Hirohito's Role in Engaging in and Ending the Pacific War
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The Ambiguous Emperor: Hirohito's Role in Engaging in and Ending the Pacific War The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37736797 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The Ambiguous Emperor Hirohito’s Role in Engaging In and Ending the Pacific War Patrick H. Choi A Thesis in the Field of International Relations for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies Harvard University Extension School November 2017 Abstract Currently, Japan is the only country to sustain a nuclear attack. The devastation of such an attack resonates with only Japan’s citizenry, but is also a grave reminder that such a force exists in the world. It is important for historians to dissect the events that perpetuated the war, and even more important to understand how such a war could have transpired. This thesis attempts to look at Emperor Hirohito’s role in engaging in war and more importantly his inability or perhaps his unwillingness to end the war. We will dissect the Emperor’s complicated place in the monarchial system, the Meiji constitution that was seemingly designed to complicate and the Emperor’s role, how his advisors were able to buffer the Emperor in order to maintain his omnipotent image, and how the military looked to the Emperor for guidance and leadership. Table of Contents I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 II. Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 6 III. Research Method ..................................................................................................................... 12 IV. The Creation of the Meiji Constitution: Sowing the Seeds of Emperor Ambiguity ................ 17 The Emperor’s Advisors ............................................................................................................ 26 The Emperor as an Organ Theory .............................................................................................. 31 A Nation Convinced Its Only Recourse Is War ......................................................................... 37 Culture of Top-Down Communication ...................................................................................... 42 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 44 V. Counterfactuals and the Attack on Pearl Harbor ....................................................................... 45 Historical Context ...................................................................................................................... 46 Performing a Counterfactual Thought Experiment .................................................................... 48 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 52 Bibliography .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Chapter I Introduction More than seven decades since the end of the Pacific War, historians continue to debate the question of the true role of Emperor Hirohito in Japan’s war efforts. Despite the western public’s wish to see Hirohito indicted as a war criminal, Hirohito was absolved. As a result, Hirohito remained until his death, in 1989, as a well-respected icon of postwar Japan, where peace and tranquility prevailed. Regardless of how Hirohito was perceived at the time of his death, historians continue to debate the Emperor’s role in Japan’s ambitious plan to dominate Asia. Some scholars—let us call them populists—espouse the popular notion that the Emperor was a mere figurehead and was subject to the whims of the bureaucratic mechanisms of the Japanese government; other historians—let us call them revisionists—argue that Hirohito was in fact the architect of the war in the Pacific. After the end of the war, during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for Class A war criminals in 1946-47, military leaders and government officials were able to fortify the idea that the Emperor’s role was merely symbolic, and that Japan was a constitutional monarchy. Despite his ability to advise and make recommendations, Hirohito was not the architect of the war. The two sides, populist and revisionist, utilize communication logs, meeting minutes, diaries, and memorandums to fortify their respective positions regarding Hirohito’s role in World War II, but written statements without an understanding of the structure and role of communications can lead to improper conclusions. Rarely do historical events occur in a clear and linear manner. Simply looking at who said what 1 leaves out important aspects of the relationship between those who spoke and those who heard. Close examination will show that there existed a certain amount of miscommunication among the Japanese military, government, and the Emperor. This miscommunication can be attributed to the transition from an agrarian society to a constitutional monarchy. This transition brought those who reverently believed in the newly installed omnipotent perception of authority of the Emperor at odds with a more democratic form of government. In addition to the populist and the revisionist views of Hirohito, there are scholars who have dissected the organizational/communication structure of the Japanese government. These scholars show that traditional forms of communication between leaders and followers allowed the war to begin and continue. In his paper, “Japanese Organizational Decision-making in 1941,” Omi Hatashin states that military leaders were looking to their superiors to tacitly imply honne (one’s unexpressed true wish) that they wanted the war to end.1 This can be seen in the example of the army’s refusal to withdraw preparations to go to war with the United States. By 12 October 1941, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano, had already taken the step of advising the Emperor to implement the recommendation of the navy’s First committee, arranging fleets in a battle formation and requisitioning ships for war. It was therefore difficult for the Admiralty Minister to say something, which was not consistent with the advice, which his senior officer, namely, the Chief of the Naval General staff, had given in audience with the Emperor… When the Chief tried to prevent the navy from aiding the army, which was then secretly maneuvering to conquer Manchuria, and said the action would “jeopardize Japan’s relationship with the US.” Admiral Togo angrily confronted the Chief’s US-Japanese-relationship remark, saying that the Admiral had 1 Omi Hatashin, “Japanese Organisational Decision Making in 1941,” International Journal of Management and Decision Making 12, no. 1 (2012): 74. 2 always been telling the Emperor that he could even fight the Americans; “Are you suggesting that I have been telling His Majesty a lie?”2 The nature of this type of exchange prevented military subordinates from making arguments against instigating a war with the United States, which they knew would end in a loss. The true wishes of the subordinates (honne) were not expressed. Near the end of the war, the army and navy were at odds with each other. Both parties wanted to blame each other in order to save “face,” and both parties were simply maintaining their current positions hoping that a parental figure would understand the army and the navy’s true wishes and end the war. “Both of them implicitly expected, however, that the Emperor, as the father of the nation, would be kind enough to take into account the army’s and navy’s true wishes.”3 The Emperor, however, chose to be faithful to the constitution and adhere to the “organ theory,” an interpretation of the constitution that considered the state as the sovereign and the Emperor as an organ of the state. To understand how the miscommunication between subordinates and superiors could lead an entire country to war, it is important to note that the transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic constitutional monarchy was at odds with two essential principles of Japanese society, the pre-war perception of the Emperor and the influence of the military on Japanese society. To understand the former, we need to first understand the structure of a constitutional monarchy. A constitutional monarchy is a monarchy in which the governing powers of the monarch are restricted by a constitution. But the 2 Hatashin, “Japanese Organisational Decision Making,” 76. 3 Hatashin, “Japanese Organisational Decision Making,” 76. 3 authority of the Emperor was above reproach. Hirohito was considered a living god forged from a dynastic line that extended back 26 centuries. Children were cautioned from looking at his face as they would be blinded, and mentioning his name was considered a taboo. Herbert Bix’s article “The Showa Emperor’s’Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility” states, It is permissible to say that the idea that the Japanese are descendants of the gods is a false conception; but it is absolutely