l he Soxiei Union faces a range of Reflections on KAL 007—page 29 TheSoviet Union's Special Purposé social, economic, and political prob- Forces—page 63 lems in the years ahead—page 2 The Air University Review, published bimonthly in English and quarterly in Spanish and Portuguese, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other nationai defense matters. The views and opinions ex- pressed or implied in the Review are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the U.S. government. A I R UNIVERSITY November-December 1986 Vol. XXXVIII No 1 AFR 50-2 2 The Soviet Union: Crisis, Stability, or Renewal? Dr. Ralph S. Ciem 14 Know H istory . o r Become History Fdilorial 16 Education and Training of Soviet Air Forces Officers Dr. William F. Scolt Harriei Fasi Scott 29 Soviet Concepts of Security: Reflections on KAL Flight 007 Dr. David R. Jones 40 Launch on YVarning in Soviet Nuclear Strategy Capt. John D. Williams. USMG 52 The Strategy of the Indirect Approach Applied to NATO Ll. Ciol. William J. Dalecky. USAF 63 SPETSNAZ: Soviet Innovation in Special Forces Roberi S. Boyd 70 Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition YVinners In My Opinion 72 The Human Factor: The United States versus the Soviet Fighter Pilot Col. Mike Press, USAF The Classic Approach 79 Train Hard, Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His “Art of Victory” Dr. Bruce W. Menning 89 You’ve Got the Stick Letters Books, Images, and Ideas 93 From Stalingrad to Berlin: Stalin’s War Dr. John T. Greenwood 98 Short Bursts 103 Contributors THE SOVIET UNION: CRISIS, STABILITY, OR RE 1)R RALPH S. C lkm N lhe titleoí his provocalive book. Will the toward lhe Soviei Union should be moreasser- Soviei Union Suwive until 1984? lhe laie live, laking inloaccount weaknesses in the So- ISoviei dissideni Andrei Amalrik posed spe- viei economy and society.1 ciíically a queslion aboul lhe longeviiy of lhe l he only problem wilh ihis noiion—and it Soviei Union, a subjecl thai has intrigued is a potemially dangerous problem—is thai it Western analysisof ihai country íor some lime. is based on a false premise and a queslionable and aboul which there has recenily been con- corollary: it is ceriainly wrong lo view the So- siderable speculalion.1 Reflecling for a mo- viei Union as beset wilh crises of sut h magni- inem on lhe fact thai lhe answer lo Amalrik s tude thai iis very existente is in doubt and query is now clear in lhe affirmaiive. ii is still probably wrong to ihink thai the problems lhe case thai many take seriously lhe notion confronting lhai couniry will in some way lhat lhe Soviei Union is in disiress and mighl make it more susceptible lo direct, unfriendly even collapse under lhe weighl of internai eco- pressure from lhe United States. This is noi lo nomic. social, and poliiical problems. Given suggesi thai the Soviei Union is wilhoul iis lheadversarial relationship between thesuper- diffitulties, or thai lhese difficulties do not powers. it is probably natural thai ihis issue present a serious t hallenge lo lhe Soviei politi- will be raised again by others in updated form, cal leadership. On thecontrary, lhat saine lead- and thai in mosí cases lhe responses will to ership has iiself taken an increasingly more some degree be biased by the ideological cli- candid and concerned view of lhe economit mate of the times and the personal views of and social situation in the Soviei Union and those involved. After all. if one perceives lhe calls for various reforms intended to correcí or Soviei Union as a militarv and political threat ai leasi lo amelioraie some of these problems to lhe Western democracies, then there is con- have received wide attention in the Soviet and siderable appeal in lhe idea thai our chief rival Western press. Likewise, the present circum- in the international arena might vanish of stance and near-term fuiure do offer certain iis own accord, or ai leasi become less menac- opportunities for an enhancemem of American ing. national interests vis-à-vis lhe Soviei Union, The issue of lhe condition of the Soviei sys- provided thai our initiatives are well grounded lem is not eniirely an academic one. The in lhe facts of the matter and are pursued in a sirength of lhe modem State is no longer a fashion calculated toavoid overt confrontation function solely of miliiary power, especially or outright hosiility. now lhat lhe awesome desirucliveness of lhat Wilh lhe seriousnessof these issues in mind. power places strong consiraints on iis use and it does seem thai the immediate past few years lhai unconventional forms of warfare (i.e., and ihe coming decade consti tule an especia 11 y guerrilla war and lerrorism) have proliferaied. imporiani transitional period foi lhe Soviei 1'lius. lhe long-term influente of lhe Soviei Union and thereforedemands someassessmem Union in international aífairs, like lhat of and guarded forecasts from those trained to oiher countries, will be deiermined to a large evaluaie lhe Soviei condition. At this writing, extern by the cohesiveness of iis society and lhe we are ai an excelleni vaniage point from viialiiy of its economy, not only for lhe value which lo take siock of Soviei prospects and thai these factors mighl have in lhe competi- their implications. A relaiively young Ieader tion between ideologies but also because social has recenily acceded lo power. the economy is and economit forces directly and indireclly entering a new Five-Vear Plan (lhe Twelfih, shape militarv capabiliiies and nonmiliiary 1986-90), and the XXVII Pariy Congressfa ma- options. Recognizing this, Richard Pipes and jor political event heldevery five years) hasjusi others have suggesied lhat American policy concluded. 3 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW However, reasonable people will disagree tries (e.g., iron and steel and machine building). aboui ihe dimensions arul imerpretations of Now, however, the Stalinisl model is expe- retem eventsand irends in. and parlicularly lhe riencing difficulties principally because the direction of, lhe Soviet economy, society, and Soviet economy has moved into an era where poliiical order during lhe near lerm. Accord- consumei goods and agriculture are given ingly, my discussion here will lót us on several higher priority, which means that productivity key issues m lerms of possibililies. However, counts for more than brute size; quality (or defini li ve stalemenisabout lhese queslionsand efficiency) has superseded quantity as lhe prime parlicularly lheir íuiure course are simply noi determinam of growth. James Millar has aplly feasible or prudeni. described this structural shift in the Soviet economy as requiring " ... changes in the lead- ership's long-standing preference for industry The Soviet Economy: over agric ulture, for the urban worker over the Problems and Prospects rural—for, in short, the hammer over the Ihere can be lillle doubl lhat Soviet eco- sickle."' nomit performance has experienced a down- More specifically, Soviet planning and con- lurn of serious proportions during lhe |>asi trolling agencies are no longer able to handle three det ades, a condilion lhal has worsened the tasks associated with a much largei and wiihin lhe lasi len years. This trend is evi- complex economy: thus, output largeis are deiued in lhe sleady drop in lheaverageannual often irrational and measuresof production are growth rate of lhe Soviet gross national prod- inaccurate. Prices are difficult toestablish; they uct (GNP) from 5.9 percent for the period 1956- are unrealistic and rarely adjusted, which fre- 60 to 5.0 percent for 1961-65, 5.2 percent for quently makes the allocation of resources per- 1966-70. 3.7 percent for 1971-75, and 2.7 per- verse. Perhaps most importam, ilu* technologi- cent for 1976-80.5 Although still respectable cal changes required to raise productivity seem by international siandardsflhe l ’.S. GNP grew very difficult for the Soviet system to generate ai an average rale of 3.1 percent betvveen 1975 internally. Some reasons for this difficulty are: and 1980), lhese figures are in dramalic conirasi • I here is lhe lack of innovation in Soviet to Soviet economic growih raies of from 6 to 11 enterprises because managers are reluctant to percent a year in lhe era prior to and imme- take risks for fear of failing to satisfy short-term diately after the Second World War. production quotas. Specialists on lhe Soviet economy by and • Research and development usually takes large concur on lhe causes for this secular de- place independem of the factories, so techno- (line iti growth rales. In general, lhe economic logical advances are difficult to integrate into developmeni siralegy adopted by the Soviet the production process. leadership (lhe ‘‘Stalinisl" model) in the late • The lack of competition among producers 1920s—which was to prove successful in im- and a chronic shortage of consumei goods plementing and sustai ning very high rates of (which perpetuates a seller’s market and redu- increase for about thirty years—is no longer ces vvorkers’ incentive) further inhibit inno- appropriate. The classic Stalinisl model, fea- vation. turing a centrally planned and tightly con- trolled system, was able to achieve impressive All of these reasons ha ve led toa steady deterio- economit residis by mobilizing cheap labor ration of both capital and labor productivity.' and abundam natural resources, by mandaling If there is general consensus on the dimen- a high levei of inveslment, and by devoting a sions of and reasons for the current Soviet eco- large share of capital to producer goods indus- nomic malaise, the course of events during the SOV1ET UNION TODAY AND TOMOÜHOW 5 coming years will be much more controvérsia!.