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ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 8008758 ARNETT, ROBERT LEE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL (1962-1977): HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE? The Ohio State University PH.D. 1979 University Microfilms International300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England Copyright 1979 by ARNETT, ROBERT LEE All Rights Reserved SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR SURVIVAL (1962-1977) HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE? DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Robert Lee Arnett, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1979 Reading Committee: Approved By: Dr. Philip D. Stewart Dr. Charles F. Hermann Dr. David M. Lampton Political Science To My Parents VITA August 15, 1947 Born — Akron, Ohio 1965 - 1969 B.A., Ohio State University 1969 - 1971 M.A., Ohio State University 1971 - 1973 U.S. Army 1973 - 1975 A.B.D., Ohio State University 1975 - 1978 Research Analyst, Library of Congress 1978 - Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Army PUBLICATIONS Author of "Soviet Views on Nuclear War Survival: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" Journal of Strategic Studies. 2 (September 1979). Author of "Soviet Military Doctrine: Views on Nuclear War," Arms Control Today. October 1978. Reprinted in Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader, Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979, pp. 115-120. Co-author of "Forecasting the Stability of the SALT Interim Agreement: A Social Exchange Approach," presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, April 1974. Co-author of "Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models," American Political Science Review. December 1972, pp. 1269-1290. Author of "The Relationship of Oblast Economic Profiles and the Political Mobility of Soviet Middle-level Elites." M.A. thesis. March 1971. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science TABLE OF CONTENTS Page VITA................................................... iii INTRODUCTION............................................ 1 Chapter I. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.............7 II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE................... 38 III. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY____62 IV. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY IN A NUCLEAR WAR................... 90 V. SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR WAR...............................10 8 VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS..... ___ 165 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................... 189 v INTRODUCTION In the United States, a major debate is currently underway concerning the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons capabilities, the effectiveness of its civil defense capabilities, and the Soviet leaders' perception of those capabilities. Some Americans contend that the Soviet Union has, or will soon have, the capability to conduct a nuclear war and incur no more losses than it incurred in World War 11.^ On the other side in the debate are Americans who argue that the United States still has, and will continue to have in the near future, the capability to inflict unacceptable losses and damage upon the Soviet o Union even after sustaining a first strike. The debate also involves different evaluations of Soviet perceptions of their capabilities. Some Americans contend that the Soviet leaders believe their nation can win and survive a nuclear war. Others argue that such a 4 conclusion is ill-founded. This group contends that the Soviet leaders are well aware of the fact that the United States can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union 5 and that a meaningful victory would not be possible. An evaluation of the types of evidence being 1 presented in this debate leads to an interesting finding. Both sides in the debate have presented numerous capability analyses to support their conclusions. At the same time, both sides have made many comments on Soviet views of the consequences of a nuclear war. But compared to the number of capability analyses, very little evidence has been presented by either side to support their conclusions about Soviet perceptions. Capability analyses are absolutely essential in studying this question, but at the same time analyses of Soviet attitudes are also very important, especially when there are differing opinions about Soviet capabilities. A key question to be answered is, how confident are the Soviets that they could win and survive a nuclear war? It is the objective of this dissertation to examine and evaluate Soviet discussions of what they expect to happen if a nuclear war occurs. American leaders need an accurate assessment of Soviet views towards nuclear war survival in order to make rational decisions regarding our defense allocations and our national defense doctrine. If the Soviet leadership believes their nation could win a nuclear war with acceptable losses, then the likelihood is increased of either a nuclear attack against the U.S. or the use of nuclear blackmail against the West. If this is the case, the United States must increase its military and civil defense capabilities to convince the Soviet leadership that 3 there is no chance that their nation could win such a war. If, on the other hand, the Soviet leadership has no doubts about the United States' capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, but the American leadership accepts the contention of various Western commentators who claim that the Soviet leaders believe it is possible to win a nuclear war, then the likelihood is increased that American leaders will make unnecessary changes in our defense allocations and our strategic nuclear doctrine. Thus, it is important not only to conduct analyses of Soviet military capabilities, but also to study the Soviet leaderships1 perceptions of these capabilities. Past studies of Soviet perceptions of their nuclear war-fighting capability vis-a-vis the United States have generally assessed, or commented on, Soviet statements on the following three issues: the feasibility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy; the possibility of victory in a nuclear war; and, the consequences of such a war. The attention given to Soviet attitudes on these issues is appropriate. The position which the Soviet leadership takes on these issues should provide evidence as to whether or not they believe their nation could achieve a meaningful 4 victory in a nuclear war. At the same time, Soviet views on these issues indicate how they evaluate their strategic nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities vis-a-vis the United States. In addition, their thinking on these issues indicates how likely it is that they might initiate, or threaten to initiate such a war. The higher their confidence in the likelihood of a meaningful victory, the more likely it is that they might decide to initiate, or threaten to initiate a nuclear war. The lower their confidence in such a possibility, the more likely they are to try every means to avoid such a conflict. If they claim that: (1) nuclear war can serve as a practical instrument of policy, (2) a meaningful victory is possible in a nuclear war, and (3) the consequences of such a conflict can be kept at an acceptable level, then this suggests that they do believe a meaningful victory is possible in a nuclear conflict. If on the other hand, they claim, in publications intended for a Russian audience, that: (1) nuclear war cannot serve as a practical instrument of policy, (2) victory is not possible in such a war, and (3) the consequences of a nuclear war cannot be kept at an acceptable level, then, it cannot be argued, on the basis of Soviet writings, that they believe it is possible to win and survive a nuclear war in a meaningful way. 5 NOTES 1. Some Westerners argue that not only can the Soviets win and survive a nuclear war, but they may be able to escape with fewer population losses than they incurred in World War II.