History of the US Marine Corps in WWII Vol IV
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CHAPTER 2 Marine Aviation in the Marianas, Carolines and at Iwo Jima l THE MARIANAS2 earlier. A similar increase in aircraft strength available for FORAGER was While Marines of the 4th MAW were notable. Shore-based aircraft for the engaged in neutralizing enemy strong- invasion of the Marianas totalled 879 holds in the Marshalls, American mili- planes ; 352 belonging to the Marine tary operations in the Central Pacific Corps, 269 to the U.S. Army, and 258 were accelerating . By June of 1944, to the Navy . Marine aircraft consisted Operation FORAGER, the invasion of of 172 fighters, 36 night fighters, 72 the Marianas, had gotten under way . dive bombers, 36 torpedo bombers, and For the operation, Admiral Raymond 36 transport aircraft .3 A. Spruance, commanding the Fifth Despite the large number of Marine Fleet, had assembled more than 800 shore-based aircraft in the Gilberts and ships, a far cry from the total of 82 Marshalls, air operations in the Mari- ships that had been available for the anas were carried out largely by the Guadalcanal landings barely two years Navy carrier planes . Previous attempts by exponents of Marine aviation to have ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from : 2d MAW Hist, Ju141-Sept46 ; 4th MBDAW WarDs, Dec42- and VMF(N)-532 Hist, Apr43-May47 ; VMF Nov44 and 4th MAW WarDs, Nov44-Mar46 ; (N)-541 Hist, Feb44-Dec49 ; VMB-612 MAG-11 WarDs, Oct42-Oct44 and MAG-11 WarDs, Aug-Dec44 and VMB-612 Supp and Hist, Aug4l-Dec49 ; MAG-21 WarDs and Hist, Hist, Oct43-Aug45 ; VMR-952 WarDs and Feb43-Dec44, hereafter MAG-21 Hist ; MAG- Hist, Ju144-Ju146, hereafter VMR-952 Hist; 25 WarDs, Aug42-Jun46 ; MAG-45 OpRpt, Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi- 8Jan45 ; MBDAG-45 WarDs and Hist, Feb- ous War ; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral Oct44 ; VMO-2 WarDs and Hist, Nov43-Ju146 King; Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in hereafter VMO-2 Hist; VMO-4 WarDs, World War II ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; Mar44-Oct45 and Hist, 20Dec43-31Dec44, here- Morison, Victory in the Pacific . after VMO-4 Hist ; AWS-5 AR and WarDs, 'Additional sources for this section include : Mar-Ju144 ; VMF-114 WarDs, Jul43-Apr47 ; Major Carl W . Hoffman, Saipan-The Begin- VMF-121 WarDs, Oct42-Dec44 and Hist, ning of the End (Washington : HistDiv, May4l-Jul44 ; VMTB-131 WarDs, Dec4l-Sep42 HQMC, 1950), hereafter Hoffman, Saipan; and Jan44-Nov45 ; VMF-216 WarDs, Jun43- Major Carl W . Hoffman, The Seizure of Tinian Mar46 ; VMF-217 WarDs, Ju143-May46 ; (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1951), here- VMF-225 WarDs, Jan43-Mar47 ; VMF-225 after Hoffman, Tinian; Major Orlan R . Lodge, Hist, Jan43-Dec49 ; VMTB-232 WarDs, Ju143- The Recapture of Guam (Washington : HistBr, Feb45 ; VMTB-242 WarDs, Ju143-Nov45 ; G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954), hereafter Lodge, VMTB-242 Hist, Ju143-Ju145 ; VMF-252 Guam; USSBS, Pacific Campaigns . WarDs, Apr42-Jan44 ; VMF-321 WarDs, Sep- 'Aircraft figures above cited in USSBS, 43-Jan46 ; VMF (N)-532 WarDs, Dec43-Ju146 Pacific Campaigns, p . 235. 422 MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 423 Marine flyers operate from carriers had were specially trained Marine pilots avail- not yet reached fruition . The invasion able for this kind of work .' of Saipan on 15 June found Navy avia- Responsible officers of the 4th Marine tion in full control of the skies. During Division attributed deficiencies in close the epic air battle of the Philippine Sea, air support on Saipan to inadequate which was to become known as the training of pilots, overcrowding of "Marianas Turkey Shoot," the Navy radio circuits between troops on the destroyed 476 enemy aircraft, nearly ground and units controlling the air all of them in the air. Between 22 and strikes, involvement of too many eche- 24 June, 73 Army Air Forces Thunder- lons in the control of air strikes, and bolt fighters (P-47s) were catapulted poor coordination between aviation, from the Navy carriers USS Natoma naval guns, and artillery . Following Bay and USS Manila Bay 60 miles off the Saipan operation, General Holland Saipan and landed on Aslito airfield . Smith once again urged that air groups These planes gave valuable assistance be designated and trained as direct to the Navy in furnishing close support support groups and be assigned to for the troops on Saipan, where bitter CVE-type carriers (escort aircraft car- fighting was in progress .4 riers, hereafter referred to as CVEs), At the end of the Saipan operation, and that Marine aviation provide air numerous voices were raised in criti- groups for this specialized duty . cism of the close support the hard- At the same time, General Vande- pressed Marine divisions had received grift, Commandant of the Marine on the ground. The most frequent com- Corps, initiated action designed to get plaint was that excessive time was re- Marine aviation assigned to carriers. quired before a much needed air strike Following discussions with the Chief of was actually executed . Many of the Naval Operations and a conference at requested missions had to be cancelled Pearl Harbor in August 1944, attended because the infantry had already ad- by General Vandegrift and ranking na- vanced beyond the targets before the val leaders, the placement of Marine first airplane appeared over the battle- aircraft on carriers was authorized. On field. An evaluation of close air support 21 October, Marine Carrier Groups, on Saipan summed up the situation this Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, way was established as a tactical command . as compared with the assistance with headquarters at Santa Barbara, given to the fighting troops by naval ships, California . Colonel Albert D. Cooley close air support was decidedly inferior . was appointed commanding officer of In the early part of the operation, close support missions were flown exclusively the Marine Carrier Groups, which con- by navy planes, and only toward the end sisted of Marine Base Defense Aircraft of the operation were army aircraft . Group 48 (MBDAG-48) at Santa Bar- employed for this purpose . At no time bara and MAG-51 at Mojave . In early November, the two groups were re- ' For a detailed account of Marine ground operations on Saipan, see Shaw, Nalty, and 6 Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 231-428. phibious War, p . 333. 424 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS designated as Marine air support From the first hops on, it was realized groups. Each group consisted of four that use of our planes could not be em- ployed the way it was originally intended . carrier air groups, each with an 18- Theoretically, we were to remain at all plane fighter squadron and a 12-air- times behind our front lines, never going craft torpedo bomber squadron. The deep into or even over enemy territory Marine air support group was scheduled and all artillery firing and adjustment was for assignment to a CVE division of six supposed to be done behind our own pieces . Very little time was needed for us carriers . Each carrier air group was to to realize that this method was impracti- be stationed on a ,CVE . The Marine air cal and relatively ineffective. Due to the support group staff was to function in rugged mountainous terrain, observation the flagship as part of the admiral's staff was practically impossible from such a for directing operations of the carrier position . Consequently, we found it neces- air groups in support of ground troops sary not only to go behind enemy lines, but deep into enemy territory to scout and in a target area. pick out targets, and to remain there It was not envisioned that the Marine while fire was conducted on these targets squadrons would furnish all close air so proper adjustments could be made and support. Instead, Marine aviation was the effect of the fire on the targets could to provide close air support for Marine be observed . Therefore, most all of our flying was done over and forward of our divisions when the situation permitted . front lines for the remainder of the Saipan Though carrier-based Marine aviation and Tinian operations.' was not yet a reality during the Mari- The monoplanes of VMO-2 continued anas campaign, the framework for such their spotting missions until the end an organization was rapidly being laid . of the Saipan operation on 9 July 1944 . Lest it be thought that Marine avia- None of the pilots or planes was lost, tion was completely left out of opera- though enemy antiaircraft fire hit many tions on Saipan, it must be mentioned of the aircraft ; two of them had their that some Marine aircraft did take off gas tanks damaged but both returned from carriers and perform a very use- safely to their base . On the night of 26 ful mission in support of the ground June, enemy bombers raided the squad- action. These were airplanes of VMO- ron area and dropped numerous anti- 2, commanded by Major Robert W. Ed- personnel bombs, wounding some of the mondson, and VMO-4, under Captain Marines on the ground. Nathan D. Blaha. Most of the small Considerably less lucky in the course artillery spotter monoplanes flew off the of the Saipan operation were the men of carriers USS Fanshaw Bay and USS VMO-4, whose mission in support of White Plains on 17 June, landed on the 4th Marine Division was identical Yellow Beach and the dirt strip at to that executed by VMO-2 for the 2d Charan-Kanoa, and subsequently, on 22 Division. The first two planes of VMO-4 June, moved to Aslito airfield . left the White Plains 150 miles off- The flying personnel of VMO-2 soon shore on 19 June and arrived safely at noticed that combat situations varied considerably from textbook theory, as related in the squadron history VMO-2 Hist, op.