was “compelled to prepare our that are strong enough to negate the effects of a Armed Forces, country, and all the people for a surprise attack. The third is to launch on warn- struggle with an aggressor, first of all and ing, firing your missiles once those of the primarily under conditions of a nuclear war."' enemy are in theair. All three methods are part There are several key principies that make of Soviet strategy, although the emphasis has up Soviet doctrine. First, vvhile war is not inev- shifted over time in accordance with changing itable, the nature of the imperialist nations technological capabilities. makeconflict with the socialistcountries likely. Much has been written concerning the ten- While the Soviets have vacillated through the dency toward preemptive strike in Soviet strat- years on the question of whether a war would egy.9 The Soviets have never stated their inten- automatically start with or escalate to a general tion to use a preemptive strike; however, if they nuclear exchange, they generally feel that a believe that any war would automatically be- major confrontation would quickly become come a general nuclear war and if a surprise worldwideand be fought with nuclear missiles: attack holds the key to success in such a war, "A world war, if it were unleashed by an impe- then it follows that they would attempt to exe- rialist aggressor, would undoubtedly take on cute such an attack as a means of achieving the character of a nuclear missile war.’M Sec- their goal of victory. The Soviets generally ex- ond, in such a war, the initial period would be pect a period of tension to precede theoutbreak crucial, if not decisive: "Therefore, the initial of war and believe they would detect any prepa- period of a present-day nuclear rocket war will ration for war being undertaken by the West. obviously be the main and decisive period and Should they detect such preparations, they will predetermine the development and the would most likely use the preemptive strike to outcomeof theentire war.'"’ Finally, becauseof attain surprise and seize the initiative.10 In this the importance of the initial peritxl, surprise vein, the Soviets often write of "frustrating the has become a key factor in modem warfare: intentionsof the enemy" and "thwartingof the Surprise nuclear attacks are capable of changing aggressor's surprise attack.” The only way to the correlation of forces6 sharply in short periods do this is todestroy theenemy’s weapons before of time and thereby exerting a decisive influence they can attack you. Thus, Sokolovskiy writes on the course and even the outcome of military that in addition to repelling a surprise nuclear operations.7 attack, the Soviets must develop "methods of It follows logically then that the main goal of frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemy Soviet strategy is to avoid a surprise nuclear by the timely infliction of a shattering attack altack. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy confirms upon him.”11 A. A. Grechko, then the Minister this in Soviet Military Strategy: "In this regard of Defense, stated in Scientif ic-Technical Pro- lhe main problem is the development of meth- gress and the Revolution in Military Affairs LAUNCH ON WARNINC. IN SOUlb.T STHATEGY 43

that "lhe Armed Forces should be abie under 1967, Marshal Nikolai k. Krylov, then head of any conditions 10 ihwart a surprise aitack by the Strategic Rocket Forces, wrote in lhe Jour- the aggressor .. . and by rapid crushing strikes nal Military Thought: defeai his basic nuclear missile weapons.”12 With the presence in the urmament of troops

ness one oí lhe main goals for its armed forces. determine the next moves: Marshal N. V. Ogarkov. former Chief of the Besides this, the indicated objectives should be General Staff, writes: examined and dassified by the degree of their A most importam poim oí lhe military-teehnical danger for the attacker. Thus, the launch posi- t omem of .Soviet miliiary docirine. diciaied by lion from which 10 minutesagoa stralegic rocket lhe rapid developmenl of nuclear missile weap- was launched does not represem an immediale ons and the possibilily of a surprise altack by the threat, since the firing of anolher missile requires enemy employing these weapons, is the demand a ceriain period of time.2*’ that the USSR Armed Forces be maimained at a high State of tombai readiness, ensuring their Clearly, a massive launch of all available prompt and expeditious deployment in order to ICBMs in desperation does not fit the Soviet repulse an enemy sneak altack, to deliver power- scheme for fighting a nuclear war. Figure 1 ful response strikes on the enemy.-' provides confirmation of this, and it also de- An artide on the development of military art picts a Soviet response to a U.S. first strike. A noted that the nnportanceof constam readiness large number of Soviet missiles would be of missile guidance Systems and continuous launched on warning, indicating again that as early warning operations is stressed in Soviet early as 1970 launch on warning was an inte- strategy. 1 The previously cited articleon corre- gral part of their strategy. However, a signifi- lation of forces stresses the importance of an cam quantity would also be retained to ride out automatedcontrol system,25 and Ogarkov stated the U.S. strike and formulate the nudeusof the that readiness is enhanced by the automated next response.30 The cominuing emphasis on firing procedures of modem missiles.26 hardening of missile silos and launch com- li is importam to note that the Soviet concept plexes illustrates that the Soviets imend to have ol LOW is fundamentally different from that forces thatcan survive theeffectsof a first strike vvhich is normally associated with this type of and be available for follow-on attacks. Thus, in concept in the West. Most Western military the Soviet tnind, the LOW concept is a flexible experts regard LOW as an act of desperation, a strategy that would guide lhe initial thrusl of throwback to the days of "massive retaliation” war, laying the foundation for the future con- where missiles vvould be hurriedly launched in duet of operations. This perception differs sig- an effort to save them from destruction. The nificantly from the view of LOW in the West lack of flexibility to respond to v; rying situa- where it tends to be seen as an irrational act of tions isone primary reason for U.S. rejection of desperation. a LOW strategy. Thus, it appears that Soviet doctrine recog- In contrast. the Soviet LOW is a controlled, nizes three methods of avoiding surprise attack measured response to the outbreak of nuclear as legitimate strategies depending on the situa- war. Soviet doctrine consistently maintains tion. Launch on warning would be an appro- that even though the initial phase of the war priate response should the enemy aiiempt to will be crucial, a single strike vvill not be suffi- launch a surprise first strike. But while the cient toensure victory: "A battle, an operation, Soviets have assembled the forces necessary for and even more, a war cannot be reduced to one a preemptive first strike and for defense of the act of destruction of the enemy; they must be Soviet Union against a surprise nuclear altack, planned in any event as a series of consecutive their capability to execute LOW is much less strikes, each of which is different in its na- evident. Although doctrine expresses the inten- ture." ' Flexibility and responsiveness are em- tion to employ a LOW strategy, without the phasized to ensure “the probability of a correct capability, that strategy could hardly be se- response."28 It is necessary to continually eval- riously considered.Thequestion of the capabil- uateand update theestimateof thesituation to ity to perform LOW must also be examined. Source: V I Vaifolumryrv and M. I. Kopytov. "Drugn and Trsltng nl Ralliitn Missilrs—/ SSH," (Washington, O.C.: Joini Publica- li<)ii% Rrsrairh Service. 19 Novctnbrr 1970). p. 305.

Richard Garwin has identified seven require- andcontrol system toconfirm the information, ments necessary 10 have lhe capabiliiy to exe- pass it to the decisionmakers, allow the deci- cute the LOW strategy.51 While Information sionmakers time to reach a decision, and com- regarding the detailed capabilities of Soviet municate that decision to the operating forces strategic forces is limited, from the data that are in time to execute a launch before thearrival oí available. it appears that until recently, the the incoming attack. In addition, like the Soviets were deficient in ai Ieast three key areas: BMEWS, the Hen House system has gaps in its sensors to detect enemy launchings, adequate coverageand may have similar reliability prob- warning time, and rapid response in missiles. lems.M The Soviets have since built an over- However, improvements over the past few the-horizon radar system that would correct vears may have corrected these deficiencies and some of the deficiencies of the Hen House Sys- resulted in an increasingly viable ability to ex- tem.''’ Nevertheless, until the Soviets developed ercise the LOW option. and deployed an early warning satellite, their The first Soviet early warning system was the system slill lacked the dual phenomenology Hen House radar net located near the borders capability in which two independem sensors of the Soviet Union. This system is assoe iated provide separate warning and. therefore, con- with the Soviet ABM system which was devel- firmation ofanattack. It isquestionable whether oped in the late 1960s.’> Assuming capabilities the cauiious Soviet leadership would have equivalem to the U.S. ballistic missile early based their nuclear strategy on input from a warning system (BMEWS) of the same time single warning source. period (a generous assumption considering the The Soviets apparently began developing U.S. advamage in electronics), the Hen House early warning satellites much later than the net would have provided fifteen to twenty United States. While the United States em- minutes warning." The limited time available barked on the Midas program in the early would strain lhe capability of any command 1960s, it is only recently that a launch detection

45 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

satellite system has been developed by the permil adequate response time and lacked the U.S.S.R. Cosmos 775, launched in October redundancy necessary to confirm an attack, 1975, was their first early w arning satellite in while the low-missile-readiness levei precluded geosynchronous orbit.56 The period 1979-81 the rapid response necessary for LOVV. The saw a flurry of early warning saiellite launches, deployment of new radar systems and launch indicating a major push toward achieving an detection satellites hascorrected deficiencies in operacional system, probably resembling the the warning system while missile readiness has T.S. Defense Support Program.'7 Again, if improved. The Soviets now have the capability comparable to its U.S. equivalem, the Soviet to execute the LOVV strategy w ith confidence. launch detection satellite system vvould pro- There has been a shift in the emphasis placed \ ide about thirty minutes warning.58 At the o n LOVV in Soviet strateg y d u r i n g the p ast few same time, the Soviets have also begun con- years.4' V7ery subtle indications of this shift ap- structing a network of new phased-array radars pear in Soviet writings and pronouncements near their borders which would significantly on the subject; the only indication being a enhance the existing radar coverage.59 Thus, more frequent mentioning of retaliation as since the early 1970s, the Soviets have signifi- opposed to discussions that imply a preemp- cantly improved their early warning system; tive posture. However, where operational ten- with the latest additions of launch detection dencies are concerned, it has been noted that satellites and phased-array radars, their capa- “theSoviets practice launching weapons under b iliiy to ex ecu te the LOVV strateg y w ill have the stringent time constraints that would pre- improved immensely, since their ability to de- vail under hypothetical launch-under-attack tect launches has been enhanced and the warn- circumstances”44andexercise their ICBM force ing time increased. under conditions that are in some respects The remaining shortcoming in the Soviet more stringent than those for U.S. missile exer- ability to execute launch on warning in the cises.4

47 48 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

ing the aggressive designs of the enemy.” ing to launch a preemptive strike. This development may be refleciive oí in- The significance of the shift in emphasis creasing .Soviet confidente in their ability to from preemption to LOW has largely been launch their ICBMs on warning; this, in turn, missed in the West. The Western press and has resulted in the deemphasis of the preemp- some military analysts regard statements from tive strategy. Indeed, the Soviet Union re- lhe Soviet leadership concerning LOW as in- nounced the first use of nuclear weapons for dicative of the adoption of a new strategy that the first time on 15 June 1982.48 This indicates the West considers to be a dangerous escalation that LOW may have achieved a higher priority in th e a rm s race. For exam ple, the 17 May 1983 than preemptive first strike in the Soviet hier- pronouncemem by the presidem of the Soviet arc hy of nutlear options. This shift would also Academy of Sciences, Anatoly Alexandrov, that reinforcean apparent tendency in recent Soviet the firing of medium-range nuclear weapons thought to recognize the potential to conduct from F.urope would result in "automatic retal- warfare at various leveis (conventional, limited iation, with all available means, at all largeis nuclear, and general nuclear) vvithout inevita- on the territories of all potential opponents” bly escalating to the next highest levei. The was reported as “the most explicit threat so far Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces, that Moscow would adopt a launch-on-warning parlicularly strategic nuclear forces, is shifting posture."49 As with the Ustinov statement, decidedly in their favor; the pressure to strike Alexandrov’s threat of “automatic retaliation" preemptively is probably less than it was in the was nothing new; it was merely a restatement past since they now believe they can conduct of a well-defined Soviet policy. If anything, the warfare at any levei and prevail. The develop- United States should have felt soinewhat re- ment of an effective capability to execute a lieved that the Soviets were relaxing their gt ip LOW strategy ensures that they can avoid the on the nuclear trigger somewhat by backing consequentes of a surprise attack without hav- away from preemption. The Soviets were aware of the mistrust of warning Systems and para- nóia over the LOW option in the West; they were undoubtedly attempting to exploit this situation. By hintingat their posilion publicly, the Soviets hoped toarouse fear in the West and slow the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the development of the MX. The real danger in deploying the Pershing 11 and MX missiles is not in pushing the Soviets intoa LOW strategy but in pushing them back into a preemptive posture. As defense analvst John Steinbrunner has pointed out: “from a Soviet military perspective, lhe deployment oí US intermediate-range missiles in Europe is a significam new dimension of strategic threat.

The Ihiiled States deployed Perslung II missiles lo Europe in response lo the Soviet deployment ofSS-2Us. Pershmgsare liighly aaurate bul vulnerableand, from lhe Somei viewpoml, propitious only for a first strike. LAUNCH ON WARNING IN SOVIET STRATEGY 49

The presumed largei oí ihese new weapons ... ing is one way of neutralizingsurprise. li began is the central command system of lhe Soviet to assume increasing impor lance in Soviet nu- Tnion. concentrated around Moscow and in clear ihouglu when the Soviets deployed an lhe Western pari oí lhe Soviet Union.”50 The improved early warning system and missiles Sovieisconsider thisone way in which lhe Wesi that could be maintained in a high siate of mighi iry toachieve surprise in a general war: readiness. The Soviets have not recently moved to LOW as a result oí the deployment of ínter- h is possible thai ii is noi lhe inierconiinenial mediate-range nuclear missiles in Lurope or missiles which will be launched first. bui the operalional-iaciical missiles--- asa means which lhedevelopment oí the MX ICBM. Thedanger is closer lo enemy objeciives. they can be used in these moves is not that the Soviets will adopt aboveall fora strike againsiantimissileand ami- LOW but that it mighi push them back toward airdefense means and comrol posts in order from preemption. lhe ver> beginning 10 deprive lhe siate subjecied The Soviet utilization oí LOW results in two to auack of the capability of defense.'1 key implications for U.S. nuclear strategy. The The increased capability of the Pershing II first is that U.S. andSo\ iet perceptionsof what over past tactical systems makes it a strategic constitutes a stable nuclear posture are differ- weapon in Soviet eyes. The improved accuracy ent. The United States has always felt that the and decreased warning lime available to react use of nuclear weapons would be a last resort; increases the pressure on the Soviets for pre- its posture of “riding out” a nudeai attack emption. Raymond Garthoff has noted that provides maximum protection against acci- one of the specific concerns Soviet commenta- dental or premature firing of strategic systems. tors (in particular, Ogarkov) have raised is that In comrast, the Soviets believe that in a crisis or the short flight time of the Pershing would noi conflict, its adversaries would quickly resort to allow sufficiem time to exercise the LOW op- nuc lear weapons; the principal threat for them tion before criticai command and comrol targets has been from a surprise first strike. Asa result, would be attacked and destroyed.52 The same is true for the MX. The potential lethality of this system as a hard-target killer will again place a premium on launching a first strike, particularly if the MX is deployed in a vulnerable basing mode. The aitractive- ness of the target and the destructive potential it represents may push the Soviets back toward preemption. In addition, they can be expected to continue to improve their LOW capability. as the penalty for noi launching on warning goes upappreciably with the MXand Pershing II operational.

O ne of the primary themes oí Soviet doctrine for nuclear war has been the avoidanceof surprise attack. Launch on warn-

Mobile SS-20s, hke llie one deputed aI lhe right, do not require jixed sites to supporl launching. 50 AIR VN1VERSITY REVIEW

theit posture has been less restrictive, employ- ever, we must anticipaieany potential responses ing LOW and preempiion as th? primary op- and be prepared to cope with them. tions. l he possibiliiy of achieving stability as l he United States has lived with a Soviet defined by U.S. strategists is therefore remote. preemptive nuclear strategy in thepastandcan \\'e must accepi the faci that as long as both do so in the future. A LOW posture would be sides have nuclear weapons, there will be preferable but only by a matter of degrees. We strategies to employ theui and that the Soviet must beawareof the current Soviet posture and strategy foremploying them will always be less alert for apparent changes or shifts toward restrictive ihan we would like. preemption. I-.ither strategy requires the United Thesecond implication is that strategic deci- States to take a cautious approach during a sions cannot be made in a vacuum. Security in strategic crisis, knowing that the Soviets have the nuclear age depends primarily on psycho- their fingersa littlecloser to the trigger than we logical perceptions of relative strength and do. However, caution during crises in the nu- vulnerability. Any change in tvpe, quality, clear age should be standard operating proce- quantity. or employment of strategic weapons dure; neither LOW or preemption would re- will change these perceptions. Moves intended quire any other significam change in strategy to enhance the security of one side may pose a or posture. We must also be aware of Soviet new and ominous threat to the other, trigger- attempts to play on Western fears of the LOW ing a destabilizing response. The potential and preemptive strategies. They have and will reaction of the other side must be weighed continue trying to manipulate public opinion against perceived gains in considering any against U.S. nuclear strategy by portraying the changes in weaponry or force posture. Ulti- United States as the aggressor while denying mately. security concerns may outvveigh the their own positions. Such attempts will have to consequences of any potential response. This be met with t lear descriptions of actual Soviet would appear to be the situation in the rase of posture and firm resolve to carry through with both the Pershing II and MX. where a strong programs essential for U.S. and Western case exists for the deployment of both systems, security. regardless of any Soviet countermoves. How- Washington, D.C.

Noies relative military strengths of two or more adversartes. l he correla- 1. l he (wo lerms used todescribe lhefiringof missiles in response tion of forces will determine lhe outeome oí a military aclion; to an .miu ipaied or at tual initiation oí allaek by an adversary are therefore, factorsaffecting this balance assume primary importante taunch on warning (LOW) and launch under attack (LUA). Tech- and influente any Soviet course of action. nically, LOW eould require an attack once indications of an im- 7. Major General S. A. Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the ix-ndmg attaik were received whelher or not the missiles had aclu- Correlation of Forces in War.” Military Thought, June 1969, in ally been íired. whereas LUA deseribes only the situation in which Selected Readmgs froin Military Thought, 1961-7) (Washington: n wasconfirtncd dtat missiles hadaetually been íired. Situe LOW is Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 69. the more commonly used term. for the pur|x>ses of this artitle. 8. Sokolovskiy, p. 210. LOW will be uiiliied to describe lhe initiation of an attatk in 9. Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy response to ar tual tnissile launehings by an enemy. for Nuclear War (Stanford, Califórnia: Hoover Institute Press. 2. Gaspar A. Weinberger, 1)01) Annual Reporl to Congre.s.s FY 1979), pp. 98-107; Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet 19,9-1 (W ashington: (.overnm ent P rinting Office, 1983), p. 34. Strategic Forces: Hequirernents and Responses (Washington: 3. Major General M. I. Cheredniihenko, "On Keatures in lhe Brookings Instituiion. 1982), p. 36. Development oí Military Ari in lhe Postwar Period,” Military His- 10. Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 103-5; Berman and Baker, p. 37. toncal Thought, June 1970. in Selected Soviet Military Wntings, 11. Sokolovskiy. p. 210. 1970-7^ (W ashington: Government P rinting Office, 1977). p. 121. 12. General N. A. Lomov, Scienlific-Technical Frogress and the 4. lbid. Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington: Government Printing 5. Marshalof the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy,.SomeiMilitary Office, 1973). p. 159. Strategy. translated by Harriet Fast Scoll (New York: Grane. Rus- 13. Major General N. D. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuinetsov, sak. and Company, 1968), p. 205. "Mcxlern Warfare and Surprise Attack," Military Thought. June 6. I he "correlation of forces" is a Soviet concepl of evaluating the 1968, in Selected Readtngs frorn Military Thought, p. 226, LAUNCH ON WARN1NG IN SOVIET STRATEGY 51

H. Colunei D. L. Kulcszynski. "Some Problems of Sur|>risc in ference Keporl (Cambridge. Massac husetts: 1980), p. 55. Waríare. Mililary Thouglil. May 1971. in Selected Keadings from 33. Albert G. Hall. " l he(aseforan Improved IGBM." Astronau- Mi/ilary Thouglil. p. 89. tas and Aemnautics, February 1977. p. 28. 15 Berman and Baker. pp. 112-53; Oepartmeni of Defense. Soviet 31. Soviet Military Power, p. 27; General James V. Harlingcr, Mililary Power (Washington: Government Prinling Office, 1983). " l he Resurgenceof Strategic Defense," Defense H2. June 1982, p. pp. 27-31. 31. 16. Sokolovskiy. p. 281. PVO. PRO, and PKO are acronyms for 35. Soviet Military Power, p. 27. the Soviet terms describing anliair. antimissile, and anttspace 36. "Washington Roundup—Soviet Big Btrd.” Avialton Week defense. and Space Technology, 17 November 1975. p. 13. 17. The earlier SS-9 and SS-II silo» were hardened to withsland 37. "Soviet Mililary Programs in Space Move Foward," Aviation 1000 psi overpressure. l he silos for SS-I7. 18, and 19 missiles are Werk and Space Technology, 8 March 1982. p. 106. hardened to 2500-1000 psi. Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in 38. Hall. p. 28. lhe l9R0s (Stanford. Califórnia: Hoover Inslitute Press. 1979). )). 39. Soviet Mittlary Power, p. 27. 112; Soviet Mtltlary Power (1983). pp. 16. 21. 10. Berman and Baker. p. 36; l'.S. Congress, Joint hconoinit 18. Douglas» and Hoeber. p. 16. Committee. Subc omtnitlee on Priornies and Kconomies m Gov- 19. Leon Sloss and Stanley Kober. "Russians Pershtng Ploy." ernrneul. A llocation of Kesources in lhe Soviet l nion and Clima— Washington Posl, 25 January 1983. p. 13. !d~H, liearings. 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Govern- 20. Major General S. I. Anureyes. "Delermining theCorrelanon ment P rinling Office. 1978). p. 67; Joseplt J. Kru/el. "M ililary of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," Military Thouglil. Au- Alerts and Diplomalit Signals," in The l.innls of Intervenlion, gusl 1968. in Selected Keadings from Military Thoughl. vol. 5. pari edited by Kllen P. Stertl (Beverly Hills. Califórnia Sage Public a- l . p . 167. lions. 1977). p. 87. 21. \"asendin and Ruznetsov. p. 226. 11. Berman and Baker, p. 88. 22. Tone. "The Vulncrability Factor," 31 August 1981, p. 16. 12. Ibid., p. 15. 23. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov. A Iways in Keadmess to Defend the 13. Raymond L. Garthoff. "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," .Survit'- Homeland. translated by Joint Publications Research Service. al. Fali 1983. p. 116. JPRS L-I04I2 (Washington: JPRS. 25 March 1982). p. 12. 11. Soviet Mililary Power, p. 16. 2T Gheredntchenko. p. 121. 15. Allocalion of Kesources in the Soviet Cnion and China— 25. Anureyes. p. 167. IV7S, p. 118. 26. Ogarkov. p. 35. 16. Vasendin and Kuznetsov, p. 227. 27. Major General V. Prokhorov. " Principies of Troop Gonirol 47. Serge Schmemann. "Arms Policies Questioned withitt the in the Ltght of Requtremems of Cybernetics." Military Thoughl, Soviet Cnion." New York Times, 13 July 1982. p. 3. May 1968. in Douglass and Hoeber. p. 48. 18. Bernard D. Nossiter. "Soviet Forswears Csing A-Arms First." 28. Anurcyev. p. 169. New York Times, 16 Ju n e 1982, p. I. 29. Major General K. M. Dzhclavkov, " l he Infliction of Deep 19. Washington Post, "Soviet Warns of Automatic Retaliation Strikes."" Mihtary Thoughl. February 1966, in Selected Keadings against New C.S Missiles." 18 May 1983, p. 12. from Mililary Thoughl, vol. 5. p art I. p. 110. 50. John Steinbrunner, "Arms and the Ari of Compromise." 30. Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 17-52. Brookings Keview, Sutnmer 1983, p. 9. 31. Richard L. Cartvin. "Launch under Attack to Redress Min- 51. Vasendin and Kuznelsov, jj. 229. uteman Vulnerability," InternationalSecuniy, Winter 1979-80, pp. 52. Garthoff. p. 116. TheSoviels Itold thai the Pershing II has lhe 118-19. range to reach Moscow and lhe strategic largeis located around tt. 32. Soviet Mililary Power, p. 27; Inslitute for Foreign Policy despitt- the C.S. and NA FO contentions that the missile'» range is Analysis. The Somei l'nion and Balhstic Missile Defense: ,1 Con- limited to lheater largeis. THE STRATEGY OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH APPLIED TO NATO

LlEUTKNANT COLONKL WlLLIAM J. DALECKY

OR nearly iwenty years, vvar in Europe of flexible response. Flexible response mean: has been deterred by the North Atlantic NATO forces must be able to conduct conven FTreaty Organization’s (NATO) sirategy lional, theaier nuclear, and strategic nuclea INDtRECT APPROACH APPLIED TO NATO 53

operaiions effectively enough to deter a YVar- that will ostensibly destroy YVarsaw Pact forces saw Pact incursion into NATO territory and, if as they aiiempt to establish offensive momen- deterrence fails, to end the conflict quickly on tum, thus preserving the integrity of NATO terms favorable to the member NATO nations. territory.* But is such an operational plan the Implicit in these favorable terms is the recovery correct one in light of the recent emerging of any lost NATO territory. strategy of the YVarsaw Pact? Jacquelyn Davis Tntil recently, the essence of deterrence for of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis has NATO rested vvith the decided superiority of rightly stated that "discussions in YVestern Eu- the strategic nuclear forces of the United States rope about Alliance strategy fail toconsider the over those of the Soviet Union. This fact logi- implications for NATO planning of thechanges cally led NATO to declare that any conven- that have laken place in the Euro-strategic en- cional attack would bring swifl first use of vironmeni.”' Deterrence for NA TO, after all. theater nuclear vveapons with prompt escala- must depend on how YVarsaw Pact political tion, if necessary, to attacks against the Soviet and military leaders view the situation. Of homeland. Deterrence was a faitaccompli since equal imporiance is the implemenialion of a the Sovietscould not risk strategic exchange on truly credible defense should deterrence fail. such unfavorable terms. But as strategic supe- The Soviet Union has dedared that it will riority has slowly become strategic parity, not resort to the first useof nuclear weapons in NATO finds itself equally deterred from ini- Europe. This declaration could simply be prop- tiating nuclear warfare. This is true despite aganda and disinformation. For several rea- what the individual NATO member govern- sons. not the least of which is the significam ments might wish to believe. The fact is that in nuclear capability of NATO, Soviet desire to the event of armed conflict with the YVarsaw keep a conflict ai the conventional levei is real. Pact, NATO governments will be "over- The Soviets are realists who understand that whelmed by what they had quietly known all the risksof theater, which to them is strategic, along, that NATO’s strategy for ‘first use' was nuclear exchange are not worth what poten- not compatible with the loss of America’s nu- tially might be gained.1 The latest analysis of clear superiority.”1 Soviet strategy in Europe indicates that they are In light of this shift in what the Soviets developing operational concepts designed to would term the correlalion of forces, conven- avoid the useof nuclear weapons. Y\'hat’s more, tional strategy should logically take on a new they intend to take the nuclear option away imporiance for NATO if war in Europe is still from NATO. The risk they perceive in a nu- to be deterred. This has not occurred. My pur- clear exchange is certainly not mitigated just pose is to delineate what NATO conventional because that exchange is initiated by NATO! warfighting strategy should beand what force New developments in operational capabil- planning implications this strategy might infer. ity, backed up by fielded equipment upgrades, NATO conventional strategy is built on in- indicate the Soviets are striving to ensure the tentions rather than capability. The forward YVarsaw Pact will be able to control and win a posilioning of NATO corps along the intra- conventional conflict in Europe. These devel- German Gzechoslovakian border (the “layer opments are designed to increase the speed, cake") is politically designed to demonstrate maneuver, and firepower of YVarsaw Pact forces. the intentions of the member nations who do The operational maneuver group (OMG), em- not border the YVarsaw Pact. It commits these ployed ai a theater levei, is the embodiment of nations ipso facto to respond militarily to a this developing concept. YVarsaw Pact incursion. Asa secondary benefil, The OMG in its various forms and sizes is it provides a framework for a forwrard defense designed to probe the from and lhen go through 54 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW and around NATO's forward defense, not only strategic reserves can be mobilized to theconti- laking away NATO s hope íor a purely con- nent.6 While this appears to be an unrealistic ventional viciory but also denying NA TO ihe goal, thegrowing strategy mismatch of NATO nuclear opiion. The concept depends on highly vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, coupled with weak- mobile and powerful forces thai will be in- ening of the nuclear leg of flexible response serted into NATO rear areas as early in the should be maiters of grave concern for the al- conílict as possible. Objectives for OMGs will liance, particularly its Central European mem- not only beassets criticai to the prosecution of bers. C. N. Donnelly States its succinctly: iheconventional war but also those which will As a coticept, [the OMG) appears to be well prevent NATO’s nuclear response—the cap- founded in view of both NATO’s present defen- ture ordestruction oí nuclear warheadsand the sive posture, and the numerous historical exam- means todeliver lhem. Thegoal for OMGs is to ples of a defensive concept being deíealed because operate in lucrative rear areas where NATO of the psyc hological inability of the defenders to political leaders could never think of autho- accepl the need to yield ground, particularly home ground.7 rizing the use of nuclear weapons even if the capability to do so remained.' It would appear then that Soviet operational An equally importam mission of OMGs will art is striving to bring together strategy and be to bypass NATO's forward defensive posi- capability. Highly mobile forces supported by tions and forces rapidly. Such operations are massed artillery and a heavy commitment of designed to exploii NATO’s weaknesses and modern frontal and theater tactical air assets avoid NA IO s strengths. Once in rear areas are capabilities the Soviets have been building where defense is decidedly more difficult to toward for years. One has a myriad of “bean orc hestratefat least undercurrent NATO plans), counts" to turn to for corroboration.8 The OMGs can encircle the ‘forward defenders” fallacy of current NATO strategy is that it is thereby effectively erasing them from the order not based on a true warfighting capability in of baule while preservingoffensive momentutn. face of these new Soviet initiatives. What Soviet military doctrine hasconceptuali/ed the NATO must develop is not a strategy that will conílict in Central Europe as the westward movement of multiple fronts(in NATO termi- nology, army groups), with unprecedented Inlwduced in I97A. lhe Su-24 Fencer (belcne) is the ('.S.S.R. 's primary deep mterdiction atrcrafl. . . . The speed and concentration, with the objective of An-12-t Condor f nght) has a 150-rnetru-lon hft capabil- arriving at the English Channel before U.S. ity. which exceeds that of the C.S. Air Force's C-5A li. INDIRECT APPROACH APPLIED TO NATO 55 counier Soviei forces but one which will coun- this task. But if the Soviets can concentrate ter Soviet strategy. quickly and push highly mobile forces ihrough Any viable strategy mustaddress theenemys weaknesses in the from created by massive fire- strategic concept firsi. Then lhe correct appli- power supported by airborne and airmobile caiion of force can be determined. If we accept operations (the OMG concept!) then the for- the fact that NATO conveniional capabiliiy is ward defense cannot function. Using Soviet criticai tooverall deterrence in Europe (which calculus, the outcome of the war is not in is by no ineans universally accepted), then such doubt. A linear disposition of available forces, capability must be sooriented that it will coun- even such a high percemage as currently ter the Soviet operational scheme—not play planned by NATO, cannot to any acceptable intoits hands. TheSoviets will be deterredonly probability prevent VVarsaw Pact forces from if the outcome of their strategy is in doubt. achieving the mass necessary for the insertion NATO s forward defense is designed to dis- of OMGs. cover the location of the enemy’s main attacks Since Soviei strategy is based on maneuver and then bring forces to bear todestroy VVarsaw and surprise, it is on these principies that Pact targets; thus, slowing momentum and NATO strategy must concentrate. This means wresiing the initiathe from the enerny while that NATO forces must modify what Dr. Steven preparing to counterattack. T he 1982 version L. Canby calls their “operational style.”10 If of the T.S. Army Field M anual 100-5 character- sufficiem force cannot beconcentrated linearly ized this scheme of defense as static, terrain- for firepower and aitrition to be effective, then oriented, and, necessarily, relying “primarily the objective must be changed. The strategic on firepower from fixed positions."9 Nearly 75 objective should be to take the initiative from percent of NATO combat ground forces and the enerny by dislocating the organization of significam tactical air asseis are committed to his attack, disrupting his scheme of maneuver,

Cotnbtned anns operalions usiiig helicoplers and arrnared unils. hke this une recently canducled against Afghan freedum fighlers, are lypual af lhe u-ay lhe uperalional maneiam group worAs.

and neutralizing the ptrner of his forces.11 How can this be done? The goal of Warsaw Pact forces is to operate in lucrative rear areas, unopposed by signifi- cam forces. What if OMGs faced the threat of powerfui NATO forces deployed throughout rear areas? What if, through ruse and deception coupled wilh highly maneuverable operational reserves supported with coordinated fires and tactical air power. the attacking OMC com- mander could never be sure his force retained Sonet oc( upahon forces enfarte Mascou’’.v nu- tlioritx m Kahul by palrais in arrnared vehu les. cohesion, his supplies were intact, and his routes of advance and retreat were secure? What if NATO's disposition of forces, still com- The T-SU rnam ballle lank is lhe prised of muhinational formations to preserve bai kbane of Somei arrnared unils. 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the characier of lhe alliance, were arrayed no- artillery and air defense froin lhe OMG. This where but, in the mind of lhe attacker. seem- lask can be accomplished ihrough the use of ingly everywhere? VVhat if Soviet forces were improved surveillance efforts coupled uith made 10 eat the “layer cake" in large pieces counterbattery and suppression of enemy air rather than to simply slice through it? The defense fires and the application of tactical air attainment of OMG objectives and Warsaw against bolh enemy capabilities. Mobility of Pact strategic goals would then, certainly, be in NATO forces will be criticai. To facilítate this doubt! movement, ground forces will need initially to Dislocating theattack of OMGs will require be deployed in and around criticai points rnost both physical and psychological methods. Once likely to be OMG objectives within rear areas. the attack axes of OMGs are discovered (a sig- These forces cannot be, in the classic sense, nificam task in itself), NATO operational re- assembled to await orders to counterattack. serve and tactical air assets will have to move Rather, lhey must have mission-type orders quickly tocounterattack. These counterattacks and be prepared to attack almost instantane- might have as an initial goal the separation of ously with the discovery of the presente of mo- bile VVarsaw Pact forces. For instante, it may be tactically wise to preestablish artillery support The Snvirt Artny lias 27.000 ineters of bndgmi’ rquipmnit in Ea.strrn Eurape to hrlp over- so that fires can be brought to bear immediatelyí come terram lenlures. such as ris>ersantl slreams. at significam depths throughoul the main bat- 1NDIRECT APPROACH APPLIED TO NATO 59

tle area. Such a “checkered square" deploy- borne, in order to respond rapidly to lhe axisof meiu of defensive forces was successfully used OMG movement. Tactical air power’s rnost earlv in World VVar II in the British Norih criticai mission will be to facililate the ma- African campaign against mobile elements of neuverability of NATO forces and deny the Rommels Afrika korps.12 maneuverability of Warsaw Pact forces. Taciical air assets, including attack helicop- Psychologically dislocating the enemy vvill ters, vvill play a decisive role in such engage- be just as importam. Camouflage, conceal- ments primarily due to the flexibí 1 ity and re- ment, and deception should take on new im- sponsiveness they provide. Air superiority will porta nce. If NATO forces are to be moved from remain criticai to success. NATO mobile re- vulnerable and ineffectual forvvard positions, serve ground forces cannot hope to move the Soviets must never know theareas iliat have quickly enough to dislocate enemy forces un- been thinned, for it isexactly where they would less they areessentially free from air attack. It is choose to strike. Instead, the main battle area somevvhat likely that the Soviets vvill devote should seem to have—through camouflage, significam air power to cover OMGs. And it is concealment, and deception—extensive cohe- quite possible that large air battles vvill rage siveness and more forces arrayed than the at- abouimostOMG incursions. NATO defensive tackercould hope todeal vvith. Electronic vvar- counterair and attack air assets vvill have to be fare vvill have decisive potential. Aclual com- at a very high State of alert, possibly even air- mand electronic signatures would becarefully concealed while bogusdeception signals would be regularly emitted. Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong has stated that, .. our strategiesought to seek this as their principal object—the mind of the opposing commander.”1' This emphasis can best be manifested by attacking the enemy along the “line of least expèctation.” The at- tacking commander must be mude to feel sud- denly trapped by the quick maneuver and sur- prise of the opposing NATO forces.“ While this might be accomplished by direct assault, a more devastating psychological effect can be produced by cutting deep into the attackers flanksand linesof communication. There is, of course, nothing revolutionary aboul such an approach. However, it seemsquestionable that effective flank and rear attackscould be carried out when the high percemageof NATO forces are arrayed along the border in forvvard defen- sive positions; especially, if operational ma- neuver groups can rapidly bypass these forces. In May 1940, French defensive doctrine was based on a similar scheme. French forces were lineariy deployed, with very few reserves, along almost the entire border with Germany; but particularly in Belgium where it was expected 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ihat lhe main thrusi vvould come. Instead, tion of the conflict on terms favorable to NATO. highl\ mobile, mechanized forces struck It is in Warsaw Pact rear areas that force through Luxembourg and were quickly into ratios mean the least and the principies of ma- lhe heart of France. Thedefense was never able neuver and surprise can most completely be 10 maneuver and concentraie effectively enough applied. NATO must siri ve to attack effectively to neutralize the German columns. first. This does not insinuate a preemptive strat- Disruption of the Warsaw Pact scheme of egy. On the contrary, it would be unwise for maneuver will requirean understandingof the NATO to be anything other than a defensive attacker‘s vulnerabilities. In the case of OMGs, alliance. However, once Warsaw Pact forces exploitation of vulnerabilities can be espe- havecrossed into the NATO territory, therecan cially fruitful for NATO. Execution of a quick be no rational reason for allowing a sancluary breakthrough by Soviet forces will require to remain. By the same token, planning for careful coordination and synchronization. Psy- such an eventuality should not irritate the sen- chological and electronic warfare by NATO sitivities of alliance governments. As Samuel can, again, prove 10 be of tremendous value. Huntington States, "there is ... no reason why Soviet automated procedures and reliance on a politically defensive alliance cannot have a operational algorithms will provide signifi- militarily offensive strategy.”16 NATO should cam opportunities for disruption. The Soviets be prepared tocross into Warsaw Pact territory will use thecover of nighi tospeed incrementai in order to take necessary steps to neutralize the advances through prepared defenses. NATO forces already in place on NATO soil and must be better prepared to fight ai night. Ob- create political leverage to force the Soviet Un- stacles, especiallv rivers, will have lo becrossed ion to negotiate termination of the conflict. quickly. Wherever possible, NATO forces Again, such attacks need not (and should not) should be prepared toexploit such hesitations be frontal assaults against strong Warsaw Pact in the OMG’s momentum. Artillery support reserves. Rather, in addition to deep attacks will be absolutely criticai to OMGs.1' In fact, already envisioned in lhe FOFA concept, raids lheability of NATO to nullify the firepower of might be accomplished by infiltrators playing Warsaw Pact artillery effectively could prove to on the political paranóia of leadership, by sa- be the proverbial “war-stopper.” boteurs againsl fragile Communications link- In order to neutralize lhe Warsaw Pact attack ups, by attacks against nuclear, ammunition, finally, its follow-on support must ultimately and fuel storage sites but, most importam, be denied. This includes not only logistics but against the lines of least expectation where the also follow-on combat forces. Thecurrent con- element of surprise can best be exploited. cept of follow-on forces attack (FOFA) should U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine has been dan- be part of NATO plans in conjunction with gerously evolving away from the concepts em- providing effective dislocation and disruption braced in forward defense. It is importam that of operational maneuver groups. It makes little the alliance maintain a consensus concerning sense tocarry the fight to theenemy’srearareas its military strategy. The essence of AirLand without first (or ai least simultaneously) neu- Battle doc trine is the identification of and con tralizing the forces present in your area. Never- centration on the enemy's strategic center ol theless, it is of criticai importance that deep gravity. The concept is built on histórica, attacks againsl support and follow-on forces precedem, which reveals that maneuver anc seize the initiative from the attacker, the ulti- surprise are the elements of combat whicF mate operational goal. Seizing the initiative is “enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones.' a prerequisite to the developmem of favorable To adopt such a doctrine, a somewhat revolu political alternatives that can lead to termina- tionary concept of command and control wil INDIRECT APPROACH APPLIED TO NATO 61

have to be instituted. Decentralized command leaders that overreliance on the concepl of for- and control will be necessary to facilitaie the ward defense in the absence oí nuclear supe- agility to conduct such mobile operations. riority is suicidai for them as well as the rest of Commanders at all leveis must have the au- NATO. European NATO governments must thority to commit forces to a course of action be made to realize that the abandonment of that they know to beconsistent wilh the lheater forward defense in favor of a defense built on strategy.1' Without such a scheme of command maneuver and surprise in no way signifies a and control, disruption, dislocaiion. and. ul- lesseningof U.S. political resolve to participaie timately, neutralization ofa synchronized War- in Europe’s defense. Inslead, it signifies a saw Pact attack cannot be assured; for, all commitmem to face squarely. in a logical NATO forces must maintain a tempo of com- manner, the strategy of the VVarsaw Pact given bat of an unprecedented nature to counter nu- the forces available to NATO now and in any merical disadvantages. Forward defense cannot foreseeable future. accomplish this, but a NATO variation of Air- If such a strategy were adopted by NATO, Land Battle might. implications for force planning would dictaie There is empirical evidence which suggests change in areas of emphasis rather than change that such doctrine applied to NATO strategy in overall scope. Military professionals who would provide a credible defense. The Office of have responded to recem strategic reform prop- the Secretary of Defense sponsored a vvar game ositions for NATO seem to feel that reliance in May 1981. In that war game, a corps sector of on maneuver and surprise and application of Central Europe was defended by former Gen- the indirect approach to strategy, with the ac- eralmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin companyingabandonment of attriiion-oriented and General der Panzertruppe Hermann Balck. operational style, is synonymous with “do Both ofíicers had faced massive Soviet attacks more with less." In fact, adoption of such a during World War II. During the war game, strategy might require initial increases in they successfully defended the sector wilh a spending to establish certain neglected or de- powerful mobile reserve. Conclusionsconcern- emphasizedcapabilities, which would include: ing the actions were as follows: • increased dispersai oí theater nuclear asseis, l he two retired generais were completeis inde- pendem from the controversies over NATO doc- • strenglheningof civil-military t ooperation, trine and strategy. The guiding principie oí the • radical upgrade in interoperability, Cierman strategy was that great resuitscould be • development oí highly mobile reserves, athieved only when the defending NATO forces • strengthening of passive defenses, shape the battlefield and retain the initialive. • expansion of psychological warfare capa- Their experience oí massive Soviet attacks and the Soviet combat mentality assured them that bility, lhe Suviets were least effective when hit by sur- • development of comprehensive covert op- prise attacks from unexpected direclions. The erations forces, and Soviets were most effective when grinding through • expansion of camouflage, concealinent, prepared positions or purposely avoiding forti- and deception capability. íied areas proceeding unchec ked deep into the enemy s rear acrording to meticulously prepared What is equally importam is the develop- plans.1* ment of a sense of strategy and operational art The implementation of such a strategy would in the professional NATO officer. This is par- encounter some predictable obsiacles. Federal ticularly true for the United States military es- Republic of Germanv leaders would have to be tablishment. It will be criticai for commanders convinced of its utility. However, it is the Ger- at all leveis to be attuned to the operational man people who will ultimatelyconvince their goalsof the theater. Adoplingoneofouradver- 62 AIR VN1VERS1TY REVIEW

sary’s adages, the Soviets say, . . no matler tic estimates, indicates that there isunaccept- hovv good ihe tactics are, if the operational able risk in relying on the attrition strategy plans are no good, you lose!”19 implicit in forward defense. It is with an em- lhe time has come for NATO to face the phasis on maneuver and surprise coupled with realitiesof the I980sand beyond. Peaceand the lhe establishment of a comprehensive opera- deterrence of war do not come without effort tional concept that NATO commanders can and com mi unem. Soviet and Warsaw Pact convincingly employ the forces supplied to strategy are changing to reflect nuclear parity them. Without this assurance, NATO cannot with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ultimaiely deter conflict in Kuropeor prevail if NATO strategy must do the same. The irrefut- deterrence fails. ability of current force ratios, even by optimis- Washington, D.C.

Notes fare: The Divergente wilhin NA TO," /ftr Vniversity Review. May- I Fred C. Ikle, "NATO‘s First NucleaY l'st*': A Deepening June 1979, p. 5. Irap?" Strategic Review. Winler 1980, as reprinted in"N A T O Ga- 11. B. II. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New pabilities and Stralegies." Air War Gollege Associale Programs, York: Praegcr, 1954), p. 339. vol. II, chap. 15, I4th edition. 1980, p. 26. 12. Ibid.. pp. 373-85. 2. William P. Mako, V.S. (íround Forces and lhe Defense of 13. Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong. "Strategymaking Central F.urupe (Washington: Brookings Insiitution, 1983), pp. for the I980's," Parameters. March 1979, p. 10. 31-35. 14. Liddell Hart, p. 340. 3. Jacquelyn K. Davis, "fcurope's Fdgy Approach to Strategy," 15. Donnelly, pp. 1185-86. Air Force. Decetnber 1985, p. 88. 16. Samuel P. Huntington, "Gonventional Deterrence and Gon- *1. Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Mines, "The Gonventional ventional Retaliation in Furope," International Security, Wintet Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis, Fali 1983, p. 699. 1983-84. p. 40. Huntingion's work isa convincing enunciation of a 5. C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group," positive strategy. It should be read by all NA TO officers. International Defense Review. vo\. 15, no. 9.1982, pp. 1177-86. This 17. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, May 1986, chap arlide tonta ms a detailed overview of Soviet operational theory as ter 2. It isclear that the U.S. Army is progressing toward a concept oli well as a hisioriial precedente from the mobile groups of World operations which reemphasi/es the historieal ascendancy of proíes War II. sional military skill. It recogni/es the clear neetl for lhe indirec 6. Lieutenant General William K. Odom, USA, address to the approach to strategy in the face of a numerically superior enetny. Gol lege of Naval Warfare. 10 January 1986. 18. F\ W. von Mellenthin and R. H. S. Stolfi, NATO unde 7. Donnelly, p. 1184. Atlach: IV/iy the Western Alhance Can Fight Oulnumbered ant 8. See Mako, op. cit. Also The Mtltlary Balance 198-f-flS (London: 11’iti in Central Furope without Nuclear Weapons (Dtirham, Nortl Institule for Strategic Studies) and Soviet Mihtary Power Garolina: Duke University Press, 1984), pp. 144-45. (Fmphasi (Washington: Government Prmting Office). added.) This work is a historical analysis of lhe Eastem Fron 9. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations during World War II as it applies to NATO today by one of th (Washington: Government Printtng Office, 20 August 1982), p. principal participants.and it hasgreat significance to NATOopei 11-9. ational art as well as strategy. 10. Dr. Steven L. Ganby, "Tactical Air Power in Armoretl War- 19. Donnelly. p. 1186. SPETSNAZ Soviet Innovation in Special Forces

R.OBERT S. BOYD

AN V press articles aboui SPETSNAZ masquerading in the West as athletes. Sensa- (Special Purpose Forces) concentraie lionalism and concentralion on issues of rela- on their glamorous and sensaiional tiveiy minor importance impede readers seek- Maspects, such as assassinaiion missionsing anda balanced understanding of SPETSNAZ B ■ 64 AIR ÜNIVERS1TY REV1EIV

capabilities and limitaiions. The purpose of and lines of communication. In addition, spe- ihis article is lo provide such an understanding. cially trained SPETSNAZ elements have the Soviet special purpose forces are called by missions of assassinating or kidnapping enemy several names, including reydoviki (from the military and civilian leaders. Knglish word "raid"), diversionary troops, and The basic SPETSNAZ unit is a team of eight reconnaissance sabotage iroops, bui they are to ten men. The team is commanded by an inost popularly known as SPETSNAZ, an acro- officer, may have a warrant officer or sênior nym from the Russian spetsialnoe naznachenie, sergeant as deputy, and includes a radio opera- meaning special purpose. SPETSNAZ are con- tor, demolitions experts, snipers, and recon- trolled by the.Soviet General Staffs Main Intel- naissance specialists. Team members have some ligence lYneciordie (GRU-Glavnoe Razvedyva- degree of cross-training so a mission can con- telnoe Upravlenie). The Soviet Union’s War- tinue if a specialist is losl. saw Pact allies maintain similar forces. Each Soviet jront or fleet would have a bri- The mission of the SPETSNAZ is toconduct gade with a wartim e strength of up to 1300 men vvhat the Soviels call Special Reconnaissance and capable of deploying about 100 teams. (Spetsialnaya Razvedka). According lo the So- A SPETSNAZ brigade consists of three to five viet Military Encyclopedia, Special Reconnais- SPETSNAZ battalions, a signal company, sup- sance is defined as, port units, and a headquarters company con- Reconnaissance carried out tosubvert thepoliti- taining highly skilled professional soldiers re- cal, econoinic and milüary potential and morale sponsible for carrying out assassinations, kid- of a probable or actual enemy. The primary mis- nappings, and contact with agents in the sionsof special reconnaissance are: acquiring in- enemy rear area. The organization of a naval telligence on major economic and military in- SPETSNAZ brigade reflects its emphasis on sea stallations and either destroying them or putting thein out of aclion, organizing sabotage and acts infiltration, with up to three frogman battal- of subversion; carrying out punitive operations ions, one parachute battalion, and a minisub- against rebels; conducting propaganda; forming marine battalion, as well as the signal com- and training insurgem detachments, etc. Special pany, headquarters company, and support ele- reconnaissance is . . . conducted by the forces of ments. Many Soviet armies have SPETSNAZ covert intelligence and special purpose troops. companies of 115 men and can deplov up to 15 More simply, the chief missions of SPETS- teams. The companies are organized similarly, N.AZ are reconnaissance and sabotage. The with three SPETSNAZ platoons, a Communi- missions of punitive action and forming in- cations platoon. and supporting units. Besides surgem groups are holdovers from World War the SPETSNAZ units at jront and army, thert II. Gurrently, theonly insurgent training con- are additional ones directly subordinate to the ducted by SPETSNAZ consists of advisory ef- GRU.1 lotai Soviet SPETSNAZ strength ir forts in África and possibly Cuba. Soviet em- peacetime is about 15,000.’ phasis on a short war probably precludes any There are stringent standards required of al serious plans to organize partisan detachments conscripts assigned to SPETSNAZ. Potentia in Western Europe in the event of war. reydoviki must be secondary school graduates SPETSNAZ operate up to 1000 kilometers intelligent, physically fit, and, perhaps mos behind enemy lines, with emphasis on enemy importam, politically reliable. Parachute train nuclear delivery means, either locating them ing with a paramilitary youth organization i forattack by other forces or, if necessary, attack- naturally a plus. Upon induction.aSPETSNAJ ing by themselves. Typical SPETSNAZ targets conscript will beasked to sign a loyalty oath ii include mobile missiles, command and control which he acknowledges death will be his pun facilities, air defenses, airfields, port facilities, ishment for divulgingdetails about his service SOVIET INNOVATION IN SPECIAL FORCES 65

After induction, some of lhe conscripts vvill for rigorous physical training involving obsta- be selected for an arduous, six-momh-long cle courses and forced marches, which are often noncommissioned officers school. Anticipat- conducted in gas rnasks. Some units also pro- ing a high washout raie. commanders may vide strenuous adventure training like moun- send as many as five conscripts for each avail- tain climbingand skiing. Up to half the year is able NCO sloi. In theeveni more NCOsgradu- spent training out of garrison. Once or twice a ate than there are slots available, lhe lower year, selected teams engage in extremely realis- ranked graduates are assigned to positions as tic exercises carried oat under battle condi- private soldiers. This excess of trained NCOs tions. Teams are provided little in the way of provides a ready pool of leaders to replace rations and are forced to forage for food. Exer- casualties in the field.! Washouts and those cise objectives are often operational installa- conscripts not selected for NCO school receive tions guarded by regular troops or soldiers of training in their units. In addition to basic the Ministry of Interior. military training, they vvill be trained in the Further indications of the realism of SPETS- following specialized skills: NAZ training are elaborate brigade training areas containing full-scale mockups of enemy • parachuting, weapon systems and facilities. Brigades oppo- • hand-to-hand combat and silent-killi,ng site NATO typically have models of Lance, techniques, including judo. karatê, and knife- Pershing, and ground-launched cruise mis- fighting, siles, as well as airfields, nuclear storage sites, • sabotage using explosives, incendiaries, air defense sites, and Communications facili- acids, and abrasives, ties. These mockups are used for both equip- • infiltration techniques, includingdefeat of ment familiarization and demolition training.' locks and security systems, SPETSNAZ careerists are well compensated • foreign language and culture, for the strenuous training. Each year of service • foreign weapons, tactics, and vehicles, w ith a SPETSNAZ unit counts as one and one- • survival, half years for pension purposes, and there is an • reconnaissance and map reading, and incentive pay of 50 percent of salary.6 As in • rappelling. other types of airborne units, SPETSNAZ re- Training in foreign language, etc., is geared ceive jump pay, which varies with the total to the SPETSNAZ unit's wartime target area. number of jumps, e.g., the fiftieth jump pays The team leader is expected to be nearly fluent more than the fifth. A conscripfs jump pay can in one of the languages of a target country, exceed his regular salary. while enlisted personnel are expected to know In keeping with their behind-the-lines mis- the alphabet and basic phrases. This specific sions, SPETSNAZ are lightly equipped. Each training relating to a foreign country is in- soldier w-ill have an AK-74 assault rifle or SVD tended not only to facilitate operations there sniper rifle, a silenced 9-mm pistol, ammuni- but also to enable the teams to conduct mis- tion, a knife, up to eight hand grenades of sions while wearing enemy uniforms or civil- various types, and rations. In addition, every ian clothing. team member carries a portion of the team’s Parachute training begins with static line gear, which will normally includean RPG-16 jumps, but many soldiers vvill progress to high grenade launcher and rounds, an R-350M burst altitude low opening (HALO) jumps using transmission radio capable of communicating steerable parachutes. Jumps are made day and over a range of 1000 kilometers, directional night, in all kinds of terrain and weather.' mines, and plastic explosives. If the mission The technical training schedule leaves time demands it, the team can also be assigned spe- Advi.sers for armeii forces friendly to lhe l '.S.S.li. are draum from lhe SPI-. TSNA7.. cessing, and SPETSNAZ. Tnder the the SPETS- Tnder SPETSNAZ. cessing, and Pro- information gence,intelligence, signals gence unit.' The latter is recruit- latter tasked with The gence unit.' cai to the success of SPETSNAZ missions. The The missions. to cai the success of SPETSNAZ NAZ departmeniare theboth SPETSNAZ forpartments reconnaissance, intelli- agent wait for theorder tocommit sabotage in prepa- insabotage tocommit wait fortheorder to than mission have no other sleeper might parisonto ordinary intelligence agents. A targetspersonnel.enemy and military peace- time potential on and collection ofinformation agents sabotage “sleeper" of ment the of second directorate brtgade aintelli- and dedicated SPETSNAZ de- separate includes It intelligence. for ble ciai weapons, such as such the ciaiweapons, SA-7 or SA-14 sur- is approximaiely40 kilograms (88 pounds).member team per load The missile. íace-to-air operalealihe m varieiy andwould. oj environmenls alsoRarnboski would haveand learnedequipment. tu lhese troops. be adepl al fighting tn lhe r lhe tn lhesebe troops. al adepl fighting depuledabove. Tu depuledabove. Tu trains on realistu aids depicting Western basing mudes Westernbasing aids depicting realistu trains on // have earned itwith iraming in a plaie like the une IW1 SPETSNAZ sabotage SPETSNAZ inagents rareare com- Provisionsintelligenceup-to-dateis oí criti- Rambo wore a Rusuan SRHTS.XAZ.beret. he would learn about s jront abotage, lheSPh.TSX AZ abotage, lheSPh.TSX staff is responsi- is staff responsi- nounlams.

Soviet legations. They will contact in-place in-place contact will They legations. Soviet membersof papersoras lalse with points entry quire safehousesto support the eventual de- agents if necessary for of prepare and thearrival time collectionefforts probablykeep SPETS- These vehitlesThese can(and do)travei near sensi- “T.I.R." marked trucks allows that agreement totrips shipson soldiersaboard cludeattachés, sleepers, the SPETSNAZ intelligence unit unit sleepers,intelligence the SPETSNAZ fessionals ofthe headquarters companiesw preceding hostilities.As tensions rise,the pro- in the days immediately importam ticularly NAZ folders full. target (Transports InternationauxRoutiers) SPETSNAZ agents Potential in- information. ployment of SPETSNAZ teams. Besides lhe lhe Besides teams. of SPETSNAZ ployment alsofor be He ration might taskedwar. to ac- infiltrate enemy territory, oftenthrough legal intelligencedepartment. Thus, intensise peace- intensise Thus, intelligencedepartment. isthe ageul with also formation exchanged tional borders. There is a European customs drivers Crossingtruck interna- West,the and trols legali and 1 to formally accredited military pers military accreditedto formally tive installations and through areas off limits borders withminimum customsformalities. The SPETSNAZ agent network will be par- par- be will network agent SPETSNAZ The lgl gns o cleto oi collection for agents legal onnel.8 In- to cross Con- ill 67 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW lhe ordinary SPETSNAZ leams. denis,12 SPEISNAZ as we know them today l he majorily of SPETSNAZ teams will infil- were probably not formed until the midsixties, trate by fixed-wing Aeroflot aircraft once hos- perhaps as a response to increased U.S. empha- tilities have begun, using Soviet offensive air sis on unconventional warfare, exemplified by operationsascover. Once in the target area, the Presidem Kennedy’s support for the U.S. Army leams will bury lheir parachutes and organize a Special Forces. Some insight into SPETSNAZ base. Routes into the base camp will be booby- capabilities can be gained from reviewing re- trapped lo provide warning of discovery, and ported past aclions. lhe location of lhe base camp will be shifted In the late sixties, four-man SPETSNAZ periodically.1' If lhe mission demands mobility, teams were clandestinely inserted into Vietnam SPETSNAZ will steal enemy vehicles or use to test the then-new SVD sniper rifle in com- transportation acquired by theagent network. bat.15 In May 1968, a reconnaissance-sabotage Most SPETSNAZ missions will have lhe group attached to the 103d Guards Airborne primary objective of reconnaissance, so they Division seized Prague Airport to enable the will use camouflage to avoid comact with division to land. Prior to the operation, the enemy patrols. They will attack if ordered to do officers and men were familiarized with the so by lhe brigade or in the event a nuclear airport and its defenses. They embarked on a missile is ready for firing. In that case, lhe team plane that received permission to land at Prague will try to desiroy the missile by fire and, if not based on a fictitious claiin of engine trouble. As successful, will mount an all-out atiack. As a the aircraft louched down and slowed, they general rule, SPETSNAZ commanders operate jumped out, seized guard posts, and helped to independently. Once missions are given 10 lhe set up a control team to bring in the division.14 teams, army and jronl headquariers keep inter- In December 1979, SPETSNAZ, in company ference toa minimum. relyingon the initiative with the Committee for State Security (RGB), and skill of the team leaders. Sufficient coordi- surrounded Presidem Hafizullah Amin’s pal- nation is maintained to be able to order the ace in Kabul, Afghanistan, and proceeded to teams out of the way of other Soviet attacks, execute Amin and virtually everyone in the particularly nuclear strikes.10 palace. In the words of an Afghan survivor, SPETSNAZ are not particularly well known “theSPETSNAZ used weaponsequipped with within the Soviet military, and they tend not to silencers and shot down their adversaries like publicize theirexistenceandcapabilities. Their professional killers.”1'’ After this, the SPETS- uniforms are not distinctive, with ground for- NAZ secured Rabul Airport in preparation for ces SPETSNAZ usually weating airborne or the mass airlanding of airborne troops. Subse- signal troops’ uniforms and naval SPETSNAZ quent operations in Afghanistan have included wearing naval infantry or submariners’ uni- attempts to ambush the rebel leader Ahmed forms. Their ethnic makeup is likewise not Shah Massoud, infiltration of rebel-held terri- distinctive and to some degree reflects the eth- tory, and heliborne ambushes of rebel units.16 nic characteristics of the intended target. For There was midget submarineactivity within example, SPETSNAZ units in the Far East are territorial waters in October 1982 in Sweden alleged to have available North Koreans and and in August 1983 in Japan. T he midget sub- Japanese from Manchuria and the Kuril marines probably belonged to naval SPEIS- Islands.11 NAZ and may have been delivered to the target There were special purposegroups in World area by specially equipped India-class subma- War II whose primary mission was to para- rines. Discovery of tracks from the submarines chute into an area and form the nucleus of a also coincided with reports of unknown divers partisan group to be fleshed out with area resi- appearing on shore, leading to speculation SOTIET INNOVATION IN SPECIAL FORCES 69

that SPETSNAZ were conducting penetration SPETSNAZ must rely on lhe brute force of the exercises in foreign countries.1' The true rea- Soviei air operaiion to cover most infiltralion. sons for this activity may never be known, but If Soviet fighter-bombers and other means do lhe boldness of the operations had lhe undeni- not inílici the necessary damage to NA TO air able effecí of enhancing the repuiaiion of defenses, unarmed transports could prove sit- SPETSNAZ. tingducks, with the result of heavy SPETSNAZ losses before teams arrive on largei. Despite these limilations, SPETSNAZ posea ^)n'E must be on guard in con- formidable wartime threat to NATO’s rear cluding from the more extreme articles in lhe area. From the Soviei side, a force of several open press that the averageSPETSNAZ soldier thousand highly trained soldiers is a small in- is ien*feet tall. Despite their qualifications, vestment with lhe potential layoff of neutraliz- tough training, and demonstrated value, the ing NATO’s nuclear delivery capability and fact remains that the majority of SPETSNAZ degrading air defense and Communications are conscripts on two-year tours of duty. Con- Systems, not merely through the efforts of sequently, there is limiied opportunity for SPETSNAZ, but by enhancing the eífective- cross-training in specialties, and soldiers may ness of aircrafl. missiles, and ground forces lack the degree of motivation that characterizes through accurate target location. The size and Western unconventional warfare forces, such quality of the SPETSNAZ establishment point as the U.S. Army Rangers, Special Eorces, and out the need for good security of key installa- the British Special Air Service. In comparison tions, a fact that is increasingly taken to heart to Western unconventional warfare forces, by Western planners. Continued awareness of SPETSNAZ lack specialized infiltralion air- the SPETSNAZ threat is necessary foi making craft such as the l ’.S. Air Force MC-130E Com- further tangible improvements in both rear bat Talon. This lack severely limitsSPETSNAZ area combat doctrine and installation defense capabilities for clandestine insertion, particu- measures. larly prior to the start of hostilities. As a result, Hq USAF

Noies 1. Viktor Suvorov, "Spelsnai—The Soviei 1'niorú Special For- 7. lbid.. p. 1211. ces." International Defense Heview, Sepiember 1983, pp. 1209-16. 8. Washington Times, 23 December 1982. 2. Estimatesof SPETSNAZ strenglh range from 15,000 lo 60,000. 9. Suvorov, p. 1215. Based on known units and Soviei manning praclices, a is quile 10. lbid. likely lhai lhe lower figure more accurately rcflecls lhe peacelime 11. Japanese newspapcr Sankei, 3 January 1984. sirenglh. An addilional 10,000 lo 15.000 would probably be re- 12. Major General V. Andrianov, "The Organizational Slructure quired to (ill oui brtgades and independem companies. of Partisan Formalions during lhe War Years," Soviei Military 3. Suvorov, p. 1212. History Journal, January 1984, pp. 38-46. 4. Captain Remhold Neuer. "Parairoops of lhe National Peo- 13. Ross S. Kelly, "Spelsnai: Special Operations Forces of lhe ple's Army: Specialisls in Combat behind Enemy Lines," Trup- USSR," Defense and Foreign A/fairs, December 1984, pp. 28-29. penpraxis. July 1983, pp. 515-20. T his discussion is mainly about 14. Aleksei Myagkov. "The Soviei Union’s Special Forces." So- East Germany recon-sabouge iroops. bul it probably appliesalso lo viet Analyst. 9 January 1980. SPEISNAZ. 15. French newspapcr Figaro, 6 Sepiember 1984. 5. Sovtel Military Power I98f (Washington: Government Print- 16. Kelly, p. 28 and p. 29. ing Office), p. 73. 17. Suvorov, p. 1212; CBS Evening News. 15 November 1983; 6. Suvorov. p. 1213. Figaro, 6 Sepiember 1984; and Sankei, 10 February 1981. IRA C. EAKER ESSAY COMPETITION

Air University and Air University Review proudly announce the unnners of the sixth annual Ira C. E aker Essay C om petition

FIRST AWARD GOLD MEDALLION AND $2000 UNITED STATES SAVINGS BOND “Technology and the American Way of War: Worshipping a False Idol?” by COLON EL DENNIS M . DREW Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Maxwell AFB, Alabama

SECOND AWARD SILVER MEDALLION AND $1000 UNITED STATES SAVINGS BOND “Combat Support Doctrine: Corning Down to Earth” by LIEUTENANT COLONEL WlLLIAM T. MCDANIEL, JR. Logisiics Concepts Division Washington, D.C.

T H IR D AWARD BRONZE MEDALLION AND $500 UNITED STATES SAVINGS BOND “The Military Image: Appearance, Reality, and the Identity Crisis” by SECOND LIEUTENANT ROBERT D. CRITCHLOW OL AB Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSC) Peterson AFB, Colorado DISTINGUISHED HONORABLE MENTION “Last Chance or Lost Chance: The Air Force Corps System” by Colonel William E. Gernert III, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE MENTION CERTIFICATES ‘‘Use and Misuse of Conventional Tactical Air Power” by Lieutenant Colonel William P. Stroud III, Military Assistance Advisory Group. Spain ‘‘Teamspirit: The Realities of Force Projection” by Captain David A. Moore, 356th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina ‘‘The Problem with ‘IntegTity’” by Colonel Victor L. Thacker, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama “Doolittle’s other Copilot” by Major Stephen Ray Mitchell, Malcolm Grovv USAF Medicai Center, Andrews AFB, D.C. “Leadership and Software” by Captain Christopher F. Greco, Hq Electronic Security Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany ‘‘Of Eagles among Sparrows” by Major Roberto Masferrer, M.D., USAF Regional Medicai Center, Clark AB, Philippines

We gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation for funding this essay competition by a permanent grant through the United States Strategic Institute of Washington. D.C. THE HUMAN FACTOR: THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE SOVIET FIGHTER PILOT

C olonkl M ik k P ress

Our mosl important advantage [over the Soviets] is our personnel. General Creech, Armed Forces Journal, 1983

U.S. tactical forces retam a quahtative advantage over those of the Soviel Union both in aircraft and weapons and—more important—in personnel and training. Soviel Military Power, A pril 1985 IN MY OIJINION 73

HERE seems to be a general consensus oí much of an advantage does the U.S. pilot main- Topinion today that in a comparison of tain, and how does one measure the difference? strength between lhe Soviet and U.S. tactical Is this advantage widening or narrowing? Fi- air forces, the Soviet advantage in numbers is nally, and mosl importam, once the advantage counterbalanced by the U.S. advantage in tech- is determined, how does one go aboul improv- nology, personnel, training, and tactics. Since ing lhe fighter force to ensure an even greater the Soviets have been successful in narrowing advantage? lhe technology gap, some U.S. policymakers To begin a comparison of two countries’ have put even more emphasis on the perceived fighter pilots' capabilities is not an easy task. U.S. advantage in personnel. In fact, some While it is quite common for an analysl to would argue that the U.S. fighter pilot, his compare fighter forces based on the number of training, and his tactics are so superior that aircrafl and quality of weapons, it is very rare to even if the Soviets could catch up in technol- find an objective study of pilot capabilities. In ogy, the U.S. fighter forces would still have un fact, mosl analyses quantify combat capability overall edge in combat capability. as a product of numerous factors, such as air- This article examines that argument and craft, logistics, maintenance, munitions, etc. provides some ansvvers to difficult questions But the human factor (pilot ability, training, surfaced by this issue. Is it true that the U.S. and tactics) is rarely included because its mea- fighter pilot is inherently better than his Soviet surement is very subjective and its impact on counterpart? Are U.S. training programs and the equation so little understood. Few will tactics better? If the comparisons are true, how argue, however, that differences in pilot capa- 74 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW

biliiy do exist, and some aspects oí the human and mililary aviation is a highly sought-after facior should be included in iheequaiion ií \ve profession. The Soviet pilot is at the top of the are to achieve accurate comparisons. economic and social scale so that selection to The human facior, as it relates to Soviet and one of the higher aviation schools is a ticket to U.S. combat capability, constitutes three main the upper echelons of society. Lieutenant Vik- variables—the inherent ability oí the individ- tor I. Belenko, the Soviet MiG pilot who de- ual pilot, his training, and his tactics. These fected in September 1976, related that more three variables, when added together, produce than 4000 applicants tested for only 360 slots to a pilot or “human facior" input to the overall his freshman class at the Soviet Air Defense effectiveness of a sortie or mission. Let’s look al Command flight training program at Armavir each of these variables in turn. in the Caucasus. And, out of the 360 that began, The first variable is the inherent ability of only 258 graduated—a 30 percent attrition rate. the pilot, or put another way, thequality of the Thus, while it can be argued that the average individual as a fighter pilot, given equal train- Soviet high school graduate is probably less ingand tactics. The pilot’s inherent ability is a technically oriented than his U.S. counterpart, product of the pilot selection process and the the Soviets have the advantage of large numbers personnel system that assigns and maintains of applicants to mililary aviation schools from therated fighter-pilot force. Relative tootherair which they can choose the cream of the high forces, the l T.S. Air Force does very little prese- school crop. lection testingof personnel prior to theirenter- When our pilots graduate, they are assigned ing pilot training. In other air forces, especially to specific unil aircraft and are managed by the IsraeFs, numerous psychological, motor skills rated officer personnel system for subsequent and other screentng tests are given to measure assignments. Here again, we do not do a very inherent fighter pilot ability prior to selection good job of rated officer management if en- for pilot training. Bv contrast, U.S. Air Force hanced combat capability is the final objective. pilot selection is based on a relatively anti- The personnel rated management system at- quated system of undergraduate academic tempts to maintain the fighter pilot rated force grades, officer qualification test scores, and at a levei based on many factors, such as unit 20 20 vision. The pilot selection process does manning leveis, training leveis, and unit expe- not differentiate between skills necessary for rience leveis. Many reasons are used for moving fighter pilots and other pilots such as airlift or fighter pilots from one air base to another, bomber pilots. This distinclion is made much from one aircraft type to another, or from rated later in the trainingcycle, is usually subjective, duties to a staff position. These reasons in- and can only select from those who have al- clude, but are not limited to, the "fairness" of ready been admitted into the program. The personnel moves, remoteassignmenteligibility, USAF pilot selection system still suffers from career broadening, manning leveis, and career the“universally assignable pilot"concept that progression. Rarely has the personnel system has been around for years. explained a move by stating that it is in the best When comparing the U.S. pilot selection interest of increased combat capability. In fact, system with lhe Soviets, one could safely say the rated management system would be hard that the Soviets’ competition for pilot training pressed to move individuais based on piloi slots is more competiiive than ours. The bene- capability since there is no formal system that fits after attaining the status of fighter pilot in raies pilots according to their relative individ- the Soviet Union are some of the highest in the ual capabilities. Promotions are not made on society. The higher aviation schools are consid- pilot capabilities, but rather on officer effec ered among the best schools in the country, tiveness reports, and most assignments art IN MY OPINION 75

madeon professional career progression rather realizing that new generation fighlers need than combai capabiliiy. new generation training philosophies. As stated TheSoviet rated management sysiem is not in Soviet Military Power, published by the De- much better Lhan ours. but because of their partm ent of Defense in March 1983, "lhe So- restriciive sysiem, a íighier piloi is noi moved viets have recently made significam changes in as frequently. The Sovieis, lherefore, expe- their air combai tacticsand training programs. rience less lurbulence in their force, and a pilol Pilot independence and initiatives are now may fly lhe same aircrafi or mission for twenty- stressed. The continuai, technological upgrad- five vears. However, their promoiions and as- ing of equipment and increasing proficiency in signments are based more on political reliabil- combat employmem of that equipment have ity lhan pilot effeciiveness. In lhe end. iheir resulted in greatly increased Soviet aviation progression is probably as equally nonrelevam capabilities.” Thus, even in thearea of training to combai capability as the U.S. sysiem. where the USAF fighter pilot has always ex- If ii is generally accepted ihen ihai the USAF celled, Soviet initiatives dictate new and ag- has better pilots than the Sovieis, it certainly is gressive U.S. training initiatives if the United not due to any preselection criteria, screening, States is to maintain its present advantage in competitive testing, or rated management sys- the training variable. iem. In fact, the individual Soviet pilot. when The third variable in the human factor to be compared to the Soviet society as a whole, is discussed is tactics. Although tactics are not a probably one of the most highly qualified and specific human quality, they are designed and capable individuais. He certainly seeins com- employed by the pilot and lherefore impact parable in inherent abilities with his American upon how well the pilol can employ his air- counterpart. It seems safe to assume that any craft. In 1972, the Fighter Weapons School ai advantage we maintain is not due to the inher- Nellis AFB, Nevada, began experimenting with ent abilities of our fighter pilots. However, if new fighter formations and tactics. These for- one were to get serious about upgrading the mations and tactics, called Fluid Two, were a pilol force and in gaining or increasing an composite of lessons learned in air-to-air com- advantage in the human factor, the pilot selec- bat in Vietnam, the U.S. Navy’s ‘‘loose deuce,” tion and rated management areas would cer- and formations flown in the F-10-4 and other tainly be good places to start. aircraft called ‘‘double attack.” Although the The second variable affecting the human fac- formation was different from the old Fluid tor is training. If there is one area where the Four tactic, the most significam difference was United States Air Force leads all countries, it is the philosophical change in the wingman’s in fighter training. In the past ten years with duties. Fluid Two detached the wingman from theadvent of Red Flag. Aggressor training. and a very restrictive cover position ("fighling Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT), the wing”) on the leader to a more active role, USAF has made gigantic strides toward realis- maneuvering independeutly, yet in coordina- tic fighter training. From the lessons learned in tion, with the leader. For the past ten years, the Vietnam and the Red Baron report, U.S. fighter tactical air force has been training with and forces have developed the most realistic and refitiing fluid attack tactics. In principie, U.S. ambitious training program in the world. fighter pilots are free to design, test, and fly However, these "new" training programs are almost any variation of formations and tactics more than ten years old now, and they have that they or their squadron wish to try. How- reached a plateau in progress with stagnation ever, in practice, due to limited sorties, safety setting in. restrictions, and a rated management sysiem The Soviets, on the other hand, were late in that always requires training to lhe lowest de- 76 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW

nominator, tactics development today is in íact their battle schemes? In either case, suffice it to spolty and often neglected. say that both the U.S. and Soviet tactics will As noted earlier, the Soviets are atiempting change with the advent of new aircraft, mis- to improve their tactics with each new genera- siles, and radars. What worked yesterday in the tion oí aircraft, and lhey are just beginning to F-86 will not w'ork in the F-15. The tactic used give their pilots more independence. On the to defeat the MiG-21 will probably not be lhe surface this appears to be a ten-year lag in tacti- best tactic to defeat the Flanker. The USAF has cal developmeni. However, when one consid- always been willing to change tactics, howrever, ers Soviet historical doctrine of mass, break- tactical development, evaluation, and imple- through, and sirici command and control, the mentation seem to be taking more time, mon- idea of large, inflexible, and slow maneuvering ey, and effort these days. And the Soviets are formations may be more design than simple not standing still. With their new- equipment, lack of progress. VVhat may look to the U.S. they are experimenting with new tactics. So observer as an unimaginative tactic may to the even in the tactics variable, the U.S. advaniage Soviet commander be as sophisticated and ad- has become questionable and possibly is slip- vanced as his doctrines, force structure, and ping away. mission would dictate. And vvho is to say that Thus, in a brief examination of the variables fluid attack and independem maneuvering that make up the human factor, it can be seen would work better than regimental control in that although in each case no quantitative measurement can be made, there is reason to The h-Ut Fiçhting Falcon, one of the world's hottest believe that the United States is equal to or fighlers, has been a part of the l .S. Air Fon e for near- slightly aheadof the Soviets. However, whereas ly a deiade.... TheMi('i-27(oppositepage) hasserved five or ten years ago this advantage may have lhe Soviet Air Force well in Afghanistan. In both air fort e.'i, regardless of equipment, i’ood aircreivs re- been quite large, the Soviets seem to be narrow- mam the hry to fielding respectahle fighting forces. ing the gap in all cases. U.S. pilot selection and IN MY OPINION 77

rated management policies have not changed, The inherent ability of the fighter pilot is and training and lactics initiaiives, while dy- one of the most importam variables in the hu- namic after Vietnam. have pretty much stag- man factor, the easiest to change, and yet the nated. In lhe meantime, the Sovieis have been most neglected. As an old fighter pilot once ploddingalong in iheir inimitable way, slowly eloquently remarked, “You can train a ham- increasing their training realism and tesiing burger. but when you’re through, you slill get new tactical philosophies to match their weap- hamburger." Fighter pilot training today is a ons improvements. If lhe United States is to demanding process and without a good prod- maintain any advantage that it may have in the uct to start with, no amount of excellent train- human factor, drastic steps need to be taken ing will produceaquality fighter pilot. There- soon. fore, the selection process must be changed to We can increase tactical cornbat capability be more aggressive, competitive, and highly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in a number of ways: selective. Large groups of candidates should be buy more aircraft, build newer aircraft, radars, screened with sophisticated, modern testing and missiles, increase the spares, etc. The one procedures. Large attrition rates should be ex- factor. however, that could have the greatest perienced in the early phases of training. Need- impact, and vet is probably the least expensive less to say, specialized fighter training should and most easily changed. is the human factor. begin early. At every stage of training, competi- By launching an aggressive and dvnamic pro- tion, and ratings based on fighter pilot perfor- gram to upgrade the fighter pilot force, the mance should be used for selection to top fight- USAF could drastically alter the cornbat equa- er pilot positions. tion in its favor for years. Sitnple initiatives and The rated management system needs a thor- policy changes affecting the human factor vari- ough review. Personnel assignment policies ables could make U.S. fighter cornbat capabil- need to be changed so they can respond to the ity increase exponentially. needs of cornbat capability and not to an arbi- 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

irary "gooddeal baddeal” list. In other words, order to quantify the advantage of one tactic ií a íorwardair controller job needs filling, you over another, testing is required. In-depth tac- don’t take the best F-15 pilot to fill it just be- tics testing is very time-consuming and costly. cause he’s due a “bad deal.” More sensitivities Conducting a valid tactics evaluation may take need to be paid to the policies that force early up to two years and hundreds of sorties. Here rotations and create turbulence in lhe units. In again “state-of-the-ari” combat simulators can today's fighter force, it takes two to three years be extremely helpful in speeding up this pro- to upgrade a flight lead and another two to cess. The combat simulator used in evaluating three years to get good ai it. Most new fighter the AMRAAM is a prime exampleof howcom- pilots don’l stay in their first squadron more bat simulators were used to simulate realistic than two to three years, and many don't remain combat engagemenis better than could have in their first assignment aircraft longer than been done in the real aircraft because of range five years. The result is that most operational and safety restriclions. Tactics development, fighter squadrons are continually upgrading testing, and evaluation are too important to new pilots, and very few squadrons reach a continue in the slow pace of only live mission levei of high combat capability. VVhat is re- testing. A realistic state-of-the-art combat sim- quired by the rated management system is a ulator similar to the one used in the AMRAAM conscious effort to keep good fighter pilots in tests should be devoted full time to tactics test- the same aircraft, same mission, same unit for ing and evaluations. Like training, tactics de- longer periods of time. Goneare thedays when velopment is expensive, but it needs to be im- wre can afford a universally assignable pilot, or proved if the USAF is to increase its advantage even a “generic fighter pilot.” over the Soviets. To make these changes in the pilot selection process and rated management system requires THE U.S. fighter pilot community is at a criti- major policy changes but should cost relatively cai crossroad. While the Soviets outnumber the little. When it comes to improving the training United States and are slowly catching up in variable, however, costs do enter into the pic- technology, our one remaining advantage is ture. Quality training is expensive, but expen- our fighter pilots. As has been shown, however, sive training is usually cheaper in the long run that human advantage is very fragile and even due to increased combat capability and a more here the Soviets show signs of progress. Unfor- efficient and effective fighting force. New, in- tunately, the human factor is one of the factors novative methods of training need to be devel- of the combat capability equation that has oped to stay ahead of the Soviets. State-of-the- gained little attention in the U.S. Air Force and art combat simulators that rival the most ad- also little support in the budget battles. I be- vanced air-to-air training are available today. lieve that with some renewed high-level inter- More air combat maneuvering instrumentation est and a moderate infusion of money, the hu- and electronic combat ranges are needed. More man factor can be significantly altered in the flying time, range lime, realistic scenarios, and proper direction. It seems only natural that a composite force training are all high priorities. fighter force with the most highly advanced Combat is not the lime to discover that you aircraft, missiles, and radars should also have need more training. pilots to fly them who are second to none. In At first glance, one would assume that tac- the air-to-air arena there is an old saying, tics, unlike training, would be very cheap to "there is a time for energy and time for action.’ change and would simply require a tactics It s time for action! manual change. However, tactics like the other variables are very difficult to measure, and in Zaragoza, Spair the classic approach TRAIN HARD, FIGHT EASY: THE LEGACY OF A. V. SUVOROV AND HIS “ART OF VICTORY”

Dr Brice W. M hnning

YFR the last cemury, commeniaiors and ing in fighting the Polish Confederates, then- military historians have wilh few excep- Major General Suvorov argued that his meth- Otions gravitated to two extremes in explainingods were justiíied in the light of Russian czarist military success during the golden age military progress against Prússia during the of Russian arms, an era of seemingly endless Seven Years' War. He noted that Frederick II, victories running from the reign of Peter the overrun from all sides, had lost soldiers drilled Great (1689-1725) to that of Paul I (1796-1801). in the niceties, had been forced to throw re- On the one hand, the academic school of inter- placements together like fish soup, anddid not pretation has sought to explain martial tri- have time to drill them more than perfunctor- umph in terms of Russian adherence to com- ily. In co n trast, by 1761 the R u ssian s were more monly perceived and practiced principies of than equal to their adversaries. The difference military art. On the other hand, the national in Suvorov's eyes? Training. YVhile Frederick (or Russian) school has sought explanation in had replaced experienced troops wilh hastily underlying and uniquely Russian cultural fac- trained recruits, the Russians, having been de- tors.1 Between these poles, other observers have ployed longer, reached a well-trained State. occasionally labored to produce a synthesis Consequently, the Prussians fell before the that buildson ihestrenglhsoí both approaches Russians, just as in 1709 theSwedes had fallen at to achieve a balance between context and Poltava before Peter the Great "who had drilled constancy.2 his troops more than the foreigners, whoseown Against the overall background of historio- forces were incompletely trained."' Suvorov graphical controversy and compromise, the later insisied that each trained soldier equaled testimony of one of the era’s chief—if not most somewhere between three and ten untrained importam—actors, Generalissimo Aleksandr counterparis. In his words, training meam Vasilevich Suvorov (1730-1800), remains espe- "light,” while lack of training spelled "dark- cially instructive. In 1771, when forced to ra- ness."4 tionalize novel approaches to taciics and train- These assertions underscore the importance

79 80 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

which perhaps the greatest Russian military command in the 1760s and 1770s, he burst into commander of all time ascribed to training. By this well-ordered world as an innovator, a field 1771, a m ixtureof influences, includingservice commander whose tactical and operational in the ranks, combat experience, and tenure in conceptions were often at variance with Kuro- various junior and sênior command and staff pean military convention. In contrast with the positions, had begun to coalesce for Suvorov languid methods and tactics of his day, Su- into the foundations of a comprehensive pro- vorov marched rapidly, struck unexpectedly, gram for military action whith underscored altacked seemingly helter-skelter from a variety lhe fundamental important e of training to vic- of formalions, and pursued relentlessly.7 lory. In 1795. several warsand nuinerouscam- Training made the injection of fury possible; paignsafter lhe brushfire conflicts of the 1770s what lent focus was a novel and complemen- in Poland, Suvorov would refine more than tary emphasis in the brief pages of "The Art of four decades of experience into a simple set of Victory" on mobility, flexibility, initiative, guidelines ttj govern the training and indoctri- and agility. These and other aspects of his Vi- nation of soldiers in the fundamentais of the sion Suvorov summed up with reference to his military art. famous triad—speed, assessment, and hitting 11 is prest riptions, known as “The Art of Vic- power (bystrota,glazomer, nati.sk).* With these tory,*' vvere initially circulated in manuscript words. he enjoined his officers and troops to form, temporarily forgotten after bis death, move fast, size up situations quickly and accu- then published and reprinted eight times be- rately, then push headlong into the attack. tvveen 1806 and 181 1.s By the second half of the Whether in combat against Polish rebels, Tatar nineteenth century, the prescriptions had be- tribesmen, Turkish janissaries, French revolu- come a Russian military classic. YVhatever the tionaries, or Prussian grenadiers, Suvorov’s version. “The Artof Victory" subsequently be- stress on thorough preparation and speedy exe- came the font to which Russian and Soviet cution was sufficient to produce threescore ma- military trainers have returned repeatedly for jor and minor victories, often in the face of information and inspiration. Because of their hopeless odds. As Philip Longworth, Suvorov’s persistem influence, a review of Suvorov’s most recent Western biographer, has noted, training principies as they evolved to culmi- “he won far too frequemly to be called lucky: nate in “The Art of Victory” promises insight he never lost.”<> not only into the Russian military past but also Although "The Art of Victory” dates to 1795, the Soviet military present. evidence shows that Suvorov first professed sys- Any discussion of Suvorov’s training methods tematic views on train in g durin g the 1760s, must begin vvith referente to context and im- when he returned from the Prussian cam- pact. Suvorov entered active Service with the paigns to assume successive command of the Imperial Russian Army in 1748 at the age of Astrakhan and Suzdal infantry regiments. By eighteen. and the majority of his career coin- 1765, he had worked out a successful training cidecl with the heyday of eighteenth-century lin- program, the “Suzdal Regulations,” which ear tactics. This was a time in which armies of servedasa legitimate supplement to theofficial highly trained professionals equipped with drill regulations of 1763. In consonance with smoothbore, flintlock muskets marched in col- circumstances and in agreement with regula- umn and fought on line in elaborately choreo- tions, in each succeeding command he sought graphed battles that at least metaphorically to extend and inslitutionalize his program of mirrored contemporary intellectual preoccu- systematic troop training. These elaborations pations with notions of order, symmetry, and and various discrete instructions would even- rationalism.6 YVhen Suvorov finally rose to tually culminate in “ l he Art of Victory." I he THE CLASSIC ATPROACH SI

developmenialaspectaside, iheSuzdal Regula- ditions. Military physicians and commanders tions already reveal lhe foundations of his made daily checks on the status of troops and training sysiem: begin with an undersianding their bivouacs. Soldiers were never to sleep di- oí the soldier and his needs; recognize the ne- rectly on the ground, meais were to include cessily of creating under sirong supervision a vegetables, water was to be boiled, and approp- confident fighting man; develop a sense of in- riate measures were taken toensure field sanita- dividual and group ideniiiy; and engage in tion. Inanagewhen skimpingon rationsmeant constant. progressive, and repetitive iraining extra income for thecommander, Suvorov held under conditions gradually approaching those his officers strictly accountable for lhe welfare of genuine combat. The approach worked so of their troops. This concern produced palpa- well that already in the mid-1760s theSuzdalers ble results in the form of decreased mortality were sufficiently well trained to attract imperial and increased readiness rates. It also lowered atteniion at summer maneuvers held near Tsar- requirements for training replacements and skoe Selo.10 produced handsome returns in morale, which For Suvorov, training began with the indi- helped make sense of lhe system for the soldier, vidual soldier. The task was to transform an- whether veteran or recruit. Denis Davydov, lhe nual levies of raw and illiterate peasant con- Russian partisan hero ol 1812, once remarked scripts into fighting troops. This meam mak- that Suvorov “put his hand on the heart ol lhe ing warriors of disoriented and disgruntled Russian soldier and learned its beat.”1' young men tom from their traditional village "The Art of Victory” reinforced lhe overall societies and pressed into what must have sense of concern by enjoining officers to “con- seemed a penal-like system of routine, regula- verse with soldiers in their own language." tion, ritual, and rigid subordination. VVhile Emphasis fell on practical explanation and recent commentators have reminded us that demonstration in terms understandable to the many elementsof village and barrack lifecoin- average soldier, and it was Suvorov’s pen- cided, soldierly existence held something new chant—possibly a carry-over from his own Ser- and alarming: calculated exposure to danger vice in the ranks—to spend lime with the with the real possibility of giving “a life for the troops, sharing their jokes and campfires at czar.”11 Suvorov faced this and other training odd moments while on campaign or hard at challenges in characteristically direcl fashion. work in a training exercise.11 In “The Art of Victory,” he declared in words The commander’s visits and his easy famil- readily understandable to his recruits that, ”if a iarity with troops did not imply lax discipline. peasant doesn't know how to plough, he can- On thecontrary, Suvorov believed that military not grow bread." The unmistakable military life as such could not exist without siric t disci- ímplicatton was that neither could an un- pline and subordination. Suvorov was an avid trained soldier succeed in battle. Therefore, the student of the history of Rome, and he surely master of iraining consciously set out to trans- realized that the reintroduction of Roman dis- form the lives of his peasant recruits to render cipline was in some measure responsible for thedifficult possible and the unthinkable more what few advances were possible in an age ol palatable.12 stagnant technology. He once noted that, “all VVhile his intent was scarcely novel, his meth- constancy of military discipline is based on od was. He deemphasized corporal punish- obedience.” He added that, “From obedience ment, and before the training cycleever started, comes thecareful and easy carrying out ofevery Suvorov strictly prescribed organizational ad- man’s responsihility and his pride in its perfec- herence to conditions which fostered mainte- tion; and in this there lies the whole essence of nance of health, diet, and adequate living con- military order.” Heenjoined his troops lodress 82 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW

and act like soldiers and held officers and non- instruciion on items of conduct, dress, and commissioned officers directly responsible for toilel. 1 here followed rudimentary introduc- lhe conduct of lheir men. Under peacelime tion to the manual of arms. Then carne train- condilions, Suvorovexpected his men togeion ing in what the Russians called ‘‘evolutions vvith lhe local populace, whelher in friendly or and maneuvers," first at the equivalem of occupied territory, loadherestrictly to military squad levei, then at platoon and company regulalions, and during wariime lo maintain levei. Primary emphasis fell on the ability to lhe discipline and presence of mind thai em- change formations, lo move from march order phasized mission and spelled success. Ií a cav- into appropriate battle order in the most expe- alryman during lhe pursuit siopped 10 looi a di tious manner. Like another eighteenth-cen- fallen foe, his officer ivas lo shooi him. If a tury military genius, Marshal MauricedeSaxe, sênior officer savv oneof his juniors not enforc- Suvorov no doubt believed thai “all the secret ing the regulalions, lhe junior man was lo be of maneuvers lies in the legs.” Although Su- placed under immediaie arrest.15 vorov preached strict adherence to regulalions l he siress on conventional discipline as lhe in garrison, in the field he was less concerned soul of military life should not obscure Suvo- with appearance, evenness of step, and glitter, rov’s emphasis on enthusiasm and the positive than he was with the troops' ability to move aspecis of a sysiemalic approach to training fast and to change formations readily.17 which instilled self-confidence. He recognized Agility and swiftness derived from physical the importante of religious sentiment in rein- conditioning, and although Suvorov himself forcing a common identity and loyalty to was not of robust physique, he subjected his shared values. He also realized thai attainment troops to rigorous conditioningroutines. They of his training objectives restedon thedegree to learned to march rapidly over longdistances, to which his methodsdeveloped men confident in swim, to traverse difficult terrain, to leap over their own capacities and abilities lo succeed, obstacles. With conditioning carne endurance even under ihemost trying condilions ofbattle. and prideof accomplishment. With condition- He ordered his men not to cry out in battle as ing also carne speed. He ceaselessly trained his did the "barbarians,” and he restricted officers soldiers to cover vast distances with little rest. and noncommissioned officers to shouting Not surprisingly, rigorous training paid hand- orders and his troops to chanting rousing somedividends: in 1769 on the way to Brest, his "hurrahs" in unison. What he wanted his sol- Suzdalers covered 275 miles in 11 traverses, an diers to project both to the enemy and to them- average march pace of nearly 26 miles per day; selves was a sense of self-contained control, a in 1799, during the sum m er heat of the Italian sense of disciplined will poiver that led inevit- campaign, he once marched nearly 53 miles in ably to viciory.16 36 hours, then fought a major three-day en- But how to build self-confidence in men gagement. Not without reason does Longworth long accustomed to life at the lower ranges of remark that Suvorov "was obsessed with the the social scale? Once having assured his men idea of speed."18 of their welfare and having stressed the impor- Within the tactical and operational context, tante of discipline and enthusiasm. the next this phrase is no exaggeration. The Russian step was lo undertake actual training. Expla- Generalissimoonce reminded an Austrian a 11 y, nation was always accompanied by demonstra- “Money is dear; human life is still dearer; but tion. And theorderof training was always done time is thedearest of all." Suvorov prized speed from the simple to the more complex. The because it put time on his side and enhanced process was to be practical, progressive, and the possibility of surprise. "One minute," Su- systematic. The new recruit received individual vorov asserted, "decides theoutcomeof a battle, THE CLASSIC APPROACH 83

one hour lhe success of a campaign, one day lhe beena fire fighi into hand-to-handcombat. Lii- faieoíempires__ I operaie not by hours but by tle wonder lhai an American of lhe same era, minutes.’’ In The Ari of Viciory,” he wroie, Benjamin Franklin, once seriously proposed “The enemy sings, walks aboui, waiis for you equipping the Continental Army with long- from lhe open field, and you hit him from bows! A cumbersome and fragile lechnology beyond lhe sieep mountains and sileni foresis, prompied Suvorov to stress the importance of like snow on lhe head.” At lhe heari of Suvo- lhe bayonei: a soldier must know how lo shoot, rov's lactical system lay the realization that his bul in the end cold sieel was his most reliable forces foughi “not with numbers bui vviih íriend. OrasSuvorov put il in language readily skill,” and thai "speed and surprise substiluted understandable for lhe average soldier, “The for numbers [while] hitting power and blows bulleds a fool, lhe bayoneds a fine lad.’Vl decided combat.”19 Suvorov is often crediied with íosiering a tmphasis on lhe legs did noi imply thai “cult of the bayonet" which would return lo Suvorov neglecied ihe manual of arms, only haunt the Russiansa century laier, when M. I. ihat he required less precise movemenis in drill Dragomirov carne lo siress lhe importance of wilh muskeis. In addilion lo being able 10 cold sieel at the expense of lactical and techni- shoulder lhe weapon in an appropriaie fash- cal innovation. Issuesof lechnological comexí ion, Suvoro\ demanded two ihings: rapid fire aside, critics of cold Steel tend lo ignore the drill and experi bayonei drill. tmphasis fell on psychological faetor. Viciory in balde ulii- rapid fire not because of a concern with fire mately represents a triumph of will, and lhere volume, but because of a concern ihai soldiers is no beiier way to demonsirate outright mas- learn 10 load in lhe most expediiious manner tery ihan lo dominate physically with cold possible. He wanied his men to fire slowly and sieel. While no one would argue lhat modern accuraiely. Inclose-in baule, hecounseled ihat lechnology has progressively imposed greaier ii was betier lo reiain a bullei in the barrei (for limils on lhe application of cold steel, even emergency) and rely first of all on the bayonei. modern soldiers must demonsiraie thecapacity If ihree Turks attacked a Russian in balde, he to impose lheir collective will on the enemy, if was 10 bayonei the firsi, shooi the second, and need be, ai dose quariers. Suvorov understood bayonei lhe ihird.20 diis, lhe armies of the French Revolution af- Suvorov's prescripiion to place maximum firmed ii, and better trainers slill seek to instill failh in lhe bayonei was well founded, given lhe same kind of resolve.^ Like other prophets lhe technologv of lhe times and his conception of iraining, including Dragomirov and Ardant of spirited. offensive aciion. Russian soldiers du Picq, Suvorov was a student of soldier psy- were armed with lhe .70 caliber smoothbore, chology and balde stress. flintlock rnuskei, whose raie of fire under ideal Less well understood than outright empha- circumstances mighi be three or four shois per sis on cold sleel was the degree to which .Su- mtnuie. l'nder conditions of genuine fire ac- vorov also viewed a disciplined resori to fire as tion, irained formalions might retain disci- an imposition of will. Withholding fire could pline and coherence for several minuies, afier be more unnerving to theadversary than firing which the noise. smoke, and confusion of bal- a volley without appreciable effect, which he de gradually gatned the upper hand, causing found only “emboldened lhe barbarians" who fire volume to drop off appreciably. At the then closed for the kill while Russian soldiers same lime, firing mechanisms were fragile and were reloading. When Suvorov’s soldiers re- effeclive ranges short. A broken flim or a pause sorted lo bulleis, the fire of individuais and to reload immediaiely iransformed lhe muskel formalions had to be muiually reinforcing. Il fitied wiih bayonei into a pike and whai had also had lo be accurate: lhere was no discharg- 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ing of vveapons with lhe vague peasant hope ing of equipment and uniforms. He whole- lhai "lhe bullels would find lhe guilly ones.”2' heartedly supported Prince G. A. Potemkin’s Suvorov irained each sinall unit to designaie m ilitary dress reforms of 1784, which repre- several sharpshooters, whose task ii was to fire sented a utilitarian depariure from earlier expe- ai will on advancing enemy horsemen and of- riments with Ptussian uniforms. Of course, ficers. Lesi anyone ihink lhai Suvorov failed lo theobject was to reduce maimenanceand facil- emphasi/e lhe importante oí firepovver, heor- iiate rapid movement.-6 dered h is soldiers to carrv 100 cartridges eac h I o attain an accepiable degree of profi- into their engagements in the south steppe. For ciency, training had lo be continuous and su- the eighteenth century, this was a high basic pervised. For Suvorov, training was a constam load of ammunition. It was also Suvorov—the concern, regardless of season and circumsiance. commander usually credited vvitli emphasizing His men irained in winter and summer. They the bayonet over lhe bullet—who said, “Infan- irained even while on campaign in a ceaseless try fire leads lo victorv."21 quest to attain perfection. On cordon duty in tmphasis on the complementary nature of small detachmenis, it waseasy for commanders firepower and cold Steel underscored the im- to grow lax in their requirements and for the portante of theoffense in trainingand practice. soldiers to grow dull on daily outpost and Officers and soldiers alike were taughi always guard duty. I he antidote was to insist that to think in terms of going forward, of pressing soldiers drill even in small garrisons. What the advantage. For Suvorov, retreat was syn- made them take the antidote was direct officer onymous with treason. The word was nevei supervision. Suvorov both exhorted and or- mentioned in training. Officers whospokeof it dered his officers to take direc t interest in train- direcily or in veiled terms were severely up- ing. In an era when officers relegated tedious braided. "A step backward isdeath,” hesaid. In aspects of troop duty lo their sergeants, and training lhere was no alternative to going for- when leaders exercised their soldiers only in ward, and this was lhe expected standard in fair wealher, Suvorov's actions represented a tombai. In battle, he would not even permit substantial depariure from contemporary one formation to replace another, lest relief be practice.27 interpreted as permission to withdraw.^ In addition to emphasis on progressive and rhisapproach fostereda natural preoccupa- continuous training, Suvorov insisted that tion with movement and mobility. VVhen en- training should have foc usand utility. Another gaged or t lose toengagement, Suvorov insisted of his maxims was that "troops be taught only that his subordinates keep their formations ad- that which was necessary in combat.” His prac- vancing on the enemy. This gave the soldiers tical approach to the manual oí armsand rapid somelhing.lo think about other than their own loading were clear indications that embellish- fears and presented the enemy with the diffi- ments were neilher necessary nor tolerated. At culty of closing with a moving larget. At the the same time, he insisted that "every soldier same time. ouiside the immediate realm of the know his maneuver.”28 This meam that train- battlefield, Suvorov emphasized rapidity of ing should be adequate to teach every man movement, a depariure which reinforced his what was crucial for him to perform in combat. emphasis on speed. During a period of static Ordinary drill, maneuvers. and exercises were lechnology, even incrementai improvements sufficient to impart the most basic combat might produce decisive results, and this was skills. However, circumstances sometimes re- surely the case with Suvorov’s philosophy of cjuired depariure from routine, as for example, mobility. VVhenever possible vvithin the pa- when encamped before the Turkish fortress ai ratneters of regulations, he ordered a lighten- Izmail in 1790, he ordered his engineers to THE CLASSIC APPROACH H5

build mockup seciions oí lhe foriress walls naia ataka). Apparently, he had devised this lhai his soldiers were to slorm. Thanks 10 care- exercise soinewhat laier lhan his experimenis ful rehearsal, before Suvorov ever altacked, wiih lhe Su/dal Regiment duiing lhe 17f)0s. each man knew his place in the baule order. From lhe marc h he divided his iroops inio iwo and each knew his assigned task.-”' Al besl, bat- opposing forces, lhen ordered them to deploy tle held surprise, and Suvorov’s inclinalion in formations facingeach other 200 10 250 paces was to use surprise againsi lhe enemy while (canister range) apari. The iwo sities com- iraining his men 10 be prooí againsi lhe inenced to attack each other, siopping at pre- unexpecied. scribed intervals to fire blank volleys againsi Perhaps lhe best Insuranceagainst lhe unex- iheir mock adversaries and finally launching a pecied was rigorous insisienceon lhe pursuiloí headlong bayonei assault. To reiain momen- realisni in maneuvers and field exercises. De- lum as the combaiants approached each othet, spiie his own physical shoricomings, Suvorov Suvorov instructed his soldiers not 10 slow gloried in leading his men inio suinmer exer- lheir pace, but at lhe last moment to step to the cises, in which they maneuvered in larger for- righi half a pace, raise their weapons, and pass mations and in which officers gained expe- through the narrow gaps in opposing files. A rience in using lhe three combat arms 10- shori distante beyond the lineof mot k contat t, geiher. During iheeighieemh century. Russian the soldiers wheeled about to face theit oppo- miliiary regulationsprescribedseveral kindsoí nenis once again. The exercise was repeated exercises, each of which usually began wiih until reiention of cohesion, momentum, and deployment froin march formalion into lhe hitting power became automalic.'1 baule formalion, changing direciion of attack To approximate the conditions of c ombat as or advance, lhen reiurning 10 march íorma- closely as possible, Suvorov often incorporaied lion. In accordance with emphasison his triad, cavalry and anillery into his “atiack through” Suvorov soughi acceleraied movemeni 10 con- exercises. The crash oí blank cannon fire, the laci, a swifi but accuraie assessmeni of the sit- drumming of hoofs, the flash of bayonei and uation, and immediate atiack. Day aíier day, saber, the din and smoke of mock baule—all his troops would praclice rapid approach injected a heavy dose of realism into the exer- marches, deploymeni from the march eiiheron cises. Suvorov believed that there was no better line or in squares, ihen advance into atiack. way both to instruct cavalry in the intricaciesof Formations and taciicsahvaysdepended on the attacking infantry and to instill in infantry the nature of lhe terrain and lhe anticipated enemy. necessary steadiness to wartl off cavalry. This flexibleapproai h 10 deployment Suvorov Realism also multiplied the possibility of ilearly suinmed up in his 1778-training m- danger, and eyewitnesses record injuries and siruciions to lhe Crimean and Kuban Corps: even (atalities resulting from the ‘‘attack "Against regular forces as in lhe Prussian war, through” exercises. In 1791, Denis Davydov againsi irregularsas in lhe last Turkish war.”'" recorded Suvorov’s reaction to his subordi- Someiimes lhe exercises were one-sided, with nates’ concern over the possibility of injuring no adversarial force; at oiher times his troops his iroops in iraining. “God be with them," he atiacked a simulated enemy. muttered, "I will kill four, five, ten men; | but 11 Al its best. however, iraining approac hed will teach four, five, ten thousand.”'' Thus, conditions of real combat in rigorous two- Suvorov accepted the probability of injuries sided exercises pillingone force against another. and even fatalilies but rationalized costs by as- In this respecí, Suvorov's contribution to real- serting that minor losses in today’s iraining ism, indeed, lhepiécederésistanceof his train- would prevení far greater ones in tomorrow’s ing sysiem. was lhe "attack ihrough” (skvoz- combat. Indeed, records in which Suvorov re- 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW peatedly asserted his concern over his men’s and ií in addilion he knows what to do in his welfare reveal that he held lheir well-being in own modest sphere— he cannot bedefeated, he high regard. Trained soldiers were simply too cannol but be victorious.”'6 This orientation, valuable to lose to noncombai causes. At the when coupled with Suvorov’s triad of speed. same lime, however, rigorous training was the assessment, and hitting power, went a long best insurance that they would survive in com- way to explain the success of Russian armies bat and emerge victorious. Far from being the which fought under the gnome-like generalis- uncaring brute, Suvorov placed his emphasis simo who would subsequently become idealized on the ultimate concern—gelling his men and idolized in Russian and Soviet military through com ba t successfully." history. Realisticexercises and retrospet tion provided And, indeed, the lessons have not been lost the opportunity to instruct officers in their on subsequent generations. Those who fought roles and missions. He urged his officers to read with Suvorov kept his memories and methods history and from the past to choose military alive, iíonly fora time. By theendof the 1830s, heroes whose careers were worthy of emula- a new generation emerged to relive the master’s tion. For Suvorov, military history was a school campaignsandsuggestreforms in his spirit. By for ta< tic a 1 instruction. "Without the beacon of the 18büs, isolated disciples such as I). A. Mili- history—tactics gropes in the dark," he said." utin gave way to a whole school of admirers VVhether by history of after-action reviews, he and imitaiors led by the indefatigable M. I. emphasized his officers’ direct supervisory role Dragomirov, one of lhe great training special- in the conduct of training. At the end of each istsof modem military history. Although Dra- dav s exercise, Suvorov would cal 1 his officers gomirov exaggerated the significance of the together, present a common-sense evaluation bayonet under modem battle condilions, he of the lessons dernonstrated, point out areas did much to improve the quality of training in that needed improvemem, and dole out equal a mass-conscript army.'7 In 1918, Lenin pre- quantitiesof praiseand admonition. Although scribed that the principal instructional artides he was nevei known to he an easy taskmaster, of Suvorov’s "Ari of Victory” be incorporated he was unsparing in his praise of those who into the Handbook of the Red Army Soldier discharged their duties intelligently atui con- (Knizhka krasnoarmeitsa). Suvorov remaineda scientiously." constani source of inspiration both through the trying period of military modernization in the 1920sand ’30sandduring thematuration of rH F purpose of all the training? Soviet military art in the Great Patriotic VVar. The intent was to create disciplined soldiers His example remains an importam point of who took strength from a firm sense of their departure for contemporary specialistson train- own identities and loyalties, and who retained ing, includingsuch prominent figuresasColo- confidence in their ability tosucceed in com ba t nel General M. A. Gareev.'8 And itcould hardly because they were sure of themselves, their be otherwise. In the words of A. A. Komarov, roles, and their leaders. One Furopean military Suvorov's importante lies not only in his em- observer summed up the situation in 1799 after phasis on progressive training anel solicitude observing the Russians train in northern Italy. toward the soldier but also in the stress on He said that ‘'the last soldier who falis under simplicity, clarity, and realism. Komarov con- [Suvorov’s] influence knows in practice and cludes that, "such aspects of his pedagogical theory his job in combat better than it is known system . . . sound fully contem porary."'9 in any Furopean army in peacetime. . .. And if The classics are always modem. Io under- a man isconvinced that surprise is impossible, stand Suvorov from an American perspective, THE CLASSIC APPROACH 87

ii would be as if a single man combined within Suvorov does live on. Certainly his training himself the military-pedagogical aiiribuies oí principies remain relevant two centuries after Baron F. W. von Sieuben, Francis Marion, and his death—and not just for Russians. Nathanael Greene, and then demonstrated that Fort Leavenworth, Kansas the same aitributes remain eternally appro- priate to modem circumstances. Such trainers and fighters are the stuff of Author't note: I acknowledge assisiance in gathenng research legend, and indeed, one Russian legend has it materiais from the Andre L. de Saint-Rat Collection of Russian History and Culture at the King Library of Miami University. All that Suvorov never really died, that he rests in a dates are given according to the Julian calendar, which in the deep sleep to awaken when Rússia is threatened eighleenth ceniury lagged behind lheGregorian calendar by eleven days; íurther. the modiíied Library of Congress system is used by grave military danger.40 To the extern that throughout to transliteraie Cyrillic characters into Lalin equival- response to military challenge in an age of ents. The phrase, "Train hard, fight easy,” is paraphrased from Suvorov and suggested by Philip Longworth. whose The Art ol modem, mass armies rests on the ability either Victory (New York. 1965) remains the standard English-language to field large numbers of trained soldiers im- biography of Suvorov. For a recent and concise trealinent of “The Art oí Victory" in Russian. readers are referred to M. A. Rakhmalul- mediately or to create them fast—as in the So- lin’s "Generalisstmus A. V. Suvorov. Ego iskusstvo pobezhdat'," viet Great Patriotic War—perhaps the spirit of Istorua SSSR, September-October 1980, pp. 64-90.

Note* istoru Rossn (Moscow. 1957), pp. 138-39; on the "Suzdal period," 1. The origins of lhe academic and national schools are surveyed see A. Petrushevskii, Generalisstmus Kmaz' Suvorov, ihree volumes in L. G. Beskrovnyi. Ocherki po voennoi istoriograffii Rossn (Mos- (St. Peiersburg, Rússia, 1884), vol. I, pp. 41-49. cow. 1962). pp. 185-88; see also, Peier von Wahlde. "Miliiary 11. Cf. John Bushnell, “Peasants in Uniform: ThcTsarist Army Thought in Imperial Rússia." Ph.D. disseriaiion. Indiana Univer- asa Peasant S o cie ly J ournal of Social H istory, Summer 1980. pp. siiy. 1966. pp. 115-16. 566-69. 2. Chrislopher Duffy, Russias Military Way to the West (Lon- 12. "Nauka pobezhdat'." in Dokumenty, vol. III, p. 508. don. 1981). pp. xiii, 234; Bruce W. M enning, “Russian Military 13. Quoted in I. Krupchenko, "A. V. Suvorov i voennoe is- Innovation in the Second Halí of lhe Eighteenth Ceniury." Mili- kusstvo," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 1980. p. 72; see also. tary and Sociely. May 1984. pp. 24-25. 36-37; cf. A. A. Komarov. "Nauka pobezhdat'." and Order (oí A. V. Suvorov). 1774, respec- "Razvitie takticheskoi mysli v russkoi armii v 60-90-kh godakli tively in Dokumenty, vol. III, p. 507. and vol. I. p. 685. XVIII v." Vestmk Moskovskogo universiteta, senta 8. Istorua. No. 3 14. "Nauka pobezhdat'," Dokumenty, vol. III, p. 504. see also (1982). pp. 62-63. John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Sociely in Rússia 3. A. V. Suvorov to 1.1. Veimam, 3 March 1771. G. P. Mescheria- 1162-1871 (Oxford. 1985), p. 211. kov. editor. A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty, íour volumes (Moscow, 15. Order of A. V. Suvorov, 18September 1778. and Instruction oí 1949-53. vol. I. pp. 366-67; this series remains the most comprehen- A. V. Suvorov, l20ctober 1787. respectively in Dokumenty, vol. II. sive collection of primary materiais on Suvorov. pp. 122-23 and 354-55. 4. These assertions are drawn from “The Ari oí Vit tory" (Nauka 16. Order oí A. V. Suvorov, 21 December 1787. Dokumenty, vol. pobezhdat') as reprinted in ibid.. vol. III, pp. 501-08, especially p. II, pp. 374-75. 508. 17. A. A. Komorov, "Velikii polkovodets i pedagog," Prepodo- 5. Nauka pobezhdat' means literally the "Science" of victory; vanieistorii vshkole, June 1980, p. 17; cf., W illiam H. McNeilí, The however. the eighteenth-century usage is better translated by the Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Sociely since A.D. contemporary word art, a preference supported by Rakhmaiullin's 1000 (Chicago. 1982), pp. 132-33. choiceof iskusstvo (art) in lhe titleof theauthor'sacknowledgment. 18. Longworth, The Art of Victory, p. 36; see also N. A. Orlov. 6. On lhe relationship beiween military art and intellect. see Lee "Taktika Suvorova," Suvorov v soobshchennakh professorov Ni- Kennett. "Tactics and Culture: The Eighteenth-Ceniury Expe- kolaevskoi akademu general nogo shtaba. two volumes (St. Peiers- riente." International Commission oí Military Hisiory. ACTA No. burg, Rússia, 1900-01), vol. II, pp. 248, 250. 5 (Bucharest 10-17 VIII 1980) (Bucharest. 1981), pp. 152-59. 19. Krupchenko, “A. V. Suvorov i Voennoe iskusstvo," p. 73; see 7. V. A. Zoloiarevetal., Voslavu otechestva RossnskogotRazvitie also "Nauka pobezhdat'," Dokumenty, vol. III, p. 506. Rakhmalul- voennoi mysli i voennogo iskusstva v Rossn vo vtoroí polovine lin, "Generalissiumus A. V. Suvorov." p. 66; and A. V. Suvorov to XVIII v.) (Moscow. 1984), pp. 226-31. G. Belgard, 20 May 1799. Dokumenty, vol. IV. p. 116. 8. "Nauka pobezhdat'," Dokumenty. III, pp. 506-07; Bystrota is 20. "Nauka pobezhdat'," Dokumenty, vol. III, p. 505. easíly translated as “speed"; glazomer means literally "measure 21. Ibid., vol. III, p. 504; see also Orlov. "Taktika Suvorova." p. with the eye.” or more simply, "estimate” or "assess." Natisk cor- 251. responds to "impulston" in the sense of striking with momentum; 22. Thomas V. Moseley, "Evolution oí the American Civil War here Philip Longworlh's "hitling power" seems a most appro- Infantry Tactics," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Caro- priate translation. lina, 1967, pp. 214-15. 9. Longworth. The Art o/ Victory, p. 11. 23. Order of A. V. Suvorov, June 1770, Dokumenty, vol. I, p. 271. 10. L G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki po istochnikovedenua voennoi 24. A. V. Suvorov to N. A. Zubov, 26 May 1788, Dokumenty, vol. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

II. p. HO. 31. M. A. Gareev, Obshchevoiskovye uchenua (Moscow, 1983), 25. A. N. Kochetkov. "Takiicheskie vzgliady A. V. Suvorova," in pp. 31-32; "Nauka pobezhdal'," Pokumenty, vol. III, pp. 502-03. Razvitie taktiki russkoi armii, compiled by D. V. Pankov( Moscow. 32. Denis Davydov, 1'oennye znpiski (Moscow. 1982). p. 32. 1957). pp. 89-90; "Nauka pobezhdal'," Pokumenty. vol. III. p. 502. 33. See. forexam ple, Order oí A. V. Suvorov. 1792, Pokumenty, 26. A. V. Suvorov lo V. S. Popov, 11 October 1787. Pokumenty. vol. III, pp. 74-75. vol. II. pp. 347-48; Order lo Kuban Corps, 16 May 1777. Poku- 34. Quoied in Krupchenko, "A. V. Suvorov i voennoe iskusstvo," menty. vol. II. p. 64. p. 72. 27. Order oí A. V. Suvorov. 9 December 1771, Pokumenty. vol. I. 35. Gareev, pp. 29-30. p. 474. 36. Quoied in ibid.. p. 35. 28. "Nauka pobezhdal'," Pokumenty, vol. III, p. 504. 37. L. A. Zaitsev, "Voenno-pedagogicheskie vzgliady M. I. Dra- 29. I. I. Rostunov, "Shiurm Izmaila." Voenno-istoricheskii gomirova," Voenno-istorichehesku zhurnal, September 1985, pp. zhurnal. December 1965. p. 114. 72-73. 30. A. I. Gippius. compiler. Obrazovante lobuchenie) voisk in 38. Krupchenko, "A. V. Suvorov i voennoe iskusstvo." p. 71; Sloletie l'oennogo Mmisterstva, edited by D. A. Skalon. 48 paris in Gareev. p. 29. 13 volumes(Sl. Petersburg. Rússia, 1902-14). vol. IV. pari I. book2. 39. Komorov, "Velikii polkovodets i pedagog," p. 16. section 3, p. 118; in "Nauka pobezhdal'." Pokumenty, vol. III, p. 40. N. Orlov, "Suvorov—russkii voennyi deiatel'," in Suvorov v 505, lhe phrase is "by line againsi regulars, by squares againsi lhe soobshchenuakh pro/essorou N tkolaevskoi akademu general' nogo iníidels." shtaba, vol. II. p. 309; see also Keep, Soldiers of lhe Tsar, p. 212. You’ve got the stick

THE DANGER OF MIRROR-IMAGING

COLONEL LLOYD T. MOORE. JR.

YVHEX they think aboui them ai all, Ameri- certain basic truthsabout the Soviet Union and, can* tend to have ceriain perceptions about lhe since then, have read some articlesor booksand Sov iet people and their leaders. Probably Lhe received some briefings and, therefore, íeel most common, ií terribly naive, holds that, ex- fairly sanguine that they have a reasonable grasp cept íor a fevv unimportant ideological differ- of “what makes the Soviets tick.” It is this as- ences. the Soviet leaders are much like us. II sumption of knowledgeon the partof oui lead- world leaders wouldonly sit down and talk, all ership that is so insidious, because a direct out- our difíerences could be resolvedand the threat growth of the assumption is a trait that intelli- of war would disappear. gence professionalscall “mirror-imaging”; that The antithesis of this view holds that the is, the assumption that because we do some- emire Soviet Union is one vast prison camp thing in a certain way, lhe Soviets will do it in filled with terribly unhappy people whoaspire the same way or, conversely, because we would to our way of life and. denied it. will someday not do someihing, an enemy likewise would soon rise up in counterrevolution. oust their not. Just what are the dangers associated with evil leaders. and establish a capitalist democ- ‘‘mirror-imaging''? racy on the model of the United States. Both of History is replete with examples wherein the these perceptions are hopelessly naive and er- armed forces of a society and, sometimes, the roneous. Fortunately, neither is widely held bv entire society itself was wiped out because the intelligenl people in American military and leadership of that society—both political and civilian positions of leadership. military—failed to have an adequate under- This does not mean our leadership is im- standing of the society and armed forces that mune from problems in its perception of the destroyed it. The Mongol hordes, for example, Soviet Union. In fact. the major problem that used this lack of awareness to their advantage besets our political and military leaders is in spreading terrot from the China Sea to the complacency, and because of its wide accept- Danube. Had the Aztecs (or the rest of the na- ance at the higher leveis, a is even more dan- tive Americans, for that matter) been awareof gerous than those mentioned above. The vast what motivated the European invaders, it is inajority of our leaders have. at some point in virtually a certainty the Europeans would have their education or professional lives, learned had more difficulty in gaining a íoothold in

89 90 AIR UNIIERSITY REVtEW

ihis hemisphere. Had Hitler and his general throughout the world short of military force? siaff been more conversam wiih thereasons for II the reader were to assume the answers to Napoleon's fate in Rússia in 1812, Operation these questions are the same as those that Barbarossa inighl ha ve been a success. would pertain if applied to American society, Coniemporary reality has even more con- he would be mirror-imaging and he would be crete examples. Hovv many of our leaders are not only dead wrong, but he could put himself really awareof theasymmetries in arms conirol in lhe position of making a decision that could verification, for example? How many are truly have a far-reaching deleterious effecl on Amer- conversam wiih the argument that lhe lack of ica^ interests. When our military leaders de- success in the economic arena makes the So- velop operations plans, when our congressmen viets less anxious to reduce the arms race rather and senators vote on military budgets and for- than more so? On an even simpler levei, how eign aid, when sênior membersof theadminis- many are awareof what theSoviets mean bv the tration hold arms talks with the Soviets, th is word peace} How many are even aware of the lack of awareness of the Soviet Union can ob- position of the military olficer in Soviet so- viously be truly dangerous. cieiv; thediffic ulties the Soviets face becauseof their geography; the reasons for the xenopho- bia that so characterizes Soviet society; or the Colonel Moore is Dircctor of Soviet Affairs Air Force lntelligence means with which the Soviets project power Service. Bolling AFB. D.C.

Letters

Lee’s Civil War dispatches

In Major Raymond C. Harlan's article, "Am and where possible to form a continuous narrative and the Man," in your May-June 1986 issue, it is implied refused to dramatize a story.” That was indeed a that General Robert E. Lee was a man "with no rarity among Civil War dispatches. record of artistic endeavor." On Lee's behalf, let me Incidentally, Lee creatively used the newspapers note that he was a historian and journal-keeper of of the North by reviewing them for possible inielli- lhe first order. His médium was the "official dis- gence value. Lee liked a particular Philadelphia In- patch,” used by newspapers of the period to expand quirer correspondem because that repórter "knew their coverage of the war. In Douglas S. Freeman’s, what he reported and reporied what he knew." (See Robert E. Lee, A Biography (4 volumes, New York, Frank Luther Mott, in American Journalism , 93d 1934-35), it is noted that Lee’s studious nature aided edition, 1962.) Outraged General William Sherman in making the multitudeof official dispatches in the of the North knew that generais such as Lee were in Civil War possibly the best of any generaTs. The fact gathering helpful information from newspaper press liked Lee's dispatches because “he preferred articles and was so upset with one correspondem, LETTERS 91

Thomas Knox oí lhe New York Herald. lhat he had Nor does Major Ryle explain how his suggestion him arrested and held as a spy. Sherman wroie lhe would make lhe air componeni commander’s air press caused "infinite harm” to his military under- space control and air defense responsibilities any takings and lhat "the only two really successful simpler. strokes out here have succeeded because of the ab- Giving up CAS, according to Major Ryle, would senceoí lhe newspapers. or by throwing them oíf the enable the Air Force to concentrate on missions like trail." counterair and interdiction for which its aircraft are best suited to perform. This suggestion reflects a Captam Dwight C. Daniels. L’SAF belief lhat there should be major dislinctions be- Wnghl-Patterson AFB. Ohio tween fixed-wing aircraft designed for CAS and in- terdiclion. However, lhe requirement fordesign dif- ferences is exaggerated, since it is difficull to define precisely thedifferences beiweenCASand battlefield air interdiction. (Forexample, whaiexactly is meant Army V/STOL aircraít for close air support revisited by the terms close proximity and near-term threat?) What is more, the threat environment, types of mu- nitions, and delivery accuracy required often are In the Letters depariment of the May-June 1986 identical for both missions. issue. Major Thomas A. Ryle believes V STOL air- Finally, Major Ryle dismisses the problem of air craft are suitable only for close air support (CAS). He base survivability because, he asserts, counterair and also believes the CAS mission should be given to the interdiction missions are far Iess dependent on prox- U.S. Army. As these viewsare shared by a number of imity to the front (than CAS) and can be conducted people, including many Air Force officers, it is quite successfully from more remote bases. I most worthwhile to look ai his suggestion in greater emphatically disagree. Major Ryle should reread my detail. article "Improving Force Flexibility ihrough Major Ryle advocates Army control so ground V STOL" in the January-February 1985 issue. Dis- commanders would have assured CAS. There is a tance from the battle often may not greatly increase danger lhat acting on this suggestion would repeat survivability, however, it does incur numerous pe- the error others have made not only with air power nalties including: decreased responsiveness, fewer but also with tanks and artillery. Permaneni distri- sorties for a given force structure, less usable pay load, bution of air asseis to assure each unit commander short-timeon largei, and larger, moreexpensiveand, has support tends to prevent timely force concentra- possibly, less survivable aircraft. Air refueling may tion. Also related to this suggestion is Major Ryle's help, but it is not a perfect solution as it introduces belief lhat dispersing V STOL aircraft prevenis ef- other handicaps, including makingoperations more fective control and. therefore, these aircraft are not complex. suitable for missions other than CAS. VVhile there I agree with Major Ryle that we musi overcome are problems inherent to dispersai, military expe- parochialism. However, the answer is not by giving rience clearly shows dispersed forces can be effec- up missions that appear to be "tied to the ground tively controlled (e.g., surface-to-air missiles and forces.” Air Force officers must recognize the dan- ground-launched cruise missiles). gerous illusion of such a goal. In modern warfare, Like many other U.S. Air Force officers, Major the acti vides of air and ground forces are inexorably Ryle rather ltghtly dismisses theair-to-aircapability tied to one another. oí V STOL aircraft. This altitude disregards the proven air-to-air capability of lhe British Sea Har- l.teulenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, l ’SAF rier and USMC A V-8B. It also fails to appreciate the Maxwell AFB. Alabama poienual oí future developments, such as arming the Sea Harrier with Hughes AIM 120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles or building a su- personic V STOL aircraft. more comments about Creative thinking in the Air Army control of V STOL aircraft, Major Ryle Force believes, would make it easier to work out airspace control problems and simpler tocoordinateground- I would echo the comments of Jerome G. Peppers, based air defenses. This suggestion ignores the fact Jr., in the Lettersdeparimeniof the July-August 1986 lhat high-performance V STOL aircraft do not fly Revtew and would add my own comments from a like helicopters except dunng takeoff and landing. junior officer’s perspective. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

How ofien in the study of Air Force history is our Is the wisdom of hauling tanks to battle in air altention drawn to lhe heroic efforts of Billy Mit- planes unquestionable? Should we indeed spenc, chell in advancing the cause of air power, especially millions in purchasing new strategic missiles, only heroic in that his urgings were contrary to then the to put them in silos that are already in the Russiar ■‘official policy.” Don t the objer.ives of Project gunsight? It would be reassuring to believe that such Warrior urge us to understand and emulate such policies could be tempered in the crucible of in efforts? formed debate. But how infrequently, if ai all, in the present day It would be reassuring to believe that, to para-, do we see articles in our professional journals that phrase a famous quote, "Ours is to reason why . . . question official policy? Shouldn t we encourage The better we’ll do. lhe fewer of us will die." our officers to responsibly debate current doctrine Captam David S. Johnson, USAF and put our decisions on air power to intelleclual Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies test? University o] Kansas, Launence books, images, and ideas

FROM STALINGRAD TO BERLIN: STALIN'S WAR

Dr John T. Gr eenwood

CAREFUL reading oí John Erickson’s 1945. Unfortunately, the significance of the The Road to Berlin will immediately wartime experience and its impact on the Aprovide a better undersianding of currem So-postwar development of the Soviet Armed Forces viel military power, whose roots lay embedded are not evaluated. in the biuer years of lhe Great Patriotic VVar, Both The Road to Stalingrad (1975) and his lhe Soviet LTnion’s war against Nazi Germany earlier, out-of-print classic, The Soviet High from J u n e 1941 to May 1945.J It is a lengthy Command, 1918-19JI (1962) should be read in and difficult book but one lhat American mili- conjunction with The Road to Berlin to gain lary officers should definitely put on their maximum benefits from Erickson’s knowledge "must be read” lisi of professional literature. and insights. His aim in this latest book is to The Road to Berlin is the second of Erick- evaluate Stalin as a war leader within the con- sons two volumes that recounts ‘‘Stalin's war text of “. . . the properties of the man and lhe with Germany." His thoroughly researched performance of the system—both operating account melds the planning and conduct of under maximum stress. . . Erickson generally military operations with diplomatic relations, succeeds in atlaining his objective but not the development of military organization and without some significam problems along lhe teehnology, and the personal interactions way. among the military and political leaders clus- He superbly handles the leading Soviet mili- tered around Joseph V. Stalin, the Supreme tary personalities; the planning of military op- Commander. He carries the war from the de- erations at the levei of Stalin, the Sta\ ka (Slaff) struction of the German Sixth Army at Stalin- of the Supreme High Command, and the Army grad to the final battles for Berlin and Prague, General Slaff; and theoften perverse and per- where the book rather abruptly ends on 9 May plexing twists and lurns of the A11 ies' wartime

JJohn Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Sta- lin’s War with Germany (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983, $42.50), 877 pages.

93 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW diplomacy, especially regarding Poland. The military operations and restruciuring of stra- author’s extellent descriptions of Soviet mili- tegic and tactical forces are to ensure central- tary planning in particular show the develop- ized strategic planning and control while de- ing strategic, tactical, and logistical skills of centralizing battle management for operational themililary leadership, while bringingout the flexibility under conditionsof modern warfare. interplay of the strong personalities whodom- Stalin had to solve many similar problems of inated the Soviet cornmand echelons during strategic cornmand and control while directing atui after the vvar. Georgii K. Zhukov, Ivan S. the Soviet war effort against Germany. Unlike Konev, Rodion Ya. Malinovskii, N. F. Vatutin Stalin's often makeshift Solutions, this new (clic*d of wounds in 1944), A. M. Vasilevksii, A. Soviet strategic structure is intended to func- I. Antonov, K. R. Rokossovskii, and others re- tion equally well in peacelime planning and ceive significam coverage, hui the principal wartime execution. character always remains Joseph V. Stalin, the On the diplomatic front, Stalin astutely ma- supreme political and military authority. neuvered the Allied leaders to attain the de- l he picture of Stalin as the Supreme Com- struction of Nazi Germany and his grand design mandei is an illuminating portrait of the su- for the establishmeni of Soviet hegemony in preme politician and war leader vvho trusted Eastern Kurope. Indeed, some of Erickson’s and confided in nooneand manipulatedevery- best sections are those that detail the wartime one. Hecarefully watched h is fieldcommanders, conferences at Tehran and Yalta and the Allied rewarding those who succeeded and punishing diplomatic dealings over Poland, Finland, those who failed or were even thought to have Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the failed. After his personal intervention caused postwar occupation of Germany. somecostly battlefield reverses early in the war, One of the most interesting aspects of Erick- Stalin carne toappreciate and heed his military son'saccount is thecomparison of the wartime advisers and commanders. Although only as a leadership of Stalin and Adolf Hitler. Unlike wartime exigency, he tempered his distrust of the Soviet leader, Hitler largely disregarded his the professional soldiers and had limited his General Staff and field commanders aftei 1942. meddling with the Stavka and military opera- YVhereas Stalin’s early losses forced him to rely tions by the time of Stalingrad. on his military advisers, Hitler's initial Stalin largely extemporized a cornmand victories convinced him of his own military structure around himself tocontrol the nation genius. Misreading the experient es of the win- and the conduct of the war. He directed the ter campaign of 1941-42 in the east, Hitler in- efforts of the State Defense Committee (GRO), sisted on rigid compliance with strict no-re- his personal Stavka of the Supreme High treat orders that largely sacrificed strategic and Cornmand, and the Army General Staff that tactical maneuver and flexibility and led to a did thedetailed operational planning. Hecon- succession of disasters that began at Stalingrad. stantly conferred in person and by telephone In the end, hundreds of thousands of troops with his Stavka, the General Staff, and field were bottled up in fortresses and hedgehogs commanders, cajoling them, arguing, threat- where they could do little to hinder the great ening, and at the same time listening to lheir Soviet offensives of 1944 and 1945 that simply advice. flowed around and beyond them. The current Soviet political and military Erickson's descriptions of the Soviet plan- leadership must have looked long and hard at ning for and conduct of the major operations Stalin’s wartime system before reorganizing its such as Rursk, Belorussiya, East Prússia, and strategic cornmand and control structure in re- Berlin are informative and effective. They also cent years. The creation of strategic theaters of vividly show Stalin's dominam central role in BOOKS. IMAGES, AND IDEAS 95

the overall siraiegic direction oí lhe war. Many Operations such as the destruclion of Army Western hisiorians and military leaders may Group Center in Belorussiya during June-Au- admire lhe German wartime military inachine, gust 1944 and the drive írom the Vistula to lhe but the Soviet planners emerge from these Oder in January 1945 must be studied more pages as far more astute and able than their closely to undersiand the development of the German counterparts. After recovering from Soviet Army’s great offensive power and skill. the devasiating opening months of the war, the More importam, the study oí such offensive Soviet leadership built a wartime economy that operations provides a valuable perspective on provided the quantities of quality materiel re- today’s Soviet military strategy and doctrine, quired to defeat theGermans. At thesame lime, which still draw so heavily on these World War the Soviet military leaders carefully analyzed II experiences. and learned from their defeats. Command and In contrast to the United States, the personal staff echelons developed new and revised stra- and national experiences and sufíering of the tegtc and taclical doctrines to meei the war's Great Patriotic War still deeply affecl lhe basic constantly changing defensive and offensive perceptions and resuhing foreign and defense conditions. Batlle-hardened frontline com- policies of thecurrent Soviet leadership. If the manders then combined the new doc trines and United States had lost 20 million oí its citizens theever-expanding flow of military equipment and had much of its heartland and national with devasiating effectivenesson the battlefield. heritage savaged in four brutal years of war and After describing the tough defensive fighting occupation, we, too, would look at the world and great tank battles around Kursk in July around us as hostile and menacing, and re- 1943, Erickson tells how Stalin, the Supreme spond accordingly. My colleague, Von Har- High Command, and the Army General Staff desty, put it aptly in the preface to his Red skillfully orchestrated a series of offensive Phoenix (1982) when he wrote: “ Even in the hammer blows that smashed the German Army nuclear age, the Great Patriotic War lingers as into submission. The Soviets deployed large a vivid memory in the national psyche, shap- numbers oí men and weapons in muliifront ing public altitudes and servingas a condition- offensives that first crushed German defenses ing and limiting factor in the evolution of So- and then were vigorously pushed until the viet military doctrine.” troops and equipment were exhausted and the Despite its many strengths, The Road to Ber- supply lines stretched to their snapping poinis. lin has some obvious deficiencies. Its coverage In these monster offensives, the Soviet docirine of military operations is sluggish. The ma- of offensive warfare was clearly and brutally neuveringof military forces on the battlefield is delineated. Developed during the trying early indeed an art, and so is the description of those years oí the fighting and honed in 1944-45, movements. Given the magnitude of Soviet- Soviet offensive siraiegy emphasized combined German war and the need to cover the major arms warfare, concentrated thrusts along the military operations at lhe front, Erickson has main axes with vastly superior numbers, and done a commendable job in just providing a the overwhelming application of artillery, air, coherent narrative. While the book is clearly and armor ai the main points of effort in the written, I found it difíicult to maintain my form of powerful, coordinated "offensives." attention and pace through hundreds of pages Then followed the rapid exploitation of break- clogged with phase lines, captured c ities, and a throughs by air-supported tank and mechan- muhitude of offensives, counteroffensives, ized forces, which drove deep into lhe German breakthroughs, linkups, envelopments, and rear areas to destroy reserves and supply lines troop movements. while surrounding major operational forces. A paucity of sufficiently detailed operational 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

maps further compounds the reader’s prob- Air Force and its wartime predecessor. lems. Only 16 maps dot the 640 pages of text While Erickson provides the broader histori- covering complex operations in a geographic cal context, readers must turn to other accounts area of the world—Fastern Europe and the to learn more about the Soviet Air Force's war- western Soviet Union—about which most time development. The best Western account Americans are almost totally ignorant. For ex- of the Soviet Air Force during the war now ample, some very importam operations are de- available is Von Hardesty’s excellent Red Phoe- scribed in chapter 4, "The Drive to the Western nix. Two general Soviet accounts of the Air Frontiers: October 1943-March 1944," but the Force’s leadership, organization, and opera- only usable reference map is in chapter 3 (p. tions are M. N. Kozhevnikov’s The Command 125), which covers the drive to the Dnieper and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the River. The reader is usually left in a complete Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 and Ray muddle unless he uses an atlas or other histo- Wagner’s The Soviet A n Force in World War 11 ries, such as Earl Ziemke's Stalingrad to Berlin (1973), a translation of an official Soviet history. (1968), which has forty-two maps for the same Shorter overviews of Soviet air power can be perúxl of the war (November 1942-May 1945). found in "Soviet Air Forces in World War II" If these shortcomings were not enough, by Von Hardesty and John T. Greenwood in Erickson’s organization makes reading even The Soviet Air Forces (1984), edited by Paul harder. The book has only eight chapters, with Murphy, and in John T. Greenwood’s "The four of them more lhan ninety-nine pages and Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945,” in Soviet Avia- chapter 5 numbering 139 pages. Moreover, the tion and A ir Power: A Flistorical Review, edited chapters have no topical subdivisions or sub- by Jacob Kipp and Robin Higham (1978). Alex- headings, so the reader haslittle help in trying ander Boyd’s The Soviet Air Force since 1918 to organize and then digest the wealth of in- (1977) covers the war years within a more gen- formation crammed intoeach very large chapter. eral history, as does Robert Kilmarx’s now In a book like The Road to Berlin, w h i c h badly dated A History of Soviet Air Power covers so much, many subjects are treated so (1962) and Asher Lee’s Soviet Air and Rocket unevenly that some receive detailed coverage Forces (1959). whileothersare barely touched. The Soviet Air Even though it has some structural short- Force and the air war in the east are among the comings, The Road to Berlin is an extremely more scantily treated subjects, until the final valuable book and a major contribution to the chapter on the last months of the war. Even Western literature on the history of the Great then. only a little more than one page (556-58) Patriotic War. Not lhe least of its contributions out of 109 pages is devoted to air operations. will be found in the extensive concluding sec- This is a.disappointment because the Soviet tions on references and sources and the bibliog- Air Force played an importam role in the fight- raphy, which provide detailed information ing and emerged from the war as the second for additional reading and research. largest air force in the world after the U.S. Taken together, John Erickson s two vol- Army Air Forces. Although it lacked a signifi- umes now must be considered the standard cam strategic air component, Soviet military work in Fnglish on the general history of the air power in 1945 was completely integrated Soviet involvement in the Soviet-German war. with the ground forces for strategic offensive While Albert Seaton's TheRusso-Gertnan liar operations and a formidable tactical weapon. 1941-45 (1970) and Earl Ziemke’s Stalingrad to More detailed coverage would have revealed Berlin are still solid accounts, they rely more the significam continuitiesof doctrine, organi- heavily on German materiais to tell their sto- zation, and leadership between today’s Soviet ries. Thus, John Erickson's works will be a

Short Bursts

YVar withoul Mercy: Race and Power in lhe Pacific goals of reconstruction occurred because of the Cole VVar by John W. Dower. New York: Pantheon YVar (lhe Americans needed the Japanese as friend Books, 1986. 399 pages, $22.50. quickly). Other racial phrases appeared, and th« VVars have never been pariicularly pleasant af- vanquished were viewed assmall children in needo fairs, and the 1941-45 war in lhe Pacific had its share guidance instead of simians, while the victors wen of rather nasty aspects—new lows in the treatmeniof seen as strangers who, like all strangers in Japanese POWs and civilian populations, individual and folklore. come and leave some benefits despite thei mass suicides, lhe use of weapons designed for mass evil non-Yamato basic nature. Getting along con destruciion, and propaganda produced primarily to tinued to reflect racial divisions. Hate, once turnei c reate hatred lor theenemy. AII wars have hadoneor on, isdifficult to slopabruptly, but itean bedivertet moreof theseelements in varyingdegrees. Yet, in the into other racial themes. Par iíic, John \V. Dower contends, the war was a rac e War without Mercy is interesting and well writ war. particularly between “white" America and ten. It is generally easy to read, though poims are “yellow" Japan. Theobjective was supremacy of the belabored needlessly in some places. Dow-er has re Pacific Basin by one of lhe races. searched thoroughly the topic of the propaganda good and bad, used on both home fronts during the War without Merc y begins with an examination of the conditions of hatred that existed in the war. war. There are some twenty-six pages of footnotesj There were three basic categories, one of which was Still, questions remain for the reader to ponder. Jus( purely racial; theenemy is portrayedas the "forceof how was lhe war in the Pacific different from olhei' darkness," and inhuman termsare used—"unjust,” conflictive situations? If a conflict is between racesj "wicked," "unfair,” '‘merciless,” etc.; while lhe is it inevitable that the “w-ar words and the race) enemy drips with darkness, our side bathes in good- words come together"? ness and liglu, being just, fair, good, and compas- I)r. Peter C. Unsingei I sionate; and our side is racially superior to their side. San Jose State 1'mver.sity, C.alifornicA Dower examines these themes and the ways they were manifest on both sides of the Pacific. All as- pects of what Dower contends was a racial war are examined. Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communisi Dower also examines the pre- and postwar view- Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 by J. Arch Getty points of the antagonists. Americans are portrayed Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge Uni- as racially hating all nonwhites and considering versity Press, 1985, 275 pages, S34.50. thein low in developmenton the Darwinian scale. In surveying American altitudes toward the Indians This is a remarkably fresh and significam piece ol and the combatants in the insurrection ol the Phil- new research. It is, oddly enough, the first systematic ippines, Dower leaves little doubt that Americans effort to study the purges as an administrative proc- spoke and acted in racial terms. Meanwhile, the ess; and. as such, it throws more new light on the Japanese saw themselvesas thechosen peoplegoing subject than most students of the period would have out and controlling the lesser developed Koreans believed possible. It is distinctly revisionist, and J. and Formosans. The Yamato peoples had a mission Arch Getty summarizes his thesis succinctly at the to perforna. (With the current trade problems and outset: "Most Western anddissident Soviet accounts other difficulties of today, Dower asserts, some of the of the Great Purges share certain assumptions: The words of the 1940s are reappearing. Is racism latem political events of 1933-39 constitute a unified phe- in Japanese-American relations? Dower hims that it nomenon (the Great Purges), which can be studied mav be.) as a process; the Great Purges were planned, pre- The racial cultural wartime clash is portrayed by pared, and carried out by a single agency (Stalin); Dower as one that talks in catastrophic terms of and the Old Bolsheviks of Lenin's (and Stalin s) annihílation, obliteration, and "no quarter” given. generation were the purges' target. The presem In 1945, the antagonists suddenly found themselves study tests these assumptions against the available at peace w ith a victor and a vanquished. Would there primary evidenceand finds them unlenable." (p. 3) be a bloodbath like Troy? Dower explains that the Getty’s thesis is the more surprising in that he has rapid shift from the hate talk of annihilation, etc., to had access to no essentially new evidence (it would

98 BOOKS, 1MAGES, AND IDEAS 99

have been even more surprising to find new evi- agent of Kirov's murder. Getiy's argument is an dence). He has simply used the publications of the interesting preseniation. 1930s, oí the khrushchev era oí ami-Stalinist revela- Andrei Zhdanov emerges hereasa popuiisi demo- tions. and oí the Smolensk archive. Of course, all oí crat (of sorts) with an antagonism to bureaucracy these materiais have been used before. Thedifference and an unbounded faith in education and propa- in Getty's findings derives from the different ques- ganda. He was a constam critic of the purges, both tions that he asked of the sources, from his openness during and after them. Nikolai Lzhov shared of mind about the subject, and from his stubbornly Zhdanov’s antagonism to bureaucracy but detested systematic collation of the documents. His work is specialists, technocrats, and probably educated peo- unusually impressive, so much so, it seems to me, ple in general. He was the model of the true believer. that his argument supporting his conclusions must a fanatical purist who was perhaps the primary be judged at least a qualified success. Of course. lhe agent of the radicalization of the purges. Leon evidence is not sufficient to write a definitive ac- Trotsky was more deeply involved in the organiza- countof the subject. and it would befoolish toclaim tion ofopposilion groups in the Soviet Union in lhe (he does not) that he has demonstrated his case early 1930s than we have usually believed, although beyond a reasonable doubt. What he has done is to he was never guilty of all oí the fantasies ol which he damage the old model of purge historiography to was accused. The Tukhachevskii alíair is steeped, such an extern that we simply cannot repeat it com- according to Getty, in more mystery than we have placently and unquestioningly ever again. the tneans to clarify, and, at the present lime, there is In the process, Getty has done something which little point in trying todo so. Finally, Stalin s politi- is, in some respects, more interesting than he himself cal program was one of great volatility and instabil- seems to recognize. He has applied to the history of ity, as Getty convincingly shows. Stalin tended to the 1930s something very like the model so current hold to the middle amid various shifting extremes among political scientists on the Soviet politics of about him, and hechanged his position with bewil- the 1960s and 1970s (i.e., the model that focuses on dering inconsistency and insouciance. pluralism and the conflict of interest groups in So- The Great Purges were. in summary, a more or viet politics). He is very criticai of Merle Fainsod s less haphazard convergence oí two phenomena: the old conception of Stalinism in the 1930s as "ineffi- conflict of Moscow with local party organizations at cient totalitarianism." More and more. it seems— the grass roots, in an effort todraft a new and admiti- however inuch we are warranted in holding to the istratively uncorrupted generation ol appauiU lukt old ideas of the oppressiveness, the injustice, the into party work; and a successful struggle of such inhumaniiy, the near cosmic misery of Soviet society radicais as Ezhov and Molotov against moderates ol in the 1930s—the idea of totalitarianism slowly but the kind of Ordzhonikidze and others. ineluctablv gives way because no government as in- Getty has given us research of extraordinan sig- efficient. arbitrary. chaotic, incoherent, ill-directed. nificance. and confused as he shows this one to have been can conceivably approach the model of totalitarianism. Dr. Hugh Ragsdale The particulars of Getty’s work are also tmeresi- Vniversity of Alabnma, Tuscaloosa ing. He shows the party to have been notonly totally unequal to the task of controlling the countryside even in the wake of colleciivization but also just as Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911- unable in managing a coherent administration of 1937 by Diana Lary. New York: Cambridge Uni- itselí. There was a virtual market in party member- versity Press, 1985, 177 pages, $29.95. ship cards. The party served as a refuge for all kinds of scoundrels who moved from place to place to li ve Because China’s warlord era has intrigued the down. among other things, an anii-Soviei past. In imagination of VVesterners, a great deal of material, order toestablish a modicum of authemic informa- both scholarly and popular, exists on lhe topic, fo- tion about the newcomers, party administrators cused understandably, on the warlords themselves: were writing to their counierparts in lhe regions their strategies, social programs, and idiosyncrasies from which these unknown members ostensibly of personality. Diana Lary's book complements the carne. existing literature by lookingat this period from lhe Getty joins Adam 1'lam. Martin Malia. and others perspective of the ordinary soldier. She asks where in his view of lhe kirov assassination, which is to recruits carne from, how they got into the army, say, he argues—and in more detail than has been what their lives were like after they joined, how they done previously—that Stalin was probably not the were treated by their officers, how they behaved to- 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ward the world lhey had left, and how they were seen whom are not yet familiar with either the scholar or by that world. his many writings. Not sLirprisingly for a society vvhich believed thal, Delbrücks life (1848-1929) spanned the period of just as one did not use good iron to make nails, one German unification, through Imperial Germany, should not use good men for soldiers, Lary íinds that the Great War, and the war s aftermath. When the the main sourcesof recruits w»ere the poor, lhe uned- Franco-Prussian War broke out, Delbrück, with his ucated, lhe bored. lhe misfits, and lhe press-ganged. well-developed historical perspective, entered the Once in the arrny, these recruits could expect better war as a corporal and soon became a reserve officer food and an income more reliable than that avail- who learned the smell and terror of battle. These able to them in their native villages. Typically, there experiences, coupled with his not being a military or was a vast social gap betvveen officers and men. academic professional, mighi have made him sus- Officers tended to treat their subordinates relatively pect to the academic community, particularly at the well when a contractual relationship was the basis University of Berlin. The University of Berlin, along under which the men had been hired, paying them with the German General Staff, was steeped in the regularly and even caring for their families. Those Prussian tradition and von Schlieffen's school of whoentered the military under noncontractual rela- attack. Delbrück’s position was that both authorita- tionships vvereapt to be the victimsof a more preda- tivegroups had tnisread history and, specifically, the tory altitude in their officers, who retained as much period of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Thus of their troops' pa\ as they thought they could get Delbrück was seen by many as an iconoclast. This away with and who tried to ensure obedience perception, along with his closeness to the Royal through harsh discipline. Given China's perpetuai Family and his experience as a polilician and later as oversupply of manpower, those whodeserted or died a political commeniator and publisher, further es- were easily replaced. The result, however, was an tranged him from the professionalsof academia and incompetent soldiery. Troops often assuaged their the General Staff. resentments by bullying civilians, w ho, in turn, re- Professor Bucholz begins his study of Delbrück garded the military with a mixture of fear and con- with theconflict over the military strategy of Freder- tempt; in fact, lhe distinction between soldiers and ick and the inierpretation of Clausewitz that existed bandits was often very difficult to draw. in 1870. He correctly describes the military thinking Although Larv avoids comparisons with presenl- of Frederick, Napoleon, and von Moltke (who used day China, thestudent of thecontemporary People’s the same strategy), explaining how this was to influ- Liberation Army will find illuminating parallels in ence the military planners for the next generation. certain instances, such as the difficulties of reinte- The reader will be fascinated by Bucholz's account grating demobilized servicemen back into civilian of Delbrück and his thinking, as well as by hisshort, life. Warlord Soldiers, however. stands on its own but detailed account of von Schlieffen. Noting that merits: it provides a fascinating, often poignant por- the two men had attempted to solve the intellectual tratt of an era mercifully past. differences between the academies and the military, Bucholz describes how, as time passed, their work I)r. JuneTeufel Dreyer brought them closer together. Bucholz concludes his í 'niversity of Miami, Florida work with the bitter dispute between Delbrück and Ludendorff about the later conduct of the Great War and lhe subsequent "stab-in-the-back” legend. This Hans Defbrück and the German Military Estab- further estranged Delbrück not only from the Ger- lishment by Arden Bucholz. Iowa City: University man military and conservative politicians and pro- of Iowa Press. 1985, 192 pages, SI7.00. fessors but even from his own family. If one looks for a core in Delbrück s thinking, it Professor Arden Bucholz, through very detailed miglu be seen as the failure of argumeni between research. has produced a fine, enviable volume on wars of annihilation and attrition to recognize that Hans Delbrück, one of Germany’s most productive, history had demonstrated that wars have been fought controversial modem military scholars. Delbriick's and won by limited strategy. Also, Delbrück be- volumes. H istory of the Art of War, have been stud- lieved, leaders sometimes overestimate their own na- ied lor some time at the United States Military tion's war poieniial, underestimatingmaterial reali- Academy, as well as at academies of a few other ties. According to Delbrück. war must beconducted nations. However. fora long time, Delbrück and his with a clear understandingof the political ramifica- writings were attacked in Germany and were gener- tions of its objectives. Thus, he saw Germany as ally ignored by professional academicians, many of going into World War I with a strategy unrelated to BOOKS, IMACiES, AND IDEAS 101

itsown relative weakness. And, as he was well aware, The Wild Blue: The Novel oí the U.S. Air Force b> one can lose a war even beíore it siarts. Walter J. Boyne and Steven L. Thompson. New H a m Delbrück and lhe (lerm an M iliiary Eslab- York: Crown Publtshers, 1986, 757 pages, $19.95. lishrnent will be read wilh interest by those vvho are íamiliar wilh the wrilings of Delbrück, as well as by The W ild Blue is a fictional account of the profes- scholars and siudenis oí German history. miliiary sional lives and personal experiences of six U.S. Aii aífairs. and modem hisiory. The proíessional oííicer Forceofficersand their familiesduring the first three will find it very rewarding. decades of the institulion's existem e. The principal characters—two fighter pilots, two bomber pilots, Dr. Raymond L. Proclor an airlift pilot, and a noncommissioned aircraft rae- University of Idaho. Moscow chanic—transcend thirty-year careers, from train- ing to command. and, in lhe process, become per- sonally involved in the miliiary events oí lhe era. I old in theepic -like manner made populai by Mic h- ener and others, the plot develops chronologi- Soldiers of Rome: Praetorians and Legionnaires by cally, using the major social upheavalsof lhe time as Colonel Robert F. Evans, USA (Rei). Washing- focal points for bringing the characters into contact. ton: Seven Locks Press. 1986, 171 pages, SI7.95. The book includes episodes and stories related to the creation of the Air Force in 1947, the Berlin Colonel Robert F. Evans has combined a revision Airlift, the Korean War, Vietnam, the Middle East, oí his Legions of Imperial Rome (a concise descrip- as well as the íntegration of lhe Air Force, lhe devel- tion of each imperial legion, wilh five maps show- opment of the F-l 11 and B-l, the Pentagon bureau- ing their disposilion) and an account of lhe Praeto- cracy, miliiary pay and compensation, promotions, rian Guard lo producean excellent litile book, albeii and the declining qualiiy oí miliiary health care. a book wilh some serious flaws. On page 11. for Oneof theauthors, retired Air Force Colonel Walter example, in rejecting the hisiorian Dio's statemenl J. Boyne, clearly contributed inuch from his per- lhat the Praetorians pillaged Rome, Colonel Evans sonal knowledge and experiences. However, al- wriies, “Neither Tacitus nor Suetonius confirm though the book's 757 pages contain interesting Dio's account. ..." Nor do they contradici it: Sueto- material about all the wars, events, and phenomena nius wrote brief, episodic biographies, and Tacitus’s oí the period, lhere is a substanlial amountoí stull- account of theperiod in question islost. On page 13, ing to contend wilh that doesn't add inuch to the Evans asserts thai the assassinaiion of Caligula in substance to the story. Rather lengthy passages are A.D. 41 proceeded . . with the approval of the devoted to explicit accounts of sexual encounters prefects, Rufrius Crispinus and Sextus Afranius ranging from pilot training flings with the cross- Burrus"; however, Burrus did not become preíect country instructor's wife, to the back streels of until A.D. 51. Typographical errors are common— Bangkok and "good ole Number 54," and then back e.g., page 48: "II Gallica" should be "II Parthica.” home again to the patient (if unlaithful) wife. The Although Soldiers of Rom e has faulis, it also has W ild Blue has it all and has it in a less than tasteful compensating virtues. Colonel Evans describes the lexicon. Praetorian Guard in contexí as an institution of Thereis little, if anything, appealingin The W ild Imperial Rome. This fruitful approach reveals, for Blue. Too many subjectsare too broadly treated in a instance, the relationships betwfeen the Praetorians contrived story held together by events ovei time. A and theemperor and the Praetorians and the Senate. reader would have to be a lifelong readet of A ir Force The Praetorians constituted a threat to Senate pre- Times to relate to this book. Moreover, while the rogatives, as well as to lhe senators’ and emperors' world is this novel’s stage, not a single map is to be lives. The emperors sought comrol oí the Praetori- found, and aglossary of acronyms must be cônsul ted ans by appointing two prefects and by co-opting a continually to translate the unnecessary jargon. prefect into the imperial family or appointing pre- íects from the imperial family. Based on my personal experience, 1 found that even the descriptions of aerial combat are not particularly Anyone who wishes to understand lhe Praetorian accurateorrevealing. Perhapswhat is most distaste- Guard or, indeed, anyone interested in a case study ful in the book, however. is lhe use oí subtle ethnic of a miliiary organization in socieiy should read this book. undertones regarding Asians, reminiscent of alti- tudes that may have characterized America in the Dr. Alíred S. Bradíord, Jr. 1930s. Stereotypes abound; Koreans are treated as Vniversily of Missouri-C.olumbia dishonest, Thais are crooks or prostituies, South 102 AIR UNIVERSITY RF.VIEW

Vietnamese are cowards, and even Americans of of heroism. chivalry, and professionalism, lhe S.\l> Asian background are portrayed as unreliable sol- Emden played havoi vvith her would-be execution- diers. VVhen, for example, our hero takes his retire- ers and became one ol the great commcrie raiders ol rafiit physical to end thii iv vears of courageous sei v - the vvai. Belore her pursuers finally sank her ir ice. he is examined by "a small, obvioush Middle Novembei 191 I. the cruiser had saileil ihirtv thou Kastern man ... wearing captains tracksandawhite saiul miles, destroyed sixteen merchant ships, sei/eo c o a t . . . . T m Do c t o r Sh a m a d . Pl e as ed 10 raeet you.’ three colliets loaded vvith Biitish coal, plunderec His voice was sibilant. He sounded like a Pakistani tvvo merc hant vessels and used them to set free cap merchant.” l he physician is too lazy toadminister a tured prisoners. and sunk one Russian cruiser anc routine EK.G properly. When a nurse finally gives one French destroyer. the test. it reveals a serious heart disorder, which the Kven hei sinking did not end the crevvs adven incompetent doctor then refuses to acknowledge, unes. l iltv c revv members escaped death or capture thereby sending our hero to an early death. and sailed an auxiliai v vessel to Turkish territory ir For professional reading in a society vvhere time is the Middle East. 1 hen they traveled across the Arab a precious commodity and Air Force professionals ian Deseri lo Palestine and Gonstantinople, and need to concentrate on studying the art and Science finally, they returned home to Germany. of war. The Wilcl Blue can be left out in the yonder. Authoi Dan van der \ at has writienan engrossiner account of the SMS Emden’s voyage. (ientlemen o} Majoi Al.ui J. Paiiiiiglon, l'SAf War will be ol particulai interest to students ol thtjj llollonum AHi. AVic México Great War. but anv military professional will profij from this reminder thal courage and skill can pro Gentlemen of War: The Amazing Story of Com- duce results far greater than available resourcea mander Kurt Mui ler and theSMS Emden by Dan might indicate. Hovvevei the book also reveals thai] \au der \at. New York: Williatn Morrow and advanced technology. braverv in combat, and un Gompanv. 1983, 208 pages, SI2.95. svverv ing performance of duty—when coupled witl a little luck—in lhe end usuallv prove insuíficiem On 12 April 1910, the SMS Emden, a new light belore a numericallv superior force. As happened ir cruiser of the Kaiser's battlefleet, left German hotne the SMS Emden's case, the "big battalions," will waters foi the last time. Aftei a leisurelv voyage to onlv competem leadership, can defeat a less power the Orient, she assumed station witli Ciei manv \ Pa- fui force, even when that force is aided by a host ol i ifit fleet and. like the rest of the Far Kastern Squad- qua 1 i ta t i v e adva n tages. ron. found herself cut off and hopelesslv ouinum- bered when wat brokc out in 1911. facing the com- Major (..iiv P. Cnx. l'SAl bined naval lorcesol Impei ial Rússia, Japan, France. í '..S. Air Force Academs^ Great Britain, and Austrália. In an inc icdible voyage Colorado Springx. C.olorad. j

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “ The Legacy of Halfway Unification” by Warren A. Trest as the outstanding article in the September-October 1986 issue of the Review. the contributors

HalphS. Ciem (B. A.. San DiegoStaieGdlege; VI.A.. PhD .. Columbia Umversiiy) is Profes- David R. Jones (B.A.. Dalhousie Universiiy; Lieulrnani Colonrl W illiam J. Dalecky èor oí Internai ion a I Relaiions ai Florida In- (USAFA; M B A.. Unisersiiy oí Califórnia ai rrnaiional Universiiy. Miaini. Dr Ciem is lhe M.A.. DukeUniversity; Ph D . Dalhousie Uni- Los Angeles; M.S.. I roy Slale Universiiy) is a tulhoi or editor oí severaI books and ariides versiiy) is Diretlor «>í lhe Russiau Mitro-Pro- regional plans oííicer lor lhe F.uropc*NA TO >n lhe population and eihnit groups oí lhe jecl, Dalhousie Universiiy. llaliíax, Nova Plans and Polit y Division. Hcj 1'SAF He has II.S.S.R ; his inosí retem edued book is He- Stoiia. He lias bcen a leclurer in history ai ílowu lhe A-10 and lhe F-l. nu luding an as- iearch (luide to lhe Hus.uan and Soviet Cen- Memorial Universiiy (Newíoundland). Dr. sigiiincut in NATO wiih lhe .r>2d Factual foues(1986). Dr. Clern isan Air Forte Reservisi Jones iscdilor oí Soviet .-irmed Forces Heview higluer Wing. Spaugdahlein AB. West Ger- issigned lo lh e -182d l a t i ira i F ig h ter W ing, Annual and M ihtary-Naval F.ntyclupedia of many. Gdonel Daletky is a graduale oí the flomesiead AFB. Florula. Hus.ua and the Soviet Cnion. His ar lides ha ve appeared in Naval War C.ollege Heview. So- Anny Gmiinand and General Stafí Gdlege viet Studie.s, and Miliiary Affair.s. and lhe Naval War Gdlege.

William F. Scoii (USMA; M.A., Georgeiown Umversiiy; PhD .. George Washington Uni- versiiy) is a consultam lo lhe Arms (iomrol and Disarrnarneni Agent v and lo a number oí research inslilulions. Beíore his reiiremem in 1972 írom lhe U.S. Air Force, he served in a varieis oí flying and staíf assignments. Dr. Stoii speni íour vears in lhe U.S.S.R as a Captain John D. Williams. USMC (B A.. semor air attachl and air and deíense atlac hé. Corncll Universiiy; M.S.. Deíense Imelligence Harriei Faai Scoli is a mcmber oí the Gdlege). is an Imelligence Analysi assigncd General Advisory Commiitce on Arms Cxm- u> Ht| U.S. Kuropean Coinmand. Captain irol and Disarmameni and a consultam on Williams has served as imelligence collections Robert S. Boyd(BA.. Dic kinum Gdlege) isan Soviet mililary afíairs to several major re- oííicer. Isi Marine Division; imelligence oí- Imelligence Researc h Specialisi íor the Gen- seart h organuations. l he Scoiis are joini au- ficer. llh Marines; recruii training oííicer ai eral Fhreai Division. Diret lorateoí Fsti males. thorsoí The Armed Forces of the l *SSH (198-1). Marine Girps Retruii Depot, San Diego. Cali- Ht| USAF. He has been an imelligence re- The Somei Contrai Structure (1988), and The fórnia; and chieí imelligenceanalysl. Isi Ma- search spetialisi at lhe Deíense Imelligence Soviet Art of War (1982). They m aim ain one rine Division. Camp Pendleton. Califórnia. Agenty and miliiary imelligence oííicer íor oí ihe largesi privaie libraries in lhe United Hisartit les havcappeared in Hroceedmgs and lhe U.S. Army wiih assignments in Arizona. Staies oí Soviet miliiary wrilmgs. Marine Corps (lazette. Germany, and Victnam.

103 John T. Greenwood (B A.. CniversityoíColo- rade»; M.A.. Cniversity of Wiscontin ai Madi- son; Ph D.. Kansas Siaie Cniversity) is Chiei of lhe Hisiorical Division of lhe U.S. Army Corpsoí Kngineers. Fori Belvoir. Virgínia. He has been a historian ai lhe Office oí Air Force History and Strategic Air (iummand and chiei historian. Spareand Missile Systems Orgam- zation. Dr. Greetiwood isauthorof numerous ariic les on lhe Soviet Air Force in World War II and posiwar C.S. Air Force strategic planning.

Bruce W. Menning (B.A., Si. John s Cniver i siiy; M.A. and Ph.D.. Duke Cniversity) is Di Colonel Michael C. Press (B.S., Cniversiiy of rec tor oí lhe Soviet Army Studies Office. U.S Oregon; M.S.. Army Com ma ml and General Army Combined Arms (a*nier. Fori Leaven Siaíí CoUrge) is Deputy Qimmander íor Op- worih. Kansas. Before serv ing in 1984-85 as th« eraiions. 106ih radical Fighter I raining John F. Morrison Professor of Militarv His, Wing. Zaragoza. Spain He is a fighter piloi tory at lhe Army (amimand and Cieneral Stafj w iih m ore th an 1000 hours and 480 com ba i Collegc. Dr. Menning was a Mililary Hisio missions in Vietnam who has srrved as lhe rian for lhe C.S. Army Cenieroí Mililary His 65ih Aggressor Squadron Cà>mmander ai Nel* lory.an aciion ofíicer for lhe Joini Operaiion] lis AFB. Nevada, and as Chiei of Fighter Re* Division. Office oí lhe Joint Chieis oí Staíí quiremenis. Hq CSAFK. Ramsiein AB. (ier- and an Associaie Professor oí History ai Mi inanv. Colunei Press isagraduateof ihe Army ami Cniversiiy. Oxford. Ohio. He is lhe au j Command and General Siafí Qdlege.md lhe ihor oí numerous arncles and has recenilo| National War Gol lege. lomplcied a book-length study. 7 >987

Professional Staff

Major Earl H. T il f o r i», J r .. USAF. Editor JOHN A. W kstcoit, Art Dnector and Production Manager STKVKN C. G arst, Art Editor and lllustrator HAITIK DlXON MlN I KR, C.opy Editor R obf.R I C. HlFPS. Financial and Administrative Manager

Advisers

C oi.onh Kknnf ui J. A i .NWICK, Dnector, War Gaming and Simulation Center, NDU L ih ' i kn vn i C oi.onh Don \ i .i> R. B vi com, USAF, Immediate Past Editor D r . D onai I) D. ClllPMAN, Educational Advisor, Squadron Ojficer School

C oi.onh. J axik.s L. C oi.k . J r ., Commander, S9th Military Airlift W ing

C oi.onh Rw .mon» A. H amii. io n , J r ., Dean, Air War College Resident Program M ajor G knfr.u . I. B. H oi.i .kv, J r ., USAFR (Rh ), Duke University D r . R ic iia r d H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

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