The Tokugawa Legacy: a Survey*

The Economic Studies Quarterly Vol. 38, No. 4, December 1987

THE TOKUGAWA LEGACY: A SURVEY*

By YASUKICHI YASUBA

1. Introduction Japan, at the time it emerged from its self-imposed seclusion from the rest of the world, used to be thought of as a backward and stagnant country. Its population had increased little during the preceding century. Fairly frequent famines were reported and infanticide was widely practiced as the major means of population control. More than three-fourths of the labor force were engaged in agriculture. How, then, was it possible for Japan to modernize itself in contrast to other late-comer countries? Japan was fortunate in a sense because Western nations, preoccupied with their own affairs, did not seriously try to colonize Japan, when they reached its shores. However, there are countries which failed or showed no interest in economic development despite a similarly favorable external environment. The question must then be asked whether the causes of the diver- gence of the course of development of Japan and other non-Western countries can be found in the differences in domestic social and economic conditions before the beginning of modern economic growth, namely, in the middle of the nineteenth century. The present paper will generally be confined to domestic social conditions toward the end of the Tokugawa Period and try to describe and evaluate part of the Tokugawa legacy in an effort to explain the later development.1) Demographic, cultural, political and economic factors will be taken up in the following sections, and the conclusion will be a general assessment.

2. Demographic Factors One of the most obvious social factors which favored Japan in the course of its industrialization after the Meiji Restoration was the relatively low rate of increase in population. The rate of natu- ral increase did not exceed 10 per thousand until around 1900, and the peak rate of increase in the 1930s was only slightly more than 15 per thousand. There is little doubt that such a slow population increase helped economic development by enabling the Japanese to achieve a higher rate of capital accumulation and requiring a lower demand for housing and related infrastructure. Despite considerable recent research in historical demography,2) the demographic state of affairs before 1920 is still less than clear. Even for the period from the Meiji Restoration to 1920

* I am grateful to Susan B. Hanley, Henry Rosovsky and C.L.J. van der Meer for comments on an earlier draft. 1) A similar, but inmost cases, more limited effort has been made by Crawcour (1965, 1974), Nakamura (1968), Umemura (1973a, 1973b). 2) For Tokugawa demographic history in particular, see the works by Akira Hayami and his associates cited below. -290- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey we have conflicting estimates of vital statistics. All we know at present is the approximate size of population in 18723)(34-35 million) and the approximate rate of increase (about 5 per thousand at first, gradually rising to 15 per thousand in 1920 and subsequent years). Hence, any combination of fertility and mortality rates capable of yielding these figures cannot be rejected.4) Under the circumstances, probably the best way to shed some light on the nature of the demographic transition in Japan is to compare life expectancy and, in particular, age-specific death rates

Table 1 Age Specific Death Rates, Male, Japan, 1751-1923 and U.N. Model

Notes: a) Ages for Yokouchiand Hida are expressedin the traditional Japaneseway. They exceedthe Westernreckoning by 1.5 years on average. b) Age groupsfor Fujito and Fukiageare 6-15, 16-45,46-65 and 66 andover. c) Averagefor the birth cohort born in 1726- 1775. d) For the population registeredat a templein Miya Mum. Age groupsare 1, 2-5, 6-10, etc. Peculiaritiesarising from using Japaneseages were correctedfor the firstthree age groups. One half of those who diedat agetwo weremoved to age one (zeroaccording to Westerncounting). Similarlyone tenth of deaths at ages5-9 and 10-14were shiftedto youngerage groups,although the mortality rate for the 15-19group was unchanged. e) Life-tablelife expectancy at age 0, estimated by a shortcut method suggestedin United Nations (1956), pp. 23-24, 26. Sources:Yokouchi: Hayami (1973), pp. 200, 204. Fujito and Fukiage:Hanley (1974), p. 133. Hida: Suda (1973),pp. 430-440. Japan, 1923: Mizushima (1963),p. 126. U.N. model: United Nations (1956),pp. 72-73

3) An incomplete registration of population was made in this year. Later estimates give the figures 34-35 million. See, for example, Mori (1935), p. 86. 4) Morita (1944), Okazaki (1962), and Yasukawa and Hirooka (1972) are some of the representative estimates. They give crude birth rates ranging between 30 and 37 for the 1870s. -291- The Economic Studies Quarterly before and after the Meiji Period. Accordingto recent studies based on religious investigations registers (shumon aratamecho), averagelife expectancyat birth or at age one tended to have been between 35 and 45.5) Since religious investigation registers do not record the deaths of infants born between the annual investigations,we are not in a position to make definitivestatements about life expectancy at birth. However, a comparison of the age-specificdeath rates of the adult population reveals that health in Tokugawavillages was no worse than in the Japan of 1923(for which life expectancy at birth for males was 41.1) or than the U.N. model correspondingto a life expectancy of 40 for males (see Table 1). Temple burial records meticulously compiled by Keizo Suda are instructive because they in- clude all deaths although under-registration cannot be ruled out. Second, they enable compari- sons to be made before and after the Meiji Period. Male life expectancy at birth, in this Hida (Gifu) villagein 1801-1850(34.7) was considerablybelow that for Japan in 1923 (41.1). This is because of higher mortality rates at ages below 10.6) Data are still limited and conflicting,7)but a few tentative conclusionsmay be presented. First health conditions for adults were relatively good. Secondly the infant mortality rate and the child mortality rate were high and were comparablewith those of LDCs before the introduction of modern medicine. Thirdly, the effective birth rate and the death rate were lower than in LDCs, setting the stage for a relativelylow rate of population increase after the Meiji Restoration. Finally, life expectancy was probably comparable to British expectancy before 1800.8) There is some evidence to indicate that a low rate of population increase was realized mainly at the expense of the poor.9) Further, there is evidence to show that it was the poor who postponed and abstained from marriage. In a village in Mino (Gifu), Akira Hayami found that the average age at first marriage was distinctly higher and the proportion of those who remained single was larger for the poor, with the result that the averagenumber of children was positively associatedwith economic status.10)A similar pattern was observed for another Mino villageby T.C. Smith. Smith also found that life expectancy was longer for peasants with large holdings than for those with small holdings.11)This and other evidence12)appear to substantiate

5) Kobayashi (1956), p. 38, Hayami (1971), p. 278, idem., (1973), p. 284, Suda (1973), p. 75, Kito (1974), p. 74, Hanley (1974), pp. 139-140, and Smith (1977a), p. 13. 6) Life expectancy can be correctly estimated from this type of data only when there is no migration of population. Probably migration may be disregarded in this particular village far from the large urban centers during the Tokugawa Period. 7) Kalland and Pedersen (1984) estimate from kakocho data that infant mortality in Fukuoka domain was as low as 100, even though there was some evidence of the underrecording of children's deaths . 8) British life expectancy is estimated to have been 35.9 in 1799-1803. Wrigley and Schofield (1981), p. 230. 9) Takahashi (1941) gives a detailed account of these practices. 10) Hayami (1974), pp. 180-181, and Hayami's worksheets. 11) Smith (1977a), pp. 51, 74, 92-94, 123. 12) Tsuda (1977) shows there was a wide discrepancy in family size according to economic status in a Kawachi (Osaka) village in 1871. The average family size for laborers was between 2.7 and 3.4, whereas the comparable figure for landowners with more than 5 koku (5 bushels of rice) was between 5.1 and 5.7 (pp. 51-56, 67-68). Towards the end of the Tokugawa Period, the extinction of poor families was often reported for Kami-Kawarabayashi, Settsu (Hyogo) [Imai and Yagi (1955), p. 76]. -292- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey the thesis13)that a large proportion of population control was realized at the expense of the poor. The practice helped to prevent the polarization of people by economic status. Official population statistics reveal no trend, remaining at about 26 million during the latter half of the Tokugawa Period. The accuracy of the figures, which exclude bushi (samurai), their servants, and certain other classes of people, is subject to doubt, but despite a recent effort at revision,14) the stagnation thesis has yet to be definitely modified. Thus, Tokugawa society was characterized by a moderate population increase until around 1730, which was followed by a century or more of near stagnation.15) Population pressure in the middle of the eighteenth century was already as high as in the early years of Meiji. It was relieved only by the population control already referred to, labor-intensive technical changes in agriculture, and the growth of non-agricultural activities, to which reference will be made later. Because of institutional and topographical peculiarities, Japan's urban growth took a somewhat different form from that of other countries. Most of the larger Tokugawa towns were known as joka-machi (castle towns), created and/or enlarged after 1600 by the shogunal policy of the con- centration of nonagricultural population. Edo (Tokyo), Osaka and Kyoto were very large towns by the early part of the eighteenth century. In particular, Edo, whose total population in this period was estimated to have been around one million, was probably the largest city in the world at the time. Other castle towns were smaller, but Nagoya, Kanazawa, Hiroshima and Okayama boasted chonin (urban commoners) populations exceeding 30,000 around 1700, and many other castle towns had chonin populations larger than 10,000. Thus, the Japan of 1700 can be described as exceptionally urbanized for a pre-industrial society. However, during the latter half of the Tokugawa Period, most of the castle towns lost ground, and, in their place, a large number of rural centers grew, based on commercial and industrial activities. 16) Some of these new rural centers (zaigo-machi), including Takasaki, Narita, Kiriu, Kobe, Hachioji and Itami, played important roles in economic development after the Meiji Restoration.17) The existence of local centers throughout Japan was a favorable factor not only for efficiency and growth but also for economic equality and political balance, in particular in comparison with countries having a single or only a few large centers. Due to the existence of the system of sankin kotai (alternate service, one year at Edo and the next year in the lord's own domain), the bushi and their servants were geographically mobile, though this mobility was restricted to movement between the home han (domain) and Edo. Commoners, at least middle-class commoners, traveled often to visit shrines, temples, hot springs

13) It is not conclusive, though, since Hanley and Yamamura (1977) has found no such systematic dif- ferential for Bizen (Okayama). 14) Hanley and Yamamura (1972). 15) It is likely that there was some increase after the 1830s, but we have evidence only for scattered villages. 16) Smith (1977b), pp. 169-172. 17) In 1884, 76% of factories whose location can be identified were located in rural areas particularly in the prefectures of Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu and Shimane [Yamaguchi (1956), p. 111]. The importance of rural locations of industry in early Meiji was also emphasized by Furushima (1961), Smith (1959) and Umemura (1973b). -293- The Economic Studies Quarterly and other places of interest.18) This movement of population caused the development of high- ways, inns and other service facilities, which further encouraged travel. At the time bridges were built and cart-and-wagon transportation was developed in the Meiji Period, the Tokugawa infrastructure proved to be a valuable heritage for economic developmehnt.

3. Cultural Factors Among cultural factors favoring economic development, the ethnic uniformity characterized by an assimilated race, a more or less common culture, and religions which were not too antago- nistic to one another should be mentioned. Because of the existence of such uniformity, after the Restoration Japan did not have to face many of the difficult problems associated with nation- building. Moreover, socio-economic development and the growth of mass culture in the latter half of the Tokugawa Period led to a change in the nature of bushi education and a rise in mass education. Here the causal relationship was circular; socio-cultural development induced educational development which then promoted further socio-cultural development. Socio-economic difficulties resulting from famines and the polarization of people by economic status apparently led the ruling class to feel the need to educate the talented so that they could serve society. This objective was stated in numerous documents from schools and han in the latter half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. Thus, for instance, a document relating to the re-establishment of hanko (domain school) in Akizuki stated in 1784; "Education , being an important means for achieving political stability, should nurture useful talents and, thus, make them serve to the interests of the 'nation'."19) The number of schools for bushi (domain schools and gogaku) increased after the middle of the eighteenth century, but more important was the restructuring of the contents of education. Bushi education gradually shifted its emphasis from classics to practical subjects including medicine, arithmetic and Western studies. The shift began as early as 1751-1780 but did not become significant until toward the end of the Tokugawa Period .20) In the 1830s and later, the shogunate, han, and even private interests established new shools specializing in Western studies, where many of the Meiji leaders were trained.21) The possibility of upward social mobility and the fear of famines and downward mobility apparently combined to create a demand for practical education on the part of the masses. The rise in mass culture in the nineteenth century was an important cause for interest in education. Various art forms formerly monopolized by the ruling class such as theater, poetry, novels, tea ceremony, and flower arrangement were starting to become popular among commoners. Particularly important was the spread of the habit of reading among commoners. Publishers sprang up, putting out books catering more and more to the demands of these people. According

18) The Japanese penchant for travel has often been referred to in the writings of foreign visitors. See, for example, Hearn (1895), p. 283. See also Nishiyama (1964), pp. 198, 204. 19) Shya (1976), p. 96. 20) Ishikawa (1953), p. 256. 21) Hidehira (1963), pp. 87, 91-96, and Sato (1967), pp. 333-334, 342-344. -294- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey to one estimate, the number of publishers operating exceeded 300 by 1700 and 400 by 1800.22) Academic books were considered to be doing well if more than one thousand copies were sold, but cheaper best-selling stories and novels as well as "how-to" books sold more than 10,000.23) Since woodblock-printed books were expensive by the standards of the time, book lenders started operation and prospered, there being 500-600 book-lenders in Tokyo and about 300 in Osaka at the beginning of the nineteenth century.24) Even one-page newspapers (kawaraban) were sold on the streeets.25) Table 2, indicating the number of schools newly established in different periods, reveals that the interest in education rose sharply after the middle of the eighteenth century and further mounted in the nineteenth. In particular, schools for commoners, gogaku for commoners and terakoya, increased greatly in number from the last decade of the eighteenth century on. The education for commoners was practical from the outset, but later the contents became richer, including the 3Rs, agriculture, commerce and some cultural subjects.26)

Table 2 Number of New Schools of Various Types, by Period of Establishment

Note: Compiled by Herbert Passin from the writings of Ken Ishikawa. Source: Passin (1965), p. 14.

Finally, the historical pattern of knowledge transfer in Japan was favorable in comparison with certain other countries which had formerly functioned as a center of civilization. Always a re- cipient of technology, knowledge and values from abroad-mainly from China and Korea-Japan found it possible to shift its sources of supply to Western countries which were found to be "supe-

22) Morita (1974), p. 1101. 23) Konta (1977), pp. 53. 144, 187. 24) Kinugasa (1962), p. 115. 25) Starting out as picture stories in 1615, kawaraban became more like sensational newspapers in the nineteenth century. Ono (1970), pp. 45, 224. 26) Ishikawa (1929), p. 369. -295- The Economic Studies Quarterly rior,"27)even though the shift did not occur until it was forced upon the country by the external threat in the middle of the nineteenth century. To sum up, pragmatic and materialistic culture-and education which supported it and was re-enforced by it-appears to be the single most important factor favoring the rapid economic transformation of Japan later. A high literacy rate, that for males being 40%28)toward the end of the Tokugawa Period, is the best indication of the cultural development.

4. Political Factors Continual wars in the sixteenth century left in their wake a large bushi class (6-7% of the entire population) and nearly three hundred han ruled by them. The shogunate, the largest of these han and a kind of central government, dominated other han through shrewdly-conceived schemes including the threat of confiscation of a domain, sankin kotai, and the power to order donations for public works. In principle, bushi positions were hereditary, but the need for administration created an ad hoc bureaucratic system for the shogunate as well as for han governments which made appointments, to some extent, disregarding inherited status.29) At least in the early years of Meiji, the technocrats must have played an important role at the middle and lower levels of administration. 30) However, the development of the system of promotion of officials according to ability or achievement was limited until nearly the end of the Tokugawa Period except in a few domains, and this obstructed the efficient administration of the day-to-day business of the government. The accusation that untalented and senile people occupied important positions was repeatedly made by the Japanese,31) while foreigners-Chinese and Koreans, for example-who had the examination system for promotion used to comment contemptuously on the Japanese system.32) When it comes to institutional changes, however, this feudal system which alienated many was probably the most potent driving force, in particular among the lower-rank bushi. A drastic institutional change had a stronger appeal to this group than to similar people in other countries (China and Korea, for example) where it was possible to climb the social ladder by studying the classics.33)

27) As Yukichi Fukuzawa, one of the Meiji intellectual leaders, expressed it, learning from Western civilization included not only the importation of "its material expressions" but also the "acceptance of its spirit." Fukuzawa (1875), pp. 29-30. This kind of attitude to other civilizations was not found in contemporary China or Korea. Cf. Eto (1968), p. 237. 28) Passin (1965), p. 57. 29) Umemura (1973c) gives considerable credit to these bureaucrats for formulating more and more coherent economic policies. 30) Uemura (1974) traces the personal continuity of certain technocrats from the budget department of the Shogunate to the Ministry of Finance in the Meiji government. 31) See, for example, Watanabe (Kazan)'s comment in Kokyo Kokoroecha quoted in Hidehira (1963), p. 82. 32) See, for example, Shin (1722), p. 300. 33) It is believed that one of the most important obstacles to the development of modern education in China was the existence of K'o-chu, or the promotion of civil servants by a system of examination in the classics. Abe (1966), p. 709. -296- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey

The new leaders utilized the pressure from below, as evidenced by the increase in the number of peasant rebellions, to achieve institutional change. However, once institutional change (the Meiji Restoration and related reforms) had been accomplished, the new government used the same sense of crisis (fear of foreign domination and resentment against the unequal Treaties of the 1850s) to forcibly put down pressure from below, giving some relief only when essential.34) The bushi who had received feudal dues were pensioned off, and the confiscated dues went to the government to be used for capital formation and other "productive" purposes.35) Institu- tional change also forced the former bushi to seek productive employment. The entire process of institutional change meant a major restructuring of the political system from wasteful authoritarianism to productive authoritarianism. Many of the former bushi who held an ideology of loyalty served in the new government at various levels. This may explain in part the relative lack of corruption of the Meiji government, but this does not seem to have been a very important factor, in view of the rampant corruption among the same class of people during the Tokugawa Period and the existence of irregularities in the Meiji Period where discretionary powers were involved.36) As an alternative, the scarcity of discretionary regulations may be considered a major explanation for the lack of corruption. If so, the reasons for the scarcity of discretionary regulations must be given. Special external relations such as the lack of tariff autonomy, the low level of Treaty-determined duties,37) the inability of the Japanese to set quotas, and the general ban on foreign direct investment were major explana- tions, but it appears that internal forces were also at work to resist the creation of discretionary regulation. One major source of such resistance was the sense of national crisis which made it difficult to create or maintain a wasteful system unless it could be defended on military grounds. It may be noted in this connection that the only major industries nationally-owned or subsidized continu- ally during the Meiji Period were military-related industries such as weapons, shipping and ship- building. Of course, the resistance to discretionary regulations would not have occurred unless people, or at least the elite, were aware that nationalization and discretionary control were wasteful. The knowledge was partly traditional, dating back to the period of fighting against guild-domination, but mainly newly-acquired, from the experience of horrendous waste associated with the operation of government factories in early Meiji. Such knowledge was re-enforced by the newly- imported Western economics,38) and the tradition was maintained by a group of liberal econo-

34) The reduction and the pegging (de facto reduction) of the land tax rate, and ad hoc relief to former bushi in distress were some of the major measures taken. 35) Crawcour (1979) makes some estimate of the amount of the surplus created as a result of confiscation. 36) Disposal of the property of the Hokkaido Development Mission and the corruption associated with shipping subsidies are two of the better known cases of corruption. 37) This factor meant that smuggling was unnecessary. 38) It may be noted that the most popular textbook of economics in early Meiji was liberal Elements of Political Economy by Francis Wayland, first introduced by Fukuzawa and used by his students to teach at other schools. Okada (1955), p. 194. - 297- The Economic Studies Quarterly mists and a large number of non-establishment businessmen.39)

5. Economic Factors I have already referred to the revision of the Malthusian view of the latter half of the Tokugawa Period by demographic historians. However, revision was not restricted to the demographic aspect. Recent research, starting from the Marxist controversy in the 1930s, has considerably revised the thesis from the viewpoint of economists.40) Population was more or less stable, but, at the same time, economic development, a rise in average living standards, a polarization of people in terms of economic status and a rise in the real income of the poor were apparently taking place. These seemingly incompatible developments can readily be understood when the underlying factors are examined. First, agricultural taxation was made favorable to increase in production. The original system of taxation (kemi) which took nearly all the surplus from the peasants on examination of the harvest every year was found so wasteful in administrative costs and so readily subject to corruption that it was given up gradually after the middle of the Tokugawa Period. The fixed (jomen) tax system 41)raised both the net revenue of the government and the burden on peasants. Neverthe- less, because taxes were assessed only infrequently, the new system acted as an incentive and led to an increase in production sufficient to raise the net income of peasants.42) Second, the management of farms changed from medium-sized farming using semi-servile labor to family farming. This involved arise in landowner-tenancy relationships, and it was made possible by the above-mentioned increase in the net income of peasants. The relaxation of the ban on the sales of land further facilitated the rise of landlordism, but landlordism was not terribly widespread even at the end of the Tokugawa Period.43) Moreover, the system of tenancy was relatively favorable to production. Sharecropping was rare44)and a fixed rent payable in kind and reducible at times of bad harvest was the rule.45) Third, many of the technical changes were apparently labor-intensive, though some labor- saving technology appeared in thrashing and auxiliary stages. The increase in irrigated and drain- able acreage, the introduction of double cropping, the use of commercial fertilizer46) with the

39) Ukichi Taguchi's journal, Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, represented the liberal tradition, and was succeeded by Toyo Keizai Shinpo. 40) A summary of some of the more recent findings can be found in Hanley and Yamamura (1977), Hanley (1983), Yasuba (1986) and Hanley's rejoinder. 41) The convention of reducing the tax at times of unusually bad harvests was still applied. 42) See Oishi (1961) for an account of the reform. 43) Various estimates put the area under tenancy at 25-30% of the total area in the early years of Meiji. Ouchi (1969), pp. 37-43. 44) A later survey reports that the area under share-cropping was less than 1% of arable land. Apparent- ly, this practice was adopted largely where the annual harvest was exceptionally unpredictable. Norinsho Nomukyoku (1926), pp. 354-355. 45) In the late Tokugawa and more generally in the Meiji Period the so-called "fixed-rate" (jomen) rent appeared. This rent was also subject to reduction at times of exceptionally bad harvests . See Takeyasu (1968), pp. 50-51. 46) In rice production, a shift from green manure to commercial fertilizer reduced the labor require- ment for manuring [Yamazaki (1963), p. 339], but the total impact of the shift was different, because a shift from rice to a cash crop was induced. -298- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey need for more frequent weeding, substitution of human labor for animals (caused by the shift to family farming), introduction of labor-intensive cash crops (cotton, silk cocoons, oil seed, tobacco, safflower and indigo), and the increase in by-employments all tended to increase demand for labor in villages.47) Presumably, this pattern of technical change fovored labor in income distribution. A quantitative appraisal of agricultural output for the entire nation is not feasible. All that can be done is to cite some sample figures for the yield of rice in various localities. Table 3 shows that the yield was increasing generally. The increase in the center (Kinai) tended to taper off in the nineteenth century but in the periphery (Harima and Aki), the increase continued until later. Coupled with the introduction of cash crops and the increase in by-employments, this must have led to a general rise in per capita output except in areas badly hit by famines.

Table 3 Yield of Rice (Koku per Tan),a) 1727-1867

Note: a) Approximately 364 bushels per one-tenth of a hectare. Source: (1): Imai and Yagi (1955), p. 186. (2)-(3): Nakamura (1968), p. 411. (4): Goto (1954), p. 52.

Division of labor spread in industry, and fairly large-scale operations managed by the putting- out system appeared in such industries as silk-reeling, weaving, dying and paper manufacture. Productivity rose in these industries as a result of the division of labor and the improvement in technology. In some industries, such as sake brewing, copper smelting and cotton weaving so- called manufactories appeared.48) Commerce and finance developed first in towns and later in villages. Some practices in these fields such as discount houses (later department stores), rice exchanges where trading in futures was introduced, various forms of credit instruments ranging from warehouse receipts to paper money, and double-entry book-keeping, have direct descendants in the Meiji Period.

47) Furushima (1947). See also Hayami (1968). Hayami (1977) called this phenomenon the "industri- ous revolution." 48) Yamaguchi (1976), pp. 97-99. Marxist economic historians studied industrial development inten- sively to see whether development had reached the stage of manufactories. Nakamura (1968) and Oishi (1975) are two of the more important recent contributions along this line. -299- The Economic Studies Quarterly

The Japanese family, or ie, has attracted a considerable amount of attention from sociol- ogists because of its possible relevance to economic development. Unlike most other non- Western countries, Tokugawa Japan did not have permissive extended families except in some isolated localities. Typically, the ie consisted of a stem family maintained by the ideology of continuity and by primogeniture.49) While inheritance by the eldest son was the normal practice, particularly among bushi, adopting was not unknown. In the case of shoka (commercial families), a son was sometimes adopted where the legitimate heir did not look too promising.50) This practice had important relevance to economic development even in the Tokugawa Period. First, the possibility of adoption encouraged the limitation of the size of the family, to which reference has already been made. Second, primogeniture was favorable to the accumulation of wealth. Third, in the case of established shoka, adoption prevented deterioration of the quality of management. Finally, a similar organizational practice was extended, with some modification, to other institutions such as dozoku (or Japanese clan), iemoto and business firms where maxi- mum use was made of loyalty, an important attribute of the ie.51) Some commercial and industrial activities shifted from cities to villages, but new activities in the cultural and educational fields would probably have offset part of this loss, which caused the reduction in urban population referred to earlier. In any case, there is little doubt that total output increased and, hence, average real income per capita must have increased. Table 4 shows the movement of real wages for different classes of workers. It appears that except in Kinai where real wages reached a high level at the beginning of the nineteenth century, real wages tended to increase until nearly the end of the Tokugawa Period. Socio-economic dis- ruption in the last years under the Tokugawa regime caused the reduction of real wages, particularly in the Kinai area where the level of wages in 1800 was not achieved again until nearly the end of the nineteenth century. 52) In other areas, the reduction was much smaller and a general rising trend was maintained. Bushi income was stagnant in the latter half of the Tokugawa Period, indicating the relative decline of their position. Urban commoners as a group were likely to have lost ground in the same period, but a fair amount of social mobility within that group can safely be assumed. It was the rural population which gained relative to other groups. Within villages, most studies have found a tendency to polarization, which is taken to indicate the creation of a proletariat and would-be capitalists. Interestingly, some studies which examined the possibility of the co-exist-

49) Oishi (1973), pp. 76-77, explains the origin of ie in terms of the government policy to maximize revenue in the face of mounting population pressure. 50) Yagi (1965), p. 145 and Nakano (1964), p. 170. Okamoto (1977) cites examples of house rules which specifically stipulate the change of surname and the retirement of a son who is lacking in ability and the adoption of a son from among relatives and employees (p. 205). Ie may explain the relative ease with which Japan could adopt the corporation and other modern system in the Meiji Period. Cf. Horie (1965), pp. 97-103, Hsu (1971), and Murakami, Kumon and Sato (1979). 51) Horie (1965), pp. 97-103, Okamoto (1977), p. 208, and Nakano (1964), p. 106. 52) There is some doubt about the reliability of the very sharp recorded decline in real wages for Settsu (1 year) and Kyoto [Columns (3) and (5)] in the nineteenth century. -300- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey

Table 4 Real Wages of Workers, 1718-1890 A. Real Wages (in Rice) of Male Agricultural Workers

Notes: a) Okamoto-ke, Kamikawarabayashi. b) Ujita-ke, Nishi Koyanomura. c) Shinyoshidamura. Source: (1) and (2): Imai and Yagi (1955), p. 158. (3): Nakamura (1968), p. 271. (4): Watanabe (1961), pp. 101-103.

B. Real Wage Index of Construction Workers, 1726-1889

Notes: d) For 1860-1868. e) 1880-1887. Source: (5): Umemura (1961), p. 175. (6): Sago (1962), pp. 69-70, ence of upward mobility obtained an affirmative answer.53) Particularly illuminating are the quantitative studies by Hayami (1974) and Smith (1977a) of Mino villages to which reference has already been made. As shown in Table 5, of 97 changes in status between 1773 and 1869 in Nishijo, 61 were downward, but as many as 36 cases represented upward movement. As expected, downward move-

53) See, for example, Shimada (1965), p. 114. Goto (1954), p. 64. Imai and Yagi (1955), p. 54. Naka- mura et al. (1962), p. 382, Kobayashi (1963), p. 310, Nakamura (1968), pp. 313-316, and Furushima and Nagahara (1954), pp. 155, 169-171. -301- The Economic Studies Quarterly

ment was concentrated in the tenant class. Since the extinction of families was also concentrated in the tenant class and more numerous (64) than upward movement , a rosy picture should not be drawn.54) Yet, what we see from the table appears to be very different from what is ascribed to the tradition-bound and fatalistic villages of the poorer LDCs.55)

Table 5 Number of Households in 1773 and 1869, and of Changes in Status in the Intervening Years, Nishijo, Mino

Note: a) Includes one move to another village. Source: Hayami (1974), pp. 188-189.

Finally, as a result of economic development, per capita output probably rose to a level not far lower than in England before industrialization. Formerly, it was believed that Japanese income level was far lower. This conclusion was arrived at because price differentials in the base period , namely, the 1960s, were neglected. In the 1960s the yen was much undervalued at the exchange rate with the result that per capita output in that period as well as in the Meiji Period was undervalued. Now, we can use Kravis's correction factor for international price differentials to arrive at comparable real incomes for different countries. According to Ohkawa's most recent estimate , Japanese per capita GNP in 1874-1878 was $14056)in 1965 prices or $180 in 1970 prices. Kravis's correction factor for the later years is 49% for the yen . When we adjust this per capita income for the undervaluation of the yen, it becomes $26857)in 1970 prices. The British per capita GNP was recently revised by N.F.R. Crafts. According to his estimate, British figure in 1970 prices was $399 in 1760.58) This figure is still somewhat higher than the comparable Japanese figure , but the difference is much smaller than it was previously assumed to have been .") Indian per capita GDP in 1861-1869 estimated by the same procedure turns out to have been $142. Hence, Japan appears to have been economically more advanced . Yet, if we compare

54) A similar pattern was found by Smith (1977a), pp. 125ff. 55) Myrdal (1968). 56) Ohkawa (1978), p. 27. 57) Kravis, et al. (1978), p. 216. 58) Crafts (1983a), p. 388. The figures before 1830 was estimated in Crafts (1983b). 59) Formerly, the British figure of $227 in 1765-1785 is compared with the Japanese figure of $74 in 1874-1879 in 1965 prices. Kuznets (1971), p. 24. -302- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey

Japanese and indian spinners' wages around 1900, we fmd Indian wages higher.60) This is probably because spinners in India were not teenage girls as in Japan,61)even though further research is needed on this point. In institutional and technological heritages, the difference between Japan and many other preindustrial societies was more clear-cut. A relatively favorable system of land taxation and land tenure, widespread irrigation and the social institutions of the villages supporting it, predomi- nance of family farming, and long working days were some of the legacies in agriculture. Actual and potential social mobility was probably a very important factor in promoting change,62)even though traditional approaches tended to emphasize polarization in economic status as a factor for providing capital and labor. Of institutional heritage outside agriculture, the appearance of manufactories is by no means as important as the Marxist economic historians believe it to be. The development of this system was very limited in Japan, and, moreover, a similar development can be found in other countries.63) There may have been some difference in the extent of the development, but it is doubtful that a single variable explanation of this sort can account for much. Other institutional heritages such as the ie and shoka, in particular, and technological legacies in industry, commerce and finance appear to have been more important. Here too, the capacity to innovate, supported by the propensity to change on the part of entrepreneurs and the technological capacity of artisans, appears to have been most important. After all, such significant innova- tions as the jinrikisha (rickshaw), hybrid looms using flying shuttles and foot pedals, hybrid silk- reeling machines, and hybrid power looms (Toyoda looms and others) were all made in Japan first and were transmitted to other countries only later.64)

6. Concluding Remarks In the period before modem economic growth commenced, Japan was endowed with a number of conditions which appear to have been more favorable for economic development than those in other non-Western countries of that time. Relatively low birth and death rates, urban growth and commercialization in villages and the resultant development of the infrastructure, ethnic uniformity, the existence of a mass culture, widespread and pragmatic education, the tradition of cultural borrowing, the existence of a unique class of bushi, a favorable system of land taxation and land tenure, the development of irrigation, and ie system and its application to other organizations, development of commercial and

60) Oishi (1975), p. 162 and Takamura (1971), p. 143. 61) Saxonhouse and Kiyokawa (1985), p. 197. 62) It was no accident that Samuel Smiles' Self Help (Saikoku Risshihen) was translated as early as 1871 and became one of the best-selling books in the Meiji Period. Studies on social mobility reveal that, while bushi were exceptionally important among the Meiji leaders, upward social mobility among other classes of people was also considerable. Cf. Ishikawa (1974), pp. 85-99 and Mannari (1965), pp. 52-58. Among business leaders in the 1950s, Smith (1960, p. 101) found the second and third sons of landlords unusually well represented. 63) See the case of China in Hatano (1961), p. 134, and Korea in An (1975), pp. 123-126. 64) Cf. Ko (1898), pp. 261-262, Nishimura (1975), p. 147 and Hatano (1961), pp. 535, 540. -303- The Economic Studies Quarterly financial practices, the retention of mass aspiration and the maintenance of social mobility despite the polarization of population in economic status are some of the factors considered. Finally, Japanese per capita output may have been higher than in other non-Western countries. These factors may be divided into three broad categories, namely, those relevant to social and institutional change, those relevant to policy formulations after major institutional change, and those directly relevant to economic change. Education and the class system dominated by bushi enabled people (lower-rank bushi in particular) to feel the urgent need for institutional change, while ethnic uniformity, the tradition of cultural borrowing and, again, education made such changes easier to attain. Ethnic uniformity, pragmatic culture, education, social mobility and the existence of technocrats were some of the more important factors responsible for the formulation and execution of relatively sensible economic policy after the Meiji Restoration, The lack of tariff autonomy prevented the overprotection of industries, although this condition was not peculiar to Japan. The transfer and assimilation of technology and other knowledge through model factories, subsidies to first-generation factories, industrial expositions, research, extension services and education, and the rapid development of infrastructure were the characteristics of Japan's development policies. The lack of foreign direct investment in the nineteenth century may have retarded technical progress, but the overall net effect should be assessed more carefully, since the government and the society were given time to become more mature in the meantime. The availability of workers who were willing to work long hours at low wages (partly explained by the rural location of factories in the nineteenth century) and the existence of an investible surplus created by the higher productivity and a lower rate of population increase, polarization of the population, thriftiness stemming from the ideology of the ie and other related philosophies, and a partial confiscation of bushi income, may have favored Japan to some extent in the initial stage of industrialization. However, what appears to be more important was the propensity to make changes, fostered by education, a cultural pragmatism, the aspirations of the people nurtured by past and present social mobility, and favorable institutional settings such as the relatively favorable land tax and land tenure, the ease of developing corporate organizations and the relative lack of resistance to technical changes (partially explained by the ie tradition). The evaluation of the Tokugawa legacy presented above should not be taken to mean that Tokugawa Japan was highly advanced. Even after the sweeping institutional changes in early Meiji, Japanese society was characterized by many features of "backwardness." Gross capital formation as a proportion of GNP was as low as 13% in 1884-1890.65) It is only in comparison with other contemporary non-Western societies that the Tokugawa legacy can be positively evaluated. (Osaka University)

REFERENCES

Abe, H. (1966) "Shinmatsu Kindai Gakko" [Modern Schools in the Last Years of the Ch'ing Period], in S. Taga, ed., Kinsei Ajia KyoikushiKenkyu, Tokyo: Bunrin Shoin, pp. 719-816.

65) Ohkawa, Takamatsu and Yamamoto (1974), pp. 16, 42. -304- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey An, B.-T.(1975) Chosen Kindai Keizaishi Kenkyu [A Studyin the EconomicHistory of ModernKorea], Tokyo:Nihon Hyoronsha. Crafts,N.F.R. (1983a) "Gross National Product in Europe1870-1910: Some New Estimates," Explorations in EconomicHistory, Vol. 20, October,No. 4, pp. 387-401. (1983b)"British Economic Growth, 1700-1831: A Reviewof the Evidence,"The Economic HistoryReview, Second Series, Vol. 36, May,No. 2, pp. 177-199. Crawcour,E. S. (1965)"Tokugawa Heritage," in W. W.Lockwood, ed., TheState and Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, pp. 17-44. (1974)"The TokugawaPeriod and Japan'sPreparation for Modern EconomicGrowth," The Journal of JapaneseStudies, Vol. 1, Autumn, No. 1, pp. 113-125. (1979)"Nihonkeizai Iko no Arikatani Tsuite-Kinsei kara Kindai e" [On the Transitionof the JapaneseEconomy from the EarlyModern to ModernPeriod], in H. Shimboand Y. Yasuba,eds., KindaiIkoki no Nihonkeizai,Tokyo: Nihon KeizaiShimbunsha, pp. 15-28. Eto, S. (1968)Kindai Chugoku Seijishi Kenkyu [A Studyin the PoliticalHistory of ModernChina], Tokyo: TokyoDaigaku Shuppankai. Fukuzawa,Y. (1875)Bunmeiron no Gairyaku[An Outlineof the Treatiseon Civilization],Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko,Iwanami Shoten (1931). Furushima,T. (1947)Nihon NogyoGijutsushi [History of AgriculturalTechnology in Japan],Tokyo: Jichosha. (1961) "Shosangyo Hatten no Chiikisei"[Regionalism in the Developmentof Various Industries], in ChihoshiKenkyu Kyogikai, ed., Nihon Sangyoshi Taikei, Soronhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan- kai, pp. 273-347. and K. Nagahara(1954) Shohin Seisan to Kiseijinushisei[Commercial Production and Parasitic Landlordism],Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. Goto,Y. (1954)"19-seiki Sanyosuji Noson ni okeruFunokeiei no Seikaku"[Characteristics of the Manage- ment of an AffluentFarm in a SanyoVillage in the 19thCentury], Shigaku Zasshi, Vol. 63, July. No. 7, pp. 48-67. Hanley,S. B.(1974) "Fertility, Mortality and Life Expectancy in Pre-ModernJapan," Population Studies, Vol. 28, March,pp. 127-142. (1983)"A High Standardof Livingin NineteenthCentury Japan, Fact or Fantasy?,"Journal of EconomicHistory, Vol. 43, March,No. 1, pp. 183-192. and K. Yamamura(1972) "Population Trends and Economic Growth in Pre-IndustrialJapan," in D.V.Glass and R. Revelle,eds., Population and SocialChange, London: Edward Arnold, pp. 451-499. and (1977)Economic and Demographic Change in PreindustrialJapan, 1600-1868, Prince- ton: PrincetonUniversity Press. Hatano,Y. (1961)Chugoku Kindai Kogyoshi no Kenkyu[Studies on the EarlyIndustrialization in China], Tokyo:Toyoshi Kenkyukai. Hayami,A. (1968)Nihon Keizaishi eno Shikaku[A Viewof a JapaneseEconomic History], Tokyo: Toyo KeizaiShinposha. (1971) "Tong Ichisanson no JinkoTokei" [Demographic Statistics of a MountainVillage in East Mino],Kenkyu Kiyo Showa 45-nendo, Tokyo: Tokugawa Rinseishi Kenkyusho, pp. 257-284. (1973)Kinsei Noson no Rekishijinkogakuteki Kenkyu [A Historico-Demographic Study of Early Modern Villages],Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. (1974)"Jinkogakuteki Shihyo ni okeru Kaisokan no Kakusa"[Class Differentials in Demographic Indicators],Kenkyu Kiyo Showa 48-nendo, Tokyo: Tokugawa Rinseishi Kenkyusho, pp. 178-193. (1977)"Keizaishakai no Seiritsuto sonoTokushitsu" [Formation of an EconomicSociety and Its Characteristics],in ShakaiKeizaishi Gakkai, ed., AtarashiiEdojidaishizo o motomete,Tokyo: Toyo KeizaiShinposha, pp. 3-18. Hearn, L. (1895)"Kokoro," in Writingsof LafcadioHearn, Vol.VII, Bostonand New York:Houghton Mifflin.,pp. 265-512. Hidehira,R. (1963)"Rangaku no Hattatsuto Kagaku-Gijutsu"[The Development of the DutchStudies, and Scienceand Technology],in NihonshiKenkyukai, ed., Koza Nihon Bunkashi, Vol. 6, Tokyo:San'ichi Shobo,pp. 31-102. -305- The Economic Studies Quarterly

Horie, Y. (1965) "Nihon no Keizai Kindaika to 'Ie'" [Modernization of Japan and Ie], Keizai Kenkyu, Vol. 16, April, No. 2, pp. 97-103. Hsu, F. L. K. (1971) Hikaku Bunmeishakai-ron [An Expanded Japanese Version of Clan, Caste, and Club], Translated by K. Sakuda and E. Hamaguchi, Tokyo: Baif ikan. Imai, R. and A. Yagi(1955) Hokenshakai no Noson Kozo [Structure of a Village in the Feudal Society], Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Ishikawa, Ken (1929) Nihon Shomin Kyoikushi [History of the Education of the Masses in Japan], Tokyo: Tokoshoin. (1953) Gakko no Hattatsu [Development of Schools], Tokyo: Iwasaki Shoten. Ishikawa, Kenjiro (1974) "Meijiki ni okeru Kigyoshakatsudo no Tokeiteki Kansatsu" [Statistical Observa- tions of Entrepreneurship in the Meiji Period], Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku, Vol. 23, March, No. 4, pp. 85-118. Kalland, A. and J. Pedersen (1984) "Famine and Population in Fukuoka Domain during the Tokugawa Period," Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 10, Winter, No. 1, pp. 31-72. Kinugasa, Y. (1962) "Minshu Bunka no Hakyu" [The Spreading of the Mass Culture], in Nihonshi Kenkyukai, ed., Koza Nihon Bunkashi, Vol. 6, Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, pp. 105-174. Kito, H. (1974) "Kiso Yubunezawamura no Jinko Tokei" [Demographic Statistics of Yubunezawa Village in Kiso], Mita Gakkai Zasshi, Vol. 67, No. 5, pp. 62-86. Ko, J. (1898) Nihon Zatsujishi [Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects in Japan], translated by K. Saneto and M. Toyoda, Tokyo: Heibonsha (1968). Kobayashi, K. (1956) "Edojidai Noson Jumin no Jumyo" [Life Expectancy of Villagers in the Yedo Period], Jinruigaku Zasshi, Vol. 65, August, No. 1, pp. 32-43. Kobayashi, S. (1963) Kinsei Noson Keizaishi no Kenkyu [Studies in the Economic History of Early Modern Villages], Tokyo: Miraisha. Konta, Y. (1977) Edo no Honyasan: Kinsei Bunkashi no Sokumen [Publishers in Edo: An aspect of the History of Early Modern Culture], Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai. Kravis, I. B., A. W. Heston, and R. Summers (1978) "Real GDP Per Capita for More Than One Hundred Countries," The Economic Journal, Vol. 88, June, No. 350, pp. 215-242. Kuznets, S. (1971) Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Mannari, H. (1965) Bijinesu Erito [Business Elite], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha. Mizushima, H. (1963) Seimeihyo no Kenkyu [Studies on Life Tables], Tokyo: Seimeihoken Bunka Kenkyusho. Mori, K. (1935) Jinko Tokeiron [Treatise on Demographic Statistics], Tokyo: Toyo Shuppansha. Morita, S. (1974) "Edoki Shoten no Hasseidoko" [Trend in the Establishment of Publishers in the Yedo Period], Bungaku, September, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 76-85. Morita, Y. (1944) Jinko Zoka no Bunseki [Analysis of Population Growth], Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha. Myrdal, G. (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 3 vols., New York: Pantheon Books. Murakami, Y., S, Kumon and S. Sato (1979) Bunmei toshiteno Ie Shakai [Ie Society as a Civilization], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha. Nakamura, K., T. Shimada, H. Yagi and T. Muranaga (1962) Kaitaiki Hoken Noson no Kenkyu [Studies in the Feudal Villages Facing Decay], Tokyo: Sobunsha. Nakamura, S. (1968) Meijiishin no Kiso Kozo [Structural Foundation for the Meiji Restoration], Tokyo: Miraisha. Nakano, T. (1964) Shoka Dozokudan no Kenkyu [Studies in Commercial Dozoku Groups], Tokyo: Miraisha. Nishimura, H. (1975) "Sangyoshihon 1, Mengyo" [Industrial Capital 1, Cotton Textiles], in K. Oishi, ed., Nihon Sangyo Kakumei no Kenkyu-1, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 119-170. Nishiyama, M. (1964) "Edo Bunka to Chiho Bunka" [Yedo Culture and Local Culture], in S. Ienaga, et al., eds., Iwanami Koza Nihon Rekishi, Vol. 13, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 161-208. Norinsho Nomukyoku ed., (1926) Hompo Kosaku Kanko [Tenancy Practices in Japan], Tokyo: Dainihon Nokai. Ohkawa, K. (1978) "Initial Conditions: Economic Level and Structure," a paper presented to the Conference on Japan's Historical Development Experience and Contemporary Developing Countries (mimeo).

-306- Y. Yasuba: The Tokugawa Legacy: A Survey

Takamatsu and Yamamoto (1974) Kokumin Shotoku [National Income], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shin- posha. Oishi, K. (1975) "Rodoryokugun no Kosei" [Composition of Labor], in K. Oishi, ed., Nihon Sangyokakumei no Kenkyu-2, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 129-186. Oishi, S. (1961) Kyoho Kaikaku no Keizaiseisaku [Economic Policy of the Kyoho Reform], Tokyo: Ochano- mizu Shobo. (1973) "Kinsei" [The Early Modem Period], in M. Aoyama, W. Takeda, T. Arichi, I. Emori and H. Matsubara, eds., Koza Kazoku-1, Tokyo: Kobundo, pp. 76-96. Okada, S. (1955) Bakumatsu-Ishin no Kahei Seisaku [Monetary Policy in the Late-Tokugawa and the Restora- tion Periods], Tokyo: Moriyama Shoten. Okamoto, Y. (1977) "'Ie' Seido to Nihon no Kindaika" [Ie System and the Modernization of Japan], Edojidai no Kigyosha Katsudo, Nihon Keieishi Koza, Vol. 1, Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, pp. 202-232. Okazaki, Y. (1962) "Meiji Shonen Iko Taisho 9-nen ni itaru Danjo Nenrei betsu Jinko Suikei ni tsuite" [On the Estimation of Population by Sex and Age Between Early Meiji Years and the 9th Year of Taisho], Institute of Population Problems, Research Series, No. 145, Fhebruary. Ono, H. (1970) Kawaraban Monogatari [The Story of Kawaraban], Tokyo: Yuzankaku Shuppan. Ouchi, T. (1969) Nihon ni okeru Nominso no Bunkai [Polarization of Peasantry in Japan], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. Passin, H. (1965) Society and Education in Japan, New York: Columbia University Press. Sano, Y. (1962) "Kenchiku Rodosha no Jisshitsu Chingin-1830-1894" [Real Wages of Construction Workers, 1830-1894], Mita Gakkai Zasshi, Vol. 55, November, No. 11, pp. 49-76. Saw, M. (1967) "Bakumatsu no Yogaku" [Western Studies in the Late Tokugawa Period], in op. cit., pp. 326- 350. Saxonhouse, G. and Y. Kiyokawa (1985) "Supply and Demand for Quality Workers in Cotton Spinning in Japan and India," in K. Ohkawa and G. Ranis, eds., Japan and Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 177-211. Shimada, T. (1965) "Kinsei no Sonraku to Kazoku" [Villages and Families in the Early Modern Period], in K. Nakamura, ed., Shakaishi II, Taikei Nihonshi Sosho, 9, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, pp. 58-130. Shin, I. (1772) Kaiyuroku [Note on a Visit Abroad], translated by J. Kan (1974), Tokyo: Heibonsha. Shya, S. (1976) Nihon Kindai Nihyakunen no Kozo [Structure of Two Hundred Years of Modern Japan], Tokyo: Kodansha. Smith, T. C. (1959) The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford: Stanford University Press. (1960) "Landlords' Sons in the Business Elite," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. IX, October, No. 2, Part I, pp. 93-108. (1977a) Nakahara: Family Farming and Population in a Japanese Village, 1717-1830, Stanford: Stanford University Press. (1977b) "Zenkindai no Keizaiseicho" [Pre-Modern Economic Growth], in Shakai Keizaishi Gakkai, ed., Atarashii Edojidaishizo o motomete, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, pp. 153-192. Suda, K. (1973) Hida O Jiin Kakocho no Kenkyu [A Study on the Burial Records at O Temple in Hida], Iryohojin Seijinkai Suda Byoin, Gifu. Takahashi, B. (1941) Nihon Jinkoshi no Kenkyu [Studies in the Demographic History of Japan], Tokyo: San'yusha. Takamura, N. (1971) Nihon Bosekigyoshi Josetsu [An Introduction to the History of Cotton Spinning Industry in Japan], Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo. Takeyasu, S. (1968) Kinsei Kosakuryo no Kozo [Structure of the Early Modern Rent], Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo. Tsuda, H. (1977) Bakumatsu Shakai no Kenkyu [Studies in the Late-Tokugawa Society], Tokyo: Kashiwa- shobo. Uemura, M. (1974) "Meijishoki Okurasho no Kinseiteki Keifu" [Early Modern Lineage in the Ministry of Finance in Early Meiji], Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku, Vol. 23, March, No. 4, pp. 53-84. Umemura, M. (1961) "Kenchikugyo Rodosha no Jisshitsu Chingin, 1726-1958" [Real Wages of Construc- tion Workers, 1726-1958, Keizai Kenkyu, Vol. 12, April, No. 2, pp. 172-176.

-307- The Economic Studies Quarterly

(1973a) "Note on Economic Development in Agriculture in the Tokugawa Period," in K. Ohkawa and Y. Hayami, eds., Economic Growth: The Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era, Vol. 1, Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha (mimeo). (1973b) "Keizai Seicho no Kaishi" [Beginning of Economic Growth], in K. Emi and Y. Shionoya, eds., Nihon Keizairon: Keizaiseicho 100-nen no Bunseki, Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp. 1-18. (1973c) "Keizai Kanryoso to Keizai Seisaku" [Economic Bureaucrats and Economic Policy], in op. cit., pp. 19-34. United Nations (1956) Manuals on Methods of Estimating Population, Manual III, Methods for Population Projections by Sex and Age, Population Studies, No. 25, New York. Watanabe, N. (1961) "Shogyoteki Nogyo niokeru Koyorodo" [Employed Labor in Commercial Agriculture], in T. Ichikawa, et al., eds., Hokenshakai Kaitaiki no Koyorodo, Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, pp. 43-106. Wrigley, E.A. and R.S. Schofield (1981) The Population History of England, 1541-1871, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Yagi, H. (1965) "Kinsei no Shokogyosha to Toshi" [Merchants, Craftsmen and Cities in the Early Modern Period] in K. Nakamura, ed., Shakaishi II, Taikei Nihonshi Sosho, 9, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, pp. 131-209. Yamaguchi, K. (1956) Meiji-zenki Keizai no Bunseki [Analysis of the Early Meiji Economy], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. (1976) Nihon Keizaishi [Japanese Economic History], Keizaigaku Zenshu, 5, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo. Yamazaki, R. (1963) "Edo-koki niokeru Noson Keizai no Hatten to Nominso Bunkai" [Development of Village Economy and the Polarization of Pesantry in Latter Half of the Edo Period], in S. Ienaga et al., eds., Iwanami Koza Nihonrekishi, Vol. 12, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 331-374. Yasuba, Y. (1986) "Standard of Living in Japan Before Industrialization: From What Level Did Japan Begin? A Comment," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 46, March, No. 1, pp. 217-224. Yasukawa, M. and K. Hirooka (1972) "Meiji-Taisho Nenkan no Jinko Suikei to Jinko Dotai" [Population Estimates and Population Dynamics in Meiji-Taisho Periods], Mita Gakkai Zasshi, Vol. 65, February/ March, Nos. 2.3, pp. 1-28.

-308-