Gang Violence in Latin America Lucía Dammert University of Santiago, Chile

102 Gang Violence in Latin America Lucía Dammert University of Santiago, Chile

The gang phenomenon has been blamed for many violent criminal problems of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries around the globe. As the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated, referring to riots that occurred in 2011, “gangs are a criminal illness that has infected the streets of our country” (Cameron, 2011). Even though there is still debate over gangs’ definition and characterizations in different contexts, blaming these groups for a variety of violent acts is commonplace worldwide (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011; Cruz, 2010; Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). Gangs have also been present in Latin America for decades (Wolff, 2015). Formed in marginalized urban areas defined by segregation, fragmentation, and inequality, streets gangs depicted the social problems and economic challenges of Latin America. One of these problems, perhaps most prominent since the 1990s, is the increasing level of violence and crime, which has impacted all countries in the region. In most cases, youth violence has been depicted as the driver of this violence and crime and has been linked to soccer gangs, street gangs, and drug-trafficking gangs. Indeed, gang violence is a growing problem in Latin America. In some cases, strongly linked to drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, gangs have developed and mutated since the mid-20th century, going from street gangs dedicated to illegal activities to criminal associations that use gang networks to consolidate transnational crime (Cruz, 2010). But that transition is not identical in all countries, cities, and even neighborhoods, which limits the possibility of developing a Latin American gang perspective (Bruneau & Dammert, 201; Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). In many countries, gangs can become mafia-like structures with the capacity to retaliate against other similar structures. However, not all gangs conform to this type of development (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). Unfortunately, gangs (particularly street gangs) have not received sufficient scholarly attention in Latin America (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011; Cruz, 2010). There is plenty of anecdotal evidence about street gangs, generally based on public opinions, general perceptions, and government policies. But most of these anecdotes are not based on

whbva102.indd 1 24-12-2016 19:54:25 2 Lucía Dammert

any empirical evidence that would allow us to fully understand the causes and consequences of such a dynamic phenomenon. This chapter aims to describe the phenomenon of youth gangs in Latin America with a special emphasis on Central American gangs, named maras, which have been linked to a substantial increase in homicides and violence since the 1990s. In order to fully grasp the various elements of the problem, there are four facts that need to be highlighted: (1) all gangs use symbols, colors, and tattoos to differentiate themselves from each other and to identify their territory; (2) most cities in Latin America have specific neighborhoods where street gangs have presence and territorial control; (3) in many countries, gang activity is highly linked to drug trafficking but not necessarily to transnational crime; and (4) gangs named maras are a specific type that developed in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the northern triangle of Central America) and are consistently linked to transnational drug trafficking. Notwithstanding most media coverage and political debates, there is little and contradictory information regarding gangs. In many countries, there are few public policies that aim to enhance the situation of millions of children and young people who face violence, poverty, and limited opportunities. Therefore, the decision to join a gang, in some neighborhoods, is a survival strategy rather than a true choice.

Gangs in Latin America

In Latin America, the formation of gangs—especially ones made up of young men—is a phenomenon that the literature has noted for decades (Cruz, 2010). During the 1980s and 1990s, in marginalized sectors of society, groups of young men looking for alternative methods of survival, mainly linked to the informal economic sector and illegality, formed gangs. As part of these identity-forming processes, origins (especially in countries with high levels of internal migration), place of residence, or even favorite soccer team became a frame of reference for individuals who felt isolated or removed from society. In this way, the presence of gangs is not a recent phenomenon that can only be linked to globalization or the transnationalization of crime (Cottrell-Boyce, 2013; Goldson, 2011; Rodgers & Baird, 2015). Society and the public’s response to these juvenile groups has mainly been one of rejection and stigmatization (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011); this has undoubtedly encouraged those who, in many cases, lack access to education, healthcare, and real possibilities of employment to identify with and thus differentiate themselves from society (Rodgers, Muggah & Stevenson, 2009; UNICEF, 2013; USAID, 2006). Most gang members display their affiliation in the type of clothing they wear, the symbols and colors they use, and the way they tattoo their bodies. For instance, the 18th Street gang uses various ways of expressing its name, including Mayan numerology for the number 18, XVIII, XV3, Dieciocho, or 666 as symbols and the colors black, silver, blue, and red (Bargent, 2015; Guerrero, 2015; Manwaring, 2010). Most of Central America’s urban graffiti (much of it incorporating symbols) can be found in disad- vantaged neighborhoods in the region’s main cities (Molina, 2015). The symbols have subtle differences—for example, a symbol may include the name of a soccer team or the name of a gang member who was killed by a rival gang or by the police—but all share a permanent envi- ronment of exclusion, abandonment, and the increasing use of violence (Washington Office on Latin America, 2006).

whbva102.indd 2 24-12-2016 19:54:25 Gang Violence in Latin America 3

Gangs use violence as a normal tool for social interaction. Also, they are involved with various types of crime as a way of sustaining themselves economically. Daily interaction with the criminal justice system—in many cases violent and corrupt—has helped to create a vicious circle that strengthens youths’ perception of abuse and maltreatment by state institutions, leading them to respond to law enforcement with ever-increasing violence (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011; Peterson & Morgan, 2013; Ungar, 2009). This situation is described in detail for the Argentinean case by Isla and Míguez (2003), who state that institutional violence is one of the most important elements in understanding the increasingly violent response of youth. In most cases, gang members’ time in jail only worsens their addictions or mental health problems (Cunningham, McGinnis, Verdu, Tesliuc, & Verner, 2008; Rehm & Monteiro, 2005). In the case of Brazil, policies centering around increasing police and even military presence were disastrous and only served to alienate shanty town inhabitants, who felt discriminated against and therefore responded with greater use of violence (Wolff, 2015, p. 27). Violent juvenile gangs have not been tackled coherently in Latin America. In most cases, the response has been implemented via the criminal justice system in the form of punishment that neglects the social causes at the center of the problem. In addition, social investment in prevention is minimal and rehabilitation even less common. The governmental response is concentrated on incarcerating violent youth (Müller, 2012). For example, there has been a systematic effort to lower the age of adult criminal responsibility in practically every country, and there is a tendency toward converting relatively open youth facilities for offenders into closed facilities whose main concern is the safety of those outside (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011; Müller, 2012). The development of these gangs has been analyzed from multiple perspectives. As mentioned, there is no clear path of gang development anywhere in the world, let alone in Latin America. Still, some researchers propose that there are three types of gangs, which can be distinguished based on their criminal activities: The first type is mostly street based and con- sists of a group of three or more persons who engage in illegal activities and have some common sign or identifier (Cruz, 2010). The second type of gang is more commercial, obtaining the majority of its income from drugs and territorial domination. The third type has political aims, with a transnational presence and links with organized crime (Manwaring, 2010). However, empirical evidence that supports this theory is limited and specifically based on the situation in the northern triangle of Central America (Olate, Salas-Wright, Vaughn, & Yu, 2015). There are many studies that describe the presence of gangs in every country in Latin America. The gangs’ degrees of organization are quite diverse, but at least four common elements can be observed: (1) intensive use of violence; (2) links with illegal activities, especially small-scale drug trafficking; (3) consolidation of territorial control; and (4) ongoing conflicts with rival gangs. In this regional context, Central American gangs known as maras are particularly significant due to their strong links with the trafficking of drugs, arms, and humans. In addition, the hundreds of homicides that occur every day in the main Central American cities seem to jeopardize both the governments themselves and their capacity to provide a rule of law and safety for all (Godson, 2011; Gurney, 2014). Maras are an unusual but not isolated phenomenon. The next section will discuss the char- acteristics of maras (in the northern triangle of Central America), criminal gangs (especially in Mexico and Brazil), and BACRIMs (in Colombia). Although they share the elements described before, the differences between them are evident.

whbva102.indd 3 24-12-2016 19:54:25 4 Lucía Dammert

Maras, Gangs, and BACRIMs

Violence in Central America has reached epic proportions when considered on a global scale. In fact, the three countries of the northern triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are among the 10 countries with the highest homicide rates in the world (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011). The most current information shows exceptionally high levels of instability and violence. In fact, on August 27, 2015, there were 51 homicides in El Salvador, the bloodiest day in more than a decade. Homicides continue daily without any clarification of the motives behind them and hardly any investigation into those who are to blame. The Ministry of Defense in El Salvador declared on that same day that 85% of the victims belonged to one of the two main gangs, seemingly giving an explanation for the reason behind the confrontations (Guerrero, 2015). Everything seems to indicate that the main problem is the maras, considered “the most prominent aspect of the new landscape of Central American violence” (Rodgers et al., 2009, p. 1). Specifically, the most well known are the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18), established by young people who migrated to the United States and later were deported to their countries of origin. Cruz (2010) provides a clear description of these organizations as “the result of the cultural flows attached to the region’s intensive migration, combined with organizational processes that took place in response to zero tolerance and mano dura (hard-handed) crackdowns and policies” (p. 281). However, the fact that violence is common cannot be ignored; studies have shown high levels of aggression and violence even among school children, with higher levels of threatening behavior reported among young urban males than among those in urban settings where violence is not predominant (Springer, Kelder, Orpinas, & Baumler, 2007). In other words, societies in which socialization processes have historically been violent are breeding grounds for these actions. The origins of MS-13 and M-18 are related to those of gangs in Los Angeles, California, and are strongly linked to mass migration and deportation, which have resulted in population movement in both directions between California and Central America. Currently, MS-13 and M-18 are not at all dependent on the dynamics of gangs in the United States, nor are they only dependent on deportation processes. Deportation of Central American migrants from the United States has been a regular practice. In the period 1998–2005, the number of people deported surpassed 200,000, with 90% being sent back to countries in the northern triangle (World Bank, 2011). The process is still going strong, as in the period 2010–2014 the number of deportees was almost half a million (Dominguez & Rietig, 2015), with the majority being Mexican (72%), followed by Guatemalan (11%), Honduran (8.3%), El Salvadorian (4.8%), and other nationalities. Most deportees have no criminal record; in fact, in the period 2009–2013, more than 61% of all adults and 95% of all minors deported to the Northern Triangle were convicted of immigration violations, traffic crimes, or other nonviolent offenses (Blake, 2012; Dominguez & Rietig, 2015, p. 19). There are varying opinions as to the nature of MS-13 and M-18. On the one hand, some authors describe them as transnational organizations mainly linked to drug dealing. In fact, in 2015, the Supreme Court of El Salvador declared both groups to be terrorist organizations, to allow for them to be dealt with easily and to substantially increase the sentences of gang members who were found guilty. On the other hand, many researchers suggest that gangs are linked to neighborhood drug trafficking and to highly violent but common crimes (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011). There has been a clear process of consolidation of the link between maras and drug trafficking from Central America to the United States. Despite the various

whbva102.indd 4 24-12-2016 19:54:25 Gang Violence in Latin America 5

interpretations of their origins, the participation of many gang members in the drug market is quite evident. It should not be assumed, however, that these organizations started out as powerful and highly concentrated entities that grouped together the actions of thousands of young people in Central America. On the contrary, they began as small groups that shared the same name and, more often than not, identifying symbols, such as tattoos, codes, and values. Hundreds of these groups, called clicas (chapters), were interconnected as part of the same barrio (neighborhood), though they may also have had direct links to either MS-13 or M-18 (Rodgers & Baird, 2015). In this context, tattoos and the use of symbols turned into practices that directly identified the youngsters with one of the two maras, despite there being no clear hierarchical organization. Until the end of the 1990s, organized youth gangs adhered to a format found across most of the Central American northern triangle. However, as cocaine and crack became increasingly available on the market and as drug, arms, and human trafficking to and from the United States increased, separate identities were created and rivalry grew between MS-13 and M-18. This consolidation took place between 2001 and 2006, and simultaneously governments implemented punitive measures against tattooed youths and against those who showed other signs of belonging to one of these groups (Ungar, 2009). Undoubtedly, one of the unex- pected results of these policies was an important transformation of the structure and dynamics of both groups (Cruz, 2010). Specifically, a structural lack of investment in prison systems in Latin America (Dammert, 2015) was most evident within the framework of the significant increase of the population. A lack of control mechanisms inside prisons led to prisoners being separated according to which mara they belonged to, generating both greater internal cohe- sion and rivalry between members. The prison crisis, therefore, has not improved but rather worsened during this period and since, with multiple complaints about human rights violations inside the prisons as well as constant violence, including homicides. The increase in the number of young people in jail has not brought a decrease in violence on the streets; on the contrary, the numbers of homicides, serious injuries, and confrontations with the authorities have increased. This situation improved slightly in 2012, when MS-13 and M-18 signed a truce that significantly reduced the number of homicides in El Salvador, caus- ing a drop from more than 4,000 in 2012 to approximately 2,500 in 2013 (Gurney, 2014). Opinions on the truce vary. On one hand, it was seen as an effective solution to the increase in the number of homicides in the region, especially in the face of the evident inability of the government to deal with the problem effectively. On the other hand, it is perceived that the truce allowed each group to further consolidate its territorial control, using more violence against those living in the most vulnerable areas (Van der Borg & Savenije, 2015). By mid-2015, the spiral of violence had gotten further out of control, involving confrontations not only between members of the maras but also between the maras and the police in El Salvador. Although the motivations for these acts of violence seem to be linked to territorial disputes based on drug routes and internal market, there are few certainties, due to the limited capacity of the northern triangle’s governments to carry out criminal investigations, enforce justice, and keep people in prison. The main question is whether the maras represent the main criminal organizations in Central America. Several possible answers exist, due to the limited information available, contradictory statistics provided by the media and governments, and the scarcity of specialized literature on the topic. However, drug trafficking is a highly profitable activity but one that does not necessarily imply consolidation into solid national or international groups for those involved (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015, p. 279).

whbva102.indd 5 24-12-2016 19:54:25 6 Lucía Dammert

What is certain is that the available information links these groups to the trafficking of arms and drugs and to kidnappings and extortions, all of which are usually carried out from inside prisons. The use of violence is a distinctive mark of these organizations; as a forensic scientist from the Institute of Legal Medicine in El Salvador stated, “each gang kills in a different way with their own special ways of cutting people up or strangling them” (RT Sepa Más, 2015). in order to leave a clear calling card. In Honduras in 2015, the media reported that, in certain areas of the capital, gangs had “ordered” that only women gang members could dress a certain way in the markets, with other women running the risk of being killed (Guerrero, 2015; Gurney, 2014; Molina, 2015). The population is used to living with such scare tactics, to which there is no clear government response. It is unlikely, however, that these gangs have links to terrorist or other more sophisticated criminal groups, mainly because of their limited organizational capacities. Furthermore, there is no real information that would connect the maras to any other gang in Latin America. In fact, in other countries of Central America, although there are gangs present, even very violent ones, there is no clear association between the transnational drug cartels and the maras. In Mexico, the gang problem is highly diverse and related generally to controlling local turf for purposes of extortion and drug distribution. Although the scenario in the southern part of Mexico is in some ways different, there is still mara presence in many Mexican states along the border with Guatemala, though the maras’ criminal involvement here is limited (Jones, 2013). However, in the northern part of Mexico, gangs are heavily influenced by US street gangs such as the Barrio Azteca, which is located in El Paso (US) and Ciudad Juarez (Mexico), and the prison gang La Eme, which in fact “is not a youth gang, but a sophisticated organized crime group” (Jones, 2013, p. 13) with strong links to extortion and transnational crime. The rest of the country faces the presence of multiple youth gangs, but they have low levels of criminal involvement (Magaloni &Razu, 2016). The gang situation in Brazil is very similar. Although it faces a serious threat from its two largest domestic criminal gangs, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital) and Red Command (Comando Vermelho), which are becoming increasingly involved in the international drug trade as well as operating extortion and kidnapping rings at home, the vast majority of Brazil’s gangs are not linked to transnational crime (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Still, increasing use of violence by the police has further intensified levels of everyday vicious- ness on the streets. In fact, in the period 2005–2014, killings by police reached 8,466 cases in the state of Rio de Janeiro, including 5,132 in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Amnesty International, 2015). Although the importance of killings by police (they represented more than 15% of all homicides registered in the city of Rio de Janeiro during 2014), there is little action taken by governments to deal with clear cases of human rights violations. In Colombia, the situation is somewhat different. Since the decline of the highly organized criminal cartels such as the Medellín Cartel (under Pablo Escobar), Colombia’s gangs have continuously fragmented into smaller cells with local roots. Escobar used to hire youths from different gangs in order to carry out killings and even plant bombs (Bargent, 2015). By 2015, there were over 500 street gangs with a presence in Colombia’s main cities, but a minority were involved with serious crimes. Only a few were considered to be criminal structures capable of transnational activity: These criminal bands (named BACRIMs [from bandas criminales, or “criminal bands”] by President Uribe in 2006 in order to clearly distinguish them from para- military organizations) are considered to be the principal threat to Colombia’s security (McDermott, 2014). In fact, the expansion of the BACRIMs can be seen in their penetration of the state at the national and regional levels and their recruitment of highly trained former

whbva102.indd 6 24-12-2016 19:54:25 Gang Violence in Latin America 7

security personnel (McDermott, 2014). There is little evidence that the BACRIMs are related to the actions of the maras in Central America; in fact, in terms of the structure of the drug trade, the BACRIMs could be considered to be highly sophisticated while the maras are in charge of the internal, less profitable work in Central America. The Latin American landscape is highly diverse in terms of the presence of youth gangs and their involvement in criminal activities. Lack of research on this issue limits the possibility of tackling this problem with sound public policies (Samandari & Speizer, 2010; World Health Organization, 2014). Still, there is worldwide confirmation that several social factors play a role in youth involvement in violence and crime. Clearly, high-level criminal organizations with transnational aims cannot be tackled via social policies only; however, as mentioned, these organizations are few in each country and use street gangs to consolidate their territorial control, and public policy may be effective at this lower level of the hierarchy.

Public Policy Responses

In Latin America, the end of dictatorships in South America and civil wars in Central America heralded a period of ever-increasing levels of violence and crime that has not been dealt with effectively by any government. The international community has played a role in funding many activities, programs, and policies, but in many cases there is no information on the impact or results of such programs. Unfortunately, low levels of technical expertise, a lack of capabilities at a local government level, and continuous changes at the national level have been the norm rather than the exception. In fact, most initiatives have been sporadic and have lacked a systematic design that would have coordinated the efforts made in the various areas of government. Public policy responses to increasing levels of crime and the growing presence of youth gangs on the criminal scene have been of a punitive nature. Mano dura (“tough on crime” or “iron fist”) initiatives in Central America were designed to tackle youth gang violence by increasing punitive measures and the policing of youths considered dangerous. Many authors have argued that the main result of those initiatives has been the increasing sophistication of youth gangs and their links to organized crime (Bruneau & Dammert, 2011; Cruz, 2010; Ungar, 2009). Still, knowledge about the gang phenomenon is scarce, and most data about its magnitude and its links with organized and transnational crime are not reliable. In other countries, penal populism (Müller, 2012, 2016) is on the rise, as seen in a rhetoric of increasing punishment and the presence of police forces to limit violence. The results are not clear; crime is increasing and specific groups linked to organized crime activities are consolidating (Paoli, 2014). Clearly, socioeconomic indicators show that Latin America in general is facing a youth crisis. Moreover, the use of violence is one of the most serious, internationally notorious manifesta- tions of this crisis. Unfortunately, the focus has been on criminalizing the youth crisis, and the policies implemented have not accepted the need for real, multidimensional interventions. It is increasingly recognized that crime prevention should play a major role in public policies at a local and national level. After many years of multiple interventions, there is no clarity about what crime prevention is and, for that reason, almost anything has been considered to be preventive. Ideas ranging from soccer training to urban improvements have been developed with the aim of preventing crime, with results that have been hard to measure. Various analyses of the practices implemented in Latin America show that, in general, secondary and even

whbva102.indd 7 24-12-2016 19:54:25 8 Lucía Dammert

tertiary crime prevention initiatives are needed in order for interventions to have a greater impact. Primary prevention aims to prevent violence and crime developing via a focus on the entire population while secondary prevention focuses on specific risk groups that have a heightened possibility of being linked to violent or criminal activities. Tertiary prevention con- cerns initiatives that focus on populations that are immersed in criminal or violent activities. Public policies designed to tackle people at risk of being linked to violence are the most difficult to implement and perhaps to sustain in the long run due to a lack of evident results. This situation has led to the development of many social and urban initiatives that are supposed to be designed to diminish crime and violence. The the difference between social protection and crime prevention policies should be made clear in order to avoid or limit the criminalization of social initiatives and to increase effectiveness in lowering crime and violence. Latin American countries have developed and implemented a plethora of policies and programs to try to reduce the number of young people engaging in antisocial behavior. Unfortunately, there is little literature on these experiences and official information does not include indicators of impact or success. In fact, very few of the programs to address antisocial youth issues in the region have been rigorously evaluated. Consequently, it has been difficult to learn programs’ real impact or provide evidence on whether programs, if effective, could be replicated or expanded. It is therefore crucial that new policies are closely monitored and evaluated. Due to the economic difficulties faced by most governments, many initiatives have been developed with the support of international donors who, in many cases, lack the infrastructure to evaluate the impact of their investment. Many interventions have been carried out by non- governmental organizations without a proper budget to develop sound evaluation strategies. The results of the analysis of internationally funded projects developed in Central America (Washington Office on Latin America, 2015) show interesting trends: The study analyzed 375 projects with a combined budget of $1.59 billion (25% loans and 75% grants) of which 90% was directed toward national governments. The strengthening of criminal justice institutions has been the main aim of all the projects and the investment in primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention initiatives has been much lower than the investment in crime control initiatives. The most important findings of the report are that (1) most projects are locally based, (2) initiatives are focused on criminal activities and do not include other social issues such as public health or school violence prevention , (3) institutional consolidation and state capacity have been a priority and for that reason direct interventions have had fewer results, and (4) there is no analysis of the results or impact in almost any of the cases (Washington Office on Latin America, 2015). Since researchers’ and policy makers’ understanding of this violence itself is minimal, the question of its causes remains open. As in many other policy areas, there is a growing from other contexts that allow certain routes toward better policy design and implementation to be defined. Crime prevention should be more specifically aimed toward tackling organized crime (which is the single most important reason for the increase in levels of violence in Central America), because tackling organized crime requires a different approach from confronting other types of crime (Levitt & Rubio, 2000; Shifter, 2012; UN Development Programme, 2013). While more specific analysis is needed, the importance of improving the quality of the information available is even more central. Without sound, timely, and accurate data, policies are likely to be defined based on subjective or ideological terms instead of on evidence-based information (Babor & Caetano, 2005; Cunningham et al., 2008; Forster, Grigsby, Unger, & Sussman, 2015).

whbva102.indd 8 24-12-2016 19:54:25 Gang Violence in Latin America 9

Information related to the gangs is also limited and often contradictory. Despite public and political debate on the importance of gangs and the violence of the young people who make up these organizations, existing literature provides little consensus on what constitutes a gang (Goldson, 2011). Comparative studies have shown that almost the same factors that influence youth involvement with gangs also influence violence, which emphasizes the need for more general prevention programs that focus on factors that are linked to violence and gangs (Peterson & Morgan, 2013). In addition, Peterson and Morgan (2013) found several unique predictors for involvement with gangs including neighborhood unrest and a lack of commit- ment to prosocial peers, which reflects the need for policies, not only in the area of criminal justice but also in other areas linked to quality of life, that will preventing new young people and children from joining gang organizations. An analysis carried out in El Salvador (Olate et al., 2015) came to the conclusion that the main factor that prevents gang membership is a capacity for self-control, for which programs that control impulsiveness are required. Second, motivation to attend school and behavior at school are solid factors that should be borne in mind when developing programs to keep young people at greater risk in the classroom instead of expelling them, as so often occurs. According to the school data analyzed, the challenges in this area are still relevant. It is more and more evident that the development of factors to protect against gang membership will emerge as a result of four processes: (1) creating self-esteem and self-efficacy, (2) creating opportunities, (3) reducing risks, and (4) reducing chains of negative reactions. In this sense, the reality in Latin America is complex given that, for many young people, being part of a gang is considered a measure of protection, providing a sense of identity and belonging and a strong bond with one’s equals (Olate et al., 2015). For that reason, any intervention should begin by trying to dissuade young people from using violence to resolve everyday conflicts, emphasizing how to deal with the more serious crimes committed by young people in a better way. This focus requires reflection on antisocial behavior and criminals more than on gangs as such (Cottrell-Boyce, 2013). Contrary to what occurs today, the use of punishment and imprisonment should be a last resort, given that prison is, worldwide, a place of endemic violence (Worral & Morris, 2012). Different studies have even shown high levels of violence in developed countries, where at least one out of every four young person in prison was a victim of violence during their first month in the system (Worrall & Morris, 2012). In most Latin American countries, even official information shows chaos and high levels of intraprison violence. In fact, in most countries the consolidation of prison gangs is evident, and multiple criminal activities are planned and exe- cuted from inside penitentiaries (Hathazy & Müller, 2016). Also, although the number of women linked to gangs is significantly lower than the number of men, the role of women should not be ignored. According to the literature on violence, aggression, and gangs (Forster et al., 2015), there is a clear need for initiatives with policies that differ according to gender, allowing for a possible increase in effectiveness. Gangs, in their various forms, constitute a phenomenon that is not going to disappear in the near future. In fact, their prevalences suggests that the formation of youth groups may be an effective initiative in tackling this problem, by providing alternative, nonviolent social structures. Alternative approaches include measures to tackle the causes of the formation of gangs, including the increasing numbers of youth who do not work or study, minimal levels of mental health coverage, limited treatment for alcohol and drug consumption, and increasing levels of domestic violence. Increasing the number of police alone is not going to affect the process of gang formation in Latin America and clearly will not limit the extreme use of violence in many of its main urban areas.

whbva102.indd 9 24-12-2016 19:54:26 10 Lucía Dammert

References

Amnesty International. (2015). You killed my son: Homicides by military police in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/2068/ 2015/en Babor, T. F., & Caetano, R. (2005). Evidence-based alcohol policy in the Americas: Strengths, weak- nesses, and future challenges. Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica, 18(4–5), 327–337. doi: 10.1590/s1020-49892005000900013 Bargent, J. (2015, April 7). Over 500 street gangs terrorize Colombia’s biggest cities. Insight Crime [Bogota]. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/over-500- street-gangs-terrorize-colombia-s-biggest-cities Blake, J. (2012). Gang and cartel violence: A reason to grant political asylum from Mexico and Central America. Yale Journal of International Law Online, 38, 31–45. Bruneau, T. C., & Dammert, L. (2011). Maras: Gang violence and security in Central America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Cameron, D. (2011). PM’s speech on the fightback after the riots. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111205181325/http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/ pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots Cottrell-Boyce, J. (2013). Ending gang and youth violence: A critique. Youth Justice, 13, 193–206. doi:10.1177/1473225413505382 Cruz, J. M. (2010). Central American maras: From youth street gangs to transnational protection rackets. Global Crime, 11, 379–398. doi:10.1080/17440572.2010.519518 Cunningham, W. McGinnis, L., Verdu, R. G., Tesliuc, C., & Verner, D. (2008) Youth at risk in Latin America and the Caribbean: Understanding the causes, realizing the potential. Washington, DC: World Bank. Dammert, L. (2015). Sistemas carcelarios en América Latina: Avances y desafíos [Prison systems in Latin America: Success and challenges]. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from https://www.academia. edu/13077987/SISTEMAS_CARCELARIOS_EN_AM%C3%89RICA_LATINA_ AVANCES_Y_DESAF%C3%8DOS Decker, S. H., & Pyrooz, D. C. (2015). The handbook of gangs. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. Dominguez, R., & Rietig, V. (2015). Migrants deported from the United States and Mexico to the Northern Triangle: A statistical and socieconomic profile. Washington, DC: Migration and Policy Institute. Forster, M., Grigsby, T. J., Unger, J. B., & Sussman, S. (2015). Associations between gun violence exposure, gang associations, and youth aggression: Implications for prevention and intervention programs. Journal of Criminology, 2015, 1–8. doi:10.1155/2015/963750 Goldson, B. (2011). Youth in crisis? “Gangs,” territoriality and violence. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Guerrero, N. (2015, August 22). ¿Por qué El Salvador vive los días más violentos del siglo? [Why is El Salvador is facing the most violent days in the century?] BBC Mundo. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http:// www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/08/150821_salvador_record_muertos_maras_pandillas_ng Gurney, K. (2014, July 8). Homicidios en El Salvador alcanzan niveles previos a la tregua [El Salvador’s homicide rates reach levels previous to the gang truce]. Insight Crime [Bogota]. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/homicidios-el-salvador-alcanzan-niveles-previos- tregua Hathazy, P., & Müller, N. M. (2016). The rebirth of the prison in Latin America: Determinants, regimes and social effects. Crime, Law and Social Change, 65, 113. doi:10.1007/s10611-015-9580-8 Human Rights Watch. (2015). World report 2015: Brazil. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from https:// www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/brazil Isla, A. R., & Míguez, D. (2003). Heridas urbanas: Violencia delictiva y transformaciones sociales en los noventa [Urban wounds: Criminal violence and social transformations in the nineties]. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial de las Ciencias. Jones, P. (2013). Understanding and addressing youth in “gangs” in Mexico (Working Paper Series on Civic Engagement and Public Security in Mexico). Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.

whbva102.indd 10 24-12-2016 19:54:26 Gang Violence in Latin America 11

Levitt, S., & Rubio, M. (2000) Understanding Colombia’s crime situation and the institutional reforms required to alleviate the problem. In A. Alesina (Ed.), Institutional reforms: The case of Colombia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Magaloni, B., & Razu, Z. (2016). Mexico in the grip of violence. Current History, 115(778), 57–62. Manwaring, M. (2010). Gangs and other transnational criminal organizations as transnational threats to national security and sovereignty. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.gwu.edu/~clai/ recent_events/2006/061024-Transnational_Crime_Manwaring_Paper.pdf McDermott, J. (2014, May 2). The BACRIM and their position in Colombia’s underworld. Insight Crime [Bogota]. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ bacrim-and-their-position-in-colombia-underworld Molina, T. (2015, October 23). Pandilleros de El Salvador superan en números a efectivos de seguridad [Gang members of El Salvador outnumber security personnel]. Panam Post. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from: http://es.panampost.com/thabata-molina/2015/10/23/pandilleros-de-el-salvador- superan-ennumero-a-efectivos-de-seguridad Müller, M. (2012). The rise of the penal state in Latin America. Contemporary Justice Review, 15, 57–76. doi:10.1080/10282580.2011.590282 Müller, M. (2016). Penalizing democracy: Punitive politics in neoliberal Mexico. Crime, Law and Social Change, 65, 227. doi:10.1007/s10611-015-9582-6 Olate, R., Salas-Wright, C. P., Vaughn, M. G., & Yu, M. (2015). Preventing violence among gang- involved and high-risk youth in El Salvador: The role of school motivation and self-control. Deviant Behavior, 36, 259–275. doi:10.1080/01639625.2014.924364 Paoli, L. (2014). The Oxford handbook of organized crime. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Peterson, D., & Morgan, K. A. (2013). Sex differences and the overlap in youths’ risk factors for onset of violence and gang involvement. Journal of Crime and Justice, 37, 129–154. doi:10.1080/07356 48x.2013.830393 Rehm, J., & Monteiro, M. (2005). Alcohol consumption and burden of disease in the Americas: Implications for alcohol policy. Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica, 18(4–5), 241–248. doi:10.1590/s1020-49892005000900003 Rodgers, D., & Baird, A. (2015). Understanding gangs in contemporary Latin America. In S. Decker & D. Pyrooz (Eds.), The handbook of gangs (pp. 478–502). New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell. Rodgers, D., Muggah, R., & Stevenson, C. (2009). Gangs of Central America: Causes, costs and interventions. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/ B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP23-Gangs-Central-America.pdf RT Sepa Más. (2015, June 7). Las maras, una gran estructura criminal que atemoriza a Latinoamérica [The maras, a large criminal structure that terrorizes Latin America]. Retrieved November 1, 2011, from https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/176920-maras-criminal-atemorizar-lationamerica Samandari, G., & Speizer, I. S. (2010). Adolescent sexual behavior and reproductive outcomes in Central America: Trends over the past two decades. International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 36, 26–35. doi:10.1363/3602610 Shifter, M. (2012). Countering criminal violence in Central America. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/countering-criminal-violence-central- america/p27740 Springer, A., Kelder, S., Orpinas, P., & Baumler, E. (2007). A cross-national comparison of youth risk behaviors in Latino secondary school students living in El Salvador and the USA. Ethnicity & Health, 12, 69–88. doi:10.1080/13557850601002155 UN Development Programme. (2013). Regional human development report 2013–2014: Citizen security with a human face—Evidence and proposals for Latin America. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/docs/Research%20and%20 Publications/IDH/UNDP-RBLAC-HDRLatAmExecSummary2013.pdf Ungar, M. (2009). Policing youth in Latin America. In G. A. Jones, & D. Rodgers (Eds.), Youth violence in Latin America: Gangs and juvenile justice in perspective (pp. 203–224). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

whbva102.indd 11 24-12-2016 19:54:26 12 Lucía Dammert

UNICEF. (2013). Finishing school in Central America: The pending challenges. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.unicef.org/lac/Completar_escuela_CA_ENG_summary.pdf USAID. (2006). Central America and Mexico gang assessment. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http:// pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadg834.pdf Van der Borg, C. & Savenije, W. (2015). De-securitising and re-securitising gang policies: The Funes government and gangs in El Salvador. Journal of Latin American Studies, 47(1), 149–176. doi:10.1017/s0022216x14000741 Washington Office on Latin America. (2006). Youth gangs in Central America: Issues in human rights, effective policing, and prevention. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.wola.org/sites/ default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/past/GangsReport_Final.pdf Washington Office on Latin America. (2015). WOLA and IDB release most comprehensive study to date on international aid for citizen security in Central America. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.wola.org/news/wola_and_the_idb_release_most_comprehensive_study_to_date_on_ international_aid:for_citizen_secu Wolff, M. J. (2015). Building criminal authority: A comparative analysis of drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. Latin American Politics and Society, 57, 21–40. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00266.x World Bank. (2011). World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_ Full_Text.pdf World Health Organization. (2014). Interpersonal violence and alcohol: WHO policy briefing. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/ factsheets/pb_violencealcohol.pdf Worrall, J. L., & Morris, R. G. (2012). Prison gang integration and inmate violence. Journal of Criminal Justice, 40, 425–432. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2012.06.002

whbva102.indd 12 24-12-2016 19:54:26 Please note that the abstract and keywords will not be included in the printed book, but are required for the online presentation of this book which will be published on Wiley’s own online publishing platform.

ABSTRACT The gang phenomenon has been blamed for the most violent criminal problems of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in Latin America. Formed in marginalized urban areas defined by segregation, fragmentation, and inequality, streets gangs depict the social problems and economic challenges of most cities in Latin America. Although much of the literature is center around maras in Central America, the BACRIMs in Colombia and multiple street gangs across the rest of the region represent an important security problem. Strongly linked to drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, gangs have developed and mutated since the mid-20th century, going from street gangs dedicated to illegal activities to criminal associations that use gang networks to consolidate transnational crime. But that transition is not identical in all countries, cities, and even neighborhoods, which limits the possibility of developing a Latin American gang perspective.

KEYWORDS Central America, crime, drug trafficking, gang violence, Latin America, maras, organized crime

whbva102.indd 1 24-12-2016 19:54:26