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Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) JAM SPECIAL GROUPS Assessment OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS BRIEF IS As of: 9 August 07 ACTO: CW3 Bryan Gray 242-0647 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Purpose To provide an assessment of JAM Special Groups. Agenda • Assessment • Situation: • Facts/Trends • Enemy: • JAM SG • IRGC-QF • JAM SG BDA • Recommended COA MNC-I COIC Notes to Previous Slide • Sir, the purpose of this brief is to provide you with a summarized EFP IPB of the overall EFP problem set. This will assist the COIC in developing a broad understanding of the enemy and the environment which is one of our key task. • The agenda lays out the subjects in which our IPB covers. Assessment • JAM SG’s, with support of IRGC-QF, is conducting a sustained attack against CF • For July, EFPs accounted for 4% of all IEDs yet account for 49% of IED caused KIA and 16% of WIA (This is a change from previous year trends which were 2% Events, <20% KIA) • Limited high profile IDF attacks vic Baghdad & Basrah create perceptions of instability & lack of security • Reports indicate JAM SG’s are paid & equipped by IRGC-QF in Iran via a carefully constructed logistical & training network • The effectiveness of the JAM SG’s that we have been fighting in the last 2 months has been markedly higher than the previous months • It seems JAM rank & file & leadership doesn’t exercise control or necessarily support JAM SG’s. Reports of Sheik discontent • This current JAM SG’s network seems to have evolved from previous networks pre OIF Badr Organization, and post OIF Sheibani network • JAM SG’s will, skill, & sustainability have enabled them to employ many more EFPs and other weapons in MND-B, MND-C, MND-CS, & in MND-SE • We must remain observant of possible use of RPG-29s & shoulder fired SAMs • JAM SG’s situation will likely get worse; JAM is taking advantage of AQI’s disruption • Ahmad Al-Sheybani leadership is affecting change; not clear of impact • Damage done to JAM SG’s; no significant downward trend in EFP & IDF attacks MNC-I COIC Situation • EFP attacks have dramatically increased since March 2007 • Rocket / Mortar attacks have increased in Baghdad and Basrah • Reports of PSAF in vic of EFP attacks • Sniper attacks are highly concentrated in MNF-W & MND-B. SVDs have been found in EFP caches • Reports indicate JAM SGs went to Diwaniyah, Amarah, Basra or to Iran for training during the months of FEB & MAR • Reports indicate JAM SG members trained by IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah on EFPs, RPGs, SA-7s, mortars, small arms, sniper, and kidnapping tactics • JAM SGs continue to get paid, supplied, and trained by IRGC- QF • Reports indicate IRGC-QF, BADR Organization, border tribes, JAM SG’s are all involved in weapons smuggling from Iran into Iraq • JAM groups moving into areas previously controlled by AQI/Sunni insurgents: Khalis, Baqubah, Baghdad Security Districts MNC-I COIC Updated: 31 JUL 07 2007 AAIED Events Statistics Highest Concentrations: Total AAIEDs AAIEDs By MNDs •Baghdad •Diwaniyah Total 300 500 Found & Cleared MND-N Detonated Detonated MND-B •Basrah Found & Cleared 250 400 MND-C MND-CS 200 MND-SE 300 33% Baghdad 150 280 470 67% 200 100 313 100 157 50 86 44 0 23 37 0 Casualties Basrah Total By Month By MND Diwaniyah 450 CF WIA 120 KIA 350 110 WIA KIA CF KIA WIA 17 400 100 23 300 62 350 90 16 250 80 300 19 70 200 250 18 431 60 200 50 101 150 8 89 272 150 40 83 65 5 100 30 8 54 9 12 100 20 40 29 50 6 50 97 10 26 8 52 72 8 25 0 0 0 MND-N MND-B MND-C MND-CS MND-SE JAN JUN JUL DEC FEB APR MAR MAY AAIEDs By Month 100 90 28 FOUND & 80 CLEARED 70 28 23 DETONATED 60 17 26 50 40 21 11 71 30 10 55 56 46 20 43 31 27 10 23 0 JAN JUN JUL DEC FEB APR MAR MAY MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy Baghdad EFP Activity DEC 06 JAN 07 Total 39 Total 32 FEB 07 MAR 07 Total 12 Total 22 MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy Baghdad EFP Activity APR 07 MAY 07 Total 38 Total 43 JAM AAIED JUN 07 JUL 07 Attacks moved into Rusafah and Karadah for the first time this year Total 48 Total 51 MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy Rocket/Mortar POOs 01 MAY – 31 JUL Baghdad & Basrah Reports of JAM SGs & Rockets • IIR 6 059 2732 07 • IIR 6 059 6674 07 Majority of rocket / mortar attacks coming from Shi’a • Diplomatic Security Daily 15 May 07 • IIR 6 110 1905 07 dominated areas. This goes along with reports of Iranian • IIR 7 921 1675 07 weapons shipments into Baghdad and Iranian weapon • Diplomatic Security Daily 17 Apr 07 • IIR 6 067 2050 07 cache finds which include rockets & mortars. • IIR 6 110 1721 07 • IIR 6 067 1542 07 • IIR 6 067 1541 07 • DIIR-1CD-32-322-07-0181 • IIR 6 067 2045 07 Legend: • DIIR-1CD-28-282-07-0236 • DIIR 6 059 0896 07 POO • DIIR-1CD-28-282-07-0212 • IIR 1 656 8878 07 • DIIR 6 059 6008 07 • DIIR 1CD 100 IST3 07 0307 • IIR 1 656 8846 07 MNC-I COIC / Information Source FFA Sniper Ops 01 MAY – 31 JUL 07 Reports of Sniper Rifle Legend: Shipments to Iraq from Iran: Sniper Op • IIR 1 656 8215 07 • IIR 7 921 1219 07 • IIR 6 110 0819 07 • IIR 6 059 2295 07 • IIR 6 806 0102 07 • IIR 6 059 1623 07 • EUP20070213031001 • TD-314/30623-07 • IIR 7 921 1243 07 • IIR 7 921 1242 07 • IIR 7 921 1239 07 • IIR 6 059 6601 07 • IIR 7 921 1016 07 • IIR 6 059 2758 07 • IIR 656 8434 07 • IIR 059 2773 07 • IIR 7 921 2223 07 • IIR 6 110 2600 07 Reporting indicates IRGC-QF trains JAM SG members as well as Sunni extremists groups in sniper operations. Several cache finds have had both EFPs / components and Sniper Rifles. MNC-I COIC / Information Source CIDNE JAM SIGACTS Timeline 2007 Increase in JAM presence JAM LDRSHP JAM sends JAM moving in Hillah & JAM departing Sadr pilot trainees weapons and Babil. JAM prevalent in City and to Jordan to equipment to relocating to Diyalah, Karbala Baghdad from be licensed prevent discovery- Shia dominant Baqubah & VBIED attack: safety in on Boeing INP supports JAM areas due to Khalis belts JAM may Karbala, An 727&737 during Fardh Al- Fardh Al NE of have planned Najaf, and Iran aircraft. Qanoon Qanoon. Baghdad this attack 26 JAN 09 FEB 16 MAR 06 APR 21 APR 06 MAY 19 JAN 02 FEB 23 FEB 23 MAR 14 APR 29 APR Detention of Sadr in Iran w/aid Death squad Sadr, Haikim, & JAM infiltrate Karkh JAM Qais & Laith Mustafa al Yaqubi- members Sistani reach a police units leadership Khazali had possibly losing receive orders political agreement and other has been direct impact support from Shia to flee Iraq & partitioning the nine government plagued with on operational population-running return to Iran dominated entities in leadership planning of K2 away from CF following the governances. SCIRI: attempt to tensions and elements detention of Basrah, OMS: Najaf , exert overall within Basrah. JAM Director of Maysan, Karbala, influence in internal strife Legal & Baghdad, Dawa & the Northern within JAM. Administrative Fadillah would divide provinces Offices in the the remaining Health Ministry governorates amongst themselves. Sadr issued a fatwa calling for JAM membership for all Shia males 15-45 years of age JAM SIGACTS Timeline 2007 Nassir Farhan is the Iran’s confidence commander for the JAM has grown since Heavy fighting Malik Ishtar SG battalion Hezballah’s (LH) in Diyala province. His MAS return to Iraq erupted in perceived victory in network is active in on May 18. Nasiriyah last year’s conflict combating both ISI and CF with Israel. The between ISF and JAM on 18 JUN. influence in the region, recent train however, his group has Reporting covering Various sectarian derailment in focused recent efforts on JAM activities in factions in Diyala Turkey of an Iranian combating ISI. are stepping up weapons shipment JAM & JAM Diyalah province has shown a efforts to conduct destined to LH Special Groups Recent reporting are currently significant drop in Information illustrates Iran’s Sadrist Council of of JAM possibly involved in heavy activity since the Operations to win abandonment to its Representatives preparing for a fighting with beginning of favor among the long standing (CoR) members renewed AQI/ISI forces in Operation local populace. strategy of plausible returned to offensive Diyalah province. Arrowhead Ripper deniability. parliament. 01 JUN 10 JUN 30 JUN 13 JUL 27 JUL 06 JUL 20 JUL 25 May 08 JUN 23 JUN 03 AUG The general OMS LDRSHP Reporting indicated Iraqi PM Maliki MAS states consensus is that Effects: Ahmad charged that MAS religious MAS returned to that the former JAM Al-Shaybani has National Commander militia has been credentials vs. Iraq to reinstate been the driving infilitrated by actual religious control over Abbas al Kufi may force behind return to Iraq. Kufi former regime credentials. mainstream JAM MAS’s strategy to members and and Special Groups. has traveled to Syria reorganize and and Iran after being Ba’thists, and is regain control of being used to removed from his JAM and JAM his militia.
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