UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC)

JAM SPECIAL GROUPS Assessment

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS BRIEF IS

As of: 9 August 07 ACTO: CW3 Bryan Gray 242-0647 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Purpose

To provide an assessment of JAM Special Groups.

Agenda

• Assessment • Situation: • Facts/Trends • Enemy: • JAM SG • IRGC-QF • JAM SG BDA • Recommended COA

MNC-I COIC Notes to Previous Slide

• Sir, the purpose of this brief is to provide you with a summarized EFP IPB of the overall EFP problem set. This will assist the COIC in developing a broad understanding of the enemy and the environment which is one of our key task. • The agenda lays out the subjects in which our IPB covers.

Assessment

• JAM SG’s, with support of IRGC-QF, is conducting a sustained attack against CF • For July, EFPs accounted for 4% of all IEDs yet account for 49% of IED caused KIA and 16% of WIA (This is a change from previous year trends which were 2% Events, <20% KIA) • Limited high profile IDF attacks vic Baghdad & Basrah create perceptions of instability & lack of security • Reports indicate JAM SG’s are paid & equipped by IRGC-QF in Iran via a carefully constructed logistical & training network • The effectiveness of the JAM SG’s that we have been fighting in the last 2 months has been markedly higher than the previous months • It seems JAM rank & file & leadership doesn’t exercise control or necessarily support JAM SG’s. Reports of Sheik discontent • This current JAM SG’s network seems to have evolved from previous networks pre OIF Badr Organization, and post OIF Sheibani network • JAM SG’s will, skill, & sustainability have enabled them to employ many more EFPs and other weapons in MND-B, MND-C, MND-CS, & in MND-SE • We must remain observant of possible use of RPG-29s & shoulder fired SAMs • JAM SG’s situation will likely get worse; JAM is taking advantage of AQI’s disruption • Ahmad Al-Sheybani leadership is affecting change; not clear of impact • Damage done to JAM SG’s; no significant downward trend in EFP & IDF attacks

MNC-I COIC

Situation

• EFP attacks have dramatically increased since March 2007 • Rocket / Mortar attacks have increased in Baghdad and Basrah • Reports of PSAF in vic of EFP attacks • Sniper attacks are highly concentrated in MNF-W & MND-B. SVDs have been found in EFP caches • Reports indicate JAM SGs went to Diwaniyah, Amarah, Basra or to Iran for training during the months of FEB & MAR • Reports indicate JAM SG members trained by IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah on EFPs, RPGs, SA-7s, mortars, small arms, sniper, and kidnapping tactics • JAM SGs continue to get paid, supplied, and trained by IRGC- QF • Reports indicate IRGC-QF, BADR Organization, border tribes, JAM SG’s are all involved in weapons smuggling from Iran into Iraq • JAM groups moving into areas previously controlled by AQI/Sunni insurgents: Khalis, Baqubah, Baghdad Security Districts

MNC-I COIC Updated: 31 JUL 07 2007 AAIED Events Statistics Highest Concentrations: Total AAIEDs AAIEDs By MNDs •Baghdad •Diwaniyah Total 300 500 Found & Cleared MND-N Detonated Detonated MND-B •Basrah Found & Cleared 250 400 MND-C MND-CS 200 MND-SE 300 33% Baghdad 150 280 470 67% 200 100 313 100 157 50 86 44 0 23 37 0 Casualties Basrah Total By Month By MND Diwaniyah 450 CF WIA 120 KIA 350 110 WIA KIA CF KIA WIA 17 400 100 23 300 62 350 90 16 250 80 300 19 70 200 250 18 431 60 200 50 101 150 8 89 272 150 40 83 65 5 100 30 8 54 9 12 100 20 40 29 50 6 50 97 10 26 8 52 72 8 25 0 0 0

MND-N MND-B MND-C MND-CS MND-SE JAN JUN JUL DEC FEB APR MAR MAY

AAIEDs By Month

100 90 28 FOUND & 80 CLEARED

70 28 23 DETONATED 60 17 26 50 40 21 11 71 30 10 55 56 46 20 43 31 27 10 23 0

JAN JUN JUL DEC FEB APR MAR MAY

MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy

Baghdad EFP Activity

DEC 06 JAN 07

Total 39 Total 32

FEB 07 MAR 07

Total 12 Total 22

MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy

Baghdad EFP Activity

APR 07 MAY 07

Total 38 Total 43

JAM AAIED JUN 07 JUL 07 Attacks moved into Rusafah and Karadah for the first time this year

Total 48 Total 51

MNC-I COIC / Information Source: TF Troy Rocket/Mortar POOs 01 MAY – 31 JUL Baghdad & Basrah

Reports of JAM SGs & Rockets • IIR 6 059 2732 07 • IIR 6 059 6674 07 Majority of rocket / mortar attacks coming from Shi’a • Diplomatic Security Daily 15 May 07 • IIR 6 110 1905 07 dominated areas. This goes along with reports of Iranian • IIR 7 921 1675 07 weapons shipments into Baghdad and Iranian weapon • Diplomatic Security Daily 17 Apr 07 • IIR 6 067 2050 07 cache finds which include rockets & mortars. • IIR 6 110 1721 07 • IIR 6 067 1542 07 • IIR 6 067 1541 07 • DIIR-1CD-32-322-07-0181 • IIR 6 067 2045 07 Legend: • DIIR-1CD-28-282-07-0236 • DIIR 6 059 0896 07 POO • DIIR-1CD-28-282-07-0212 • IIR 1 656 8878 07 • DIIR 6 059 6008 07 • DIIR 1CD 100 IST3 07 0307 • IIR 1 656 8846 07

MNC-I COIC / Information Source FFA

Sniper Ops 01 MAY – 31 JUL 07 Reports of Sniper Rifle Legend: Shipments to Iraq from Iran: Sniper Op • IIR 1 656 8215 07 • IIR 7 921 1219 07 • IIR 6 110 0819 07 • IIR 6 059 2295 07 • IIR 6 806 0102 07 • IIR 6 059 1623 07 • EUP20070213031001 • TD-314/30623-07 • IIR 7 921 1243 07 • IIR 7 921 1242 07 • IIR 7 921 1239 07 • IIR 6 059 6601 07 • IIR 7 921 1016 07 • IIR 6 059 2758 07 • IIR 656 8434 07 • IIR 059 2773 07 • IIR 7 921 2223 07 • IIR 6 110 2600 07

Reporting indicates IRGC-QF trains JAM SG members as well as Sunni extremists groups in sniper operations. Several cache finds have had both EFPs / components and Sniper Rifles.

MNC-I COIC / Information Source CIDNE

JAM SIGACTS Timeline 2007

Increase in JAM presence JAM LDRSHP JAM sends JAM moving in Hillah & JAM departing Sadr pilot trainees weapons and Babil. JAM prevalent in City and to Jordan to equipment to relocating to Diyalah, Karbala Baghdad from be licensed prevent discovery- Shia dominant Baqubah & VBIED attack: safety in on Boeing INP supports JAM areas due to Khalis belts JAM may Karbala, An 727&737 during Fardh Al- Fardh Al NE of have planned Najaf, and Iran aircraft. Qanoon Qanoon. Baghdad this attack

26 JAN 09 FEB 16 MAR 06 APR 21 APR 06 MAY

19 JAN 02 FEB 23 FEB 23 MAR 14 APR 29 APR Detention of Sadr in Iran w/aid Death squad Sadr, Haikim, & JAM infiltrate Karkh JAM Qais & Laith Mustafa al Yaqubi- members Sistani reach a police units leadership Khazali had possibly losing receive orders political agreement and other has been direct impact support from Shia to flee Iraq & partitioning the nine government plagued with on operational population-running return to Iran dominated entities in leadership planning of K2 away from CF following the governances. SCIRI: attempt to tensions and elements detention of Basrah, OMS: Najaf , exert overall within Basrah. JAM Director of Maysan, Karbala, influence in internal strife Legal & Baghdad, Dawa & the Northern within JAM. Administrative Fadillah would divide provinces Offices in the the remaining Health Ministry governorates amongst themselves. Sadr issued a fatwa calling for JAM membership for all Shia males 15-45 years of age JAM SIGACTS Timeline 2007 Nassir Farhan is the Iran’s confidence commander for the JAM has grown since Heavy fighting Malik Ishtar SG battalion Hezballah’s (LH) in Diyala province. His MAS return to Iraq erupted in perceived victory in network is active in on May 18. Nasiriyah last year’s conflict combating both ISI and CF with Israel. The between ISF and JAM on 18 JUN. influence in the region, recent train however, his group has Reporting covering Various sectarian derailment in focused recent efforts on JAM activities in factions in Diyala Turkey of an Iranian combating ISI. are stepping up weapons shipment JAM & JAM Diyalah province has shown a efforts to conduct destined to LH Special Groups Recent reporting are currently significant drop in Information illustrates Iran’s Sadrist Council of of JAM possibly involved in heavy activity since the Operations to win abandonment to its Representatives preparing for a fighting with beginning of favor among the long standing (CoR) members renewed AQI/ISI forces in Operation local populace. strategy of plausible returned to offensive Diyalah province. Arrowhead Ripper deniability. parliament. 01 JUN 10 JUN 30 JUN 13 JUL 27 JUL

06 JUL 20 JUL 25 May 08 JUN 23 JUN 03 AUG The general OMS LDRSHP Reporting indicated Iraqi PM Maliki MAS states consensus is that Effects: Ahmad charged that MAS religious MAS returned to that the former JAM Al-Shaybani has National Commander militia has been credentials vs. Iraq to reinstate been the driving infilitrated by actual religious control over Abbas al Kufi may force behind return to Iraq. Kufi former regime credentials. mainstream JAM MAS’s strategy to members and and Special Groups. has traveled to Syria reorganize and and Iran after being Ba’thists, and is regain control of being used to removed from his JAM and JAM his militia. command position in conduct terrorist Since mid-April, Special Groups MAY 07 following his activities reporting continued to are heavily inability to control throughout Iraq. indicate the use of fighting with Al JAM Special Groups illegal checkpoints JAM maintains a Qaeda in Iraq/ (SG) elements. operated by JAM in the presence in the Islamic State of Amel district of SW majority of the Iraq (ISI) forces in Baghdad. The fake population centers Diyala Province. checkpoints tactic TTP throughout Diyalah is mostly notably used province. by JAM within Baghdad. Notes to Previous Slide • Khalis: The City of Khalis is strongly linked to the BADR Organization and utilizes JAM as their military. JAM continues to establish checkpoints through out the city and is preventing Sunnis from transiting the city and shopping in the market. AQIZ continues to attack the Shia and local Sunni insurgents have entrenched themselves in small pockets around the city. Operations to clear AQI from the surrounding villages has potentially left a security void that JAM may potentially exploit by attacking East and SE Sunni controlled areas. Reporting indicated JAM received new recruits and supplies from training camps in Iran which JAM will likely utilize in the fight for Khalis thus giving them a significant advantage.

• Muqdadiyah: JAM is losing ground in its battle for influence in Muqdadiyah. Muqdadiyah, like Khalis is key terrain for both groups. Muqdadiyah serves as the apex for the main Sunni population belt from the DRV to Muqdadiyah and for the Shia population belt from Balad Ruz to Muqdadiyah along with a Kurdish presence in the city so, control of this point is crucial for both in order to expand further into other areas of central Diyalah. JAM influence in the ISF is preventing AQIZ from gaining control of the central and western districts of the city where there is a mixed (Sunni/Shia) or majority Shia population. Due to aggressive operations by ISI, displaced in eastern Muqdadiyah.

• Ahamiyah/Rusafa: The Adhamiyah Security District is primarily a Shia dominated area, with JAM/SG using the area to conduct operations and cache weapons. However, the Adhamiyah Rusafa area is known to be an AQI stronghold. AQI in Adhamiyah Peninsula are currently being challenged by JAM for control of the area.

• Ashraf: An area that has become a relative safe zone free of CF and ISF intervention which had permitted insurgent’s spreading of sectarian violence, freedom of movement, and a base of operations from which they can stage additional attacks against Khalis. Additional AQIZ strong points exist in the North DRV. JAM is increasing its presence in the Shia villages in the north Diyala River Valley in response to the growing AQIZ threat. They present themselves to the Shia population as their only source of protection to the Sunni threat. They control access in and out of Serajik village.

Notes to Previous Slide

• Samarra: Tensions in Samarra continue to rise between Sunni terrorist elements and Shi’a extremist groups, with the majority of CF/ISF focused in Baqubah and Diyala, Samarr has become a hotbed for sectarian violence. Currently the ISF are allowing insurgent groups freedom of movement throughout the city, making it easy for them to escape and evade CF. This also allows JAM and AQI to focus on fighting for power and control over the city. AQI elements that have fled Diyala are using Samarra as a logistical area and safe haven, after being forced out of Baqubah.

• Baqubah: AQI that have been removed from Baqubah have taken refuge in many major cities in the surrounding area. They have staged themselves along M/ASRs. Reporting indicates that JAM is exploiting AH Ripper as it is backfilling areas once held by AQI and allowing them to fill the vacuum.

• Abu-Ghurayb: This area is key terrain to both AQI and JAM. Because MSR Mobile and ASR Michigan run through it, controlling this area means controlling the western approaches to Baghdad, through which external trade between Iraq and Jordan/Syria travels. Also, the area’s proximity to the Abu-Ghurayb prison, Baghdad International Airport, and the Victory Base Complex increase its attractiveness for both Shia and Sunni insurgencies. Currently AQI is the dominant group in Abu Ghurayb. However, since past spring the local Anti-AQI and CF have pushed AQI east resulting in a dramatic decline in attack rates in western Abu-Ghurayb. Easter Abu-Ghurayb has not experienced the same decline or the same success in removing AQI. The Muthana IA BDE which is predominately Shia, and infiltrated with JAM members has exploited and abused the residents within its area of responsibility. Reportedly, the Muthana BDE is the source of a significant amount of sectarian violence in eastern Abu-Ghurayb. In these areas, AQI enjoys greater tacit support from the predominately Sunni population as it is perceived to have a legitimate role as protectors of JAM and Shia encroachment

ENEMY: JAM SG

• Goals: – Keep CF “bogged down” in Iraq – Maximize CF casualties – Force the American public to increase their anti-war sentiment – Change American political views of the war – Eventually force CF withdrawal • Key Task: – Conduct Reconnaissance / Surveillance on CF – Attack CF using EFP, Sniper, small arms, RPG, & IDF tactics – Kidnap CF – Murder Sunnis / EJK / Kidnap / Illegal Check Points • Extended Purpose: – Used as 1st line of defense for Iran – Allow Iran to claim plausible deniability

MNC-I COIC

Why They Fight

• JAM SG’s have begun to distance themselves from JAM. JAM SG’s are more effective at paying its lower level fighters. Special Groups not only pay well, but members are supplied with cars to facilitate operations. Special Group members view Muqtada Al-Sadr as weak since he gave the order not to attack CF or ISF. With very little job opportunities, most JAM members see the SG’s as a better prospect. • Paid by IRGC-QF – Given vehicles – CO CDRs $700 p/month – SQD LDRs $300 p/month – Fighters $100-$150 p/month – $700 p/successful attack against CF • Successful attack: The IED, rocket, or mortar hits the target and proof of the attack is recorded

Sources: IIR 6 059 2695 07, IIR 1 656 8241 07, TD-314/39734-07, TD-314/34831-07, TD-314/40154-07

MNC-I COIC

MUQTADA AL -SADR Face of Movement

MUSTAFA AL - YA ’ QUBI Constant Advisor

Abbas Al Kufi AHMAD AL - SHEBANYI Sadrist Trend Leader in Iraq 10 Committee Prominent OMS Main Headquarters Members COR OMS Spokesman OMS Main NajafHeadquarters Salah al - Ubaydi & Hazim al - A’ raji Nassar al-Ruba’i Najaf Al Musawi Salam al-Maliki Haydar al-Musawi Jalil al Nuri Salah Al - Ubaydi(Walid al-Zamili)& Hazim Al - A ’ raji Baha’ al-A’raji Riyadh al Nuri Hassan al-Ruba’i Ahmad al Sheybani Nassar al-Ruba’i Zahra al Suwaydi Muhammad Tabtaba’I Bal Qis al-Khafaji Information Committee Social/Economic Committee Religious Committee Tribal Committee JAM BDE CDR Salah al-Ubaydi Oversees religious instruction: Qusay al-Wahhab Oversees dissemination of religious Oversees traditional core Razzaq Alal - Gharawi Haydar al Jabiri teachings: advocates Islamic Law, function: basic socio -economic Spread Trend’s activist religious possibly coordinates OMS websites services ideology, revival of Shi’a Islam Wissam al Khafaji Abd al-Mutayyiri

Political CommitteeCommittee Legal Committee Imam/FridayInformation Prayer Committee Committee Najaf / Sadr City Oversees Imams for Sadrist Mosques Abd Al- Mahdi Al- Mutayyiri Oversees JAM activities: Internal affairs, ensures Oversees Sadrist CoR and Ministers: following guidance Special coordinate to advance Sadrist agenda, Groups JAM source of strength to garish support

Special Groups Legal Committee National Special Muhammad Al - Commander: Committee Sa ‘adi & Jabar KazimSayid Abbas Al Isawi al UnknownUnknown Al - Khafaji Strategic Leadership Kufi Akram Al -Kaabi South North Baghdad Strategic Leadership ReligiousReligious Leadership Muhammad Husayn Al - Shara Tabataba ’i Diyala: Baghdad: Muthana: Dhi Qar : Maysan:Maysan: JAM Najaf: Ibrahim al Hilfi Hajji Ahmed aka Muhannad Aws Shaykh Hardi Abu Ali Al (Detained) al Fradawi al Nasiri Sheikh Ahmed or Abd Al al Khafaji Abu Issa Razzaq Al Ka’ abi Abu Muqtada Gharawi Chief of Logistics Operations Chief of Logistics West East Abu Dharr Abu Dua Wasit:Wasit: JAM Karbala: Qadisiyah: Baghdad: BaghdadBaghdad: ???????? Mudafar al JAM JAM Musawi Shaykh Qa ’ id Abu AssamAssem Leadership Leadership al Karbala ’i Basrah: South Baghdad Diwaniyah: Central South North Wisam Abu Qadir Kut:Kut: JAM Musa Kamil Hurriya: Rusafa District (Deceased) OMS: Sheikh Sadr City: Serayar Wisam al Hafaji Qasim al Muhammad Tahir Suhail Al-Iqabi Qurashi (Detained) Amarah: Basrah: Baghdad: Diyala: Mansour: Asad Al - Basri Abu Mustafa Sheikh Bakr Sheikh Hadri Al Karbala/Hillah Nassir Farhan Fardawi al Mustafa Ali SadrKarada City: Ala Abu Mohammad Abu Bakir (Three Man Ka’ abi Jawad Al - Sari Thamir Al - Dulaymi Haydar Sheik Habib OMS: Sayyid Abu Shajin Yusuf Al - Ali Committee Head) Kadamiya: Qasim Al - Dulaymi Qatan Abu Tiba Fadhil al Shara Yarib Al - Rudani Abul Rahman Al - Badawi OMS: Ahmand al Amarah: JAM Asad Al - Ma ’ muri Abu Tufuf Sheik Ra ’ ad Al - Shuwayli Abu Sajjad Al - Sayyid Muhammad Basri NewSadr Baghdad City: Gharrawi Rahim Al - Shamushi West Rashid: Aqil Hashim Sayyid Malik Abu Layl Abu Mariam Abu Zarha Ahmad Sarki Sattar Al - Battat Abu Mariam Rogue JAM Shaykh Fadil Ramzi Jabr Al - Shammari Abu Ibrahim Adhamiyah: Basrah: Jalil al Nuri Karkh: ShaykhHusan al Arkan Nazir Shaykh Yusuf ShaykhAbudi Shayk Karrar Abu Dura Muhammad Abd Kazim al Sadah

Legend: JAM SGs AO JAM SG AO JAM SG Stronghold

Irbil Baghdad Network On Next Slide Sulaymaniyah

Diyala Nassir Farhan Al Kut Shiek Habib Sayid Hamid Sayyid Abbas Jasim Al Yasiri Madafar Muhshin Jabar Al Imam Haer Salih Abd Ali Khaid Abd Ziryab Mohammad Jasim Gara Hasayn Fallan Hasan Ali Haim Al-Ajali Mussayyib Hashim Habib Al Zubaydi Hashim Shehab Al Abbedy Azzam Abd Al Ajali Ahmad Hassan Hatruge Abu Kowther Shaykh Muhammd Jodah Al Zamili Muhammad Al Sultani Ali Abdullah Athab Al-Khafaji Ahmad Al-Ma’muri Baghdad Abu Hora Sa’id Al-Sultani

Mussayyib Al Imam Karbala Hillah Al Kut Karbala / Hillah An Najaf Amarah Sayyid Muhammad Asad al Bahadli Thamir Al-Dulaymi Diwaniyah Fadhil Abu al Bahadli Qasim Al-Dulaymi Amarah Abu Sjjad Al-Gharrawi Asad Al-Ma’muri Aqil Hashim Tariq Jundi Jassim Abu Mariam COL Farhadi Majid Diwaniyah Sattar Al-Battat Seyed Hassan Salim Nasiriyah Shaykh Fadi Nahidh Abu Assim Saad Ubaid Musali Basrah Abu Ibrahim Ali Hakim Abu Mustafa Asad al Basri Kifa al Grayti Mohammad Hassan Ali Hamza al Hadad Ahmed al Kazzawi Abu Khalid Asad Al-Basri Basrah Ala Abu Mohammad Hawad Al-Sari Yusuf Al-Ali Yarib Al-Rudani Shaykhy Yusuf Shayk Karrar Abu Sajaad Al-Gharawi Sayid Talib Khalid Jasim Abd Al Sadi MNC-I COIC / Information Source CACE / TDC Kazim JAM SGs Baghdad AO

JAM SG QUDs Adhamiyah JAM CO? Arkan Nazir SG Hashim aka Abu Yusif Sayid Abdul Jalil Mohammaed Shaker Sadr City Thamer Jassam Shayikh Abd Al Zahra Al Sawadi JAM Muhammad Jasim Shindi Deraji Abu Dura SG Haydar Khadir Shwub Sabeh Ali Abdul Zahri Abbas JAM Husayn Al Sadi Sheikh Hssam SG Kadamiyah Qamis Al Amari Haydar Al Hilfi Haydar Mehdi Khalid Ismail Al Mukhayif Al Saraji Abu Jamal New Baghdad Hikmat Naziad Qasim Haydar Khaddam Kamil Akab Al Darraji Thamir Abu Rihab Raad Majid Mahmud Said Khalid Imad Rashid Al Daraji Mazin Abu Karar Ahmed aka Al Muaqaq Yasir Kazim JAM Abbas Taqwah Abu Jamal SG Riyadh Al Wawi Talib Kazim Sayid Rahman Karkh Hajji Thaer

JAM SG

West Rashid Walid Al Shumusi Hassan Falih Al Dilfi Ali Thayb Haydar Al Bahiyal Sayid Haydar Haydar Rashid Ali Abwa Muhammad Mulla Hirayshan Khalifa

MNC-I COIC / Information Source CACE / TDC JAM SGs: How They Fight Methods of Attack: • EFP • MTR/RKT • Sniper • RPG Irbil • Kidnap • Murder Cells: Sulaymaniyah Operate in 5-7 man elements Tactics: • Attack CF FOBs w/ MTR/RKT • Attack CF along LOCs w/EFP • Attack CF w/precision small arms • Use local populace to hide Attack Zones: • ASRs, MSRs, FOBs Support Zones: • Shi’a dominated areas/populace Baghdad

Hillah Al Kut

Diwaniyah

Nasiriyah Basrah Legend: EFP Attack Zone

Structure & Operations of an EFP Cell Individual Roles Within A Cell ~ 2 meters = tape marks on wall for targeting The Teams Within A Cell: 1. Conduct surveillance on position of the EFP 2. Conducts reconnaissance on Coalition Force convoys ~ 3. Assembles EFP ~ 80 cm Seven Individuals Are Needed For A Successful EFP Cell:

1. Conduct surveillance on the road or position of the EFP PIR 2. Assembles the EFP 3. Connects the trigger and programs the circuit board 4. Trigger Man 5. Drives vehicle containing the EFP for emplacement 6. Collect intelligence of CF convoys including markings and numbers identifying the convoy. 7. Also collects intelligence on CF convoy Attack Preparations 1. Preparation for an attack takes from six to nine days 2. The individual who emplaces the EFP aims for the Rhino Box as the first place the motion sensor will detect 3. Surveillance teams spend three days to collect information on CF Convoys. A. Individuals move to various locations to mask collection efforts B. Surveillance is kept in a notebook that is later given to the individual emplacing the EFP C. Collection is taken on the speed of the vehicles, the lanes they travel in, and the markings and numbers on the vehicles. IIR 6 059 2231 07

Data Source: TF Troy / TDC Notes to Previous Slide

• Slide 5: Sir, this information was derived from the interrogation of the Hillah captures.

• The interrogation revealed that there are at least 7 members to an EFP cell.

• Each member has a specific duty such as surveillance of the EFP site, reconnaissance of CF convoys, and assembling the EFP itself.

• The detainee also revealed the steps for attack preparations which he stated takes anywhere from six to nine days. Note: Majority of reports indicate JAM SGs Concept of Support weapons shipments are coming from Iran into Iraq via large trucks containing produce or appliances In order for Iran to maintain it’s goals in Iraq, JAM such as refrigerators.

SGs are trained, equipped, and paid by the IRGC- NASR

QF. Key EFP cache finds have also included IRGC-QF Iranian weapons. The cache finds are located Irbil Ramazan along key LOCs and known weapons transfer points into Baghdad and in JAM SGs AOs. This Sulaymaniyah logistical network was established in early 2003. Tehran Iranian weapons found in caches: • EFPs / components • 60mm, 81mm, 120mm mortar rounds • 155mm artillery rounds

• Hang Grenades ZAFAR • RPG-7 launchers and rounds •Trained Fighters •Guidance • Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines Baghdad •Money •Small Arms • Draganov Sniper Rifles Mehran • PKCs, AK-47s, G3 Assault Rifles •EFPs •Sniper Rifles • 7.62 ammunition •RPGs KarbalaKarbala Hillah •Rockets / Mortars • C-4 Al Kut

An Najaf FAJR Legend: Diwaniyah Nasr CMD Amarah Zafar CMD Ahvaz Fajr CMD Samawah Border Crossing Nasiriyah

Smuggling Routes Basrah JAM SG AO JAM SG Stronghold Waypoint Key EFP Cache MNC-I COIC Notes to Previous Slide

• IIR 4201-4650-07 RPGs purchased from Iran for US $350. REL//ACGU

02 JUN 07 CJSOTF-AP INTSUM “Free EFPs”

Kharnabat

Khanaqin

Baqubah

Kharnabat 38S MC 66138 40318 Report: Illegitimate transport company sponsored by Iranian INTEL transporting ready-made EFPs in semi trucks through Khanaqin to final stop in Kharnabat. Truck drivers pay off corrupt Iraqi border patrol officers. EFPs hidden inside produce, new refrigerators, and other kitchen appliances. EFPs not sold for money but are pushed to Shi’a terrorist groups. Shi’a terrorists groups drive to Kharnabat to receive free EFPs then drive back to their own region to attack CF and ISF.

Iranian Support

• Iran knew in 2003 that U.S. Forces would invade Iraq. • Iran developed a strategy that would make Iraq their 1st line of defense against U.S. forces. Iran would accomplish this by: – Keeping the U.S. “bogged down” in Iraq – Maximize CF casualties with EFPs – Claim plausible deniability – Force the American public to increase their anti-war sentiment – Change American political views of the war – Cause CF withdrawal from Iraq and claim victory • Iran prepared by giving Abu Mustafa Al-Sheibani $40 million in July 2003 to set up a secret network to attack CF with EFPs – Approximately 380 members – Extends from Basrah to Baghdad • Al-Sheibani is a former BADR Corps Baghdad Front Commander, BADR Corps Intel Chief, & IRGC-QF Intel agent who conducted operations against Saddam’s Regime. • IRGC-QF: Principle Iranian organization employed to execute proxy war in Iraq – Reports directly to Ayatollah Khomeini – Provides training, weapons, and funding to JAM Special Groups – Assisting AQI & other Sunni insurgent groups with weapons to help accomplish Iran’s goals – Its methods are strikingly similar to methods used in Lebanon 1982-2006 – Iran’s involvement in Iraq is part of a larger regional strategy • Bottom line: IN THE SHORT TERM, IRAN’S STRATEGY IS WORKING. IT IS WAGING A PROXY WAR AT MINIMAL COSTS FOR A REGIONAL STRATEGIC ENDSTATE. Abu Mustafa Al-Sheibani

=

MNC-I COIC

IRGC-QF Organization

Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khomeini

Armed Forces General Staff Soleimani answers only to Khomeini IRGC Commander Rahim Safavi

IRGC Joint Staff

IRGC QUDs Force Commander Ghasem Soleimani

Ramazan Corps Arabia Operations Intelligence Dept 1000 (Iraq) Dept 6000 Dept 600 Dept 500 BG Ahmad Foruzandeh (Elements in Iraq)

Africa Spec Ops Lebanon Corps Dept 7000 Dept 9000 Spec Ops Trng Dept 2000 (Elements in Iraq) Dept 710 Balkans Afghanistan Corps Dept 11000 Dept 4000 Missile Logistics Dept 8000 Dept 740 (Elements in IRAQ)

Information Source: NGIC & MNC-I CACE

IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps

Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khomeini

IRGC QUDS Force BG Ghasem Soleimani Commander

Ramazan Corps BG Ahmad Foruzandeh HQ, Tehran, IR

Nasr Command Zafar Command Fajr Command Command (Northern Iraq) (Central Iraq) (Southern Iraq) COL Majid Alizadeh Mesgariyan ?? BG Obeidavi HQ, Marivan, IR HQ, Mehran, IR HQ, Ahvaz, IR

Baghdad Office Al Kut Al Amarah As Sulaymaniyah Irbil Office Hasan Kazemi-Ghomi Office? Office? Office Abbas Hosseini Hormat Farughi Karbala An Najaf Al Basrah Office? Office? Office?

Information Source: NGIC & MNC-I CACE IRGC-QF Dept 1000 Ramazan Corps Facilities

Legend: NASR

Nasr CMD IRGC-QF Irbil Ramazan Zafar CMD Fajr CMD Irbil Sulaymaniyah Border Crossing Tehran Ramazan Offices

ZAFAR

Baghdad Mehran

Karbala Al Kut

FAJR

An Najaf Amarah

Ahvaz

Basrah

Information Source: NGA Organization of IRGC-QF Ramazan Bases

Ramazan Corps personnel may work out of their residence or from the offices IRGC QF of an affiliated Iraqi Shi'a NASR IRGC-QF Ramazan organization.

Irbil Tehran Sulaymaniyah

ZAFAR IRGC-QF

Baghdad

Karbala Al Kut

FAJR Legend: An Najaf Al Amarah IRGC-QF Influence Khazali Network Ahvaz Gharawi Network Shebani Network “Fartusi” Network Al Basrah

Source: NGIC (U) Iran/Iraq: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iraq DEC 2006 & TF 17 Interrogations of Khazalis

JAM Special Groups Training

Common threads: Reports of JAM Training • EFPs in Iran since 01 MAY 07: • RPGs • IIR 6 059 6657 07 • SA-7s • IIR 6 059 2418 07 • 120mm Mortar • IIR 7 921 1825 07 • 81mm Mortar • IIR 6 110 2062 07 • 60mm Mortar • IIR 6 059 2608 07 • Small Arms • DIIR-1CD-28-810-07-0085 • Sniper • IIR 6 110 2059 07 • Kidnapping • DIIR-1CD-71-716-07-0322 • DIIR-504-81-701-07-140 • IIR 6 067 8714 07 • IIR 1 656 8069 07 • IIR 2 363 0147 07 JAM members trained in LEBANON • IIR 2 363 0132 07 by Lebanese Hezbollah • IIR 6 059 6289 07 & return to attack CF • IIR 2 363 0131 07 • IIR 6 067 8684 07 • IIR 6 110 1987 07 Reports of JAM Training • IIR 6 059 2519 07 in Lebanon since MAR 07: • IIR 6 067 8677 07 • IIR 7 936 0664 07 • IIR 2 363 0164 07 • IIR 6 059 6286 07 • IIR 1 656 7967 07 • IIR 6 059 6285 07 JAM members trained in IRAN • IIR 6 067 8673 07 • IIR 2 363 0076 07 by IRGC-QF • IIR 6 059 2489 07 • IIR 7 933 1032 07 • IIR 1 656 7945 07 • IIR 2 362 0257 07 & return to attack CF • IIR 7 933 1085 07 • IIR 7 921 1534 07 • IIR 6 110 1892 07 • DIIR-1CD-BDOC-HST1-07-9927 • IIR 6 067 8839 07 • IIR 6 110 1584 07 • IIR 7 933 0845 07 • TD 314/56417 07 • DIIR-1CD-33-334-07-0068 • TD 314/56417 07 • IIR 6 067 5584 07 • IIR 2 363 0151 07 • IIR 7 921 1401 07 • IIR 6 110 1524 07 • IIR 6 110 1450 07 • IIR 2 362 0070 07 • IIR 5 503 0902 07 • DIIR-1CD-28-283-07-0101 • IIR 7 921 1943 07 • IIR 6110 2196 07 • TD 314/43403 07 •

MNC-I COIC IRGC-QF / MOIS Assist AQIZ / Sunni Extremists Groups

• IRGC-QF supporting AQIZ & other Sunni Extremists Groups with $, training, and weapons (No EFP NASR

support). Most reports state this is IRGC-QF occurring in the Diyala Province. Irbil Ramazan • Goal: • Keep Iraq in a chaotic state • Maximize CF casualties Irbil SulaymaniyahJAM SG • Hasten the withdrawal of CF AQIZ / SUNNIS Tehran Supporting Reports: • DIIR MNFW HET 002 022602 07 • IIR 2 314 0473 07 • IIR 5 503 0676 07 • IIR 6 067 5596 07 • DIIR-1CD-33-IST1-07-0036 • DIIR-25-31-IST07-07-0243 • DIIR-25-34-680-07-150 Iranian weapons found in MNF-W: • DIIR 6 059 9389 07 ZAFAR • DIIR MNFW 024396 07 5 Jul 06: 2 x G3 Rifles (AO Denver) • DIIR MNFW 038174 07 7 Nov 06: 1 x G3 Rifle (IVO Karmah) 9 Dec 06: 1 x G3 Rifle (Fallujah) • DIIR MNFW 040150 07 Baghdad • DIIR MNFW 040185 07 29 Jan 07: 1 x 70mm RPG rnd (Ramadi) • IIR 2 314 0467 07 20 Feb 07: 1 x G3 Rifle (Amiriyah) Mehran • IIR 2 314 0644 07 10 Mar 07: 1 x G3 Rifle (Fallujah) • IIR 5 503 0560 07 27 Mar 07: 5 x G3 magazines (Fallujah) • IIR 5 503 087 07 10 May 07: 2 x G3 Rifles (Amiriyah) Karbala Weapons • IIR 6 059 6214 07 14 May 07: 3 x 60mm mtr rnds (Khalidiyah) Money • IIR 6 105 4318 07 17 May 07: 4 x 81mm mtr rnds (Karmah) Trained FightersAl Kut • IIR 6 110 1048 07 01 Jun 07: 1 x 60mm mtr rnd (Fallujah) Intelligence FAJR • IIR 6 110 1182 07 18 Jul 07: 3 x Iranian GC Rifles • IIR 7 921 1583 07 Source: MNC-I CACE Iranian Weapons Tracker An Najaf • IIR 7 936 0390 07 Amarah • IIR 7 936 0579 07 • DIIR MNFW 032224 07 • IIR 7 932 0828 07 • TD-314/19917-06 Ahvaz • TD-314/25723-07 • TD-314/30644-07 • IIR 6 110 1645 07 • IIR 6 067 8740 07 • DIIR-4ID-32-321-07-005 Basrah • SIR-1CD-33-IST1-07-0248-DAT1788 • TD-314/34684-07 • IIR 2 363 0206 07 • DIIR-25-3-2SBCT-370-07-137 • DIIR 6 059 0310 07A

Information Source: NGA / JIOC-I Numerous Reports of Sensitive INTEL: Current Situation Weapons Smuggling Weapons Smuggling 9 August 07 from IIam

Ilam

Mandali JAM SG’s Training

ZAFAR Baghdad Numerous Reports of Weapons Smuggling, JAM SG’s crossing back into Iraq after Mehran Increased EFP, training Rocket, Mortar 19 Attacks •Trained Fighters •Guidance •Money Karbala Hillah •Small Arms •EFPs Al Kut •Sniper Rifles Increased EFP •RPGs Attacks •Rockets / Mortars Numerous Reports of An Najaf WeaponsIranian II Diwaniwah TransferWeapons Point Transfer Points JAM SG’s Amarah FAJR Training Increased EFP Attacks, EFP Caches

Ahvaz

Samawah Nasiriyah Legend: Border Border Crossing Basrah Smuggling Route Waypoint Increased EFP, Zafar CMD Rocket, Mortar Fajr CMD Attacks MNC-I COIC

CF BDA Against JAM SG’s Detained: Detained: • Abu Zaki (Logistics for K2 Network) • Hakim al Zamili (K2 Leader) • Abu Sayf (Southern Karkh CDR) • Jum’ah Diwan Sultan Al Bahadli (Sadr City CDR) • Abu Surrur (Ghazaliyah CDR) • Abu Miriam (Western Baghdad Leader) • Abu Musa (Weapon facilitator K2 Network) • Qais Khaz’ali (K2 Leader) • Musa Khaddam Lazim Al Sadi (Ops Officer Ghazaliyah) • Layth Khaz’ali (K2 Leader) • Abu Rusi (JAM SG Leader) • Kuki (Sheibani Network Leader) • Abbas Al Fatlawi (SE Baghdad Spec Ops CDR) • Adnan Shaya (Karkh CDR) • Abu Rusl (K2 Financier) • Ayid Haddi Abbas Al-Juburi (Co CDR Khadamiyah) • Abu Liqa (K2 Leader) • Hussein Amin Al Qurrahghuli (EJK DCDR Khadamiyah) • Abu Hisham (Karkh BDE CDR) • Sayid Muhammed Al Ittabi (Legal Advisor) • Adnan Ism’il Hafiz al Zarjawi (Baghdad SG EJK Cell) • Ahmed Zhirjawi (Karkh CDR) • Ahmed Husayn (Baghdad EFP SG Network) • Haydar Muhammad Baqir Al Badri (Husayniyaha Leader) • Yasir Al Sheibani (EFP Facilitator Baghdad) • Abu Zahrah (K2 Leader) • Rahim Jabur (Weapons Facilitator Baghdad) • Martada al Hajaj (Gharawi Network Leader) • Hussein Ramsey Al Sumayde (EJK Leader Baghdad) • Abu Zaynab (Sheibani EFP Facilitator) • Basim Al Kabi (South Karkh CDR) • Jais Theish Fais al Draji (Sheibani Network Leader) • Abu Surur Al Sa’adi (Ghazaliyah CDR) • Sed Amed al Macsusi (Sheibani Network Leader) • Abu Karrar (Karkh Leader) • Mohammad Tahir (Basrah Leader) • Abu Mustafa (Basrah DCDR) • ‘Abbas Ma’n Faqir al-Musawi (Key Weapons Smuggler) • Allawi Ala (SG’s Cell Leader) • Asa’ad (JAM SG’s Senior Leader) • Kamil Hamdan Issa Al-Sudani (JAM SG Leader) • Ali Rodan (JAM SG Leader) • Ibrahim al-Hilfi (JAM SG Leader) • Qayis Kazim Ghazi al Zubaydi (JAM SG Leader) 7 August • Qahtan Ashur Zabun al-Draji aka Abu Tiba (JAM SG Leader) 07 MND-C • Ali Thayb (JAM SG Leader) Captures • Abu Hayder (JAM Cell Leader) • Abu Mustafa (JAM SG Leader) • Muhammad Hasan Ismail Al Sultani (JAM Cell Leader) • Abu Karrar (JAM Commander Narhwan) • Abu Aous (Jam BN Cmdr) • Sabah al Kuwaiti (JAM Commander Mahmudiyah) • Sayid Muhammad (JAM SG Commander Hillah) 58 Total EFP Caches EKIA: • Shaykh Azar al Dulaymi (Tactical CDR Karbala PJCC Attk) Interrogations continue to provide • Wissam Abu Qadir both targeting information and (Basrah CDR) insight on JAM SG’s. • Arkan Hefez (JAM SG Leader)

As of 01 JUL 07

JAM SG Strengths & Vulnerabilities

• Strengths: – Motivated – Well equipped with effective weapons – Supported by sophisticated, well led IRGC-QF professionals – Mobility – Concealment – Knows terrain – Adaptable – Trained – Support of locals

• Vulnerabilities: – Few in numbers – Politically isolated from OMS / Friction with Sadr – Reports indicate possible friction with Shiite tribal Sheiks – Uneducated – Depends on IRGC-QF – Used by and exploited by IRGC-QF; therefore expendable

MNC-I COIC UNCLASSIFIED

Questions?

UNCLASSIFIED