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Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Dissertations

2007 The influence of public relations on coverage and public perceptions of foreign countries Hye Hyun Hong Iowa State University

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Recommended Citation Hong, Hye Hyun, "The influence of public relations on news coverage and public perceptions of foreign countries" (2007). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 15040. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/15040

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more , please contact [email protected]. The influence of public relations on news coverage and public perceptions of foreign countries by Hye Hyun Hong Athesissubmittedtothegraduatefaculty inpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof MASTEROFSCIENCE Major:JournalismandMassCommunication ProgramofStudyCommittee: SumanLee,MajorProfessor LuluRodriguez AliciaD.Cast

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TableofContents ListofTables...... iii ListofFigures ...... iv Chapter1.Introduction ...... 1 Chapter2.Literaturereviewandtheoreticalframework...... 3 Influenceofpublicrelationsonnewscontent...... 3 Influenceofpublicrelationsonpublicperceptions ...... 6 Newsmediainfluenceonpublicperception ...... 9 Secondlevelagendasetting...... 12 Hypothesesandresearchquestion...... 13 Chapter3.Method...... 17 Operationalizationandmeasurementofinternationalpublicrelations...... 17 Operationalizationandmeasurementofpublicperceptionsofforeigncountries...... 18 Contentanalysisofnewscoverage ...... 20 Theoreticalmodel...... 24 Chapter4.Findings ...... 26 Descriptivestatistics...... 26 Hypothesestesting...... 32 Modelfitting...... 36 Chapter5.Discussion...... 41 Mainissues...... 41 Limitationsofthestudyandsuggestionsforfuturestudy ...... 44 References ...... 47 AppendixA.Searchingprocedureandcodingguidelineforcontentanalysis ...... 52 AppendixB.Codingsheetforcontentanalysis ...... 53

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ListofTables Table1.Examplesofpositiveandnegativevalence ...... 23 Table2.NumberofPRcontractsandthedollaramount(fromthe2002FARAreport) ...... 27 Table3.Publicperceptionsofforeigncountries(fromthe2002CCFRsurvey) ...... 29 Table4.Numberofarticlesbynews ...... 30 Table5.Newsprominenceofthecountries...... 31 Table6.Newsvalenceofcountries ...... 33 Table7.RegressionanalysisofinternationalPRvariables onnewsprominenceandvalence...... 35 Table8.Regressionanalysisofnewsprominenceandvalenceonthepublicperceptions .... 36 Table9.RegressionanalysisofinternationalPRonthepublicperceptions ...... 37 Table10.Estimatesofmodeltesting ...... 40

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ListofFigures Figure1.NationalimagesofforeigncountriesperceivedbyU.S.newsmediaandpublic .....2 Figure2.Thechainofnewscommunication...... 10 Figure3.TheflowmodelofinternationalPR,newscoverage,andpublicperceptions...... 14 Figure4.Flowchartofvariablesinvolvedinthesixhypotheses...... 16 Figure5.Theoreticalmodelofthevariables’relationships...... 25 Figure6.Modifiedmodelfitting...... 38

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Today,itiswidelybelievedthatapositivenationalimageenablesanationto achieveamoreadvantageouspositioninglobaleconomicandpoliticalcompetition.A positivenationalimagemaydriveothernations’foreignpoliciesinfavorofacountry, increaserevenuesfromproducts,anddrawtouristsandforeigninvestment(Wang,2006).

Moreover,astheattacksofSeptember11,2001haveshown,severeantagonisticfeelings fromforeignpublicsmayeventhreatennationalsecurity.

Cognizantoftheseissues,manyhavestartedstrategicpublicrelations

(PR)effortstoimprovetheirnationalimagesthroughouttheworld.Theforeignnewsmedia havebecomeamajoroutletforgovernmentstryingtoinfluencenewscontentabout internationalissuesandforeignaffairs,especiallywithregardtotheirowncountries.

However,governmentsalsoreachforeignpublicsdirectlybydisseminatinginformation regardingtheircountriesandlaunchingsponsoredinternational channelsand(e.g.,VoiceofAmerica).Governmentsalsotrytoinfluencepublic opinioninforeigncountriesthroughculturalexchangeprograms(e.g.,artisticperformances, festivals,secondlanguagetraining,andstudentexchangeprograms).TheFulbright program,whichsubsidizesinternationalstudents’intheU.S.,isagoodexampleof suchefforts.

Thisstudyaimstoinvestigate(1)howinternationalPRactivitiesconductedbya governmentinfluencetheimageofacountryasperceivedbyforeignpublicsandportrayed intheforeignnewsmedia,and(2)howthepublic’sperceptionofforeigncountriesis

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influencedbythisnewscoverage.FollowingLee’s(2004)proposedpathofinfluenceas showninFigure1,thisstudyexplorestheinternationalPRactivitiesofforeigngovernments thattargettheUnitedStatesinordertoinfluenceU.S.mediaportrayalofforeigncountries, and,consequently,U.S.citizens’perceptionoftheseforeigncountries.

International PR activities of foreign Country1 countries

Country2

Country3 Newscoverage Publicperception inatargetcountry Inatargetcountry (theU.S.) (theU.S.)

Country4 …

CountryN

Figure 1. National images of foreign countries perceived by U.S. and public. Adapted from A theoretical model of national image processing and international public relations, by S. Lee, 2004, p. 4.

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Chapter 2. Literature review and theoretical framework

Influence of public relations on news content

Inmanystudiesintheareaofmediasociology,scholarshaveidentifiedanumberof factorsthatinfluencenewscontent.Specifically,fivecategoriesoffactorshavebeen identifiedasinfluencingnewscontent(ShoemakerandReese,1991;Shoemaker,1991).

Accordingtoscopeofinfluence,thesefactorsinclude(1)individualattributes(e.g.,media professionals’educationandgender);(2)mediaroutines(e.g.,gatekeeping,beatsystem,and packjournalism);(3)organizationalcharacteristics(e.g.,politicalendorsements,editorial positions,andcorporatepolicies);(4)extramediavariables(e.g.,advertisers’andnews sources’interventions);and(5)ideologicalinfluences(e.g.,standardsocialvalues).

AccordingtoShoemakerandReese(1991),inadditiontocompetingmedia ,advertisers,,andgovernmentcontrols,thepublicrelationsactivities ofavarietyofnewssources,suchasinterestsgroupsandcorporateorganizations,canbe consideredextramediaorganizationalfactorscansignificantlyinfluencenewscontent.

Manheim(1987)alsoarguedthatexternalfactors,includingthestrategicpublicrelations effortsofnewssources,mayaffectdecisionsaboutwhetheratopicisincludedordiscarded inthenewsmediaagenda.

Manyorganizationsconsidertheirownappearanceinthenewsmediaasacost effectivewayofreachingtheirpublics.Pressreleasesfromdifferentsourcesalsoassist inidentifyingnewsitemsandfillnewsholesundertightdeadlines(Shoemaker,

1991).Indeed,Shoemaker(1991)explainsthatpublicrelationsactivitiesaffectnewscontent

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directlybyprovidingstoryideastothemediathatsupportan’spositionor indirectlybyusingthemediatoprojectorganizationrelatedissuesontothepublicagenda.

Publicrelationspractitionersalsocreatepseudoevents,suchasdemonstrationsand, togainmediaattentionand,subsequently,publicattention,andtheseeventsservemove newscontenttowardthedirectionintendedbythesourceorganizations(Shoemakerand

Reese,1991;Shoemaker,1991).Turow(1989)pointedoutthat“publicrelationsisadriving forcebehindwhatgetsonandintoprint”(p.26).Henotesthatmanynewsstories originatefrompressreleases,indicatingthe“overwhelmingimportanceofPRmaterialsfor thecontemporarypress”(p.206).Intheprocess,publicrelationspractitioners“insinuate theirideasintohardnewsstorieswiththeaimofattractinglawmakers’attention”(p.208) andtrytodisguisetheirownpoliticalagendafromboththemediaandthepublic.Inspiteof itssignificantinfluenceontheflowofnews,however,thefieldofpublicrelationshas receivedlimitedattentionfromscholars.Thisneglectbecomesmoreproblematicconsidering thepotentialimpactofpublicrelationsoninternationalnewscontent.

Theempiricalevidencethatdemonstratespublicrelations’effectonnewscontentis sometimescontradictory.Forexample,AlbrittonandManheim(1983)foundthatapublic relationscampaignimprovedRhodesia’simageintheU.S.press.Stocking(1985),onthe otherhand,suggestedlimitedeffectsofPRactivitiesbysayingthatPRactivitiesoftendonot gobeyondnewsvalue.Anissue’snewsvalue,Stockingsuggests,isamorepowerful predictorthatanissuewillappearinthenewsmediaagenda.

AccordingtoManheimandAlbritton(1984),professionalandsystematicpublic relationseffortsintheU.S.onbehalfofforeigngovernmentsnoticeablyincreasedinthe

1970s,assuggestedbytheForeignAgentRegistrationRecords(FARA)oftheDepartment

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ofJustice.Sincethen,fosteringacountry’spositiveandfavorableimageintheU.S.news mediahasbeenanimportantgoalthatinternationalclientstrytoachievebycontractingwith

AmericanPRfirms.Testingtheeffectofpublicrelationsinterventiononthevisibilityand valenceofU.S.newscoverageaboutaforeigncountry,ManheimandAlbritton(1984)found thatnationalimage,asportrayedinthenewsmedia,improvedafterthesigningofcontracts withPRfirmsintheU.S.Thisfindingsuggeststhatpublicrelationscanchangehow countriesareportrayedinthenewsmediaofatargetcountry.

However,recentempiricalstudieshaveshownasomewhatlimitedeffectof internationalpublicrelationsactivitiesonthenewscontentoftheforeignnewsmedia(Lee,

2004;Yoon,2005).Yoon(2005)organizedpreviousstudiesthatinvestigatetheimpactofPR onnewscontentintotwomajorcategories:(1)acceptanceorrejectionofsources’ informationsubsidiesandtheutilizationoftheseinformationsubsidies;and(2)journalists’ perceptionsofPRandPRpersonsandhowtheseperceptionsaffectjournalisticproducts.An organizationcanbuildlegitimacyasanewssourceandcanattractmediaattentionbysteadily providingjournalistswithinformationsubsidies(Yoon,2005).AccordingtoYoon(2005),

“PRcouldbeakeystrategicchoicetopursue,eithertoconsolidatesuperiormediaaccessor tomakefrequentinterventionsassourcescontendformediaspace”(p.763).Shefoundthat althoughpublicrelationseffortsdonotdirectlycorrelatewithmediaaccess,mediaaccess canbeincreasedbyenhancingjournalists’perceptionsofthesources’legitimacy,whichis significantlycorrelatedwiththequantityandqualityofpublicrelationsefforts.Thesources perceivedaslegitimatebyjournalistsarelikelytobecoveredmorefavorablyandpositively inthelongterm.

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AccordingtoLee(2004),themorepublicrelationscontractsforeigncountriessign withPRagenciesintheU.S.,themorecoveragethosecountriesreceiveintheU.S. .HealsofoundthatthenumberofpublicrelationscontractsintheU.S.was positivelycorrelatedwithacountry’sprominenceinnationalnewspapersandinnetwork televisionnewscoverage.Aftercontrollingforenvironmentalandrelationalfactors,strategic publicrelationsemergedasasignificantfactorexplainingthevarianceintheprominence thatcountriesenjoyedinU.S.coverage.Heconcludedthatpublicrelationsmay beassociatedwithprominenceintermsoflengthofstoriespublishedandwheretheyare locatedinanewspaperedition,whereasthequantityofcoverageisinfluencedby newsworthiness(Lee,2004).

Influence of public relations on public perceptions

Becauseapositivenationalimageisregardedasnationalcapital,manygovernments arestartingtoimprovetheirnationalimagebydirectlycommunicatingwithforeignpublics.

Wang(2006)arguesthatnationalisanindicationofanation’spowerandstrength.

Otherscholars(Jervis,1970;Nye,1990,2004)haveemphasizedthepivotalroleofapositive nationalimageasaformof“softpower,”asopposedtothe“hard”militaryoreconomic formsofpower.Nye(2004)definessoftpoweras“theabilitytogetwhatyouwantthrough attractionratherthancoercionorpayments”(p. x).Itcanbeachievedby“theattractiveness ofacountry’sculture,politicalideals,andpolicies”(p. x).Hardpower,ontheotherhand,is generallyrepresentedbyeconomicandmilitarysanctions.Nye(2004),however,alsoargues thathardandsoftpowermustcomplementeachothertoachievenationalgoals.

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Publicdiplomacyisonewaybywhichgovernmentscanimprovetheirsoftpowerby goingdirectlytoforeignpublics.Overthepastdecades,governmenttogovernment interactionsthroughpoliticalleaderssuchpresidents,primeministers,andambassadorshad typicallybeenconsideredthemostefficientformofdiplomacy.However,many governmentsarenowexperimentingwithvariouswaysofreachingforeignpublicsthrough themediaandthroughotherwaysbecausetheyrecognizethatthepositiveopinionofforeign publicscanimprovenationalimageand,consequently,influencefavorableforeignpolicies towardtheircountries.

Publicdiplomacyisdefinedas“agovernment’sprocessofcommunicatingwith foreignpublicsinanattempttobringaboutunderstandingforitsnation’sideasandideals,its institutionsandculture,aswellasitsnationalgoalsandcurrentpolicies”(Tuch,1990,p.3).

Gilboa(2000)definespublicdiplomacyas“directcommunicationwithforeignpeopleswith theaimofaffectingtheirthinking,andultimately,thatoftheirgovernments”(p.291).

Melissen(2006)arguesthatpublicdiplomacydiffersfromtraditionaldiplomacyinthat publicdiplomacy“targetsthegeneralpublicinforeignsocietiesandmorespecificnon officialgroups,organizationsandindividuals,”ratherthanusingofficialrelationships betweeninternationalactors(p.5).Publicdiplomacy“describesactivities,directedabroadin thefieldsofinformation,education,andculture,whoseobjectiveistoinfluenceaforeign government,byinfluencingitscitizens”(Frederick,1993,p.229).Wang(2006)notesthat

“publicdiplomacyisnotmerelyaboutadvocatingandpromotingpoliticalandeconomic goalstotheinternationalpublics;itis,instead,aboutrelationshipbuildingbetweennations andculturesthroughbettercommunication”(p.93).ToWang,therefore,publicdiplomacyis the“publicfaceoftraditionaldiplomacy”(p.91).

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Previousstudieshaveuncoveredtwotypesofpublicdiplomacyefforts:(1) informationdisseminationthroughthemassmediaandothermeans;and(2)cultural diplomacy.

First,governmentscanreachforeignpublicsbydisseminatinginformationthrough themassmedia(e.g.,throughpublicrelationscampaignsinmassmedia)orbydirectly deliveringinformation(e.g.,printorvideomaterials)tothegeneralpublicwithoutmass mediaintervention.TheU.S.,forinstance,reachesouttotheMiddleEastthroughAmerican

Corner,anorganizedcollectionofaccessiblecomputersandbooksonAmerican subjectsinstalledinseveralMiddleEasternuniversities.Itisconsideredtobeacosteffective andsafewaytohelpstudentsandthegeneralpublicknowmoreaboutAmericanculture, society,andpolitics(Robinson,2005).

Governmentsponsoredandtelevisionbroadcastsinforeignmarketsisanother waytoreachforeignpublics.Forinstance,duringtheColdWar,theVoiceofAmerica,

RadioFreeEurope,andRadioLibertywerelaunchedtoconveyapositiveAmericanimage tospecifictargetcountries.Today,inresponsetonegativeintheMuslimmedia thesocalled Al Jazeera effecttheBushadministrationsubsidizesavarietyofmedia channels,includingradiostations,satellitechannels,websites,andteenmagazinestodirectly reachtheMuslimworld(Nisbet,Nisbet,Scheufele,andShanahan,2004).

Second,governmentscanreachforeignpublicsthroughavarietyofcultural channelsusedinpublicdiplomacyefforts.Culturaldiplomacy,orpublicdiplomacythrough culturalchannels,focusesonlongtermrelationshipbuildinginsteadofconflictresolutionor immediateinformationdelivery.Schneider(2006)notesthat“cultureprovidesameansto expanduponideasandimagescreatedbythemarket”(p.158).Gilboa(2000)counts

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“culturalandscientificexchangesofstudents,scholars,intellectuals,andartists;participation infestivalsandexhibitions;buildingandmaintainingculturalcenters;teachingalanguage; andestablishinglocalfriendshipleaguesandtradeassociations”asculturaldiplomatic activities(p.291).

Schneider(2006)arguesthatevenduringtheColdWar,artistsintheSovietUnion, suchasdancerswiththeBolshoiandKirovballets,impressedtheAmericanpublicinspiteof ideologicaldifferencesbetweenthetwocountries.Artisticandculturalexchangesbetween theU.S.andtheSovietUnionwereregardedas“ameansofcounteractingisolationismand increasingunderstandingbetweenthetwocountries”(p.157).

Aspartofitsongoingefforts,topromoteapositiveimageinMiddleEastern countries,theStateDepartment’sMiddleEastPartnershipInitiativepromotestheideologyof democracyandwomen’srights.InJordan,forexample,theU.S.sponsorsastudentexchange oreducationprogramtargetedatteenagersthatinvolvesafterschoolEnglishclassesandU.S. embassytours.Robison(2005)explainsthattheseculturalprogramsaredesignedtoallow studentsinMuslimcountriestoexperience“realimagesofAmericansratherthantheones theyseein Al Jazeera ”(p.5).

News media influence on public perception

Usingstructuraltheory,GaltungandRuge(1965)explainthattheeconomic,social, political,andgeographicattributesofacountrycanaffecthowoftenandhowfavorablythat countryisdescribedinanothercountry’snewsmedia.Intheirtheory,whichemphasizesthe criticalroleofthenewsmediaasimageprojectors,theysuggestedalinearprocessofimage formationthroughnewscoverage(Figure2).Inthismodel,thepublic’sperceptionofa

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countryiscreatedthroughaseriesofstepsalthougheachstepmayintroduceimage distortions.GaltungandRuge(1965)indicatedthatnationalimageisshapednotonlybythe newsmediabutalsobyavarietyofinformationchannels,suchaspersonalcontacts.The newsmedia,however,remain“firstratecompetitorsforthenumberonepositionas internationalimageformer”becauseoftheir“regularity,ubiquity,andperseverance”(p.64).

Figure 2. The chain of news communication. Adapted from “The structure of foreign news,” by J. Galtung and M. H. Ruge, 1965, Journal of Peach Research, 2 , p. 65.

Additionally,accordingtothemediadependencytheory(BallRokeach,1979), individualsgenerallyrelyonthemediaforthebestavailableinformationtounderstand issuesandtoformtheirperceptionsaboutthem,especiallywhentheissuesarebeyondtheir personalexperience.ManheimandAlbritton(1984)alsoarguethatthenewsmediaareoften themajorsourcesofthemostuptodateinformationregardinginternationalaffairs.

However,thenewsmediahavealimitedcapacityintermsofcoveringallpartsof theworld.Thus,countriesreceivevaryinglevelsofcoverageintheU.S.newsmedia(Golan

&Wanta,2001;Wu,1998;Chang,1998).Political,geographical,economic,andcultural considerationsforcethenewsmediatoassigndifferent“weights”intheircoverageofother countries(Lee,2004;Golan&Wanta,2001;Wu,1998;Larson,1982).Thisimbalanceinthe

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coverageofforeigncountriesininternationalnewsreportingmayinfluencethepublic’s perceptionofthesalienceofeachcountrytotheirowncountry’sandtotheirpoliticallives and,consequently,publicopiniontowardthem(Wanta,Golan,&Lee,2004).Thenews medianotonlyreportforeignpolicybutalsohelpshapeforeignpolicybygalvanizingpublic opinionthroughtheircoverage.

Previousstudieshaveexaminedtherelationshipbetweeninternationalnews coverageandpublicopinionaboutforeigncountries.Forexample,Semetko,Brzinski,

Weaver,andWillnat(1992)analyzedU.S.networknewsandwireservicecoverageofnine countries(WestGermany,EastGermany, theSovietUnion,Hungary,Poland,GreatBritain,

France,Japan, andIsrael),andcompareditwithpublicopinionabouttheseninecountries gatheredfromtheU.S.nationalpublicopinionsurveys.Thefindingsshowedthatthe visibilityofforeigncountriesinTVnewssignificantlyinfluencedpublicopinionaboutthese countries(Semetkoetal.,1992).McNellyandIzcaray(1986)alsoconcludedthatmass mediaexposurewasrelatedtopositiveimagesofforeigncountriesinagivennation.

Nisbetetal.(2004)foundthatMuslimaudienceswhochooseWesternnetworksas primarynewschannelshavelessnegativeperceptionsoftheU.S.thanthosewhopreferthe panArabregionalnetworks.ViewingthepanArabnetworksservesto“amplify”anti

Americanattitudes,butwatchingWesternnetworksfunctionsto“bufferorattenuate”this effect.Thisfindingsupportstheideathattheselectiveuseofmediachannelsandbiased contentshaveabearingonpublicopiniontowardacountry.

Manymediaeffectsstudieshaveshowntheinfluenceofnewscoverageonpublic perceptions.Theagendasettingtheory,whichproposesthetransferofissuesaliencefrom

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themediaagendatothepublicagenda,isoneofthetraditionalmediaeffectstheoriesoften appliedinstudiesofthiskind.

Second-level agenda-setting

SinceMcCombsandShawproposedtheagendasettingtheoryin1972,alarge numberofstudieshavebeenconductedtoshowthatthesalienceofissuesportrayedinthe mediainfluencesthesalienceofthesesameissuesinthepublicagenda.Agendasetting studieshavenowshiftedfromresearchingnotonlythetransferofissuesaliencebutalsothe transferofissueattributes,secondlevelagendasetting.Whilefirstlevelagendasetting focusesonthe“transmissionofissuesaliencecuesfromnewscoverageofissuestopublic concernwithissues,thesecondlevelinvestigatesthetransmissionofattributesofactorsin thenewsfrommediacoverageoftheseattributestothepublic’srecallofthesameattributes”

(Wantaetal.,2004,p.365).Secondlevelagendasettingpositsthattheattributesofissues

(orobjects)emphasizedinthemediaaffectthewaypeoplethinkabouttheissue(orobject), aswellasthesalienceoftheseissue(orobjects).Inshort,secondlevelagendasetting examines“howmediacoverageaffectsbothwhatthepublicthinksaboutandhowthepublic thinkaboutit”(Ghanem,1997,p.3).

Ghanem(1997)conceptualizesfoursubdimensionsofissueattributesinsecond levelagendasetting:subtopics,presentations,affectiveelements,andcognitiveelements.

Forexample,analyzingmediacontentregardingthe1996Spanishgeneralelection,

McCombs,Liamas,LopezEscobar,&Rey(1977)foundtwobasicattributesofcandidates, substantiveandaffectiveattributes,whichareconceptuallyconsistentwiththecognitiveand affectiveelementsinGhanem’s(1997)study.Affectiveattributesweredefinedasthefacets

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thatelicitemotionalreactionsfromaudiences;substantiveattributesinvolvethecognitive processesaudiencesapplytomakesenseofthenews.

Withafewexceptions(e.g.,Wantaetal.,2004),mostempiricalstudiesoffirstand secondlevelagendasettingwereconductedinpoliticalcontexts,suchaspresidential elections.Somestudieshaveshownapositivecorrelationbetweennewscoverageof candidatesandthepublic’sperceptionsofeachcandidate’scognitiveandaffectiveattributes.

Peopleperceiveissuesasmoreimportantwhencandidatesaredescribedinrelationwiththe issuesinthemedia.Themorepositivelycandidatesappearedinthemedia,themore positivelypeopleperceivethecandidate(GolanandWanta,2001;Kiousis,Bantimaroudis,&

Ban,1999).

Wantaetal.(2004)appliedsecondlevelagendasettingtothecontextofforeign newscoverageandthepublic’sperceptionofforeigncountriesbyconsideringcountriesas objectsinsteadofissuesorattributesofissues.Wantaetal.(2004)foundthatincreased coverageofforeigncountriesincreasedtheperceivedvitalinterestofthecountriestotheU.S. amongAmericans,andthatthenumberofnegativenewsitemsaboutforeigncountries createdanegativepublicofthosecountries.

Hypotheses and research question

Fromtheforegoingliterature,thisstudysuggestsamodelillustratingthe relationshipsamonginternationalpublicrelationseffortsbyaforeigncountry,theU.S.news coverageoftheforeigncountry,andtheU.S.public’sperceptionofagivencountry(Figure

3).ThemodelwillbetestedusingtheU.S.asthetargetcountrywhosepublicopinionmany foreigncountriesaimtoinfluence.Followingcommonpublicrelationsobjectives,itis

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assumedthatthesecountriesemploycommunicationstrategiesandtechniquestogain positiveportrayalsintheU.S.media.Suchpositiveportrayalstranslatedtofavorable

Americanpublicopinionaboutthesourcecountries.

International News Public PR Coverage Perception

Figure 3. The flow model of international PR, news coverage, and public perceptions

Basedontheliteraturereview,thisstudypositsthefollowinghypothesesinregard totherelationshipsamongthethreeelements.

Thefirstsetofhypothesesproposestheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsofa foreigncountrywillinfluencetheU.S.newscoverageintermsoftheprominenceand valenceofU.S.mediacoverageofthesourcecountries.Thus:

H1a:Moreinternationalpublicrelationseffortswillleadtomoreprominentnews coverageofaforeigncountryintheU.S.media.

H1b:Moreinternationalpublicrelationseffortswillleadtomorepositivenews coverageofaforeigncountryintheU.S.media.

Thesecondsetofhypothesesassumesthattheextenttowhichaforeigncountryis prominentlyandpositivelyportrayedintheU.S.newsmediawillaffectAmericanpublic perceptionofthisforeigncountryintheU.S.Hence,

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H2a:Themoreprominentnewscoverageaforeigncountryreceives,themorethe countrywillbeperceivedbytheU.S.publicassignificanttotheircountryandtotheirlives.

H2b:ThemorepositivelyaforeigncountryisportrayedintheU.S.newsmedia, themorepositivelythecountrywillbeperceivedbytheU.S.public.Themorenegativelya foreigncountryisportrayedintheU.S.newsmedia,themorenegativelythecountrywillbe perceivedbytheU.S.public.

Thethirdsetofhypothesesassumesthattheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsof aforeigncountrywillinfluenceU.S.publicperception.

H3a:Internationalpublicrelationseffortsbyaforeigncountrywillbepositively correlatedtotheperceivedsignificanceofthatcountryamongtheU.S.public.

H3b:Internationalpublicrelationseffortsbyaforeigncountrywillincreasethe positivefeelingsoftheU.S.publictowardthatcountry.

ThesixsuggestedhypothesesareillustratedinFigure4.Eacharrowlinkingthetwo variablesrepresentsoneofsixhypotheses.

Inadditiontothesixhypotheses,thefollowingresearchquestionisposed:

RQ1:Towhatextentdoestheproposedmodel(Figure4)explaintherelationships amongtheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsofaforeigncountry,newscoverageofthe country(i.e.,prominenceandvalence)intheU.S.media,andU.S.publicperceptionsofthe country(i.e.,cognitiveandaffective)?

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News H2a Public’sperceived prominence significance H1a H3a International PR

H3b Publicfeelings H1b News valence H2b

Figure 4. Flow chart of variables involved in the six hypotheses

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Chapter 3. Method Thisstudyemploysmultiplemethodsofdatagathering.First,secondarydatawere gatheredandanalyzedtodetermineinternationalPReffortsofforeigncountriesfromthe semiannualreportgeneratedthroughtheForeignAgencyRegistrationAct(FARA).The resultsoftheChicagoCouncilonForeignRelations(CCFR)surveywerealsoanalyzedto examineU.S.publicperceptionsofselectcountries.Second,contentanalysiswasconducted torevealthenatureofU.S.newscoverageofforeigncountries.Usingthesemethods,this studyexaminestheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsconductedbyforeigncountriesinthe

U.S.,theU.S.newscoverageofthosecountries,andU.S.citizens’perceptionsofthose countries.

Operationalization and measurement of international public relations

Internationalpublicrelationsinvolvesintentionalactivitiesgovernmentsundertake toinfluenceforeignmediaandpublics.AccordingtoLee(2004),theseactivitiesinclude contractswithpublicrelationsagenciesinatargetcountry,thedisseminationofpress releasesdisseminations,andthemanagementofapublicinformationministryorembassy.

ThefundsdedicatedtointernationalPRandadministrativeexpertiseinpublicdiplomacyare alsopotentialfactorsthathaveabearingonacountry’sabilitytoinfluencetheforeignmedia andpublics.Amongthese,accordingtoGilboa(2000),contractingpublicrelationsagencies inatargetcountryisthemosteffectivemethodthat“strengthensthelegitimacyand authenticity”ofpublicrelationsefforts.

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Inthisstudy,internationalpublicrelationseffortswereoperationalizedusingtwo indicators:(1)thenumberofcontractsforeigngovernmentshavesignedwithPRagenciesin theU.S.,and(2)thedollaramountofthesecontracts.Thesedataweregatheredfromthe semiannualFARAreports.FARAwasenactedbytheU.S.Congressin1938becauseof significantconcernsabouttheinvolvementofAmericanPRagenciesinGerman.

Sincethen,PRagencieshavebeenrequiredtopubliclyreportcontractsinvolving internationalclientstotheDepartmentofJustice.ThustheFARAdatasethasbeenthebest availablesourceofinformationregardingthediversetypesofinternationalpublicrelations activitiesconductedintheU.S.

ThedataforthisstudycamefromthefirstsemiannualFARAreportof2002.Aside fromthenumberofcontractsandthecontractpricesusedinthisanalysis,thereportalso includesotherPRrelatedcontractinformationfromover150countries,sortedin alphabeticalorder(e.g.,thePRagencyinvolvedanditscontactinformation,thedescription ofthecontractedservices,andthetermsofthecontract).TheFARAreportincludesallPR contractswithalltypesofinternationalclientssuchasindividuals,politicalparties,and corporateorganizations.However,onlycontractsbyforeigncentralgovernmentsincluding foreignaffairministriesandembassieswereselectedandcountedtotestmainhypothesesin thisstudy.

Operationalization and measurement of public perceptions of foreign countries

Publicperceptionofforeigncountrieswasconsideredashavingtwodimensions, cognitiveandaffectiveevaluations,followingGhanem’s(1997)andWantaetal.’s(2004) conceptualizations.Inthisstudy,cognitiveevaluationwasdefinedashowsignificantlythe

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AmericanpeopleperceiveacountryinrelationtotheU.S.,whiletheaffectiveevaluation wasdefinedashowAmericansfeelaboutagivencountry.

Tomeasurethesetwoaspectsofpublicperceptions,theresultsofaU.S.national survey,conductedbytheCCFRinJune2002,werecollected.TheCCFRisanonprofit organization,anditsquadrennialpublicopinionsurveyisregardedasthemost comprehensiveprojectexploringAmericanattitudestowardabroadrangeofinternational relationsissues,includingU.S.foreignpolicy.TheCCFRbeganitsWorldviewsProjectin

1974,andthe2002surveydataisthemostrecentoutputavailableonline

(www.worldviews.org or www.ccfr.org ).Inthe2002survey,withthecollaborationofHarris

Interactive,arandomlysampledsetof3,262U.S.citizenswereinterviewedviatelephone

(n=2,862)orinperson(n=400)fromJune1toJune30,2002.

Amonganumberofquestionsaskedinthesurvey,twoquestionswereutilizedasa measureofU.S.publicperceptionofforeigncountries:perceivedU.S.vitalinterestin foreigncountries,andthepublicfeelingstowardthesecountries.Theformerwasmeasured bythepercentageofrespondentswhothinktheU.S.hasavitalinterestinaforeigncountry.

ThemorepeopleagreedthatthecountryisofvitalinteresttotheU.S.,thehigherthescorea countryreceivedinthisarea.Publicfeelingsinvolvedemotionalevaluationselicitedwhen peoplewereaskedtorateeachcountryonascalefrom0to100.Assumingthemidpoint,50, isneutral,numbersover50meanapositivefeelingandnumberslessthan50indicatea negativefeeling.Themorepositivelyandfavorablyindividualsconsideredthecountry,the higherthescoregiventothatcountry.

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TheFARAreportandtheCCFR’spublicopinionsurveyhad24countriesin common.These24countriesconstitutedthecompletelistofcountries(N=24)thattargeted theU.S.withpublicrelationseffortsthatwereanalyzedinthisstudy.

Content analysis of news coverage

Acontentanalysisofnewscoveragewasconductedtoexaminehowprominently the24countrieswereportrayedintheU.S.newsmediaandvalenceofthatcoverage.Thus, newscoverageofthe24foreigncountriesintheU.S.presswasanalyzedforprominenceand valence.

Sampling process. Twonewspapers,the New York Times andthe Washington Post , wereselectedforanalysis.Thesenewspapersarewidelyconsideredtohavethestrongest internationalnewscoverageandaremostinfluentialinreachingtheopinionsofU.S.leaders andthegeneralpublic.Thesenewspapersarealsoknowntoaffectthecontentofothernews mediachannelsintheU.S.andoverseas.

Thefulltextofstoriesaboutthe24countriespublishedfromJanuary1,2002to

June30,2002,wereretrievedfromtheLexisNexisdatabase( http://web.lexis nexis.com/universe/form/academic/index.html ).Theperiodofanalysiswasidentifiedby consideringthetimeittakestotransferanissuefromthemediaagendatothepublicagenda.

Amongatotalof4,302articlesretrievedfromLexisNexis,onethirdwereselected foranalysisthroughasystematicsamplingmethod.First,newsarticleswereretrieved countrybycountrybyusingthenameofagivencountryasasearchkeywordinnews headline.Then,everythirdarticleswereselectedineachlistofarticleswithhavingthefirst oneinthelistasastartingpoint.

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Sampledarticleswereexcludedforcodingifthearticlesmentionedacountryonlyin aperipheralway.AnynewsitemintheInformationBankAbstracts,whichisanabstract typeofnewsarticleprovidedbythe Wall Street Journal andpublishedinthe New York

Times ,wasincludedforaanalysis(i.e.,thetotalnumberofarticles),butwasexcludedin furthercodingforprominenceandvalencebecausetheyaretooshort(about30wordsinone ortwosentences)toprovideanysenseofvalence.Iftwoormorecountrieswerediscussedin anarticle,thearticlewascodedaspertainingonlytothecountryoftheprimaryactor.The actionsofacountry’scitizens(e.g.,crime,murder,fraud)intheirowncountryandintheU.S. wereincludedforanalysisbecausethebehaviorsofcitizensmayaffectpublicperceptions.

Thus,ifmorethan20percentofthesamplesforeachcountrywereexcludedforthese reasons,thesamenumberofarticleswassubstitutedinthesamesamplingframethrougha repeatedsystematicsamplingmethod.

Prominence. Prominence,inthisstudy,wasmeasuredbyevaluatingfourindicators:

(1)thenumberofnewsarticles,(2)thelengthofcoverage,(3)thepositionofstorieswithin thecoverage,and(4)thepresenceofsupplementarygraphicdevicesinthecoverage.

First,thetotalnumberofarticlesforeachcountrywascounted.Thetotalnumberof articleshasbeenusedasareliableindicatorofintensityofcoverageinmanypreviousstudies

(e.g.,Shoemaker,Damielian,&Brendlinger,1991;Wantaetal.,2004;Manheimand

Albritton,1984).Inaddition,thelengthofthearticlewascodedintermsofnumberofwords, andthepositionofthearticleswithinanewspapereditionwascodedasacategorical variable:3=frontpage,2=sectionfrontpage,1=otherpages.Thesetwovariableswere added,followingShoemakeretal.(1991)andLee(2004),becausepeopleareinfluencednot onlybythesheervolumeofstoriesbutalsobyirregularandaccidentalexposuretocoverage.

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Lastly,theuseofsupplementarygraphicdeviceswascoded:1=oneormore graphicdevices,0=nographicdevice.Supplementarygraphicdevicesincludeanyvisuals thataccompanynewsarticles,suchaspictures,graphs,diagrams,tables,andcartoonsor otherillustrations.Thepresenceofthesegraphicdeviceswasdeterminedbythecaption informationprovidedbyLexisNexis.Scholarsnotethatvisualcuesinnewsstories,bothin newspaperandtelevision,haveasignificanteffectonaudiences’cognitiveprocessesand responsebecausetheyfunctionas“capturingandsustainingattention,improvingmemory, andincreasingarousal”(ColemanandBanning,2006,p.317).Forinstance,Wanta(1988) pointsoutthatthesizeofphotographsthataccompanynewsstoriesinfluencesreaders’ perceptionoftheimportanceofthatstory.

Acountryenjoyshighprominenceinthenewscoveragewhenitisoftencoveredby atargetcountry’snewsmediainlongerandmoreindepthstories,whenthearticlesare presentedinmorevisiblespace(suchasthefrontpageandthesectiontoppage),andwhen supplementarygraphicdevicesareprovided.

Valence. Valenceisdefinedasthegeneralorientationofnewscoverageandwas assessedas(1)positive,(2)negative,or(3)neutral.Positivearticlesarethosethatdiscuss

“progress,growth,prosperity,resources,strength,stability,andtrustworthinessonthepartof agivencountry.”Negativestoriesdiscuss“unreliability,untrustworthiness,weakness, instability,retreat,andinefficiencyonthepartofagivencountry”(Lee,2004,pp.42–43).

Wantaetal.(2004)sawatopic’sconformitywithU.S.interestsandvaluesasaglobal standardwithwhichindividualsjudgewhetherthenewsiseitherpositiveornegative.Inthis study,iftheprimaryforeigncountrydescribedinthestorythreatenedtheinterestsoftheU.S. orifitsactivitywasinconsistentwithU.S.values,thearticlewascodedasnegative.Ifthe

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activityofaforeigncountrywasseenassupportingU.S.interestsorvalues,itwascodedas positive.

TwocodersweretrainedtofollowthecodingguidelinesbasedonLee’s(2004)and

Wantaetal.’s(2004)studiestodecidewhetherthevalenceofanarticleispositiveor negative.Table1showscommonexamplesofpositiveornegativevalencefoundduringthe contentanalysis.

Table 1. Examples of positive and negative valence Examples of positive news Examples of negative news ∙Growthofcountryorigin ∙Lossofcountryorigincompanies ∙PositivecooperationwiththeUS (e.g.,bankruptcy,decreasein,etc.) ∙Lackofreligiousrights/freedoms ∙ Dangerousandunsafeenvironment (e.g,bombings,terroristthreats,armsthreats) ∙Conflictbetweencountriesandincountry (e.g.,labordispute,politicaltensions,etc.) ∙Turmoilandviolence ∙Devaluationofcurrency ∙Naturaldisaster(e.g.,earthquake) ∙Humandisaster(e.g.,airplanecrash) Aneutralvalenceisdefinedasoneinwhichneitherpositivenornegativeaspectsof acountryarediscussedorasonedemonstratingbothpositiveandnegativeaspectsofagiven countryinabalancedway.Thus,newsarticlesabouttheoutbreakofnaturalorhuman

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disasterswerecodedasnegative,butthosedealingwithgovernmentandpubliceffortsof restorationafterthedisasterswerecodedasneutral.

Thisstudyalsoconsideredvalenceproportion,whichisdefinedastheratioofthe numberofpositivearticlestothenumberofnegativearticles.Valenceproportionrecognizes thatpeopleareinfluencedbythedifferenttonesofthenewsitemstheyencounter;theimpact ofpositiverepresentationsofacountryinthenewsmaybebalancedbythatofnegative representations.Therefore,themorepositivecoverageacountryreceivedcomparedtothe negativecoverage,thehigherthescoreitattainedintermsofvalenceproportion.

Inter-coder reliability. Totestforintercoderreliability,10percentofthearticles weresystematicallychosenandcoded.TheresultoftheHolstiformulaforintercoder reliabilityshowsacceptablescoresforthefollowingcodedvariables:Country(1.00);Source

(1.00);Date(1.00);Length(1.00);Position(1.00);Graphics(1.00);Valence(0.89).The codingguidelinesandcodingsheetforthecontentanalysisareshowninAppendicesAand

B.

Theoretical model

TheproposedmodelofrelationshipsamongthevariablesisillustratedinFigure5.In thefigure,variablesinrectanglesdenoteobservedvariables,whereastheonesinovals denoteunobservedlatentvariables.

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Numberofarticles

Positionofthearticle

Lengthofthearticle

Useofgraphics

Public’s perceived News H2a significance H1a prominence Totalnumberof PRcontracts H3a International PR Totalamountof H3b Contractprices

News H1b Public feelings valence H2b

Percentageofpositivearticles

Percentageofnegativearticles

Valenceproportion

Figure 5. Theoretical model of the variables’ relationships

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Chapter 4.

Findings

Totestthehypothesesandthedegreeofmodelfitness,theSPSSandAMOSsoftware programswereused.

Descriptive statistics

International PR .FromthefirstsemiannualFARAreportof2002,thenumberof

PRcontractsandtotaldollaramountofthecontractsbyforeigncentralgovernmentincluding ministriesandembassies,werecountedandadded.Table2showshowmanyPRcontracts eachcountryhadintheU.S.andhowmuchmoneywasinvolvedinthesecontracts.

AccordingtotheFARAdataset,Japan,Mexico,SaudiArabia,andGreatBritainare thefourcountriesthathavethehighestnumberofcontractsandthehighesttotaldollar amountofcontractswithPRfirmsintheU.S.Ontheotherhand,nogovernmentbasedPR contractswerereportedforBrazilandRussia.Brazil,Iran,Iraq,Nigeria,Pakistan,and

Russiahavefewcontracts,andthuslittlemoneywasreportedforthesesmallnumbersof contracts.

Public perceptions of foreign countries .The2002Worldviewsreportfromthe

CCFRgroupedcountriesthattheU.S.publicperceivedtobeofvitalinteresttotheU.S.:(1) countriesforwhichover70%ofrespondentsagreedtheU.S.ashavingvitalinterest(Japan,

SaudiArabia,China,Russia,Israel,GreatBritain,Canada,Pakistan,Iraq,Iran,Afghanistan, andMexico);(2)countriesforwhich51to70%oftherespondentsagreed(SouthKorea,

Germany,Taiwan,India,Colombia,Egypt,France,andTurkey);and(3)countriesforwhich

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Table 2. Number of PR contracts and the dollar amount (from the 2002 FARA report) Number of PR contracts Dollar amount of PR contracts by Country by foreign central government foreign central government ($) Afghanistan 2 30,000 Argentina 4 125,000 Brazil 0 0 Canada 2 752,426 China 4 468,254 Colombia 2 385,603 Egypt 4 600,688 France 1 5,717,660 Germany 1 91,980 GreatBritain 7 6,721,831 India 4 1,873,737 Iran 2 5,793 Iraq 1 0 Israel 4 444,772 Japan 17 4,886,009 Mexico 11 3,008,663 Nigeria 3 300,000 Pakistan 2 300,408 Russia 0 0 SaudiArabia 9 6,818,764 SouthAfrica 2 2,839,060 SouthKorea 6 1,457,811 Taiwan 2 91,700 Turkey 5 1,077,018

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under50%oftherespondentsagreed(SouthAfrica,Argentina,Brazil,andNigeria).

Statisticsregardingthepublic’sperceivedsignificanceofthesecountriesisprovidedinTable

3.

TheWorldviewsreportalsomeasureshowtheU.S.publicfeelsaboutthesecountries byaskingrespondentstoratethemonascalefrom0to100.Consideringthemidpoint,50,as representinganeutralfeeling,ascoreofover50indicatesapositiveandfavorablefeeling andascoreunder50indicatesanegativefeeling.Accordingtothereport,Canada(77)and

GreatBritain(76)areatthetopofthescale,followedbyGermany(61),Japan(60),and

Mexico(60).Russia,Israel,Brazil,France,Taiwan,SouthAfrica,China,Argentina,India,

SouthKorea,Turkey,Egypt,andNigeriaareinthemidrange,betweenthe40sand50son thescale.Atthesametime,U.S.citizensfeelnegativelyaboutthefollowingcountries:Iraq

(23),Iran(28),Afghanistan(29),Pakistan(31),SaudiArabia(33),andColombia(36).

Content analysis of news coverage. Amongthe4,302articlesretrieved,1,277 articles(approximately30%)weresampled.Thenumberofarticlespublishedinthe New

York Times articlesinthesampleistwiceaslargeasthenumberof Washington Post articles.

Atotalof865(67.7%)articleswerefromthe New York Times while412(32.3)articleswere fromthe Washington Post (Table4).

Prominencewasdefinedearlierasacompositevariablethatincludesthetotal numberofnewsarticles,thelengthofcoverage,thepositionofstorieswithinthenewspaper issue,andthepresenceofsupplementarygraphicdevicesinthecoverageofaforeigncountry.

Table5showsthebreakdownofthesefourprominenceindicatorsbycountry.

ThesecondcolumnofTable5showstotalnumberofarticlesandnumberofsampled articlesinparenthesis.Thereisahugevarianceintotalnumberofarticlesbetweencountries

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Table 3. Public perceptions of foreign countries (from the 2002 CCFR survey) Country Public’s perceived significance Public feelings Afghanistan 73 29 Argentina 39 47 Brazil 36 55 Canada 76 77 China 83 48 Colombia 62 36 Egypt 53 45 France 53 55 Germany 68 61 GreatBritain 78 76 India 65 46 Iran 75 28 Iraq 76 23 Israel 79 55 Japan 83 60 Mexico 72 60 Nigeria 31 42 Pakistan 76 31 Russia 81 55 SaudiArabia 83 33 SouthAfrica 49 50 SouthKorea 69 46 Taiwan 65 50 Turkey 52 45 *Public’sperceivedsignificancewasmeasuredbythepercentageofrespondentswhoagreed thatthecountryisofvitalinteresttotheU.S. *Publicfeelingswasmeasuredonascalefrom0to100;withthemidpoint,50,asneutral, over50representsapositivefeelingwhileunder50representsanegativefeeling.

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Table 4. Number of articles by news source Source Number of articles Percent (%) New York Times 865 67.7 Washington Post 412 32.3 Total 1,277 100.0 duringthestudyperiod:from30(Nigeria),thefewest,to479(China),themostnumberof stories.

Eachsamplearticlewasalsocodedforthefollowingvariables:(1)thelengthofthe article(thenumberofwordsinastory),(2)thepositionofthearticlewithinthepublication

(3=frontpage;2=sectionfrontpage;1=otherpages),and(3)theuseofsupplementary graphicdevices(1=oneormoregraphicdeviceused;0=none).Themeanoflength,the meanofposition,andtheratioofsupplementarygraphicdevicesarepresentedinTable5.

Intermsoflength,storiesthatareIran,Argentina,Russia,Pakistan,andIsraelwere prominentlyreportedwithmorethan850wordsperarticleontheaverage.Thiswasfollowed byIndia,with820words.ThearticlesregardingGermanyweretheshortest,withanaverage of326wordsperarticle.Egypthad420wordsperarticle,andFrancehadaround480words.

Intermsofposition,articlesaboutGermanywerethemostprominentlydisplayed(1.49).

Israel(1.48),Argentina(1.47),andAfghanistan(1.46)werealsomorelikelytoappearin visiblepositionsthanothercountries.Table5presentsthatEgypt,Nigeria,andTurkey registeredapositionmeanof1.00,whichmeansthatarticlesaboutthesecountriesmostly appearedinlessvisiblepagesratherthaninthefrontorsectionfrontpages.Storiesabout

SouthKoreanoticeablyrankedatthetop(0.57)intheiruseofgraphicdevices,followedby

SouthAfrica(0.55),Japan(0.43),andTurkey(0.42).Almosthalfofthearticlesregarding

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Table 5. News prominence of the countries Total number of articles Ratio of Country Mean length Mean position (Number of sampled graphic device articles) Afghanistan 207 (61) 730 1.46 0.23 Argentina 191 (57) 860 1.47 0.30 Brazil 125 (40) 610 1.43 0.28 Canada 201 (55) 541 1.42 0.22 China 479 (138) 761 1.38 0.28 Columbia 109 (32) 691 1.16 0.25 Egypt 42 (13) 420 1.00 0.38 France 193 (60) 477 1.33 0.37 Germany 186 (53) 326 1.49 0.40 GreatBritain 245 (69) 512 1.25 0.25 India 273 (73) 820 1.29 0.34 Iran 94 (30) 872 1.17 0.13 Iraq 158 (40) 663 1.18 0.13 Israel 393 (130) 850 1.48 0.25 Japan 368 (119) 758 1.39 0.43 Mexico 183 (48) 702 1.25 0.33 Nigeria 30 (11) 499 1.00 0.18 Pakistan 268 (72) 851 1.43 0.35 Russia 238 (76) 856 1.36 0.26 SaudiArabia 45 (15) 605 1.07 0.13 SouthAfrica 39 (11) 717 1.27 0.55 SouthKorea 76 (23) 627 1.43 0.57 Taiwan 77 (27) 616 1.33 0.26 Turkey 82 (24) 599 1.00 0.42 Total 4,302 (1,277) 705 1.35 0.30 *Meanlengthwascalculatedbythesumoflengthdividedbythenumberofsampledarticles(N). *MeanpositionwascalculatedbythesumofpositionfactordividedbyN. *RatioofgraphicdevicewascalculatedbythefrequencyofgraphicdevicesdividedbyN.

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thesecountrieshadsupplementarygraphicdevices.ArticledealingwithIran,Iraq,andSaudi

Arabiabarelyemployedsupplementarygraphicdevices(Table5).

Table6presentshowpositivelyornegativelyeachcountrywasportrayedinthe newspapersintermsofthepercentageofpositiveandnegativearticles.Thetableshowsthat

SouthKorea,Turkey,SouthAfrica,andRussiahadrelativelyhighpercentagesofpositive articles,eachregisteringgreaterthan40%.Ontheotherhand,Iraq,Iran,Argentina,Pakistan,

Colombia,andIsraelwerepresentedmorenegativelythanothercountries.Thepercentageof negativearticleswasgreaterthan50%forthesecountries.Iraqwasdescribedmost negatively.Itwasrankedatthetopintermsofthepercentageofnegativearticles(67.5%) andatthesecondbottomintermsofthepercentageofpositivearticles(10.0%).

Valenceproportion,ortheratioofthenumberofpositivearticlestothenumberof negativearticles,wascalculated.Thisnumberprovidesanindexthatexcludesneutraland nonavailablearticles.AsTable6shows,Canada(2.40)hasthehighestvalenceproportion, followedbySouthKorea(1.71),GreatBritain(1.62),Turkey(1.57),andRussia(1.48).Iraq,

Colombia,andIranhadthelowestvalenceproportions,0.15,0.19,and0.32,respectively.In addition,France(.33),India(.34),Israel(.35),Afghanistan(.37),Argentina(.37),and

Pakistan(.39)werelikelytobeportrayedmorenegatively.

Hypotheses testing

StructuralequationmodelingusingtheAMOSprogramwasplannedtotestthe hypothesesandtheresearchquestion.However,becauseoflimitedsamplesize,SEM analysisproducederrorssuchasnegativevariancesandinadmissibleparametersolutions.

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Table 6. News valence of countries Number of Number of Number of Valence Country N positive negative neutral NA proportion articles (%) articles (%) articles (%) Afghanistan 61 10(16.4%) 27(44.3%) 20(32.8%) 4(6.6%) 0.37 Argentina 57 13(22.8%) 35(61.4%) 8(14.0%) 1(1.8%) 0.37 Brazil 40 14(35.0%) 15(37.5%) 10(25.0%) 1(2.5%) 0.93 Canada 55 24(43.6%) 10(18.2%) 21(38.2%) 0(0.0%) 2.40 China 138 25(18.1%) 61(44.2%) 48(34.8%) 4(2.9%) 0.41 Colombia 32 3(9.4%) 16(50.0%) 11(34.4%) 2(6.2%) 0.19 Egypt 13 4(30.8%) 3(23.1%) 5(38.5%) 1(7.7%) 1.33 France 60 7(11.7%) 21(35.0%) 30(50.0%) 2(3.3%) 0.33 Germany 53 13(24.5%) 23(43.4%) 16(30.2%) 1(1.9%) 0.57 GreatBritain 69 21(30.4%) 13(18.8%) 35(50.7%) 0(0.0%) 1.62 India 73 12(16.4%) 35(47.9%) 25(34.2%) 1(1.4%) 0.34 Iran 30 6(20.0%) 19(63.3%) 5(16.7%) 0(0.0%) 0.32 Iraq 40 4(10.0%) 27(67.5%) 9(22.5%) 0(0.0%) 0.15 Israel 130 23(17.7%) 65(50.0%) 37(28.5%) 5(3.8%) 0.35 Japan 119 31(26.1%) 53(44.5%) 35(29.4%) 0(0.0%) 0.58 Mexico 48 15(31.3%) 18(37.5%) 14(29.2%) 1(2.1%) 0.83 Nigeria 11 3(27.3%) 5(45.5%) 3(27.3%) 0(0.0%) 0.60 Pakistan 72 14(19.4%) 36(50.0%) 22(30.6%) 0(0.0%) 0.39 Russia 76 31(40.8%) 21(27.6%) 23(30.3%) 1(1.3%) 1.48 SaudiArabia 15 4(26.7%) 7(46.7%) 4(26.7%) 0(0.0%) 0.57 SouthAfrica 11 5(45.5%) 5(45.5%) 1(9.1%) 0(0.0%) 1.00 SouthKorea 23 12(52.2%) 7(30.4%) 3(13.0%) 1(4.3%) 1.71 Taiwan 27 5(18.5%) 11(40.7%) 10(37.0%) 1(3.7%) 0.45 Turkey 24 11(45.8%) 7(29.2%) 6(25.0%) 0(0.0%) 1.57 Total 1,277 310 (24.3%) 540 (42.3%) 401 (31.4%) 26 (2.0%) 0.57 *Percentagesinparenthesiswerecalculatedbythenumberofpositive/negative/neutralarticlesdividedbytotal numberofarticles(N). *NAdenotesnewsarticlesthatwerenotcodedforvalencebecausethearticlesdidnothavetextbutrathera graphicdevice. *Valenceproportionwascalculatedasthenumberofpositivearticlesdividedbythenumberofnegative articles.

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Therefore,multivariateregressionanalysisusingSPSSwasappliedtotesthypotheses assumingtherelationshipsamongvariables.

Thefirstsetofhypothesesproposedtheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsofa foreigncountrywillinfluencetheU.S.newscoverageintermsoftheprominenceand valence.Multiplelinearregressionswerecalculatedtopredicteachprominencevariable

(totalnumberofarticle,length,position,andgraphicuse)andvalencevariable(percentage ofpositivearticles,percentageofnegativearticles,andvalenceproportion)basedontwo internationalPRvariables(numberofPRcontractsanddollaramountofPRcontracts).

AsTable7shows,twointernationalPRvariablesexplained6.5percentofvariance intotalnumberofarticles,12.1percentofvarianceinlengthofthearticles,3.0percentof varianceinpositionofthearticles,and4.2percentofvarianceingraphicuseinthearticles, andtheseresultswerenotstatisticallysignificant.NeithernumberofPRcontractsnordollar amountofPRcontractscanaccountforthevarianceoffourprominencevariablesina significantlevel.

TwointernationalPRvariablesalsodidnotcontributetoeachofthreevalence variables.OnlytinyportionofvarianceswereexplainedbytwointernationalPRvariables, andtheallofthemwerenotstatisticallymeaningful:1.8%ofpercentageofpositivearticles;

8.6%ofpercentageofnegativearticles;and1.3%ofvalenceproportion(Table7).Insum, twointernationalPRvariablesdonotinfluenceanyofvalenceindicatorsatasignificantlevel.

Thesecondsetofhypothesesassumedthattheextenttowhichaforeigncountryis prominentlyandpositivelyportrayedintheU.S.newsmediawillaffecthowAmerican publicperceivetheforeigncountry.

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Table 7. Regression analysis of international PR variables on news prominence and valence Independent variables Number of PR Amount of PR Dependent variables contracts contract prices Total R 2 Newsprominence Totalnumberofarticles .316 .155 .065 Length .329 .422 .121 Position .012 .165 .030 Graphicuse .206 .001 .042 Newsvalence Percentageofpositivearticles .142 .011 .018 Percentageofnegativearticles .116 .347 .086 Valenceproportion .009 .120 .013 *p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note .Numbersinthesecondandthirdcolumnarestandardizedcoefficientbeta.

Table8indicatesthatfournewsprominencevariableswerefoundtoexplain31.2% ofthevarianceinpublic’sperceivedsignificance,butwasnotatasignificantlevel.Among fourindependentvariables,however,totalnumberofarticleswasturnedoutasastatistically significantdeterminantwithastandardizedbetaof.514.

Ontheotherhand,accordingtoTable8,amultiplelinearregressionshowsthat threenewsvalencevariablesexplainalmosthalfofthevarianceinpublicfeelings(46.8%)at the.005level.Percentageofnegativearticleswasthemostpowerfuldeterminanttoexplain differencesinpublicfeelings(standardizedbeta=.589).Therefore,theresultssupportthe hypothesisthatthemorenegativelyaforeigncountryisportrayedintheU.S.newsmedia, themorenegativelythecountrywillbeperceivedbytheU.S.public.

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Table 8. Regression analysis of news prominence and valence on the public perceptions Dependent variables Independent variables Public’s perceived significance Public feelings Newsprominence Totalnumberofarticles .514 * Length .071 Position .057 Graphicuse .180 TotalR 2 .312 Newsvalence Percentageofpositivearticles .048 Percentageofnegativearticles .589 * Valenceproportion .146 TotalR 2 .468 *** *p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note .NumbersinthesecondandthirdcolumnexcepttotalR 2scoresarestandardizedcoefficientbeta.

Thethirdsetofhypothesessuggestedthattheinternationalpublicrelationseffortsof aforeigncountrywillinfluenceU.S.publicperception.However,theresultsindicatedthat neitherofinternationalPRvariablesdidcontributetopublic’sperceivedsignificanceand publicfeelingsinameaningfulextentatasignificantlevel;9.3%ofvarianceinpublic’s perceivedsignificanceand11.3%ofvarianceinpublicfeelingscanbeaccountedfornumber ofPRcontractsanddollaramountofthecontracts(Table9).

Model fitting

Becauseoflimitedsamplesize(N=24),testofproposedmodelfitnesswasrestricted.

Comparedtothenumberofparameterstobeestimatedintheproposedmodel,24caseswere

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Table 9. Regression analysis of international PR on the public perceptions Dependent variables Independent variables Public’s perceived significance Public feelings InternationalPR NumberofPRcontracts .289 .050 AmountofPRcontractprices .026 .303 TotalR 2 .093 .113 *p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note .NumbersinthesecondandthirdcolumnexcepttotalR 2scoresarestandardizedcoefficientbeta. notsufficientfortheSEManalysis.Theresultofanalysisthereforecausedsomeerrorssuch asnegativevarianceandinadmissibleparametersolution.Becausethisproblemcouldnotbe solveduntilmoresamplecasesarecollected,amodelwasmodifiedinawaywhich decreasesthenumberofindicators.Insteadoftwolatentvariables–newsprominenceand valenceandsevenobservedindicatorslinkedwiththesetwolatentvariables,oneobserved indicatorforeachlatentvariablewasselected–totalnumberofarticlesandpercentageof negativearticleswhichwasfoundouttobestexplaintherelationshipsbetweenvariables throughpreviousmultipleregressionanalyses.Figure6showstheoutcomesofthemodified modelfitting.

Inthismodifiedmodel,thereisonelatentvariable,orinternationalPR.Twoobserved indicators–numberofPRcontractsandamountofPRcontractpriceswereusedforthe unobservedlatentvariable,andsquaredmultiplecorrelations(SMCs)wereusedtotestthe reliabilityoftheobservedindicators.TwointernationalPRindicatorswerereportedto have.652and.548score,whichmeansthat65.2%and54.8%oftheobservedindicators wereexplainedbythelatentvariables(i.e.,internationalPR).

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e3 e4

.468*** Total number Public ’s perceived .218 of articles significance .808 e1 Number .218 Int ’l e2 Amount PR .213 .740 -.206 Percentage of negative Public feelings articles -.638****

e5 e6

Figure 6. Modified model fitting *p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001.

Thestandardizedregressionweightfromtotalnumberofarticlestopublic’s perceivedsignificanceis.468[criticalratio(CR)=2.589]andisstatisticallysignificant

(p<.01),andtheregressionweightfrompercentageofnegativearticlestopublicfeelingsis

.638(CR=4.181, p<.001).Theresultsofmodeltestingsupporttwohypotheses:themore oftenacountryisreportedinthenews,themoresignificantlythecountryisperceivedbythe

U.S.public(H2a);themorenegativelyacountryisportrayedinthenews,themore negativelythecountryisperceivedbythepublic(H2b).

TherelationshipsbetweeninternationalPReffortsandnewscoveragewerenot statisticallysignificant(H1aandH1b).TheamountofinternationalPReffortswas significantlyrelatedneithertototalnumberofarticles(standardizedregressionweight=.218,

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CR=.901, p=.357)nortopercentageofnegativearticles(standardizedregressionweight=

.206,CR=.850, p=.395).

Lastly,asforthedirectcausalrelationshipsbetweeninternationalPReffortsand publicperceptions(H3aandH3b),thereisnostatisticalevidencetoshowtheinfluenceof internationalPReffortsonthepublic’sperceivedsignificanceofforeigncountries

(standardizedregressionweight=.218,CR=1.016, p=.309)oronpublicfeelings

(standardizedregressionweight=.213,CR=1.159, p=.247).

Inaddition,themodelfitindexesshowthatcollecteddatadonotfitfortheproposed model[ Chi-square (df=7)=10.869,goodnessoffitindex(GFI)=.880,adjustedgoodness offitindex(AGFI)=.639].Generally,themodelisconsideredacceptablewhenGFIis greaterthan.9andAGFIisgreaterthan.8.Becausethesetwomeasuresfailedtomeetthese criteria,thesuggestedmodelisnotacceptabletoexplainthedata.

DetailedstatisticsregardingthetestedmodelareprovidedinTable10.

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Table 10. Estimates of model testing Model Parameters Unstandardized SE CR Std. RegressionWeights PR→Totalnumberofarticles .016 .017 .901 .218 PR→Percentageofnegativearticles .000 .000 .850 .206 PR→AmountofPRcontractprices 1.000 .740 PR→NumberofPRcontracts .002 .001 1.858 .808 PR→Public’sperceivedsignificance .002 .002 1.016 .218 PR→Publicfeelings .002 .002 1.159 .213 Totalnumberofarticles→Public’sperceivedsignificance .062 .024 2.589 *** .468 Percentageofnegativearticles→Public 70.028 16.749 4.181 **** .638 feelings Variance PR 2616990.696 1814664.031 1.442 e1 4.995 4.905 3.339 **** e2 2161062.796 1456026.559 3.344 **** e3 12786.877 3829.972 1.484 e4 161.085 48.541 1.018 e5 015 .005 3.319 **** e6 94.362 28.648 3.294 **** Note.SE=StandardError;CR=CriticalRatio Chi-square (7)=10.869, p=.144;GFI=.880;AGFI=.639;NFI=.767;TLI=.738;CFI=.878;RMSEA=.155. *p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001.

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Chapter 5.

Discussion

Main issues

Theresultsofhypothesestestingpartiallysupportthepropositionsofthesecond levelagendasettingtheory.Howpositively(ornegatively)acountryisportrayedinthenews moreinfluencedhowpeoplefeelaboutthecountrythanhowprominentlyacountryis reportedinthenewsinfluencedhowsignificantlythecountryisperceivedbythepublic.

Thestrongrelationshipbetweentotalnumberofarticlesandthepublic’sperceived significanceofacountry(standardizedregressionweight=.468)isconsistentwiththe outcomesofWantaetal.’sstudy(2004).Wantaetal.(2004)alsofoundthattherespondents’ affectiveevaluationwasnotinfluencedbypositivecoverageofacountrybutbythenegative coverage.Inthecurrentstudy,amongthreeindicatorsofnewsvalence,onlypercentageof negativearticlesturnedouttobesignificantlyrelatedtopublicfeelings.

Theresultsofthisstudy,however,didnotprovidestatisticalevidencetosupporta directinfluenceofinternationalPReffortsoneithernewscoverageorpublicperceptions eventhoughhypothesizeddirectionsanddecentscoresofregressionweightswereestimated

(around.22).ThecurrentstudyalsoshowedthatinternationalPRbearsaweakindirecteffect onpublicperceptionofaforeigncountry,whichismediatedbynewscoverage(.102on public’sperceivedsignificance;.131onpublicfeelings).Therearesomepossible explanationswhyinternationalPRhasonlylimitedeffectsonmediaandpublicagenda.

EventhoughonlyinternationalPRwasconsideredtoinfluenceinternationalnews contentandpublicperceptionsinthisstudy,therearealotofinfluentialfactorstoaffect

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newscontentandpublicperceptionsofforeigncountries.Thisstudydidnotcontrolother substantialfactors,andfollowingsmaybesuchfactors.

Firstly,historicaleventsduringtheanalysistimeframemayhaveinfluencedthenews prominenceandvalenceofcertaincountriesinacertainway.Forexample,the2002World

Cupandthe2002WinterOlympicsgeneratedaconsiderablecoverage.SouthKoreamadeit tothe2002WorldCupsemifinalsandcohostedthisinternationalsportsevent.Its performanceandrolemayhaveproducedasubstantiallypositivecoverageofthecountry.

PresidentClinton’svisittoChinaalsoproducedaheavypositivecoverageofChina.Onthe otherhand,the“Waronterror”launchedfollowingSeptember11,2001,musthaveproduced alargenumberofnegativearticlesaboutMiddleEasterncountries.Severeconflictswith guerrillasandterroristgroups,andproblemswithinternationaldrugtraffickersinColombia causednoticeablyhighpercentageofnegativearticlesregardingthecountry.Thesehistorical eventsmayencouragegovernmentdrivenPRactivities,butthatdoesnotalwayshappen.

Second,somecountrieshaveinvolvedlonglastingeconomicandpoliticalinterests withtheU.S.ChinaandRussiaaresuchcases,andtheytendtobeprominentlyportrayedby theU.S.mediaandalsosignificantlyperceivedbytheU.SpublicregardlesstheirPRefforts.

Inaddition,countrieswhichhavepotential/currentconflictwiththeU.S.,especiallymilitary involvements,suchasIran,Iraq,Afghanistan,andPakistan,tendtobeconsideredsignificant becauseofpotentialdamageonpeople’sdailylifeaswellasnationalinterest.These countriesrarelyhavePRcontractswithU.S.firms,butU.S.publicsperceivethesecountries assignificantandU.S.mediaoftentimescoverthesecountriesintheirstories.

Thesefactors–internationalhistoricalevent,economic/politicalinterestswithforeign countries,andpotential/currentthreatsofforeigncountriesaregenerallyregardedashaving

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highnewsvalueornewsworthiness.Consideringthatcountriesorforeignaffairswithhigh newsvaluearelikelytobeappearedinthenewsmediaregardlessofthecountries’PRefforts, newsvalueisanothermajordeterminanttoaffectnewscontentandpublicperceptions.

Third,therearelongestablishedpublicperceptionsofforeigncountriesasalliesor enemiesinrelationtotheU.S.Forexample,CanadaandGreatBritainaretraditionalU.S. allies,andthefavorableopinionaboutthesecountrieshasnotbeenbuiltinashorttime.Such alongestablishedpublicperceptionmaynotbeaffectedbyshorttermPRactivities.

Lastly,althoughthisstudyhypothesizedthatmoreinternationalPReffortwilllead peopletoconsiderthecountryassignificanttotheU.S.,peopleinthesurveymayperceive the term “significant” somewhat differently from what the researcher conceptualized. A country’ssignificanceorvitalinterestcanbeconsideredastwodifferentways—positiveor negative,butitseemsthatrespondentsinthe CCFRsurveyweremorelikelytoperceive thesetermsasnegative(e.g.,threattonationalsecurity)thanpositive.Peopletendtoconnect significanceofacountrywithseriouspoliticaloreconomicissues.For example,evenifa countrylikeBahamamakeshugePReffortstopromoteintheU.S.,itisconsidered as a nice vacation destination, not necessarily as a “significant” country to the U.S. In contrast,countrieslikeIranandSyriaareconsideredassignificanttotheU.S.withoutany

PRactivitiesintheU.S.becausetheyareconsideredasenemiestothreatentheU.S.national security.

TherearesomeempiricalcasestoimplytheinfluenceofinternationalPRonpublic perceptionsandmediacoverage.Forexample,Japan,Mexico,SaudiArabia,andSouth

KoreaareenjoyinghighsignificanceamongU.S.publicwithhavingrelativelymany

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contractswiththeU.S.PRfirms.Inspiteofthecaseswhichsupportthepotentialof internationalPR,theeffectseemstobeoffsetbytheothercasesmentionedabove.

Thisstudyisoneofafewthatquantifiedpublicrelationsandtriedtofindempirical evidenceofPRinfluenceonthenewsmediaandpublicperception.InternationalPRefforts wasoperationallydefinedandquantifiedfromthepubliclyavailablegovernmentgenerated data.Lee(2004)arguedthatalthoughthestrategicpublicrelationsofforeigngovernments areastrongdeterminantofinternationalnewsflows,alongwithenvironmentalandrelational factors,buthowPReffortsactuallyworktoachievetheirobjectiveshaveyettobecritically examined.EventhoughtheFARAdatasethassomelimitations,itisstillthebestavailable sourceofinternationalPRdata.Howtoimproveandutilizethisresourceremainsachallenge tofutureresearchers.

Limitations of the study and suggestions for future study

Thefirstlimitationofthestudyisthatitusedonly24countrycasesforanalysis

(N=24)duetothelimitedavailabilityofsecondarydata.Suchasmallnumberofcasesdid notonlyyieldinsufficientstatisticalpowerbutalsorestrictedtheuseofSEManalysisby producingnegativevariancesandinadmissibleparametersolutions.Therefore,itwasnot possibletotestoverallmodelfitwhichwasoriginallyproposed.Andalso,lessrigorous significancetestwiththe.10levelwasconductedhereduetorelativelyaverysmallsizeof cases.Ifmorecountrycasesareaddedfromothersecondarydatasetsoradditionaldata gatheringmethods(e.g.,asurvey),SEManalysisofanoverallmodelwillbefeasible,andthe resultsmaybemoreaccurateandmeaningful.

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Duringtheanalysis,italsobecameapparentthattheFARAdatasethascritical limitations.First,notallcontractsreportedprice.Becausemanycontractpricesaremissing, thesumofPRcontractpricesdoesnotrepresenttheactualfinancialresourcesdevotedto internationalPRefforts.Forexample,amongthefourPRcontractsreportedforAfghanistan, threecontractpricesweremissing(onereportedamountofa$30,000)thereby underestimatingAfghanistan’sPRefforts.Second,thereportreflectsonlycontractsthatare activeatthetimeofdatacollection,andthesecontractshavedifferentterms.Third,the majorityofthecountries(19outof24)includedinthedatasethadlessthansixgovernment drivenPRcontracts,andthus,thenumberofPRcontractswereextremelyskewedto0to5.

Withsuchskeweddistributionofdata,asmallnumberofcountrycasesstandinghighinPR contractnumbersmaydominatethestatisticresultintheirfavor.

ToovercomethelimitationsoftheFARAdataset,newindicatorsneedtobe developedtomoreaccuratelyassessinternationalPRefforts.Twoquantifiedindicatorsin thisstudycouldnotcapturethevarietyofPRefforts.Onepossibleindicatoristhenumberof foreignconsularofficesandtheirstaffingstrength.Inthenewsarticlesanalyzedinthisstudy, mostreaders’opinionsorresponsestoeventsanddevelopmentswereprovidedbystaff membersworkinginforeignembassiesandconsulatesintheU.S.whosupporttheinterests oftheircountriesbygivingfeedbacktothenewsmedia.Theyalsocontributetoimproving theirrespectivenationalimagesbyrepresentingthepointofviewoftheirowncountriesand byjustifyingtheirperspectives.Inaddition,otherstrategicactivitiesprogrammedbyforeign governments(e.g.,governmentsponsoredscholarshipsforforeignstudents,student exchangeprograms,andsecondlanguagelearningprograms)arealsopotentialindicators thatmayexplaintheinfluenceofinternationalPR.

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Third,inthemodelsuggestedinthisstudy,newscoveragemediatedtherelationship betweeninternationalPReffortsandpublicperception.Theresultsshowedasignificant relationshipbetweennewspapercoverageandpublicperceptionratherthanbetween internationalPReffortsandpublicperception,whichbolsterstraditionalagendasetting effects.However,toaccountforthediversemediaenvironment,othertypesofmedia channelsshouldbecountedasinfluentialcommunicationsourcesforforeignpublics,suchas ,entertainmentTVprograms,andwebsites.

Fourth,theresultsindicatethatgovernmentdrivenPRactivitieshavealimitedeffect onpublicperception.Peoplemaybeinfluencedmostlybyindividuallevelexperience,such asinterpersonalrelationshipswithforeignindividualsandexposuretoforeigncultures throughtravelingandculturalexchanges,ratherthanbyprogrammedPRactivitiesfrom foreigngovernments.Thus,itmaybeinterestingtocompareandcontrasttheeffectsof governmentdrivenPRactivitiesandindividuallevelexperiencesinfuturestudies.

Lastly,includingreversedirectionaleffects(linkagefrompublicperceptiontomedia contentandinternationalPRefforts,andfromnewscontenttointernationalPRefforts)inthe analysismaystrengthenthemodelproposedinthisstudy.Forexample,governmentswhich areconcerningaboutanegativenationalimageamongpublicsinatargetcountry,may deliberatelyincreasethePReffortstoimprovetheirnegativeimages.InternationalPR activitiesofIraqgovernmentintheU.S.(e.g.,PRcontractsreportedinFARA)arean implicitevidencetoshowthepossibilityofreversedirectionaleffect.Althoughconsidering reciprocalrelationshipsrequiresresearcherstoconfrontdifficultiesintimecontrol,these bidirectionalinteractionsmayhelpbetterunderstandtherelationshipsamongthevariables examinedinthisstudy.

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Appendix A. Searching procedure and coding guideline for content analysis 1.Goto http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/form/academic/index.html 2.Select“GuidedNewsSearch”tab 3.Select“GeneralNews”onStepOne:Selectanewscategory 4.Select“MajorPapers”onStepTwo:Selectanewssource 5.Select“NewYorkTimes,The”and“WashingtonPost,The”onSourceListandclick“Pasteto Search” 6.Type“countryname”intheblankandselect“Headline”onStepThree:Entersearchterms Retrievearticlesinanalphabeticalorderofcountryname Usesynonyms(BritainorEnglandorUK)whensearchingarticlesassociatedwithBritain Use“andnot”optionwitharestrictionwordtoexcludetheirrelevantarticlesforthe followingcases(“PaidNotice”forFrance;“NewEngland”forGreatBritain;“NewMexico” forMexico;and“chicken”forTurkey) 7.Specifysearchingperiodas“From01/01/02to06/30/02”onStepFour:Narrowtoaspecificdate range 8.Click“Search”atthebottom,thenyouwillseethelistofnewsarticlesandthenumberofarticles 9.Selecteverythirdarticles.Inotherwords,selectNo.1,4,7,10,13,16…articlesonthelist.By doingso,approximately33%oftotalarticleswillbeselectedforanalysis. 9.Startcodingeacharticleselectedandrecordingthedatainthecodingsheetfollowingthecoding instructions.

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Appendix B. Coding sheet for content analysis Variables Instructions Coding ID Assignconsecutiveintegersfrom1 Country Afghanistan(1);Argentina(2);Brazil(3);Canada(4); China(5);Colombia(6);Egypt(7);France(8); Germany(9);GreatBritain(10);India(11);Iran(12); Iraq(13);Israel(14);Japan(15);Mexico(16);Nigeria (17);Pakistan(18);Russia(19);SaudiArabia(20); SouthAfrica(21);SouthKorea(22);Taiwan(23); Turkey(24) Source NewYorkTimes=1 WashingtonPost=2 Date DateofarticlepublishedinMM/DD/YY Length Wordcount(Numeric) Position Frontpage=3 Sectionfront=2 Others=1 Supplementary Presenceofcaptionforsupplementarygraphicdevice graphicdevice Nocaption=0 Oneormorecaptions=1 Valence Positive=1 Negative=2 Neutral=3