A PUBlicAtion of the institUte for the stUdy of WAr And WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBlicAtion of the institUte for the stUdy of WAr And WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM

Soldiers from the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment conduct their fi rst mission in the Diyala province, engaging anti-Iraqi forces in Baqubah, Iraq, on March 14, 2007. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall)

February 11, 2007 – April 25, 2007 The Battle for Diyala

by KimBerly Kagan

Summary Diyala province has become one of the central battlegrounds between the Coalition and al Qaeda. Its capital, Baqubah, is just a short drive from Baghdad, and the province has suffered from and contributed to the ongoing violence in the Iraqi capital. In the months before the full complement of additional U.S. forces arrive in Iraq, U.S. commanders have reinforced their troops in Diyala in an effort to get this area under control before beginning major clear-and-hold operations in Baghdad. Al Qaeda has responded to this effort with a signifi cant surge of its own in the province, increasing attacks on coalition forces, local government offi cials, and civilians. Coalition attacks have been met with al Qaeda counterattacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces. Sectarian violence fell dramatically in Diyala in February 2007, as al Qaeda and other extremist groups fought coalition and Iraqi forces. But the terrorists are gradually losing control, local government is beginning to function once again, and the local population is turning against al Qaeda and toward cooperation with coalition forces in a manner similar to what has occurred in Anbar. Still, Establishing security in Diyala will be extremely diffi cult. Al Qaeda remains determined to reestablish its position in the province, and Iranian support for all sides in the ongoing struggle there fans the fl ames of violence as rogue Shiite militias challenge radical Sunni extremists.

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Mission to pacify the capital. Since the full complement of additional U.S. forces will not arrive in Iraq until he current objective of U.S. military opera- June, Generals Petraeus and Odierno chose ini- tions in Iraq is to establish security in and tially to reinforce critical areas beyond Baghdad in around Baghdad. However, much of the an effort to create the preconditions for the major T fighting since the beginning of Operation clearing operations in the capital that are set to Enforcing the Law has been focused outside of begin later this summer. the capital. General David Petraeus, commander This method of addressing the problem re- of Multi-National Forces-Iraq flects the fact that Baghdad is a (MNF-I, the overall coalition partially functioning city. Food command in the country) and n The previous Iraq comes in from outlying agricul- Lieutenant General Raymond Report described the tural areas to city markets, as Odierno, commander of Multi- changing situation does fuel and electricity. Efforts National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I, the in Anbar province. to restart economic activity in organization tasked with conduct- This report addresses the capital, underway for some ing counter-insurgent and security time and now showing signs operations throughout the coun- developments in Diyala of progress, require the move- try), have even sent newly-arriving resulting from al Qaeda’s ment of goods to the rest of the units to reinforce U.S. troops in efforts to reignite country. Many Iraqis move into the northern and southern “belts” sectarian violence and through the capital on a of small villages and towns around there and from General daily basis. Cutting the lines of Baghdad, and into Diyala province communication into the city in to the northeast as well. This al- Odierno’s decision to an effort to prevent insurgent location of resources reflects the reinforce American attacks would destroy this prog- reality that operations in Baghdad troops in that province. ress, alienate the population of do not occur in a vacuum. Insur- the capital, and meet with insu- gents have long been based in the perable resistance from the Iraqi Baghdad belts and in Anbar province to the west, government. The military operations designed to and both sectarian and al Qaeda violence has prepare the way for clearing operations in the cap- plagued Diyala province from 2006 to the pres- ital have therefore focused on attacking insurgent ent. Although struggles in Anbar, Diyala, Salah- and terrorist strongholds outside of the city and ad-Din, and Ninewah provinces have their own on bringing order to the two most chaotic prov- dynamics and react to changing local circum- inces, Anbar and Diyala, which are feeding the stances, they are also connected to the violence in violence in Baghdad. The previous Iraq Report de- Baghdad and are inseparably linked with efforts scribed the changing situation in Anbar province. This report addresses developments in Diyala re- Kimberly Kagan is a military historian who has taught at sulting from al Qaeda’s efforts to reignite sectarian the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, violence there and from General Odierno’s deci- Georgetown University, and American University. She is a sion to reinforce American troops in that province Senior Fellow and Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Cen- in response. ter for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown Univer- sity, where she teaches the History of Military Operations; Enemy an affiliate of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University; and a visiting fellow at Yale Interna- Simultaneous U.S. and Iraqi operations in tional Security Studies. She is the author of The Eye of Baghdad and its surrounding areas over the past Command (University of Michigan Press, 2006), and the few months have driven al Qaeda and its affiliates founder and executive director of the new Institute for the from some of the organization’s strongholds inside Study of War, www.understandingwar.org. and outside of Baghdad province. In 2006, al Qa-

Page  • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM eda and its affiliates maintained safe havens just similar enemies terrorized); and the terrain north beyond the Baghdad belts, in Anbar and Diyala and south of Lake Hamrin (the vicinity of Muq- provinces, as well as in the belts. Since November, dadiyah).2 the clearing of Ramadi and the arrival of the An- Al Qaeda fought U.S. forces in Diyala and at- bar Awakening have combined to reduce popular tempted to terrorize the local population of that support for al Qaeda in the Sunni prov- ince of Anbar. January’s clearing opera- tions in Diyala Province drove numer- PROVINCES OF IRAQ ous al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq TURKEY For map of 1515 major roads fighters from their stronghold in Turki T ig r in Diyala and Village, south of Balad Ruz. Operations is R Mosul north of Baghdad, i v south of Baghdad resulted in killed e 16 see page 5 r 16 and captured al Qaeda insurgents, 1414 18 seized weapons caches, and destroyed 1717 18

r e car bomb factories from Yusifiyah (on iv SYRIA 22 R the Euphrates River, south and east la Euph a ra y te i Diyala of Ramadi) to Mahmudiyah (south of s D R 33 iv Province Baghdad). Previous editions of The Iraq 1313 er Falluja Baqubah Report have described these operations. Ramadi 1 (Baghdad) The surge of U.S. and Iraqi forces into 44 Baghdad disrupted al Qaeda’s patterns Karbala 1010 IRAN 1111 Kut of activity within the capital in Febru- 99 55 ary. Targeted raids elsewhere in Bagh- JORDAN Najaf dad province were aimed at al Qaeda 1212 77 and affiliated extremists. SAUDI As U.S. forces surged into Baghdad 66 and its environs, al Qaeda and Sunni ARABIA 88 insurgents generally moved north, while 100 miles Persian the Jaysh al Mahdi generally moved Gulf south.1 U.S. forces set conditions to KUWAIT meet al Qaeda and other insurgents 1. Baghdad 7. Dhi Qar 13. Al-Anbar outside of Baghdad before Operation 2. Salah ad-Din 8. Al-Muthanna 14. Ninawa Enforcing the Law began, focusing on 3. Diyala 9. Al-Qadisiyyah 15. Dahuk the northern roads and the southern 4. Wasit 10. Babil 16. Arbil belt in the Baghdad governorate. U.S. 5. Maysan 11. Al-Karbala 17. Kirkuk troops, indeed, met them in the prov- 6. Al-Basrah 12. An-Najaf 18. As-Sulaymaniyyah inces. General Odierno, commander STANDARD WEEKLY THE of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, sent reinforcements to Diyala to follow up on the op- province. Al Qaeda also conducted spectacular, portunities presented by Operation Turki Bowl mass-casualty and high-visibility attacks in Bagh- outside of Balad Ruz, described in the firstIraq dad and in other provinces using suicide vests and Report, and to handle the influx of enemies into car bombs. The organization attempted to cause that province. sectarian violence in Baghdad and elsewhere in After Operation Turki Bowl, enemy groups an effort to derail the Baghdad Security Plan and concentrated in a few areas in Diyala Province. Al break the will of the Iraqi and American people. Qaeda and affiliated Sunni extremists operated Al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups at- from the Diyala River Valley (particularly, villages tacked U.S. and Iraqi forces in Diyala province such as Zaganiyah and Qubbah); Buhriz (which directly.

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At the end of April, General David Petraeus, Population, Terrain, and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, stated that Communications in Diyala “Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda’s global campaign and we devote considerable re- iyala offers fertile ground for al Qaeda sources to the fight against al Qaeda Iraq.”3 He to operate, and presents great challenges added, “We do definitely see links to the greater al to coalition forces. It is overwhelmingly Qaeda network [from Iraq]. I think you know that Sunni, but has a Shi’ite minority that cre- we have at various times intercepted messages to D ates the sort of mixed areas in which al Qaeda of- and from. There is no question but that there is ten works to spread terror as a way of establishing a network that supports the movement of foreign bases. It borders both Iran and Kurdistan, serving fighters through Syria into Iraq.”4 General Petrae- as a conduit for Iranian weapons and advisors us concluded of al Qaeda, “I think it is probably moving east and for attackers moving to and from public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose Kurdistan. It is also a target of the foreign fighter actions sparked the enormous increase in sectar- network that stretches from the Syrian border ian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in through northern and central Iraq. It encapsulates 2006, the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in in one area many of the most serious security Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third challenges Iraq faces, and it is currently the site holiest Shi’a shrine. And it is the organization that of one of the most dramatic in a series of battles continues to try to reignite not just sectarian vio- that have unfolded between the Coalition and al lence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Qaeda. Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas During and immediately after the collapse of such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very Saddam Hussein’s regime, Baathists and ex-army significant enemy in that regard.”5 officers effectively controlled Diyala, making the General Petraeus also confirmed that “the area a hotbed of Sunni resistance.8 In April 2006, spectacular car-bomb attacks . . . are generally al Abu Musab al-Zarqawi designated a location in Qaeda and elements sort of connected to al Qa- Diyala as the capital of the caliphate he was try- eda. Typically, in fact, still we believe that . . . 80 ing to establish.9 He was killed in Hib Hib, near to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out Baqubah, in June 2006. The area had already by foreigners. . . . A network . . . typically brings become a magnet for al Qaeda and other Islamic them in through Syria . . . ”6 Some of these fight- extremists by that time. ers enter Syria through the airport.7 So presum- Diyala, though close to Baghdad, was not ef- ably these fighters also originate from beyond that fectively controlled by the government of Iraq or state’s borders. Manufacturing vehicle bombs and U.S. forces for most of 2006 and the first quarter conducting suicide attacks on highly visible targets of 2007. Al Qaeda, then the Islamic State of Iraq, requires financial resources, supplies, planning, controlled the province for a portion of that time. and training that seem to be available only to in- The central government ceased to supply the ternational terrorist networks in Iraq, rather than province with food and fuel by September 2006, local insurgents. and the provincial government recessed in Octo- In addition to al Qaeda, some of Moqtada al ber of last year.10 No central or provincial govern- Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi operated in Diyala Province. ment control existed in the province from October U.S. and Iraqi forces captured or killed some of the 2006, through late January 2007. Few U.S. forces rogue militia leaders in and around Baqubah in the were present in the region. opening days of Operation Enforcing the Law. Nev- As the sectarian violence in Iraq spread in Fall ertheless, rogue elements of Shiite militias continued 2006, extremist elements of different ethno-sec- to function in Diyala, particularly as al Qaeda ex- tarian groups contested the area. Shiite militias tremists concentrated north of Baghdad. The Jaysh and Iraqi Security Forces moved into the area al Mahdi apparently relied upon weapons supplied from Baghdad to contest the presence of Sunni from Iran through Diyala Province. terrorists, arresting and killing hundreds upon

Page  • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM hundreds of Sunni civilians, while Kurds migrated nearby town of Khalis, and then north to Kirkuk. southward toward Khanaqin, on the province’s A secondary road from Khalis branches north- northeastern fringe, bordering on Iran. Some of west along the Tigris and connects that city to the Kurds in Khanaqin are Shiite; Sunni Kurds Duluiyah, Samarra, and the villages across the also live nearby.11 Tigris from Tikrit. A third highway runs from the The province’s proximity to Baghdad has en- northwest of Baghdad, along the west bank of the abled violent groups to travel from one area to Tigris, through the major U.S. base and airfield at the other with ease. Several north/south routes Taji. That highway and its peripheral roads lead pass through or near Baqubah and connect that to the population centers at Tarmiya, Balad, and city with Baghdad. A highway from the eastern Tikrit. part of Baghdad runs to Baqubah, 35 miles north From Baqubah, a primary road runs northeast of Baghdad, through the town of Khan Bani to Muqdadiya, a substantial city. At the town of Sa’ad. Another primary road from northeastern As Sadiyah, northeast of Muqdadiyah, this main Baghdad runs just west of Baqubah, through the road forks. One branch extends generally north

MAJOR ROADS OF IRAQ’S DIYALA PROVINCE & NORTH OF BAGHDAD Tikrit

Khanaquin

Buhayrat Hamrin

Samarra As Sadiyah Duluiyah IRAN Balad Tig ri s er R iv i R v a e al r iy D Khalis

BAQUBAH Balad Ruz Kan’an Mandali Tarmiya Buhriz

Khan Bani Sa’ad. Taji Turki

BAGHDAD

Eu 10 miles ph ra te s R i ve r THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE

Page  • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM toward Sulamaniyah; another branch runs north- U.S. and Iraqi forces, meanwhile, exploited east toward Khanaquin, near the Iranian border. intelligence given by residents and gleaned from A secondary road stretches east from Baqubah to their operations around Turki Village. Because Kan’an, Balad Ruz, and Mandali near the Iranian U.S. forces controlled the rural terrain around border. A highway connects Khalis and Kirkuk. Balad Ruz after the operation, they were able Secondary roads fan out of Muqdadiyah and As to move more freely into nearby areas where al Sadiyah and around Lake Hamrin, on which As Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq operated: to- Sadiyah is situated. These secondary roads even- ward Baqubah, Buhriz (a village to its south), and tually hit the main highways connecting the Kurd- Muqdadiyah. ish region to Kirkuk. The ethno-sectarian fault lines, the province’s proximity to Baghdad, and Baqubah’s position on Operations in Diyala Province the road network left the area exposed to fight- ers and refugees during the early months of the s the Baghdad Security Plan began, U.S. Baghdad Security Plan. Baqubah and Khalis in and Iraqi forces conducted shaping opera- Diyala Province, and the cities of Tarmiya and Taji tions in Diyala province. Combat missions on the northern border of Baghdad Province, fun- A prioritized clearing the lines of commu- neled the north/south and east/west movements of nication through Diyala province, denying the people entering and leaving Baghdad to the north. enemy sanctuaries in towns and rural areas, and preparing to clear the cities and large towns in or- Setting Preconditions in Diyala der to secure the population. for the Baghdad Security Plan Units prioritized achieving freedom of maneu- ver along the roads outside Baqubah. Insurgents Colonel David Sutherland, commander of the challenged Coalition control over the road net- 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, work by emplacing improvised explosive devices which operates in Diyala Province, explained in (IEDs). By January 31, U.S. units were scouring January that he had traced the extremists in Turki the road through Muqdadiyah toward the Iranian Village to violence in Baqubah, Khalis, Balad border for weapons caches.14 On February 15, Ruz, and Muqdadiyah.12 After Operation Turki the 6-9 Armored Reconnaissance Squadron, at- Bowl, he established a combat outpost between tached to the 3-1 Cavalry, conducted targeted Balad Ruz and Turki Village. U.S. and Iraqi forces raids in Muqdadiyah itself. There they captured worked with the government and leaders of Balad an al Qaeda cell leader, who had kidnapped locals Ruz and surrounding areas to establish municipal and emplaced IEDs, as well as other suspected control over rural terrain, to link the villages with terrorists. They also found 12 weapons caches, in- the provincial government, and to establish a cluding two with IEDs ready for emplacement.15 connection between the provincial and central This evidence suggests that the road through governments. Muqdadiyah functioned as a supply-line for al Following Operation Turki Bowl, al Qaeda or an Qaeda or for rogue Jaysh al Mahdi forces. affiliated extremist group retaliated against the local At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces con- population. Suicide bombers attacked processions ducted combat patrols east of Baqubah. On Feb- during the Ashura holiday in Balad Ruz and Mandali. ruary 16, they found and detonated a large cache Another attacker placed a bomb in a garbage can of weapons. Iraqi forces received evidence of in- in downtown Khanaqin, where Shiite Kurdish resi- surgent activity and detained suspects nearby in dents and pilgrims gathered for the procession.13 The Kan’an. Also in the second week of February, resi- suicide bombings are a hallmark of Sunni Islamic dents identified major weapons caches at Khan extremist groups. It is less clear that al Qaeda was Bani Saad. Coalition forces removed the weapons responsible for the bombing at Khanaqin. Another and conducted searches and raids on other sus- Sunni extremist group might have planted that bomb. pected caches in the province.16

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The initial operations demonstrate the variety Sunni insurgent groups, rather than rogue Jaysh of enemy forces in Diyala province. On February al-Mahdi, and suggest that al Qaeda or other 20, U.S. forces began to move into Buhriz, then Sunni insurgents were already present and con- an insurgent-controlled village, south of Baqubah. testing Muqdadiyah at this time.21 Muqdadiyah They conducted targeted raids against terrorist is significant because it controls movement from cells accused of murder, kidnapping, and emplac- Baqubah to the Iranian border; Sunni insurgents ing IEDs.17 Operations on that date also targeted present might have been attempting to prevent the a foreign fighter facilitator network in coordi- facilitation of weapons from Iran to Baqubah. nated raids in Ramadi, Falluja, Taken together, U.S. opera- and south of Baqubah (possibly n Taken together, U.S. tions indicate the beginnings of Buhriz). It is not clear whether intelligence preparation of the these raids targeted members of a operations indicate the battlefield (IPB), the phase when coordinated network, or whether beginnings of intelligence a unit reconnoiters an area, they were separate operations. preparation of the conducts raids and strikes, and South of Baqubah, coalition battlefield, the phase engages in cordon and search forces discovered terrorists, body when a unit reconnoiters operations in order to understand armor, and a suicide vest, the the nature of the enemy in an hallmark of al Qaeda fighters. If an area, conducts raids area and permit subsequent op- these operations pursued a related and strikes, and engages erations in territory that friendly network, it is possible to surmise in cordon and search forces do not yet hold. This pat- that foreign fighters from the Syr- operations in order to tern characterized the movement ian border were in Buhriz by Feb- understand the nature of U.S. forces into neighborhoods 18 ruary 21. of the enemy in an area in Baghdad, including Sadr City, By that time Iranian arms had throughout the month of Febru- also entered the province: a cache and permit subsequent ary, as described in the second discovered at Mandali on that operations in territory Iraq Report. As enemy forces oc- day contained 190 anti-personnel that friendly forces do cupied positions in Buhriz by this mines, five mortar rounds, a rock- not yet hold. time in February, preparing the et-propelled grenade, and 133 battlefield was a necessary condi- millimeter rounds.19 Shiite mili- tion for subsequent clearing op- tias were also operating in the province by then. erations. Follow-on operations targeted IED and On the same day, U.S. forces captured a senior ambush cells in Titten, near Baqubah.22 Iraqi police official whom they suspected of using his position to organize sectarian violence, includ- Al Qaeda Counterattacks in Diyala ing kidnapping, torturing, murder.20 Because po- lice officials in Diyala were generally Shia at this By the first week of March, the Islamic State of time, this arrest suggests that rogue members of Iraq, the primary al Qaeda organization in Iraq, a militia operated in Diyala before Operation En- again attempted to disrupt Diyala. As in Anbar, forcing the Law began. some of its early attacks were apparently reprisals Also on February 21, 3rd Brigade, 5th Iraqi against locals affiliated with the Iraqi government, Army Division, and 6-9 Armored Reconnais- as well as civilians, in areas where Jaysh al Mahdi sance Squadron, 3rd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, operated. For example, on March 2, the Islamic conducted targeted cordon and search operations State of Iraq kidnapped and killed 15 Iraqi Police against specific insurgent cells in Balour, a town officers in southern Diyala.23 Three days later, a in the vicinity of Muqdadiyah. One of these ter- suicide bomber killed 28 civilians at a coffee shop rorists had emplaced an IED at a cellphone shop in Dor Mandali, a few kilometers south of Balad in November 2006, killing twelve people. Such Ruz.24 attacks against civilians are generally the work of

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The U.S. Prepares for an Offensive in Diyala Abdulla al Jubouri, runs the program, which he believes has helped end fighting between compet- U.S. and Iraqi forces continued to challenge ing villages, provided security to reopen schools, terrorist groups straddling the lines of commu- and allow travel along area roads.29 Mayor Najim nication between Iran and Baghdad. Soldiers of Muqdadiyah stated that the program gave poor from the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry Regiment, residents an incentive to work against the terror- attached to the 6-9 Armored Reconnaissance ists, rather than accepting their funding to em- Squadron, 3rd BCT, and Iraqi soldiers from the place improvised explosive devices.30 3rd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division, were patrol- The program also generated recruits from the ling Muqdadiyah routinely by March 8. On that province for the Iraqi police force. As a reprisal, day, they discovered caches of IED making sup- a female suicide bomber, most likely al Qaeda, plies and IEDs. They also apprehended three peo- targeted Iraqi police in front of the Muqdadiyah ple riding a motorcycle, carrying a mortar round police station on April 10, 2007.31 prepared to detonate.25 These motorcycles were On March 14, U.S. and Iraqi forces advanced the hallmark of al Qaeda-linked fighters operating into the village of Shakarat, three kilometers north in the irrigation canals around Turki Village dur- of Muqdadiyah. The village contains the only ing the January offensive into that area, and so it bridge across the Marrouk Canal. As a result, sev- seems reasonable to conclude that these suspects eral roads intersect in the village. It became a hub were linked to the remainder of that portion of on the lines of communication used by Sunni in- the al Qaeda network. COL David Sutherland re- surgents.32 Before U.S. forces arrived, the school ported that tribes near Muqdadiyah were fighting in Shakarat flew the al Qaeda flag. In the first al Qaeda.26 week of operations, U.S. and Iraqi soldiers closed On March 10, the Iraqi Army, with its Military the bridge to traffic, established combat outposts Transition Team (MiTT) advisors, conducted in the town, and patrolled the area.33 On March targeted raids against terrorist cells in As Sadiyah, 17, Iraqi forces shot and killed a suicide bomber a town halfway between Muqdadiyah and the running toward a checkpoint south of Shakarat.34 border crossing at Khanaqin.27 On the same day, The U.S. and Iraqi operations in Shakarat preced- criminals burned fifteen houses and killed live- ed their larger, coordinated offensive in Diyala. stock in the rural town of Towakel, six kilometers northeast of Muqdadiyah. They used IEDs to bomb homes and farm structures. Such an attack U.S. Reinforces Diyala suggests that their goal was displacing residents from the area or terrorizing them into cooperat- ajor General Benjamin Mixon, the ing. The local population fled when it no longer commander of Multi-National Divi- had ammunition to fight. When they left the area, sion-North (MND-N, the command the terrorists destroyed their abandoned homes M responsibly for Diyala, Ninewah, and and cars. COL Sutherland stated that al Qaeda much of Salah-ad-Din provinces) requested ad- in Iraq was responsible for the attack.28 It is not ditional forces for Diyala Province to assist forces clear whether the enemy operating in Towakel was already in the province with securing the cities displaced from As Sadiyah, or a separate group and roads in the area. LTG Odierno reinforced pushing into areas northeast of Muqdadiyah in Diyala with the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regi- order to gain control over rural terrain for training ment, a Stryker Battalion (the Stryker is a mobile, camps or weapons caches—or to oppose the flow armored vehicle with significant firepower capa- of settlers from Kurdish regions into the area. bilities) from Taji.35 They had previously oper- To retain control of Muqdadiyah and its en- ated in Mosul and Baghdad. The Strykers arrived virons, U.S. forces began a neighborhood watch in Diyala on March 13.36 The reinforcements program that hires local residents to protect their increased the troop density and mobility in the own village. The former governor of Diyala, Dr. province. Prior to their arrival, only “a few dozen

Page  • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM foot soldiers and a few tanks from Company B of The combat patrols near Buhriz preceded a the 1-12 Battalion” patrolled “the area from east- major, multi-week clearing operation that lasted ern Baquba to Zaganiya—an insurgent-dominat- from March 24 through April 8. This operation ed region of hundreds of thousands of people.”37 targeted “an Islamic State of Iraq power base at As the reinforcement arrived, COL Sutherland the Diyala River Valley,” in Zaganiyah and Qub- explained that in Diyala, “attacks against coalition bah, villages halfway between Baqubah and Muq- forces and Iraqi security forces” increased “over dadiyah along the Tigris (rather than the main the past several months. These attacks are in part road).40 During these operations, elements of due to the Iraqi army—their growing capabili- the 5th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. Army 5th ties and effectiveness. However, Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regi- due to our increased operations, ment, attached to the 3rd BCT, partnered with the Iraqi army and n Attacks against 1st Cavalry Division, captured Iraqi police, the enemy is increas- the local population and killed terrorists and discov- ing relying on surface-laid, hast- are becoming more ered eight weapons caches.41 ily emplaced IEDs. On the other spectacular to induce On March 29, these same units hand, we have also seen a drop in discovered a fortified defensive the overall sectarian violence in fear with the people. position and al-Qaeda training the province. Attacks against the This is the enemy we camp in the palm groves at Za- local population are becoming are facing right now, ganiyah.42 They subsequently more spectacular to induce fear an enemy that targets discovered seven more large with the people. This is the enemy innocent civilians, that weapons caches, for a total of 15, we are facing right now, an enemy destroys their homes and killed 30 terrorists, and detained that targets innocent civilians, 28 suspects.43 So approximately that destroys their homes and even their mosques. 60 al-Qaeda terrorists, with over even their mosques. Even though 17,000 rounds of small-arms am- they have changed their names to munition, 130 mortar rounds, the Islamic State of Iraq to portray themselves as 175 rocket propelled grenades, 80 grenades, 20 an Iraqi resistance group, this is the same foreign- IEDs, and IED making material had been operat- led group dedicated to death and destruction. The ing from these bases, training camps, and forti- deployment of the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry fied positions.44 The enemy in Zaganiyah, like Regiment Strykers will support our current coun- the enemy in Turki Village, was well-trained, well terinsurgency strategy. They will be used to build organized, well-supplied, and capable of conduct- upon recent successes in the area of Buhriz, Tah- ing complex attacks and from well-established rir, Mufrek and in the Baqubah area.”38 defenses. COL Sutherland assigned the Stryker battalion The following day, and perhaps in response, al to the area around Buhriz, just south of Baqubah. Qaeda effectively detonated three suicide car and The date palm groves around Buhriz, and the un- truck bombs in Khalis, Iraq, to the west of Za- derbrush beneath them, provided good cover for ganiyah on the far side of the Tigris. The first two insurgents. Within 48 hours of beginning offen- bombs targeted civilians, and a subsequent bomb sive operations, the Stryker battalion found and targeted first-responders from the Iraqi Security destroyed a large weapons cache, including 300 Forces.45 Unlike the previous suicide bombings blasting caps (used to make IEDs), and terrorist in Diyala, which were conducted by individu- documents.39 als, this attack used vehicles and required more Members of Sunni Islamic extremist groups sophisticated timing and coordination. (The next counterattacked with a suicide bombing. On spectacular vehicle borne bombs incidents in Di- March 16, Iraqi forces killed a suicide bomber yala occurred nearly three weeks later, on April 23 as he attempted to assassinate the police chief of and 24, in Baqubah and As Sadah, respectively.) Balad Ruz, who was visited the local Hospital. In March, U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested Khalis’s

Page  • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM police chief for inciting sectarian violence, indicat- (north of Baqubah along the Diyala), then began ing that rogue Shiite militias likely operated in the to cooperate with residents, Iraqi Security Forces, city.46 So the al Qaeda attack on Khalis presum- and U.S. forces after al Qaeda had been cleared ably targeted that city because Shiite militias oper- from the area.55 ated there. Al Qaeda responded with a coordinated at- U.S. forces thus encircled Baqubah and at- tack on one of the seven new U.S. combat out- tempted to cut the insurgents’ supply lines into posts—the one in As Sadah, which had been the city. They then moved into the city itself.47 open since March. But the vehicle borne explo- U.S. forces cleared Old Baqubah and Buhriz sive did not destroy the combat outpost; rather, (south of Baqubah), shortly after completing the the shockwave of the blast toppled a wall of the major operation to push the Islamic State of Iraq building and several homes and a mosque near- and al Qaeda from Zaganiyah. The Baqubah City by. Al Qaeda achieved this effect by coordinating Council advised the U.S. and Iraqi forces that small arms and two vehicle bombs.56 As Sadah they wished to reopen the Old Baqubah market controls communications between Khalis and to safe commerce. Elements of the 5th Stryker Lake Hamrin. Presumably, al Qaeda also sought Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, cleared the to destroy that outpost because the local Sunni market of Old Baqubah during a multi-day opera- tribal leaders cooperated with Americans, a pat- tion that began on April 2. That unit maintained tern that a previous Iraq Report found in Anbar a 24 hour presence in the area, hunted for terror- province. ists, identified weapons caches, and established Yet, even as al Qaeda targeted the local Sunni checkpoints to search vehicles moving into the population, provincial government in Diyala re- area.48 They “hardened” the neighborhood, em- sumed with the assistance of U.S. forces and Iraqi placing concrete barriers throughout it to prevent officials. The fuel shortage in Diyala was one of vehicle bombs and to protect the Iraqi Security the province’s most urgent problems. On March Forces there. Subsequently, the Stryker Bat- 18, the governor of Diyala province met with the talion, along with several Iraqi Army and Police director general of Diyala’s oil ministry in an at- units, entered Buhriz.49 They conducted house to tempt to restore fuel services to the province. The house searches for terrorists and weapons on April director general agreed to relocate from Khanaq- 10.50 They discovered five weapons caches there in, on the Iranian border, to offices in Baqubah. on April 12, including one vehicle bomb. These Border enforcement officials were also present caches were sufficiently important that terrorists at that meeting.57 The governor and the Diyala set up an observation post to guard at least one of Provincial Council met on April 23 to discuss the them.51 Many of the terrorists left Buhriz before province’s budget.58 A vehicle-borne bomb ex- the Strykers arrived.52 The U.S. and Iraqi forces ploded outside, near the council’s headquarters, planned to open an Iraqi Police station in Buhriz. at a checkpoint through which a Coalition convoy By April 15, U.S. soldiers had established had previously passed through safely, indicating seven combat outposts in and around Baqubah, that the local government, rather than Coalition and residents were returning to Buhriz. Tribal forces, was the target of the attack.59 leaders from Buhriz met in the government cen- ter and distributed food to their people. Some insurgents—mounted on the scooters typical of Iranian Involvement Sunni extremist groups—fought in the vicinity in the War North of Baghdad of these combat outposts.53 A week later, U.S. forces reported that local residents of Zaganiyah ranian weapons were smuggled into and were volunteering information about the location through Diyala Province in the first quarter of of weapons caches.54 Sunni tribal leaders in As 2007. U.S. and Iraqi forces worked to discover Sadah, just north of Baqubah along the road to I the pattern by which they were smuggled, to Muqdadiyah, and Had Maskar, near Zaganiyah interdict the flow of weapons, and to identify the

Page 10 • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM smugglers who were responsible for this activity. Baghdad to Diyala or Salah ad-Din provinces. Furthermore, facilitators from Iran and north- Though these weapons originated in Iran, it is ern Iraq supplied weapons and men to the prov- not clear whether the cache belonged to rogue ince from February through April 2007. When elements of the Jaysh al Mahdi, to al Qaeda, or the Baghdad Security Plan began on February to other insurgent groups. Yet rogue elements of 14, U.S. and Iraqi forces closed certain ports of the Jaysh al Mahdi are located in both Khalis and entry (border crossings) into the country for sev- northeastern Baghdad. enty-two hours.60 On February 17, Iraqi border Iraqi forces, supported by U.S. forces, discov- enforcement officials discovered ered another cache near Mandali a cache near the Iranian border, on April 4.64 In the early morn- where a donkey stood unaccom- n In March, U.S. forces ing hours of April 4, Iraqi forces, panied by a person.61 Presum- detained important with U.S. support, conducted a ably, smugglers had used the ani- figures in the Qazali sweep of a site in Imam al-Hajj mal to carry weapons to that loca- network. General Yusuf Village, a town five miles tion, or else were intending to use Petraeus described southwest of Mandali, on the the animal to carry weapons from eastern edge of the well-irrigated, that location. A previous Iraq Re- the network and the Diyala plain. The village is not port has documented the discov- detainees as “the far from the mountains near the ery on February 21 of one such head of the secret cell Iranian border. A small road con- cache, probably supplied from network, the extremist nects the village with Mandali, Iran, in Mandali, a city on the Ira- secret cells. They were and another route leads back nian border, south of Khanaqin toward the main east-west road along the road network to Bagh- provided substantial toward Balad Ruz. This operation dad and Kut. At the time, the Iraq funding, training on resulted in the detention of four Report surmised that the weapons Iranian soil, advanced suspects and the seizure of a large were intended for al Qaeda opera- explosive munitions and ammunitions cache.65 These tives, who had recently been the technologies as well as types of operations generally sig- primary enemy in the area. nal the presence of U.S. Special On February 24, Iraqi Police run of the mill arms and Forces. The topography, arrest, and Coalition forces discovered a ammunition, in some and cache suggest that this opera- major cache of the sophisticated cases advice and in some tion aimed to interdict weapons disks used to make explosively cases even a degree of smuggling across the Iranian bor- formed projectiles (EFPs), the direction....” der. lethal improvised explosive de- In March, U.S. forces detained vices imported from Iran, near al important figures in the Qazali Jedidah. This town is conveniently located on the network. General Petraeus described the network east bank of the Tigris River, along the highway and the detainees as “the head of the secret cell from northeastern Baghdad to Khalis, convenient network, the extremist secret cells. They were pro- to both lines of supply.62 In addition to the 130 vided substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, EFP disks, the cache contained improvised mines advanced explosive munitions and technologies in various states of production, containers for as well as run of the mill arms and ammunition, making IEDs, five anti-aircraft rounds, six rocket in some cases advice and in some cases even a launchers, IED making materials, 24 mortar degree of direction. . . . There’s no question, again, rounds, and 15 rockets.63 It is not possible to dis- that Iranian financing is taking place through the cern whether fighters had located these weapons Quds force of the Iranian Republican Guards there in order to import them into Baghdad, to Corps.”66 Open-source information has not yet concentrate them in Diyala for fighting there and revealed specifically where in Iraq the Qazali net- in neighboring provinces, or to export them from work operated, but, presumably, it was based in

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Shia areas. Diyala province is only one possibility. might have controlled both supply lines. Alterna- The southern provinces of Iraq and Baghdad’s tively, one sectarian group (perhaps the Jaysh al Sadr City also seem plausible. Again, this is specu- Mahdi) controlled the supply line from Muqdadi- lation only. yah to northern Baqubah, and another controlled Iranian arms have also reached Sunni insur- the supply line from Mandali to Buhriz. Sunni gents. For example, U.S. and Iraqi forces found extremists established bases and training camps a cache containing 250 81mm mortar rounds about half-way along both of these supply routes, north of Abu Ghraib (west of Baghdad) on Feb- suggesting that they aimed either to cut them or ruary 3.67 Iran exports 81mm mortars, whereas facilitate the movement of weapons along them. other states in the region use and export 82mm tubes and shells.68 Sunni insurgents held the area Terrorism along the Roads west of Baghdad. So it is reasonable to assume to the Kurdish Region that Sunni insurgents had acquired Iranian arms no later than early February. The road beyond Muqdadiyah extends to As U.S. and Iraqi forces detained seven members Sadiyah. Beyond that town, the road forks. One of the Quds force (an elite Iranian military orga- branch extends northeast toward Khanaqin, a nization) in Iraq in 2007. A weapons smuggler town where Shiite Kurds reside, and from there to named Sheibani provided the information that the Iranian border. The other branch of the road led to the detention of the Quds operatives. His extends north to Jalula, and from there, northeast network smuggled explosively formed projectiles along the rough, riverine terrain to Kalar, Dar- (EFPs) from Iran into Iraq. The detainee’s brother band i Khan, and Sulamaniyah—one of the major operated mainly from Iran, presumably acquiring cities in the Kurdish Region of Iraq. Violence in and exporting the weapons. The detainee himself As Sadiyah, Jalula, and Khanaqin in the spring operated primarily in Iraq, distributing the weap- 2007, might well pertain to the conflict between ons to purchasers, who were generally “extremist Kurdish extremists and local inhabitants, as well elements . . . of these secret cells” of the Qazali as to the supply of weapons from Iran. network.69 Eight insurgents, in two different vehicles, Iran or Iranians provided some services to the conducted an organized attack against a health general population of Diyala province at the end clinic in Jalula on April 12. The clinic had not of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. In January yet received patients. The insurgents evacuated 2007, Baqubah had, on average, 12 hours of elec- the hospital staff and then destroyed the build- tricity per day, and other areas in Diyala Province ing with explosives.74 had 11 hours.70 Iran exported electricity to the province.71 According to U.S. forces, Iranians and insurgents broadcast radio stations to the people Al Qaeda Violence beyond Diyala of Balad Ruz until the town opened a new radio station in December.72 By the end of March, an l Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq, and independent radio and television station began to their foreign fighter facilitator network broadcast in Diyala province (and to a total audi- extended beyond Diyala province to the ence of 11 million people in Tikrit, Hillah, Bagh- nearby towns of Tarmiyah, Balad, and 73 A dad, and Falluja, as well as all of Diyala). Samara. Roads link Baqubah and Khalis with Two insurgent supply lines traversed Diyala Samarra via Duluyiah, all of which are east of the in February, March, and April 2007. One ran Tigris. On the west bank of the Tigris, a road links from Iran through Muqdadiyah into northern Baghdad, Taji, Tarmiyah, and Balad. The popu- Baqubah (a predominantly Shiite area), and an- lation east of the river is more heavily Shia, and other through Mandali to southern Baqubah or west of the river, Sunni, especially in the proximity Buhriz (which Sunni insurgents have controlled). of Baghdad.75 Rogue Jaysh al Mahdi or other Shiite extremists A Sunni insurgent group established itself in

Page 12 • February 11, 2007 – ­pril 25, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM the Jabouri Peninsula, ten miles east of Balad but they supplied weapons to rogue Shiite militias in on the north and east side of the Tigris, some time order to facilitate sectarian killing.81 Their loca- before mid-October 2006. At that time, they kid- tion suggests that rogue Jaysh al-Mahdi elements napped and murdered 14 Shia, causing four days used the Tigris roads as their supply line. Rogue of sectarian violence in nearby Jaysh al-Mahdi also operated in Balad. At the start of the Baghdad Taji, where many al Qaeda ele- Security Plan, U.S. forces cleared n At the start of the ments concentrated on their way the Jabouri Peninsula in order to year, al Qaeda controlled into or out of Baghdad in Febru- prevent insurgents fleeing Bagh- sizable areas of the ary and March. JAM might have dad from establishing themselves province and its capital, moved weapons toward Baghdad in the area and in order to deny from Samarra, or supplied weap- the area to insurgents moving into Baqubah, and the ons to Samarra from Baghdad. It Baghdad from the north. Some Islamic State of Iraq is reasonable to conclude that in insurgent leaders escaped.76 had established its own Salah ad-Din, as in Diyala, rogue Less than ten days later, coali- “capital” in Turki Village. Jaysh al Mahdi cells and al Qa- tion forces captured three men Coalition operations eda contested one another along suspected of foreign fighter facili- destroyed the “emirate” the main and secondary supply tation northeast of Samarra.77 A routes. subsequent operation in Samarra south of Balad Ruz, Tarmiyah, likewise, has been apprehended suspects who were cleared many areas contested and used by al Qaeda part of a network that allegedly the terrorists had held, and the Islamic State of Iraq acquired passports and sold weap- and helped to turn the since January. Most significantly, 78 ons. And on March 8, U.S. and population against al insurgents staged a coordinated, Iraqi forces captured other terror- complex attack using a vehicle ists in Duluyiah, a town at the top Qaeda. bomb and other weapons to at- of the Jabouri Peninsula, on the tack a U.S. outpost there on Feb- road between Samarra and Khalis. Local residents ruary 19.82 U.S. forces detained a senior al Qaeda informed Iraqi Security Forces about these ter- leader in Tarmiyah on April 20, 2007, reacting to rorists, and the Iraqi Army, reinforced from Tikrit information provided by residents of the area.83 and accompanied by a U.S. force, apprehended the suspects.79 Duluyiah might then have been a significant Conclusions hub for the foreign fighter network. A bridge from Duluyiah connects both banks of the Tigris. The he cycle of attacks and counter-attacks by road over the bridge leads quickly from the pen- Coalition forces and al Qaeda has not pro- insula to the town of Balad. Taken together, this duced a stalemate in Diyala province. In evidence suggests that foreign fighters (usually T general terms, al Qaeda has lost significant part of the al Qaeda network) moved along the ground. At the start of the year, al Qaeda con- east bank of the Tigris south to Samarra in Febru- trolled sizable areas of the province and its capital, ary and March. If so, their route began north of Baqubah, and the Islamic State of Iraq had estab- Mosul and proceeded through that city, and from lished its own “capital” in Turki Village. Coalition there, south toward Tikrit along the roads or open clearing operations destroyed the “emirate” south countryside. In late February, U.S. and Iraqi forc- of Balad Ruz, cleared many areas the terror- es apprehended al Qaeda operatives and vehicles ists had held, and helped to turn the population rigged with explosives in both Mosul and Tikrit.80 against al Qaeda. Less than a month after the Baghdad Security This report has focused on al Qaeda because Plan began, rogue Jaysh al-Mahdi cells operated illegal killings by Jaysh al Mahdi fighters dropped in Balad, west of the Tigris. From that location, significantly in the province, as they have in

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Baghdad. Sectarian violence fell in Diyala by 70 according to COL Sutherland. “[T]he ministry of percent between July 2006 and February 2007, oil and the ministry of trade” subsidize such dis- indicating that JAM fighters in the province are tributions. “And the governor [of Diyala] has been largely obeying the dictates of Moqtada al Sadr working very hard with the national government to refrain from killing Sunnis, even in the face of to increase those opportunities for the people.”85 continued al Qaeda provocations. The local government has taken a number of pos- Violence in the province overall remains high, itive steps to regain effective control of the prov- however, as attacks against Coalition forces and ince, although much remains to be done. The cen- Iraqi security forces increased. According to COL tral government in Baghdad has also reached out, Sutherland, “This is an indication . . . that . . . the albeit in a limited way, to establish contact with terrorists are trying to disrupt the operations by the embattled people of Diyala. Violence in Di- Coalition forces working with the Iraqi security yala is likely to last for a long time, and will prob- forces and taking the fight, instead of the innocent ably outlast the beginning of major operations in people of Diyala . . . , to the security forces.”84 Baghdad. But coalition and Iraqi operations in the Securing Baghdad is essential for securing province have reversed the trend of increasing al Diyala. When security permits the central gov- Qaeda control and are allowing and encouraging ernment to function better, “increased services” the local people to take up the fight against terror- could flow into “the province, [namely] increased ists as the people of Anbar have done. Amidst the fuel distribution and increased food distribution,” violence of war in Diyala, this is a hopeful sign.

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Endnotes April 16, 2007, A11. 1 “The Jim Lehrer Show,” Interview with General David 12 Continuing Operations in Turki Village Net Huge Weap- Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding General, Multina- ons Caches,” American Forces Press Service, January 11, tional Force-Iraq; Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Inter- 2007 (web). viewer: Jim Lehrer; Wednesday, April 3, 2007. 13 Kim Gamel, “Bomb strikes in Iraq kills at least 29 dur- 2 Operational update briefing by Colonel David W. ing Ashoura ceremonies,” Associated Press, January 30, Sutherland, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Di- 2007, 11:59 a.m. EST; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “At vision Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail least 12 Iraqis killed, 23 wounded in a blast in Khanaq- Husain, 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: For- in,” January 30, 2007, 12:51 PM EST. ward Operating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by video- 14 “Soldiers from Troop C, 6th Squadron, 9th Cavalry conference to the Combined Press Information Center, Regiment search for weapons caches near the Iranian Baghdad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, border in Muqdadiyah, Iraq;” www.army.mil/-im- March 16, 2007. ages/2007/01/31/2208; photo by SPC. Elisha Dawkins, 3 Defense Department Special Briefing with General January 31, 2007. David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, 15 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Release No. 20070216-19, “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon Feb. 16, 2007, “IA, CF target terrorist cells in Muqdadi- Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. ya,” Multi-National Division – North PAO. 4 Defense Department Special Briefing with General 16 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Release No. 20070210- David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, 19, Feb. 10, 2007, “Local citizen leads IA, CF to “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon weapons caches in factory,” Multi-National Division Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. – North PAO; Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Release No. 5 Defense Department Special Briefing with General 20070210-08, Feb. 10, 2007, “Building explodes in Di- David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, yala,” Multi-National Division – North PAO. “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon 17 MNC-I Release No. 20070221-18, “Iraqi Army, Co- Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. alition Forces Clear Buhriz,” Multi-National Divi- 6 Defense Department Special Briefing with General sion-North PAO, February 21, 2007; Joshua Partlow, David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. Bolstering Force “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against Troops Has Risen Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, April 16, 2007, A11. 7 Defense Department Special Briefing with General 18 MNF-I Release A070221b, “Seven terrorists killed, 13 David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, detained in VBIED, foreign fighter raids,” February 21, “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon 2007. Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. 19 MNC-I Release 20070222-09, “Border element discov- 8 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. ers cache,” MND-North PAO, February 22, 2007. Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against 20 MNF-I, Release 20070222b, “IA and CF detain Iraqi Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, Police Official in Baqubah,” February 22, 2007. April 16, 2007, A11. 21 MNC-I Release No. 20070221-16, “Joint Operation 9 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. leads to detention of AIF,” Multi-National Division- Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against North PAO, February 21, 2007. Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, 22 MNC-I Release No. 20070226-12, “Iraqi Army, Co- April 16, 2007, A11. alition Forces disrupt terrorist cells in Titten,” MND- 10 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. North PAO, February 26, 2007. Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against 23 MNC-I Release No. 20070304-06, “Leaders must con- Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, demn IP murders,” MND-North PAO, March 4, 2007. April 16, 2007, A11. 24 MNC-I Release No. 20070308-09, “Suicide bomber 11 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. kills 28, wounds 31 in Balad Ruz coffee shop,” MND- Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against North PAO, March 8, 2007. Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, 25 “Patrol leads to discovery of caches,” Sgt. Serena

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Hayden, 3rd BCT, 1st Cav. Div., March 14, 2007, 37 Richard A. Oppel Jr. and an Iraqi reporter for the New MNF-Iraq. York Times, “Attacks Surge as Iraq Militants Overshad- 26 Operational update briefing by Colonel David W. ow City,” New York Times, Monday, April 16, 2007, A1. Sutherland, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Di- 38 Operational update briefing by Colonel David W. vision Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail Sutherland, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Di- Husain, 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: For- vision Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail ward Operating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by video- Husain, 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: For- conference to the Combined Press Information Center, ward Operating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by video- Baghdad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, conference to the Combined Press Information Center, March 16, 2007.. Baghdad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, 27 MNC-I Release No. 20070313-03, “Iraqi Army stops March 16, 2007.. 27 terrorist cel members in As Sadiyah,” MND-North 39 MNC-I Release No. 20070320-05, “Strykers discover PAO, March 11, 2007. cache in Diyala palm groves,” MND-North PAO, March 28 MNC-I Release 20070313-18, “Criminals victimize in- 20, 2007. nocent Iraqis,” MND-North PAO, March 13, 2007; Op- 40 MNF-I “Joint operation disrupts anti-Iraqi forces,” Sgt. erational update briefing by Colonel David W. Suther- Armando Monroig, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detach- land, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division ment, March 30, 2007; MNC-I Release No. 20070402- Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail Husain, 11, “Iraqi Security Forces, Cavalry discover extremist 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: Forward Op- training camp,” MND-North PAO, April 2, 2007; erating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by videoconfer- MNC-I Release No. 20070408-02, “Joint operation ence to the Combined Press Information Center, Bagh- clears terrorists from Diyala River Valley,” April 8, 2007. dad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, March 16, 41 MNF-I “Joint operation disrupts anti-Iraqi forces,” Sgt. 2007. Armando Monroig, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detach- 29 MNF-I, “Neighborhood watch program shows success ment, March 30, 2007. in Muqdadiyah district,” April 8, 2007. 42 MNC-I Release No. 20070402-11, “Iraqi Security Forc- 30 MNF-I, “Neighborhood watch program shows success es, Cavalry discover extremist training camp,” MND- in Muqdadiyah district,” April 8, 2007. North PAO, April 2, 2007. 31 MNC-I Release 20070411-12, “Coalition forces dis- 43 MNC-I Release No. 20070408-02, “Joint operation cover sizable cache,” MND-North PAO, April 13, 2007; clears terrorists from Diyala River Valley,” April 8, 2007. Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. 44 MNC-I Release No. 20070408-02, “Joint operation Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against clears terrorists from Diyala River Valley,” April 8, 2007. Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, 45 MNC-I Release No. 20070330-17, “Three suicide April 16, 2007, A11. VBIEDs target Khalis population,” MND-North PAO, 32 “U.S., Iraqi Forces Target Diyala Insurgents,” Jamie March 30, 2007. Tarabay, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 46 Richard A. Oppel Jr. and an Iraqi reporter for the New March 21, 2007. York Times, “Attacks Surge as Iraq Militants Overshad- 33 “U.S., Iraqi Forces Target Diyala Insurgents,” Jamie ow City,” New York Times, Monday, April 16, 2007, A1. Tarabay, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 47 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. March 21, 2007. Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against 34 MNC-I Release 20070318-14, “Iraqi Security Forces Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, stop suicide bombers,” MNF-North PAO, March 18, April 16, 2007, A11. 2007. 48 Staff Sgt. Antonieta Rico, 5th Mobile Public Af- 35 Richard A. Oppel Jr. and an Iraqi reporter for the New fairs Detachment, “Stryker Battalion restores market York Times, “Attacks Surge as Iraq Militants Overshad- security,”MNF-I, April 16, 2007. ow City,” New York Times, Monday, April 16, 2007, A1. 49 Staff Sgt. Antonieta Rico, 5th Mobile Public Affairs De- 36 MNC-I Release 20070313-09, “Stryker Battalion arives tachment, “Effort under way to clear market,” Northwest in Diyala Province,” MND-North PAO, March 13, Guardian, April 19th, 2007. 2007. 50 Staff Sgt. Antonieta Rico, 5th Mobile Public Affairs

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Detachment, “Soldiers in Baqouba keep pressure on Al- vid Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, Qaida in Iraq, Monday, 23 April 2007. “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon 51 MNC-I Release No. 20070412-03, “Iraqi Army, Iraqi Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. Police, Coalition force members deny enemy territory in 67 MNC-I Release No. 20070207-10, “Iraqi Soldiers, U.S. Buhriz,” MND-North PAO, April 12, 2007. troops find weapons cache near Abu Ghraib,” February 52 Staff Sgt. Antonieta Rico, 5th Mobile Public Affairs 7, 2007. Detachment, “Soldiers in Baqouba keep pressure on Al- 68 Media roundtable with Maj. Gen. William Caldwell IV, Qaida in Iraq, Monday, 23 April 2007. MNF-I spokesman, and Maj. Marty Weber, 79th Explo- 53 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “U.S. sive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Baghdad, April 11, 2007. Bolstering Force in Deadly Diyala; Violence Against 69 Defense Department Special Briefing with General Da- Troops Has Risen Sharply,” Washington Post, Monday, vid Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force Iraq, April 16, 2007, A11. “Update on Security Operations in Iraq,” Pentagon 54 MNC-I Release No. 20070423-02, “Coalition Forces see Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia, April 26, 2007. progress in Diyala River Valley,” Multi-National Division 70 Joint Press Conference with Colonel David Sutherland, – North PAO, April 23, 2007. Commander of 3rd BCT, 1st Calvary Division; Sergeant 55 MNC-I Release No. 20070423-02, “Coalition Forces see Steve Lynne (Sp), Bravo Troop 5th Squadron, 73rd progress in Diyala River Valley,” Multi-National Division Calvary Regiment; Staff Sergeant Glenn Bennett (Sp), – North PAO, April 23, 2007. Alpha Troop 573; Major Brett Sylvia, Operations Officer, 56 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Release No. 20070425-01, 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment; Captain Stephen “SVBIEDs target Coalition patrol base in Diyala prov- Dobbins, Company Commander, 3-505th Parachute ince,” Multi-National Division – North PAO, April 25, Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division; Major Gen- 2007. eral Shakur, Commander, 5th Iraqi Army Division; And 57 CENTCOM Release No. 07-01-03, “Diyala leadership Major General Ghanam, Iraqi National Police Modera- to fix fuel shortage in province,” March 21, 2007. tor: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver, Director, 58 MNC-I Release No. 20070423-13, “VBIED detonates Cpic; Location: The Combined Press Information Cen- near Diyala’s provincial council headquarters,” Multi- ter, Baghdad, Iraq, January 22, 2007. National Division – North PAO, April 23, 2007. 71 Joshua Partlow, Washington Post Foreign Service, “Teh- 59 MNC-I Release No. 20070423-13, “VBIED detonates ran’s Influence Grows As Iraqis See Advantages,”Wash - near Diyala’s provincial council headquarters,” Multi- ington Post, January 26, 2007, A1. National Division – North PAO, April 23, 2007. 72 Spc. Ryan Stroud, 3rd BCT Public Affairs, “Radio Sta- 60 Borzou Daragahi, Times Staff Writer, “Iraq unveils Bagh- tion Opens Doors, Provides Freedom of Speech,” Armed dad security moves; Some border crossings are to close Forces News, December 28, 2006; Joint Press Conference temporarily, and residents will lose more freedoms. The with Colonel David Sutherland, Commander Of 3rd killings continue.” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2007, BCT, 1st Calvary Division; Sergeant Steve Lynne (Sp), Home Edition, A3. Bravo Troop 5th Squadron, 73rd Calvary Regiment; 61 MNC-I Release 200702017-03, “Donkey leads border Staff Sergeant Glenn Bennett (Sp), Alpha Troop 573; patrol to cache, suspect,” MND-North PAO, February Major Brett Sylvia, Operations Officer, 5th Squadron, 17, 2007. 73rd Cavalry Regiment; Captain Stephen Dobbins, 62 MNC-I Release No. 20070226-05, “EFP Cache footage Company Commander, 3-505th Parachute Infantry available on DVIDS,” February 26, 2007. Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division; Major General 63 MNC-I Release No. 20070226-01, “Iraqi Police, Coali- Shakur, Commander, 5th Iraqi Army Division; and Ma- tion Forces Discover Large EFP Cache,” MND-North jor General Ghanam, Iraqi National Police Moderator: PAO, February 26, 2007. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver, Director, CPIC; 64 MNC-I Release No. 20070404-16, “Iraqi Security Forc- Location: the Combined Press Information Center, es discover weapons cache,” April 4, 2007. Baghdad, Iraq, January 22, 2007. 65 MNC-I Release No. 20070404-16, “Iraqi Security Forc- 73 MNF-I, “Iraqi independent TV, radio launches,” March es discover weapons cache,” April 4, 2007. 28, 2007, compiled by Spc. Stephen P. Kretsinger, Sr.. 66 Defense Department Special Briefing with General Da- 74 MNC-I Release No. 20070415-15, “Terrorists destroy

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local clinic in Diyala,” MND-North PAO, April 15, Off Insurgents, Detain Seven in Wake of Onslaught,” 2007. 2/20/2007, Release number: 07-01-03p. 75 Department of Defense, News Briefing with COL Paul 83 MNC-I Release No. 20070420-14, “Ironhorse troops Funk from Iraq, April 6, 2007. take down suspected al-Qaeda leader,” Multi-National 76 MNC-I Release No. 20070217-12, “IA, CF units clear Division—Baghdad PAO, April 20, 2007. Jabouri Peninsula of terrorists,” MND-North PAO, Feb- 84 Operational update briefing by Colonel David W. Suther- ruary 17, 2007. land, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division 77 MNF-I Release No. A070226a, “Suspected al-Qaeda Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail Husain, Emir, 14 Others Captured,” February 26, 2007. 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: Forward Op- 78 MNF-I Release A070307a, “24 suspected terrorists cap- erating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by videoconfer- tured throughout Iraq,” March 7, 2007. ence to the Combined Press Information Center, Bagh- 79 “33 Detained in Iraq; Suicide Bombing Kills 28,” Finan- dad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, March 16, cial Times, March 8, 2007. 2007. 80 MNC-I Release No. 20070220-01, “Al Qaeda in Iraq 85 Operational update briefing by Colonel David W. Suther- operations interdicted by IA, 2-7 Cavalry in Ninewa land, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division Province,” February 20, 2007. Commander, and Major General Shakir Halail Husain, 81 MNC-I Release No. 20070311-08, “Iraqi Army captures 5th Iraqi Division Commander. Location: Forward Op- four suspects during operations against rogue elements erating Base Warhorse, Baqubah, Iraq, by videoconfer- of JAM,” MNC-I PAO, March 11, 2007. ence to the Combined Press Information Center, Bagh- 82 Headquarters United States Central Command, dad, Iraq. Time: 8:30 a.m. EDT Date: Friday, March 16, “Update on Tarmiyah Attack: MND-B Troops Fight 2007.

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