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University Microfilms International 300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 8008758
ARNETT, ROBERT LEE
SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL (1962-1977): HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE?
The Ohio State University PH.D. 1979
University Microfilms International300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England
Copyright 1979 by ARNETT, ROBERT LEE
All Rights Reserved SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL (1962-1977)
HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE?
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University
By
Robert Lee Arnett, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1979
Reading Committee: Approved By:
Dr. Philip D. Stewart
Dr. Charles F. Hermann
Dr. David M. Lampton
Political Science To My Parents VITA
August 15, 1947 Born — Akron, Ohio
1965 - 1969 B.A., Ohio State University
1969 - 1971 M.A., Ohio State University
1971 - 1973 U.S. Army
1973 - 1975 A.B.D., Ohio State University
1975 - 1978 Research Analyst, Library of Congress
1978 - Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Army PUBLICATIONS
Author of "Soviet Views on Nuclear War Survival: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" Journal of Strategic Studies. 2 (September 1979).
Author of "Soviet Military Doctrine: Views on Nuclear War," Arms Control Today. October 1978. Reprinted in Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader, Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979, pp. 115-120.
Co-author of "Forecasting the Stability of the SALT Interim Agreement: A Social Exchange Approach," presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, April 1974.
Co-author of "Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models," American Political Science Review. December 1972, pp. 1269-1290.
Author of "The Relationship of Oblast Economic Profiles and the Political Mobility of Soviet Middle-level Elites." M.A. thesis. March 1971.
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Political Science TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
VITA...... iii
INTRODUCTION...... 1
Chapter I. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY...... 7
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE...... 38
III. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY____62
IV. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY IN A NUCLEAR WAR...... 90
V. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR WAR...... 10 8
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS..... ___ 165
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 189
v INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a major debate is currently underway concerning the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons capabilities, the effectiveness of its civil defense capabilities, and the Soviet leaders' perception of those capabilities. Some Americans contend that the Soviet
Union has, or will soon have, the capability to conduct a nuclear war and incur no more losses than it incurred in
World War 11.^ On the other side in the debate are
Americans who argue that the United States still has, and will continue to have in the near future, the capability to inflict unacceptable losses and damage upon the Soviet o Union even after sustaining a first strike.
The debate also involves different evaluations of
Soviet perceptions of their capabilities. Some Americans contend that the Soviet leaders believe their nation can win and survive a nuclear war. Others argue that such a 4 conclusion is ill-founded. This group contends that the
Soviet leaders are well aware of the fact that the United
States can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union 5 and that a meaningful victory would not be possible.
An evaluation of the types of evidence being
1 presented in this debate leads to an interesting finding.
Both sides in the debate have presented numerous capability
analyses to support their conclusions. At the same time,
both sides have made many comments on Soviet views of the
consequences of a nuclear war. But compared to the number
of capability analyses, very little evidence has been
presented by either side to support their conclusions about
Soviet perceptions. Capability analyses are absolutely
essential in studying this question, but at the same time
analyses of Soviet attitudes are also very important,
especially when there are differing opinions about Soviet
capabilities.
A key question to be answered is, how confident are the Soviets that they could win and survive a nuclear war? It is the objective of this dissertation to examine and evaluate Soviet discussions of what they expect to happen if a nuclear war occurs.
American leaders need an accurate assessment of
Soviet views towards nuclear war survival in order to make rational decisions regarding our defense allocations and our national defense doctrine. If the Soviet leadership believes their nation could win a nuclear war with acceptable losses, then the likelihood is increased of either a nuclear attack against the U.S. or the use of nuclear blackmail against the West. If this is the case, the United States must increase its military and civil defense capabilities to convince the Soviet leadership that 3
there is no chance that their nation could win such a war.
If, on the other hand, the Soviet leadership has
no doubts about the United States' capability to inflict
unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, but the American
leadership accepts the contention of various Western
commentators who claim that the Soviet leaders believe it
is possible to win a nuclear war, then the likelihood is
increased that American leaders will make unnecessary
changes in our defense allocations and our strategic
nuclear doctrine. Thus, it is important not only to conduct analyses of Soviet military capabilities, but also
to study the Soviet leaderships1 perceptions of these capabilities.
Past studies of Soviet perceptions of their nuclear war-fighting capability vis-a-vis the United States have generally assessed, or commented on, Soviet statements on the following three issues:
the feasibility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy;
the possibility of victory in a nuclear war; and,
the consequences of such a war.
The attention given to Soviet attitudes on these issues is appropriate. The position which the Soviet leadership takes on these issues should provide evidence as to whether or not they believe their nation could achieve a meaningful 4
victory in a nuclear war. At the same time, Soviet views
on these issues indicate how they evaluate their strategic
nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities vis-a-vis the
United States. In addition, their thinking on these issues
indicates how likely it is that they might initiate, or
threaten to initiate such a war. The higher their
confidence in the likelihood of a meaningful victory, the
more likely it is that they might decide to initiate, or
threaten to initiate a nuclear war. The lower their
confidence in such a possibility, the more likely they are
to try every means to avoid such a conflict.
If they claim that: (1) nuclear war can serve as
a practical instrument of policy, (2) a meaningful victory
is possible in a nuclear war, and (3) the consequences of
such a conflict can be kept at an acceptable level, then
this suggests that they do believe a meaningful victory is
possible in a nuclear conflict. If on the other hand, they
claim, in publications intended for a Russian audience,
that: (1) nuclear war cannot serve as a practical
instrument of policy, (2) victory is not possible in such a
war, and (3) the consequences of a nuclear war cannot be
kept at an acceptable level, then, it cannot be argued, on
the basis of Soviet writings, that they believe it is possible to win and survive a nuclear war in a meaningful way. 5
NOTES
1. Some Westerners argue that not only can the Soviets win and survive a nuclear war, but they may be able to escape with fewer population losses than they incurred in World War II. Among those who espouse this view are: Retired Major General George J. Keegan cited in "Can the U.S. Survive a Nuclear Exchange," The American Intelligence Journal (Fall 1977): 20-22; Boeing Aerospace Company, Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear Attack, A Report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production, U.S. Congress, 17 November, 1976, pp. 73-75; Boeing Aerospace Company, Effect of Evacuation and Sheltering on Potential Fatalities from a Nuclear Exchange , 15 August 1977, p. 3; S.T. Cohen and E.F. Black, "SALT and the Public Law," National Review (20 January 1978), p. 88; Carsten M. Haaland and Eugene P. Wigner, "Surviving a Nuclear War," National Review (17 September 1976): 1005; Arthur A. Broyles and Eugene P. Wigner, "Civil Defense in Limited War-A Debate," Physics Today (29 April 1976): 47; Foy D . Kohler in Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976), p. xiii; R.J. Rummel. Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente (Beverly Hills/London: SAGE Publications, 1976), p. 137; Retired General Daniel Graham, cited in "Civil Defense Seen as a Fading Program," New York Times, 20 February 1977, p. 35; Westerners who conclude that Soviet industrial losses could be limited and recovery could be rapid include: Keegan, 1977; O.C. Boileau, "Nuclear War: A Soviet Option," The Journal of Social and Political Affairs (1 July 1976); Industrial Survival and Recovery After a Nuclear Attack, 1976, p. 73. Others in the West contend that the Soviet leaders believe they can win and survive a nuclear war. They include: Congressman Paul Trible in Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068, POD Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Part I, 1977, p. 275; Leon Goure, 1976; Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974); Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Win and Survive a Nuclear War," Commentary 64 (July 1977): 21-34.
2. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Report Fiscal Year 1979 (2 February 1978), pp. 4-6, 60; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through the Mid-1980's: A Comparative Analysis (August 1978); CIA, Soviet Civil Defense, NI-78-10003, (July 1978); Richard Burt, "Secret Carter Study of Soviet Threat." The Washington Star. 6 January 1978, pp. A1 , A6; 6
William H. Kincade, "Repeating History: The Civil Defense Debate Renewed," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 99-120; William H. Kincade, "Rethinging the Unthinkable: Targeting Doctrine and Strategic Arms Control," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists CMav 1978): 14-20.
3. See footnote 1.
4. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security 3 (Summer 1978): 112-147; Fred M. Kaplan, Dubious Spector: A Second Look at the Soviet Threat (Washington, D.C. and Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1977); P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War. Peace and Neutrality (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
5. I define a meaningful victory as a situation where the benefits derived from achieving a policy goal far outweigh the costs which are paid to achieve it. A mere victory is when the costs paid to achieve a goal are about equal to the benefits derived from its achievement. A pyrrhic victory is when the costs far exceed the benefits gained from attaining the objective. We cannot be certain specifically what would constitute a meaningful victory from the Soviet leaders point of view. What I argue in this dissertation is that they do not believe such a victory is possible if they contend, in Russian publications, that: (1) nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy, (2) a meaningful victory is not possible in a nuclear war, and (3) the consequences of such a war for the USSR would be much worse than ever suffered before.
6. I am not arguing that there is necessarily one Soviet view. In the Soviet Union, officials are not always in agreement on policy issues. In this dissertation, I examine whether there is a predominate view or widely divergent views among civilian and military officials on the issue of nuclear war survival. CHAPTER I
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study is qualitative documentary analysis. A review was conducted of Soviet writings in authoritative publications for the period 1962 to 1977 in search of statements which reflected Soviet thinking on nuclear war survival.
This research method was selected for several reasons. First, many authors have found qualitative documentary analysis to be useful in examining Soviet attitudes on various issues.'*' Another reason is that the methods available for studying Soviet attitudes are limited. The main methods available to scholars are: (1) qualitative documentary analysis, (2) quantitative content analysis, and (3) behavioral analysis. All three methods could be used in examining Soviet thinking on nuclear war survival. Two factors, however, were prominent in not choosing the quantitative content analysis method. At the outset of this research, it was uncertain whether an adequate number of relevant Soviet statements could be collected to make statistical analysis worthwhile. More
7 important was the fact that one objective of this research
was to draw out important nuances in the subject areas
being examined. Before one can perform quantitative
content analysis, it is necessary to understand what is
being quantified. For example, in studying Soviet
attitudes towards nuclear war survival, is a statement that
"nuclear war is still a continuation of politics" an
indication that the author believes nuclear war could serve as a practical instrument of Soviet policy? Answering such questions is one of the objectives of this dissertation.
The third method -- analysis of Soviet behavior — was not selected because it has been the most widely used method for evaluating Soviet attitudes and because it has resulted in widely divergent conclusions. Qualitative documentary analysis of Soviet attitudes towards nuclear war survival has also resulted in divergent conclusions, but relatively little research has been published using this method.
The Value and Limitations of Documentary Analysis
Qualitative documentary analysis has been widely used by political scientists, Soviet-area specialists, journalists, and Western commentators to describe attitudes and to predict behavior. When utilizing this methodology for such purposes, however, two potential problems should be recognized. The first concerns the validity of the 9
methodology for measuring attitudes and the second concerns o the relationship between attitudes and behavior.
Using articulated views as indicators of
attitudes can be misleading because such views can be
expressed for many reasons. For example, they may merely
represent propaganda. Another potential problem in measuring attitudes is the fact that the indicators
selected as representative of that attitude may not actually measure the attitude being examined.
If one goes beyond the measurement of attitudes and tries to predict behavior on the basis of attitudinal expressions, another potential problem arises. This results from the fact that even if we have accurately identified the attitudes, there is no guarantee that the expected behavior will occur.
After discussing these potential problems, the obvious question is: Is this methodology valid for the purpose for which it was intended? There are several reasons for an affirmative answer to this question.
As mentioned before, many social scientists have found this methodology to be useful and many Soviet-area specialists have utilized it for studying Soviet attitudes 3 on various issues. Thus, this methodology has been generally accepted as one method, which when properly used, can provide useful information. In addition, steps can be taken to increase the probability that the articulated views examined are representative of the attitudes one is 10
trying to measure. For example, in this research, I surveyed only publications written in Russian. By not including Soviet views published or broadcast in English, I expect to decrease the likelihood that the views were expressed to influence foreign thinking. As will be discussed, I have taken other measures to overcome this problem.
I also carefully selected the attitudinal indicators which were to represent the attitudes being examined. As will be discussed later, I believe that
Soviet views on nuclear war as a practical instrument of policy, the possibility of a meaningful victory, and the consequences of a nuclear war, are valid indicators of
Soviet attitudes about the possibility that their nation could win a nuclear war with an acceptable level of losses.
As I will also discuss later, I do not believe that certain attitudinal indicators utilized in some past studies, such as Soviet statements about victory in war and about war as a continuation of politics, represent the attitudes which they are claimed to represent.
The main objective of this dissertation is to review and analyze Soviet views on: nuclear war as an instrument of policy, the possibility of victory in such a war, and the consequences of a nuclear war. The findings of this study, however, are also intended to assist in predicting how likely the Soviet leadership is to initiate, or threaten to initiate, a nuclear war. As a result it 11
must be noted that elite attitudes are just one of many 4 factors which influence foreign policy decisions. But
elite attitudes are a factor. Thus, the findings of this
study should be utilized in conjunction with other studies, 5 especially behavioral studies, in an attempt to assess
Soviet thinking and probable behavior regarding the use of
nuclear war as an instrument of policy.
Research Design
I examined and evaluated Soviet statements
intended for a Soviet audience on the subject of nuclear war survival which were made between 1962 and 1977. For these years, I reviewed every issue of the two major sources of translations of Russian publications and broadcasts — the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and g the Joint Publications Research Service. I also reviewed all other available translations which I could find.
In my search, I examined all articles whose titles indicated that nuclear war might be a subject of discussion. In this dissertation, I have cited all Soviet statements, which I found in my search, on nuclear war as a practical instrument of Soviet policy, on the consequences of a nuclear war for the Soviet Union, and I have included representative Soviet statements on the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. I have also cited Soviet 12
statements referred to by Westerners in past discussions of
Soviet views on nuclear war survival.
Because a preliminary survey indicated that
Politburo members rarely .discussed this subject in public
forums, I utilized what few statements they had made along
with as many statements as possible which were made by
military and civilian spokesmen in the major authoritative
newspapers and journals. While statements by members of
the Politburo would be the most authoritative, statements made in the major Soviet newspapers and journals can also
be regarded as representative of official thinking because
the ideas expressed in the press and on the radio are
Q strictly controlled. The degree to which differences of opinion are expressed on an issue in such media reflects the extent to which the top political leaders agree on the issue. Thus, a general concensus on an issue in the media indicates that the political leaders, or at least those with the most power, are in agreement. A major debate in the media reflects a division of opinion on the issue among the leaders.^ H. Gordon Skillings, in discussing the role of the media in expressing group opinion in the Soviet
Union, said that,
The regulated nature of the discussion, especially in its written form, suggests that the diversity of view is the result not merely of initiative from below by individuals, but also of'decisions by persons in authority, who approve or perhaps sometimes sponsor certain lines of argument. 10 13
Thus, to determine what the political and military leaders
think about nuclear war survival, I examined what they have said, as well as what other civilian and military spokesmen have said on the subject. In my analysis I sought to determine whether there is a consensus of opinion on the issues of nuclear war as an instrument of Soviet policy, the possibility of a meaningful victory and the consequences of such a war. I also sought to determine how broadly these views are held and whether these views have been held consistently over time.
It should be noted at this point that in analyzing Soviet articulated views on an issue, there may be periods when the issue is not discussed or there may be an end to the expression of diverse opinions. One possible reason why certain national security issues may surface for discussion periodically may be related to the budgetary process. When the time comes to justify defense spending, it is more likely that issues which could affect the level of spending would be debated.
There are several reasons why a debate over an issue may end. This could mean that either a compromise was reached, the side with the most power was able to force its opponents to cease public opposition, or the debate has only temporarily subsided.
Thus, in studying Soviet articulated views on an issue we can expect: (1) a view which is consistently 14
expressed over time, (2) differing opinions on the issue,
or (3) no discussion of the issue. A position on an issue
which is consistently expressed over time, with no
opposition, suggests that that view dominates among top
officials. When differing views are expressed over an
issue, this indicates that the top leadership is divided on
the issue. No discussion of an issue could mean many
things, including, as just mentioned, a compromise was
reached, the more powerful group prevailed, or the issue
had only temporarily subsided.
Soviet Open Sources: Are They a Valid Expression of Soviet Attitudes?
At this juncture, it is necessary to discuss in
more detail whether there is any value in studying Soviet
open source statements. Some people are skeptical of such
a venture because of the Soviet propensity for secrecy,
deception, and disinformation. This task is further
complicated because substantive statements are made in
Marxist-Leninist terminology. But although it is difficult
to find out about Soviet attitudes from their open sources,
it is not impossible. Many Western scholars have surveyed
Soviet sources and have considered them to be valuable in 12 providing insight into Soviet thinking.
There are several reasons why we can have some 15 confidence in reviewing certain Soviet sources for
expressions of their thinking. For one thing, in the
Soviet system, key publications serve as a means of communicating official thinking to members of the military, party officials, and the general populace.
One Westerner states that there is no doubt as to the essential reliability of official Soviet newspapers, journals, and books. He contends, "It would be inconceivable that the Moscow regime would risk deluding its own military personnel on such a mass scale, simply to 13 confound the West." Leon Goure argues that we can learn a great deal from such sources because the Soviets are forced to use these publications "...to inform, indoctrinate and pressure a complex bureaucracy and a large 14 number of people." According to William T. Lee, "What the regime's spokesmen say to their own people "...usually can be taken at face value." In addition, Richard Pipes claims, "There is ample evidence that the Soviet military say what they mean, and usually mean what they say.-*-®
Others in the West who have studied Soviet writings have 17 reached the same conclusion.
Another reason why we can have some confidence in the validity of statements being made in open sourcs results from our ability to compare this literature with that of certain writings of restricted Soviet publications.
In 1960, Raymond Garthoff compared these publications and concluded: 16
These (classified) sources go further into some sensitive matters than do the open published materials, but in no case did the open materials display any discrepancy or divergence from the secret ones. This confirms and underlines the conclusion that the open sources are, to the extent they do treat strategic matters, a generally reliable source.
In recent years more articles from this restricted journal, 19 Voyennaya mysl1. have become available in the West, thus
enabling us to further compare Soviet writings from
classified and unclassified sources. These articles have
been reviewed for this dissertation and relevant articles
are cited in the following chapters.
Several measures were taken in developing this
research design to increase our confidence that the
statements reviewed represent attitudes and were not just
propaganda statements. First, the discussions examined are
from authoritative Soviet sources, written or broadcast in
Russian. These sources are intended for Russian audiences
and serve as key means of communicating official thinking
and differences of opinion among officials. In addition,
views expressed in open-source publications in the 1960's
are compared with views expressed in the restricted
General Staff publication Voyennaya mysl1 (Military 20 Thought). Finally, this study consists of an examination
of a large number of Soviet discussions of these issues over a sixteen year period. One objective was to determine
if Soviet spokesmen were consistent in what they were 17
saying over time. Consistency of Soviet statements
especially when compared with what was said in Voyennaya
mysl1 increases our confidence that the statements are a
reflection of attitudes.
The Relative Importance of Articulated Views
In this study, many Soviet statements, from
different sources and by many different people, are quoted
or referred to. It should be recognized that the
statements vary in their authoritativeness and thus in
their importance.
In measuring the authoritativeness of a Russian 21 language article and hence the views expressed therein,
the major factors are the source of the publication and the
position held by the author. This research cites Soviet
statements from many sources, but relies mostly on the
journals and newspapers which are considered to be the
major authoritative publications of importance on matters
dealing with national security. They do represent
different institutions within the Soviet system which is
another reason they were reviewed. The objective was to
see if the various institutions expressed different views on nuclear war survival.
Publications within the Soviet Union can also be
evaluated on another basis. If the article or book is 18
11 recommended for study" or if it has received an award such
as the Frunze Prize, these are indications that the views
expressed in the publications are considered to be
important.
The second criterion for evaluating the
importance of an articulated view is the position held by
the Soviet spokesman. The further a person is from the
decision-making process, the less the importance of the
view he expresses. At this point, a digression to discuss
the Soviet national security decision-making process is
necessary in order to understand whose views are most
important.
In the Soviet Union, major national security
policy decisions are made by the Politburo. Various organizations, however, can have an influence on these decisions. Brezhnev's personal secretariat and the Central
Committee Secretariat (especially the International
Department) are involved in staff preparation of papers for policy decisions. The Ministry of Defense and the KGB can influence policy because they provide the Politburo with information on military capabilities. For a civilian perspective of a national security issue, the Politburo can call upon the Academy of Science's Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
The views of the Politburo are most important on any national security issue. Unfortunately, members of the 19
Politburo rarely speak in an open forum about their view of
the consequences of a nuclear war. Thus, to determine the
Soviet leaders' view(s), on nuclear war, it is necessary to
analyze what they have said along with statements made by
other spokesmen in authoritative publications intended for
a Soviet audience. Although this method is imperfect, as
noted before, statements about important national security
issues made in official publications would not be published
if they were in direct opposition to the position taken by
the Politburo.^
But obviously some people's views are more
important than others. Most important, for this study, are
the people who have access to the national leadership or
who have some role in formulating national security policy.
Statements made by other top political officials,
such as Secretariat members, or heads of Departments within
the Central Committee are important by virtue of their
position within the Party and their access to the Politburo
members. Also of great importance are comments made by top
officials within the Ministry of Defense (MOD). This
Ministry is responsible for developing military doctrine
and specific war plans, preparing estimates of military
requirements, assessing foreign military capabilities, and
directing the training of the Soviet armed forces. In making decisions relating to national security, the
Politburo must rely heavily on information provided by the
Ministry and undoubtedly listens to the views of MOD 20 officials — one of whom, the Minister of Defense, is
himself a Politburo member.
The views of top KGB officials are also important. These officials direct the collection and analyzing of foreign intelligence information and select what information is provided to the political leadership.
The views expressed by civilian defense analysts can be important because they do analyses for the political leadership. These analysts are found in the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada (hereafter referred to as IUSA) headed by G.A. Arbatov, the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) headed by N.N. Inozemtsev, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Politburo member, A.A. Gromyko. Arbatov and
Inozemtsev reportedly have access to the Politburo members 23 or at least their staffs. Gromyko is a member of the
Politburo.
In assessing the military leaderships' thinking on a national security issue it is worthwhile to examine the views expressed by military officials at the academies and the history research institute of the Ministry of
Defense. Especially, important are the General Staff
Academy, the Frunze Military Academy, the Lenin 24 Military-Political Academy, and the General Staff's
Institute of Military History. Officials at these institutions do not have any formal access to the political leadership, but they do have an indirect role in national 21 security policy by virtue of the fact that they are involved in the development of military doctrine. Faculty members at the academies also have the important responsibility of teaching this doctrine to senior officers who will take over important positions within the military.
As a result, the writings of the faculty (mostly lieutenant-colonels, colonels, and general-majors) at these institutions are considered to be important in studying
Soviet military doctrine.
Persons writing in journals and newspapers who are not members of these institutions may not have access to the national decision-makers, but their views are still worth examining. By virtue of the fact that their articles are accepted for publication means that they reflect official thinking or are sponsored by someone in a position of authority.
Thus, in this research, I cite not only the views expressed by top-level officials in the major authoritative publications, but I also added as many statements as possible by spokesmen in lesser positions especially if their work was published in one of the key military, party, or government journals. My justification for citing the latter group of spokesmen is two-fold. First, if their work was published in an authoritative journal, it does have some official sanction. In addition, I was looking to see if there was consistency among the views expressed by spokesmen of differing levels of importance. 22
One other point must be made in reference to the
importance of the statements cited. I have tried to
examine the views on nuclear war as expressed by as many
spokesmen as possible. A limitation of this study is that
I have not measured the intensity with which the
individuals held these views. When important decisions
have to be made, this factor could be important. The
stronger the intensity of one's view, the more likely he is
to work and sacrifice to see it prevail.
Russian Sources
The sources examined in this study consist of printed material and broadcasts in Russian which have been 26 translated in the West. The main sources reviewed were:
Kraznaya zvezda (Red Star) — The official daily newspaper of the Ministry of Defense.
Pravda (Truth) — The daily newspaper of the Communist Party Central Committee.
Izvestiya (News) — The daily newspaper of the government.
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (Communist of the Armed Forces) — The official journal of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense.
Kommunist (Communist) — The major theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya (USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology) — Monthly 23
journal of the Academy of Science's Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada.
Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military History Journal) — A military journal which analyzes military history and discusses the implications of the findings for improving Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
Voyennaya mysl1 (Military Thought) — A monthly publication of the Ministry of Defense. Dissemi nation is restricted to generals, admirals, and officers in the Soviet armed forces. It is the chief theoretical journal of the General Staff.
These are the major publications which most often discuss national defense issues and they represent the main institutions in the USSR which make or can influence the making of foreign policy decisions. In addition to these sources, other relevant publications have also been used, especially books written for members of the Soviet armed forces.
Time Frame
This study examines Soviet writings on nuclear war survival for the period 1962-1977. This time span was selected because it allows us to study not only recent
Soviet thinking, but also permits a review of Soviet views during several distinct periods of political and military change within the Soviet Union. From 1962 to October 1964,
Khrushchev was the political leader during a time when the 24
Soviet Union was inferior to the United States in terms of
nuclear weapons capabilities. From October 1964 through
1970, the Soviet Union was ruled by a collective leadership
headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. During these
years, the Soviet Union embarked on an effort to catch up
with the U.S. in strategic nuclear weapons. From 1971
through 1977, the Soviet Union continued to be ruled by a
collective leadership, but Brezhnev seemed to emerge as the
leader of this group. During these years, the Soviet Union
was in a position of parity with the U.S. in regards to
strategic nuclear weapons.
Thus, there are several reasons for examining the
1962-1977 time frame. As previously stated, it allows us
to examine relatively current Soviet thinking. In addition, it permits us to examine whether the numerous
internal changes (in military capabilities, political
leadership, etc.) which have occurred during this time have caused any change in Soviet thinking about nuclear war survival. Finally, this examination of an extended time period allows us to determine whether certain Soviet spokesmen have been consistent over time in the views they express. 25
Issues to be Examined
There are three issues which are discussed in
Soviet publications which can provide us with insight into
their views on nuclear war survivability. These issues
are:
- Can nuclear war serve as an instrument of policy?
Is victory possible in a nuclear war?
- What are the consequences of a nuclear war?
These are the key questions which Soviet spokesmen have
addressed in discussing the implications of the development of nuclear weapons for strategic doctrine. These issues are interrelated. Their perception of whether or not a meaningful victory is possible depends upon their assessments of the consequences of the war. In turn, their view on the possibility of a meaningful victory will directly influence their thinking on the usefulness of nuclear war as an instrument of policy. Thus, because of the interrelationship between the issues, I will be examining their views on all three. The position which the
Soviet spokesmen take on these issues should indicate whether or not they consider nuclear war as a viable policy option.
In this researcn, I collected and analyzed all 26 statements which addressed the three issues. I examined the text in which the statements were made to determine whether other comments were made which contradicted or qualified the statements. I also compared statements made by the same author over time to check for consistency. The overall objective was to present a large number of statements reflecting Soviet views on these issues.
In evaluating Soviet views on the first issue, this study examined several questions. When Soviet spokesmen say that war, even in the nuclear era, is still a continuation of politics, are they claiming that nuclear war is an instrument of policy? Some Westerners have cited
Soviet statements about "war as a continuation of politics" as evidence that the Soviets perceive nuclear war as a potential instrument for achieving their political objectives. This mixing of Soviet comments on war as a continuation of politics and war as an instrument of politics, as I will show, results in a distortion of Soviet thinking.
Another question to be examined, relating to the first issue, is, when they say war is an instrument of policy even in the nuclear era, does this mean that they perceive it as being a practical instrument of policy?
Finally, what have they said about nuclear war as a means for attaining political objectives?
To answer these questions, I examined whether
Soviet spokesmen talked about differences in meaning 27
between the statement that "war is a continuation of
politics" and "war is an instrument of policy". Because I
did find that there was a difference, I sought to determine
the validity of the claim. To do so I reviewed the context
in which such statements were made to determine whether
Soviet writers are consistent in their usage of these
phrases. I also examined as many direct Soviet comments,
as possible, on war as an instrument of policy, to
determine not only whether they state that it is still an
instrument of policy, but more importantly, whether they
perceived it as a practical instrument. If they believe
the latter is true, then as some Westerners contend, Soviet
thinking is radically different from that of American
leaders. It would also mean that the Soviet leaders do not
perceive the U.S. to have a nuclear capability and doctrine
sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from utilizing, or
threatening to utilize, its nuclear arsenal.
Concerning the second issue, some Westerners point to the fact that Soviet writings often refer to a
socialist victory in the event of a nuclear war. In my research I reviewed the context in which such victory statements were made. The objective was to determine:
What kind of victory are they referring to?
Why do they talk about victory?
Are their statements about victory consistent with what they say about the consequences of a nuclear war?28 28
Finally, a review was conducted of Soviet
comments on the consequences of a nuclear war. I examined
what they have said about the number of population losses,
the damage to industry, the radiation effects, the
consequences for the socialist revolution, and any other
consequences which they anticipated. Of value in this
analysis will be their comparison of the results of such a
war with past wars. Some Westerners contend that the
Soviet Union was able to survive the vast destruction,of
World War II and become one of the two major world powers.
These Westerners go on to argue that the Soviet leaders may
therefore consider the level of destruction suffered in the
last war as acceptable in certain situations. Although
this conclusion itself is questionable, if the Soviets do
hold such a belief, it would not be relevant if they also
believed that the destruction of a nuclear war would be
much worse than they suffered in World War II.
Criteria for Evaluating Soviet Views on Nuclear War Survival
The major issue being examined in this dissertation is whether the Soviet leaders believe their nation could win a nuclear war while incurring an acceptable level of destruction. To answer this question, 29
it will be necessary to analyze their thinking on the three
issues previously cited: war as an instrument of policy,
the possibility of victory, and the estimated consequences
of such a war.
I will conclude that they do not believe their 29 nation could achieve any type of meaningful victory in
such a war if their statements consistently express all
three of the following beliefs:
nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy;
a meaningful victory is not possible in such a conflict; and,
the consequences would be disastrous for the Soviet Union in terms of population losses and destruction to the economy.
If they state that nuclear war cannot serve as an
instrument of policy, this is a good indication that they
perceive that victory would not be possible and losses
would be unacceptably high. If they state that victory is
not possible in such a war, this again indicates that they
expect that losses would be extremely high and that, at
best, only a pyrrhic victory would be possible. If they
state that the consequences would be disastrous for the
Soviet Union, this indicates that they do not believe a meaningful victory is possible.
I will conclude that the leaders of the Soviet
Union believe their nation could achieve a meaningful 30
victory in a nuclear war if they consistently express all
three of the following beliefs:
- nuclear war can serve as a practical instrument of policy;
a meaningful victory is possible in a nuclear war; and,
the consequences for the Soviet Union could be kept to an acceptable level.
If they argue that nuclear war can serve as a practical instrument of policy, it is an indication that they believe victory is possible in such a conflict and losses could be kept to an acceptable level. If they contend that victory is possible in a nuclear war, then this may mean that they perceive that their losses could be kept to an acceptable level. As will be discussed later, however, the term "victory" is a vague concept and there are many reasons why the victory notion is espoused. Thus,
I will conclude that they are referring to the possibility of a meaningful victory if the text in which the statement is made indicates that this is the type of victory being referred to.^
I will conclude that they believe losses could be reduced to an acceptable level if their statements indicate that population losses and destruction to the economy could be held to the level of losses experienced in World War II, and especially if they believe losses could be reduced 31
below that level.
At this point, it is necessary to discuss what
level of destruction would be considered "unacceptable11 to
the Soviets. United States government officials have
argued that the Soviets will be deterred as long as we have
the capability to destroy 20-33 percent of their population 3 1 and 50-67 percent of their industry. Soviet writings,
however, do not list such percentages. Thus, for this
study, other criteria must be established whereby we can
determine what level of damage would be considered
unacceptable to the Soviet leadership.
In this study, I assume that Soviet spokesmen believe their nation would incur unacceptable losses if
they make statements to the effect that the consequences of such a war, for the Soviet Union, would be worse than what 32 their nation experienced in World War II. Statements that the consequences would be far worse than ever experienced will be considered as very strong indications of a belief that unacceptable damage could not be avoided.
Statements that nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy and that victory is not possible in such a war will be regarded as reflections of the same belief.
Another problem which must be addressed is the fact that there is no set level of what the Soviet leadership (or the U.S. leadership) considers to be unacceptable losses. That level will vary depending on the 32
political objective they seek, the importance of the
objective, the available means to achieve the objective and
the costs and benefits associated with the alternative
means. If they believe they can achieve a policy goal
peacefully, the level of what they consider to be
unacceptable losses will probably be quite low. On the
other hand, if they believe that the U.S. is about to
launch a nuclear strike, they would probably launch a
preemptive strike regardless of the losses their nation
would incur. Thus, a deliberate decision by the Soviet
leaders to initiate a nuclear war could occur if there is a
very important political objective which they seek which
they perceive they have no other way to achieve and which
is considered so valuable that the benefits of attaining it
far outweigh the costs. Once we have determined the Soviet view of the consequences of a nuclear war, it would be possible to explore what political objectives might be so
important as to be worth the costs of such a war. 33
NOTES
1. For example, see Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, London, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1951); William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969); Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitations: 1969-1972," Soviet Studies 27 (January 1975): 27-45.
2. For discussions of the problems, see: Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically: 'Cognitive Process’ Approaches," in In Search of Global Patterns, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1976): pp. 121-144; Nigel Lemon, Attitudes and Their Measurement (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1973); Richard Merritt, "Cross-National Content Analysis," Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), pp. 64-103; Robert C. Angell and J. David Singer, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites: A Comparison of the Findings of the Two Studies," Journal of Conflict Resolution 8 (December 1964): 486-487.
3. Philip D. Stewart, "Diversity and Adaptation in Soviet Political Culture: The Attitudes of the Soviet Political Elite", presented at the First International Slavic Conference, Banff, Alberta, Canada, September 3-7, 1974; Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969); William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969); Nathan Leites, Operational Code of the Politburo, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) .
4. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, California and London: Sage Publications, 1973).
5. The behavioral studies would include analyses of Soviet weapons development, civil defense efforts, and risk-taking in foreign policy.
6. I reviewed: FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union which is published 5 times a week; JPRS, Translations of USSR Military Affairs; and JPRS, Translations of Political and Sociological Affairs. The JPRS translations are published on an irregular basis with the former one coming out at a rate of about six issues per month and the latter 34 one less frequently. (Note: Between 1962 and 1977, the titles of the FBIS and the JPRS publications have changed several times.)
7. The main other sources of translations which I reviewed are: (1) The U.S. Air Force Soviet Military Thought Series of translations of Soviet books (to date 15 books have been translated); William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott's translations of Soviet articles in their book The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); and translations published in the U.S. periodical — Strategic Review.
8. Censors in the Soviet Union are responsible for ensuring that only officially sanctioned views, especially on national security issues, are published. For a brief discussion of Soviet censorship see Warner, 1977, p. 49.
9. Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education," World Politics 22 (October 1969): 29-50; H. Gordon Skillings and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pess, 1971) especially pages 42-44.
10. Skilling, 1971, p. 43.
11. For a discussion of the role and influence of institutional and attitudinal interest groups, the implications of debates in the media, and the importance of how broadly and intensely attitudes are held, see: Stewart, 1969 and Skilling, 1971.
12. For example, see Leites, 1951; Zimmerman, 1969; and Payne, 197 5.
13. Frank R. Barnett. Preface to Soviet 3ci;rces of Military Doctrine and Strategy by William F. Scott. (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1975), p. vii.
14. Leon Goure, et al., The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy, (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 24.
15. William T. Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977), p. 37.
16.Pipes, 1977, p. 22.
17. For example, see William R. Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy: A Developing American View," The 35
Future of Soviet Military Power, Lawrence L. Whetten, ed. , (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc. 1976), pp. 43-44.
18. Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Second Printing, 1960), p. 270.
19. Voyennaya mysl1 is a monthly publication of the Ministry of Defense. Dissemination is restricted to generals, admirals, and officers in the Soviet armed forces.
20. Issues of this journal are only available through 1969.
21. Books can be judged according to their publisher and the position held by the author.
* 22. Differences of opinion in official publications can occur if the Politburo members are in disagreement or have not taken a stand on the issue.
23. A CIA report states that Arbatov sometimes serves as an adviser on U.S. affairs to top policymakers. CIA, Biographic Report: USSR Institute on the USA and Canada, CR76-10864, April 1976, p. 3. Douglass Garthoff writes that Arbatov appears to have occasional access to Brezhnev through the General Secretaries' personal secretariat. Douglass Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and Arms Control," Survival 19 (November/December 1977): 246-7. Carl Jacobsen believes that Arbatov has comparatively easy access to Brezhnev's private staff and perhaps to Brezhnev himself. Carl Jacobsen, "Soviet Think Tanks," Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Volume I, David R. Jones ed., (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), p. 143. Jacobsen states that Inozemstev appears to have close ties to M.A. Suslov and B.N. Ponomarev and perhaps other members of the Politburo and Secretariat. Jacobsen, 1977, p. 143.
24. The Lenin Military-Political Academy is subordinate to the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Army and Navy. The MPA is both a directorate within the Ministry of Defense and a Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
25. Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Formulation and Dissemination, (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 1971), pp. 67-78.
26. Some people may be skeptical of research based upon available translated sources. Indeed, there are some potential problems using translations. The danger always 36
exists that there are errors in the translations. The main sources I relied upon, the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), however, are considered to be generally reliable. In addition, the large number of articles, books, and broadcasts cited in this study will ensure that even if there were a few errors in the translations, they will have no significant effect on the overall findings.
27. I reviewed all available translations of other Soviet books, journals and newspapers which had articles discussing nuclear war.
28. Because the possibility of a meaningful victory is directly related to the consequences of a nuclear war, statements about both should be consistent with each other. If Soviet spokesmen argue that victory is possible in a nuclear war but also state that the consequences would be disastrous for both sides, this inconsistency suggests that the statement about victory was made for reasons other than an expectation that a meaningful victory is possible.
29. A meaningful victory is when the benefits of achieving a goal far outweigh the costs which must be paid to achieve it. A mere victory is when the costs paid to achieve a goal are about equal to the benefits derived from its achievement. A pyrrhic victory is when the costs paid far exceed the benefits gained from attaining the objective.
30. As I will discuss later, a Soviet statement — that victory is possible in a nuclear war — is by itself of little value. I argue that to automatically equate the concept "victory” with the concept of a "meaningful victory," as some Westerners have done in studying Soviet writings, is inappropriate. Thus, in any article where an unspecified type of victory is referred to, it is wrong to consider it as referring to a meaningful victory unless the article also states that nuclear war could serve as a practical instrument of Soviet policy or that losses and damage could be kept to an acceptable level — which I define as being comparable to the level incurred in World War II.
31. C. Johnston Conover, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence (P-5967) (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, August 1977), pp. 11-15.
32. Some Westerners argue that the Soviet leaders might consider the population losses suffered in World War II as "acceptable". Besides the dubious logic of this conclusion, these people ignore the fact that in any calculation of what might be acceptable, the Soviet leaders 37 will also consider the damage which will be inflicted on their industrial and agricultural production capabilities. In addition, Soviet writings suggest that the losses suffered in World War II were not acceptable in any sense of the term. CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Literature of the 1960's
In the mid-1960's, a considerable amount of
research was published which dealt with Soviet thinking on
nuclear war survival. In 1964, Soviet Strategy at the
Crossroads. by Thomas Wolfe, discussed the many strategy
and defense issues-which were being debated in the USSR.^
One of the unresolved issues concerned the question of
whether nuclear war could serve as an instrument of policy.
The issue, Wolfe states, had been a matter of debate in the
USSR since 1954. He identifies two groups in the debate,
one dominated by political spokesmen and the other by military spokesmen. The first group questioned the validity of the dictum, while the military defended it.
Wolfe, also mentions a third group who argue that war is always a continuation of policy, but it may not always be a practical instrument.
On the question of whether victory was possible
38 39
in a nuclear war, Wolfe noted that the military theorists
and ideologues continued to attack the notion that there
would be no victor in a nuclear war. The civilian
leadership, however, appeared to have real doubts that
victory in any meaningful sense was possible.
On the consequences of the war, Wolfe stated that
there was a general consensus. A nuclear war would be
highly destructive and it must be avoided.
Thus, Wolfe found, that in the early 1960's there
was a debate in the Soviet Union over the implications of
the development of nuclear weapons. The debate generally
was between the military and the civilian leadership.
While both agreed that such a war would be highly
destructive, the military defended the notion of war as a •
continuation of politics and the possibility of victory in
a nuclear war, but the civilian leadership had grave doubts.
As to the implications of the debate, Wolfe argued that some of the differences of view on the utility of war might be explained by differences of institutional outlook. Political spokesmen in the polemical debate with
China chose to stress the irrationality of war and used
Lenin's dictum in a cavalier way. The military felt it had to defend the dictum because to deny the usefulness of war as an instrument of policy is to weaken the claims of the military for increased expenditures. For the same reason, the military voiced oposition to claims that there could be 40
no victory in a nuclear war.
Thus, Wolfe sees these issues as reflections of
the debate over what military strategy the Soviet Union
should pursue. Khrushchev advocated a 'minimum deterrence1
strategy — maintaining the minimum number of nuclear
weapons to deter the U.S. from a nuclear attack. Wolfe
suggests that others favored a war-winning strategy and the
development of forces to carry out this strategy. If
nuclear war could not serve as a practical instrument of
policy and there was no chance of victory in a nuclear war v then a minimum deterrence strategy was logical. If on the
other hand, nuclear weapons could be used as instruments of
policy and if a meaningful victory was possible, then there
was justification for pursuing a war-winning strategy.
Wolfe notes that up until 1964, Khrushchev's view had
prevailed.
Three works were published in 1966 which
addressed these subjects. In The Soviet Military Scene:
Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations. Thomas
Wolfe analyzed some of the discussions which had occurred 2 since the ouster of Khrushchev. He stated that most
Soviet commentary had continued to reflect the view that
nuclear war would be so mutually destructive that there was grave doubt whether it could be used as a practical
instrument of policy. The debate surfaced again, however, in September 1965, when Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin criticized the notions that victory is not possible in a 41
nuclear war and that such a war had ceased to be a valid
instrument of policy. Wolfe again suggests that the real
underlying issue may be whether it is worthwhile to make
the large investment in military programs necessary to
reverse the imbalance of strategic power between the Soviet
Union and the U.S. Thus, in 1965, the issue was still
being debated.
In The Red 'Hawks' on the Rationality of Nuclear
War, Roman Kolkowicz stated that since the late 1950's the
traditional Soviet view on nuclear war stressed its total
destructiveness and its inability to be used as a practical 3 instrument of policy. During its first year in power, the
Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership accepted this view. Kolkowicz
then analyzes in detail two articles which appeared in late
1965 and which indicated that the debate over the utility
of nuclear war had not been resolved. The first article by
Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin criticized those who doubted
that victory was possible in a nuclear war. He states that although war cannot serve as an instrument of policy, it is still a continuation of politics. Although Rybkin argues that victory is possible he admits that the war would be highly destructive. Kolkowicz stated that Rybkin was advocating a strengthening of Soviet forces and was challenging the foundations of the Soviet policy towards the U.S. which was based upon the following beliefs:
viability of nuclear deterrence; 42
rationality of Western leaders;
possibility of settling issues by peaceful means; and
the political-military uselessness of nuclear war.
Kolkowicz believed that Rybkin's views had widespread support and the article was an attempt by the hardliners to
influence the XXIII Party Congress.
The second article examined by Kolkowicz came out in the Polish press several weeks after Rybkinrs article.
The article did not appear to have been a reply to Rybkin, but the Polish author stated that no political objectives can be achieved by means of nuclear war. Thus, Kolkowicz sees a continuing debate among communists over the utility of a nuclear war and the larger issue of what military strategy to pursue.
The third work published in 1966 which addressed these issues was Soviet Military Policy: A Historical
Analysis by Raymond Gorthoff.^ In an analysis of the
Soviet view of war, peace and revolution, Garthoff states that Stalin's successors realized that nuclear war was not a feasible instrument of policy. They believed that such a war would be highly destructive and must be avoided.
In 1967, Thomas Wolfe wrote a major work on the
Marxist-Leninist view of war — how it developed and how it
C was affected by the development of nuclear weapons. The 43
Marxist-Leninist theory on war maintains that war is a
continuation of politics of particular classes in pursuit
of class goals. Only after capitalism, and these classes,
are eliminated will war cease to exist.
Wolfe wrote that the development of nuclear
weapons caused substantial changes in Soviet thinking on
war. Among the changes were:
Khrushchev's revision in 1956 of the inevitability of war thesis;
Khrushchev's questioning of the inevitable communist victory in a nuclear war.
In addition, it started a debate over whether the Leninist
thesis on war as an instrument of politics remained valid.
Military leaders argued that it was valid — war was still
a continuation of politics and an instrument of policy.
Some political writers, however, claimed it was a
continuation of folly.
Literature of the 1970's
In 1970, Thomas Wolfe again addressed the subject
in Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970.6 Wolfe writes that under Brezhnev and Kosygin there was a revival of the
doctrinal argument about nuclear war as an instrument of
policy. One group argued that it was theoretically and 44
politically unwise to believe no victory was possible in a
nuclear war. Those with this view were arguing for a
further build-up of Soviet forces. The other group warned
that theorizing on the prospects of victory in a nuclear
war should not be carried too far. They were skeptical of
the chance for a meaningful victory. This view led to a
questioning of whether additional large resource
expenditures were necessary to prepare for such a war.
Wolfe noted that Brezhnev and Kosygin increased military
spending, but he pointed out that the debate — over how
much to spend in developing the forces to enhance the
prospects of a meaningful victory — had not been resolved.
In 1971, Roman Kolkowicz wrote that there were
two strategic schools of thought in the Soviet Union which
influenced the development of Soviet doctrine and policy in 7 the 1950's and 1960's. The Conservatives made high threat
estimates, demanded high defense budgets, urged strategic
superiority and saw utility in nuclear war. The Moderates
made moderate threat estimates, were satisfied with
Party-established defense levels, desired parity, and
denied the utility of nuclear war. After 1960, under
Khrushchev, the Moderate view prevailed. After his ouster,
the new regime raised the defense budget and decided to
seek strategic parity. The Conservatives, however, were unsatisfied and launched a sustained public and private
campaign between 1965-67 to influence the regime on such
issues as re-establishing the political utility of nuclear 45
war and the need for strategic or technological
superiority. Kolkowicz concluded that a compromise
formula, embracing Conservative and Moderate positions, was
reached in the late 1960's. That agreement, he speculated,
probably included providing adequate resources to achieve strategic parity and to enhance general military
flexibility and mobility and to seek a stabilization of the arms race. Kolkowicz also pointed out that
Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had accepted one of the underlying assumptions guiding Khrushchev's policy — that a nuclear war would be a catastrophe.
In 1974, Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L.
Harvey published The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current
Soviet Strategy which surveyed Soviet writings on nuclear 8 war. The authors briefly acknowledged that the Soviet leadership is aware of the enormous damage which a nuclear war could cause. The authors emphasized, however, the following findings: (1) Soviet commentators~contend that nuclear war has not ceased to be an instrument of politics; and (2) the main thrust of current statements is that victory is possible in a nuclear war. This issue was long a matter of debate in the Soviet Union. It was apparently resolved in 1967 in favor of those who believe that it is feasible to wage and win such a war.
In 1975, Peter Vigor wrote The Soviet View of
War, Peace and Neutrality covering the period 1917 to 1975.®
His analysis was based upon Soviet writings, 46
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, historical evidence, and in
regards to the nuclear era, his own assessments of the
nuclear balance. Vigor concluded that the Soviet leaders
believe war is still a continuation and an instrument of
policy. The only time they would consider using nuclear
war, however, is if they perceive the U.S. were going to
attack or if the U.S. second strike capability could be
neutralized and a Soviet victory was certain. Vigor also
reviewed the publicly expressed foreign and domestic goals
sought after by the Soviet leaders. He concluded that a
third World War was unsuitable for attaining any of the
goals. On the possibility of victory, Vigor stated that
the Soviet leadership believes it would lose a war with the
West. On the consequences of such a war, Vigor claimed
that the Soviets realize they would incur hideously
unacceptable damage.
After 1975, the debate intensified in the U.S.
over Soviet views on nuclear war survival. But although a
great deal has been said about the Soviet view since then,
relatively little research has been done, especially on what Soviet spokesmen have said in the past four years.
In July 1976, O.C. Boileau wrote that the Soviet
Union could win and survive a nuclear war. As part of his evidence, he cited an official Soviet estimate that the
Soviet Union could hold down its casualties to from five to eight percent of the urban population.
During the same year Soviet World Outlook 47 published excerpts from a 1975 Soviet article which
"...once more affirmed Moscow's acceptance of the permissibility of nuclear war."^^ The key point of the article, according to Soviet World Outlook is that the
Soviet leaders still see nuclear war as an instrument of policy.
In 1977, a German journalist writing in Die Zeit analyzed an article written by Army General Kulikov, the newly appointed Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. ^ In the article Kulikov defended the dictum — "war is a continuation of politics" as still being valid in the nuclear era. Carl Gustaf Stroehm concluded that Kulikov believed nuclear war was a practical instrument of policy and would not hesitate to start such a conflict.
The same year, Richard Pipes wrote an article on
"Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a 13 Nuclear War." In the article he describes what he sees as the stark differences between U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrines. U.S. doctrine, he states, is based upon the notion of mutual deterrence (i.e., that neither side will start such a war as long as both sides can inflict unacceptable damage upon the other in a retaliatory strike). He also states that according to U.S. thinking, neither side could emerge with a meaningful victory in such a war. In contrast he claims that Soviet doctrine is based upon a war-fighting and war-winning strategy. The Soviet leaders believe that it is possible to win such a war and 48 emerge a viable society. To support his conclusions Pipes presents the following: (1) a Soviet source which stated 14 that the no victory view was erroneous; (2) a Soviet statement that, "It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament." This statement, Pipes claims, "...spells the rejection of the whole basis on which U.S. strategy has come to rest: thermonuclear was is not suicidal, it can be fought and won, and thus resort to 15 war must not be ruled out." Pipes goes on to conclude that "...as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the
Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual 1 & deterrence does not really exist."
In the realm of this dissertation, two other claims by Pipes are relevant. He argues that Soviet statements about nuclear war being suicide are meant for foreign consumption. Internally, he notes, Soviet officials attack such thinking. Pipes also claims that the
Soviet leaders undoubtedly define what is unacceptable damage differently than Westerners do. As evidence, he points out that up to 60 million Soviets died as a result of two world wars, a civil war, famine, and various purges.
Pipes claims that the Soviets could lose 30 million people and would be no worse off than they were at the end of
World War II from which they succsssfully recovered.
In 1977, Fred Kaplan took Western assessments of 17 Soviet doctrine, such as Pipes, to task. Kaplan argues 49
that there is very little in Soviet military doctrine to
support the view that the Soviets believe they can win and
survive a nuclear war. He also notes that Soviet writings
do not indicate that the Soviets view nuclear war with any
less horror than Americans do. Kaplan argues that American
hawks have misread and have distorted Soviet writings. The
hawks cite the Soviet usage of the Clausewitzian notion of
"war as a continuation of politics" even in the nuclear era
as evidence that the Soviets believe it is possible to win
and survive a nuclear war. Kaplan contends that this
misrepresents the Soviet usage of the dictum. The notion
is part of the Soviet theory of the causes of war and is
not a statement on the practical utility of nuclear
weapons. Kaplan also attacks Westerners who use Soviet
claims about victory in a nuclear war. He states that by
reading the context in which such statements are made, it
is evident that they were not meant in a strictly military
sense. In addition, many were made during the verbal war
with the Communist Chinese.
In a book on the importance of bureaucratic
politics in Soviet politics, Edward L. Warner, III analyzes 1 R the role of the military in the Soviet system. In his discussion of the Soviet military and arms control, Warner
writes about a debate between military and civilian spokesmen which occurred in 1973 and 1974 on the essence and consequences of a nuclear war. He states that the major participants in the debate were the members of the 50
Main Political Administration (MPA) and the staff of the
Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSA).
During 1973-1974, civilians at the IUSA and elsewhere stated that a nuclear war would be suicidal and could undermine the conditions for the existence of mankind. Warner notes that MPA members attacked these views claiming they were based upon erroneous analyses of the consequences of a nuclear war and they ignored the qualitative factors in determining the likely victors.
Warner states that this latest debate ended, although not resolved, in 1974. He also contends that the attacks by the professional military ideologists indicated their sensitivity to civilians making erroneous statements on issues which the military ideologists believed are their responsibility. Warner also argues that the statements by the military were a response to the belief among certain civilians about the decreasing utility of military force in the nuclear era. Such a belief, Warner notes, indicates an interest in diverting resources away from defense spending which the military leaders are certain to oppose.
The conclusion that the Soviet leadership believes their nation can win and survive a nuclear war was criticized in several articles in 1978. In one, Major
Elbert C. Black, III reviewed 340 Soviet radio and newspaper items for the year 1976, and evaluated them against a criteria scale ranging above and below a perception of achieved war-winning capability.1^ He found 51
that all but ten of the statements were evaluated as
indicating a Soviet perception that a war-winning
capability has not been achieved.
In 1978, in a discussion of the differences in
U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine, Benjamin Lambeth
analyzed the Soviet military view of the notion of victory 20 in a nuclear war. He argues that a basic tenet of Soviet
military doctrine is the notion that, if deterrence fails,
some meaningful form of victory is theoretically
attainable. He qualifies this conclusion by stating that
it does not mean that the Soviet military leadership
prefers war over peace or places any less importance on the
role of deterrence than Americans do. He also notes that
this does not mean they believe such a victory would be automatic for them. What it does mean is that victory is an objective to be sought after with every reasonable effort. Lambeth cites the Soviet strategic buildup and civil defense efforts as evidence that they are preparing to come out ahead in a nuclear war if deterrence fails.
Lambeth also comments on Soviet statements about victory in a nuclear war. He believes that Soviet claims that "victory would go to us" are "...mere reflective of exhortation than serious strategic analysis."21-
In the past ten years there have been only two detailed analyses of Soviet views on nuclear war survival which were based upon a review of a substantial number of
Soviet writings. One, discussed above, was by Leon Goure et al., The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet
Strategy. written in 1974. The second major review of
Soviet thinking on these subjects was written by Raymond 22 Garthoff in 1978. In his article, Garthoff discusses
Soviet writings in the 1960's and 1970's including articles written in the 1960's in the restricted Soviet General
Staff journal - Voyennaya mysl' (Military Thought). He argues that Western commentators who contend that the
Soviets do not accept mutual deterrence as a reality are not sufficiently aware of Soviet writings on the subject.
The same Western commentators, Garthoff notes, contend that
Soviet statements on mutual deterrence and the unacceptability of nuclear war are for export. Garthoff presents Soviet statements on these subjects from the restricted military publication -- Military Thought -- to refute the idea that such statements are merely for propaganda purposes.
On the Soviet view of war as a continuation of policy in the nuclear age, Garthoff finds, that the debates between military and civilian spokesmen over the dictum is not a theoretical, but instead a political debate. Both sides agree that war is a matter of politics or political motivation and both accept the fact that nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of Soviet policy. Garthoff contends that the military is concerned with the fact that those who argue that war cannot serve as an instrument of n o policy are advocating a reduction in military spending. ° 53
On the Soviet view of victory in a nuclear war,
Garthoff finds that the Soviets are well aware that a
meaningful victory is not possible. The military still
talks about victory for several reasons: (1) to deny that
socialism would be victorious would place the validity of
their .ideology into question; and (2) to deny that victory
is possible undermines morale and can lead to a lessening
of preparedness and a reduction in defense spending.
On the Soviet view of the consequences of a
nuclear war, Garthoff states that civilian and military
leaders alike are aware that the Soviet Union would suffer
colossal and unacceptable damage. This conclusion is based
upon Soviet statements in open source and in restricted
military publications.
In 1979, assessments continued to be made about
Soviet views of nuclear war survival. During the SALT II
Treaty hearings, Lieutenant General Edward J. Rowny, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the American SALT
delegation for six years, stated that Soviet military
literature is filled with references to fighting and winning a nuclear war and that the Soviets believe they have an effective civil defense program to protect their 24 population.
In addition, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta
M. Hoeber conclude in Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War what
Goure, Pipes, and others had been arguing — the Soviet leaders believe their nation could win a nuclear war. 54
Douglass and Hoeber contend the Soviets believe: (1)
nuclear war is a continuation of politics; (2) the war will
cause unprecedented destruction but under favorable
circumstances they can win such a war; (3) the war will not
be the end of civilization; people and nations will
recover; and (4) five to eight percent losses in a nuclear 25 war would be acceptable.
Summary of the Literature
Thus, in the 1960's, Westerners who wrote about
Soviet thinking on nuclear war survival were in general
agreement that Soviet civilian and military leaders had no
illusions about the possibility of obtaining a meaningful
victory or of avoiding unacceptable damage in a nuclear
war. Some Westerners, however, did argue that there were
continuing debates over whether war could still be a
continuation and an instrument of policy in the nuclear era
and whether victory was possible in such a war. These
debates were believed to be part of a major debate over the
broader questions of how much should be spent on defense,
and what kind of military strategy should be pursued. The military was said to have defended the notions that "war is
still a continuation of politics and an instrument of
policy" and "victory is still possible in a nuclear war"
because to deny these views would provide justification for 55
reducing the defense budget.
Western writings in the 1970's, however, differ
radically in their evaluations of Soviet thinking on
nuclear war survival. One view is that Soviet civilian and
military leaders are well aware that: (1) nuclear war
cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy, (2) a
meaningful victory is not possible, and (3) the Soviet
Union would receive unacceptable damage in such a war.
Other Westerners argue that although the Soviet leaders are
aware that a nuclear war could be quite destructive, they
still believe it is an instrument of policy and victory is
possible in such a war. Proponents of this view also argue
that the Soviet leaders may believe that it is possible to
keep their losses at an acceptable level. Some Westerners
even argue that the Soviet view of what is acceptable
losses is different from the view held in the West. The
Soviets are said to be willing to pay a much higher price
in such a conflict.
Critique of the Literature
A review of the literature reveals several reasons why more research is necessary on Soviet views on 26 nuclear war survival. Some of the studies are now dated.
Few works which addressed the subject in the past decade 27 provided much evidence to support their conclusions. 56
Some Westerners used selected statements from Soviet
articles as evidence but failed to consider the context in
which they were made or failed to present other statements
in the same articles which would have resulted in a
different evaluation of Soviet thinking.^ Some Westerners
have also misinterpreted the meaning of a key
Marxist-Leninist concept which led to an incorrect
evaluation of Soviet thinking on war as an instrument of 29 policy. The major focus of past research has been on
Soviet views on the possibility of victory in a nuclear war
and on war as an instrument of policy. Generally
overlooked have been Soviet comments about the consequences
of such a war. Another reason for the need for more
research results from the fact that Westerners who have written on the subject in the 1970's have reached radically different conclusions. For these reasons, it is evident
that more research was necessary in examining Soviet
thinking on nuclear war survival.
This dissertation utilizes the same basic methodology -- citing relevant statements from Soviet publications -- as used in the literature I have reviewed.
This research has also relied heavily upon the same authoritative Soviet journals, newspapers, and books which have been referred to in previous discussions of nuclear war survival. I have tried to improve upon past studies, however, in several ways.
First, I have incorporated relevant Soviet 57
statements which have been cited by various Western
analysts and I have added a significant amount of new 30 information from Soviet writings. The relevant Soviet
statements which I have added were derived from a review of
all available translations of the authoritative Soviet publications, cited earlier, for the period 1962 through
1977. As a result this study has a larger data base, than previous studies, to utilize in examining Soviet thinking on nuclear war survival. I have also included relevant statements from the restricted Soviet publication Voyennaya mysi1. To date only one other Soviet-area scholar has utilized this source for examining the issues discussed in 31 this dissertation.
In addition, I have taken Soviet statements, which have been cited in some previous studies as key indicators of Soviet thinking, and I have reexamined the context in which the statements were made. I have then presented an alternate interpretation of the meaning of the statements cited.
As noted earlier, a potential problem which exists in trying to use articulated views to determine attitudes is the fact that the attitudinal indicators selected may not reflect the attitude which is being examined. I contend that some previous studies have utilized attitudinal indicators which do not reflect Soviet thinking about the possibility of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war. In the next two chapters I will 58 discuss how these studies have erred.
Finally, I do not claim that the Soviet statements I cite are necessarily more authoritative than
those referred to in other studies. I relied basically upon the same Soviet publications as have been used before.
I have tried to make a contribution to the literature, however, for the reasons which I just discussed. 59
NOTES
1. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy At The Crossroads (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 9-10, 18-20, 26, 70-78, 112, 225-6, 259-60.
2. T.W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, RM - 4913PR, June 1966), pp. 90-93.
3. Roman Kolkowicz, The Red "Hawks” On The Rationality of Nuclear War, (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, RM - 4899 PR, March 1966).
4. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: An Historical Analysis (New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 191-206.
5. Thomas W. Wolfe, Communist Outlook On War. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, P - 3640, August 1967), pp. 6-7, 29-32.
6. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 428-9, 454-456.
7. Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," World Politics 23 (April 1971): 431-451.
8. Goure, The Role of Nuclear Forces, pp. 8-10, 14, 58-63.
9. P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.' 80, 87, 111, 136, 139, 142, 145, 157, 195.
10. O.C. Boileau, "Nuclear War: A Soviet Option," The Journal of Social and Political Affairs 1 (July 1976).
11. "Foremost Soviet Military Journal Emphasizes Continuing Crucial Role and Military Might," Soviet World Outlook, 13 February 1976, p. 1.
12. Carl Gustaf Stroehm, "Moscow's New Marshals: Clausewitz and Nuclear War." Die Zeit (Bonn), 8 February 1977, p. 5. Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (69026), 2 May 1977, pp. 1-4.
13. Richard Pipes, "Why The Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary 64 (July 60
1977): 21-34.
14. Ibid., p . 21. H* • CJI Ibid., p . 30.
16. Ibid., p. 34.
17. Fred M . Kaplan, Dubious Spector: A Second Look At The 'Soviet Threat1, (Washington, D.C., Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, TNI Pamphlet Series. No. 6, 1977).
18. Edward L. Warner, III, The Military In Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York and London: Praeger Special Studies, 1977), pp. 85, 252-4, 269.
19. Major Elbert C. Black, III, "Achilles Heel of the Deterrence Triad," Military Review 58, (April 1978): 46-53.
20. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, December, 1976).
21. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
22. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security 3 (Summer 1978): 112-147.
23. As will be shown later, although military officials believe it is important to defend the notion that victory is possible in a nuclear war, they give no indication that they believe a meaningful victory would be possible. The distinction is crucial.
24. Robert G. Kaiser, "SALT Called Dangerous to U.S. Security," The Washington Post, 13 July 1979, p. A-22.
25. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War (Stanford University, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 2, 7, 10, 23, 96.
26. The works by Wolfe (Soviet Strategy, 1964; The Soviet Military, 1966; War, 1967), Kolkowicz, and Raymond Garthoff (Soviet Military Policy, 1966) are valuable for examining Soviet thinking for the first half of the 1960's. They are dated in terms of providing us with current assessments of Soviet thinking.
27. In most discussions of the subject, the authors present a few statements from Soviet writings to support 61 their conclusions regarding Soviet views on nuclear war survival. Examples of this are: Kolkowicz (1971), Boileau (1976), Pipes (1977), Kaplan (1977), Warner (1977), Douglass and Hoeber (1979).
28. An article in Soviet World Outlook for example, claimed that an article in a Soviet journal "...once again affirmed Moscow's acceptance of the permissibility of nuclear war." In the article to which it referred the Soviet writer also stated that a third World War would result in greater losses than had occurred in both World War I and World War II. Such a statement does not support the conclusion that the Soviets believe in the permissibility of a nuclear war. See "Foremost Soviet Military Journal Emphasizes Continuing Role of War and Military Might," Soviet World Outlook (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 13 February 1976), p. 1; Colonel S. Tyushkevich, "The Development of the Doctrine on War and the Army on the Basis of the Experience of the Great Patriotic War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 22 (November 1975): 9-16. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 18 December 1975, pp. A6, A9 .
29. In Chapter III, I discuss this point in detail.
30. At least seventy percent of the Soviet statements which I cite in the chapter on war as an instrument of policy have not been cited in previous studies. On Soviet views towards the consequences of a nuclear war, for the period 1962 through 1970, I have consolidated what has been cited previously and I have added some Soviet statements, especially from the restricted journal Voyennaya mysl'. For the period 1970 to 1977, at least fifty percent of the Soviet statements I quote have not been presented in the literature on this subject.
31. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence," pp. 112-147. CHAPTER III
SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE UTILITY OF
NUCLEAR WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
War as a Continuation of Politics
To understand Soviet attitudes towards the use of
nuclear war as an instrument of policy, we must make
certain crucial distinctions. First, when they espouse the
dictum that war is a continuation of politics even in the
nuclear era, does it mean that they believe nuclear war is
an effective instrument of policy? Furthermore, when they
refer to war as being an instrument of policy, do they mean
it can be used as a practical means for obtaining a political objective or only that it is conceivable that
someone, someday, might use nuclear weapons? The following discussion will consider these questions in analyzing what
the Soviets have said about nuclear war as a practical instrument of policy.
Some Western analysts conclude that the Soviet advocacy of war as a continuation of politics means that
62 63 the Soviets believe that war, even nuclear war, can still be used as a practical instrument of policy. Richard
Pipes, for example, states that the Soviets believe
''...thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can be fought and won and thus resort to war must not be ruled out."'*’ To support his claim, Pipes cites Marshal Sokolovskiy's book
Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) which stated, "It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing 2 technology and armament." Pipes also states that, "As long as the Russians persist in adhering to the
Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual
O deterrence does not really exist."
Another evaluation of Soviet attitudes regarding nuclear war by Carl Gustaf Stroehm makes even stronger 4 statements in this regard. Stroehm notes that Army
General Viktor Kulikov, the then newly appointed Chief of the Warsaw Pact, wrote an article defending the thesis that war is the continuation of politics by other means.
Kulikov stated that no weapon can change the interrelationships between politics and military strategy.
Stroehm argues that Kulikov's statements have a "strategic foreign policy significance" because they mean that the
Warsaw Pact Chief believes nuclear war can serve as a practical instrument of policy. Stroehm claims, 64
In contrast to Khrushchev, who at least in his ] it year.... said that a nuclear war would bring a g-neral ruin with it, Kulikov is of the opinion that even this 'ultimate weapon' may be used as the continuation of politics and thus as a political tool.5
...this marshal is ready to think beyond the point where thought stops among Western military men: acceptance of a nuclear inferno.®
In addition, a special report by members of the
Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) claimed that,
...the West has come to reject the notion that total war could be still used as a valid instrument for the achievement of foreign policy goals. This faith is not shared in Moscow...?
...the Stalinist view that war remains war despite nuclear weapons continues to inspire Soviet strategy today.®
The authors base these conclusions on the fact that the
Soviets still adhere to the dictum that war is a
continuation of politics by other means.®
The February 1976 issue of Soviet World Outlook argued that an article in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil
"...once more affirmed Moscow's acceptance of the permissibility of nuclear war."'*'0 The author claims that
the key point of the Soviet article is that despite the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the Soviet leaders continue to view war as an instrument of policy. This conclusion is based upon the Soviet's adherence to the 65
dictum war is a continuation of policy.
A review of Soviet writings, however, suggests
that the inferences made by Pipes, Stroehm and the authors
of the ISC report and the Soviet World Outlook article are
incorrect. To the Soviets, there is an important difference between defending the thesis that "war is a continuation of politics" and arguing that "war is an instrument of policy." They have been pointing out this distinction for at least the past fourteen years.
In September, 1965, Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin wrote in Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil (KVS),
...it is absolutely wrong to identify the concepts continuation of politics and weapon of politics.H
The article was from the 'Lectures and Consultations' section of KVS which is intended for officers, admirals and 12 generals. Rybkin also argued against confusing the two concepts in 1966 in the restricted Soviet military publication Voyennaya mysl'^ and in KVS in 1973. ^
Between 1964 and 1976, there were eight other publications which pointed out the importance of the distinction between 15 the concepts.
Soviet criticisms of Western interpretations of
Soviet writings, however, are not necessarily valid. With this in mind, the texts of numerous Soviet articles which 66
cite the dictum "war is a continuation of politics" were 16 examined. The review indicated that in every case Soviet
spokesmen referred to the dictum in the context of
discussing the Marxist-Leninist theory on the causes of
war. There was no indication that the statements in any
way referred to Soviet views about whether nuclear war
could serve as a practical instrument of policy. A 1972
article in Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military
Historical Journal), for example, referred to the dictum as
"...the most fundamental one (tenet) in understanding the
17 i essence of war." An editorial in Krasnaya zvezda (Red
Star) made a similar claim,
this formula serves as a methodological starting point which enables us to detect what is most important in war, to discover its class nature and to establish the subordination of its targets, means and methods to the economic and political interests of states and classes involved in it.-*-®
The Soviet theory on war, in brief, contends that wars don't just happen. They are caused by the existence of classes within a nation pursuing by violent means certain political objectives which could not be achieved by peaceful means.
Colonel I.A. Grudinin pointed out in 1966,
...no matter what the consequences of a given war, this in no way changes the position that war would be a continuation of the policies of the government and the classes taking part in it by forceful means. And in 67
this is the essence of any war.
The dictum, therefore, (1) helps to explain the
Marxist-Leninist theory of war (i.e., war is caused by the
existence of classes; war is consequently a continuation of
politics — the struggle of classes for certain political
objectives through violence) and, (2) indicates that
nuclear war is still possible -- it is still an instrument
of policy because war will continue until classes are
abolished.
What the dictum does not address, however, is
whether war can be a practical instrument of policy.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin, for example stated, "War is
always the continuation of politics, but it cannot always 20 serve as its weapon." Another illustration of the fact
that the dictum, by itself, does not refer to the practical
value of war as an instrument was made in another article
by Colonel Rybkin in October 1973. In that article, he
criticized an earlier article by the Izvestiya political
correspondent -- A. Bovin. It is significant to note that
Rybkin states that Bovin is correct in asserting that nuclear war is not acceptable as a means of achieving a
political goal. What Rybkin criticizes is the fact that
Bovin "...does not mention a single word about the
Marxist-Leninist definition of war as an extension of policy and makes no attempt at a scientific analysis of the 21 essence of war." 68
la this context, it is evident that when the
Soviets defend the dictum as being valid even in the
nuclear age, they are not suggesting, as some Westerners
contend they do, that nuclear weapons can be used as
practical instruments of policy. Instead, the Soviet
spokesmen are arguing that the Marxist-Leninist theory of
war is still valid and that if a nuclear war does start, it
too will occur because certain classes within a nation are
pursuing a policy by violent means. It is improper,
therefore, to infer that the Soviet usage of this dictum
means they believe that nuclear war can serve as a
practical instrument of policy or to conclude, as Pipes has
done, that, "...as long as the Russians persist in adhering
to the Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual 22 deterrence does not really exist."
2q War as an Instrument of Policy
Soviet leaders have always believed that war could serve as an instrument of policy. This is evident both from their Marxist-Leninist ideology, which makes such a claim, and from the Soviet Union's actions in conducting its foreign policy. The question to be examined in this section is whether the Soviet leaders perceive that a nuclear war might serve as a practical means to obtain a political objective. 69
Various Westerners have argued that the Soviet
leadership does believe this way. According to Leon Goure,
Foy Kohler, and Mose Harvey,
Soviet commentators... insist that war in the nuclear age has not ceased to be an instrument of politics... Significantly, Soviet spokesmen also now generally denounce as 'bourgeois pacifism' the view that both sides would be destroyed in a nuclear war and that there can be no victor in such a w a r . 24
Other Westerners, however, argue that the Soviet leadership does not hold to such an illusion. An examination of what the Soviets said on this issue between 1962 and 1977 should help us in our evaluation of Soviet thinking.
The Khrushchev Era (1962-1964)
In April 1962, Nikolay Talensky, a retired
General-Major, strongly denounced the idea that nuclear war could have any practical political utility. He stated,
A modern war could clearly be so devastating that it cannot and must not serve as an instrument of politics, as has been the case throughout history.25
Talensky's argument, it should be noted was consistent with the view of nuclear war being espoused at that time by
Khrushchev. 70
A year and a half later, two other Soviets echoed the view expressed by Talensky. In a radio commentary, M.
Sturua, an Izvestiya Observer, claimed that,
Whereas war was formerly a means of solving disputes between states, world war in our thermonuclear age is a direct road to the same heavenly kingdom which is praised by everyone but where no one wants to go.26
Sturua goes on to attack the Chinese view that a nuclear war could serve as a practical means to achieve the socialist revolution. He states that,
...genuine Marxist-Leninists cannot think of the creation of a communist civilization on the ruins of world centers of culture, on devastated earth contaminated by thermonuclear fallout...
Two weeks after Sturua's broadcast, Boris
Dmitriyev wrote in Izvestiya that "...war can be a 28 continuation only of folly." From the rest of his discussion, it is obvious that he is arguing that nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy. His rationale for this view was based upon his estimate of the consequences of such a conflict. He saw a nuclear war as consuming whole continents, and sparing no one.
In January 1964, General-Major N. Sushko and
Major T. Kondratkov, from the Lenin Military-Political 29 Academy, argued that nuclear war should not be used as an instrument of policy because of the destructive nature of 71 such a conflict. They claimed that in such a war,
...all nations, even those which will survive the war, will be retarded in their development by decades and centuries.30
The article was to be used in officer training courses.
Other military and civilian spokemen during this period also argued that nuclear war could not serve as a practical 31 means of policy.
Thus, during the last 21 months of Khrushchev's rule there was a consensus among civilian and military spokesmen who addressed this subject. They did not believe that nuclear war could serve as a practical instrument for achieving political goals. Its destructive effects were too great.
Many statements during this period, including those by Sturua and Draitriyev, were made during the polemical debate with the Chinese. Several factors suggest that the statements were not just for propaganda purposes.
First, similar statements were being made in articles which were not directed towards the Chinese. In addition, the view is consistent with what Soviet spokesmen were saying about the consequences of a nuclear war. 72
The Brezhnev-Kosygin Era (1964-1977)
Seven months after Khrushchev's ouster Talensky
once again repeated his earlier argument.
In our days, there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and at the same time survive, that it is possible to find acceptable forms of nuclear w a r . 3 2
He went on to warn the leaders of all nations:
the better the people and the rulers of all states realize that war with the use of thermonuclear weapons has outlived itself as an instrument of politics, turning into a weapon of national and social suicide, the stronger will be the confidence that human society will survive and continue to develop and improve. 33
In 1965 and 1966, two military spokesmen, both of whom were apparently at the Lenin Military-Political 34 Academy, attacked Talensky's claim that nuclear war could
not serve as a means to achieve political goals. The first
attack came in September 1965 in an article by
Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin in Kommunist vooruzhennykh 35 sil. The second criticism was by Colonel I.A. Grudinin
in Krasnaya zvezda in July 1966.^®
Although Rybkin and Grudinin criticized
Talensky's claim, they did not proclaim the opposite view
— that nuclear war could serve as a practical means for 73
attaining political objectives. Instead they were
concerned that acceptance of Talensky1s view would lead to the belief that such a war would be so terrible that it would never occur. Such a belief was dangerous, according to Rybkin and Grudinin, because the possibility still remained that the U.S. might launch a nuclear attack against the USSR. The authors were also concerned that
Talensky's view would lead to disbelief in the possibility of a Soviet victory in the event of an attack by the West.
Such attitudes they feared would lead to a lack of vigilance and preparedness.
Rybkin, after quoting Talensky's statement, claimed that,
The a priori rejection of the possibility of victory is bad because it leads to moral disarmament, to disbelief in victory, to fatalism and passivity.37
Likewise, Grudinin stated that,
Such an assertion is not only in error, but it is harmful because it can shake one's assurance in our victory over the aggressor, and the consciousness of the necessity to be ready at any moment for armed struggle with the use of the nuclear rocket weapon.38
He goes on to claim that the U.S. was preparing for a nuclear war and that it might try to achieve its political goals by using the nuclear weapon. 74
Consequently, nuclear-rocket war might serve as an instrument of politics both for those governments which unleash it and for those governments which, because of it, are forced to take up arms in order to defend themselves and to crush the aggressor.39
Both authors' main concern is that the Soviet
Union maintain the vigilance and preparedness to deter and if necessary to defeat the U.S., if the U.S. ever decided to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. They do not, however, contend that nuclear war can serve as a practical means for attaining political goals. Rybkin states that,
War is always the continuation of politics, but it cannot always serve as its w e a p o n . 40
Remaining as the continuation of politics, such a war now, because of the effect of the consequences of the nuclear means of struggle, is limited as a weapon of politics.41
He states that nuclear war is 'limited' as a weapon of politics which suggests that there are times when it might be useful. His discussion about the destructive consequences of such a war, however, suggests that he foresees the Soviet Union utilizing nuclear weapons as a means of politics for the Soviet Union only to defeat the
U.S. after an attack on the USSR. Grudinin holds the same view. He contends that,
...from the assessment of the possble results of world 75
nuclear rocket war is the conclusion that it is necessary to prevent such a war and that such a war must not serve as a method of solving international AO disputes.^
Two years later, in August 1968, another military
writer spoke out on the subject. T. Kondratkov, now a
Lieutenant-Colonel, repeated the view he had expressed in
an article he coauthored with General-Major Sushko in 43 January 1964. He argued that nuclear weapons had
"...made war an exceedingly dangerous and risky means of 44 politics."
Between August 1968 and 1972, there appeared to be
no debate or detailed discussion of the issue. As will be
discussed later, however, Soviet statements made during
these years about the consequences of a nuclear war
indicate that nuclear war was not considered to be a
practical instrument of Soviet policy.
In 1972, Rybkin presented an evaluation of war as
an instrument of policy which was similar to what he said
in 1965. He claims that nuclear weapons limit the
usefulness of nuclear war as a means to attain political 45 objectives. Rybkin goes on to chastise Western pacifists, however, who claim that nuclear war has ceased
to be an instrument of policy. It should be noted that he does not say that such a war could serve as a practical
instrument to obtain political objectives. His objective,
instead, is to refute the idea that nuclear war would be so 76
disastrous that it will never occur. He wants the Soviet
reader to realize that such a war could occur and thus the
Soviet people must be prepared for such an eventuality. He
states that the view that nuclear war has ceased to be an
instrument "...understates the danger of a nuclear
war...gives rise to illusions about the 'automatic 46 destruction1...and dulls the vigilance of peoples."
In October 1973, Ye. Rybkin, now a Colonel and on
the staff of the General Staff's Institute of Military 47 History, made a direct comment on the issue. He wrote
that, "...a total nuclear war is not acceptable as a means
of achieving a political goal," and that nuclear weapons had made "...such a war an unfeasible means of policy.
It is interesting to note that Rybkin does not claim, as he did in 1965 and 1972 that nuclear war was limited as a means of policy.^ Now, he directly states that cannot be a practical means of policy.
Several months later, a civilian spokesman stated the same view. G. Arbatov, Chief of the Institute for the
Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, wrote that,
...with the emergence of nuclear missiles any correspondence between the political ends of war and the means was lost, since no policy can have the objective of destroying the enemy at the cost of complete self-annihilation. 50
In August of the next year, the editor of SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, V.M. Berezhkov, made a similar 77
argument. He stated that, "Universal war can no longer be
regarded as a means of policy because of the 51 destructiveness of the weapons."
According to one Western source, a 1975 article
by Colonel Tyushkevich in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil
again "...affirmed Moscow's acceptance of the 53 permissibility of nuclear war." Soviet World Outlook, 13
February 1976, states that the key point of Tyushkevich1s article is that, "..despite revolutionary increases in the
destructive power of weapons, Moscow continues to" view war 54 as an instrument of policy." As evidence they cite
Tyushkevich's statement that,
The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons lead war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy, and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary.... The description of the correlation between war and policy is fully valid for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Far from leading to a lessening of the role of policy in waging war, the tremendous might of the means of destruction leads to the raising of that role. After all, immeasurably more effective means of struggle are now at the direct disposal of state power.
The claims made in the Soviet World Outlook article, however, are in error on two accounts. First, the article claims that Tyushkevich once again affirmed
Moscow's acceptance of the permissibility of nuclear war. 78
As the discussion in this chapter indicates, the view that
has been expressed from Moscow is that such a war is not
permissible. The second error is the claim that
Tyushkevich1s article supports the permissibility of
nuclear war. The points which Tyushkevich makes in the
statement which Soviet World Outlook cites, is that even in
the nuclear age, war is still a continuation of politics
and the United States may try to use it as an instrument of policy. He does not believe that nuclear war can serve as a practical instrument to achieve political goals. This is evident in his statements that,
...the problem of war and peace has become the problem of the life and death of hundreds of millions of people.
The two world wars took over 70 million human lives and wiped thousands of prosperous cities and villages off the face of the earth. A world war involving the use of nuclear missile weapons would lead to even greater losses.57
Tyushkevich does not believe that nuclear war is permissible or a practical means of policy. It should be noted that at the time he wrote this article, he was on the faculty of the General Staff's Institute of Military
History.^
In July 1976, Colonel T. Kondratkov repeated what he had said in 1964 and 1968. Writing in the Soviet
Military History Journal, he claimed that nuclear weapons had transformed war into an exceptionally dangerous means 79 59 for politics.
Finally, in March 1977, V.M. Berezhkov, repeated
the view that he had expressed in August 1975. Writing
again in SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, he states,
...the practice of past centuries when armed force and war were used as instruments of foreign policy, is totally unacceptable in our epoch.®0
Thus, the view expx-essed by both civilian and military
spokesmen throughout the period 1962-197 7 is that nuclear
war cannot serve as a practical rrleans to attain political
goals. Their view results from their estimates of the disastrous consequences of such a war.
Military spokesmen point out, however, that this does not mean that nuclear war cannot be used as an instrument of policy. They are very concerned that the
United States might start such a war someday. As a result, they want the Soviet leaders and citizens to realize that although nuclear war is not permissible, it is possible. 80
NOTES
1. Pipes, 1977, p. 30.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p . 34.
4. Carl Gustaf Stroehm, "Moscow's New Marshals: Clausewitz and Nuclear War," Die Zeit (Bonn), 8 February 1977, p. 5. Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (69026), 2 May 1977, pp. 1-4.
5. Ibid., page 2 in translation.
6. Ibid.
7. Institute for the Study of Conflict, The Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union: Fallacies in Western Assessments (London and Reading: Eastern Press, Ltd., March 1978), p. 28.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Ibid., pp. 5, 8, 24.
10. "Foremost Soviet Military Journal Emphasizes Continuing Crucial Role of War and Military Might," Soviet World Outlook (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International"Studies, 13 February 1976), p. 1.
11. Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "On the Nature of a Nuclear Missile War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 17 (September 1965): 50-56. Translated in Kintner, 1968, p. 109.
12. V.D. Sokolovskiy, editor, Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968, third edition). Translation by Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1975), p. 167.
13. In a book review, Rybkin wrote in Voyennaya mysl’ that the book's author was correct,
...in the assertion that a modern war would signify the end of all politics, in as much as it would mean the mutual destruction of both warring sides, we cannot help seeing a confusion of the question on the political character of war and its aims, with the question of the results of war. 81
Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "A Critique of the Book On Peace and War," Voyennaya mysl' No. 7 (July 1966), FPIR 0475/67 Translated 17 May 1967, p. 79.
14. In October 1973, Rybkin wrote,
Those individuals who deny this (dictum) are confusing the causes, essence, and social nature of the phenomenon with the expediency of using it as a means of achieving a political goal. Although inseparable, these two represent two different aspects of the matter.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "The Leninist Concept of War and the Present," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20 (October 1973). Translated in Strategic Review 2 (Spring 1974): 103.
15. In April 1970, the same point was made by retired Colonel-General N.A. Lomov, who served as a professor at the General Staff Academy until his retirement in 1969 at which time he became affiliated with the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. He wrote,
In connection with this qualitative change in the means of waging armed warfare, some Western politicians and theoreticians are attempting to refute Lenin's definition of war. They maintain that owing to its destructive nature, nuclear war cannot be regarded as a continuation of policy, that the development of nuclear missile weaponry has supposedly gotten out of policy's control.
The author's expounding this viewpoint (denying the validity of the dictum because of nuclear weapons) are confusing albeit for different motives — two individual and essentially different questions: (1) whether nuclear war, in terms of its essense and substance, can be regarded as the continuation of policy by violent means; and (2) whether it is prudent for a nation to resort to nuclear war for thepurpose of attaining political goals.
N.A. Lomov, Symposium paper at the Institute of the USA. SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya 1 (April 1970). Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs (50637),2 June 1970Tp- 50. 82
The 1972 issue of Marxism-Leninism on War and Army proclaimed that,
Western sociologists and authors on military subjects confuse two closely interconnected yet different questions, namely, the theoretical question of the essence of nuclear war and the practical question of whether it can serve as an effective instrument of policy-making.
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army: A Soviet View, published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. Soviet Military Thought Series No. 2, Washington, D.C., Government printing Office, no date, p. 28. See also page 30.
Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag, considered to be a hardliner, criticized Westerners who, he says,
...lump together two different propositions. The theoretical proposition characterizing the essence of war and the proposition concerning the expediency or otherwise of war as a means of achieving political objectives.
Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag, "Two World Outlooks — Two Views on War," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 1974. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 12 February 1974, p. A4.
In July 1975, Colonel A. Dmitriyev wrote that certain Western and some Soviet authors had failed to,
...distinguish the question of the nature and substance of such a war from the question of its possible consequences of its effectiveness as an instrument of policy.
Colonel A. Dmitriyev, "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the Army As An Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 13 (July 1975): 9-17. Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (65480), 18 August 1975, p. 7. S3
In 1976, Colonel Kondratkov, a faculty member at the General Staff Academy wrote that,
Western sociologists and military writers....mix two closely interconnected but different questions in the approach to possible nuclear war: first, the theoretical question of the essence, political content, and social class nature of possible nuclear war.... second, the practical question of whether such a war can serve as an expedient weapon, tool, and means for the implementation of policy.
Colonel T. Kondratkov, "The 25th Congress of the CPSU and The Problem of Peace and War," Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7 (July 1976): 8. Kondratkov made the same point in articles written in 1964, 1968, and 1974. General-Major Sushko and Major Kondratkov, "War and Politics in the Atomic Age," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 2 (January 1964): 14-23. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, (23,522), 4 March 1964, pp. 17. Lieutenant-Colonel T. Kondratkov, "The Essence of War and Its Bourgeois Falsifiers," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 August 1968, pp. 2, 3. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 13 August 1968, pp. A27-A31. Colonel T. Kondratkov, "War as a Continuation of Policy," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February 1974): 7-9.
16. I examined Soviet references to war as a continuation of politics in all of the articles and books cited in this dissertation. Soviet usage of the dictum was consistent. An article by Colonel T. Kondratkov entitled "War as a Continuation of Policy," (Soviet Military Review, February 1974, pp. 7-9) is typical of Soviet usage of the dictum. Kondratkov discusses the Marxist-Leninist theory of the causes of war. War, he argues, is a political phenomenon inherent in a society divided into antagonistic classes. The contradictory interests and aims of these classes eventually lead to war which is a continuation of the policies pursued by the classes during peace. Kondratkov, then states that one "...cannot understand the character of a war correctly without defining what policy has given rise to it, and what policy it continues." (p. 8) He goes on to attack those who do not believe war is a continuation of politics in the nuclear era. He states that nuclear war "...cannot arise out of nothing, out of a vacuum." (p. 8) It would be caused by a nation (and thus the classes within the nation) pursuing a political objective by use of force. Kondratkov's usage of the dictum, therefore, is to explain and defend the Marxist-Leninist theory of the causes of war. He does not suggest that nuclear war can be a practical instrument of 84-
policy. He explicitly states that,
Considering the essence of a possible nuclear war, Marxist-Leninists do not confuse it with another question, close but not identical with it — concerning the admissibility or inadmissibility of nuclear war as a means of politics. (p. 8)
The following articles and books were among the many I reviewed. The meaning they ascribe to the dictum is the same as presented by Kondratkov. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, pages 6-10 and 21-23 in translation; Problems of War and Peace: A Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories (Moscow, Progress Publishers , 1972), pp. 57-68, 77-95; General- Lieutenant S. Lototskiy (reserve), "The Classics of Marxism-Leninism on the Development of the Military Art," Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (September 1973), translated in Strategic Review 2 (Spring 1974): 104-407; Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "The Leninist Conception of Contemporary War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20 (October 1973): 21-28, translated in Strategic Review 2 (Spring 1974): 100-103; Colonel V. Izmaylov, "The Nature and Features of Modern Wars," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 6 (March 1975): 67-75, translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (64665), 30 April 1975, pp. 29-46; Colonel A. Dmitriyev, "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the Army is an Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 13 (July 1975): 9-17, translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (65480), 18 August 1975, pp. 1-12; Colonel S. Tyushkevich, "The Development of the Doctrine on War and the Army on the Basis of the Experience of the Great Patriotic War,"; Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil No. 22 (November 1975): 9-16, translated in FBIS, Daily ITeport: Soviet Union. 18 December 1975, pp. A6-A11; Colonel N. Kulikov, "On Just and Unjust Wars," Soviet Military Review No. 3 (March 1977): 8-10; V. Antonov, book review, Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military Historical Journal) No. T~, (April 1972): 105-110, translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (56087), 24 May 1972, p. 32; "Theory, Politics, Ideology on the Essence of War," Krasnaya zvezda, 24 January 1967, translated in FBIS,""Daily keport: Soviet Union, 30 January 1967, p. bbl9. In addition, the noted military writer, Colonel Ye. Rybkin, wrote,
In his definition of war as a continuation of politics by violent means, Lenin saw the most general point of departure essential in order to reveal the entire complexity of each specific war and to isolate the fundamental, principal elements within it. This 85
definition is not the culmination of the investigation of a war but on the contrary is an initiation, a theoretical basis.
Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "Leninists Principles of Sociological Analysis of Wars and Contemporary Problems," in Filosofskoye Naslediye V.I. Lenina i Problemy Sovremennoi Voiny (The Philosophical Legacy of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War), General-Major A.S. Milovidov, editor-in-chief, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972). Translated and published by the U.S. Air Force. Soviet Military Thought Series No. 5, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, n.d.
17. V. Antonov, book review, Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 4 (April 1972). Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSlT Military Affairs, (56087), 24 May 1972, p. 32.
18. "Theory, Politics, Ideology on the Essence of War," Krasnaya zvezda, 24 January 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 30 January 1967, p. bbl9.
19. Colonel I .A. Grudinin, "On The Question of the Essence of War," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 July 1966. Translated in Kintner, 1968, p. 347.
20. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 109 in translation.
21. Rybkin, "Leninist Concept of War," October 1973, page 103 in translation.
22. Pipes, 1977, p. 34.
23. In this section, I discuss only statements which refer directly to war as a 'means' or an 'instrument' of policy. Soviet statements on the consequences of a nuclear war are also a reflection of Soviet views on the use of nuclear war as an instrument. They will be discussed, however, later in this paper, although it should be noted here that Soviet statements on the consequences of such a war are consistent with their statements on the use of nuclear war as an instrument of policy.
24. Goure, 1974, p. 9. Others who hold this view are: Pipes, 1977, pp. 30, 34; Stroehm, 1977, page 2 in translation; and The Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union, 1978, pp. 8, 28.
25. N. Talensky, "The 'Absolute Weapon' and the Problem of Security," International Affairs (April 1962): 27. 86
26. M. Sturua, Moscow Domestic Radio Service in Russian, 12 September 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 19 September 1963, p. bb36.
27. Ibid., p. bb38.
28. Boris Dmitriyev, "Brass Hats: Peking and Clausewitz," Izvestiya , 24 September 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 25 September 1963, p. bblO.
29. At this time, Sushko was head of a chair at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. See Scott, 1971, p. 94.
30. Sushko and Kondratkov, 1964, page 8 in translation.
31. In October 1963, Colonel P. Trifenenko responded to Chinese accusations that the Soviets had abandon the dictum "war is a continuation of politics." He stated that the Soviets did believe the dictum because it correctly expressed the essence of any war. At the same time, he expressed doubt about the practical utility of nuclear war and noted that the validity of the thesis need not be tested, since the destruction which would result had made world war unrealistic. Colonel P. Trifonenko, "War and Politics," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 October 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 30 October 1963, pp. bb37-bb38. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 74. In December 1963, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov, Chief of the General Staff wrote that, "Nuclear war, like any war is also an instrument of policy, but of senseless insane policy because its utterly devastating character cannot guarantee to the aggressive quarters the achievement of their reactionary goals." (p. bb6) It appears that he is referring to the United States because he speaks of reactionary goals. He goes on, however, to make a statement which indicates that he has doubts about the utility of such a conflict. "Mankind faces a dilemma either to avoid a new world war or to find itself in a position whose consequences are difficult to foresee." S. Biryuzov, "Politics and Nuclear Weapons," Izvestiya, 10 December 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 11 December 1963, pp. bb5-bb6. In 1964, two civilian commentators claimed that nuclear war could not be used as a practical means of achieving political goals. N.M. Nikolskii wrote, "The disappearance of the likelihood that victory in a thermonuclear war could be a means for attaining political goals of states, and the 87 negation of all military categories of the institution of war bespeak the fact that thermonuclear world war is in its essence no longer war but rather the self-negation of war." N.M. Nikolskii, Osnovnoi vopros sovremennost (The Basic Problem of Our Time), izdatel 'stvo IMO, 1964, p. 381. Cited in Roman Kolkowicz, The Red 'Hawks' on the Rationality of Nuclear War (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, March 1966) RM - 4899 - PR, pp. 14-15. Viktor Glazurov made similar comments in July 1964. Viktor Glazurov, Moscow Radio, 22 July 1964, translated in FBIS, Dailv Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 23 July 1964, pp. bb9-bbl0.
32. N. Talensky, "The Late War: Some Reflections," International Affairs No. 5 (May 1965): 15.
33. Ibid.
34. According to Harriet Fast Scott, Rybkin was probably on the Faculty of the Academy in 1965. He received a Doctor of Sciences degree from that Academy in 1969. According to Scott, Grudinin was probably on the faculty of the Academy in 1966.
35. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, translated in Kintner pp. 101-115.
36. Grudinin, July 1966, translated in Kintner, 1968, pp. 340-351.
37. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 114 in translation.
38. Grudinin, July 1966, page 346 in translation.
39. Ibid., pages 346-347 in translation.
40. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 109 in translation.
41. Ibid., page 115 in translation.
42. Grudinin, July 1966, page 345 in translation.
43. Sushko and Kondratkov, January, 1964, pp. 8-20 in translation.
44. Kondratkov, "Essence of War," August 1968, page A30 in translation.
45. Rybkin wrote that, "...the qualitatively new consequences caused by mutual utilization of the most advanced weapons substantially limit the capability of a 88
nuclear war to be a means of achieving the political objectives of imperialism. This lies behind the important conclusion stated in the CPSU program that nuclear war "cannot and shall not serve as a means of settling international disputes." Rybkin in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 36-37 in translation.
46. Ibid., page 37 in translation.
47. Rybkin was mentioned in an article on a meeting of the Bureau of the Scientific Council for Coordination of Research in Military History held at the Institute of Military History in September 1973. Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal No. 1 (1974): 97. Also see Krasnaya zvezda, 11 April 1975, p. 2; and 13 November 1976, p. 3.
48. Rybkin, "Leninist Concept of War," October 1973, pages 102-103 in translation.
49. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 115 in translation. Also see his article in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 36-37 in translation.
50. G.A. Arbatov, "The Impasse of the Policy of Force," Problemy mira i sotsializima (Problems of Peace and Socialism) No. § (February 1974): ¥17-47. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 20 February, p. b2.
51. V.M. Berezhkov, "Detente Prospects and Soviet-American Relations," SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya (USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology) No. 3 (21 August 1975): 3-14. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 9 October 1975, p. A7.
52. Tyushkevich, November, 1975, pages A6-A11 in translation.
53. Soviet World Outlook, 13 February 1976.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid. In the last sentence of the quote Tyushkevich refers to the more effective means of struggle at the direct disposal of state power. In the context of what else he says in the article, it is evident that he sees the military might of both the USSR and the US as having increased immeasurably.
56. Tyushkevich, November 1975, page A6 in translation. 57. Ibid. 58. See Pravda, 9 May 1974; Krasnaya zvezda, 11 Apr 1975, p. 2.
59. Kondratkov, "The 25th Congress and War," July 1976, p. 9.
60. V.M. Berezhkov, "Basic Principles of Soviet-U.S Relations." SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, No. 4 (1977): 6. CHAPTER IV
SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF
VICTORY IN A NUCLEAR WAR1
A cursory review of Soviet writings could easily
lead one to conclude that the Soviet leaders believe
victory is possible in a nuclear war. Soviet spokesmen
have said,
Let it be known to all that in a clash with any aggressor the Soviet Union will win a victory worthy of our great people, of the homeland of the October Revolution.^
...we are firmly convinced that victory in this war would go to us — to the socialist system.3
There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologies that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world w a r . 4
These statements and others have been cited by Westerners as evidence that the Soviet leaders believe it is possible to win and survive a nuclear war. Professor Pipes, in fact, uses the last quote as evidence that Soviet doctrine, in contrast the Western doctrine, holds that "...the
90 91
country better prepared for it (a nuclear war) and in
possession of a superior strategy could win and emerge a 5 viable society."
It is the thesis of this chapter that indeed
Soviet statements about victory must be considered in any
assessment of Soviet views of nuclear war survival. But
these statements must be considered in the context in which
they were made and in conjunction with other types of g statements which also reflect the Soviet view on nuclear
war.
The first problem which arises in analyzing
Soviet statements about victory in a nuclear war is the
ambiguity of the word "victory". The fact is that there are many kinds of victory. At one extreme there is absolute victory in which one nation totally defeats another and incurs no damage. An example of this type of victory, at least from a military point of view, would be the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. At the other extreme, is a victory in the sense of just barely coming out ahead of a totally defeated enemy or having to pay such a high price for the win that the costs far outweigh the benefits. An example of this type of victory would be the defeat of the Romans by the King Pyrrhus of
Empirus in 272 BC. The King's troops were victorious, but they suffered heavy losses. As a result, the phrase pyrrhic victory means a victory won at excessive cost.
Between these extremes there are many degrees of victory. 92
Thus, it is essential that we understand what kind of victory Soviet spokesmen are referring to.
A calculated decision to start a nuclear war will be based not only on estimates of the possibility of victory, but more importantly, on what kind of victory could be achieved. While the belief in the possibility of a meaningful victory (where the benefits far outweigh the costs) will encourage the initiation of conflict, perceptions of a pyrrhic victory will inhibit rational leaders from initiating or threatening to initiate a nuclear war. Soviet statements, therefore, which merely state that the Soviet Union would be victorious in such a war, are too vague, by themselves, to assist us in evaluating their precise beliefs or their probable behavior.
In analyzing Soviet statements about the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, we must also guard against confusing statements of goals with statements of realistic expectations. Certain Soviet spokesmen argue that victory is possible in a nuclear war, but this does not necessarily mean that they believe such an objective is possible now or in the foreseeable future. In such cases we must analyze what else they are saying in order to determine how close they perceive they are to achieving such a goal.
Another factor to consider in evaluating Soviet victory statements is the fact that, according to the 93
Soviets themselves, there are several important reasons why
such statements are necessary. First, Marxist-Leninist
ideology predicts a socialist victory in any war. In
addition, victory statements are considered important to maintain the morale and readiness of the population and the armed forces.
According to Marxism-Leninism, the fates of capitalism and socialism are historically predetermined and cannot be changed. The socialist system is considered to be inherently superior. Even if the United States initiated a nuclear war to try to reverse the trend of history, the Soviet Union would prevail. This ideological influence is directly evident in some Soviet statements about victory.
In 1962, Retired General-Major Nikolay Talensky argued that the outcome of a nuclear war would depend upon which nation was superior with respect to:
-the social and economic system, -the political soundness of the state, -the morale and political understanding of the masses, -the organization and unity, and -the prestige of national leadership.
Talensky contends that, "In these respects, the superiority 7 of socialism over capitalism is beyond any doubt." He then states that a third World War would mean the doom of imperialism. Thus, Talensky's assessment of the outcome of a nuclear war derives from Marxist-Leninist ideology which 94
maintains that the socialist system is inherently superior
to the capitalist system. It should be noted that in the
same article, Talensky also argued that the massive
destructive power of nuclear weapons and the inability to
defend against them had created a situation whereby nuclear
war, unlike previous wars, could not serve as a practical g instrument of policy.
Also, in 1962, Colonel-General N. Lomov referred to
the inevitable outcome of a nuclear war based upon the
teachings of Marxism-Leninism. He claimed that, "Its
outcome is predetermined by the objective laws of 9 historical development." Marxism-Leninism, he noted,
teaches that the "...social and political order of a nation
decisively influences the state of economic, moral-political, and war-making potential of a
state...which are the chief factors determining the course and outcome of a war."'*'® The ideology also teaches, Lomov pointed out, the superiority of the Soviet socio-political system. Lomov also stated that Soviet military doctrine
could be understood correctly only by an awareness of the theoretical and political conclusions of the 22nd CPSU
Congress. One conclusion was the inevitability of victory of the socialist camp over the West if the latter started a nuclear war.'*''*’ In the same article, however, Lomov wrote,
Victory in war does not come of itself, it must be prepared for. Its achievement requires a high level of military technology, military art, and organizational 95
capabilities on the part of command cadres, particularly the higher-echelon operational-tactical leadership.
Thus, his belief in the validity of Marxism-Leninism was
tempered by his awareness, as a military man, of what is
required to achieve victory in war.
Between 1965 and 1975, military spokesmen continued to claim that if the West started a nuclear war,
the socialist nations would emerge victorious. They argued
that such a conclusion is derived from the laws of history as predicted by their Marxist-Leninist ideology.
In 1965, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya.
Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense, stated that the claim that the Soviet Union would be victorious in a nuclear war IB was not wishful thinking, but a law of history. This same point was made in 1969 by the Chief of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, N.I. Krylov who wrote,
The imperialists are trying to lull the vigilance of the world's people by having recourse to propaganda devices to the effect that there will be no victor in a future nuclear war. These false affirmations contradict the objective laws of history.. .victory in war, if the imperialists succeed in starting it, will be on the side of world socialism and all progressive mankind.1"* (underline added)
In 1971, a book written for Soviet officers claimed that victory would always be on the side of the working class. The basis for the claim is the author's 96
belief, based upon Marxism-Leninism, in the invincibility
of the socialist state and its army which arises from the
superiority of the socialist social system over the 15 bourgeois social system.
A year later, another book intended for Soviet
officers, generals and admirals, claimed that in a new war
the socialist nations would be victorious. This conclusion
was based upon two factors: (1) the balance of forces; and
(2) the logic of history; its objective laws prescribe that
the new in social development is invincible.^®
Then, in 1975, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A.
Grechko stated that the most important lesson of the Great
Patriotic war was the fact that the victory of the Soviet
people was historically determined and axiomatic. He goes
on to point out that this fact is important to keep in mind 17 in the modern era.
Thus, certain Soviet officials believe that to deny the possibility of a Soviet victory in any war,
including a nuclear war, is to challenge, even if not intentionally, Marxist-Leninist ideology and the laws of history which are expressed by that ideology. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find Soviet spokesmen referring to the possibility of victory in a nuclear war.
This perspective also helps to explain why Soviet spokesmen can talk of the dire consequences of a nuclear war and yet still assert that socialism will emerge victorious. They may not be contradicting themselves as it appears they are 97
doing but merely expressing their assessment of the
consequences of such a war while maintaining the proper
ideological position on the outcome of Soviet spokesmen also state that the notion of victory is important to keep up the morale of the military 18 and the civilian population. In 1965, Lieutenant-Colonel Rybkin wrote, The a priori rejection of the possibility of victory is bad because it leads to moral disarmament, to a disbelief in victory, to fatalism and passivity. In 1967, two publications made the same claim. A book on the morale factor in modern warfare, stated that the no victory concept could "...cause harm to the cause of 20 political and military training of personnel." Then an article on the psychological training of military personnel warned that a grim view of the outcome of such a war would 21 lead to passivity among the troops. > In 1968, an article in the restricted Soviet military publication, Voyennaya mysl1, strongly criticized a civilian spokesman who argued that no victory was possible in a nuclear war and the result would be mutual destruction. General-Major K. Bochkarev's comments were directed at A.I. Krylov. He stated that Krylov, ...considers in vain the fears that the conclusion about the hopelessness of global nuclear missile war will not stimulate raising the morale of the army. In 98 his opinion...knowledge of the truth...strengthens the morale of the armies of socialism. Surprising logic: to strengthen the morale of the troops on the basis of their recognition of the hopelessness of the struggle for which they are preparing.22 In 1969, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Tabunov, from the Lenin Military-Political A c a d e m y ,2 3 stated explicitly, ...the dubious theoretical concepts whose adherents deny the possibility of a victory in armed struggle involving the use of nuclear missiles are capable of sowing seeds of pessimism among the fighting men and weakening the combat abilities of the armed f o r c e s . 24 Thus, according to the Soviets, statements about victory are necessary to maintain morale. General-Major Bochkarev, in his 1968 Voyennaya mysl' article attacking Krylov, indicated that victory statements were important for other r e a s o n s . 25 ne argues that the no victory notion would mean that socialist states could not set as a goal the defeat of imperialism in such a war. In addition, acceptance of such a notion would hinder the establishing of a military strategy for fighting a nuclear war. He also states that in such a case there would be no sense to call for the readiness of the armed forces. Bochkarev, incidently was apparently an instructor at the Lenin Military-Political Academy when he wrote this 26 article. The Academy trains political officers for the military and it is understandable that its faculty members are very concerned about anything which could have a 99 negative impact on the morale and readiness of the Soviet armed forces. The length of time that Soviet spokesmen have been proclaiming that they would be victorious in a nuclear war also suggests that such claims are, or at least have been, mainly for maintaining morale and preparedness. A conclusion of the XXII Party Congress and the Party Program in October 1961, for example, was that in a nuclear war, a 27 victory by the socialists was inevitable. The claim was made at a time when the U.S. had nuclear superiority. Thus, it is not likely that the Soviet leaders had any real expectations about such an outcome. An evaluation of the context in which victory statements (or claims about the destruction of capitalism) are made indicates that very often such claims are qualified by a statement about how disastrous such a war would be. A Pravda article in 1965, for example, stated that there was no doubt about the downfall of capitalism in a nuclear war. The author emphasizes, however, that, ...the destruction would be so great that this would not speed up the transition to socialism, but, on the contrary, throw mankind a long way b a c k . ^8 Two years later, an article in Krasnaya zvezda again proclaimed that imperialism would be destroyed. The author goes on to point out, 100 However, such a thermonuclear war would have catastrophic consequencies and would for a long time hamper the solution of the constructive tasks of the revolution.29 In 1968, two military writers stated in the restricted military publication, Vovennaya mysl1, that nuclear war would end in the defeat of imperialism, but they state it will also lead to the most dire consequences on for all peoples and countries. In 1970, General-Major Bochkarev again attacked those who believed that victory would not be possible in such a war. He goes on to point out, however, that the war would result in incalculable calamities for mankind. He also states, Marxist-Leninists would never agree to such a high price if the choice of weapons depended on them alone.31 In 1972 and 1974, two other military spokesmen attacked those who doubted the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. In the first publication, the author goes on to state that such a war would cause unprecedented qp destruction and would inhibit the revolutionary process. In the second publication the author noted that the war OO would be extraordinarily dangerous. An examination of Soviet statements about victory indicates several interesting points. First, claims about the possibility of victory are made almost exclusively by military spokesmen. Civilians, on the other hand, generally state that in such a war imperialism would be 101 destroyed, but they avoid claims about a Soviet victory. As will be discussed later, it is understandable why civilian spokesmen talk of the destruction of the West but do not talk of a Soviet victory. That is because they realize that at best they could achieve only a pyrrhic victory. Military leaders agree with this, but it is the job of the military to fight and win such a war if it occurs and to maintain morale and preparedness during peacetime. For these reasons, it is understandable why military spokesmen talk about victory even though they do not believe, or at least have strong doubts about the possibility of achieving a meaningful victory. Another interesting fact is that during the sixteen years under review, there were nine publications in which the author directly criticized Soviets and Westerners 34 who believed that no victory was possible in a nuclear war. Of the eight authors (one wrote two articles), seven were associated with the Lenin Military-Political Academy and the other worked for the Main Political Administration of 35 the Minisry of Defense. In addition, at least four of the eight authors had attended the Lenin Military-Political 36 Academy as students. The sources of these attacks are not surprising. Both institutions have a major role in ensuring that a nigh level of morale and readiness is maintained within the armed forces. It is thus logical that persons at these institutions have a vested interest in refuting any ideas which might have a negative impact on 102 morale and readiness. It can be expected, therefore, that writings which talk about such notions as the death of civilization and the impossibility of victory in a war are likely to be attacked. In fact four of the eight authors state directly that the "no victory" view is dangerous because it can have a negative impact on the morale and 37 readiness of the armed forces. In addition, it should be noted that another military spokesman wrote in 1967 that a grim view of the outcome of a nuclear war would lead to 38 passivity among the troops. In 1970, he received his Doctor of Science degree from the Lenin Military-Political 39 Academy. This assessment of Soviet statements about victory in a nuclear war indicates that such statements, by themselves, tell us little about Soviet views on nuclear war survival. The term victory is vague. The Soviets have claimed the inevitability of their victory in such a war even when they were in a position of strategic inferiority. Furthermore, Soviet spokesmen openly admit that such claims are essential for maintaining morale and preparedness. To determine if the Soviets believe victory is possible in a nuclear war, and if so what kind of victory they envisage, it is necessary to review what they have said about the consequences of a nuclear war. Thus, the next chapter will examine this subject in detail. 103 NOTES 1. This chapter analyzes Soviet statements on the feasibility of victory in a nuclear war. Soviet statements about nuclear war as an instrument of policy and about the consequences of such a war also reflect Soviet thinking about the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. These areas, however, are addressed in separate chapters. The findings of all three chapters will be examined in the concluding chapter. 2. Leonid Brezhnev, Pravda, 4 November 1967. Cited in Goure, 1974, p. 62. 3. A.A. Grechko, Krasnaya zvezda, 28 March 1973. Cited in Goure, 1974, p. 62. 4. Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, page 17 in translation. 5. Pipes, 1977, p. 21. 6. Specifically, their statements on nuclear war as an instrument of policy and the consequences of such a war. 7. Talensky, "The Absolute Weapon," April 1962, p. 26. S. Ibid., pp. 23-27. In 1965, he again wrote that nuclear war could not serve as a practical instrument of policy. Talensky, "The Late War," May 1965, p. 15. 9. Colonel-General N. Lomov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," Kommunist vooruzhennvkh sil No. 10 (May 1962): 11-21. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, (15, 294), 17 September 1962, p. 39. 10. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 11. Ibid., p. 31. 12 . Ibid., p . 43. 13. Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, Radio Volga via East Berlin in Russian to Soviet Forces in Germany, 8 September 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union,. 10 September 1965, CC 10-15. 14. Marshal N.I. Krylov, "The Instructive Lessons of History," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 30 August 1969. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 2 September 1969, p. A20. 104 15. General-Major S.N. Kozlov, editor, Spravochnik Ofitsera (Officer's Handbook) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971). Translation published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. The Officers Handbook: A Soviet View. Soviet Military Thought Series No. 13, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 40. 16. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, 1972, p. 30 in translation. 17. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, Vooruzhennye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1975). Translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series No. 12, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 63. 18. Raymond Garthoff argues that the standard military statements implying victory in nuclear world war are predominately intended for indoctrination and morale-boosting of the armed forces and the public. Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," Problems of Communism 24 (January/February 1975): 33. In addition, Thomas W. Wolfe has argued that, Assertions that the Soviet system would meet the test of war better than the capitalist system do not necessarily reflect solid confidence in the outcome. They probably can be regarded more as patriotic assurances, intended to serve morale and propaganda purposes. (Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, 1970, p. 73). 19. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 114 in translation. 20. S.K. Il'in, Moral'nyy Faktor v Sovremennoy Voyne (Morale Factor in Modern War), (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1567). Partial translation in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, (44, 726), 14 March 1968, p. 7. 21. Colonel M. Korobeynikov, "On The Psychological Training of Military Personnel," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 8 (April 1967): 62-67. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations. (41,029), 15 May 1967, p. 34. 22. General-Major K. Bochkarev, "The Question of the Sociological Aspect of the Struggle Against the Forces of Aggression and War," Voyennaya mysl' No. 9 (September 105 1968). FBIS Translation, Foreign Press Digest No. 0115/69, 16 December 1969, p. 14. 23. The 1969 article referred to was written by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Tabunov. He is most likely the same LTC N.A. Tabunov referred to in Scott (1971, p. 121) who received a Doctor of Sciences Degree from the Lenin Military-Political Academy in 1969. Officers at the Lenin Military-Political Academy often publish articles in Kommunist voorzhennykh sil. The subject of the article also suggests the author was probably from that Academy. 24. Lieutenant-Colonel N. Tabunov, "New Weapons and the Moral Factor," Kommunist vooruzhennvkh sil No. 2 (January 1969). Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs. (47667), 18 March 1969, p. 6. 25. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 14 in translation. 26. Based on discussion with Harriet Fast Scott. 27. Lomov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," May 1962, page 31 in translation. 28. G. Glezerman, "The Great Significance of the Leninist Ideas on the Struggle for Democracy and Socialism," Pravda, 21 January 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 27 January 1965, p. bb8. 29. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Migolatev, "On The 50th Anniversary of V.I. Lenin's Work 'War and Revolution' — On the Correlation Between War and Revolution." Krasnaya zvezda, 27 May 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 2 June 1967, p. CC6. 30. General-Major K. Stepanov and Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "The Nature and Types of Wars of the Modern Era," Voyennaya mysl' No. 2 (February 1968). Translated in FBIS, Foreign Press 'bigest No. 0042/69, 25 April 1969, p. 74. 31. General-Major K. Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms and the Fate of Social Progress," Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 25 August 1970, p. 3. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 4 September 1970, p. A23. 32. Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 15-17 in translation. 33. Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag, "Two World Outlooks -- Two Views on War," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 197 4. 106 Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 12 February 1974, pp. A4-A5. 34. Tabunov, January 1969, page 6 in translation; Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 101-115 in translation; II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation; Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 14 in translation; Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms," August 1970, pages A22-A23 in translation; Khalipov, in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 16-17 in translation; Milovidov, "Military Thought," May 1973, pages M1-M6 in translation; Shelyag, May 1974, pages A1-A5 in translation; and Grudinin, 1966, page 346 in translation. 35. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 101-115 in translation. According to Harriet Fast Scott, Rybkin was probably on the faculty of the Academy in 1965. He received a Doctor of Sciences degree from that Academy in 1969. See Scott, 1971, p. 120. II'in, 1967, pages 6-7 in translation. In 1967, he was Deputy Chief of Agitprop of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense. Til i snabzheniye Sovetskikh voorzhennykh sil (Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces), No. 1~, 1967, p . 95. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Agression," September 1968, page 14 in translation; Also see, "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, pages A22-A23 in translation. According to Harriet Fast Scott, Bochkarev was probably an instructor at the Academy during, 1968-1970. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, he did work, for the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense. Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 1958; Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 4, February 1963. In 1967, he was identified as an assistant professor. FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 29 December 1967. Khalipov, in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 16-17 in translation. Colonel V.F. Khalipov was identified two years later as Head of the Scientific Research Department of the Academy in 1974. Znamenosets, No. 11, 1974, p. 34. In 1965, he received a Candidate of Sciences Degree from the Academy. See Scott, 1971, p. 122. Milovidov, "Military Thought," 17 May 1973, pages M1-M6 in translation. Five years later, he was identified as head of a chair at the Academy. Krasnaya zvezda, 8 September 1978, p. 4. In 1965, he received a Doctor of Sciences Degree from that institution. See Scott, 1971, p. 120. 107 Shelyag, 7 February 1974, pages A4-A5 in translation. In 1975, he was identified as Deputy Chief of the Academy. Krasnaya zvezda, 3 July 1975, pp. 2-3. Tabunov, January 1969, page 6 in translation. He received a Doctor of Sciences Degree from the Academy in 1969. (Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Formulation and Dissemination (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 1971), p. 121. Grudinin, 1966, page 346 in translation. He is believed to have been on the faculty of the Academy in 1966. (Based upon conversation with Harriet Fast Scott.) 36. Rybkin, Doctor of Sciences degree at Lenin Military- Political Academy in 1969. (Scott, 1971, p. 120). Khalipov, Candidate of Sciences degree at the Academy in 1965. (Scott, 1971, p. 122). Tabunov, Doctor of Sciences degree from the Academy in 1969. (Scott, 1971, p. 121). Milovidov, Doctor of Sciences degree from the Academy in 1965. (Scott, 1971, p. 120). Because of the jobs which II'in, Bochkarev and Shelyag later held, it is likely that they also attended the Lenin Military- Political Academy. Bochkarev and Shelyag served on the faculty at the Academy and II'in worked for the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense. (See footnote 35). 37. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, page 14 in translation; Il'in, 1967, page 7 in translation; Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 14 in translation; and Tabunov, January 1969, page 6 in translation. 38. Korobeynikov, April 1967, page 34 in translation. 39. Scott, H. June 1971, p. 120. CHAPTER V SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR WAR As noted before, various Westerners contend that there has been a change in Soviet thinking on nuclear war and that Soviet leaders now believe their nation could win and survive a nuclear war, possibly with fewer losses than they suffered in World War II. To evaluate the validity of this contention, this chapter will examine what the Soviets have said about the consequences of a nuclear war. Soviet views during three periods will be examined. (1) January 1962-October 1964: This covers the last few years of the Khrushchev era when the Soviets were in a position of strategic inferiority. (2) November 1964-December 1970: This period covers the first six years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective leadership when the Soviets began to redress the strategic military imbalance. (3) January 1971-December 1977: This covers the seven years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership during which the USSR had a nuclear destruction capability similar to that of the U.S. The objective is to compare the views 109 expressed in each period to determine if the changes in strategic capabilities, in the leadership or in other areas have resulted in an alteration in their perception of survival and victory in a nuclear war. The Khrushchev Years (1962-Qctober 1964: The Period of Strategic Inferiority) In the later years of the Khrushchev era, the United States had a much greater capacity for inflicting nuclear destruction on the Soviet Union than vice versa.'*' The U.S. had more ICBM's, SLBM's, long-range bombers, and had medium bombers in Europe which could attack the Western part of the Soviet Union. Because of the difference in strategic nuclear capabilities and because there was little that could be done to reduce destruction (i.e., the objective situation), it would be expected that the Soviet leadership would perceive the massive destruction the USSR would incur in a nuclear war. The leadership would not believe that they could utilize nuclear war as a practical instrument of policy nor that a meaningful victory would be possible. Such would be their perceptions unless there were intervening subjective factors. For example, they may not have correctly perceived the relative capabilities of the superpowers. It is possible that their intelligence 110 information could have been incomplete, incorrect or ignored. Civilian Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War: 1962-1964 As it turns out, the Soviet leaders seemed well aware of their relative strategic nuclear inferiority and of the resultant disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union if a nuclear war should occur. Khrushchev, especially seemed very concerned about a possible nuclear war and the U.S. nuclear destructive capability. In June 1962, he claimed that, "...a future war would destroy all big cities and would take a toll of 700-800 million human lives. Several months later, during the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev's vision of the consequences of a nuclear war apparently weighed heavily on his mind. In a letter to Bertrand Russell, he wrote, Clearly if this catastrophe breaks out it will bring extremely grave consequences to mankind and will spare neither right, nor left, neither those who champion the cause of peace nor those who want to stay aloof. After the crisis was over, he is reported to have said, "If reason had not prevailed, we would not be here tonight at this reception and there would have been no elections in Ill 4 the U.S. today." That Khrushchev perceived that the USSR would suffer greatly in a nuclear war is also evident in other statements he made during his last two years in 5 power. Of the other Politburo members, only Kosygin expressed his views on this subject in public and he seemed to agree with Khrushchev. In a speech in November 1962, Kosygin stated that he was relieved that the two great powers had averted a nuclear war over the Cuban crisis because such a conflict would have killed hundreds of millions and would have caused innumerable disasters for all mankind.® Grim assessments of the consequences of a nuclear war were also expressed in the newspapers of the party and the government — Pravda and Izvestiya. In January 1962, N. Inozemtsev wrote in Pravda that a nuclear war would threaten mankind with unprecedented destruction and casualties. He predicted that hundreds of millions of persons would be killed and the great production centers of the world would be destroyed.^ Two months later, an Observer article in Pravda, which represents official high-level views, warned President Kennedy against contemplating a first strike against the Soviet Union. The article stated that such an attack would be suicide for the U.S. because of the nuclear might of the USSR. The same article, however, also indicated that Soviet officials greatly feared such a war. 112 It estimated that hundreds of millions would die and that such a war, ...would pale the horrors of the invasions of the Vandals and the Crusades, the Thirty-Years' and One Hundred-Year's Wars, the Napoleonic Battles, and Hitler's 'blitzkrieg' into insignificance. 8 Dire predictions about the consequences of a nuclear war were also expressed by other civilian spokesmen in other Pravda articles^ and in Izvestiya.^ Similar views were presented in other official publications and in radio broadcasts.^ An article in Pravda Ukrainy, the Ukraine Republic Party newspaper, indicated that the author believed the Soviet Union would suffer greatly in such a war. The author wrote, It is common knowledge that it is impossible to build communism amid ruins. The ravages and sacrifices that would be caused by a new war would prove too high a price for our victors. Such a war would take mankind back hundreds of years and would be a major blow to the cause of the proletarian revolution.12 As noted earlier, General-Major N. Talensky wrote in 1962 that a nuclear war could not serve as an instrument of policy because of the disastrous consequences which would result. ^ 113 Military Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War During this same period, military spokesmen also indicated that they believed that in a nuclear war the Soviets would suffer greatly. Marshal of the Soviet Union Yeremenko, in a speech to the Soviet armed forces, stated that in a nuclear war the imperialist aggressor would be annihilated, but he also admitted that it would bring 14 innumerable disasters to mankind. He provided a more detailed description of his perceptions of the consequences of a nuclear war in an article almost two years later in which he attacks the Chinese advocacy of nuclear conflict. Yeremenko wrote that, In reality war can be compared as far as its consequences are concerned, to the most terrible catastrophes, such as covering of the earth's surface with .ice or a collision between the earth and other big celestial b o d i e s . 15 In July 1962 and February 1963, Defense Minister Malinovsky sternly warned the U.S. that if it attacked the USSR, the Soviet strategic forces would launch a devastating attack against the U.S. His warning in 1962 was in reaction to President Kennedy's statement that in certain conditions, the U.S. might take the initiative in a nuclear conflict. Malinovsky's warning in 1963 was a 114 result of his fear that the U.S. would attack Cuba and in turn night attack the USSR. Although Malinovsky was stern in his threats, it is obvious that he hoped a nuclear war could be avoided. Both times, he discussed what destruction would result from nuclear weapons of various yields. In addition, in the 1962 article in Kommunist, he wrote that a nuclear war, ...would cause all countries and peoples terrible disaster, which would far exceed anything which history has so far known.16 v It is noteworthy that he stated that all countries would be devastated. In his 1963 speech, he again admitted his concern: At the same time we realize well the destructive power of the present nuclear weapons, which are able to suddenly wipe from the face of the earth whole countries, to turn big towns into dust and to destroy many millions of people. Thus, Malinovsky expected that the USSR would suffer greatly if a nuclear war occurred. In the January 1964 issue of Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, General-Major N. Sushko and Major Kondratkov wrote about war and politics in the nuclear era — an article which was recommended for study by officer training groups. The authors declared that capitalism would perish if the West started a nuclear war. At the 115 same time, these military spokesmen openly indicated that the consequences for the Soviet Union would be disastrous. They stated that hundreds of millions would die and that, ...all nations, even those that survive, will be retarded in development for decades and c e n t u r i e s . 18 The same month, another military spokesman expressed a similar view in an article intended for the training of servicemen. The author, Colonel-General N. Lomov, a professor and Chief of the Strategy Department of the General Staff Academy, stated that a nuclear war would be so "...destructive as never in history and would cause 1 9 tremendous losses beyond comparison with anything known." During this same period, other military spokesmen made 20 simlar statements. Summary of Views: 1962-1964 During the period between January 1962 and October 1964, civilian and military spokesmen presented similar assessments of the consequences of a nuclear war. The United States and other imperialist nations, they warned, would be destroyed if the Western nations attacked the Soviet Union. Although they spoke confidently about the destruction of imperialism in such a war, they also 116 admitted that the consequences of such a conflict would be far worse than any previous war. Hundreds of millions of persons would be killed and the major cities of the world would be destroyed. Significantly, the Soviet spokesmen expected unprecedented destruction not only in the West, but also in the socialist nations. Although Khrushchev was the major civilian spokesman presenting this view, various other civilians expressed similar views mainly in Pravda and Izvestiya. Similar assessments were also made by military officials including several Marshals of the Soviet Union (Malinovsky and Yeremenko) and a General-Colonel on the faculty of the General Staff Academy (Lomov). Thus, in the early 1960's, when the Soviet Union was at an obvious•disadvantage in terms of strategic nuclear capabilities, Soviet spokesmen indicated that they were well aware that the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented destruction in a nuclear war. The Brezhnev-Kosygin Era (1964-December 1970) During the period 1964-1970, there were several changes which could also have led to a different view of the consequences of a nuclear war. First, there was the removal of Khrushchev from power. The rest of the Politburo membership remained the same, but Khrushchev's views had dominated Soviet thinking on nuclear war. His 117 removal, therefore, would allow the possibility of more open disagreements with his views. Another consequence of his ouster was the change in the situation of the military. The new leadership needed the military's support, and as a result, had to pay more attention to the desires of the military leadership. At the same time, the military began to reassert itself and was more open in espousing its views. Another factor, which could have led to a change in views on nuclear war was the change in the military balance. Between 1964 and 1970, the Soviet Union went from 9*1 a position of strategic inferiority to parity.As a result of the changes within the Soviet Union and the change in the military balance, there could have been a change in the Soviet leaders views of the consequences of a nuclear war. Civilian Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War: 1964-1970 One difference was that Khrushchev's replacement, Leonid Brezhnev, said little in public during this period about the consequences of a nuclear war. In addition, the view that he expressed was not as strong as that espoused by his predessor. At the same time, however, there is no evidence that Brezhnev perceived any meaningful victory 118 resulting from such a war. In June 1966, he stated that a new world war would mean "...innumerable sacrifices and 22 sufferings." Sixteen months later, he warned that a nuclear war, ...might bring destruction to hundreds of millions of people and entire countries; it might contaminate the earth's surface and atmosphere.23 Kosygin also said little in pubic about this issue, but in the six months after Khrushchev's ouster, Kosygin made several speeches in which he reiterated his view that although imperialism would be destroyed in such a war, the Soviet Union would also suffer great destruction.^ Other members -of the Politburo said little in open discussions on this topic but Suslov, and Demichev (a candidate member) all said that such a war would have 9=; catastrophic consequences. Although members of the Politburo remained relatively mute on this subject, other civilian spokesmen did not. They continued to argue that a nuclear war would be disastrous not only for the U.S. but also for the Soviet Union. In the months following Khrushchev's ouster, several Pravda articles talked about the dire consequences of a nuclear war and noted that such a conflict would be a major setback for the socialist revolution.^® One editorial argued that peaceful coexistence was essential 119 because in a nuclear war, ...hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and irreparable damage to the development of society's productive forces and to the world revolutionary process would be c a u s e d . 27 In April 1965, the President of the Academy of Sciences warned that a nuclear war "...threatens to destroy 28 civilization." Between 1965 and 1970, other civilian spokesmen continued to talk about the disastrous 29 consequences of a nuclear war. One article in Pravda in December 1969 stated, ...both we and America know that within a few hours such a conflict could not only kill millions but could also destroy all that has been created by both people's labors.30 Then, in 1970, another civilian writer claimed that a nuclear war could annihilate contemporary -civilization, ; losses could run as high as 1.5 to 2 billion and modern industry would disappear. ^ In 1969 and 1970, however, two civil defense manuals stated that Soviet urban population losses could be reduced to less than eight percent if a complete dispersal and evacuation was carried o u t . 32 Various Western commentators have cited these claims as indications that the Soviets leaders believe it is possible that their nation could win a meaningful victory in a nuclear w a r . 33 120 It is true that it is theoretically possible to significantly reduce immediate urban population losses if a completed evacuation is effected. The same civil defense manuals also point out, however, that without an evacuation, losses in the cities could be as high as ninety percent of the population. The important question, therefore, is, how confident are the Soviet leaders that their nation has the capability, and that circumstances will permit them to utilize that capability, to carry out a complete evacuation of their major cities? Another important point which some Westerners ignore, or downplay, is the fact that even if the cities are evacuated, Soviet industry is still vulnerable to nuclear strikes. Thus, the civil defense manuals describe what is theoretically possible, more important, however, are the Soviet leaders' perceptions of their civil defense capabilities to reduce both population losses and destruction to industry. Based upon what civilian and military spokesmen said between 1964 and 1970, there is no indication that they believed their nation could avoid unprecedented destruction in a nuclear wa r. Military Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War: 1964-1970 In 1965, various military spokesmen began to take 121 to task certain notions about nuclear war which had been prominent during the Khrushchev years. In March, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov argued that in a nuclear OA war, mankind and civilization would not be destroyed. In September, Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Rybkin attacked the view that no victory was possible in such a war. He specifically criticized Retired-General Talensky and N. OC Nikolskii for espousing that notion. In July 1966, Q £ * Colonel Grudinin criticized Talensky for the same reason. In 1967, General-Major S.K. II'in criticized Westerners and Soviets who argued that no victory was possible in such a war and civilization would be destroyed 37 in such a conflict. Then in 1968 and again in 1970, General-Major K. Bochkarev attacked the same notions and specifically mentioned the works of N. Nikolskii and A.I. O O Krylov in his 1968 article. But did these military spokesmen believe that the Soviet Union could win and survive a nuclear war? In addition, it is important that we examine what other military spokesmen were saying at the time about the consequences of a nuclear war. Lieutenant-Colonel Rybkin's attack on Talensky is 39 well documented. Rybkin vigorously attacks the notion that victory would not be possible in a nuclear war, but in that article and in later articles he indicates that he an expects the Soviet Union would suffer great destruction. * He does maintain that the socialist nations will be victorious and that the extent of destruction will depend 122 on the speed of the armed struggle. In the same article, however,he said we must recognize the consequences of such a war, The destruction of people, the razing of factories and energy systems, the poisoning of topsoil and water, the spontaneous movement of radioactive clouds, the changes in the biosphere, enormous fires and so forth...41 Rybkin indicated that he expected the USSR would suffer greatly in a nuclear war in articles written in 1968 and 1970. In 1968, he coauthored an article with General-Major K. Stepanov in the restricted military journal Voyennaya mysl1 . The authors maintained that the imperialists would be destroyed, but they also admitted that "...it will also lead to the most dire consequences for all peoples and countries." 4 2 (underline added) In 1970, Rybkin, now a Colonel, wrote that nuclear war would be an inexpedient way to solve the basic contradiction between socialism and imperialism. The rationale for this conclusion is based on his belief that World War III "...would force mankind to endure tests which cannot be compared with anything."4^ In March 1965, Marshal of the Soviet Union Chuykov argued that mankind and civilization would not vanish in such a war. In the same article, however, he states that in such a conflict millions would die, the largest cities of the world would be destroyed and it would 123 44 take many decades to repair the damage. Three years later, in a pamphlet on civil defense, Chuykov talked about the great losses which the Soviet Union incurred in World War II. He went on to point out that, ...the losses and destruction in past wars can in no way be compared with the tremendous human victims and colossal destruction which a world thermonuclear war can bring if the aggressor succeeds in plunging the world into its a b y s s . 45 In Krasnaya zvezda in July 1966, Colonel Grudinin attacked the notions that victory was not possible and that civilization would be destroyed in a nuclear war. In the same article, however, he states that such a war "...would demand enormous sacrifices and cause serious destruction to the productive forces." He goes on to argue that "...the most nearly correct and direct conclusion drawn from such an assessment is that it is necessary to prevent such a conflict." In 1967, General-Major S.K. II'in argued that too many troops believe that victory would not be possible and civilization would be destroyed in a world war. His concern is the negative effect such ideas have on training. He argues that such thinking "...causes harm to the cause of political and military training of personnel."4? At the same time, he believes that his nation would suffer great losses in such a conflict. 124 A nuclear war would be a great misfortune for our people, bringing us limitless disaster and suffering. 48 Finally, General-Major Bochkarev criticized the no victory/end of civilization notions in 1968 and again in 49 1970. In the same articles, he argues that imperialism would be destroyed and socialism would be victorious, but he also indicates that he believes it would be a pyrrhic victory. In the restricted military publication Voyennaya mysi' he states, ...in case it is unleashed by imperialism, it will be the greatest tragedy of mankind; it inevitably will lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people and places under question the life and fate of entire peoples and countries.. . 50 Unquestionably, a world nuclear war will bring unprecedented calamities to all mankind, (underline added) 51 ...if imperialism commits a crime and plunges mankind into the abyss of nuclear war, it will perish, and not 'both sides', not socialism, although the Socialist countries, too, will face supreme tests and will suffer tremendous sacrifices.52 In the 1970 article, he states, ...a nuclear war could cause incalculable calamities for mankind -- troubles exceeding everything hitherto known in history. ..53 It is indisputable that the aggressors defeat in a nuclear war will be achieved at a high price...Marxist- Leninists would never agree to such a price if the choice of weapons depended on them alone. 54 125 In addition, Bochkarev had warned about the dangerous consequences of a nuclear war in three publications in 1965. In fact, in one he stated that nuclear war could threaten the existence of mankind.^ Western evaluations of the articles by Rybkin, Grudinin, and Bochkarev, emphasized the fact that these military writers believed victory is possible and civilization would not be destroyed in a nuclear war.^ Their views on what kind of victory would result and the specific consequences of a nuclear war were not adequately examined. Based on this evaluation of their views of the latter subject it is evident that they did not foresee nuclear war as a practical instrument for the Soviet Union nor did they believe that their nation could survive with anything more than a pyrrhic victory. Between 1964 and 1970, other military spokesmen also discussed the consequences of a nuclear war. They generally proclaimed that imperialism would be destroyed, but they also indicated a strong desire to avoid such a war because of the great destruction which it would cause, especially since they did not seem confident that the Soviet Union could avoid unprecedented devastation. 57 Colonel V. Morozov, for example, wrote in Voyennaya mysl' in 1965 that a nuclear war could threaten the existence of 58 human society. Several months later, Colonel S.V. Malyanchikov called for vigorous training of Soviet 126 soldiers because a future world war "...will be the most destructive in its consequences, the most devastating that has ever been known in history."®® In 1968, in Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) the authors admitted that World War III would cause losses not only to the U.S. and its NATO allies, but also to the socialist nations. They predicted that hundreds of millions would die and that the survivors would be exposed to radioactive contamination.®® In 1969, General-Major Zemskov, The Chief Editor of Voyennaya mysl', wrote two articles in that restricted publication in which he discussed the consequences of a nuclear war. In the first, he notes the extreme vulnerability of national economies to nuclear weapons. As the result of powerful nuclear-missile strikes, literally in a matter of hours and days it (the economy) can be virtually completely destroyed. In any case, the loss which will be inflicted against it will be hundreds and thousands of times greater than was the case during the past war.51 In the second article, he wrote that such a war would result in an unprecedented disaster for mankind. "It will be distinguished from all past wars and will cause mass destruction and millions of victims."®® In the same publication in May 1969, the Commandant of the General Staff Academy, Army General S. Ivanov wrote that "...with the existing level of development of nuclear missile weapons...it is also 127 impossible to prevent an annihilating retaliatory strike."63 Summary of Views: 1964-1970 Throughout this period, civilian spokesmen continued to make dire predictions about the consequences of a nuclear war as they had during the last two years of the Khrushchev era. The general view was that such a war would cause unprecedented destruction, not only for the United States but also for the Soviet Union. Some went so far as arguing that civilization would or could be destroyed, while others talked of vast destruction and very long recovery pereiods. The general consensus was that because of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, such a war had to be avoided. In analyzing Soviet military thinking during this period, two points are important. First, military spokesmen began to attack the notions that there could be no victory in a nuclear war and that civilization would be destroyed. Various civilian spokesmen were named in military publications and their ideas were criticized. This fact has been discussed by various Western analysts 64 discussing this time period. One, in fact, concluded that the debate in 1965-1967 was resolved in favor of those who still stressed the feasibility of waging and winning a nuclear war 128 The military was obviously concerned with the impact that such notions could have. They were worried about the effect it would have on troop morale and 66 training. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to train troops to fight in a nuclear environment if they believed that the world would be destroyed and there was no chance of victory. Military leaders were probably also concerned about two other effects. If there was a nuclear war, and they believe it was possible, it would be difficult to mobilize the national will if the people believed such negative notions. In addition, the no victory/end of civilization ideas would likely have a negative impact on the military's influence and share of the resources. It would be difficult to justify massive expenditures for additional strategic weapons if their acquisition would not make any difference in the outcome of such a conflict. While assessments of this period have concentrated on the discussion of war as an instrument of policy, the possibility of victory, and the possible destruction of civilization, they did not adequately analyze what the military spokesmen were saying about the consequences of such a war. As noted earlier, the very military spokesmen who attacked the no victory/end of civilization ideas also talked about the vast destruction that would result and argued that such a war had to be avoided. These spokesmen and others stated that a nuclear 129 war would be the "most destructive ever," and the only reason that would justify the Soviet Union's paying the high price such a war would cost would be if it were attacked by the United States and its allies — in which /2Q case there was no choice but to fight. During this period various Politburo members did talk about the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war. Another prominent spokesman with the same view was M. Keldysh, the President of the Academy of Sciences. Various other civilians expressed similar views in a wide range of publications including Pravda. Kommunist, and Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) . In addition, as has been discussed, many military officials indicated that they expected the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented losses and destruction in a nuclear war. These officials included Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, other Marshals of the Soviet Union (Timoshenko, Sokolovskiy, Yakubovskiy, and Zakharov), the head of The Frunze Military Academy (Kurotshkin), the head of the General Staff Academy (Ivanov), and faculty members from The General Staff Academy (Skirdo) and The Lenin Military-Political Academy (Bochkarev). Thus, the change in leadership, the increased influence of the military and the significant increase in the strategic nuclear capability of the USSR did not have any effect on the estimates of the consequences of a 130 69 nuclear war. The general view of civilian and military spokesmen was that although capitalism would be destroyed, the Soviet Union could not avoid unprecedented destruction. The boisterous claims of military spokesmen that they would be victorious in a nuclear war were generally followed by estimates of the consequences of such a war which indicated that they realized that any victory would be pyrrhic at best. The Brezhnev-Kosygin Era (1971-1977) Between January 1971 and December 1977 the Soviet Union considerably increased its strategic nuclear weapons capability and upgraded its civil defense effort. As a result, some Western analysts, as noted earlier, claim that the Soviet leaders believe their nation could win and survive a nuclear war in a meaningful sense. It is argued that the Soviet Union could escape such a conflict with fewer population losses than it suffered in World War II. In addition, some state that the hardening and dispersal of industry will allow the rebuilding of its capacity to current levels within a matter of a few years. As noted earlier, however, many analysts disagree with these estimates. The important question, however, is what do the Soviet leaders think? Have the increases in their strategic capabilities (both offensive and defensive) led 131 to a shift in their estsimates of the consequences of a nuclear war? Civilian Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War (1971-1977) Brezhnev's references to the consequences of a nuclear war suggest that although he may not endorse a mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy as a basis for national security, he does recognize the threat of MAD. In a speech in October 1973, he stated that existing nuclear stockpiles were "...capable of blowing up the entire planet." While recalling the destruction of World War I and World War II, he concluded that World War III would be "...a tragedy the like of which has not been seen in the 70 history of mankind." Nine months later, he noted that there were enough nuclear weapons in the world "...to destroy everything on earth several times over."^ Then, in November 1976, he declared that in a nuclear war.mankind might be wholly destroyed."'^7 9 Another Politburo member who frequently discusses the consequences of a nuclear war is Andrey Gromyko, the USSR Foreign Minister. In speeches to international audiences at the United Nations and in letters to the U.N. Secretary General, Gromyko gives no indication that he believes any nation could win and survive a nuclear war in 132 a meaningful way. He has talked of, 73 ...a nuclear war with all its dreadful^ consequences. how nuclear weapons have "radically changed the picture of the consequences which military conflicts could have for the peoples."^4 ...with the emergence of nuclear weapons the threat of local conflicts developing into a world nuclear war with all the ensuing pernicious consequences for mankind has increased beyond measure.75 Gromyko also has made similar statements to Russian audiences. In a 19 January 1974 speech in Yerevan, Armenia, he stated that World War III "...would have the most tragic consequences for all countries and nations."^® Two years later, he wrote in Kommunist (Communist), the bi-weekly journal of the Party Central Committee, In the modern, nuclear age, the arms race conceals within it a threat to people's lives incomparably more serious than has ever existed before, in addition to the obvious disastrous nature of the possible military - consequences. .. In 1978, a speech which he gave to the thirty-third United Nations General Assembly was published in Izvestiya. He stated, It is essential to make the maximum effort to prevent a new military catastrophe that would be even more deadly for mankind than the two World Wars combined.78 133 Other Politburo members rarely address this subject in an open forum. Three of the leaders, Mazurov, Kirilenko, and Kosygin made comments on the subject while visiting foreign countries. In Syria, Mazurov said that a nuclear war would be a "...horrible disaster for all 79 mankind." Kirilenko, while in Italy in March 1975, repeated what Brezhnev had been saying, that enough weapons had been stockpiled "...to annihilate the whole of 80 mankind. Two months later in Libya, Kosygin talked of the devastation suffered in World War II. He went on to say that World War III "...would be even more horrible and Q -I could be disastrous for mankind." Both Kirilenko's and Kosygin's speeches were printed in Pravda indicating that they were meant for a domestic as well as a foreign audience. Another Politburo member, Andropov, who is also head of the KGB, stated in a speech in Moscow in 1976, that nuclear weapons "...make the consequences of a nuclear war on truly catastrophic." Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo, proclaimed that a nuclear war would be a "deadly threat to hundreds of millions of people."®^ About a year later he referred to the strength of the nuclear arsenal of the West as being "...two million times greater than (the explosive power of the bomb dropped on) Hiroshima.TT • U ' 'I These members of the Politburo, therefore, do not seem to have any illusions about their nation being able to 134 survive or win a nuclear war in any meaningful sense of the terms. They do seem to believe that the U.S. can still inflict vast damage upon their nation. And while it is true that we cannot be sure what they consider to be 'unacceptable' damage, their statements that the consequences of a nuclear war would be worse than experienced in World War II, truly catastrophic, and threatening the existence of mankind, indicate they still believe the U.S. has an assured destruction capability. While Soviet capabilities have increased in this period, there does not appear to be any shift in other civilian spokesmen's estimates of the consequences of a nuclear war. In May 1971, L.N= Ignatev, writing in Voprosy istorii — bi-monthly of Party Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism — argued that seeking nuclear superiority was meaningless since both superpowers had the capability of inflicting massive destruction on the 85 other. In 1973, in a brochure on the nature of a future nuclear war, Zh. Dyusheyev claimed that such a war would be much worse than any which preceded it. The devastation and losses in civilian population which occurred in past wars cannot be compared to the great losses in the civilian pcppulation or the tremendous amount of destruction that will occur if a nuclear missile war is unleashed. 86 In 1974, V.G. Dolgin, a deputy chief of a department of the 87 CPSU Central Committee warned that, 135 "...one, several or many nuclear devices will wipe from the face of the earth, cities and even entire states, turn our planet into a chaos of chain reactions, global disasters and undermine the conditions of the existence of mankind."88 Statements in the daily newspaper of the government — Izvestiya (News) — also suggest that Soviet leaders have no illusions about their ability to obtain a meaningful victory or to avoid unprecedented destruction. One Izvestiya political commentator, V. Matveyev, has written several articles to this effect. He claims that a nuclear war would result in the deaths of hundreds of millions of people and would turn world civilization and 89 culture into ruins and ashes. A. Bovin, a colleague of Matveyev shares his associate's view. Bovin, a political observer for Izvestiya, wrote that a nuclear war would cause "...inestimable misfortunes to mankind. The aggressor 90 would be crushed. But at what cost?" Thus, he takes the correct Party position that the "aggressor" — which can only be the United States — will be smashed, but he goes on to suggest that the Soviet Union would not fare much better. Another dire estimate of the consequences of a nuclear war was made in Izvestiya in 1976 by an academician — Ye. Fedorov. He wrote, 136 Modern knowledge enables us to evaluate what might happen to our planet and mankind in the event of a world conflict involving the use of the current store of nuclear and other weapons, but it is difficult for the imagination to envisage such a picture. The predictions made in Izvestiya have also been made in Pravda — the daily newspaper of the CPSU Central 92 Committee. In February 1977, Sh. Sanakoyev wrote that a nuclear war would be a "...catastrophe on a colossal 93 scale." Strong statements in this regard have been made by members of the two prestigious foreign affairs research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences — the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada.^ One such statement was made by V.M. Berezhkov, editor of SShA, the journal of the Institute for the Study of the USA, who argued that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union are so powerful that nuclear war could not serve as a practical instrument of policy, and that neither side can expect to survive such a conflict in any meaningful sense of the word. In 1977, he wrote, Whereas in previous eras whole peoples were sometimes exterminated and great civilizations perished as a result of wars,at that time the aggressor, having prepared his attack well, could count on his country having a chance of surviving even after a very destructive war, in the event of victory. In our time there is no such chance.95 137 Other publications have also carried articles which predict catastrophic destruction in a nuclear war. 96 Most notable are Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn and Novoye vremya. Military Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War (1971-1977) Those in the West who argue that the Soviets believe they could win and survive a nuclear war generally cite statements made by military spokesmen. Indeed, in the early 1970's some military spokesmen attacked those who argued a nuclear war would result in the death of civilization and that there could be no victor. In 1972, Colonel V.F. Khalipov quoted Lenin who said "...no destruction can made civilization disappear. In 1973, General-Major A. Milovidov attacked those persons who concluded that no victory is possible in a nuclear war. Milovidov argued that these authors had made errors in calculating the consequences of a nuclear war because they relied strictly on quantitative analyses which resulted in an exaggeration of its destructiveness. ^8 Eight months later, Rear Admiral Shelyag also argued that certain authors erred in calculating the consequences of a nuclear war because "...they do strictly quantitative analyses. As pointed out earlier, it is interesting to note that Khalipov, Milovidov, and Shelyag are all from the Lenin 138 100 Military-Political Academy. In evaluating such declarations by Soviet military spokesmen, however, several factors must be taken into consideration. First, stating that civilization will not be destroyed in a nuclear war is not the same as arguing that unacceptable damage could be avoided. What it does mean, which Shelyag points out, is that they do not believe that every living thing on earth would be destroyed. In reality, such an assertion is not very profound. The fact is that Western estimates of the consequences of such a war have reached the same 102 conclusion. Second, there is a reason why members of the Lenin Military-Political Academy would argue against statements suggesting that in a nuclear war that fatalities would be unacceptably high. It is the job of political officers to ensure high morale is maintained within the armed forces. The notion that civilization would be destroyed is considered, at least by political officers at the Academy to be bad for morale. In evaluating the statements of Khalipov, Milovidov, and Shelyag, we must also guard against confusing statements of goals from statements of realistic expectations. They might believe that the Soviet Union should try to win and survive a nuclear war, but this does not necessarily mean that they believe such an objective is possible under current conditions. In fact, Khalipov and Shelyag have expressed doubts about the chances for meaningful victory and survival in such a war. Khalipov states that such a war "...can lead to unprecedented destruction to entire countries and can destroy entire peoples" and "...it can inhibit the advance of the 103 revolutionary process." He also admits that losses may be extremely high, but claims that this depends on the activeness of the masses. Shelyag wrote that the proper "...Marxist-Leninist view is not one of futility and pessimism" although he admits that a nuclear war would be 104 extraordinarily dangerous. Thus, a reexamination of th views expressed by Khalipov, Milovidov, and Shelyag provides no evidence to support the view that they believe nuclear war is a practical instrument of policy or that they believe the Soviet Union could avoid unprecedented damage in a nuclear war. Contrary to the impression which some Western writers have presented, the military spokesmen who discuss the consequences of a nuclear war appear to have little doubt that the United States has the capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko, the late Politburo member and Minister of Defense, wrote in his book Vooruzhennye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State) in 1975, that in the event of a nuclear war, hundreds of millions would die, the earth's surface would be contaminated, entire countries would be destroyed, and basically that it would be an enormous disaster for 105 mankind. He expressed these same views in two other 140 publications several years earlier. He wrote in Kommunist that a nuclear war "...will assume a particularly destructive nature,"1®6 and in Pravda that it would be a "...deadly threat to the future of mankind."1®7 The strongest statements on this subject have been made by General-Lieutenant P.A. Zhilin, whose writings suggest that he believes that both the United States and the Soviet Union have an assured destructon capability. In 1973, he wrote, The contemporary revolution in means of conducting war...has led to a situation where both combatants can not only destroy each other, but can also considerably undermine the conditions for the existence of m a n k i n d . 108 In a book written for officers and generals of the-armed forces, Zhilin wrote, ...such a mass of lethal weapons has been accumulated making it possible to destroy every living thing on the world several times o v e r . . . 109 He repeated his argument in Krasnaya zvezda in 1976, This task (explaining the causes of war) is especially topical in the epoch of nuclear missile .veapons capable not only of inflicting incalculable disasters and suffering on peoples but also of destroying the conditions for the existence of mankind.110 Zhilin is the Chief of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense. The institute is the major center for military historical research and is charged with coordinating such research on a nationwide scale. The institute thus plays an important role in the development of military science which influences the development of military doctrine. Zhilin, therefore, is a military spokesmen of some prominence. General Zhilin's view does not appear to be the exception. Another member of the Institute of Military History, Colonel Ye. Rybkin, wrote that the rejection of nuclear war is dictated by the realities of the era. He cited Brezhnev's statement that enough weapons had been stockpiled to destroy all life several times ove r . ^ ^ Several years earlier, in a book written for military personnel, Rybkin cited Brezhnev's view that in a nuclear war hundreds of millions would be destroyed, and the earth's surface and atmosphere would be contaminated by ,. .. 112 radiation. Another military spokesman who has given a dire assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union is General-Major R.G. Simonyan, a professor at Frunze Military Academy. While arguing that adding weapons could not give either side a military or political advantage, he stated, both sides possess weapons which are capable of annihilating all life on earth many times over. ^ 3 142 Other military writers have commented on the consequences of a nuclear war in the prestigious journal of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet armed forces, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (Communist of the Armed Forces). In 1972, Colonel T.R. Kondratkov, wrote that a nuclear war would have exceptionally dangerous consequencs. After mentioning the tremendous human and material losses suffered in World War I and World War II, he states that World War III will wreak unprecedented destruction on 114 entire countries. In July 1975, Colonel A. Dmitriyev wrote, ...a nuclear war will bring immeasurable disasters and suffering to the masses of working people and makeit more difficult to achieve the goals of socialist building. Several months later, Colonel S. Tyushkevich, a professor at the Institute of Military History, wrote that World War III would result in much greater losses and destruction than had been suffered in World War I and World War II combined. He said, The two World Wars took over 70 million human lives and wiped out thousands of prosperous cities and villages off the face of the earth. A World War involving the use of nuclear missile weapons would lead to even greater losses. 143 Another pessimistic assessment of the consequences of a nuclear war was made in the 1972 edition of a book written "for the attention of Soviet officers, generals, and admirals." The book, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, written by faculty members of Soviet military-educational institutions, stated that a nuclear war would cause unprecedented destruction, kill hundreds of millions of people, lay waste to entire countries, inflict irretrievable losses to material and spiritual culture and throw mankind back many decades. When Soviet military spokesmen consider the possibility of an attack by U.S. strategic nuclear forces, they vigorously proclaim that the imperialist forces would be crushed and the socialist nations would emerge victorious. When they discuss the practical consequences of a nuclear war, however, they admit that there would be unprecedented destruction. Thus, Soviet military spokesmen seem to expect that, at best, in a nuclear war they could only obtain a pyrrhic victory. Summary of Views (1971-1977) As before, Soviet spokesmen during this period, continued to argue that capitalism would be destroyed in a nuclear war. At the same time, however, they continued to express grave concerns about the consequences of such a 144 war. Contrary to some Western assessments, Soviet officials gave no indication that they believed that the destruction could be reduced to levels lower than that incurred in World War II. The general view is that a nuclear war would cause unprecedented damage to the U.S. and to the USSR. Certain military spokesmen continued to attack the ideas that victory would not be possible and civilization would be destroyed in a nuclear war. But as noted before, these claims by the military are not the same as arguing that unprecedented damage can be avoided. During this period the view that a nuclear war could destroy mankind was expressed more frequently and by higher officials than during the 1964 to 1970 period. Civilians making this claim included several Politburo members (Brezhnev and Kirilenko), a deputy chief of a department of the CPSU Central Committee (Dolgin). Military officials who made the same claim included the Chief of the Institute of Military History of the General Staff (Zhilin), and faculty members at the Lenin Military-Political Academy (Rybkin) and the Frunze Military Academy (Simonyan). In addition, many spokesmen indicated that they expected the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented losses and destruction in a nuclear war. Civilians expressing this view included several Politburo members (Gromyko, and 145 Mazurov) officials at the Institute for the Study of the USA (Arbatov, Berezhkov, Milshteyn, and Semeyko), officials at the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs (Inozemtsev, Proektor), and various other civilians most of whom had articles published in Pravda and Izvestiya. Military officials who expressed this view included the Minister of Defense (Grechko), a member of the faculty at the Institute of Military History of the General Staff (Tyushkevich) and a member of the faculty of the General Staff Academy (Kondratkov). Soviet Views on the Consequences of a Nuclear War (1962-1dVV) Contrary to the impression created by some Western analysts, Soviet views on the consequence of a nuclear war for the USSR have not changed in the past 16 years. The general view of Politburo members, civilian and military spokesmen surveyed in this research has been, and continues to be, that such a war would cause unprecedented death and destruction, not only to the United States but also to the Soviet Union. They perceive that their population and economic losses will be much greater than they suffered in World War II and they also recognize the short- and long-term destructive effects of radiation poisoning. They also talk of the great setback that such a 146 conflict would be for the socialist revolution. A continuous theme in their writings is that in the nuclear era nuclear war must be avoided. Peaceful coexistence, they perceive, is the only rational alternative. It is significant to note that these views have been expressed in the major publications of the Party, the government, and the military. 147 NOTES 1. Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race, (Boston: Beacon Press , 1971), pp „ 157-161. 2. N. Khrushchev, Pravda. 6 June 1962, and 17 January 1963. Cited by Leon Goure in Soviet Nuclear Strategy: A Critical Appraisal edited by Robert Dickson Crane, (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Second Printing, February, 1965), p. 2. 3. N. Khrushchev, Moscow TASS in English to Europe, 24 October 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 25 October 1962, p. BB7. 4. Nikita Khurshchev statement reportedly made at reception in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 7 November 1962. Neues Deutschland, East Berlin, on 8 November 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 9 November 1962, p. bb7. 5. In 1962, he stated that, "It does not pay us...to die either with or without music." He was referring to the music of atomic bombs. Speech at the 12 December 1962 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 13 December 1962, p. CC24. In 1963, he spoke of the tremendous losses that would result from such a conflict and he suggested that the living may envy the dead. Pravda, 20 July 1963. Cited in Kolkowicz, March 1966, p. 11. Also see his speech of 12 June 1964, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 16 June 1964, pp. bb56-57; and his later recollections of this period in Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Strobe Talbott, editor and translator, (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 530, 541, 542. 6. Kosygin stated in a speech at the Kremlin Palace, All mankind's pleased by the fact that at the critical moment when the fate of the world, the lives of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people hung literally by a hair, the one or the other side did not lose self-control and feelings of responsibility and reason did not take the last step toward unleashing a thermonuclear war...which would have brought innumerable disasters to all mankind. Speech at Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 6 November 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East 148 Europe, 7 November 1962, p. BB14. 7. N. Inozemtsev, "Peaceful Coexistence — A Most Important Question of Our Time," Pravda, 17 January 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 19 January 1962, p. BB21. 8. Observer, "Who Stands To Benefit From Such Speeches, Mr. President?", Pravda, 2 April 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 2 April 1962, p. BB1. 9. In January 1963, a Pravda editorial cited a radio speech in which the Soviet commentator claimed that in a nuclear war hundreds of millions would die and there would be vast destruction of the productive forces. He also argued that such a war would severely hamper the building of socialism. Pravda, 7 January 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 9 January 1963, pp. BB7-10. Later that year, Y. Arbatov wrote that the radioactive ruins would make it difficult to build a new society. "Thermonuclear War and The Masses of People," Pravda. 12 August 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 13 August 1963, p. B12. 10. Iosif Lemin, Doctor of History, attacked the Chinese notion that communism could best be achieved by a nuclear conflict. Lemin argued that World War III would kill hundreds of millions of persons and "...would turn huge areas of the globe into radioactive deserts." "Historic Mission of Communism," Izvestiya, 24 July 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 25 July 1963, pp. BB4-BB5. In June 1964, V.A. Zorin, in attacking the Chinese opposition to peaceful coexistence, noted that nuclear war would lead to the catastrophic destruction of entire countries and kill hundreds of millions of persons. "The Disarmament Problem and Peking's Maneuvers," Izvestiya, 30 June 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 6 July 1964, p. bb8. Also see, Boris Dmitriyev, "Brass Hats: Peking and Clausewitz," Izvestiya, 24 September 1963. 11. Text of Soviet memorandum on disarmament. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 16 March 1962, p. bb41. Mikhail Melkonyan in Moscow radio broadcast, 2 August 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 6 August 1963, p. BB25. W. Sturua on Moscow radio, 13 September 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 19 September 1963, pp. bb37-bb38. G.P. Shakhazarov, Moscow radio, 10 June 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 12 June 1964, p. bb25. Viktor Glazurov, Moscow radio, 22 July 149 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 23 July 1964, pp. BB9-BB10. 12. G. Nikolnikov, "Peaceful Coexistence is a Behest of Ilich," Pravda Ukrainy, 20 April 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 17 May 1962, p. CC11. 13. Talensky, "The Absolute Weapon," April 1962, page 27. 14. Marshal of the Soviet Union Yeremenko, "To Be on Duty as the Party Teaches as the Country Demands." Radio Volga via East Berlin in Russian, 10 January 1962. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 12 January 1962, p. CC2. 15. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Yeremenko, "Is the Tiger a 'Paper Tiger' or a Thermonuclear One?" Rabotnichesko Delo, Sofia, Bulgaria, 19 October 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 16 October 1963, pp. bb25-bb29. 16. Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky, "The CPSU Program and Questions About Strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR," Kommunist No. 7 (May 1967): 11-22. Translated in Survival 4 (September/October 1962): 229-232 . 17. Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky. Speech at Kremlin Palaceon Soviet Army and Navy Day. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 22 February 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 25 February 1963, pp. CC18-19. 18. Sushko and Kondratkov, January 1964, page 17 in translation. 19. General-Colonel N. Lomov, "New Weapons and the Nature of War," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 January 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 15 January 1964, p. CCS. The article was written by General-Colonel N. Lomov. His rank, first initial, and the source and nature of the article suggest that this is General-Colonel Nikolay Andreyevich Lomov of the General Staff Academy. See Biographic Report: USSR Institute on the USA and Canada by the CIA, report number CR76-i0804, April 1974, p . 61. 20. In March 1964, Colonel N. Voroshilov wrote that in a nuclear war, 150 ...hundreds of millions on all continents will die, ...immense quantities of material goods will be destroyed ...The great creations of world culture will disappear from the face of the earth and mankind will be thrown into a great retrogression. Colonel N. Voroshilov, "Problems of War and Peace in the Modern Era," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 6 (March 1964): pp. 9-17. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, (24,628), 15 May 1964, p. 25. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov, The Chief of the General Staff, said that such a war would be rash and senseless and the consequences would be difficult to foresee in full. S. Biryuzov, "Politics and Nuclear Weapons," Izvestiya, 10 December 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 11 December 1963, p. BB6. 21. Bottome, 1971, pp. 160-163. 22. Leonid Brezhnev. Speech at Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 10 June 1966. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 13 June 1966, p. D 9 . 23. Leonid Brezhnev speech to a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 3 November 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, Supplement, 6 November 1967, p . 50. 24. Kosygin stated that such a war would be the greatest of disasters. Report to Supreme Soviet, 9 December 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 10 December 1964, p. CC22. Five months later he told an East European rally that the consequences of a new world war would be much worse than World War II. He said, ...the horrors and hardships of the past war cannot in any way be compared with the horrors and hardships that the nations would have to suffer if a new world conflaguration were to be started...would extend to all territories throughout the world and would be a considerable setback for all mankind. Speech at East Berlin rally, 7 May 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 10 May 1965, p. CC8. 25. Demichev, a candidate member, predicted that a nuclear war would have "...truly catastrophic consequences." Moscow speech, 22 April 1965. Translated 151 in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 23 April 1965, p. BB13. Suslov, in Italy, said it would cause dire catastrophes and destruction. Speech translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Western Europe and Africa, 27 January 1966. 26. A writer in Pravda claimed that imperialism would be destroyed, but went on to note that the "...destruction would be so great that this would not speed up the transition to socialism but, on the contrary, (would) throw mankind a long way back. G. Glezerman, "The Great Significance of the Leninist Ideas on the Struggle for Democracy and Socialism," Pravda, 21 January 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 27 January 1965, p. BB8. Also see Boris G. Leontyev, "The Problem of Preserving Peace is the Most Urgent Problem of Our Time," Moscow Radio, 19 October 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 20 October 1964, p. CC18. 27. Editorial, "The Great Banner of the Builders of Communism." Pravda, 1 November 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 3 November 1964, p. CC8. 28. M. Keldysh speech at conference of historians on 14 April 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 14 April 1965, p. bbl2. 29. In 1965, an editorial in Kommunist, a semi-weekly publication of the Party Central Committee, stated that because of the devastation which would result from a nuclear war, there was only one rational policy — peaceful coexistence. Editorial, "For Policy and the Contemporary World," Kommunist No. 3 (February 1965). Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 25 March 1965, p. bbl6. In May 1965, Retired General-Major N. Talensky wrote that no nation could survive a nuclear war. N. Talensky, "The Late War: Some Reflections," International Affairs, No. 5 (May 1965): 12-18. In 1966, D. Tomashevskiy stated that such a war would mean a profound social regression. D. Tomashevskiy, "The USSR and the Capitalist World," International Affairs, No. 3 (1966): 14. G. Gerasimov argued that both sides had an assured destruction capability. G. Gerasimov, "Pentagonia," International Affairs, No. 5 (May 1966): 28. In 1967, N. Nikolskiy stated in "a radio broadcast that , "After only the first hour of such a war, 14-16 times more human life will perish than during the whole of World War II. Nikolay Nikolskiy, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 14 November 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe . 17 November 1967, p. BB11. In March 1968, A.I. Krylov argued that both sides would perish in a 152 nuclear war. A.I. Krylov, "October and the Strategy of Peace," Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) No. 3 (March 1968): 3-13. Also see I. Alexandrov, "To Imperialism's Advantage," Pravda, 19 March 1970. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East 1 Europe, 20 March 1970, p. A7. 30. K. Simonov, "On the Other Side of the Ocean," Pravda, 26 December 1969, pp. 4-5. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 31 December 1969, p. A1 . 31. M.F. Goryainov, "Nuclear Weapons and the Problem of Nuclear Disarmament," in Sovremennyye Problemy Razoruzheniya (Present Day Problems of Disarmament), (Moscow: Mysl’ Publishing House, 1970). Translated in JPRS, Translation on USSR Political and Social Affairs, (51027), 24 July 1970, p. 36. 32. N.I. Akimov, ed., Grazdanskaya Qborona, Moscow, 1969. P.T. Yegorov, I.A. Shlyakov, and N.I. Alabin, Grazdanskaya Qborona, (Moscow: Publishing House for Higher Education, Second Edition, 1970). Translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force in Civil Defense: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series No. 10, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.) pp. 73-74. 33. T.K. Jones and M.R. Edwards, "Deterrence and Civil Defense," in Trends in U.S.-Soviet Military Power: The Emerging Strategic Imbalance, by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. et al., (Washington, D.C.: ACU Education and Research Institute, Second Printing, September 1977), p. 54; Boileau, 1976; Cohen and Black, 1978, p. 88. 34. Marshal of the Soviet Union Chuykov, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 16 March 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 16 March 1965, p. CC1. 35. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 113-114 in translation. 36. Grudinin, July 1966, pages 346-7 in translation. 37. Il'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation. 38. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 3; and "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, pages A20-A23 in translation. 39. For example, see Kolkowicz, The Red Hawks, March 1966, p. 15. 153 40. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 103-115 in translation. 41. Ibid., page 113 in translation. 42. Stepanov and Rybkin, February 1968, page 74 in translation. 43. Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "Wars of the Modern Era and Their Influences on Social Processes," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 11 (June 1970). Translated in USSR Military Affairs, (51171), 14 August 1970, p. 27. 44. Chuykov, Moskovkaya Pravda, 16 March 1965. 45. V.I. Chuykov, Civil Defense in a Nuclear-Missile War, (Moscow: Atomic Publishing House, 1968). Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations , (46,720), 22 October 1968, p. 26. v 46. Grudinin, July 1966, pages 345-347 in translation. 47. II'in, 1967, page 7 in translation. 48. Il'in, 1967, page 4 in translation. 49. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, pages 1-15 in translation; and "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, pages A20-A23 in translation. 50. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 5 in translation. 51. Ibid., page 6 in translation. 52. Ibid., page 15 in translation. 53. Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, page A20 in translation. 54. Ibid., page A23 in translation. 55. During this period, General-Major K. Bochkarev made several references to the vast destruction which he expected in a nuclear war. In 1965, in a book which he coauthored, he argued that there was no realistic alternative to peaceful coexistence because a nuclear war would have extremely dangerous consequences for all mankind. General-Major K. Bochkarev, Colonel I. Prusanov, and Colonel A. Babakov, Programma KPSS o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (CPSU Program on Defense of the Socialist Fatherland) Moscow:Voyenizdat, 1965. 154 Translated in JPRS, (36,233) Soviet Military Translations, 28 June 1966, p. 19. In January 1965, he wrote in Krasnaya zvezda that a nuclear war would cause unprecedented damage on mankind, whole nations would perish, and hundreds of millions of people would be killed. He also stated that the best way to achieve communism was to avoid such a war. It should be noted that this article was intended for officers, generals, and admirals. General-Major K. Bochkarev and Colonel I. Sidelnikov, "New Age, New Conclusions — On the Development by the Party of V.I. Lenin's Ideas on War, Peace, and on Safeguarding the Concepts of Socialism and Communism" Krasnaya zvezda, 21 January 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 25 January 1965, p. CC2. In June 1965, he wrote in Communist vooruzhennykh sil about the dangerous consequences of such a war. He claimed that the destructiveness of the weapons made such a war intolerable. In fact, he stated that such a conflict "...would create a threat to the very existence of human civilization." General-Major K.S. Bochkarev, "On the Character and Types of Wars in the Modern Era," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 11 (June 1965). Translated in Kintner, 1968, pp. 72, 74, 77. 56. For example, see Kintner and Scott, (1968), p. 101. 57. From November 1964 until his death in April 1967, Defense Minister Malinovsky made several references to the consequences of a nuclear war. He does argue that imperialism would be destroyed and the Soviet Union would be victorious in such a war. In view of his estimates of the consequences of a nuclear war, however, his statements about a Soviet victory seem intended to encourage preparedness and high morale in the armed forces. In September 1965, he wrote that the consequences of a nuclear war must not be overexaggerated, but he also states that, A new world war, if it should break out, will envelop all the continents and water areas of the world. There will be no protection from nuclear strikes anywhere. Any military base, any city, any industrial area might be not only destroyed but so covered with radioactive fallout that people could not live in that locality for a long time. Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Task of the Military Press," in Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs, ed., Colonel P.N. Derevyanko (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965). 155 Translated in Kintner, 1968, p. 20. In May 1965, he stated that the imperialists would be destroyed, but the war would be a terrible disaster for mankind. Speech at war veterans meeting on 11 May 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 12 May 1965, p. bb24. He had made dire predictions about the consequences of a nuclear war in earlier writings. Malinovsky, May 1962 and February 1963. See footnotes 16, 17. In 1965, Colonel I. Sidelnikov wrote that a nuclear war would result in the end of the imperialist system, but he goes on to state that such a war would inflict great damage upon the productive forces of present-day society and that this would not be in the interest of the working class. Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, "V.I. Lenin on the Class Approach in Determining the Nature of Wars," Krasnaya zvezda, 22 September 1965. Translated in JPRS,""Soviet Military Translations, (32,332), 11 October 1965, p. 5. In May 1965, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko said, "...we can understand, as no one else can, what incalculable calamities a world thermonuclear war could bring to humanity, if it became a reality." Speech at War Veterans Meeting, 11 May 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 12 May 1965, p. bb26. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy and General-Major M. Cherednichenko wrote in April 1966 that imperialism would perish in a nuclear war. Significantly, they went on to say, "However, this kind of war would entail inevitable destruction, enormous sacrifices and suffering among all nations of the globe." "On Comtemporary Military Strategy," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 7 (April 1966). Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations, 27 May 1966, p. 5. The Head of the Frunze Military Academy, General P. Kurotshkin stated in 1966 that the Soviet Union must strengthen its armed forces in order to prevent the outbreak of a World War. He claimed that such a war could lead to tremendous human sacrifices and horrible destruction. He also noted that, "...anyone who dared to unleash a new world war would be destroyed in retaliation." General Pavel Kurotshkin, "The Soviet Army — A Reliable Guarantee of Peace and Security," Deutsche Aussenpolitik (German Foreign Policy) East Berlin, October 1966. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations (39,079), 13 December 1966, pT 16. In May 1967, Lieutenant Colonel A. Migolatev criticized the Marxists who believed that the world communist revolution would be helped by a nuclear war. He proclaimed that, indeed, imperialism would be destroyed, "...however, such a thermonuclear war would have catastrophic consequences and would for a long time hamper the solution of the 156 constructive tasks of the revolution." Lieutenant Colonel A. Migolatev, "On The 50th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's Work 'War and Revolution' — On The Correlation Between War and Revolution," Kraznaya zvezda, 27 May 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 2 June 1967, p. CC6. In 1970, Colonel M.P. Skirdo, a Professor at the General Staff Academy, described what factors are necessary to make it possible to achieve victory in the event of a nuclear war. In discussing the consequences of the war, however, he noted that, Great as former losses of personnel were, they are not to be compared with the casualties which will be sustained in the event of a nuclear missile war. The number of victims among armed forces personnel and the civilian population will increase to a level that can hardly be imagined at the present time. He was not just referring to the losses the West would suffer. He stated that, "...the belligerent parties will sustain losses without precedent in the history of warfare." Colonel M.P. Skirdo, Narod, Armiya, Polkovogets, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1970). Translation published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. The People, the Army, the Commander: A Soviet View. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.) pp. 18, 31. Also see Bochkarev, "The' Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 5 in translation. General-Lieutenant S.S. Lototskiy, Armiya Sovetskaya (The Soviet Army) Politizdat, 1969. Cited in William F. Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy: Realities and Misunderstandings," Strategic Review 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 58, 65. Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Yakubovsky, no title, Agitator, No. 7 (April 1969), pp. 14-17. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 6 May 1969, p. Ell. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, "On Guard Over Socialism and Peace," Partiinaya zhizn (Party Life), No. 9 (1969), pp. 11-17. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 12 May 1969, pp. E5, E6. Colonel G. Khvatkov, "The Problem of Peace and War and the Revolutionary Process," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 1 (January 1970): 28-35. Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, (49876), 18 February 1970, p. 4. In 1967, two military writers (one from the Lenin Military-Political Academy and the other from the Main Political Administration) discussed the attitudes of Soviet soldiers toward the consequences of a nuclear war. The authors were concerned that the pessimistic views which many soldiers held about such a war would have a negative impact on their morale and training. General-Major S.K. II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation. Colonel M. Korobeynikov, 1967, pages 157 33-36 in translation. 58. Colonel V. Morozov, "Book on Laws of Armed Conflict," Voyennaya mysl' No. 7 (July 1967). FDD 962, translated 25 May 1966, page 79. 59. Colonel S. Malyanchikov, "The Nature and Characteristics of Nuclear Missile Warfare," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 21 (November 1965). Translated in Jf’RS , Soviet Military Translations, (33,580), 5 January 1966, p. 17. 60. Sokolovsky, Voyennaya strategiya, 1968, pagt 197 in translation. 61. General-Major V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Moden Era," Voyennaya mysl' No. 5 (May 1969). FPD translation No. 0116/69, 18 December 1969, p. 530. 62. General-Major V. Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Modern Warsand Possible Methods of Conducting Them," Voyennaya mysl', No. 7 (July 1969). FPD translation No. 0022/70, 6 April 1970, p. 21. 63. Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," Voyennaya mysl' No. 5 (May 1969). FPD translation No. 0116/69, 18 December 1969, p. 48. 64. Kintner and Scott, 1968, pp. 101, 340, 341; Kolkowicz, The Red Hawks, 1966. 65. Goure, 1974, p. 59. 66. Korobeynikov, April 1967, pages 30-39 in translation; II'in, 1967, pages 1-18 in translation. 67. Malyanchikov, November 1965, pages 14-26 in translation. 68. Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, pages A20-A23 in translation. 69. During this period, the military did succeed in selling the idea that their forces must be trained and equipped to fight a nuclear war. This has led to Westerners claiming the Soviets have a war-winning strategy. This notion must be further analyzed. It is implied that the Soviets believe they can win and survive a nuclear war in a meaningful way. Soviet discussions of the consequences of a nuclear war, however, suggest that another interpretation is closer to the truth. The spokesmen of this period did not foresee any meaningful victory as feasible. What they did believe is that such a 158 war could occur and as a result they must be prepared to come out of such a conflict as best as they could. 70. Leonid Brezhnev, speech at Moscow World Peace Congress, 26 October 1973, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 29 October 1973, Supplement No. 40, p p . 8^ 14. ^ 71. Leonid Brezhnev, speech to Polish Sejm, 21 July 1974, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 22 July 1974, No. 141, p. D17. 72. Leonid Brezhnev, speech at Soviet-Romanian Friendship rally in Bucharest, 24 November 1976, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 24 November 1976, No. 228, p. D 5 . 73. A.A. Gromyko, letter to U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim, 4 July 1972, cited in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (International Affairs), No. 9, 1972. 74. A.A. Gromyko, speech at 27th United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1972, cited in Pravda. 27 September 1972. 75. A.A. Gromyko, 28 September 1976, letter to U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet. Union. 1 October 1976, p. A19. 76. A.A. Gromyko, 19 January 1974, speech in Yerevan, Armenia, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 23 January 1974, No. 16, p. R9. 77. A.A. Gromyko, "The Leninist Peace Strategy: Uniting Theory and Practice," Kommunist, No. 14 (September 1976), p. 20. 78. A.A. Gromyko, speech to 33rd U.N. General Assembly. Published in Pravda, 27 September 1978. 79. K. Mazurov, 21 February 1972, speech to Syrian People's Assembly in Damascus. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Middle East and Africa, 25 February 1972, p. FI. 80. A.P. Kirilenko, speech at 21 March 1975 meeting in Bologna, Italy. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. No. 64, 2 April 1975, p. E12. 81. A.N. Kosygin, speech for Libyan Prime Minister in Libya, 13 May 1975. Translated in'FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 15 May 1975, p. F3. 82. Yu. V. Andropov, 22 April 1976, speech at Lenin 159 Birthday Anniversary meeting in Moscow. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 23 April 1976, p. BIO. 83. B.N. Ponomarev speech at 4-7 July 1975 Moscow Conference. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 12 September 1975, p. R 5 . 84. B.N. Ponomarev, "The 25th CPSU Congress and Its International Significance," Problemy mira i sotsializma, 6 April 1976, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 21 May 1976, p. 8. 85. L.N. Ignat'ev, "Nuclear Weapons and American Foreign Policy," Voprosy istorii (Problems of History), No. 5 (May 1971): 86-87. 86. Zh. Dyusheyev, Samopomoshch i Vzaimopomoshch Pri Primenii Oruzhiya Massovogo Porazheniya i Pri Neschastnykh Sluchayak (Self Help and Mutual Assistance When Mass Destruction Weapons Are Being Employed and During Accidents), 1972. Translated in JPRS, (59294), Translation on USSR Military Affairs, 15 June 1973, p. 22. 87. Warner, 1977, p. 253. 88. V.G. Dolgin, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Factors Contributing to Its Intensification and Development," Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), No. 1, January 1974. Translated in Warner, 1977, p. 253. 89. V. Matveyev, an Izvestiya political commentator, wrote in June 1972 and again in June 1973 that a nuclear war "...would mean the destruction of hundreds of millions of people and the turning of world civilization and culture into ruins and ashes." In the June 1973 article, he also stated that "...only madmen can see anything in nuclear war except disaster for our planet," and in August 1973 he argued that "no responsible statesman can ignore the consequences of such a conflict." In 1974, in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, Matveyev repeated Brezhnev's pronouncement that the available nuclear arsenals could blow apart the entire planet. Finally, in December 1976, he talked of a nuclear war "whose consequences for mankind and our planet would be unimaginable." V. Matveyev, "Struggle for the Most Important Thing," Izvestiya, 10 June 1972, p. 4. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 13 June 1972, p. HI; A. Artamonov, V. Matveyev, and N. Polyanov, "A Historic Day and a Historic Document, Izvestiya, 24 June 1973, pp. 1, 3. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 28 June 1973, p. AA9; V. Matveyev, "In the Interests of All People," Izvestiya, 7 August 1973, p. 2. Translation in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 13 August 1973, p. HI; V. Matveyev, "The 160 Realities and Demands of the Nuclear Age," Mezhdunarodnava zhizn, No. 3 (February 1974). Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 1 April 1974, p. AA6; V. Matveyev, "New Limits of the Peaceful Offensive," Izvestiya, 7 December 1976, p. 4. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 14 December 1976, p. BB1. 90. A. Bovin, "Peace and Social Progress," Izvestiya. 11 September 1973. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 13 September 1973, p. A4. 91. Ye. Fedorov, "To Stop the Arms Race," Izvestiya, 21 September 1976, p. 4. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 29 September 1976, p. AA4. 92. In May 1977, an article by I. Aleksandrov, which is a pseudonym known to represent authoritative Kremlin views, criticized the Chinese view of the desirability of a nuclear conflict. It said, "If the world thermonuclear holocaust, which the Maoists are provoking, were to break 'out, it would cause an incalculable disaster for all the earth's peoples without sparing the Chinese people." I. Aleksandrov, "Peking: A Course Towards Wrecking International Detente Under the Guise of Anti-Sovietism," Pravda, 14 May 1977, pp. 4-5. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 16 May 1977, pp. C1-C6. 93. Sh. Sanakoyev, "Real Preconditions," Pravda, 24 February 1977, p. 4. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 1 March 1977, pp. AA3. 94. Members of the Institute of the USA and Canada have made predictions about the dire consequences of a nuclear war. The head of the Institute, G.A. Arbatov, is a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, who is reported to have access to Brezhnev's staff and perhaps Brezhnev himself. Arbatov stated in an interview in Hungary in 1973 that, "The prevention of nuclear war equally serves the interests of the United States and the USSR since nuclear war would be suicide to both." G.A. Arbatov, Budapest Televisison interview, 5 August 1973. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 7 August 1973, p. A15. Another member of the Institute expressed his concern in a 1976 monograph. G.A. Trofimenko, the head of the Department for the Study of U.S. Foreign Policy, wrote that, "...the stakes in a nuclear conflict are now so colossal." In an article the same year, he quoted Brezhnev's assessment that current nuclear weapon inventories could blow up the entire planet. G.A. Trofimenko, SShA: Politika, Voyna, Ideologiya (The U.S.: Policies, War, and Ideology) (Moscow, 1976); G.A. Trofimenko, "The Logic of Detente Dictates," Za Rubezhom (Abroad) No. 48, 25 November 1976, pp. 9-10. Translated in 161 FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 2 December 1976, pp. AA1-AA~ Two senior analysts at the Institute of the USA and Canada, M.A. Mil'shteyn, a retired General-Lieutenant, and L.S. Semeyko, a retired colonel, have written about both the short-term and the long-term effects of nuclear war. They state that the latest research (a U.S. Academy of Science study) "...once again reminds us of the catastrophic consequences which might result from a nuclear conflict.” (pp. 33-34) Citing the findings of the study, the authors note that there would be a sharp reduction in the concentration of the ozone layer in the atmosphere which would drastically increase solar radiation and could lead to climactic changes. Harvest yields would diminish causing famines in many parts of the world. The mortality rate would rise and "solar radiation would give rise to genetic diseases... in more than thirty generations of people." "Epidemics would rage in the world for a long time." (pp. 33-34). M.A. Milshteyn and L.S. Semeyko, "The U.S. and the Question of New Types of Mass Destruction Weapons." SShA: Ekonomika, politika ideologiya No. 5, (1976): 33-34. The head of IMEMO, N.N. Inozemtsev, who is a candidate member of the Central Committee and is reported to have access to certain Politburo and Secretariat members, wrote in Pravda, 9 June 1972 that a nuclear war would be "...suicide for whomever unleashes it." More recently, a staff member of IMEMO, D. Proektor, a retired colonel, argued that a nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization. Writing in Kommunist, the bi-weekly journal of the CPSU Central Committee, in May 1977, he concluded that, In our time, when unlike the situation in the past, the threat of a new world war, unless blocked, could lead to the destruction of civilization, problems of international security have come to the fore with unparallelled urgency." "Today the risk (of war) has become excessive and the failure of detente may mean a step toward universal dstruction. D. Proektor, "Socialism and International Security," Kommunist, No. 7 (1977): 99. 95. V.M. Berezhkov, "Basic Principles of Soviet-U.S. Relations," SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya No. 4 (1977): 8. In 1975, he wrote that, "Universal war can no longer be regarded as a means of policy because of the destructiveness of the weapons." V.M. Berezhkov, "Detente, Prospects and Soviet-American Relations," SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya No. 9 (1975): 3-14. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 9 October 1975, p. A 7 . 162 96. In February 1974, Y. Molchanov wrote tht a nuclear war "...could result in a holocaust for human civilizaion and, at any rate, would give no advantage to the aggressor and end in his defeat and destruction." Y. Molchanov, "The Leninist Policy of Peace," International Affairs No. 2 (February 1974): 5. In 1975, A Karenin said that superiority is meaningless because a nuclear war would cause catastrophic destruction. A. Karenin, "The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Disarmament," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 8 (175): 13-23. In September 1976, V . Karenov wrote in Novoye Vremya (New Times), that a nuclear war would cause "...colossal damage to mankind." Several months later, in the same publication, V. Kuznetsov, in arguing that the continuing military buildup was senseless, noted that "both sides already possess weapons capable of killing everything on earth several times over." V. Karenov, "Real Paths to Disarmament," Novoye Vremya, No. 39 (September 1976): 4-6. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 5 October 1976, p. AA5. V. Kuznetsov, "According to the Laws of Detente," Novoye Vremya, No. 5 (1977): 4-5. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 1 February 1977, pp. A4. 97. V.F. Khalipov in The Philosophical Heritge of V.I. Lenin and the Problems of Contemporary War, (Moscow, Progress Publishes, 1972), USAF translation, Soviet Military Thought Series No. 5, GPO, Washington, D.C., p. 16. (Note: The book published in 1972, does not identify who V.F. Khalipov is. A 1974 source, however, identifies Colonel Vyachesslav Filippovich Khalipov, Doctor of Philosophy, Head of the Scientific Research Department of the Military-Political Academy. It states that he is a prolific writer. Because of the nature and authorship of the 1972 book, it is very likely that these are the same individuals. Znamenosets, No. 11, 1974, p. 34.). 98. General-Major A. Milovidov, "A Philosophical Analysis of Military Thought," Kraznaya zvezda, 17 May 1973, pp. 2-3. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 23 May 1973, p. M2. 99. Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag, "Two World Outlooks-Two Views on War," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 1974. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 12 February 1974, pp. A1-A5. 100. Shelyag was Deputy Chief of the Academy. (Krasnaya zvezda. 7 February 1974). Milovidov was listed as being on the Academy faculty. (Kraznaya zvezda, 17 May 1973, pp. 2-3). For Khalipov, see explanation in footnote 97. 101. Shelyag, 7 February 1974, page A4 in translation. 163 102. "The World of Survival," Commonweal, 25 November 1977; Bruce Douglas Clayton, "Planning for the Day After Doomsday," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 33 (September 1977): 50-51; Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1979): 8. 103. Khalipov, in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 197 2, pages 15-17 in translation. 104. Shelyag, 7 February 1974, page A4 in translation. 105. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State (1975). USAF translation, Soviet Military Thought Series Wo. 12, pp. 84, 164. 106. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, "Combat Cooperation Between the Armies of the Socialist States," Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1972). Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 21 November 1972, p. M3. 107. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, 29 September 1972 speech to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 30 October 1972, p. H6. 108. General-Lieutenant P. Zhilin, "Characteristics of Current World Development," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 11 (1973), pp. 31-34. Translated in JPRS, (60729), Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, 10 December 1973, No. 469, pT 19. ” 109. General-Lieutenant P. Zhilin, Problemy Voyennoy .Istorii (Problems of Military History) (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975), pp. 389, 393. 110. General-Lieutenant P. Zhilin, "The Truth of History is Irrefutable," Kraznaya zvezda, 1 September 197 6, in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union"] 17 September 1976, p. A4. 111. Colonel Ye. Rybkin, "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problem of Peaceful Coexistence Between Socialism and Capitalism," Voyenno-Istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 3-9*! (Note: Rybkin apparently moved from the Lenin Military-Political Academy to the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense sometime in the early 1970's. In 1975, he is definitely identified as being at the Institute of Military History. See interview with General-Lieutenant Zhilin in Krasnaya zvezda, 11 April 1975, p. 2.) 164 112. Colonel Ye. Rybkin, in USAF translation of The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, (Moscow, 1972), USAF translation, Soviet Military Thought Series No. 5, GPO, Washington, D.C., p. 36. 113. General-Major R.G. Simonyan, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 17 June 1977. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 21 June 1977, p. A8. 114. Colonel T. Kondratkov, "Social Character of Modern War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 21 (November 1972): 9-16. Translated in JPRS, (57930), Translations on USSR Military Affairs, 8 January 1973, No. 880, p. 39. 115. Colonel A. Dmitriyev, "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and Army is an Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, (July 1975): 9-17. Translated in JPRS, (65480), Translations on USSR Military Affairs, 18 August 1975, pp. 1-12. 116. Colonel S. Tyushkevich, "The Development of the Doctrine on War and the Army on the Basis of the Great Patriotic War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 22 (November 1975): 9-16. Translated in EBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 18 December 1975, p. A6. (Note: Tyushkevich is listed as being at the Institute of Military History. Krasnaya zvezda, 11 April 1975, p. 2.) 117. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, Translated in p. 73 in USAF* translation. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS Substantive Findings This review and analysis of Soviet views on nuclear war survival has led to several substantive findings. The major finding is that the Soviet leaderships' view of the consequences of a nuclear war is similar to the view held by American leaders — neither side could avoid unprecedented damage. A Misinterpreted Dictum Westerners who have used Soviet statements about war as a continuation of politics as evidence that the Soviets consider nuclear war to be a practical instrument of policy have misinterpreted Soviet usage of the dictum and have distorted Soviet thinking on nuclear war. Soviet writers refer to the dictum when discussing the 165 166 Marxist-Leninist theory on the causes of war. It does not address the question of whether or not nuclear war could serve as a practical instrument of Soviet policy. Nuclear War Cannot Serve as a Practical Instrument of Soviet Policy While Soviet spokesmen believe that non-nuclear war, especially wars of national liberation, can sometimes be used as an instrument of policy, they do not believe 1 that nuclear war could be used for such purposes. Soviet military officials who have criticized the notion that "nuclear war cannot serve as an instrument of policy" have done so because they fear that such a view can lead to the belief that there is no threat of attack from the United States. This, in turn, could result in a slackening of vigilance and could cause political leaders to reduce defense spending. A Meaningful Victory is Not Possible Soviet claims that the socialist nations would win a nuclear war are not as significant as some in the West would have us to believe. The concept of victory itself is vague. A nation could end up with a decisive 167 victory with few losses or with a pyrrhic victory. The difference between the two types of victory is important. Expectations of which kind of victory would be likely will greatly influence the decision on whether or not to initiate a war. Soviet military spokesmen who have criticized the no victory view have done so, not because they believe a meaningful victory is currently possible, but because they anticipate that the notion will have a negative effect on the morale and readiness of the troops. They also believe that to deny the possibility of victory is to deny the validity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology which claims that the socialist system is inherently superior to the capitalist system and that the ultimate victory of socialism is a law of history. In addition, many military spokesmen who talk about a socialist victory go on to talk about how disastrous such a war could be not only for the U.S. but also for the Soviet Union. Also, some military officials state the party line that victory undoubtedly will be on the side of the socialist nations in such a war. As military men, however, they go on to warn that victory is not automatic. It requires-preparation and the maintenance of a strong military capability. Finally, Soviet military leaders believe that the main purpose of their nuclear forces is deterrence, but as can be expected, they also believe such a war may occur, thus their goal is to win 168 such a war if it happens. The significant question, however, is, how close do they perceive they are to having the capability to achieve the goal? Medical science has as a goal, the elimination of disease in the world. Theoretically, it is possible to wipe out disease, however, medical science is a long way from the achievement of that goal. Statements made by Soviet military leaders about the consequences of a nuclear war indicate that they also perceive that they are a long way from having the capability to achieve a meaningful victory in a nuclear war. Unprecedented Damage Unavoidable Soviet writings indicate that there is a general consensus about the consequences of a nuclear war. It would cause unprecedented destruction not only to the U.S. but also to the Soviet Union. It will definitely be much worse than the destruction in World War II. This view is presented not only in publications in English which are meant for Western consumption, but also in a wide variety of party, government, and military publications intended for Russian audiences. The same view is also found in the restricted military journal -- Voyennaya mysl'. Furthermore, this view is expressed, not only by spokesmen from the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. (IUSA), who 169 some in the West consider as mere propagandists, but also by top political leaders, military officials, and other civilian spokesmen. Consistency of Views: 1962-1977 The numerous internal changes within the Soviet Union between 1962 and 1977 did not cause any major change in Soviet perceptions about their ability to avoid unprecedented losses in a nuclear war, the utility of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy, or the possibility of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war. The military leadership has long maintained that their objective is to win a nuclear war if it occurs. At the same time, their statements indicate that they are well aware that with their present capabilities, achieving a meaningful victory is not possible. Consistency of Views in Soviet Publications The view that the Soviet Union could not avoid unprecedented losses and damage in a nuclear war has been expressed, during the time period reviewed, in all of the most important Soviet journals and newspapers. Such statements were even found in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 170 which was the main source of the attacks against the "no victory" and "end of civilization" notions. The Major Discussants The major discussants of the issues examined in this study have been members of the Politburo, high-ranking military officers, commandants and faculty members at three military academies (General Staff, Frunze, and Lenin ’Military-Political), officers at the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, officials at the Academy of Science's Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, and journalists for Pravda and Izvestiya. All of these officials and spokesmen have indicated that they believe the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented damage in a nuclear war. In the 1970's the strongest and most numerous statements to this affect have been made by Brezhnev, military officials at the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, and officials at the Institute for the Study of the. USA and Canada. As will be discussed, between 1965 and 1974 faculty and staff members at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, while agreeing that the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented destruction in a nuclear war, argued against overexaggerating the consequences of such a war. 171 Disputes Over Related Issues During the period surveyed there were no serious disagreements with the following conclusions: The Marxist-Leninist theory of war as a continuation of politics is valid in the nuclear war; The Soviet Union could not utilize nuclear war as a practical instrument of policy; The Soviet Union does not have the capability to achieve a meaningful victory or to avoid unprecedented destruction in a nuclear war. Disputes did occur, especially between 1965 and 1974, however, on tangential aspects of these issues. The main concern was that the conclusions cited above would be carried too far and would have an adverse effect on the morale and training of their soldiers, on the development of military strategy, and on defense expenditures. Between 1965 and 1974, nine publications attacked the notions that civilization would be destroyed and no victory was possible in a nuclear war. The expression of this concern was relatively steady between 1965 (the year after Khrushchev's ouster) and 1974. The publications came out in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1974.1 As noted previously, these attacks were made by officers at the Lenin Military-Political Academy and in one instance by an official at the Main Political Administration of the 172 Ministry of Defense. During this period it was evident that these military spokesmen were very disturbed with certain ideas which were presented in Soviet publications. One concern was over the notion that nuclear war could not serve as an instrument of policy. They were concerned that if the notion became prevalent, civilian and military personnel 9 would begin to think that such a war would never occur.“ Such thinking has been vigorously attacked not only by officers at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, but also by other military officials because the result could be a weakening of vigilance against the threat from the West. Members of the Lenin Military-Political Academy have also criticized the overexaggeration of the consequences of such a war. They have attacked the notions that everyone would be killed and nothing could be done to q reduce the level of destruction in a nuclear war. Their objective was to counter the view that nuclear war would be so horrible that it was unthinkable and would therefore not 4 occur. They were also concerned about the negative impact 5 which such thinking would have on morale and training. The officers at the Academy also criticized the idea that victory would not be possible in a nuclear war. They were concerned that such a notion would have a detrimental effect on training and morale and consequently the preparedness of the armed forces. They were also concerned about the impact that such a notion would have on 173 the development of military strategy to fight such a war. General-Major Bochkarev, attacked such thinking in 1968 in the restricted journal Voyennaya mysl1. He said that, ... a situation arises in which the concept of 'military victory' is unacceptable and 'military strategy', the strategy of conducting war, loses its significance. In other words, the armed forces of the socialist states at the present time, in principle, will not be able to set for themselves the goal of defeating imperialism and the global nuclear war which it unleashes and the mission of attaining victory in it, and our military science should not even work out a strategy for the conduct of such a war since the latter has lost its meaning and significance.7 The same year, in the same journal, General-Major N. Sushko and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Kozlov criticized the end of mankind and no victory notions.® Their concern was that the overemphasis of the disastrous nature of such a war could cause a situation where all attention was being focused on the prevention of a nuclear war. As a result too little attention would be given to develop the capability and a strategy to fight a nuclear war — a war which the authors claim could be started by the West. (They were probably also concerned about the possibility of such a war occurring accidentally or unintentially.) They wrote, In some works a one-sided approach to questions of war is observed. The main emphasis is placed on the problems of preventing war, after which the idea is practically lost sight of that the possibility of wars breaking out remains. Therefore, a resolution of the 174 question facilitates the spread of pacifist attitudes and does not create the necessary mobilizing influence on the masses for supporting efforts at strengthening the countries defensive might.9 Undoubtedly, as some Western writers have pointed out before, another reason why the no victory/end of civilization notions are attacked is related to the impact which such thinking could have on defense expenditures.10 If increased military spending cannot increase the likelihood of victory or survival then a major reason for increasing such expenditures no longer exists. A question which must be addressed is why have there been no direct attacks on the no victory/end of civilization notions since February 1974? One reason may have been prudence on the part of those who had previously openly attacked these notions. Until 1973 Brezhnev had periodically noted that a nuclear war would have disastrous consequences, but in October of that year he stated that existing nuclear stockpiles were "...capable of blowing up the entire planet."11 He repeated this claim in July 1974 1 9 and in November 1976. Since 1974, Brezhnev's view has continued to be expressed by other spokesmen. In 1974, V.G. Dolgin, a deputy chief of a department of the CPSU Central Committee, said that such a war could "...undermine the conditions for the existence of mankind." *1 Kirilenko, a member of the Politburo, quoted 175 Brezhnev's statement in March 1 9 7 5 .-^ General-Lieutenant P.A. Zhilin, head of the Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense, drew the same conclusion in publications written in November 1973,15 1975,1® and 1976.17 Colonel Ye. Rybkin of the same institute quoted Brezhnev's 18 statement in January 1977. In June 1977, a professor at the Frunze Military Academy, General-Major R.G. Simonyan wrote that "...both sides possess weapons which are capable of annihilating all life on earth many times over."I0 In 20 addition, others have made similar statements. With Brezhnev's personal approval of what amounts to an acceptance of the reality that both nations have an assured destruction capability, direct attacks on such 21 claims are understandably avoided. The one exception is Rear Admiral V. Shelyag who criticized the no victory/death of civilization notions three months after Brezhnev's speech in October 1973, although since then Shelyag apparently has not repeated his statements in a public 22 forum. The Soviet Concern About Nuclear War Before discussing the implications of these findings, it would be worthwhile to address another related subject. That is, why are Soviet officials concerned about nuclear war? Since most Americans believe that we would 176 never launch a first strike against the Soviet Union, the Soviet concern seems unrealistic and suspicious. By considering the Soviet perspective, their concern may be easier to understand. In recent years, Soviet writings suggest that the likelihood of a nuclear war has been reduced. At the same time, Soviet spokesmen are quick to state that such a war is still a realistic possibility. Why do they hold to such a view? Several factors probably influence their thinking. For one thing, they are afraid that the West might someday see reason to use its nuclear capability against the Soviet Union. For the people of the United States this possibility is absurd. The Soviet leaders, however, have reasons for seeing things differently. Historically, they cannot forget the numerous times that their nation was invaded. Today, they perceive their nation and their socialist satellites as being surrounded by hostile capitalist nations which would like to put an end to communism and by a major communist nation (China) which poses a threat to the Soviet Union. Their ideology also predicts that the capitalist system will eventually begin to collapse and when that happens the Western nations may make a futile effort to change the course of history and launch a desperation nuclear attack. They also see in Western writings statements of aggressive intentions. They were very concerned, for example, when Kennedy, and later Schlesinger, stated that 177 in some cases the United States might have to be first to use nuclear weapons. Soviet spokesmen have also expressed concern about Westerners, like Herman Kahn, who according to the Soviets, consider nuclear war as an acceptable instrument of policy and who ignore the fact that there is a qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. In addition to historical and ideological factors, the Soviet view is also influenced by their awareness that a nuclear war could occur even if both nations had no interest in starting such a conflict. They fear that a war could start by accident or that a local conflict could escalate. Thus, they consider it appropriate and necessary to take certain measures to be prepared to fight such a war and to reduce the level of destruction which would result even if they know they cannot avoid unprecedented destruction. Another factor which some in the West ignore when evaluating Soviet perceptions and behavior is the fact that most Western capability studies assume a Soviet first strike. In determining their defense needs, the Soviet leadership knows it cannot afford the luxury of such an assumption. They must assume that the Soviet Union will be attacked first. In such a case, the Soviet leaders realize that their nation would suffer incredible destruction. ^3 This possibility undoubtedly has an important impact on decisions related to defense expenditures. 178 It is important, therefore, in analyzing Soviet behavior, to understand what factors influence their thinking. Based on the above considerations, it is understandable^ why the Soviet leadership is so concerned about the possible outbreak of nuclear war and why they are taking certain preparations for such an eventuality even though they believe that such a conflict would have disastrous consequences for their nation. Implications There are several implications of the findings of this study. One relates to the need for continuing research on the issues examined. The second concerns the likelihood of a nuclear war. Finally, there are the implications of the findings for U.S. defense planning. The Need for Continued Research Based upon the findings of this study, one may ask how some Westerners who have discussed Soviet views on nuclear war survival have reached conclusions far different from those made in this study. One reason is that some of these authors have misinterpreted what the Soviets are saying when they refer to the notion that war is a 179 continuation of politics. Soviet references to this notion are not statements about how nuclear war could serve as a practical means of Soviet policy as some in the West have suggested. Some authors have also placed heavy emphasis on Soviet claims about a socialist victory in such a war. For the reasons which I discussed earlier, reliance on such statements results in a distortion of Soviet thinking. Finally, a major reason for the differences in the findings and conclusions of this study in comparison to certain past studies is the fact that some authors have ignored, downplayed, or have been unaware of the many statements made in Soviet publications about the consequences of a nuclear war. A review of such statements provides strong evidence that the Soviet leaders have had no illusions about the possibility of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war. In the past ten years, too many mistakes have been made in evaluating Soviet views on nuclear war survival and too little research has been done on the subject. Because of the importance of the issue for our national security, continuing research will be necessary not only on Soviet military capabilities but also on the Soviet leaderships' perceptions of their capabilities. 180 The Need for Research on Related Theoretical Questions This dissertation has attempted to make a contribution to the literature by reanalyzing old evidence, presenting new evidence and discussing the importance and the meaning of key concepts regarding Soviet attitudes towards nuclear war survival. At the same time, the findings of this research suggest that additional study is needed on broader theoretical questions. One question is, what role does ideology play in influencing the decisions of political leaders? Several case studies have found that, (1) ideology is more than just rhetoric to justify a policy, (2) ideology seems to be a more potent force in the formulation of policy than is national interest, and (3) while ideology is an important determinant in formulating general policy, it is less relevant in making decisions on specific actions. 9 ^ 4 Soviet-area scholars, however, disagree as to the influence of Marxism-Leninism on the decisions made by Soviet 25 leaders. Some contend that the Soviet leaders make their decisions on the basis of national interest, personal power, etc., while ideology only serves to rationalize the decisions. Other Western scholars argue ideology does influence Soviet foreign policy. Still others take a position between these two extremes. 181 The position one takes on this question can make for an important difference in how one assesses Soviet thinking about nuclear war, its likelihood, and the chances of victory in such a war. If the Soviet leadership strictly adheres to Marxism-Leninism then they would believe that a nuclear war between the two superpowers is no longer inevitable, but as long as capitalism exists, the possibility of war exists. The possibility of war will increase as the major capitalist powers begin to lose power as socialism continues to spread around the world. As that happens the capitalist nations will be more likely to attack the Soviet Union in a last ditch effort to reverse the course of history -- which according to Marxism-Leninism will be the inevitable triumph of socialism and communism. A strict Marxist-Leninist will also believe that in any war between capitalist and socialist nations, the latter will prevail because of the natural superiority of the socialist system. Thus, a doctrinaire Soviet leader may be more likely to develop a distorted view of the military balance and to perceive that the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war. The findings of this study suggest that the Marxist-Leninist ideology has not caused the Soviet leadership to misperceive the realities of the military balance. Many Soviet spokesmen talk about the inevitable destruction of imperialism in a nuclear war, but they go on to admit that the Soviet Union would suffer unprecedented 182 destruction. In addition, Soviet military leaders have warned that it is wrong to believe that victory will be automatic for the socialist nations. Further study of the role of ideology in the Soviet Union, however, is necessary. Another relevant theoretical question concerns the process by which decision-makers receive information (relevant facts and analyses) as they prepare to make a policy decision. The questions which must be asked are: Do the information systems which different national leaderships rely upon have an effect on the decisions which are made? Are the Soviet leaders more or less likely to receive accurate information than American leaders? How accurate is the information which the Soviet political leaders receive about the relative military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States? We do know that the Soviet political leadersip is heavily dependent upon the Ministry of Defense and the KGB for information relating to matters of national security. We also have evidence that military officials do keep certain information from some civilian officials.^® Under such circumstances, there may be a greater likelihood that Soviet political leaders may receive incorrect assessments of the strategic balance. The findings of this dissertation, however, suggest that thus far the Soviet leaders have received accurate information about the consequences of a nuclear 183 war because their estimates of the destruction which would result, although stated in general terms, are similar to the estimates made by U.S. government agencies. To better understand Soviet thinking about nuclear war survival, it will be necessary to learn more about the means by which the Soviet leaders receive information and the likelihood that such information will be accurate. The existing theoretical literature will be helpful in evaluating how political leaders; mentally 27 process the information they do receive. The Likelihood of a Nuclear War Based upon an analysis of Soviet writings, the evidence is overwhelming that the Soviet leaders want to avoid a nuclear war. They foresee that their nation and the cause of socialism would have nothing to gain from such a war. As long as this view prevails, the likelihood of a nuclear war is reduced. The Soviets appear ready to risk such a war only as a last resort and only in a situation 9 o involving a matter of national survival."0 Unfortunately, as American and Soviet leaders are well aware, a nuclear war could occur even though both sides wish to avoid it. Such a war could occur as a result of an accident, a misperception of the other sides motives, or an escalation of a local crisis. The fact that both 184 sides are very intent on avoiding a nuclear war, however, does decrease the likelihood of its occurrence. Implications for U.S. Defense Planning The findings of this dissertation indicate that Soviet perceptions of the strategic nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR are in line with the conclusions reached in capability studies conducted by U.S. government 29 agencies. These studies found that even under the most favorable circumstances for the Soviet Union, the U.S. would still have the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the USSR. Soviet estimates have apparently reached the same conclusion. There are two implications of this finding for U.S. defense planning. The Soviet leaders have a healthy respect for the strategic nuclear capability of the U.S. To help ensure that their perceptions do not change, we must continue to maintain an unequivocal capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the USSR. At the same time, efforts should continue to reach arms control agreements which are mutually beneficial to the national security of the U.S. and the USSR in terms of reducing the likelihood of a nuclear war. The Soviet leaderships' concern about the possibility of such a war and about the consequences of a nuclear war for their nation, suggests that they view such agreements as feasible 185 and desirable. This study has reviewed and analyzed Soviet thinking on nuclear war survival. The major finding is that Soviet leaders, like American leaders, expect both sides to suffer unprecedented destruction in a nuclear war. There is no indication that Soviet officials believe it is possible to keep the level of destruction to what the Soviet Union incurred in World War II. They believe their nation would suffer much worse destruction in World cWar III. 186 NOTES 1. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 101-115 in translation; Grudinin, 1966, page 346 in translation; II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation; Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 14 in translation; Tabunov, 1969, page 6 in translation; Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms," 25 August 1970, pages A22-A23 in translation; Khalipov, in Milovidov, Lenina i voiny, 1972, pages 16-17 in translation; Milovidov, "Military Thought," 17 May 1973, page M2 in translation; Shelyag, 1974, page A5 in translation. 2. For example, see Grudinin, 1966, pages 346-347 in translation. 3. See Milovidov, "Military Thought," 17 May 1973, page M2 in translation. Shelyag, February 1974, pages A4-A.1? in translaton. Grudinin, 1966, page 346 in translation. II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1966, pages 2, 3, 5, 7 in translation. 4. For example, see Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, pages 5, 12-13 in translation. 5. For example, see II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation. 6. Rybkin, "Nuclear War," September 1965, pages 113-114 in translation. Grudinin, 1966, page 346 in translation. II'in, 1967, pages 7-8 in translation. 7. Bochkarev, "The Struggle Against Aggression," September 1968, page 14 in translation. 8. General-Major N. Sushko and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Kozlov, "The Development of Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army," Voyennaya mysl' No. 4 (1968). FPD 0052/69, translated 27 May 1969, pp.86-99. 9. Sushko and Kozlov, 1968, page 95 in translation. 10. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1970, p. 454ff; Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity," April 1971, pp. 444-448; Warner, 1977, p. 254; Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence," 1978, pp. 114-115, 118. 11. Brezhnev, October 1973, page 14 in translation. 12. Brezhnev, 1974, page D17 in translation and 1976, page D7 in translation. 187 13. Dolgin, 1974, p. 253 in Warner. 14. Kirilenko, 1975, page E12 in translation. 15. Zhilin, "Current World Development," 1973, page 19 in translation. 16. Zhilin, Problemy voyennoy istorii, 1975, pages 389, 393. 17. Zhilin, "The Truth of History," 1 September 1976, page A4 in translation. 18. Rybkin, "The 25th Party Congress," January 1977, page 8. 19. Cimonyan, 1977, page A8 in translation. 20. Matveyev, "The Nuclear Age," February 1974, page AA6 in translation; Proektor, 1977, page 109; and Berezhkov, "Soviet-U.S. Relations," 1977, page 8. 21. Officers at the Lenin Military-Political Academy do not disagree with Brezhnev that the U.S. has the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage on the USSR. Their concern has been that concentrating on how bad such a war would be will lead to: (1) a belief it will never occur, and a lessening of vigilance, (2) a lowering of troop morale, and (3) a reduction in defense spending. 22. Shelyag, February 174, pages A1-A5 in translation. 23. According to their own estimates, they expect that up to 90% of the population of large urban areas would be killed as a result of the immediate effects of a first strike by the United States. (Yegorov, 1970, pages 73-74 in translation.) They also expect heavy destruction to Soviet industry. 24. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparataive Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings, (Beverly Hills and London: SAGE Publications, 1973), pp. 125-126. 25. For a discussion of these differing views, see The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (pp. 91-211) by Erik P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron, editors, (Chicago and New York: Aldine/Atherton, 1971). 26. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and 188 Winston, 1973), p. 56. 27. For examgi-e-~5e^-R-eradings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective by Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, editors, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973). 28. General-Major K. Bochkarev wrote in 1970 about the high level of destruction which would result from a nuclear war and he comments on when the Soviet leaders would consider it as a means of policy. Marxist-Leninists would never agree to such a price if the choice of weapons depended on them alone. But in the specific case assumed here, it is a question of a situation in which a raging aggressor, having lost all sense of reality, is the first to press the button and launch his missiles with nuclear warheads. In such a situation, the high price would be compulsory and dictated by necessity. General-Major K. Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms and the Fate of Social Progress," Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 25 August 1970, p. 3. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 4 September 1970, p. A23. Such a statement cannot be taken as a guarantee that the Soviet Union would not attack under other circumstances. It does suggest that the Soviet leaders are eager to avoid such a war. 29. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Civil Defense, NI-78-10003, July 1978; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through the Mid-1980'ls: A Comparative Analysis, August" 1978; Department of Defense, Annual Defense Report Fiscal Year 1979, 2 February 1978, pp. 4-6, 60; Richard Burt, "Secret Carter Study of the Soviet Threat," The Washington Post, 6 January 1978, pp. A1, A6. BIBLIOGRAPHY Russian Sources: Books, Articles, and Radio Broadcasts Akimov, N.I., ed. Grazdanskaya Oborona (Civil Defense) Moscow, 1969. Aleksandrov, I. "Peking: A Course Towards Wrecking International Detente Under the Guise of Anti-Sovietism." Pravda, 14 May 1977, pp. 4-5. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 16 May 1977, pp. C6. . "To Imperialism's Advantage." Pravda, 19 March 1970. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 20 March 1970, pp. A4-A9. Andropov, Yu.V. Speech at Lenin Birthday Anniversary in Moscow, 22 April 1976. 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"Detente Prospects and Soviet-American 189 190 Relations." SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya (USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology) No. 9 (21 August 1975): 3-14. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 9 October 1975, pp. A1-A12. . "Basic Principles of Soviet-U.S. Relations." SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya No. 4 (1977): 3-11. Biryuzov, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey. "Politics and Nuclear Weapons." Izvestiya, 10 December 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. 11 December 1963, pp. BB5-BB6. Bochkarev, General-Major K.S. "On the Character and Types of Wars in the Modern Era." Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 11 (June 1965). Translated in The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968, pp. 65-82. _____ . "The Question of the Sociological Aspect of the Struggle Against the Forces of Aggression and War." 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"Peace and Social Progress." Izvestiya, 11 September 1973. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 13 September 1973, pp. A1-A4. Brezhnev, Leonid. Election speech at Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 10 June 1966. Translated in FBIS, Daily 191 Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 13 June 1966, pp. DD1-DD13. _ . Report to a Joint Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 3 November 1967. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe. Supplement, 6 November 1967, p. 50. _ . Speech at Moscow World Peace Congress, 26 October 1973. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 29 October 1973, Supplement No. 40, pp. T-20. . Speech to Polish Sejm, 21 July 1974. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 22 July 1974, pp. D10-D17. . Speech at Soviet-Romanian Friendship rally in Bucharest, 24 November 1976. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 24 November 1976, pp. AA6-AA7. Chuykov, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I., Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 16 March 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 16 March 1965, p. CC1. . Moskovskaya Pravda, 16 March 1965. . Grazhdanskaya Oborona v Raketno-Yaderno Voyne (Civil Defends in a Nuclear-Missile War) Moscow: Atomic Publishing House, 1968. Translated in JPRS, Soviet Military Translations. (46,720), 22 October 1968, pp. 23-46. Demichev, Petr. Speech'at 95th Anniversary of Lenin's Birthday on 22 April 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 23 April 1965, p. BB13. Dmitriyev, Colonel A. "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the Army is an Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres." Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 13 (July 1975): 9-17. Translated in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (65480), 18 August 1975, pp. 1-12. Dmitriyev, Boris. "Brass Hats: Peking and Clausewitz." Izvestiya, 24 September 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 25 September 1963, pp. BB9-BB10. 192 Dolgin, V.G. "Peaceful Coexistence and the Factors Contributing to Its Intensification and Development." Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) No. 1 (January 1974). Cited in The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis by Edward L. Warner, III, New York, London: Praeger Special Studies, 1977, p. 253. Dyusheyev, Zh. Samopomoshch i vzaimopomoshch Pri Primenii oruzhiya Massavogo Porazheniya i Pri NeschastnySrh Sluchayak (Self Help and Mutual Assistance, When-Mass Destruction Weapons Are Being Employed and During Accidents) Frunze: Izdatel'stvo Kyrgystan, 1972. Partial translation in JPRS, Translations on USSR Military Affairs, (59294), 15 June 1973, pp. 20-26. Editorial. "Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement in the Name of the Triumph of Socialism and Peace." Pravda, 7 January 1963. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 9 January 1963, pp. BB7-BB10. Editorial. "The Great Banner of the Builders of Communism." Pravda, 1 November 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 3 November 1964, pp. CC1-CC11. Editorial. "For Policy and the Contemporary World." Kommunist No. 3 (February 1965). Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 25 March 1965, pp. bbl3-bb25. Fedorov, Ye. "To Stop The Arms Race." Izvestiya, 21 September 1976. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 29 September 1976, pp. AA4-AA6. Gerasimov, G. "Pentagonia." International Affairs No. 5 (May 1966): 24-30. Glazurov, Viktor. Moscow International Service in Russian, 22 July 1964, Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 23 July 1964, pp. BB9-BB10. ______. Moscow Domestic Service, 22 July 1964. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 23 July 1964, pp. BB9-BB10. Glezerman, G. "The Great Significance of the Leninist Ideas on the Struggle for Democracy and Socialism." Pravda, 21 January 1965. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union and East Europe, 27 January 1965, pp. BB6-BB10. 193 Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. "Triumph of Lenin's Ideas on Defense of the Socialist Motherland," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20, COctober 1967): 31-39. * . Speech to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 29 September 1972. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 30 October 1972. . "Combat Cooperation Between the Armies of the Socialists States." Kommunist No. 15, (October 1972). Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 21 November 1972, pp. M1-M16. ______. Vooryzhennye sily Sovetskago gosudarstva (The Armed Forces of1 the Soviet State). Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1975. Translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. 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