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How China's Shadowy Agency Is Working to Absorb Taiwan

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TAIWAN SHOW OF INDEPENDENCE: An activist holds up Taiwan’s national flag during a Chinese official’s visit to Taipei on June 26.REUTERS/PICHI CHUANG Beijing is using the United Front as its main agent to thwart Taiwanese independence and incorporate the island of 23 million into the mainland. How China’s shadowy agency is working to absorb Taiwan BY YIMOU LEE AND FAITH HUNG SPECIAL REPORT 1 CHINA’S SHADOWY AGENCY TAIWAN TAIPEI / HONG KONG, NOVEMBER 27, 2014 ver since a civil war split the two sides more than 60 years ago, China Ehas viewed Taiwan as a renegade province that needs to be absorbed into the mainland. To that end, the legion of Taiwanese businessmen working in China is a beachhead. In June, hundreds of those business- men gathered in a hotel ballroom in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen. They were there to toast the new head of a local Taiwan merchants’ association. They sipped baijiu liquor and ate seafood as a troupe performed a traditional lion dance for good luck. An honored guest, senior Communist Party official Li Jiafan, stood to deliver con- gratulations and a message. “I urge our Taiwanese friends to contin- KEEPING ALERT: Annual military drills in Taiwan are aimed at repelling an attack from China. ue to work hard in your fields to contribute REUTERS/PICHI CHUANG to the realisation of the Chinese dream as soon as possible,” said Li, using a national- ist slogan President Xi Jinping has popula- The Chinese dream is also on visits to the mainland. rised. “The Chinese dream is also the dream the dream of the people on both INFLUENCING POLITICS of the people on both sides of the Taiwan sides of the Taiwan Strait – our Strait – our dream of reunification.” Through the United Front and other Li, who ended his speech to beating dream of reunification. Chinese state bodies like the Taiwan drums and loud applause, is a department Li Jiafan Affairs Office, which is responsible for im- chief in the Shenzhen arm of the United A department chief in the Shenzhen arm of the plementing policies toward Taiwan on is- Front Work Department, an organ of the United Front Work Department sues including trade and transport, Beijing Communist Party’s Central Committee. has also tried to influence politics on the is- Its mission: to spread China’s influence by Zhejiang, for instance, includes the num- land, in part by helping mobilise Taiwanese ultimately gaining control over a range of ber of Taiwanese living in the province, the businessmen on the mainland. groups not affiliated with the party and that number of businesses they run as well as an Many of them are heading back home are often outside the mainland. entry on background checks that have been this weekend to vote in mayoral elections United Front documents reviewed by conducted on the Taiwanese community in that are being viewed as a barometer of sup- Reuters, including annual reports, instruc- the province, an entrepreneurial hub near port for Taiwan’s ruling Nationalist Party, or tional handbooks and internal newslet- Shanghai. Kuomintang (KMT), which favours closer ters, as well as interviews with Chinese The United Front hasn’t confined itself ties with China than does the pro-indepen- and Taiwanese officials reveal the extent to the mainland. It is targeting academics, dence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). to which the agency is engaged in a con- students, war veterans, doctors and local A large number of those businessmen, who certed campaign to thwart any move to- leaders in Taiwan in an attempt to soften a senior KMT source said will largely vote ward greater independence by Taiwan and opposition to the Communist Party and for the party, will be flying on deeply dis- ultimately swallow up the self-ruled island ultimately build support for unification. counted airfares being offered by Chinese of 23 million. The 2013 work report, reviewed by Reuters, and Taiwanese airline companies. The United Front’s 2013 annual includes details of a program to bring “The goal is simple – peaceful unifica- work report for the Chinese province of Taiwanese students and military veterans tion,” said a person with ties to the Chinese SPECIAL REPORT 2 CHINA’S SHADOWY AGENCY TAIWAN MAYORAL RACE: Campaigning for Taiwan’s municipal elections on Nov. 29 . REUTERS/PICHI CHUANG leadership in Beijing. Soft power, not residents and which China’s leaders have Nations, and China has refused to rule out armed force, is the strategy. “To attack the proposed as a model for Taiwan. Reuters the use of force to gain control of the island. heart is the best. To attack a [walled] city reported in July that United Front opera- Since the KMT won the presidential is the worst,” the source said, quoting Sun tions in Hong Kong had shifted from the election in 2008, cross-Strait ties have been Tzu’s “Art of War.” backroom courting of academics and busi- warmer than ever. More than 20 trade Questions sent by fax to the Beijing office nessmen to the streets, where new groups deals, including the establishment of the of the United Front Work Department were of pro-Beijing agitators were attempting to first direct flights between Taiwan and not answered. The Chinese government’s silence critics of China. the mainland, have been inked. No trade Taiwan Affairs Office referred Reuters to a “What the United Front is doing to agreements were signed under the previous statement on its website saying it does not Taiwan now is the same as what it has been DPP-led administration. Earlier this year, comment on elections on “the island.” doing in Hong Kong since the 1980s – a Chinese and Taiwanese officials held their What’s happening in Taiwan is part of a quiet, slow but extensive penetration,” said first official meeting since 1949. broader effort by Beijing to bolster its con- Sonny Lo, a professor at the Hong Kong Taiwan’s economy has become increas- trol over restive territories on its periphery. Institute of Education and author of a book ingly intertwined with China’s. About 40 The United Front has long been active in on China’s covert control of the city. percent of Taiwan’s exports are to China Hong Kong, which is ruled under the “one Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan is a ful- and some key sectors like technology country, two systems” model that enshrines ly democratic entity. It has an army but have much of their manufacturing on the a wide range of personal freedoms for its does not have membership in the United Text continues on page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 3 CHINA’S SHADOWY AGENCY TAIWAN Taiwan-China trade Since 2008, China-friendly President Ma Ying-jeou has signed a series of landmark trade and economic agreements with Beijing, but both sides have showed little desire for political dialogue. Taiwan’s exports to Mainland China Taiwan’s imports from Mainland China $10 billion Jan. 2008 Sept. 2014 $6.0 bln $6.7 bln 7.5 August $4.1 bln 5.0 $2.8 bln 2.5 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 March April June January January April March Opposition Taiwan and Taiwan, China Senior army President Ma Taiwan holds Protesters block candidate China sign sign landmark officer wins second first live fire cross-Strait Ma Ying-jeou banking MOU, free trade pact, detained on term. drills in five services trade is elected which allows dubbed the suspicion of years, aer agreement, president. August both sides’ banks Economic spying for China and President Ma which they say July to conditionally Cooperation China. Taiwan sign warns of China's would allow Taiwan and China invest in each Framework investment rising military China too much agree to set up other. Agreement protection deal investment. sway over the permanent (ECFA), to cut economy. and ink yuan June offices. tariffs on about clearing Taiwan and June 800 products. November agreement, China sign a Chinese and China, Taiwan allowing cross-Strait Taiwanese sign agreement Taiwanese to services trade officials hold first for first direct trade RMB on pact under government-to- flights, shipping the island. ECFA. government and postal links. meeting since 1949. Data includes re-imports and re-exports. Sources: Reuters; Taiwan’s Bureau of Foreign Trade; Central Election Commission, Mainland Affairs Council SPECIAL REPORT 4 CHINA’S SHADOWY AGENCY TAIWAN mainland. The world’s biggest electronic components maker, Foxconn Technology Party Power Structure Group, which assembles Apple Inc’s Party Chief and President: iPhones, has many of its plants in China. Xi Jinping Taiwan presidential spokesperson Ma Weikuo said Taiwanese heading home to Seven-member Politburo standing committee Described as the collective leadership of China vote were exercising their right as citizens. “It is normal that Taiwanese businessmen living in Hong Kong, Macau, mainland China, Europe, Japan and other parts of the world want to return to Taiwan to vote,” Political she said. Bureau 25 members PRIZED HONOUR The United Front’s annual work reports and handbooks provide a window into the agency’s methods. It has at least 100 offices in Zhejiang. The 2013 work report said 30,000 Taiwanese businesspeople and their Central Committee families were living in the province and 6,800 Taiwanese enterprises had operations there at the end of 2012. United Front officials reported creat- ing a more friendly business environ- Government Central Military Central Secretariat United Front Discipline ment by helping to smooth investment People’s Commission Work Inspection Department problems and resolve legal disputes for Republic of China Commission resident Taiwanese. In the Zhejiang city People’s of Ningbo, one United Front office said it Liberation spent 110,000 yuan (about $18,000) to buy Army life and traffic accident insurance for 137 Taiwanese businessmen.
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