A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM Soldiers from the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment conduct their fi rst mission in the Diyala province, engaging anti-Iraqi forces in Baqubah, Iraq, on March 14, 2007. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall) February 11, 2007 – April 25, 2007 The Battle for Diyala by KIMBERLY KAGAN Summary Diyala province has become one of the central battlegrounds between the Coalition and al Qaeda. Its capital, Baqubah, is just a short drive from Baghdad, and the province has suffered from and contributed to the ongoing violence in the Iraqi capital. In the months before the full complement of additional U.S. forces arrive in Iraq, U.S. commanders have reinforced their troops in Diyala in an effort to get this area under control before beginning major clear-and-hold operations in Baghdad. Al Qaeda has responded to this effort with a signifi cant surge of its own in the province, increasing attacks on coalition forces, local government offi cials, and civilians. Coalition attacks have been met with al Qaeda counterattacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces. Sectarian violence fell dramatically in Diyala in February 2007, as al Qaeda and other extremist groups fought coalition and Iraqi forces. But the terrorists are gradually losing control, local government is beginning to function once again, and the local population is turning against al Qaeda and toward cooperation with coalition forces in a manner similar to what has occurred in Anbar. Still, Establishing security in Diyala will be extremely diffi cult. Al Qaeda remains determined to reestablish its position in the province, and Iranian support for all sides in the ongoing struggle there fans the fl ames of violence as rogue Shiite militias challenge radical Sunni extremists. PAGE 1 • FEBRUARY 11, 2007 – APRIL 25, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM Mission to pacify the capital. Since the full complement of additional U.S. forces will not arrive in Iraq until he current objective of U.S. military opera- June, Generals Petraeus and Odierno chose ini- tions in Iraq is to establish security in and tially to reinforce critical areas beyond Baghdad in around Baghdad. However, much of the an effort to create the preconditions for the major T fighting since the beginning of Operation clearing operations in the capital that are set to Enforcing the Law has been focused outside of begin later this summer. the capital. General David Petraeus, commander This method of addressing the problem re- of Multi-National Forces-Iraq flects the fact that Baghdad is a (MNF-I, the overall coalition partially functioning city. Food command in the country) and n The previous Iraq comes in from outlying agricul- Lieutenant General Raymond Report described the tural areas to city markets, as Odierno, commander of Multi- changing situation does fuel and electricity. Efforts National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I, the in Anbar province. to restart economic activity in organization tasked with conduct- This report addresses the capital, underway for some ing counter-insurgent and security time and now showing signs operations throughout the coun- developments in Diyala of progress, require the move- try), have even sent newly-arriving resulting from al Qaeda’s ment of goods to the rest of the units to reinforce U.S. troops in efforts to reignite country. Many Iraqis move into the northern and southern “belts” sectarian violence and through the capital on a of small villages and towns around there and from General daily basis. Cutting the lines of Baghdad, and into Diyala province communication into the city in to the northeast as well. This al- Odierno’s decision to an effort to prevent insurgent location of resources reflects the reinforce American attacks would destroy this prog- reality that operations in Baghdad troops in that province. ress, alienate the population of do not occur in a vacuum. Insur- the capital, and meet with insu- gents have long been based in the perable resistance from the Iraqi Baghdad belts and in Anbar province to the west, government. The military operations designed to and both sectarian and al Qaeda violence has prepare the way for clearing operations in the cap- plagued Diyala province from 2006 to the pres- ital have therefore focused on attacking insurgent ent. Although struggles in Anbar, Diyala, Salah- and terrorist strongholds outside of the city and ad-Din, and Ninewah provinces have their own on bringing order to the two most chaotic prov- dynamics and react to changing local circum- inces, Anbar and Diyala, which are feeding the stances, they are also connected to the violence in violence in Baghdad. The previous Iraq Report de- Baghdad and are inseparably linked with efforts scribed the changing situation in Anbar province. This report addresses developments in Diyala re- Kimberly Kagan is a military historian who has taught at sulting from al Qaeda’s efforts to reignite sectarian the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, violence there and from General Odierno’s deci- Georgetown University, and American University. She is a sion to reinforce American troops in that province Senior Fellow and Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Cen- in response. ter for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown Univer- sity, where she teaches the History of Military Operations; Enemy an affiliate of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University; and a visiting fellow at Yale Interna- Simultaneous U.S. and Iraqi operations in tional Security Studies. She is the author of The Eye of Baghdad and its surrounding areas over the past Command (University of Michigan Press, 2006), and the few months have driven al Qaeda and its affiliates founder and executive director of the new Institute for the from some of the organization’s strongholds inside Study of War, www.understandingwar.org. and outside of Baghdad province. In 2006, al Qa- PAGE 2 • FEBRUARY 11, 2007 – ­PRIL 25, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM eda and its affiliates maintained safe havens just similar enemies terrorized); and the terrain north beyond the Baghdad belts, in Anbar and Diyala and south of Lake Hamrin (the vicinity of Muq- provinces, as well as in the belts. Since November, dadiyah).2 the clearing of Ramadi and the arrival of the An- Al Qaeda fought U.S. forces in Diyala and at- bar Awakening have combined to reduce popular tempted to terrorize the local population of that support for al Qaeda in the Sunni prov- ince of Anbar. January’s clearing opera- tions in Diyala Province drove numer- PROVINCES OF IRAQ ous al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq TURKEY For map of 1515 major roads fighters from their stronghold in Turki T ig r in Diyala and Village, south of Balad Ruz. Operations is R Mosul north of Baghdad, i v south of Baghdad resulted in killed e 16 see page 5 r 16 and captured al Qaeda insurgents, 1414 18 seized weapons caches, and destroyed 1717 18 r e car bomb factories from Yusifiyah (on iv SYRIA 22 R the Euphrates River, south and east la Euph a ra y te i Diyala of Ramadi) to Mahmudiyah (south of s D R 33 iv Province Baghdad). Previous editions of The Iraq 1313 er Falluja Baqubah Report have described these operations. Ramadi 1 (Baghdad) The surge of U.S. and Iraqi forces into 44 Baghdad disrupted al Qaeda’s patterns Karbala 1010 IRAN 1111 Kut of activity within the capital in Febru- 99 55 ary. Targeted raids elsewhere in Bagh- JORDAN Najaf dad province were aimed at al Qaeda 1212 77 and affiliated extremists. SAUDI As U.S. forces surged into Baghdad 66 and its environs, al Qaeda and Sunni ARABIA 88 insurgents generally moved north, while 100 miles Persian the Jaysh al Mahdi generally moved Gulf south.1 U.S. forces set conditions to KUWAIT meet al Qaeda and other insurgents 1. Baghdad 7. Dhi Qar 13. Al-Anbar outside of Baghdad before Operation 2. Salah ad-Din 8. Al-Muthanna 14. Ninawa Enforcing the Law began, focusing on 3. Diyala 9. Al-Qadisiyyah 15. Dahuk the northern roads and the southern 4. Wasit 10. Babil 16. Arbil belt in the Baghdad governorate. U.S. 5. Maysan 11. Al-Karbala 17. Kirkuk troops, indeed, met them in the prov- 6. Al-Basrah 12. An-Najaf 18. As-Sulaymaniyyah inces. General Odierno, commander STANDARD WEEKLY THE of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, sent reinforcements to Diyala to follow up on the op- province. Al Qaeda also conducted spectacular, portunities presented by Operation Turki Bowl mass-casualty and high-visibility attacks in Bagh- outside of Balad Ruz, described in the firstIraq dad and in other provinces using suicide vests and Report, and to handle the influx of enemies into car bombs. The organization attempted to cause that province. sectarian violence in Baghdad and elsewhere in After Operation Turki Bowl, enemy groups an effort to derail the Baghdad Security Plan and concentrated in a few areas in Diyala Province. Al break the will of the Iraqi and American people. Qaeda and affiliated Sunni extremists operated Al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups at- from the Diyala River Valley (particularly, villages tacked U.S. and Iraqi forces in Diyala province such as Zaganiyah and Qubbah); Buhriz (which directly. PAGE 3 • FEBRUARY 11, 2007 – ­PRIL 25, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM At the end of April, General David Petraeus, POPULATION, TERRAIN, AND commander of U.S.