CHAPTER 2

Marine Aviation in the Marianas, Carolines and at Iwo Jima l

THE MARIANAS2 earlier. A similar increase in aircraft strength available for FORAGER was While Marines of the 4th MAW were notable. Shore-based aircraft for the engaged in neutralizing enemy strong- invasion of the Marianas totalled 879 holds in the Marshalls, American mili- planes ; 352 belonging to the Marine tary operations in the Central Pacific Corps, 269 to the U.S. Army, and 258 were accelerating . By June of 1944, to the Navy . Marine aircraft consisted Operation FORAGER, the invasion of of 172 fighters, 36 night fighters, 72 the Marianas, had gotten under way . dive bombers, 36 torpedo bombers, and For the operation, Admiral Raymond 36 transport aircraft .3 A. Spruance, commanding the Fifth Despite the large number of Marine Fleet, had assembled more than 800 shore-based aircraft in the Gilberts and ships, a far cry from the total of 82 Marshalls, air operations in the Mari- ships that had been available for the anas were carried out largely by the Guadalcanal landings barely two years Navy carrier planes . Previous attempts by exponents of Marine aviation to have ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from : 2d MAW Hist, Ju141-Sept46 ; 4th MBDAW WarDs, Dec42- and VMF(N)-532 Hist, Apr43-May47 ; VMF Nov44 and 4th MAW WarDs, Nov44-Mar46 ; (N)-541 Hist, Feb44-Dec49 ; VMB-612 MAG-11 WarDs, Oct42-Oct44 and MAG-11 WarDs, Aug-Dec44 and VMB-612 Supp and Hist, Aug4l-Dec49 ; MAG-21 WarDs and Hist, Hist, Oct43-Aug45 ; VMR-952 WarDs and Feb43-Dec44, hereafter MAG-21 Hist ; MAG- Hist, Ju144-Ju146, hereafter VMR-952 Hist; 25 WarDs, Aug42-Jun46 ; MAG-45 OpRpt, Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi- 8Jan45 ; MBDAG-45 WarDs and Hist, Feb- ous War ; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral Oct44 ; VMO-2 WarDs and Hist, Nov43-Ju146 King; Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in hereafter VMO-2 Hist; VMO-4 WarDs, World War II ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; Mar44-Oct45 and Hist, 20Dec43-31Dec44, here- Morison, Victory in the Pacific . after VMO-4 Hist ; AWS-5 AR and WarDs, 'Additional sources for this section include : Mar-Ju144 ; VMF-114 WarDs, Jul43-Apr47 ; Major Carl W . Hoffman, Saipan-The Begin- VMF-121 WarDs, Oct42-Dec44 and Hist, ning of the End (Washington : HistDiv, May4l-Jul44 ; VMTB-131 WarDs, Dec4l-Sep42 HQMC, 1950), hereafter Hoffman, Saipan; and Jan44-Nov45 ; VMF-216 WarDs, Jun43- Major Carl W . Hoffman, The Seizure of Tinian Mar46 ; VMF-217 WarDs, Ju143-May46 ; (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1951), here- VMF-225 WarDs, Jan43-Mar47 ; VMF-225 after Hoffman, Tinian; Major Orlan R . Lodge, Hist, Jan43-Dec49 ; VMTB-232 WarDs, Ju143- The Recapture of Guam (Washington : HistBr, Feb45 ; VMTB-242 WarDs, Ju143-Nov45 ; G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954), hereafter Lodge, VMTB-242 Hist, Ju143-Ju145 ; VMF-252 Guam; USSBS, Pacific Campaigns . WarDs, Apr42-Jan44 ; VMF-321 WarDs, Sep- 'Aircraft figures above cited in USSBS, 43-Jan46 ; VMF (N)-532 WarDs, Dec43-Ju146 Pacific Campaigns, p . 235. 422 MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 423 Marine flyers operate from carriers had were specially trained Marine pilots avail- not yet reached fruition . The invasion able for this kind of work .' of Saipan on 15 June found Navy avia- Responsible officers of the 4th Marine tion in full control of the skies. During Division attributed deficiencies in close the epic air battle of the Philippine Sea, air support on Saipan to inadequate which was to become known as the training of pilots, overcrowding of "Marianas Turkey Shoot," the Navy radio circuits between troops on the destroyed 476 enemy aircraft, nearly ground and units controlling the air all of them in the air. Between 22 and strikes, involvement of too many eche- 24 June, 73 Army Air Forces Thunder- lons in the control of air strikes, and bolt fighters (P-47s) were catapulted poor coordination between aviation, from the Navy carriers USS Natoma naval guns, and artillery . Following Bay and USS Manila Bay 60 miles off the Saipan operation, General Holland Saipan and landed on Aslito airfield . Smith once again urged that air groups These planes gave valuable assistance be designated and trained as direct to the Navy in furnishing close support support groups and be assigned to for the troops on Saipan, where bitter CVE-type carriers (escort aircraft car- fighting was in progress .4 riers, hereafter referred to as CVEs), At the end of the Saipan operation, and that Marine aviation provide air numerous voices were raised in criti- groups for this specialized duty . cism of the close support the hard- At the same time, General Vande- pressed Marine divisions had received grift, Commandant of the Marine on the ground. The most frequent com- Corps, initiated action designed to get plaint was that excessive time was re- Marine aviation assigned to carriers. quired before a much needed air strike Following discussions with the Chief of was actually executed . Many of the Naval Operations and a conference at requested missions had to be cancelled Pearl Harbor in August 1944, attended because the infantry had already ad- by General Vandegrift and ranking na- vanced beyond the targets before the val leaders, the placement of Marine first airplane appeared over the battle- aircraft on carriers was authorized. On field. An evaluation of close air support 21 October, Marine Carrier Groups, on Saipan summed up the situation this Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, way was established as a tactical command . . . as compared with the assistance with headquarters at Santa Barbara, given to the fighting troops by naval ships, California . Colonel Albert D. Cooley close air support was decidedly inferior . was appointed commanding officer of In the early part of the operation, close support missions were flown exclusively the Marine Carrier Groups, which con- by navy planes, and only toward the end sisted of Marine Base Defense Aircraft of the operation were army aircraft . . . Group 48 (MBDAG-48) at Santa Bar- employed for this purpose . At no time bara and MAG-51 at Mojave . In early November, the two groups were re- ' For a detailed account of Marine ground operations on Saipan, see Shaw, Nalty, and 6 Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 231-428. phibious War, p . 333. 424 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS designated as Marine air support From the first hops on, it was realized groups. Each group consisted of four that use of our planes could not be em- ployed the way it was originally intended . carrier air groups, each with an 18- Theoretically, we were to remain at all plane fighter squadron and a 12-air- times behind our front lines, never going craft torpedo bomber squadron. The deep into or even over enemy territory Marine air support group was scheduled and all artillery firing and adjustment was for assignment to a CVE division of six supposed to be done behind our own pieces . Very little time was needed for us carriers . Each carrier air group was to to realize that this method was impracti- be stationed on a ,CVE . The Marine air cal and relatively ineffective. Due to the support group staff was to function in rugged mountainous terrain, observation the flagship as part of the admiral's staff was practically impossible from such a for directing operations of the carrier position . Consequently, we found it neces- air groups in support of ground troops sary not only to go behind enemy lines, but deep into enemy territory to scout and in a target area. pick out targets, and to remain there It was not envisioned that the Marine while fire was conducted on these targets squadrons would furnish all close air so proper adjustments could be made and support. Instead, Marine aviation was the effect of the fire on the targets could to provide close air support for Marine be observed . Therefore, most all of our flying was done over and forward of our divisions when the situation permitted . front lines for the remainder of the Saipan Though carrier-based Marine aviation and Tinian operations.' was not yet a reality during the Mari- The monoplanes of VMO-2 continued anas campaign, the framework for such their spotting missions until the end an organization was rapidly being laid . of the Saipan operation on 9 July 1944 . Lest it be thought that Marine avia- None of the pilots or planes was lost, tion was completely left out of opera- though enemy antiaircraft fire hit many tions on Saipan, it must be mentioned of the aircraft ; two of them had their that some Marine aircraft did take off gas tanks damaged but both returned from carriers and perform a very use- safely to their base . On the night of 26 ful mission in support of the ground June, enemy bombers raided the squad- action. These were airplanes of VMO- ron area and dropped numerous anti- 2, commanded by Major Robert W. Ed- personnel bombs, wounding some of the mondson, and VMO-4, under Captain Marines on the ground. Nathan D. Blaha. Most of the small Considerably less lucky in the course artillery spotter monoplanes flew off the of the Saipan operation were the men of carriers USS Fanshaw Bay and USS VMO-4, whose mission in support of White Plains on 17 June, landed on the 4th Marine Division was identical Yellow Beach and the dirt strip at to that executed by VMO-2 for the 2d Charan-Kanoa, and subsequently, on 22 Division. The first two planes of VMO-4 June, moved to Aslito airfield . left the White Plains 150 miles off- The flying personnel of VMO-2 soon shore on 19 June and arrived safely at noticed that combat situations varied considerably from textbook theory, as related in the squadron history VMO-2 Hist, op. cit., p . 8. MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 425 the Charan-Kanoa strip . The remaining activity observed . On the morning of aircraft, in crates, were brought ashore D plus 2, 17 June, the squadron went two (lays later ; by 22 June, eight squad- ashore on Saipan. As fighting on the ron planes were in operation . From island progressed, the detachments dis- this point on, and for the duration of placed forward with their radar equip- its employment on Saipan, bad luck ment in line with the advance of the appeared to dog the squadron . Six days two Marine divisions . While conducting after reaching Saipan, VMO-4 had al- a reconnaissance for a new site to be ready lost a substantial number of its occupied on 29 June, a lieutenant and original aircraft . Two planes were dam- five men were taken under enemy ma- aged beyond repair by enemy fire ; an- chine gun fire. The lieutenant was killed other had to be scrapped after it col- and a corporal subsequently was re- lided with a vehicle during takeoff . Loss ported as missing. of the fourth plane resulted in the death On 12 July, after the battle for Sai- of the pilot as well . pan had come to an end, a dozen air- The misfortunes of VMO-4 did not craft of VMF(N)-532 joined the Army end there . On the night of 26 June, the Air Forces night fighters already sta- squadron area was bombed. This raid, tioned on the island. An advance eche- from which the men of VMO-2 had lon of 7 officers and 32 enlisted men had escaped relatively unscathed, had a far been flown to Saipan a week earlier . more serious effect on the sister squad- Beginning 10 July, in addition to pa- don. Three enlisted men of VMO-4 were trolling over Saipan, the squadron killed and three officers and men were maintained one night fighter on station wounded. Among the seriously injured over Guam between the hours of 1930 was the squadron commander, who had and 0530. to be evacuated and was succeeded by The invasion of Guam on 21 July Lieutenant Thomas Rozga .7 found MAG-21, commanded by Colonel Another Marine aviation unit on Sai- Peter P. Schrider, offshore awaiting the pan was Air Warning Squadron 5 seizure of the Orote Peninsula . The air (AWS-5) . On 17 April 1944 the squad- group had been detached from the 2d ron, commanded by Captain Donald D . MAW on 4 June and subsequently was O'Neill, had been divided into three attached to the 4th MBDAW. After 30 detachments for operations with V Am- days at sea, the aviation Marines were phibious Corps. One of these was as- eager to go ashore and get an airfield signed to the Northern Troops and operational on the peninsula. Due to the Landing Force, the other two to the 2d heavy and prolonged fighting in this and 4th Marine Divisions . The initial particular part of Guam, the forward mission of these detachments was to echelon of MAG-21 was still ship-bound provide an early air raid alert for the a week after D-Day. Two days later, a headquarters to which they were at- work detail of 50 men finally went ashore tached and to record all enemy air to assist in the restoration of the old airstrip. The initial job was to clear ' VMO-4 Hist, op . cit., pp. 11-12. the strip of shell fragments and Japa- 426 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS nese dead in various stages of decom- field as the first American plane attempted . There remained to be done to land on the captured strip, and the position Marine reception committee lay pinned another extremely unpleasant job, to the deck at the moment the Grumman which fell to the bomb disposal officer torpedo bomber began its cautious ap- of MAG-21 : clearing the area of mines, proach toward the former Jap airbase . unexploded bombs, and the booby traps Halfway down the strip, mangled and around the designated bivouac area. charred Jap bodies lay in grotesque mounds before a fallen redoubt of con- From the time that the first Marines crete. The stench of 3,000 other dead Japs of MAG-21 started to restore the air- was over the scorched peninsula . . . a strip, and for many weeks thereafter, bullet-riddled wind sock flapped wearily they were constantly harassed by enemy in the hot breeze from across Apra Har- snipers and bypassed stragglers who bor. The noise of battle from the smoky lurked in the underbrush at night and mountain sides beyond the harbor rode on the same wind . infested the coral caves on both sides The word passed quickly. In a few of the strip. Mechanics of the air group minutes the strip was lined with curious captured several Japanese ; hundreds spectators. But as Navy Lieutenant (jg) remained to be killed or captured on Edward F. Terrar, Coffeyville, Kansas zoomed the field, the sharp whine of Orote Peninsula . bullets cut the air overhead, and the on- By 31 July, a 2,500-foot section had lookers scrambled for cover without been added to the coral strip, which had thought of dignity. Unmindful of the com- already been cleared. The strip was motion on the ground, the Navy pilot ready for operations and several Ma- dropped his flaps, cut his throttle and came on. His wheels touched lightly once, rine officers planned to have the first bounced harder a second time, and as the American plane to land on Guam be one plane leaped on the third impact, he from VM0-1, commanded by Major opened the gun and roared back into the Gordon W. Heritage, whose craft were air for a second try . poised on the escort carriers USS San- As he circled for another approach, the gamon and USS Suwanee.$ This plan Marines on the ground weighed curiosity against prudence . But even the sniper was was frustrated when, during the after- caught up in the drama of the situation . noon of 31 July, a Navy torpedo bomber As suddenly as they had begun, the shots from the USS Chenango attempted a ceased. The TBF settled in again, but this landing on the newly constructed strip time it greased the runway all the way, shortly before the Marine observation and pulled up to an easy stop as Marines swarmed around on every side . The time planes were scheduled to arrive. The was exactly five o'clock ; American avia- importance of the occasion was not lost tion was on Guam.' on the numerous observers gathered to The stay of this American aircraft on witness this memorable event, which Guam was very shortlived . Three min- was recorded for posterity in these utes after landing, heavy sniper fire words forced the torpedo bomber to take off . Sniper fire cracked across Orote Air- Minutes later, without major fanfare, a "grasshopper" of VM0-1, piloted by 'Col Frederick P . Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 21Nov52, as cited in Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p . 525n. °MAG-21 Hist, pp . 33-34. MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 427 the squadron commander, Major Gor- But the men were only on Guam a few don W. Heritage, landed on the airstrip days when dengue fever and dysentery began to take their toll . Dengue fever, as previously scheduled . As it developed, with its symptoms very much like malaria, neither the torpedo bomber nor the doesn't hang on and recur like malaria, VMO-1 spotter planes were the first but its original effects are much more American aircraft to touch down on painful. Every section of the MAG was Guam following its recapture . That hit seriously by dengue in those first few weeks. As soon as hot food was served, honor fell to an Army liaison aircraft when dead Japs had all been buried, and assigned to the 77th Infantry Division when plenty of fresh water was available, Artillery, which had taken off from an dengue and dysentery slowly disappeared . improvised airstrip elsewhere on the After the first month and a half, cases island at 1310 of the 30th .'° dropped appreciably.' Work on the field continued at a furi- On 4 August, Marine aviation re- ous pace through 4 August, by which turned to Guam in force . MAG-21 date all but 150-200 yards at the west squadrons, flying in from the aircraft end of the strip had been completed . carrier USS Santee, safely touched Except for unloading parties working down on the airstrip just before noon . on board ships, most of the MAG-21 The first squadron to land was VMF- headquarters and service squadron per- (N)-534 flying Grumman Hellcats, led sonnel moved into a new bivouac area by the squadron commander, Major at the east end of the field . Initially, the Ross S. Mickey, followed by VMF-216, lot of these men was not an easy one . -217, and -225 . As the squadrons For one thing, the new "shelter-half touched down, the planes were moved camp" lacked mess and sanitary facili- to the edge of the runway for parking ties. The air group history gives a vivid since revetment areas had not yet been account of conditions prevailing at completed. At 0600 on 7 August, VMF- Orote airstrip at this time 225 took off from Orote Field to make In the camp, unavoidably in some re- the first regular combat air patrol flown spects, the men lived for more than a by Guam-based aircraft. month in filth. The group did not bring Barely a week after Orote Field had with it ready-made heads or sanitation become operational, distinguished vis- facilities . Men ate canned rations for some time before stoves could be set up itors arrived on board a large C-54 and hot rations served . Worse than the Skymaster transport. The dignitaries mosquito that pestered Marine aviation included Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, men in the South Pacific, far worse was Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the big, fat ordinary variety of house- Lieutenant General Alexander A . Van- flies that swarmed over everything on Guam the first month . Of course, as the degrift, Commandant of the Marine dead were gradually buried and ration Corps. Awaiting them at the field were cans properly disposed of, the fly began Lieutenant General Holland H . Smith, to disappear. Major General Roy S . Geiger, Major General Henry L . Larsen, Brigadier 10 77th InfDiv Arty AAR, 21Jul-10Aug44, as cited in Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p . 525. ' Ibid., pp . 37-38. 428 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

General Pedro A . Del Valle, and other In flying strafing and bombing mis- ranking Marine and naval officers on sions against the enemy-held island of the island. Rota, the pilots of MAG-21 initially Even though pilots and ground crews concentrated their attacks on the en- had landed on Guam with high hopes emy airfield. Continuous bombing, on of engaging the enemy in combat, they the average of once a day for four con- soon learned to their disappointment secutive months, kept the enemy field that no enemy airmen were going to in a chronic state of disrepair . The run challenge American domination of the to Rota and return required barely an skies over the island . For a few months hour and at least one pilot cracked following the capture of Guam, there "Sighted Rota, sank same, and got were several air alerts, but no enemy home in time for lunch ."12 bombs were dropped . There were no For a while it appeared that the operational accidents in more than bomb runs to Rota were a picnic, and 6,000 takeoffs and landings during the Marine aviators came to look upon the first month. Orote airfield had the dis- island as something akin to a practice tinction of becoming the first all-Marine range--a place to discharge a dull, airfield in the Pacific Theater . routine, and necessary, but not overly Situated only 1,500 miles from Tokyo, hazardous, task . Enemy antiaircraft the new base dispatched fighters and fire initially was feeble . As weeks bombers to attack Japanese-held Pagan turned into months, the enemy antiair- Island, 200 miles north of Guam, and craft gunners marooned on the island Rota, only 55 miles to the northeast apparently derived some benefit from and halfway to Saipan. The establish- tracking the daily low level sweeps of ment of Orote airfield represented a the Marine pilots . In any case, as time long and ambitious step forward in went on, the raiding aircraft began to the two-year story of developing Amer- get hit. Some managed to limp back to ican air power in the Pacific . Just two their base, others were shot down out- years earlier, Marine pilots had flown right. In contrast to their earlier non- into embattled Henderson Field on chalance, the pilots learned to respect Guadalcanal to establish a precarious Rota. When vegetable gardens were foothold in the southern Pacific. Almost subsequently spotted on the island, the a year later, in August 1943, Marine Corsair squadrons were dispatched to aviators were the first to land on Munda destroy them and so to deprive the airstrip on New Georgia . That advance enemy holdouts of a much-needed food of only 181 tortuous miles had followed supply. The tactics used were simple a year of bitter fighting in the South but effective . Several fighters dropped Pacific. By August 1944, American belly tanks of aviation gasoline on the forces had advanced boldly into the targets . Planes following closely behind Marianas-1,100 miles west of the Mar- the belly-tank-bombers would then shalls and halfway along the 3,000-mile road from the Solomons to the Japanese homeland. " I bid ., p. 47. MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 429 strafe the fuel-soaked fields with incen- -321, VMTB-131 and -242, VMO-1 diary bullets . and -2, VMF (N)-534, VMR-253, Another enemy-held strongpoint fre- VMB-612, and AWS-2. The comple- quently on the receiving end of Marine ment of the group at this time included fighter bombers was Pagan. Ever since 529 officers and 3,778 enlisted per- the American invasion of the Marianas, sonnel. Aircraft of the group included the enemy had tried to keep the Pagan 113 fighters (98 F4Us and 15 F6Fs), airstrip operational, but these efforts 15 night fighters (F6F-Ns), 39 torpedo were frustrated by continuous air raids. bombers (TBFs and TBMs), 15 me- Taking off with a heavy gas load, carry- dium bombers (PBJs), 14 transports ing belly tanks and a pair of thousand (R4Ds), 22 observation planes (OYs), pound bombs apiece, the Corsairs re- and a solitary amphibious utility plane peatedly attacked the enemy airfield on (J2F-6) ." As 1944 drew to a close, Pagan in the face of fairly heavy anti- most veteran pilots of the MAG-21 aircraft fire. Enemy aircraft caught on fighter squadrons either had or were in the ground were raked by strafing the process of returning to Pearl Har- fighters, and in time the field became bor and the continental United States well pockmarked with bomb craters . In for training on aircraft carriers . keeping the enemy airstrips on Rota and Pagan Islands in daily disrepair, THE CAROLINESI5 the Corsairs of MAG-21, acting as fighter-bombers, played a vital part in The occupation of the Marianas by . forces during the summer of 1944, protecting the new B-29 Superfortress U.S bases on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam coupled with further advances in the southwest Pacific, opened the door to from enemy air action .13 On 7 September 1944, Colonel Schri- the seizure of the Philippine Islands . The logical step before retaking the der, commanding MAG-21, was suc- ceeded by Colonel Edward B . Carney, Philippines was the seizure of the west- who remained in command until late ern Carolines, whose possession would not only provide the final stepping- March 1945. By late November, MAG- 21 consisted of VMF-216, -217, -225, stone to the Philippines but also protect the right flank of the invasion force . " The first B-29 arrived on Saipan on 12 By this time, the Japanese were facing October 1944 while final paving and other a strategic situation that had greatly construction was still incomplete . Facilities changed to their disadvantage, for were not substantially operative until April American forces were strongly em- 1945. On Guam, the newly constructed airfields did not become operational for B-29s until late February 1945 . On Tinian, the first two run- 14 Figures on personnel and materiel taken ways were completed in January 1945, the from MAG-21 Hist, p . 50. third in late February, and the fourth in "Additional sources for this section include : early May. The first runway of West Field 2d MAW WarD, Jan-Apr43 ; ILIAC Palaus became operational on 22 March 1945, the Rpt ; Hough, Assault on Peleliu ; Smith, Ap- second on 20 April. Craven and Cate, The proach to the Philippines ; •Fane and Moore, Pacific, pp. 515-520. The Naked Warriors. 430 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS placed on their inner line of defense . 1944, when carrier-based planes had The fall of Saipan in the overall Japa- dropped 600 tons of bombs on the island nese view of the war was a disaster in a two-day raid. Preinvasion air comparable to the German defeat at strikes were designed to eliminate any Stalingrad during the winter of 1942- enemy aircraft left in the Palaus . Once 43. For many Germans the loss of the the Marines of the III Amphibious Sixth Army at Stalingrad meant the Corps had seized the Peleliu airfield, the war could no longer be won ; many Japa- main objective of the operation, Marine nese reached the same conclusion fol- aviation was to be based on the island . lowing the loss of Saipan . While, for the The task of bringing Marine aviation time being, no political repercussions in to Peleliu was turned over to the 2d Germany followed in the wake of the MAW, commanded by Brigadier Gen- military debacle, the loss of Saipan eral Harold D . Campbell . The air wing, proved a sufficient disaster to topple the consisting of MAGs-11 and -25, had cabinet of General Tojo . In announcing spent considerable time in the Pacific the fall of Saipan to the nation, the lat- Theater. Some of its squadrons had ter was forced to admit that "Japan was participated in the Battle of Midway facing an unprecedented national and in operations on New Georgia . On crisis." 16 30 June 1944, the headquarters of the As early as 10 May 1944, Admiral 2d MAW moved from Efate, in the Nimitz had designated the commander New Hebrides, to Espiritu Santo, where of the Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey, to it joined the remainder of the squad- head the invasion of Peleliu and Ang- rons attached to the wing . One week aur under the code name Operation later, Major General James T . Moore STALEMATE. A second phase of the took over as wing commander. Upon his operation called for the capture of Yap arrival at Espiritu Santo, General and Ulithi. The seizure of Yap was Moore found the wing fully engaged subsequently shelved, and the island in preparing for Operation STALE- remained in enemy hands until the end MATE. Commanding officers and load- of the war. The invasion date for Pele- ing officers of VMF-114, -121, -122, liu and Angaur was set for 15 Septem- and VMF(N)-541 were reporting to ber. While planning for STALEMATE the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal was in progress, Army Air Forces with embarkation data for the impend- bombers frequently attacked enemy in- ing operation . stallations in the Palaus . As in previous It is perhaps not surprising that of- invasions, the target was out of range ficers of the 2d MAW should show a of land-based fighter aircraft, and direct greater than average interest in ship- air support for the Peleliu beachhead borne movement to a new objective . would have to be furnished by naval Many of them remembered or had heard aviation . The Navy had already struck of the saga of the liberty ship S .S . at enemy defenses on Peleliu in March Walter Colton, which in January 1943 had transported part of the wing head- 16 USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p . 220. quarters to the South Pacific . At the MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 431 time, what had begun as a routine for the ground personnel of Marine three-week voyage when the ship pulled squadrons attached to the 2d MAW, out of San Diego Harbor on 8 January, and ground elements of the air wing had turned into a seemingly intermin- went ashore on Peleliu on 15 September able odyssey for the aviation Marines only one hour behind the assault waves. on board. No one to this date has deter- During the early phase of the opera- mined what factor was responsible for tion, enemy resistance was so fierce the strange voyage of the Colton, but that aviation Marines were used as something went awry along the way . stretcher bearers, ammunition carriers The wing historian subsequently was to and riflemen.18 Six Marines of the 2d describe the sequence of events in the MAW were killed and 11 wounded while following words aiding the ground troops during the Instead of proceeding directly to Gua- early part of the operation. dalcanal, the Colton received a change of The unfinished Japanese airfield on orders directing her to Noumea ; then, Peleliu was captured on 16 September ; running ahead of schedule, she failed to roughly a week later it became opera- pick up radioed orders from Pearl Harbor tional. On 24 September, General which directed her to Espiritu Santo in- stead. Dropping anchor in Noumea Har- Moore, with part of his staff, arrived bor, the ship and passengers learned they by transport and set up his headquar- were not expected there . Several days ters as Air Commander, Western Caro- later they steamed on, arriving February lines (Task Group 59.6) . In this capac- 4 at Espiritu. Apparently the ship was ity, he headed a combined Army-Navy- not expected there either, for during the following 21/2 months while crew and pas- Marine staff in addition to personnel sengers fretted to be moving, and the of the 2d Wing, to direct the operations Squadron's materiel lay useless in her of all aircraft based on Peleliu, Angaur, hold, the ship remained tied up in that big and Ulithi . Garrison Air Force, West- port without orders for further move- ern Carolines, whose largest component ment . Major Wilfrid H . Stiles and several was the 2d MAW, had a threefold task. other officers and enlisted personnel got It had to provide air defense for all off the Colton on February 6, and were ground troops and convoys in the West- flown to Guadalcanal . Others followed at ern Carolines, furnish air support for later dates, but some of those who left the ground troops in the vicinity of the States on that ship never were de- tached from her until she reached Auck- Peleliu Island ; and neutralize the re- land, New Zealand, late in April. maining enemy bases in the Western The result was that the ship never Carolines. reached Guadalcanal, nor did she reach The first Marine aircraft to operate Efate, where the material aboard also on Peleliu Island were the spotter could have been used . Until she sailed for planes of VMO-3, commanded by Cap- Auckland where the cargo finally was taken ashore, she remained at Espiritu tain Wallace J. Slappey. The ground Santo." echelon of the observation squadron No such long voyage was planned "For the complete history of ground oper- 17 2d MAW WarD, Jan-Apr43 . ations on Peleliu, see Part III of this volume . 432 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS went ashore on Peleliu on 17 September Peleliu operation, two OY-1 spotter and built a small airstrip about 500 aircraft were lost . The first loss oc- feet long, just south of the main airfield . curred on take-off from the CVE on The first planes touched down on the the day that the spotters were launched following day, the remainder arriving from the carrier off Peleliu . The second on the 19th . On that day artillery aircraft was shot down behind enemy spotting got under way and continued lines. In both instances the flying crews for the remainder of the month . The were rescued. difficult and jagged terrain on the is- On 24 September, the first eight F6F land required aerial observation 90 night fighters of VMF(N)-541, which percent of the time. Most spotting was had staged from Emirau through Owi directed at seeking out previously un- Island, off New Guinea, arrived on Pele- identified natural fortifications, which liu . Two days later, the Corsairs of had remained hidden from view be- VMF-114, commanded by Major Robert neath heavy vegetation . Despite the F. Stout, touched down . The Marine volume of fire directed against such Corsairs wasted no time in assisting the fortifications, positive destruction of the ground troops in blasting the enemy out enemy could not be determined because of his strongpoints. Details of these mis- of the depth and strength of these sions have been described elsewhere in positions. All enemy positions, build- this volume, but for the purposes of an ings, and dumps of any kind that were overall description of Marine aviation exposed or built above ground level activities on Peleliu there were two were either destroyed or left burning . types of missions that deserve particu- In addition to artillery spotting, the lar mention. One feat was the dropping squadron assisted the infantry by exe- of 1,000-pound bombs by Corsairs on cuting numerous reconnaissance flights enemy caves less than a mile from the at extremely low altitudes over the Peleliu airstrip. The other was the em- front lines, seeking enemy gun posi- ployment of napalm, beginning on 12 tions that were holding up the advance . October, against enemy caves and dug- Other flights maintained a patrol over outs. enemy-held islands to the north, looking Japanese air power in the Western for activities in general and barge Carolines never posed any serious movements in particular. Spotter air- threat to Marine aviation . Enemy strips craft also aided in directing amphibian at Babelthuap and Yap were kept out tractor patrols to enemy troops trying of commission by repeated attacks of to escape from the island. The pilots, Marine fighters and torpedo bombers . not content with passively spotting tar- By the end of October, Garrison Air gets, carried hand grenades and mortar Force, Western Carolines, had complete shells along on many flights and control of the air. The capture of Ulithi dropped these on enemy troops and and adjacent islands provided Marine buildings. On occasion, planes returned aviation with additional airfields . As a from flights with holes from small arms result, by the end of 1944, 11 squadrons fire and shell fragments . During the were operating from fields on Peleliu, MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 433

Angaur, and Ulithi. As early as 17 No- Ions of VMF-312 and VMTB-232 ar- vember, Army bombers based on An- rived at Ulithi from Espiritu Santo in gaur and attached to General Moore's the New Hebrides and joined the air task group were able to bomb enemy- group at Falalop . Two days later, VMF- held objectives on Luzon . 312 was administratively attached to The only instance of direct air sup- Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet port for ground troops during the Pele- Marine Force, Pacific . Operational con- liu operation occurred on 28 September, trol remained with the commanding when the Corsairs of VMF-114 sup- officer of MAG-45 until the ground eche- ported the landing of 3/5 on Ngesebus, lon departed from Ulithi on 19 Novem- an island adjacent to Peleliu . This iso- ber. lated instance of direct air support was On 29 October, the flight echelon of only a forerunner of what Marine avia- VMF(N)-542, led by Major William C . tion was to accomplish several months Kellum, reached Falalop and began fly- later in the Philippines. Nevertheless, ing local combat air patrol around the even on this occasion, spectators to the clock on the following day . The second operation, including Generals Smith, day of November witnessed the arrival Geiger, Rupertus, and Moore, were of the flight echelon of VMTB-232, led highly impressed with the results ob- by Major Menard Doswell III, from tained. The commander of the 1st Ma- Peleliu. On the 4th, a division of six rine Division, General Rupertus, com- Avengers of this squadron carried out plimented the squadron commander, a reconnaissance of Yap Island . By 14 Major Robert F. Stout, on the perform- November VMTB-232 had begun a reg- ance of his pilots. Major Stout was des- ular antisubmarine patrol, with two- tined not to survive the war ; he was plane sections flying two-hour flights killed by enemy antiaircraft fire over around the atoll from dawn to dusk . Koror on Babelthuap Island on 4 March Two days later, the Avengers launched 1945, one of 16 pilots and 2 crewmen the first of many strikes against the to lose their lives in bombing the re- Japanese airstrip on Yap . maining enemy-held islands in the Pa- Even though the enemy field on Yap laus and on Yap . had been heavily pounded from the sea Following the capture of Ulithi on and air long before the arrival of Ma- 21 September 1944, MBDAG-45, com- rine aviation on Ulithi in early October manded by Colonel Frank M . June, was 1944, it remained a constant threat to charged with the responsibility of pro- Allied bases and shipping in the West- viding air defense for the biggest an- ern Carolines . Well entrenched enemy chorage in the western Pacific . The air ground troops on Yap made it necessary group, subsequently redesignated as to neutralize the enemy strongpoint MAG-45, landed on Falalop Island on from the air, for there was always the 8 October. The 51st Naval Construction danger that the strip might be hastily Battalion, assisted by the group, com- repaired and used as staging point for pleted a 3,500-foot airstrip within three a surprise air assault on the Ulithi base weeks. On 22 October, the ground eche- and anchorage. There was a further 434 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS possibility that the enemy might use IWO JIMA20 Yap as a refuelling station for subma- As Marine aviation began to expand rines. Even though Marine pilots did its operations to the Western Carolines, not expect aerial opposition over Yap, a development important to the future they did encounter antiaircraft fire of of Marine air was taking place far from sufficient intensity to cause them to the Pacific scene of action . After pro- maintain a minimum altitude of 6,000 longed discussions and long delays, Ma- feet. rine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet Proof that the enemy was aware of Marine Force, Pacific was finally estab- the presence of American shipping at lished on 21 October 1944 as a tactical Ulithi anchorage was furnished on the command .21 morning of 20 November, when enemy Training of Marine pilots for carrier and 1-47, released submarines, the 1-36 qualification had already started during . One of these torpedoed five midget subs the summer of 1944. Even though about a fleet oiler the USS Mississinewa, 15 percent of the aviators assigned to loaded with more than 400,000 gallons Marine Carrier Groups, FMFPac, had . The ship sank at her of aviation gas seen combat action, few had ever landed berth in the lagoon with a loss of 50 on a carrier . On 3 February 1945 the .'° Immediate counter- officers and men first carrier, the Block Island, was as- measures taken by hunter-killer teams signed to MASG-48 . Three other carri- under the atoll commander, Commodore ers were furnished at one-month inter- Oliver 0. Kessing, resulted in the de- vals. It was hoped that by late 1945, struction of all five midgets, two of when the invasion of Japan itself was which fell victim to Marine Corps air- to get under way, eight carriers would 1-36 and craft. Nevertheless, both the be available to the Marines .22 the 1-47 were able to make good their The invasion of Iwo Jima, Operation escape. DETACHMENT, came too early to en- In general, tactical operations of MAG-45 from 30 October 1944 through the end of the year consisted of routine 'Additional sources for this section include : strikes and reconnaissance of Yap, So- MajGen Holland M . Smith, ConfRpt, TF 56, rol, and Fais, and regular dawn to dusk "Air Operations in Support of the Capture of antisubmarine patrols, all executed by Iwo Jima," n.d., hereafter Smith, Iwo Jima Avengers of VMTB-232 . VMF (N) -542 Special Air OpsRpt ; S. E. Smith, The United States Navy in World War II (New York : flew the regular combat air patrols, us- William Morrow & Company, 1966), hereafter ing the Falalop strip and its facilities, Smith, U. S. Navy in World War II ; Vice but depending on its own maintenance Admiral E . P. Forrestel, Admiral Raymond crews for service. On such missions, A . Spruance, USN-A Study in Command naval aviators were briefed by the Ma- (Washington : GPO, 1966), hereafter Forres- tel, Admiral Spruance ; Okumiya, Horikoshi, rine group operations and intelligence and Caidin, Zero! ; Leckie, Strong Men Armed . officers. 'Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, p. 329. 18 Morison, Leyte, p. 51 . 2-'Ibid., p. 331. MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 435 able Marine aviation to furnish close the South China Sea, from where air air support from its escort carriers . strikes were launched against Indo- Each one of the 11 escort carriers taking china, Hong Kong, and Formosa. Effec- part in the operation was manned by tive 27 January, having returned to Navy pilots. Nevertheless, Marine avi- Ulithi, the Third Fleet was redesig- ators were to be given at least a limited nated the Fifth Fleet and Admiral Spru- opportunity to strike a blow both di- ance took over the tactical command rectly and indirectly in support of the from Admiral Halsey . Iwo Jima operation, one against the On 10 February, TF 58 sortied from island itself, the other in the diversion- Ulithi bound for Tokyo, 1,500 miles to ary attack against the Japanese main- the north. Three additional large car- land. riers, each with two Marine fighter While the program to put Marines squadrons on board, joined the Fifth on carriers was being slowly imple- Fleet, so that in the end Admiral Spru- mented stateside, a crisis arose in the ance disposed over eight Marine fighter field that was to hasten this develop- squadrons on four large carriers. The ment in an entirely unforeseen fashion . air attack on Tokyo was to precede the The appearance of Japanese suicide invasion of Iwo Jima by troops of the planes during the Leyte campaign in V Amphibious Corps by three days . Fol- the autumn of 1944 had created an lowing their attacks against the Japa- instant need for additional fighters nese capital, the Marine squadrons of based on the big carriers of the Third TF 58 were to furnish air support at Iwo Fleet. The employment of Marine fight- Jima on D-Day, which was set for 19 ers and pilots was decided upon as an February. immediate expedient ; by the end of Following the air strikes against 1944 the first of the Marine fighter Japan, which were carried out under squadrons were to fly from the decks unfavorable weather conditions, TF 58 of five of the big carriers in major was approximately 100 miles from Iwo operations involving a fast carrier task Jima on D-Day, and prelanding strikes force.23 were launched against the landing On 28 December 1944, VMF-124, un- beaches and adjacent areas . The initial der the command of Lieutenant Colonel sweep against the Iwo defenses was William A . Millington, and VMF-213 executed by a flight of 24 Marine Cor- under Major Donald P . Frame, went sairs and an equal number of Navy aboard the USS Essex at Ulithi. After Hellcats . Under the command of Colonel a series of air strikes against Formosa Millington of VMF-124, this flight at- and Luzon from 3-9 January 1945, Ad- tacked the flanks and high ground along miral Halsey's Third Fleet moved into the landing beaches with napalm, rock- ets, and machine gun fire . Five minutes before the first Marines hit the shore, the flight attacked the landing beach For additional details on this subject mat- ter, see Frank and Shaw, "Marines on Car- in low-level attacks . The contribution riers," op. cit . of Marine aviation in direct support of 436 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS the Iwo landings was relatively small ous Corps, directed the pilots of VMO-4 in numbers, for on D-Day a total of in Hawaii to test a special piece of more than 600 aircraft, including those equipment, dubbed "Brodie gear," of the Navy and Army Air Forces, were which had been designed by the U . S. engaged in reducing enemy defenses and Army to launch the small observation supporting the assault . Carrier-based aircraft from an LST . The device, which Marine aviation continued to fly in close resembled a giant slingshot, consisted support of the assault troops until 22 of two projecting beams, a cable, arrest- February, when Corsairs from the Wasp ing gear, and a loop. Hooks were fitted flew a ground support mission as part on the planes, and on 21 December 1944 of a 23-plane flight . After that date, air tests were begun using LST 776 as a support for the embattled Marines on base. Initial tests were unsatisfactory the island was turned over to Navy and resulted in the loss of several spot- escort carrier planes and Army P-51s, ter aircraft . who did the best job under the circum- The experimentation did not end stances. here, however. With added experience Marine aviation contributed to oper- it became evident that launching the ations on Iwo Jima in other ways . First small spotter aircraft from an LST in to become engaged in the aerial assault this fashion was possible, though three against the island were the Mitchell planes fell overboard and sank before medium bombers (PBJs) of VMB-612 the feasibility of such launchings was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack established . For more than a week fol- R. Cram . From early December 1944 lowing the invasion of Iwo Jima, LST until the end of January 1945, this 776 with Brodie gear and observation squadron, based in the Marianas, flew planes on board remained offshore. By night sorties against enemy shipping in 26 February, when the first strip on the Volcano and Bonin Islands and seri- Iwo had been secured, two spotter air- ously disrupted the flow of enemy sup- craft of VMO-4 on board the aircraft plies to these islands. Once the Marines carrier Wake Island took off and reached had landed on Iwo, artillery spotter air- the new field while it was still under craft of VMO-4, commanded by Lieu- mortar and artillery fire. A plane of tenant Thomas Rozga, and VMO-5, VMO-5 reached the strip on the follow- headed by Lieutenant Roy G . Miller, ing day. By the last day of February, lent valuable support to ground opera- all of the planes that had made the voy- tions. For the Marines, whether on the age on aircraft carriers were ashore . ground or in the air, Iwo was to be an When the first of the observation extremely difficult operation ; the spotter planes on board LST 776 was finally aircraft were to share the dangers and launched with the help of the Brodie tribulations of the campaign along with gear on 27 February, it fell into the the remainder of the assault force . water. Another attempt made on 1 The difficulties of the observation March was at least partially successful . squadrons had begun in December 1944. Of the four planes of VMO-4 launched The Commanding General, V Amphibi- that day, two received a dunking ; the MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 437 remainder made it to Maple Field No . mando," the largest twin-engined plane 1 on Iwo Jima.24 then in production . The squadron his- Pilots and planes of the two observa- tory described the early weeks of the tion squadrons eked out a hazardous unit's existence at an airfield in Cali- existence even after their arrival on fornia as follows the island . While stationary on the air- An area was pointed out along the taxi- strip, the small aircraft were frequently way at Camp Kearney Field ; tents were hit by enemy fire . VMO-4 spotted for erected, a field telephone was installed, the 3d and 4th Marine Divisions ; VMO- and the three "commandos" then belong- ing to the Marine Corps were rolled onto 5 supported the 3d and 5th Marine Di- the check line . visions. When VMO-4 completed its This was an occasion! Although a few mission on Iwo after 19 days, the pilots of the squadron's new recruits could boast had flown more than 200 missions . Of of a little experience with the "Com- the squadron's seven planes, six had mando" (they had flown and maintained been so badly damaged that they had the three first planes for the short time that they were attached to Marine Air- to be scrapped . VMO-5 pilots flew 379 craft Group 15), the majority of the per- missions in support of the divisions on sonnel from the pilots to the mechanics the ground ; their spotter aircraft in- had never been in one. Their time in the curred heavy damage similar to those R4D had been brief enough, but now this . of VMO-4 . One pilot was shot down Never had they been confronted with so large a portion of the unknown at one behind the enemy lines and lost . showing . Amazement soon gave way to The story of Marine aviation in the curiosity and the quest for knowledge Central Pacific would be incomplete began anew25 without mention of the Marines that In February 1944, the squadron were members of the Transport Air was transferred to Hawaii, where it Group, an organization responsible for became attached to Marine Air, Ha- hauling passengers and equipment all waiian Area, working directly under the over the Pacific area . supervision of that headquarters . The VMR-952 was organized on 15 June initial mission of the transport squadron 1943 under MAG-15 . At the time of the was to keep open the lines of communi- squadron's activation, it was com- cation and supply between Hawaii and manded by Major Harry F . Baker, who Midway, Johnson, and Palmyra Islands . in early July was replaced by Major Weekly and semi-weekly flights were Malcolm S. Mackay. One of the first made to each island with special addi- problems facing the newly commissioned tional flights when the need arose . squadron was the replacement of its VMR-952 transported personnel and time-honored R4D Douglas Skytrain equipment and escorted single engine transports with the little heard of and aircraft to facilitate their movements . lesser known R5C, the Curtiss "Com- Pilots of the transport squadron carried out overwater flights which extended to 24 RAdm E. M. Eller, Navy HistDiv, ltr to New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific Head, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 28Sep67, in Marine Aviation Comment File . 2i VMR-952 Hist, op. cit., p. 2. 438 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS and included stops at Espiritu Santo runway. After the unloading of its 5,500 and Guadalcanal, as well as at Tarawa, pounds of mortar ammunition, the air- Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok, in craft returned to Guam. The next day, the Central Pacific. a crippled B-29 bomber, returning from In August 1944, the squadron moved a raid on Japan, was the first of many to Emirau, in the Bismarck Archipel- in like condition to make an emergency ago, where it remained until Christmas landing on the Iwo strip. Day, when it shifted to Guam . Follow- On each return flight from Iwo, the ing the capture of the Peleliu airfield air transports evacuated casualties . Be- in mid-September, transport aircraft fore the Iwo operation ended, VMR-952 of VMR-952 made frequent stops on had made 79 trips to the island and Peleliu, bringing in urgently needed evacuated 625 wounded . The remaining equipment and departing with wounded. air transport squadrons also contrib- On 4 October 1944, two of the big Cur- uted to the operation . VMR-353, for tiss transports, carrying 43 wounded, example, carried out 8 flights during left Peleliu, inaugurating the first air the month of March 1945 ; and VMR- evacuation of battle casualties from the 253 evacuated 100 casualties in 20 island.26 On the following day, three flights. more flights took out an additional 63 In a direct ratio to the growth of casualties 2 7 During the extended Pele- American air power in the Pacific the- liu campaign, the planes delivered large ater was the decline of Japanese air quantities of welcome fresh food to the strength. Aside from a growing short- island. age in raw materials and aviation fuels, Three Marine transport squadrons there was a breakdown in planning and and a similar Army Air Forces unit aircraft production all along the line . participated in the Iwo Jima operation . As seen from the "enemy side of the These four were VMR-253, -353, and hill," the technical and administrative 952, as well as the 9th Troop Carrier factors that hampered production were Squadron. The Army Air Forces squad- explained as follows : ron dropped supplies to Marine ground The urgent need of the combat air forces on Iwo on 28 February. On the corps forced the Army and Navy to place following day, pilots of VMR-952 ar- in production several types of experimen- tal aircraft which lacked the required rived with urgently needed mortar test flights and design modifications. Air- shells, spare parts for machine guns, planes were rushed from the experimental blood plasma, and mail . On 3 March, hangars to the production line, with the the commanding officer of VMR-952, result that the planes were dispatched to Lieutenant Colonel Mackay, flew from the front lines before we could determine the missions which they could most effec- Guam to Saipan and then to Iwo Jima, tively perform. Our engineers lacked the where he piloted the first plane to land time necessary to prepare maintenance on the slightly more than 3,000 feet of manuals and texts ; thus the front-line mechanics, plagued with primitive work- ing conditions, were forced to service air- 29 VMR-952 WarD, Oct44 . planes about which they understood little . 27 Ibid. The confusion of the maintenance crews MARINE AVIATION IN THE MARIANAS 439

inevitably caused equipment malfunction flying boats, our men regarded them as and breakage on a prohibitive scale .' unusually courageous ." Along with the decline of older equip- In contrast with the all-out American ment and failure of new and better mod- attempts to salvage downed air crews els to replace aircraft that were becom- was the attitude of the Japanese naval ing more and more obsolete as the command, which held that the possible American war effort swung into full loss of a large flying boat could not be action, there was a corresponding drop risked to effect the rescue of one air of morale in the ranks of Japanese crew. A former Japanese naval aviator pilots. This did not in any way lessen who participated in and survived action the enemy pilot's determination to do over Midway, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, his duty to the death . Nevertheless, even and Santa Cruz, expressed the follow- the enemy was well aware of the human ing thoughts on the subject of rescue factor involved, though few, if any, pos- and survival : itive steps were taken by the Japanese I pondered this situation more than military leadership to ease the lot of once. For this apathy toward rescuing their aviators . Enemy flyers, sizing up downed pilots was not merely the attitude of the high command . . . our own combat their adversaries, could see with their men, the flying mates of the same men own eyes the great value that Americans who were shot down and adrift at sea, placed on retaining experienced pilots would not, even under orders, take any and air crews. Japanese flying person- unnecessary chances to save their lives . nel, whose quality and quantity were Lest this attitude be misconstrued as indi- cating that our men lacked compassion for both in a severe state of decline, avidly their friends, it should be added that they observed : would not expect otherwise should they . . . after every mission the Americans be the ones to be shot down . Any man who sent out flying boats to the areas in which was shot down and managed to survive by their planes had fought, searching for and inflating his liferaft realized that his rescuing air crews which had been shot chance for continued survival lay entirely down and stood a good chance of surviving within his own hands . Our pilots accepted aboard life rafts . Every lumbering flying their abandonment stoically . At any rate, boat, normally an easy catch for our the entire Japanese Navy failed to evince fighter planes, went out on its search mis- any great interest in rescue operations of sion with nine to twelve escort fighters . this nature ." Although their duties were extremely Along with the men fighting on the hazardous, the crews of these flying boats ground, and the flying personnel of the performed their missions gallantly, and there arose few occasions during the war other services, Marine pilots in the Cen- when groups of men so consistently ex- tral Pacific made their contribution to posed themselves to multiple dangers. Our the overall war effort . The day of close pilots could not fail to be impressed with air support that Marines were to deliver these daring search missions and, despite in the Philippines had not yet dawned the fact that enemy pilots manned the when operations in the Central Pacific

'Okumiya, Horikoshi, and Caidin, Zero!, 2'Ibid., p. 311. p. 357. 'Ibid., p. 312. 440 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS got under way. But the Marine air arm and oftentimes death, at the hands of left its milestones across the vast a remorseless enemy . Many survived reaches of the Central Pacific. Often against all odds the ravages of an relegated to arduous but monotonous equally cruel sea. Others fell victim to duty, Marine pilots defied death and flying accidents. All of them, together disease in areas that did not rate head- with those who survived, had an equal lines and that are all but forgotten to- share in bringing the war across the day. They braved the dangers of com- Central Pacific to the enemy's doorstep, bat or, if captured, humiliation, torture, paving the way for final victory. PART VI

Iwo Jima

CHAPTERI

Background to DETACHMENT'

The autumn of 1944 saw the Allies ber 1943, the inexorable advance across poised for a major thrust both in Eu- the Pacific had taken American forces rope and in the Pacific. On the European 3,000 miles westward by the end of the Continent, the Allies had liberated al- year. The conquest of Saipan, more than most all of France and stood ready to any other reverse, had brought home advance into Germany ; in fact, the to Japanese leaders the realization that German western border and the heavily there no longer was any chance of a fortified Siegfried Line had already been Japanese victory . Loss of the Marianas, breached ; on the Eastern Front, the accompanied by the Battle of the Phil- Russians had recaptured almost all ippine Sea which all but destroyed Russian territory, had driven deep into Japanese naval aviation, left the Jap- the Balkans, and were engaged in cut- anese home islands open to American ting off sizable German forces in the attack. Capture of Peleliu and Ulithi Baltic countries after an advance into protected the American right flank for East Prussia . It was evident that Ger- a thrust into the Philippines . By late many, now fighting by herself, having October 1944, American forces had not been abandoned by nearly all of her only gained a foothold on Leyte, but had former allies, could stave off the col- also inflicted disastrous punishment on lapse of the Third Reich for only a the Imperial Navy during the Battle limited time. for Leyte Gulf . In the Pacific Theater, the year of The beginning of 1945 saw American 1944 had gone badly for the Japanese forces in possession of most of Leyte also. Starting with the American of- and with a solid foothold on Luzon . The fensive against the Gilberts in Novem- enemy naval forces, rendered largely impotent by the reverses they had suf- Unless otherw:'se noted, the material in this fered during the previous year, were chapter is derived from : LtCol Whitman S . no longer able to interfere successfully Bartley, Iwo Jima : Amphibious Epic (Wash- with American operations in the Philip- ington : HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954), here- after Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Iwo Jima Com- pines, whose liberation had become ment File (HRB, HistDiv, HQMC), hereafter merely a matter of time. Iwo Comments; Smith, Approach to the Philip- The Allied advance by early 1945 had pines ; Capt. Clifford P . Morehouse, The Iwo carried friendly forces deep into enemy Jima Operation (Washington : HistDiv, territory in a line extending from an HQMC, 1946), hereafter Morehouse, Iwo Jima area east of the Kurile Islands south- Campaign ; Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi- ward and westward to a point separat- ous War. ing the Mariana and Volcano Islands, 443 444 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS thence westward to the Philippines, 750 miles to within 300 miles of the where the line turned to the southeast Mariana Islands . The Nanpo Shoto con- and continued southwestward towards sists of three major groups of islands : New Guinea and Australia (see Map I, the Izut Shoto, the Bonin Islands, also Map Section) . Even though many thou- known as the Ogasawara Gunto, and sands of enemy troops remained on by- the Volcano Islands, known to the Japa- passed islands such as New Britain, nese as the Kazan Retto . Among the lat- Kavieng, Wake, Marcus, and Yap, these ter group of islands lies Iwo Jima, lo- erstwhile Japanese strongholds had been cated about 670 miles south of Tokyo, so effectively isolated and neutralized by 700 miles north of Guam and nearly American air power and submarines halfway between Tokyo and Saipan . that they remained merely a nuisance. Iwo Jima, translated into English, With the capture of the Mariana Islands means Sulphur Island, named for the during the summer of 1944, the United sulphur deposits that extend to the very States had obtained a strongpoint from surface of the island . Iwo's shape has which the further assaults towards the alternately been compared to that of a Japanese home islands could be pork chop, a dripping ice-cream cone, launched. As an added steppingstone or an elongated sea shell of the type towards the ultimate invasion of Japan, commonly found on ocean beaches of an advance from the Marianas to the the mid-Atlantic and southern United Ryukyus appeared logical . It was also States. From northeast to southwest, the considered necessary to secure a foot- island measures less than five miles hold in the Nanpo Shoto . The island across ; the width varies from approxi- finally selected for invasion within the mately two and a half miles in the Nanpo Shoto was barely more than a northern part to only one-half mile in speck of dust and volcanic ashes in the the southern portion. Altogether, Iwo Pacific. Little known to the outside Jima occupies less than eight square world until 1945, its name was destined miles. soon to be on the lips of thousands of There was little about Iwo Jima or men and women throughout the free the remainder of the Volcano-Bonin Is- world and Japan . That island was Iwo lands to make them attractive to for- Jima. eigners in search of areas that could be colonized. In the mid-Sixteenth Century HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE a Spanish navigator sighted the Volcano OF THE BONIN ISLANDS2 . . Islands but thereafter Europeans paid From the entrance to Tokyo Bay, a little attention to them . As the century chain of islands, known as the Nanpo drew to a close, a Japanese explorer dis- Shoto, extends southward for about R. Dulles, America in the Pacific (New York : Additional sources for this section include : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932) ; Philip T. Amphibious Forces South Pacific G-2 Study, Terry, Terry's Japanese Empire (New York : Information on Iwo Jima (Kazan Retto), n.d.; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914) ; Willard Encyclopedia Britannica, 1944 Edition, "Oga- Price : Japan's Islands of Mystery (New sawara Jima" and "Volcanic Islands" ; Foster York : John Day Company, 1944) . BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 445 covered the Bonin Islands and found sions they proudly displayed Old Glory, them to be uninhabited. They remained an act hardly in keeping with Japanese this way until the early part of the policy.3 Nineteenth Century, when an assort- By 1943, Japanese colonization of Iwo ment of British and American whaling Jima had resulted in the settlement of captains sailed into the waters surround- almost 1,100 Japanese civilians on the ing the islands . A group of colonists, island. Most of these Japanese were consisting of Englishmen, Portuguese, either employed at a sugar mill located Italians, Hawaiians, and an American in the northeastern portion of the island named Nathaniel Savory, who hailed or a sulphur mine and refinery located from New England, set out from Ha- in the same general area . The inhabi- waii and settled on Chichi Jima under tants of Iwo Jima lived in five villages British sponsorship . or settlements scattered over the north- In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry ern half of the island . The northernmost stopped at Chichi Jima and, impressed of these was Kita, located in the north by the possible use of the island as a central part of Iwo . The village of Nishi coaling station for U. S. Navy vessels, was situated in the northwestern part urged the government to purchase a of the island, while Motoyama, the strip of land on the island on which largest built-up area on Iwo, was lo- warehouses could be erected . Congress cated in close proximity to the sulphur at the time showed little interest in mine and refinery . The remaining two such a venture, and in the end the villages, Higashi and Minami, were lo- project was abandoned . cated in the northeastern part of the While none of the European powers island . (See Map 24) . showed any interest in the largely bar- Only the northern part of Iwo Jima ren and forbidding island of Iwo Jima, had soil permitting some gardening . the Japanese had different ideas . Shortly Vegetables, sugar cane, and dry grains after Perry's visit to Japan in 1853, were raised for local consumption . Rice the Japanese sent officials and colonists and all other manufactured consumer to the Volcano-Bonins . Eight years items had to be obtained from Japan later, Japan laid formal claim to these proper. The inhabitants of Iwo were islands. By 1891, following increased able to supplement their diet through colonization, all of the islands in the fishing. In this connection it must be Nanpo Shoto had come under the direct pointed out that one of the most serious jurisdiction of the Tokyo Prefecture and impediments to large-scale settlement thus became an integral part of the of the island was the total absence of Japanese homeland . A ban on foreign any source of fresh water, such as a settlement all but stamped out outside lake or a river . Since the island also influence in the islands with only one ex- lacked wells, water had to be obtained ception : on Chichi Jima, the descend- ants of Nathaniel Savory and his group ' Maj John N . Rentz interview with HistBr, still celebrated Washington's Birthday G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 29Nov51, in Iwo Com- and the Fourth of July ; on these occa- ments. 446 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

IWO JIMA (SULPHUR ISLANDS

Map 24 E . L . Wilson BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 447

exclusively from rain carefully collected land, to Tachiiwa Point, two miles to in concrete cisterns . At times, Iwo Jima the southeast, are steep and narrow with was supplied with potable water by many rocky shoals offshore . They bor- tankers. Some effort was also made to der terrain that rises sharply towards augment precious water supplies the northern plateau. Rough and broken through the distillation of sea water . ground is typical of all beaches on north- While the northern part of the island ern Iwo Jima, in numerous instances was hardly designed to become a tourist with cliffs that drop off sharply towards attraction, the southern half of Iwo the water's edge . Beaches along the Jima was ugly beyond description . Near southwestern and southeastern shores the narrow southern tip of Iwo, domi- of the island vary in depth from 150 nating the entire island, stands Mount to 500 feet and generally are free from Suribachi, an extinct volcano, which rocks offshore . The terrain would be rises to an elevation of about 550 feet. level, rising gradually towards the in- To the north of Suribachi, inland from terior, if it were not for the existence the beaches, the ground terraces suc- of sand terraces created by the action cessively upward to form a broad table- of waves. These terraces, which differ land occupying most of the central sec- in height and width, are undergoing a tion of the island . The area between constant change depending on the surf the northern base of Suribachi and the and winds. Surf conditions at Iwo are dome-shaped northern plateau is cov- unfavorable, even under normal condi- ered by a deep layer of black, volcanic tions . The island does not possess any ash so soft and so much subject to drift- anchorage or other inlets to protect ing that even walking becomes a prob- ships from the fury of the sea . Steep lem. Wheeled vehicles cannot negotiate beaches bring breakers close to the such ground ; tracked vehicles can move shore, where they can mete out severe across it only with difficulty. punishment to small craft that are in- The northern plateau consists of sev- ward bound or beached. Winds hitting eral elevations ; the highest of these is the shore from the sea serve to increase Hill 382, located just east of Motoyama the fury of the waves . Airfield No . 2, halfway between Moto- The climate of Iwo Jima is subtropi- yama and Minami ; two other hills reach cal with a cool season extending from a height of 362 feet . Much of this ter- December through April and a warm rain consists of rough and rocky ground, season from May through November. interspersed with deep gorges and high Temperatures are moderate, with an ridges. Sulphur vapor permeates the average ranging between 63 and 70 de- entire area with a characteristic smell grees during the cool period and 73 of rotten eggs . The ground itself is hot through 80 degrees during spring, sum- in this part of the island ; the veils of mer, and autumn . Annual rainfall aver- vapor only serve to accentuate the im- ages 60 inches, with February the dri- pression of a ghostly landscape . est month and May the wettest . The beaches of Iwo Jima from Kitano The desolation of the island is further Point, the northernmost tip of the is- accentuated by the sparse vegetation. 448 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

A few coarse grasses and gnarled trees closest quarters on this inhospitable are engaged in a perennial struggle for island, be readily understood . survival . An officer in the Imperial Jap- JAPANESE DEFENSIVE anese Army, formerly stationed on Iwo, PREPARATIONS IN THE has described it as an "island of sulphur, BONIN-VOLCANO ISLANDS(; no water, no sparrow, and no swallow."4 Japanese military interest in the Vol- The only living thing on Iwo, aside from cano-Bonin Islands first arose in 1914, the Japanese, was a bird resembling the coincident to the outbreak of World American rail, a wading bird related to War I. Even though the Japanese home the cranes, but of medium size . islands were never threatened during The above description of Iwo Jima, that war, which Japan entered on the hardly complimentary in essence, may side of the Allies, a few defenses were easily give rise to the question how an prepared on Chichi Jima, an island in island of such poor proportions could the Bonin-Volcano Group about 175 assume the strategic importance that miles north-northeast of Iwo Jima . On both the Japanese and Americans placed 10 August 1920, the Chichi Jima on it by the summer of 1944 . At least Branch, Army Fortification Department, one American, speaking to a Navy Chap- was formally established, followed by lain, expressed the sentiment that "after the construction of fortifications begin- God got through making the world, he ning in June 1921 . As a result of the must've took all the dirty ash and rub- Naval Arms Limitation Agreement, ble left over and made Iwo Jima ."5 Yet concluded on 6 February 1922, work on the island was destined to witness one the fortifications was halted.? Since all of the epic amphibious assaults of World of the action had occurred elsewhere, War II, followed by a month-long run- the Japanese garrison on Chichi Jima ning battle that cost the assault force led a peaceful existence and never fired heavily in men and equipment and at a shot in anger . the same time resulted in the complete During the postwar period and destruction of the enemy garrison . The factors that made this otherwise worth- 'Additional sources for this section include : less pile of rock and black sand such Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ; Richard F . a prize to friend and enemy alike, re- Newcomb, Iwo Jima (New York, Chicago, and quire a detailed explanation. Only then San Francisco : Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), hereafter Newcomb, Iwo Jima, quoted can the struggle between 23,000 Japa- with permission ; Richard F . Newcomb notes nese and an assault force initially of for Iwo Jima, hereafter Newcomb notes ; Heinl, 60,000 men, combatting each other at Soldiers of the Sea ; Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai! ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ; Capt Raymond Henri, et al, The U. S. Marines on 'Major Yoshitaka Horie, IJA, "Explanation Iwo Jima (Washington : The Infantry Journal, of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo 1945), hereafter Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima," dtd, 25Jan46. Jima . ' Capt Raymond Henri, USMC, Iwo Jima 'War History Office, Defense Agency of -Springboard to Final Victory (New York : Japan ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, U. S. Camera Publishing Corporation, 1945), dtd 21Aug69 in Iwo Comments, hereafter Jap- hereafter Henri, Springboard to Final Victory . anese Defense Agency Comment . BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 449

throughout the twenties and thirties, the duct an agonizing reappraisal of the status of Chichi Jima did not undergo military situation. All indications any appreciable change. Though a pointed to an American drive towards small garrison remained on the island, the Marianas and Carolines . To counter no additional installations were con- such a move, it became necessary to structed . On Iwo Jima, the presence of establish an inner line of defense ex- any military installation was even less tending generally northward from the conspicuous, though by 1937 a wooden Carolines to the Marianas, and from sign had been erected by the Imperial thence to the Volcano-Bonin Islands . Navy, bearing a legend in both Japanese In March 1944, the Thirty-First Army, and English, clearly cautioning the care- commanded by General Hideyoshi less trespasser from recording or photo- Obata, was activated for the purpose graphing such installations as he might of garrisoning this inner line . The com- encounter on the island. mander of the Chichi Jima garrison was At the time of the Japanese attack placed nominally in command of Army on Pearl Harbor an Army force of and Navy units in the Volcano-Bonin Is- about 3,700-3,800 men garrisoned Chichi lands. Jima. In addition, about 1,200 naval Following the American seizure of personnel manned the Chichi Jima most of the Marshalls, both Army and Naval Base, a small seaplane base, the Navy reinforcements were sent to Iwo radio and weather station, and various Jima. Five hundred men from the naval gunboat, subchaser, and minesweeping base at Yokosuka and an additional 500 units! On Iwo Jima, the Imperial from Chichi Jima reached Iwo during Navy had constructed an airfield about March and April 1944. At the same time, 2,000 yards northeast of Mount Suri- with the arrival of reinforcements from bachi. Initially stationed on this field Chichi Jima and the home islands, the were 1,500 naval aviation personnel and Army garrison on Iwo Jima had reached 20 aircraft.° a strength of over 5,000 men, equipped In the wake of the American seizure with 13 artillery pieces, 200 light and of the Marshalls and devastating air heavy machine guns, and 4,552 rifles ." attacks against Truk in the Carolines In addition, the defense boasted 14 during February 1944, the Japanese 120mm coast artillery guns, 12 heavy military leadership was forced to con- antiaircraft guns, and 30 25mm dual- mount antiaircraft guns ." Japanese Defense Agency Comment. The loss of the Marianas during the B To the Japanese, this first of two airstrips summer of 1944 greatly increased the on Iwo Jima to be completed prior to the importance of the Volcano-Bonins for American invasion was known alternately as Chidori Airfield or Motoyama Airfield No . 1. the Japanese, who were fully cognizant A second airfield, located about 2,000 yards northeast of the first one, in the very center 10 CinCPac-CinCPOA Item No . 9652, "A Re- of the island, was known to the Japanese as port from the Chief of Staff of the Thirty- Motoyama No. 2. A third airfield north of the First Army to the Chief of Staff, Central village of Motoyama was still under construc- Pacific Fleet," dtd 31May44 . 11 tion at the time of the American landings . I bid . 450 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS that the loss of these islands would tactics. Even the suicidal attacks by small facilitate American air raids against the groups of our Army and Navy airplanes, the surprise attacks by our submarines, and home islands . Such raids, beyond any the actions of parachute units, although doubt, would raise havoc with the entire effective, could be regarded only as a stra- Japanese war production program, and tegical ruse on our part. It was a most deal a severe blow to civilian morale . depressing thought that we had no avail- Final Japanese plans for the defense able means left for the exploitation of the strategical opportunities which might of the Volcano-Bonins were oversha- from time to time occur in the course of dowed by the fact that the Imperial these operations ." Navy had already lost most of its naval Even before the fall of Saipan in June strength and no longer constituted a 1944, Japanese planners knew that Iwo major factor in frustrating possible Jima would have to be reinforced American landings . Moreover, aircraft materially if it were to the held for any losses throughout 1944 had been so length of time, and preparations were heavy that, even if war production was made to send sizable numbers of men not materially slowed by American air and quantities of materiel to that island . attacks, combined Japanese air strength In late May, Lieutenant General Tada- was not expected to increase to 3,000 michi Kuribayashi was summoned to aircraft until March or April of 1945 . the office of the Prime Minister, Gen- Even then, these planes could not be eral Hideki Tojo, who informed the used from bases in the home islands general that he had been chosen to against Iwo Jima because their range defend Iwo Jima to the last . Kuri- did not exceed 550 miles ; besides, all bayashi was further apprised of the available aircraft had to be hoarded for importance of this assignment when possible use on Formosa and adjacent Tojo pointed out that the eyes of the islands where land bases were available entire nation were focused on the de- in close proximity .12 fense of Iwo . Fully aware of the impli- In a postwar study, Japanese staff cations of the task entrusted to him, officers described the strategy applied the general accepted . By 8 June, Kuri- in the defense of Iwo Jima in the follow- bayashi was on his way to his toughest ing terms and final assignment, determined to In the light of the above situation, see- ing that it was impossible to conduct our convert Iwo Jima into an invincible air, sea, and ground operations on Iwo fortress that would withstand any type Island toward ultimate victory, it was de- of attack from any quarter . cided that in order to gain time necessary The Japanese could hardly have for the preparation of the Homeland de- selected an individual better qualified fense, our forces should rely solely upon . As a the established defensive equipment in to lead the defense of Iwo Jima that area, checking the enemy by delaying member of a Samurai family, the 54- year-old Kuribayashi already had a "USA, FEC, HistDiv, "Operations in the distinguished military career behind him Central Pacific"-Japanese Studies in World at the time he received the Iwo as- War II (Japanese Monograph No . 48, OCMH), p. 62 . 13 Ibid. BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 451

signment. In the 30 years in which he aircraft carriers under the command had served the Empire, the general had of Rear Admiral Joseph J . Clark, un- seen much of the world . During the late leashed their first strike against the twenties, as a captain, Kuribayashi had Bonins, which resulted in the destruc- spent two years in the United States tion of 10 Japanese fighters in the air performing attache duties . In the course and a possible 70 planes on the ground of his travels in America, he gained a in two days of operations . In addition, keen appreciation of American eco- 21 seaplanes were destroyed on Chichi nomic power, as expressed in a letter Jima. On 24 June 1944, the American to his wife carriers under Admiral Clark again The United States is the last country in struck at Iwo. This time, 80 Japanese the world that Japan should fight . Its fighters rose to challenge the intruders . industrial potentiality is huge and fabu- When the smoke of battle over Iwo lous, and the people are energetic and versatile. One must never underestimate cleared nearly half of the Japanese the American's fighting ability." fighters had been destroyed . One of the Japanese fighter pilots who survived the Following his travels in the New fierce dogfights over Iwo Jima that day World, Kuribayashi served in the Japa- commented nese cavalry. In August 1936, as a lieu- The loss of forty planes and pilots in a tenant colonel, he commanded a cavalry single action staggered me . Equally dis- regiment. For the next two years, by turbing was the sight of our inexperienced then a colonel, he served in the Ministry pilots falling in flames, one after the other, of War. In 1940, he was promoted to as the Hellcats blasted our outmoded Zeros brigadier general and given command of from the Sky. How much like Lae the battle had been! Except that now the a cavalry brigade . Following the Pearl obsolescent planes were Zeros, and the in- Harbor attack, he participated in the experienced pilots were Japanese . The war occupation of Hong Kong as chief of had run full circle .16 staff of the Twenty-Third Army . In The loss of the 40 sorely needed fight- 1943, General Kuribayashi, by then a ers on 24 June was not the only disaster major general, was recalled to Tokyo, that befell Rear Admiral Teiichi Mat- where he commanded the Imperial sunaga, commanding the Japanese naval Guards until his appointment as com- forces on Iwo. Not one of 20 torpedo mander of the Iwo Jima Garrison.15 bombers he sent out against the Amer- General Kuribayashi arrived on Iwo ican carriers returned to the island . Jima between 8 and 10 June . As a A third wave of 41 aircraft dispatched result, he was on the island when TG against the task force not only failed to 58.1 and TG 58 .4, consisting of seven inflict any damage on the carriers, but in the process nearly half of the Japanese " Tadamichi Kuribayashi ltr to Yoshii Kuri- planes were shot out of the sky . bayashi, as cited in Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. On the evening of 2 July, Japanese 8-9. 1 For a detailed breakdown of General Kuri- radio monitors on Iwo Jima noted a bayashi's military assignments, see Japanese sudden increase in their adversary's Defense Agency Comment ; Hayashi and Coox, Koqun. " Sakai, Caidin, and Saito, Samurai!, p . 213 . 452 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS radio traffic. Though the Japanese were proved no match for the intercepting unable to decipher the code, the strength fighters. The slow, sluggish Japanese of the signals indicated to experienced bombers, heavily loaded with their tor- monitors that an American force was pedoes, were shot down one after the in fairly close proximity to Iwo Jima . other by the attacking Hellcats . One of Early the following morning, American the few Japanese pilots to survive this carrier-based aircraft once again raided action reported that in less than a min- the island. While the 40 Japanese ute seven of the bombers had been fighters remaining on Iwo took to the destroyed by American fighters . Late on air to intercept the attacking American 5 July, four dispirited Japanese fighter planes and soon became engaged in pilots and one bomber pilot returned to heavy dogfights, a squadron of bom- Iwo. bers pounced on the island and bombed In addition to the annihilation of the airstrip in five waves. Not a single virtually all Iwo-based aircraft, another fighter opposed them, since all of the ordeal was in store for the Japanese Zeros had been diverted by the Amer- garrison. On the day following the un- ican fighters. At the end of the day it successful bombing mission, a U .S. became apparent that once again the naval force boldly appeared within sight Japanese had lost half of their remain- of the island and subjected the Japa- ing fighters, which left only 20 of the nese to a naval bombardment from original 80 . The air battle over Iwo point-blank range . What it felt like to continued on 4 July . At the end of the be on the receiving end of such a bom- day, only nine Zeros, most of them badly bardment has been recorded by one of damaged, returned to Iwo. This left the Japanese : Japanese aviation on the island with For two days we cowered like rats, try- nine damaged fighters and eight tor- ing to dig ourselves deeper into the acrid pedo bombers which had somehow volcanic dust and ash of Iwo Jima . Never escaped the holocaust in their revet- have I felt so helpless, so puny, as I did ments. during those two days . There was nothing we could do, there was no way in which On the following day, this remnant we could strike back. The men screamed of Japanese naval aviation on Iwo was and cursed and shouted, they shook their dispatched on a final mission : to seek fists and swore revenge, and too many of out the American naval task force and them fell to the ground, their threats choking on the blood which bubbled destroy as many carriers as possible. through great gashes in their throats. Vir- The fighter pilots were admonished to tually every last structure on Iwo Jima stay with the eight torpedo bombers and was torn to splintered wreckage. Not a avoid combat with intercepting Ameri- building stood. Not a tent escaped . Not can fighters at all costs. It was made even the most dismal shack remained standing. Everything was blown to bits . clear to both fighter and bomber pilots The four fighter planes which had re- that they were engaged in a one-way turned from our last sortie were smashed mission from which they were not ex- by shells into flaming pieces of junk" pected to return . When the attack force approached Admiral Clark's carriers it " I bid., p. 235 . BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 453

For several days the survivors of the time, faithful to the doctrine that an bombardment remained in a state of invasion had to be met practically at shock from their ordeal and frantic calls the water's edge, Obata had ordered for reinforcements went out in view of the emplacement of artillery and the what appeared to be an imminent in- construction of pillboxes near the vasion of the island . When several Japa- beaches. General Kuribayashi had dif- nese transport ships appeared on the ferent ideas . Instead of a futile effort to horizon, the garrison rejoiced, only to hold the beaches, he planned to defend fall into deeper gloom and frustration the latter with a sprinkling of auto- when American submarines torpedoed matic weapons and infantry. Artillery, these ships before their very eyes . Look- mortars, and rockets would be emplaced outs posted atop Mount Suribachi scan- on the foot and slopes of Mount Suri- ned the ocean for signs of the approach- bachi, as well as in the high ground ing invasion fleet, and false alarms were to the north of Chidori airfield . frequent. A prolonged defense of the island Much to the surprise of the Japanese required the preparation of an extensive garrison on Iwo, an American invasion system of caves and tunnels, for the of the island did not materialize during naval bombardment had clearly shown the summer of 1944 . There was little that surface installations could not doubt that in time the Americans would withstand extensive shelling . To this be compelled to attack the island . Gen- end, mining engineers were dispatched eral Kuribayashi, who had personally from Japan to draw blueprints for witnessed Admiral Clark's second air projected underground fortifications strike against Iwo, as well as the naval that would consist of elaborate tunnels bombardment in early July, was more at varying levels to assure good ventila- determined than ever to exact the tion and minimize the effect of bombs heaviest possible price for Iwo when or shells exploding near the entrances the invaders came. Without naval and or exits. air support, it was a foregone conclusion At the same time, reinforcements that Iwo could not hold out indefinitely were gradually beginning to reach the against an invader possessing both island. As commander of the 109th naval and air supremacy. Infantry Division, General Kuribayashi As a first step in readying Iwo for decided first of all to shift the 2d In- a prolonged defense, the island com- dependent Mixed Brigade, consisting of mander ordered the evacuation of all about 5,000 men under Major General civilians from the island . This was ac- Kotau Osuga, from Chichi to Iwo . With complished by late July . Next came an the fall of Saipan, 2,700 men of the overall plan for defense of the island. 145th Infantry Regiment, commanded Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata, by Colonel Masuo Ikeda, were diverted Commanding General of the Thirty- to Iwo . These reinforcements, who First Army, early in 1944 had been reached the island during July and responsible for the defense of Iwo prior August 1944, brought the strength of to his return to the Marianas . At the the garrison up to approximately 12,700 454 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

men. Next came 1,233 members of the 25mm antiaircraft guns and 69 37mm 204th Naval Construction Battalion, and 47mm antitank guns . The fire power who quickly set to work constructing of the artillery was further sup- concrete pillboxes and other fortifica- plemented with a variety of rockets tions. varying from an eight-inch type that On 10 August, Rear Admiral Toshi- weighed 200 pounds and could travel nosuka Ichimaru reached Iwo, shortly between 2,000-3,000 yards, to a giant followed by 2,216 naval personnel, in- 550-pound projectible that had a range cluding naval aviators and ground of more than 7,500 yards .20 Altogether, crews." The admiral, a renowned Japa- 70 rocket guns and their crews reached nese aviator, had been crippled in an Iwo Jima. As a result of American at- airplane crash in the mid-twenties tacks against Japanese shipping, a num- and, ever since the outbreak of the war, ber of artillery pieces were lost . Others had chafed under repeated rear echelon reached Iwo, but their crews, travelling assignments . More than pleased with on other ships, drowned en route . In finally having been granted a combat several instances, guns and crews ar- assignment, Ichimaru penned a poem rived intact, only to discover that vital which began optical sights, shipped on other vessels, Grateful to his Majesty for giving me had been lost . Large shipments of barbed A chance to fight on the foremost front . wire, essential for the defense of Iwo, I depart with buoyant heart, never reached the island ; the ships car- Filled with joy and exultation . rying this vital commodity were sunk Next to arrive on Iwo were artillery en route. units and five antitank battalions . Even In order to further strengthen the though numerous supply ships on route Iwo defenses, the 26th Tank Regiment, to Iwo Jima were sunk by American which had been stationed at Pusan, submarines and aircraft, substantial Korea after extended service in Man- quantities of materiel did reach Iwo churia, received orders for Iwo . The during the summer and autumn of 1944 . officer commanding this regiment was By the end of the year, General Kuri- Lieutenant Colonel Baron Takeichi bayashi had available to him 361 artil- Nishi. Like Kuribayashi, he was a lery pieces of 75mm or larger caliber, cavalryman, had travelled extensively a dozen 320mm mortars, 65 medium abroad, and in the 1932 Olympics at Los (150mm) and light (81mm) mortars, Angeles had won a gold medal in the 33 naval guns 80mm or larger, and 94 equestrian competitions. The regiment, antiaircraft guns 75mm or larger . In consisting of 600 men and 28 tanks, addition to this formidable array of sailed from Japan in mid-July on board large caliber guns, the Iwo defenses could boast of more than 200 20mm and "Information on the Japanese artillery buildup on Iwo Jima was compiled from data 'For a breakdown of Japanese naval units contained in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 152-45, on Iwo Jima, see Japanese Defense Agency dtd 1Jul45, pp . 38, 76, 80, 84 ; CinCPac-CPOA Comment. Bul No . 6-45, Supplmt 4, dtd 4Jun45 ; VAC 1° Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 14. IntelR pt, Iwo Jima, p . 18 . BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 455 the Nisshu Maru. As the ship, sailing in the Western Carolines, also awaiting in a convoy, approached Chichi Jima American invasion, had turned the im- on 18 July 1944, it was torpedoed by an provement of natural caves into an art, American submarine, the USS Cobia. the defenders of Iwo literally developed Even though only two members of the it into a science . Because of the impor- 26th Tank Regiment failed to survive tance of the underground positions, 25 the sinking, all of the regiment's 28 percent of the garrison was detailed to tanks went to the bottom of the sea . tunneling . Positions constructed under- It would be December before these tanks ground ranged in size from small caves could be replaced, but 22 finally reached for a few men to several underground Iwo Jima. Initially, Colonel Nishi had chambers capable of holding 300 or 400 planned to employ his armor as a type men. In order to prevent personnel of "roving fire brigade," to be com- from becoming trapped in any one ex- mitted at focal points of combat. The cavation, the subterranean installations rugged terrain precluded such employ- were provided with multiple entrances ment and in the end, under the colonel's and exits, as well as stairways and watchful eyes, the tanks were deployed interconnecting passageways . Special in static positions . They were either attention had to be paid to providing buried or their turrets were dismounted adequate ventilation, since sulphur and so skillfully emplaced in the rocky fumes were present in many of the ground that they were practically in- underground installations . Fortunately visible from the air or from the ground . for the Japanese, most of the volcanic For the remainder of 1944, the con- stone on Iwo was so soft that it could struction of fortifications on Iwo also be cut with hand tools . went into high gear . The Japanese were General Kuribayashi established his quick to discover that the black volcanic command post in the northern part of ash that existed in abundance all over the island, about 500 yards northeast of the island could be converted into con- Kita village and south of Kitano Point . crete of superior quality when mixed This installation, 75 feet underground, with cement. Pillboxes near the consisted of caves of varying sizes, con- beaches north of Mount Suribachi were nected by 500 feet of tunnels. Here the constructed of reinforced concrete, many island commander had his own war- of them with walls four feet thick . At room in one of three small concrete- the same time, an elaborate system of enclosed chambers ; the two similar caves, concrete blockhouses, and pill- rooms were used by the staff . A com- boxes was established . One of the results munications blockhouse protruded above of American air attacks and naval the ground level . This structure was bombardment in the early summer of 150 feet long, 70 feet wide ; the roof had 1944 had been to drive the Japanese so a thickness of 10 feet with walls five deep underground that eventually their feet wide . The blockhouse was manned defenses became virtually immune to air by 70 radio operators who worked in or naval bombardment . shifts. While the Japanese on Peleliu Island Farther south on Hill 382, the second 456 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

highest elevation on the island, the Marines landed on Iwo Jima, more than Japanese constructed a radio and 11 miles of tunnels had been completed .23 weather station . Nearby, on an elevation A supreme effort was required of the just southeast of the station, an enor- Japanese personnel engaged in the un- mously large blockhouse was constructed derground construction work. Aside which served as the headquarters of from the heavy physical labor, the men Colonel Chosaku Kaido, who commanded were exposed to heat varying from 90 all artillery on Iwo Jima. Other hills in to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, as well as the northern portion of the island were sulphur fumes that forced them to wear tunnelled out . All of these major ex- gas masks. In numerous instances a cavations featured multiple entrances work detail had to be relieved after and exits and were virtually invulner- only five minutes. When renewed Amer- able to damage from artillery or aerial ican air attacks struck the island on 8 bombardment. Typical of the thorough- December 1944 and thereafter became ness employed in the construction of a daily occurrence until the actual in- subterranean defenses was the main vasion of the island, a large number of communications center south of Kita men had to be diverted to repairing the village, which was so spacious that it damaged airfields . contained a chamber 150 feet long and While Iwo Jima was being converted 70 feet wide. This giant structure was into a major fortress with all possible similar in construction and thickness speed, General Kuribayashi formulated of walls and ceilings to General Kuri- his final plans for the defense of the bayashi's command post . A 500-foot- island. This plan, which constituted a long tunnel 75 feet below the ground led radical departure from the defensive into this vast subterranean chamber .21 tactics used by the Japanese earlier in Perhaps the most ambitious construc- the war, provided for the following tion project to get under way was the major points : creation of an underground passage- a. In order to prevent disclosing their way designed to link all major defense positions to the Americans, Japanese installations on the island . As projected, artillery was to remain silent during the this passageway was to have attained expected prelanding bombardment. No a total length of almost 17 miles . Had fire would be directed against the Amer- it been completed, it would have linked ican naval vessels . the formidable underground installa- b. Upon landing on Iwo Jima, the tions in the northern portion of Iwo Americans were not to encounter any Jima with the southern part of the is- opposition on the beaches. land, where the northern slope of Mount c. Once the Americans had advanced Suribachi alone harbored several thou- about 500 yards inland, they were to be sand yards of tunnels .22 By the time the taken under the concentrated fire of automatic weapons stationed in the vi- cinity of Motoyama airfield to the north, ' POW Interrogation Rpt, Iwo Jima, 3d MarDiv G-2 Language See, dtd 2Mar45 . " VAC C-2 Rpt, End H . = Japanese Defense Agency Comment, BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 457 as well as automatic weapons and artil- firepower-disposed appropriately on lery emplaced both on the high ground the terrain and behind man-made to the north of the landing beaches and works-that the initial disparity of Mount Suribachi to the south . forces became equalized to the point of d. After inflicting maximum possible eventually permitting the defense force casualties and damage on the landing to go over to the offensive . force, the artillery was to displace north- As far as the objective in defending ward from the high ground near the Iwo Jima was concerned, General Kuri- Chidori airfield. bayashi's plan adhered closely to the In this connection, Kuribayashi stres- prevalent doctrine . It was the manner sed once again that he planned to of execution that aroused the displeasure conduct an elastic defense designed to of some of his subordinates, for during wear down the invasion force. Such the period following the American cap- prolonged resistance naturally required ture of Guadalcanal and up until the end the defending force to stockpile rations of the fighting on Saipan, it had become and ammunition. To this end the island almost standard procedure for the Japa- commander accumulated a food reserve nese to defend the beaches in an at- to last for two and a half months, ever tempt to drive the invader back into the mindful of the fact that the trickle of sea. Once the position of the defending supplies that was reaching Iwo Jima force on an island had become unten- during the latter part of 1944 would able, a brave banzai charge, in which cease altogether once the island was sur- the defenders sought victory in death, rounded by a hostile naval force . usually terminated all organized resist- Opposition to General Kuribayashi's ance. Kuribayashi's intent of conserv- unorthodox defense plan, which reflected ing his manpower and not staking all on changes in earlier Japanese military a defense of the beaches or futile banzai doctrine, was not long in developing. It charges was the epitome of the revised must be noted that the defensive form Japanese doctrine, already employed at of combat in itself was distasteful to Biak in the Southwest Pacific, to some the Japanese, who early in the war had extent in the Palaus, and very ex- been loath to admit to themselves that tensively on Luzon in the Philippines . the Imperial Army would ever be forced The most vociferous opposition to to engage in this form of combat . In General Kuribayashi's plan of defense, fact, "so pronounced was their dislike strangely enough, came from his own for the defensive that tactical problems chief of staff, Colonel Shizuichi Hori, illustrating this type of combat were a former instructor at the Japanese extremely rare."24 According to stand- Military Academy. The latter was ard Japanese doctrine, the object of strongly supported by General Osuga, the defensive was to inflict on the commander of the 2d Independent Mixed superior hostile forces such losses by Brigade. In an unusual display of soli- darity between Army and Navy, Cap- u MillntelDiv, WD, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, TM-E 30-480 (Washington, tain Samaj i Inouye, commanding the 1944), p. 99. Naval Guard Force, sided wih the two 458 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Army dissidents. According to one tions and specified that personnel were source who was stationed on Iwo during to spend 70 percent of their time in the summer of 1944 training and 30 percent in construction Arguments raged in July, August, and work. September. Arguments were not confined Despite intermittent harassment by to Iwo command alone, but taken to American submarines and aircraft, ad- Tokyo's Army and Navy staffs . In August ditional personnel continued to arrive Tokyo asked Nazi German General Staff's opinion . Germany replied that waterfront on Iwo until February 1945 . By that repulse was unfeasible under overwhelm- time General Kuribayashi had under his ing American shelling and bombings ac- command a force totalling between cording to German experience . It was not 21,000 and 23,000 men, including both that German reply was the decisive fac- tor. But anyway, supporters of the water- Army and Navy units .° front idea gradually dwindled . Kuriba- General Kuribayashi made several yashi made some compromise and the hot changes in his basic defense plan in the arguments ended in September . months preceding the American in- Finally, in December 1944, General vasion of Iwo Jima . The final stra- Kuribayashi decided to restore unity to tagem, which became effective in his command. He dismissed Colonel Hori January 1945, called for the creation as chief of staff of the 109th Division of strong, mutually supporting positions and replaced him with Colonel Tadashi which were to be defended to the death . Takaishi. General Osuga, commander of Neither large scale counterattacks, with- the 2d Independent Brigade, was suc- drawals, nor banzai charges were con- ceeded by Major General Sadasue Senda, templated. The southern portion of Iwo an experienced artilleryman who had in the proximity of Mount Suribachi seen combat in Manchuria and China . was organized into a semi-independent Altogether, a total of 18 officers were defense sector . Fortifications included replaced . casemated coast artillery and automatic During the final months of preparing weapons in mutually supporting pill- Iwo Jima for the defense, General Kuri- boxes. The narrow isthmus to the north bayashi saw to it that the strenuous of Suribachi was to be defended by a work of building fortifications did not small infantry force. On the other hand, interefere with the training of units . As an initial step towards obtaining more 20 Available sources disagree as to the exact time for training, he ordered work on strength of the Iwo Jima garrison . Bartley, in the northernmost airfield on the island Iwo Monograph, App VI, pp . 230-231, places halted. In an operations order issued in Japanese strength on 19Feb45 at 20,530- 21,060. Morehouse, in Iwo Jima Campaign, App early December, the island commander C, p. 159C, estimates enemy strength at set 11 February 1945 as the target date 21,000-22,000 . A Japanese postwar report for completion of defensive prepara- that mentions a figure of 17,500 Army and 5,500 Navy personnel is cited in Hayashi and Interview of Capt Tsunezo Wachi, IJN, For- Coox, Kogun, p . 137. Japanese postwar sources mer CO, Iwo Navy Garrison, from Feb-0ct44, place the total of Japanese troops on Iwo Jima by Fred Saito, 25Jan64, in Saito ltr to Richard at 20,933, consisting of 13,586 Army and 7,347 F. Newcomb, 25Jan64, p . 5, in Newcomb Notes. Navy. Japanese Defense Agency Comment . BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 459 this entire area was exposed to the fire assigned the job of filling the bomb of artillery, rocket launchers, and mor- craters with as many as 50 men detailed tars emplaced on Suribachi to the south to each bomb crater . The end of 1944 and the high ground to the north. saw American B-24 bombers over Iwo A main line of defense, consisting of Jima almost every night while U. S. mutually supporting positions in depth, Navy carriers and cruisers frequently extended from the northwestern part of sortied into the Bonins . On 8 December, the island to the southeast, along a gen- American aircraft dropped more than eral line from the cliffs to the north- 800 tons of bombs on Iwo Jima, which west, across Motoyama Airfield No . 2 to shook the Japanese up but did very Minami village . From there it continued little real damage to the island defenses . eastward to the shoreline just south of Even though frequent air raids inter- Tachiiwa Point. (See Map 25) . The en- fered with the Japanese defensive prep- tire line of defense was dotted with pill- arations and robbed the garrison of boxes, bunkers, and blockhouses . Colonel much badly needed sleep, progress of the Nishi's immobilized tanks, carefully dug work was not materially slowed . in and camouflaged, further reinforced Despite the air raids, which became this fortified area, whose strength was a daily occurrence in December, and supplemented by the broken terrain . A increasing isolation from the homeland, second line of defense extended from a morale remained high among members few hundred yards south of Kitano of the Iwo garrison . Japanese national Point at the very northern tip of Iwo holidays, such as the birthday of across the still uncompleted Airfield No . Emperor Meiji on 11 February, were 3, to Motoyama village, and then to the celebrated with rice cake and an extra area between Tachiiwa Point and the ration of sake. At the same time, the East Boat Basin . This second line con- Iwo Jima defenders, gathered in small tained fewer man-made fortifications, groups near their battle stations, but the Japanese took maximum advan- listened to a Tokyo broadcast in which tage of natural caves and other terrain a song, especially dedicated to the features . defense of Iwo, was released to the pub- As an additional means of protecting lic. Many of the men wore white head- the two completed airfields on Iwo from bands, similar to the ones worn by direct assault, the Japanese constructed kamikaze pilots, to demonstrate their a number of antitank ditches near the determination to die in defense of the fields and mined all natural routes of island. Inside the pillboxes, for all to approach. When, on 2 January, more see and burn into their minds, were than a dozen B-24 bombers raided Air- copies of the "Courageous Battle Vow," field No . 1 and inflicted heavy damage, which pledged all to dedicate themselves Kuribayashi diverted more than 600 to the defense of Iwo, and to fight to the men, 11 trucks, and 2 bulldozers for im- last with any and all weapons at hand . mediate repairs . As a result, the airfield The pledge appropriately ended with again became operational after only 12 the following words hours. Eventually, 2,000 men were Each man will make it his duty to kill 460 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

JAPANESE DEFENSE SECTORS

Map 25 E L . Wilson BACKGROUND TO DETACHMENT 461

ten of the enemy before dying. Until we one month later, Japanese radio oper- are destroyed to the last man, we shall ators on Iwo reported to the island com- harass the enemy by guerrilla tactics?' mander that code signals of American As early as 5 January 1945, Admiral aircraft had undergone an ominous Ichimaru conducted a briefing of naval change . On the 13th, a Japanese naval personnel at his command post in which patrol plane spotted 170 American ships he informed them of the destruction of moving northwestward from Saipan. the Japanese Fleet at Leyte, loss of the All Japanese troops in the Bonin Islands Philippines, and the expectation that were alerted and occupied their battle Iwo would shortly be invaded . Exactly positions. On Iwo Jima, preparations for the pending battle had been com- 2`4th MarDiv Translations, Iwo Jima, 24- pleted, and the defenders were ready. Feb45 . CHAPTER 2

Offensive Plans and Preparations'

Preliminary planning for the seizure operation in July brought the continua- of an objective in the Volcano-Bonin tion of operations in the Central Pacific Islands began as early as September into sharper focus . In a conference held 1943, when the Joint War Plans Com- in Washington by top echelon U . S . mil- mittee, a planning agency of the Joint itary leaders from 13-22 July 1944, the Chiefs of Staff, advocated such a move .2 senior members of the Joint War Plans However, because of impending military Committee presented to the Joint Chiefs operations in the Gilberts, Marshalls, the possible courses of action in con- and Marianas no further preparation for tinuing the war against Japan . Plans any operations against the Bonins were for the bombing of the Japanese home made until the summer of 1944 . The islands figured prominently in these successful completion of the Saipan discussions . In this connection, the use of the Marianas as a base for long- 'Unless otherwise noted, the material in this range bombers was again discussed, as chapter is derived from : USPacF1t OpO 1-45, well as the need for seizing the Bonins dtd 10Jan45 ; Fifth Flt OPlan No . 13-44, dtd to facilitate such air operations .3 31Dec44 ; ComPhibPac OPlan A25-44, dtd In the course of a visit to Hawaii 8Dec44 ; CinCPOA OPlan 11-44, dtd 25Nov44 ; VAC OPlan 3-44, dtd 23Dec44 ; TF 51 OPlan in mid-July 1944, Admiral Ernest J . A25-44, dtd 27Dec44 ; TF 52 OPlan A101-45, King discussed with Admiral Chester dtd 1Jan45 ; VAC AR, Iwo Jima, Anx A, W. Nimitz some of the decisions which OPlan (Alt) 4-44, dtd 31Dec44, and OPlans the Joint Chiefs had reached . He ap- and Orders, 20Feb-22Mar45 ; 4th MarDiv prised Nimitz of the fact that the OPlan 49-44, Iwo Jima, dtd 26Dec44 ; 4th MarDiv OPlan 50-44, Iwo Jima, dtd 4Jan45 ; Army Air Forces had been ordered to 5th MarDiv OPlan 2-44, Iwo Jima, dtd 31- set up four B-29 groups in the Marianas Dec44 ; 3d MarDiv OPlan 1-45, Iwo Jima, dtd for long-range bombing . In time, 12 22Jan45 ; Iwo Comments ; Craven and Cate, groups of B-29s were to be based in The Pacific ; Robert A. Aurthur and Kenneth the Marianas . In this connection, King Cohlmia, The Third Marine Division (Wash- ington : Infantry Journal Press, 1948), here- brought up the desirability of estab- after Aurthur and Cohlmia, The Third Marine lishing bases in the Bonins to furnish Division ; Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division ; fighter escorts for the B-29s . With oper- Howard M. Conner, The Spearhead-The World War II History of the Fifth Marine Division (Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 'Early planners for operations against Iwo 1950), hereafter Conner, The Fifth Marine Jima and Chichi Jima referred to these islands Division. as being part of the Bonin Islands even though 'JWPC 91/D, dtd 13Sep43, "Seizure of the they are actually located in the Volcano Bonins," in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 19. Group . 462 OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 463 ations in the Carolines and the Philip- China under the Army Air Forces XX pines scheduled within the next few Bomber Command. This command, for months, both naval commanders felt all practical purposes, constituted an that no forces should be diverted to the experimental organization, designed to Bonins at this time. Nevertheless, King serve as a prototype for similar units instructed Nimitz to prepare plans for to be activated later . Its mission was an assault against the Bonins, although three-fold : to test the B-29 under com- he considered such an operation unwise bat conditions ; to formulate and refine unless it was shortly followed by an a tactical doctrine ; and to perfect the invasion of Japan. administrative structure to support the Planning for an amphibious assault B-29 strikes. By mid-October 1944, against the Bonins was inextricably in- China-based B-29s had flown a total of terwoven with the development of the 10 missions against a variety of indus- B-29 long-range bomber of the U . S. trial targets ranging from Bangkok in Army Air Forces, and for this reason southeast Asia to Manchuria and the an explanation of the development and home islands. characteristics of this aircraft appear Meanwhile, the progress of the Amer- warranted. The B-29 had its origin in ican offensive in the Central Pacific had 1939, when General H . H. Arnold, then resulted in the capture of the Marianas . Chief of the Army Air Corps, ordered Preparations got under way for a sus- the experimental development of a four- tained bomber offensive against the engine bomber with a range of 2,000 home islands by Marianas-based B-29s . miles. As eventually developed, the B-29 It was anticipated that the first airfield or "Superfortress" had a wing span of in the Marianas capable of accommodat- slightly more than 141 feet, a length of ing the big B-29s would be operational 99 feet, and four Wright engines with by October 1944 . In connection with the turbo-superchargers developing 2,200 initiation of very long-range bombing horsepower each at sea level . The giant of the Japanese home islands from bomber was armed with a dozen .50 cal- B-29 bases in the Marianas, the Vol- iber machine guns and a 20mm cannon cano-Bonin Islands, situated halfway mounted in the tail . The B-29 had a between the Marianas and Tokyo, as- service ceiling of 38,000 feet and near sumed major strategic importance . As that altitude had a maximum speed of part of this island group, Iwo Jima 361 miles per hour . Without a load, the appeared the logical choice for invasion aircraft was estimated to have a range because it was the only island suitable of 4,400 miles ; it could move 3,500 miles for the construction of airfields of suffi- when carrying a bomb load of four cient size to handle the new Super- tons 4 fortresses. In this connection, it was During the latter half of 1944, about not intended to use Iwo as a base or 100 B-29s operated from airfields in staging area for the B-29s, but as a forward air station from which fighters could fly escort missions for the big ' Craven and Cate, The Pacific, pp. 8-9 . bombers. At the same time, crippled 464 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

B-29s limping back from raids over against the Volcano-Bonin Islands with Japan would be able to make emergency a target date of mid-April 1945 . It was landings on the island instead of ditch- estimated that three divisions would be ing into the Pacific . Even while the required for these operations .' While battle for Saipan was in full swing, 500 planning an invasion of Formosa, Ad- of the giant bombers were ready for miral Nimitz also was attracted to the combat. Volcano-Bonin Islands. In September As increasing attention focused on 1944, he informed Lieutenant General bases in the Marianas, the strategic im- Holland M. Smith, Commanding Gen- portance of the B-29 bases in China eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, that waned . As early as September 1944, the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions should General Arnold had seriously consid- be retained in the Marianas as an area ered transferring the XX Bomber Com- reserve for Formosa . In addition, they mand to a more profitable site. Japanese were to make up the bulk of the landing gains in China ultimately forced the force once an attack was mounted abandonment of the B-29 bases and against Iwo Jima . transfer of the B-29 combat groups and By this time, key service command- their supporting units to the Marianas . ers were beset by serious doubts with In July 1944, the Army Air Forces respect to a major operation against advised the Joint Staff Planners that Formosa. Lieutenant General Millard F . Iwo was a potential base for fighter Harmon, Commanding General, Army planes, since Tokyo would be within the Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, advo- range of P-51 Mustangs based on Iwo .5 cated that Formosa be bypassed in On 12 August, the Joint War Plans favor of the Volcano-Bonins and Ryu- Committee recommended the seizure of kyus. His superior, Lieutenant General the Volcano-Bonins, listing as major Robert C . Richardson, Jr ., Command- reasons their availability for bases from ing General, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean which fighter cover could be provided to Areas, likewise failed to see any advan- support the air effort against Japan ; tage in seizing Formosa and expressed denial of these strategic outposts to the himself in favor of advancing through enemy ; furnishing air defense bases for the Nanpo Shoto . Admiral Nimitz felt American positions in the Marianas ; that the capture of Formosa could serve and providing fields for staging heavy a useful purpose only if it was a pre- bombers against Japan.6 liminary step towards subsequent land- In a study of naval personnel require- ings on a coast of China, where recent ments prepared by the Joint Planning Japanese military gains made such a Staff in late August 1944, a list of pro- move of questionable value . jected operations included an assault Despite an increasing rejection of Formosa as an invasion target by the AAF Memo to JPS, dtd 21Jul44, "Fighter military leaders concerned, Admiral Escort for VLR Bombers," in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 20. JLC 67/4m "Memorandum of Request, e JWPC 91/3, dtd 12Aug44, "Plan for the Naval Personnel Requirements," dtd 23Aug44, Seizure of the Bonins," as cited in Ibid. as cited in Ibid. OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 465

King, Commander in Chief of the U .S. reason for this change was that Lt .Gen. Fleet, consistently adhered to the pro- S. B . Buckner, U.S.A., Commander 10th Army, who was to command the Landing jected operation against that island, at Force for Formosa, said that he had in- least until early October 1944. However, sufficient Service Troops for an objective on 11 and 12 July, when Admirals King so large as Formosa ; but that he could and Nimitz visited Saipan, King asked take Okinawa . Admiral King, after con- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance what siderable discussion, was convinced of the objective he would recommend for his necessity for the change and so recom- mended to the JCS who approved it." next operation. Spruance replied that he would like to take Okinawa .' The Joint Chiefs of Staff lost little Admiral Spruance has described his time in issuing a new directive on 3 participation in the early planning and October ordering Admiral Nimitz to the final change of objectives in the provide fleet cover and support for Gen- following words eral MacArthur's forces in the oc- After the completion of the Marianas cupation of Luzon, scheduled for 20 Operation I turned my command over to December 1944 ; to occupy one or more Admiral Halsey on 28 August 1944 and positions in the Nanpo Shoto, with a returned to Pearl Harbor early in Sep- target date of 20 January 1945 ; and to tember. On reporting to Admiral Nimitz, occupy one or more positions in the he advised me that my next operation Nansei Shoto by 1 March 1945 .11 would be the capture of Formosa and Amoy. I said that I thought Iwo Jima, Subsequently, delays encountered in followed by Okinawa, would be preferable, operations in the Philippines affected but was told that the orders from Cominch planning for the Iwo Jima and Okinawa called for Formosa .' Operations, which were designated DE- Following this conversation, Admiral TACHMENT and ICEBERG, respec- Spruance went on leave . He was about tively. Target dates had to be readjusted to return to Pearl Harbor during the to 19 February for the Iwo operation, latter part of September, when he was and to 1 April for the invasion of Okin- ordered to attend a conference between awa. Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz On 7 October Admiral Nimitz and his which was to be held towards the end staff issued a staff study for preliminary of the month at San Francisco . Admiral planning, which clearly listed the objec- Spruance recalled the focal points of tives of Operation DETACHMENT . this meeting as follows The overriding purpose of the operation At this Conference Admiral Nimitz was to maintain unremitting military presented a paper-prepared, I believe, pressure against Japan and to extend by Captain Forrest Sherman, U.S.N., head American control over the Western Pa- of Fleet War Plans Division-recom- cific. In American hands, Iwo Jima mending the substitution of Iwo Jima and could be turned into a base from which Okinawa for Formosa and Amoy. The 10 Ibid. 'Admiral Raymond A . Spruance ltr to CMC, "JCS 713/19, 300ct44, "Future Operations dtd 5Jan52, in Iwo Comments . in the Pacific," in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, 0 I bid. p. 22. 466 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS we could attack the Japanese home is- chronicler of the Iwo Jima operation lands, protect our bases in the Mari- put it in the following words anas, cover our naval forces, conduct The team assigned to Iwo Jima was search operations of the approaches to superb-the very men who had perfected the amphibious techniques from Guadal- the Japanese home islands, and provide canal to Guam . . Nearly every problem, it fighter escort for very long-range op- was believed, had been met and mastered erations . Three tasks specifically en- along the way, from the jungles of visioned in the study were the reduction Guadalcanal up through the Solomons, of enemy naval and air strength and and across the Central Pacific from the bloody reefs of Tarawa to the mountains industrial facilities in the home is- of the Marianas ." lands ; the destruction of Japanese na- val and air strength in the Bonin For General Smith, who was 62 years Islands, and the capture, occupation, old, the Iwo Jima operation was to be and subsequent defense of Iwo Jima, his last . In mid-October 1944, Smith which was to be developed into an air issued a letter of instruction designat- base. ing Major General Harry Schmidt, On 9 October, General Holland Smith Commanding General, V Amphibious received the staff study, accompanied Corps, as Commander of the Landing by a directive from Admiral Nimitz Force, Task Group 56.1. General ordering the seizure of Iwo Jima. This Schmidt, 58 at the time, was a veteran directive designated specific command- of nearly 26 years of military service, ers for the operation . Admiral Spru- who had commanded the 4th Marine ance, Commander, Fifth Fleet, was Division during the invasion of Roi- placed in charge as Operation Com- Namur in the Marshalls and during mander, Task Force 50 . Under Spru- the Saipan operation in the Marianas . ance, Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Tur- His experienced staff, headed by Colonel ner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, William W. Rogers,14 was responsible Pacific, was to command the Joint for the preparation and execution of all Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51 . Landing Force plans for the operation . Second in command of the Joint Ex- When completed, plans for the execu- peditionary Force was Rear Admiral tion of the landing had to be submitted Harry W. Hill. General Holland Smith by the commander of the landing force was designated Commanding General, to General Smith for the latter's ap- Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56 . proval. On 20 October 1944, VAC re- It was not accidental that these men ceived a directive from FMFPac, as- were selected to command an operation signing troops to the corps for training, of such vital importance that it has planning, and operations. Initially, the since become known as "the classical amphibious assault of recorded his- "Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 27 . tory."12 All of them had shown their " Promoted to brigadier general for duty as mettle in previous engagements . One corps chief of staff about 1 Mar 1945. MajGen William W. Rogers ltr to HistBr, G-3 Div, " Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- HQMC, dtd 26Jun69 in Iwo Comments, here- phibious War, p . 432. after Rogers ltr. OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 467 corps was to be ready in all respects for took Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian . combat by 15 December . 15 When the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, The major units assigned to the Land- was organized after the capture of Sai- ing Force were the 3d, 4th, and 5th pan, General Erskine became Chief of Marine Divisions . The 3d Marine Divi- Staff of that organization . Promoted to sion had already distinguished itself on the rank of major general in October Bougainville in the Solomons and on 1944, he assumed command of the 3d Guam in the Marianas. While planning Marine Division at that time.'° for Operation DETACHMENT was in The 4th Marine Division, commanded progress during the late autumn of by Major Clifton B . Cates, also had seen 1944, the division was still reorganizing considerable action . During the invasion on Guam after the heavy fighting for of Roi-Namur in the Marshalls, it had that island and was actively engaged been the first Marine division to go di- in rounding up or dispatching Japanese rectly into combat from the United that continued to infest the island . At States.'7 In less than a year's time, the the age of 47, the division commander, division had taken part in three land- Major General Graves B . Erskine, was ings. In addition to the Roi-Namur oper- one of the youngest generals in the Ma- ation, the 4th had also made assault rine Corps with a well-established repu- landings on Tinian and Saipan. The tation for toughness. Joining the Ma- forthcoming invasion of Iwo Jima would rine Corps Reserve in 1917 as a second be the division's fourth landing in less lieutenant, Erskine had distinguished than 13 months. himself in France during World War I . General Cates had assumed command Following the war, he had seen service of the division on 12 July 1944, when in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nica- General Schmidt became the Command- ragua, and China. ing General of the V Amphibious Corps . At the time of the Pearl Harbor at- Cates already had a long and distin- tack, he served as Chief of Staff of the guished Marine Corps career behind Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet . In him, having served in France during 1942, he was assigned as Chief of Staff World War I as a company grade officer . of the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, During his 20 months of service with under Holland Smith, who was then a the 6th Marines he had been wounded major general . After taking part in the in action twice and had earned the amphibious training of Army troops Navy Cross, in addition to other decora- for the Kiska and Attu operations in tions. At Guadalcanal early in World the Aleutians, Erskine became Deputy War II, he had commanded the 1st Ma- Corps Commander and Chief of Staff of rines, one of the two assault regiments the V Amphibious Corps when it was or- that landed on the island. ganized in 1943 . He had an active part in planning the seizure of Tarawa and 19 For further details concerning the opera- accompanied the assault forces which tions of the 3d Marine Division and its com- manders, see Aurthur and Cohlmia, The Third 11 VAC AR, App 3 to Anx B, GenStaff Sec Marine Division . Rpts, dtd 31Mar45, p . 3. 17 Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division, p . 15. 468 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS In contrast to the 3d and 4th Marine rine Divisions found themselves in Divisions, the 5th Division had not seen Hawaii during the latter part of 1944 combat as a unit prior to the Iwo Jima was to have a favorable effect on joint operation . Organized at Camp Pendle- planning between the divisions . When ton, California, on 11 November 1943, General Schmidt moved VAC headquar- the division was commanded by Major ters to Pearl Harbor on 13 October, the General Keller E. Rockey. Like his major planning staffs concerned with counterparts in the 3d and 4th Marine Operation DETACHMENT, except for Divisions, General Rockey had seen the 3d Marine Division, now were func- combat action at Chateau Thierry in tioning close to each other, a circum- 1918. Even though the 5th Marine Divi- stance that resulted in better coordina- sion had no previous combat experience, tion of efforts . nearly half of the men comprising the Of the three divisions scheduled to unit had served with other combat participate in DETACHMENT, the 3d units. In speaking of the division after Marine Division was the only one still the end of World War II, General actively engaged in military operations Rockey made the following comment during the planning phase for Iwo From its earliest days to the hour of Jima. Even though Guam had been its disbandment, I found the 5th to possess officially declared secure by 10 August and maintain a high standard of military 1944, Marines continued to round up performance and an esprit exceptionally or annihilate stragglers until mid-De- fine . And when the 5th Division entered combat, it acted from the first hour like cember. The situation on Guam was not a unit of veterans . It fought that first without effect on the planning for Iwo fight with the utmost vigor, courage, and Jima and resulted in one of the changes intelligence1e in the basic operations plan . As General At the time that final plans and Holland Smith was to reminisce at a preparations for Operation DETACH- later time, with reference to the status MENT were being made, the 3d Marine of the 3d Marine Division Division was still stationed on Guam, It had been proposed to hold the division following the recent recapture of that in reserve, alerted at Guam. On further island. As commander of VAC, General study, I considered it much sounder for this division to arrive with the other Schmidt had also located his command troops in the target area on D-Day, avail- post on that island . The 4th Marine able as a floating reserve. This decision Division, upon completion of operations proved sound because we ran into a larger on Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas, garrison and far stronger defenses than had returned to its permanent camp we had anticipated ." site on Maui in Hawaii. In August 1944, General Schmidt issued the first blue- the 5th Marine Division had moved print for Operation DETACHMENT from California to Hawaii, where it on 19 October 1944, to be used as a underwent final training . The close guide by subordinate commanders. On proximity in which the 4th and 5th Ma- the following day, General Smith di- rected him to have the VAC ready for ' Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, Preface. 1B Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p . 242 . OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 469

Operation DETACHMENT by 15 De- with the 5th Division . The 3d Marine cember.2o Division was to stage on Guam and During the two remaining months of would remain as reserve on board ship 1944, VAC evolved tactical and logisti- in the objective area until D plus 3 . cal plans in joint conferences with all The VAC scheme of maneuver for commanders concerned . As increasing the landings was relatively simple . The intelligence became available, alternate 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were to plans were drafted and changes were land abreast on the eastern beaches, the incorporated into the original plan .L1 4th on the right and the 5th on the All commanders issued tentative drafts left. When released to VAC, the 3d Ma- of their respective operation plans, and rine Division, as Expeditionary Troops continual adjustments were made to Reserve, was to land over the same achieve maximum support with the beaches to take part in the attack or forces available and to organize the play a defensive role, whichever was most effective assault force possible . called for . The plan called for a rapid Planning remained flexible right up to exploitation of the beachhead with an D-Day, which itself was postponed twice advance in a northeasterly direction to because the naval forces required for capture the entire island . A regiment the invasion of Iwo Jima were still en- of the 5th Marine Division was desig- gaged in the Philippines . As a result, nated to capture Mount Suribachi in on 18 November D-Day was postponed the south.23 to 3 February 1945 ; on 6 December, an Since there was a possibility of un- additional postponement to 19 Febru- favorable surf conditions along the ary became necessary .22 eastern beaches, VAC issued an alter- When Admiral Spruance assumed nate plan on 8 January 1945, which command of all forces assigned to the provided for a landing on the western Central Pacific Task Force on 26 Janu- beaches. However, since predominant ary, CinCPOA Plan 11-44 was in full northerly or northwesterly winds caused effect. Designated for the beach assault hazardous swells almost continuously were the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along the southwest side of the island, less the 26th Marines, which was to be it appeared unlikely that this alternate held in Landing Force reserve. For plan would be put into execution .24 training purposes prior to the opera- The eastern beaches over which the tion, the 26th Marines would remain landings were to be made extended for about 3,500 yards northeastward from "For Task Organization of VAC Landing Mount Suribachi to the East Boat Basin . Force, see App G . (See Map 26) . For purposes of organi- 'Final drafts for Operation DETACH- zation and control of the invasion force, MENT were published on the following dates : these beaches were divided into seven CinCPOA OPlan 11-44, 25Nov44 ; VAC OPlan no. 3-44, 23Dec44 ; Joint Exped Force OPlan no. A25-44, 27Dec44 ; and ComFifthFlt OPlan VAC OPlan no. 3-44, dtd 23Dec44, in TF no. 13-44, 31Dec44 . 56 AR, Encl A, p. 5. TF 56 AR, Encl B, G-3 Rpt, Planning and "VAC OPlan no. 4-44, dtd 8Jan45, in TF Ops, Iwo, dtd 27Mar45. 56 AR, Encl A, p. 6. 470 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 471 500-yard segments, which, from left to then wheel northeastward and seize the right, were designated as Green, Red 1 0-1 Line. Action by the 27th and 28th and 2, Yellow 1 and 2, and Blue 1 and 2 . Marines was designed to drive the The 5th Marine Division, landing over enemy from the commanding heights Green, Red 1, and Red 2 beaches, was along the southern portion of Iwo, to advance straight across the island, simultaneously securing the flanks and which at this point formed a narrow rear of VAC. As far as the 4th Marine isthmus, until it reached the west coast . Division was concerned, the 23d Ma- At the same time, it was to hold along rines, commanded by Colonel Walter W . the, right, while part of the division Wensinger, was to go ashore on Yellow wheeled to the south to capture Mount 1 and 2 beaches, seize Motoyama Air- Suribachi . The 4th Marine Division had field No . 1, then turn to the northeast the specific mission of moving into the and seize that part of Motoyama Air- center of the isthmus, while its right field No . 2 and the 0-1 Line within its flank swerved to the north to seize zone of action . After landing on Blue Motoyama Plateau, the high ground Beach 1, the 25th Marines, under Colo- above the East Boat Basin . Unless this nel John R . Lanigan, was to assist in vital ground to the north of the invasion the capture of Airfield No . 1, the cap- beaches and Mount Suribachi to the ture of Blue Beach 2, and the 0-1 Line south-terrain features which over- within its zone of action . 25 The 24th looked the beaches and permitted the Marines, under Colonel Walter I . Jor- enemy to fire at the exposed Marines at dan, was to be held in 4th Marine Divi- will-were quickly seized, the landing sion reserve during the initial landings . force could be expected to take very The 26th Marines, led by Colonel heavy casualties . Chester B. Graham, was to be released Once the southern portion of Iwo from corps reserve on D-Day and pre- Jima had been secured, the two divi- pared to support the 5th Marine Divi- sions could join in a combined drive to sion. the north. At this time, the 3d Marine Division artillery was to go ashore Division, initially in Expeditionary Troop Reserve on board ships near the The initial VAC LanFor plan had called beachhead, could be disembarked and for the use of Blue Beach 2 as a landing landed to assist in maintaining the beach. Because of the proximity of Blue 2 to momentum of the VAC attack. the commanding high ground on the right, and in order to provide a safety factor while main- The detailed scheme of maneuver for taining adequate neutralization fires on this the landings provided for the 28th Ma- high ground during the landing, the 4th Ma- rines of the 5th Marine Division, com- rine Division had requested that the landing manded by Colonel Harry B . Liver- of the 25th Marines be limited to Blue 1 . This sedge, to land on the extreme left of the permission was granted, and the 25th Marines . On the right of the was ordered to land on Blue Beach 1 and seize corps on Green 1 Blue 2 as quickly as possible to enable suc- 28th Marines, the 27th, under Colonel ceeding units and supplies to use this beach . Thomas A. Wornham, was to attack 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Iwo Jima, dtd 18May45, towards the west coast of the island, Sec. I, p . 2. 472 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS on order from the respective division ians from the 2d Armored Amphibian commanders . The 4th Marine Division Battalion, to seize Kangoku Rock, a was to be supported by the 14th Ma- 600-yard-long island lying about 2,200 rines, commanded by Colonel Louis G . feet northwest of Iwo Jima . The island DeHaven ; Colonel James D . Waller's could be used as an artillery site and 13th Marines was to furnish similar for this reason a contingency plan was support for the 5th Marine Division . prepared to land the 105mm howitzers The operation was to be so timed of 4/14 there. that at H-Hour 68 LVT (A) 4s, compris- ing the first wave, were to hit the beach. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 27 These vehicles were to advance inland The scheme of maneuver for the Iwo until they reached the first terrace be- Jima operation, as well as the prelimi- yond the high-water mark . The armored nary planning, was largely based on amphibians would use their 75mm ho- available intelligence . Enemy docu- witzers and machine guns to the utmost ments seized on Saipan during the sum- in an attempt to keep the enemy down, mer of 1944 gave a fair indication of thus giving some measure of protection enemy strength in the Volcano-Bonin to succeeding waves of Marines who Islands. Captured Japanese maps, sup- were most vulnerable to enemy fire at plemented by aerial photographs ob- the time they debarked from their tained by U.S . Navy carrier pilots LVTs. Though early versions of the during the air strikes of June and July VAC operations plan had called for 1944, were utilized in the preparation tanks of the 4th and 5th Tank Battal- of situation maps and beach studies . ions to be landed at H plus 30, subse- During the planning phase for the op- quent studies of the beaches made it eration, pilots of Navy Photographic necessary to adopt a more flexible sche- Squadrons 4 and 5 and the Army Air dule. The possibility of congestion at the water's edge also contributed to Additional material in this section is de- this change in plans. In the end, the rived from : Amphibious Forces Pacific, Infor- time for bringing the tanks ashore was mation on Iwo Jima, n.d., hereafter PhibFor- left to the discretion of the regimental Pac G-2 Rpt; Hq, US Army Forces, POA, commanders. Company A of the 5th InteIRpt, n.d. ; Nanpo Shoto Info Bulletin No. Tank Battalion attached to the 27th 122-44, Supplmt 1, dtd 100ct44 ; CinCPac- CinCPOA Bulletin No . 9-45, dtd 10Jan45 ; TF Marines was scheduled to land on the 56 AR, Encl C, Rpt of Intelligence, Iwo Jima, Red Beaches at the prearranged time dtd 1Apr45, hereafter TF 56 G-2 Rpt ; TF 51 of H plus 30 minutes .26 AR, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-26Mar45, hereafter In the event that the landings took TF 51 AR ; VAC C-2 Special Study of Enemy place on the western beaches of Iwo, Sit, Iwo Jima, dtd 6Jan45, hereafter VAC G-2 Study ; VAC Rpt on Beaches, Iwo Jima, the alternate plan made provision for a dtd 300ct44 ; VAC Estimate of Enemy Sit and company of the 24th Marines, rein- Strength, dtd 7Mar45 ; VAC G-2 Jnl, 11Jan- forced by a platoon of armored amphib- 24Mar45 ; 4th MarDiv D-2 Tactical Study, Iwo Jima, dtd 20Jan65, hereafter 4th MarDiv G-2 Study ; 5th MarDiv D-2 Study, Iwo Jima, = B 5th MarDiv AR, Sec. VII, p . 10 . dtd 16Nov44, hereafter 5thMarDiv G-2 Study . OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 473

Forces 28th Photographic Reconnais- self."2s Additional observations included sance Squadron flew 371 sorties . Liber- construction work at various parts of ators of the Seventh Air Force obtained the island, an armored car in motion, additional photographic coverage of the and various earthworks and block- island in the course of their bombing houses on different parts of the island . missions. The submarine reconnaissance failed Significantly, during the preparatory to discover any guns or emplacements phase, representatives of the 3d, 4th, on the slopes of Mount Suribachi itself, and 5th Marine Divisions, the Com- nor could individual pillboxes be iden- mander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific, tified, though a number of caves were and VAC combined their efforts in pre- visible .30 paring a Joint Situation Map which was Beach studies indicated that move- completed on 6 December 1944 . Repre- ment over the loose sand would be sentative officers from Navy and Ma- difficult for wheeled vehicles ; tracked rine units were ordered to report to vehicles were not expected to bog down . Photographic Interpretation Squadron Partially buried gasoline drums, ob- 2, based on Guam, in late January 1945 . served at the edge of the water both There, the most recent photographs on the eastern and western beaches, were available . On the basis of the gave rise to considerable speculation . most current information then avail- It was thought that these drums might able, a final enemy installations map be wired for electrical ignition, so that was prepared that was to play a major burning gasoline would run out over part in the pre-D-Day naval and aerial the water to check landing craft, or strikes, as well as during the actual that they would ignite at the mo- assault phase . 28 ment the amphibious tractors or tanks Between 29 November and 2 Decem- reached land to raise a wall of fire be- ber 1944, the submarine USS Spearfish fore them. It was also possible that the conducted a reconnaissance off Iwo drums had been converted into mines, Jima. Approaching as close to the is- equipped with pull-type detonators, with land as he could without being detected, attached trip wires, which would ignite the submarine commander gave a run- when either personnel or tanks came ning account of the view that presented into contact with the wire.31 itself to his eyes as he watched through In any case, Marines were warned to his periscope . This commentary was expect the widespread employment of transcribed . So close did the submarine antitank mines and obstacles, combined approach the shore of Iwo that at one with "close quarter attack units" using point the skipper spotted a cave going hand-placed charges. No change in into the base of Mount Suribachi "with a dejected looking individual sitting =B USS Spearfish ReconRpt, Iwo Jima, 1Dec- right in the entrance sunning him- 44, p . 4. 30 I bid., p. 2. =" Extracts from CG, VAC Landing Force 37 1st Supplement to Nanpo Shoto Info Bulle- Rpt, Iwo Jima, 013/124, Ser . 02848, dtd 20May- tin No. 122-44, dtd 100ct44 ; CinCPac- 45, p . 3. CinCPOA Bulletin No . 9-45, 10Jan45, p. 10. 474 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Japanese artillery tactics was antici- the Japanese were believed to have nine pated. Even though the presence of a infantry battalions on the island, this large number of artillery pieces on the would leave five battalions to be held island was a foregone conclusion, there in reserve . Photographs taken in Janu- was no reason to believe that the Japa- ary 1945, as the invasion date was nese would employ massed fires in drawing closer, indicated that the num- larger than battery concentrations . ber of field fortifications, pillboxes, and From a thorough study of aerial covered artillery positions was increas- photographs and a captured map show- ing despite intensive aerial bombard- ing the scheme of the enemy's defense, ment. A most significant development it was known that the Japanese had noted in these photographs was the established an elaborate defense in construction of a line of defense across depth. Gun positions were sited to place the island from a point near Hiraiwa withering fire on the selected beaches ; Bay on the northwest coast to high defensive works such as pillboxes, ground north of the East Boat Basin . blockhouses, antitank trenches, and During the period from 3 December mines were located where they could 1944 to 10 February 1945, it was noted repel the American advance once the that the number of enemy coast defense invasion force had landed . Numerous guns on the island increased from 3 to antiboat gun positions as well as coast 6 ; the number of dual purpose guns defense guns were discovered . Unless rose from 16 to 42. Automatic anti- these guns were neutralized, it was aircraft guns showed an increase from more than likely that the enemy would 151 to 203, and covered artillery po- use them to fire on the leading waves sitions rose from 39 to 67 . There was a and transport areas of the invasion decrease in openly emplaced artillery, force. antitank and antiboat guns, and ma- Planners for the invasion of Iwo chine guns, but in the words of the Ex- Jima further deduced from documents peditionary Troops G-2, Colonel Edmond captured on Saipan that the enemy J. Buckley, the apparent reduction in would adhere to his older tactics of at- observed machine guns could be offset tempting the destruction of the invasion by the heavy increase in field fortifica- force before an adequate beachhead had tions, including blockhouses and pill- been established . The most likely time boxes. The blockhouses could contain for this counterattack was considered fixed artillery, and, in numerous in- the early morning of the day following stances, their construction was such as the initial landing .32 to permit mobile artillery pieces to be Further study of aerial photographs wheeled into them . It also appeared and captured documents indicated that likely that each pillbox was equipped Iwo had probably been divided into with one or more machine guns, whose four defense sectors with one infantry presence could not be ascertained by battalion manning each sector . Since aerial observation . Prelanding reconnaissance had shown I VAC C-2 Study, p . 17. that the Japanese had established nu- OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 475 merous antiboat gun positions, as well doctrine specifies that the enemy must not as coast defense guns . It was imperative gain a foothold on shore and that in order . Such to combat this all troops must be prepared that these guns be neutralized to attack with the mission of splitting our neutralization, of course, depended upon forces and destroying them by local the ability of the invasion force to de- counterattacks." tect targets and destroy them by naval At the latest, the enemy could be ex- gunfire and aerial attack prior to pected to throw all available reserves 33 H-hour. against the beachhead prior to dawn Even though planners of the Iwo on D plus 1. Jima invasion were generally correct In addition to their task of accumu- with reference to the enemy's intentions lating and analyzing all information and capabilities, their intelligence esti- available to them about the enemy's mate erred in two important respects . strength, capabilities, and dispositions First among these was an underestima- during the planning period, American tion of enemy strength on the island . planners were faced with the formidable Intelligence officers had estimated that problem of maintaining complete se- the Iwo garrison numbered between crecy with reference to the movement 13,000 and 14,000 troops.34 Names and of such a large force as was to take background of Japanese commanders in place in the Iwo Jima assault. This was the Bonins were known, though the in- not an easy undertaking in view of telligence estimate mistakenly assumed the tremendous size of the force as- that General Kuribayashi exercised signed to capture and develop the is- overall command of the Volcano-Bonin land. Admiral Turner's command alone Defense Sector from his 109th Division consisted of 495 ships, including, among Headquarters on Chichi Jima, and that others, 4 command ships, 8 battleships, a Major General Osuka was in charge 12 aircraft carriers, 19 cruisers, 44 de- of the defense of Iwo Jima. Informa- stroyers, 43 transports, 63 LSTs, and tion on the Japanese naval guard and 31 LSMs. The addition of Task Force air base units on Iwo was lacking . 58, together with supply and auxiliary The second serious shortcoming of ships, brought the invasion fleet to more preinvasion intelligence was the mis- than 800 vessels . The Marine assault taken assumption that the enemy defen- troops numbered 70,647 officers and sive tactics to be expected on Iwo Jima men.36 This force was further aug- would conform to tactics employed in mented by Marine and Army garrison earlier operations . In describing Japa- units, as well as three Army amphib- nese capabilities, the intelligence esti- ian truck companies in the assault mate voiced the following expectations phase, and Navy personnel assigned to The enemy may be prepared to attempt shore duty, bringing the total of the small local counterattacks prior to the expeditionary force to 111,308 men .37 If establishment of our beachhead in order one further adds the crews of Turner's to annihilate our forces at the beach . His

-1 VAC C-2 Study, p . 17 . Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 3. 3° TF 51 AR, pt. I, p . 4. 476 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS ships and of Task Force 58, more than intelligence officer of Amphibious Group 250,000 men on the American side were 2 reported the incident to VAC . There is involved in the Iwo operation .38 no indication that this information ever Intelligence officers had a few bad reached the Japanese, though under dif- moments on 22 December 1944, when a ferent circumstances this compromise of Pearl Harbor newspaper printed two vital information could have had disas- pictures of Iwo Jima under aerial at- trous consequences . tack. The pictures bore a startling re- semblance to pictures and maps of LOGISTICS AND "Island X," which VAC had issued for ADMINISTRATION41 training purposes . In order to prevent the Japanese from learning of the as- Another major responsibility accru- sembly and destination of the invasion ing to the staff of the VAC was logis- force, General Schmidt recommended a tical planning, which had already begun counterintelligence diversion . Word was even before VAC staff officers reached spread in the bars and hotels of Hono- Pearl Harbor on 13 October. Special lulu that the command would shortly staffs of FMFPac conducted prelimi- depart for an attack on Formosa . nary conferences and executed logistical Whether the diversion had any effect planning for the assault on Iwo Jima . in deceiving the enemy could not be As in other areas, logistics required the determined .38 harmonious teamwork of different lev- A serious breach of security occurred els of command, and between the armed on 14 February 1945, while the invasion services. The convoy was en route to the objective. Quartermaster, U. S. Army In the course of a radio transmission, Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, was re- someone in the vicinity of Saipan was sponsible for supplying rations (Class overheard making the following state- I) to all personnel taking part in the ment operation, as well as clothing, special equipment, and supplies (Class II), and We are going to Iwo Jima . It's a Jap ammunition (Class V), for partici- island not far from here . The B-29s bomb it from here every day. It's about pating Army troops . Fuel and lubri- 600 miles from Japan . We'll make it hot cants (Class III) were to be supplied for them Japs when we get there . We're leaving for there in the next day or so 90 ' Additional material in this section is de- Such a breach of security was more rived from TF 56, AdminO 1-44, 8Nov44 ; than enough to make experienced intelli- VAC C-1 PersRpts, Iwo Jima, 20Feb-24Mar45, hereafter VAC G-1 Rpt ; VAC C-4 Jnl, 29Jan- gence officers quake in their boots . The 21Feb45 ; 3d MarDiv D-1 Jnl, 14Feb-12Apr45 ; 3d MarDiv Breakdown of Ammunition and Fuel, Iwo Jima, 1Feb45 ; 3d MarDiv C-4 Jnl, 34 I bid. 23Feb-8Apr45 ; 3d MarDiv G-4 Log, 8Dec44- "s Newcomb, Iwo .lima, pp. 27-28 . 9Aug45 ; 3d MarDiv G-4 Periodic Rpts, 3Jan- O VAC G-2 SAR, Iwo Jima, 30Apr45, p . 8, 20Mar45 ; 4th MarDiv AdmO 44-44, 24Dec44 ; in VAC AR, Anx B, GenStaffSecRpts . US PacFlt Logistics Plan for Land-Based '° I bid . Forces, 140ct44 . OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 477 by the Navy's Service Force, Pacific . be preloaded at Pearl Harbor with as- The Supply Service, FMFPac, was to sorted small arms and mortar ammuni- furnish ammunition (Class V) and tion, rations, fuel, medical supplies, and special supplies, and equipment (Class flamethrower fuel . These vehicles were IV) for the Marines . The latter supplies scheduled to provide an early replenish- were to be distributed initially by the ment supply on the beaches on D-Day . 6th Base Depot in Hawaii and the 5th Resupply plans and preparations were Field Depot on Guam . performed by the Marine Supply Serv- Administrative planning, including ice. Initial resupply ships were to be service and support to the VAC Land- loaded at Oahu with 30 days Class I, ing Force, was the responsibility of the II, and IV supplies and 15 days Class G-4 Section, V Amphibious Corps. Pre- III supplies (except for aviation gaso- scribed levels for Class I supply were line) for two reinforced Marine divi- two days' rations for the assault troops sions and for all garrison troops esti- plus a 30-day backup supply. Water was mated to be located on Iwo Jima at D to be carried in cans, drums, or other plus 35. Class V was to be loaded in organizational equipment at the ratio this shipment on board one ammunition of two gallons per man per day for ship at the rate of 9 U/F for one Ma- five days 4 2 Class II and IV supplies rine division, 7 U/F for one 155mm how- were to be stockpiled for 30 days . Am- itzer battalion, 8 U/F for one Army munition for ground forces (Class V) heavy antiaircraft battalion, 4 U/F for was to be provided in quantities of seven one Army light antiaircraft battalion, units of fire (U/F) for artillery, mor- and 90 tons of engineer and Chemical tars, and antiaircraft guns, and five Warfare Service demolitions. units of fire for all other types of The Commander, Forward Area, Cen- weapons 43 tral Pacific was instructed to hold avail- Special preloads on LSTs were made able in the Marianas for shipment on to provide a balanced initial supply of call in an emergency, a stock of 30 days rations, fuel, and ammunition for the supplies of Classes I, II, III, and IV assault troops . These supplies were and two units of fire for one reinforced loaded in LST tank decks and were de- Marine division and one reinforced signed to provide initial priority combat Army division. Supplies were to be pro- supplies close in to beaches on D-Day vided by the Commanding General, Pa- and D plus 1. A total of 38 LSTs were to cific Ocean Areas, the Commanding be preloaded at Pearl Harbor, Hilo, and General, FMFPac, and ComServPac . Guam prior to the embarkation of the ComAirPac was to maintain a 45-day assault units. In addition, 42 21/2-ton stock of aviation supplies, except for Amphibian Trucks (DUKWs) were to Class V, in floating storage in the for- ward area for Navy and Marine air- 42 VAC G-4 SAR, Iwo Jima, dtd 30Apr45, craft employed in that area. Aviation p. 2, hereafter VAC G-4 SAR . 'a A unit of fire is a predetermined quantity supplies at Guam and on Roi-Namur of ammunition a weapon can be expected to were to be held available for emergency fire in an average day of combat . shipment. ComGenPOA was to maintain 478 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS a 45-day stock of aviation supplies in Planners of the Iwo operation were floating storage in the forward area for aware of the fact that the soft volcanic Army aircraft. ComServPac was to pro- ash along the beaches, as well as the vide the necessary storage if space and steep terraces en route inland, would facilities assigned to ComGenPOA impede the movement of wheeled ve- proved inadequate . ComServPac was to hicles. To insure a steady flow of sup- shift Service Squadron 10 to Ulithi to plies from the beaches inland, runner furnish support to fleet units and emer- sleds were improvised that could be gency supply for land-based forces . Ele- loaded with needed items and pulled in- ments of the above squadron were to land by tracked vehicles. Another im- be located in the Marshalls and Mari- provisation designed to overcome the anas for support of small task forces . soft sand or volcanic ash was the use Pre-packaged supplies were stock- of Marston matting at the beaches . Even piled by the VAC Air Delivery Section though this material was originally on Saipan for emergency deliveries by used for the construction of airfield run- air. If needed, the Commander, Expe- ways, it likewise could be employed to ditionary Troops, could draw from simi- great advantage in bridging strips of lar stockpiles in Hawaii and elsewhere sand along the beaches that would other- in the Marianas. For the Iwo Jima op- wise be impassable . eration, VAC organized the 8th Field In addition to the large variety of Depot, commanded by Colonel Leland supplies and equipment normally used S. Swindler. The depot was designed for an amphibious operation, VAC em- to serve as the nucleus of the shore party ployed two items for the first time . One organization ; the depot commander had was the two-wheeled Clever-Brooks a dual designation as Shore Party Com- 31/2-ton amphibion trailer, the other mander of the Landing Force, in which the M-29C light cargo carrier, subse- capacity he was responsible for coordi- quently known as the "Weasel ." This nating the activities of the division boat-like, tracked vehicle resembled a shore parties . miniature LVT without ramps . The am- Since Iwo Jima was not surrounded phibian trailers reached the three as- by reefs, all types of landing craft could sault divisions during November and proceed directly from the transport area December 1944.45 The Weasels arrived to the beachhead without becoming in- in November and were subjected to ex- volved in time-consuming transfer op- tensive tests which revealed that the erations that had been characteristic cargo carriers were capable of excellent of many previous landings in the Cen- performance under conditions antici- tral Pacific . This circumstance led VAC pated at Iwo. to authorize subordinate units to mount up to 50 percent of their supplies on unloading when cranes and other lifting de- pallets .44 vices were available to handle such convenient but heavy loads . "Pallets was the designation for wooden 'The 3d Marine Division was issued the platforms on which supplies were strapped or trailers in November ; the 4th and 5th Marine fastened. Palletization facilitated loading and Divisions received theirs in December. OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 479

Three Army and two Marine DUKW come casualties on each of the first and companies were assigned to VAC for second days ; three percent on the third the operation, as were the 31st and and fourth days ; and one and one-half 133d Naval Construction Battalions. 46 percent on each of the remaining 10 In addition, a Marine engineer battalion, days. It was further estimated that 20 a topographic company, an Army bomb percent of all casualties would be dead disposal company, and the 62d Naval or missing .48 Construction Battalion were attached For the evacuation of casualties from to VAC and placed under operational Iwo Jima, two hospital ships, the Sa- control of the Corps engineer . These maritan and the Solace were assigned, units would be responsible for clearing as well as the auxiliary hospital ship minefields, bomb disposal, road construc- Pinckney, and LSTs 929, 930, 931, and tion and maintenance, water supply, 1033. These LSTs, especially equipped and the restoration of airfields on Iwo to handle casualties close to the beach, Jima. Following the beach assault, and were to be stationed 2,000 yards off- as soon as conditions permitted, the shore and serve as evacuation control 62d Naval Construction Battalion was centers . There, the casualties would be to begin to ready Motoyama Airfield logged, given additional emergency No. 1 for observation and fighter air- treatment, and transferred to other craft. Target date for completion of this ships for further care . One of the LSTs assignment was D plus 7 . The 31st Na- was equipped with a blood bank . val Construction Battalion was to re- As in so many other instances of op- store Airfield No. 2 for use by the B-29 erations in the Pacific Theater, the adap- bombers. Making the latter field opera- tation of existing equipment to a new tional for this purpose involved not only use was due to the efforts of one indi- restoration of facilities that were al- vidual who not only conceived the idea ready in existence, but called for exten- but also had to sell it at the right time sion of existing runways to 7,000 feet and place. In this instance the conver- to accommodate the giant aircraft . Air- sion of LSTs for the evacuation of field No . 2 was to become operational casualties was the brainchild of Lieu- at D plus 1047 tenant Commander George J . Miller, In view of the size and scope of the Medical Corps, USNR, who prepared impending operation, the handling and blueprints of the LSTs showing the plan evacuation of casualties required spe- of operating tables, beds, and other cial planning. Initially, it was assumed equipment. In December 1944 he pre- that seizure of the objective would re- sented his idea to several high ranking quire 14 days . It was estimated that five naval medical officers who initially ve- percent of the assault force would be- toed it. In the end, the persistent lieu- tenant commander was able to sell the "The 133d Naval Construction Battalion idea to an even higher ranking person- was attached to the 4th Marine Division, the age who immediately recognized the 31st to the 5th Marine Division . 47 VAC OPlan 3-44, dtd 23Dec44, Anx M, 48 VAC Surgeon, SAR, Iwo Jima, dtd 24Mar- Eng Plan. 45, hereafter VAC MedRpt . 480 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS merit of the plan and gave his unquali- lion cigarettes and enough food to feed fied approval of it .40 Columbus, Ohio, for thirty days. Ships began loading as early as Novem- In addition to the hospital ships and ber, every parcel stenciled, weighed, sized, the specially converted LSTs, long range and stowed in a particular spot . Marked dispositions had to be made from Iwo photos showed where the cemetery would Jima for the reception of casualties . In be located, orders specified the exact depth addition to the hospitals that were to of burial and space between bodies (3 feet from centerline to centerline of body, fifty be set up on the island itself, once the bodies to a row, 3 feet between rows.) The situation following the landings had sta- graves registration team would land on bilized to some extent, 5,000 beds were D-Day, equipped with its own bulldozers available in hospitals on Saipan and to bury the bodies exactly 6 feet deep . Guam. Air transportation of casualties Then men would mound each grave with was scheduled to begin as soon as air- a special wooden form strips were ready to accommodate trans- Nor was the multiplicity of supplies port planes.50 all that the planners had to consider ; These preparations only give a bare there was one more commodity whose outline of the time and effort required importance transcended all others . This to bring logistics and administration was the flow of men towards the scene into line with the operational planning. of action to replace those who would At least one account has briefly summed become casualties. During the last up the diverse items involved and the months of 1944, long before the first thought that had to be given to their Marines were scheduled to hit the transport and storage : beaches of Iwo Jima, the complex ma- It was necessary to think of everything chinery of administration was already -pencils, blood, toilet paper, `this item,' set in motion when six replacement said the orders, `will be stowed under drafts embarked from the United States tarpaulin at the rear of all landing ve- to join VAC . Each draft was composed hicles to protect it from spray,' matches, gasoline, socks, bullets, wooden crosses of about 1,250 officers and men . Each (prepainted), water, welding rods, gar- of the three Marine divisions slated to bage cans, splints, food, spark plugs, participate in the operation received blankets, flares, dog food, maps, holy 2,500 replacements, some of whom were water, smoke pots, paint, shoelaces, finger- incorporated into the divisions before print ink, batteries, rock-crushers, bulbs, cigars, asphalt machines, carbon paper . they left their staging areas . The bulk The Fifth Division alone carried 100 mil- of the replacement units was kept in- tact ; their personnel were assigned to °D "This use of LSTs saved many, many shore parties, to be employed on the lives of wounded men who received treatment beaches until they were needed to re- on the LSTs . If they had not received this treatment and had had to be taken from the place combat losses . 52 beach all the way to the hospital ships, many Launching an amphibious operation would have died before they reached the ships ." on the scale of the contemplated assault BGen John S . Letcher ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jun69, in Iwo Com- ments, hereafter Letcher ltr . " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 37. "VAC'G-1 Rpt, p . 13. "VAC G-1 Rpt, pp . 13-15 . OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 481 against Iwo Jima required far more Only then can the vital and difficult than merely assembling men and ma- process begin of forging the whole into teriel and shipping them to the objec- an instrument of such power and pre- tive. The real planning effort had only cision that it continues to function even begun at the point when the objective in the face of the most adverse condi- had been decided upon and the means tions that climate, weather, and enemy to seize it were being made available . opposition can impose. When the cur- The efforts of various arms and services tain rises, the spectator is awed by the had to be combined until the gigantic booming of the big naval guns, the col- machine of war functioned as an instru- umns of dirt and smoke rising over the ment of precision . Each man, each objective from naval shells or aircraft weapon, each unit, every ship, tank, and dropping their lethal cargo, as rockets airplane had a very definite part in the swoosh towards the target . Once this scheme of things . In this respect, an orchestra has begun to play, any flaw assembled invasion armada can be lik- still remaining can be measured in the ened to an orchestra. The finest musi- lives of assault troops who are separated cians, well skilled in their profession from the enemy bullets and shells by and equipped with the best instruments no more than a few cubic feet of air, that money can buy, still must learn often protected only by the thickness to work with one another. Few among of a uniform. the audience are aware of the tremen- The forging of the precision instru- dous effort that went into writing the ment of war, under way months before score, the seemingly endless rehearsals, Marines went ashore on Iwo, determined the continuous and often painful plan- in large measure how many men of the ning and rehoning that must take place landing force would go on to seize the before all meshes into an integrated objective and return home ; the number whole. whose fragile and mangled bodies would It is no different with the orches- be carried off Iwo for salvage and re- tra of war. A plan is made, followed pair ; and those destined to remain on by the assembly of men and supplies . the island forever. CHAPTER 3

The Preliminaries 1

In his capacity as Commanding Gen- (Weasel), but also familiarized per- eral, VAC Landing Force, Major Gen- sonnel with new weapons and tech- eral Harry Schmidt was directly respon- niques scheduled for employment dur- sible for the preparation and training ing Operation DETACHMENT . Divi- of all units placed under his command sion training programs stressed attacks for the Iwo Jima operation . Such train- against fortified positions ; the reduc- ing, in addition to a routine program, tion of pillboxes ; detection, marking, not only featured the participation of and removal of mines ; and the employ- VAC units in tests and demonstrations ment and coordination of supporting of new types of amphibious equipment arms . such as the Clever-Brooks amphibian During the last two weeks of Novem- trailer and the M-29C cargo carrier ber, the 4th Marine Division carried out amphibious maneuvers on Maui, and ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this a field exercise on the division level . chapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; TF 52 Two command post exercises followed . AR, Iwo Jima, 10-19Feb45, 22Feb45, hereafter TF 52 AR; TF 54 AR, 10Feb-10Mar45, here- The 5th Marine Division conducted after TF 5.4 AR; TF 56 AR; VAC Landing training exercises at Camp Tarawa on Force AR, Iwo Jima, Oct44-Mar45, 13May45, Hawaii Island. At Hilo, the men prac- hereafter VAC AR ; PhibGru 2 AR ; 3d MarDiv ticed the embarkation and debarkation AR, Iwo Jima, 310ct44-16Mar45, 30Apr45, of troops and loading and unloading of hereafter 3d MarDiv AR ; 5th MarDiv AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, 24Mar45, hereafter equipment onto LSTs . The artillery bat- 5th MarDiv AR ; ComPhibPac TrngO A29-44, talions of the 13th Marines went to Iwo Jima, 18Dec44 ; TF 31 Rpt of Trng, 31- Maume beach for special loading exer- Ju144 ; TF 52 OpO No . A105-45, 3Feb45 ; TG cises with DUKWs, LSTs, and LSMs . 53.2 AR, Iwo Jima, 310ct44-4Mar45 ; TransDiv Using the big amphibious trucks, the 32 AR, Iwo Jima, 1OFeb-6Mar45 ; TransDiv 45 AR, 27Jan-19Feb45, hereafter TransDiv 45 artillerymen learned how to load and AR; 3d MarDiv EmbO 1-44, 18Dec44 ; 3d Mar unload their howitzers and practiced Div EmbO 1-45, 19Jan45 ; 3d MarDiv TrngO moving in and out of the great jaws of 1-45, 5Jan45 ; 4th MarDiv TrngOs, 270ct44- the LSTs, causing at least one Marine 22Jan45 ; 4th MarDiv Trng Memo 82-44, 10- to comment : "This reminds me of Jo- Dec44 ; 5th MarDiv TrngO 64-44, 31Dec44 ; ."2 Iwo Comments; Conner, The Fifth Marine nah and the whale Division ; Craven and Cate, The Pacific ; Smith Within the 5th Marine Division, the and Finch,Coral and Brass; Heinl, Soldiers of 28th Marines, scheduled to spearhead the Sea; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and the assault, received special training . Amphibious War; Morison, Victory in the Pa- cific ; Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division ; Newcomb, Iwo Jima. ' Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 21 . 482 THE PRELIMINARIES 483 Each battalion of that regiment con- refinement of combat techniques and ducted exercises that involved landing provision for supervision and support on beaches resembling those of Iwo, of divisions and corps troops . Otherwise, right down to soft volcanic ash . The training was left to the divisions. A maneuvers also included the envelop- late delivery of DUKWs caused some ment of a hill that could pass for a delay in training the newly activated fairly close duplicate of Mount Suri- amphibian truck companies with their bachi. Without those in the ranks being vehicles. Considerable retraining was aware of it, elements of the division required to familiarize tank crews and actually executed the scheme of maneu- maintenance personnnel with the opera- ver called for in the Iwo operations plan . tion and servicing of new M4A3 Sher- The division conducted three command man tanks . post exercises in Hawaii, including one Upon the conclusion of amphibious problem calling for the coordination of exercises, the Hawaii-based assault air, naval gunfire, and artillery support . forces began staging on 24 December On Guam, the men of the 3d Marine 1944 ; by 9 January, all troops had em- Division trained for the impending op- barked. Individual units proceeded to eration in accordance with the mission Oahu, where they assembled with other assigned to them . Training stressed the elements of the Joint Expeditionary phases a reserve unit had to pass Force for rehabilitation. This period through upon landing and moving up lasted from 19-26 January 1945 . During into the interior of the island . Since this time, all men received some liberty the division was not scheduled to take ashore and took part in supervised rec- part in the amphibious assault, no as- reation . sault landing exercises were conducted . From 27 December 1944 to 8 January The 3d Division was to utilize the shore 1945, the 4th Marine Division moved on party facilities of the two assault divi- board its transports off Maui . The 5th sions preceding it ashore . Marine Division loaded at Hawaii from The replacement drafts did not join 25 December to mid-January . The men their divisions until late November . of the 3d Marine Division on Guam Even though the replacements had re- were not scheduled to begin embarka- ceived basic individual training in the tion for another month . United States, they had to learn basic Final rehearsals for the remainder small unit tactics and had to exercise of the landing force were held in the in them before qualifying as combat Marianas during the second week of ready. Since the men were to serve with February. Also participating in these shore parties prior to being assigned rehearsals were aircraft and ships of to combat duty, they also had to be ini- the Amphibious Support Force (TF tiated into cargo-handling duties . 52), commanded by Admiral Blandy, Owing to the advanced state of train- and the Naval Gunfire and Covering ing in the divisions and the high level Force (TF 54), under Rear Admiral of experience of their Marines, VAC Bertram J. Rodgers . The final exercises training directives were concerned with had the primary aim of testing coordi- 484 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS nation between the attack force and of the crew initially was unaware of his the supporting arms . Shore fire control presence. It was James V. Forrestal, Sec- parties actually landed on Tinian and retary of the Navy, intent on witnessing tested communications in connection the imminent operation as an observer . with a simulated bombardment. Sea con- Dressed in khakis without insignia of ditions made it impractical to boat the any kind, he might easily have been mis- troops during that part of the exercises taken for one of the civilian war corre- conducted on 12 February ; on the fol- spondents on board the command ship .3 lowing day, however, the troops de- The Japanese were aware of the ar- barked, waves were formed, and land- mada's departure from Saipan almost ing craft were taken to within 300 as soon as it had gotten under way . yards of the beaches on the west coast Whether the fleet was spotted by an of Tinian. enemy aircraft or submarine has never On 15 February, the combat-loaded been clearly established, though at least LSTs (tractor groups) departed for one source credits a naval patrol plane the target area ; during the afternoon with having reported on 13 February of the following day, Transport Squad- that 170 ships were moving northwest rons 15 and 16, carrying the landing from Saipan.4 As a result, all Japanese force assault troops moved out, screened troops in the Volcano-Bonins were by cruisers and destroyers . On the same placed on a state of alert. day, ships carrying the 3d Tank Bat- The reaction to the news that an talion, corps engineers, naval construc- American invasion force was moving tion battalions, one corps artillery and towards the Bonins or the Volcano Is- two U. S. Army antiaircraft artillery lands was nothing short of explosive in battalions left Guam . On 17 February, the home islands, where emotions had Transport Squadron 11 departed Guam, already been whipped to a fever pitch carrying the 3d Marine Division as Ex- Uniformed schoolboys stormed into peditionary Troops Reserve . During the Perry Park at Kurihama, near Yokohama, voyage to Iwo Jima, RCT 26 was re- the site where Commodore Perry had come leased from Corps Reserve to the 5th ashore nearly a century before to reopen Marine Division . RCT 21, which was Japan to the Western world . The boys, rallying under the banner of the Imperial embarked in Transport Division 32, left Rule Assistance Youth Corps, rushed the Guam on the evening of 16 February, granite shaft and in a frenzy of patriotism to be released from Expeditionary toppled it to the ground and spat upon it' Troops Reserve to Corps Reserve when No such hysteria gripped General it reached Iwo in midmorning of 19 Kuribayashi and his Iwo Jima garrison . February. The Japanese defenses on the island As the invasion fleet silently moved had progressed as far as they ever towards the objective, Admiral Turner's would. In the time available to fortify flagship, the USS Eldorado, carried a distinguished passenger, who on 15 'Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 251 . February had boarded the ship with ' Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 59 . such little fanfare that a large number 5 Ibid. THE PRELIMINARIES 485 the island, all that could possibly be Beginning on 8 December, and continu- done had been accomplished . Filled with ing for 74 consecutive days, the bombers great fighting spirit, reverence for the rained death and destruction on the Emperor, and determination to drive Volcano-Bonin Islands. Iwo Jima re- the invaders back into the sea, the en- ceived special attention .' Marine PBJs emy sat in his dugouts and waited . (B-25 medium bombers) of VMB-612 participated in this bomber offensive PRELIMINARY AIR AND from early December 1944 until the NAVAL BOMBARDMENT6 last days of January 1945 . Operating Actually, the battle for Iwo Jima had from the Marianas under the Army Air opened long before the first ships of Forces VII Bomber Command, the Ma- the American invasion fleet hove into rine aviators flew night missions over view off the island . Following the first the Volcano-Bonin Islands with special large-scale carrier raid of June 1944, emphasis on the disruption of enemy regularly scheduled air strikes against shipping, since it was known that the the target began in August . Air opera- Japanese, vulnerable to American air tions against Iwo passed through two attack during the daytime, were making stages. First, there was the strategic a frantic effort to rush supplies to Iwo phase prior to 16 February 1945, car- and nearby islands at night. ried out mainly by Marianas-based B- As of 31 January 1945, all air mis- 24 bombers of the Seventh Air Force . sions were executed in accordance with the Iwo Jima Air Support Plan .8 Dur- ing the last three weeks preceding the 'Additional material in this section is de- rived from : FMFPac, Naval Gunfire Section, invasion, B-24s from the Marianas flew Rpt on NG Support in Operations, hereafter 30 sorties a day or more against the FMFPac NGS; FMFPac, Naval Gunfire Sec- island.9 The overall purpose of the tion, The Bargaining Phase, Iwo Jima Bom- bombing was to neutralize the airfields bardment, 240ct44-20Jan45, hereafter Iwo and installations on Iwo, destroy gun Preliminary Gunfire Requirements ; FMFPac, Naval Gunfire Section, Preliminary Rpt on positions and fixed defenses, and un- NGF in Iwo Jima Operation, 1Apr45 ; Am- mask additional targets .',' Initially, the phibious Forces, U . S. Pacific Flt, Amphibious Gunnery Bulletin No . 1, Capture of Iwo Jima, AAF POA, Rpt of Participation in the Iwo 11Mar45 ; Fifth Flt, NGF Support, Exp Trps Jima Op, 1945, p. 75. Rpt, 16Jun45, hereafter Fifth Flt NGF Rpt ; 8 CTF 51 OPlan, A25-44, dtd 27Dec44 . TF 56, Sp Rpt on Air Ops in Support of the 0 TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec E, pp . 17-18. Capture of Iwo Jima, n.d. ; VAC AR, Anx C, 10 "While it was true that the runways were Apps 2 and 3, NGF and Air Rpts, 30Apr45 not kept out of operation for any length of and 30May45, hereafter VAC NGF and Air time, it was also true that after 2 January Rpts ; Col Robert D . Heinl, Jr. "Target Iwo," 1945 no enemy air raids were made from Iwo U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v . 89, no . 7, Jima fields against the B-29 bases in the (Ju163), pp. 71-82, hereafter, Heinl, Target Marianas . The B-24s used large quantities of Iwo; Col Donald M . Weller, "Salvo-Splash! 100-pound bombs and fragmentation bombs, -The Development of NGF Support in World which obviously were not intended to destroy War II," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, fixed defense installations such as blockhouses, Pt 1, v. 80, no . 8 (Aug54), pp . 839-849 ; Pt 2, pillboxes, etc. The B-24 targets on Iwo Jima v. 80, no. 9 (Sep54), pp. 1011-1021 . specified in VII Bomber Command mission 486 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS land-based missions against Iwo were positions and field fortifications than it executed under the Commander, Task was on 15 October 1944, when initial heavy bombing strikes were initiated ." Force 93, Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, USA. As the invasion date This information was corroborated neared, the bomber raids were con- in a special memorandum submitted by ducted in accordance with requests from the G-2 to the C/S on 13 February. 12 the Commander, Joint Expeditionary This memorandum compared the en- Force. emy's static defenses between 3 Decem- Beginning 16 February, air attacks ber 1944 and 10 February 1945, and against Iwo increased in frequency un- noted significant increases in the num- til a daylight attack hit the island at ber of heavy weapons and field fortifi- least once every 24 hours . In addition, cations, particularly blockhouses and Iwo was exposed to night harassing mis- pillboxes. sions and fighter sweeps. Photographic A further evaluation of the constant reconnaissance flights attempted to ob- bombing indicated that it was not alto- tain a last-minute picture of enemy de- gether ineffective : the destruction of fenses prior to the invasion . aircraft on the ground and the tem- At numerous times prior to D-Day, porary neutralization of the Iwo air- aerial photographic reconnaissance at- fields was accomplished. On the other tempted to estimate the effectiveness of hand, gun emplacements, blockhouses, both aerial and naval bombardment of pillboxes, shelters, and other strong the target with particular emphasis on points proved far less vulnerable owing the study of selected target areas which to the thorough preparation of such in- had been the subject of specific strike stallations against attack from the air requests . Among the last of these stud- and naval gunfire . The rugged terrain ies was one submitted to the Chief of with its countless caves afforded excel- Staff (C/S) of VAC on 9 February 1945 . lent protection from high level bomb- The first paragraph of this report poig- ing.13 nantly stated Even the bomber attacks against the Photographic coverage of Iwo Jima to Iwo Jima airfields could not prevent 24 January 1945 indicates that damage their use by the enemy for any appre- to installations resulting from bombing ciable length of time . In evaluating the strikes between 3 December 1944 and 24 January 1945 was, on the whole, negli- effectiveness of the air strikes, the Army gible . These strikes have apparently not Air Forces had to concede "that at no prevented the enemy from improving his time were all of Iwo's strips rendered defensive position and, as of 24 January inoperational and no single strip was 1945, his installations of all categories had notably increased in number . The island is now far more heavily defended by gun " Encl C, Extract from Bomb Damage As- sessment, G-2 Rpt no . 2, 9Feb45, p. 4, in TF reports for February 1945 were generally AA 56 AR . defenses and radio/radar installations ." Dr. ' State of Enemy Defenses, Iwo Jima, dtd Robert F . Futrell ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 13Feb45, in ibid., p. 5 . Div, HQMC, dtd 7Jul69, hereafter Air Force 73 TF 56 SplRpt, Air Operations in the Sup- Comment, in Iwo Comments . port of the Capture of Iwo Jima, n.d., p. 3. THE PRELIMINARIES 487 out of service for a whole day : the in importance. The very nature of an destructive Christmas raid on Saipan amphibious assault against a strongly was run the day after a heavy air-sea fortified enemy bastion, largely devoid bombardment of Iwo .14 of the element of surprise, made it man- As D-Day for Operation DETACH- datory for the preliminary gunfire to MENT approached, the Army Air eliminate a sizable portion of the enemy Forces stepped up the assault against defenses. Without this shore bombard- Iwo. Between 1 and 16 February, Sev- ment, the very success of the assault enth Air Force bombers flew 283 day- could become imperiled or severe casu- light sorties, dropping 602 tons of alties could result among the Marines bombs and 1,111 drums of napalm ; in slated to go ashore. It was in this vital the same period, B-24s flew 233 night realm of naval gunfire support that snooper missions, dropping 504 tons of Marine and Navy leaders of the Iwo bombs. On 12 February, 21 B-29s of expedition failed to achieve complete the 313th Bombardment Wing dropped accord ; the former, represented by Gen- 84 tons of bombs on carefully pin- eral Holland Smith, had seen in previ- pointed gun emplacements on Mount ous assaults what fire from an enemy Suribachi as well as on antiaircraft not sufficiently subdued could do to Ma- positions and radio and radar installa- rine assault waves nearing the shore of tions elsewhere on the island . Again a well-defended island . results were disappointing because the General Smith's anxiety increased the bombers flew at moderately high alti- closer D-Day approached. This experi- tudes and frequently released their enced Marine leader compared Iwo to bombs by radar because of cloudy a worm that became stronger the more weather. In any case, the bomber crews it was cut up, for the island seemed to found it extremely difficult to score thrive on the American aerial bombard- square hits on the cleverly concealed ment. The leader of the expeditionary and deeply dug-in targets. Napalm was troops was to recall his feeling of what dropped for the purpose of burning off was ahead the camouflage, but this method was un- My own study of early air photographs successful, partly because of inaccurate indicated that a situation of an incredible nature existed on the island . It was plain drops and partly because the rocks and that Iwo Jima had fortifications the like ashes used as cover would not burn . and extent of which we had never encoun- In view of the failure of the bombing tered. Mindful of Tarawa, where most of assault to inflict crippling damage on the fortifications were above ground and the Japanese on Iwo, the preliminary were still standing when the Marines naval gunfire bombardment of the is- landed, my opinion was that far more naval gunfire was needed on an island land, a vital and indispensable prelude five times the size of Tarawa, with many to the operation, was bound to grow more times the number of defenses, most of them deep under ground. 14 Hist Air War POA, III, Anx to p . 129, I could not forget the sight of Marines pp. 143-150, p . 159. AAF Eval Bd POA, Rpt floating in the lagoon or lying on the no. 7, cited in Craven and Cate, The Pacific, beaches at Tarawa, men who died assault- pp. 584-585. ing defenses which should have been taken 488 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

PREINVASION BOMBING of Iwo Jima by the U.S. Seventh Air Force. Note Mt. Suribachi in left foreground. (USAF 54717 AC)

AERIAL VIEW OF IWO JIMA LANDINGS as assault waves head for the shore. Mt. Suribachi looms in the background . (USN 80-G-415308) THE PRELIMINARIES 489

out by naval gunfire . At Iwo Jima, the it was known that Iwo Jima represented problem was far more difficult . If naval one of the most heavily fortified strong- guns could not knock out visible de- points on earth, Marine planners stipu- fenses, how could they smash invisible defenses except by sheer superabundance lated that a force of battleships and of fire?" cruisers would require 10 days to reduce point targets on the island that could General Smith and his staff were in bring direct fire to bear on either of agreement that the softening up of Iwo the two landing beaches then under con- Jima would have to be preceded by an sideration. On 24 October 1944, VAC especially lengthy period of intense na- submitted to Admiral Turner its naval val gunfire. The type of guns, as well gunfire requirements, which called for as the amount and type of ammunition a preliminary bombardment force of required to do a thorough job, hinged seven battleships, seven heavy cruisers, on the intelligence on the kind and num- and two light cruisers .16 ber of targets . Based on such intelli- Meanwhile, Admiral Turner's gun- gence, the number of ships to be em- nery officers had also worked on the na- ployed in the bombardment force could val gunfire requirements for Operation be computed with some degree of accu- DETACHMENT . Their conclusions dif- racy. The guaranteed destruction of a fered materially from those of the Ma- target required visual identification by rines. In this respect, the naval officers' a spotter on board ship or in the air, viewpoint was influenced by a number followed by precision adjustment . In of factors that unintentionally were to addition to competence in surface gun- work to the disadvantage of the Marine nery, the men directing this shore bom- assault force . Foremost among these bardment required special training and was the consideration that the initial experience . On the basis of previous op- surface bombardment had to be closely erations at Tarawa, Guam, Saipan, and coordinated with the first carrier attack Peleliu, Marine planners knew that the against Tokyo by the Fast Carrier Force process of preliminary gunfire could not (TF 58) . Admiral Spruance initially be hurried . had planned that a carrier strike on As early as September 1944, the staff Tokyo was to coincide with the opening of VAC, supported by members of Fleet of the prelanding bombardment of Iwo Marine Force, Pacific, had begun the Jima. Once the naval bombardment preparation of detailed planning for the started, all tactical surprise at Iwo naval gunfire required for the assault would be lost. The longer the preland- on Iwo Jima. This planning was carried ing bombardment continued, the more out under the direction of Lieutenant it became likely that enemy aircraft Colonel Donald M. Weller, who had been from the home islands would interfere designated Naval Gunfire Officer for with the landings. A two-day carrier both VAC and FMFPac. Since, even at strike against Japan would detract this early stage of the planning effort, enemy attention from Iwo . At the same

'Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, pp . '° CG, VAC ltr to ComPhibPac, dtd 240ct44, 243-244 . in Iwo Preliminary Gunfire Requirements . 490 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS time, naval aviation could strike a blow in the times recommended for prelimi- at the enemy's aircraft manufacturing nary naval gunfire by the Navy com- plants, which thus far had escaped manders and those of the Marine land- crippling damage from landbased air- ing force. The initial VAC request for craft. Sustained air attacks would be re- naval gunfire not only asked for a mini- quired to reduce enemy aircraft produc- mum of 10 days' bombardment, but also tion. Admiral Spruance observed, never- stipulated that D-Day be made depend- theless, that he could see no object in ent on "the successful prosecution of combatting these aircraft around the the destruction of enemy defensive in- perimeter if accurate bombing could stallations."18 wreck the factories that produced the Marine Corps naval gunfire require- enemy planes . As a result, carrier air- ments, strongly endorsed by General craft were to be employed against a Holland Smith, were forwarded to the strategic, rather than a tactical objec- Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific tive.17 Fleet. The expectation was that the Somewhere in the course of the naval Navy would generally concur with what planning process, the air strike against was considered a carefully prepared Honshu began to loom ever larger in and reasonable estimate of the naval importance until what had started out gunfire required to ensure the quick sei- as a diversionary maneuver began to zure of the objective with a minimum of turn, in the minds of the naval planning casualties. To the surprise and conster- staff, into the major attraction . More nation of Marine planners, Admiral Tur- and more emphasis was placed on the ner informed VAC on 15 November that importance of the naval air strike "a methodical and thorough bombard- against Japan ; the imminent assault on ment would be instituted by the Am- Iwo gradually began to recede further phibious Support Force on Dog minus into the background . Naval planners, in three."1s reaching their own conclusions as to Faced unexpectedly with a reduction what could be made available by way of the vital naval gunfire support from of preliminary gunfire, had to consider 10 days to 3, General Schmidt had a limitations on the availability of ships, special staff study prepared, consisting difficulty in replenishing ammunition, of detailed tabulations, and an appended and a tight schedule that made it neces- interpretation and evaluation of these sary to launch and complete the Iwo very detailed statistics . As a concession, operation with all possible dispatch to the study pointed out that the overall avoid any delay in the assault on Oki- time for preliminary fires of all types, nawa, which was to follow closely at the including support of Underwater De- heels of Operation DETACHMENT . molition Team (UDT) and minesweep- The two widely varying viewpoints of Marine and Navy naval gunfire plan- 11 CG, VAC ltr to ComPhibPac, dtd 240ct44, ning staffs soon found their expression op. cit., p . 6. 1° ComPhibPac ltr to CG, VAC, dtd 15Nov44, 17 Forrestel, Admiral Spruance, p . 171. in Iwo Preliminary Gunfire Requirements . THE PRELIMINARIES 491 ing operations, as well as the systematic the preliminary bombardment the preparatory missions, should not be less absolute minimum necessary for suc- than nine days.20 cess. General Smith went on to warn Admiral Turner countered the VAC that unless the strong Japanese defenses recommendations with a letter that were destroyed or at least neutralized, praised the Marine planners and at the casualties far beyond any heretofore same time dashed icy water on any suffered in the Central Pacific had to hopes that VAC would receive anything be expected ; in fact, the success of the approaching the nine days of naval entire operation might be jeopardized .22 gunfire. In Turner's words On 30 November, it appeared that . . . the preliminary Naval Gunfire Esti- Admiral Turner was willing to go along mates for the assault of Iwo Jima given in with four days of naval gunfire, provided the basic letter are much the best such both that the Commander Fifth Fleet analysis ever submitted to this command . agreed, and that the fast carrier strike It is desired not only to meet the wishes force could deliver its blow against expressed in the letter as far as limita- tions of ships, ammunition, and time per- Japan on D minus 4.23 Upon being ap- mit, but also to furnish even more support prised for the recommended extra day than asked for, up to the limit of naval of naval gunfire, Admiral Spruance capabilities .' disapproved the request. The rejection Attached to the basic letter were was based on three reasons . First, comments supporting the naval view- Spruance insisted that the initial sur- point. Once again, the efforts of VAC face bombardment had to coincide with to obtain what it considered a minimum the initial carrier attack upon the Tokyo amount of naval gunfire preparation area. Second, the Commander, Fifth had been thwarted . Nevertheless, Gen- Fleet, thought that the situation on Iwo eral Schmidt was not yet ready to ac- Jima differed from that previously cept the inevitable . By way of another encountered on Saipan for the reason proposal, this one a severe compromise, that by D-Day the enemy personnel and he asked that the preliminary bombard- fixed defenses at Iwo would have been ment begin on D minus 4 . under heavy shore-based air attack for In this request, the Commading Gen- a considerable period of time . Accord- eral, VAC, was strongly seconded by ing to Spruance, this prolonged air General Holland Smith, who pointed out bombardment, which was not under- that from lessons learned in previous taken at Saipan, had to be considered at operations and from continued study least as effective as the recommended and analysis of Operation DETACH- additional day of ship bombardment . MENT, he considered four full days for Third, the admiral pointed out that there would be no early opportunity for

20 CG VAC ltr to CG, FMFPac, dtd 8Nov44, "CG, FMFPac ltr to ComPhibPac, dtd 26- in ibid. Nov44, in ibid. 2' ComPhibPac ltr to CG, VAC, dtd 26Nov44, ComPhibPac ltr to Com'FifthFlt, dtd 30Nov- in ibid. 44,in ibid. 492 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS replacement of naval ammunition, a ment then planned not only would in- large proportion of which had to be crease the overall time necessary to saved for support on D-Day. There was complete the operation, but also would a limit to the quantity of ammunition require an unnecessary expenditure of available for pre-D-Day bombardment lives during the initial assault phase .25 and no advantage was seen in deliver- In his memoirs, General Smith con- ing that quantity in four days rather ceded with some bitterness that his than in three.24 warning did not fall on fertile ground Still, the last word on the subject of Limited, against our better judgment, to naval gunfire support had not yet been only three days' preliminary bombardment spoken, and during the first week of there seemed nothing to do but make the best of the situation . . . Thus we were January the Marines tried again. On defeated-a group of trained and experi- the 2d, General Schmidt once again enced land fighters, our full realization of pleaded for an extension of the pre- the necessity for naval gunfire based on liminary bombardment period . On this many previous island operations-again occasion, he suggested that either the overridden by the naval mind. Finding ourselves in this dilemma, we had tried time allotted for the preliminary bom- our best to enlighten the high command, bardment be increased or the fire be feeling that our judgment would be re- concentrated against the main landing spected, but naval expediency won again .° beaches, leaving other parts of the island Even while the duration of the pre- for later. Once again, General Holland liminary naval bombardment was still Smith supported the VAC request add- under discussion, the force required to ing that since the overall time element deliver this fire was being organized . was an important factor in the capture The Amphibious Support Force (TF of Iwo Jima, a preliminary bombard- 52), commanded by Rear Admiral ment of sufficient time would actually Blandy, consisted of a Gunfire and Cov- reduce the duration of the operation. ering Force (TF 54) under Rear Ad- Smith reiterated that the effects of the miral Rodgers ; a Support Carrier Group horizontal bombing attacks on the (TG 52.2) under Rear Admiral Calvin objective had thus far been negligible T. Durgin ; a Mine Group (TG 52.3), and that the final result of the air of- commanded by Rear Admiral Alexander fensive against the island could not be Sharp ; an Underwater Demolition expected to measure up to the benefits Group (TG 52.4), commanded by Cap- derived from an additional day of naval tain B . Hall Hanlon ; Gunboat Support bombardment. The Commanding Gen- Units One and Two (TUs 52 .5.1 and eral, FMFPac, warned that only an 52.2.2), headed by Commander Michael adequate, methodical preliminary bom- J. Malanaphy ; and an Air Support Unit bardment could reduce the island de- (TU 52.10), under Captain Elton C. fenses to a point where a quick capture Parker. was assured . The preliminary bombard- CG, FMFPac ltr to ComFifthFlt, dtd 6Jan45, in ibid. "ComFifthFlt, ltr to ComPhibPac, dtd 2- Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, pp . Dec44, in ibid. 246-247 . THE PRELIMINARIES 493 The limitation of the preliminary the preassault period . Lieutenant Colo- bombardment to three days placed a nel Weller was also on board the Estes, heavy burden on the support ships of heading the Marine gunfire team . Ma- TF 54, whose mission it was to knock rines under his command were stationed out or neutralize the most powerful and on board each ship participating in the menacing enemy defenses prior to preassault firing . The bombardment D-Day. There were no less than 724 plan incorporated lessons learned in the Type A and B priority targets '27 to be European and Pacific Theaters of Oper- destroyed during 16, 17, and 18 Feb- ations. Iwo Jima had been divided into ruary. The mission was to be executed numbered squares and each square was by 6 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 1 assigned to a specific ship . (See Map light cruiser, and 16 destroyers . The 27) . Every target was numbered, and battleships were the Tennessee, Idaho, on board the Estes was a master card Texas, New York, Nevada, and Arkan- index which consisted of a card with ap- sas ; the Chester, Salt Lake City, Tus- propriate information for each target . caloosa, and Pensacola made up the Carrier pilots, with special training as heavy cruiser force ; the light cruiser gunfire spotters, were ready to take to was the Vicksburg . The Arkansas, the air from the carrier Wake Island to Texas, and Nevada were veterans of the act as eyes for the bombardment ships . Normandy invasion in June 1944 ; the An elaborate radio net had been set up New York had seen previous service to coordinate the efforts of the various during the invasion of North Africa in gunfire teams . Since area bombardment 1942. Two new battleships, the North had been found wasteful and inefficient Carolina and the Washington, each in previous operations, all fire support equipped with 16-inch guns, were the units had been ordered to fire only when most powerful ships initially slated to specific targets could be identified and the effects of the shelling could be ob- take part in the preinvasion bombard- 28 ment. They were withdrawn, however, served from the air . to take part in the strike of Task Force Early on 16 February, just as 58 against Tokyo . Admiral Mitscher was launching his On board the AGC Estes were Ad- planes against the Japanese homeland, miral Blandy and his staff, responsible Admiral Blandy's bombardment fleet for all operations against Iwo during appeared off Iwo Jima in plain view of the Japanese garrison. Aware of the 2P Target priorities for the preliminary bom- approach of the invasion force, General bardment were : Priority A: Installations Kuribayashi had on the previous night threatening ships, aircraft, and UDT opera- dispatched to Tokyo an urgent request tions (coast defense and antiaircraft guns, Imperial Japanese Fleet to come artillery emplacements and antitank guns) . for the Priority B : Installations threatening the land- out and engage the American forces . ing force in the ship to shore movement (block- The reply to his urgent plea was houses, covered artillery, pillboxes, machine negative ; the Imperial Fleet would not guns, and command posts) . Priority C : Instal- lations such as caves, ammunition and fuel Adm W. H. P. Blandy ltr to CMC, dtd dumps, and bivouac areas . 20Jan53, in Iwo Comments.

494 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

NAVAL GUNFIRE AREAS

OF RESPONSIBILITY

D-3 AND D-2

Map 27 E .L Wilson THE PRELIMINARIES 495 come out now, but on 1 April, when it During the afternoon of the 16th, would sally forth and push the Ameri- little more was accomplished as far as cans back all the way to the mainland .29 the destruction of primary targets on The shore bombardment began at Iwo Jima was concerned. During one 0800, with support vessels following the tense moment, the pilot of one of the minesweepers. It became apparent al- spotter planes from the Peinsacola, an most at once that prevailing weather OS2U Kingfisher, reported that there conditions precluded the execution of was a Zero on his tail. To everyone's scheduled firing. A low ceiling made surprise, the much faster Zero missed it impossible for observers and spot- the slow moving target, and as he roared ters to perform their duties . Each ship by, the pilot of the spotter plane fired fired in its assigned sector only when into the Japanese fighter's tail, causing the weather permitted . On those in- the plane to crash . The appearance of frequent occasions, intensive antiair- this Zero marked the only aerial opposi- craft fire from the island forced observa- tion the Japanese offered throughout tion planes to maintain an altitude the day. above 3,000 feet, too high for an ac- During the late afternoon, members curate assessment of the effects of the of UDT 13 proceeded in small boats to naval gunfire . Higashi Rock, about 11/2 miles off the Despite the unfavorable weather, the eastern beaches, where they placed a air offensive against Iwo continued on marker which flashed at two-second in- D minus 3, though on a vastly reduced tervals, to be used as a guide for the scale. Eight Navy fighters attacked Air- assault troops. The Japanese observed field Number 1 with rockets, while other the men on the rock and fired at them, carrier aircraft attacked gun emplace- but failed to inflict any casualties. ments on Mount Suribachi . During the Their mission completed, the frogmen afternoon, 42 B-24 bombers arrived withdrew. At 1800, the bombardment from the Marianas, but by this time the ships sailed further out to sea for the overcast had thickened, so Admiral night. An undetermined number of the Blandy ordered them back home with several hundred priority targets on Iwo their bombs still aboard. Altogether, on had been destroyed by the first day's 16 February, carrier aircraft from Rear bombardment . Poor visibility precluded Admiral Calvin T. Durgin's Support an accurate assessment of the results . Carrier Group (TG 52.2) flew 158 It was not an auspicious beginning for sorties. Until the airfields on Iwo were the Marines . secured, carrier-based aircraft would Six hundred miles to the north, Ad- have to furnish all the close air support miral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force had for the combat troops ashore 30 also gone into action on the 16th . From a launching position only 60 miles off

2 D Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 67. the Japanese mainland, TF 58 unleashed 3D USS Makin Island Action Report, Iwo its carrier planes against the Tokyo Jima, 1OFeb-11-Mar45, pp . 2-3. area in the early morning hours, spe- 496 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

cifically against aircraft plants that ing of the previous day . All indications previous Army Air Forces B-29 raids were that the second day of the preland- had failed to obliterate . Despite a low ing bombardment would be more suc- ceiling and bad weather, the carrier cessful than the first, for the morning's pilots, in two days of pounding the Japa- weather had brought clear skies and nese homeland, inflicted heavy damage excellent visibility. The schedule for 17 on enemy war plants. In addition, TF 58 February called for fighter sweeps claimed 341 enemy planes shot down, against Chichi Jima, minesweeping off 190 destroyed on the ground, at a cost Iwo Jima, and beach reconnaissance by of 60 aircraft lost in combat and 28 Underwater Demolition Teams, closely operationally.31 When weather condi- supported by the large ships, destroyers, tions deteriorated on 17 February and and LCI gunboats. During the early temperatures dropped so low that a afternoon, B-24s were slated to give the considerable number of guns of carrier island another going over. aircraft froze, Admiral Mitscher can- Shortly after 0800, a dozen mine- celled further strikes. After recovering sweepers approached to within 750 its planes, TF 58 began retiring towards yards of the island, searching for mines Iwo Jima during the afternoon of the and obstacles and probing the reefs and 17th, a day sooner than had been plan- shoals. The tiny wooden vessels drew ned . During the night from 17-18 Feb- small arms fire from Mount Suribachi, ruary, destroyers of TF 58 en route to but refused to be deterred from their the landing force objective destroyed mission. No mines or shallows were several small enemy picket boats and discovered. At 0840, the battleships rammed a fourth . In passing Chichi Nevada, Idaho, and Tennessee moved to Jima and Haha Jima to the north of within 3,000 yards from shore to Iwo, carrier planes attacked the airfield provide close support for the UDT team on the former and destroyed several operations scheduled for 1100 that small vessels offshore. TF 58 approached morning. The three vessels opened fire Iwo Jima during the afternoon of the at almost point blank range . It quickly 18th and prepared to lend direct sup- became apparent that the Japanese did port to the landings scheduled for the not intend to take this bombardment morning of the 19th. lying down, and the covering fire sup- The activities of Admiral Blandy's port vessels drew heavy fire from enemy bombardment force off Iwo Jima on 17 shore batteries . First to receive a hit February were to be of decisive impor- was the Tennessee, which had four men tance, particularly in view of the fact injured shortly before 0900, though the that little damage on the Japanese ship itself suffered no damage 32 defenses had been inflicted by the shell- Around 0930, the Pensacola came close in under the cliffs of the east coast al TF 58 OpRpt, 1OFeb-4Mar45, hereafter of Iwo in order to provide cover for the TF 58 OpRpt ; cf. ComAirPac "Analysis of Air minesweepers. Even though the Japa- Operations, Tokyo Carrier Strikes, Feb45," dtd 28Apr45, cited in Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 25. " TF 52 AR, p. A-38. THE PRELIMINARIES 497 nese had received specific orders to hold gunfire against the beaches . This fire, their fire, the temptation for one gun and particularly the launching of the crew of having such a juicy target pass rockets, presumably led the enemy to within 1,500 meters of its gun proved believe that an assault against Iwo Jima too much ; the enemy gunner opened was under way . In any case, contrary to fire at the heavy cruiser with the 150mm the orders they had received to hold gun. The first round was 50 yards short . their fire until the assault force had The Pensacola took immediate evasive landed, Japanese heavy artillery to the action, but by this time the Japanese north of the eastern beaches and at the had the range and in a matter of three foot of Suribachi opened fire on the minutes scored six hits on the vessel . lightly armored gunboats . In the course The shells wrecked the combat informa- of this uneven contest, which continued tion center, set fire to a plane on the for 45 minutes, the LCIs absorbed a starboard catapult, punctured the hull, severe pounding . An official report and killed 17 and wounded 120 of the noted ship's crew. 33 Among the dead was the The personnel of these little gunboats executive officer. Despite the heavy displayed magnificent courage as they re- damage and the extensive casualties, the turned fire with everything they had and Pensacola continued to fire as she with- refused to move out until they were drew to extinguish the fire and repair forced to do so by material and personnel casualties. Even then, after undergoing damage. She continued to carry out her terrific punishment, some returned to mission, ceasing fire from time to time their stations amid a hail of fire, until while casualties were being operated on again heavily hit. Relief LCI (G) s replaced and given blood transfusions.34 damaged ships without hesitation." Shortly before 1100, nearly 100 UDT During the furious though unequal swimmers headed for the island . The exchange of fire, all of the 12 gunboats hazardous mission of these daredevil were hit. The Japanese damaged LCI frogmen was to check beach and surf 474 so badly that the crew had to conditions, look for underwater ob- abandon the ship ; when it capsized stacles both at the approaches to the later, friendly shells sent it to the bot- landing beaches themselves and on the tom. Intensive fire from destroyers and beaches, and to destroy any such im- fire support ships, and a smoke screen pediments while in plain view of the laid by white phosphorus projectiles, enemy. As the swimmers neared the is- were used to cover this operation . Fire land, they came under heavy mortar support ships took on board casualties and small arms fire . Covering them from the LCI (G) s as they withdrew . were 12 LCIs, stationed about 1,000 Altogether, 7 men had been killed and yards offshore, from where they directed 153 wounded in the LCIs ; the destroyer a steady barrage of rockets and 40mm Le, tze also had received a direct hit which killed 7 and wounded 33. Only I TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec H, MedRpt, Table 6 of the 12 gunboats, LCIs 438, 449, II, p . 6. 33 U. S. Fleet OpRpt, Iwo Jima, pp. 1-13. 33 I bid. 498 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

450, 466, 457, and 469 made it back to ships began to pound top priority Saipan under their own power . targets on the east coast . The heavy By 1220 all of the frogmen, with one enemy fire from hitherto unsuspected exception, had been recovered ; the fate positions had brought home to officers of the missing man was to remain un- conducting the preliminary bombard- known. The members of the four UDT ment the fact that a large amount of teams had accomplished their mission. damage remained to be inflicted on the Their reconnaissance had disclosed that enemy installations . Admiral Blandy re- there were no underwater or beach vised ammunition allotments upward obstructions or minefields . Beach and to permit heavier concentrations of fire surf conditions were found to be favor- against the eastern beaches, particularly able for a landing. In fact, some of the those areas sheltering the recently spot- swimmers actually had crawled out of ted enemy coast defense guns . Admiral the water to collect soil samples for Rodgers, commanding the Gunfire and examination on board ship .3° Covering Force (TF 54), recommended While the badly damaged LCIs were to Admiral Blandy that all available withdrawing out to sea, the Nevada fire power be brought to bear against delivered a heavy and concentrated top priority installations around Mount counterbattery fire against the enemy Suribachi and on the high ground north artillery positions until 1240 . At the of the eastern beaches. This recom- same time, the battleship Tennessee and mendation was approved, and for the two others, the Idaho and the Nevada, remainder of the 17th, Fire Support put down a smoke screen along the Units One and Two, including the entire eastern beach area to cover the Nevada, Idaho, Tennessee, Vicksburg, withdrawal of the frogmen . The smoke and Salt Lake City executed close range screen also obscured the view of sup- fire missions against those areas. porting destroyers and battleships, The UDT reconnaissance of the west- which experienced difficulty in picking ern beaches got under way at 1615, out enemy weapons because of the under the protection of three battleships smoke screen over the water and the dust and a cruiser. Once again, the swim- kicked up by shells bursting on the mers drew Japanese automatic weapons island. and rifle fire, but on this occasion there The work of the UDTs was not were no casualties and at 1800 the frog- completed with the exploration of the men, having completed the reconnais- eastern beaches ; a reconnaissance of the sance, returned to their APDs. One western beaches was scheduled for the mine was discovered and destroyed. No afternoon of the 17th. As elements of minefields or water obstacles blocked the UDTs were preparing for the second the approach to the western beaches . reconnaissance, heavy bombardment Both beaches and surf conditions were thought to be suitable for landing . TF 52 AR, Pt C, p. 1, ; Cdr D . L. Kauffman, Twenty-two Marines from the recon- USN, ltr to HistBr, HQMC, dtd 13Jan53, in naissance companies of the 4th and 5th Iwo Comments . Marine Divisions had accompanied the THE PRELIMINARIES 499

UDT teams on both beach reconnais- In a similar vein, Admiral Soemu sance exploits. Upon completion of these Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the, missions, the Marines returned to their Combined Fleet, sent the following mes- units on board commandd ships at sea . sage to Rear Admiral Ichimaru on Iwo The intelligence collected by the recon- Despite very powerful enemy bombings naissance men provided assault unit and shellings, your unit at Iwo coolly commanders with current information judged the enemy intentions and foiled about the area they were soon to en- the first landing attempt and serenely awaits the next one, determined to hold counter. Iwo at any cost. I am greatly elated to As a result of good weather through- know that, and I wish you to continue to out 17 February, aviation also carried maintain high morale and repulse the out destructive raids on Iwo Jima dur- enemy, no matter how intense his attacks, ing the day. Carrier pilots flew a total and safeguard the outer defenses of our homeland .' of 226 sorties, not counting search and patrol missions . The main targets of Even as the Japanese were rejoicing these attacks were dual-purpose guns at the thought of having driven an and antiaircraft automatic weapons assault force back out to sea, the top around the airfields and beach areas . echelon of the American invasion force Napalm dropped by eight Navy fighters met in Admiral Blandy's cabin on board during the day had only limited suc- the Estes. The atmosphere was not a cess. Some of the bombs did not release ; joyful one, for only one more day others failed to ignite upon hitting the remained, and two days of bombard- ground. In any case, there was little ment had inflicted comparatively little left to burn on Iwo. The Japanese did damage on enemy installations on shore . not remain passive in the face of the In fact, following two days of heavy continuous air attacks, for heavy anti- shelling, the Iwo defenses looked more aircraft fire met the attacking planes . formidable than ever . In Blandy's A force of 42 Army Air Forces B-24 presence, Commander W . P. Chilton, bombers dropped bombs from an alti- the gunnery officer, and Lieutenant tude of 5,000 feet, scoring hits in the Colonel Weller, representing the land- target area. As far as could be ascer- ing force, discussed what should be tained, however, this bombing inflicted done. Weller urged that on the last day little or no known damage to enemy remaining, all available fire-power be installations .3T brought to bear against the defenses Late on the 17th, it became apparent commanding the beaches . Admiral that the Japanese really believed that Blandy approved this recommendation they had repulsed an invasion of Iwo at once.39 earlier that day . Radio Tokyo reported According to the modified plan drawn that the American landings had been up on the evening of 17 February, four frustrated and that five warships, in- 3' Adm Soemu Toyoda msg to RAdm Toshi- cluding a battleship, had been sunk . nosuke Ichimaru n.d., in Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 82-83 . ' TF 52 AR, Encl I, p. 1. ae VAC NGF and Air Rpts, p . 15 . 500 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS battleships, the Tennessee, Nevada, New coast defense guns, 22 out of 33 five- York, and California, as well as the inch dual-purpose guns, 16 of 20 large heavy cruiser Chester, were to con- blockhouses, and nearly half of the 93 centrate their entire armament of 5-, pillboxes had been destroyed or heavily 8-, and 14-inch guns in a blanket bom- damaged . bardment of the landing areas. The While Iwo was receiving a final going ships received permission to fire all over by the bombardment group, Sev- unexpended ammunition, except that enth Air Force bombers arrived over needed for D-Day, provided the weather the island after a long flight from the permitted it . Marianas. Once again the weather failed Promptly at 0745 on the morning of to cooperate, and the air strike had to the 18th, Admiral Rodgers ordered his be cancelled . Naval aviators of the Sup- Gunfire and Covering Force to "close port Carrier Group, commanded by Rear beach and get going ."40 These ships im- Admiral Calvin T. Durgin, flew 28 mediately moved to within 2,500 yards sorties against positions flanking the offshore and opened fire . In line with landing beaches . These were the last Blandy's special order, the Tennessee of 612 sorties flown by carrier planes and Idaho were to concentrate their fire against ground targets on Iwo Jima against the batteries sited at the foot prior to D-Day . Only three of the naval of Mount Suribachi, as well as against aircraft fell victim to enemy ground the coast defense guns emplaced on the fire, and their air crews were rescued .42 rim of a quarry about 400 yards north Late on 18 February, a low-flying of the East Boat Basin . In executing enemy plane was to strike a brief but this vital mission in somewhat less than vicious blow against the invasion force . five hours, the Tennessee expended a At 2130, the Blessman (APD-48) was total of 333 rounds ; the Idaho fired 280 hit by an enemy bomb which exploded rounds during the same period of time 41 in the troop space above the forward Unfortunately, the weather on 18 fireroom . In addition to serious material February was not nearly so favorable as damage, 2 of the courageous frogmen on the preceding day . Visibility, only of UDT 15, who had emerged from the fair throughout most of the day, was hazardous beach reconnaissance mis- reduced to poor during the frequent sions of the previous day un- light rains on D minus 1 . Despite the harmed, were killed, and 20 were handicap imposed by poor observation, wounded. The crew of the Blessman the massive bombardment was having suffered 11 wounded .43 This attack on its effect. When the last day of the prep- the evening of 18 February was the aratory fire ended shortly before 1830, only action by enemy aircraft to inflict vital enemy installations had sustained any damage on American units at or massive damage . Among 201 major near Iwo during the preinvasion oper- targets in the main landing area, 11 ations. °TF 52 AR, Encl D, p. 9. d0 TF 52 AR, p . 11 . °TF 51 AR, Pt IV, p . 13 ; TF 52 AR, Encl VAC NGF and Air Rpts, p . 15. H, p. 1. THE PRELIMINARIES 501

All that remained now before Marines for nine days of preparatory gunfire and would hit the Iwo beaches the follow- then withdrew two of the 16-inch gun ing morning was the execution of the ships to provide antiaircraft fire for D-Day fires in preparation for the land- Task Force 58, Admiral Spruance had ings. This pre-H-Hour bombardment told him : "I regret this confusion would be the Navy's final opportunity caused in your carefully laid plans, but to pound the enemy defenses before the I know you and your people will get assault. In fact, when the heavy sup- away with it ."46 Smith realized even port units withdrew from Iwo on the then that any curtailment in the dura- evening of the 18th, the softening-up tion and volume of preparatory naval phase had already come to an end . On gunfire would be paid for with the lives the eve of D-Day, Admiral Blandy sent of many Marines . Years later, the gen- this message to Admiral Turner eral was to recall Though weather has not permitted com- I felt certain we would lose 15,000 men plete expenditure of entire ammunition at Iwo Jima . This number was the abso- allowance and more installations can be lute minimum calculated in our plans found and destroyed with one more day of made at Pearl Harbor, although some of bombardment, I believe landing can be my officers wistfully predicted a lower accomplished tomorrow as scheduled if figure . So far as the Marines were con- necessary. I recommend, however, special cerned, we had made every preparation attention before and during landing to humanly possible to capture the island as flanks and East Coast of island with neu- expeditiously and as economically as pos- tralizing fire and white phosphorus pro- sible . We were to land 60,000 assault jectiles immediately available if required ." troops, and the estimate that one in every four would be dead or wounded never left The final night before the landings my mind. was one of deep soul-searching for Gen- I was not afraid of the outcome of the eral Holland Smith, who found that battle . I knew we would win . We always "the imminence of action and the had. But contemplation of the cost in lives caused me many sleepless nights." responsibility for the most appalling operation we had yet undertaken As night descended upon Iwo Jima weighed heavily."45 This veteran Marine and its surrounding dark waters on the commander was filled with apprehension evening of the 18th, the preliminary by the gravity of the coming battle . bombardment phase came to an end . Weeks earlier, Smith recalled, when the Early on the 19th a new phase, the as- Navy had overruled the Marines' request sault would begin . The invasion of Iwo Jima would take place without modifica- "CTF 52 msg to CTF 51, NCR 60303, dtd tion of the carefully laid plans . 18Feb45, as cited in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p. 49. "Ibid., p . 247 . " Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 253. 'Ibid., pp . 253-254 . CHAPTER 4

D-Day on Iwo Jima 1

PRE H-HOUR BOMBARDMENT' Hill arrived off Iwo Jima and joined Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Early on 19 February, the assault Force. As dawn rose over Iwo Jima, ships of Task Force 53 under Admiral more than 450 ships of the Fifth Fleet ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this lay offshore, the largest armada ever chapter is derived from : U . S . Flt Ops Rpt, assembled thus far for a military oper- 16Feb-16Mar45 ; TF 51 AR ; TF 52 AR ; TF ation in the Pacific Theater . 56 AR ; TF 56 G-3 Jnl, 26Jan-14Mar45, here- Included in Admiral Hill's Attack after TF 56 G-3 Jnl ; TG 53.2 AR, 19Feb- 4Mar45, hereafter TG 53.2 AR; PhibGru 2 Force were the troop ships carrying the AR; VAC AR ; VAC G-2 Rpts ; VAC C-3 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The huge Jnl, 25Jan-27Mar45, hereafter VAC C-3 Jnl ; vessels headed towards the transport VAC C-3 PerRpt, 19Feb-26Mar45, hereafter area about 10,000 yards offshore. On VAC C-3 Rpt ; VAC C-4 Jnl, 6-13Mar45, here- board the ships, 50,000 Marines ate a after VAC C-4 Jnl ; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 4th MarDiv G-2 PerRpts, 19-25Feb45, hereafter hearty breakfast and went topside for 4th MarDiv G-2 Rpts ; 4th MarDiv D-3 Per- a glance at the island which they would Rpts, 8Feb-17Mar45, hereafter 4th MarDiv shortly assault . There was little to see . D-3 Rpts ; 4th MarDiv D-4 PerRpts, 3Jan- Almost totally obscured by the dark- 19Mar45, hereafter 4th MarDiv D-4 Rpts ; 5th ness, the island appeared as a shadowy MarDiv AR ; 5th MarDiv G-1 Jnl, 19Feb- 26Mar45, hereafter 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; 5th mass of land, dominated by Mount MarDiv D-2 PerRpts, 19Feb-26Mar45, here- Suribachi which "gave thousands of after 5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts ; 5th MarDiv straining eyes aboard ship only periodic D-3 Jnl, 19Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 5th MarDiv glimpses of its sharp, vertical-cone ."3 D-3 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv D-4 Jnl, 19Feb-26Mar45, It was apparent by early morning hereafter 5th MarDiv D-4 Jnl ; Iwo Comments ; Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Sherrod, Marine that the landing force would encounter Corps Aviation in World War II ; Craven and favorable weather. The sea was rela- Cate, The Pacific ; Proehl, The Fourth Marine tively smooth and surf conditions were Division ; Conner, The Fifth Marine Division ; satisfactory . The sky was clear ; visi- Newcomb, Iwo Jima ; Morehouse, The Iwo Jima bility was virtually unlimited, and the Campaign ; T. Grady Gallant, The Friendly Dead (New York : Doubleday and Company, temperature was 68 degrees . Wind Inc., 1964), hereafter Gallant, The Friendly velocity was eight to ten knots from the Dead, quoted with permission . north. 'Additional material in this section is de- Promptly at 0640, the heavy support rived from : Fifth Flt NGF rpt; Iwo Prelimi- ships launched the pre-H-Hour bom- nary Gunfire Requirements ; TF 53 AR ; TF 56 AirRpt ; TF 56 Preliminary NGF Rpt ; bardment, as Admiral Rodgers' Gunfire VAC NGF and Air Rpts; Henri et. al., Ma- rines on Iwo Jima. ' Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 43. 502 D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 503 and Covering Force hurled tons of high lowered the landing craft, which circled explosives into the island . This was the as they waited to be boarded by the last chance to silence the heavy enemy Marines. On the tank decks of the LSTs, guns that dominated the boat lanes and the engines of the LVTs were started, beaches, and the gun crews of the and Marines took their places in the North Carolina, Washington, New York, vehicles assigned to them to await the Texas, Arkansas, and Nevada turned-to launching signal . The signal was given with grim determination . As shell bursts at 0725 ; less than half an hour later, flicked flame, smoke, and chunks of Iwo 482 amtracs were churning the water, into the air, it appeared as if the bom- ready to carry eight battalions into bardment were intended to blow the battle.5 very island out of the sea . Even the The prelanding bombardment pro- dead crater of Mount Suribachi seemed ceeded exactly as scheduled . A few to come to life as it steamed from suc- minutes after 0800, the naval guns cessive hits along its lip . Blasts, follow- lifted their fire and 120 fighters and ing one another in close succession, bombers of TF 58 swept over the island rocked the beaches, the airfields, and in two waves. The aircraft concentrated the northern portion of Iwo with its their attack against the slopes of Mount numerous hills and gullies . Suribachi, the landing beaches, and the In addition to the heavy gunfire ships, high ground to the north of the landing the gunboat and mortar support groups beaches. Following the bombing and participated in the preparatory fire . The strafing by the first wave, the second latter groups consisted of 42 LCI gun- arrived over the island and unleashed boats. Twelve of the LCIs were armed napalm, rockets, and machine gun fire with 4.5-inch rockets and 40mm guns ; against the defenders . Included in the 18 carried 4 .2-inch mortars, and 9 were second wave were 24 Marine F4U Cor- equipped with 5-inch rocket launchers .4 sairs under the command of Lieutenant The LCIs joined the bombardment by Colonel William A . Millington, com- the big ships at 0730 and, throughout manding VMF-124 on board the Essex. the morning, expended nearly 10,000 The squadron commander led his rockets and large quantities of mortar flight over Iwo Jima to attack the flanks ammunition while showering the slopes and high ground along the landing of Mount Suribachi and the high ground beaches. From H minus 45 to H minus to the north of the beaches with rocket 35, the planes remained over the island and mortar fire . and launched their attacks in accord- At the same time, initial prepara- ance with a plan previously worked tions for boating the assault force got out between Millington and Colonel under way . LSTs and troop transports Vernon E. Megee, Commander of the eased into the areas assigned to them Landing Force Air Support Control and prepared to discharge their cargo of Unit and Deputy Commander, Aircraft, troops and equipment . The transports Landing Force. Prior to the mission,

`VAC NGF Rpt, pp . 25-26. 6 Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 51 . 504 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Megee had admonished the fighter assault troops approached the shore, squadron commander to "go in and the naval bombardment shifted ahead scrape your bellies on the beach"e and to provide the mightiest preinvasion that is precisely what Millington pro- shelling thus far experienced in the posed to do. Pacific Theater . In less than 30 minutes, While these air strikes were under more than 8,000 shells smashed into the way, the gunfire support ships moved beach area . closer to the shore and assumed posi- In other amphibious assaults in the tions from which they would deliver Pacific Theater, naval gunfire had the final neutralization fires . A strike sometimes lifted too far inland when by 44 Army Air Forces bombers had the troops came ashore . This lack of also been scheduled prior to H-Hour, adequate fires close to landing areas had but over half of the Liberators failed resulted in heavy casualties early in the to complete the trip from the Marianas ; operation, notably at Saipan . In order only 15 arrived to drop 19 tons of 100- to prevent this situation from arising pound bombs on the eastern defenses at Iwo Jima, VAC recommended the of Iwo.7 use of a rolling barrage reminiscent of At 0825, the naval bombardment re- the massive artillery concentrations of sumed. Since only a half hour remained World War I. Such a barrage had to before the first assault wave would hit be precisely timed to keep the fire just the beaches, all available fire was di- ahead of the advancing troops ; infantry rected against the landing sites . As the commanders had to exercise maximum last phase of the pre-assault bombard- care to keep their men from advancing ment got under way, air bursts were faster than the scheduled time for lift- employed to annihilate any Japanese ing the barrage forward . The rolling that might be caught out in the open. barrage was to be delivered by the 5- The naval gunners subsequently shifted inch batteries, whose gunners were to to impact rounds as time for the ap- maintain a 400-yard margin of safety proach of the first assault wave grew ahead of the friendly troops . If, for any near. During the final 15 minutes of the reason, the attack bogged down and bombardment, the naval vessels off- did not move forward as rapidly as shore blasted the invasion beaches with anticipated, certain prearranged fires everything they had. The thunderous were to be repeated .8 roar of the 16-inch guns was supple- Only minutes remained to H-Hour. mented by the sharper bark of the 5- None of the officers responsible for the and 8-inch guns of the destroyers and preliminary bombardment could fath- cruisers . Rocket craft unleashed their om the effect of the damage inflicted fire, and mortar boats shelled inland to on the enemy defenses ; at best they a depth of about 1,000 yards. As the could hope that the naval bombardment and the aerial bombing and strafing had 'Colonel Vernon E. Megee, as quoted in seriously diminished the enemy's ability Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, p. 347. ' Craven and Cate, the Pacific, pp . 591-592. 8 VAC NGF and Air Rpts, p . 23 . D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 505 to frustrate the imminent landings . The Iwo Jima were fully aware of what lay Marines about to hit the hostile beaches ahead ; there had been no attempt at would be the first to know for certain concealing the fact that a tough and how strongly the enemy could still react costly battle awaited them. Men of the to their amphibious assault . 4th Marine Division were going in with the prayer of their commander, Gen- THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT 9 eral Cates, that as many of them as For the Marines in the assault waves, possible might be spared . General D-Day had started with the traditional Schmidt felt that it would be a bitter but meal of steak and eggs. Shortly after short fight. 0800, while naval shells were rocking The men in the assault waves hoped Iwo, the amphibian tractors carrying that the Navy could come up to its eight Marine battalions to the Iwo expectation of knocking out all defenses beaches were churning in the water . A on the beaches, as well as most other line of departure had been established targets further inland. Their mood about two miles offshore and parallel to varied from incredulity that any of the the beach. At each end of this line, a defenders could survive the heavy naval control vessel was stationed to mark its bombardment to skepticism born out of boundaries . A central control vessel oc- past experience . Many Marines remem- cupied the middle of the line . Along the bered how many of the Japanese had line, at regular intervals, small vessels survived similar bombardments on Ta- marked the boat lanes . The assistant rawa, Guam, and Peleliu . There was division commanders, Brigadier Gen- also some wishful thinking ; smaller is- eral Franklin A . Hart for the 4th Ma- lands in the Volcano-Bonins had been rine Division, and Brigadier General known to sink into the ocean, and there Leo D . Hermle for the 5th, stationed was hardly a Marine in the convoy who themselves at each end of the line of de- did not hope that Iwo might put on parture as observers . such a disappearing act under the Boated and circling, the first three weight of the explosives pouring upon waves were ready to cross the line of it.1o departure by 0815 . It was from here At precisely 0830, the central control that the Marines watched the island vessel dipped her pennant, releasing the take a severe pounding from the naval first assault wave . Sixty-eight LVT- shelling and cheered as the supporting (A) s of the 2d Armored Amphibian aircraft unloaded their lethal cargo Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant over the island . The men approaching Colonel Reed M. Fawell, Jr., crossed the line of departure and headed for the 'Additional material in this section is de- beaches. While hundreds of naval shells rived from : TransDiv 45 AR ; 2d Armd Am- whistled overhead, the first wave fol- trac Bn AR, 17Apr45 ; 1st SP Bn UJn1, 19-24- Feb45 ; 2d SP Bn UJn1, 19Feb-3Mar45 ; 5th SP lowed the gunboats that poured rockets Rgt. AR, n.d. ; LSM Gru 13 AR, 19Feb-14Mar- and 40mm shells into the beach before 45, hereafter LSM Gru 13 AR ; 31st NCB AR, 9Mar45, in 5th MarDiv AR, Anx U, hereafter $1st NCB AR ; 1st JASCO OpRpt, 5Apr45 . 10 Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 34. 506 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS turning right and left respectively to proach to the objective. For some of the positions from where they continued Marines, a small sliver of hope began to to support the flank battalions . emerge that the heavy bombardment The operations plan had allowed 30 had reduced the enemy to impotence . minutes for each assault wave to travel Up to the point where the first the 4,000 yards from the line of de- LVT (A) s emerged from the water and parture to the beaches . Following the ground forward, the entire maneuver first, successive waves crossed the line had been executed with parade-ground at 250- to 300-yard intervals. The sec- precision. For the incoming Marines, ond assault wave, consisting of 1,360 the only indication of the enemy's pres- Marines in LVTs, crossed the line of ence on the island thus far had been departure two minutes behind the first confined to the air. One moment, a 5th wave. Eight more waves formed behind Marine Division observation !aircraft the first two, to be landed at five-minute was circling lazily overhead ; the next, intervals. The plan called for 9,000 men enemy antiaircraft fire scored a direct to be ashore in somewhat less than 45 hit and the small airplane spiralled into minutes. the surf. The first tractors had no When the leading wave had reached sooner reached the beach and com- a point 400 yards offshore, the naval menced heading inland than it was dis- bombardment shifted to the interior of covered that the 15-foot terrace directly the island and to the flanks . At the same behind the beach blocked their fields of time, Lieutenant Colonel Millington's fire. The height and steepness of the fighters streaked down in magnificent terrace was the first unpleasant sur- strafing which continued relentlessly as prise that the Marines were to en- the LVT (A) s approached the beaches. counter on Iwo. A second one was not In accordance with their orders, the long in coming . As the Marines of the pilots, who earlier that morning had 4th and 5th Divisions swarmed from executed the napalm and rocket strike their vehicles, it became evident that against Iwo, now hit the beaches in the composition of the volcanic sand daring low-level attacks . Just as the was not what had been expected . In- first wave came ashore, the planes stead of sand with sufficient consistency shifted their strafing runs about 500 to support at least tracked vehicles and yards inland. men on foot, Marines of the landing The ship-to-shore movement of the force, many of them weighted down assault waves was carried out accord- with more than 100 pounds of weapons ing to schedule . The first wave landed and other gear, found themselves floun- between 0859 and 0903 ; the second and dering in a sea of soft volcanic ash that third waves came ashore at two-min- all but precluded their ascending that ute intervals. The defenders remained 15-foot seawall . Almost immediately, strangely silent as the first assault the Marines sank up to their ankles into troops approached the beaches, and the the loose ash that tugged at their feet initial waves were not subjected to any and made all forward movement a enemy antiboat fire during the final ap- strenuous undertaking.

D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 507

ASSAULT TROOPS of the 4th Marine Division go ashore on Iwo Jima. (USMC 110109)

MARINES OF 2/27 hit the beach in the shadow of Mt . Suribachi. (USMC 111688) 508 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS Some of the amphibian tractors of mortar fire hit the beach within two never slackened their speed upon reach- minutes after the first wave had landed . ing the beaches but pushed their way Within 15 minutes, Marines on the Yel- straight inland, up the first terrace and low and Blue beaches were reporting beyond it until they had advanced be- heavy enemy mortar fire . To the south, tween 50 and 75 yards. Those LVT (A) s on the Red Beaches and Green 1, 5th failing to negotiate the incline headed Division Marines started to advance in- back out to sea, where they turned land against initially light opposition . around and fired inland . At 0907, the By 0930, 1/28 had moved 150 yards third wave of 1,200 men went ashore, inland. Ten minutes later, the battalion followed about five minutes later by reported receiving heavy mortar fire another 1,600 men of the fourth wave. from the left flank . By the time the Successive assault waves followed close- advance had covered 300 yards, the ly behind the first ones. There still was men were sprinkled, showered, and ulti- no organized enemy opposition though mately deluged by mortar and artillery a few isolated artillery and mortar fire from Mount Suribachi, as well as shells began to fall in the surf as the from the high ground to the north of later waves neared the shore. Except the landing beaches . The loose, slipping for a number of land mines, the beaches sand offered poor cover ; foxholes filled were found clear of man-made obstacles . in almost as fast as a man could shovel, The eight battalions of the 4th and and urgent requests for sandbags began 5th Marine Divisions that landed to fill the air waves. By 0935, Green 1 abreast on the southeastern shore of and the Red Beaches were on the re- Iwo Jima were 1/28, commanded by ceiving end of a heavy mortar barrage . Lieutenant Colonel Jackson B . Butter- Marines moving inland drew intense field, and 2/28, commanded by Lieuten- machine gun and rifle fire from well- ant Colonel Chandler W . Johnson, on concealed pillboxes, blockhouses, and Green 1 ; 2/27, under Major John A. caves as soon as they left the protective Antonelli, on Red 1 ; 1/27, under Lieu- cover of the first terrace . tenant Colonel John A. Butler, on Red While the Marines advancing into 2 ; 1/23, commanded by Lieutenant Colo- the interior of Iwo were being swamped nel Ralph Haas, on Yellow 1 ; 2/23, un- by enemy fire that was still increasing der Major Robert Davidson, on Yellow both in volume and accuracy, conges- 2 ; 1/25, headed by Lieutenant Colonel tion among the additional waves along Hollis U. Mustain, on Blue 1 ; and 3/25 the shore began to mount. The Japanese under Lieutenant Colonel James Taul, meanwhile had begun to concentrate on the southern edge of Blue 2 . their fire on LVTs and landing craft on As the men headed inland, the Japa- and near the beaches . Enemy mortars nese gradually came to life . The first and artillery soon scored numerous di- among the landing force to feel the rect hits on the hapless vessels . Jeeps enemy reaction were the men of Major and trucks emerging from those land- Davidson's 2/23 on Yellow 2 in the ing craft that had been fortunate 4th Division sector . A moderate amount enough to survive the trip ashore rolled D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 509 out on the beaches only to become bog- of attack into effect. Along the northern ged down in the treacherous volcanic part of the beachhead, the 25th Marines ash even before they had cleared the was to advance towards a quarry just ramp. Many of the small craft, their north of the East Boat Basin, which bows pinned to the beach, broached and formed the eastern anchor of the 0-1 swamped. Line denoting the objectives to be seized Despite the enemy fire, congestion at by the end of D-Day . This line, bisecting the water's edge, and initial confusion Motoyama Airfield No . 2, curved across accompanying the landings, men and the center of the island to the western supplies continued to pour ashore . shore at a point approximately 1,200 Within an hour and a half from the yards west of the airfield . Moving in- time that the Marines of the first wave land from the Yellow Beaches, the 23d had set foot on the island, all of the Marines was to advance across the eight assault battalions were ashore . northern portion of Motoyama Airfield At 1005, three LSMs carrying 16 tanks No. 1 towards Airfield No. 2. To the of Lieutenant Colonel Richard K . 27th Marines fell the task of advancing Schmidt's 4th Tank Battalion hit the inland in a northwesterly direction, Yellow Beaches. The tanks encountered slicing across the southern tip of Air- considerable difficulty in getting ashore . field No . 1 and then pivoting more to Even then, their troubles were far from the north, to reach a point west of Air- over, and three tanks struck mines less field No . 2. The 28th Marines had the than 150 yards in from the water. mission of isolating Mount Suribachi While the naval barrage was still and assaulting this formidable obstacle . providing cover, the four newly landed To this end, the 1st Battalion, landing Marine regiments prepared to reorgan- at H-Hour, was to cut across the nar- ize and begin the push inland . From row neck of the island, a distance of north to south these regiments were only 700 yards . The 2d Battalion was to the 25th Marines, commanded by Colo- nel John R. Lanigan, and the 23rd Ma- 9Apr45, 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx F, hereafter rines under Colonel Walter W . Wen- 23d Mar OpRpt ; 24th Mar OpRpt, 19Feb- singer, both belonging to the 4th Marine 18Mar45, Anx G to 4th MarDiv OpRpt, here- Division . The 5th Marine Division was after 24th Mar OpRpt; 25th Mar UJn1, 18Feb-23Mar45, hereafter 25th Mar UJnl ; represented by the 27th Marines, led 25th Mar OpRpt, 15Apr45, 4th MarDiv OpRpt, by Colonel Thomas A . Wornham, and Anx H, hereafter 25th Mar OpRpt; 28th Mar the 28th Marines under Colonel Harry UJn1, 19Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 28th Mar B. Liversedge. UJn1; 5th Tank Bn AR, Feb-Mar45, hereafter 5th Tank Bn AR ; 1/13 UJnl, 19Feb-17Mar45, THE ADVANCE INLAND" hereafter 1/13 UJn1 ; 1/24 OpRpt, 20Apr45, hereafter 1/24 OpRpt ; 2/24 AR, 19Feb- As troop strength built up ashore, 16Mar45, hereafter 2/24 AR ; 1/27 UJnl, the time had come to put the basic plan 19Feb-18Mar45, hereafter 1/27 UJn1; 2/27 UJn1, 19Feb-23Mar45, hereafter 2/27 UJn1 ; "Additional material in this section is de- 3/27 UJn1, 19Feb-23Mar45, hereafter 3/27 rived from : 13th Mar UJn1, 19Feb-21Mar45, UJn1 ; 471st Amph Truck Co (Army) OpRpt, hereafter 13th Mar UJnI ; 23d Mar OpRpt, 17Mar45, hereafter 471st Amph Trk Co OpRpt. 510 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS advance about 350 yards inland, then Captain Mears continued to attack suc- turn southward towards Mount Suri- cessive enemy positions until he became bachi. too weak to move .12 On the right, Cap- At 0935, 2/28 started to land on tain Phil E . Roach led the advance of Green 1 behind 1/28 . Its mission was to Company C across the island, carefully take up positions facing Mount Suri- maintaining the same rate of progress bachi, protecting the left flank of the as Company B . While assaulting a heav- landing force . By this time, heavy mor- ily fortified position, Captain Roach tar and artillery fire was enveloping the also became a casualty. Many men who beaches, making reorganization of the found themselves separated from their companies difficult. platoons during the dash across the As the 1st Battalion launched its 700- island formed small groups that con- yard sprint for the western shore with tinued to advance independently, thus Companies B and C abreast, accurate helping to preserve the momentum of enemy small arms fire from concealed the attack . positions began to rake the advancing The success of the 28th Marines' at- Marines. It soon became evident that the tack owed much to the support pro- advance would prove costly . The in- vided by the 60mm mortars which tensity of the enemy fire all but pre- maintained continuous fire against cluded a coordinated movement. Men groups of Japanese that had been advanced in small groups, heedless of flushed out of their emplacements . This security to their flanks ; some units fire kept the enemy on the run and were temporarily pinned down by an out in the open, where he presented a enemy who remained largely invisible . visible target to the advancing riflemen . Between the bursts of artillery and Lieutenant Richard H. Sandberg, com- mortar shells all around them, the Ma- manding Company A's mortar platoon, rines strained to get a glimpse of the spotted an enemy 90mm mortar squad defenders. What they saw was not re- and concentrated his fire on the Japa- assuring, for halfway across the island nese until they were forced to abandon a maze of mutually supporting block- their weapon . Even more remarkably, houses and pillboxes extended across in the heat of the engagement this pla- the entire front . toon leader was observed firing a 60mm In a situation where movement threat- mortar with amazing accuracy, though ened to bog down in the heavily forti- it was without a base plate.13 Before fied area, the courage of individual noon, Lieutenant Sandberg became a Marines kept the attack rolling . Among casualty and had to be evacuated . the first to distinguish himself was Cap- At 1035, elements of Company B tain Dwayne E. Mears, commanding reached the western shore of Iwo. En- Company B. Armed with only a pistol, emy fire had inflicted so many casual- the company commander personally ties and made control so difficult that assaulted a pillbox that was retarding the advance of his company . Despite a S' 5th MarDiv AR, Anx S, p . 2. wound that later proved to be fatal, Ibid, D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 511

THE INVASION OF IWO JIMA as seen through the eyes of a Japanese artist . (USA SC 301128)

DOBERMAN PINSCHER of the 6th War Dog Platoon and handler approach enemy cave. (USAF 58252 AC) 512 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS only the platoon leader, Lieutenant For such an attack, the support of Frank J. Wright, and four men of the armor was necessary . Company C of 1st Platoon, Company B, made it all the 5th Tank Battalion was therefore the way across the island . Lieutenant ordered to land in direct support of the Wesley C. Bates, leading the 2d Platoon, 28th Marines . This company had 14 and six of his men reached the western Sherman M-4 tanks, two flametanks, beach around 1100 and joined forces one tankdozer, and one retriever . When with Lieutenant Wright. they landed on Red One Beach about Even though elements of the 1st Bat- 1130, the tanks found it rough going talion had now crossed the island, by- because soft sand and storm terraces passed enemy positions continued to made exit difficult and the first terrace offer fierce resistance . Company A, was mined. By the time additional ele- which had landed in 1/28 reserve and ments of the 5th Tank Battalion got faced south towards Mount Suribachi ashore, the beach was congested by to protect the battalion's left flank, was stranded wheeled vehicles disabled by now relieved by 2/28 and joined the enemy fire. The increasing concentra- remainder of the 1st Battalion in mop- tion of men and equipment in a re- ping up. Because of the heavy casual- stricted area was beginning to cause ties 1/28 had sustained, Colonel Liver- considerable confusion . sedge requested the release of 3/28, the An eye witness had this to say about division reserve, to his control . General Company C's arrival on Iwo Jima Rockey granted this request . The bat- An infantryman picked up one of the talion, boated and prepared to land on first tanks to land and started to guide any 5th Division beach, received the him off the beach ; the route he used was order to land at 1210 . Ten minutes marked with white tape. When the tank later the first boats crossed the line of reached the top of the first terrace, he was guided to the right, across the tape departure. As the leading wave ap- and immediately struck a horn mine. One proached the shore, heavy fire from casualty was suffered, the driver having Mount Suribachi and the high ground both legs broken, the remainder of the north of the landing beaches was di- crew was badly shaken up . The interior rected at the boats. This unit suffered of the tank was so badly damaged no attempt was made to repair it. Later it many more casualties during the ship- was turned into spare parts ." to-shore movement than had the 1st and 2d Battalions . Shortly after 1300, all Altogether, eight of the battalion's elements were ashore, though it was not tanks were unable to get off the beaches . until late afternoon that the battalion Five threw tracks, one hit a mine, one was able to edge its way into the line . stuck in the sand, and one stalled .15 Following a naval gunfire preparation, Even less fortunate were other sup- and with adequate air support, the 2d and 3d Battalions were to jump off 14 Co C, 5th Tank Bn AR, Encl C, p. I, to 5th jointly at 1545 to attack south towards tank Bn AR. Mount Suribachi . ' 5th Tank Bn AR, p. 4. D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 513 porting arms units, such as the regi- jumpoff positions alongside the 2d Bat- mental rocket section of RCT 28 which talion. The tanks of Company C had landed during the morning . Enemy moved out about 200 yards when it was artillery smashed three of the four observed that the troops on the right truck-mounted rocket launchers imme- were not moving . By the time the 3d diately after landing . When the re- Battalion did get on line, it was con- maining launcher finally got into action sidered too late to launch the attack, and opened fire, a terrific explosion and Shepard's men began to dig in for rocked the target area bringing loud the night. cheers from Marines nearby ." Shortly before 1700, 2/28 launched The tanks of Company C eventually an attack of its own, supported by tanks exited the beach by a road between of Company C . By 1730, the battalion Red Beach 1 and 2, arriving in the had advanced only 150 yards and even zone of action of 1/28 about 1400 . this slight gain, obtained at the cost Lieutenant Colonel Butterfield's bat- of many casualties, had to be relin- talion at the time was pinned down, quished when 2/28 was ordered to fall suffering casualties from Japanese fire back and tie in with the 3d Battalion for coming from pillboxes and blockhouses the night. The tanks of Company C bypassed earlier . It was decided to use thereafter found themselves in the un- the entire tank company in cleaning up usual role of remaining forward of the the area. Because of minefields and lines, firing at pillboxes and covering tank traps, the tanks advanced in a the infantry units as they prepared for column which came under antitank fire the night . Company C was released immediately after moving out. Armor- from this assignment about 1845. One piercing shells penetrated the turrets tank, bogged down in a shell crater, had of two tanks, each of which suffered to be abandoned after the crew removed three casualties. Shortly thereafter, the the gun mechanism and destroyed the enemy scored a hit on a third tank, ren- radio. The company withdrew to a point dering the turret inoperative . The tank- about 300 yards from the front lines ers ultimately knocked out the hostile and dug in for a first night marked by gun. This completed their mission with almost continuous mortar fire . 1/28. At the same time that the 28th About 1600, the tanks formed up to Marines was advancing inland from support 2/28 and 3/28 in the planned Green Beach, Colonel Wornham's RCT attack towards Mount Suribachi but 27 was preparing to advance inland enemy fire was so heavy that the attack- from Red 1 and 2, where 2/27 and ing battalions could not get into their 1/27 had landed abreast. On the left, proper positions. The 3d Battalion, com- 2/27 pushed inland, initially meeting manded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles only scattered resistance . Both battal- E. Shepard, Jr ., was unable to get into ions advanced rapidly against stiffening resistance, bypassing numerous enemy 1° LtCol Oscar F . Peatross ltr to CMC, dtd positions along the way . By 1130, 1/27 23Dec52, in Iwo Comments. 514 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS was infiltrating the southern end of Mo- Antonelli's 2d Battalion, hell-bent on toyama Airfield No . 1 and consolidating driving to the opposite side of the is- along the western edge of the field . land. Moving inland from Red Beach 1, Company C had passed the field and the battalion ran into heavy fire from occupied a line extending for tabout light machine guns and rifles ; progress 250 yards from its southwestern part was further impeded by the enemy's to the northwest . The 2d Battalion was use of hand grenades . generally abreast of the 1st, maintain- About 50 yards inland, the battalion ing contact with it . The 27th Marines encountered its first pillbox, one of also was receiving its share of enemy many carefully camouflaged in this mortar and artillery fire, and casual- area. In accordance with their orders ties mounted as the advance continued . to cross the island as quickly as pos- Among those wounded at this time was sible, Companies E and F bypassed the executive officer of the regiment, many enemy installations, eliminating Colonel Louis C . Plain, who was hit in only those directly in their path . As- the arm and subsequently evacuated . sault teams equipped with flamethrow- The support of armor was needed ers and hand grenade-throwing riflemen to overcome the stubborn enemy resist- neutralized the Japanese inside while ance, so Company A of the 5th Tank engineer teams blew up the pillboxes Battalion was attached to 1/27 . Earlier with explosive charges. that morning, this company had been Leading a machine gun platoon of the first tank unit ashore, landing on 1/27 past the southern end of Moto- the Red beaches at 0925 . In attempting yama Airfield No . 1 was Gunnery Ser- to get off the beaches, four tanks broke geant John Basilone, know as "Manila their tracks in the loose sand ; the en- John" and famous for his exploits on gine of another Sherman malfunctioned Guadalcanal in October 1942 that had so that it could no longer move . The won him the Medal of Honor. On remaining tanks finally found a way Guadalcanal he had thwarted a Japa- off the beach and proceeded towards nese assault by alternately firing two Motoyama Airfield No. 1. With their machine guns and a pistol . His presence support, 1/27 was somewhat better on Iwo Jima was his own choice ; he able to reduce the strongly defended had previously turned down a commis- enemy positions, although the presence sion in favor of remaining an enlisted of armor in the front lines proved a man. As Manila John rushed for the mixed blessing to the hard pressed Ma- west coast of Iwo, a few steps ahead rines who found that the Shermans of his men, a mortar shell suddenly attracted enemy antitank fire . Even burst close behind him, mortally with tank support, however, the 1st wounding this great fighting Marine Battalion was unable to make any sig- and four of his men. nificant advance for the remainder of Although the 1st Battalion, 27th Ma- the day. rines could not advance to the north, It was a different story with Major 2/27 was able to push its attack west- D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 515 ward and seized the cliffs overlooking Red Beach 1 . The regiment moved into the west coast by mid-afternoon . The an assembly area just south of Moto- regimental reserve, 3/27 under the yama Airfield No . 1, where it took up command of Lieutenant Colonel Donn defensive positions . J. Robertson, had landed at 1130 and, The four artillery battalions of the moving up behind 2/27, assisted in 13th Marines, commanded by Colonel mopping up positions bypassed by the James D . Waller, were also preparing 2d Battalion. to go ashore. Reconnaissance parties Despite heavy Japanese shelling of sent to the beaches as early as 1030 the entire beachhead on D-Day, addi- had discovered that the previously tional units arrived on shore through- selected battery positions were still in out the day . At 1500, 1/26, commanded enemy hands . As a result, 3/13, under by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel C . Pol- Lieutenant Colonel Henry T . Waller, lock, completed its landing and moved did not reach the island until 1400 . Half into an assembly area about 300 yards an hour later, 2/13, commanded by inland from Red Beach 1. Shortly Major Carl W. Hjerpe, went ashore, thereafter, the battalion was attached to be followed at 1645 by 1/13 under to the 27th Marines and ordered to take Lieutenant Colonel John S . Oldfield . up defensive positions behind 2/27 . Major James F . Coady's 4th Battalion Company B, 5th Tank Battalion, began reached Iwo between 1930 and 2000 . landing on Red Beach 1 at 1300 . As in The darkness and enemy fire took their the case of the armor that had landed toll of 4/13 . Three DUKWs swamped ; earlier, the tanks encountered trouble their cargo, consisting of two guns and in getting off the beach, but by 1600 badly needed radio equipment, was lost . they had reached the western side of Major Hjerpe's 2d Battalion had the island, where they were attached to been scheduled to land on Red Beach 2, the 27th Marines . but just as the first DUKWs ap- Meanwhile, the 26th Marines, under proached the shore, they were hit by a Colonel Chester B . Graham, had spent heavy enemy barrage. One 105mm how- most of the day on board ship in corps itzer was destroyed by enemy fire ; reserve. Just before 1000, General another was slightly damaged. The Schmidt released the regiment, less the landing of 1/13 took place under more 1st Battalion, to its parent division ; the favorable conditions . One hour after 21st Marines of the 3d Marine Division landing, despite the same beach condi- became the corps reserve . The 26th tions that had slowed up the other Marines was ordered to proceed to the battalions, the first battery was in po- line of departure . shortly after 1100, sition and ready to fire, a state achieved but the crowded condition of the by the entire battalion at 2245 . Last to beaches and limited space inland pre- go ashore, 4/13 was able to emplace cluded a landing until late afternoon . eight howitzers by 0440 on D plus 1 ; It was 1730 before Colonel Graham's two of the 105s and other equipment regiment finished coming ashore over did not reach the position until later in 516 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS the morning because their access road the wreckage, landed the field pieces of the was blocked by crippled LVTs . 13th Marines in a steady column.' Landing four artillery battalions on Most of the artillery managed to get beaches that were still exposed to in- ashore. From that time on, the Japanese cessant enemy fire was a hazardous no longer had it all their way, though undertaking . When the DUKWs of the they retained the capability of inflicting Marine 5th and the Army 471st Am- major punishment on the assault force phibian Truck Companies reached the for some time to come. beaches with their cargo of 75mm and The experience of the 13th Marines 105mm guns, they found it difficult to is typical of what was accomplished on negotiate the deep sand . The wheeled D-Day and of the difficulties all Ma- vehicles could not get over the steep rines were to encounter on Iwo Jima . terrace behind the beaches until bull- The 3d Battalion, going ashore at the dozers and LVTs were pressed into northern end of Green Beach, went into service to pull them over the crest. In- position close to the water's edge . land, the cargo was unloaded amidst Within 20 minutes, one section of the heavy mortar and machine gun fire, 105mm guns was registered ; by 1745, while many furiously working artillery- all guns were in position and ready to men used their helmets and whatever support the 28th Marines . else they could lay hands on to dig gun Throughout D-Day, reinforcements pits. poured ashore as the organizational The arrival of the artillery on Iwo component of the landing force began Jima underscored the fact, if any such to build up. At 1430, General Hermle emphasis was required, that the Ma- went ashore with the ADC group and rines had come to stay . To the men a headquarters reconnaissance party pinned down by heavy enemy fire, the and established an advanced 5th Divi- presence of friendly artillery had addi- sion command post . The assistant divi- tional implications sion commander, the first American The 13th's guns got over the south general officer to set foot on the island, beaches somehow, and up the terraces. crossed Motoyama Airfield No . 1 while Within thirty minutes the crack of artil- it was still under heavy enemy fire and lery, clearly recognizable to the foot sol- gained first-hand information from diers, gave heart to the men on both fronts. Sergeant Joe L. Pipes' "Glamor units in the front lines . Gal" was first to fire on Suribachi . At The picture that presented itself to about the same instant, Sergeant Henry the observer at the beaches during the S. Kurpoat's 75 let go from behind Yellow afternoon of D-Day was not a pretty 2, firing north . one : They never settled the argument over At the water's edge amtracs, LCMs and which gun fired first, and it really didn't LCVPs were hit, burned, broached, cap- matter . Other guns were right behind sized, and otherwise mangled . The loose, them. The Marines shouted as the shells black volcanic cinders, slid past the churn- went over them. Dukws of the Army's 471st Amphibian Truck Company, their Negro drivers pressing ashore through 17 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 119. D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 517 ing tires of wheeled vehicles, miring them Robert H. Davidson, landed to the right axle-deep ; the steep terraces blocked over Yellow 2. As in the 5th Division egress from the beach and extensive mine- fields took a heavy toll . Debris piled up sector to the south, RCT 23 encountered everywhere. little initial resistance until the two Wounded men were arriving on the assault companies reached the second beach by the dozen, where they were not terrace. At this point, they began to draw much better off than they had been at the heavy and accurate fire from the front front. There was no cover to protect them and supplies of plasma and dressings ran and flanks, where the enemy was very low. The first two boats bringing in badly much alive and firmly entrenched in needed litters were blown out of the water . pillboxes, ditches, and spidertraps. Casualties were being hit a second time Squarely astride the regiment's front as they lay helpless, under blankets, await- were two huge blockhouses and 50 pill- ing evacuation to ships .' boxes. Even though the blockhouses had A similar situation prevailed on the sustained massive damage from the 4th Marine Division beaches . There pre-landing bombardment, they still af- also, men's feet sank to the ankles in forded cover for the enemy . Before an the loose, coarse, volcanic ash and jeeps advance inland could get under way, sank to the hubcaps . Trucks could not the formidable enemy obstacles had to operate at all, and supplies had to be be eliminated, a task requiring the em- manhandled from the water's edge to ployment of armor . the front. On the congested beaches, Shortly before 1000, Company C of the enemy laid down a sustained fire the 4th Tank Battalion was dispatched along the water's edge that at times from the line of departure for Beaches caused heavier casualties among Sea- Yellow 1 and 2, in three LSMs, carrying bees and engineers and in evacuation a total of 16 tanks . The first tank to stations than those suffered by combat leave LSM 216 bogged down after get- units. One account likened operating in ting off the end of the ramp. Discharge such terrain to "trying to fight in a bin of the armor from the remaining land- of loose wheat ."19 ing ships proceeded more smoothly, but While 5th Division Marines struggled after moving inland less than 150 yards for the southern portion of Iwo Jima, from the water's edge, three tanks were fierce action developed on the northern immobilized by mines or the terrain .20 beaches, where General Cates' 4th Di- After attempting for half an hour to vision had gone ashore. Precisely at recover the tank that had bogged down H-hour, Colonel Walter W. Wensinger's just off the ramp, LSM 216 withdrew 23d Marines had landed on the Yellow to the line of departure. At 1100, an- beaches with two battalions abreast . other attempt was made to land the The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieu- tanks, this time on Yellow 1, but none tenant Colonel Ralph Haas, landed over succeeded in getting ashore . Instead, Yellow 1 ; the 2d Battalion, under Major LSM 216, having received a number of hits, proceeded to the hospital LST to " Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 53 . ' Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division, p . 149 . 2' 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx F, p. 9. 518 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

discharge casualties . At 1245, LSM 216 apparent that such support would not finally succeeded in landing its tanks be available for some time . In view of on Yellow 1 . These tanks proceeded this situation, the regimental com- inland, but were unable to locate a route mander decided to land 3/23, the reserve to the hard pressed 2/23 . Nor was such battalion, commanded by Major James a route ever found on D-Day. S. Scales. The battalion received orders Thus, only 1/23 received any tank at 1300 to land along Yellow 1 Beach, support on 19 February, and due to move 200 yards inland, and support the difficult terrain and heavy enemy resist- attack of 2/23 with 81mm mortars . ance, this support was relatively inef- Upon going ashore, the reserve bat- fective. Colonel Wensinger eventually talion came under very heavy mortar requested that two tank retrievers be and artillery fire. Fortunately, none of landed to assist the assault tanks which the landing craft received direct hits were in trouble along the beach . Some during the approach to the beach . Once progress was made, but the nature of they had come ashore, it was a different the terrain and heavy mortar and artil- story ; enemy shells could not help but lery fire from the flanks severely hin- hit something on the congested beaches, dered retrieving operations. and casualties and destruction of RCT 23 had to fight its way forward materiel caused serious disorganiza- with limited armored support. A hail tion. of shells and small arms fire took a More trouble for the landing force heavy toll of casualties . It was generally on the beaches was in the offing, and agreed that of all the unpleasant beaches for a time it appeared as if nature had on Iwo that day, those of the 4th Di- joined hands with a stubborn and vision were the hottest. At 0930, 1/23 determined enemy to thwart the in- reported that its forward elements had vasion of Iwo . At the same time that the advanced 250 yards inland. Continued intensity and accuracy of enemy fire progress was slow. Ten minutes later, on the beaches reached a climax, the 2/23 sent word that it had advanced in- surf began to rise. As LVTs bogged land a similar distance, but that its down or were hit, the congestion and leading elements were pinned down by confusion on the beaches grew im- machine gun fire from pillboxes to its measurably . But no real trouble devel- front and flanks . oped until the arrival of the LCVPs . At noon, 1/23 had advanced 500 yards As the light boats hit the beaches, the further inland to within 200 yards of surf broke over them, broaching some Airfield No . 1. The advance of the 2d and swamping others . Other boats, some Battalion, still meeting intensive resist- already disabled, piled in behind the ance, was lagging . In fact, 2/23 had first ones and were soon hurled on the made only 250 yards since its earlier beach by the waves. report. The absence of tank support for Despite this combination of unfavor- the 2d Battalion was beginning to make able surf and deadly resistance, Marines itself felt ; at the same time, it became continued to advance inland, though D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 519

often every yard gained was paid for in Beach 1, the northernmost of the inva- blood. In the zone of attack of RCT 23 ; sion beaches, located right below a cliff tanks finally reached the front lines that was held by the enemy in great during the afternoon. The left flank of strength. It was the unenviable task of 1/23 had advanced to the edge of Air- the 25th Marines to secure the Blue field No. 1 shortly after 1400, but heavy Beaches. The regiment, under Colonel antitank fire forced the armor to beat John R. Lanigan, landed two battalions a hasty retreat behind the revetted edge abreast over Blue Beach 1 and the south- of the field. In order to get 3/23 off the ern edge of Blue Beach 2 . As on the re- congested beaches, Colonel Wensinger maining beaches, the first waves, land- ordered the battalion to pass through ing shortly after 0900, reported only 1/23 and carry the attack across the light enemy fire until the troops disem- airfield . This order was partly carried barked and moved approximately 25 out despite casualties and confusion, yards from the LVTs, when they came and, by 1700, 3/23 had reached the air- under very heavy machine gun, mortar, field boundary . The 2d Battalion derived artillery, and rocket fire . little benefit from the arrival of armor At 0935, 1/25, commanded by Lieu- in its zone of attack, where enemy tenant Colonel Hollis U . Mustain, mines, the soft volcanic ash, and ac- reported that the battalion was still curate enemy fire precluded effective under heavy fire of all types but had tank support. By 1730, Company F was moved inland 300 yards .21 Half an hour barely able to reach the apron of Air- later, 3/25, under Lieutenant Colonel field No. 1, and there halted its advance Justice M . Chambers, reported that for the remainder of the night . elements of the battalion had moved 350 As a result of the heavy resistance yards northeastward along the beach encountered by the 23d Marines, Gen- and that the battalion's left flank was eral Cates shortly after 1400 committed inland 400 yards and in contact with two battalions of the division reserve, 1/25. The continuous, well-aimed enemy the 24th Marines, commanded by Colonel fire caused some disorganization along Walter I. Jordan. The 1st and 2nd Bat- the beach and the men sought cover in talions were to be attached to the 25th large bomb craters along the shore . and 23d Marines respectively. At 1615, Casualties were heavy. By midafternoon, 2/24, under Lieutenant Colonel Richard Company K had lost eight officers ; Company L had lost five by 1630, and Rothwell, was ordered to land on Yellow 22 Beach 2 to relieve 2/23. Shortly before Company I lost six .' 1700, the battalion landed and moved At 1020, Company A, 4th Tank Bat- inland about 700 yards to the front talion, which had been attached to 3/25, line. By 1800, it had relieved 2/23 and went ashore on Blue Beach 1 . Almost dug in for the night just short of the at once the enemy concentrated the fire airfield, tying in between 2/23 and 1/25 . =' 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx H, p . 1. Among all of the Iwo beaches, the 2'Colonel Justice M . Chambers ltr to CMC, one most exposed to enemy fire was Blue dtd 5Nov52, in Iwo Comments. 520 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS of his mortars, artillery, and antitank 1/25 and 3/25, seize the high ground guns on the tank landing ships (LSMs) . to the northwest near a quarry, and All three of the LSMs were hit and assist the advance of 3/25 .23 damaged while unloading . The enemy By 1400, 2/25 had moved one com- fire could not prevent the LSMs from pany into the line between the other landing, but caused a delay in launch- two battalions and a coordinated attack ing the tanks . After having discharged to the north got under way . From the the tanks, the LSMs retracted from the very outset, the regimental attack moved beach. A tank dozer cut a road from slowly because of heavy enemy resist- the first terrace inland from Blue Beach ance. The 3d Battalion advanced for 1, but became a total loss when it hit a about 300 yards along the beach, then mine and turned into a sitting target for headed for the quarry about 400 yards Japanese mortars and artillery . north of the East Boat Basin . On the The remaining tanks formed a column battalion's left, elements of 2/25 and and gingerly proceeded inland for about 1/25 advanced 100 yards, but were driv- 100 yards. At that time, the column en back by intense small arms fire . By came to a halt when it encountered an 1730, casualties and disorganization of enemy minefield . Though immobilized 3/25 had assumed such proportions that for the time being, while engineers Colonel Lanigan requested and received cleared the mines, the tanks supported permission to commit one company of the Marine riflemen with their 75mm 1/24. An hour later, 2/25 and 3/25 had guns, which fired on enemy positions seized the high ground on top and in- and pillboxes behind the beach and in land of the quarry, but this advance the cliffs to the north. had been paid for with extremely heavy Meanwhile, the withering enemy fire casualties. At 1900, Lieutenant Colonel had inflicted very heavy casualties on Chambers reported that the combat the 25th Marines, which doggedly con- strength of 3/25 had diminished to only tinued its advance against a continuous 150 men .24 mortar barrage and intense rifle and In order to compensate for the heavy machine gun fire both from the front losses his regiment had sustained on and the flanks . By noon the attack of D-Day, and because the Japanese were the two assault battalions had become expected to counterattack along the so channelized that a 100-yard gap had right flank of the regiment, Colonel opened between 1/25 and 3/25 . At this Lanigan requested from division the use time, Colonel Lanigan decided that it of one company of 3/24, the division was imperative for RCT 25 to seize reserve, which was in position directly the high ground northeast of Blue behind 3/25 . This request was denied, Beach 2. To this end, he ordered but the regimental commander received Lieutenant Colonel Lewis C. Hudson to permission to use one more company land 2/25, which constituted the regi- of 1/24. As a result, Company B of 1/24 mental reserve, on Blue Beach 1. The battalion was to attack in a column of 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx H, p. 2. companies astride the boundary between =° Ibid . D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 521 was attached to 3/25 . Units began dig- was Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Mc- ging in at 1700 and firm contact was Farlane, commanding the 3d Battalion. established along the front of RCT 25 At 1405, General Cates ordered 1/14 except on the left flank where a 75-yard under Major John B . Edgar, Jr. to land gap remained . This gap was covered in direct support of the 25th Marines ; by fire and observation during the night . Major Clifford B . Drake's 2/14 was to In the course of the evening, the depleted lend direct support to RCT 23 . Upon 3/25 was relieved by 1/24 and took up hitting Blue Beach 1, the DUKWs of defensive positions to the rear of 1/24. the 4th Amphibian Truck Company The relief, which took place under oc- with their cargo of 75mm Pack Howit- casional enemy fire, was not completed zers of 1/14, became immobilized at until close to midnight . once. They quickly bogged down and set- The last battalion of the 24th Marines tled in the volcanic ashes . Bulldozers to go ashore was 3/24, under Lieutenant attempting to get the DUKWs mobile Colonel Alexander A . Vandegrift, Jr . again tugged and strained, but more The battalion landed before 1900 and often than not cables snapped and moved inland a short distance from towing cleats sheered . One howitzer was Blue Beach 2. All of the 4th Marine lost when the DUKW in which it was Division's infantry battalions were now loaded sank immediately after being ashore, and Marines were busily making discharged from its LST 2 5 Nevertheless, preparations for an enemy counter- by 1715 the 1st Battalion had succeeded attack they felt sure would develop dur- in getting 11 howitzers into position ing their first night ashore. after wrestling them up the terraces As in the 5th Marine Division sector by hand. Half an hour later, all bat- on the southern beaches, additional teries of 1/14 were registered and ready units reached Iwo on the northern to fire. beaches during D.-Day. With most of An even more difficult feat was to get the infantry ashore, the time had also the 105mm howitzers of 2/14 ashore . come for the artillery regiment of the Because of the increased weight of these 4th Division, under Colonel Louis G . guns, it proved impossible to manhandle DeHaven, to land on the island . Recon- them up and over the terrace . The only naissance parties from the artillery bat- feasible expedient was to keep each talions had already debarked early in howitzer in the DUKW and then at- the afternoon in order to select positions tempt to get the loaded DUKWs over for their batteries . In doing so, they the terrace . Surf conditions, the slip- faced difficulties similar to those en- pery sand, and continuous enemy fire countered by the 13th Marines on the combined to make this movement a southern beaches . The front lines had miserable undertaking that took hours advanced more slowly than planned ; no to complete . None of the DUKWs routes had been cleared to enable the received a direct hit, though several DUKWs to carry artillery pieces inland . casualties resulted from near misses. One of the first members of the recon- naissance teams to become a casualty ' 14th Mar OpRpt, App . 6, p. 3. 522 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Shortly before dusk, all 12 howitzers of on Iwo that day had actually seen a live Major Drake's 2/14 were in position Japanese. No prisoners had been taken near Yellow Beach 1 . that first day, and only an occasional The 3d Battalion, under Major Harvey enemy corpse was visible . A. Feehan, was ordered to launch its Nevertheless, a steady flow of Ameri- DUKWs shortly after 1500 . At this time, can casualties from the front to the for unknown reasons, several DUKWs beaches underscored the ferocity of the could not be started and more than an enemy resistance . Along the surf line, hour elapsed before all of the vehicles the litter of war continued to pile up were in the water. Because of the con- in an almost unimaginable jumble : gestion ashore and approaching dusk, smashed landing craft surged upward Colonel DeHaven decided that the 3d and forward with every wave, crashing and 4th Battalions were to delay going headlong into trucks, crates, and bodies ashore until the following day, and 3/4 at the edge of the water. Nearby, the was reembarked on board the LST. Dur- wounded were gathered in small groups ing the reembarkation, a howitzer and sitting or lying, just as exposed to the a DUUKW were lost when the amphibian incessant enemy shelling as anyone else truck's motor failed as it headed back on the island and even more helpless in up the ramp. the face of it . For the remainder of As D-Day on Iwo Jima came to an D-Day, and into the night, boats ap- end, Marines all along the VAC front proached Iwo Jima, loaded with rein- lines braced for a major Japanese coun- forcements and supplies ; having un- terattack they felt sure would come loaded these, they took on a new cargo before the night was over .26 The carnage the wounded, for whom surgeons would which had taken place on the island be waiting in transports and hospital on D-Day differed from anything the LSTs especially prepared for this Marines had encountered elsewhere in purpose. the Pacific Theater during World War II . Despite the enemy presence, which FIRST NIGHT ON IWO JIMA27 made itself felt everywhere and con- As D-Day on Iwo Jima came to an tinuously on the island, and to which end and darkness descended over the the numerous dead and wounded could island, Marines could take well justified attest, few of the men who had landed pride in having seized a solid foothold on a heavily fortified bastion, where both ""It was realized by VAC that there was the advantage in terrain and troop much confusion and congestion on the beaches disposition rested with the defending as D-Day wore on, but it was considered essen- tial to avoid confusion afloat also, and Divi- 20 Additional material in this section is de- sions were requested to get as many troops rived from : 28th Mar AR, 19Feb-26Mar45, in ashore as possible on D-Day, and to prepare 5th MarDiv AR, Anx S, hereafter 28th Mar for the anticipated banzai attack that night . AR ; 28th Mar UJnl ; VAC Rpt on Night Oper- We had more troops on the island by nightfall ations, Iwo Jima, 12Aug45, hereafter Iwo Jima than the enemy had all told ." Rogers ltr, Night Ops Rpt. D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 523 garrison. Even though the advance enemy positions on Iwo in response to nowhere came near to reaching the 0-1 Marine requests . Gunfire support ships Line, VAC had succeeded in getting six shelled enemy gun emplacements on the infantry regiments and six artillery high ground north of the beaches and battalions-nearly 30,000 men and thou- did their best to destroy the concealed sands of tons of equipment-ashore . enemy mortars whose fire was causing (See Map 28) . so many casualties on the beaches .28 From General Holland Smith down The heavy enemy fire on the beaches, through the ranks, it was generally as well as unfavorable surf conditions, believed that according to their earlier precluded the landing of all but high- tactics, the Japanese would throw all est priority cargo on D-Day. In order the manpower they had against the of importance, this cargo was limited vulnerable Marines during their first to ammunition, rations, water, and night ashore. The enemy was known signal equipment. Once this equipment to have a large reserve force of infantry had been unloaded on the beaches, the and tanks available for such an all-out shore party teams could do little more counterattack .28 None of the intelli- than stack the supplies. LVTs and gence personnel of VAC could suspect weasels carried these supplies inland at the time that General Kuribayashi and returned with a cargo of wounded . planned to conserve his manpower and As night fell, most of the transports would find other means to decimate the and other vessels retired from Iwo, but Marines that were crowded into the some of the command ships, preloaded narrow beachead . LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained be- The burden of battle was not only hind. The work of stacking supplies on borne by the Marine assault units who the beach and terraces continued after had gone ashore on D-Day . Throughout nightfall. Offshore, mortar boats con- the day, the supporting arms of the centrated their fire against the enemy Amphibious Support Force had done positions on the high ground overlook- all they could to assist their hard ing the 4th Marine Division beaches . pressed comrades in arms . Carrier pilots Bulldozers continued hauling vehicles of TF 58 and the escort carriers of inland, and whenever possible, pulled TF 52 flew missions as long as daylight equipment out of the sand . Under cover prevailed ; airborne observers and spot- of darkness, critical items, especially ters kept a continuous vigil over the 81mm ammunition, were brought in. target area. More than 600 aircraft flew The 81mm shells that had been hand- 26 missions in the course of the day, carrried ashore with these mortars had including strikes prior to H-Hour, drop- lasted for only one hour after the ped 274,500 pounds of bombs, not in- mortars opened fire . With the 81mm cluding more than 100 napalm bombs . mortars out of ammunition, the assault Offshore, naval guns continued to shell battalions lost the services of a large

VAC G-2 PerRpt No. 1, dtd 19Feb45 . 29 TF 54 OpRpt, p . 13 .

524 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

VAC FRONT LINES D-DAY 19 FEBRUARY 1945

Map 28 E . L . Wilson D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 525

portion of high trajectory weapons sup- 99 of the assault force suffered from port during most of the violent action combat fatigue.31 on D-Day.3o Despite the heavy casualties, on the While the Marines anxiously awaited evening of D-Day VAC still rated the the big banzai charge that would finally combat efficiency of the assault force as bring the enemy out into the open, very good to excellent.32 As the day General Kuribayashi cannily began to ended, the 5th Marine Division had employ his plan which would destroy established a beachhead approximately the Americans and their supplies on 1,500 yards wide and 1,000 yards in and near the beaches without his risk- depth, dividing the enemy forces in the ing many of his own men . In short, his northern and southern part of the island plan consisted of a few attempts at in- and effectively isolating Mount Suriba- filtration, while at the same time step- chi. The 4th Marine Division had ping up the fire of his deadly artillery reached a line extending northward and and mortars against the crowded Amer- inland from Blue Beach 2 for about ican beachhead. As the night pro- 200 yards on low ground, then from the gressed, the rain of enemy shells Quarry on top of the ridge for about mounted in intensity, as. did the number 300 yards, then south across the low of American casualties . ground which led off the beach towards By 2300, the enemy shelling of the Motoyama Airfield No . 2, and from Yellow and Blue Beaches had become there to a line which was roughly a so heavy that both beaches were ordered projection of the main runway of Air- closed. Elsewhere, it proved to be a field No. 1 . It was clear that the landing sleepless night for most of the Marines had been successful . The Marines were on Iwo. On the southern beaches, a few dug in and occupied positions that were vessels still attempted to bring in cargo, difficult but tenable. Supplies were as runners crawled in and out of com- scanty but sufficient for immediate mand posts, bearing reports and orders . needs. Other men were shuffling around in the As the night progressed, there was darkness looking for their units and movement of all kinds on and around their equipment . Because of the dis- Iwo Jima. Offshore, transports carrying organization of units, it proved impos- the 3d Marine Division were arriving sible at this time to obtain an accurate in the reserve area 80 miles southeast account of D-Day casualties, though it of the island . Amidst the steady thump- was known that they were heavy . It 31 Casualty figures taken from statistics pre- was to be determined later that 501 pared by the Casualty Section, HQMC . It Marines had died on this first day of should be noted that in the confusion of D-Day, the invasion ; 1,775 had been wounded casualties were thought much more severe than in action ; an additional 47 died of was actually the case . 1/28 alone reported wounds, and 18 were missing in action ; 600 missing. However, many of these men had returned by D plus 2. They had been fighting with other companies and in some cases other "Lieutenant Colonel Fenton J . Mee Itr to regiments. 28th Mar AR, p . 17 . CMC, dtd 15Dec52, in Iwo Comments . 3Y VAC AR, Anx B, Encl A, p. 12 . 526 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS ing and crashing of the enemy artillery Japanese artillery kept pounding the and mortar shells deluging the 30,000 American positions. Shortly after mid- Marines that had gone ashore, there was night, the enemy scored a direct hit on stealthy movement as some of the the command post of 1/23 on Yellow enemy, their guns near Mount Suri- Beach 1, killing Lieutenant Colonel bachi rendered useless by American air Haas and the regimental operations of- and naval bombardment, moved through ficer, Captain Fred C . Eberhardt. Min- the lines and headed for northern Iwo . utes later, one of the giant spigot The enemy had lost a good part of his mortar shells, which many Marines first artillery, and within three hours after thought to be a P-61 night fighter be- H-Hour, all of the heavy guns on the cause of the peculiar sound it made slopes of Mount Suribachi had been while passing over, came wobbling silenced. down from the north and exploded on There were several enemy attempts one of the Green Beaches near Mount at infiltration . Shortly after 2300, a Suribachi. Around 0400, the 25th barge carrying 39 Japanese approached Marines ammunition and fuel dump the west coast of Iwo and prepared went off with a terrifying roar. Two to land them. The enemy was spotted full boatloads of 81mm mortar shells, by alert riflemen of 1/28, who picked gasoline, and flamethrower fuel ex- the Japanese off one by one as they tried ploded, caving in foxholes for yards to get ashore, until all had been killed .33 around. On the east coast of Iwo a member of Initially, these disasters were at- a naval construction unit had a strange tributed to lucky enemy hits on these experience . He was watching a log in vulnerable targets. It remained for a the surf which the current bore south Japanese postwar history to clear up along the shore. Suddenly, the log made this point . According to the Japanese a sharp turn. The Seabee fired 13 rounds version and at dawn found a riddled Japanese Instead of all-out desperate banzai body at the water's edge . charges, Kuribayashi organized small What it felt like to be a member of packs of prowling wolves-three or four the VAC assault force during that first in a pack-which sneaked in at night to eerie night on Iwo Jima has been enemy depots or concentration of fuel and ammunition and attacked with demolition graphically described as follows charges and hand grenades . This new tac- Bunched in foxholes along the perim- tic again proved quite successful at the eter, the Marines took turns on watch, nights of February 19 and 20 . For in- fighting to stay awake, waiting, waiting stance, heaps of 81mm mortar shells of for the crazy banzai. Now and then, shout- the 4th Marine Division blew up at the ing and ragged fire broke out in hysterical southern coast; flamethrower fuel and patches as the rocks and bushes seemed gasoline at the same coast also burned.' to move in the eerie light of the star shells . Still the rush didn't come.' Excerpts from Masanori Ito, Fall of the Imperial Army (Teikoku Rikugun No Saigo) ' 28th Mar AR, p. 17 . v. IV, pp. 55-110), in Newcomb Notes, here- " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 135 . after Ito, Fall of the Imperial Army . D-DAY ON IWO JIMA 527

As dawn rose over the island on 20 beach. Many men who had been only February, less than 24 hours had passed wounded were killed ." since the first Marines hit the Iwo It appeared that General Kuribaya- beaches. A newspaper correspondent, shi's strategy was paying off . There looking at the scene surrounding him, had been no banzai that first night ; but made this comment from dusk to dawn Japanese shells had steadily killed off Marines on the con- The first night on Iwo Jima can only be described as a nightmare in hell . About gested beaches at no cost to the enemy . the beach in the morning lay the dead. As the new day dawned, it would be up They died with the greatest possible vio- to the tired Marines to strip the enemy lence. Nowhere in the Pacific have I seen of his excellent observation posts and such badly mangled bodies . Many were cut firing positions, their only means of squarely in half. Legs and arms lay 50 feet away from any body . All through the eliminating the deadly fire in which the bitter night, the Japs rained heavy mor- entire landing force was engulfed . tars and rockets and artillery on the entire area between the beach and the airfield . 38 Robert Sherrod, as cited in Ibid., pp. Twice they hit casualty stations on the 136-137. CHAPTER 5

The Struggle for Suribachi 1

SECURING THE BASE2 and all of the 4th had wheeled to the right to complete the capture of Air- Dawn on 20 February saw VAC Ma- field No . 1, and then continue the ad- rines engaged in two distinct opera- vance to the northeastern part of Iwo . tions . One was the capture of Mount The assault on the extinct volcano Suribachi whose forbidding slopes promised to be difficult. To some of the glowered down on the Americans on Marines, gazing at the mottled, bare the exposed ground beneath . The other mountain, "Suribachi resembled the was a prolonged drive to the north, in- head of a fabulous serpent, with fangs tended to seize the vital airfields and ejecting poison in all directions from eliminate all enemy resistance . its base."3 Between Colonel Liver- The story of the capture of Suribachi sedge's men and the base of Suribachi is basically that of the 28th Marines . lay a wasteland of broken rock and After landing on D-Day, Colonel Liver- stubble. This wasteland, guarding the sedge's men were facing southward, one approach to the volcano, was prepared to tackle the mountain, while studded by hundreds of caves, pillboxes, the remainder of the 5th Division blockhouses, bunkers, spider traps, mines, and every other conceivable de- ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; TF 56 fense . It was in the slow and costly AR; VAC AR ; VAC G-2 Rpts ; 5th MarDiv approach to the mountain that many AR; 5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts ; 5th MarDiv Marines were to die or be wounded . D-8 Jnl; 5th MarDiv D-4 Jnl; 28th Mar R-2 On the mountain itself, 1,600 Japa- Jnl, 19Feb-25Mar45, hereafter 28th Mar R-2 Jnl; 28th Mar UJnl ; 28th Mar AR ; 2/28 Op- nese were occupying well-camouflaged Rpt, l9Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 2/28 OpRpt; 5th defensive positions with orders to hold Tk Bn AR ; 5th Tk Bn UJnl, 19Feb-26Mar45, out to the very end . That the Marines hereafter 5th Tk Bn UJnI ; 5th EngBn OpRpt, had cut the southern portion of Iwo 9Mar45, hereafter 5th Eng Bn OpRpt ; Bart- off from the northern part on D-Day ley, Iwo Monograph ; Iwo Comments ; Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima ; Conner, The Fifth had little effect on General Kuribaya- Marine Division ; Newcomb, Iwo Jima ; New- shi's dispositions and plans . The wily comb Notes ; Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign ; enemy commander had foreseen that Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely and the island defenses would be split early Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. in the operation. In relation to his over- 'Additional material in this section is de- rived from : Richard Wheeler, The Bloody all defensive plan, Mount Suribachi was Battle for Suribachi (New York : Thomas Y . Crowell Company, 1965), hereafter Wheeler, ' Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- Suribachi, quoted with permission . phibious War, p. 488. 528 THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 529

37MM GUN firing on Japanese positions on the slopes of Mt . Suribachi. (USMC 110139)

DEBRIS OF BATTLE litters Iwo beaches on D plus 2 . (USMC 110252) 530 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

but one of several semi-independent Italy a year earlier when they suddenly defense sectors capable of resisting the found themselves confronted by Mount American assault with their own re- Cassino. The impact of such a terrain sources. feature, known to be held in strength Colonel Liversedge's plan of attack by the enemy, can be formidable . As one was for the 28th Marines to surround account of the Iwo operation was to the base of the mountain, maintain a report steady pressure on enemy positions that On this day, and increasingly as days could be identified in the cliffs, and seek went by, Suribachi seemed to take on a out suitable routes to the summit . The life of its own, to be watching these men, looming over them, pressing down upon regiment was to advance towards Suri- them . When they moved, they moved in bachi with the 2d Battalion on the left, its shadow, under its eye. To be sure, there the 3d on the right, and the 1st in re- were hundreds of eyes looking at them serve. H-Hour was 0830, 20 February .4 from the mountain, but these were the At first light, carrier planes attacked eyes of a known enemy, an enemy whose intent was perfectly clear . In the end, it the mountain with bombs and rockets . is probable that the mountain represented Napalm was dropped at the foot of the to these Marines a thing more evil than slopes, since most of the enemy fire the Japanese' seemed to come from that area . A The assault of the 28th Marines destroyer stood offshore close to the against Suribachi began on schedule, west coast to support the advance of preceded by a bombardment of the the 3d Battalion ; a minelayer stood off mountain by destroyers, rocket gun- the east coast to assist 2/28 . The boats, and artillery . This bombardment weather had changed for the worse ; destroyed a few enemy emplacements a light rain was falling and it had and at the same time unmasked many turned chilly . Four-foot waves were concrete structures buried in the scrub pounding the beach and the wind from and rocky ground leading to the base the south was rising . of Suribachi. It soon became evident As Colonel Liversedge's men waited that the caves on the lower slopes and to jump off, they felt far from rested . at the base of the mountain were as The exertions of the previous day had formidable as its pillboxes and block- been followed by a night of continuous houses. The caves had from two to five enemy bombardment . The sense of entrances with interconnecting tunnels . gloom and foreboding felt by many men Prior to the invasion they had served on the morning of D plus 1 was due as air raid shelters and living quarters . not only to lack of sleep and the They were linked with supply and com- weather, but to the nature of the ob- mand caves containing food, water, and jective. Mount Suribachi itself imposed ammunition . From the entrances to the a mental hazard on the assault troops caves, 6-inch guns, protected by five- similar to that faced by the Allies in foot walls, pointed down the island .

'5th MarDiv AR, Sec VIII, p . 19. 6 Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 57 . THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 531

Almost immediately, the advancing weapons company were also moved up Marines came under heavy fire from in support . In the face of bitter enemy small arms, mortars, and artillery . resistance, only split-second teamwork Working against the success of the at- by every unit could gain any ground . tack was the lack of needed tank sup- The procedure employed was for in- port. The 5th Tank Battalion had been fantry and tanks to take each pillbox scheduled to support RCT 28. Even under fire, while a flamethrower team though eight tanks were available, no worked up to one of the entrances . fuel or ammunition was at hand . The After several bursts of flame had been tankers finally salvaged some from dis- squirted at the fortification, the re- abled tanks and divided it up . During mainder of the assault squad closed in this redistribution, the enemy put a to finish the job with grenades. Once heavy mortar barrage on the vehicles, the occupants had been eliminated, forcing them to move to another posi- engineers and demolition teams blasted tion. Almost immediately, the mortar the positions to ensure that they would fire shifted to the new position . This not be reoccupied by the Japanese after occurred three times ; there was no nightfall. Whenever the rugged ter- place where the tankers could move that rain permitted, flamethrowing tanks was not under direct enemy observa- were employed against the pillboxes . tion. By 1700, RCT 28 had laboriously During the morning, the Marines moved 200 yards closer to the objective, advanced only 50 to 70 yards. Support at the cost of 2 officers killed and 6 from aircraft and ships helped, as did wounded, and 27 men killed and 127 the artillery support from 3/13 . How- wounded.6 The advance had taken the ever, even the best efforts of these Marines of 2/28 and 3/28 close to the combined arms failed to neutralize base of the mountain ; in the course of enemy fire, particularly that coming the afternoon, they had closed off from the well-camouflaged pillboxes nearly 40 caves with demolitions . As hidden in the scrub around the base of the men prepared to dig in for the the mountain . Once the Marines ad- night, they found themselves sur- vanced into these formidable enemy rounded by the debris of the heavy defenses, they would be too close for enemy coastal guns which the naval support from aircraft and artillery . bombardment had smashed prior to and Assault demolition teams, using flame- during D-Day . Moving towards Mount throwers and explosive charges, would Suribachi along the western shore of have to do the job. Once again, the Iwo, 3/28 killed 73 of the enemy . The continuation of the advance depended Japanese corpses presented an encour- on the skill and bravery of the indi- aging sight in an operation where, thus vidual Marine. far, little had been seen of the enemy, At 1100, the tanks were finally ready dead or alive. to support the advance. The 37mm guns and 75mm half-tracks of the regimental '28th Mar AR, 19-20Feb45, p . 18.

532 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

FLAME THROWERS in action at the base of Mt. Suribachi . (USMC 110599)

LONE MARINE protects flank of patrol headed for summit of Mt . Suribachi . (USMC A419741) THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 533

As the 28th Marines pressed their portant batteries on Suribachi .8 One of assault, the enemy situation on Suri- the Japanese officers, initially sta- bachi steadily deteriorated . The Amer- tioned on Iwo, who was familiar with ican naval and air bombardment on the enemy command organization, later D-Day had knocked out all of the was to refer to the Suribachi Sector 140mm guns. Inside the mountain, the commander as "a poor superannuated commander of the Suribachi Sector, amateur," adding "that it was the Colonel Kanehiko Atsuchi, 7 pondered Army's mistake to send such an aged his mounting casualties and dispatched and rusted character to Iwo, who was a message to General Kuribayashi ask- simply a misfit for leading many peo- ing the latter's permission to go out ple." Other accounts were somewhat and seek death through a banzai charge, more charitable towards Atsuchi . In rather than sitting it out in his present any case, there can be no doubt that position . Shortly thereafter, the ad- a banzai attack was precisely what vancing Marines found and cut the General Kuribayashi did not want . He buried cable linking Suribachi with the much preferred to force the Americans northern sector . Colonel Atsuchi never to fight for the mountain foot by foot, received a reply from the island com- and to inflict heavy losses as a price mander, either because communica- for seizing the strongly defended eleva- tions were now disrupted or simply be- tion. cause General Kuribayashi felt that his Loss of telephone communications sentiments regarding the outdated ban- with the command post in the northern zai charge were sufficiently well known part of Iwo did not mean that Atsuchi's to his subordinates to require no men had been abandoned by their com- repetition. rades. As darkness fell, the Japanese Some postwar Japanese sources, em- on Suribachi fired white and amber phasizing that Atsuchi was actually in flares as a signal that artillery and charge, have implied that the island mortar support were desired from the commander was not happy with having northern sector . For the second night entrusted Atsuchi, then 57 years old, in succession, artillery and mortar fire with command of the crucially im- from Suribachi and northern Iwo pounded the Marine positions . Amer- ' Mistakenly referred to as Navy Captain ican guns, ashore and afloat, answered Kanehiko Atsuchi in Ito, Fall of the . Imperial this barrage, as the din of battle Army, pp. 55-110. There is some disagreement echoed and resounded well into the . as to who was in charge at Mount Suribachi night. According to one Japanese source, Major Nagahiko Matsushita, commanding the 10th As on the eve of D-Day, the men of Independent Antitank Battalion, was the unit the 28th Marines peered into the dark- commander in the Mount Suribachi area, while Colonel Atsuchi (also spelled Atsuji) was dis- 'Major Yoshitaka Horie comments on Iwo patched from the 109th Division headquarters Jima operation, in Fred Saito ltr to Richard to provide operational guidance. Japanese R. Newcomb, dtd 27Jan64, in Newcomb Notes. Defense Agency Comment . ° Ibid. 534 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS ness, ever watchful for signs of an en- to those of the previous day . Once emy counterattack. Tired eyes strained again, the tanks were unable to meet to the south in an effort to detect enemy H-Hour because of delays in rearming activity, but for the second night the and refuelling, and the attack had to expected counterattack failed to de- get under way without them . velop. Division orders for D plus 2 Under cover of fire from warships called for a continuation of the 28th and land-based artillery, the 1st Bat- Marines attack towards Mount Suri- talion attacked towards Mount Suri- bachi. Despite enemy artillery and mor- bachi along the west coast . Because the tar fire, the tired men tried to obtain terrain there precluded effective em- what little sleep they could get in antici- ployment of tanks, their absence at the pation of the rigors that awaited them beginning of the attack was immaterial . on the following day. On the left, it was a different story ; On the morning of 21 February, the even with naval gunfire support no rough weather of the previous day gains were made until the tanks ar- showed no signs of abating . The wind rived. By 1100, the attack gained mo- had risen to 19 knots from the north- mentum when armor, 37mm guns, and east and six-foot waves were pounding half-tracks mounting 75mm guns, as the landing beaches . Since the distance well as rocket detachments, joined in between the forward elements of the pounding the enemy positions . By noon, 28th Marines and the base of Mount the 1st Battalion had reached the west- Suribachi was still significant for air ern base of Suribachi . strikes, naval gunfire, and artillery During the advance it became ap- support, the combined force of air and parent that the enemy was particularly artillery was again brought to bear vulnerable to the heavy explosive blast against the Japanese before the Ma- of the rockets and retaliated by con- rines jumped off . centrating his fire on the rocket launch- Prior to the scheduled jumpoff at ing trucks which were unprotected by 0825, 40 aircraft struck at the enemy armor-plate . When caught in such a with bombs and rockets, and, strafing concentration of fire, the crews with- within 100 yards of the forward Ma- drew to cover and ran up singly to load rine lines, concentrated against an area the rocket platform . When the order to inaccessible to tanks . This was the fire was given, one Marine would scam- closest air support thus far provided per forward, dive under the truck, then and possibly the last, since another reach his arm around the side to push day's advance would bring the men too the firing button. The resulting explo- close to their objective . sion when the rocket hit the target The 1st Battalion was assigned a usually meant that the Marines had one one-company front on the regimental less enemy position to contend with . right. When the regiment jumped off Advancing in the center, the 3d Bat- for the attack at 0825, the units and talion encountered heavy resistance boundaries assigned to it were identical from the same positions that had THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 535 blocked the advance on the previous get through the lethal curtain of fire, day. Nevertheless, the attack of this but there were enough of them to carry battalion also was gaining momentum the advance forward . The feelings of by 1100. Within the hour, an enemy these men, as they faced what seemed counterattack struck the front of 3/28 ; to them almost certain death, were this action failed to halt the advancing expressed by one of their number who Marines, and by 1400 the forward ele- lived to tell about it ments had reached the foot of Mount We were now part of a real hell-bent- Suribachi . There, 3/28 spent the re- for-leather attack, the kind the Marines mainder of the day . are famous for . But there was nothing The attack of the 2d Battalion down inspiring about it. None of our ex-raiders the eastern shore also got under way shouted "Gung Ho!" . . . and none of our southerners let go the rebel yell . We felt slowly. At first, there was little resist- only reluctance and enervating anxiety . ance and for a few moments, the hulk- There seemed nothing ahead but death . ing natural fortress remained quiet, If we managed somehow to make it across but enemy reaction was not long absent . the open area, we'd only become close- First came the crack of rifles and the range targets for those concealed guns. I myself was seized by a sensation of utter chatter of machine guns . The chatter hopelessness . I could feel the fear drag- turned into a heavy clatter and bullets ging at my jowls . began to snap and whine around the It is in situation like this that Marine advancing Marines. Some of them Corps training proves its value . There found their mark. Then the Japanese probably wasn't a man among us who didn't wish to God he was moving in the began firing their deadly mortars . Some opposite direction. But we had been or- of the Marines could see the high arc dered to attack, so we would attack . Our of the mortar rounds . Soon the area was training had imbued us with a fierce pride blanketed by roaring funnels of steel in our outfit, and this pride helped now . The noise and fury increased to keep us from faltering. Few of us and sand would have admitted that we were bound until the hearing of the attacking Ma- by the old-fashioned principle of "death rines was numbed and their thinking before dishonor," but it was probably this, impaired. It seemed as if the volcano's above all else, that kept us pressing ancient bowels had suddenly come to forward."' life and the men were advancing into Two uncommon acts of heroism, a full-scale eruption . One of the Ma- among many, were to occur during the rines, speaking of the holocaust, was to day, indicative of the caliber of the men remark later who had gone ashore on Iwo Jima. The It was terrible, the worst I can remem- first one was unpremeditated, nor was ber our taking . The Jap mortarmen seemed to be playing checkers and using us as there time for lengthy thought . It took their squares. I still can't understand how place in 2/28 when Private First Class any of us got through it10 Donald J. Ruhl deliberately threw him- Not all of the attacking Marines did self on a hand grenade that had landed

"Wheeler, Suribachi, p. 108. 'Ibid., p. 109, 536 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS next to him and his platoon guide, Ser- tanks supported the advance towards geant Henry 0. Hansen, sacrificing his Mount Suribachi . Two of them were own life in order to save the sergeant . put out of action by the enemy and one The second involved the rescue of two by the terrain. One ran over a mine, one Marines who lay wounded for more was hit by antitank fire, and one broke than 24 hours at the eastern base of a track. About 1630, after the advance Mount Suribachi . A hospital corpsman halted for the day, the tanks were re- had been keeping them alive by creep- leased. To avoid any delay when the ing up to them and treating their attack resumed on the following morn- wounds under fire . One of the wounded ing, the tanks were rearmed and re- was breathing through a glass tube in fueled before dark. Despite the damage his neck. Since evacuation by land was sustained by the three vehicles, the out of the question because of enemy tankers engaged near Mount Suribachi fire, a group of Marines, headed by Staff had suffered no casualties on this third Sergeant Charles E . Harris, manned a day of the invasion.13 raft, landed it on the rocky shore in a As the afternoon of 21 February heavy surf, and succeeded in evacu- wore on, a cold rain began to fall on Iwo, ating both men under the noses of the greatly increasing the discomfort of the enemy. Both casualties survived the Marines holding positions around the ordeal. base of Suribachi. Behind them, and all By evening of 21 February, the 28th around them were the remnants of the Marines occupied a line which formed main defenses guarding the volcano . a semicircle just north of Mount Suri- Some of the pillboxes and bunkers had bachi. The 1st Battalion was halfway been crushed like matchboxes by naval around the mountain on the western gunfire ; others had been seared black shore ; 2/28 had advanced an equal dis- by napalm flames . The entire area was tance along the eastern base of the pervaded by the smell of death and mountain ; the 3d Battalion was square- burned flesh, where flamethrowers had ly facing the volcano in the center of done their deadly work . The expendi- the semicircle . During this third day ture of flamethrower fuel had reached ashore, the 1st Battalion had advanced such proportions that a temporary 1000 yards, the 2nd Battalion 650 yards, shortage developed - overcome only and the 3d, 500 yards . These gains were when versatile Weasels carried addi- made at a cost of 34 Marines killed and tional supplies to the front lines . 153 wounded. Due to these heavy addi- In the gathering dusk, many Marines tional casualties, by evening of 21 Feb- could clearly hear the enemy talking ruary the combat efficiency of the 28th inside the mountain . They succeeded in Marines had declined to 75 percent .12 killing a large number of Japanese by Much of the success of the day's ad- pouring gasoline down the fissures and vance had been due to the tank support setting it aflame. Inside the volcano, available on D plus 2 . Altogether, seven Colonel Atsuchi was dying from a shell

"28th Mar AR, 20-21Feb45 . " Co C, 5th Tk Bn AR, p. 3. THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 537 fragment wound incurred during the board, its bomb blowing a hole in the day.14 His last order was that a squad flight deck. Nevertheless, shortly after of men attempt to break through to 2000, the Saratoga once again was able General Kuribayashi's headquarters to to recover planes . Losses were 123 report the situation on Suribachi . Many killed and missing and 192 wounded ; of the enemy felt extremely bitter at in addition, the carrier lost 36 planes their own lack of air support while by burning and jettisoning, and six by American aircraft filled the sky . Never- water landings in the choppy seas .15 theless, enemy morale remained un- The Saratoga, once her fires had been shaken and nearly all were determined extinguished, limped back to Pearl Har- to go down fighting . bor for repairs . Actually, air support for the Japa- Another carrier, the Bismarck Sea, nese garrison on Iwo was closer at hand was in position 20 miles east of Iwo than anyone, friend and foe alike, might when, shortly before 1900, a kamikaze have suspected. At dusk, as the Ma- hit the ship square abeam . Gassed rines were digging in for the night, the planes on board caught fire and ammu- enemy made one effort from the air . nition exploded in the rapidly spreading About 50 kamikazes had left an airfield blaze. As a 22-knot wind fanned the near Tokyo early in the day and, after fires, it became necessary to abandon refuelling at Hachijo Jima in the ship. Following a tremendous explo- Bonins, headed towards Iwo Jima . sion, the Bismarck Sea turned over and Each member of the Special Attack sank. Many of the men who had gone Unit had but one objective : to hurl his overboard were picked up by the escort aircraft and himself at the invasion vessels ; others succumbed to the cold fleet that was gathered around Iwo . waters. Altogether, 218 men of the Radar equipment on the Saratoga, Bismarck Sea were lost, out of a crew about 35 miles northwest of the island, of 943 officers and men .16 picked the aircraft up when they were Other ships attacked by the kami- still 100 miles away, but they were first kazes were the escort carrier Lunga mistaken for friendly planes . At 1700, Point, which fought off four torpedo interceptor aircraft reported that the bombers without loss ; the net tender approaching formation was Japanese Keokuk, set afire, losing 17 men killed and that they had downed two of and 44 wounded ; and LST 477 carrying the intruders . Shortly thereafter, two artillery for the 3d Marine Division . kamikazes struck the Saratoga and set The LST was struck a glancing blow by her on fire. These fires had barely been a kamikaze, which failed to do any put out when another Japanese plane major damage . None of the Japanese grazed the flight deck and crashed over- pilots survived the attack . As 21 February came to an end, the hospital ship Samaritan sailed from " Official Japanese sources claim that Colonel Atsuchi was killed during the daylight battle on 20 February. Japanese Defense Agency ' Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 54. Comment. 'Ibid., p. 55. 538 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Iwo Jima to Guam. Her cargo consisted Iwo's loose soil and cinders into a sloshy of 623 seriously wounded Marines . The gumbo. At 0800 the enemy scored a care given to these wounded was in mortar hit on the regimental CP which stark contrast to the little attention the killed the regimental surgeon, Lieuten- Japanese received from their own med- ant Commander Daniel J . McCarthy. ical personnel . Japanese defense plans The rain, driven from the southeast by for Iwo Jima had made no provision for a strong wind, not only caused great the evacuation of any wounded . Those discomfort to the Marines, but the wet Japanese who were wounded either volcanic ash clogged automatic weap- crawled back or were carried to aid ons, which could fire only single rounds . stations behind the lines. There, they Nevertheless, the 28th Marines con- might be placed in niches in the walls tinued their attack at the foot of Mount of tunnels, where their comrades would Suribachi . Because of the bad weather look after them as best they could . and the Marines' proximity to the Some of the Japanese bound up their mountain, no air support was available, wounds and remained with their units, and artillery support was severely cur- either to fight again if physically able tailed. Once again, it became the task or else perform other work behind the of individual Marines to pick a path lines. through the rubble, blasting and burn- For the Marines dug in around the ing their way through the enemy base of Mount Suribachi, another rest- defenses . The Japanese within the less night was in the offing. The rain mountain and isolated pillboxes around was still coming down, increasing their the base still resisted with heavy mor- discomfort . Some of the Japanese inside tar and small arms fire. the mountain were moving around Once again, seven tanks of Company and talking, but no banzai charge de- C, 5th Tank Battalion, supported the veloped. Enemy artillery and mortar attack of the 28th Marines. Two were fire continued to fall in the area, though attached to 2/28 to work around the its effect was not as deadly as during east side of Suribachi ; three were sent the preceding night . The enemy con- to 1/28 to advance around the right, fined himself to two attempts at infil- and two remained in support of 3/28 in trating the American lines in the 28th the center. The heavy rainfall that con- Marines sector . Men of the regiment's tinued throughout the day severely 81mm mortar platoon killed some 60 limited the operation of the tanks . At Japanese in front of 2/28 during one one time during the afternoon, the rain of these efforts. Company C accounted became so heavy that the crews, unable for 28 more who, in accordance with to see where they were going, had to Colonel Atsuchi's final orders, at- be guided by men on foot . tempted to infiltrate north along the Poor weather and enemy resistance western beaches . to the contrary, 22 February marked The following morning, 22 February, the day on which Mount Suribachi was began with all the earmarks of a miser- neutralized and surrounded . The men of able day. The cold, hard rain had turned 3/28 cleared out the base of the north THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 539 face of the volcano during the day and to Mount Suribachi, the final act in the sent a patrol around the west coast drama was about to open. The time had down to Tobiishi Point, Iwo Jima's come to start climbing. On the evening southernmost extremity . There, the prior to that venture, no one could men of 3/28 encountered a patrol from guess what the following day would 2/28 which had advanced down the east bring. coast. By 1630, the 28th Marines halted SEIZING THE HEIGHTS 17 operations for the day . One sergeant of Company I who scrambled part way up Friday, 23 February, marked the day the north face of Mount Suribachi re- on which the Marines climbed to the ported seeing no Japanese. He asked top of the craggy 550-foot rim of Mount whether he should continue up the Suribachi . The steep slopes of the mountain, but Colonel Liversedge felt mountain fortress all but precluded a that it was too late in the day, and the converging ascent from various direc- final advance to seize the mountain was tions. When it was discovered that the delayed until the following morning. only practical route to the crater lay up By the end of D plus 3, the fight for the north face of the mountain, in the Mount Suribachi was virtually over . zone of the 2d Battalion, Lieutenant Substantial numbers of the enemy, per- Colonel Johnson became directly in- haps 300 in all, still occupied caves and volved in planning the climb . The bat- other places of concealment within the talion commander's decision was to volcano. But in the course of the 28th send several small reconnaissance pa- Marines' advance, hundreds of the en- trols to the top before ordering a emy had been killed, and the pernicious platoon-size combat patrol to make the power of the fortress was now broken. ascent. As Marines, shivering from the cold At 0800, Sergeant Sherman B . Wat- and wetness, huddled at the foot of son of Company F led a four-man Suribachi, the enemy survivors within patrol up the mountain . On top of Suri- debated whether they should stay or bachi this patrol encountered a battery attempt to fight their way north . Only of heavy machine guns with ammu- half of them decided to remain and nition stacked alongside around the rim fight it out. The remainder crawled out of the crater. There was no sign of the into the murky darkness and tried to enemy. The bald, gray rock was now make their way north through the surrounded by silence ; the caves and American lines. Most of them fell vic- underground chambers seemed devoid tim to accurate fire from alert Marines, of life. Uprooted blockhouses and pill- determined to halt any infiltration . boxes offered mute testimony to the About 20 of the enemy made it across destructive power of the heavy naval the lines and reached General Kuriba- yashi's headquarters near Motoyama in "Additional material in this section is de- rived from : 5th EngBn UJn1, 19Feb-24Mar45, the northern part of the island where hereafter 5th EngBn UJn1 ; Maj Yoshitaka they were reassigned. Horie (NA) Rpt, Iwo Jima, dtd 11Feb46, For the Marine survivors of the drive hereafter Horie Rpt . 540 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS guns ; most of the tunnels on the slopes to the point : the patrol was to climb to were closed and smoking. Unaccus- the summit, secure the crater, and raise tomed to the silence, the men wondered the flag. As the patrol prepared to move why they drew no fire . They slid and out, the battalion commander handed scrambled down Suribachi to report to Schrier a folded American flag that had the battalion commander. been brought ashore by the battalion Even before the first reconnaissance adjutant, 1st Lieutenant George G . patrol returned from its climb, Lieuten- Wells. The flag, measuring 54 by 28 ant Colonel Johnson dispatched two inches, had been obtained from the three-man patrols from Companies D Missoula, the transport that had car- and F at 0900 to reconnoiter other ried 2/28 from its staging area to Iwo suitable routes up the mountain and Jima . probe for enemy resistance . None drew Forming an irregular column, the any fire. While the small reconnaissance patrol headed straight for the base of patrols were still executing their mis- Suribachi . They moved at a brisk pace sion, Colonel Johnson assembled the at first. When the route turned steep combat patrol that was slated to seize and the going became more difficult, the Mount Suribachi in force and hoist the patrol leader dispatched flankers to American colors over the mountain . The guard the vulnerable column against 3d Platoon, Company E, was selected surprise attack . The men, heavily bur- for this mission . The Company execu- dened with weapons and ammunition tive officer, 1st Lieutenant Harold G . climbed slowly, stopping occasionally to Schrier, led the patrol. A member of catch their breath . At times, the route the patrol was to recall later became so steep that they moved up- The 25 men of the 3d Platoon were by ward on their hands and knees . Along this time very dirty and very tired . They the way, they passed close to several no longer looked nor felt like crack com- cave entrances, but the caves appeared bat troops. Although they had just had a deserted and no resistance developed . relatively free day, their rest had been marred by a chilling rain . They hardly The only Japanese encountered were yearned for the distinction of being the the dead. Friendly eyes were observing first Marines to tackle the volcano. But the patrol's laborious ascent : Marines the colonel didn't bother to ask them how near the northeast base of Suribachi they felt about it7e and men of the fleet, who, cognizant of Lieutenant Schrier assembled the the drama unfolding before them, were platoon at 0800 and bolstered its thin watching through binoculars. ranks with other men of Company E Higher and higher the patrol picked until it totalled 40 men . Before starting its way, avoiding heavily mined trails the ascent, he led the men back around and keeping men out on the flanks to the base of Suribachi to battalion head- thwart any enemy ambush . Within half quarters just northeast of the base . an hour after leaving battalion head- Johnson's final orders were simple and quarters, the patrol arrived at the rim of the crater . There, Schrier called a ' Wheeler, Suribachi, p. 128. halt while he sized up the situation. He THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 541

MEN OF THE 28TH MARINES raise Old Glory on Mt . Suribachi, morning of 23 February 1945 (USMC 112720) 542 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

spotted two or three battered gun em- come fascinated spectators of the most placements and several cave entrances, dramatic moment of the Iwo operation . but no sign of the enemy . He signalled Deeply moved by the sight was Secretary the men to start filing over the rim . of the Navy Forrestal, accompanied As the patrol entered the crater, the by General Holland Smith and an as- men fanned out and took up positions sortment of Navy and Army person- just inside the rim. They were tensed nel including two admirals. Turning for action, but the caves along the rim towards General Smith, Forrestal said and the yawning floor below remained gravely : "Holland, the raising of that silent. flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps While half the patrol deployed for the next 500 years ."19 around the rim, the remainder pressed Atop the mountain, the men of into the crater to probe for resistance. Lieutenant Schrier's patrol had little Part of their mission had been exe- time for rejoicing. The sight of the cuted. It now remained for them to American flag waving over Suribachi locate something to serve as a flagpole. was too much for the remnants of Scouting along the rim of the crater, Colonel Atsuchi's garrison to take lying a couple of men located a 20-foot sec- down. Sergeant Louis R . Lowery, a tion of pipe . Lashing the flag to one Marine photographer, had just clicked end, they thrust the other into soft the shutter of his camera, taking pic- ground near the north rim . At 1020, tures of the flag raising on the rim of the Stars and Stripes rose over the the crater, when two Japanese charged highest point of the island, where it out from a cave near the summit . One fluttered in a brisk wind. Small though of the Japanese, running towards the it was, the flag was clearly visible from flag and waving his sword was promptly land and sea, proof that Suribachi had shot down . The other heaved a hand fallen. grenade at the Marine photographer Far below, on the sandy terraces and who escaped injury or death by vault- in foxholes, still exposed to deadly fire ing over the rim and sliding about 50 from enemy artillery and mortars in feet down the mountain before his fall the north of Iwo Jima, exhausted and was broken. His camera was smashed, unshaven men openly wept, while others but the negatives inside remained safe. slapped each other on the back and The second Japanese was also killed . shouted . Out at sea, ships' whistles, Other Japanese, frenzied by the sight horns, and bells rang out in jubilation. of the American flag, started to emerge On deck of the hospital ship Solace, from caves near the crater and met the badly wounded Marines raised them- same fate. selves on their elbows to look up at the Three hours later, a larger flag, tiny speck on the summit . almost twice the size of the first one, Not far from the CP of the 28th was raised over Mount Suribachi . It was Marines, a group of men stood on the the raising of this second flag, obtained beach near the surf . They had just step- ped ashore from a Higgins boat to be- 1B Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 261 . THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 543

from LST 779, that resulted in photog- saw February 24, 1945 . A Navy lieutenant, rapher Joe Rosenthal's picture of the whose name I don't recollect, and several flag raising that became perhaps the of his men-all blood stained wearing torn uniforms, reached the command post and most famous photograph of World War said they broke through the enemy en- II and that has since served as an in- circlement of Suribachi and managed to spiration to countless Americans . reach the command post for a report . Proportionate to the elation of Amer- When I showed the lieutenant up to Cap- icans at the fall of Suribachi, the Japa- tain (IJN) Inouye's desk, Inouye became furious and bellowed : "Why did you nese on Iwo Jima and elsewhere felt come, you son of a bitch? Wasn't your great consternation. Upon receiving the assignment to hold that fortress at any news of the fall of the volcano, one cost? Shame on you to come here . Shame, Japanese staff officer, once himself shame, shame! Don't you know what shame is? I tell you that you are a coward stationed on Iwo, but subsequently reas- and deserter!" His aides tried to calm signed to Chichi Jima, later recalled the Captain down . But Inouye was madder .1120 that "he was bursting with emotion and howling more profanity, and finally Equally shocking to this officer was the said : "Under any military regulations, a fact that the mountain fortress had deserter is executed summarily . I shall condescend myself to behead you." fallen in only three days . According to So the Captain drew his sword and the Japanese timetable, Suribachi was pulled it up . The wounded lieutenant to have been held for at least two knelt down silent, immobile. Presently, weeks .21 the aids clung to the captain and physi- For the remainder of the afternoon, cally wrested his sword away. Inouye burst into tears, mumbling : "Ugh, ugh, 2/28 continued to mop up on and around Suribachi's fallen! Suribachi's fallen!" Mount Suribachi . Marines annihilated The aides took the lieutenant away to the enemy snipers and, together with the sick bay for first aid treatment . engineers, blasted shut a large number While the reinforced platoon of Com- of cave entrances . Many Japanese were pany E scaled Suribachi, part of the sealed in and though undoubtedly some same company patrolled down around later managed to dig their way out of the eastern end of the island until it these tombs, an unknown number suc- made contact with elements of 1/28 cumbed from their wounds or were advancing down the west side.23 Tem- asphyxiated. A few Japanese who sur- porary contact between patrols in this vived the fall of Suribachi managed to get back to their own lines in the north- ern part of Iwo where they faced yet Fred Saito interview with Riichi Koyatsu, another ordeal . As the survivors from former Intendance Petty Officer 3/c, in Saito ltr to Richard F. Newcomb, dtd 10Feb64, in Suribachi entered the Japanese lines, Newcomb Notes. the following incident took place, to be ""My recollection is that, on my way down remembered long after by a Japanese the mountain (I was up there between the two petty officer who survived the operation flag raisings) I met the rest of E Company, I remember a very dramatic scene I its commander at its head, marching up with the second flag." BGen Robert H . Williams ltr 2° Horie Rpt, p. 8. to Head, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Jun69, 21 Ito, Fall of the Imperial Army . in Iwo Comments . 544 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECOND FLAG RAISING, afternoon of 23 February 1945 . (USMC 113062) THE STRUGGLE FOR SURIBACHI 545 area had already been made on the It proved impossible to obtain an previous day. The two patrols met near accurate figure of Japanese killed on Tobiishi Point at 1015, just a few min- and around Suribachi, though 1,231 utes before the first flag raising . There enemy were counted and hundreds more was no enemy resistance, though a mine were sealed inside caves and block- killed two men of 1/28. houses.27 Except for a handful of men To garrison the summit of Mount that succeeded in getting through to Suribachi during the coming night, 40 northern Iwo, the entire garrison of men from Company E remained on the Mount Suribachi was virtually killed to crest ; the rest of the regiment occupied a man. In the days following the fall positions around the base of the of the fortress, an occasional Japanese mountain. During the night, 122 Japa- might succeed in digging his way out nese were killed trying to infiltrate the of a cave or tunnel that had been blasted American lines. Many of them had shut, only to be shot by the alert Marines demolitions tied to their bodies and stationed on and around the mountain probably were trying to blow up Marine for the purpose . command posts and artillery positions Working together with the infantry, along with themselves 24 members of the 5th Engineer Battalion During one predawn breakthrough had destroyed 165 concrete pillboxes attempt early on 24 February, 30 and blockhouses, some with walls 10 grenade-throwing Japanese assaulted feet thick. They had blasted 15 strong the command post and aid station of bunkers and naval gun positions ; de- 1/28. Personnel of battalion headquar- stroyed thousands of enemy shells, ters, corpsmen included, used whatever grenades and land mines ; and had sealed weapons were at hand to kill the in- 200 caves, some of them three stories filtrators while protecting wounded high and equipped with heavy steel Marines who lay helpless on stretchers doors. In addition, the supporting troops amidst the turmoil . evacuated several hundred wounded There were to be no easy victories on Marines and bulldozed 1,500 yards of Iwo Jima, and the cost of seizing Mount roads and tank paths up to the crater . Suribachi was high. The operation from Immediately after it was secured, D plus 1 to D plus 4 cost the 28th Mount Suribachi was put to practical Marines 519 casualties . Of these, 3 of- use. The 14th Marines rushed echo and ficers and 112 men were killed and 21 flashranging equipment to the top in officers and 354 men were wounded 25 order to spot Japanese artillery and These figures do not include the 385 fortifications in the northern end of the casualties sustained by the regiment on island from this vantage point, which Dt-Day.26 thus was turned into a vital observa- tion post. Colonel Liversedge's regiment ~' 28th Mar AR, p . 22 . remained in corps reserve in the Suri- 5th MarDiv AR, Sec VII, pp . 17-22 . z° Ibid., p . 17. 24 Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 68 . 546 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS bachi area for the next five days, pick- north. Few Marines at this stage ing off occasional enemy survivors, suspected the strength of the enemy salvaging arms and equipment, and defenses and the cost to be exacted in training new replacements . advancing to the northern end of the As vital and dramatic as the capture island . For the Marines on Iwo, the of Mount Suribachi was, it marked but capture of Suribachi marked the end one step in the conquest of the stub- of a beginning ; for General Kuriba- bornly defended island . A grim and yashi's well entrenched main force it deadly battle was being fought to the was the beginning of the end . CHAPTER 6

Drive to the North 1

CAPTURE OF AIRFIELD NO . 1 2 battalions in line for the offensive were, from west to east, 1/26, 3/27, 3/23, While the 28th Marines was engaged 2/24, 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25. Two com- in the epic assault on Mount Suribachi panies of 1/24 were attached to the lat- during the first four days of the inva- ter battalion . The seven battalions were sion, a bloody slugging match involving deployed along a 4,000-yard front ex- the main body of General Schmidt's tending from the western shore just VAC was developing to the north . The north of Mount Suribachi northeast- 'Unless otherwise noted, the material in this ward across the southern end of Air- chapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; VAC AR ; field No. 1 . From there, the line followed VAC C-1 PerRpts ; VAC G-2 Rpts ; VAC C-3 the eastern fringes of the field and then Jnl; VAC C-3 PerRpts; 3d MarDiv AR, 19Feb- pivoted sharply to the east, meeting 25Mar45, hereafter 3d MarDiv AR ; 3d MarDiv the coast at the East Boat Basin . (See D-2 Jnl, 14Feb-27Mar45, hereafter 3d MarDiv Map II, Map Section) . D-2 Jnl ; 3d MarDiv G-3 Jnl, 6Feb-3Apr45, hereafter 3d MarDiv 'G-3 Jnl ; 3d MarDiv G-1 It had already become evident on PerRpts, 14Feb-11Apr 45, hereafter 3d MarDiv D-Day that, despite extensive naval G-1 PerRpts ; 3d MarDiv D-1 Jnl, 14Feb- gunfire and air support, numerous 12A,pr45, hereafter 3d MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; 4th enemy positions had survived the pre- MarDiv G-2 Rpts ; 4th MarDiv D-3 Jnl ; 4th liminary bombardment completely un- MarDiv D-3 Rpts ; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; 5th Mar Div D-2 PerRpts ; scathed . At this juncture, the depth of 5th Mar Div D-3 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv AR ; 5th the enemy defense system on the island MarDiv Casualty Rpts, 17Feb-26Mar45, here- was still a matter of conjecture. The after 5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts ; 5th TkBn dramatic drive of the 28th Marines AR; Iwo Comments ; Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; towards Mount Suribachi had initially Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Newcomb, Iwo Jima ; Newcomb Notes ; Aurthur, Cohlmia, captured the limelight ; but it was in and Vance, The Third Marine Division ; the central and northern part of Iwo Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division ; Conner, that General Kuribayashi had concen- The Fifth Marine Division ; Morison, Victory trated the bulk of his forces. The wily in the Pacific ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines enemy commander had left nothing un- and Amphibious War . 'Additional material in this section is de- done to make his defenses in the north- rived from : 1/24 OpRpt, 19Feb-18Mar45, here- ern and central sectors impregnable . after 1/24 OpRpt ; 2/24 AR, 19 Feb-16Mar45, In this, he was aided by the topography hereafter 2/24 AR ; 25th MarRgt UJnl, 18Feb- of the island, for the entire area com- 23Mar45, hereafter 25th MarRgt UJn1 ; 26th MarRgt UJn1, 19Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 26th prised a weird looking array of cliffs, MarRgt UJnl ; 3/27 UJn1, 19Feb-23Mar45, ravines, gorges, crevices, and ledges . hereafter 3/27 UJn1 . Jumbled rock, torn stubble of small 547 548 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

trees, jagged ridges, and chasms by to obtain further details about sprawled about in a crazy pattern. the impending attack, scheduled to be Within this maze, the enemy sat deeply launched within the hour, was killed . entrenched in hundreds of carefully The executive officer of 3/25, Lieutenant constructed positions, ranging from Colonel James Taul, took over the com- blockhouses to bunkers, pillboxes, caves, mand of the 2d Battalion . and camouflaged tanks . All fields of fire The initial objective of the assault were well integrated . on D plus 1 was to seize the 0-1 Line One of the reasons for the failure extending eastward from Iwo's west of American naval gunfire and aircraft coast to the southern tip of Airfield to neutralize or destroy an appreciable No. 2, whence it curved southward in number of enemy positions prior to the the form of a horseshoe and continued landings was the masterful use of generally east to the coast northeast of camouflage by the enemy . So skillfully the East Boat Basin. In order to reach had the Japanese hidden their positions the 0-1 Line, VAC units would have to that American ships and aircraft failed complete the northward pivot from to detect them. Even those that were west to east, which had already begun spotted and became targets of Amer- on D-Day. Units along the left flank ican naval gunfire and bombs frequently of VAC and those in the center were escaped major destruction because of to sweep across Airfield No . 2 and their structural strength . straighten the sagging portions of the In the northern part of Iwo Jima, line until they had advanced generally just as in the south, the first night abreast of the 25th Marines, with 1/24 ashore proved to be a restless one . attached, which occupied the hinge posi- Damage and casualties to the 1/23 com- tion on the right . mand post on Yellow 1, as well as the For many of the Marines preparing explosion of the 25th Marines ammuni- to jump off on the morning of D-plus 1, tion dump during the early morning daylight brought with it a most depress- hours, have already been recounted . ing sight. At least one observer was to Elsewhere, it was a similar story. At record 0230, about 500 Japanese formed in . . . it was not until the next morning, front of the 27th Marines but were when Marines along the airfield could dispersed by artillery fire from the 13th look back on the beach, that the full extent Marines. Shortly after 0700, the enemy of our losses was apparent . The wreckage scored a mortar hit squarely on the was indescribable. For two miles the debris was so thick that there were only a few command post of 2/25 above Blue Beach places where landing craft could still get 1. The battalion commander, Lieutenant in. The wrecked hulks of scores of landing Colonel Lewis C . Hudson, Jr ., the boats testified to one price we had paid to executive officer, Major William P . put our troops ashore . Tanks and half- Kaempfer, and the operations officer, tracks lay crippled where they had bogged Major Donald K down in the coarse sand . Amphibian trac- . Ellis, were badly tors, victims of mines and well aimed wounded. The commander of Company shells, lay flopped on their backs . Cranes, B, 4th Tank Battalion, who had stopped brought ashore to unload cargo, tilted at DRIVE TO THE NORTH 549

insane angles, and bulldozers were smashed the airfield, Colonel Wornham's men in their own roadways . had to move through relatively open Packs, gas masks, rifles, and clothing, ripped and shattered by shell fragments, terrain that offered neither cover nor lay scattered across the beach. Toilet ar- concealment from an enemy who en- ticles and even letters were strewn among joyed both excellent observation and the debris, as though war insisted on pry- fields of fire. Supported by Companies ing into the personal affairs of those it A and B of the 5th Tank Battalion, the claimed. And scattered amid the wreckage was 5th Division Marines moved forward death. An officer in charge of an LCT had steadily, taking heavy losses as they been hit while trying to free his boat from advanced. At 1800, when Colonel Worn- the sand and was blown in half ; a life ham ordered the two battalions to halt preserver supported the trunk of his body and consolidate, the advance had gained in the water. Marines, killed on the beach, 800 yards . However, 1/26 on the left were partially buried under the sand as the tide came in. Perhaps a hand stretched had to pull back about 200 yards to rigidly out of the sand, and that was all? more favorable ground for night de- In the face of all this death and fense. As D plus 1 came to a close, the two 5th Division battalions dug in along destruction, the battle continued and, following an intensive artillery, naval an east-west line extending from the gunfire, and air preparation, the VAC northwestern edge of Airfield No. 1 to attack to the north jumped off as the west coast. For the night, 2/27 scheduled at 0830 . Along the 1,000-yard backed up 1/26 while 1/27 dug in be- front in the 5th Division zone of attack, hind 3/27 to provide a defense in depth . Colonel Wornham committed 1/26 and For the attack on D plus 1, the 4th 3/27 abreast, keeping 1/27 and 2/27 Marine Division committed two regi- in reserve. General Rockey had desig- ments abreast . On the left of the division nated the 26th Marines, less 1/26 which zone of attack, the 23d Marines, with had been attached to RCT 27, as division 2/24 attached, jumped off at 0830 and reserve, standing by in positions near almost immediately encountered intense the southwestern tip of Airfield No . 1 . enemy machine gun, mortar, and artil- The advance of 1/26, commanded by lery fire . In attempting to pinpoint the Lieutenant Colonel Daniel C . Pollock, source of this fire and silence it, Colonel Wensinger's men temporarily lost con- and 3/27, under Lieutenant Colonel Donn J. Robertson, soon was seriously tact with Lanigan's 25th Marines . Even slowed down by numerous enemy pill- though the terrain in this area was unfavorable for the employment of boxes and land mines ; even more deadly was the well-aimed enemy mortar and armor, a reinforced platoon from Com- pany C, 4th Tank Battalion was able artillery fire and particularly a heavy to support the advance of the 23d concentration of air bursts from Japa- Marines. By noon, an aggressive attack nese antiaircraft guns fired from their minimum angle of elevation . West of had carried past the northern fringes of Airfield No . 1. This thrust breached 3 Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division, pp. an important portion of the Japanese 152-153. defensive system and at the same time 550 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

reduced a number of well-concealed pill- casualties sustained on D-Day, 3/25 was boxes and infantry strongpoints . The pulled out of the lines and held in regi- attacking Marines also had suffered mental reserve . severe casualties. Movement, both on The 25th Marines jumped off on the airfield flats and on the slopes from schedule . Tanks of Company B, 4th the beaches, was almost entirely under Tank Battalion, supported the attack, enemy observation, and the Japanese but the exceptionally rough terrain made the most of their favorable made this support practically worthless . situation. In addition, each time that a tank During the afternoon, the 23d Mar- reached a firing position, it immediately ines continued the advance . However, attracted accurate enemy mortar and minefields and increasingly rough ter- artillery fire. Crossfire from enemy rain all but precluded effective armored machine guns mounted in concealed em- support. The enemy directed deadly placements, combined with a heavy rocket, artillery, and mortar fire against volume of well-aimed rifle fire, seriously the advancing Marines, and after the interfered with the advance of Colonel morning's gains little more ground was Lanigan's regiment and inflicted heavy taken for the remainder of the day . casualties . Altogether, in crossing the airfield, In discussing the advance on D plus Colonel Wensinger's men had advanced 1, a survivor of the Iwo battle later was roughly 500 yards . At 1630, the reserve to remark of the 23d Marines, consisting of 1/23 There was no cover from enemy fire . and 2/23, moved forward to positions Japs deep in reinforced concrete pillboxes along the seaward edge of the airfield laid down interlocking bands of fire that cut whole companies to ribbons . Camou- to form a strong, secondary line of flage hid all the enemy installations. The defense. The 23d Marines linked up high ground on every side was honey- with the 27th Marines on the left and combed with layer after layer of Jap em- the 25th Marines on the right before placements, blockhouses, dugouts, and ob- nightfall. servation posts. Their observation was perfect; whenever the Marines made a The attack of Colonel Lanigan's 25th move, the Japs watched every step, and Marines on D plus 1 was to be carried when the moment came, their mortars, out by three battalions abreast . On the rockets, machine guns, and artillery, long left, 1/25 under Lieutenant Colonel Hol- ago zeroed-in-would smother the area in lis U. Mustain, was to make the main a murderous blanket of fire. The counter- battery fire and preparatory barrages of effort ; the 2d Battalion in the center, Marine artillery and naval gunfire were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel often ineffective, for the Japs would James Taul, was to seize the high merely retire to a lower level or inner cave ground directly to its front and, after and wait until the storm had passed . Then taking it, give fire support to 1/25. they would emerge and blast the advanc- On the extreme right flank, the attached ing Marines.' 1/24 under Major Paul S . Treitel, was The deadly effectiveness of the enemy to remain in place until 1/25 and 2/25 fire was not limited to the front lines . At could come abreast. Because of heavy 'I bid ., p. 153 . DRIVE TO THE NORTH 551 1100, Japanese artillery scored a direct by friendly aircraft were not enough, hit on the aid station of 1/25, killing the hapless company also was shelled by six Navy corpsmen and wounding an naval gunfire and found friendly artil- additional seven . It was apparent that lery registering on its positions.' This General Kuribayashi had so sited his misguided naval gunfire, consisting of artillery that all the beaches and routes two complete salvos fired by an un- into the interior of the island were identified cruiser, landed in the front covered. Japanese gunners could search line of 1/24 and resulted in approx- out various supply dumps, evacuation imately 90 casualties.7 stations, and command posts at will . By 1800, 1/25 and 2/25 had made Normally, LVTs had the task of bring- gains of 200-300 yards . The left flank ing supplies to the front lines . In the of 1/25, on the other hand, had been zone of attack of the 25th Marines, how- unable to move at all throughout the ever, even these versatile vehicles were day because of extremely heavy fire unable to get through and work details received from the left front in the zone from units in reserve had to manhandle of action of the 23d Marines . At 1800, critically needed materiel. orders were issued to all units to con- Colonel Lanigan's Marines continued solidate, dig in, and establish firm con- to press the attack throughout the after- tact with each other. noon of D plus 1, but progress was As night descended over bitterly woefully slow. At 1600, the exhausted contested Iwo Jima on 20 February, the men were cheered by the arrival of capture of Airfield No . 1 had been friendly aircraft which, it was hoped, completed and the 4th Division front might lend some impetus to the advance . had advanced between 200 and 500 This joy, however, soon, turned into yards. For these gains, the Japanese terror when .50 caliber machine gun had exacted a heavy price . As the second bullets, rockets, and bombs from a day ended, the 5th Marine Division had friendly air strike hit men of Company lost 1,500 men killed and wounded and B, 1/24, standing upright on the south- the 4th Division about 2,000 .8 The first ern slope of the quarry about 400 yards prisoners, a total of three, had been inland from the eastern shore . This taken during the day, but two of them strike, neither called for nor controlled died. A total of 630 enemy dead had by 1/24, was delivered without a pre- been counted, but it was assumed that liminary run and placed on the front many others had been killed . lines despite the fact that yellow front- Early on D plus 1, General Schmidt line marking panels had been displayed had ordered the corps reserve, the 21st prior to and during the attack . In con- Marines, commanded by Colonel Hart- sequence of this error, 1/24 suffered five noll J. Withers, to boat and prepare to killed and six wounded.5 As if attempt- ing to advance under heavy enemy fire '4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx G, p. 121. and being strafed, bombed, and rocketed LtCol Paul S . Treitel ltr to CMC, dtd 5Feb53, in Iwo Comments . '4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx H . p. 4. I Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 146. 552 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

land on order . The regiment began de- 105 down with it . Seven more DUKWs barking before noon, in rain and rough waddled out of the LST and sank in water. Dozens of men missed the drop succession. As a result, a total of eight into the bobbing boats and after they 105s were lost, as well as a dozen offi- had been fished out, the boats went to cers and men . It was subsequently de- the rendezvous area . There the LCVPs termined that motor failure of the circled for six hours, the Marines cold, DUKWs was caused by water in the wet, and miserable. The congestion at gasoline, and by insufficient freeboard the beaches which was steadily increas- resulting from extremely heavy loads ing, combined with a rising surf that and choppy water. Thus, 4/14 had lost made landing conditions hazardous, 8 out of 12 howitzers before firing a precluded their landing. In the end, round on Iwo Jima .lo General Schmidt ordered the regiment The disaster for Lieutenant Colonel back to its transports to be landed later Youngdale's battalion did not end here . when conditions had improved . The remaining four DUKWs headed for At the same time, on D plus 1, there the beach late in the evening and two was a desperate need for artillery, of them broached at the surf line while whose landing could not be postponed. attempting to go ashore at 2230 . Out of As a result, the 4th Marine Division a dozen DUKWs and howitzers, only landed the 3d and 4th Battalions of the two finally made it to shore. The guns, 14th Marines during the day . Shortly having gone into position, began firing after 1000, 3/14 had launched all of its northward into the inky darkness. DUKWs, but the landing was delayed In order to offset the critical artillery by enemy fire . Finally, in midafternoon, shortage, some of the big 155mm how- the amphibian trucks carrying 3/14 itzers also were ordered to land. In began to land over the southernmost late afternoon, LST 779 forced its way portion of Yellow 1 . The battalion's through the wreckage littering Red 105mm howitzers moved into positions Beach 1 and discharged Battery C of prepared by the 3/14 reconnaissance the 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion. De- party just inland from the boundary spite extremely difficult beach condi- separating Yellow 1 and Red 2 . Around tions, the four howitzers were hauled 1730, the howitzers opened fire and re- up the steep bluffs by tractors and were inforced the fires of the 1st Battalion in position by 1840 in the 5th Marine of the division artillery.9 Division sector near the west coast . The landing of the 105s of 4/14 The two remaining batteries of Major turned into a disaster . The first DUKW Earl J. Rowse's battalion were not to emerge from LST 1032 remained landed for another two and four days afloat only for a moment . Then waves respectively. Even those artillery bat- surged over the side, the engine stop- talions that did make it ashore en- ped, and the DUKW sank, taking the countered unusual problems from the 0 14th Mar OpRpt, App. 3, pp . 8-10 . 10 14th Mar OpRpt, App . 5, p. 3. DRIVE TO THE NORTH 553 very outset. Before the 28th Marines enemy resistance on 20 February was put the Japanese artillery on Mount even heavier than that encountered on Suribachi out of action, artillerymen D-Day, both Marine divisions were firing to the north received enemy fire holding the ground they had seized. from the south that proved more Beach conditions remained extremely troublesome than enemy rounds from difficult throughout the day, both be- the front ." cause of a high surf and the continuous enemy artillery fire. The shore party ADVANCE TOWARDS THE 12 battalions were raked by artillery, mor- 0-1 LINE tar, and small arms fire as they des- At the cost of heavy casualties, the perately attempted to clear the beaches Marines at the end of D plus 1 con- and unload incoming landing craft . trolled nearly one-third of Iwo Jima They stacked supplies well above the and occupied a two mile-wide beach- high-water mark, but gear piled up head extending along the landing area there faster than it could be moved in- and 2,000 yards up the southwest coast . land. In order to cope with this crisis, Motoyama Airfield No . 1 was com- the entire logistical plan of establish- pletely in American hands. Marine lines ing shore-party dumps had to be aban- stretched in an east-west direction from doned. Without pausing on the beaches, the west coast opposite the end of the incoming amtracs-the only vehicles airstrip, past the end of the airfield, that could climb the terraces and reach with a slight curve to the quarry. Just firm ground unassisted-waddled up beyond that point the line curved at the slopes into the front lines, where right angles to face east with the right they delivered ammunition, rations, and flank resting on the shore along the water directly to the combat units . The ridge facing the East Boat Basin . The tractors freed weapons and vehicles 0-1 Line had not yet been reached at that had bogged down and hauled any point, but positions were well knit supply-laden DUKWs over the terraces, and more artillery and serviceable tanks thus enabling the latter vehicles to move were available for support. Even though supplies right up to the front lines . In addition to the vehicles shuttling back 'LtCol Roland J. Spritzen Itr to CMC, dtd and forth between the beaches and the 7Nov52, in Iwo Comments. lines, Marine working parties hand- "Additional material in this section is de- carried ammunition forward in order rived from 13th MarRgt UJn1, 19Feb-21Mar45, hereafter 13th MarRgt UJn1 ; 14th MarRgt to alleviate critical shortages . OpRpt, 22Feb-14Mar45, hereafter 14th Mar- In view of the overall situation, it Rgt OpRpt ; 5th EngBn UJn1, 19Feb-24Mar45, became apparent to Generals Smith and hereafter 5th EngBn UJn1 ; 5th Shore Party Schmidt at the close of D plus 1, that Rgt AR, 19-28Feb45, hereafter 5th Shore the strength of enemy resistance dic- Party Rgt AR ; 2/26 UJnl, 19Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 2/26 UJnl ; 3/26 UJn1, 19Feb-26Mar- tated the necessity of employing the 3d 45, hereafter 3/26 UJnl ; VAC Transl of Jap Marine Division, still afloat, before long. Docs, Iwo Jima, hereafter VAC Translations. The requirement of furnishing food and 554 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ammunition to an additional 20,000 Ma- numerable pillboxes and around 1,500 rines would impose an added strain on caves . available beach facilities, but the dwin- The terrain in the 27th Marines' dling combat strength of the two Ma- zone of advance was suitable for the rine divisions already on the island left employment of armor ; elements of the no other choice . As a result, the 21st 5th Tank Battalion moved forward just Marines of the 3d Marine Division were ahead of the infantry . By 1340, 1/26 again ordered to land on D plus 2, to on the left and 3/27 on the right had be placed at the disposal of General advanced nearly 1,000 yards and had Cates. reached a point just south of the 0-1 The night of 20-21 February was Line. Because of the relative speed of punctuated by loud explosions as the the advance and heavy enemy shelling, Japanese exchanged artillery fire with a sizable gap had developed by this time the Americans . At the same time, U .S. between the 4th and 5th Marine Divi- Navy gunfire support ships and LCIs sions. Company B, 1/27 was committed mounting 4.2-inch mortars delivered from regimental reserve to fill this gap counterbattery and harassing fires . between 3/27 and the 23d Marines . Early in the evening, around 2000, a Under continuous enemy fire, the 5th group of Japanese was observed mass- Marine Division spent the remainder of ing opposite the 27th Marines . Imme- the afternoon reorganizing, evacuating diate fire by the 13th Marines and casualties, and consolidating its lines . attached corps artillery killed a number In the course of the afternoon, General of the enemy and dispersed the rest. Rockey and his staff came ashore and Shortly before 0500, about 100 Japa- established their headquarters near the nese attempted to pierce the lines of southern end of Airfield No . 1. the 4th Marine Division in the 1/25 At the same time that the 5th Marine sector, but were driven off with heavy Division jumped off on D plus 2, the losses. 23d and 25th Marines continued their As 21 February dawned, 12 de- attack. The 23d, with 2/23 on the left stroyers, 2 cruisers, 68 aircraft, and 33 and 2/24 on the right slowly pushed howitzers took turns at battering the forward with 1/23 and 2/23 following enemy-held portion of Iwo before VAC at a 600-yard interval. Almost imme- resumed the attack on D plus 2 . At diately, the advancing Marines encoun- 0810, both the 4th and 5th Marine Divi- tered severe mortar, machine gun, and sions jumped off . On the left flank of artillery fire, as well as a number of VAC, the 27th Marines met immediate minefields . The advance through the and violent resistance from the enemy's minefields and against numerous pill- main defensive positions, which con- boxes was very time-consuming and sisted of a belt of caves and concrete- costly. Engineer units went forward to and-steel emplacements . This defense remove the mines . The only significant system had a depth of a mile and a half advance made was on the left flank in and extended from the west coast to the 23d Marines zone of advance, where the east coast of Iwo . It featured in- slightly defiladed areas permitted local DRIVE TO THE NORTH 555 and restricted envelopment . But even countered major difficulty in moving the progress of the 23d Marines aver- into the line. By 1700, the move had aged only slightly more than 100 yards been accomplished and the regiment during the entire day. After reestab- consolidated for the night . Similarly, in lishing contact with the 27th Marines order to fill a sizable gap between the on its left, the 23d dug in for the night right flank of the 5th Marine Division shortly before 1800 . and the left flank of the 4th, 1/27 was On the extreme right, the 25th Ma- moved into position along the 5th Divi- rines attacked with 1/25, 2/25, and sion's right flank . Lines of General 1/24 in line, and 3/25 in reserve. Even Rockey's division had to be extended though the enemy had laid minefields about 400 yards into the 4th Division in front of the 25th Marines, the ter- zone of attack . rain here was so rocky and irregular Throughout the day, the two-divi- that the enemy had not been able to sional advance towards Airfield No . 2 mine all avenues of approach . Tanks of received effective air and naval gunfire Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, sup- support. More than 800 aircraft flew ported the advance of 1/25 and 2/25, direct support missions with a total of while tanks of Company B fired on pill- 32 strikes carried out by 14-20 planes boxes and dugouts on the cliff fac- each. Eleven destroyers stood by off- ing 1/24, driving the enemy from the shore to provide direct support and heights of the quarry and cliff areas . illuminating fires for VAC ; 1 destroyer, Howitzers of 1/14 placed counterbat- 2 LCI mortar support units, and 2 tery and supporting fire across the regi- cruisers fired deep support missions .13 mental front . Resistance in the center Naval gunfire and artillery air spotters of the regimental zone gradually weak- continued to use carrier-based aircraft, ened and fair progress was made on since Airfield No . 1 was still unable to the right along the shore of the East accommodate VMO units. Boat Basin . Altogether, the 25th Ma- A pressing need for reinforcements rines gained from 50-300 yards in the made it necessary to land more troops course of the morning. Casualties were on Iwo as soon as possible . Improved heavy throughout ; at 1000, while check- beach and landing conditions on the ing his frontline positions, Lieutenant morning of D plus 2 finally permitted Colonel Hollis U . Mustain, commanding the 21st Marines of the 3d Marine Divi- 1/25, was killed by enemy shellfire . The sion to come ashore. The regiment, com- battalion executive officer, Major Fen- manded by Colonel Hartnoll J . Withers, ton J. Mee, assumed command . was ordered to land at 1130 over the The irregular advance of units over Yellow Beaches ; it was to be attached difficult terrain caused a serious gap to the 4th Marine Division to assist in to develop between the 1st and 2d Bat- the capture of Airfield No . 2.14 Colonel talions, 25th Marines ; in midafternoon Withers landed his battalions through- Colonel Lanigan committed his 3d Bat- talion between the two . Since all units "VAC AR, Anx B, p . 16. were under heavy enemy fire, 3/25 en- 14 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Sec IV . 556 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS out the afternoon of 21 February. De- The night from 21-22 February spite a heavy surf, the regiment did not proved to be a bad one for men of the incur any casualties and by 1800 all landing force, who felt extremely un- three battalions and the regimental comfortable in the cold drizzle . Within command post were ashore. After being the overall scope of General Kuribaya- attached to the 4th Marine Division, shi's prohibition of any major banzai RCT 21 assembled near the edge of charges, the Japanese did all within Airfield No . 1 . their power to make their unwanted Shortly after noon, the assistant com- guests as miserable as possible . mander of the 4th Marine Division, At dusk, enemy aircraft attacked Brigadier General Hart, also went American shipping offshore and scored ashore in order to report on beach con- hits on the outer ring of the warships ditions and select an appropriate site surrounding Iwo Jima. Taking advan- for the division command post . Finding tage of the commotion resulting from the beaches under heavy fire and lit- the sudden air attack, the enemy exe- tered with the debris of the invasion, cuted local counterattacks and infiltra- General Hart recommended that divi- tion against both the 4th and 5th sion headquarters remain afloat at least Divisions. Along the left front of VAC, until 22 February . The assistant di- an enemy counterattack in undeter- vision commander also recommended, mined strength hit the 27th Marines at after consultation with the regimental 2100. No penetration resulted from this commanders, that the 21st Marines, in- attack, which was stopped within the stead of relieving the 25th Marines as hour. At 0245, the exhausted men of previously planned, would relieve the Colonel Wornham's regiment repulsed 23d Marines on D plus 3 . His recom- an attempted infiltration . An hour later, mendation was approved . the enemy tried his luck once again, As 21 February drew to a close, VAC and at 0400, RCT 27 reported 800 en- held a very irregular line which passed emy massing in front of its lines .'' As between the two airfields . When units the long night finally ended, the regi- consolidated their positions for the ment's lines were still intact, though night, a total of eight battalions was an undetermined number of the enemy facing the enemy across the island . The had managed to infiltrate. slow Marine advance during D plus 2 It also proved to be a restless night had forced the Japanese back yard by for Marines of the 4th Division . Shortly yard. Once again, for the gains made in before midnight, an enemy force of the course of the day, VAC Marines had about 200 men massed on Airfield No . 2 paid with heavy casualties . During the and headed for the lines of 3/23 . Before first 58 hours ashore, the landing force this attack could get organized, the had sustained more than 4,500 casual- enemy was hit by naval gunfire and ties, and combat efficiency of the 4th artillery and was forced to withdraw . Marine Division had been reduced to 68 percent. ' .5th MarDiv AR, p. 21 . DRIVE TO THE NORTH 557

During the long night, the 25th Ma- been attached to RCT 27, was to revert rines reported that an enemy aircraft to its parent regiment. The 27th Ma- had bombed Blue Beach behind its lines . rines reserve, 2/27, would become at- Almost as steady as the rain was the tached to the 26th Marines. volume of enemy mortar and artillery At 0500 the 21st Marines prepared fire that covered the Marine front lines, to relieve RCT 23 with the attached beaches, and rear areas throughout the 2/24. Upon being relieved, the 23d Ma- night. rines, less two mortar platoons, was to D plus 3 was, if anything, even worse be held in VAC reserve near the north- than the three days that had preceded eastern edge of Airfield No . 1. The mor- it. A cold, heavy rain pelted the island, tar platoons were to remain in position coating Marines and their weapons to support the attack of RCT 21 . The with a sort of grayish paste on top of 25th Marines, with 1/24 attached, was the layer of volcanic ash they had al- to remain on the 4th Division right, ready acquired . The front lines of VAC, while the 24th Marines, less 1/24, would on the morning of 22 February, bent continue in division reserve . back in the form of a horseshoe in the The relief of the 27th Marines took center of the 3,400-yard line, where ele- place in a heavy downpour of rain, ments of the 23d Marines still were which turned the ground into gumbo . 1,200 yards short of the 0-1 Line . Fa- Mortar fire, coming from the higher tigue and heavy casualties both had ground ahead and in the center of the left their imprint on the men in the island, fell as steadily as the rain, and lines, and the three days and nights of both combined to create confusion and incessant, nerve-shattering action were disruption . The 26th Marines, with beginning to have an adverse effect on 2/27 attached, passed through the lines combat efficiency. Without rest or sleep, of the 27th Marines with the mission subsisting solely on a diet of K rations of attacking to the northeast, following and water, occasionally supplemented by the western contour of the island . At unheated C rations, the men were begin- the same time to the right, the 21st Ma- ning to show a marked drop in morale . rines moved in on the left of the 4th In order to provide added impetus for Marine Division . the attack on this fourth day of the The zone of attack of the 5th Division operation, both Generals Rockey and extended from the western beaches to a Cates decided to relieve some of the formidable terrain obstacle which ran frontline units, notably the 23d and from northeast to southwest down the 27th Marines. Along the left flank of west center of the island, curving west VAC, the 26th Marines under Colonel across the division's front near Airfield Chester B. Graham moved out at day- No. 2. This obstacle was a bluff almost break with the mission of relieving the 100 feet high, whose slopes dropped al- 27th Marines and continuing the attack most vertically towards the American to the north. Once RCT 26 had passed lines. The high ground above the bluff the lines, 1/26, which previously had provided the enemy with perfect obser- 558 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

vation into the division area and enabled 1400, the exhausted and severely mauled him to effectively block any advance Marines were forced to relinquish the from both the front and the right flank. 400-yard gain they had made earlier in At 0835, following preparatory naval the day and pulled back to the line of gunfire and air strikes, both divisions departure. Japanese mortar and artil- jumped off . In the zone of attack of the lery fire harassed the men for the re- 5th Marine Division the 26th Marines mainder of the afternoon during the attacked with three battalions in the withdrawal and continued after the Ma- line . Almost immediately, the advanc- rines had occupied defensive positions ing Marines drew heavy fire from the for the night . front and right flank . Enemy shells and In the sector occupied by the 4th bullets were no respectors of rank ; Marine Division, things had gone little around 0940, Lieutenant Colonel Tom better during D plus 3 . At 0500, the M. Trotti, commanding 3/26, and his op- 21st Marines began the relief of the erations officer, Major William R . Day, 23d. The newly arrived 3d Division Ma- were killed by a mortar shell . Captain rines faced very rough going from the Richard M . Cook, commanding Com- outset. In the heavy downpour and con- pany G, took over until noon, at which tinuous enemy fire, the relief of the time Major Richard Fagan, the division 23d Marines required nearly six hours . inspector, assumed command . Despite Even before the relief was completed, heavy losses, the 26th advanced for Colonel Withers committed his 1st and about 400 yards . In the course of the 2d Battalions, commanded by Lieu- day, the weather turned from bad to tenant Colonel Marlowe C. Williams and worse. Rain was falling in torrents and Lieutenant Colonel Lowell E. English, visibility became extremely poor. Be- respectively, against an intricate net- cause of the heavy rain, no air support work of mutually supporting pillboxes could be made available . The poor on the high ground between the two air- weather even handicapped the tanks, fields. The 3d Battalion, under Lieuten- whose drivers could see but a few yards ant Colonel Wendell H . Duplantis, re- ahead. mained in reserve . During the afternoon it became ap- As the 21st Marines advanced north- parent that the attack by 3d Division ward, with 1/21 on the right and 2/21 Marines against the bluff itself had on the left, it had to push its attack stalled, leaving the 26th Marines ex- uphill against mutually supporting posed to heavy fire from the front, the pillboxes and bunkers with mined ap- right flank, and the right rear . In addi- proaches. These pillboxes were well tion, the Japanese were beginning to protected on the flanks and only direct launch several thrusts against the regi- hits by large caliber weapons appeared ment's left flank and center . As if to to have any effect on them . In the taxi- mock Colonel Graham's drenched and ways between the airfields, bunkers dispirited Marines, Japanese artillery blocked the advance, and the area ad- and mortars on the bluff directed heavy joining the runways of Airfield No . 2 fire into the 26th Marines' lines . At was dotted with pillboxes that were DRIVE TO THE NORTH 559 covered with sand and often protruded any sizable gains had an adverse effect only a foot or so above the ground. This on operations of the 25th Marines, was the beginning of the enemy main which was unable to launch a full-scale line of resistance. The restricted nature attack. Nevertheless, in the course of of the area and the excellent defensive the morning, 1/25 advanced about 200 system precluded any maneuver but a yards, only to find its left flank com- frontal assault . pletely exposed . As a result, the ad- Bad weather and a well-entrenched vance had to be halted until the enemy who took full advantage of the battalion could tie in firmly with the terrain with prearranged fires, pre- 21st Marines. In the center of the 25th sented the 21st Marines with an exceed- Marines line, the 3d and 2d Battalions ingly brutal introduction to Iwo Jima . found themselves marking time . The By afternoon of D plus 3, 2/21 had only cheerful note for the day was advanced 250 yards in places ; 1/21 had sounded when 3/25 requested and re- gained about 50 yards . Casualties had ceived rocket support against a hill been out of all proportion to the gains some 800 yards northwest of the made. Lieutenant Colonel Williams was quarry. Two salvoes fired against en- wounded by a mortar shell but refused emy positions on this hill drove about evacuation until nightfall, at which time 200 Japanese from their emplacements. he turned command of 1/21 over to the Caught out in the open by well-placed battalion executive officer, Major Clay machine guns of 3/25, a large part of M. Murray.16 At about 1700, the attack the enemy force was wiped out . halted for the day and all units began Around 1530, the Japanese struck to prepare positions for the night . back. While leaving his forward obser- To the right of the 21st Marines, the vation post, Lieutenant Colonel Cham- 25th, with three battalions and the at- bers was severely wounded by enemy tached 1/24 in the line, was to have machine gun fire, when a bullet struck attacked on D plus 3 in order to his left collarbone. Since Lieutenant straighten its regimental front in con- Colonel James Taul, the battalion ex- junction with the advance of the 21st ecutive officer, had assumed command Marines. Once the lines had been of 2/25 on 20 February, when the com- straightened out, both the 21st and 25th mander of 2/25 had been wounded and Marines were to launch a coordinated evacuated, Captain James C . Headley drive to the north to seize the 0-1 Line . assumed command of 3/25 . Failure of the 21st Marines to make The 2d Battalion of the 25th Ma- rines, meanwhile, remained largely sta- . Even so, it took 10 Major Murray himself was wounded on tionary during the day the following day and forced to turn command its share of casualties . In midmorning, of the battalion over to Major Robert H . the Japanese laid a heavy and accurate Houser, who led 1/21 for the duration of the mortar barrage on the battalion lines ; Iwo operation . LtCol Robert H . Houser ltr to an attempted enemy counterattack was CMC, dtd 3Apr53 and Col Marlowe C . Wil- liams ltr to CMC, dtd 9Feb53, in Iwo quickly smashed . At 1830, Japanese Comments . were observed moving towards the bat- 560 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS talion lines . Before an attack could get Burials in the 5th Division cemetery, under way, infantry heavy weapons fire located just south of the airfield, had and artillery support from the 14th already commenced during the after- Marines dispersed the Japanese . noon of D plus 1 .18 Provision was made At the right end of the VAC lines, for those Marines who died on board 1/24 spent most of the day in mopping ship to be buried at sea, provided that up along the east coast above the land- this took place in water more than 100 ing beaches. Major Treitel's men blasted fathoms deep . caves and pillboxes in an attempt to Evacuation of the numerous casual- reduce the heavy enemy mortar and ties became a critical problem on D plus sniper fire originating in the bluffs 3 because of poor beach conditions . LST around the quarry . In its operations 807 voluntarily remained on the beach during D plus 3, the battalion fared under fire and acted as a hospital ship better than the 25th Marines on its left during the hours of darkness, while the and casualties were comparatively light. remaining LSTs withdrew for the At 1700, the battalion consolidated its night. As darkness descended over the positions and established contact be- battle area, a steady stream of casual- tween units. ties arrived on the 807, where doctors The ferocious battle raging between performed emergency operations in the the airfields took its toll not only of wardroom . Before morning, more than men but also materiel . Thus, at the 200 casualties had been treated on the end of D plus 3, the 4th Tank Battalion LST ; of this number only 2 died. 19 reported that 11 of its tanks had been At sundown on 22 February, Task destroyed and 8 were under repair, Force 58 set sail for its second raid leaving 28 operational .17 The 5th Tank against Tokyo. On board the Indiana- Battalion reported 34 tanks operational, polis, Admiral Spruance accompanied 4 under repair, and 13 destroyed . this strike force . A task group of this Even though the advance towards fast carrier force, TG 58 .5, consisting the north of Iwo had made little head- of the Enterprise, two cruisers, and way during 22 February, the command Destroyer Squadron 54, remained at organization and activities on the Iwo Iwo to provide night fighter protection . beaches became somewhat better co- The departure of TF 58 materially re- ordinated . Headquarters of the 9th Na- duced the availability of aircraft for val Construction Brigade, commanded direct ground support ; overall respon- by Captain Robert C. Johnson, CEC, sibility for providing this type of sup- USN, was set up ashore, and initial port for the Marines ashore now fell on work was started on preparing Iwo to the small carriers of the carrier support serve as a giant aircraft carrier. In the force under Admiral Durgin, in addi- course of the day, burials began in the tion to its mission of conducting air Fourth Division cemetery halfway be- searches for survivors, providing anti- tween Yellow 1 and Airfield No . 2. ' VAC C-1 PerRpts, p . 21. 'VAC AR, p. 18. ' 5th Shore Party Rgt AR, p . 6. DRIVE TO THE NORTH 561 submarine and combat air patrols, and the 0-2 Line . Jumping off at 0730, the strikes against nearby Chichi Jima . As 4th Marine Division was directed to a result, the close air support for Ma- make the main effort on its left against rines fighting on the ground would Airfield No. 2. Since the strongly de- henceforth have to be curtailed due to fended bluffs on the far left of the 4th the shortage of aircraft .20 Division's zone of advance dominated all Marines shivering from wetness and of western Iwo, VAC authorized the cold in the front lines, faced another 5th Marine Division to advance beyond restless night. The Japanese began to the boundary separating the two divi- probe the American lines shortly after sions if such an advance promised to dusk. Following an extremely heavy neutralize or eliminate these prominent mortar and artillery barrage around obstacles. 1800, a strong enemy force attacked the At 0730 on 23 February, the VAC northernmost lines of the 26th Marines attack continued in the direction of and succeeded in driving back the out- Airfield No. 2 and the 0-2 Line. The posts. The enemy counterattack was 26th Marines, with 2/27 attached, moved brought to a halt after heavy casualties forward against very heavy fire from had been inflicted upon the attacking the front and the right flank. After ad- force. During the early morning hours, vancing for about 200 yards against enemy swimmers, who had infiltrated bitter opposition, the regiment found across the western beaches into the 5th the ground untenable and withdrew to Division area, had to be eliminated . Sim- its jumpoff positions. Shortly before ilarly, in the zone of action of the 4th noon, enemy artillery scored a direct Marine Division, there was sporadic hit on the command post of 2/26 . The enemy activity throughout the night. battalion commander, Lieutenant Colo- Around 0500, an estimated 100 Japa- nel Joseph C . Sayers, was wounded and nese attempted to infiltrate the lines of had to be evacuated . Major Amedeo 2/25 and 3/25 . Even though these enemy Rea, the battalion executive officer, as- efforts were thwarted, the intermittent sumed command . For the remainder of firing served to keep the weary Marines D plus 4, the 26th Marines attempted from getting some much-needed sleep. to advance, but it was driven back each In addition to all this activity, Japanese time by heavy enemy fire . At the end artillery continued to hit friendly posi- of the day, the battalions dug in for the tions along the corps front, inflicting night in about the same positions they further casualties and adding to the had occupied during the preceding sense of uncertainty . night. Despite the continuous harassment In the center of the VAC line, where by enemy infantry and supporting the 4th Marine Division with the at- arms, VAC plans called for the con- tached 21st Marines was to make the tinuation of the attack on 23 February . main effort against Airfield No. 2, The objective for D plus 4 was to be events took a similar turn . Because of the importance of this airfield General '0 VAC Air Support Summary, p . 2. Kuribayashi had assigned the 145th 562 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Regiment commanded by Colonel Masuo open his left ear . Major Robert H. Houser Ikeda to defend this vital objective . became 1/21's third commander in two This regiment was considered the best days. Private First Class George Smyth, 18, Japanese outfit on Iwo Jima ; its 47mm of Brooklyn, had never seen such Japa- antitank guns were sited to fire straight nese. They were six footers, and they down the runways. In fact, the Marines never retreated : Smyth's buddy fell beside were now encountering the enemy main him, a pistol bullet through his head, dead defense line, which began in the west center. It came from a captured Marine .45. On the other side, a Japanese came at the rocky cliffs to the north of the down with his sword, both hands grasping western beaches, stretched east across the hilt. The Marine put up his right hand the island to skirt the southern end of to ward off the blow, and his arm was sliced Airfield No. 2, and terminated in the down the middle, fingers to elbow. As cliffs at the northern end of the eastern Smyth ran forward, a Japanese disap- peared before him into a hole . Smyth beaches. This line was organized in dropped at the hole to finish him off, but depth with all types of heavy weapons the Japanese was already rising from a within and behind it, capable of deliver- tunnel behind him . Smyth turned just in ing fire upon both the isthmus and time to kill him . The ground was giving beach areas Ikeda's men every advantage, and they . It was also heavily organ- were using them all ized with a series of mutually support- ing pillboxes, bunkers, blockhouses, tun- In the end, 1/21 was unable to make nels, and other dug in positions . In addi- any gains for the day and had to con- tion, all approaches to the airfield were solidate for the night in its jumpoff mined ; enemy dead, saki bottles, hel- positions. The 2d Battalion, now com- mets, and ammunition dumps were manded by Major George A . Percy, had found booby trapped . already become engaged in a sharp fire- It became the lot of the 21st Marines fight at daybreak and, as a result, did to advance into this cauldron of enemy not jump off until 0935. The heavy cur- fire. Typical of the fighting which this tain of enemy fire prevented any ad- regiment was to see at the approaches vance until a second artillery prepara- to Airfield No . 2 on D plus 4 were the tion had neutralized some of the known experiences of some of the members of targets on Airfield No . 2. The assault this unit companies reached the southwest ap- proaches to the airfield, but every ef- Major Clay Murray taking over 1/21 fort to get troops onto the field itself for his first day, figured that if he could failed, despite heavy support from naval find the weakest point and destroy it he could then knock off the supporting posi- gunfire and a rocket barrage . Finally, tions one by one. He lifted the telephone some of the advance elements succeeded to give an order and a machine gun burst in crossing the lower end of the north- smashed the phone in his hand. Two bul- east-southwest runway following an air lets tore through his left cheek and out strike, only to be driven back later by his open mouth, taking five teeth with them, and the rest of the burst sheared the knuckles of his left hand and ripped ^21 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 175-176, DRIVE TO THE NORTH 563 heavy machine gun and direct antitank parent that Iwo's eastern beaches would fire. The 21st Marines consolidated its have a high surf on the following day, lines for the night at the southern edge preparations were made to shift the of the field. For all practical purposes, unloading of cargo to the western gains for the day were nil, though the beaches in the 5th Division sector for regiment had sustained heavy casual- the next few days. ties. At the same time that supplies were On the right flank of the 4th Marine coming ashore at a more steady pace, Division zone of attack, the 24th Mari- the command organization on Iwo Jima nes, now in line with three battalions also became more stabilized . During the abreast, was to make the only sizable morning of D plus 4, General Cates came gains for the day. Advancing against ashore and established his command moderate to heavy enemy resistance, post just east of the northwest-south- Colonel Jordan's men gained as much west runway of Airfield No. 1. Now as 300 yards . Since units along the that the headquarters of both the 4th regiment's left flank failed to advance, and 5th Marine Divisions had been set the regiment halted around 1500 and up on the island, General Schmidt made dug in for the night . an inspection of activities ashore while Even though two air strikes, artil- an advance party of the VAC Landing lery, and naval gunfire had supported Force under the corps chief of staff the VAC attack on D plus 4, gains made made preparations for the establish- for the day remained negligible . Before ment of a command post .22 In the course the morning attack opened, the Idaho of a meeting between General Schmidt had fired 162 rounds of 14-inch fire and the division commanders it became within 400 yards of the Marine lines ; apparent that more pressure against the Pensacola fired 390 rounds of 8-inch the enemy would have to be applied if ammunition, all apparently without any appreciable progress was to be seriously affecting the enemy's power to made on the following day . In conse- resist. Discouraging as this tenacious quence, an intermediate objective south enemy defense was to the frontline of the O-2 Line was established . The troops, there was a brighter side to the new line roughly corresponded at both picture along the beaches, where, al- ends with the 0-1 Line ; however, in most imperceptibly, order was beginning the center it protruded nearlyrly 800 yards to emerge out of chaos . More exits to include all of Airfield No . 2. On 24 from the beaches were being opened, February, a concerted attack was to be permitting a steady flow of supplies launched against the bluffs that stood inland. On 24 February, 2,500 rounds squarely in the center of the VAC line . of 81mm mortar ammunition, of which The assault was to be preceded by the there had been a critical shortage, were heaviest concentration of aerial bom- brought ashore, as were 25 tanks of bardment, naval gunfire, and artillery the 3d Marine Division . When an east- ward shift of the wind made it ap- 2' VAC AR, p . 20. 564 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

that could be mustered . Tanks of the Even as the Japanese naval com- 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions were mander was composing this message, to support the main effort . Lieutenant small groups of Japanese once again Colonel William R . Collins, Tank Of- attempted to infiltrate the lines of both ficer of the 5th Marine Division, was the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions . In the charged with responsibility for coordi- 5th Division sector the enemy attempted nating the armored support . At the to infiltrate both from the north and the same time, the remainder of the 3d south. In addition, the enemy shelled the Marine Division, except for the 3d rear areas and beaches during the night, Marines, was to land and move into thus assuring another miserable night position, prepared to take over the cen- for the Marines, who were dug in as ter of the VAC line on the following best they could on the fringes of the day.23 enemy's main defense line . As D plus 4 drew to a close, one On Saturday, 24 February, Iwo Jima phase of the Iwo Jima campaign had resembled a giant beehive as the strong ended. The Stars and Stripes had been winds of the previous day diminished hoisted above Mount Suribachi ; Task and moderate wind and surf under Force 58 had already pulled out on the partly cloudy skies favored the unload- previous day, and Secretary of the ing of men and supplies . On the Navy Forrestal departed for Guam dur- beaches, a steady stream of men, ing the late afternoon of 23 February . machines, and supplies was pouring The Marines of VAC had established ashore, heedless of sporadic enemy mor- a solid foothold ashore, and there no tar fire that was still hitting the longer was any chance for the Japa- beaches. At 1000, General Schmidt nese on the island to dislodge them . landed and assumed command ashore ; Yet the most bitter and bloody part shortly after noon, the VAC command of the campaign was just about to post opened near the western beaches .21 begin. No one knew this better than On Airfield No . 1, men of the 31st Naval the Japanese who, poised in their mas- Construction Battalion began the sive defenses, somberly awaited the hazardous job of restoring the field . American onslaught . During the night With riflemen covering them, they had from 23-24 February, Admiral Ichi- to crawl up the runways on hands and maru cabled to Admiral Toyoda his knees, probing for mines and picking apologies for not having annihilated out shell fragments. Hidden Japanese the Marines at the water's edge, add- ing still sniped at the Seabees and enemy Real battles are to come from now on . artillery occasionally shelled the run- Every man of my unit fully realizes the ways, but the work continued with- importance of this battle for the future out interruption . By midafternoon, the of the nation and is determined to defend 9th Marines, commanded by Colonel this island at any cost, fulfilling his honor- able duty." Howard N. Kenyon, and Headquarters, Ibid. Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 176. VAC AR, Anx B, p. 21. DRIVE TO THE NORTH 565

3d Marine Division, had come ashore .,26 the axis of the main effort in the zone General Erskine established his com- of action of the 5th Marine Division. mand post at the northern tip of Air- For all practical purposes, however, field No . 1, preparatory to taking over tanks advancing on Airfield No . 2 in the central zone of action on the follow- the zone of advance of the 21st Marines, ing day. were to deliver the main stroke . Once On the northern front D plus 5 got this attack had gained impetus, the com- under way with a terrific bombardment bined force of infantry, armor, and ar- of enemy positions just north of Air- tillery was to be brought to bear against field No . 2 from air, ground, and sea . the enemy . The concentration of over- Beginning at 0800, the Idaho, stationed powering force at one point, in accord- off the western beaches, began to hurl ance with the maxims of war, could pro- 14-inch salvoes at the heavily fortified duce significant results . area abutting the field ; standing off It was evident from the outset that the eastern beaches, the Pensacola, still the success or failure of the day's bearing the scars of her previous duel operation would hinge largely on the with enemy artillery on Mount Suri- performance of the tanks of the three bachi, was firing her heavy guns against Marine divisions, which had been placed enemy positions lying east of the under the overall control of Lieutenant Idaho's target area . This destructive Colonel Collins . The approach of the naval bombardment continued for more tanks to the front lines ran into con- than an hour. At 0845, howitzers of siderable difficulty almost from the out- the VAC artillery joined the bombard- set. The original plan for the employ- ment in conjunction with the division ment of armor had stipulated that the artillery, which laid down a powerful 5th Division tanks, followed by those preparation directly in front of the of the 3d Division, were to proceed to VAC line. At 0900, the naval bombard- Airfield No . 2 by way of the western- ment ceased as aircraft from the escort most taxiway which led from Airfield carriers arrived over Iwo Jima to satur- No . 1 to the second field. Tanks of the ate the target area with bombs and 4th Marine Division were to head for rockets. Following the powerful prepa- No. 2 airfield over the eastern taxiway. ration, VAC opened its attack at 0910 This plan proved impossible to carry with the 26th Marines on the left, the out when Company A, 5th Tank Bat- 21st Marines in the center, and the 24th talion, which spearheaded the advance Marines on the right. along the western route, ran into horned The Corps attack order 27 had placed mines, buried aerial torpedoes, as well as heavy antitank fire . The first tank "'When the balance of the 3d Division less in the column struck a mine and was 3d Marines was released to VAC, a separate disabled . Shortly thereafter, the second beach was assigned by contracting the 4th and tank in line, which had proceeded some 5th Division beaches at the junction, allowing distance beyond the first, ran over a some 700 yards for the 3d ." Rogers ltr . 37 OpO 4-45, dtd 23Feb45, in VAC OpRpt, buried aerial torpedo which demolished Anx A . the vehicle and killed four members 566 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS of the crew.2 S In the midst of the con- sitions on an elevation just north of fusion resulting from the explosion of the junction of the two runways . the aerial torpedo, heavy artillery and It was rough going for the attacking mortar fire immediately hit the remain- Marines of 3/21 all the way, as they ing tanks in the column, four of which charged across Airfield No . 2 and up- were put out of action momentarily, hill against a well-defended belt of in- though two of them were repaired terconnected pillboxes, trenches, tun- under fire . Since the enemy had effec- nels, and antitank gun positions . Twice tively blocked their route of advance, they were driven off the ridge, but they the remaining tanks returned to the attacked again . Once within the enemy bivouac area and prepared to advance positions, the Marines assaulted Colonel on Airfield No . 2 by way of the east- Ikeda's men with rocks, rifle butts, bayo- ern taxiway. There, the advancing nets, knives, pistols, and shovels. armor also encountered mines and spent Around noon, just as it appeared that most of the morning in clearing a lane . the ridge had been secured, heavy ar- Eventually, a dozen tanks reached the tillery fire began to hit the forward- fringes of Airfield No. 2 and, having most elements of 3/21 and the attack arrived there, opened fire on enemy ground to a halt. Nevertheless, a gap emplacements to the north of the field . had been made in the enemy line and Because of the delayed arrival of the through this gap tanks, bazookamen, supporting armor, the 26th Marines did mortarmen, and machine gunners were not jump off until 0930 when, with three now able to advance. battalions abreast, it advanced making The attack of 2/21 encountered con- the main effort on its right in coordi- siderable difficulty in moving towards nation with the assault by the 21st Ma- Airfield No . 2 in its zone of advance . rines . Progress was slow, and many The arrival of supporting armor at tanks fell victim to mines and accurate 1000 proved to be a mixed blessing, enemy antitank fire . For the men of since the armor attracted a heavy the 21st Marines, who were denied the volume of artillery and mortar fire that expected armored support during the pinned down the assault companies . early part of the day, the going was When the supporting tanks tried to extremely rough, and the regiment had advance over the runways, Colonel to advance into intense enemy fire . Ikeda's antitank guns soon put a stop Shortly after 1000, both Companies I to this effort. Nevertheless, by inching and K lost their commanding officers northward around the end of the run- in a matter of minutes. Nevertheless, way, elements of 2/21 were nearly and despite high casualties, the ad- abreast of the 26th Marines on their left vance continued. By noon, elements of shortly after noon . This advance served Company K, 21st Marines, had crossed to erase the deep bulge which the enemy the field and were attacking enemy po- positions had previously made into the Marine lines. Co A, 5th Tank Bn AR, p . 2, At 1330, as soon as the 21st Marines DRIVE TO THE NORTH 567 had consolidated the morning's gains, ficulty over the ground directly in front a second deadly preparation of naval of the regiment until they pulled gunfire and artillery, similar to that abreast of the forward lines of the ad- which had preceded the jumpoff in the jacent 21st Marines . From that point morning, rained down on the Japanese on, they drew continuous fire from cave positions north of Airfield No . 2. As positions to their right front . As the aircraft joined in the preparation, the Marines approached, the Japanese on 26th and 21st Marines launched a co- the high ground lobbed down grenades ordinated tank-infantry attack against on the exposed assault force . The Ma- the high ground to the north of the rines retaliated with flamethrowers and airfield. Once again, vicious hand-to- white phosphorus grenades . By 1600, hand combat broke out . By 1415, Com- 3/26 had advanced about 400 yards be- panies I and K of 3/21 had occupied yond the forward lines of the 21st Ma- the high ground across the east-west rines and secured for the day . The 1st runway and tied in with each other . Battalion, 26th Marines, was pulled out The supporting tanks now were able of reserve and moved up to positions to operate on the western half of both along the foot of the ridge line on the runways, from where they directed their right boundary which the 5th Marine fire against enemy gun emplacements Division shared with 2/21 . As in the and pillboxes. The enemy responded case of the 21st Marines, RCT 26 had with heavy antitank fire and mortar paid for the day's advance with heavy barrages. The latter did little damage losses. The enemy did not spare the to the tanks, but proved extremely de- stretcher bearers who were forced to trimental to the infantry advancing run a gantlet of fire as they attempted alongside the armor . By the time the to carry wounded Marines to the rear, attack halted in late afternoon, the and losses among these men were heavy . most forward elements of the 21st Ma- The most difficult fighting and ter- rines had to withdraw to the southern rain, with the least gains on D plus edge of the east-west runway . Com- 5 fell to Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines panies I and K of 3/21, on the other on the very right flank of the VAC line. hand, were determined to hold their Following the thunderous preparation hard-won positions north of the air- prior to H-hour, the 24th Marines, with field and remained in place . Badly need- 2/25 attached, jumped off . Both 2/24 ed supplies for these men had to be and 3/24 attacked alongside the 21st brought up after dark across the air- Marines towards Airfield No . 2. Initial- field. ly, the two battalions made good prog- At the same time that the 21st Ma- ress and by 1100, 2/24 was approach- rines swept northward across the air- ing the eastern end of the east-west field during the afternoon, the 26th runway. Marines, with 2/26 and 3/26 abreast, At this point the advancing Marines also jumped off . Colonel Graham's men found themselves confronted by a non- moved forward without significant dif- descript hill which ran along the south- 568 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

east edge of the east-west runway . For my positions, Marines of 2/24 were lack of a better name, in accordance able to move four machine guns into with military custom, this otherwise in- positions offering a clear field of fire significant elevation was designated as on some of the enemy emplacements Charlie-Dog Ridge, so named after the on Charlie-Dog Ridge. At the same time, map grid squares in which it was lo- men of the weapons company moved a cated. To the southeast, a spur of this 37mm gun close to the front and suc- ridge culminated in a semicircular rise ceeded in knocking out a number of of ground soon to become infamous as enemy emplacements . the "Amphitheater ." There, the Japa- Under cover of this barrage, the Ma- nese had constructed some of the most rines were able to inch their way for- formidable defenses on the island . The ward . For the remainder of the after- approach to this terrain feature from noon, assault squads, burning and the south came squarely under the guns blasting their way to the top of the emplaced on the ridge. To the east, the ridge, led the way, followed by the re- route led across a weird series of vol- mainder of Company G . As elsewhere canic outcroppings and draws. along the VAC line, casualties were Just before 1130, as the Marines were heavy ; at 1500, the mortars of 3/24 preparing to assault Charlie-Dog Ridge, fired 80 white phosphorus smoke shells only 150 yards from the eastern end to screen the evacuation of wounded . of the east-west runway, the enemy on Shortly after 1600, just as it appeared the ridge fired at point-blank range that all the enemy resisting on Charlie- with heavy machine guns, rifles and D'og Ridge could be mopped up before antitank guns. At the same time, 2/24 nightfall, the Japanese unleashed a and 3/24 were hit by antiaircraft air- tremendous mortar barrage which bursts and mortar and artillery fire drove 2/24 and 3/24 off the ridge that that stopped them cold . The 24th Ma- had been taken at such heavy cost . One rines was approaching the core of Gen- of the mortar shells exploded in the eral Kuribayashi's central island de- command post of 3/24, killing three fense system, featuring Hill 382, men and wounding the battalion com- highest elevation on northern Iwo just mander, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander beyond the airfield, as well as the Am- A. Vandegrift, Jr., the son of the Com- phitheater, Turkey Knob, and Minami mandant. Wounded in both legs, the village. A sensitive enemy nerve had battalion commander had to be evacu- been exposed, and the Japanese react- ated and the battalion executive officer, ed accordingly . Once the pinned-down Major Doyle A . Stout, assumed com- men had taken the measure of what mand. confronted them, they called for sup- On the right of the 24th Marines, port from the 105mm howitzers of the the 1st Battalion had also jumped off 14th Marines and brought fire from for the attack on D plus 5 . However, their 81mm and 60mm mortars to bear from the very outset, the progress of against the firmly entrenched enemy . 1/24 was seriously impeded by the While these weapons peppered the ene- broken terrain, which prevented the DRIVE TO THE NORTH 569 battalion from playing any part in the end of D-Day. During the five-day the main effort taking place to its left . drive to Airfield No . 2, 773 Marines Instead, Major Treitel's men crept and had died ; 3,741 had been wounded, of crawled forward, while an unseen ene- whom nearly 300 subsequently were to my, operating from cleverly concealed succumb to their injuries ; 5 were miss- emplacements and caves, poured a ing, and 558 were suffering from com- steady stream of fire into the attack bat fatigue.32 The combat efficiency of force. In its attempt to keep the ad- the 4th Marine Division at the end of vance from bogging down altogether, the day had been reduced by casualties 1/24 had the assistance of five LVT (A) s and battle fatigue to an estimated 60 which had been attached to the regi- percent.33 The 5th Marine Division with ment for fire support. Three of the a total of more than 3,000 casualties, vehicles went up the coast road a short had fared little better . The 26th Ma- distance beyond the East Boat Basin rines, in particular, had sustained very and fired on targets designated by in- heavy losses . By evening of D plus 5, fantry commanders ; the remaining two Colonel Graham's regiment had lost 21 fired inland from the water, giving the officers and 332 enlisted men 3 4 hard pressed infantry all possible sup- Nevertheless, the Japanese were be- port. At 1700, Colonel Jordan ordered ginning to feel the impact of the VAC all units of his regiments to consolidate assault. Late on 23 February, the com- for the night. During the day, the left mander of the 309th Independent Infan- flank of RCT 24 had advanced about try Battalion had already reported to 500 yards ; the center approximately Major General Sadasue Senda, com- 50 yards, and the extreme right flank manding the 2d Mixed Brigade, that about 100 yards, thus straightening communication to all units had been the line in the regimental sector .29 severed, and that his command post had On the whole, 24 February had been been surrounded for the last three days a gruelling day for all VAC units. As and harassed by hand grenades and the day closed, General Schmidt was flamethrowers through the entrance . able to report that gains of 200 to "Nevertheless," the battalion command- 1,000 yards has been made in the at- er concluded, "the fighting spirit of all tack and that the VAC objective had men and officers is high . We shall con- been reached on both flanks .30 The price tinue to inflict as much damage as pos- for the gains made in men and materiel sible upon the enemy until we are all continued to be very heavy . Since D- annihilated. We pray for final victory Day, the enemy had destroyed 32 and the safety of our country" .35 friendly tanks .31 As D plus 5 ended, Japanese intentions for the continued American casualties on Iwo Jima had risen to 7,758, an increase of 5,388 since ' Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 98 . 3° 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRepts, 23-24Feb45 . ' 5th MarDiv AR, Anx Q, p. 7. 3° 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx G, p . 11. 3° Capt Awatsu Rpt to 2d Mixed Brigade, 30 TF 51 AR, 24Feb45 . 23Feb45, in 4th MarDiv Translations, Iwo a I bid. Jima, dtd 25Feb45 . 570 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS defense of Iwo Jima were correctly high ground held by the Japanese now formulated in a 4th Marine Division was jeopardized, a counterattack by a intelligence report which concluded large enemy force was a dangerous that "lack of a large scale enemy probability . In any event, the enemy counter-attack to date was an indica- was certain to continue his harassment tion of conservation of forces for a of the invasion force with artillery and continued stubborn defense in depth ."3s through air attacks launched from Since the enemy' had a sizable force nearby islands . The scales of battle had left, an eventual counterattack could not yet tilted fully in favor of the not be discounted. In fact, since the American assault troops. It was clear to all involved that much heavy fighting lay ahead before all of Iwo Jima was -" 4th MarDiv G-2 Rpts, 23Feb45, p . 4. conquered. CHAPTER 7

3d Marine Division Operations on 1 Iwo Jima

ADVANCE IN THE CENTER2 ground in the center of northern Iwo, commonly known as the Motoyama By the end of the first week on Iwo Plateau. The plateau itself was rela- Jima, VAC had made important gains, tively level and unmarked by ravines . though far more slowly than had been To the east and west, the ground was anticipated. The key to seizing the re- broken, descending to the shore in a mainder of the island north of the two very irregular pattern of gullies, can- completed airfields was the flat, high yons, and arroyos . The extensive shell- ing this part of the island had received 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from : VAC AR; 3d MarDiv prior to and since the landings had AR ; 3d MarDiv Staff Memos, 23Jan-17Mar45, done nothing to improve the terrain, hereafter 3d MarDiv Staff Memos ; 3d MarDiv which was beginning to look like a G-1 PerRpts ; 3d MarDiv D-2 Jnl ; 3d MarDiv lunar landscape . Cliffs, often with a G-2 PerRpts, 14Feb-4Apr45, hereafter 3d sheer drop down to the waterline, were MarDiv G-2 PerRpts ; 3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpts, 16Feb-27Mar45, hereafter 3d MarDiv G-3 Per- characteristic of the coast along the Rpts ; 3d MarDiv G-4 Jnl, 16Feb-8Apr45, here- northwestern, northern, and northeast- after 3d MarDiv G-.4 Jnl ; 3d Mar AR, 5Nov44- ern shore of the island . 8Mar45, hereafter 3d Mar AR ; 9th Mar The frontal assault northward from URpts, 26Feb-4Apr45, hereafter 9th Mar Airfield No . 1 towards the second air- URpts ; 9th Mar UJn1, 24Feb-11Mar45 ; 9th Mar AR, 24Feb-4Apr45, hereafter 9th Mar field had thrown the Marines squarely AR ; 12th Mar AR, 25Feb-16Mar45, hereafter against the most heavily fortified part 12th Mar AR ; 21st Mar UJn1, 24Feb-16Mar- of the island. There was no way to by- 45 ; 1st ProvFldArty Gru G-1 Jnl, 9Jan- pass this area . On the west coast, the 15Mar45 ; Iwo Comments ; Bartley, Iwo Mono- 5th Marine Division was confronted graph; Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign ; New- comb, Iwo Jima; Newcomb Notes; Aurthur with one ridge after another . In each and Cohlmia, The Third Marine Division ; instance, men fought their way up the Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi- slope and over the top, only to run into ous War ; Benis M. Frank, A Brief History of another ravine with another ridge be- the 3d Marines (Washington : HistBr, G-3 . To the east, the 4th Marine Divi- Div, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Frank, Brief yond History of the 3d Marines . sion was attempting to maneuver on 2 Additiopal material in this section is de- a battlefield devoid of all cover. Where rived from : 1/9 AR, 15Jan-6Apr45, hereafter trees once had grown, all that remain- 1/9 AR ; 2/9 AR, 24Feb-7Apr45, hereafter ed was shattered rock, tangled brush, 2/9 AR ; 3/9 UJn1, 24Feb-18Mar45 ; 3/21 and defiles running to the sea . In the URpts, 25Feb-12Mar45, hereafter 3/21 URpts ; 3d TkBn AR, 7Nov44-27Mar45, hereafter 3d midst of this desolation, three terrain TkBn AR . features stood out, each a formidable 571 572 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS obstacle in itself : Hill 382, highest ele- In the midst of this rubble, Major vation in northern Iwo ; a bald knob General Sadasue Senda had deployed designated as Turkey Hill,, and the his 2d Independent Mixed Brigade, con- southeastern extension of Hill 382, sisting of the 310th, 311th, and attach- known as the Amphitheater. ed 315th Independent Infantry Bat- Since an advance up either coast did talions, plus an artillery and an engineer not appear promising the only way for battalion. The top of Hill 382 harbored VAC to take the remaining two-thirds remnants of a thoroughly demolished of the island was to go up the high radar station ; on the far bluff of the ground in the center. Since, from D Amphitheater, cave mouths and tunnel plus 6 onward, the three Marine divi- entrances could be seen, yet not a sin- sions on Iwo Jima fought jointly but gle gun barrel was visible . But, accord- in clearly defined areas, the narrative ing to one account, henceforth will deal separately with the . . . at every turn and fold in the rock day-to-day progress of each division as were crosslanes of fire for machine guns it forged a laborious trail across the and mortars, automatic weapons and rifles, light artillery, and rapid-fire can- island. non. Behind them were the men, some Fully aware of the limitations im- with sabres or pistols, bamboo lances, and posed upon the assault force by the ter- sacks of grenades, waiting rain, General Kuribayashi had estab- Since there was no way to bypass the lished his most elaborate defenses across strongest enemy defenses on the Moto- Motoyama Plateau, right in the path of yama Plateau, an advance into this the 3d Marine Division. A detailed de- veritable hornets' nest became unavoid- scription of the plateau, therefore, ap- able. The enemy had to be driven from pears in order : the high ground in the center of Iwo . . . dangling ledges, and caves carved by Jima to permit opening up the west- nature as well as the Japanese . Fissures ern beaches. VAC was working under of steam spewed from cracks in the ground, and evil-smelling sulphur fumes a tight deadline to clear the beaches, vied with the repulsive odor of decompos- get the airfields back into operation, and ing bodies. Everywhere were Japanese de- unload with all possible dispatch so fenses, grottoes, bunkers, blockhouses, that ships could be made available for pillboxes, deep caves, antitank ditches and Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of walls, minefields, and a profusion of flat- trajectory antitank guns, dual purpose Okinawa, now only five weeks away . automatic antiaircraft weapons, and small The same urgency applied to driving arms, all backed by lethal mortars and the Japanese from the high ground in rockets firing from reverse slopes . At a the northeastern portion of the island, loss for words to describe this devil's which enabled the enemy to place ob- playground, correspondents and officers writing their action reports sometimes re- served fires on VAC reserve areas and called a Goya sketch or Dore's illustra- rear installations. Even though the tions for Dante's Inferno.3 Japanese had interfered with the Amer- ican buildup on Iwo Jima, they had ' Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- phibious War, pp. 489-490. ' Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 188. 3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 573 not done so to the extent that they the enemy's main defenses in the cen- were capable. Probably, they feared ter of the island. Of the 3d Division's that such activity, if carried too far, three infantry regiments, the 3d, 9th, would expose their guns and mortars and 21st Marines, the latter had already to aerial observation, and that these been landed and attached to the 4th mainstays of the defense would fall vic- Marine Division on 21 February . Three tim to American artillery and naval days later, the 9th Marines, command- gunfire. ed by Colonel Howard N. Kenyon, had One of the problems facing General gone ashore, together with division Schmidt at the end of D plus 5 was headquarters, leaving only the 3d Ma- maintaining control of his advance up rines afloat. Attached to the infantry the island. Fresh in his mind was his were units of the 12th Marines, the 3d experience on Saipan, where the 4th Tank Battalion, the 3d Pioneer Bat- Marine Division had advanced so rap- talion, and the 3d Engineer Battalion . idly that at one point it was left with a By the end of D plus 5, three bat- 3,000-yard gap on its flank.5 Similarly, talions of the 9th Marines had moved on Iwo Jima, if one division advanced into assembly areas ready to join in significantly beyond the others, troops the attack. Elements of the 12th Ma- for flank security would have to be made rines, under Lieutenant Colonel Ray- available, and the exposed division could mond F. Crist, Jr ., also came ashore expect to receive fire from every direc- on the 24th, followed by more batteries tion. Even though the VAC commander on the following day. It was 1 March was aware of the necessity of executing before all of the 3d Division artillery a frontal assault across the center of the had been landed . Several factors were Motoyama Plateau, he was determined, responsible for the slow debarkation of for the time being, to push the VAC the artillery. Foremost among these front forward all along the line in what were the lack of landing ships and ad- may appear to have been "a partial vio- verse beach conditions. Having antici- lation of the military principles of mass pated that his troops would be employed and economy."6 piecemeal, General Erskine had decen- In any case, as of 25 February, Gen- tralized his artillery while combat load- eral Schmidt still favored a coordinat- ing. Most of the men and equipment ed advance across the island . Since the of the 3d Division were embarked in 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, which attack transport and cargo vessels . It had thus far borne the brunt of the had been planned to put them ashore fighting, were already seriously de- as needed in landing craft, DUKWs, pleted in men and materiel, General and amphibian tractors borrowed from Schmidt decided to commit the 3d Ma- the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions . rine Division for the assault against Participation in the drive to the north by the 3d Marine Division could not 'General Harry Schmidt ltr to CMC, dtd wait until all of the division artillery 28Oct52, in Iwo Comments . ° Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- had come ashore . As a result, only one phibious War, p . 491. battery of the 12th Marines, and 1/14 574 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

in direct support and 4/13 in a rein- tillery. More than half of these shells forcing role, would be available on the hit the enemy in front of the 3d Ma- morning of D plus 6 . rine Division, where the main effort was As of 0700, 25 February, the task to be made . Carrier planes pounded of clearing the critical central portion the enemy positions with 500-pound of the Motoyama Plateau fell to Gen- bombs just prior to the jumpoff. eral Erskine and his 3d Marine Divi- As soon as the attack got under way sion. The division's route of advance at 0930, both the 1st and 2d Battalions lay across Airfield No . 2, through the of the 9th Marines moved out, with 2/9 remains of Motoyama Village to Air- making the main effort . Lieutenant field No . 3, which was still largely un- Colonel Cushman's men almost imme- finished. As soon as the 21st Marines diately drew heavy fire from enemy was returned to its parent division, emplacements to their front and left General Erskine passed the 9th Ma- flank and made little progress . The 1st rines through the 21st to continue the Battalion made some headway and one attack, while the latter unit went to platoon actually advanced to the base the rear to rest and reequip . On D of Hill PETER, but was unable to hold plus 6, the line of departure for the the position . Since the main effort was 9th Marines skirted the southwest edge to be made on the left, 26 tanks from of Airfield No . 2, protruded across to Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion, the high ground due north of the cen- under Major Holly H. Evans, had been ter of the field, and then receded to attached to the 2d Battalion . Prior to the southern edge, where the regiment the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Cushman tied in with the 4th Division . On the had weighed the idea of having his in- left, 2/9, commanded by Lieutenant fantry ride the tanks across the airfield. Colonel Robert E . Cushman, Jr., faced In view of the heavy enemy mortar heavily defended positions along a line and machine gun fire, this idea had to of bluffs that extended northward from be abandoned, and the tanks moved out the western edge of the airfield and the across the airstrip 200 yards ahead of high ground just north of the east- the infantry. Almost immediately, the west runway. On the right 1/9, under three leading tanks were hit by enemy Lieutenant Colonel Carey A . Randall, antitank fire ; two of them flamed, the was face to face with a low but strate- third was immobilized. The heavy enemy gically placed hill subsequently to be- mortar fire directed against the tanks come known as Hill PETER . (See Map did little damage to the vehicles but III, Map Section) . inflicted heavy losses on the infantry Preparations for the 3d Marine Divi- following in their wake . As the agoniz- sion attack on D plus 6 were similar ingly slow advance of the 2d Battalion to those of the previous day . A battle- continued, nine tanks were knocked out ship and two cruisers fired for 20 min- before some of the enemy installations utes before the jumpoff. The naval could be destroyed . bombardment was followed by a 1,200- By 1400, the situation had reached round preparation fired by the VAC ar- a comparative stalemate. Both assault 3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 575 battalions had made slight gains, the ization ; the riflemen could not pene- biggest one being made by 1/9, which in trate the curtain of fire thrown up by five hours of bitter fighting had ad- the enemy and some of the ground pre- vanced 100 yards . The battalions were viously seized was being ceded .8 De- now separated by a sizable gap which spite the confusion of battle, Lieutenant had developed during the intense fight- Colonel Boehm succeeded in reestablish- ing. As a result, at 1430, the 3d Bat- ing contact with adjacent units, so that talion, commanded by Lieutenant Colo- shortly after 1900 the situation had nel Harold C. Boehm, was ordered to again stabilized and contact existed be- pass through the right of 2/9 and attack tween all units along the regimental to the north until it had bypassed the front. As D plus 6 came to a close, the center of resistance that had thwarted 9th Marines had gained little ground, the advance of 2/9 .7 Once this had been but, at any rate, the line had moved accomplished, 3/9 was to effect a junc- north of Airfield No. 2 at all points tion with the 26th Marines of the 5th except for the extreme right tip. The Marine Division . regiment had seized a foothold on the As soon as 3/9 began its advance, rising ground north of Airfield No . 2 it started to receive a hail of rifle and from where, on the following day, the automatic weapons fire from the front attack could be continued . and the left flank . At the same time, Three additional batteries of the 3d the mortar and artillery fire increased Division artillery came ashore during in volume and accuracy. Casualties 25 February and were ready to fire by mounted with alarming speed . Unless 1700. The newly arrived units were or- the high ground to the battalion's front ganized into a provisional battalion was quickly seized, the attack was in under 1/12, and 1/14 was relieved of danger of bogging down. As the Ma- supporting the regiment. Additional help rines crept ahead, the Japanese adjust- for the 9th Marines during the day ed their artillery to keep pace with had been furnished by the 21st Marines, the advance. Within minutes, the two which had fired heavy machine guns, commanders of the assault companies 37mm guns, and light mortars at the were killed ; many more officers and stubborn enemy defenses . The 81mm men became casualties . By 1700, losses mortars of the 21st Marines also had had become so heavy that units were been attached to the 9th Marines dur- beginning to show signs of disorgan- ing the day, but reverted to control of the parent regiment in late after- noon. ' In commenting on this order, the CO, 3/9 had this to say : "2/9 reported being pinned At 0800 on 26 February, the 9th Ma- down by heavy enemy fire-unable to move- rines resumed the assault, following a and it was through this kind of fire that 3/9 was expected to execute a `passage of lines' ; a poor decision at best!" Col Harold C . Boehm 8 "The losses of key and seasoned personnel in ltr to Head HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd this . . . attack manifestly reduced the battal- 17Jul69 in Iwo Comments, hereafter Boehm ion's effectiveness in later situations ." Boehm ltr. ltr. 576 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

45-minute artillery preparation . The 1st in support of the main effort of the ground and 2d Battalions attacked abreast, forces.' with 3/9 and newly attached 3/21 in In his operation order for 27 Februa- reserve. The men of Colonel Kenyon's ry, General Schmidt ordered the 3d Ma- regiment knew that they were now up rine Division to continue the assault . against the enemy's main defenses . In The corps artillery was directed to de- front of the regimental zone of attack, vote half of its fire in support of this Hill PETER and 225 yards to the north- main effort, while the remaining 50 per- west, Hill OBOE, formed the most im- cent was to be equally divided between portant obstacles to the advance . the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions ." Once again, the 1st and 2d Battalions At 0800 on D plus 8, the 3d Marine bore the full brunt of the day's Division continued its attack, which fighting. At the cost of heavy casualties, was preceded by a 45-minute artillery slight gains were made in the high preparation in which corps artillery ground beyond Airfield No. 2. The 3d fired 600 rounds . Once again, the 9th Battalion remained in position, return- Marines, with the 1st and 2d Battalions ing to regimental reserve after the at- abreast and 3/9 and 3/21 in reserve, tack jumped off. For the remainder of jumped off . The 1st Battalion on the the day, 3/21 occupied a defensive posi- right immediately encountered devas- tion just north of the east-west runway . tating enemy mortar, artillery, and Several aircraft were on station small arms fire from well concealed em- throughout the day and executed four placements on and around Hills OBOE missions for the ground troops . Tanks and PETER. On the left, 2/9 made an were also available to support the as- initial advance of approximately 150 sault. Naval gunfire was employed yards. The increased employment of ar- against deep targets spotted by aircraft ; mor, particularly in the 2/9 zone of ad- infantry units called for supporting fire vance, aided the attack materially, even against suspected gun and mortar posi- though 11 tanks were knocked out. The tions. The effects of this support could infantry, using flamethrowers and not be accurately gauged by the as- rocket launchers to good advantage, sault units, for enemy resistance con- made small gains throughout the morn- tinued unabated . With respect to the ing. The 2d Battalion finally reached air support received during this critical the base of Hill OBOE, while 1/9 took phase of the operation, the 3d Marine the top of Hill PETER and began work- Division had this comment ing down the northern slope . At this point, 1/9 was pinned down by fire from The number of planes on station daily well-concealed enemy positions on the for support of three divisions was eight fighters and eight torpedo bombers, a de- reverse slope of the hill . Heavy fire cidedly inadequate number . An average of from Hill OBOE also caused the ad- two and a half hours was required before vance of the 2d Battalion to grind to a mission could be executed . . . . Support a halt. aircraft, like artillery, should not be frit- tered away in the execution of piecemeal 9 34d MarDiv AR, p . 48. missions but should be employed in mass '° VAC OpO 6-45, dtd 25Feb45 .

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 577

Just as it appeared that the re- of advance . In summing up the overall mainder of the day would pass without results of this phase, the 9th Marines any major gains being made, the un- listed gains of 800-1,200 yards . Beyond expected occurred. Following a 10- that, the regiment stated that high- minute preparation by the entire 3d Di- lighted in this fighting were vision artillery, reinforced by the corps . . . the skill, determination and ag- artillery, 1/9 and 2/9 jumped off in a gressiveness displayed by our troops ; the coordinated attack . This time, the co- unprecedented tenacity and defensive re- ordination of all arms brought results, sourcefulness displayed by the enemy (in the left of the 2d Battalion 77 large pill- and the Japanese, stunned by the mass- boxes were counted) ; the decisive aid ed artillery fire, were temporarily un- rendered infantry troops by tanks ; and fi- able to halt the Americans . Following nally, the excellent coordination of all sup- the preparation, the 2d Battalion moved porting units with infantry maneuvers' forward rapidly for a distance of 700 . The 1st Battalion overran Hill ADVANCE TO MOTOYAMA yards 12 PETER, continued down the reverse VILLAGE slope and drove up to the crest of Hill On Wednesday, 28 February, the 3d OBOE . Now that most of the enemy Marine Division continued its drive to fire from the two important hills had the north . The last day of February been silenced, Lieutenant Colonel Cush- marked the tenth day since the Marines man's 2nd Battalion moved forward first had stormed ashore on Iwo Jima . rapidly for approximately 1,500 to 1,700 Optimistic forecasts to the contrary, yards. For the first time since the be- somewhat less than half of the island ginning of the attack, the lines of 2/9 had been taken thus far . No one ashore now were abreast of those of the 1st doubted that fighting of the utmost Battalion. severity still lay ahead. Thus, after three days of ramming Since the 5th Marine Division on headlong into the main enemy defenses, the left also had made gains during the the 9th Marines had scored a major last days of the month, the center and advance. All of Airfield No . 2 and the western portion of the VAC front now commanding terrain to the north were was approaching the 0-2 Line . As a now in American hands, even though result, in his operation order for 28 enemy troops, many of them bypassed February, General Schmidt established in their caves, continued to offer stub- an 0-3 Line . This line started on west- born resistance . Mopping up operations ern Iwo about 1,000 yards south of in the area would require two more Kitano Point, then curved southeast- days, but General Erskine's men were ward, generally following the northern now coming out on the Motoyama and northeastern contour of the island Plateau, with relatively level terrain ahead . As D plus 8 came to an end, yet u 9th Mar AR, p . 5. another phase of the heavy fighting for '~ Additional material in this section is de- Iwo Jima had been brought to a close, rived from : VAC Arty Rpt ; 21st Mar URpts, at least in the 3d Marine Division zone 26Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 21st Mar URpts . 578 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS until it reached the eastern shore just teetered . Captain Edward V . Stephenson, north of the eastern terminus of the who had fought at Guam with great valor, rushed forward and rallied his company . 0-2 Line near Tachiiwa Point . Massing flamethrowers and bazookamen, Before dawn on D plus 9, the 21st he led a counterattack that smashed the Marines, with the 3d Tank Battalion tanks. Three were destroyed on the and the 81mm mortar platoons of RCT ground, and planes caught two more of 9 attached, relieved the 9th Marines. them with 20mm fire's Enemy snipers and machine gunners Now there were only three tanks left interfered with these movements, but by out of the 22 which Colonel Nishi had 0815 the relief was essentially com- been able to obtain the previous De- pleted and the 9th Marines passed into cember, all of which had been carefully division reserve . dug in . Shortly before noon, the attack Following a 30-minute preparation by bogged down all along the 3d Division the division artillery, reinforced by front. At this time, 3/9 was attached corps artillery, the 21st Marines con- to the 21st Marines and by VAC order, tinued the attack at 0900 with the 1st 4/13 reverted to the 5th Division con- Battalion on the left and 3/21 on the trol, after having been attached to Gen- right ; the main effort was to be made eral Erskine's division for several days . by 1/21 . The artillery preparation was At 1300, following a five-minute followed by a seven-minute rolling bar- preparation by the corps and division rage which lifted 100 yards every artillery, the 1st and 3d Battalions of minute to extend 700 yards beyond the the 21st Marines launched a coordinat- front lines . The 1st Battalion advanced ed attack. The 1st Battalion bogged about 500 yards when it was stopped down almost at once, but 3/21, follow- by hostile mortar and small arms fire . ing closely behind an artillery barrage, On the right, 3/21 also made good prog- advanced rapidly and seized the rem- ress, closely following the barrage and, nants of Motoyama Village and the high within a half hour after the jump-off, ground overlooking Airfield No . 3. The had gained 400 yards. As the morning advance of 3/21 created a gap between wore on, elements of 3/21 became inter- the left of the 3d Battalion and the mingled with 4th Division troops near right of 1/21 ; into this gap, 2/21 was the division boundary. committed at 1530 with orders to at- Shortly after launching its attack, tack. (See Map IV, Map Section) . Fol- Company I of 3/21 was to have an eerie lowing a five-minute preparation, the experience. As the men moved forward battalion moved out in an attempt to in the wake of the rolling barrage outflank the enemy positions which were . . . Company I was confronted with holding up the advance of 1/21 . Because tanks rising from the earth. These were of the heavy fire it received as it moved Colonel Nishi's tanks, flushed at last from up to the line of departure, 2/21 was what had appeared to be hillocks . They unable to launch its attack on time and churned forward, throwing off mounds of consequently did not closely follow the dirt, shrubbery, and rocks, and firing rap- idly. The Marines faltered in shock before the heavy fire, and for moments the battle " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 203-204,

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 579

rolling barrage . As a result, only small By morning of 1 March, all battalions gains were made . At 1700, when the as- of the 12th Marines were ashore. For sault troops halted for the night, units the remainder of the operation, until held a winding but continuous line the 3d Marine Division reached the across the division front . northeast coast, Erskine's modus oper- As night fell over the battle-scarred andi remained the same . He brought island, it appeared that the 3d Marine all the fire power available to him to Division had burned and blasted its way bear against the enemy. Neutralization through the center of the Japanese main furnished by his own guns and by the line. To either side of the 3d Division, corps artillery, when available, enabled however, neither the 4th nor the 5th him to push forward. As soon as he had kept pace with General Erskine's sensed a weak spot in the enemy de- men. As a result, the VAC operation fenses, he exploited the situation by order for 1 March made a change in committing reserves at the flanks and the quantity of supporting fires that through the gaps that were created as would be made available . The lion's his two assault regiments moved for- share of artillery support no longer ward. The advance across Motoyama would go to the 3d Marine Division ; Plateau did not leave room for any ad- instead, the corps artillery henceforth ditional maneuver. was to divide its fires equally among The tactics employed by General Er- the three divisions . skine during this critical phase of the General Erskine believed that this operation have been explained as fol- division, in breaking through the ene- lows my's main defenses in the center of Erskine's zone of action was sufficiently Iwo Jima, had not received all of the narrow and his reserve sufficiently deep to . permit him to employ these tactics more neutralizing support it should have had readily than could the other division com- In commenting later on the Iwo Jima manders who were operating on wider operation, he stated fronts and across more difficult terrain . . . . that the zone of action assigned this Cates and Rockey were equally competent, division was the most suitable for making but the Third Division was in the pivotal the main effort as it extended along the position. high ground in the center of the island . These tactics saw Erskine's men ad- Had the bulk of all supporting weapons vance across the second airfield and up been allotted to this division instead of onto the Motoyama Plateau, through the being more or less equally distributed stench of the sulphur refinery, and beyond between all three divisions, it is believed the shambles that was Motoyama Village . that penetration would have been ef- No longer could the Japanese sit atop fected sooner at less cost" the central ridge and place observed fire on every inch of lower Iwo The Third "3d MarDiv AR, p . 38. In connection with Division had cut its way through the main this report the VAC chief of staff was to com- line of resistance into the guts of Iwo ment that : "It was essential that no substan- tial gaps occur, therefore it was necessary for the 3d Division as well as the bulk of the the 4th and 5th Divisions to advance also, naval gunfire support, in addition to elements which necessitated adequate support" ; and of the 12th ashore, and at least standby sup- "Half of the Corps artillery was assigned to port from the 13th and 14th." Rogers ltr . 580 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Jima. The evening of the 28th found these The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, ad- Marines looking down on the third air- vanced against light resistance and field. It was believed that penetration to the coast would be easy, and the final prior to 1500 had arrived at the divi- airfield was quickly overrun, but then the sion's left boundary . By this time 1/21, secondary line of resistance was struck, attacking generally north to mop up the and again the assault slowed and halted' pocket of resistance to its front, had At 0830 on 1 March, the 21st Ma- eliminated it and also had reached the rines continued the assault with 2/21 boundary of the division to the left of and 3/21 abreast, the latter making the 3/9. By VAC order, at 1500, the bound- main effort. Once again, the attack was ary between the 3d and 5th Marine Di- preceded by a heavy artillery prepara- visions was adjusted to shift the posi- tion. The 12th Marines fired a 15-min- tion held by 1/21 to the 5th Division ute preparation in support of the attack, sector. The latter division was ordered reinforced by VAC artillery. Direct to extend to the northeast and relieve support destroyers fired a half-hour 1/21. preparation from 0800 to 0830, deepen- In mid-afternoon, 2/21 and 3/21 were ing the fires of the 12th Marines . 'The unable to advance further in view of heavy artillery preparation was follow- effective enemy opposition. After hav- ed by a rolling barrage which lifted 100 ing broken through the center of the yards every eight minutes for 300 yards . first line of resistance, Marines of Gen- The 1st Battalion remained behind on eral Erskine's division now had to ad- the left flank to mop up the enemy vance into even more nightmarish ter- pocket that the regiment had bypassed rain whose outstanding features are de- on the previous day. scribed below As the two battalions jumped off, the Beyond the low-lying final airfield, the 2d Battalion, which had attacked to the ground rose again sharply into a saddle, north on 28 February, pivoted on its and then fell off to the sea . The high right and advanced towards the north- points of the saddle were two additional east. Initially, both battalions made hill masses of almost identical height, good progress, particularly 2/21 which which represented the northwestern and southeastern corners of the Motoyama was receiving effective tank suport . As tableland. These terrain features were in- a result, the 21st Marines was moving termingled with caves and bunkers in deep well ahead of elements of the 5th Ma- criss-crossing crevices, and were studded rine Division to the left. In order to with huge standstone boulders, many out- protect the left flank of 2/21 and seize croppings, and defensive weapons of all calibers and types. Their height gave the the left boundary of the division's zone enemy full observation of the Marines to of action, at the same time encircling the east of the third airfield, and Erskine the enemy pocket, 3/9 was committed found it impossible to snake between in support of 1/21 in the course of the them. The job was all the more difficult morning. since there were no feasible ridge lines which could be followed onto their sum- mits. On the contrary, just to the north- 15 Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- west of the right point of the saddle, com- phibious War, p . 494 . manding direct approaches to the high

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 581

ground in the center, was a third heavily The afternoon attack was preceded by fortified hill, almost as high as the other a five-minute preparation fired by the two."' division artillery and direct support de- The three hills were situated in such stroyers, followed by a rolling barrage. proximity that the two on the right Enemy resistance remained heavy, par- fell into the zone of advance of the 3d ticularly in front of the 9th Marines, Division, while a portion to the left was and little ground was gained . When lines just beyond the division boundary . were consolidated shortly after 1800, Since the capture of this high ground General Erskine had contact with both was deemed essential for the further adjacent divisions . Even though the af- advance of General Erskine's division, ternoon attack had brought little gain, it was shifted from General Rockey's some progress had been made during zone to that of the 3d Marine Division . the day, and the 21st Marines, in the Even so, the Japanese would be able to course of the morning, had advanced delay any advance on General Erskine's 500 yards to deepen the breach in the left until the 5th Division had been able heavily fortified enemy defense line. On to pull up alongside. The center of the the evening of 1 March, the two 3d Di- secondary line of resistance thus would vision regiments faced northeast from have to be broken by a frontal assault positions about 600 yards east of Mo- against the southeastern hill mass. toyama Village, along a line running Several days were to pass before this north across the western portion of Air- second line could be cracked . In the field No. 3. meantime, General Erskine, "his avail- The peculiarities of the terrain within able infantry substantially weakened by the 3d Marine Division's zone of at- the furious fighting of late February," 17 tack dictated some changes in the di- had little choice but to continue the as- vision boundary . While Hill 362B did sault. Thus, at 1545 on 1 March, he de- not physically block the advance of the cided to launch a coordinated attack 21st Marines, the division left flank was with both regiments abreast, while the completely exposed to it . The decision 9th Marines took over a portion of to attack this hill was made on the eve- the zone of action of the 21st Marines, ning of 1 March and permission to do so with 3/21 and a tank company attached . was obtained at that time . This decision The 3d Tank Battalion, less one com- departed from convention in that in at- pany, was to remain attached to the tacking . and seizing the hill, 3/9 which 21st Marines. The attack actually was still attached to the 21st Marines, got under way at 1645, the 9th Marine would attack north across the division passing 1/9 through 3/21, which took boundary to seize the ground vital to up a reserve position in the vicinity of the division's progress.18 Motoyama Village. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, went into reserve. ' Boehm ltr . There were three hills with an elevation of 362 feet on Iwo Jima . In order i' Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- to avoid confusion, they were designated as phibious War, p. 496. A, B, and C . Hill 362A was located in north- 17 Ibid. western Iwo in the 5th Division sector. Hill 582 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

On the morning of 2 March, the position for a direct attack on the final 3d Marine Division continued its at- objective. tack with the 21st Marines and the 9th As a result of heavy enemy resist- Marines abreast . The 21st Marines at- ance, the attack came to a standstill tacked with 3/9 attached on the left in early afternoon. A new assault, fol- and 1/21 on the right, while the 9th lowing a powerful artillery prepara- Marines attacked with 2/9 on the left tion, was launched at 1530. Eight ar- and 1/9 on the right. The attack, which tillery battalions took part in this pre- jumped off at 0800, followed a 15-min- paratory fire . As had become customary ute artillery and naval gunfire prepara- by this time in 3d Marine Division at- tion. Again, a rolling barrage preceded tacks, the original preparation was fol- the assault units . Tanks, using direct lowed by a rolling barrage . But even fire, participated in the advance. with such powerful support, the infan- Almost immediately, the 9th Marines try was unable to score any notable ran into heavy small arms, mortar, ar- gains. At 1730, the commanding officer tillery, and antitank gun fire. The sup- of 2/21, Lieutenant Colonel Lowell E . porting tanks were able to destroy one English, was wounded, and the execu- enemy gun and several emplacements ; tive officer, Major George A . Percy, at the same time, it was becoming ap- took over command . In tying-in for parent that Colonel Kenyon's men were night defense, one company of 2/21 had facing an exceptionally strong and well- to be pulled back a short distance organized enemy position . from its exposed position . A slight The 21st Marines, advancing in a withdrawal also became necessary for column of companies, made only small 3/9 to more favorable night positions . gains before the attack bogged down As D plus 11 drew to a close, there by heavy machine gun and antitank gun had been some significant progress on fire from Airfield No . 3. Only 3/9, sup- the division left, but little gain else- ported by tanks firing directly on em- where. The attack of 3/9 had driven placements, was able to move forward . a 700-yard salient into the enemy lines, By 1300, 3/9, advancing against strong and the battalion had occupied positions enemy resistance, had secured a foot- on the lower slopes of Hill 362B.1"' At hold on the rising ground in front of the same time, 2/21 had advanced north- Hill 362B . By this time, the battalion east along the left boundary . However, had advanced beyond the units on its the 9th Marines had gained almost noth- right and left regardless of flank secu- ing against the enemy stronghold in rity. Using 60mm and 81mm mortars, the right of the 3d Division zone of ad- the Marines slowly moved up to a ridge vance. In their exposed positions, the that would serve as the final jumpoff ""This enabled the 5th Division to occupy the hill with little difficulty the following day, 362B, also in the 5th Division sector, was in which they hadn't previously been able to do at the north-central portion of the island . Hill all. The majority of enemy gun emplacements 362C, located to the northeast, was in the 3d on the 362B hill mass had been destroyed." Division zone . Boehm ltr.

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 583 3d Division Marines were to spend a preparation by the division artillery restless night. Throughout the hours of and direct support destroyers, followed darkness, the enemy remained very ac- by a rolling barrage . Almost immedi- tive in the broken terrain in front of ately, the 9th Marines drew such heavy the 21st Marines . Since Airfield No. 3 fire that it was unable to advance. In was still covered by enemy fire, it was the zone of action of the 21st Marines, not possible to occupy a continuous line . 3/9 maintained its position while wait- During the night 2-3 March, luck ing to be relieved by elements of the played into the hands of the 3d Marine 5th Division. This relief was ac- Division . An enemy sketch of the de- complished in the course of the day, but fensive area facing the division, par- the maneuver was complicated by the ticularly the zone of action of the 9th fact that both the relief force and 3/9 Marines, fell into General Erskine's became embroiled in time-consuming hands. This map had been captured by fire fights with the enemy . the 21st Marines and was immediately In the zone of action of the 21st Ma- forwarded to the division command rines, 2/21 advanced slowly under post, where it was translated. The cap- heavy fire and shortly before noon tured sketch bore out the belief that secured a foothold on Hill 357 . At this the 9th Marines was in contact with a time it was believed that no major re- strongly organized enemy position, if sistance remained in front of 2/21, there had been any doubt left . General though it was still receiving heavy fire Erskine now hoped that he might find from the high ground to its left in the a soft spot in the enemy defenses, zone of action of the 5th Marine Divi- through which a wedge could be driven, sion. General Erskine decided to change somewhere between the enemy holding the direction of attack by assigning a up the 9th Marines and the strong ene- new boundary between regiments in or- my defenses near Hill 362B. der to attack the flank of the enemy de- The VAC operation order for 3 March fensive area opposite the 9th Marines . called for elements of the 5th Marine Accordingly, an attack to the southeast Division to relieve 3d Division units was launched at 1500 with the main ef- near Hill 362B by 1000 . In line with this fort on the left. relief, General Erskine planned to ad- At this time, 1/21 was pulled out of just the boundary between his regi- reserve and moved to the rear of 2/21 ments so that the zone of attack of the with orders to launch a drive towards division was again equally divided . In the southeast with the mission of seiz- consequence, the 21st Marines once ing Hill 362C . At the same time, 2/21 again would be attacking northeast- was to advance northeastward to the ward. 0-3 Line. The 3d Battalion was to At 0800 on 3 March, the 3d Marine remain in 9th Marines reserve, but Division resumed the attack with the could not be committed without Gen- same formation but with a new eral Erskine's specific permission- 10. boundary between the regiments. The assault was preceded by a 10-minute I3d MarDiv AR, p . 12 . 584 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

The afternoon assault followed a At 1800, the attack halted and the five-minute artillery and naval gunfire assault battalions consolidated for the preparation. The 1st Battalion, 21st night as best they could . In the zone of Marines, initially made rapid progress action of the 21st Marines, 2/21 and and advanced for about 250 yards to its 1/21 made physical contact, but an front. The 2d Battalion seized the high open flank remained on the right of the terrain on Hill 357 along the eastern 21st adjoining the 9th Marines . The gap edge of the Motoyama Plateau, but was was 250 yards wide and covered by fire . unable to continue its drive because of It would not take the combat-wise Japa- heavy flanking fire from hills in the 5th nese long to note the existence of this Marine Division zone of action . The gap and take advantage of it. movements of 1/21 were facilitated by Most of the action in the 3d Division a platoon of tanks attached to the 21st zone of attack on D plus 12 had taken Marines which, from positions in the place in the northern half of the zone, vicinity of Motoyama Village, effective- where the 21st Marines had seized ly supported the battalion's attack by nearly all of the high ground north- placing direct fire on targets in front of east of the airfield . Beyond that, they 1/21. had launched a drive to the southeast In resuming its attack during the to envelop the enemy to the south . The afternoon of 3 March, the 9th Marines 9th Marines, having made little head- once again ran into a stone wall and way, remained in substantially the same no gains were made. In an attempt to positions it had occupied all day. make some progress, Colonel Kenyon At this point, an assessment of the committed tanks singly and in small situation from the Japanese point of groups in the broken terrain . The armor view appears in order . In seeking to did what it could and, in fact, reduced block General Erskine's drive to the sea, a number of enemy emplacements and the Japanese resisted at every hill, rise, some guns. Nevertheless, the tanks and rock. Every fold in the earth was were unable to breach this enemy posi- cut with trenches and tank traps and tion sufficiently to permit an advance 21 covered by mortar and machine gun by the infantry The Japanese emplace- fire. Artillery had been sited across the ments, cleverly hidden in the chaotic unfinished runways of Airfield No . 3, jumble of torn rocks, could not be and the roads and edges of the field detected, because enemy artillery, mor- were strewn with mines. From Hill tars, and small arms firing from these 362B, north of the airfield, the fire came positions were using smokeless powder straight down into the flanks of units as a propellant . In addition, the heavier moving east. As one account of the bat- weapons were not as active as they had tle was to sum up the situation been on previous days, but the fire from The enemy was making a last organized antitank guns and machine guns was stand, and doing it well . This was Kuriba- devastating. yashi's order. He had estimated that losses on both sides had been about equal until the end of February. He felt these tm Ibid. early days of March to be the crucial ones 3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 585

and believed that if he could apply enough General Erskine had to secure permis- force, possibly even a counterattack, the sion from VAC to delay the 3d Division Americans might fall back, or at least halt. If not victory, he would buy time, attack until 3/21 could complete its which is all he really hoped for .' mopping up and get into position to During the night of 3-4 March, Gen- attack. The battalion started to move eral Kuribayashi decided that the time shortly before 0700, at which time it was ripe for a limited counterattack . reverted to its parent regiment . In How the Japanese learned of the exist- crossing the area to the northwest and ence of the gap between the 21st and north of Airfield No . 3, the battalion 9th Marines is not clear, but at ap- drew heavy fire from enemy mortars proximately 0300, 4 March, an estimated and small arms. Extremely poor 200 enemy troops attempted to in- visibility further delayed and hindered filtrate the eastern end of Airfield No . 3 preparations for the passage of lines, between 2/9 and 1/21. After a sharp so that 3/21 did not reach its positions fire fight, the brunt of which was borne until 1100. by the left company of 2/9, the enemy Forty minutes later, the division at- was repulsed with 166 casualties ; 2/9 tack jumped off, again preceded by an also had heavy losses . Reports indicated artillery preparation and a rolling bar- that some of the enemy infiltrators had rage. The same scheme of maneuver succeeded in crossing the lines and were used on the previous day was employed, observed moving along the airfield . except that 3/21 passed through 1/21 . Patrols were sent to intercept this Once again, the 9th Marines was unable enemy force and 3/21, which ordinarily to penetrate the enemy positions to its would have moved out for the attack front. Similarly, the 21st Marines en- at dawn of 4 March, was directed to countered heavy resistance, including remain in place and continue patrolling direct fire from artillery pieces that until after daybreak, when the situation were difficult to locate ; little progress could be clarified. Around dawn, patrols was made . Still unable to advance be- of 3/21 killed two or three of the enemy cause of hostile flanking fire from the and the situation was found to be under high ground to its left in the zone of control.23 action of the 5th Division, 2/21 suffered The VAC attack on 4 March had been heavy casualties . scheduled to jump off at 0815 . General In the course of the morning, elements Erskine initially had issued orders for of the 5th Marine Division relieved 3/9, 3/21 to be released to the 21st Marines. which, together with 1/21 withdrew to The battalion was to have moved prior reserve positions near Motoyama Vil- to daybreak, passing through 1/21 and lage. One company of 1/21 was em- continuing the attack to the southeast ployed to cover the gap between the to seize Hill 362C. In view of the con- 9th and 21st Marines when lines were fusion caused by the enemy infiltration, consolidated for the night . At 1800, the units dug in with assault battalions just 2' Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 218. east of Airfield No . 3 and Motoyama 23 3d MarDiv AR, p . 12, Village. All of the assault battalions 586 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS of the 3d Marine Division were tied in 5 March has been described in the fol- with each other, as well as with 5th lowing words Division units on the left and the 4th All were tired and listless, their key Division on the right. personnel were largely casualties, and it Late in the afternoon of D, plus 13, was little short of miraculous that they could advance at all . Some gained comfort a welcome dispatch from VAC reached and a much-needed lift from a powerful the exhausted troops of all three Marine drink called "Suribachi Screamer," sick divisions.24 Except for limited adjust- bay alcohol and fruit juice . But even ment of positions, no attacks were to be where units were pulled back in corps or division reserve, there was only relative launched on 5 March . Instead, present quiet and rest, because night infiltration positions were to be held and one bat- and minor counterattacks were constant ; talion of each regiment was to be rested, and day and night, Japanese appeared reorganized, and prepared to resume from overrun caves and tunnels, necessi- the assault on the following day, when tating mopping up of seized ground .' all three divisions were to launch a In military operations enemy opposi- coordinated attack . tion often surpasses all expectations. On 5 March, the 3d Marine Division According to this maxim, after seeing held an irregular line with 2/21, 3/21, most of its carefully scheduled and sup- 1/9, and 2/9, while the other two divi- parted attacks frustrated day after day, sions spent the day receiving replace- VAC may have tended to overestimate ments and equipment to strengthen the extent of the resistance of which the their tired and depleted units for the enemy on Iwo Jima was still capable . attack on 6 March . Two companies of Actually the position of the Japanese the 21st Marines were pulled back from during the first week of March was far their positions on the line to rejoin the from reassuring. According to at least 1st Battalion in an assembly area north one account : of Airfield No. 2. The men of 3/9 The fact was the island defenders were remained in position as division reserve in a bad way . Most of their artillery and between the northeast-southwest run- tanks had been destroyed, and 65 percent of the officers had been killed . On Satur- way and Motoyama Village . day, March 3, General Kuribayashi esti- The day of rest and rehabilitation mated that he had 3,500 effectives left . passed without any major ground Communications had broken down to the action, though artillery duels took place point that General Senda was virtually isolated in the east. Captain Inouye still and naval guns continued their harass- commanded a small remnant of sailors ing fires throughout the day . One air near Airfield No . 3. Admiral Ichimaru strike was conducted in the area of Hill was in the north, in touch with Kuriba- 362C. It appeared as if even the Japa- yashi but no longer having effective con- nese welcomed a respite, as shown by trol over Inouye . In the northern corner of the island, no organized force remained their lack of aggressiveness. On their -only small groups of survivors of indi- part, the men of VAC also were badly vidual units, acting locally and almost in need of a rest. Their condition on Isely and Crow], U.S. Marines and Am- ' VAC Dispatch, 1624, 4Mar45 . phibious War, p . 97 .

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 587

independently. Spirit was still strong, tinued for an hour and a half . A roll- however, and in no unit was there the ing barrage was also fired in sup- thought of surrender.' port of the attack . Nevertheless, despite VAC orders called for a resumption all this expenditure of ammunition, of the attack on 6 March. Since any results remained negligible. As soon as further advance by 2/21 was depend- the remainder of the 3d Division at- ent directly on the progress made by tacked at 0900, it drew such heavy fire the adjacent 5th Division, the 2/21 at- from enemy small arms, mortars, artil- tack was to be coordinated with that lery, and antitank guns that any advance of General Rockey's men . The advance was all but out of the question . of 2/21 was so timed that the battalion A second push was ordered for 1440, would move out at 0800, one hour ahead again preceded by a heavy artillery of the remainder of the 3d Division, preparation. This time 1/21, having which would launch its assault in con- passed through 3/21, was able to score junction with that of the 4th Division . some gains against continued bitter Except for the staggered timing, no enemy resistance, slowly advancing for other changes were made in the previous 200 yards before lines were consoli- scheme of maneuver. dated at 1800 for the night . Once again, At 0600 on 6 March, 3/9 was attached the progress made was completely out to the 21st Marines in preparation for of proportion to the ammunition and the attack . For ten minutes prior to the effort exerted . During the two prepa- jumpoff of 2/21, three battalions of the ratory fires on the morning of 6 12th Marines, three battalions of the March, 11 artillery battalions had ex- 14th Marines, and one battalion of the pended 2,500 rounds of 155mm how- corps artillery laid down a heavy prepa- itzer ammunition and 20,000 rounds of ration, which was further supple- 75mm and 105mm shells .27 In addition, mented by naval gunfire . However, no a battleship and cruisers had fired an sooner had 2/21 attacked than it be- additional 50 rounds of 15-inch and came apparent that the artillery prepa- 400 rounds of 8-inch ammunition . Car- ration had been totally ineffective . The rier-based aircraft had bombed and advance bogged down almost at once strafed the Japanese positions, all ap- in the face of heavy enemy mortar and parently without eliminating the en- small arms fire coming from the high emy's power to resist . ground in the zone of action of the 5th There was one bright note on this Marine Division . otherwise very discouraging day . Dur- Prior to the jumpoff of 3/21 and the ing the bitter fighting, two platoons of 9th Marines, three battalions of the Company G, 3/21, fought their way to 12th Marines and one battalion of the the top of a ridge . Before enemy fire corps artillery fired two five-minute drove them off, they were able to get a preparations, which were further sup- glimpse of the sea, just 400 yards away . plemented by naval gunfire which con- It was an inspiring view, for it indicated

`7 " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 224. VAC Arty Rpt, pp. 14-15. 588 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS to the weary Marines just how far they made, Lieutenant Colonel Boehm later had come, despite all adversities . It also was to comment served as a distant promise that there The order for the attack on Hill 362C, would be an end to the ordeal all of received verbally over the telephone from them were undergoing . Colonel Eustace Smoak, executive officer of the 21st Marines, was simply to attack at 0500, using the present front lines of DRIVE TO THE SEA28 1/21 as a line of departure, maintain maximum secrecy and silence, and seize On the evening of 6 March it was the hill . My complaint that I had never apparent that the Japanese positions seen the ground was countered by the on northern Iwo would not yield to the assurance that Major Bob Houser, CO 1/21, would give me all the details on the tactics that had been thus far employed . lay of the land to the front, point out the At the same time, General Erskine was objective, etc. etc ., "Don't worry about a keenly aware of the heavy losses that thing, Houser's been observing the ground were draining the offensive strength of all afternoon, he'll give you all the dope ." his division . As a result, despite the I had my company commanders meet me at the K Company CP, which was known risk inherent in such 'an opera- nearest 1/21's disposition, briefed them, tion, he ordered an attack against Hill then took them to the 1/21 CP . Major 362C under cover of darkness. It was Houser accompanied us up to a point hoped that employment of the element about the center of his lines, pointed to of surprise would yield results where a hill mass about 300 yards to the front and said that was Hill 362, my objective . all other conventional means had failed. I told him it didn't seem possible that his Instead of attacking at 0730 on the position was so close to the hill . He as- morning of 7 March, as specified in sured me that it was, and his company VAC orders issued late on 6 March'29 commanders determinedly agreed, so we General Erskine requested and received went back a short distance and, under permission to jump off at 0500 . The cover, consulted a map . He confidently indicated the position of his front lines 21st Marines was to make the main and, although highly skeptical, I had no effort. Its objective was to seize Hill alternative but to accept his description 362C, while the 9th Marines was to as an accurate picture ." advance for about 200 yards in the dark- There was a good chance that the ness as a diversionary measure . Actual surprise attack would succeed . As a seizure of Hill 362C was to be executed rule, during previous World War II by Lieutenant Colonel Boehm's 3/9, operations in the Pacific Theater, which was attached to the 21st Marines . Marines had not carried out night at- In reconstructing the events leading tacks. Aside from night patrols, Amer- to this attack and the preparations icans had not ventured in front of the lines after dark on Iwo Jima . To prevent Additional material in this section is de- the enemy from learning of the pro- rived from : 3d EngBn URpts, 26Feb-9Apr45, posed attack, special precautions had to hereafter 3d EngBn URpts ; 3d Amtrac Bn, be taken. No mention of the attack was AR, dtd, 18Mar45, hereafter 3d Amtrac Bn AR. 2B VAC Op0 14-45, dtd 6Mar45. °0 Boehm ltr.

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 589

made in any radio traffic, nor was the checked? Get the naval gunfire officer! It assault to be preceded by any artil- was a 4th Division ship, he reported, and lery preparation, except for white lunged to the field phone and radio . Mean- while, word came back that the attack phosphorus shells fired around the ob- had jumped off. Still no sound. Were they jective five minutes before the jump- moving at all? Had the steaming earth off. The men were ordered to move as swallowed them?31 quietly as possible . No one was to fire It had not. At 0500, the assault until it became certain that the enemy companies climbed out of their holes had discovered the main body of the as- and silently headed southeastward to- sault force . wards Hill 362C assumed to be 250 The assault companies moved out of yards away. The surprise attained was their assembly areas at 0320 for the line total and 3/9, catching the enemy asleep of departure. A light rain was falling in his emplacements, took a heavy toll throughout the night, and the darkness with flamethrowers and automatic that engulfed everything on the island weapons. Shortly after 0530, a Japa- was broken only by the naval gunfire nese machine gun came to life . It was illumination, which ceased before the quickly silenced by a flamethrower, and attack was launched. Lieutenant Colonel Boehm's battalion Minutes before H-Hour, the situation continued its slow but determined at the 3d Marine Division command advance towards the objective . By this post was tense . Even though there was time, sporadic enemy resistance was a good chance that surprise would be making itself felt, but still the advance achieved, there had been no opportunity continued . for Lieutenant Colonel Boehm's bat- Shortly before daybreak, around talion to carry out any detailed prior 0600, 3/9 reported that it had taken reconnaissance. In the inky darkness, Hill 362C. Japanese were being killed his men would be stumbling into the out in the open with flamethrowers as unknown. The risks inherent in the they stumbled out of their caves. The venture were only too apparent. The battalion had advanced 400 yards with atmosphere prevailing at General no resistance whatever for the first 40 Erskine's command post during these minutes, and only a smattering of it crucial minutes has been recaptured as afterwards . Just when it appeared that follows complete success had been attained, the In the Division CP, the staff checked light of day revealed a somewhat dif- watches ; it was 0430. Every few minutes someone would look outside through the ferent and sobering picture . It became foul and rainy weather. If a burst of fire apparent that on the basis of the in- or a stray round was heard, faces tensed . structions received from 1/21 the At 0450, the illumination slacked and preceding evening, 3/9 had captured ceased. Five more minutes, and there fol- Hill 331 instead of Hill 362C. The real lowed the familiar crack and swish of an outgoing harassing concentration from the artillery. You could set a watch by the III Maj Robert D. Heinl, Jr ., "Dark Horse 12th Marines . Then at King-hour, a star- on Iwo," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 shell burst. Hadn't all illumination been (Aug 45), p. 58. 590 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS objective still lay 250 yards ahead . Ap- While 3/9, as part of the 21st parently, the battalion's j umpoff posi- Marines, was to make the most spectac- tions had been somewhat further back ular gains for the day, the remainder than anyone had realized. of the 9th Marines was to see some Determined to strike while the iron of the most bitter fighting of the Iwo was still hot, Lieutenant Colonel Boehm operation. While 3/9 was attacking called for artillery support and con- southward towards Hills 331 and 362C, tinued to press the attack against the 1/9 and 2/9 attacked eastward, also in real objective. By this time, the element the general direction of Hill 362C . By of surprise had been lost. Jumping off daybreak the 9th Marines, with the 2d at 0715, 3/9 savagely slashed its way Battalion on the left and the 1st Bat- forward from Hill 331 towards 362 . talion on the right, had advanced about The advance progressed over broken 200 yards. However, at first light of and treacherous ground, which exposed day the enemy, consisting of Baron Lieutenant Colonel Boehm's men to fire Nishi's 26th Tank Regiment, awoke to from the front, the flanks, and the rear . the presence of the intruders and put Bitter fighting continued throughout up a fierce opposition . The 2d Battalion, the morning, and in approaching the which had already advanced into the objective, Marines had to eliminate enemy fortifications, began to draw caves and bunkers one by one with heavy fire from the front, flanks, and flamethrowers, rockets, and demolition rear. For all practical purposes, the two charges. At 1330 3/9 reported that it battalions were cut off and casualties had captured the objective .32 This report were heavy. proved correct, and a major obstacle in By midmorning it became apparent the path of the 3d Marine Division's that the 9th Marines could not break advance was thus eliminated . In out- through the resistance it faced from lining the activities of 3/9 on 7 March, the front, and General Erskine shifted the battalion commander was to make the regimental boundaries so that the this comment advance of the 21st Marines would pinch Most notable in the night attack was out the 9th. Around noon, 1/9 regained the fact that, although nearly all the basic some freedom of movement and at- dope was bad, the strategy proved very tempted to establish contact with sound, since it turned out that the open elements of 3/9 atop Hill 362C . This ground taken under cover of darkness was attempt which, if successful, would have the most heavily fortified of all terrain captured that day, and the enemy occupy- caught Baron Nishi's men in a giant ing this vital ground were taken com- vise, failed. Instead, elements of 2/9 pletely by surprise (actually sleeping in were themselves surrounded and unable their pillboxes and caves) . . . . It should to move in any direction . Tanks sent be kept in mind, however, that a stroke forward in support of 2/9 were un- of luck went a long way toward making the attack a success ." able to get through, though they did relieve some of the pressure on the sur- 3d MarDiv AR, p . 15. rounded units. At dusk on 7 March, 9th Mar AR, Encl C, p. 11. elements of 2/9 were still pinned down . 3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 591 It would be 36 hours before two com- to be the final organized enemy defenses panies of Lieutenant Colonel Cushman's before the coast was reached . battalion would be able to extricate In the zone of action of the 9th themselves from the encirclement . Marines, 3/9 attacked eastward from Just about that length of time would Hill 362C, passing 3/21, which had been be required before the first Marines of attached to it, and moving through the the 3d Division reached the coast . It right of 1/9 . The intermediate objective would not be an easy advance for the of 3/9 was the edge of the plateau over- men of 2/21, 1/21, and 3/9 who would looking the beach ; the final objective was continue the drive for the sea, while the beach itself. Despite tenacious enemy Marines of 3/21 and 2/9 would continue resistance, the battalion advanced some to chip away at a stubborn pocket of 400 yards beyond Hill 362C towards enemy resistance that still showed no the beach . At times it appeared that, sign of disintegrating. despite the ferocity of the battle, enemy On the morning of 8 March, D plus resistance was less organized and as- 17, the men of the 3d Marine Division sumed the dimensions of a "last ditch" resumed the attack, this time with fight.34 In order to assist the battalion conventional tactics . The attack was in its drive through the broken terrain, preceded by a 10-minute artillery prepa- in which sandstone buttes abounded, a ration. Destroyers offshore supported destroyer fired into the draws that led the division and corps artillery with a down to the sea ; an air strike also was half-hour bombardment . Once again, a directed" into the same general area . By rolling barrage was employed . The 21st late afternoon, 3/9 had seized the inter- Marines jumped off with the 1st and 2d mediate objective and was ordered to Battalions abreast, 1/21 on the right . hold up the advance on the high The advance of 2/21 had to be coordi- ground. nated with that of the adjacent 5th Meanwhile, the attack of the remain- Marine Division . der of the 9th Marines had bogged down This time, the Japanese were wide in the inaccessible terrain in which awake and the 21st Marines received the Japanese had holed up . Remnants of heavy flanking fire from the sector of Colonel Nishi's force were making their the adjacent division, as well as from last stand here, fighting from caves the zone of action of the 9th Marines, and emplacements in the sandstone whenever an attempt was made to move with all they had. The materiel at their down to the cliff overlooking the beach . disposal was still formidable : well Nine tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion concealed antitank guns, and dug-in supported 2/21 as best they could by tanks, equipped with 37mm and 47mm shelling caves and pillboxes in the rug- guns. As a result, no coordinated ged terrain over which the battalion advance was possible . Small teams of had to advance. To the right of 2/21, the 1st Battalion was making slow ' "This is exactly what it was, but with the progress and by evening had advanced inevitable `handwriting on the wall' they 300 yards through what was believed fought like Hell." Boehm ltr . 592 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS men, rushing from one standstone butte deeply disturbed by his losses and their to another, fought Indian style, blasting adverse effect on his division's combat away at the enemy defenses here and efficiency. He strongly felt that some of there, but nowhere could the pocket be these casualties could have been avoided dented. and subsequently made this statement The following day, 9 March, saw the Infantry battalions were now definitely continuation of the 3d Division drive beginning to feel the presence of the to the sea. Once again, 3/9 jumped off large number of replacements, manifested following the customary preparation by .a sharp drop in combat efficiency . These and advanced towards the beach men were found to be willing but very . While poorly trained, especially in basic indi- still very much in evidence, enemy vidual conduct. The faulty teamwork, re- resistance was becoming more sporadic. sulting from lack of small unit training, By late afternoon, 3/9 had penetrated was also a definite hindrance to the oper- down to the beach, both 3/9 and 1/21 ation of the infantry battalions. Many dispatching patrols to the water's edge needless casualties occurred in these re- . placements because of a lack of knowl- In support of the two battalions, an air edge of the proper use of cover and strike was directed against an obstinate concealment enemy pocket in the zone of action of The situation described by General the 5th Division. In addition, a destroyer Erskine resulted from an organizational offshore, with the 3d Division naval innovation employed for the first time in gunfire officer on board, fired on caves the Marianas and subsequently on Iwo and enemy positions in the beach area . Jima. Six replacement drafts, totalling Once again, the 9th Marines, with 7,188 officers and men, all of them re- 3/21 attached, hit a stone wall of resist- cent arrivals from the United States, ance. Even though tank support was had been attached to the three divisions . available, the terrain severely limited It had been planned to feed these re- the employment of armor . The enemy placements into the combat units as was not slow to take advantage of this warranted by casualties, in hopes that situation. He first fired a number of air such a steady flow would guarantee a bursts over one of the tanks in order high degree of combat efficiency . Prior to disperse the infantry . Once this had to being channeled into the combat been accomplished, he dispatched a units, these men were to supplement the demolition detachment under cover of a shore party, thus serving a dual pur- smoke screen which put the tank out pose. The basic thought behind this pro- of action with a demolition charge and cedure may have been sound, but a Molotov cocktail . Neither 2/9 nor 3/21 . . . unfortunately, this plan did not work were able to score any sizable gains dur- out nearly so well as had been hoped . ing the day. Like most replacement drafts, these had Ever since the 3d Marine Division had been sent overseas with inadequate com- entered the fight for Iwo Jima and bat training, the idea being that they would complete this in the field . But the begun its drive through the center of the island, General Erskine had been Sd MarDiv AR, p . 17 .

3D MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 593 necessity of mastering shore party duties hands into two separate sectors . At the prevented this, with the result that most northern tip of the island, near Kitano of them had to be broken in during actual battle by the units into which they had Point, General Kuribayashi would con- been incorporated . This was hard on all tinue to offer stubborn opposition . This hands, and there were times during the last vestige of enemy resistance would later stages when it appeared that prog- be eliminated only after protracted ress was being hindered rather than fighting by elements of both the 3d and helped by the presence of the new men 5th Marine Divisions. Upon reaching In reviewing the handling of replace- the northeast coast after their arduous ments during the Iwo Jima operation, and costly advance through the center the former VAC chief of staff was to of Iwo, elated 3d Division Marines sent comment back a canteen filled with sea water 1. These replacements were the only to General Schmidt, marked "for in- ones available . VAC could do nothing spection, not consumption." about additional training. Another milestone in the prolonged 2. If not used for shore party duty, separate troops would have been required battle for Iwo Jima had been reached . for that, necessitating additional shipping . In the words of one historical nar- 3. Shore party requirements should be rative reduced as the advance continued . In fact some pioneers were used later as frontline Not as dramatic an incident as the flag troops. raising on Suribachi, this was far more 4. Duty with the shore party in itself significant. The enemy in the bulge of the necessitated some training in self pro- island was split, and Americans controlled tection, which should have proved useful the terrain approaches from the Moto- at the front .' yama tableland down the deep ravines to the cliffs and to the sea In any case, by evening of 9 March, General Erskine had achieved his General Kuribayashi and the rem- primary mission which was to break nants of his garrison still held one through to the northeastern shore of the square mile in the north of the , island, island. The initial approach to the beach determined as ever to sell their lives had been made by elements of Company as dearly as possible. Small though A, 21st Marines, who were later joined tenacious pockets of resistance re- by 3/9. By nightfall the 3d Division mained in the southeastern portion of Marines held nearly 800 yards of shore- Iwo. But an end to the terrible slaughter line, thus cutting the area still in enemy was finally in sight. 11 'e Hough, The Island War, p. 335. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- "' Rogers ltr. phibious War, pp. 497-498. CHAPTER 8

Airfield Development and Activities Behind the Lines

RECONSTRUCTION OF While three Marine divisions were THE AIRFIELDS2 inching their way northward against tenacious resistance, an equally difficult 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from U. S. Pacific Fleet, battle was being fought to the rear of Base Development Plan, Iwo Jima, TF 51 AR; the combat troops . Aside from the Japa- TF 52 AR; TF 56 AR ; TF 56 TQM Rpt ; TF nese who, particularly during the early 56 Air Rpt ; TF 56 Med Rpt, dtd 28Mar45; days of the operation, were able to VAC SAR ; VAC C-1 PerRpts; VAC C-3 Rpt ; blanket any part of the island with VAC C-4 Jnl ; VAC Logistics Rpt ; VAC NGF and AirRpts ; 3d MarDiv G-1 PerRpts ; artillery and mortar fire, the biggest 3d MarDiv G-4 Per Rpts, 27Feb-lApr45 ; 3d enemy was the time factor . The basic MarDiv G-4 Jnl, 23Feb-8Apr45, hereafter 3d premise on which the entire operation MarDiv ~G-4 Jnl; 4th MarDiv D-4 Rpts; 5th had been planned was to secure the two MarDiv Casualty Rpts ; 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; southernmost airfields on the island as 5th MarDiv SerTrps UJnl, 19Feb-8Mar45, hereafter 5th MarDiv SerTrps UJn1 ; 5th SP quickly as possible, and it was for this Rgt AR ; ComPhibGru 2 AR ; Iwo Comments ; purpose that Marines up front were Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Newcomb, Iwo Jima; hourly giving their lives . Unless the air- Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World War fields could be quickly put into opera- II; The Pacific ; Craven and Cate, Gallant, The tion, the sacrifice of these Marines would Friendly Dead ; Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ; serve little, if any, purpose . Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chem- On D plus 5, men of the 31st Naval ical Warfare Service : The Technical Services Construction Battalion, commanded by -U. S. Army in World War II-Chemicals in Lieutenant Commander Dominick J. Combat (Washington : Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Ermilio, began work on the southern 1966), hereafter Kleber and Birdsell, Chemi- airfield . This job initially had been as- cals in Combat ; Leo P. Brophy and George J . signed to the 133d Naval Construction B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service : The Technical Services-U. S. Army in World Bradford Huie, From Omaha to Okinawa War II-Organizing for War (Washington : (New York : E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., Office of the Chief of Military History, De- 1945) . partment of the Army, 1959), hereafter 'Additional material in this section is de- Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War ; rived from : 31st NCB AR : 1st JASCO OpRpt, David E . Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Iwo Jima, 27Nov44-19Mar45, hereafter 1st Lilienthal, The Atomic Years, 1945-1950, v . II JASCO OpRpt ; 2d Sep Eng Bn URpts, 25- (New York : Harper and Row, 1964), hereafter Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 2d Sep EngBn URpts ; Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years ; Depart- 3d JASCO AR, Iwo Jima, 7Nov44-16Mar45, ment of the Navy, Building the Navy's Bases hereafter 3d JASCO AR ; 2d Bomb Disposal in World War II, v. II (Washington : U. S. Co. UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19iFeb-22Mar45, hereafter Government Printing Office, 1947) ; William 2d Bomb Disposal Co UJnl . 594 AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 595 Battalion under Lieutenant Commander Once the first spotter aircraft had Raymond P. Murphy, but the battalion flown in from the escort carrier Wake had suffered such heavy casualties on Island, others followed in rapid succes- D-Day that it was still undergoing re- sion. By 1 March, 16 planes of VMO-4 organization four days later . While, to and -5 had reached the island . Since the the north, the battle for Airfield No . 2 airstrip was still under enemy artillery was in progress, the Seabees, with and mortar fire, many of the small riflemen covering them, were crawling planes sustained damage which had to up the runway of No . 1 Airfield on be patched up in frantic efforts . Of the hands and knees, probing for mines and seven aircraft which VMO-4 brought picking up the most jagged shell frag- ashore, six eventually were so badly ments that could wreak havoc with the damaged that they had to be surveyed rubber tires of aircraft. after the end of the operation . Throughout the day, the Seabees and Completion of the first 1,500-foot elements of the VAC 2d Separate strip of Airfield No . 1 was but the ini- Engineer Battalion, commanded by tial step in the restoration of the entire Lieutenant Colonel Charles 0 . Clark, field. The 2d Separate Engineer Bat- sifted the dirt on the runways, often talion was charged with the recon- under enemy sniper and artillery fire . struction of the north-south and north- By late afternoon of 25 February, the west-southeast runways, while the 62d ^,ngineers had filled, bladed, and rolled Naval Construction Battalion, com- 1,500 feet of the north-south runway manded by Lieutenant Commander of Airfield No. 1, which was then ready Frank B. Campbell, was responsible for for use by small aircraft . This was the rebuilding the northeast-southwest run- scene that took place at the airfield on way. Quarries available on the island the following day yielded an excellent sand-clay fill that Down on Airfield No. 1 the first planes could be used for the construction of came in, two little OY-1s of the 4th Divi- roads and was widely utilized in sion (VMO-4), their wheels kicking up rehabilitating and extending Airfield spurts of dust as they touched down . Dirty engineers and Seabees lined the No. 1. In fact, it was the use of this runway and cheered as the little spotter material that had made possible the planes rolled to a stop. The Grasshoppers early completion of the short strip for (Stinson Sentinels), or "Maytag Messer- the land-based observation planes . schmitts," stayed only a few minutes and Good progress was made in restoring then took off again, to fly over Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater to spot tar- the airfield, except for the hours of gets for the 4th Division . As they left, darkness and those times when the the first of the 133d Seabees' rollers and enemy took the field under fire . On the scrapers climbed up onto the runway. last day of February, Airfield No . 1 After a week of fighting, and heavy casu- invited emergency landings by carrier alties, and reorganization, the 133d was ready to start on the job it had come for .' aircraft. This offer was promptly ac- cepted by a damaged torpedo bomber . ' Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 193-194. From this time on, the popularity of

596 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

HOLY COMMUNION during Mass atop Mt. Suribachi . (USMC 110322)

FIRST MARINE OBSERVATION PLANE lands on Motoyama Airfield No. 1 (USMC 110595)

AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 597 the airfield among carrier pilots rapidly become operational, a variety of air- increased. By 2 March, a 4,700-foot craft could be brought into the island . runway had been completed and the The value of Iwo Jima was further first air transport, a R4D of Air enhanced when, on 12 March, the 5,800- Evacuation Squadron 2, departed with foot strip was completed . By this time, 12 wounded Marines on board. Noting landings and takeoffs on Airfield No . 1 increased activity on the newly restored had become a daily occurrence . airfield, the enemy concentrated his In addition to the aircraft using the artillery fire on the strip. For the southern airfield for bringing in sup- remainder of the day, the field remained plies and evacuating the wounded, inoperative, but subsequent evacuation fighter planes were needed to assist the flights became an almost daily occur- ground forces fighting on Iwo . Their rence without any further serious enemy mission was both an offensive and a interference. defensive one. On the one hand, the A new milestone was reached during fighters had to give the closest support the afternoon of 4 March, when a B-29 possible to Marines fighting on the bomber, returning from an air attack ground. Their second mission, of no less against the Japanese homeland, made a importance, was to make continuous forced landing, refueled, and continued sweeps over Japanese islands in the on its return flight. This was only the vicinity of Iwo to preclude any reinfor- first of hundreds of the giant B-29s cement of the Iwo garrison, and at the which were to make emergency land- same time to eliminate any Japanese ings on the island for the remainder air power still remaining in the Bonins. of the war. Above all, the enemy had to be pre- As early as 28 February, planes of vented from interfering with the the Army Air Forces 9th Troop Car- progress of the Iwo ground operation rier Squadron had dropped more than or with the numerous supply ships 9,000 pounds of supplies near the west- standing by offshore . ern beaches . Beginning 1 March, air- During the first two weeks of the Iwo drops were made over the southern air- Jima operation, Colonel Vernon E . field. The cargo dropped consisted of Megee acted as the Commander, Land- badly needed 81mm mortar shells, ing Force Air Control Unit. In this medical supplies, radio gear, and mail . capacity, he came ashore on 24 February Work on the two short runways was but did not assume control of support completed on 4 March . On this date, the aircraft until 1 March, at which time first Marine transport, a R5C, piloted he also became Commander Air, Iwo by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S . Mac- Jima. The establishment of these func- kay, commanding VMR-952, landed on tions ashore greatly facilitated coordi- the island. The aircraft, carrying 5,500 nation and control of fire support for pounds of badly needed mortar shells VAC,¢ particularly since Colonel Megee, and ammunition from Guam, had stop- using forward observers, developed a ped at Saipan before continuing the flight to Iwo . Once Airfield No . 1 had • TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec E, p . 15 . 598 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS system of close air support controlled rived from Tinian . This squadron, com- from VAC Headquarters.,' manded by Major William W. Dean, This proved to be a very busy time began to fly air defense missions around for the representative of Marine avia- Iwo Jima day and night . Based on the tion, who was to reminisce later southern airfield, the bomber squadron You see, I had a dual status there really . also relieved carrier aircraft of anti- In fact, I stayed Commander there even submarine patrol missions . After 23 -let me see, we were supposed to have an days of well executed and strenuous Air Force Brigadier for that job but he operations, the Support Carrier Group never showed up until a couple of weeks after the landing and during the interim departed from Iwo .7 I was the Air Commander, Iwo Jima . . . . On 11 March, 15 of the Iwo-based And I had air defense responsibility and P-51 fighters launched their first attack the logistical responsibilities during that against nearby Chichi Jima . This was time so I was like the proverbial paper only the first raid of many to follow . hanger with the itch .' Throughout the assault and occupation On 6 March, Brigadier General Ernest phase, Army Air Forces bombers based Moore, USA, arrived on Iwo to as- in the Marianas conducted day and sume his duties as air commander . With night raids against Haha and Chichi him came an initial complement of 28 Jima with two raids being directed P-51 Mustang fighters and 12 P-61 against enemy positions on Iwo Jima Black Widow night fighters of the 15th in general support of our forces . Air- Fighter Group . On 8 and 9 March, the craft from the Support Carrier Group, forward echelon of VMTB-242 ar- while it was still in the Iwo area, in addition to their numerous daily local ' Rogers ltr. 8 Gen Vernon E. Megee interview with Hist- commitments, also flew several strikes Div, HQMC, dtd 17May67 (Oral History Col- against Haha and Chichi Jima . Once lection, HistDiv, HQMC), p . 32 . According to the southern airfield became oper- USAF historical sources, "On 10 January ational, an increasingly large number 1945 General Moore recommended that Colonel of B-29s sought refuge on the island Megee (as Landing Force Commander, Air Support Control Unit) would continue to act while returning from raids over Japan, as the Landing Force Aircraft Commander often in a precarious condition . By 14 during the assault phase at Iwo until the March, D plus 23, 24 of the giant arrival of the designated Landing Force Air- bombers had made emergency landings craft Commander, namely Moore. He stated on the island's often under the very that Colonel Magee concurred in the plan since it would provide unity and continuity of com- noses of the enemy still holding out in mand. Moore also pointed out that he would northern Iwo. be needed on Guam to get aircraft prepared to Even as Airfield No . 1 was becoming go forward as scheduled, and it would be more operational and the number of aircraft important for him to do this than to be on using its facilities increased, first steps Iwo during the assault phase. . . . On 6 March, General Moore led the air echelon of the 15th were under way to restore the second Fighter Group to Iwo Jima, and upon arrival there promptly assumed the Air Commander ' TF 56 AR, Encl F, p. 4. duty. Air Force Comment . 8 ComPhibGru 2 AR, pp . 9-10,

AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 599

B-29 SUPERFORTRESS, the first of many, makes emergency landing on Iwo Jima . (USAF 57013 AC)

4TH MARINE DIVISION observation post near wrecked enemy aircraft at northern end of Motoyama Airfield No . 1 . (USMC 110251)

600 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

airfield. Since the field, shortly to be- tral Field would be turned into one huge come known as the Central Airfield, complex featuring two B-29 strips, two was still under enemy fire during the fighter strips, and a combat service cen- latter part of February and early ter. It was finally decided that once the March, little could be done by way of island was secured, the North and Cen- actual reconstruction . As a first step, tral Fields would be combined, covering an abundance of mines and booby traps, more than four square miles, just about which the enemy had left behind, had half of the surface of the island .1 p to be cleared, an unenviable task that In rebuilding the Iwo Jima airfields, was handled by the 2d Bomb Disposal the engineers ran into complex and Company, a Marine unit specializing exasperating problems . Because of the in the removal of mines and duds. recent volcanic origin of Iwo, laying The company had already performed out the runways or putting in subsur- a similar job creditably at the southern face gasoline lines became a very diffi- airfield before restoration could get cult undertaking when steam pockets or under way. By 16 March, the Central sulphur laden crevasses were encoun- Airfield had been restored to a point tered. Construction of runways on the where it also became operational . It volcanic rock also posed a major prob- featured one strip graded to 5,200 feet, lem and it became necessary to put the another to 4,800 feet .9 naval construction units on a schedule As the assault phase on Iwo Jima of two 10-hour shifts daily ." came to a close, attention turned to the By mid-July, the first B-29 runway execution of plans for the development had been paved to its full length of of the island as an important air base . 9,800 feet . The second strip had been To this end, once the objective was se- graded to 9,400 feet by the end of the cured, a naval construction brigade was war but was never resurfaced. The old organized and additional construction runway, running from west to east, be- units were employed . Original plans for came a 6,000-foot fueling strip. The the development of Iwo Jima had called fighter strip on Number 1 Airfield was for three airfields and installations to eventually paved to 6,000 feet and was accommodate the garrison . The fields equipped with 7,940 feet of taxiways were to be designed to handle up to 90 and 258 hardstands . The rough terrain B-29s daily, as well as five groups of in the area of the northern strip de- escort fighters . The Central Airfield was layed construction, so that by the end to be utilized for staging Superfort- of the war it had been paved to 5,500 resses en route from the Marianas to feet for the use of fighters ; in addition, Japan. Airfields No . 1 and 3 were to some 10,000 feet of taxiway had been serve fighters and smaller bombers. Al- graded. Two large tank farms and fa- ternate plans, however, were more am- cilities at each field took care of the bitious than the earlier ones and even- supply of fuel . tually it was anticipated that the Cen- 10 Ibid., p s . 596. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 595 . ' Ibid., p. 521 . AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 601 The utilization of Iwo Jima as a initial landings, the main emphasis was fighter base was to be greatly affected on meeting the urgent requirements of by the overall war situation . The reduc- the combat troops . The supplies brought tion of enemy air strength in Japan ashore in LVTs and DUKWs often were proper proceeded so rapidly during the sent directly inland without any re- late spring and early summer of 1945 handling on the beaches. For the first that in time fighter escorts from Iwo five days, until roads capable of sup- were no longer required for the B-29s . porting wheeled vehicles could be uti- Nevertheless, some 1,191 escort sorties lized, LVTs, DUKWs, and the versatile were to be flown from Iwo, as well as Weasels took care of transporting the 3,081 strike sorties against enemy tar- bulk of supplies from the beaches to the gets in Japan . 12 The primary use to inland dumps. which the airfields on the island were The landing of ammunition and sup- put was as an intermediate landing plies took place under extremely diffi- point, particularly for big B-29s in dis- cult conditions . Heavy swells caused tress. By the time the war came to an extensive broaching of landing craft. end, about 2,400 of the giant bombers With each wave, boats were picked had made emergency landings on Iwo up bodily and thrown broadside of runways, involving a total of 25,000 the beach, where succeeding waves airmen. swamped and broached numerous land- ing craft. Other craft in succession LOGISTICS, REAR INSTALLA- hit the wrecks already beginning to pile TIONS, AND NEWS COVERAGE13 up on the beaches until considerable wreckage had accumulated . The LSTs A combination of enemy fire, deep volcanic ash, and heavy surf resulted and LSMs sent to the beaches once the beachhead was secured also had great in grave supply problems during the Iwo Jima operation. The early phase, in difficulty in keeping from broaching. particular, became a nightmare for the Tugs were in constant attendance to tow them clear Navy beach parties and the Marine . Since unloading con- tinued day and night, the beach parties shore parties. In the days following the had to work around the clock . '~ Air Force Comment . In order to facilitate getting supplies 39 Additional material in this section is de- to the combat troops, Marston matting rived from : 3d EngBn AR; 3d Pioneer Bn and armored bulldozers were utilized URpt, 25Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 3d Pioneer Bn URpt; 4th MedBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb- on the beaches. The matting was of Mar45, hereafter 4th MedBn OpRpt; 4th Ser tremendous value in overcoming the Bn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-19Mar45, here- obstacle created by the soft volcanic after 4th SerBn OpRpt ; 5th Eng Bn UJnl, Iwo ash on the landing beaches . The ar- Jima, 19Feb-24Mar45, hereafter 5th EngBn mored bulldozers, equipped with steel UJn1 ; 5th MedBn UJn1, Iwo Jima, 27Feb- 18Mar45, hereafter 5th MedBn UJnI ; 5th plates to protect both the driver and the Pioneer Bn UJn1, Iwo Jima, 7-23Jul45, here- machine, were employed on the beaches after 5th Pioneer Bn UJnl. to level sand terraces and carve out 602 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS exits. When fighting shifted to the coming depleted from casualties and northern part of the island, several fatigue. bulldozers were used to cut roads There were slow but steady signs of through the rocky gorges characteristic progress. On D plus 6, the day that of northern Iwo, notably in the 5th Ma- General Erskine launched his drive up rine Division zone of advance . the center of Iwo, engineers of the 5th In discussing the value of the Mars- Marine Division began the operation of ton matting and the armored bull- the first water distillation plant on the dozers, the Commander of the Attack West coast. Cognizant of the geological Force Beach Party Group, Captain Carl characteristics that were peculiar to the E. Anderson, USNR, pointed out that island, the engineers drove intake pipes these two items of equipment into the natural springs . The water . . . contributed materially to the suc- emerging from the ground was so hot cess of the landing and the moving of that it had to be cooled with sea water . heavy equipment off the beaches, which One of the first amenities of civiliza- could not have otherwise been accom- plished without almost insurmountable tion, the hot shower, thus became a hardship." welcome arrival on the island . The pioneer battalions were the basic On the same day, the VAC Shore Party assumed control of all shore component of their respective division party activities, a further indication shore parties . The 133d and 31st Naval Construction Battalions provided equip- that the situation on the beaches was stabilizing. The general unloading of ment operators and cargo handlers for cargo ships on the eastern beaches now the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions . In got under way . As large quantities of addition, the Army's 442d and 592d supplies began to reach the shore, it Port Companies, assigned to the 4th soon became evident that additional and 5th Divisions respectively, and Ma- beaches on the west coast of the island rine service and supply units were given would have to be utilized. Preliminary special tasks within the shore party organizations . Invaluable service was surveys had indicated that conditions also rendered by the three Army DUKW on the west coast were suitable for beaching LCTs and smaller craft companies which, like the port com- . By panies, were Negro units. Replacement D plus 8, beach exits and roads had drafts furnished the largest source of been constructed on western Iwo. Si- multaneously, a number of beaches, de- labor for ships platoons and shore de- signated as Purple, Brown, White, and tails, though their subsequent integra- tion into the depleted combat units left Orange, were established. The Japanese, increasingly compelled much to be desired . As of D plus 3, units of the 8th Field Depot went to watch the beehive of activity along ashore and were assigned to assist the the eastern shore in helpless frustra- tion, saw an opportunity to interfere divisional shore parties, which were be- with operations on the western beaches. "RAdm Carl E . Anderson ltr to CMC, dtd On 1 March, an ammunition resupply 26Nov52, in Iwo Comments . ship, the Columbia Victory, was ap- AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 603 proaching the west coast with a cargo ashore on D plus 8 as the advance of artillery ammunition when mortar echelon of Army ground and aviation fire from Kama and Kangoku Rocks, troops that would play an important as well as northwestern Iwo, bracketed part in garrisoning the island . Mean- the vessel. One shell exploded so close while, the Army 506th Antiaircraft to the ship that it wounded one man Battalion, having landed on D plus 6, and caused light damage to the vessel . was firing its 90mm guns at Kama and Anxious eyes were watching the Japa- Kangoku Rocks off the west coast, from nese artillery fire, including those of which the enemy had harassed the Generals Holland Smith and Schmidt, Columbia Victory . Men of the 5th Ma- who viewed the action from VAC rine Division advancing up the west headquarters on the west beach . More coast had already become the target of than the loss of a ship was involved . mortar and rocket fire from these If the Columbia Victory's cargo of am- islets. munition blew up, the entire west coast While the Marines in the front lines of Iwo could go with it, along with were pitting their bodies against a cruel thousands of Marines working on the and remorseless enemy, the battle to beaches. Keenly aware of the danger, save lives was being waged with equal the cargo ship reversed course and, devotion in the rear. American skill at miraculously evading additional near improvisation, coupled with determina- misses, headed back out to the open tion and medical know-how, were des- sea.15 tined to save many lives . On Purple As a result of enemy interference, Beach on the west coast, a Navy evacu- the western beaches could not be opened ation hospital opened on the evening until D plus 11, when Purple 2 went of D plus 6 with a capacity of 200 beds. into operation . By 3 March, all assault At the 4th Marine Division hospital, shipping had been unloaded and retired located at the northern tip of the south- from Iwo Jima, and Garrison Force ern airfield, 17 doctors, operating in Zero began to discharge its cargo . This four surgical teams, worked around the element consisted of troops of the garri- clock. The Army's 38th Field Hospital, son force, commanded by Major General consisting of 22 officers and 182 enlisted James E . Chaney, USA . The Zero eche- men, came ashore on 25 February . lon had been embarked in additional Working together with the Navy med- shipping to arrive at the objective on ical facilities, it was to make a major call after the assault ships, but prior contribution in providing medical care to the first echelon garrison ships .16 to the wounded in the days to come . General Chaney, together with his staff Hospital facilities on Iwo were further and elements of the Army's 147th In- supplemented when the 5th Marine fantry Regiment and men of the 7th Division Hospital went into operation Fighter Command, had already gone at the southern tip of Airfield No. 1. In order to provide the best possible '~ CominCh 1-9 . care for the wounded, time was of the TF 56 TQM Rpt, p . 6. essence. This applied particularly to the 604 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS availability of blood at the company On D plus 9, the hospital LSTs, medical aid stations . Blood plasma had which thus far had provided emergency been used in earlier operations, where treatment for the wounded, were re- its life-saving capabilities had already leased and left the area, fully loaded become legend. On Iwo Jima fresh with casualties . At this time, shore- whole blood, recently drawn on the west based medical facilities took over the coast of the United States, packed in task of caring for the wounded . Serious ice and airlifted directly to the scene of cases were subsequently evacuated di- action was used with excellent effects . rectly from the beach to hospital ships Initially, whole blood was flown in by and transports. By D plus 14, more seaplane to a base established near than 9,500 casualties had been evacu- Mount Suribachi at the southeastern ated to rear areas by transports and tip of Iwo. Use of the seaplane base hospital ships, not counting another 125 continued until 8 March, at which time evacuated by air .19 Plans called for the it was decommissioned and the sea- evacuation of the wounded to Saipan, planes, which had also been used to where 1,500 beds were available and to conduct rescues at sea, were returned Guam, which had beds for 3,500 .20 to Saipan. From the Marianas, the casualties were Once the southern airfield became to be transported to Hawaii by such operational, whole blood was flown into surface ships as were available and by Iwo by casualty evacuation planes. Up air as the condition of the men per- to D plus 25, a total of 960 pints had mitted. been flown in . Additional supplies of Part of the activities carried on in blood plasma were obtained from the the rear involved the collection and hospital ships . Before the Iwo opera- burial of the dead . This task was per- tion came to a close, the Landing Force formed by service troops, often under had used up 5,406 pints of whole blood . extremely hazardous conditions, since The total used for the care of the Iwo the dead were in close proximity to the casualties up to this date amounted to front lines. Carrying parties often be- 12,600 pints.17 came the target of enemy small arms Before the Iwo Jima operation ended, and mortar fire . The ever present spec- Army and Marine air transports, con- ter of death on Iwo Jima was to give sisting of C-46s and C-47s, airdropped rise to this description by a veteran of 78 tons of supplies and delivered an- the battle other 40 tons by air freight. The cargo As the struggle in the dust of Iwo Jima, planes involved were from the Army in the rocks and ravines, continued night Air Forces 9th Troop Carrier Squadron and day, the act of war became a monotony and Marine VMR-253, -353, and -952 .18 of horror, a boredom of agony and death ; it became a way of life, a task, a burden, 17 HQ FMFPac MedRpt, Iwo Jima, dtd 28- Mar45, p. 19, hereafter FMFPac MedRpt. 19 Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 113. ' VAC Logistics Rpt. Encl A, pp . 16-23. TF 56 MedRpt, p. 3. AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 605

a work that was repetitious, galling to the casualties of its own . Even in the ceme- body and mind . tery there was no security .' Death was so commonplace as to be without interest to the living, for the liv- The Japanese, on their part, ap- ing were resigned to it . They no longer peared reluctant to abandon their dead expected to survive. Fear was not of death, on the field, presumably not for senti- but of mutilation . And there was no end mental reasons but in order to keep to this ; no end to mutilating wounds the advancing American forces from Because of the heavy casualties dur- becoming aware of the true extent of ing the Iwo operation, burial of the the enemy losses. As a result, fre- dead posed a special problem . Disposi- quently under cover of darkness, Japa- tion of the dead was the responsibility nese carrying parties sneaked into the of the 4th Marine Division burial offi- battle area and removed the dead . cer, Captain Lewis Nutting, who oc- Where the disposition of bodies proved cupied a dual position as VAC burial impractical, the enemy burned his dead officer. Headquarters personnel, and or buried them in pillboxes. especially members of the division As the campaign progressed, the band, performed this sad but necessary efficiency of the landing force organiza- duty, which in time became a never- tion increased . Improved coordination ending chore, as outlined here of air, naval gunfire, and artillery was achieved through the VAC artillery of- All day long, men carried litters to the ficer, Colonel John S . Letcher, who al- field and placed them in neat rows . Two men passed along the rows, taking finger- ready had worked out detailed guide- prints, if the right index finger remained . lines back in Hawaii with the 4th and Other men picked up one dog tag from 5th Marine Divisions .23 In close team- each body, leaving the other for burial . If work with members of the Landing there were neither hands nor dog tags, Force Air Support Control Unit and the and often there were not, the teams tried to establish identification by means of corps air and naval gunfire officers, teeth, scars, tattoos, birthmarks, clothing Letcher screened requests for support- stencils, jewelry, or uniform marks . Some- ing fires with members of the three times there was so little left that it was division artillery regiments. Some of necessary to ascertain which section of the members of this coordinating group the battlefield the body came from in order to determine to which unit the man had continued to function on board the belonged. Auburn even after corps headquarters When a row was ready, the bodies were had gone ashore on 24 February . On wrapped in blankets or ponchos and placed the other hand, Colonel Letcher left the in a trench. The bulldozer covered them with 6 feet of Iwo Jima sand, and a grader spread clay on top to keep it from ^3 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 254-255. blowing away . The sounds of battle off to For a detailed account of the procedure the north were ignored . Since D plus 3, laid down for obtaining various types of ar- Captain Nutting's unit had suffered five tillery and air support, and the sequence in which such type of support was to be re- 'Gallant, The Friendly Dead, p. 164. quested by the infantry, see Letcher ltr. 606 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

155MM GUN on Iwo Jima at moment of firing . (USMC 110636)

MARINE ROCKET TRUCKS furnishing fire support for advancing infantry . (USMC 111100) AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 607 Auburn at 1430 that date and half an vessels, whose performance was to lead hour later went ashore, where he re- to the following observation mained until the operation had ended. Perhaps the best thing of all was the Along with the demands of the situa- way the tenders mothered the landing tion, there were changes in the organ- boats and their crews . Many of these were caught at the beach when their own ships ization of the shipping that stood by moved out of sight . Many were tempo- off Iwo Jima. A new type of logistic rarily disabled, some lost . These tenders vessel, the small craft tender, was in- berthed a total of 2,500 officers and men, troduced here. This vessel was a self- and fed 4,000 on the scale of one man, 1 day. It was a great help to a tired and propelled barracks ship, later desig- hungry boat crew to have a place to eat nated as the APB . Two of these vessels and sleep . The tenders did not carry were employed at Iwo Jima on an ex- landing-craft spares or repair facilities . perimental basis . Actually, the vessels The principal part of the maintenance were LSTs converted to meet the needs and repair work at Iwo was done by 3 landing ships (dock), 3 repair ships, 1 of the numerous small craft employed diesel repair ship, and 1 landing-craft around the island with insufficient en- repair ship. The job was no small one, durance for long voyages and long totaling work on 30 landing ships (tank), periods at objectives. In order to effec- 3 destroyers, 5 attack transports, 1 net ship, and numerous landing boats . It has tively support the small craft, the con- been said that every small boat used in verted LSTs each carried about 225 landing on beaches had sustained damage tons of frozen and dry provisions, of some sort, many of them more than 120,000 gallons of water, and about once. The LSDs worked 24 hours a day on 235,000 gallons of fuel ; they had berth- repairs. The divers of the repair ships ing facilities for 40 transient officers practically lived in diving suits from sun- rise to 10 or 11 o'clock at night clearing and 300 men, a sick bay for 14 patients, propellers and doing underwater repair and messing arrangements for 750 men and salvage work.=° on a round-the-clock basis . The ships An account of developments on and serviced by these tenders at Iwo in- around Iwo Jima would not be com- cluded destroyers, destroyer escorts, plete without mention of the 3d Ma- destroyer minesweepers, landing ships, rines. This regiment, commanded by minelayers, patrol and landing craft, Colonel James A . Stuart, constituted minesweepers, submarine chasers, and the Expeditionary Troops Reserve . As rescue tugs. From 19 February through early as D plus 9, 28 February, both 7 March, the two APBs refueled and Generals Schmidt and Erskine had re- rewatered 54 vessels and reprovisioned quested commitment of this reserve to 76.24 lend impetus to the lagging drive up The above does not by far represent the center of the island.26 This request the total accomplishment of the two was made at a time when the landing Ibid., pp . 290-291 . ' Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, 1 CTG 56 .1 Dispatch to CTF 56, 1732, 28- p. 290. Feb45 . 608 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS force already had sustained crippling that has remained unresolved more casualties, and the loss of manpower, than two decades later . Members of the coupled with exhaustion of the men, landing force still consider with bitter- was beginning to seriously impair the ness that "commitment of a fresh regi- combat efficiency of all three Marine ment at that time would have cheered divisions committed on Iwo Jima. De- up the exhausted troops ashore and spite the energetic efforts on the part would have permitted the final capture of VAC to get the 3d Marines landed, of Iwo Jima in much less time and with General Holland Smith felt compelled far fewer casualties."29 According to to repeat the argument of Admiral one analysis of the situation Turner, Commander of the Joint Ex- The consequences of using battle re- peditionary Force, that the number of placements rather than landing the infan- troops already ashore was sufficient to trymen of the Third Regiment and short- ening the fronts of the units in the line complete the capture of the island and are, in retrospect, evident. Completing the that the employment of an additional assault was delayed . Key personnel in the regiment would only add to the con- front lines were unduly exposed, and gestion.27 This contention was to be casualties relative to the resistance en- strongly disputed by the VAC opera- countered began to increase both among regular infantrymen and among the battle tions officer who was to make this replacements .' comment In almost all respects, the conversion It was my considered opinion while on of Iwo Jima into an American military Iwo Jima, having visited all parts of the island in our hands, and keeping in close base was influenced by the small physi- touch with the situation, that the 3d Ma- cal size of the island. There were no rine Regiment could have been landed buildings, roads, wooded areas, fields, or without in any way overcrowding the streams. But above all, there was little island. Commitment of this well trained room in the rear area, such as there and experienced regiment would have shortened the campaign and saved us was. Always close to the front lines casualties.' and never more than two or three miles The pros and cons of committing the to the rear, the airfields, gun positions, 3d Marines were to spark a controversy supply dumps, and troops occupied virtually every inch of the island . 'According to the VAC chief of staff : "I The lack of space in the rear had its was present when General Smith discussed this effect as much on the location of with General Schmidt, and to the best of my medical facilities as it did on the recollection General Smith stated categorically headquarters of the three divisions that Admiral Turner would not release the 3d Marines unless General Schmidt stated that he operating on the island and VAC head- could not capture the island without them . quarters . The medical organizations This, of course, General Schmidt could not do ." dispersed their units into such areas Rogers ltr. LtGen Edward A. Craig ltr to Head, Rogers ltr . HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., in Iwo '0 Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Am- Comments, hereafter Craig ltr. phibious War, p . 528 .

AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 609

AIR VIEW OF Iwo Jima beachhead on D plus 11 . (USMC 112223)

SHORE PARTIES prepare to haul supplies to the front line . (USMC 109635) 610 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS as were allotted "and with the help average daily expenditure of artillery of the ubiquitous bulldozer literally dug ammunition right up to the final phase themselves a place on the island ."31 of the campaign, exceeded 23,000 Portable plywood operating rooms were rounds daily. Enough ammunition of set up in holes in the ground and cov- various types was unloaded across the ered with tarpaulins to keep out the beaches to fill 480 freight cars, plus dust and cold. The engineers built roofs enough food to feed the entire city of over sunken water reservoirs which Columbus, Ohio, for an entire month .33 made good operating rooms. Ward Expressed in definite numbers, for the tents were set up in airplane revet- naval bombardment alone the total of ments or simply in long trenches bull- ammunition actually expended came to dozed in the ground . The electric lights a staggering 14,650 tons . This amount went in, the field surgical units were was divided into 2,400 rounds of 16- set up, the blood bank moved ashore, inch, weighing 2,280 tons ; 5,700 rounds and by the time the transports left, a of 14-inch, 3,640 tons ; 1,440 rounds system of excellent surgical facilities of 12-inch, 520 tons ; 11,700 rounds of was in operation . 8-inch high capacity, 2,020 tons ; 8,400 In his memoirs, General Holland rounds of 6-inch high capacity, 440 Smith recalled his impression of the tons ; 152,000 rounds of 5-inch high command posts on Iwo Jima which he capacity, 4,160 tons ; 17,700 rounds of had occasion to inspect 5-inch star, 300 tons ; 12,000 rounds of I went ashore every second day, calling 5-inch, 270 tons ; 10,000 rounds of on Harry Schmidt at V Corps Headquar- 4-inch, 145 tons ; and 70,000 rounds of ters, or on Rockey, Cates, and Erskine at 4.2 mortar, 875 tons.34 their Command Posts, and going forward In addition to ammunition, an amaz- to watch the progress of the fighting . None of these Command Posts was the ing quantity of fuel and other items Hotel Splendide the invading general were to be required for the capture of seizes for himself and his staff in fictional the five-mile long island. These in- war. Cates' post, overlooking the sea near cluded : 4,100,000 barrels of black oil, the fortified quarry, was a knocked-out 595,000 barrels of diesel oil, 33,775,000 Japanese pillbox, where the smell of de- composing enemy dead, buried in the gallons of aviation gasoline, and 6,703,- ruins, grew more loathesome every day. 000 gallons of motor gas ; plus about Erskine, just south of Motoyama Airfield 28,000 tons of various types of ammu- Two, occupied an abandoned Japanese gun nition ; 38 tons of clothing ; more than emplacement, with a tarpaulin slung over 10,000 tons of fleet freight ; more than a 4.7-inch dual purpose gun . Over on the left, Rockey had a ramshackle place up 7,000 tons of ship supplies of rope, can- against a cliff, where the Japanese had been flushed out recently." " CG FMFPac, Arty Anx to Encl. G, Iwo Supply of the landing force was a AR ; New York Times Editorial, 25Feb45, p . highly complex operation . Thus, the 8E, columns 2-3, as cited in Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibious War, p . 517. 21 FMFPac MedRpt, p . 21. " Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, ' Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p . 267. p. 289. AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 611 vas, fenders, cleaning gear, and hard- it did not interfere with strikes. A com- ware ; approximately, 1,000 tons of plete cessation of artillery fire became candy ; toilet articles, stationary, and necessary only once or twice when air- ship's service canteen items ; and about craft delivered a low-level napalm 14,500 tons of fresh, frozen, and dry attack.37 provisions .35 Progress in developing the island did General Holland Smith himself was not stop with the construction of new to remark later "that the amount of ef- facilities. In some instances, the very fort that had gone into the capture of shape of the island had to be changed the barren island was staggering . The to meet the requirements of the new Navy had put more ammunition on Iwo occupants. Even Iwo's most outstand- Jima than anywhere else in the Pacific . ing landmark, Mount Suribachi, was to Marine artillery expended 450,000 be affected by these changes. The Army shells and we used huge quantities of garrison troops planned to get various mortar shells, grenades, and rockets ."36 trucks housing radar, weather, and Closely connected with the expendi- navigational equipment for the coming ture of ammunition by shore-based assault against the Japanese home is- artillery and naval gunfire was the Air lands on top of the mountain . Before Support Control Unit, in charge of the such plans could be realized, it became combat air and antisubmarine patrol . necessary to construct a road to the The unit was composed of Marine and top, a project that had never been re- Navy officers and Marine enlisted tech- alized by the Japanese. On D plus 15, nicians and operators . Here the cramped construction of a two-lane road, 35 feet space available on Iwo Jima was an ad- wide, got under way, winding its way vantage. In this case, the unit was lo- up and around the mountain for nearly cated only 75 feet from the Landing a mile. Early the following morning, Force Command Post. As a result of this the first bulldozer drove into the crater proximity, troop requests for air sup- at the top of Suribachi. The Japanese, port could be handled much more expe- a number of whom were still living in- ditiously than before. side the mountain after surviving the For the coordination of artillery fire battle for Suribachi, were powerless to and air strikes, a brief of each air strike interfere with the road construction. was broadcast over the Corps Artillery They stole out of their caves only at Fire Direction Control Net. Each air night in search of food and water and strike was given a number and infor- were methodically eliminated when mation obtained on number and type of spotted. aircraft, direction of approach and re- In the midst of the multitude of sup- tirement, minimum altitude, and other porting headquarters and units oper- pertinent data . Each artillery battalion ating on the island, there was a special thus was able to control its fire so that complement of men, neither wholly military or civilian, whose job it was ~' I bid., p. 291. '6 Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 275 . 3' ComPhibGru 2 AR, Pt 5, pp . 1-2 . 612 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS to photograph the action on the island subdue the enemy. Among the expedi- or write about it . They were represen- ents suggested was the employment of tatives of American and Allied news toxic gas. services, radio networks, and local THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST newspapers. The news reporters were given the widest possible latitude in CHEMICAL WARFARE38 covering the operation and thus could Unknown to the public at large, be found among the invasion force, in the employment of chemical warfare the landing boats, and occasionally in agents in the Pacific Theater had al- the foxholes. ready undergone active consideration In addition to the accredited civilian while the Iwo operation was still in the correspondents, each of the military planning stage . Through collaboration services had its own news writers and with the Office of Strategic Services, photographers, including a special forerunner of the Central Intelligence Navy film crew which recorded the Agency, a special report had been com- entire operation on color film . Radio piled on the subject of gas warfare teletype equipment was set up on the on Iwo Jima .30 Its primary feature was beaches for the benefit of the press, and the recommendation that Japanese a Navy floatplane was made available transmitters on the island be jammed. to carry copy, photographs, and news- Once the enemy's communications had reels directly to Guam, where this ma- been rendered inoperable and he was terial was processed and flown back to isolated, the entire island was to be in- the United States. Another precedent undated with gas . In late June 1944, the was established when, on D plus 7, Ad- director of Research and Development, miral Turner and General Holland M . OSS, had made a special trip to Hawaii Smith were interviewed on Iwo Jima in to discuss the project with Admiral a live broadcast while the battle was Nimitz. still raging on the island. The difficulties of employing gas war- The events on the battlefield received fare were twofold, both technical and wide coverage and distribution in moral. During the early part of World American newspapers and magazines . War II, the United States had thought None of the ferocity of the fighting was withheld from the American public . As ~'Additional material in this section is de- casualties mounted and the full impact rived from : Frederic J. Brown III, Chemical of the cost in lives expended to secure Warfare, A Study in Restraint (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1968), hereafter the island began to hit home, plaintive Brown, Chemical Warfare . voices arose to question the need for I A chapter dealing with this matter, known such a bloodletting. Then as now, sin- as the Lethbridge Report, appears in the recol- cere and serious-minded Americans, ap- lections of Stanley P . Lovell, former Director palled witnesses to the savage fighting of Research and Development, OSS, in his memoirs entitled : Of Spies and Strategems they could not stem, groped for a way (Englewood Cliffs, N . J. : Prentice-Hall, 1963), out, at least a more inexpensive way to pp. 70-78. AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 613

of the use of toxic gases only as a higher level. It was in the hands of the retaliatory measure . In this connection, Allied Powers, who alone could authorize the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb was its use in a war which would have as- sumed even more frightful proportions considered by chemical warfare officers had gas been allowed ." as the most suitable munition for retali- In the end, it was the Chief Execu- ation. The peak stock of this item at- tained in the Pacific Theater in July tive of the United States who had a 1944 was 15,244 bombs with 541 .2 tons final voice in approving or disapproving the entire plan of toxic filling. In the words of a chem- . Regardless of their divergent political views, both Herbert ical warfare service officer Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt in This supply was token only . If, for ex- ample, this entire supply had been used the years between the two world wars on Iwo Jima, which had an area of seven had been in favor of eliminating gas as and one-half square miles, it would only a military weapon . In 1937, when veto- have contaminated a little more than half, ing a bill that would have changed the or four and one half square miles . Consid- ering the vapor effect of mustard and the designation of the Army Chemical fact that the entire island would not have Warfare Service to that of Chemical been regarded as a target, the stock Corps, the President had expressed his would have been sufficient for one contami- views on this subject in no uncertain nation. In the opinion of most chemical terms officers one contamination would have been is the policy of this enough to end all enemy resistance on the It has been and Government to do everything in its power island. The question of resupply for other to outlaw the use of chemicals in war- objectives would then arise ." fare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to The second difficulty in employing what modern civilization should stand chemical warfare against the Japanese for" could be found in the attitude of most One of the official Army histories deal- of the nation's civilian and military ing with chemical warfare has pointed leaders. In fact, military reluctance to out in this connection that "gas war- use this weapon had its origin in the fare had no advocates in high places ."43 experiences of the American Expedi- While this may have been true during tionary Forces in World War I . In con- the early years of World War II, there nection with the possible employment is some evidence that, as of early 1945, of toxic gas on Iwo Jima, General Hol- the atmosphere in Washington has be- land Smith made this comment gun to shift in favor of chemical war- :1 am not prepared to argue this ques- fare.44 Another reason for increased tion. Certainly, gas shells smothering the island, or gas introduced into caves and 41 Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 276 . tunnels would have simplified our task, " Veto msg of Bill S .1284, as cited in Brophy but naturally the use of this prohibited and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 21-22 . weapon was not within the power of a " Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat, field commander . The decision was on a p. 653. "In Brown, Chemical Warfare, the author " Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat, attributes this change to three factors : Ger- pp. 269-270. many's imminent collapse, removing the last 614 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

American readiness to accept initiation mantling its limited chemical warfare of chemical warfare towards the final apparatus as operations reached their phase of the war may be found in the climax. Stranger still, Japanese reason- extremely heavy American casualties ing apparently was based on the de- sustained in the Western Pacific . None clared policy of the United States not other than General of the Army George to initiate gas warfare. The Japanese C . Marshall was to testify after the war failed to consider that, given different had ended that "following the terrible time and circumstances, such a policy losses at Iwo Jima, he was prepared to might be subject to change . use gas at Okinawa."45 With present knowledge, not avail- It is interesting to note that, at the able to Allied planners in 1944, it be- same time that American views towards comes clear that by the time the Iwo the employment of gas offensively be- Jima operation got underway, Japan came more aggressive, the Japanese pol- was no longer in a position to retaliate icy shifted in the opposite direction . with chemical means in response to Al- With the loss of the Marianas in the lied action, with one minor exception 4 7 spring and summer of 1944, the home All that prevented the employment of islands had suddenly become extremely gas on Iwo Jima was the President's vulnerable to American chemical attack . aversion to gas warfare . Even though In the firm belief that the United the United States had not signed any States would not initiate gas warfare, international instrument outlawing and since Japanese ability to retaliate such warfare, national policy clearly was in any case too low, Japan, in mid- limited the conditions under which 1944 : toxic gas might have been introduced . . . . decided to discontinue production In consequence of this policy, heavy of toxic agents and to recall all stocks of casualties to the contrary, Marines gas munitions from the hands of troops in the field. Thus, in mid-1944, the would continue to assault Iwo Jima with Japanese started a policy of disarmament . rifle, hand grenade, and flamethrowers Readiness spiraled downward until hos- until all resistance had been overcome. tilities ended ." In a matter of roughly three weeks Thus we are faced with the strange from D-Day, Iwo Jima had been trans- spectacle of a hostile nation, pledged formed from a strongpoint in the Japa- to fight to the death, and confronted nese defense system to an important by an immense military machine, dis- American air base of strategic and tac-

""The Japanese troops on Iwo Jima had Axis possibility of retaliating with gas against been supplied with glass containers-I suppose an Allied population ; President Roosevelt's they could be called gas grenades-which was death; and the over-riding importance of liquid hydrogen cyanide . These containers of bringing the war against Japan to a speedy clear glass were a little larger than a baseball . conclusion . When the container was broke the liquid re- "Quoted in Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy leased cyanide gas . These could have been Years, p . 199. effective if they had been used inside pillboxes 10 Brown, Chemical Warfare, p . 260. or caves or other closed spaces." Letcher ltr. AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES 615 tical importance to the overall air of- Japanese homeland got underway later fensive against Japan . The capture and in the year. development of the island denied its This, then, was the significance of use to the enemy and at the same time the fiercely contested island . This is it served as an emergency haven for air- why General Kuribayashi had decided craft returning from raids against to adopt those tactics that would prove Japan. In American hands, Iwo Jima most costly to the invasion force and represented an advance base for search that would cause the most delay in the and reconnaissance . It further pro- conversion of the stronghold to Amer- vided a base within fighter range of ican use. After three weeks of bitter Japan. Furthermore, the island could fighting, his intention has been partial- be utilized as a staging point for bomb- ly realized as far as taking a toll in ers, permitting greater bomb loads in American lives was concerned . But, lieu of gasoline, though the island was just behind the front lines, bulldozers not much used for this purpose 4 8 Iwo were shifting earth, changing the very Jima could also become a refuelling landscape of the island ; communica- stop for short-range aircraft en route tions were humming, and heedless of to bases closer to Japan yet to be seized tenacious Japanese holed up in the before the general assault against the northern part of the island, the task of reconstruction was proceeding at an I Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p . 597. ever-increasing pace . CHAPTER 9 i The 5th Marine Division Drive on the Left

ADVANCE UP shore has already been narrated . In ad- THE WEST COAST2 dition to the men of the 3d Marine Di- vision who fought and died at such As the battle for Iwo Jima neared landmarks as Hills OBOE and PETER, its climax, the full force of three Ma- Motoyama Village, and Hill 362C, Ma- rine divisions was employed to reduce rines of the adjacent 4th and 5th Di- the main enemy defenses near the Cen- visions were making similar sacrifices tral Airfield. General Erskine's drive up to the east and west respectively. In the center of the island to the northern the sectors of the latter two divisions the landmarks may have varied in some ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this respects . They were to bear names like chapter is derived from : ComPhibPac AR, Hill 362A, 362B, Nishi Ridge, and Iwo Jima, 12Jan-26Mar45, dtd 19May45, here- . Men of the 4th Division after ComPhibPac AR ; TF 51 AR ; TF 56 Bloody Gorge AirRpt; TF 56 G-3 Rpt ; VAC AR ; VAC G-2 would suffer at places appropriately Rpts ; VAC C-s Jnl; VAC C-3 Rpt; VAC named the Meat Grinder, the Amphi- NGF and AirRpts ; VAC Translations ; 5th theater, and Turkey Knob . For all of MarDiv AR ; 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv them the enemy remained the same D-2 Jnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter fanatical, utterly devoted to his mis- 5thMarDiv D-2 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv D-2 Per Repts ; 5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv Casualty sion, bent on the destruction of the in- Rpts ; 1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl, 9Jan45-15 vaders who had dared violate sacred Mar45, hereafter 1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl ; Japanese soil . 13th Mar UJnl ; 13th Mar AR ; 26th Mar UJn1 ; An attack by the 5th Marine Divi- 26th Mar AR, Iwo Jima, 1Jan-26Mar45, dtd sion on 24 February had resulted in 20Apr45, hereafter 26th Mar AR ; 27th Mar UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-22Mar45, hereafter sizable gains by the 26th Marines, 27th Mar UJnl ; 27th Mar AR, Iwo Jima, which by the end of the day advanced 190ct44-23Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, hereafter 27th 400 yards north of the 3d Division ele- Mar AR ; 28th Mar UJn1 ; 28th Mar AR ; 28th Mar R-2 Jnl ; Horie Rpt ; Iwo Comments ; Bart- AR; 2/26 UJn1 ; 2/26 Obs Rpt, Iwo Jima ley, Iwo Monograph ; Newcomb Notes ; More- 18Feb-23Mar45, hereafter 2/26 ObsRpt ; 2/26 house, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Morison, Victory AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, in the Pacific; Henry et al, U. S. Marines on hereafter 2/26 AR ; 3/26 UJnl ; 3/26 AR, Iwo Iwo Jima ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, hereafter Amphibious War ; Conner, The Fifth Marine 3/26 AR ; 1/27 UJnl ; 1/27 AR, Iwo Jima, Division ; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ; 19Feb-23Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter 1/27 Robert Leckie, Strong Men Armed ; Newcomb, AR; 2/27 UJn1; 2/27 AR, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44- Iwo Jima. 23Mar45, dtd 17Apr45, hereafter 2/27 AR ; 'Additional material in this section is de- 3/27 UJnl ; 3/27 AR, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44- rived from : 5th TkBn UJn1 ; 5th TkBn 23Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 3/27 AR . 616 THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 617 ments on its right. The gains were during the day. Around 1500, one of made at a heavy cost ; 21 officers and the spotter planes reported enemy ar- 332 enlisted men became casualties on tillery moving north along a road fol- D plus 5.3 In order to give the 9th Ma- lowing the contour of the island on rines a chance of straightening the northern Iwo . Three batteries of the lines, the 26th Marines was ordered to 13th Marines immediately adjusted on remain in place on 25 February . the target and fired nearly 600 rounds . On the morning of D plus 6, the 5th At the end of this fire mission, the ob- Marine Division held a line extending server reported that three artillery for 1,200 yards from west to east. From pieces had been destroyed, several prime the left to right, 2/27 held the cliffs movers were burning, and an ammu- overlooking the western beaches ; the nition dump was ablaze .4 This was the center of the line, protruding into en- only time during the Iwo Jima cam- emy territory, was held by 2/26 ; to the paign that the enemy ever offered such right of this battalion, the line slanted a choice target . Hereafter, Japanese ar- southward, held by 3/26 with one at- tillery deployed to new firing positions tached company of 1/26 . (See Map V, only at night. Map Section) . It had become evident by On D plus 7 General Rockey's divi- this time that the high ground in the sion resumed the attack . Following a zone of action of the adjacent 3d Marine 45-minute artillery and naval gunfire Division exerted a paramount influence preparation, the 26th Marines jumped on the further advance of the 5th Di- off in the main effort. Almost immedi- vision. No major progress could be ex- ately, the attack ran into heavy resist- pected until General Erskine's division ance. The enemy poured fire from small had driven the enemy from this high arms, machine guns, and mortars into ground in the center of the island . the ranks of the advancing Marines. At While the 26th Marines consolidated the same time, heavy artillery and mor- its positions on 25 February, the ad- tar fire from the northern part of the jacent 9th Marines of the 3d Division island hit the assault troops . As the attacked northward along its joint Marines closed with the enemy, hand boundary with the 5th Marine Division . grenade duels ensued . On this day, the 9th Marines failed to During the advance, the nature of make any noteworthy gains, and the the terrain underwent a subtle change. situation along Colonel Graham's right Thus far, General Rockey's division had flank remained substantially unchanged . been operating in soft, sandy, and open Throughout the day, heavy enemy fire terrain. As the 26th Marines moved from the right front raked the posi- northward, the level ground gave way tions occupied by the 26th Marines, to heavily fortified cliffs . Essentially, greatly interfering with supply and the 5th Marine Division now entered a evacuation. Nevertheless, the men of difficult complex of ridges. In each case, the 5th Division were to get one break the attack had to be carried up one

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 81. '13th Mar AR, p . 13 . 618 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

slope, across the top, and then down infantry launched a spirited attack into another ravine beyond . Above the against the stubborn enemy position . ridges, there loomed a major enemy The efforts of this company were quick- bastion, Hill 362A, just south of Nishi ly crowned with success . For the first Village. This terrain feature impressed time since 2/26 had come ashore, the the advancing Marines because its sin- battalion came face to face with the ister presence overshadowed all other usually elusive and unseen enemy . In obstacles in the area . The hill was rug- the resulting pitched battle, the Japa- ged and rocky, devoid of all vegeta- nese came out second best . Those of tion on its southern slopes. To the north, the enemy who sought to flee were killed as yet unseen by the Americans advanc- out in the open . Catching the ordinarily ing from the south, there was a sheer well entrenched enemy for once in such drop of about 80 feet . The Japanese a vulnerable position greatly boosted had exploited this formidable obstacle the morale of the Marines engaged in to the utmost. The entire hill bristled this action, "for no man likes to fight with caves of varying sizes, many of something he cannot see, and the sight them serving as mortar and machine of running Japs was, if nothing else, gun emplacements. The elevation en- reassuring ."5 abled the enemy to observe western Iwo Advancing on the right and support- all the way south to Mount Suribachi, ed by tanks of Company A, 5th Tank and thus exposed to his view all Amer- Battalion, 3/26 gained about 100 yards, ican activity in the front lines, as well smashing fortifications as it went along as on the western beaches . and destroying numerous guns in the Despite fierce enemy resistance, the ravines that led down from the plateau 5th Marine Division attack on 26 perpendicular to the route of advance . February moved steadily towards Hill Gains made by the adjacent 9th Ma- 362A, still about 800 yards away, whose rines helped 3/26 in its forward move- very prominence made it a natural ob- ment. jective. The three battalions in the main To the left of the 26th Marines, 2/27 effort were the 2d and 3d Battalions, initially made rapid progress, gaining 26th Marines, commanded respectively 400 yards during the first two hours . by Major Amedeo Rea and Major For the remainder of the day, the bat- Richard Fagan, and 2/27 under Major talion stayed in place in order to per- John W. Antonelli . Because of heavy mit 2/26 to come abreast . The terrain automatic weapons fire from an enemy in the zone of advance of 2/27 pre- strongpoint consisting of pillboxes and cluded the employment of tanks . In- caves, the advance of 2/26 was so slow- stead, 20 LVT (A) s of the 2d Armored ed that in two hours gains of only 50 Amphibian Battalion, under Lieuten- yards were registered . Tanks of Com- ant Colonel Reed M. Fawell, Jr., sup- pany B, 5th Tank Battalion, took a hand ported the battalion attack from the in the fighting. At 1000, Company F of sea. The 75mm fire from the armored 2/26, thus far held in reserve, was com- mitted. With the support of armor, the 'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 85 . THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 619

SOLIDLY EMPLACED tank of the Japanese 26th Tank Regiment after capture . (USAF 70317 AC)

MARINE COMBAT PATROL moves through jagged terrain in northern Iwo Jima . (USMC 142316) 620 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS amphibians knocked out several enemy with picric acid satchel charges . The caves, but in the choppy seas their fire two officers routed the enemy with hand began to endanger friendly troops and, grenades, killing one of the intruders .? as a result, they were ordered to cease This was only one example of the ene- fire.6 my's boldness in approaching or pene- When action halted on the evening trating the American lines . Marines up of 26 February, the lines of the 5th front could never be sure of who or Marine Division still formed an arc what was approaching them in the whose apogee extended some 400 yards darkness. One of the early incidents into enemy territory. Gains for the day which occurred on D plus 2, involved amounted to roughly 300 yards. Most the compromise of the password "Che- important of all, the day's advance had vrolet" in the area then occupied by netted the 26th Marines two Japanese Company F, 2/26 . A sentry challenged wells, the last ones believed to be under a moving figure, who gave the correct enemy control. Henceforth, the Japa- password. Not satisfied with the pro- nese would have to rely on such water nunciation of "Chevrolet," the sentry as they had been able to store or on repeated his challenge . Once again the rainfall. password was mispronounced. The sen- Enemy reaction to the loss of this try fired and killed the intruder, who the vital resource was not long delayed . next morning was identified as Japan- Following a rainy afternoon, the skies ese.' cleared. In bright moonlight, a com- Confrontations of this type tended to pany-size force of Japanese assembled increase the vigilance of Marines on and started to move down the west Iwo Jima. At times, such alertness was coast, presumably with the intention of carried to the extreme and, a few nights recapturing the two vital wells. Men later, resulted in a humorous incident of the 26th Marines spotted a sizable involving the same company. During enemy force heading for one of the the night of 25-26 February, Company wells near the cliffs south of Hill 362A . F, 2/26, seized a Navajo Indian, who The Japanese represented a splendid was mistakenly identified as Japanese .' target in the moonlight . Both artillery His poor English, made worse by a bad and naval gunfire racked the enemy case of fright, made his position pre- force and dispersed it before it reached ' 2/26 AR, p. 8. any of the wells . 8 lbid., p. 6. In another incident during this rest- 'On Iwo Jima, as in other military opera- less night, at the observation post of tions in the Pacific Theater during World War II, the U. S. Marine Corps employed specially Company D, the company commander, trained Navajo communicators or "talkers," Captain Thomas M. Fields, and a mem- whose language was not known to the Japa- ber of his staff observed three Japanese nese and thus not open to enemy translation . walking boldly within 25 feet of them In tactical situations where time was of the essence, precious minutes were gained since radio voice transmissions could be used with- 8 5th MarDiv AR, Anx M, pp . 12, 15. out coding or decoding . THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 621

carious for a while . Fortunately, he es- tified area, the call went out for tanks . caped physical harm ; his ordeal ended The arrival of a flamethrower tank, in when he was finally identified by an- particular, was eagerly awaited . When other Navajo Marine. it finally reached the scene of action, ac- At 0630 on 27 February, the 27th companied by other armor, it received Marines, with 1/26 attached, relieved a mortar hit and was disabled before the 26th Marines . Ninety minutes later, it had a chance to take part in the en- following a half-hour preparation by gagement. Nevertheless, the remaining the 13•th Marines, reinforced by corps Shermans lent effective support. They artillery, Colonel Wornham's men jump- fired with everything they had and then ed off with 2/27 on the left, 1/27 in the moved forward in concert with the in- center, and 3/27 on the right . The 1st fantry. In the course of this advance, Battalion, 26th Marines, remained in several more enemy pillboxes, as well regimental reserve . Shortly before the as a dug-in tank, were put out of ac- jumpoff, truck-mounted launchers of tion. Once the momentum of the attack the 3d Rocket Detachment showered the had been regained, the Marines moved area directly in front of the lines with forward for an additional 200 yards a heavy barrage of 4.5-inch rockets, until they halted shortly after 1900 . then pulled back before the enemy could Advancing on the left of the 27th retaliate. At the same time, naval gun- Marines, the 2d Battalion faced not fire was brought to bear against Hill only a determined enemy, but extremely 362A, followed by carrier aircraft difficult terrain . The cliff on the high which bombed and rocketed the hill . ground adjacent to the west coast Moving forward in the center, 1/27 beaches was honeycombed with caves gained 200 yards before running and emplacements, most of them shel- straight into a heavily defended cluster tering mortars and machine guns . In of pillboxes . A half-track was able to such terrain the employment of tanks knock out one of these strongpoints was out of the question ; furthermore, with its 75mm gun before its crew was the few existing routes of approach hit by well-aimed small arms fire . A were heavily mined. Once again, the decision to move up 37mm guns for full burden of the attack fell on small support could not be implemented be- infantry and demolition teams, each cause no suitable positions could be one advancing more or less independ- found. Consequently, the task of re- ently, taking its losses as it eliminated ducing the formidable obstacle once one enemy strongpoint after another . again fell to small flamethrower-demo- Of necessity, such a movement is slow lition teams who would reduce one and extremely exhausting, yet steady pillbox after another in the slow, dan- gains were made and by • late afternoon, gerous, but time-proven method . 2/27 had advanced 500 yards. During the afternoon, when the On the right of the division line, company advancing on the left of the 3/27 moved against a ridge which 1st Battalion encountered a heavily for- guarded the approach to Hill 362A . 622 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Company G launched a frontal assault indication of the 5th Marine Division's against this ridge and was promptly losses since D-Day. By noon of D plus 8, thrown back. A group of 30 men at- the division had sustained 32 officers tempting to outflank this position was and 530 men killed, 134 officers and initially repulsed ; a second try appeared 2,360 men wounded, and 2 officers and more promising . As the Marines ad- 160 men missing in action, a total of vanced up the slope they were hit by a 168 officers and 3,058 men .' hail of hand grenades thrown by the The 5th Marine Division had now enemy from the reverse slope . Ten Ma- reached the 0-2 Line across its entire rines were killed on the spot, includ- zone of advance, though the lines on ing Gunnery Sergeant William G. the evening of D plus 8 were not per- Walsh, who dived on a hand grenade fectly straight . Not all of the action oc- which landed in a hole where he and curred in the front lines . Continuous several of the men had taken cover . vigilance was required to clear the As other elements of the company enemy out of the previously captured reached the scene, the enemy was ground. Japanese kept appearing driven from the reverse slope, and the seemingly out of nowhere. Only later ridge remained in friendly hands . was it determined that they could move As D plus 8 came to a close, the 5th at will through a carefully constructed Marine Division had gained roughly system of tunnels . As a result, before 500 yards through the heart of the a day's attack could get under way, enemy main line of resistance in some some mopping up remained to be done of the heaviest fighting in which any in the rear area . Despite the gains Marine unit on Iwo Jima was to take made by the 27th Marines on 27 part. Losses throughout the day had February, an even more difficult opera- been heavy, some units being harder tion awaited 5th Marine Division units hit than others . In one instance, Com- on the following day . pany A, 1/27, occupied a ridge only to discover that it was exposed to heavy THE ASSAULT ON HILL 362A 12 enemy rifle and machine gun fire. The company suffered additional casualties On the morning of D plus 9, the last from enemy hand grenades, thrown day of February, the 5th Marine Divi- from bypassed positions in the flanks and rear. For all practical purposes, the Marines of Company A on top of 11 5th MarDiv AR, App 3, Sec VIII, p . 15 . the ridge were cut off . The 1st Platoon, 1' Additional material in this section is de- rived from : 5th Eng Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb- in particular, was hard hit . By the time 26Mar45, dtd 13Apr45, hereafter 5th EngBn the company was relieved by Company AR ; 1/26 AR, Iwo Jima, 15Nov44-26Mar45, B, 8 men had been killed and 50 dtd 19Apr45, hereafter 1/26 AR; 1/28 AR, wounded.1° While the Company A losses Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n .d., hereafter 1/28 were unusually heavy, they serve as an AR ; 2/28 OpRpt ; 2/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19 Feb- 26Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 2/28 AR ; to Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, pp . 3/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n.d., here- 86-87. after 3/28 AR. THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 623 sion was squarely up against Hill 362A, At this point, the attack began to the highest elevation on western Iwo . bog down . In accordance with General The hill loomed forbiddingly above the Kuribayashi's orders, the Japanese re- Marines huddled at its approaches . mained in their positions and fought to Around the base of this hill mass, rocky the bitter end. Those who were by- outcrops dominated every approach . passed continued to fire into the rear The Japanese had fortified each one of of the advancing Marines. At such close these rocky spurs, which afforded ex- range, the enemy snipers were extreme- cellent fields of fire. For the attack on ly effective and inflicted heavy casual- 28 February, the 27th Marines had ties on the assault force. In the course been ordered to seize an intermediate of the afternoon, several patrols from objective between the 0-2 and 0-3 Lines . 3/27 probed the defenses on the hill Initially, the mission of taking Hill itself, seeking for a way to seize it . A 362A had been entrusted to 3/27, while patrol from Company I actually made it 1/27 was to simultaneously attack an up the southwest slopes to the crest of irregular line of ridges extending from the hill around 1630. However, since the objective down to the western cohesion between 1/27 and 3/27 had beaches. During the night, 1/26 had re- been lost, the patrol had to be recalled lieved 2/27 and was committed along in late afternoon and Company I pulled the left flank of the regiment along the back about 100 yards, where it tied in beaches. Following a 45-minute prepa- with elements of the adjacent 21st Ma- ration by artillery, naval gunfire, and rines on the left of the 3d Marine Divi- rockets, and supported by carrier-based sion. aircraft, the 27th Marines jumped off Far from being content with halting at 0815 for what was to develop into the Marine advance, 50-100 enemy one of the bloodiest encounters on the troops sallied forth from positions on island. Hill 362A during the late afternoon From the outset, the enemy offered and counterattacked the 3/27 lines . The stubborn resistance all along the regi- brunt of this blow fell upon Company mental front. Advancing in the center H, which engaged in desperate hand-to- and on the right of the regimental line, hand fighting with frenzied Japanese 1/27 and 3/27 encountered some of before the latter were driven off . the heaviest small arms fire yet direct- By nightfall, men of the 27th Ma- ed against them . The 1st Battalion call- rines were still stalled at the foot of ed for and received tank support as it Hill 362A, which towered above them, had on the previous day, but the ter- seemingly as impregnable as ever. Af- rain in the zone of advance of 3/27 pre- ter a day of extremely bitter action, cluded the employment of armor, and which had cost numerous casualties, the battalion had to rely strictly on its the overall regimental gain had been own fire power. Advancing gingerly about 300 yards. To the left, 1/26 had across 200 yards of difficult terrain, the sent out advance detachments along the two assault battalions reached the foot beaches, but the northward movement of the hill around noon . of any large body of troops was seri-

624 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ously impaired by the enemy's posses- number of times from mortars and ar- sion of the adjacent high ground . tillery. This shelling resulted in sev- The night from 28 February to 1 eral casualties . On at least two occa- March turned out to be a very quiet sions, all work in the operations tents one for the exhausted 5th Division Ma- of the various staff sections came to a rines in the front lines . Four listening stop and officers and men piled together posts had been established by 2/26 on the ground as shells landed nearby ." along the beaches to frustrate any ene- In the midst of the commotion caused my intentions of landing reinforcements by the exploding ammunition dump, on the island . Each listening post had the island's air alert system went off . been augmented with one dog and its The nerves of personnel in the south- handler from the 6th War Dog Platoon. ern part of the island were further Eventually, things became so quiet that strained when exploding white phos- even the dogs found it difficult to re- phorus shells were mistaken for gas main awake .13 shells and someone gave the gas alarm Elsewhere on Iwo Jima, it was a dif- at 0300. Within ten minutes, the gas ferent matter . In the southern part of alarm was cancelled ; not so the air the island, in the vicinity of Mount Su- alert, which continued until 0430 .16 ribachi where they had been positioned As it turned out, there was some sub- ever since that elevation was captured, stance to the air alert . No enemy planes the 28th Marines was preparing to move appeared over Iwo Jima during the north to join the 5th Division drive. night, but shortly before 0300 an enemy At midnight, the enemy began shelling aircraft, skimming in low over the the positions of the corps artillery and water, dropped a torpedo near the de- those of the 13th Marines . This bom- stroyer Terry a few miles north of Ki- bardment continued at some length . tano Point. The destroyer took evasive Shortly after 0200, the 5th Marine Di- action and barely avoided getting hit by vision ammunition dump blew up with the torpedo . However, a few hours later, a tremendous roar, blazing fiercely for while passsing the northernmost point the remainder of the night . At least 20 of Iwo Jima, the ship came under fire percent of the division small arms am- from enemy shore batteries, which munition supply was lost in the con- scored hits on the main deck and for- flagration, along with large quantities ward engine room. Eleven destroyer of heavier ammunition . One of the ex- crewmen were killed and 19 wounded be- ploding shells landed in the corps ar- fore the Terry, assisted by the Nevada tillery fire direction center but caused and Pensacola, made good her escape . no casualties, though it did wreak havoc In addition to the loss in lives, the ship 14 with the telephone wire. had suffered substantial damage ." An- In the course of the operation, VAC other vessel, the destroyer Colhoun, an- Headquarters itself came under fire a 13 26th Mar AR, App . 4, p . 9. "Craig ltr . 1` .BGen John S . Letcher ltr to CMC, dtd 10 VAC OpRpt, p. 28 . 13Mar53, in Iwo Comments. 17 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 64 . THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 625 chored off the northeastern coast of Iwo By 1030, both the 1st and 2d Bat- to repair damage sustained in a colli- talions had reached the top of the ridge sion, took several hits from enemy shore and the ridgeline running east and west batteries which wrecked a torpedo tube, of Hill 362A. As they attempted to ad- exploded the air flask of a torpedo, and vance beyond the crest, they discovered caused other extensive damage. One that a steep drop of nearly 100 feet man was killed and 16 were wounded in into a rocky draw confronted them . To the course of this action.'s make matters worse, heavy fire from At 0630 on 1 March, the 28th Ma- small arms, automatic weapons, and rines, with the 5th Tank Battalion and mortars hit the advancing Marines 3/27 attached, moved forward through from the adjacent ridge to the north, the 27th Marines in order to continue subsequently to become known as Nishi the attack on Hill 362A. Between 0745 Ridge. The draw itself ran parallel to and 0830, the objective and surrounding the ridge line and was bisected by an area received a heavy shelling from all antitank ditch that ran perpendicular four battalions of the 13th Marines to the hill. Covering the ditch were and the corps' 155mm howitzers . Off- cleverly constructed positions in the shore, a battleship and two cruisers face of the steep cliff, inaccessible from joined in the bombardment . The volume the top. Beyond the antitank ditch and of fire was such that it was deemed best, the draw, the ground leveled off for in the interests of coordination, to ex- about 200 yards before again rising clude aircraft from the preparatory sharply to form Nishi Ridge . fires. They would have ample oppor- In order to keep the attack moving, tunity to support the attack later in Lieutenant Colonel Jack B . Butterfield, the day. commanding 1/28, sent his reserve, Shortly before 0900 the 28th Marines Company A, around the right of Hill jumped off with the 1st, 2d, and 3d 362A . This maneuver proved unsuccess- Battalions from right to left. The at- ful and the company came under such tack moved ahead slowly under heavy withering fire, accompanied by a shower enemy mortar and small arms fire . To of grenades, that it was stopped short Colonel Liversedge's men, the dogged in its tracks. During this assault the defense of Hill 362A was reminiscent company commander was killed . A of the action at the base of Mount Su- similar attempt by Company B to get ribachi. The scheme of maneuver called into the draw proved equally unsuccess- for 1/28 and 2/28 to attack around ful, and the company commander was the right and left of Hill 362A respec- wounded. In this jumble of rock, both tively and link up on the north side companies suffered heavy casualties . of the hill. Meanwhile, 3/28 was to ad- Among these was Corporal Tony Stein vance up the west coast to the left of of Company A, who had already made 2/28. a name for himself on D Day . He set out with 20 men to clear the ridge of " Ibid. snipers. Only seven men returned from 626 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

this mission. Among the men of Com- Shortly before 1900, 3/26 relieved 1/21 pany B killed near the base of Hill and established contact with 3/9 on the 362A this day were three who had raised right and 1/28 on the left . At the same the American flag on Mount Suribachi ; time, 2/26 displaced forward as 28th one of them had taken part in the first Marines reserve . and the two others had participated in While the 1st and 2d Battalions, 28th the second flag raising. Marines, were making little progress Throughout the day, 10 regular in the extremely difficult and well de- tanks and 2 flame tanks of Com- fended terrain, 3/28 was making a pany C, 5th Tank Battalion, gave steady advance with two companies all possible support to 2/28 to the ex- abreast near the west coast. The bat- tent that the terrain permitted, with talion moved forward against moder- fire on the cliffs and the high ground ate resistance until its assault elements to the front. Shortly after noon, two on the left were ahead of those on the platoons of tanks spearheaded an at- right, at which time they drew heavy tack along the left flank of the batta- fire from the right front. The battalion lion ; subsequently, one platoon was had gained about 350 yards and since withdrawn and shifted to the right of the regimental attack to the right had the zone of action of 2/28, just north stalled, 3/28 halted its advance . and west of Hill 362A . Even with the By the end of 1 March, Hill 362A support of tanks, 2/28 proved unable to and a rocky ridgeline extending to the advance. The battle raged hot and heavy west coast had been seized . In all, ele- at close quarters ; in one instance, one ments of the 5th Division held a 1,000- of the tanks bogged down, surrounded yard front, which was exposed to heavy by 30-40 Japanese, some of them oc- artillery and mortar fire from positions cupying a cave only 10 feet from the to the north. In order to obtain better tank. Fighting as infantry, the tank observation over the northwestern crew was able to make a harrowing coast of Iwo Jima, artillery observers escape after disabling the gun and were placed on board an LCI(G) which radio. cruised up and down the northwest For the remainder of the afternoon shore. This expedient was successful of D plus 10, the 1st and 2d Battalions, and several enemy positions were lo- 28th Marines, remained stalled along cated and silenced . 1 the crest of Hill 362A and at the base At the end of 1 March, the 5th Ma- of the hill, where the enemy still held rine Division had taken a total of 12 out in caves . In the course of the after- prisoners ; it was estimated that 3,252 noon, the boundary of General Rockey's of the enemy had been killed in the 5th division was extended about 200 yards Division area of responsibility .20 Casu- to the east to facilitate the advance of alties sustained by the division to this the adjacent 3d Marine Division . As a result, General Rockey committed '° 5th MarDiv AR, pp. 23-24. 3/26 on the right of the 28th Marines . 20 I bid., p . 24.

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 627 date were 48 officers and 952 men killed, ingly slow. Even though the terrain 161 officers and 3,083 men wounded in did not favor the use of armor and action, and 2 officers and 47 men miss- abounded in antitank obstacles, 3/26 re- ing." The capture of Hill 362A and the quested tank support, and tanks from ridges on either side of it in a one- Company A, 5th Tank Battalion, spear- day operation had cost the 28th Ma- headed the attack . rines alone 224 casualties .2 V Companies D and F of 2/26 were in While General Rockey's men were en- the midst of blasting their way into gaged in reducing Hill 362A, the ad- and through the enemy defenses when jacent 3d Marine Division had pene- the battalion had to shift to the right trated the enemy defense system in the to close a new gap that had developed center of the island and had pivoted between the 3d and 5th Divisions . In to the northeast . This move threaten- executing the shift, the two companies ed to open a widening gap between had to disengage under heavy fire ; they the 3d and 5th Marine Divisions. As a were further harassed by mortars and result, for 2 March, General Schmidt minefields . A solid line was finally form- directed the 5th Marine Division to ed in late afternoon just before night- make the main effort on the right while fall. In order to fill the void created maintaining contact with General Er- when the two companies of 2/26 were skine's men. In order to carry out the shifted to the northeast, it became newly assigned mission calling for an necessary to commit 1/26. expansion of his boundaries, General When fighting came to an end on D Rockey committed the 26th Marines to plus 11, 3/26 had gained 500 yards. (See the right of the 28th. For the con- Map VI, Map Section) . Responsible for tinuation of the 5th Division attack on these gains to a large measure were the D plus 11, the fire of the 13th Marines division engineers, who moved alongside was augmented by half of the corps the assault units to clear minefields and artillery fires .23 open supply roads in the rear . In front At 0800 on 2 March, the 26th Ma- of the 26th Marines, the enemy had rines jumped off along the division mined the approaches to his pillboxes boundary with 3/26 in the assault. As and permanent fortifications ; without the battalion moved forward, a gap the help of the engineers, the advance of arose on the left, and Companies D and Colonel Graham's regiment on D plus 11 F of 2/26 were committed to regain would have been doomed to failure . contact with 1/28. In the zone of ad- In the left of the 5th Division zone vance of the 26th Marines the Japa- of advance, the 28th Marines jumped nese made maximum use of cleverly off at 0800 with its three battalions em- concealed positions, whose approaches ploying the same scheme of maneuver were mined. Progress was correspond- as on the previous day . The 1st and 2d s I bid. Battalions were to attack around both z Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 53. sides of Hill 362A and join on the north VAC Op0 10-45, dtd 1Mar45. side for a coordinated assault against 628 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS the next elevation 200 yards to the En route to the front lines, the tanks north. This obstacle, extending west- of Company C, including a flame tank, ward from the plateau almost to the blasted and burned enemy positions in water's edge, was squarely in the path the steep northern face of Hill 362A, of the 28th Marines . Beyond were the from which the enemy was still firing stark remains of what had once been a into the rear of the advancing infantry . small hamlet called Nishi . From it, the The enemy made numerous attempts elevation took its name : Nishi Ridge. to destroy the supporting armor with As the two battalions jumped off, satchel charges . Apparently, the ap- they encountered undiminished resist- pearance of tanks in close support of ance. Every time the Marines moved the infantry in terrain that all but pre- into the depression north of Hill 362A, cluded the effective employment of ar- they drew heavy fire from both the front mor confounded the Japanese. One of the and the rear. Tanks from Company B, officers on General Kuribayashi's staff 5th Tank Battalion, tried to give ef- was to make the following comment on fective support, but were severely lim- this subject : ited in their movements by the antitank When American M-4 tanks appeared in ditch extending across their front . front of Osaka Yama (Hill 362A), Lieu- As a result, the 28th Marines made tenant General Kuribayashi was very only little progress. The 13th Marines anxious to know how to dispose of this gave all possible support to the infantry, tank. Even our 47mm antitank gun could not destroy it, and at last came to the con- concentrating its fire on enemy mortar clusion that bodily attacks with explosives positions identified from the air and was the only way to destroy it." . Finally, through forward observers Actually, the Japanese island com- elements of the regimental weapons mander may have overestimated the company succeeded in setting up three structural strength of the M-4 tank, .50 caliber machine guns to cover the which was indeed vulnerable to 47mm caves that honeycombed the northern antitank fire. Nevertheless, the Sher- . Friendly mortar slopes of Hill 362A mans were indispensable on Iwo, and fire saturated the defile in front of the without them the assault might have infantry. failed. Ideally, a tank with heavier ar- Eventually, armored bulldozers of the mament and a lower silhouette, as well 5th Engineer Battalion got close enough as improved traction, would have been to the antitank ditch to fill in a portion more desirable, but at the time of the of it. This permitted the tanks to move Iwo Jima operation only the Shermans out and advance for 200 yards until the were available to the Marines engaged terrain narrowed and precluded any in the assault. further forward movement. Caught in While the tanks were keeping the this type of cul de sac, the tank crews enemy to the rear occupied, Company fought with the enemy at closest quar- E, 2/28, charged across the exposed ter- ters. At 1400, tanks of Company C re- rain north of Hill 362A to the foot lieved those of Company B, which was beginning to run out of ammunition . ' Horie Rpt, p . 8.

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 629 of Nishi Ridge . Enemy reaction to this which induced vomiting and caused move was immediate and, in the words severe headaches to some of the men of the regimental report, "All Hell exposed to it . A brief gas scare resulted broke loose "25 as the Japanese fought until it became apparent that only those back from the cliff line to the north, men in the immediate proximity of a from Hill 362A, and from a blockhouse shell burst were affected ; symptoms in front of and to the east of Hill 362A . lasted only for a short time . In the end, Combined with the heavy enemy artil- the ill effects were ascribed to the pres- lery and mortar fire was a counterat- ence of picric acid fumes .2s tack by a large group of Japanese At 1700, VAC ordered the lines to be against 1/28. This attack was repulsed consolidated for the day. In the 5th Di- with 129 Japanese killed . vision zone of advance, fighting con- Losses among the Marines of 2/28 tinued until nightfall, some of it at also were beginning to mount . Shortly very close quarters. For the night, 5th after 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Chand- Division Marines were generally dug ler W. Johnson, commanding 2/28, was in at the base of Nishi Ridge ; on the hit squarely by an artillery shell as he far right, the 2/26 lines extended to the was inspecting the front lines . The bat- northeast along the division boundary talion commander was killed instantly where they tied in with 3/9 near Hill and the battalion executive officer, 362B. The biggest advance for the day Major Thomas B . Pearce, Jr ., assumed had been made by the 26th Marines, command. For the remainder of the af- which had gained 500 yards . There were ternoon, reserve units mopped up in the indications that the regiment was mov- vicinity of Hill 362A, whose northern ing into a different type of defensive po- face was giving the advancing Marines sition than had been previously encoun- infinitely more trouble than the south- tered. There were fewer concrete forti- ern slopes had . fications and more rock barriers and While bitter fighting was raging tank ditches . Even though the enemy along the center and eastern portion was resisting as fiercely as ever, he was of the division line, 3/28 was advancing abandoning some of his equipment . along a narrow front near the west Items captured on D plus 11 were a coast. Movement in this area was seri- generator truck found behind one ously impeded by numerous caves and ridge and a large searchlight behind heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire . another. The caves were attacked and slowly As night fell, the enemy made sev- neutralized with 37mm guns, heavy eral attempts to infiltrate the 5th Di- mortars, and demolition charges ; a total vision lines. About 50 Japanese sallied of 68 were blasted during the day . At forth near Hill 362A and some of this 0900 and again around noon, shells fall- force succeeded in getting into the Ma- ing within the battalion zone of ad- rine positions . Once the Marines be- vance gave off a green-yellowish gas came aware of their presence, bitter

28th Mar AR, p . 27 . 21 Ibid. 630 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in the would have to be dozed out before tanks course of which knives, sabers, pistols, could move in to support the advance . and hand grenades were liberally used . The attack jumped off at 0745 . Sup- The alertness of the Marines in deal- ported by 75mm half-tracks, 37mm ing with the infiltrators led General guns, and a reinforced tank platoon, Kuribayashi to report that "the look- 1/28 and 2/28 in the regimental center out of American forces has become very moved out and almost immediately ran strict and it is difficult to pass through into heavy mortar and small arms fire . their guarded line . Don't overestimate As the two battalions inched forward, the value of cutting-in attacks ."27 the men soon came to close grips with On the evening D plus 11, the battle the enemy and numerous hand grenade of Hill 362A was over, but an even duels were fought. Within two hours bigger challenge was to confront Gen- after the jumpoff, Nishi Ridge had been eral Rockey's men for the following seized and the battalions prepared to day : the capture of Nishi Ridge and move into the rugged terrain beyond . Hill 362B. As the advance gained momentum, the 28th Marines swept down from Nishi NISHI RIDGE, HILL 362B Ridge into the remnants of Nishi Vil- AND BEYOND 28 lage, and by late afternoon had reach- On the morning of D plus 12, the ed a point about 200 yards beyond, de- 5th Marine Division resumed the at- spite mounting casualties, for enemy re- tack with basically the same formations sistance never slackened. At the close it had employed on the previous day . of the day, when the fury of the battle From the very outset, both the terrain receded, 1/28 made further gains which and enemy resistance combined to make brought it ahead of the other two bat- it a difficult day . The 26th and 28th talions. Since morning, 1/28 had gained Marines were to make the main effort. 500 yards, while 2/28 had scored gains In the path of the 28th Marines lay a of only 150 yards, as had 3/28 along series of gorges and ridges ; in front of the coast . the 26th Marines the terrain was heavi- By far the most spectacular fighting ly mined ; in addition, from strongly and resultant gains were made in the held Hill 362B, the enemy was able to zone of advance of the 26th Marines . sweep the area with fire. New roads The mission assigned to the 26th Ma- rines for D plus 12 had been to ad- 2' Hone Rpt ., p. 9. ' Additional material in this section is de- vance northeastward to relieve elements rived from : 133d NCB AR ; 2/13 UJnl, Iwo of the 3d Marine Division near Hill Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter 2/13 UJn1 ; 362B. The line of departure for 2/26 2/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar45, n.d., and 3/26 formed an inverted horsehoe hereafter 2/13 AR; 3/13 UJn1, Iwo Jima, 19- with 3/26 on the left and 2/26 on the Feb-17Nfar45, hereafter 3/13 UJnI ; 3/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar45, n .d. hereafter right. The two battalions moved out 3/13 AR; 4/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar- rapidly, even though both began taking 45, dtd 7Apr45, hereafter 4/13 AR. casualties almost at once. Company B THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 631 of the 5th Tank Battalion supported gone, 3/26 was able to launch an ad- the 2d Battalion by covering the left vance of its own, which resulted in flank of Company F. Just as it had done a 200-yard gain . While Company F was on D plus 7 when first committed in tackling the enemy at close quarters, the assault, this company smashed into Companies D and E launched an at- the enemy defenses with great force tack northeastward along the division and aggressiveness . Since, at the outset, boundary in order to seize Hill 362B the terrain was comparatively level and and relieve 3/9 . The relief was com- thus favored the employment of armor, pleted by 1430 and the two companies, the company commander was able to from positions just southwest of the radio instructions to the armor through hill, prepared for the assault. a tank liaison man assigned to the com- When it came, at 1600, the battle for mand post of 2/26 . The assault swept the hill proved to be a bloody one . Using on for about 300 yards before the open rocket launchers, flamethrowers, demo- terrain changed into the deep gorges litions, plus a goodly amount of sheer and rock formations characteristic of courage and will, the two companies northern Iwo Jima. In these rocky bad- forced their way to the top . The south- lands the battle continued, frequently ern and western slopes of the hill were man against man . The Japanese fiercely honeycombed with caves and pillboxes, contested the advance behind every rock each of which required an individual and boulder but could not stop it. In assault. By the time the crest of the some of the most bitter fighting of the hill was reached, both company com- entire operation, every weapon at hand manders and many of their men had was brought into play. become casualties . By the time the forceful advance came The advance made by the 5th Ma- to a halt, Company F had advanced rine Division on 3 March was almost more than 600 yards to the high ground spectacular under the conditions in to its front. Even then, the Japanese which the battle was fought. The cost grimly contested every foot of the fresh- of seizing this ground was correspond- ly seized ground, and numerous hand ingly high. On D plus 12, the 26th Ma- grenades continued to harass the Ma- rines alone had 281 casualties 2 9. Total rines from cleverly hidden caves and losses for the 5th Marine Division on 3 gullies whose presence had hitherto March were 9 officers and 127 men been unsuspected . But the enemy was killed or dead of wounds, and 15 officers mortal, and bazooka shells accurately and 357 men wounded .30 As of D plus fired into such defensive positions usual- 12, total casualties for the division since ly eliminated this resistance in short D-Day numbered 4,960 officers and order. men.S1 The 600-yard advance of 2/26 elimi- nated the horseshoe and for all prac- 26th Mar WarD, Mar45. tical purposes, straightened the line . ' 5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts, dtd 25Jun45. With the severe threat to its left flank " Ibid. 632 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

As the fury of the battle receded the rigors of the preceding days' combat on the evening of D plus 12, the 5th and lack of sleep caused by the con- Division lines extended from the west tinuous Japanese infiltration attempts coast at a point roughly 200 yards north of the previous night. The rugged ter- of Nishi Village along the northern edge rain seriously limited the use of 75mm of Motoyama Plateau to the crest of half-tracks and 37mm guns . With Japa- Hill 362B. All along the front, the nese lurking all around them, the crews casualty rate had reached alarming of these vehicles felt progressively more proportions and it became necessary to exposed to enemy fire . Beyond that, the send men from headquarters and weap- enemy was beginning to take a toll in ons companies into the line as riflemen vehicles with mines, skillfully emplaced to bolster the tired and depleted units. in the few avenues of approach avail- Not all of the 5th Marine Division men able to the supporting armor. were able to get much rest that night . Perhaps the biggest difference be- In the sector of the 28th Marines, there tween the success attained on D plus 12 were relatively few attempts at infiltra- and the fighting on the following day tion. It was another story in the 26th was the fact that the attacks were not Marines area, where the enemy in- closely coordinated . Once again, the filtrators appeared more aggressive and brunt of the battle was borne by small crowded the 26th Marines throughout detachments, moving more or less hap- the night . Almost all of the nearly 100 hazardly against those enemy caves would-be infiltrators were killed. and pillboxes that were unmasked . As Following an artillery preparation a result, only small gains were made, and rocket barrage, the 5th Marine even though in this jungle of rocks the Division resumed the attack on the bravery of the individual Marine con- morning of D plus 13 . As the men tinued undiminished . As on the previous jumped off in the same formation they day, losses were heavy and many of the had employed on the previous day, they combat units were operating at half were hit by intensive fire from small strength or less. The enemy was notice- arms and mortars . Once again, the ably more aggressive in the daytime Marines advanced into terrain dotted than he had been before, and the 26th with interconnected caves . The lines Marines beat back several counter- were now so close to each other that attacks executed in company strength . artillery support could be used only Nowhere did the Japanese succeed in on special occasions . Because of a low breaking through the 5th Division lines, cloud ceiling, the air support which had but the counterattacks served to take been scheduled for the day had to be additional steam out of the drive of the cancelled. fatigued Marines, and net gains for the The low clouds soon gave way to in- day remained practically nil . As one termittent showers, which did little to account of the day's operations put it, lift the morale of the men who were "The only successful move, in fact, was still exhausted in spirit and body from made by Division headquarters which THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 633 moved from its original location near countered, was initially bewildered and the eastern beaches to a position north terrified resulting from a mental attitude of Airfield No . 1 on the west side of the of his being "alone," and not knowing his leaders and companions on the battlefield . island.32 At about this time, General This lack of a sense of security, even when Kuribayashi shifted his headquarters among battle-experienced troops, was from the center of Iwo Jima to a large brought about by his separation from con- cave in the northwestern section of the tact with those with whom he had previ- island, between Hiraiwa Bay and the ously trained and not yet having become assimilated into a fighting team. Those ruins of Kita Village, where he prepared who did not readjust themselves quickly to make his final stand. had a high percentage of casualties since General Schmidt's order to his three in their bewilderment they usually care- divisions that 5 March was to be utilized lessly exposed themselves for reorganioation, resupply, and prepa- For the resumption of the attack on rations for the resumption of the 6 March, General Rockey directed 1/26 attack on the following day reached 5th to relieve 1/27 and ordered the 27th Division units during the afternoon of Marines into reserve . At the same time, 4 March . At a time when physical the 28th Marines was to reorganize so strength and fighting spirit were begin- that 3/28 would take over the sector of ning to flag, this order was more than 2/28. This would leave all three bat- welcome. Logically, the day of rest talions of the 26th Marines in the line, would be used, above all, to funnel repla- the 28th Marines holding a front with cements into the depleted ranks of the 3/28 on the left and 3/27 on the right, frontline units . The exigencies of com- and the 27th Marines, less the 3d Bat- bat had already necessitated sending talion, in reserve . some men with specific and critical In accordance with VAC orders, com- skills, such as demolition personnel and bat activity by 5th Division units was bazooka or flamethrower operators into limited to local attempts to straighten the lines prior to 5 March . On the whole, the lines during the morning. Through- except for small emergency details, out the day, artillery and naval gunfire replacements were sent forward when were brought to bear on suspected the combat battalions were out of the enemy positions, and carrier aircraft lines. Replacements, no matter how will- flew 18 missions. Within the 26th ing and well trained, always tended to Marines sector, a few tanks engaged present something of a problem before in reducing caves and other strong- they were wholly integrated. The points that were directly menacing the reasons for this were outlined in the front lines. Those tanks not actually following report engaged with the enemy received badly Reports from infantry units indicate needed maintenance in the bivouac that the average replacement, upon being areas. assigned to a rifle unit and immediately Despite general inactivity on the part subjected to the type of fierce fighting en- of the Japanese infantry, the 5th

" Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 95 . '5th MarDiv AR, Anx A, p . 14 . 634 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Division suffered casualties through a vast improvement over what had been enemy action even on this day of rest . previously available . As early as 3 One of the tanks operating near the March, the situation from a naval view- 26th Marines lines ran over a mine and point had become relatively quiet . Un- was disabled, another was hit by enemy loading and evacuation progressed antitank fire . Japanese mortars con- favorably over both the eastern and tinued to harass the Marines through- western beaches . It thus became pos- out the day, particularly when the sible for all of the assault shipping in- enemy observed troop movements near cluding the Defense Group and the Joint Road Junction 338 northwest of Moto- Expeditionary Force Reserve to retire yama Village. Even though this junction to rear areas. was situated in the 3d Marine Division On the morning of D plus 15, it was area, it constituted a supply road for business as usual for all three assault the 26th Marines and other 5th Division divisions on Iwo . The only change from units. the norm was that the heaviest artil- A particularly unfortunate incident lery barrage thus far fired preceded the occurred shortly after the relief of 1/27 attack. Shortly before 0700, 11 artil- by 1/26. The 1st Battalion, 27th Ma- lery battalions, a total of 132 guns rang- rines, was in the process of moving to ing from 75mm to 155mm in caliber, an assembly area in the vicinity of Road unleashed a tremendous bombardment Junction 338 when an enemy shell hit of enemy positions in northern Iwo, the jeep carrying the battalion com- followed by a rolling barrage. Offshore, mander, Lieutenant Colonel John A . a battleship, two cruisers, three de- Butler, who had been observing the stroyers, and two landing craft added relief. The battalion commander was their fire to that of the land-based artil- killed, and two other men in the vehicle lery, which in little more than an hour were wounded . Later that afternoon, expended 22,500 shells, some of them Lieutenant Colonel Justin G . Duryea, falling within 100 yards of the Marines the operations officer of the 27th Ma- waiting to jump off . At pretimed in- rines, took over command of 1/27 . tervals, carrier planes strafed, rocketed, While all three Marine divisions on and bombed the enemy positions . The Iwo remained in place and prepared to portion of the island still in Japanese continue the assault, several important hands literally rocked under the punish- changes occurred to the rear, indicative ment being meted out, and it appeared of what had been accomplished and how that little could withstand such an ex- much remained to be done . At the foot tensive pounding. of Mount Suribachi, the 133d Naval As soon as they jumped off at 0800, Construction Battalion put into oper- the Marines of the 5th Division, as well ation six portable water distillation as those of the two remaining divisions, units. The processed water was sent to discovered to their dismay that the bar- the front and there was enough to rage had done little to soften up enemy furnish three canteens per day per man, resistance . When the artillery fire lifted, THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 635 the Japanese, little the worse for wear, days after it was given on the West Coast, contested the advance of General but often it could not help ." Rockey's men from prepared bunkers, After the heavy volume of artillery pillboxes, and caves . Marines attempt- fire on 6 March, expended with such ing to advance north from Hill 362B im- little effect, VAC limited the use of mediately drew heavy rifle, machine ammunition, particularly for harassing gun, and mortar fire interspersed with missions. In his orders for 7 March,"', white, phosphorus shells. It was almost General Schmidt directed the 5th Ma- as if the heavy bombardment had never rine Division to seize the high ground happened. The broken terrain all but overlooking the sea with the main effort precluded close tank support and, in- to be made in the northeastern portion stead of a big push, the advance could of the division zone of action . Within be measured in yards . The vigorous this zone, the main effort was to be drive to the 0-3 Line that had been carried out by the 27th Marines, while envisaged could not materialize under the 26th and 28th Marines were to such conditions and the attack soon bog- execute limited objective attacks.-16 ged down. By the end of the day, the THE DRIVE TO THE SEA37 26th and 27th Marines had gained between 50 and 100 yards ; the 28th Just as General Erskine's division on Marines' advance bogged down alto- the right jumped off for a surprise at- gether. tack without an artillery preparation The only progress made could be early on 7 March, so the 26th Marines, measured, not in yards, but in the num- less 2/26 in VAC reserve, duplicated ber of enemy caves and emplacements the maneuver on a minor scale . Jump- destroyed. Engineers operating with ing off 40 minutes prior to H-Hour with- the 28th Marines were able to seal off out an artillery preparation, 1/26 and numerous caves. As in preceding days, Company H, 3/26, set about to reduce the Japanese harassed the advance from the stubborn enemy defenses that had the front, flanks, and rear. Casualties thwarted the regiment's advance on the were correspondingly heavy. The type previous day. After overcoming moder- of vicious close in fighting the Marines ate resistance, the battalion reached a were engaged in during this period was 30-foot knoll just north of Nishi Vil- reflected in the nature of the casualties lage. As Marines wearily surrounded evacuated to the rear . In the words of this hill, enemy fire all but ceased. The one observer : sudden stillness was broken only when At the Fifth Division hospital, Lieu- tenant Evans was noticing a change in the " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 247. type of wounds coming in. They were bad ~' VAC OpO 14-15, dtd 6Mar45. ones, from close range sniper or machine ~° 5th MarDiv Op0 13-45, dtd 6Mar45. gun fire. The earlier wounds, mostly from '7 Additional material in this section is de- mortar bursts, had been numerous and rived from 1/13 UJnI ; 1/13 AR, Iwo Jima, ragged, but not so penetrating . The whole 270ct44-21Mar45, dtd 5Apr45, hereafter 1/13 blood was being used as little as twelve AR. 636 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS demolitions men blasted and closed one Meanwhile, 3/26 had also jumped off cave entrance, while machine gunners and almost at once ran into such heavy made short work of several of the enemy resistance that continuous fighting at who rushed out of a rear entrance . close range, which lasted until night- Marines of Company H ran towards fall, produced a gain of only 150 yards . the top of the hill in a suspicious silence Once again, even this meager advance that was most unnatural for Iwo, until had to be paid for with heavy casualties . about 40 had gathered on the crest . The 5th Marine Division main effort Then the unbelievable occurred on D plus 16 was made by 2/27, sup- . . . The whole hill shuddered and the top ported by a company of 1/27. Follow- blew out with a roar heard all over the ing a 15-minute preparation by a bat- island. Men were thrown into the air, and tery of the 13th Marines, the battalion those nearby were stunned by the con- jumped off for an attack that was cussion . Dozens of Marines disappeared in coordinated with elements of the 21st the blast crater, and their comrades ran to dig for them . Strong men vomited at Marines operating beyond the division the sight of charred bodies, and others boundary. The objective was a stretch walked from the area crying . The enemy of high ground squarely astride the had blown up his own command post, in- regimental zone of advance. Initially, flicting forty-three Marine casualties at the same time good progress was made until the for- ward elements entered a draw directly All that remained of the ridge was in front of the first of a series of ridges . a mass of torn, twisted, and burning At this point, enemy machine gun fire, rock and sand. Smoke emerged from a coming from two directions, raked the ragged hole so large that it might well exposed men, who sought in vain to have harbored a good sized apartment pinpoint the well-camouflaged positions . building. Many of the men, not directly Casualties mounted as a 37mm gun was injured by the blast but stunned by the arduously manhandled to a forward po- concussion, were staggering around in sition, from where it engaged the hid- a daze. It remained for the commander den machine guns with undetermined of Company H, Captain Donald E . results. Castle, to gather the remnants of his Throughout the day, fighting raged men and lead them in a renewed at- at close quarters, each side making tack.39 generous use of hand grenades . In the end, the overall gain for the 27th Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 252. Marines on D plus 16 was 150 yards, 39 This was the first time that men of the 5th similar to the ground seized by the 26th . Marine Division had become involved in a Even such a limited advance, executed disaster of this type. A similar incident, on a against a firmly entrenched enemy force somewhat smaller scale, involved 2/24 of the 4th Division on Roi-Namur in November 1943 . Then, a large blockhouse used to store aerial instant, the battalion suffered more than half bombs and torpedo warheads blew up as the of its total battle casualties for the operation . Marines surrounded it . At the time, in an Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division, p . 29. THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 637 that contested every foot of ground order to maintain the momentum of the with knee mortars, grenades, and deadly attack, numerous caves were bypassed, accurate sniper fire, was a major ac- to be mopped up later by 1/28 and 2/28 . complishment. The task of the Marine Mortar and rocket fire was directed infantrymen might have been greatly well ahead of the advancing Marines ; eased had tank support been available . additional fire support came from a As it was, the broken terrain was alto- destroyer offshore . gether impassable for armor . During By 1530, the two battalions had the afternoon, platoon-sized elements of advanced about 500 yards over and 2/27 attempted to outflank some of the through rocky gorges in terrain that enemy positions, only to be caught was passable only for men on foot. In- by heavy flanking fire that all but iso- cluded in the ground taken this day was lated them from the main body . A Hill 215, located about 500 yards north- withdrawal became possible only with east of Nishi Village, only 750 yards the help of a smoke screen. Fighting from the northern shore. The relative continued throughout the afternoon and absence of enemy resistance in this individual enemy caves were assaulted sector was to be the most surprising and taken. But there was no way of development of the day's operations . telling how many hidden tunnels led In addition to making the longest into these caves, or how long it would advance yet in the 5th Division zone, take the enemy to restock them with the attacking units killed nine of the new men and weapons after the Marine enemy in this area and captured one .4o assault squads had moved on . According to the battalion action report, The only sign of progress of the 5th "a little further advance might have Marine Division on 7 March occurred been made, but the positions for the on the division's left wing . There, in night would have been weak, so the the zone of advance of the 28th Marines defenses were laid out in the area in- near the west coast, 3/28 and 3/27 dicated."41 dispatched combat patrols before the From the time the advance halted main body launched a general attack . for the day until dusk, all three bat- These patrols moved out at 0900, met talions of the regiment dug in for the with little resistance, and reported this night in the vicinity of Hill 215, while fact back to the regiment . One hour some of the Marines were engaged in later, without any special artillery pre- mopping up in the immediate vicinity paration, the main body moved out . of the hill . In the midst of this activity, There was scattered resistance, but not few Marines paid much attention to the enough to delay the forward movement fact that a stiff breeze had begun to as 3/28 and 3/27 struck out in a north- blow from the north towards the Amer- easterly direction . In this instance, the ican lines. This nonchalance changed to extremely difficult terrain proved to be much more of an obstacle than the "3128 AR, 7Mar45 . sporadic resistance encountered . In Ibid. 638 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS near-panic when this ill wind was found what less than successful : of 40 carried, to be 7 failed to release ; of the 33 released, . . . bringing with it eye-smarting sul- 7 failed to ignite .45 An additional phur fumes and smoke from a burning 67 500-pound bombs, 170 100-pound enemy ammunition dump . Unit com- manders, always alert to the possibility of bombs, and 426 rockets were not sub- the enemy's employing poison gas, sounded ject to technical failures, but no esti- an alert which brought hundreds of gas mate as to their effectiveness against masks into use . The alarm soon passed, a well dug-in enemy could be obtained . however, and CT 28 went on with its re- The night of 7-8 March was charac- organizing ." terized by relatively light enemy activity, The 5th Division advance on D plus though it was far from quiet. In the 16 had moved the lines forward from zone of action of the 5th Marine Divi- 500 yards in the west to 150 yards along sion, the Japanese kept things lively the boundary with the 3d Marine Di- with small arms and knee mortar fire vision, where resistance had been the and hand grenades. Enemy patrols stiffest. In support of the day's opera- probed the Marine lines at various tions, naval gunfire had played a points. The only determined attempt at significant part. Following the tremen- infiltration occurred in front of 1/26, dous expenditure of ammunition by the where approximately 25 Japanese tried shore-based artillery on 6 March, VAC their luck. The attempt ended in dismal had restricted the use of the corps failure when the enemy, tripping flares 155mm howitzers to "deliberate de- in his stealthy approach, became a good structive fires against known enemy target and was mowed down by the targets."43 The resulting gap in artil- alert Marines . lery support had been taken up by The operations order issued by Gen- naval gunfire. All naval gunfire control eral Schmidt for D plus 17 was simple parties received instructions to expend and to the point . Instead of naming 500 rounds per ship . On the basis of phase lines to be reached in the coming data furnished by the corps intelligence day's assault, the VAC commander di- section, the 5th Division intelligence rected all three divisions "to capture officer, Lieutenant Colonel George A. the remainder of the island ."", For Gen- Roll, assigned target priorities .'' Ad- eral Rockey's division, these orders ditional support was obtained through meant that the main effort would air strikes, even though the shrinking continue to be made on the right by the enemy perimeter and the proximity of 27th Marines, advancing to the north- the lines made such support a rather east coast along the division boundary risky undertaking. Altogether, 119 car- parallel to the movements of the ad- rier aircraft flew 147 sorties . The em- jacent 3d Marine Division . ployment of napalm bombs was some- The terrain over which the 27th Ma- rines was to advance featured a series 'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 101 . ' VAC OpO 14-45, dtd 6Mar45 . "5th MarDiv D/3 PerRpt No . 17, dtd ' VAC AirRpt, Encl A, p. 5. 7Mar45. '° VAC OpO 15-45, dtd 7Mar45 .

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 639 of interconnected caves and tunnels . itzer and 200 rounds of ammunition All approaches to these defenses were close to the lines to provide badly heavily defended . Colonel Wornham needed fire support . This unorthodox planned to meet this challenge by hav- employment of artillery raised the eye- ing trails bulldozed into enemy terrain, brows of the 1/13 intelligence officer, over which the infantry could advance impelling him to leave this statement into close proximity of the enemy . Once for posterity : there, Marines could reduce the Japa- We thought this morning that this bat- nese fortifications at close range with talion had done everything it was possible for an artillery unit to do . We had landed time proven methods . As added in- under machine gun, artillery, and mortar surance, tanks would support the in- fire ; gone into position at night ; repelled fantry advance over the newly bull- Jap pre-dawn counterattack on D plus 1 ; dozed trails . fired countless counterbattery missions ; At the first glint of dawn, prior to had snipers in our position area ; partici- pated in regimental missions ; fired T .O .T. the jumpoff of 2/27 scheduled for 0750, missions ; had our observers on land, on Shermans of the 5th Tank Battalion sea, and in the air, and we hauled ammo slowly crawled forward from their all night. But today we detached No. 4 bivouac area over a previously recon- Baker and sent it forward to knock off . In the rough, unfamiliar some Jap pillboxes. A report came back noitered route that their fire on pillbox was very effec- terrain, the tanks moved slowly and did tive. This was a new twist but the same not reach the front until 0930 . Mean- result-Japs destroyed ." while, 2/27 had launched its assault on The infantry received additional sup- schedule, but little progress was made port from rocket launcher crews who until the tanks arrived . The armor im- blasted the Japanese in their holes and mediately commenced cleaning out pill- buried them alive . Despite the punish- boxes and emplacements, permitting the ment doled out to the enemy, neither infantry to move in close to caves in company made much progress, and order to seal them . The enemy opposed gains were limited to less than 100 the Marines with accurate small arms yards. fire, grenades, and mortar fire . Despite In the center of the division line, the this opposition and the heavily mined 26th Marines failed to make even that terrain, elements of 2/27 by 1030 had much progress. With 1/26 and 3/26 gained 100 yards . Company E, 2/27, re- still in the assault, Colonel Graham's ported killing 75 Japanese during the men found themselves facing a complex first two hours .47 system of pillboxes and interconnected On the battalion left, Companies D caves among the debris that was all that and F attempted an advance without had remained of Kita Village . In the tank support and were soon halted by midst of such forbidding defenses, the heavy machine gun and mortar fire . A regimental attack barely got off the 15-man crew from Battery B, 13th Ma- ground and, at the end of another ex- rines, manhandled a 75mm pack how- hausting day, the regiment was still in

47 2/27 AR, p . 12 . 48 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 8Mar45, in 1/13 UJnl. 640 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS substantially the same position it had sea, but hidden behind every crag and occupied prior to the jumpoff. A gain of in every crevice was an enemy deter- 400 yards laboriously carved out by mined to block any and all egress by the 1/26 during the day had to be re- advancing Marines to the sea just east linquished at dusk because it was un- of Kitano Point. tenable. As bitter close fighting raged in this The 28th Marines on the division left inaccessible area, one man began to nearly equalled the previous day's stand out among the rest of Company advance. Moving along the coast against E. He was 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus, initially weak enemy resistance, 2/28 a former gridiron star at Baylor actually advanced another 500 yards . University, now determined to over- Once again, opposition became more come the final obstacle barring his men stubborn on the regiment's right where from the sea . Rushing forward at the 1/28 gained a respectable 300 yards . head of his platoon, the lieutenant was Both battalions covered the initial 100 knocked down by an exploding grenade . yards before serious resistance devel- He got to his feet, shook off some of the oped, both from the front and the rear . dust, and rushed an enemy gun em- Within the limitations imposed by the placement . A second grenade exploded, terrain, the attached 75s and 37mm knocking him down again and shatter- guns of the weapons company supported ing his shoulder. Undaunted, the platoon the regiment, as did the 81mm mortars . leader got up, rushed a second enemy Ahead of the advance, naval gunfire position and killed all of its occupants . attempted to neutralize enemy positions As his men watched, Lummus con- near the coast, while carrier planes tinued his rush . When he called to his struck twice at Hill 165, one of the last platoon, the men responded, now mov- significant obstacles separating the 5th ing forward with a deadly purpose. As Division Marines from the northern the attack gained momentum, the entire shore. For these carrier aircraft, 8 company began to move, hesitantly at March was the last day of support for first, then with growing speed and as- the ground forces. Effective 9 March, surance. such close support would become the Lummus was still at the head of his responsibility of the Army Air Forces . men, viciously slashing at the enemy The violent battle of attrition raging in his path, when the incredible hap- in the craggy terrain of northern Iwo pened : on D plus 17 was to have more than Suddenly he was in the center of a pow- its share of personal drama in the in- erful explosion obscured by flying rock formal setting of war . Tragedy struck and dirt. As it cleared, his men saw him, rising as if in a hole . A land mine had within the setting of Company E, 2/27, blown off both his legs, the legs that had which in the course of the morning had carried him to All-American football hon- already scored an advance of 150 yards ors at Baylor University. They watched in through engineer-tank-infantry team- horror as he stood on the bloody stumps, work calling them on . Several men, crying now, . Only a jumble of rocks separated ran to him and, for a moment, talked of the Marines of Company E from the shooting him to stop his agony.

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 641

But he was still shouting for them to fire. As a result, tank support was move out and the platoon scrambled for- limited to four rounds of 75mm and ward. Their tears turned to rage, they half a load of flame fuel in this area swept an incredible 300 yards over impos- sible ground, and at nightfall they were for the entire day . At about 1300, one on a ridge overlooking the sea . There was platoon with a flame tank was dis- no question that the dirty, tired men, patched to the center of the division cursing and crying and fighting, had done zone of advance to support 1/26 . Even it for Jack Lummus .4° though the area allegedly had been Lieutenant Lummus died later that checked by the engineers, two of the day and was subsequently awarded his tanks hit mines causing considerable country's highest decoration . Even in damage to both. These tanks had to be death his triumph over the enemy and abandoned after the guns and radio had the slaughter that was Iwo Jima was been disabled .52 complete. His devotion to duty and As fighting came to a close on the personal sacrifice had supplied the evening of 8 March, the 5th Marine impetus for the wild charge ." A mixture Division had slashed deeply through the of love and compassion for their leader, enemy lines and was within reach of the mixed with anger and frustration, had northern shore . It had rained intermit- supplied the spark to an explosive tently throughout the day and the men mixture which set off a reaction that, were utterly exhausted . However, the for all practical purposes, was the enemy was in little better shape, as in- American equivalent of the traditional dicated by the following report sub- enemy banzai charge. mitted by General Kuribayashi on the Throughout D plus 17, tanks of the day's action 5th Tank Battalion supported the in- Troops at "Tamanayama" and Northern fantry assault units as best they could . Districts are still holding their position Tanks of Company B, backing up 2/27, thoroughly and continue giving damages advanced into an important enemy to the enemy. Their fighting situation be- bivouac area replete with ammunition lieving their country's victory looks god- dumps, motor vehicles, and trailers . In like.' the course of this advance, tankers Two hours later, the Japanese com- observed at least 100 of the enemy mander conceded : killed, many of them wearing U . S. Ma- I am very sorry that I have let the rine uniforms." Eleven regular tanks enemy occupy one part of the Japanese and two flame tanks of Company C, 5th territory, but am taking comfort in giving Tank Battalion, moved out in support heavy damages to the enemy ." of 2/28 but soon were unable to keep On the evening of D plus 17, the 5th up with the infantry advance when the Marine Division stood within reach of engineers, who were checking the road victory, but more than two weeks of for mines, were pinned down by sniper bitter fighting over the island's most

4° Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 256. L7 Co C, 5th Tk Bn AR, p . 7. °° 27th Mar AR, p . 13. ' Horie Rpt, 1800, 8Mar45 . sx Co B, 5th Tk Bn AR, p . 7. w Ibid. 642 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS treacherous terrain in northwestern As on the previous day, another Iwo would be required before Japanese human drama, again involving the 27th resistance within the division zone of Marines, was to be enacted in the front action was broken . During 9 and 10 lines on 9 March. During the early March, there was no forward move- afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Duryea, ment, and General Rockey's men, with commanding 1/27, and Major Antonelli, extreme exertion, were able to extend commanding the adjacent 2d Battalion, the division left flank about 40 yards . went forward to check their lines . They At this point, the 28th Marines came were headed back to the rear when under intensive fire from the high . . . Duryea called to his runner, who ground that extended southeast from was sitting on a rock, and the youngster Kitano Point . This fire brought the replied "I'm coming Colonel ." He took one drive to the northeast to an abrupt halt step and was blown to bits . He had set off the detonator of a 6-inch naval shell in front of a long, low ridgeline over- buried in the ground to catch a tank . looking a deep gorge. This canyon was A huge fragment of the shell tore off to become the final enemy pocket of Duryea's left arm at the elbow and an- resistance on Iwo Jima, where General other smashed his left knee . Antonelli fell, Kuribayashi and the remnants of his blinded by sand . Duryea, still conscious, garrison would fight to the bitter end . could not see his left leg, doubled under him and thought he had lost it. Thinking In the northeastern portion of the is- an attack was under way he shouted to land, between Tachiiwa Point and Mi- the others, "Come here, come here. Don't nami, in the 4th Marine Division sector, go away." He tried to roll over to get the a second pocket occupied mostly by pistol under his right hip, but could not . naval personnel, would soon become A captain ran to get corpsmen, and they bundled Duryea and Tony Antonelli depleted following a reckless banzai into stretchers. Duryea's left leg dangled charge. off the side, and a bullet pierced it, break- By noon of D plus 18, within sight of ing it ." the sea to the north, General Rockey's With the two battalion commanders Marines still faced an uphill battle in out of commission, the executive officers some of the worst ground on Iwo . There, of the two battalions, Major William Ii. the ridges and gorges were so steep as Tumbelston and Major Gerald F. Rus- to be almost impassable even for men sell, assumed command. The detonation on foot. As in more accessible areas, had also wounded the company com- caves and dugouts abounded. This phase mander and another officer of Company of the fighting, in the face of undimin- E, as well as the intelligence officer of ished enemy opposition, is referred to 2/27. Major Antonelli, despite his eye in the official records as "a battle of injuries and a broken eardrum, refused attrition".55 For a number of days to evacuation until he had issued orders come, the advance could be measured for the resumption of the attack . Sub- in feet instead of yards . sequently, the indomitable battalion

w 5th MarDiv AR, p . 26. " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 262-263.

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT 643

commander walked out of the division 100 men from the 5th Motor Transport hospital and returned to his unit until Battalion joined 1/28 . Colonel Wornham personally ordered While the Marines were still able to him to return to the hospital . The fol- reinforce their frontline units, such lowing day, Antonelli was back at the expedient was denied to General Kuri- battalion command post, where he bayashi . In the narrow strip of coast remained during the daylight hours for separating the 5th Division from the another week until Colonel Wornham sea, the northern pocket had been com- requested his evacuation from the island pressed into an area less than one to prevent further injuries .57 square mile in size . Caught in this Aside from routine operations on 9 pocket were General Kuribayashi and March, two developments occurred. One his division headquarters, elements of was indicative of progress made in the 2d Battalion of Colonel Ikeda's 145th developing Iwo Jima as an air base . Infantry Regiment, remnants of the Cd The other showed to what extent the Battalion, 17th Independent Mixed Reg- combat units had been depleted . Dur- iment and a conglomeration of strag- ing the difficult fighting along the north glers from other units. Altogether, Jap- coast, Army Air Forces P-51s went into anese Army and Navy strength in north- action for the first time, strafing and ern Iwo came to approximately 1,500 bombing the enemy-held gorges in men.5s precision attacks that drew admiration At 0800 on 10 March, the 5th Marine from the Marines on the ground .58 Division continued its attack against Nevertheless, this impressive air sup- enemy opposition that was undiminished port failed to break enemy resistance in ferocity. On the division left, the or morale, and the results remained in- 28th Marines made an advance of 200 conclusive . yards before it was stopped by fire from At noon of 9 March, General Rockey a ridge running generally southeast- decided to bolster the dwindling combat ward from Kitano Point. The 26th Ma- strength of his infantry units by send- rines gained roughly 100 yards in almost ing personnel from the supporting arms impossible terrain . The 27th Marines to the front . On the morning of 10 destroyed numerous enemy caves and March, 100 men of the 13th Marines pillboxes in close-in fighting, but prog- joined 3/28 as riflemen . About the ress was minimal. By the end of D same number reinforced 3/26 . The 11th plus 19, after another day of heavy and Amphibian Tractor Battalion furnished costly fighting, the lines of the 27th 55 men for 3/27 and slightly more than Marines were substantially the same as they had been that morning . Throughout the day, the 5th Marine 64 Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 108. Division attack was supported by shore- `~ On 10 March, the VAC air officer reported : "The precision low altitude work of the P-51s based and naval gunfire, as well as air was particularly pleasing to the ground troops." VAC Air Rpt, Encl A, p. 6. ' Horie Rpt, p. 10. 644 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS strikes. Once again, the effectiveness face of the earth has changed completely of this support could not be accurately and we can see numerous holes of bom- gauged by the exhausted Marines on bardments ." the ground . It was obvious by this time In its two-week drive up the coast that it was becoming increasingly diffi- of western Iwo Jima between 25 cult to make effective use of these sup- February and 10 March, General porting arms because of the rapidly Rockey's division had covered about diminishing area held by the enemy . At 3,000 yards from the vicinity of the the same time, the bombs and heavy Central Airfield to a line that ran from gunfire directed in heavy concentrations west to east across the base of the north- against a shrinking pocket were bound ern tip of the island . In the course of to hurt the enemy . This is best con- this advance the division had sustained firmed by the messages emanating from more than 4,000 casualties .62 General Kuribayashi's headquarters on Indicative of the severity of enemy the evening of 10 March . Beginning on opposition is the minute number of a fairly confident note, the Japanese prisoners taken by D plus 19 . Alto- commander reported that, "even though getheer VAC had seized 111 prisoners American attacks against our northern since D-Day. Of this figure, only 67 districts are continuing day and night, were Japanese, the remainder consist- our troops are still fighting bravely and ing of Korean labor troops .03 At the holding their positions thoroughly ."6 o same time, 8,073 enemy dead had been Changing to a more plaintive note, Gen- counted in the 5th Marine Division sec- eral Kuribayashi continued tor.' On the evening of 10 March, no . . . 200 or 300 American infantrymen one could guess how much more blood with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" would be shed before the battle for Iwo (northern Iwo in the 5th Division sector) Jima was over . all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers and aircraft are very severe, especially 6' Ibid. the bombing and machine gun firing "These losses consisted of 830 killed in against Divisional Headquarters from 30 action, 2,974 wounded, 263 died of wounds, 5 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I missing in action, and 220 cases of combat cannot express nor write here . fatigue, a total of 4,292 casualties. Before American forces landed on Iwo 03 A breakdown of this total by divisions is Jima, there were many trees around my as follows : the 3d Marine Division had cap- Headquarters, but now there are not tured 49 ; the 4th Marine Division 28, and the even a grasp of grass remaining. The sur- 5th Marine Division, 34 . Bartley, Iwo Mono- graph, p . 148. ' Ibid., 1930, 10Mar45. °4 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 11Mar45, in 1/13 UJnl . CHAPTER 10

i The 4th Marine Division Drive on the Right

ADVANCE INTO THE came the division's mission to seize and MEAT GRINDER= hold that part of Iwo that lay east of the Central Airfield and to the south of The first six days of the Iwo Jima Hill 362C. The ruggedness of the ter- operation had taken the 4th Marine Di- rain over which General Cates' Marines vision to the eastern portion of the would have to advance equalled or out- Central Airfield and Charlie-Dog Ridge, did that encountered by the 3d and 5th which had been secured at heavy cost Marine Divisions . on 24 February. As of D plus 6, it be- As might be expected, the enemy had made maximum use of the natural ter- 3 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; VAC AR ; rain features by digging caves, con- VAC G-2 Rpts ; VAC C-3 Jnl; VAC C-3 structing blockhouses, and tunnelling Rpts ; VAC NGF and Air Rpts ; VAC Trans- between ridges until the entire area was lations; 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts ; 4th Mar- honeycombed with defense installations Div OpRpt ; 4th MarDiv D-3 Jnl ; 4th MarDiv rivaling every other sector on the is- D-3 PerRpts ; 4th MarDiv D-4 PerRpts ; 4th MarDiv OpOs, Iwo Jima, 24Feb-9Mar45 ; 4th land. Among a large number of non- MarDiv Translations ; 4th MarDiv Dispatch descript ridges and canyon-like depres- Summaries, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-15Mar45 ; 4th sions, the following stood out and form- MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 28Dec- ed cornerstones of the main line of de- 44-17Mar45, dtd 4Apr45, hereafter 4th Mar- fense in the northeastern part of the Div Support Gp OpRpt ; 1st ProvFldArtyGp G-1 Jnl; 23d Mar OpRpt ; 24th Mar OpRpt ; 25th Mar UJn1 ; 25th Mar OpRpt ; 25th Mar TkBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-18Mar45, Strength and Casualty Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb- dtd 18Apr45, hereafter 4th TkBn OpRpt ; 26Mar45 ; 25th Mar R-2 PerRpts, Iwo Jima, 1/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 31Dec44-16Mar45, n.d., 22Feb-16Mar45, hereafter 25th Mar R-2 Per- hereafter 1123 OpRpt ; 2/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, Rpts ; 14th Mar War]), 28Dec44-5Apr45 ; 14th 310ct44-16Mar45, n.d., hereafter 2/23 OpRpt ; Mar OpRpt ; 14th Mar R-3 Rpts, 22Feb- 3/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 18Jan45-16Mar45, dtd 14Mar45, hereafter 14th Mar R-3 Rpts ; Iwo 12Apr45, hereafter 3/23 OpRpt ; 1/24 OpRpt, Comments ; Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; More- Iwo Jima, 11Feb-18Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, here- house, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Horie Rpt; after 1124 OpRpt ; 2/24 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely and 270ct44-18Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibious War ; 2/24 OpRpt ; 3/24 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 1Jan45- Newcomb, Iwo Jima ; Newcomb Notes ; Hayashi 17Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter 3/24 OpRpt ; and Coox, Kogun ; Henri et al, Marines on 2/25 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-17Mar45, dtd Iwo Jima ; Proehl, The Fourth Marine Divi- 16Apr45, hereafter 2/25 OpRpt ; 3/25 OpRpt, sion; Leckie, Strong Men Armed . Iwo Jima, 22Nov44-17Mar45, n.d., hereafter 2 Additional material in this section is de- 3/25 OpRpt; 2d ArmdPhibBn, Iwo Jima, rived from : 2/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 15Jan- 1OFeb-13Mar45, n.d., hereafter 2d PhibBn 13Mar45, n.d., hereafter 2/14 Op Rpt ; 4th OpRpt. 645 646 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

island : Hill 382, just east of the Cen- innocent appearance, the Amphitheater . tral Airfield (Nidan Iwa to the enemy), Prior to the naval bombardment, this situated about 250 yards northeast of area had been covered by heavy vegeta- the east-west runway. About 600 yards tion and resembled a slight depression south of Hill 382, just west of the re- in rolling terrain . The true extent and mains of Minami Village, was an un- cohesiveness of this major enemy de- sightly elevation which was to become fensive area had not as yet revealed known as "Turkey Knob." Even though itself to the 4th Division Marines . To its height was not impressive, it shel- them, it looked just like a slight hollow tered a large communications center in rolling terrain, though in reality "the made of reinforced concrete. The top of Amphitheater was a veritable large this hill afforded an unobstructed view scale booby trap, containing three tiers of the entire southern portion of the is- of deep prepared positions facing their land. To the southwest, the high ground advance."3 gave way to a depression soon to be- The failure of the advancing 4th Di- come infamous as the "Amphitheater ." vision units to be aware of what awaited On the evening of D plus 5, units of them on the rocky, cave-studded ter- the 4th Marine Division held a line, rain of northeastern Iwo Jima was not facing east, extending from the Central due entirely to a lack of intelligence . Airfield southward to the coast to the Observers had studied the terrain in vicinity of the East Boat Basin . From the zone of advance of the division from their lines, the men could see Hill 382, battalion observation posts, from a the highest point in northern Iwo, sec- vessel close to the shoreline, and from ond in size only to Mount Suribachi . one of the reconnaissance planes of The hill was readily identifiable from VMO-4. A detailed intelligence report the remnants of a radar station, where compiled on the basis of such observa- the skeleton of a radio tower pointed tion noted starkly skyward . The Japanese had hol- The volcanic, crevice lined area is a lowed out a sizable portion of the hill, tangled conglomeration of torn trees and which was bristling with field pieces blasted rocks . Ground observation is re- and antitank guns . The guns them- stricted to small areas. While there are selves were housed in concrete emplace- sundry ridges, depressions, and irregulari- ties, most of the crevices of any moment ments, often protected by as many radiate from the direction of Hill 382 to as 10 supporting machine guns. Some fan out like spokes generally in a south- of Colonel Nishi's tanks, mounting easterly direction providing a series of 47mm and 57mm guns, backed up these cross corridors to our advance and emi- formidable defenses . nently suitable for the enemy's employ- ment of mortars . The general debris The concrete blockhouse on Turkey caused by our supporting fires provides Knob was so soundly constructed as to perfect concealment for snipers and mor- make it virtually immune to bombing tar positions. From the air, caves and and naval gunfire . The Knob dominated a broad, rocky area of a deceptively 3 Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p. 61. THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 647 tracks are observed everywhere, but the remain in reserve . In the adjacent sec- enemy's camouflage discipline is flawless tor, the 24th Marines, with 2/25 at- and it is the rarest occasion that an Aerial Observer can locate troops.' tached, was to continue the advance with 3/24 on the left and 1/24 on the right . The enemy force charged with the The 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, was to defense of the Meat Grinder, which become regimental reserve as soon as it consisted of Hill 382, Turkey Knob, and had been relieved by 3/23 . The 25th the Amphitheater combined, was the Marines, less 2/25, was to remain in di- 2d Mixed Brigade under Major General vision reserve . The division main ef- Sadasue Senda . This force consisted of fort was to be made on the left, where five infantry battalions' an artillery the 23d Marines was to maintain con- battalion, an engineer battalion, and a tact with the adjacent 3d Marine Di- field hospital. Prior to D-Day, the 2d vision. Mixed Brigade Engineers had consoli- The attack jumped off at 0930 . (See dated the three terrain features into Map VII, Map Section) . Almost imme- a closely integrated defense system, diately, Colonel Wensinger's 23d Ma- complete with extensive communica- rines, advancing in a column of battal- tions and electric lights . Marines of the ions, encountered heavy mortar and ma- 4th Division, preparing to move into chine gun fire from pillboxes, bunkers, northeastern Iwo, faced the most ex- and caves. Progress was accordingly tensive and powerful defenses on the slow. Enemy antitank guns and mines, island. as well as unfavorable terrain, made it In the course of 25 February, General impossible to move armor to the front Cates' men prepared to advance into in the 4th Division zone of advance . The the eastern bulge of Iwo Jima . Early on adjacent 3d Division was requested to D plus 6, the 21st Marines which had permit tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion been attached to the 4th Division, re- the use of an approach route leading verted to General Erskine and the through 3d Division terrain to the Cen- boundary between the 21st and 24th Ma- tral Airfield. Permission was granted rines became the left boundary of the shortly before 1300 . Once the Shermans 4th Division. At the same time, the 23d had taken up firing positions along the Marines reverted from VAC reserve to left boundary of the 23d Marines, they the 4th Division and prepared to attack were able to lend effective support to after passing through the left of the the infantry, destroying antitank weap- 24th Marines . Plans for the assault on ons, pillboxes, and enemy machine gun D plus 6 called for 3/23 to move out emplacements. Once these defenses had with 1/23 following 600 yards behind . been eliminated, an armored bulldozer The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, was to of the 4th Engineer Battalion was able to clear a route of advance for the tanks '4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 62, dtd 5- in the zone of action of the 23d Marines . Mar45. 6309th, 310th, 311th, 312th, and 314th Inde- Throughout the day, 3/23 continued to pendent Infantry Battalions . meet heavy resistance as it gained a 648 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS foothold on the high ground at the gains. An air strike against the high northeastern edge of the Central Air- ground facing 3/24 in the early after- field and pushed eastward along Char- noon temporarily reduced the volume lie-Dog Ridge . Heavy and accurate ene- of the enemy mortar fire and enabled my mortar fire that blanketed the run- Major Stout's men to move forward a ways of the airfield made it extremely few additional yards . In midafternoon, difficult for Colonel Wensinger's Ma- 2/24, which had spent most of the day rines to maintain contact with the ad- in regimental reserve, was ordered to jacent 9th Marines. relieve 1/24 on the regiment's right . The 24th Marines, with 2/25 at- This relief, ordered at short notice, was tached, made only little progress on 25 executed without casualties . February, slowed by difficult terrain, On the evening of D plus 6, the 4th mortar fire, and interlocking bands of Marine Division was poised for the at- fire from automatic weapons in pill- tack into the enemy's strongest line of boxes, bunkers, and caves . Prior to the defenses in the division's zone of ad- jumpoff, artillery, naval gunfire, and vance. At this stage, even before the div- carrier aircraft attempted to soften up ision had launched a direct assault into the Amphitheater and Minami Village . what came to be called the Meat Grinder, While the air strike was in progress, its combat efficiency had already been 81mm mortars fired 200 rounds into this reduced to an estimated 55 percent by area. Offshore, LVT (A) s of the 2d Ar- casualties and battle fatigue .r, Yet Gen- mored Amphibian Battalion attempted eral Cates and the men under his com- to support 1/24, but rough seas soon mand were unflagging in their deter- made their withdrawal necessary. mination to see the difficult job through. Enemy resistance in front of 3/24 In commenting on the limited gains of came from the Amphitheater, while 25 February, the division sized up the 1/24 found its advance contested by situation as follows strong enemy defenses to its front . Five The combination of terrain skillfully tanks of Lieutenant Colonel Richard K . employed to the best advantage by the Schmidt's 4th Tank Battalion eventual- enemy, terrain unsuited for tank employ- ly got into position to support the at- ment, the location$ of installations in tack, but the rough terrain severely lim- areas which were . defiladed from our ar- tillery, and the stubborn fight to-the-death ited the movement of armor. Having attitude of the defenders had temporarily gained roughly 100 yards, the two bat- limited the advance of this Division ; but talions were halted by heavy enemy fire the Division prepared to continue the that took a steady toll among officers and attack' men. Among those mortally wounded At 2200 on D plus 6, the rear com- in the course of the morning was the mand post of the 4th Marine Division commander of Company A, 1/24 . The closed on the USS Bayfield . In the course battalion intelligence officer was of the evening, support ships fired night wounded and evacuated . For the remainder of the afternoon, '4th MarDiv OpRpt, 25Feb45. neither regiment made any significant 7 1 bid. THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 649 missions. During the night, there was my medium tanks, armed with a 57mm little activity in the 4th Marine Divi- gun, occupied a stationary position in a sion sector. A small enemy patrol at- crevice, from where it could fire at will tempted to infiltrate into the 3/24 area, along the entire length of the main but all of the Japanese were either runway of the Central Airfield . Three killed or dispersed . The enemy fired 47mm antitanks guns were emplaced in sporadically into the division sector the northern portion of Charlie-Dog with rockets, mortars, and artillery . Ridge, which also afforded an unim- The 4th Division attack on the morn- peded field of fire at the same runway. ing of 26 February was preceded by a Despite bitter opposition, Colonel coordinated preparation fired by the Wensinger's Marines continued to corps and division artillery and naval push the attack throughout the day . gunfire support ships. Following the Elements of 1/23, commanded by shelling, the 4th Marine Division re- Lieutenant Colonel Louis B . Blissard, sumed the attack at 0800 with five bat- drew heavy and accurate fire not only talions abreast . Once again, on the di- from Hill 382, but also from the ad- vision left, Colonel Wensinger's 23d jacent 3d Division zone, where the ene- Marines attacked with 1/23 on the left my still occupied strong positions to the and 3/23 on the right . On the division north of the Central Airfield . To the right, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines, right of 1/23, the 3d Battalion, com- which had relieved the 24th Marines manded by Major James S . Scales, met earlier that morning, advanced at 0830 equally heavy fire, but managed to fight with all three battalions . The half hour its way forward, eliminating well-em- delay in the jumpoff of the 25th Ma- placed and dug-in pillboxes and block- rines was caused by the necessity of re- houses through the use of flamethrow- turning 2/25 from 24th Marines' con- ers, rockets, and demolition teams . trol and moving the battalion to the By late afternoon, the 23d Marines line of departure. had gained about 300 yards and seized The division attack encountered the the southwest slopes of Hill 382. This same difficulties that had stymied its advance partially denied the use of this progress on 25 February . Enemy re- vital hill to the enemy. At 1700, the re- sistance from well organized and mu- giment was ordered to consolidate, but tually supporting positions continued one hour later Major Scales' men were undiminished . In front of the 23d Ma- still engaged in close combat with the rines, the enemy occupied a maze of enemy and vicious fighting at close pillboxes, bunkers, and caves . All ave- quarters continued until well into the nues of approach were protected by evening. In addition to receiving fire successive minefields, which made it al- from the front and flanks, the Marines most impossible to commit armor in occupying precarious positions on the support of the infantry . On the other slopes of Hill 382 also drew scattered hand, enemy tanks dug in on the slopes sniper fire from the rear, which did of Hill 382 had a clear field of fire into little to ease the minds of the exposed the advancing Marines . One of the ene- Marines. When heavy enemy mortar 650 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS and rocket fire began to hit the south- around the right flank to envelop enemy western slopes in the afternoon, it be- defenses on Turkey Knob . This attempt came necessary to withdraw all units ended in dismal failure when the Japa- to the foot of Hill 382 . nese became aware of the maneuver and The 25th Marines was to find the go- shifted their mortar fire . The barrage ing equally rough on D plus 7 . Follow- caught the men out in the open and ing a rolling artillery barrage, Colonel killed several, including the platoon Lanigan's regiment, with 3/24 attached, leader. The survivors of this ill-fated jumped off with 1/25, under Major Fen- platoon were able to withdraw only ton J. Mee on the left, 2/25 under Lieu- under cover of a smoke screen . tenant Colonel James Taul in the center, Along the division right flank, 3/25 and 3/25 commanded by Captain James made a slow but steady advance against C. Headley, on the . right. heavy machine gun and rifle fire from Initially, the advance of 1/25 and the high ground on the left and caves 3/24 into the Amphitheater proceeded and pillboxes to the front . As Company slowly but steadily against enemy small L slowly moved forward, Company I, arms fire . After an advance of about supported by two medium tanks and by 150 yards, the terrain became extreme- LVT (A) s offshore, was systematically ly difficult . At the same time, Japanese mopping up near the East Boat Basin . machine guns and mortars unleashed In the wake of Company L's advance such a deluge of fire from well pre- followed Company K, using demolition pared and camouflaged positions near charges and flamethrowers on every Minami Village that the men were ef- position that might possibly shelter ene- fectively pinned down . Tanks of Com- my troops that had been bypassed . pany A, 4th Tank Battalion, attempted As D plus 7, 26 February, came to to reduce enemy pressure on the in- a close, the 4th Marine Division held fantry but succeeded only in drawing a very irregular line somewhat re- additional artillery and mortar fire sembling the wings of a seagull. On which resulted in the destruction of two the left, the 23d Marines had gained Shermans just east of the airfield . In roughly 200 yards . In the center of the the jumbled terrain, artillery forward division line, where 1/25 was directly in observers were unable to direct effec- front of Turkey Knob and the Amphi- tive counterbattery fire against the ene- theater, gains were at best 75 yards . my. Two spotter aircraft from VMO-4, The most progress for the day had been which had just reached the island, made made by 3/25 on the right which by an attempt to spot the bothersome ene- late afternoon had seized a line of cliffs my mortar and artillery positions from east of the East Boat Basin for an over- the air, but this effort was also unsuc- all gain of nearly 500 yards. One more cessful due to skillful enemy camouflage . accomplishment accrued to 3/25 : in With the left and center of the 25th mopping up the area near the East Boat Marines pinned down, Company C of Basin, the battalion wiped out the last 1/25 made an attempt at 1400 to send nest of snipers that had interfered with a platoon, supported by three Shermans, shore party activities on the beaches

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 651

below. Even though the unloading was peace of mind of 4th Division Marines, still carried on under the muzzles of the were the huge rockets wobbling over enemy artillery and rockets from north- their positions and exploding far to ern Iwo still were capable of hitting any their rear. In the midst of this bedlam, point on the island, at least the bother- there was small arms fire from the ene- some sniper fire had been eliminated . my side. The 4th Marine Division intelligence Small groups of Japanese attempted report for D plus 7 outlined the sever- to infiltrate all along the division pe- ity of the resistance that the division rimeter. Around 0530, the sound of tank had encountered, particularly in front engines was heard in front of the 23d of Hill 382 and Turkey Knob, and noted Marines and there were indications that "that the enemy is now fighting to the the enemy was preparing to counter- death in pillboxes, foxholes, and attack. An artillery preparation into trenches . . . and is not retreating as he the presumed enemy assembly area apparently formerly had done."8 restored silence. Offshore, support ships The enemy unit to which this report furnished harassing fires and illumina- referred was the 309th Independent tion. Aside from the enemy probes, no Infantry Battalion . On D-Day, this bat- major attack developed and it was as- talion had been stationed near the sumed that the artillery barrage had Southern Airfield and since then it had dispersed the possible counterattack . In- fought a delaying action, gradually dicative of the bitterness of the action withdrawing northeastward under that continued through the long night superior pressure . On D plus 7, the at- is the fact that in the area in front of tack by the 23d Marines had severely 1/25 alone, 103 enemy dead were mauled the battalion and pushed it counted after daybreak9 southeastward, where it found itself in Dawn on 27 February, D plus 8, the path of the 25th Marines' advance . marked the beginning of the second day As a result, when the day ended, the of the concerted 4th Division assault battalion had been for all practical pur- into the Meat Grinder . The lineup of poses annnihilated . units for the attack was substantially After a day of exhausting action, 4th the same as on the previous day . From Division Marines were in for a rest- left to right, the five battalions com- less night. Enemy mortars and artillery mitted were 1/23 and 3/23, and all three kept both the division's front and rear battalions of the 25th Marines . The 24th areas under steady fire, paying special Marines, except for the 3d Battalion attention to the division artillery posi- which was still attached to the 25th tions. Beyond any doubt, the accuracy Marines, continued in regimental re- of the enemy fire was aided by bright serve. moonlight which emerged after an af- The assault was preceded by a 45- ternoon of intermittent rain . Less ac- minute preparation of the corps and curate, but equally disturbing to the division artillery. Even though, at this

1 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt, 26Feb45 . 9 25th Mar OpRpt, p . 8, 652 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS particular time, the corps artillery was rifle grenades in volleys, which took giving priority to supporting General a further toll of casualties among the Erskine's 3d Division, Colonel Letcher, exposed Marines . commanding the 1st Provisional Field By noon, the Japanese were still fully Artillery Group, ordered his 155mm in control of the hill. The 1st Battalion, howitzers to expend 300 rounds as part 23d Marines . was slowly gaining ground of the preparation . For the remainder to the northwest of Hill 382 . Once he of the day, the corps artillery was au- had bypassed the objective from the thorized to fire up to 25 percent of the north, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard, the general support missions for General battalion commander, planned to attack Cates' division . The 4th Division objec- up the reverse slope. Both battalions, tive for D plus 8 was capture of Hill 382 but especially 3/23, had sustained losses and advance to the 0-2 Line . that had reduced them to little more Following a thunderous artillery than company strength ; some of the preparation, the 4th Division attacked companies had shrunk to platoon size . at 0800. On the division left, the two bat- Nevertheless, the assault continued. In talions of the 23d Marines resumed the order to assist 3/23 in its frontal as- assault on Hill 382. While 1/23 attacked sault, 2/14 fired a 30-minute prepara- northeastward in order to envelop the tion beginning at noon, against Hill hill from the north, the 3d Battalion 382. Following this barrage, the ex- resumed the assault up the southwest- hausted men of 3/23 jumped off . This ern slopes . Since the Japanese atop the time, some progress was made, as Ma- hill enjoyed a perfect view of the Amer- rines threw grenades and satchel ican lines, smoke was employed to screen charges into the caves and other strong- the reorganization and movement of points still held by the obstinate de- frontline companies in the 3d Battalion fenders. Once the Marines had advanced area. The enemy was not deceived, how- within striking distance of the two ever, and almost immediately, the ad- tanks, they were able to finish them vancing Marines came under such se- off with bazooka fire. Slowly and pain- vere fire that forward movement was fully, the assault force fought its way all but impossible. Nevertheless, up the hill. throughout the morning, 3/23 launched Additional support for Major Scales' repeated assaults up the southwestern men arrived in two forms . First, shortly slopes of the hill without making any after 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard's substantial headway . Strong and deter- battalion, having bypassed the hill, com- mined enemy resistance from the high menced an attack up the reverse slope . ground effectively pinned Major Scales' Secondly, almost at the same time, en- men down. Two of Colonel Nishi's tanks, gineers with a tank dozer began to emplaced in the recesses of Hill 382, carve out a path over which some of further added to the volume of the ene- the Shermans could come within strik- my fire. A new technique resorted to ing distance. Once they had gone into by the Japanese at this time was firing position, the supporting tanks took the THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT . 653 Japanese on the higher reaches of Hill attempt an envelopment from the 382 under effective fire . This badly south. When it became evident by 1500 needed support, arriving at a crucial that the advance of 3/23 was progress- time, reversed the situation. The Japa- ing much more slowly than anticipated, nese on the hill found themselves vir- Major Fenton J . Mee, commanding 1/ tually cut off . The deadly fire of the 25, ordered the battalion forward, even Shermans forced them to stay under though Hill 382 still had not been taken . cover. As Major Scales' men approached The attack, supported by tanks and pre- the top of the hill, they discovered that ceded by a rocket barrage, initially gain- the top had been hollowed out and that ed 150 yards across open terrain but it contained a solid wall of artillery came to a halt before cover on the far and antitank gun positions . side could be reached when heavy mor- Here, among the ruins of the radar tar and antitank fire, as well as intense station, the men of 3/23 came to grips machine gun fire, hit the assault force . with the Japanese in vicious close com- In addition to inflicting heavy casualties bat in which no quarter was asked or on the infantrymen, the Japanese also given. Just when it appeared that the succeeded in putting two of the three Japanese would be driven off, a heavy tanks supporting the attack out of ac- artillery and mortar barrage hit the tion and damaging the third . Shortly advancing Marines . With darkness ap- after 1700, it had to be conceded that proaching, 3/23 still had not gained a the commanding ground which formed solid foothold on top of Hill 382, and the day's objective could not be reach- rather than risk an envelopment dur- ed before nightfall, and the battalion ing the night, 3/23 was ordered to con- pulled back to its jumpoff positions . solidate on ground that would permit In the regimental center and on the solid contact with adjacent units to the right, 2/25 and 3/25, attacking due east left and the right . As a result, Major gained between 200 and 300 yards . Af- Scales' men withdrew from the hill and ter having reached ground that was spent the night in practically the same favorable for night defense, both bat- positions from which they had launched talions were ordered at 1600 to halt their attack on the morning of D plus 8. for the day . Since it was still considered Progress on 27 February was little possible that the enemy might attempt better to the right of the 23d Marines, a flanking attack from the sea, elements where the 25th Marines, with 3/24 at- of 3/25 were held in reserve near the tached, jumped off at 0800. On the regi- East Boat Basin with the specific mis- mental left, the advance of 1/25 sion of defending that area against any hinged on the progress made by 3/23 . If further attack from the ocean . the latter succeeded in seizing the crest As D plus 8 ended, an analysis of the of Hill 382, 1/25 was to advance north progress made that day showed clear- through part of the 3/23 zone of at- ly that the gains made were minimal . tack, then pivot southeastward to en- Summing up the situation at Hill 382, velop Turkey Knob while 2/25 was to the 4th Division noted with some dis- 654 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS gust that "it was envisaged that the though unobserved, was expected to capture of this terrain freak would be a have resulted in the destruction of most costly and a time-consuming job ."10 of the supplies that had been airlifted to General Senda's 2d Mixed Brigade, THE BATTLE OF ATTRITION" elements of which were still holding For 4th Division Marines, the night the crest of Hill 382 . The cargo re- from 27-28 February proved to be a ceived by the Japanese that night con- restless one . Throughout the darkness, sisted of medical supplies and ammu- both the front and rear areas came un- nition, dropped with paper parachutes der heavy mortar fire . For a while it from planes based elsewhere in the appeared that the enemy had singled Bonins. Some of these supplies, still at- out the division command post for tached to the flimsy parachutes, were special punishment, and no less than recovered several days later when Ma- 15 heavy shells hit the CP prior to rines entered the drop zone . 2200 .12 At the same time, the enemy Objectives for the continuation of fired on the beach area with either 20mm the attack on the last day of February, or 40mm automatic weapons . Offshore, D plus 9, remained unchanged though ships of Task Force 54 furnished nor- some of the regimental boundaries mal harassing and illumination fires . within the 4th Division underwent a The enemy probed various sectors in slight change. On the left, the 23d Ma- the 4th Marine Division lines, but no rines was to continue the assault on Hill counterattack developed. 382 ; in the center, 1/25 and 2/25 were Shortly before 0100, the 23d Marines to continue their envelopment of Turkey reported that enemy cargo parachutes Knob, while 3/25 along the coast was were dropping into the enemy lines to advance to the 0-2 Line . about 400 to 600 yards ahead of them . At 0815, following a 45-minute ar- Strangely enough, none of the enemy tillery preparation, the assault battal- planes had been picked up by the Amer- ions of the 4th Marine Division jumped ican radar on and around Iwo Jima . off. On the left, the 23d Marines, re- Nevertheless, the visual sightings were inforced with one company of the 24th sufficient to spur American artillery into Marines, resumed the attack with 1/23 vigorous action . Concentrated artillery on the left and 2/23 on the right after and naval gunfire into the drop zone, the latter battalion had relieved 3/23 . The 2d Battalion, under Major Robert 10 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 25. H. Davidson, attempted an advance in- "Additional material in this section is de- rived from: 1/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Jan- to the area between Hill 382 and Tur- 15Mar45, dtd 27Mar45, hereafter 1/14 OpRpt ; key Knob, while 1/23 again assaulted 3/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-13Mar45, dtd the hill from the east. Following the 27Mar45, hereafter 3/14 OpRpt ; 1/25 OpRpt, jumpoff, 2/23 advanced about 200 yards Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-17Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, before it came under increasingly heavy hereafter 1/25 OpRpt ; 1st JASCO OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 24Aug44-18Mar45, hereafter 1st mortar and automatic weapons fire JASCO OpRpt. from concealed bunkers and pillboxes . "4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 26. The 1st Battalion likewise drew fire

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 655

from automatic weapons and mortars, enemy small arms and automatic wea- which brought its advance to a virtual pons. Corps and division observers standstill . The 3d Battalion spent most teamed up in an effort to pinpoint as of the morning reorganizing and did many as possible of the cleverly hid- not start its push up the southwestern den enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket slopes of Hill 382 until later in the af- positions, a slow and time-consuming ternoon. process that did not always produce im- As a result, the only battalion of the mediate results . 23d Marines to make any appreciable The difficult terrain, combined with gains in the course of the morning was Japanese expertise in mining the ap- 2/23. At 1300, following a 10-minute proaches to the front lines and the ex- preparation, 1/23 launched a coordinat- cellent marksmanship of the enemy an- ed attack with the 21st Marines of the titank gun crews, severely curtailed the adjacent 3d Marine Division . This joint use of tanks in close support of the in- venture resulted in a 300-yard advance fantry. Nevertheless, individual tanks of 1/23 near the division boundary . were able to move forward to deliver Other elements of 1/23, attacking Hill overhead fire, which was helpful but 382 from the east, destroyed two of still lacked the volume necessary to be Colonel Nishi's dug-in tanks and con- really effective. Finally, it was decided tinued the ascent to a point where they that the 4 .5-inch rockets of the 1st Pro- could take the enemy on top of the hill visional Rocket Detachment might pro- under fire . By midafternoon, Hill 382 vide the massed firepower needed. Ini- was virtually surrounded ; the noose tially, whenever the rocket trucks around the Japanese was further tight- went into action, they invariably at- ened when two companies of 3/23 were tracted immediate counterbattery fire committed to reinforce the lines of the from the enemy entrenched on the do- two assault battalions. minating heights blessed with the ad- Despite the punishment he was tak- vantage of unlimited observation . In ing, the enemy atop Hill 382 continued order to compete effectively at such a to fight as if nothing out of the or- disadvantage, the rocket launcher crews dinary were happening around him . In employed hit-and-run tactics . Rocket addition to resistance coming from the trucks would whip into position, fire hill itself, the Marines of the encircling their launchers, and take off to pre- force drew heavy mortar, rocket, and designated assembly points in the rear artillery fire from enemy positions hid- with all possible speed . If a particularly den in the jumbled rocks to the east of intensive barrage was desired, six the hill. Behind the American lines, the trucks and launchers would fire once, supporting weapons did all they could reload with rockets carried on the ve- to support the attack of the infantry hicles, fire a second salvo, and then against Hill 382 . In addition to firing head for the rear. In this way, a double ripple of 432 rounds could be delivered preparations before the jumpoff, the 13 14th Marines shelled the area ahead in somewhat less than five minutes . of the infantry in an attempt to silence '3 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx C, p. 27. 656 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

By late afternoon of 28 February, it mendous mortar and artillery barrage ; became evident that despite the deterio- heavy machine gun fire from the front rating situation of enemy troops on the and the left flank began to rake the crest of Hill 382, capture of. this ob- Marines. Prompt counterbattery fire jective would not be completed in the called for by observers with the 1st Bat- remaining hours of daylight . As a re- talion failed to silence the enemy bat- sult, the 23d Marines remained active teries . By noon, the situation of 1/25 well into the night in an attempt to in the woods had become critical and the consolidate its lines for night defense. battalion was suffering heavy casual- The 1st Battalion, in particular, found ties . Nevertheless, Major Mee, the bat- it extremely difficult to close the gap talion commander, ordered his men to on the left with the 21st Marines . This hold the woods in order to enable the was finally accomplished under sniper southern pincers to complete the en- fire from enemy pockets that has been velopment of Turkey Knob . As Company bypassed in the adjacent 21st Marines' B, which was to make the envelopment, zone of advance during the day . Gains started its encircling movement, sup- made by the 23d Marines on D plus 9 ported by two Shermans, the enemy on totalled about 300 yards on the left and the high ground east of the objective 200 yards on the right . started to shower the force with hand As Colonel Wensinger's regiment grenades, at the same time raking them vainly struggled to complete the cap- with accurate machine gun fire . One of ture of Hill 382 on D plus 9, the ad- the tanks soon hit a mine and was dis- jacent 25th Marines faced its own or- abled ; the other managed to pull back . deal in its drive to seize Turkey Knob, At the fury of the enemy fire in- the Amphitheater, and the area sepa- creased and casualties mounted, the at- rating the Knob from the east coast . tack of Company B stalled . By 1645 it At 0815, the regiment, with 3/24 at- was readily apparent that continuation tached, jumped off in the same forma- of the attack in the face of such heavy tion it had maintained on the previous enemy resistance during the limited day. Two companies of the 1st Battal- daylight remaining would serve no use- ion, plus one company of 3/24, were to ful purpose, and both pincers of 1/25 attempt an envelopment of Turkey pulled back to their respective start- Knob from the north, while another ing positions. In the fading daylight, company was to advance along the low two tanks made their way forward to a ground southwest of the Knob and at- point northwest of Turkey Knob and tack eastward around the Amphitheater from this vantage point opened fire until it could link up with the north- against the enemy communications cen- ern pincers. ter atop the hill. The 75mm shells, to Following the usual preparation, ele- all appearances, did little damage to the ments of the 1st Battalion moved into concrete structure and the shelling was the wooded area just north of Turkey ineffective. Knob and advanced some 50 yards . At To the right of 1/25, the 2d Battal- this point, the enemy unleashed a tre- ion attempted to extend its left flank

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 657 to support the advance of the southern On the right of the 25th Marines' pincers of 1/25 . To this end, it had to zone of advance, 3/25 jumped off on seize the high ground directly to its the morning of D plus 9 at the same front. Enemy fire, most of it coming time as the other battalions of the di- from pillboxes to the left of the bat- vision. Moving eastward roughly paral- talion zone of advance, pinned down the lel to the east coast, the battalion had infantry. The difficult terrain made it gained about 100 yards by 1000 . At that impossible for the Shermans and half- time, the advance of the adjacent 2d tracks to give close support to the in- Battalion began to bog down, and 3/25, fantry. The attack soon stalled . At noon, which was pacing itself by the progress the battalion commander, Lieutenant of the unit on its left, also halted the Colonel Taul, decided to improvise in attack. Since 2/25 on the left failed to order to get the attack moving again . make any further progress for the day, He requested and received permission neither did 3/25 . At 1800, units of the to have a 75mm pack howitzer rushed 25th Marines were ordered to consoli- forward, to be used as a direct assault date for the night . weapon. A DUKW was used to trans- In summing up the results of the port the howitzer to a position just be- day's operations, the 4th Marine Divi- hind the front lines . There, the gun sion felt that, even though the enemy was dismantled and the various pieces was still clinging to the crest of Hill were gingerly hand-carried into the 382 and Turkey Knob, the day's limited zone of advance of 2/25, where the advance had outflanked these enemy piece was carefully reassembled . Once strongpoints. The feeling was that 4th this feat had been accomplished, the Division Marines could henceforth by- pack howitzer pumped 40 rounds at pass the Amphitheater and continue the concrete structure atop Turkey the drive along the east coast of Iwo Knob. Most of the shells bounced harm- Jima. Despite the small gains made on lessly off the thick concrete walls and D plus 9, the division intelligence of- did little, if any, damage to the com- ficer felt that the central defensive core munications center . However, it was not of resistance had been cracked . He af- altogether a wasted effort for the bat- firmed the possibility of an enemy talion reported that while "the direct counterattack, but assumed that the result to the enemy was not readily ap- Japanese would be least likely to mount parent, the morale effect on the men any major counterattack in the zone of of this battalion was of considerable action of the 4th Division because of the value because after the howitzer was difficult terrain.h Events were to prove fired our lines advanced approximately this forecast only 50 percent correct . 75 yards by 1900."14 Two hours later, Throughout 28 February, the assault under cover of darkness, the pack battalions had received a variety of as- howitzer was again disassembled and sistance from the supporting arms . Off- returned to its parent organization. ` 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No . 57, dtd 28- "2/25 OpRpt, p . 8. Feb45. 658 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS shore, gunfire support ships furnished Division orders for 1 March called call-fire missions, while smaller craft for continuation of the attack against fired mortars in support of 2/25 and Hill 382 and Turkey Knob . Beginning 3/25. During the afternoon a destroyer at 0530, the 24th Marines was to re- approached the east shore and began lieve the depleted units of the 23d, with shelling enemy positions on the high 2/24 relieving 1/23 and 1/24 taking ground in front of the 2/25 zone of ad- over the 2/23 sector.1 T The relief was vance. Air support extended to the en- completed by 0630 without major in- tire 4th Division sector, though half cident and, following a 45-minute naval of the napalm bombs dropped in front gunfire and corps artillery preparation, of the 25th Marines in the course of the attack against the key enemy de- the morning failed to ignite. A second fenses resumed . For 10 minutes prior to strike, this time in support of the 23d H-Hour, set for 0830, the division ar- Marines, took unduly long to be ex- tillery blasted enemy positions in the ecuted. When the aircraft did arrive, division zone of advance . they went into action against the wrong On the division left, the 24th Ma- target area.16 rines jumped off, with the 2d Battalion, The night from D plus 9 to D plus commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 10 turned out to be another restless one Richard Rothwell on the left and 1/24, for Marines of the 4th Division . The under Major Paul S. Treitel, on the enemy concentrated his artillery fire right. Almost immediately, 2/24 was against rear installations of the 5th hit by heavy artillery and mortar fire . Marine Division and scored several In order to keep his battalion from get- lucky hits on the ammunition dumps ting bogged down, Lieutenant Colonel of that division . The resulting explo- Rothwell requested supporting fire . sions coming from the rear did little Shortly after 0930, carrier aircraft to reassure the men of any of the three dropped napalm about 600 yards in divisions. Some enemy mortar and ar- front of 2/24. The aerial assault was fol- tillery fire also fell in the 4th Division lowed within the hour by a fire con- area, causing further disruption of centration against the same area by sleep. Alert Marines of 3/23 frustrated the corps artillery ; this fire was fol- several enemy attempts to infiltrate lowed by naval gunfire . This counter- their lines, and 29 enemy dead were fire had a salutory effect and enemy op- found in front of the lines on the fol- position diminished to the extent that lowing morning. Around 2200, the 25th elements of the battalion, in the course Marines noticed that the enemy in com- of the afernoon, were able to make pany strength was massing for a coun- gains of 150 yards . ter attack near the coast in the 3/25 While part of 2/24, notably Company area. Naval gunfire and shore-based ar- F, was engaged in attacking northeast- tillery promptly fired on and dispersed ward along the boundary with the 3d this assembly . Marine Division, at times even cross- 19 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 55, dtd 28- Feb45. " 4th MarDiv OpO 10-45, dtd 28Feb45 . THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 659 ing the boundary, the gains made by without letup. While hand grenades General Erskine's men on 1 March ex- flew back and forth, assault squads ceeded those of the 4th Division and, were blowing cave entrances, and flame- in consequence, a gap developed along throwers were incinerating such Japa- the boundary. Colonel Walter I . Jor- nese as showed themselves . Lieutenant dan, commanding the 24th Marines, at Colonel Rothwell, escorted by his com- 1430 had to commit two companies of pany commanders, appeared on the 3/24 into the gap in order to regain scene in order to conduct a personal contact with the 3d Division along the reconnaissance, select positions for the left flank. coming night, and make plans for the Somewhat farther to the south, the attack on D plus 11 . Despite heavy fire battle for Hill 382 continued with un- that was coming from nearly every di- diminished fury . The reduction of the rection, the reconnaissance party com- battered strongpoint fell to Company pleted its inspection and the battalion G, 2/24, which assaulted the hill with commander left the hill unscathed. As flamethrowers, bazookas, grenades, and the day ended, the remnants of Major whatever else was at hand. Just as ele- Anso's battalion clung to the crest of ments of the 23d Marines had previ- Hill 382, still full of fighting spirit de- ously fought their way to the top to spite the loss of their commander. engage in close combat with the de- Along the southern slopes of the hill fenders, only to be driven off, so it was and near its base to the southeast, the with the determined Marines of Com- fighting on D plus 10 waxed just as pany G, 2/24 . The viciousness of the bitterly as it did at the top . Here, 1/24 fighting that ensued has been depicted was attempting an envelopment of Hill in these words : 382 from the south against heavy fire At one time, Company G of 2/24 was coming not only from the top of the astride the top, but still there was no hill but also from a patch of woods quarter . The attackers fought with rifles directly in front and the high ground and grenades, with flamethrowers and beyond. As men of the 1st Battalion satchel charges . Still the defenders would not give up, even though their own fire inched ahead, two tanks attached to fell on them from the ridges further east . Company C provided covering fire. Just These were the men from Kumamoto in before noon, the company commander Kyushu, a historic battlefield of the 1877 was wounded and casualties mounted to Civil War, and they would not give up. a point where smoke had to be employed Not even when Major Kenro Anso died, to screen evacuation of the wounded. burned from head to foot by a flame- thrower. He led the 3d Battalion, 145th Following a heavy artillery and mor- Regiment, in defense of the hill . So great tar concentration, and led by a new was his inspiration that at his death he commander, Company C resumed the was promoted two full ranks to colonel . attack at 1300 . Within minutes, the new As the afternoon wore on, the bat- commander was wounded and had to tle for control of the hill continued be replaced. Despite all enemy opposi- tion, the company continued its dogged 7e Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 212. advance and by 1700, when it began to 660 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

consolidate its positions, it had seized hit by heavy mortar, artillery, and ma- some of the high ground to the south- chine gun fire, which caused the ad- east of Hill 382 . vance to bog down. Despite counter- The biggest gains for the 24th Ma- battery fire and aerial spotting, it proved rines on D plus 10 were to accrue along impossible to put the enemy mor- the 4th Division boundary, where 2/24 tars out of action, nor were the aerial made an advance of 400 yards to the observers able to spot to the cleverly east. To the right, the dogged attack concealed enemy artillery positions. of 1/24 to the high ground southeast Fighting for the woods raged of Hill 382 culminated in a gain of 200 throughout 1 March, as Marines of 1/25 yards. This forward movement, flanking pressed the attack . It was an unequal Hill 382 from two sides, all but sur- contest with the enemy possessing the rounded the enemy atop the hill, though advantage of cover, concealment, com- this made little, if any, difference to manding terrain, and superior fire Japanese determined to die there . Of power. In the end, the assault units of added importance to the further ad- 1/25 had to pull back to their jump- vance of the 24th Marines was the fact off positions. As the tired men began that from the high ground southeast of their withdrawal the enemy, in a final Hill 382, Company C was able to look gesture of defiance, subjected them to down on the ruins of Minami Village . a heavy mortar and rocket barrage, Thus it appeared that the day's ad- which caused additional casualties . The vance had served not only to outflank withdrawal was accomplished with the most of Hill 382, but a portion of Tur- help of a smoke screen, which also made key Knob and the Amphitheater as it possible to evacuate the casualties . well. Shortly after 1600, the Japanese added To the south, the 25th Marines, at- insult to injury by subjecting Colonel tacking in the same formation employ- Lanigan's command post to a severe ed in previous days, also was in for a shelling. hard day's work . The regiment's plan Since the remaining two battalions was ambitious : to execute a double en- of the 25th Marines were pacing them- velopment of Turkey Knob, supported selves in relation to gains to be made by two companies of 3/23 which re- by the 1st Battalion, they remained lieved elements of 3/24 that had been more or less in place when it became attached to 1/25 for the past two days . apparent that the attack of 1/25 had As the 1st Battalion moved out, sup- bogged down . Nevertheless, 2/25 did ported by the companies of 3/23, it succeed in gaining 100 yards along its crossed an open area prior to entering left. For the most of the day, the di- the woods to its front . Upon reaching vision reconnaissance company was at- the edge of' the woods around 1000, 1/25 tached to 2/25 in order to mop up the encountered the same conditions that rear area . From the 3/25 area, a tank had halted the advance on the previous was able to destroy two enemy ma- day. Once again, Major Mee's men were chine guns, but no additional ground THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 661 was taken . Indicative of the artillery Early on 2 March, General Cates' di- support furnished to the 25th Marines vision again resumed the battle of at- by 1/14 on D plus. 10 are the following trition in the Meat Grinder . Though figures. The battalion fired 4,640 rounds none of the weary 4th Division Marines for 135 missions, of which 94 were was aware of it that morning, the final harassing, 31 were aimed at targets of battle for the Meat Grinder was about opportunity, 6 were for preparation, and to begin. The main effort was to be 4 were fired at miscellaneous targets ."' made by the 24th Marines against Hill The figures listed above do not include 382, while farther south the 23d and the defensive fires, which 1/14 started 25th Marines were to assault the Am- at 1640, and harassing fires which phitheater and Turkey Knob from the continued throughout the night . north and south . If the heavy enemy As D plus 10 came to a close, the 4th fire against Hill 382 from these two Marine Division could book only very staunch bastions of the enemy defense limited gains for itself. After five days system could be eliminated, the hill it- of continuous assault into the Meat self could be taken. Grinder, all three of the mutually sup- Following a 25-minute artillery prep- porting cornerstones of the enemy de- aration fired by the corps artillery fense system, Hill 382, Turkey Knob, from H-Hour minus 30 to minus 15, and the Amphitheater were still in en- and again from minus 10 to H-Hour, the emy hands, and, with the exception of assault resumed . On the morning of Hill 382, firmly so. With the heaviest D plus 11, there was one change in assaults still ahead, the combat effici- the preparatory fires . Precisely at H- ency of the 4th Division on the evening Hour, 0800, the division artillery un- of 1 March remained at 55 percent 20 leashed an intensive preparation, fol- The night from 1-2 March passed lowed by a rolling barrage. with few untoward incidents, except On the division left, the 24th Ma- in front of 2/24, where small groups rines with 3/24 on the right, 2/24 in of the enemy made various attempts the center, and 1/24 on the left moved at infiltration, keeping the battalion in out for the attack. The 3d Battalion, a general state of unrest. All of the 4th commanded by Major Doyle A . Stout, Division units came under sporadic advanced eastward along the division enemy mortar and artillery fire that boundary northeast of Hill 382 and, hit the lines and rear area in a seeming- while keeping contact with 3d Divi- ly haphazard fashion. By way of re- sion elements on its left, advanced about sponse, the corps and division artillery 300 yards . As the battalion fought its replied to each enemy salvo with im- way forward, enemy opposition stiffen- mediate counterbattery fire, the results ed until all further movement became of which could not be readily deter- impossible. mined. It was in the regiment's center and 19 1/1 .4 OpRpt, p. 16, dtd 1Mar45 . on its right that the most desperate ° 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 30 . fighting for the day was to occur . It 662 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS fell to 2/24 to launch an assault against ly large caliber of mortar shells em- Hill 382 from the northeast, while 1/24 ployed. As elsewhere on Iwo Jima, the enveloped the hill from the south. At artillery and naval gunfire furnished in the time they jumped off, the men of support of the attack was of little bene- 2/24 had spent an even more restless fit to the infantrymen slowly inch- night than had other units in the di- ing their way up the reverse slope of vision . The front lines on Hill 382 had Hill 382, exposed to everything the ene- been active throughout the night . Hand my was capable of throwing at them grenade duels and hand-to-hand fight- with little else but their own organic ing frequently erupted with small weapons to answer. groups of the enemy that filtered out As the attack was on the verge of of recesses in the hill in front of the bogging down, Lieutenant Colonel Marine positions, between them, and Rothwell assembled his company com- even to the rear . In fact, two Marines manders a short distance behind the had received saber cuts during the lines and decided that one . platoon of nocturnal fighting.2' Nevertheless, the Company E, accompanied by two battalion attacked Hill 382 with vigor, tanks, was to make an attempt to out- even though it was immediately sub- flank the stubborn enemy defenders jected to heavy machine gun, rifle, from the right . At this time, a platoon mortar, and artillery fire. Since Lieuten- of Company E, commanded by 2d Lieu- ant Colonel Rothwell's men constituted tenant Richard Reich, had already the main effort, four Shermans and a reached the top of the hill and was section of the 1st Provisional Rocket locked in close combat with the enemy Detachment furnished support, in ad- underneath the radar antenna at the dition to the division artillery. A.- the same spot which already had seen vi- tanks and rocket launchers blasted the cious close fighting when the 23d Ma- area ahead of 2/24 with shells and rines was attempting to seize the hill. flame, they were spotted by the enemy As Major Roland Carey, commanding and taken under such heavy fire that Company E, attempted to relay the or- the armor had to pull back . The rocket ders for the flanking movement to his launchers were able to fire three mis- men, he was hit by machine gun fire sions before they, too, had to be with- and had to be evacuated. The executive drawn . officer, Captain Pat Donlan, took over By 1100, the frontal assault on Hill and prepared to see that his predeces- 382 was beginning to bog down in sor's orders were carried out . the face of interlocking enemy machine Just as Captain Donlan was in the gun fire, as well as heavy mortar fire . process of orienting his platoon lead- The importance that the Japanese at- ers and issuing orders for the flanking tached to the defense of the hill was movement at the battalion command underscored not only by the severity of post, he was hit by a fragment of a the mortar fire but also by the unusual- mortar shell exploding nearby . As one of the platoon leaders, 1st Lieutenant `1 2/24. AR, p. 16. Stanley Osborne, prepared to relieve

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 663

him, another large mortar shell scored introduces a new element in assessing a square hit on the command post with the progress made by 2/24 on 2 March devastating results by pointing out Osborne was killed instantly, Donlan's It appears that there are underground right leg was blown off below the knee, passageways leading into the defenses on and two other officers were wounded, one Hill 382 and when one occupant of a pill- mortally. Reich, still holding under the box is killed another one comes up to take radar screen, was in command. He was the his place. This is rather a lengthy only officer left in Company E ." process.' Despite the loss of five of its officers, And that is precisely the way it Company E continued the assault on turned out . For the remainder of D Hill 382. When elements of Company F, plus 11, 2/24 mopped up the objective commanded by Captain Walter Ridlon, and consolidated its positions atop the joined forces on the hill with Company hill. Because of the underground tun- E, the doom of the defenders was seal- nels linking various pillboxes and ed . By 1530, 2/24 reported the objec- strongpoints on the slopes of Hill 382, tive secured.23 Colonel Jordan, the re- "the mopup proved to be an almost in- gimental commander, had by this time terminable process ."27 In fact, sealing apparently grown somewhat leery of the caves around Hill 382 and the elimi- optimistic reports concerning the cap- nation of isolated enemy holdouts would ture of this particular objective, and require several additional days . But for in consequence, in describing the action all practical purposes, one of the three of 2 March, the 24th Marines reported strongpoints of the enemy defense only "that small gains were made system in the 4th Division zone of throughout the day all along the line advance had been eliminated, which left except in the vicinity of Hill 382 where the remaining two, Turkey Knob and ."24 The the bitter opposition continued the Amphitheater, somewhat more vul- regiment did not officially record the nerable to attack . capture of Hill 382 until the following Operations on D plus 11 to the south day. of Hill 382 also differed from those of There was some truth to the comment preceding days. While the enemy atop that enemy opposition at Hill 382 con- Hill 382 was treated to an exception- tinued, even though the Marines were ally heavy preparation on that day, now in possesssion of the crest . In the precisely the opposite was the case in words of one account of the action on the 25th Marines zone of advance . 2 March, "the hill was overrun, but it There, Colonel Lanigan decided to em- was not subdued ."25 A clue to this seem- ploy the element of surprise and launch ing contradiction may be found in a 4th an attack at 0630 without the benefit of Division report for D plus 11, which any artillery preparation . During the early stages of the action, while the 2" Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 215. 2/24 OpRpt, p. 188. 24 24th Mar OpRpt, p. 15. "4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 57 dtd 2Mar45 . Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 216. I Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 66. 664 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS enemy was still off guard, 1/25 was to succeed. However, as soon as the enemy infiltrate and seize the high ground became aware of this latest develop- north of Turkey Knob . Elements of 1/25 ment, he threw a tremendous barrage and 3/23, the latter having been at- against Company B, 1/25, which had tached to the 25th Marines, were to been inching its way north to the high execute an envelopment from the north- ground from positions south of the west and the south . Amphitheater. This murderous rocket The infiltration got under way at and mortar fire, interlaced with a heavy 0630 and proceeded on schedule for volume of small arms fire, inflicted over about 20 minutes . However, the Japa- 30 casualties on the company and forced nese soon recognized the multiple threat its withdrawal .21 facing them and at 0650 unleashed a In the center of the 25th Marines line, devastating rocket and mortar barrage 2/25 was to extend its left flank to as- against the assault forces . As Marines sist 1/25, and for this purpose one com- hit the ground to escape the lethal shell pany of 3/23 was attached to the bat- fragments, enemy machine guns opened talion. Since no appreciable gains were up at close range and raked the area in made by 1/25 during the day, the 2d which the assault force was pinned Battalion remained in place and spent down. All need for further secrecy hav- the day in mopping up enemy stragglers ing disappeared, Marine artillery and and reducing such fortifications in its mortars retaliated, and eight Shermans zone as the enemy still occupied or had moved forward in support of the attack . reoccupied. Similarly, 3/25, nearest the Once again, the large blockhouse atop coast, remained in position during the Turkey Knob drew most of the support- early part of the day . Enemy mortar ing fire. A large number of 75mm shells fire into these positions caused several and no less than 1,000 gallons of flame- casualties, leading Captain James C . thrower fuel were hurled against this Headley, the battalion commander, to impressive obstacle, but no immediate make this comment effects of this fire became apparent . The Throughout this period of time we were blockhouse appeared to be unoccupied suffering casualties from enemy mortar after the tank attack, but it was as- fire and our failure to advance while suf- fering casualties had a depressing effect sumed that the enemy would feed re- upon the morale of the troops .' placements into it through tunnels as soon as the fury of the American as- During the late afternoon of 2 March, elements on the right of 2/25 and the sault diminished . 3d Battalion finally were given permis- Under cover of the heavy support- sion to advance to the high ground ing fire, the envelopment of Turkey directly to their front . Surprisingly Knob continued, though progress was enough, the enemy did not contest this slow. By 1430, the two pincers of the advance, and the 25th Marines gained double envelopment were only 65 yards from each other, and for a while it ap- 2'25th Mar OpRpt, p . 12 . peared that the movement might still 2D 8/24 OpRpt, p. 11 .

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 665 300 yards, enabling the regiment to a division public relations photographer consolidate on the freshly taken high took pictures from an altitude of 1,000 ground . feet. This improvisation became neces- By evening of D plus 11, the 4th sary because "the sustained bombard- Division line protruded both in the north ment of Iwo Jima had so torn the face and in the south, hanging back only in of the land that pre-D-Day maps were the center where the Amphitheater and by now of little use in terrain apprecia- Turkey Knob remained to be taken . tion.-" Overall, important progress had been The night from 2-3 March passed made during the day with the seizure without major incidents. It almost ap- of Hill 382 and the unexpectedly easy peared as if the Japanese were begin- advance near the coast during the latter ning to feel the results of the prolonged part of the day . The fighting for Hill battle of attrition . Along the 4th Ma- 382 had been costly for 2/24, in par- rine Division lines, the only action oc- ticular, which summed up the day's curred in front of 2/24, where the fighting as follows enemy attempted an infiltration. Once the presence of the intruders had been Today's fighting more intense than any other day up until now . Enemy resistance discovered, a lively firefight ensued . It very heavy. Many pillboxes and strong ended when the enemy withdrew, leav- emplacements to the direct front . Many ing behind 20 dead . Four Marines of officers, NCO's and experienced personnel 2/24 were killed in this action .32 were casualties . Leadership now an acute For the continuation of the assault on problem . Enemy installations knocked out during the day's advance : 8 machine guns ; 3 March, General Cates made certain 15 cave entrances, from which fire was changes in the disposition of his forces . being received, were sealed ; one 47mm gun At 0500, the 23d Marines relieved the in bunker knocked out. No count of enemy 25th and just before H-Hour, set for dead, estimated to be over 1003 0 0630, 1/23 passed through 1/25 . The 2d Throughout 2 March, Marines on the and 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, were ground had received excellent support attached to the 23d and retained their from the sea as well as from the air . positions in the center and on the right . Two battleships and one cruiser fur- There were no changes in the 24th Ma- nished general support, while destroyers rines' sector, where Colonel Jordan's and gunboats deployed near the eastern men were preparing to continue the at- bulge of the island to shell the rocky tack, except that Company L, 3/24, suf- draws leading down to the sea . Carrier- fered 22 casualties while relieving ele- based aircraft carried out six strikes ments of the 9th Marines near the di- 33 against enemy positions in front of the vision boundary . 4th Division. The pilots and observers In an attempt to use the element of of VMO-4 flew five missions, includ- surprise, the 4th Marine Division attack ing a rather unorthodox one in which "4th MarDiv OpRpt, Sec IV, p. 32 . " I bid. "2124 OpRpt, p . 189. 30 24th Mar OpRpt, p. 16. 666 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS was not preceded by any preparatory were well protected from the support- fire. On the division left, the 24th Ma- ing artillery fire. Tanks and flame- rines jumped off against formidable new thrower tanks, in particular, encount- defenses in its zone of advance, the bulk ered major problems in getting into of which appeared to be concentrated on position. Once there, their fields of fire the high ground to the northeast of Hill were limited so that they could effec- 382, and in the vicinity of Minami Vil- tively concentrate only on a few em- lage. Initial resistance was heavy, and placements. As the infantry approached mortar, artillery, machine gun, and rifle the enemy positions, the very close sup- fire hit the assault companies as soon as port needed could be furnished only by they began to move out. Directly in front 60mm and 81mm mortars emplaced of 2/24 were pillboxes and reinforced within 50 yards of the front lines. A concrete emplacements, including one shortage of ammunition limited the emplacement containing a high velocity employment of the 81mm mortars, so gun. that these weapons were fired only Immediately following the jump-off, periodically and when dire necessity corps and division artillery began to made their close supporting fires indis- pound these defenses with some effect . pensable. The regiment, with 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 As usual, the infantry bore the brunt from left to right, slowly advanced of the fighting. Marines, equipped with against the enemy positions to its front . demolitions, portable flamethrowers, a Some progress was made until the lines variety of small arms, bazookas, and advanced to a point close enough to work smoke and fragmentation grenades, on enemy emplacements with demoli- maneuvered into position in small tions and flamethrowers . Once this groups and attempted to neutralize the close-in fighting got under way, fierce enemy positions one by one . It was a action ensued and the assault slowed slow, tedious, and costly process calling to a crawl. The terrain consisted of for able leadership on the part of squad numerous hillocks, mounds, and shal- and fire team leaders, a number of whom low cross-corridors with vertical sides. were killed or wounded and had to be Covered reinforced concrete and sand- evacuated . covered log machine gun and rifle em- By late afternoon, the center of the placements with firing ports covering 24th Marines had advanced 350 yards, the front and both flanks blocked the with smaller gains along the northern advance. It soon became apparent that and southern flanks . Throughout the the line of defense to the north and east day, the Shermans of Company B, 4th of Hill 382 had a depth of over 300 Tank Battalion, gave as much support yards. to the regiment as the difficult terrain The difficulties accompanying an allowed . Rocket launchers employed advance into prepared positions of this their now customary hit and run tactics type were only too apparent. Due to the to escape counterbattery fire from the character of the terrain, these defenses enemy mortars and artillery . THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 667 When Colonel Jordan's regiment con- regiment's right soon lagged when solidated on D plus 12, the 3d Bat- Marines drew fire from the concrete talion on the left had tied in with blockhouse atop Turkey Knob . In ad- elements of the 9th Marines, while 1/24 dition, the enemy had mined the routes on the right held a narrow front with of approach . Any attempt to remove only Company B in the line . After an- these antipersonnel mines was frus- other day of fatiguing combat, the men trated by deadly accurate sniper fire . were even more exhausted than on the Nevertheless, by 1400 the attached previous day . Their condition was engineer platoon had cleared a path graphically outlined in a 2/24 report for over which flame tanks and infantry the day : demolition teams were able to get with- Men very tired and listless, lack leaders . in effective range of the blockhouse . As Close support by effective close support a result of the combined teamwork of weapons, such as tanks and 37mm weap- these arms, the blockhouse atop Turkey ons not possible except in rare instances, Knob was partially reduced in a slow due to terrain limiting fields of fire . Tank and costly assault that continued dur- support is seldom sufficient to warrant the casualties resulting from the counter- ing the latter part of the afternoon . By mortar fire" evening of 3 March, however, when Bitter fighting also marked the day's units consolidated for the night, the operations to the south of the 24th Japanese were still firmly in control of Marines, where the enemy still retained Turkey Knob. a strong hold both on the Amphitheater While 1/23 was battling for pos- and Turkey Knob . There, 1/23 was to session of the Knob, the remaining two make the main attack southeastward battalions of the 23d Marines remained above the Amphitheater and link up in position, except for Company K, 3/23, with units on the left of 2/25 . If com- which, supported by tanks and 75mm pleted, this envelopment would result in halftracks, assaulted stubborn enemy reduction of Turkey Knob and encircle- defenses along the southwestern portion ment of the well-dug-in enemy troops of the Amphitheater . Towards the end in the Amphitheater . In order to support of the day, Company I was moved into the attack, Company C, 4th Tank Bat- a gap south of the Amphitheater be- talion and a platoon of the 4th Engineer tween 1/23 and 2/25. The 2d Battalion Battalion were attached to 1/23 . of the 23d Marines remained in corps Following the artillery preparation reserve for the day ; it occupied an as- which came after the jump-off, the en- sembly area between the Southern and emy initially appeared stunned and, in Central Airfields and could be moved the words of the regimental report, "the anywhere within the Corps zone of initial phase of the attack progressed action as required . For the remainder favorably ."35 However, progress on the of D plus 12, 2/25 and 3/25 remained in their respective positions on the di-

~' 2/24 OpRpt, p . 191 . vision's right, while 1/25 in division ~" 23d Mar OpRpt, p . 14 . reserve underwent reorganization and 668 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

rehabilitation, and got some badly rines. There, small groups of the enemy needed rest. attempted unsuccessfully to infiltrate Throughout the day, the slight but the lines of 3/24 . The enemy placed nevertheless important gains made by heavy artillery and mortar fire into the 4th Marine Division had been the 24th Marines area throughout the achieved with the help of the support- night, causing moderate casualties . Four ing arms. Within the division, 2/14 had destroyers provided illumination during furnished direct support to the 23d Ma- the night. rines, while 1/14 had reinforced the At 0730, 4 March, the 4th Marine fires of 2/14. The 24th Marines had been Division continued its attack with no directly supported by 3/14, while 4/14 change in its formation or direction of was in general support . The 4th Tank advance. Prior to the jumpoff, the corps Battalion had furnished such assistance and division artillery fired a half-hour as the difficult terrain permitted. By the preparation, which was further supple- end of 3 March, 36 tanks were oper- mented by naval gunfire . In contrast to ational, 12 had been destroyed, and 8 the preceding days, the weather on D had been damaged.16 Ships of TF 54 plus 13 was overcast and showers began continued to provide supporting fire, but to fall in the morning. Because of the the use of such support was restricted leaden skies and the limited visibility, because of safety factors dictated by all air strikes had to be cancelled . It also the location of the front lines . was a very poor day for aerial obser- At the end of D plus 12, the combat vation. efficiency of the 4th Marine Division was On the ground, the battle of attrition estimated to be 50 percent . All units continued . On the division left, the 24th were ordered to consolidate at 1700, Marines attacked in a generally south- prepared to continue the attack on the easterly direction. The direction of following day . With the capture of Hill advance was to be parallel to the cor- 382, one of the main props of the ridors. Once again, the assault turned enemy's defensive system in the 4th into a step-by-step affair, as usual com- Division sector had been knocked out, bined with heavy casualties and little and despite heavy losses, it could be gain. Such progress as could be made assumed "that the Division was now was achieved with the assistance of the fighting in the rear of the highly pre- Shermans, which were employed with pared defensive area in which the oper- good effect against the numerous pill- ations for the past three days had been boxes and caves . Good results were also conducted."a7 obtained from the flamethrower tank The night from 3-4 March passed which scorched the enemy defenses . without major incident in the 4th Ma- Even though the regiment advanced rine Division zone of operations, except only about 100 yards, the steady de- for the sector occupied by the 24th Ma- struction of the formidable enemy de- fenses sooner or later was bound to "4th, MarDiv OpRpt, p . 34 . have a concrete effect . Indicative of the °' Ibid. regiment's effort is the fact that 2,200 THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 669 pounds of explosives were employed on ging, and in his battered positions in the D plus 13 to blow cave entrances and Amphitheater, he was clinging to every exits.38 foot of ground as resolutely as ever . On the division right, the 23d Ma- Nevertheless, there was a quiet feeling rines, with 2/25 and 3/25 still attached, of optimism that perhaps, after all, the 1/23 in line, and 2/23 in corps and 3/23 enemy might be beginning to crack . in division reserve, made small gains in Perhaps it was brought about by the the 1/23 zone of advance . The two at- decrease in the accuracy of the enemy tached battalions of the 25th Marines artillery and mortar fire resulting from on the regiment's right had to sit it out the accurate counterbattery fire fur- in their positions, much against their nished by the corps artillery. It was also will. As the division was to report the possible that the loss of Hill 382 and day's activities the severe mauling that Turkey Knob BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 could have ad- had taken by this time had deprived the vanced within their zones, but such an enemy's artillery observers of their advance was not deemed advisable because choice observation sites . it would have overextended the lines . The The battle of attrition being waged terrain in front of this RCT was the most difficult yet encountered ; observation was all over northern Iwo Jima was begin- limited to only a few feet, and it was im- ning to affect the enemy's power to possible to support the attack with any- resist, even though his spirit was as thing heavier than normal infantry high as ever . In recognition of the bit- weaponsB' ter struggle waged by General Kuri- By evening of 4 March, the combat bayashi against overwhelmingly super- efficiency of the 4th Marine Division ior American forces, his superiors in had dropped to 45 percent, the lowest Tokyo sent a message addressed both yet since the Marines had gone ashore to him and Admiral Ichimaru, express- on Iwo Jima . The enemy was still offer- ing Japan's admiration for the battle ing stubborn resistance from closely they were waging. Ichimaru replied integrated positions, and General Cates' "The enemy is hitting us hard, but we men were more exhausted than ever . will hit back."40 For his part, General This circumstance, combined with the Kuribayashi had earlier stated de- murky skies, the discomfort created by fiantly "I am not afraid of the fighting the rain, and the ever present enemy power of only three American divisions, snipers in front of, behind, and be- if only there were no bombardments tween the lines should, by all normal from aircraft and warships . This is the yardsticks, have reduced the morale of only reason why we have to see such the wet and tired Marines to a new low . miserable situations ."41 Yet, strangely enough, this was not Looking at the overall situation on the case . There was no definite indica- Iwo and the decimated remnants of his tion that the enemy's morale was sag- garrison, consisting of only 3,500 ef-

Ibid., p. 35. `° I bid., p. 225. Ibid. "Horie Rpt ., p. 9. 670 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS fectives, General Kuribayashi saw clear- ments to Iwo . However, in view of over- ly that his time was running short . In all requirements, I earnestly hope you desperation, he signalled Tokyo for help will maintain calm and fight staunchly on the evening of 4 March, calling for by any means . "44 air and naval support. "Send me these The meaning of this was clear and things, and I will hold this island", he Admiral Ichimaru, who had never ex- said. "Without them I cannot hold ."42 pected reinforcements in the first place, But there was no response from the accepted the inevitable . Clearly, the Iwo Japanese mainland, which itself was garrison was on its own, and its pro- reeling underneath the intensified Amer- longed death throes would, in any case, ican bombing attacks . In view of total be a lonely business . American air superiority in the Bonins and a mighty American fleet patrolling REORGANIZATION AND the surrounding waters, Iwo Jima was, CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK" indeed, isolated. The defenders of Iwo In accordance with General Schmidt's Jima had the full sympathy of almost order that 5 March was to be a day of the entire population of Japan, whose rest and rehabilitation for all VAC attention was riveted on the fierce bat- units, no offensive action was planned tle in progress there . On its part in the 4th Division sector on D plus . . . the Army High Command had mean- while been conducting earnest investiga- 14. Instead, the division was to re- tions into the possibility of mounting an organize so that by noon it would have effective attack against the U . S. naval one regiment, less one battalion, avail- forces which were swarming around Iwo able to continue the attack on a limited Jima. Air power on hand was small, how- front on the following day. The general ever, while overwater flight training was inadequate ; hence a massive effort could direction of the attack on 6 March was not be staged to be eastward. (See Map VIII, Map As for the Japanese Navy contingent Section) . on Iwo Jima, Admiral Ichimaru did not The regiment which General Cates even bother to radio for help . Admiral selected for the main effort was Colonel Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Wensinger's 23d Marines . In order to Imperial Navy, had sent word that the relieve this regiment from its other Navy would be ready for the next ex- duties, the area on the division's right pected American thrust by the end of reverted to the 25th Marines. The 2d April, but that all plans depended on and 3d Battalions of the 25th Marines, the outcome at Iwo. The message ended hitherto attached to the 23d, reverted to with these words : "I regret that except "Quoted in Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 207 . for full submarine support and some ' Additional material in this section is de- air support, we cannot send reinforce- rived from : 4th SerBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-19Mar45, dtd 2Apr45, hereafter 4th ' Quoted in Leckie, Strong Men Armed, SerBn OpRpt ; 4th MedBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, p. 456 . 19Feb-15Mar45, n. d., hereafter 4th MedBn "Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 138. OpRpt. THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 671 the parent regiment . The 1st Battalion, on targets of opportunity and executed 25th Marines, relieved 1/23 in almost harassing fires . A total of 17 missions identical positions held by 1/25 on 2 employed air observation . VMO-4 flew March. Since 3/23 was still heavily com- 10 tactical observation missions . One mitted along the southern fringes of the pilot was -wounded and evacuated. By Amphitheater, where it was mopping late afternoon of 5 March, the squadron up previously bypassed enemy defenses had four aircraft that were still opera- and overcoming other stubborn pockets tional. In addition to the artillery fire of resistance, Colonel Lanigan com- provided by the 14th Marines on D plus bined the division reconnaissance com- 14, elements of TF 54 fired call fire mis- pany, which had been attached to his sions throughout the day .4° regiment as of 0700 on 5 March, with It had, for all practical purposes, been Company L, 3/25, into a provisional bat- a quiet day on Iwo Jima . There had talion, commanded by Major Edward L . been no gains since there had been no Asbill, executive officer of 1/25 . In the offensive action . Yet, as this day of rest northern portion of the division sector, ended, "there had been more than 400 three companies of the 24th Marines casualties on the line where there was were pulled out of the line and stationed no fighting . The men got ready for the in the regimental rear area, where they next big push."47 were to form a strong regimental re- Following the day of rest, the VAC serve. In order to further bolster the offensive resumed on the morning of 6 25th Marines, Company B of the 2d March . In order to obtain the maximum Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion results from extensive massed prepara- was attached to the regiment . This com- tions, General Schmidt had ordered his pany was to patrol the beach areas divisions to attack in echelon . Each at- north of the 3/25 sector and fire on tack was to be preceded by an intensive targets along the beach. artillery and naval gunfire preparation, The reorganization within the 4th in which the corps and division artil- Division area of responsibility was com- lery, as well as the medium and heavy pleted by noon of 5 March, as scheduled. guns of the fire support ships, were to During the entire period of reorganiza- join.48 Altogether, not including the tion, beginning on the evening of 4 naval gunfire, 12 artillery battalions March, the enemy did not initiate any would unleash a devastating curtain of offensive action, though his supporting fire against the enemy garrison that arms remained active. During the night still blocked the path of the VAC from 4-5 March, only sporadic fire hit advance. They would first fire for ap- the 4th Division zone, with the excep- proximately 30 minutes at the western tion of the 24th Marines' area . There, portion of the front, then shift the heavy mortar and artillery fire Was preparation for a little over half an received almost incessantly during the "° 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 39. hours of darkness. Throughout D plus 4 P Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 244. 14, the 14th Marines continued to fire " VAC OpO 13-45, dtd 5Mar45. 672 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS hour to the eastern half . Within the sault companies moved forward about overall assault, the 4th Marine Division 50 yards . On the left, where the terrain was to jump off at 0900, H plus 60 min- favored the employment of armor, Com- utes, with the main effort on its left pany G, 2/23, supported by four tanks, in conjunction with the adjacent 9th gained 300 yards . As the company pre- Marines of the 3d Marine Division . pared to move into a gap that had arisen At 0845, the coordinated fire of the between it and Company F, the enemy 132 guns and the naval gunfire shifted caught Company G in a murderous mor- to support the second phase of the VAC tar barrage that caused numerous casu- attack along the eastern portion of the alties and wounded the company com- front. The shore-based artillery alone mander. Fierce fighting continued had expended 22,500 shells ranging from throughout the day . At 1800, when 2/23 75mm to 155mm in a little over an hour . dug in for the night, Company G on the In the zone of action of General Cates' left still was 350 yards in front of the division, the full force of the barrage line of departure ; the remainder of the was brought to bear on the left in the 2d and 3d Battalions, 23d Marines, had zone of action of the 23d Marines . gained approximately 100 yards during There, prior to 0600, the 23d Marines, the day. less 1/23, had moved into position . In To the right of the 23d Marines, 2/24 preparation for the assault, 2/23 had and 1/24 jumped off abreast at H-Hour. relieved 3/24 without enemy interfer- Almost immediately, Colonel Jordan's ence. The weather promised to be fair Marines found themselves in the same with good visibility ; only a slight haze type of terrain that had impeded the obscured observation in the early dawn . movements of the 23d Marines to the Following the earth-shaking artillery north. The ground was characterized by preparation, which gave way to a roll- a series of jagged ridges and heavy ing barrage, 2/23 jumped off at H-Hour, undergrowth, both favoring the defend- followed by the 3d Battalion at a 400- ing force. Despite support from gunfire yard interval. As the assault battalion ships and three heavy air strikes, enemy advanced eastward towards the high resistance continued undiminished . Af- ground to its front, it became apparent ter a day of exhausting and costly fight- that the heavy volume of artillery fire ing, the regiment gained 150 yards on had not incapacitated the Japanese who the left and even less on the right . emerged from their dugouts little the Since the Amphitheater and Turkey worse for wear and, in the extremely Knob had, for all practical purposes, al- rugged terrain, put up a spirited fight ready been bypassed prior to D plus 15, for every yard of the way and defended no frontal assault was launched against each cave, pillbox, and emplacement these positions, which still formed a with the greatest tenacity. deep salient in the 4th Division lines . As the advance gained momentum, in Because of these protruding enemy posi- the face of accurate fire from rifles and tions, the 23d and 24th Marines north automatic weapons to the front, the as- of this salient attacked in an east-south- THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 673 easterly direction, while the 25th Ma- fatigue and lack of experienced leaders rines to the south were attacking gen- is very evident in the manner in which erally to the northeast . As a result, it the units fight ."4° Conversely, the enemy appeared that all the 4th Division seemed to adapt himself readily to the thrusts on 6 March were directed gen- changing conditions on Iwo Jima by erally towards the remnants of Higashi making widespread use of American Village. equipment. Thus it was discovered dur- For the three battalions of the 25th ing the day that five enemy bodies in Marines, it was another day of waiting front of the 4th Division lines were for the left wing of the division to move fully dressed in Marine uniforms . One forward. Since no decisive gains were Japanese who decided to give American made by the 24th Marines, 2/25 and food a try was to record in his diary : 3/25 stayed in position and conducted "I tasted Roosevelt's rations for the mop-up operations within their respec- first time, and they were very good." tive areas. The only forward movement No doubt, the frequently maligned origi- took place in the 1/25 sector, where Ma- nator of the American combat rations rines continued chipping away at enemy would have been pleased with this fortifications to the east of Turkey compliment. Knob near Minami Village, supported The night of 6-7 March turned into by flame and medium tanks and 75mm a veritable hell for many 4th Division half-tracks . Once the armor had com- Marines. The continuous and exhaust- pleted its mission, the tanks were pulled ing action in preceding days had been back in order to prevent their exposure enough to wear down many of them, to the expected enemy counterbattery both physically and mentally. Instead of fire. the rest which they so badly needed and By evening of 6 March, it was evident desired, the men were kept in a state that the momentous artillery prepara- of upheaval all night by Japanese tion which had so promisingly ushered activity which, according to the official . in the resumed offensive had failed ut- report, was "sporadic but costly" 5o terly in crushing the enemy's will or At 2130, several enemy mortar shells capacity to resist . At the time it con- fell in the lines of 2/23, wounding ap- solidated for the night, the 4th Marine proximately 30 men. While confusion Division held a line extending for engulfed this hard-hit battalion, the roughly 2,470 yards . A gap of 400 yards action shifted to the right flank of the still separated the division's left flank 4th Division. There, shortly after 2200, from the right of the adjacent 3d enemy were reported moving in front Division . of 3/25. Immediate artillery fire was Once again, despite meager gains, the brought to bear on the enemy assembly, division's losses on D plus 15 had been which was dispersed . Up to this time, heavy. The division D-3 report for the 99 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 61, dtd day estimated combat efficiency at 40 6Mar45. percent and added that "the result of G0 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 40. 674 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS all had remained quiet in front of 1/25, the assault in the same direction and but as the night continued, an estimated with the same lineup of units as on the 40-50 Japanese infiltrated the battalion preceding day . There was to be no sector and sneaked into the foxholes preliminary artillery or naval gunfire occupied by Major Mee's men. An preparation, though neutralization fire occasional bursting hand grenade against known enemy mortar and ar- punctured the quietness of the night- tillery positions was scheduled between a solitary rifle shot, a deep grunt or 0800 and 0830 . Because of the disrup- groan, and then stillness again . It was tion caused by the enemy rocket hit on not until morning that an accurate tally the command post of 2/23, H-Hour was of the 1st Battalion's losses was pos- postponed for an additional half hour . sible. Then it became evident that 1/25 Promptly at 0800 the 4th Division had lost one officer and 12 men killed ; attack resumed, with the battered 23d the enemy had lost an estimated 50 Marines, less 1/23, in the main effort . men." Conversely, 1/24 reported that The supporting neutralization fire ap- this had been the quietest night in its peared to be having a salutary effect, sector. since there was little response from the Just as it appeared that this long enemy supporting arms . As a result, night was nearing its end, disaster 2/23, attacking along the 4th Divison struck once more, this time in the 2/23 boundary, was able to make slow gains area. Shortly after 0500, one of the big, in the course of the morning, particular- inaccurate enemy rockets wobbled its ly along the regimental left. In the way into the 2/23 command post with center and on the right, on the other devastating results . The battalion com- hand, enemy resistance was as bitter as mander, Major Robert H. Davidson, was ever, and there the advance quickly badly shaken up by the blast and suf- ground to a halt . By shifting the focal fered a severe concussion ; the com- point of the assault quickly between munications chief was killed, and the companies, comparable to a boxer who battalion executive officer, the opera- hits his opponent with a low blow and tions officer, the adjutant, and two then follows with a haymaker to the clerks were wounded. With practically uncovered chin, the 2d Battalion was all the headquarters staff officers out of able to catch the Japanese off balance action, a skeleton staff was quickly long enough to make a gain of 150 yards formed at regimental headquarters within an hour after jumpoff . Following under Lieutenant Colonel Edward J . this limited success, strong enemy posi- Dillon, the regimental executive officer, tions were encountered all along the bat- who proceeded to 2/23 around dawn talion front and for the remainder of the and took over the battalion. day progress was minimal . Enemy H-Hour for D plus 16 had been set for resistance on 7 March consisted pri- 0730. The 4th Division was to continue marily of heavy machine gun fire and extremely accurate rifle fire from con- " Ibid. cealed positions in the rocky ridge for- THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 675 mations and draws along the front . The eastward advance towards Tachiiwa virtual absence of enemy artillery fire Point on the east coast, they threatened at the 23d Marines' front was notice- to envelop Captain Inouye's forces, able, though the regiment still drew in- which would be compressed in an area termittent fire from enemy mortars . bounded by the sea in the east and The 24th Marines resumed the attack the 25th Marines to the south . For all with 2/24 and 1/24 on the line and practical purposes, the northern wing almost immediately encountered heavy of the 4th Division formed a hammer opposition, particularly on the right while the stationary 25th Marines would where intense machine gun and mortar serve as the anvil. In all respects, this fire halted the advance of the 1st Bat- type of maneuver closely resembled the talion before it really got moving. For large-scale German antipartisan opera- the remainder of the morning, the tions in Russia where precisely such regimental advance could be measured tactics often led to success .52 in yards as small demolition teams In anticipation of increased pressure blasted and burned the enemy out of his once this pocket was compressed, well concealed and strongly-held posi- Colonel Lanigan took preparatory tions. At 1245, the 14th Marines fired a measures to enable his regiment to cope five-minute preparation which signalled with any threat posed by the Japanese a renewal of the attack. Employing the whose encirclement was imminent . same tactics used during the morning, Engineers attached to the regiment laid and with considerable air support, the antipersonnel mines across the front . regiment scored a gain of 50 yards be- Barbed wire was strung out along the fore 1700, when the lines were con- line. The men sited machine guns, 37mm solidated for the day . cannon, and 60mm mortars, waiting for On the division right, Colonel La- the Japanese to be driven against the nigan's 25th Marines continued mop- regimental line . For the time being, the ping up the numerous stragglers in its mission of the 25th Marines would be rear area. On the regiment's left, the a defensive one. 1st Battalion, supported by regular and Activity during the night from 7-8 flame tanks, destroyed enemy emplace- March was not comparable to that of ments to its front, while the Provisional the preceding night and along the 4th Battalion continued the systematic re- Division lines consisted mainly of mor- duction of stubborn enemy defenses in tar and small arms fire. Some of the the bypassed Amphitheater and Turkey enemy mortar shells fell into the posi- Knob. Even though the 25th Marines tions of 1/24 and in front of the 25th did not seize any new ground on D plus 16, its strategic location along the di- "For further information on this subject, vision right would shortly change its see Department of the Army Pamphlet No . mission into a defensive one . As the 20-244, Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement (Washington : Department of the 23d and 24th Marines very slowly and Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, inexorably continued their east-south- Aug 1956) . 676 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Marines. At 0300, 3/24 returned to the in the general direction of Tachiiwa parent regiment and two hours later re- Point. lieved 2/24 in the line. The 24th Marines, with 3/24 on the On D plus 17, the division main effort left and 1/24 on the right, jumped changed from the left to the center, and off on schedule, but encountered far the direction of the attack shifted to the stronger resistance than the 23d Ma- southeast. Within the shrinking area rines to the north, mostly from enemy left to the Japanese on Iwo Jima, the units concealed in perfectly fortified designation of phase or objective lines positions. Enemy opposition was charac- had become superfluous, and General terized by extremely heavy fire from Schmidt's operations order for 8 small arms, knee mortars, and mortars March was essentially "to capture the of larger calibers . Gains made during remainder of the island ." 53 No one the day were negligible, though at the familiar with the yard-by-yard struggle end of the day the regiment was tied in expected enemy resistance to cease on with the 23d Marines on the left and the this day, or for a number of days to 25th Marines on the right . Throughout come, but the tenor of the order gave the day, 2/24 remained in division a vague assurance that there was to be reserve. an end to the bloodletting. Facing the On the right flank of the division, the Marines of all three divisions were only three battalions of the 25th Marines the jumbles of rock and the sea, and a remained in position and continued to dwindling number of highly motivated strengthen the regimental lines in the Japanese determined to sell their lives event that the enemy decided to counter- as dearly as possible. attack as he was driven into a corner . H-Hour on 8 March had been set for Behind the lines, various elements of the 0750. However, in accordance with corps regiment and the division reconnais- orders, the 4th Marine Division jumped sance company continued to mop up ; off at 0620, 90 minutes ahead of the 3d enemy stragglers were also rounded up and 5th Divisions. The jump-off was car- in the vicinity of Minami Village. ried out without any artillery prepara- In the course of D plus 17, Shermans tion, though for half an hour following of the 4th Tank Battalion gave such it the 14th Marines and the corps artil- support as was feasible to the regiments lery fired successive concentrations in of the 4th Division, though the move- support of the attack . In the zone of ment of armor was restricted largely to advance of the 23d Marines, there was the few existing trails, most of them initially only light resistance, the enemy in the 23d Marines' area. There, several apparently being confused by the early tanks ran into a minefield and three morning attack. Even though opposition were destroyed. During the time re- stiffened in time, gains were made in quired to clear the minefield, the remain- the center of the regimental zone of ing tanks remained in place . In the advance, as 2/23 drove southeastward course of an air strike, an auxiliary gas tank filled with napalm was dropped ' VAC OpO No. 15-45, dtd 7Mar45 . erroneously into the friendly lines . It THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 677 landed directly behind one of the Sher- scale infiltration of the 2/23 and 3/24 mans, and napalm splashed all over the sectors. tank. Even though the outer surfaces Had the Marines compressing the of the Sherman caught fire, the crew Japanese naval force into the pocket was able to evacuate the vehicle and near Tachiiwa Point been able to look put out the blaze with a portable fire into the enemy lines, and had they been extinguisher. There were no casualties able to gauge the background and vola- and the mishap failed to put the Sher- tile temperament of the Japanese Navy man, at this point somewhat the worse captain commanding the 1,000-odd men for wear, out of action .4 about to be trapped, certain inevitable When the regiments of the 4th Di- conclusions would have become appar- vision secured for the night around dusk ent almost at once . Captain Samaji In- of 8 March, the combat efficiency of the ouye, commanding the Naval Guard division was still clinging to a pre- Force on Iwo Jima, was a Samurai, a carious 40 percent, but even this figure noisy, swashbuckling extrovert, a cham- fails to convey the excessive number of pion swordsman, who was prone to key personnel, the driving force of any boast of his prowess as a fighter, lover, unit, that had been sent out of the lines and drinker in front of his subordi- suffering from wounds or battle fatigue . nates .56 The weather had turned cloudy and It was totally incompatible with cold, and the men of General Cates' Inouye's character that he would sit division shivered in their foxholes while back in his dugout and idly watch his attempting to rest their weary bodies force being encircled . Also, he had felt for the continuation of the struggle that deeply emotional about the loss of Mount would await them in the morning. Suribachi and, in his grief at the Amer- ican capture of this landmark, he had THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK-15 nearly decapitated the hapless survivors In the gathering dusk and during the of the force that had straggled into his early evening of 8 March, something lines following the fall of the mountain . was beginning to stir in front of the For the Japanese, ever since the attack 23d and 24th Marines. At first, there on Pearl Harbor, the eighth day of each was only the blur of muted voices and month had a special significance, and movement, nothing definite that would Inouye was only too well aware that 8 indicate anything out of the ordinary March would be his last . He planned to was brewing. But then the intensity of make it a memorable one for all con- the enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket cerned. fire against the two Marine regiments Late in the evening, at 2200, he increased, followed at 2300 by large- gathered the remainder of his troops, a mixture of survivors from many Navy 64 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 43. 'Additional material in this section is de- ' A fascinating account of Inouye's back- rived from : 4th EngBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, ground and mentality is contained in a letter 18Feb-19Mar45, n.d., hereafter 4th EngBn from Fred Saito to Richard F . Newcomb, dtd OpRpt. 5Feb64, in Newcomb Notes. 678 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

units on Iwo Jima . It was anything but In a moment there was chaos . The Marines a uniformly equipped force : threw up flares and star shells lighted the sky. Machinegun fire, rifles, and mortars . . . many men had only bamboo spears, began to cut into them, but still the Japa- but some had hand grenades and rifles . nese came on. Some of them carried There were a few machine guns, and some stretchers and shouted "Corpsman, corps- men strapped land mines across their man" in fair English . Finally the hordes chests, determined to blow up some Ma- faltered and broke, and no one knew rines with themselves ." where Captain Inouye was . He had last What Captain Inouye had in mind been seen running and shouting, his sword was, of course, an all-out charge against waving in the air .' the American lines . But, short of killing According to an account of Inouye's Americans, there had to be a definite orderly, who became separated from the purpose to the assault. Still preoccupied captain in the melee, Inouye charged with the loss of Mount Suribachi, ahead with loud shouts, followed by his where the Stars and Stripes fluttering men. As accurate Marine fire raked the on the summit had kindled his anger ranks of the charging Japanese, Inouye anew every day, the Captain announced shouted "Banzai, Banzai," at the top of to his assembled force the objective his voice, and that was the last heard of the imminent assault was Suribachi of him . As one of the Japanese was to itself. En route, after breaking through comment regretfully later : "It's a pity the American lines, the men were to he could not reach the American posi- blow up as many American planes as tion for a full display of his final they could on the airfields . swordsmanship ."59 Judged by the standards employed As the Japanese charged the bound- earlier in the war on islands like Gua- ary between the 23d and 24th Marines, dalcanal, and particularly when com- it was inevitable that some of them pared to the desperate Japanese all-out would get through the Marine lines . charge on the Garapan Plain at Saipan, There was vicious fighting throughout what Inouye had planned could best be the hours of darkness . Some of the ac- described as a mini-banzai. His objective tion eventually extended to the 24th was unrealistic, the Marines to his front Marines and, on a smaller scale, to the were too alert, and above all, he lacked 25th. Company E, 2/23, continued to the approval of his superiors for the bear the brunt of the counterattack, action he was about to take. As the at- expending 20 cases of hand grenades, tack got under way, the following situa- 200 rounds of 60mm illumination shells, tion developed and an unknown quantity of machine The band started south, not in a wild gun, BAR, and rifle ammunition 6 0 charge, but crawling slowly and quietly. Company E faced a critical situation One group got within 10 yards of 2/23's around 0100, when ammunition began command post, where Lieutenant Colonel Dillon was still in command, before the to run out. Finally, additional loads alarm was given. Then the sailors lobbed 'Ibid., p. 258. " grenades and charged, shrieking "Banzai!" Saito ltr to Newcomb, 5Feb64, in Newcomb Notes. G7 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 257-258. '2123 OpRpt, p . 33. THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 679 were sent forward in a jeep and trailer, j acent sectors . Among those who per- which brought the badly needed sup- ished in the counterattack was Captain plies forward over an enemy infested Inouye, who died as he had wished to road, with the aid of 60mm illumina- die . The counterattack cost the Marines tion. The jeep drew several rounds of 90 men killed and 257 wounded, a large enemy small arms fire but was able to number of men to lose in one night's deliver its badly needed cargo. Fire sup- bitter fighting ; yet beyond any doubt port ships expended 193 star shells dur- the cost would have been higher had it ing the night, thus lessening some of been necessary to ferret the enemy out the confusion that accompanied the ac- of his dugouts one by one . tion. In the flickering light the chewed- To the Japanese survivors of the up volcanic ground became visible, slaughter, the arrival of daylight filled with wriggling forms . Artillery brought little comfort. Stripped both fire soon blanketed the area and many of the protective cover of darkness and of the would-be infiltrators halted in leadership on which all of them so their tracks. much depended, the 200 sailors that But many of the attackers did get had survived the abortive banzai hud- into the Marine lines and, in the words dled in small groups, wondering what of one account : to do next . It was apparent to all that The night became alive with the noise getting to Mount Suribachi or any of and lights of a determined fire fight. Red the airfields was far beyond their capa- tracer bullets shot across the flats . Jap bilities. A lieutenant finally gathered rockets hurtled through the air, leaving a them together and those who could quarter-mile trail of golden sparks . Star shells of yellow and green hung in the sky . crawled away from the place of car- The battle kept up all night . Individual nage, constantly harassed by the Ma- men in foxholes didn't know what was rines hunting for them . As to their happening . They waited for Japs to appear further operations and killed them as fast as they came . Men . Each night the with telephones whispered into their in- Their fighting was over struments and tried to discover how strong lieutenant sent out patrols of three to five men. They never returned . Others went the enemy attack actually was . Machine into caves, and some died of wounds, of guns chattered incessantly. Grenades sickness, or of thirst. Some drank urine popped.' and died. As day dawned over Iwo Jima on 9 The lieutenant lasted until April 29, the March, the area in and around the 2/23 Emperor's birthday, when he told the positions, and to a lesser extent in front others, "We will steal a B-29 and fly to the homeland. You others do as you please of the 24th Marines, showed the signs after we're gone." He left, accompanied of horrible carnage. Mopping up con- by the chief Navy medical officer, an en- tinued until noon . A body count of en- sign, and a petty officer .' emy dead revealed approximately 650 There was to be one more sequel to at the focal point of the attack, while Captain Inouye's counterattack : Obvi- another 150 were discovered in the ad- ously aware of General Kuribayashi's

01 Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 291. 62 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 259. 680 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS orders to stay in place and fight as long was able to advance in the center and as possible, he had neglected to inform to its right against resistance that his superior, Admiral Ichimaru, of his lacked the bite of the preceding days . intentions. As a result However, the left of the regiment drew . . . on the night of Inouye's last charge, heavy fire from a ridge near the divi- Admiral Toyoda again messaged Admiral sion boundary about 500 yards north Ichimaru, praising the brave acts of the of Higashi . By 0900, the ridge had Navy men and again begging them to been seized in direct assault, and the hold out as long as possible . Ichimaru did battalion slowly but persistently forced not know that Inouye had already sacri- ficed the last of the Japanese Navy force its way forward . At 1500, 1/23 reverted on Iwo Jima to the regiment . Ordered to consolidate at 1700, Colonel Wensinger's men con- For the men of the 4th Marine Divi- sion, Captain Inouye's abortive counter- tinued the attack to improve their posi- attack at one stroke eliminated a large tions and did not halt until half an hour segment of the enemy force holding the later. Gains for the day were a respect- eastern part of the island . With just able 300 yards . As the regiment dug in, it maintained contact with the 3d Ma- about all of this force out of the way, there no longer was any central direc- rine Division on the left and the 24th Marines on the right tion of Japanese forces in the east. . Major General Senda, with a force of In the remaining division sectors, en- undetermined strength, was still as- emy opposition was as strong as ever, sumed to be blocking the 4th Division's and, in consequence, no additional path between Higashi Village and the ground was seized in the center and on coast. Enemy remnants were still in the right of the division . To some ex- control of Turkey Knob, and a few tent, lack of progress in the center was other pockets of resistance still existed, due to depletion of manpower, which but by this time the enemy's capability made it necessary to shuffle companies to resist was drastically reduced . from one battalion to another in order Even though the mopup of survivors to bring the assault battalion up to of the counterattack continued through- effective strength . As part of the re- out the morning of 9 March, the 4th organization of 1/24, Lieutenant Colo- Division continued its attack in accord- nel Austin R . Brunelli, the regimental ance with previously laid plans . At executive officer, assumed command of 0700, following a 10-minute prepara- 1/24, relieving Major Treitel . Because tion, the 4th Division jumped off . Once of the heavy resistance on its left flank, again, the division employed the same the 25th Marines, less 3/25 but with scheme of maneuver it had used in pre- 2/24 attached, remained in position . vious days, with the 23d Marines on the During the night from 9-10 March, left, the 24th Marines in the center, and there was a relative lack of enemy ac- the 25th Marines on the right . The tivity. A small amount of light and 23d Marines, with 2/23 in the assault, medium mortar fire at infrequent inter- vals harassed the 4th Division lines 03 Ibid., pp . 259-260. during the night, and infiltration at- THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 681 .tempts remained on a large scale . In tar and small arms fire which reduced order to counter the threat still posed gains of 2/23 in this sector. Through- by groups of the enemy operating in out the regimental zone of advance, the division rear, the Provisional Bat- small but determined groups of the talion, which had been mopping up in enemy tried to impede the advance . the Amphitheater and around Turkey Since the Japanese no longer held a Knob, was disbanded and its mission solid line on commanding ground, the taken over by 2/25 . At the same time, Marine assault elements were able to a 4th Provisional Battalion, consisting bypass such nests of resistance, leaving of 37 officers and 498 enlisted men, was their annihilation to teams of engi- organized from units of the Division neers, tanks, and infantry, which Support Group. This unit, under the blasted and scorched such obstacles command of Lieutenant Colonel Melvin with demolitions and flamethrowers . L. Krulewitch, had special responsibil- As the regimental attack gained mo- ity for mopping up behind the division mentum, an enormous amount of lines and retained this mission until 12 ground was taken by Iwo standards . March, when it was disbanded .64 By 1500, Colonel Wensinger's men had At 0800 on D plus 19, the 4th Marine advanced no less than 700 yards and Division continued its attack after a were within 500 yards of the east coast . coordinated corps and division artillery Having reached commanding ground preparation, which changed into a roll- in this area, the regiment halted in mid- ing barrage as the men moved out. afternoon. Patrols from 2/23, dis- On this day, which was to be full of patched during the remainder of the significant developments for General afternoon, reached the coast near Ta- Cates' men, the assault was made es- chiiwa Point without encountering any sentially by the 23d and 25th Marines . enemy opposition . A short distance to The 24th Marines reverted to division the south, elements of 3/24 recon- reserve. The 1st Battalion, 24th Ma- noitered to within 100 yards of the rines, was pulled out of the line and coast without making contact with the replaced by 3/25. The 3d Battalion, enemy. 24th Marines, remained in its previous On the division right, the 25th Ma- zone of action but was attached to the rines, with 2/24 and the Reconnais- 23d Marines, while 2/24 remained at- sance Company attached, completed the tached to the 25th Marines . relief of 1/24 by 0600. Following this The 23d Marines, with 2/23 on the relief, 3/25 took over the sector of 1/24 . left and 3/24 on the right launched a In order to complete the encirclement of vigorous attack that encountered only those enemy remnants still holding out light opposition on the right . The en- in the Amphitheater and on Turkey emy, entrenched in the rocky ridges Knob, 3/25 was shifted to the north of along the left boundary of the division, the enemy salient, where, together with replied with accurate and effective mor- 1/25, it would attack to the southeast parallel to the axis of advance of the ' 4th MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt, pp . 17-18. 23d Marines . Along the southern per- 682 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS imeter of the salient, 2/25 and 2/24 head-on assault, fought its bloody way from were to advance generally to the north- Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Mi- east or east respectively, which would nami and formidable defenses northeast enable 2/25 to effect a linkup with those of 382, almost to the coast . The slow but units of the regiment attacking towards relentless movement of this division front the coast from the northwest . can be compared to the closing of a giant Jumping off at H-Hour on 10 March, door. The right flank, which advanced less than 1,000 yards, acted as a hinge while 3/25 and 1/25 attacked towards the the rest of the division (the door) turned high ground to their front from where upon it and attacked northeast, east, and the enemy still offered moderate to southeast to close and sweep trapped heavy opposition . It soon became ap- enemy toward the sea .' parent that the 3d Battalion would be The 4th Division assault on eastern able to move faster than 1/25 and, in Iwo Jima thus had broken the back of consequence, 3/25 was ordered to con- enemy resistance by 10 March. In the tinue regardless of its flanks . As the wake of the division's advance, there attacks of 3/25 and 2/25 converged, the remained a staggering number of cas- distance separating the two units dwin- ualties, whose bodies and minds bore dled until, shortly after noon, the two ample witness to the ferocity of the battalions linked up . Overall gains for fighting. Between 25 February, when the 25th Marines on D plus 19 were General Cates' men first attacked the 600 yards. More important than the Meat Grinder and 10 March, when they yardage gained was the fact that Tur- were within a stone's throw of the key Knob was at last completely sur- coast, the division had sustained 4,075 rounded and all resistance remaining casualties. A total of 847 Marines had could now be eliminated. As the 25th been killed or were dead of wounds ; Marines consolidated for the night, its 2,836 had been wounded ; 1 was miss- left flank was tied to the 23d Marines ing, and 391 were suffering from com- about 800 yards from the coast while bat fatigue.66 the stationary right flank was still As the three Marine divisions slowly anchored on the beach to the south . approached the coastline in their re- The significance of the 4th Division's spective zones of advance, it became movements and gains on 10 March was apparent to all on the island that time summed up in one historical narrative for General Kuribayashi and his gar- in these words rison was running out . In Japan, anx- It was now evident that the Japanese ious eyes were watching the contest of counterattack had marked the turning wills being waged for possession of Iwo point in the battle. Although bitter and Jima. To the military observers, the out- costly fighting continued for six more days, particularly in the 25th Regiment's come was a foregone conclusion . But zone, organized resistance was now dying the nation's morale was precariously out in the 4th Division area . During the 14-day period covered in this a Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 176. chapter, the 4th Division, in constant Ibid., p. 177. THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT 683 perched on the faint hope that General is trying her darndest to lessen her Kuribayashi's masterful defense of the defeat."67 island would give the business-minded That time was running out on the Americans food for thought about the mainland as well was strongly re- cost of a full-scale invasion of the home emphasized on the evening of 9 March, islands . Thus, in Japanese eyes, the when more than 300 B-29s mounted one prolonged defense of Iwo Jima pursued of the biggest air raids of the war not only the immediate tactical objec- against Tokyo. This attack severely tive, but a vastly more far-reaching devastated the enemy capital, serving strategic one . notice to all Japanese that they were Few of the surviving members of now open to American attack both from that garrison had any illusions left sea and air ; that henceforth the citi- about the outcome of the war . One zens of Tokyo were as exposed to Japanese captured in the 4th Division American explosives as General Kuri- area late on 9 March was better quali- bayashi's diminishing garrison on Iwo fied than most others to comment on Jima. the overall situation. A peacetime edi- tor and publisher of one of the large ` Interrogation of Leading Private Yutaka metropolitan newspapers of Japan, he Oyanagi, 10Mar45, by 1stLt G. A. Hoeck, 4th remarked that "this is not a winning MarDiv Preliminary POW Interrogation Rpt war for Japan-she cannot win, but she #15, 10Mar45, in 4th MarDiv Translations. CHAPTER 11

Final Operations on Iwo Jima 1

ELIMINATION OF THE POCKETS- three Marine divisions . As the pockets 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA 2 became more constricted, the nature of On 11 March 1945, operations on Iwo the fighting changed, mostly because Jima entered their final phase . No the terrain no longer permitted the em- longer under any central direction, ployment of naval gunfire, air support, three more or less clearly defined enemy and in the end even artillery . Eventu- pockets fought a battle to the death ally, as Japanese resistance neared the in the zone of advance of each of the end, tanks and half-tracks furnished the heavy supporting fire needed to root out 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this the last of the obstinate enemy de- chapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; VAC fenders. SAR ; VAC G-2 Rpts ; VAC C-3 Jnl ; VAC On D plus 20, the only major oppo- Translations ; 3d MarDiv AR ; 3d MarDiv D-2 sition in the zone of advance of the 3d Jnl; 3d MarDiv 'G-2 PerRpts ; 3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpts ; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 4th MarDiv Marine Division extended along the D-3 Jul ; 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpts ; 4th Mar- division's rough boundary, where en- Div Translations ; 5th MarDiv AR ; 5th MarDiv emy remnants still occupied a ridgeline D-1 Jul ; 5th MarDiv D-2 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv paralleling the coast to the east of D-2 PerRpts ; 5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl ; 5th Mar- Kitano Point . (See Map IX, Map Sec- Div Casualty Rpts ; Horie Rpt ; Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Iwo Comments ; Morehouse, Iwo tion) . A second center of resistance far- Jima Campaign; Newcomb, Iwo Jima; ' New- ther south, to the east of Motoyama Vil- comb Notes; Morisbn, Victory in the Pacific ; lage, southeast of the Northern Airfield, Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima ; Isely and and southwest of Hill 362C was a pocket Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War ; which had already been under attack Leckie, Strong Men Armed ; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ; Aurthur and Cohlmia, The for several days prior to 11 March . Third Marine Division ; Proehl, The Fourth Named after the commander of 2/9, Marine Division ; Conner, The Fifth Marine Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, this pock- Division ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun. et was honeycombed with caves and Additional material in this section is de- emplacements cut into sandstone . The rived from : 9th Mar URpts; 9th Mar UJnl ; 9th Mar AR ; 21st Mar AR, Iwo Jima, 23Jan- pocket itself was ringed by antitank 16Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 21st Mar guns and Colonel Nishi's dug-in light AR; 21st Mar UJnl ; 21st Mar URpts; 1/9 AR; and medium tanks, equipped with 2/9 AR ; 3/9 AR ; 1/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 29Jan- 37mm and 47mm guns . The most 26Mar45, dtd 6Apr45, hereafter 1/21 AR ; prominent occupant of the pocket was 2/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 30Jan-24Mar45, dtd 12Apr45, hereafter 2/21 AR; 3/21 AR, Iwo Colonel Nishi, who had thus far sur- Jima, 15Jan-16Mar45, dtd 11Apr45, hereafter vived the ferocious fighting on the 3/21 AR ; 1/23 OpRpt; 3d TkBn AR. island. 684 FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 685 On 11 March, 1/9 and 3/9 were to outs, caves, and stationary tanks, the execute a converging attack from the Japanese contested every foot of high ground near the east coast into ground, continuing to make the Ma- the northeastern fringes of the pocket . rines pay an exorbitant price for every Once the two battalions had linked up, yard gained. they were to launch a concerted drive In order to support the advance of into the pocket from the east . In the 3/21, a 7.2-inch rocket launcher, course of the morning, the 1st Battalion mounted on a sled, was attached to the assaulted a ridge overlooking the pock- battalion. This improvisation was the et and blasted its way to the top, idea of the VAC ordnance officer, who demolishing caves and other positions had four of the rocket launchers as it went along. The advance was sup- mounted on sleds when it was found ported by Shermans from the 3d Tank that these weapons did not fit the Battalion, whose fire either destroyed M4A3 tank with which VAC was then such enemy defenses as could be spotted equipped. The sled mount appeared to or at least kept the occupants of strong- be the answer to the problem of getting points underground to permit the ap- this powerful supporting weapon into proach of demolition teams . The 3d terrain which was impassable for Battalion was forced to assault similar tanks . Each rocket launcher, equipped terrain during -the morning without with 20 tubes, was capable of delivering tank support, which did not arrive until 640 pounds of TNT in a salvo . Effective an armored bulldozer had carved out range of the launcher was 250 yards . a road for the Shermans during the A volley of rockets, exploding within early afternoon . In mid-afternoon, a narrow area, could be expected to shortly after 1500, the two battalions have a gruesome and highly demor- linked up. For the remainder of the day, alizing effect upon the enemy . elements of both battalions mopped up As 3/21 approached the confines of along the east coast, outposted the the pocket, meeting very heavy resist- beach, and established defensive posi- ance all the way, a rocket launcher was tions on the high ground east of Hill towed into action by a tank of Company 362C. C, 3d Tank Battalion . Altogether, 10 Even though no solid line of contain- volleys were fired into the pocket with ment surrounded the pocket from the undetermined results . Only too soon did west or southwest, there was no ac- it become apparent that the efficiency of tivity on the part of the Japanese the launchers did not match the visual trapped within, aimed at either evading effect created by the exploding rockets. the encirclement or launching a direct When the dust settled, the enemy still assault against the Marines approach- sat securely in his defenses, little the ing them. Instead, the enemy followed worse for wear . An official report of the orders issued by General Kuribaya- this action was to note with discourage- shi to the letter. Remaining within ment : "Nearly 200 of the 7.2-inch rock- their relatively secure pillboxes, dug- ets were thrown into this pocket and 686 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS still our infantry was unable to go in yards separated 3/21 from the two bat- and occupy the ground ."3 talions of the 9th Marines . The 2d Bat- Elsewhere in the 3d Division zone of talion, 9th Marines, was in division re- advance, General Erskine was able to serve just east of Motoyama Village, pull 2/21 out of the line for a much where it was engaged in mopping up needed rest after elements of the 27th the enemy units on the southern fringe Marines, of the 5th Division had moved of the pocket. At the same time, the behind the left flank of that battalion . battalion formed a line some 400 yards To fill the gap thus created, 1/21 ex- long which acted as a stop-gap for any tended its lines northward and tied in enemy troops seeking to escape west- with the adjacent 5th Division . At the ward from the encirclement. same time that 1/9 and 3/9 were con- Early on 12 March, compression of verging on Cushman's Pocket from the Cushman's Pocket continued, with 1/9 northeast, 3/21, then attached to the and 3/9 again hammering from the 9th Marines, was approaching the east while 3/21 formed the anvil along pocket from the southwest . the western fringes . Lieutenant Colonel For the remainder of 11 March, 3d Boehm's 3d Battalion, advancing west- Division engineers and riflemen blasted ward, apparently hit one of the develop- caves and dugouts. Because of the ing weak spots in the enemy lines and proximity of the battle lines, General made fair progress. The 1st Battalion Erskine's division did not receive any to the south, on the other hand, ran artillery support that day, though 1/12 into heavy resistance and was unable stood by for call fires if needed . Similar- to keep pace with 3/9 . Finally, an ly, there was no air support for the armored bulldozer carved out a path same reasons, except that aerial obser- over which the Shermans could move vation was used to report the move- to the front lines . Once the tanks had ments of 3d Division units . After arrived there, eager infantrymen ac- nightfall the Japanese, employing hit- curately pinpointed the enemy position and-run tactics, emerged from their for the tankers, and, in the words of hideouts and stealthily approaching the the official report, "successful work in Marine positions, hurled a few hand eliminating these positions was done by grenades, and then attempted to dis- the tanks ."4 appear as quietly as they had come . In the zone of advance of the 1st Such tactics succeeded only infrequent- and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines, ex- ly, and many of the infiltrators did not treme difficulty was encountered with survive to tell of their exploits. the terrain which alternately featured On the evening of 11 March, 3/21 steep banks and gulches filled with soft was facing eastward with a frontage of volcanic ash. The tankers constantly 200-300 yards, while 1/9 and 3/9 were had to be on the alert for Japanese facing westward with a frontage of in the vicinity who were only too eager about 600 yards . A distance of 500-600 to seek death if there was a chance of

3 3d TkBn, AR, 11Mar45. `Ibid., 12Mar45 . FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 687 blowing up an American tank along vance of the two battalions . The flame with themselves . Tanks bogged down tanks proved most effective in reducing in the difficult terrain proved irresist- a number of troublesome concrete em- ible objectives for suicidal Japanese, placements . Still operating in very not to mention their attractiveness as rough terrain, the Shermans moved stationary targets of opportunity for only short distances at a time, and then the remaining enemy antitank guns . In only with the aid of an armored bull- addition to the above, the tankers found dozer. it very difficult to maintain direction As far as the 9th Marines was con- since their movements were directed cerned, the performance of the Sher- over the radio through remote control . mans was of crucial importance . The Many of the enemy positions were so regimental commander, Colonel Ken- carefully camouflaged that as often as yon, considered them "to be the most not Marines were almost on top of formidable supporting weapon at our them before they were spotted. Once disposal . . . tank support was the de- again, flamethrowers and demolitions ciding factor in this action ."', proved their worth in this type of fight- By the end of D plus 22, Cushman's ing. Progress was made on D plus 21, Pocket had shrunk to a mere 250 yards . but in the rear of Cushman's Pocket, The diminishing size of the pocket en- specifically along the crest of the ridge abled the withdrawal of two units from overlooking the east coast of Iwo Jima, the encircling force. On the morning of resistance remained stubborn . 13 March, 1/21 relieved those elements On the following day, 13 March, the of 3/21 that were engaged on the line, pocket was further compressed when and the latter battalion reverted to its 1/9 and 3/9 continued their drive . Once parent regiment . Having cleared its zone again, the progress of the attack was of action by evening of the same day, impeded by caves, pillboxes, emplaced 3/9 was pulled out of this area early on tanks, stone walls, and trenches. So 14 March and shifted to the vicinity of masterfully had these defenses been Hill 362, where it commenced a syste- camouflaged that "only those immedi- matic mop-up . ately in front of the troops could be The morning of 14 March marked located . . . . Out of about 150 of these the beginning of the final drive aimed positions (by later count), we knew at eliminating Cushman's Pocket. The roughly twenty or thirty of them ."5 main burden of the attack now rested Nevertheless, despite the initial advan- on 1/9, which pressed forward through- tage accruing to the defenders, the Ma- out the morning and by midafternoon rine incursion into the pocket could not had gained about 100 yards . Once be stopped. Sherman tanks, particular- again, the use of armor proved decisive ly those equipped with flamethrowers, in eliminating the stubborn enemy de- lent the necessary emphasis to the ad- fenses. A flame tank belonging to Com- pany B, 3d Tank Battalion, was hit ' Aurthur and Cohlmia, The Third Marine Division, pp. 246-247. 9th Mar AR, p . 6. 688 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS by a rifle grenade which caused a small elsewhere, namely the combination of explosion inside the vehicle, wounding physical and mental exhaustion that the driver and assistant driver . was taking its toll among Marines on At 1530, 2/9 reverted from division Iwo Jima at this phase of operations reserve to regimental control . Shortly as surely as had shells and bullets of before 1800, the battalion passed the enemy. Few Marines who had made through 1/9 and launched an attack the initial landing were left during the into the enemy position which by this final phase of the fighting . Their places time had already shrunk to about 150 had been taken by willing though in- square yards. Shermans of the 3d Tank experienced replacements, whose per- Battalion played a dominant role in formance in combat left much to be reducing whatever stubborn resistance desired. As one Marine historian was to remained, but a flame tank borrowed put it from the 5th Marine Division outdid By this stage in the operation a large all others. This tank was able to shoot percentage of infantry troops were re- a flame about 125 yards and, according placements who lacked the combat train- ing and experience that prepared and con- to the official report, it "proved to be ditioned men for closing with the enemy . the weapon that worked when all Therefore, the skill and efficiency of as- others failed . Its long flame range and sault Marines showed marked deteriora- the area covered by one burst were the tion after three weeks of personnel attri- contributing factors to its remarkable tion of original D-Day troop strength. During the final days of 3d Division efforts success."' By the time the Shermans to smash remaining pockets, armor support and flame tanks had roamed through made success possible . Gun tanks, armored the pocket, blasting and burning every- bulldozers, and flame-throwing Shermans thing in their path, enemy resistance combined their operations to give the ex- became sporadic and gradually began hausted infantry a very effective and much needed assist .' to flicker out. The stage was now set for the infantry to move in and finish In dealing with the same subject the job. matter, the battalion report was to What might have turned into a rou- state succinctly : "Almost all of the in- tine chore of mopping up turned in- fantry were replacements . They lacked stead into a rather protracted operation entirely the will to close with the requiring all the skill the attacking enemy."1° Needless to say, this state- force could muster . The action that 2/9 ment was not intended as an indictment saw for the remainder of 14 March of the men involved, but of the replace- was subsequently described with the ment system which forced men to join statement : "Inconclusive hand to hand strange squads and platoons whose fighting ensued until dark ." Hidden teamwork was dissipated by heavy cas- within this sentence, however, was a ualties . For the individual Japanese, factor which was to be brought out who fought to the end among friends,

' Ibid., p. 7. ° Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 181. '219 AR, p . 3. '° 2/9 AR, p . 3. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 689 death was an infinitely less lonely and curved like an S . Entranceways protected impersonal affair than for the average each other, so that Marines would be hit Marine replacement . in the back from holes guarding the one they were assaulting . The inter-connecting While bitter fighting continued in tunnels inside the ridge also allowed the Cushman's Pocket, where one enemy Japs to play deadly tag with the Marines . position after the other was eliminated, They would shoot out of one hole. By the a different type of action took place time Marines got close enough to that hole, the Japs had left it and were shoot- just to the east of -the pocket on one of ing from another one twenty yards away the ridges overlooking the east coast . and higher up in the wall . The Marines Initially, this ridge had been seized on had to post guards at every hole they D plus 16 in the conventional manner could see in order to attack any one of -direct attack with flamethrowers, them . The tunnels also curved and twisted inside the ridge . The Japs could escape the small arms, and demolitions-by 3d straight trajectory weapons and grenades Division Marines, who blasted this ob- thrown into the cave entrances, merely by jective like hundreds of others and then running back into the interior ." moved on, leaving behind blackened Finally, flamethrowers squirted their and battlescarred cave entrances that lethal liquid into the caves, which be- looked sinister even in broad daylight . came boiling infernos . A number of the Several days passed and the front lines Japanese who had reoccupied the ridge had moved on to the north when this were incinerated . Others, their clothing desolate ridge came to life again . and bodies aflame, tried to escape, only The first indication that something to fall prey to accurate Marine bullets. was going awry in this so-called rear In desperation, some of the enemy area came when a heavy Japanese ma- trapped inside the ridge blew them- chine gun, hidden somewhere in the selves up with hand grenades. Before previously cleared ridge, opened up on long an unsuspecting Marine carrying am- . . . the scene became wild and terrible . munition and killed him . Other Marines More Japs rushed screaming from the near the ridge soon became startled caves . They tumbled over the rocks, their victims of the enemy fire from the ridge clothes and bodies burning fiercely. Soon the flamethrowers paused . A Marine lifted which grew in intensity as small arms himself cautiously into view . There were joined the machine gun. The next vic- no shots from the caves . A Jap with his tims were stretcher bearers and their clothes in rags hunched himself out of one wounded burden . Eventually, tanks and hole, his arms upraised . The Marines stood demolitions men arrived and the dan- up behind the rocks and waved to him to come out . The Jap indicated that there gerous, time-consuming job of clearing were more who would like to surrender. the ridge had to be repeated . To quote The Marines motioned him to tell them one report : to come out. =' Despite their preponderance of weapons the Marines found that there were too In all, 40 men emerged from the many holes. They would attack one only ridge, many of them Koreans . Marines to be shot at from another one half a dozen feet away. Moreover, the ridge was 71 Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 231. not a straight wall but, in many places, 12 ibid., p. 232. 690 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS shouldered their weapons as the prison- Efforts to employ flamethrowers ers were marched to the rear. The against the ridge during the fading tanks left the erstwhile battlefield and hours of daylight proved unavailing, quiet descended over the area . Yet this since all of these weapons were com- peaceful interlude was soon to be shat- mitted in the front lines . At dusk, ele- tered again a few hours later when the ments of the 9th Marines bivouacked Japanese, moving through underground on the ridge, which had become dor- tunnels, reoccupied the ridge . One of mant again. Apprised of the situation, the first victims proved to be Sergeant the commanding officer posted sentries Reid Chamberlain, a Marine with an behind the rocks facing the ridge, ready unusual background . As a member of to fire on anything that moved . the U.S . Army, he had witnessed the Hardly had dusk settled over the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, but in- area, when there was stealthy move- stead of surrendering to the enemy, he ment on the slopes of the ridge as had turned his activities towards the individual Japanese emerged from pre- organization and training of Filipino viously undetected cracks and holes . guerrillas . He received a commission Marines opened fire on these blurred in the U.S. Army and returned to the silhouettes . The results of this fire be- United States, where he promptly re- came quickly evident as some of the signed his commission and enlisted in Japanese who had been hit groaned the U.S. Marine Corps. with pain, others jerked spasmodically En route to the forward positions and then lay silent while the remainder, of the 21st Marines, Sergeant Chamber- realizing that they were trapped, at- lain was walking past the long, rocky tempted to burrow their way back into ridge, unaware that there were any the ground . A few who managed to get enemy in the vicinity. Suddenly, there back under cover committed suicide . were several shots, one of which hit Shortly before midnight there was a the sergeant in the head . This incident tremendous blast which hurled huge took place in front of several Marine pieces of rock through the air and news correspondents, some of whom shook the entire area . Some of the also drew enemy fire . When help ar- Marines were buried in volcanic ash rived for the sergeant, it was too late. and debris up to their necks and had to As one of the correspondents present be dug out . Others were hit by chunks was to put it later, speaking of the of concrete that rained down through- enemy out the area. The ridge itself became a In an instant they had claimed one of mass of fire and disintegrating matter . our best men. Chamberlain's wonderful While the Marines were still engaged war record had ended abruptly. After so in assessing what had happened and many heroic deeds, it seemed an added tragedy that he was killed while doing trying to aid each other as best they nothing but walking . There was nothing could, Japanese began to emerge from anybody could do about it ." their holes on the ridge, some of them dazed, others carrying antipersonnel " Ibid., pp. 250-251. mines tied around their waists . A group FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 691 of five Japanese, running along the wall marked the final phase of the prepara- of the ridge, was spotted by the light tory fire moved only 50 yards ahead of of the flames and all were instantly the assault units and then moved for- killed. ward at 100-yard intervals in conjunc- At dawn it became apparent that, de- tion with the advance. In addition to spite the explosion and subsequent bit- the shore-based artillery, a destroyer ter fighting, the Marines had suffered offshore shelled northern Iwo for nearly only one serious casualty . There might an hour and then stood by to deliver call have been more if men, who found fires. Fighters stationed on the South- themselves buried in debris and vol- ern Airfield were available for air sup- canic ash, had not been rescued by fel- port, but the restricted area in which low Marines before they were smoth- the final operations on Iwo Jima took ered. It was subsequently discovered place precluded their employment. that the enemy had used land mines and The attack of 1/21 made good head- aerial bombs to blow up the ridge . way against only light resistance . On On 15 March organized resistance in the other hand, 2/21 encountered heavy the 3d Division sector had just about small arms fire and extremely difficult ended. General Erskine's division was terrain, both of which combined to re- ordered to relieve elements of the 5th tard its advance. Japanese, fighting Marine Division on the right of that from caves and spider trap positions, division and attack to the northwest.14 offered their customary obstinate re- Early on 16 March, D plus 25, the 21st sistance. Some of them, obviously bent Marines took over an 800-yard sector on suicide, charged tanks or groups of on the right of General Rockey's divi- Marines with grenades and demolition charges. For the most part, such sorties sion. The boundary between the two divisions now extended from a point were marked more by fierce fanaticism 400 yards east of Hill 362B to the than cool logic, and most of them failed northern tip of Iwo Jima near Kitano before the human bomb could inflict much damage on the Marines or their Point. Following the relief of 3/27 and 2/26 armor. During the early afternoon both by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 21st battalions reached the coast near Kita- Marines, that regiment prepared to at- no Point. From that point, it became tack to the north in conjunction with a matter of mopping up such enemy elements of the 5th Marine Division . A as remained in caves and other shelters. 20-minute preparation by the 3d and By the end of 16 March, General 5th Division artillery, as well as the Erskine's men had completed the elimi- 155s of the corps artillery, preceded the nation of Cushman's Pocket and, at the jumpoff, which was scheduled for 0815, same time, had completed their mission and continued for 10 minutes follQwing in helping out the 5th Marine Division . H-Hour. The rolling barrage, which This action, for all practical purposes, ended combat operations of the 3d Ma- rine Division on Iwo Jima . Late on D "VAC OpO No. 23-45 with changes, dtd 15Mar45 . plus 25, General Erskine announced 692 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS that all enemy resistance in the zone of tinued the attack on the following action of his division had ceased .'', morning. Jumping off with the 23d and In fact, even though Cushman's Pock- 25th Marines at 0730, the division con- et had been overrun, Colonel Nishi, tinued its advance to the coast . (See commanding the 26th Tank Regiment, Map X, Map Section) . On the left the was still inside with about 450 men, all 23d Marines reached its objective rapid- that had remained of his command . Of ly, overrunning such enemy resistance these, 300 were wounded and few of as flared up in its path . In the wake of them were able to move on their own . the regiment's advance, engineers sealed From their underground hideout, the caves and constructed a road . In late Japanese could hear their erstwhile afternoon, 1/23 relieved 2/23 and pulled comrades, now prisoners of war and back to the same positions held during working for the Americans, calling on the preceding night. Combat patrols Colonel Nishi to surrender . But such were dispatched into the beach areas to appeals fell on deaf ears . Early on 19 search out enemy stragglers or hold- March, with only two days' food supply outs. remaining, Colonel Nishi ordered his The advance of the 25th Marines did men to make a final charge against the not progress as smoothly as that of Americans . Only 60 were able to heed the 23d. Almost immediately after the his call. Sometime between 19 and 22 jumpoff, Colonel Lanigan's regiment March, Colonel Nishi died . Whether he ran into heavy fire from rockets, mor- was felled by an American bullet or by tars, and small arms . As a result, little his own hand has never been clearly ground was gained . An explanation of determined though his widow finds sol- the stubborn resistance came during ace in the thought "that he died at the the afternoon when the interrogation foot of the northern cliffs, and that of a captured Japanese revealed that ocean waves have scattered his re- about 300 of the enemy were holed up mains."16 in caves and tunnels directly in front of the regiment . The prisoner further 4TH MARINE DIVISION MOPUP 17 volunteered that a Japanese brigadier Following its impressive gains on 10 general was trapped inside the pocket ."' March, which had taken some of its In describing the area of the pocket, assault units to the vicinity of the east 4th Division records had this to say coast, the 4th Marine Division con- It was at once apparent that this area was the final defensive position of the enemy in this zone. The terrain in this ' 3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpt No. 31, dtd 16- area was not normal in any respect ; it Mar45. could be classified only as a terrain freak '° Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 267. of nature. However, it was well suited for " Additional material in this section is de- the construction of cave positions, and the rived from : 23d Mar OpRpt ; 24th Mar QpRpt ; Japanese had utilized this advantage to 25th Mar UJn1; 25th Mar OpRpt ; 14th Mar OpRpt; 1 123 OpRpt ; 2/23 OpRpt; 2/24 OpRpt ; - 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 68, dtd 11- 1/25 OpRpt ; 2/25 OpRpt ; 3/25 OpRpt . Mar45. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 693

the fullest extent. Their scheme of maneu- sniper fire, which eventually caused a ver was to hold up the advance as long as casualty, Marines set up an amplifier- it was possible, and to inflict as many speaker system over which an appeal casualties as they could before they were forced to adopt their usual suicidal to surrender was to be broadcast. For tactics ." more than two hours the psychological warfare team failed in its efforts to The terrain itself consisted of a start a power generator which would series of deep crevices and steep ridges have provided the electricity needed to that extended generally to the south- drive the amplifier . A second motor- east towards the coast . Smaller gullies driven power plant failed to start and cutting through the area created a maze due to this technical breakdown the of compartments and cross compart- entire operation had to be called off . ments. The rough rocky outcroppings Whether General Senda might have and scrubby vegetation that had sur- heeded the appeal promising and guar- vived the extensive shelling provided anteeing him and his men the best of the Japanese with excellent cover and treatment, remains doubtful. Certainly concealment . none of the other Japanese commanders That the elimination of this small approached in this fashion on Iwo Jima but tough pocket of resistance would proved responsive . be a difficult and time-consuming opera- Following the two-hour delay engen- tion had already become apparent to dered by the abortive surrender appeal, 4th Division Marines by the end of 11 Marines of the 4th Division launched March. The presence of one of the big their attack into the pocket at 0900 with fish in the pocket, General Senda, com- 2/25, 3/25, and 2/24. The scheme of mander of the 2d Mixed Brigade, made maneuver called for 2/25 to attack it virtually certain that the remnants down the draws toward the coast while of that unit would fight to the bitter 3/25 and 2/24 were to support the at- end with undiminished fanaticism .20 tack with heavy weapons fire . This fire, Even though there was only a mar- furnished by bazookas, antitank gre- ginal possibility that General Senda nades, and 60mm mortars, had to sub- might be persuaded to surrender, in- stitute for artillery support. As of 12 telligence personnel of the 4th Marine March, the limited area occupied by the Division decided on 12 March that such enemy in the 4th Division zone no an attempt was worth the effort. A longer constituted a practicable target prisoner of war volunteered to lead a area, and orders had been issued to detail of Marines to the vicinity of Gen- secure all 4th Division artillery . eral Senda's presumed hideout during The Japanese, firmly entrenched in the early morning of D plus 21 . Under ravines, caves, and pillboxes, resisted in their customary tenacious fashion, with 19 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 50. 'For a detailed breakdown of General the result that only minimal progress Senda's military career, see Japanese De- was made. The character of the terrain fense Agency Comment . precluded the employment of tanks, 694 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS forcing Marines to flush the enemy out fired northwestward into the inacces- of his emplacements one or two at a sible draws with good effect . time. In addition to the slow progress, This drive on D plus 24 resulted in this type of fighting was, as usual, ex- a net gain of 200 yards. More impor- pensive for the attacking force . By eve- tant, it scored a deep penetration of the ning of 12 March, the combat efficiency left flank of the pocket, where General of General Cates' division had dropped Senda had established his strongest to a new low of 36 percent .21. positions. In the midst of this bitter The drive to eliminate General Senda's fighting, repeated attempts were made pocket continued on 13 and 14 March to induce the surrender of the Japanese, along the same lines as on the 12th . but none of them fell on fertile soil . Progress throughout remained agoniz- The destruction of one cave after an- ingly slow, due to the depletion of per- other, together with their occupants, sonnel as much as enemy resistance . continued . While the pocket was being reduced, the Increased evidence that the pocket 23d Marines began a systematic mop- could not hold out much longer was ping up of its area from the beach received during the night of 15-16 towards the regimental rear . At the March, when a group of 50-60 Japanese same time, the regiment took care of attempted to break out of the encircle- other urgent business, notably the evac- ment. Six of the enemy were killed and uation of the friendly dead, the burial the remainder were driven back into of enemy dead, and the general policing the caves from which they had emerged . of the area. When the 25th Marines resumed the at- By 15 March, the slow and deliberate tack at 0630 on 16 March, the Marines advance of the 25th Marines was begin- drew rifle and machine gun fire, and ning to bear dividends . Even though the hand grenades exploded all around enemy continued to offer desperate re- them . Nevertheless, the Japanese now sistance, there were signs that his fought without any real organization power to resist had been considerably and such resistance as was offered came reduced. Since 2/25 had become so de- from small, isolated groups. By mid- pleted in strength that it required re- morning, the assault battalions had lief, 2/24 was ordered into the line . A fought their way through to the beach provisional company composed of head- road and Colonel Lanigan declared all quarters personnel and members of the organized resistance in his zone of ac- 81mm mortar platoon of 1/25 was tion ended as of 1030 .22 organized to take over the area pre- General Senda's body was never viously held by 2/24. Colonel Lanigan found ; prisoners volunteered that he ordered his men to press the attack into had committed suicide on 15 March . As the pocket regardless of contact . At the the din of battle receded, all that re- same time, flame tanks stationed on the mained in the hotly contested area were road paralleling the east coast of Iwo the torn and battered terrain, large

' 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 53. 'Ibid., p. 58 . FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 695

numbers of enemy dead, and the scarred of oxygen available within this defen- and blackened cave entrances. In six sive system. days of bitter fighting, General Senda's In addition to the excellent cover, the pocket had finally been reduced. The Japanese also had the advantage of ef- Japanese had fought practically to ex- fective concealment . Their uniforms tinction. The 4th Marine Division had blended closely with the color of the paid for the ground with 833 casualties . sandstone. They were familiar with the maze of tunnels that criss-crossed the 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE TO entire area and could find their way KITANO POINT23 around in the darkness as well as in Elimination of the enemy centers of the daytime. Fighting this type of de- resistance in eastern Iwo Jima left only fensive action, General Kuribayashi one area in the hands of the Japanese . could continue to hang on with the This was to be the final enemy pocket austere means at hand. He had no logis- of resistance in the very northern part tics problem, for anything that had to of the island, where General Kuribaya- be moved, be it men or supplies, trav- shi with about 1,500 men was preparing elled underground . Such vital supplies to make his final stand . The Japanese as ammunition, food, water and med- pocket, squarely in the path of the 5th icine all had been stockpiled under- Marine Division's advance, occupied ground long before the first Marines approximately one square mile between began to approach the northern portion Kita Village and Kitano Point on the of the island. In addition to his exten- northwest coast . Not by coincidence, it sive preparations for combat, General also comprised the worst ground on the Kuribayashi had seen to it that the island. knowledge of the entire defense layout The badlands of northern Iwo, as this was limited to very few of his men, area may well be called, consisted of most of whom were told only enough thousands of soft sandstone outcrop- to be familiar with the immediate de- pings . Here, the Japanese had dug in fenses in their vicinity. As a result, with their customary efficiency . Each few of the enemy knew anything about underground position had been pro- the command setup of their own forces vided with multiple entrances and exits and most of them did not know the to protect the defenders against fire and precise location of Kuribayashi's com- to permit their escape if one or more of mand post. the entrances were sealed . These de- For General Rockey's men, the battle fenses had been dug to such a depth that for northwestern Iwo meant a continu- flamethrowers could neither burn out ation of previous difficulties aggravated their occupants nor exhaust the supply by worsening terrain . Once again, they would have to seize the forward face of Additional material in this section is de- a ridge, fight their way across the crest, rived from : TF 56 OpRpt; 26th Mar AR ; 27th then continue to fight their way down Mar UJnl; 27th Mar AR ; 28th Mar R-2 Jnl ; 28th Mar AR ; 13th Mar AR ; 1/26 AR ; 2/26 the reverse slope, all the while drawing AR; 3/26 UJnl ; 3/26 AR; 3/27 UJnl; 3/27 AR. fire from the front, the flanks, from the 696 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ENEMY POSITIONS near Nishi Village under fire . Note burning M-4 tank at left . (USMC 142316)

PRISONER captured by 5th Marine Division near Hill 165 is escorted to the rear fo, interrogation. (USMC 114881) FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 697 rear, and, in some instances, even from and to continue the systematic destruc- below. The latter circumstance was per- tion of enemy cave positions . This was haps the most demoralizing, as pointed the job of small infantry-demolition out by one participant in the fighting teams, which operated more or less on Perhaps worst of all, every Marine their own, blasting their way forward commander fighting through this sand- as they went along . Operating on the stone jungle knew that underneath him division left, the 28th Marines en- were healthy Japanese who would be out countered similar difficulties as Ma- that night to harass his rear, steal his supplies, either recover or booby-trap rines assaulted individual strongpoints their own dead, and booby-trap his dead guarding a rocky gorge to the front . if he couldn't get them out first . The significance of this gorge, which And so the battle for Iwo Jima was was approximately 200 yards wide and ending as it had begun, at close quarters 700 yards long, was not yet apparent with Marine forces stripped of the advan- tages of their fire power, fighting an to Colonel Liversedge's Marines . How- enemy who had been indoctrinated since ever, it was clear that the Japanese had childhood that the greatest honor he would taken great precautions to effectively ever know was to die for his Emperor . He cover all approaches leading into the could not be threatened out of his position gorge with rifle and machine gun fire . by encirclement or by superior force ; he could not be induced to surrender because While the enemy generally remained of his hopeless position-tactically or underground and invisible throughout strategically, he had to be killed .' the day, the entire division front erupted The 5th Marine Division drive into into action shortly after nightfall and the biggest enemy pocket remaining on remained that way throughout the the island got under way on 11 March . night. Small groups of Japanese con- The attack was preceded by a 10-minute tinuously attempted to infiltrate the preparation, which continued until 20 Marine lines . A few were successful minutes after the jumpoff. The half- in reaching the 81mm mortar positions hour barrage, fired by the 12th, 13th, of 3/27. Seven of the infiltrators were and 14th Marines, as well as the corps killed in this attempt, one of them wear- artillery, provided an impressive spec- ing a Marine uniform and equipped tacle but once again, in accordance with with an M-1 rifle.25 Around 2100, an en- previous experience, was generally in- emy concentration opposite the 28th effective against enemy personnel who Marines was broken up by an artillery huddled in well-protected cave positions . and mortar barrage which killed 26 As the division attacked, with the of the enemy . Sporadic rifle fire and 27th Marines on the right and the 28th grenade duels continued for the re- on the left, the men faced a double foe mainder of the night. the Japanese and the terrain, each The arrival of daylight on D plus 21 being equally formidable . The 27th Ma- returned the initiative to the Marines, rines, with 1/26 attached, was able to who, once again, carried the battle to carve out limited gains of 200 yards the enemy . On this occasion, the day

' Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 107 . ' 5th MarDiv AR, p. 26 . 698 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS started off with several air strikes Marines advancing up the west coast against enemy positions just south of had been harassed from suspected Japa- Kitano Point. One of the 500-pound nese positions on these two islands . bombs aimed at a blockhouse missed its There was no doubt that even if the target, only to fall into the mouth of a enemy had not permanently stationed cave, where a tremendous explosion artillery there, they harbored keen-eyed caused not only this entrance, but vari- observers who had helped to harass ous others connected to this cave sys- shipping approaching the western beach- tem, to belch fire and smoke. A similar es during the early phase of the opera- incident occurred during the early after- tion. As the Marines neared the two noon, when a 500-pound bomb hit a cave islands on 12 vehicles furnished by the entrance and created a violent explosion 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, they with smoke observed coming out of were greeted by silence . It was decided caves 200-300 yards away . that a landing on the island would be For the remainder of the day, the made at 0900 on the following morning . course of the fighting mirrored that of These landings, carried out by 6 D plus 20. The enemy continued to re- officers and 94 men, proceeded without sist from caves, emplacements, and incident. The Marines went ashore first spider foxholes, frequently holding his on Kama Rock and subsequently on fire until Marines had approached to Kangoku, the larger island . On the within a few feet of his positions . With latter, there was evidence of previous the support tanks, the 27th Marines enemy occupancy in the form of several made slow progress against a network caves and stone emplacements, but no of pillboxes and prepared positions . In Japanese were present to offer any the course of this advance, between 15 resistance. Having completed its mis- and 18 pillboxes were destroyed, but sion, the reconnaissance company with- overall progress still had to be meas- drew from the islands. ured in a few yards . The Japanese also In a report issued on 12 March, the had learned a few tricks in recent 5th Marine Division intelligence officer operations and, in order to escape estimated that at least 1,000 Japanese American air strikes and artillery fire, were still defending the northern end attempted to hug the Marine lines . of Iwo Jima and concluded : ". . . there Backbone of the Japanese defense is no shortage of manpower, weapons, were his machine guns, rifles, and knee or ammunition in the area the Japanese mortars, all of which continued to exact have left to defend."26 Actually, the a continuous toll in Marine lives for battle was beginning to reach General each foot of the advance. Kuribayashi's very doorstep . As one During the afternoon of 12 March, account was to relate it Company B of the Amphibious Recon- On March 13, a patrol from the 26th naissance Battalion scouted Kama and Regiment came very near to Kuribayashi, peering into the cave in which he sat, near Kangoku Rocks, situated close to the northwestern shore of Iwo Jima . Inter- =° 5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 22, dtd 12- mittently throughout the campaign, Mar45. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 699

the eastern end of the Gorge . The Gen- the 27th Marines was to shift its direc- eral's orderly quickly blew out the candles tion of attack westward . In the center and wrapped the General in a blanket . of the division line the 26th Marines "Thank you," Kuribayashi said, and walked deeper into the cave . The Marines, took over a two-battalion front and was one carrying a flamethrower walked a ordered to attack northward with 3/26 little way into the cave then turned and on the left and 2/26 on the right. went out. The orderly sighed .' Enemy resistance was less obstinate While the Japanese on northern Iwo on D plus 23 than it had been during Jima had been suffering badly in the the preceding days and the 27th Ma- battle of attrition that was now reach- rines, with 2/26 attached, gained up ing its climax, the Marines of all three to 600 yards . The attack was supported divisions had hardly fared any better . by tanks which were able to assist the As assault troops of General Rockey's infantry after armored tankdozers had division were beginning to close in on carved routes of approach to the front the final enemy pocket, the men wearily lines for them. The official report, speak- attacking the ridges above the gorge ing of the flame tanks, pointed out were tired to the point of exhaustion . . . this was the one weapon that and many of them found it difficult to caused the Japs to leave their caves and remain on their feet. Few veterans of rock crevices and run . On many occasions the early battles were left, and death the Japs attempted to charge our flame had reaped a grim harvest among the tanks with shaped charges and other ex- plosives . Few of these attempts were men who had gone ashore on the island successful.' 22 days before. Companies were now Other developments on Iwo Jima on reduced to platoon size . Most of the 14 March gave clear evidence that the aggressive and experienced small unit end of the long battle was approaching . leaders had long since become casual- In mid-morning, five Army Air Forces ties. Gaps in the decimated ranks had planes bombed and strafed Japanese been filled with replacements who positions in front of 3/27 for what lacked combat experience that would enable them to fight and survive . proved to be the last air support mis- sion over Iwo Jima. The diminishing On 14 March it became apparent that size of General Kuribayashi's pocket the slow, step-by-step advance of the rendered all further air support im- 27th Marines finally had cracked the strong enemy positions along the north- practical. Limited support until the end of the operation would continue to be eastern coast of Iwo Jima . Since the furnished by artillery and destroyers, main ridge lines in this area ran from and even these supporting arms soon the center of the island to the sea on the west coast, General Rockey decided that found it difficult to furnish fire in the small area still remaining under enemy the most practical direction of attack . henceforth would be from east to west . control While compression of the northern As a result, the 28th Marines was pocket was under way, a ceremony was ordered to hold its present line while n Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 270-271. 5th MarDiv AR, p . 27. 700 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS taking place at 0930 on 14 March at small number of Japanese approached General Schmidt's headquarters . It was the lines of 2/26 and started tossing not an elaborate proceeding ; in fact, hand grenades . At dawn, the action its stark simplicity underscored the shifted to 3/26, where 30 of the enemy significance of the long awaited event . were discovered attempting to enter In the presence of flag and general of- caves southwest of Kitano Point. Half ficers of the fleet and landing force, of this group were killed, the remainder assembled around a flagpole erected in committed suicide .32 these stark surroundings, the official The 5th Division attack continued on flag raising on Iwo Jima was held . 15 March. On the right, the 27th Ma- Among those present were General Hol- rines advanced 400 yards and reduced land Smith, Admirals Turner and Hill, enemy resistance in this sector to spo- and Generals Schmidt, Erskine, Cates, radic small arms fire. In the center, the Rockey, and Major General Chaney, rep- 26th Marines made smaller but equally resenting the Army Garrison Force .29 significant gains, carving out an ad- After the reading of an official procla- vance of 200 yards . On the division left, mation in which the United States in front of the 28th Marines, enemy officially suspended the powers of gov- reaction remained determined and for- ernment of the Japanese Empire and midable. At this time, enemy resistance took over the occupation of the island, was still centered in two areas : the the flag was raised at the same time steep draw that extended northwest to that the one on top of Mount Suribachi the sea across the front of the 28th was taken down . Upon completion of Marines and the strong core of resist- the ceremony, General Holland Smith ance in front of the 26th Marines, just and his staff departed from the island east of the draw . by air.3o Within the diminishing pocket, Gen- The night from 14-15 March was eral Kuribayashi and the surviving marked by continuous enemy activity members of his staff were still in radio directed against the 5th Division lines . contact with the Japanese on Chichi Around 0200, close to 100 Japanese at- Jima. They were also able to listen to tempted to infiltrate the positions of the "Song of Iwo Jima," especially 3/27. In the ensuing firefight, 15 of the broadcast from Tokyo for the Iwo Jima enemy were killed, most of them by garrison . Already on the morning of 15 mortar fire.31 Around the same time, a March, General Kuribayashi had an- nounced that the situation was very 3° The VAC chief of staff recalled that "while dangerous and that his strength was the ceremony of raising the flag was in prog- down to 900 men .33 By the evening of ress near VAC headquarters, the ground was the following day, his strength had been shaking around us from the bombardment of reduced to 500. Clearly, the end was the unsecured area by nearby Corps artillery ." Rogers ltr . 30 TF 56 OpRpt, pp. 10-11. " Ibid. 01 5th MarDiv AR, p . 27. "Horie Rpt, p. 10. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 701 drawing near. General Kuribayashi against heavy rifle fire, as it proceeded summoned the commander of the 145th over rugged and rocky ground, where Infantry Regiment, Colonel Ikeda, to all movement was extremely difficult. see how much longer resistance could However, it was a sign of the progress continue. When the regimental com- that had already been made that the mander informed him that it would all volume of enemy machine gun fire had be over in another day or so, General greatly diminished, as had the number Kuribayashi admonished him to be cer- of caves that were encountered . Never- tain that the regimental colors were theless, there was still an abundance of burned lest they fall into American spider foxholes and positions in the hands . rocky outcrops which permitted the en- Behind the Marine lines, additional emy to inflict a deadly fire from close signs of progress were becoming evi- range. In the course of the day, the 26th dent as the naval construction engi- Marines advanced 200 yards. The 28th neers put the final touches on the Marines remained in position along the restoration of the Central Airfield . southern rim of the rocky gorge and Even though the runways remained un- continued the reduction of enemy de- paved, they were usable and the field fenses to its immediate front and flanks . was about to become operational . Addi- Losses of the 5th Marine Division at tional gasoline storage facilities had this time consisted of 89 officers and been completed, and the carpenters of 1,993 men killed, 249 officers and 5,710 the 5th Division were already busily enlisted men wounded, and 3 officers engaged in building crates in which the and 128 men missing . Combat efficiency division's equipment would be shipped . was estimated at 30 percent.34 The divi- At the southern end of Iwo Jima, a dirt sion had sustained a total of 8,162 road leading to the top of Mount Suri- casualties in 25 days of fighting . bachi had been completed and it was At 1800 on 16 March, Iwo Jima was now possible to make the trip up by officially declared secured. Three hours jeep or bulldozer . earlier, the 13th Marines had fired its Reduction of the northern pocket last rounds, since the regiment's guns continued on 16 March. During this could no longer furnish supporting fires final phase of the operation, General in the limited area comprising the re- Rockey's division was supported by maining pockets of resistance . It now elements of the 3d Marine Division, became incumbent on the mixed 3d and which passed through the 27th Marines 5th Division assault forces to complete and took over a sector on the right of the occupation of the island with all the 5th Division. Attacking to the north, possible dispatch, a task easier con- General Erskine's men reached the templated than accomplished . north coast shortly before 1400 . Following its relief by the 21st Ma- The 26th Marines, with 3/28 at- rines on 16 March, the 27th Marines re- tached, attacked with three battalions abreast. The advance progressed slowly *4 5th MarDiv AR, p . 28 . 702 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS organized its badly depleted units into articles of clothing and toilet articles as three battalions, each consisting of two were available were sent up to the lines . rifle companies and a headquarters Some of the more lucky Marines even company. A composite battalion, con- enjoyed the luxury of hot showers . But, sisting of a headquarters company and despite such amenities, the report con- four rifle companies, was formed under cludes "Iwo Jima remained an unclean, the command of Lieutenant Colonel evil little island, an island that these Donn J. Robertson . A small remainder men would never forget, however much of the 27th Marines stayed in division they would have liked to."36 reserve until the end of the operation . Despite their ebbing strength and The unit mopped up in the rear area often only through the application of and prepared to leave the island . The sheer will power, those men of the 3d composite battalion, numbering 460 and 5th Marine Divisions still able to men, subsequently was to be attached move on their feet and carry a, weapon to the 26th Marines, where it would now entered the final phase of the battle participate in eliminating the final en- for Iwo Jima . Fought in a narrow emy positions on northern Iwo Jima . corner of the island, the final struggle All of the records dealing with this would prove every bit as difficult as the final phase of the operation emphasize early phase of the operation : death the state of exhaustion in which the came no easier now than in the begin- men found themselves . According to one ning. account : With the end clearly approaching and That the Division still moved forward under steadily increasing pressure at all was a credit to the men and their from the advancing Marines, General leaders, but the fearful strain of days in Kuribayashi on 16 or 17 March left his the line was showing up in every unit. Men were getting careless, exposing them- headquarters, housed in a large dome- selves to fire when they were tired . Too, shaped concrete structure, and moved many of the men now were replacements, to a cave occupied by Colonel Ikeda and men who fought gallantly and brought Admiral Ichimaru, the remaining senior credit to themselves and the Division, but officers of the Iwo Jima garrison fol- who were not, nevertheless, as highly lowing the death of Major General trained as the Division's original men had been and for that reason probably took Senda and Captain Inouye in the 4th slightly heavier losses'' Division sector . From this cave, situ- A sustained effort was made on the ated near the southeastern end of the part of General Rockey's division to gorge, the Japanese officers could do keep up morale. Baked goods and fruit little but exhort their men to continue juice were sent to the units in the line ; resistance to the last. This cave was still the wounded were evacuated and the linked to Chichi Jima by radio, and thus dead buried with all possible dispatch . the final days of Japanese resistance on A division newspaper was circulated Iwo Jima have become a matter of among the frontline units, and such record.

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 113 . ' Ibid., p. 114. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 703

BATTLE FOR THE GORGE AND of the company commanders, platoon FINAL OPERATIONS 37 leaders, and squad leaders had become casualties and many platoons were com- The final battle for Iwo Jima began manded by Corporals or PFC's . Assault on 17 March, D plus 26, when 1/26 squads were depleted . reached the north coast and pivoted to Plans for reducing the final pocket the southwest towards the gorge which called for the 28th Marines, with ele- had already been blocked by the 28th ments of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Marines for the past few days. (See the division reconnaissance company at- Map XI, Map Section), It was here that tached, to occupy a blocking position General Kuribayashi had determined to along the southern rim of the pocket make his final stand, and he had chosen while the 26th Marines, in conjunction his final position with great care . The with 3/28 and 3/27, was to advance gorge, 700 yards long and 200-500 yards into the gorge from the north and east . wide, would have been difficult to ap- Because of the depleted strength of the proach even under normal conditions . units and the condition of the men, Outcrops of rocks subdivided the ravine assigned zones of action were relatively into minor draws that greatly impeded narrow. In their drive against the all movement . The Japanese commander pocket on 17 March, 3/26 and 3/28 had taken care to insure that all routes made slight gains in the northeastern of approach leading into the gorge were perimeter of the pocket, but once again covered by machine gun and rifle fire their progress could be measured in from positions that were all but in- yards. visible to the approaching Marines . A drama of a different sort was en- Units of the 5th Marine Division pre- acted on the island on D plus 26. On paring to offer the coup de grace to the the preceding day, prisoners captured final enemy position on the island would by General Erskine's men had conveyed have to use their last strength irr at- to their captors the whereabouts of taining this objective . A brief break- General Kuribayashi and his staff, and, down of casualties in this connection acting upon this information, General speaks for itself Erskine decided to make an attempt to Our own losses at this time had been induce these officers to surrender . Reali- extremely heavy . The average battalion zing that a direct appeal to General which landed with 36 officers and 885 Kuribayashi would be fruitless, General enlisted, now had about 16 officers and 300 Erskine instead dispatched a message enlisted from the original battalion . Most to Colonel Ikeda, commanding the 145th 1; Additional material in this section is de- Infantry Regiment. The message was rived from : 1/28 AR ; 2/28 AR; 3/28 AR ; 5th handed to two prisoners of war who, Pioneeer Bn UJnl, 7-23Mar45 ; U. S. Army carrying cigarettes and rations, pro- Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas Rpt, Iwo ceeded into the gorge, fully aware of the Jima, Feb-Mar45, dtd 4Feb46 ; VAC Shore importance of their mission. As they Party AR; Clive Howard and Joe Whitley, trudged off on this unusual errand, the One Damned Island After Another (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press), pair was handed a walkie-talkie over 1946. ' 5th MarDiv AR, p . 29. 704 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS which they were to maintain contact nil . None of the high-ranking Japanese with the 3d Division Language Section . officers on Iwo Jima surrendered, and As they slowly continued on their the battle of attrition continued to take journey, the two emissaries crossed its slow and agonizing course . Even lines and soon made contact with though nearly all of the Japanese on groups of Japanese, apparently with- Iwo Jima, under General Kuribay+ashi's out arousing anyone's suspicion. Sev- dynamic leadership, would fight to the eral radio messages were received by end, there were some who heeded the 3d Division personnel indicating that repeated appeals to surrender . Ameri- the prisoners were getting close to their can planes dropped propaganda leaflets, objective. At this point, the couriers and the artillery fired shells filled with stopped all further transmissions . One surrender leaflets and passes . For the of them, who had incurred a leg wound, Japanese soldier on Iwo Jima, sur- dropped out, but the other continued render was not an easy matter . He and six hours after embarking on his could count on being executed by his bizarre mission, reached the headquar- own people if caught with American ters cave. There, he turned the message propaganda on his person . Surrender over to one of the sentries who passed might mean that he could never again it on to the regimental commander . return to his homeland and face his Upon learning that Ikeda had taken compatriots. And, last but not least, he the message in to General Kuribayashi, had no guarantee that the Marines the prisoner lost his nerve and beat a would honor their promise of fair treat- hasty retreat. ment once he turned himself in to them . As soon as he had rejoined his fellow No wonder that the Japanese were courier, the radio trasmissions to the hesitant to take the final and irrever- 3d Division resumed and the Marines sible step in view of the uncertainty were informed that the two were on surrounding it . A sampling of 65 pris- their way back. Upon reaching the Ma- oners of war showed that 53 had been rine lines at the rim of the gorge, the influenced in their decision to give up prisoners thought themselves safe and by some contact with American propa- were more than slightly disturbed at ganda . The remaining 12 had been the rude reception accorded to them by deterred by fear of their officers and 5th Division Marines, who were un- distrust of the Marines and were cap- aware of General Erskine's psycho- tured under different circumstances .39 logical warfare effort. The situation Meanwhile, the Marines continued to was finally straightened out before the close in on General Kuribayashi's two messengers came to any harm, pocket. With the end in sight, the Japa- though it took some convincing of the nese garrison commander addressed this skeptical 5th Division Marines that the order to his men on 17 March two Japanese were indeed working for 1. The battle situation came to the last General Erskine . moment . The practical results of this surrender attempt, as in previous instances, were I VAC G-2 Rpts, pp. 19, 20. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 705

2. I want my surviving officers and men other units in rear areas opened up a to go out and attack the enemy tonight . jubilant barrage with machine guns, anti- 3. Each troop! Go out simultaneously aircraft guns, carbines, rifles, and pistols." at midnight and attack the enemy until Before it was over, units all over the the last. You all have devoted yourself to His Majesty, the Emperor . Don't think island and the ships offshore had the of yourself. news. An end to the celebration came 4. I am always at the head of you all.'"' only when Condition Red was declared, Strangely enough, there was no un- a warning that enemy planes were in usual activity during the night from 17- the area. As one account has it, "The 18 March, and nothing even resembling Fifth Division hospital treated three a banzai charge occurred . From this casualties from `the German war' and point onward, the information concern- there were certainly others ."'-1 Follow- ing the last days of the enemy's battle ing the excitement, Marines on Iwo for Iwo Jima becomes increasingly Jima returned to the more normal hazy. Most of what has remained passed routine of routing individual Japanese through the hands of the Chichi Jima and thwarting the enemy's infiltration garrison, which continued to receive attempts. radio messages from Iwo that were As the advance continued on 19 filed and subsequently turned over March, enemy resistance became cen- to the Americans. Thus, early on 17 tered around General Kuribayashi's March, Chichi Jima was notified that erstwhile headquarters . The structure "the 145th Infantry Regiment fought proved completely impervious to the bravely near 'Hyoriuboku' holding their 75mm tank shells and likewise defied regimental flag in the center ." Later in all attempts to demolish it with 40- the day, Colonel Ikeda sent this cryptic pound shaped charges . It would take message : "Here we burnt our brilliant the assaulting Marines two days to Regimental Flag completely. Good destroy the surrounding positions and bye."41 then commence a direct assault on the Iwo Jima became the scene of a wild command center . Engineers with bull- celebration on the evening of 18 March . dozers sealed an entrance on the north It had nothing to do with the fact that side of the structure and several air the enemy was finally cornered in the vents. Finally, four tons of explosives, northwestern portion of the island -and divided into five charges, proved suf- his elimination now was but a matter ficient to destroy this stubborn center of days. Instead, someone had leaked of resistance . Just who and how many word that Germany had surrendered, among the Japanese perished within has and this item of news, entirely un- never become known. However, the gar- founded and nearly two months pre- rison commander and the high-ranking mature, spread all over Iwo Jima like officers were safely tucked away in wildfire. As a result Colonel Ikeda's cave, and reports con- . . . for about an hour the island was the tinued to reach Chichi Jima, though happiest spot on earth . Antiaircraft and d0 Horie Rpt, p. 11 . " Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 117 . " Ibid. " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 281. 706 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

communications daily became more with operational control of all units sporadic . engaged in the final mop-up at the gorge . Around 17-18 March, General Kuri- From an observation post affording a bayashi sent his final message to Im- clear view of the gorge, General Hermle perial General Headquarters, in which directed the operation that would bring he apologized to the Emperor for his organized enemy resistance in this sector failure to hold the island. The message to an end. was accompanied by a poem in which On Chichi Jima, Major Horie learned the garrison commander promised with astonishment on 21 March that My body shall not decay in the field General Kuribayashi and his men were Unless we are avenged ; still fighting. The durable garrison com- I will be born seven more times again mander reported that his cave was To take up arms against the foe. My only concern is under direct attack by tanks and de- Our country in the future molition teams . Of American attempts When weeds cover here." to induce his surrender he mentioned About the same time, but in a less disdainfully that "they advised us to poetic and more down-to-earth fashion, surrender by a loud-speaker, but we Admiral Ichimaru penned a rather vitu- only laughed at this childish trick and 4° perative letter to none other than Pres- did not set ourselves against them ." ident Roosevelt, charging the latter Major Horie radioed to Iwo Jima the with a lack of understanding for Japan's information that, effective 17 March, problems and accusing the white race, the Imperial government had promoted and the Anglo-Saxons in particular, "of Kuribayashi to the rank of full gen- monopolizing the fruits of the world, at eral, Ichimaru to vice admiral, Inouye the sacrifice of the colored races ." 4 to rear admiral, and Nishi to full colo- Meanwhile, reduction of the pocket nel. The two latter promotions were continued unabated . Tanks moved up made posthumously, though most likely to the front lines over paths cleared by all of them were intended that way . the tank dozers which themselves fre- On D plus 30, 21 March, the 26th Ma- quently came under attack by individ- rines, with 3/27 and 3/28 attached, con- uals or small groups of Japanese bent tinued the assault as 1/26 and 3/27 on suicide . The slow but steady Marine advanced into the gorge . At the rim, advance into the gorge was carried out 3/28 held its positions. Fighting on this under the command of the assistant day, as on the preceding ones, was ex- division commander, General Hermle, ceedingly bitter. The Japanese refused whom General Rockey had entrusted to yield ; in fact, there no longer was any place for them to go but stand their " Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 272. ground and die. Thus, the Marines had ' Admiral Ichimaru ltr to President Roose- to eliminate them one by one. As on an velt, n.d., in Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, earlier occasion, it was noticed that pp. 172-173. This letter was found by Marines in a cave in the northern part of Iwo Jima ; many of the enemy were wearing Ma- the original reposes in the museum of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md . "Horie Rpt, p. 11 . FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 707 rine uniforms and firing M-1 rifles . In For four days men of the 5th Division the course of the day's advance, elements tried to take Death Valley by direct as- sault. They failed, because any man who of 1/26 made gains of 200 yards down set foot in the gorge was dead ." the gorge, but beyond that point re- quired the support of flame tanks . It Still, some progress was apparent as developed that the terrain did not per- one enemy defensive position after an- mit their employment, so that portable other was whittled away . On 22 March, flamethrowers were used until the Japa- 3/27, supported by tanks, tank dozers, nese shot the liquid out of the tanks . and flame tanks, gained another 300 When his equipment was hit, one of the yards. On the following day, D plus 32, operators became a human torch and Major Horie received one final message burned to death ; another was just from Iwo Jima which said : "All officers 1149 barely saved from suffering the same and men of Chichi Jima, good-bye . fate. For three more days, Horie tried to As D plus 30 ended, 1/28 had gained communicate with Iwo Jima, but there 400 yards at the edge of the cliff, while was no answer and it was assumed that 2/28, after one of its patrols had elimin- all resistance on the island had ended . ated 20 of the enemy, moved forward This fact had already been mournfully 100 yards to the very edge of the cliff . announced over Tokyo Radio by the On this day, Major Horie received a Japanese Prime Minister, who bemoaned message from Iwo Jima, informing him the fall of the island as "the most un- "We have not eaten nor drunk for five fortunate thing in the whole war situa- days. But our fighting spirit is still run- tion."50 ning high."47 The end was now very By 24 March, the backbone of enemy near, yet the battle for Death Valley, resistance in Death Valley had been a name Marines had given to the gorge, broken, and the size of the pocket was continued. In a situation where the down to a square of 50 by 50 yards . orthodox arms and tactics of warfare On the following day, D plus 32, ex- proved unavailing, other means had to hausted Marines of 3/26 and 3/28 be improvised. In the words of one ac- moved down into Death Valley and count : completed the task of mopping up, seal- ing caves and squeezing the enemy into The Marines tried everything in the . book, and a good many things that weren't, an area that was no longer defensible to clean the Japs out of the gorge . Explo- Still, individual Japanese held out until sives were lowered over cliffs by rope to 25 March, when death-tired remnants blast the Japs from their caves. Drums of of the 26th, 27th, and 28th Marines gasoline were emptied into canyons and staggered into the gorge and silenced set afire. Over-sized rockets were hauled what remained of enemy resistance . At up to the front on bulldozers and used to blow the Japs off hillsides . Aerial observ- ers dropped grenades on enemy positions "Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 303 . from their low-flying grasshoppers . "Horie Rpt, p. 12. 60 Radio address by Premier Kuniaki Koiso, 17Mar45, as cited in Newcomb, Iwo Jima, "Ibid., p . 12. p. 274. 708 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

1045 on D plus 34, the gorge was de- captured . As a precautionary measure, clared secured and fighting on northern a LCI (G) patrolled off the northwest Iwo officially came to an end . beaches to prevent the escape of any Withdrawal of Marine units from of the enemy by water during the hours Iwo Jima got under way on 17 March, of darkness. when the VAC artillery completed em- Early on 26 March, a force of be- barkation. Artillery of the three di- tween 200 and 300 Japanese moved visions reembarked on subsequent days, down from the area near the Northern except for 4/12, which stood by for sev- Airfield over a trail skirting the west- eral days, prepared to deliver fire on ern coast of the island and launched a request. On 18 March, the 3d Marine full-scale attack against Marine and Division relieved the 4th and General Army units encamped near the western Cates closed his CP on Iwo Jima . On beaches. Far from executing a howling the same day, men of this division em- banzai charge, the Japanese launched a barked. Two days later, the ships car- well-organized attack which was car- rying the division departed from the ried out in echelon from three direc- island en route to their rehabilitation tions. Carefully calculated to achieve the area in Hawaii . The arrival of the 147th maximum confusion and destruction, Infantry Regiment on 20 March brought the Japanese set about to do their deadly Army troops into the picture . The regi- work in silence . Beginning at 0515, and ment was attached to General Erskine's for more than three hours, the enemy division for operational control . As early ranged through the Marine and Army as 7 March, General Chaney had as- bivouacs, slashing tents, knifing sleep- sumed responsibility for base develop- ing airmen, and throwing grenades at ment and antiaircraft defense of all Iwo random . ground installations. He had delegated The units engaged and partly overrun the air defense of Iwo Jima to General were the 5th Pioneer Battalion, elements Moore effective that date . At 0800 on 26 of the 8th Field Depot, comprising the March, General Chaney took over as VAC Shore Party, the 98th Naval Con- Iwo Jima garrison commander, in effect struction Battalion, elements of the 21st assuming operational control of all units Fighter Group, the 465th Aviation stationed on the island . General Moore Squadron, and the 506th Antiaircraft continued as Air Defense Commander . Artillery Gun Battalion . In the dark- Just as it appeared that Iwo Jima ness, the fighting was confused and ter- was about to become a garrison, rather rible. The chief difficulty, that of dis- than a fiercely contested battlefield, the tinguishing between friend and enemy, Japanese decided to strike a last blow was compounded by the fact that many against the invaders who by this time of the attackers were armed with BARs, had victory all but within their grasp . M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols, and one Mopping up operations up to this time even with a bazooka . Other Japanese had continued daily in northern and charged with their swords, a sure in- central Iwo, and day and night individ- dication that a sizable part of the as- ual Japanese had either been killed or sault force consisted of officers . FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 709

OFFICER BIVOUAC AREA of the 21st Fighter Group following the Japanese attack of March 1945 . Note bullet-marked tents. (USAF 47590 AC)

GENERAL VIEW of parking area on Motoyama Airfield No . 1 after its restoration. (USAF 57620 AC) 710 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS At the height of the attack, the Japa- and the efficiency with which it was car- nese penetrated to the Army 38th Field ried out would lend some substance to Hospital, where they tore out the tele- the report. The 40 swords gathered up phone lines, slashed tents, and machine- on the field of battle after the action gunned ambulances . In the midst of the gave evidence of the high percentage prevailing turmoil, officers of the 5th of officers and senior noncommissioned Pioneer Battalion organized the first officers that participated. Years after resistance, and there were instances of the war, a Japanese who had been taken great personal heroism and sacrifice. prisoner during this final attack and Initially, a firing line was established in who had been subsequently repatriated, some foxholes. Subsequently, as the din was to claim that one-legged Admiral of battle increased, other Marines ar- Ichimaru .had taken part in the charge. rived on the scene and Army flame tanks But a body count following the battle began to go into action . The 5th Pioneers and examination of the bodies failed to organized a skirmish line and, for the identify either Kuribayashi, Ichimaru, first time, the enemy was forced to give or Ikeda, and their exact fate has never ground . Joining in the action was any- been determined . one who had a weapon, including air- The final Japanese attack also proved men, Seabees, Army medical personnel, costly to the Americans in terms of and members of the Corps Shore Party. casualties. The 5th Pioneers lost 9 In fact, the performance of the latter killed and 31 wounded in this action ; Marines earned them a special com- units of the VII Fighter Command had mendation from their commanding of- 44 killed and 88 wounded.s2 At just ficer who stated about the time that the last of the enemy The Corps Shore Party Commander is raiders were being killed off on western highly gratified with the performance of Iwo, the capture and occupation phase these colored troops, whose normal func- of the Iwo Jima operation was an- tion is that of labor troops, while in direct nounced completed . As of 0800, 26 action against the enemy for the first time. Proper security prevented their be- March, the Commander Forward Area, ing taken unawares, and they conducted Central Pacific, Vice Admiral John H . themselves with marked coolness and Hoover, assumed responsibility for the courage. Careful investigation shows that defense and development of the island. they displayed modesty in reporting their own part in the action .' General Schmidt closed his CP and de- parted from Iwo Jima by air shortly When it was all over, 196 Japanese after noon . The remainder of his head- littered the area of the 5th Pioneer Bat- quarters embarked on the USS Pres- talion alone ; 66 of the raiders were ident Monroe . killed in the adjacent areas and a total Embarkation of the remaining Ma- of 18 were captured . Rumor had it that rine units followed a schedule long General Kuribayashi had led the attack,

' Shore Party AR, dtd 30Apr45, in VAC 'VAC 'G-3 PerRpt No. 35 dtd 26Mar45 ; AR, App 10, Anx C, p. 13. 5th Pioneer Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 27Mar45, p. 2. FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA 711 worked out in advance . Thus, elements Regiment continued throughout April of the 3d Marine Division began to em- and into May, resulting in additional bark on 27 March, when the 21st Ma- Japanese killed and captured . Isolated rines and the division CP went aboard enemy strongpoints continued to hold ship . The remainder of General Er- out and had to be reduced, some of them skine's men departed on the return run more than once. of ships carrying garrison forces to Iwo . During the first week of April, in an On 4 April, the Army's 147th Infantry incident reminiscent of the unexpected Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ro- enemy attack of 26 March, about 200 bert F. Johnson, assumed full respon- Japanese materialized just above the sibility for the ground defense of the East Boat Basin, where they attempted island and the 9th Marines prepared to to rush an infantry command post . This embark. The last unit of General Er- battle continued all night and all of the skine's division left Iwo on 12 April and attackers were killed, but not before arrived on Guam six days later . During they had succeeded in exploding 6,000 the final phase of the operation between cases of dynamite, which rocked the is- 11 and 26 March, the Marines had land and caused a number of casualties.56 sustained a total of 3,885 casualties .53 Nor was this the end. Also during the Total Marine casualties for the Iwo month of April, Army troops stumbled Jima operation came to 25,851 .54 upon the field hospital of the 2d Mixed The total number of Japanese who Brigade, located 100 feet underground died in the defense of Iwo Jima has on eastern Iwo Jima . The surrender of never been definitely established, but the hospital proved to be somewhat nearly the entire garrison went down complex, as outlined by this account fighting. As of 26 March, the Marines A language officer appealed to the Japa- had taken only 216 prisoners," a large nese to come out. After a long discussion, . the senior medical officer, Major Masaru number of whom were Korean laborers Inoaka, called for a vote . The ballot Nor did the fighting and dying on the turned out sixty-nine for surrender, 3 island end with the departure of the opposed. Of the three nays, Corporal VAC Landing Force . Aggressive patrols Kyutaro Kojima immediately committed and ambuscades by the 147th Infantry suicide. The others came out, including two more medical officers, Captain Iwao Noguchi and Lieutenant Hideo Ota. Cap- "Broken down by divisions, these casualties tain Noguchi, beset by remorse that he : 147 were as follows : 3d Marine Division had lived while so many died, later emi- killed, 60 died of wounds, 505 wounded, and grated to Brazil, unable to accept life in 53 combat fatigue ; 4th Marine Division : 139 Japan G7 killed, 87 dead of wounds, 442 wounded, and 52 combat fatigue ; 5th Marine Division : 467 For the remainder of April and May, killed, 168 died of wounds, 1,640 wounded, 3 members of the 147th Infantry Regi- missing, and 122 combat fatigue . Above figures derived from HQMC postwar statistics . " Headquarters, Army Garrison Force G-2 °" A detailed breakdown of Marine casualties Weekly Rpt No . 2, dtd 8Apr45, as cited in by unit is shown in Appendix H . Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 69-70. ' VAC G-2 PerRpt No. 35, dtd 9Apr45 . 17 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 287. 712 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS ment accounted for 1,602 Japanese There were many who would pay killed and 867 captured ." As the fight- tribute to the heroism of the Marines ing and dying gradually subsided, the who captured this key bastion of the utilization of the island as a forward Japanese inner defense ring, bristling base went into high gear . But even as with the most powerful defenses a clever bulldozers tore across ground that had and crafty enemy could devise . None of previously been so bitterly contested and them put it better than Admiral Nimitz, aviation gas was beginning to reach Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet Iwo in large quantities, three large Ma- and Pacific Ocean Areas, who made this rine Corps cemeteries remained to offer comment a mute eulogy to the men who had The battle of Iwo Island has been won. fought and died there. Arriving on Iwo The United States Marines by their indi- Jima on 20 April 1945, one eminent vidual and collective courage have con- Navy historian counted 5,330 graves in quered a base which is as necessary to us the Marine Corps cemeteries, but, in his in our continuing forward movement toward final victory as it was vital to the own words enemy in staving off ultimate defeat . . . . there were about 31,000 soldiers, By their victory the Third, Fourth and Air Force ground crews and Seabees on Fifth Marine Divisions and other units of the island, very much alive, healthy and the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made in high spirits . Army officers said they an accounting to their country which only wouldn't trade Iwo for any South Pacific history will be able to value fully . Among island' the Americans who served on Iwo Island I Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment, uncommon valor was a common virtue G° Report of Operations Against the Enemy, Iwo Jima, dtd 11Jun45, as cited in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 193. 'Pacific Fleet Communique No . 300, dtd 1 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 70. 17Mar45. CHAPTER 12

1 Summary

The battle of Iwo Jima requires a then Secretary of the Navy, James V . detailed analysis because it was unique Forrestal, gave voice to his "tremendous in certain respects . First, it featured the admiration and reverence for the guy employment of three Marine divisions who walks up beaches and takes enemy (less one regiment) under a single positions with a rifle and grenades or tactical Marine command, the largest his bare hands ."2 Yet it would be folly body of Marines committed to combat to assume that sheer courage alone, in one operation during World War II . even when coupled with material supe- Secondly, enemy resistance under Gen- riority, was the decisive factor that led eral Kuribayashi was such that Amer- to certain, if bloody, victory . Even ican casualties sustained in this opera- Admiral Spruance's statement, that "in tion exceeded those of the Japanese . Out view of the character of the defenses of the savage struggle for eight square and the stubborn resistance encoun- miles of inhospitable island emerged tered, it is fortunate that less seasoned convincing re-affirmation of the fact or less resolute troops were not com- that once air and naval superiority had mitted," 3 only touches on one important been gained over and around an objec- facet within the overall picture . tive, Marines could make a landing, gain The reason Marines were able to a foothold, and extend it until the enemy prevail against a firmly entrenched was driven into a severely restricted enemy, who knew in advance of the area. There, he could be annihilated, impending attack, can be found in de- regardless of the size and number of his tailed and meticulous planning . The guns or the quality of his defense . The plans for the Iwo Jima operation pos- sibly were the most far-reaching for any 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this operation in the Pacific area up to this chapter is derived from : Fifth Fleet OpRpt; time in World War II . Preparations ex- TF 51 AR ; TF 52 AR ; TF 53 OpRpt ; TG tended not only to American bases in 53.2 AR; TF 56 AR ; VAC AR ; VAC NGF the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Rpt ; 3d MarDiv AR ; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv AR ; 1st Prov FdArty Gp AR ; Shaw, Hawaiian Islands but all the way back Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive ; to the mainland of the United States, Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Iwo Comments ; "from whence came hundreds of new Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Craven and ships to transport the troops to the Cate, The Pacific; Forrestel, Admiral Spru- ance ; Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely and 'Quoted in The New York Times, dtd 26- Crowl, U S. Marines and Amphibious War ; Feb45, p. 1, col 6, as cited in Bartley, Iwo Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World War Monograph, p . 210. II ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea. 'Fifth Flt OpRpt, p . 3. 713 714 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

objective. Most of these ships were reason he went on the expedition was in under construction less than six months case something happened to General Schmidt.' before the target day, and some of the smaller ones existed at that time only When Admiral Nimitz coined his in blueprint form ."' In fact, with one phrase about the uncommon valor dis- exception, the transports carrying the played by Americans who served on Iwo 4th and 5th Marine Divisions to the Jima, he was referring not only to the objective were either under construc- Marines who did the lion's share of the tion or being commissioned as late as fighting, but also to personnel of the 31 October 1944 .5 It is typical of the U. S. Army and Navy, on the ground, long-range planning preceding Opera- at sea, and in the air, who supported tion DETACHMENT that many of the them. According to one historical evalu- ation participating vessels had to be trans- ferred from the European Theater to Without supplies and medical care the assault would have ground to a halt, and the Pacific prior to the invasion . without close air, naval gunfire, and ar- At Iwo Jima, as in similar operations, tillery support, there would have been no two command ships were employed so neutralization to permit the tank-infantry that, in the event one command ship demolition teams to advance .' became a casualty, the commander Based on sound doctrine, training, aboard the other could take over . In this and experience, the participating serv- case Admiral Turner, as Expeditionary ices and arms developed excellent team- Force Commander, was embarked in a work that could not have been sur- command ship with General Holland passed . In view of the depth and extent Smith as Expeditionary Troops Com- of the Japanese defenses, naval gunfire mander, while Admiral Harry Hill, as had only a limited effect. Long and Attack Force Commander and General medium range bombardment accom- Schmidt, as Landing Force Commander, plished little, and even area fire failed were embarked in the other command to do much damage to underground ship. The VAC chief of staff was to com- enemy defenses. Following the opera- ment on the command relationships at tion, Admiral Blandy was to make this Iwo Jima in these terms comment in dealing with the preliminary The Navy was of course in command bombardment afloat. The Landing Force Commander It was not until fire support ships, their assumed command ashore after setting up spotting planes, and the support aircraft a command post there . General Holland had worked at the objective for two days, Smith could have assumed command had become familiar with the location and ashore by setting up a headquarters appearance of the defenses, and had ac- ashore . He did not do so, nor to the best curately attacked them with close-range of my knowledge did he ever issue any gunfire and low-altitude air strikes, that command to the troops ashore . In fact, substantial results were achieved .8 he had only a skeleton staff, and as he remarked to General Schmidt the only ° Rogers ltr. ' Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 93. phibious War, p . 501. r'TG 53.2 AR, p. 2. 8 TF 52 AR, p . 10, SUMMARY 715 This statement leads directly into the D-Day would have materially shortened only deep-seated controversy to devel- the battle and saved many lives ."" op from the Iwo Jima operation, that It would serve no useful purpose at of the duration of the naval gunfire this time to rekindle the barely sub- support.° This dispute still simmers merged passions that have occasionally more than 25 years after the event, and popped to the surface regarding this it appears doubtful that it will ever be subject. Even minute inspection of all completely resolved to the satisfaction available data does not lead to concrete of all concerned. The issues in this case and infallible conclusions that would are clear stand up to prolonged investigation . Previous amphibious assaults had am- Thus the controversy simply becomes ply demonstrated that against such de- one of the vantage point occupied by fenses only deliberate, short-range de- each of the participants at the time of structive fire would be effective . And both Marine and Navy commanders knew that the operation . To a Marine who went even under the most favorable conditions ashore on D-Day or later and saw the this method of bombardment was ex- carnage wrought by the Japanese shore tremely time consuming .'" guns among his comrades, it becomes Then, as now, the lines in the naval inconceivable that, regardless of time gunfire controversy were clearly drawn, limits and restrictions on ammunition and little room remained for compro- expenditure, more was not done to as- mise. Most of the Marines who fought sure that enemy shore defenses were on Iwo Jima give credit to the high knocked out prior to the landings . This degree of precision which naval gunfire feeling is born of a mixture of anger had reached since the early operations and frustration, known only to those of World War II, but at the same time who have been exposed to superior firmly agree with one former Marine enemy firepower for any length of time, participant who commented that "un- bereft of the possibility to reply at once doubtedly, longer bombardment before and in kind . Little has yet been devised to relieve the initial feeling of helpless- ' In his version of the Iwo operation, Samuel ness experienced by the rifleman who Eliot Morison mentions an attack on Navy strategy and Marine Corps tactics launched hits a hostile beach under the muzzle by a segment of the American press, accusing of still functioning enemy guns . both of being wasteful of American lives in From the Navy's vantage point, the paying an exorbitant price for the seizure of situation was slightly different. In the heavily defended objectives of limited useful- first place, the Iwo Jima operation had ness. Deplorable as was the loss of lives at Iwo Jima, the American public then, as now, came been tightly wedged in a time frame to realize that the cost of victory is high . between the invasion of Luzon and the Despite expressions of public anguish at the coming assault on Okinawa . Under such losses sustained at Iwo Jima, the value of the pressure, perhaps the best that could objective for continued operations never was be achieved was neutralization, not de- in doubt, nor did the issue, for lack of an alternate solution, ever assume the dimensions struction of the enemy artillery as of a public controversy . 10 Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 202. " Heinl, Soldiers o f the Sea, p . 484 . 716 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS desired by the Marines. The naval view- done much to cool the passions of Ma- point is summed up in this statement rines who underwent the trial by "fire There is no reason to believe that ten or and steel" on Iwo Jima . There simply even thirty days of naval and air pound- appears to be no way to equate the feel- ing would have had much more effect on ings of men who have watched their the defenses than the bombardment that comrades and friends torn apart by was delivered . The defenses were such, by enemy weapons with the cold realities and large, that the only way they could be taken out was the way they were taken of logistics, statistics, and strategy . out, by Marine Corps infantry and demo- Thus, for the purposes of this history, litions . . . . Aerial bombardment and naval the controversy must remain unsolved . gunfire simply could not reach under- Let it be said for the record that, once ground into the maze of caves and tun- nels, yet these had to be cleared or sealed the Marines had gone ashore, naval shut before the island could be secured as gunfire was furnished to the satisfac- an air base on the Bonins' road to Tokyo .12 tion of the landing force . In this con- nection, the positive must be ac- This line of reasoning carries little weight with Marines who faced the centuated . One account summed up the maze of virtually untouched pillboxes quality of naval gunfire support in these words and covered emplacements between the Southern and Central Airfields and The cooperation of these vessels, from the largest battleship to the small, spe- those to the east and west of the latter . cialized gunboats, was excellent . The na- These defenses were situated in more ture of the terrain continued to limit their or less open terrain that was largely ac- effectiveness, however, and in most in- cessible to direct fire at relatively short stances only neutralization was obtained. ranges from vessels standing offshore . Supporting ships and craft were quick to observe enemy activity and take it under It required the herculean efforts of men fire after first checking with units ashore in eight days of costly fighting to reduce to determine that the shelling would not these fortifications . In the words of Gen- endanger friendly troops ." eral Harry Schmidt : "With additional General Kuribayashi himself unwit- time available for pre-D-Day firing tingly paid tribute to the accuracy of naval guns might have accomplished American naval gunfire support when much in this area to facilitate its cap- he passed word to his superiors that the ture."13 The Navy has contended that power of bombardment from ships re- . . . heavy ammunition replenishment at quired reevaluation : sea had not been service tested and the bombarding ships were far from a supply The beach positions we made on this base and could not carry enough ammuni- island by using many materials, days and tion for the prolonged bombardment de- great efforts, were destroyed within three sired by the Marines ."} days so that they were nearly unable to Neither the validity of this conten- be used again . . . . tion nor the flow of time itself have Power of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing operation possible to whatever beachhead they like, "Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 73. " VAC NGF Rpt, pp. 21-22. " Forrestel, Admiral Spruance, p . 168. " Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 203. SUMMARY 717

and preventing them from landing means On D minus 1, as the weather cleared nothing but great damages ." and the carrier pilots had become The same factors that limited the suc- familiar with the terrain and the targets cess of naval gunfire also proved a on the island, more was accomplished hindrance to the effectiveness of the than during the two preceding days . preinvasion air bombardment. The Japanese defenses on the slopes of bombing of Iwo Jima and adjacent is- Mount Suribachi and emplacements lands over a period of several months above the East Boat Basin proved to by high-altitude B-24 bombers based in be particularly attractive targets for the the Marianas had prevented the Japa- Navy flyers, who not only bombed these nese from enjoying the unrestricted use targets but also strafed them with of the two airfields on Iwo Jima . On the 5-inch rockets . The latter were effective other hand, the increasingly heavy air due to their accuracy but lacked the raids did much to drive the enemy un- destructive power required against the derground. In evaluating the results of formidable enemy fortifications . In this extensive bombing, Air Force evaluating the effectiveness of these air historians themselves conclude that, strikes, the advance commander of the despite "the heavy going over the island air support control units only al- had received, weather conditions and lowed that they "conceivably weakened the topography of Iwo Jima had ren- the areas commanding the landing dered the results much less decisive than beaches."13 had been expected ." 17 Greatly contrasting with the incon- While bombers of the Seventh Air clusive results obtained from the above Force had concentrated mostly on the air strikes was the support furnished destruction or neutralization of the by the pilots of Task Force 58 on D-Day. operational airfields in the Bonins, Ad- The Marine and Navy flyers, whose miral Durgin's carrier pilots assaulted heroic efforts were clearly visible to those defenses that would interfere with Navy personnel and Marines about to the amphibious assault and the sub- hit the Iwo Jima beaches, drew vocifer- sequent push inland . Deficiencies in the ous praise. As long as Vice Admiral armament of the support aircraft and Mitscher's carriers remained at Iwo, the the small size of the bombs they car- carrier squadrons were able to furnish ried severely limited the effectiveness all the ground support requested, but on of these attacks . Even when a target D plus 4, when the large carriers de- had been pinpointed, the bombs proved parted, a shortage of aircraft quickly too small to smash buried blockhouses . developed . Planes needed for ground The use of napalm, which was badly support had to be diverted to such other needed to strip enemy positions on Iwo duties as antisubmarine patrols, strikes Jima of their natural cover, also proved against other islands in the Bonins, and disappointing when, in numerous in- sea rescue operations . stances, the liquid failed to ignite . As a rule, response of aviation to requests from ground units was quick, '° Horie Rpt, p . 13 . 1- Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p . 584. 18 TF 52 AR, Encl D, p. 4. 718 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS though on many occasions more than an divisions unanimously recommended hour elapsed before the supporting air- that in future operations, the air liaison craft appeared on the scene. Even then, parties be given more direct control over the normally overcrowded Support Air aircraft during close support missions ." Request Net proved to be the weak link The start made in this direction during in obtaining air strikes without undue 1944 proved to be only the first step in loss of time . It is ironic that Iwo Jima an uphill and time-consuming struggle, Marines were denied the close support some of which still had not been resolved that was to become the trademark of at the time of the Korean War . Marine aviation, while Army troops in Throughout the Iwo operation, air the Philippines at this time were reap- observers played an important role . ing the benefits from exactly that type Fighter-type aircraft, flown by espe- of support furnished by Marine dive cially trained pilots of VOC-1, aug- bombers. 19 As in other campaigns, each mented the float planes normally used echelon intervening between the ground to spot naval gunfire . On an improvised unit requesting air strikes and the pilots basis, Marine artillery and tactical ob- furnishing the support resulted in loss servers operated from carrier-based of time and attendant confusion . Once torpedo bombers until the small obser- again, the crux of the matter was control vation planes of the VMO squadrons of support aircraft by the ground units, had gone ashore . In spite of the dif- something that higher headquarters ficulties, the latter held their own. One were still most reluctant to grant . At historical account was to sum up their the conclusion of operations in the Mar- performance this way shalls and the Marianas Like other Marines on Iwo, the VMO Marine commanders pressed hard for squadrons had to prove they could take it. increased use of Marine air in close sup- The little planes and their pilots and port. They wanted pilots, planes, and a ground crews were subjected to every- control system oriented to ground needs thing from kamikazes to artillery fire to and quickly responsive to strike requests . faulty launching gear, and all of these took The winds of change were in the air in the their toll .' summer of 1944 and refinements in close Aside from difficulties encountered support techniques were coming . Opera- with the overcrowded Support Air tions later in the year saw planes bomb- ing and strafing closer to frontline posi- Request Net, communications on and tions and evidenced a steady increase in around Iwo Jima functioned exceed- the employment of Marine squadrons in ingly well . The multiplicity of wire and this task as well as in air-to-air radio nets complicated the situation, and operations .' there were instances of enemy jamming In the case of Iwo Jima, it is signifi- and interference between sets . The per- cant that all three participating Marine formance of communications personnel

1D For the role played by Marine aviation " 3d MarDiv AR, Anx G, App . 1, p . 3; 4th during operations in the Philippines, see Part MarDiv OpRpt, Anx C, pp. 6-7 ; 5th MarDiv IV of this volume . AR, Anx G, App . 1, p . 3. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pa- " Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World cific Drive, p. 584. War II, p. 348. SUMMARY 719 was rated as excellent . Wire was widely so-called, adjacent to the G-3 Section . In used and with good effect. Radio bridged this center, wire communications con- verged from the division switchboard, the gap where wire could not be em- from the similar 5th Amphibious Corps ployed. It was a far cry from the un- establishment, from the division artillery satisfactory radio equipment that had fire direction center, and from the naval been employed in the early operations gunfire and air radio centrals . It was thus in the Pacific, notably at Tarawa . The possible to establish any sort of commu- nications necessary, and to plan without short distances involved at Iwo Jima, interruption, while being within a few as well as the very slow rate of advance, steps of the G-3 Section .21 eased the burden of maintaining and ex- Throughout the operation, close liaison panding communications : there never was maintained between the corps artil- was any serious breakdown . As in lery, air, and naval gunfire officers and previous operations, the Navajo talkers the Commander, Landing Force Air performed an outstanding service, and Support Control Unit, in the Joint Oper- their employment contributed material- ations Rooms on board the USS Auburn ly to the effective and speedy transmit- and subsequently through facilities of tal of urgent classified radio traffic with- the supporting arms tent at VAC head- out danger of enemy interception .23 quarters ashore .25 Contributing to the overall success The performance of the shore based of the Iwo Jima operation was close artillery at Iwo Jima deserves special coordination between the supporting mention. Standard tactics, vindicated in arms. The systems of coordination used previous operations, were employed . It at the headquarters of the three di- quickly became evident, though, that the visions were similar, though General 75mm and the 105mm howitzers of the Erskine's division maintained an in- division artillery battalions were far stallation known as the "supporting from adequate for the destruction of the arms tent,"' whose organization and type of emplacements encountered on functions have been described in these the island. In fact, the 155mm guns and words The basic method of coordination be- howitzers of the corps artillery fre- tween supporting arms was to achieve quently had to score up to a dozen hits close personal liaison on all levels . Targets in one place before they caused major were freely interchanged according to the damage to some of the strongest enemy method of attack best suited, and, when- installations .21 In performing its mis- ever operations were in progress or pros- pect, the artillery, naval gunfire, and air sion, artillery was further handicapped officers were together or readily accessible by limited observation, which often pre- to each other by wire . Plans for scheduled vented forward observers from seeing fires or pre-King-Hour preparations were more than 200 yards ahead . As a result, habitually prepared jointly, and so pre- great dependence was placed on aerial sented to the G-3, Chief of Staff, and the spotting, particularly for counter-bat- Commanding General . Much of the success achieved may be traced to the separate maintenance of a "supporting arms tent," 8d MarDiv AR, p . 53. 24°VAC NGF Rpt, p . 38 . I VAC Sig Bn Rpt, p . 5. VAC Arty Rpt, p . 29, 720 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS tery and destruction fire. Despite such of the firing unit placed to observe whether limitations, officers and men of the corps any aircraft were in the line of fire and to give warning if that were the case.' and division artillery carried out their mission in an exemplary fashion . Engineer support to VAC during From 23 February to 1 March, the Operation DETACHMENT was gen- VAC artillery fired its maximum num- erally excellent. The task of construct- ber of missions, most of them counter- ing and maintaining roads in the VAC battery. During the first four days in area was assigned to the 2d Separate March, normal missions were fired, but Engineer Battalion, which also accom- the amount of ammunition expended had plished the preliminary work in restor- to be reduced since expenditure ex- ing the Southern Airfield . It was the ceeded the inflow . After a breather on work carried out by this unit that en- 5 March, when no preparations were abled small observation aircraft to fired, both the corps and division artil- operate from this airfield by D plus 7 . lery made a maximum effort on the fol- The further completion of additional lowing day. On 6 March, a heavy time- strips on this airfield was the shared ac- on-target preparation was fired in complishment of these Marine engineers which 11 division and corps artillery and the 62d Naval Construction Bat- battalions participated . Despite the talion. higher expenditure of ammunition, In addition to executing their impor- amounting to 2,500 rounds for the corps tant task of constructing roads, operat- and 20,000 rounds of 75mm and 105mm ing water points, and erecting various for the division artillery, this massive buildings and supply dumps, Marine concentration had no decisive effect . engineers also had a combat mission to In discussing the performance of the perform. The latter was the respon- artillery during the Iwo Jima operation, sibility of the division engineers who General Schmidt underscored another cleared mines, dozed trails that enabled aspect : tanks to approach the front lines, and performed such other jobs as were de- A feature of the employment of artillery signed to help the infantry advance over in the Iwo Jima operation not noted in the report was that the bulk of the artil- treacherous terrain . Much of this work lery ashore was sited around Airfield No. was carried out under direct enemy 1. During the greater portion of the time observation and fire . Engineers, in- artillery was firing continuously (approx- dividually or in small groups, joined imately 450,000 rounds fired during op- the infantry in demolishing the numer- eration) at the same time Airfield No . 1 was being used for aircraft operation to ous enemy caves and strongpoints . For capacity. This was also true even after the hard-toiling engineers, there were Airfield No . 2 began operating. It is con- only two bright sides to the operation sidered remarkable that no friendly planes the sand-clay fill obtained from quar- were hit and that aircraft operations ries on the island made excellent road were not impeded by our artillery or vice versa . The method of control employed for the protection of planes taking off or =' 1st Prov Fd Arty Gp AR, 1st Endorse- landing was simply to have an individual ment . SUMMARY 721 construction material ; and "engineer It soon became apparent that the operations were further facilitated in volcanic cinders and sand would not sup- that no bridges were required.11 28 port wheeled vehicles . Only the LVTs, The employment of amphibious caterpillar tractors, and other tracked vehicles on Iwo Jima featured a greater vehicles had a chance of making it in- variety than had been previously used, land across this treacherous ground . As including armored amphibian tractors, emphasized in one report : "Supplies amphibian trucks, and sea-going jeeps . and equipment were hauled from ships First to hit the beach were the directly to the front lines, and had it LVT (A) s of the 2d Armored Amphibian not been for LVTs the troops ashore Battalion, equipped with one 75mm could not have been supplied during the howitzer, one .50 caliber machine gun early stages of the landing .""" Because mounted in the turret ring, one .30 of their importance to the logistics ef- caliber machine gun mounted in front fort, it became necessary to use these of the assistant driver, and one .30 vehicles around the clock during the caliber machine gun mounted in front early phase of the operation . of the howitzer loader. Once within ef- One of the new types of equipment to fective range of the beaches, the be used by all three Marine divisions LVT (A) s were to open fire with all during the Iwo operation was the weapons. After going ashore, these 3V2-ton Clever-Brooks trailer, employed vehicles were to move about 50 yards to haul cargo and medical supplies . inland and protect the following as- Major difficulty was encountered in sault waves by firing on targets to their launching these amphibious trailers in front and flanks . the rough seas and getting them across Almost immediately, the steep ter- the steep terraces . LVTs were generally races and the composition of the beaches able to bring the trailers ashore, but caused the vehicles to bog down . A few attempts to have the DUKWs perform made it across the first terrace only to this service resulted in the loss of both become stalled on the second . While the trailer and DUKW. While com- neither the LVT (A) s nor the following ments on both the LVT and DUKWs LVTs containing the assault troops were generally favorable, VAC con- drew voluminous enemy fire, progress of cluded : "The amphibian trailers did not the LVTs upon reaching the beaches al- prove to be of any particular or specific so was stymied by the loose volcanic ash help during the operation ."30 and the steep terraces . Since in many The amphibian truck, the DUKW, had instances the beach was very narrow the primary mission of bringing the di- and the surf broke very close to the steep vision artillery ashore on D-Day. Per- ledge, many LVTs swamped . Some of sonnel to operate these vehicles was the vehicles were thrown broadside on furnished both by the Marine Corps and the beach where sand and salt water the U.S. Army. The difficulty in land- filled them . 'Ibid., p. 133. "I Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 144. ' VAC AR, Anx B, App. 4, G-4 Rpt. 722 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS ing the artillery resulted from the high DUKWs were destroyed during the Iwo surf and the tactical situation ashore . Jima operation, amounting to 53 per- While some of the DUKWs landed with- cent of those employed ; only 9 Weasels out difficulty, others were swamped were lost in combat, accounting for 13 after exhausting their limited fuel sup- percent of the number that were disem- ply or developing mechanical problems . barked. The remaining 61 vehicles Others that were overloaded, sank al- remained in operating condition until most immediately after disembarking the Marines left Iwo Jima .31 from the LSTs. Many of the DUKWs One of the most successfully handled, ran afoul of the steep beaches and yet difficult aspects of the Iwo Jima broached when the front wheels dug operation pertained to the treatment and down into the sand or volcanic ash and evacuation of the wounded . The bitter- could not get sufficient traction to pull ness of the fighting, from the first to the the vehicles forward . Following the last day of battle, coupled with the large initial landings, DUKWs hauled sup- number of men simultaneously locked plies, especially ammunition, evacuated in combat, placed an extremely heavy the wounded, and performed mail and burden on the medical units, both ashore messenger runs. and afloat . During the initial days of Another amphibious vehicle that the operation, doctors and corpsmen proved its worth during the Iwo oper- alike occupied a precarious foothold on ation was a light cargo carrier, dubbed beaches that were exposed to enemy the "Weasel ." This tracked carrier had fire of all calibers . As often as not, the been issued to the three Marine di- medical personnel ashore became cas- visions participating in DETACH- ualties themselves, especially the corps- MENT in November 1944 . At Iwo Jima, men attached to the combat units or the the Weasels hauled light supplies, evac- beach evacuation stations . It was not a uated the wounded, and were used to rare occurrence for corpsmen to be hit string telephone lines . Their versatiity as they carried litters with wounded to in overcoming loose sand and the steep the rear or cared for the wounded at terrain made them the ideal all-purpose the evacuation stations. Casualties vehicle, and they were soon pressed into among medical officers and corpsmen service as messenger or command cars were correspondingly high : 738, among or for the purpose of hauling trailers them 197 killed .32 and small artillery pieces over terrain In order to take care of the Iwo Jima that wheeled vehicles could not nego- casualties, medical plans had been drawn tiate. In addition to their versatility, the up well in advance of the operation . As Weasels offered a poor target for the a result, during the first nine days of enemy because of their speed and low the battle, once a casualty had arrived silhouette . The only difficulty encoun- tered with these vehicles was at sea, where the high swells occasionally "VAC AR, Anx B. ' U. S. Navy Bureau of Medicine, Statistics proved more than they could handle . It Division, World War II Casualties, dtd lAug- is interesting to note that a total of 133 52, as cited in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 195. SUMMARY 723 at one of the evacuation stations, he passable for wheeled vehicles, jeeps of- could expect prompt evacuation to one tentimes carried casualties to the rear. of the hospital LSTs that were lying The availability of whole blood to 2,000 yards offshore. These LSTs acted treat the victims of extensive loss of as collection centers from which the blood and shock undoubtedly saved casualties were forwarded to APAs and many lives. Such transfusions of whole hospital ships. Initially, the transport of blood had not been used in any previous casualties from the beaches to the hos- Central Pacific campaigns . Landing pital LSTs was handled by landing force medical facilities alone used more craft, LVTs, and DUKWs . However, in- than 5,000 pints . By D plus 25, 12,600 creasingly rough surf eventually pre- pints had been used, nearly one pint for vented the use of small landing craft, every patient evacuated .35 Once the situ- and amphibious vehicles were employed ation on the beaches had stabilized, hos- exclusively. The DUKWs, in particular, pital tents went up wherever a place proved useful because they handled well for them could be found, and as electric in the surf and alongside the big ships, power became available, the shore and patients were more comfortable in- based hospitals were able to operate side the DUKWs than inside the wet, around the clock . In evaluating the effi- bouncing LVTs .38 ciency of the medical care provided at In addition to the hospital ships Iwo Jima, VAC was to report Bountiful, Samaritan, and Solace, and The medical service for the Iwo Jima the hospital transport Pinkney, the LSV operation approached nearer the ideal Ozark was pressed into service as an than during any previous operations in . Together with the Central Pacific Area, and it is firmly auxiliary hospital ship believed that the casualties received the transports that were leaving the combat maximum medical care possible commen- area, these ships evacuated 13,737 cas- surate with the military situation .' ualties.34 An additional 2,449 men were One of the most difficult problems airlifted to the Marianas . that had to be overcome during Opera- Because of the small size of Iwo Jima, tion DETACHMENT was that of sup- distances from the front lines to bat- plying the landing force. Heavy surf, talion aid stations were invariably the deep volcanic ash, the enemy's com- short. Nevertheless, the difficult terrain plete coverage of the beaches with artil- and constant exposure to enemy fire lery, mortars, and small arms fire, and made even such short distances ex- congestion at the beaches all combined tremely hazardous both for corpsmen to increase the complexity of logistics . and patients alike . At first, LVTs and Only the abandonment of carefully laid Weasels were widely used in order to plans and timely improvisation saved bring casualties to the beaches ; during the day, making possible an uninter- the latter phase of the operation when rupted flow of supplies to the frontline roads had been constructed that were units that kept the operation going .

m TF 56 MedRpt, pp . 8-9 . VAC MedRpt, p. 12 ; TF 56 MedRpt, p . 19. "TF 53 OpRpt, Part VI, pp . 5, 12 . 3 A VAC AR, Anx B . 724 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Iwo Jima provided a testing ground their mission in an exemplary fashion for the vehicles that shuttled back and despite the most adverse conditions im- forth through the heavy surf in an at- posed by the terrain and the heavy tempt to land badly needed cargo when enemy fire. The casualties among these and where required. Beyond that, it units were correspondingly heavy, some became a proving ground for men of of them being reduced to half strength . the beach and shore parties, the fre- In order to keep the logistics effort quently unpublicized and unsung heroes from foundering in the deep volcanic of the battle of logistics . Previously, ash, Marston matting and armored bull- little had been done to provide these dozers had to be pressed into service . parties with proper training, experience, Once again, the American penchant for and continuity of function. The force improvisation proved to be a decisive that went ashore on Iwo Jima included factor in getting troops and supplies off beefed-up pioneer battalions, which the crowded beaches . Marston matting were further reinforced with men from was of tremendous value in serving as the replacement drafts and division the only usable roadways over which headquarters personnel, as well as U. S. vehicles could move inland during the Army port troops. initial phase of the assault . The armored Taken as a whole, this conglomera- bulldozer was employed on the beaches tion of units performed well in a situa- to level sand terraces and cut routes in- tion which was considerably more land. Their steel plates protected both complex than had been envisioned in the driver and engine from enemy fire . On planning for the invasion . It had not northern Iwo, these machines and their been intended to bring any of these men, drivers performed an equally impor- except for advance elements, ashore tant service in clearing roads into pre- until the beaches were reasonably viously impassable terrain under fire . secure. Yet circumstances dictated a de- The movement of supplies across the parture from previous plans and more beaches was in no small way facilitated than 10,000 of these service troops were by the presence of Navy cranes, as well landed on D-Day . Once ashore, under as other equipment designed to expedite the most difficult circumstances, these the unloading of the cargo vessels . In men performed splendidly, though their this connection, the expertise of TF 53 presence added to the congestion and and its commander proved invaluable . increased the number of casualties . In line with his extensive logistical ex- As it turned out, between 60 and 70 perience, Admiral Hill was keenly aware percent of the supplies unceremoniously of the requirements that had to be met dumped on the beaches were salvaged and had at an early time recommended and either moved inland or incorporated that ample cargo handling equipment be into the hastily established beach dumps available for Operation DETACH- set up by forward elements of the di- MENT.37 Despite all preparations, the vision shore parties which went ashore with the fifth and sixth assault waves . BGen Leland S . Swindler ltr to CMC, dtd These advance elements carried out 14May53, in Iwo Comments. SUMMARY 725 tactical situation prevailing on Iwo Jima to small landing craft on 2 March on D-Day caused the beaches to become removed the entire unloading operation so congested that on the following day from the threat posed by variable underwater demolition teams had to be weather conditions . Henceforth, the employed to assist in clearing lanes menace of heavy surf pounding the through the wreckage for incoming ves- eastern side of the island could be over- sels. come by switching shipping to the west- It needs to be emphasized that, all ern beaches. difficulties to the contrary, no acute In evaluating the overall success of supply shortages developed for the as- the logistics effort at Iwo Jima, it ap- sault troops, though in the days fol- pears appropriate to comment lowing the landings units were living . . . the wonder is not that things were from hand to mouth . Such shortages as confused but that the vast quantities of did develop involved 60mm mortar il- supplies actually crossed the beaches so lumination shells, grenades, cylinders quickly. Expertly handled ship-to-shore for charging flamethrowers, and ord- communications and a high degree of co- ordination between Navy and Marine nance spare parts . As an expedient, logistical control personnel afloat and these items were flown to Iwo Jima from ashore did much to overcome the difficul- Saipan, the first extensive use of air ties inherent in the situation ." supply by the Marines .38 The official VAC report dealing with The timing of the logistics support at Operation DETACHMENT echoes this Iwo Jima, an extremely important sentiment and, speaking of the adver- factor in an amphibious operation, sities facing the Marines that went proved to be well conceived and ex- ashore on Iwo Jima, concludes ecuted. Liaison teams from the 8th Field Depot, which constituted the VAC shore The fact that these factors failed to im- pose any limitations on the conduct of party, accompanied the 4th and 5th operations reflects the highest credit on all Marine Divisions ashore. As of 22 Feb- concerned. Without the tireless support ruary, units of the field depot came through unprecedented difficulties ren- ashore and rendered valuable service in dered by the expeditionary force and the assisting the divisional shore parties . supply agencies of the landing force, the sustained assault of the Corps would have Two days later, when VAC assumed been impossible." control ashore, the field depot took over and the unloading continued without in- Finally, a word about the tactics terruption. At this time, the beaches employed on Iwo Jima both by the as- were still under enemy fire, which sault force and the defending Japanese . caused temporary work stoppages but The small size of the island permitted proved unable to interfere seriously little or no maneuverability to either with the unloading. On D plus 6, 25 force, and once the first Marines had February, general unloading got under 8° Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- way. The opening of the western beaches phibious War, pp. 519-520. 40 TF 56 AR, Encl B, Comments and Recom- VAC Logistics Rpt, pp . 12, 16. mendations, p . 4. 726 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

gone ashore, the fighting that was to strongest yet encountered in the Pacific typify the entire operation was dictated Theater, indicative of the progress made by General Kuribayashi, whose de- by the Japanese in this sphere of de- fensive organization "was the most in- fensive warfare . The operation also saw telligent and complete one yet encoun- the first use of antipersonnel mines by tered."41 Basically, the Japanese con- the Japanese in the Central Pacific 4'' ducted a position defense which was The Japanese made more widespread effective, intense, and notable for its use of rockets than in earlier operations, economy of forces. There was no em- though on Iwo Jima their effect was ployment of mobile reserves, nor was limited . Some of the rocket launchers there a withdrawal through a series of were installed in locations from where defensive lines . All precautions had they could be fired at certain areas . been taken to assure that enemy troops Movable rocket launchers were kept in were not exposed to the American sup- caves, moved outside and fired, then porting arms . General Kuribayashi's pulled back into the caves . During the defense was simple ; it was this very early phase of the Iwo Jima operation, simplicity that made it so effective . the Japanese fired large rockets towards The enemy plan was based on the the northern slope of Mount Suribachi . concept that a maximum number of However, due to the inaccuracy of this weapons of all calibers were to fire more fire, the missiles went beyond the moun- or less continuously from well-con- tain and finally fell into the sea . If cealed and -protected positions until they anything, these large weapons were well were destroyed . Almost from the begin- adapted for harassing fire, but their ning of the operation the American sup- accuracy was doubtful . porting arms were handicapped by the In contrast to the relative inefficiency geographical limitations of the island, of the enemy rockets, the Japanese artil- the character of the terrain, and the lery performed better than had been strength of the enemy defenses . The anticipated by the invasion force . Co- heavier Japanese installations, in par- ordination, volume, and accuracy of the ticular, often proved impervious to field enemy artillery fire, especially during artillery of light and medium calibers the days immediately following the in- and required the destructive power of vasion, initially made it appear as if the main battery naval gunfire . During the Japanese were massing their fire, thus latter phase of the fighting, the proxi- taking a page out of the book dealing mity of the Marines to enemy positions with American artillery doctrine . It was frequently denied them the benefit of subsequently determined that prior to adequate heavy fires or bombardment . the American landings, the enemy had Even though few underwater ob- stacles interfered with the Iwo Jima "Detailed information on this subject can landings, the minefields ashore were the be found in Military Intelligence, War Depart- ment, Minefield Patterns in the Defense of Iwo Jima, Intelligence Bulletin (Washington, " Ibid., p. 1. D.C., June 1945), pp . 15-19. SUMMARY 727 registered his artillery on critical ter- recommendations following operations rain features against which he massed in the Marianas, an effort was made to his fire, rather than relying on current develop a craft mounting the 4 .2-inch observation. chemical mortar . As a result, three 4 .2s General Kuribayashi's use of mortars were mounted on an LCI and success- was exceptionally skillful and very ef- fully employed on D-Day and there- fective. In fact, it was this weapon, and after. the large number used, that inflicted The effectiveness of the enemy mortar more casualties on the Marines than fire gave rise to the recommendation any other support weapon. During the that a larger mortar be adopted, and latter part of the campaign, the Japa- that possibly a 120mm mortar battalion nese apparently suffered a shortage of be added to each division . Marines who mortar ammunition which restricted had been on the receiving end of enemy their choice of targets to Marine weap- 47mm gunfire felt that a 57mm gun ons, vehicles, and large groups of per- should be substituted for their own sonnel. As with rocket launchers, the 37mm piece . Similarly, a tank with Japanese skillfully hid their mortars, thicker armor and heavier armament either emplacing them on reverse slopes than the Sherman would have facil- or moving them out of caves to fire, and itated operations on Iwo Jima . A great quickly moving them back under cover. majority of the Shermans were Among the weapons Marines en- equipped with small flamethrowers that countered on Iwo Jima for the first time proved their worth by squirting fire were the 320mm spigot type mortar, through one or two of their machine gun new types of mobile rocket launchers ports, but a tank capable of shooting a and rockets, and 90mm and 120mm flame for about 100 yards from a tur- howitzers. ret-mounted tube proved the most ef- The landing force also made use of ficient. In order to deceive the Japanese, several innovations, sometimes on an who tended to concentrate their fire experimental basis. Thus the rolling against any type of flamethrower, these barrage, dating back to World War I, tubes outwardly were exact replicas of found renewed use during the operation . the 75mm gun . Generally, this type of artillery sup- In his letter to President Roosevelt, port proved successful, though the Rear Admiral Ichimaru somewhat con- troops often did not advance as rapidly temptuously referred to American ma- as expected. This required continuous terial superiority as opposed to Japa- modification of the barrage schedule nese fighting spirit.44 While there can resulting in repeating fires in certain be no doubt that such material supe- blocks and delaying the lifting of fires riority did in fact exist, it is equally from others.43 With respect to the util- ization of mortars, in accordance with " RAdm Ichimaru ltr to President Roosevelt, n.d., as cited in Morehouse, Iwo Jima Cam- " TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec C, p. 3. paign, App. E, p . 172E. 728 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS clear that other important factors were crete."45 For the men of the landing at work which the Japanese admiral force that assaulted and captured one pointedly ignored. Not least among these of the strongest enemy bastions in the were the outstanding leadership and Pacific, the operation was the supreme discipline of the men who came to take test. Judging by the performance of Iwo Jima or die in the attempt ; the these men and the results attained, the physical stamina and mental power of inevitable conclusion can be drawn that endurance of these men, both tempered a heavily defended objective can be in months or years of thorough train- seized by such a force regardless of its ing ; and the intangible, indefinable size, the difficulty of its terrain, and the something known as esprit de corps or degree of man-made defensive perfec- morale, that induces men to give their tion. An amphibious assault against last in a common cause . such an objective will be successful if Without all of the above qualities, it can be isolated by surface and air the individual Marine could not have superiority and prepared by naval bom- gone on to victory on Iwo Jima, a bat- bardment and bombing . tle that has been linked to "throwing '5 Isely and Crowl, U. S . Marines and Am- human flesh against reinforced con- phibious War, p . 475 . CHAPTER 13

Conclusions

The ground operations discussed in weapons already existing and those yet this volume, notably Peleliu and Iwo to come, both pessimism and fear were Jima, span the period of seven months dominant : pessimism as to what would from September 1944 to the end of happen to the country and its people March 1945. Within the overall context once the Allies had won ; fear of death of World War II, this time span was from the air for the civilian populace ; most significant . In Europe, this period fear of death or capture on the part of saw the advance of Soviet forces into the military, particularly those facing a Germany proper, the collapse of the merciless enemy on the Eastern front ; German allies in Scandinavia and the fear of the numerous foreign workers Balkans, and the slow but steadily ac- who, in many cases forcibly conscripted celerating drive of the Western Allies and not always well-treated, posed an into western Germany. increasing threat to internal security as An ingenious offensive in the Arden- the ring closed around Germany . nes and the introduction of new types Finally, there was fear of the ruling of rockets failed to halt the steamroller police and semi-military organizations that was beginning to engulf the Reich whose measures against military per- from the west, east, and the south . Dis- sonnel and civilians alike became ever sent within the ranks of the Germans more menacing as the strategic situa- themselves had been all but snuffed out tion deteriorated. During the late fall following the abortive attempt on and throughout the winter of 1944- Hitler's life in late July. The harsh 1945, the German war machine still measures that followed in the wake of functioned efficiently despite heavy the Generals' Plot all but silenced those losses in personnel and materiel, devas- who might have raised their voices tation from the air, increasing shortages against the continuation of a war that in raw materials, and covert popular the overwhelming majority of the mil- discontent . The German offensive in the itary, as well as the civilian population, Ardennes, the last of the great German already had to consider lost. The heavy offensives of World War II, represented Allied air raids, carried out in such but the final gasp of a machine that had force that entire cities were literally waged almost unlimited blitzkrieg dur- obliterated from the face of the earth ing the initial years of the war . When only underscored the fact that time was this offensive fell short of its goals and on the side of the Allies . Despite reports could not be sustained, the end of the of the miraculous effect of those wonder war in Europe became a visible goal, 729 730 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS at the most only months away . As one carried into the Home Islands . Mean- history of that war was to sum it up while, despite increasingly heavy inter- . . . the roads back over the Eifel led ference by American submarines with straight to the decimation and collapse of Japanese shipping, raw materials con- the German armies on the banks of the tinued to flow to Japan from the con- Oder River, along the Danube, in the Ruhr quered territories : urgently needed rub- pocket, and, at last, to the bunkers of ber arrived from Burma, Malaya, and Berlin' Indochina ; vital food products and In comparison with operations in petroleum made their way north from Europe, the war in the Pacific Theater the Philippines and from the former during the latter part of 1944 and Dutch East Indies ; and war plants in through the early months of 1945 Manchuria and Korea were producing showed certain similarities as well as at full capacity. The vast pool of Japa- marked differences . The vital gains in nese manpower had been barely touched territory and raw materials made by by combat losses, though the caliber the Japanese during the early months of the aviators was diminishing . of the war had realized for them most Both the Japanese military and the of the tactical and strategic objectives civilian population stood solidly behind they had embarked on . Beginning with the government, at whose apex was the the American landings in the Solomons, Emperor against whom no voice of dis- prolonged operations in New Guinea, sent could be raised. The entire popula- and the American recapture of islands tion was in some way involved in the in the Aleutians, the Japanese situation war effort. There was absolute confid- had very gradually deteriorated, though ence in the leadership and the foreign such setbacks were in no way overly policy pursued by the country. The worrisome to the Japanese leaders who borders of Japan were secure . There continued to maintain an optimistic out- were still the numerous island outposts look as to the eventual outcome of the to the south and west ; much of the war. They hoped that, in time, a nego- Chinese mainland, especially the vital tiated peace would permit Japan to re- coastal areas, was under Japanese con- tain at least some of the vital areas from trol and the possibility of Russia's which she drew her raw materials . entry into the war against Japan on the The heavy American losses at Tarawa side of the Allies appeared remote . With- only strengthened the Japanese belief in the Home Islands, the entire nation that the United States would not be was functioning as a military-civilian willing to continue paying such a team under quasi-military rule . There heavy price for each island that would were few foreigners in the Home Is- have to be seized before the war was lands, aside from closely guarded Al- lied prisoners of war and civilian in- 'Hugh M . Cole, The Ardennes : Battle of the ternees, including missionaries, all of Bulge-The U. S. Army in World War II (Washington : Office of the Chief of Military whom represented an infinitesimally History, Department of the Army, 1955), p . small number that posed no threat to 673. the Japanese war effort . Their presence CONCLUSIONS 731 in the country was not a factor in designated these islands as an "abso- maintaining the agriculture or industry lute strategic area within the absolute of Japan . zone of national defense ."4 What did The spring and summer of 1944 saw cause great surprise and consternation a rapid acceleration of Allied operations were the might of the American naval in the Central Pacific, primarily an bombardment, notably at Saipan, the American effort. Based on the bitter les- great speed of the landing operations, sons of Tarawa, U. S. Marines had per- and the overwhelming superiority of the fected their planning and refined their Americans in the air, which under- techniques until their drive into the scored the loss of the well-trained Marianas "saw the flowering of a vital and seasoned aviators that Japan had skill, logistics planning, whose incred- possessed at the beginning of the war. ible complexity met the need to sustain The success of the American landings massive assaults and at the same time on Saipan only nine days after the provide a continuous flow of men, sup- Normandy invasion, coupled with the plies, and equipment for a host of exist- subsequent operations against Tinian ing and future requirements ."2 and Guam, struck the Japanese with Noting the change in the strategic the same impact that the Allied invasion situation in the Pacific brought about of Europe had on the Germans . In either by American seizure of the Gilberts and case it was less the initial success of Marshals, one postwar survey has noted the landings that confounded the de- that fenders than the fact that the invasion The United States position was firm force could not be confined to the beaches indeed in early March 1944 . The initiative or driven back into the sea . There were had been won, adequate forces were in sight, and it was possible to plan in or- several fringe benefits for the Amer- derly fashion for future operations. Japan, icans inherent in the Saipan operation . on the other hand, was faced with the most First, the fact that "it lured the Japa- urgent need for devising means to counter nese carriers to defeat might alone be the unpredictable but obviously intended enough to call it the decisive operation blows at her inner perimeter, with forces so limited that opposition with the slight- of the Central Pacific Campaign ."5 The est chance of a favorable outcome could capture of Saipan provided the Amer- only be offered under ideal conditions .' icans with a base from which giant B-29s would soon be able to launch a The stage was now set for an Amer- devastating air offensive against the ican advance into the inner perimeter Home Islands . The sea battle in the of Japan's defense. The possibility of Marianas resulted in the loss of most an American invasion of the Marianas of the carriers and air strength of the in the spring and summer of 1944 hardly Combined Fleet, which gave American came as a surprise for the Japanese, aircraft full control of the air while the who nearly a year earlier had already U. S. Navy dominated the Central ' Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pa- ' Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 109. cific Drive, p. 583. 'Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Paci- 1 USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 204. fic Drive, p. 583 . 732 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Pacific. Without support from sea or so far as highly placed officers making air, Tinian and Guam were for all prac- profuse assurances "that our fleet had tical purposes isolated plums ripe for emerged victorious from the engage- the picking. Since the loss of 300 naval ment (in the Philippine Sea) . They even aircraft had all but wiped out naval drank hilariously to the spectacular strength in the Marianas and the Japa- victory."8 nese Army had only few planes with In Germany the question of continu- sufficient range to fly from bases on Iwo ing the war or finding a way to the Jima to Saipan, there was no hope that peace-table resulted in an ever widen- Japan would regain command of the ing chasm between the Armed Forces air over the Marianas . With this realiza- and the Nazi Party, with the former tion went any Japanese hopes of recap- favoring an end to the war . In Japan, turing either Saipan, Guam, or Tinian . the military closed ranks in favor of Beyond this, from the Japanese point fighting to the last man, woman, and of view child, if necessary, though major dif- . . . there appeared a wide gap in the ferences as to the further prosecution of absolute zone of national defense in the the war remained between the Army and Central Pacific region. The advance of the U. S. Navy toward Japanese waters was Navy. The dismissal of Tojo as Premier facilitated by this breach, which threat- on 18 July preceded the assassination ened the very security of the homeland . attempt against Hitler by two days . Even more painful for Japan, the Ameri- Whereas the abortive General's Plot can Air Force began to bomb the main resulted in a major upheaval in the islands from bases on Saipan and Guam German ranks with numerous courts -raids which began on September 24 .1 martials and summary executions in its Following the successful Allied in- wake, the transition from the Tojo vasion of Normandy, and in the weeks Government to a new cabinet took place that followed, it is interesting to note in an orderly fashion, though it was far that a group of German general officers, from routine. Never having been ques- many of them members of the General tioned, the stature and authority of the Staff, concluded that the war could no Emperor remained unchanged . In order longer be won and set about to remove to put and end to Army-Navy antago- Hitler before attempting to reach a nism, both the War Minister and the negotiated peace with the Allies. In Chief of Staff made efforts aimed at Japan, at approximately the same time, resolving the long-standing rivalries be- . It the situation was directly reversed tween the two Services, though the time was recognized that, with the loss of was late. Saipan, the war situation had reached a While the drive across the Central . However, while the Em- critical phase Pacific was aimed directly at the Japa- peror and the senior statesman "grew nese Home Islands, General Douglas anxious and perturbed," 7 the military MacArthur was embarked on the road radiated an air of optimism, which went to Tokyo over a more circuitous south- ° Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 109. ' Ibid. -Ibid., p. 208. CONCLUSIONS 733 erly route which would take him from Arthur's drive from the south . Since the New Guinea to the Philippines . As Palaus were situated only 500 miles east compared to the European Theater, this of the Philippine island of Mindanao, drive might be likened to the Allied in- their permanent neutralization from vasion of North Africa and the sub- sea or air was impractical ; as result, sequent moves to Sicily and Italy. Where the southernmost of these islands be- the seizure of North Africa and Italy came the target of invasion . had been intended to open a door into At the time Admiral Nimitz, General Europe through the supposedly "soft MacArthur, as well as the Joint Chiefs belly" in the south, MacArthur's stra- of Staff, were in general agreement as tegy of isolating Japan from her sources to the necessity of securing the southern of supply in the Philippines and freeing Palaus, notably Peleliu and Angaur, as the inhabitants of these islands from well as islands closest to Guam, notably Japanese oppression, as he had prom- Yap and Ulithi in the Northern Caro- ised, was to serve as a stepping stone lines. Possession of the smaller islands to towards the invasion of the Home Is- the northeast and south of Babelthuap, lands. Both in southern Europe, as in the largest and most heavily-defended the southern Pacific, the respective cam- island in the Palaus, would permit the paigns proved costly, arduous, and time- neutralization of that stronghold. At the consuming. Neither the recapture of the same time that a joint force of Marines Philippines nor the plodding advance and Army troops assaulted Peleliu up the Appenine Peninsula yielded and Angaur respectively, MacArthur's quick results that would have brought forces prepared to assault Morotai, the war to a rapid end in either theater ; located about halfway between the nor was there any clear agreement in western tip of New Guinea and Celebes, early 1944 where MacArthur would go 480 miles southwest of Peleliu . Seizure once the liberation of the Philippines of Peleliu and Angaur to the north had been accomplished . (with Morotai as a stepping stone in It is in the light of this overall situa- the south) would effectively screen Gen- tion. that the seizure of the southern eral MacArthur's drive into the Philip- Palaus, Operation STALEMATE, must pines, at the same time providing vital be viewed. During the early part of airstrips to the Americans from which 1944, the Palaus represented one of the aircraft could neutralize enemy forces key strongholds in Japan's second line and such air power as remained to the of defense . Once New Guinea and the Japanese on adjacent islands . Marshall Islands had been seized by the The overall situation that had devel- Americans, the Central Carolines had oped by mid-summer made it possible to been bypassed, and the Marianas had scrap the planned operation against fallen, the Palaus moved into the first Yap Island in the northern Carolines. line of defense for Japan . They became The invasions of Peleliu and Morotai the most powerful and strategic enemy took place on 15 September, followed outposts halfway between the Central two days later by the assault on Angaur. Pacific drive in the northeast and Mac- Fighting on Peleliu, in particular, 734 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS proved long, bitter, and costly, so much portant staging area for the fleet and so that at the conclusion of the oper- amphibious forces taking part in the ation doubts arose as to whether results invasion of Okinawa . Generally speak- had been worth the effort, particularly ing, seizure of some islands in the west- in view of the fact that last-minute ern Carolines, including Peleliu, gained changes in plans for subsequent oper- for the Allies valuable bases, though the ations, specifically the invasion of the accelerating drive towards Japan made Philippines, "made it all but impossible it necessary to convert these newly to fit the Palaus into the operational seized bases to uses other than those role originally planned for them ." The originally anticipated. capture of Angaur also failed to provide For the men of the 1st Marine Di- immediate support to MacArthur's vision who assaulted Peleliu, the seizure forces. Terrain difficulties and inade- of the island meant a hard and bloody quate gasoline storage facilities pre- campaign. Of particular interest is the vented the operation of bombers from ratio of forces employed by both op- Angaur until 21 October, the day after ponents. At Attu in the Aleutians, the American forces had landed on Leyte American forces had enjoyed a numer- in the central Philippines .10 Even then, ical superiority of 5 :1 . The ratio was it was not until 17 November that the 2.5 :1 in favor of the attacking force first bomber mission was flown against at Saipan, and at Guam it amounted to the Philippines from a field in the 2 :1.11 In the Palaus, the defending Japa- Palaus. In time, Angaur became an nese were considerably superior in num- important base for heavy bombers and ber to the invasion force. Yet the latter an aircraft staging point, from which was able to bring its full striking power operations on Luzon could be supported . to bear against the objective, while the Aircraft based on Morotai did not fly main Japanese garrison on adjacent sorties against Leyte, but flew many Babelthuap was effectively blocked by missions over Mindanao and other is- the U. S. Navy from giving any relief lands in the southern Philippines . After to its hard-pressed comrades in arms 7 October, fighters based on Morotai on Peleliu. flew cover for Allied bombers en route Completion of the operation in the to Mindanao and the Visayan Islands . Western Carolines placed the United An unexpected dividend accruing to States in a favorable position for car- American forces from the seizure of the rying the war to the enemy at an ac- Palaus was the capture of Ulithi Atoll celerated pace . Since early summer of by Army troops. Seized in an unop- 1944, the Japanese situation had de- posed operation from 22-24 September, teriorated alarmingly . Even while Ja- this atoll became an extremely valu- pan attempted to bolster her sagging able base for the U. S. Pacific Fleet. As line of defense, the Japanese air gar- the war progressed, it became an im- rison in the Philippines had suffered staggering losses, as had Japanese ship- ' Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p . 572 . 70 Ibid., p. 573 . " Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp . 110-111 . CONCLUSIONS 735 ping, both through U.S. submarine ac- had begun to blow at a stiffer pace, and tion and later through carrier and the employment of Marine air for close shore-based air strikes. support missions became a distinct pos- The arrival of 1945 saw an almost sibility. In anticipation of such a devel- complete reversal of the still fairly opment, MAG-24, then stationed at stable position of Japan just one year Bougainville, began the crash training earlier. The final months of 1944 had of Marine pilots for close support . faced the Japanese with almost un- A radical departure from orthodox imaginable reverses that the nation methods was the adoption of direct com- could no longer compensate for . Loss munications between pilots and ground- of the Philippines to General Mac- based air liaison parties. The perform- Arthur's forces was not only a very sore ance of Marine aviators on Luzon Island blow to Japanese pride, but more prac- and in the Southern Philippines was to tically become an outstanding chapter in a long The Southern Resources Area, the prize history of excellent achievements, com- for which the war had been fought, was bining raw courage with skill and gone and American fleets sailed with im- flexibility . The activities of Marine air punity to the shores of eastern Asia . All hope of future resistance had depended in the Philippines constituted one of the upon oil and now the tankers were sunk few opportunities that Marine air and the oil cut off. The surface fleet was groups had to show their skill in close gone, and so were 7,000 aircraft, expended air support . Except for a brief period in four months defense of the last supply of employment during the early days of line. Suicide attack, bleeding tactics, were the Iwo Jima operation, there would be now the last hope of this shrunken em- pire, and even these economical methods little occasion for the Marine flyers to of defense suffered from the blockade's give any further demonstration of their From the Marine Corps point of view, close support prowess. Only later, on the tactical development of close air sup- Okinawa, would Marine pilots have a final opportunity to perfect their close port had been one of the most dis- .13 tinguishing features of the Peleliu oper- support tactics ation. The remarkable performance of The early days of 1945 were bleak Marine aviators during the capture of ones for Germans and Japanese alike. Ngesebus Island had been but a forerun- In the case of the former, the Ardennes ner of what Marine air was shortly to offensive had failed and only further accomplish in the Philippines in sup- weakened the depleted divisions of the Reich, port of Army troops . This development which was now under aerial at- had been slow in coming, the inevitable tack around the clock, while invading result of the early wartime naval train- armies were striking at her interior ing of Marine pilots, which devoted lit- from three directions . For the Japa- tle serious attention to closely coordi- nese, the fortunes of war had come full nated air attacks in support of ground units. By late 1944 the winds of change 13 For a detailed account of Marine Corps operations on Okinawa, see Frank and Shaw, 'B USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 289. Victory and Occupation, Pt. II. 736 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS circle. The spirit of optimism that had sources of heat, notably American troop- still filled the people of Japan with hope ships. Actual experiments had been car- during the summer of 1944 had now ried out during the summer of 1944, but vanished. The news from the battle- the onrush of events overtook the slow fronts was all bad, and it could no longer experimentation before a multitude of be kept from the populace . The thought technical problems could be eliminated . of rebellion against the Emperor was In the end, the "weapons of science" still unacceptable to the Japanese, but could not be put to any practical use, there were some effects, notably to and "weapons for decisive combat thus morale : "At home the bad news began came to mean suicidal expedients," such to be known and mutterings of nego- as the kamikaze." The only practical tiated conditional peace arose even in Japanese secret weapon ever to be used the armed forces . Japan was defeated against the United States was a balloon it remained only necessary to persuade bomb, which for about six months after her of the fact."14 1 November 1944, was released daily As the war situation deteriorated for from Japan. Purpose of the bomb was the Axis, the peoples of Germany and a psychological one : "Americans were Japan realized that nothing short of a to be made to feel uneasy because of miracle could still save their situation . surprise explosions scattered through- In Germany, the die-hard optimists out the United States ." While a number looked for a reversal of imminent defeat of these balloons actually reached the through the V-Weapons, whose devel- Continental United States, their effec- opment assumed ever grander propor- tiveness was practically nil ; only a few tions, though reality lagged far behind grass fires resulted from 9,000 incen- wishful thinking . As early as 1943, the diary balloons launched . Japanese received word that Germany The invasion of Iwo Jima must be was working on atomic weapons, but viewed in the light of what the loss of nuclear physicists maintained that such the island would do to Japanese civilian weapons were not far enough advanced morale, coupled with the benefits the use for use in World War II. Nevertheless, of the island's three airfields would an attempt was made to employ science provide to the Allied air effort against in a bid to solve the numerous military Japan. Because of the serious losses in- problems. curred in the Philippines and other cam- During 1944, an increasing number paigns, together with a breakdown in of scientists and technical experts were the pilot replacement program and a pressed into service in order to test a critical shortage of fuel, the Japanese number of unorthodox devices that were Army and Navy Air Forces were no to be employed in the decisive battle . longer effective deterrents to American Thus, the Japanese Army experimented incursions at sea or in the air . On the with a thermal ray and bombs that other hand, the American potential for would be guided to their targets by waging war was at its height . The Amer-

11 1, USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p . 290. Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 118 . CONCLUSIONS 737

icans were stronger in numbers, better of Japan. Even as bitter fighting raged trained, and moving forward with an on Iwo Jima, a huge American invasion overwhelming offensive power. "United armada was already en route to Oki- States domination of the Pacific Ocean nawa, which was ultimately to turn into Area was complete and the time was at "the most difficult operation undertaken hand to strike in earnest toward the in the Pacific by United States forces," 17 heart of the Japanese Empire ."16 though from the point of view of the The Iwo Jima operation was wedged Marine Corps, the Iwo Jima campaign in time into a very narrow period, remains aptly designated as "The Su- barely preceded by the American land- preme Test.""' A comparison of the Iwo ings on Luzon and shortly followed by Jima and Okinawa operations does not the invasion of Okinawa. The ambitious fall within the purview of this volume ; plans for this decisive period almost the latter operation has been most aptly exceeded the capabilities of a fully described elsewhere in this series .19 mobilized United States, particularly The seizure of Iwo Jima eliminated when the Tokyo carrier strikes were in- a strong Japanese bastion of defense cluded. As a result, the landings at Iwo near the Home Islands ; it provided the Jima took place under the shadow of Americans with forward airfields ; and the major invasion of Luzon in the the U. S. presence on Iwo Jima was de- south, the imminent assault against the cisive in neutralizing other fortified Ryukyus, and a carrier-based aerial as- enemy islands in the Bonins. As the war sault against the Home Islands . This in Europe thundered to its conclusion, accelerated schedule of events con- the inevitability of defeat following the tributed to the reduction in the number fall of Iwo Jima was impressed on all of days available for the prelanding Japanese. As the shadow of American bombardment of Iwo Jima. That the airpower and the specter of an all-out island could be taken at all in view of assault against the Home Islands them- the strength of its defenses and the selves became a distinct possibility, casualties incurred by the attacking Ma- Japanese diplomats began delicate man- rines is proof of the latters' courage, euvers behind the scenes to save what highly advanced state of training, and could be salvaged from a misguided the soundness of amphibious doctrine and misconceived war . Japanese defeats that had become an integral part of Ma- in the Pacific also were beginning to rine Corps tactics . have international repercussions, nota- Control of Iwo Jima provided the bly with regard to the Soviet Union, Americans with airfields 600 miles which was beginning to waver in its closer to the Home Islands, opening the neutrality towards Japan . The horror of doors wide to a full-scale aerial assault atomic warfare was yet unheard of dur- on Japan. The early months of 1945 thus saw a further extension of Amer- " USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 324. 1e Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am- ican power towards the inner defenses phibious War, ch 10 . 'B See Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occu- '°USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 320 . pation, Pt II.

738 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ing these early months of 1945 . But the remains of Japanese dreams, and it each succeeding American assault across was on islands such as Peleliu and Iwo the Central Pacific had driven the nails Jima that these dreams were finally laid of defeat deeper into the coffin that bore to rest . Bibliographical Notes

This history is predominantly based on offi- and furnished much material of value to this cial Marine Corps records comprising the history. The War History Office of the Defense diaries, reports, plans, journals, and orders of Agency of Japan has read and commented the commands and units that participated in on the passages dealing with Japanese opera- the operations covered by this volume . Such tions on Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and in the Philip- records of the other Services as were pertinent pines, providing valuable information that has to the subject matter have been consulted and been incorporated into the narrative . used. Activities on high strategic levels have been reconstructed with the help of the records Books of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or official publica- Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, tions that derived a considerable portion of eds. The Pacific : Matterhorn to Nagasaki, their basic data from JCS records . June 1944 to August 1945-The Army Air Since this volume deals with a number of Forces in World War II, v . 5. Chicago : Uni- seemingly unrelated topics, ranging from an versity of Chicago Press, 1953 . The Air Force administrative history of the Fleet Marine official history covering the final year of World Force, Pacific, to major operations in the West- War II with particular emphasis on the de- ern Pacific, not to mention aviation activities velopment and employment of the B-29 in widely separated areas, a large number of bomber and operations in the Western and sources had to be consulted . Some of these Southwestern Pacific. This well documented were pertinent to only one area or period of book is a reliable source for the operations of time while others offered detailed information Army Air Forces units in the Pacific and their on a scope encompassing the entire volume . vital part in the defeat of Japan . Unless otherwise noted, all of the official rec- Jeter A. Isely and Philip A . Crowl . The ords cited are on file with or obtainable through U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Prince- the Library and Documentation Sections, Ref- ton : Princeton University Press, 1951 . An out- erence Branch, Historical Division, Headquar- standing source of information dealing with ters, U . S . Marine Corps . the adoption, development, and perfection of A number of published works of general amphibious warfare and application of these interest have been consulted frequently during techniques during various phases of World War the preparation of this volume . The more im- II. The authors' critical comments on each portant of these are listed below. major operation and their conclusions are in- In order to bridge the inevitable gaps and valuable for a clear perspective of warfare in inadequacies that occur in the sources con- the Pacific Theater . sulted, extensive use was made of the knowl- VAdm E. P. Forrestel . Admiral Raymond A . edge of key participants in the actions de- Spruance, USN-A Study in Command. Wash- scribed. These men, representing all Services, ington : Department of the Navy, 1966 . Record generously offered time and effort in replying of a naval leader's service to his country in to specific questions, making themselves avail- war and peace. This well documented and able for interviews, and furnishing critical illustrated biography not only tells the story comments on draft manuscrips of this volume of a man and his brilliant career in the Pacific and preliminary monographs . The historical during World War II but also outlines some offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have of the major naval operations of World War II . conducted a detailed review of draft chapters FAdm William F . Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan 739 740 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

III. Admiral Halsey's Story. New York: comprehensive source in its field published Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill' Publishing to date. Company, Inc ., 1947. The life and service of Robert Ross Smith . The Approach to the one of the most prominent American naval Philippines-The War in the Pacific-United commanders in World War II . In addition to States Army in World War II. Washington : gaining a close look at the human side of this Office of the Chief of Military History, De- great naval leader, the reader is also presented partment of the Army, 1953 . An excellent with the background and development of some account of the strategy and tactics that were of the great naval actions in the Western employed in laying the basis for the recapture Pacific during World War II . of the Philippines, specifically during amphib- FAdm Ernest H . King and Cdr Walter M . ious and ground operations in New Guinea Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King : A Naval Rec- and the southern Palau Islands. ord. New York : W. W. Norton & Company, United States Strategic Bombing Survey Inc., 1952. An autobiography covering the en- (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. The Cam- tire span of service of this great naval leader, paigns of the Pacific War, 1 vol. and Inter- highlighting his part in the formulation of rogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols . Wash- American strategy within the high-level com- ington : Government Printing Office, 1946. The mand structure employed in World War II . three volumes give an interesting account of FAdm William D . Leahy. I Was There . New World War II as seen through Japanese eyes . York : Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Pub- Prepared shortly after the end of hostilities, lishing Company, 1950 . The autobiography of this series is deficient in accuracy and per- another high-ranking naval officer who served spective. Yet the information and viewpoints as Chief of Staff under Presidents Roosevelt provide an insight into Japanese military and Truman. In addition to highly relevant thinking, both through translation of perti- comments on top-level Allied conferences which nent documents and through interviews. the author attended, a sizable portion of the The War Reports of General of the Army book deals with his most delicate prewar ap- George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General pointment as American Minister to the Vichy of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding Gen- Government and his official and personal eral, Army Air Forces; Fleet Admiral Ernest relations with prominent Vichy persons . J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Samuel Eliot Morison. History of United Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations . Philadel- States Naval Operations in World War II, v. phia and New York : J. B. Lippincott Company, XII, XIII, XIV . Boston : Little, Brown and 1947. Collection of the official reports of the Company, 1958, 1959, 1960 . These three vol- chiefs of the armed services, issued during umes by Rear Admiral Morison, Leyte, June World War II and the immediate postwar 1944-January 1945, The Liberation of the period. Excellent material for reviewing the Philippines, 1944-1945, and Victory in the Pa- big picture of World War II operations . cific, 1945 give an excellent account of Navy operations in the Southwestern and Western PART I Pacific . Though prepared with Navy collabo- INTRODUCTION ration and support, these volumes nevertheless bear the personal imprint of the author, whose Official Documents masterful description of the naval operations The operational span of ground operations of this period is without equal . in this volume covers the invasion of the south- Robert Sherrod . History of Marine Corps ern Palaus as a preliminary step in the re- Aviation in World War II. Washington : Com- conquest of the Philippines and the subsequent bat Forces Press, 1952 . An unofficial history, decision to seize Iwo Jima in the Volcano- but prepared with substantial research sup- Bonins as an advanced base in the direction port from the Marine Corps, this work con- of the Home Islands . For the strategy and tains information on Marine aviation units not tactics employed by the United States during to be found elsewhere. It represents the most this crucial period of the war in the South- BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 741 western and Western Pacific during the latter This program culminated in the preparation part of 1944 and early 1945, a variety of of a series of monographs detailing Japanese sources were required . These ranged from activities in widespread areas of the Pacific records of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of and Asia . These early studies which varied Staff as cited in previously published official greatly in scope, quality, and accuracy under- histories to the minutes of CominCh-CinCPac went a further process of refinement in the Conferences conducted during the summer of mid-1950s, at which time they were published 1944. In some instances, copies of reports and in the form of monographs under the auspices minutes portraying the evolution of Anglo- of the Office of the Chief of Military History, American strategy can be found in the files of Department of the Army . A complete listing the World War II Division, Federal Records of these monographs is contained in Guide to Center, The National Archives which has re- Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies cently relocated to Suitland, Maryland . on Manchuria 1945-1960 (Washington, 1961) Information on the status of Marine Corps prepared by OCMH, which also exercises cus- units and personnel during the period covered tody over this collection. has been derived from such tables of organiza- Of primary interest for the purposes of this tion station lists and status sheets for air and volume were those monographs dealing with ground units as were readily available in the Japanese preparations for the defense of the archives of the Historical Division . Additional Philippines during the summer of 1944. Mono- sources of information were the monthly graph No. 45 comprising the History of the FMF air and ground status reports prepared Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, within the Division of Plans and Policies and gives an insight into the prosecution of the war the Division of Aviation, HQMC, and the as seen through eyes of Japanese on the ele- Annual Reports of the Commandant of the vated level of command in an exhaustive study Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy . of 382 pages . Monograph No . 48, Central Pacific Operations Record, Volume I, (December 1941- Japanese Sources August 1945) furnished considerable informa- In appraising the strategic and tactical situ- tion on the defense of Iwo Jima, while No . 49, ation from the Japanese side, our view is Volume II of the same title, was useful in pro- necessarily limited by the factors of time, viding a general outline of the Japanese situ- distance, availability of enemy persons and ation in the Pacific for most of 1944. records, and linguistics. A full exploitation of Books and Periodicals official Japanese wartime records on a scale even remotely resembling that of captured The first three volumes of this series, Pearl German military records by the Allies proved Harbor to Guadalcanal, Isolation of Rabaul, impossible. On the tactical level, few of the and Central Pacific Drive, as well as the last, Japanese garrison commanders and their staffs Victory and Occupation, have served as a survived the fighting ; as a result, such infor- useful basis for the background information mation as was obtainable had to be gleaned that had to be incorporated into the fourth, from American intelligence surveys prepared particularly with respect to the development by higher headquarters, mostly based on the and employment of amphibious doctrine . An interrogation of the few prisoners that were appropriate setting was arrived at with the taken or such Japanese military records, help of the following : mostly of a tactical nature, that fell into Ray S. Cline. Washington Command Post : American hands . The Operations Division-The War Depart- Fortunately for the historian and researcher, ment-United States Army in World War II . during the immediate postwar period while Washington : Office of the Chief of Military the occupation of Japan was in full swing, History, Department of the Army, 1951 . An General MacArthur's headquarters utilized its official Army history outlining high-level available resources to initiate a study program planning in the Operations Division of the with the help of former Japanese officials . War Department during World War II . An 742 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS excellent source based on important primary Marine Corps which, for the years under con- data. sideration, faithfully mirrored the increasing John Miller, Jr. "The Casablanca Conference size and complexity of the organization . The and Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs, v. 13, evolution of amphibious doctrine is further no. 4 (Winter 49) . A concise account of this reflected in Marine Corps and Navy manuals high-level conference and its results . dealing with landing operations, issued be. Walter Millis, ed . The Forrestal Diaries . tween the two world wars, again notably dur . New York : The Viking Press, 1951. The per- ing the 1930s. Information on the develop- sonal files and papers of the former Secretary ment of landing craft and amphibious vehi- of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense cles was obtained from Headquarters Marine dealing with top level planning, decisions, and Corps files and those of the Department of conferences during the later phase of World the Navy Bureau of Ships. For a look at Fleet War II . An important source for evaluating Marine Force organization and plans shortly the Administration's plans in the realm of before the United States entered the war, the international affairs, the conclusion of the war "Report of the General Board on Expansion in the Pacific, and the formulation of plans for of the U . S. Marine Corps," of 7 May 1941, the postwar period. in the custody of the Operational Archives Louis Morton. "American and Allied Strat- Branch, Naval History Division, proved of egy in the Far East," Military Review, v . 29, great value. no. 9 (Dec49) . This article deals with plan- Additional information was obtained from ning for the eventual drive across the Pacific Volume I in this series, Part I, "Introduction towards the Japanese Home Islands . to the Marine Corps," which thoroughly dis- Adm Raymond A . Spruance . "The Victory cusses this subject matter and the resulting in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal United Marine Corps posture on the eve of World Service Institution, v . 91, no. 564 (Nov46) . A War II. brief but well prepared look at World War II In connection with the parallel growth of operations in the Pacific Theater stressing Marine aviation several sources proved im- planning and strategy. portant. Among these, the Marine Corps Avia- United States Army, War Department. tion Status Sheets, prepared by the Division Handbook on Japanese Military Forces . TM-E of Aviation ; an Administrative History of 30-480. Washington, 1Oct44 . A basic source Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; the War on the organization and equipment of Japanese Diary, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, and land forces with useful detail on weapons the War Diary of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force characteristics and textbook tactics . Pacific made a major contribution in follow- ing the expansion of Marine Corps aviation in World War II . PART II Unofficial Sources FLEET MARINE FORCE, The official material enumerated above was PACIFIC further supplemented with letters of comment Official Documents on draft manuscripts obtained mostly from retired officers connected with the Fleet Ma- The evolution of amphibious doctrine from rine Force following its establishment and the mid-1930s to the end of World War II those who played a part in it during the directly reflects on the size and shape of the succeeding phases of its evolution. Many of organization employed to implement this doc- the men who occupied leading positions dur- trine. In tracing the origin and development ing the two decades covered are no longer of the Fleet Marine Force, pertinent informa- among the living. Nevertheless, their views, tion was obtained from the official files at as expressed in statements, directives, and Headquarters, Marine Corps .. The material other correspondence have trickled down to us found fruitful for this purpose included the and have been carefully considered in the Annual Reports of the Commandant of the development of conclusions . An unpublished BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 743 draft entitled "FMFPac Administrative His- operations of World War II and his part in tory-The Development of FMFPac" in the the development of the FMFPac . custody of the Documentation Section, Refer- PART III ence Branch of the Historical Division served as a valuable guide in the reconstruction of .THE PALAUS : GATEWAY TO THE the organizational development . PHILIPPINES Official Documents Books and Periodicals The seizure of the southern Palaus as final- Robert D . Heinl, Jr . Soldiers o f the Sea- ly executed in Operation STALEMATE II The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 . resulted in the neutralization of the entire Annapolis : United States Naval Institute, island group . The high level planning that 1962. An outstanding labor of love by an au- preceded this operation, one of the most vi- thor who combines great writing skill with his cious and costly to be fought in the Pacific, intricate knowledge of the Marine Corps scene spanned the period of nearly six months, dur- both in peace and war . Not always with the ing which time the progress of the war in greatest objectivity, the narrative provides the Pacific forced several revisions in the comprehensive coverage of the organization basic operation plan . The planning and ex- and operations of the Marine Corps includ- ecution of STALEMATE II resulted in a ing its struggles afar and at home . wealth of documentation ranging from min- Once again, Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines utes of the CCS and JCS to detailed plans and Amphibious War provided valuable infor- on the corps and division level. On the tac- mation on early amphibious doctrine and the tical level, considerable information was avail- evolution of the Fleet Marine Force . able in the form of war diaries, appendices, Clyde H. Metcalf. A History of the United and annexes including reports of general and States Marine Corps . New York : G. P. Put- special staff officers and sections, unit jour- nam's Sons, 1939 . A valuable historical work nals, and after action reports. While these showing the triumphs and tribulations of the vary greatly in scope and content, they never- Marine Corps in time of war and peace . Of theless provide a comprehensive basis for an special interest in this context for its cover- operational narrative, since all fields ranging age of the lean years following World War I from personnel, intelligence, and operations to to the beginning buildup in the late 1930s logistics have been covered . If anything, the that foreshadowed World War II . sheer quantity of material available from of- John H . Russell, Jr., "Birth of the Fleet ficial sources, extending from the corps down Marine Force," U. S. Naval Institute Proceed- to battalion level often made the selection of ings, v. 72, no. 515 (Jan/46) . An authoritative pertinent data a difficult undertaking. In those contribution by a former Assistant Comman- instances where a conflict existed between ac- dant and later Commandan who was closely in- counts on different reporting levels, the ver- volved with the Fleet Marine Force in its sion of the unit most closely concerned with early years . the action described has been utilized . General Holland M . Smith, "Development of Unofficial Documents Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy," Ma- rine Corps Gazette, v. 38, nos . 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 In addition to the voluminous official sources, (Jun-Oct48) . A five-part article written by a number of unofficial documents were avail- the man who made a major contribution to im- able in the form of letters that passed be- plementation of amphibious doctrine and the tween various high-level participants in Oper- development of the Fleet Marine Force . ation STALEMATE II, particularly in the Holland M . Smith and Percy Finch, Coral correspondence between Generals Geiger and and Brass . New York : Charles Scribner's Rupertus, and General Vandegrift, then Com- Sons, 1949 . An autobiography in which the mandant of the Marine Corps . These letters are author discussses his noteworthy military part of a personal correspondence file which career with valuable comments on the military the Commandant maintained with general and 744 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS flag officers, and which ultimately came to be the postwar period offcers a wide range of placed in the custody of the Archives of the material not to be found elsewhere, particu- Historical Division. larly Monograph No . 48, Central Pacific Oper- During the preparation of the historical ations Record, v. II . A recently published of- monograph, The Assault on Peleliu, the author, ficial Japanese History of World War II num- Major Frank 0 . Hough, prepared numerous bering several volumes undoubtedly contains notes in the form of a card file . These cards, much information that could fill existing gaps though no longer complete, contain substan- in the narrative of this volume. Unfortunately, tial information on all phases of STALE- publishing deadlines and lack of resources for MATE II and may be examined through the the translation and exploitation of this ma- Documentation Section, Reference Branch, of terial prevented its utilization. the Historical Division . In the years since the end of World War MajGen Oliver P . Smith. "Personal Narra- II, a number of books dealing with opera- tive." The personal journal of the Assistant tions in the Central and Western Pacific have Division Commander of the 1st Marine Divi- been published in Japan . Some of these, of sion covering the period from 28 January-1 varying degrees of quality, have been trans- November 1944, including very perceptive com- lated into English and are listed below . ments on the Peleliu campaign . After the draft chapters of the above mono- Books and Periodicals graph had been completed, they were circulated Once again Craven and Cate, Matterhorn among the higher ranking participants in the to Nagasaki ; Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines operation for critique and comment . The re- and Amphibious War ; Sherrod, History of plies received brought to light much additional Marine Corps Aviation, and Smith, Approach information of varying quality, ranging from to the Philippines constitute invaluable sources . outstanding to average, which were assembled Other works which shed considerable light on in a folder designated as the Peleliu Comment the Peleliu operation are : File. To these comments, dating back to the LtCol Kimber H . Boyer. "The 3d Armored early 1950s, must be added a similar critique Amphibian Battalion-Palau Operation, 15 of the chapters in this volume . Both com- September-20 October 1944." Quantico : ment files are in the custody of the Historical Marine Corps Schools, Amphibious Warfare Division, which will make them available to School, Senior Course, 1948-49 . A brief his- the serious researcher . torical tactical study of the Peleliu opera- tion on the battalion level . Japanese Sources RAdm Worrall R. Carter . Beans, Bullets, Compared to the wealth of official records and Black Oil . Washington : Government Print- available from American sources, those from ing Office, 1953 . Official history of Navy logis- the Japanese side are at best sparse. Among tics in the Pacific during World War II . a large cache of documents captured on Sai- Burke Davis . Marine!-The Life of Lieuten- pan a number dealt with Japanese defensive ant General Lewis B . (Chesty) Puller. Bos- preparations in the Palaus . These were ex- ton : Little, Brown, and Company, 1962. The ploited, translated in the rough, and made story of one of the great fighting men of the available to the assault units prior to the Corps and the experiences of the 1st Marines, invasion. The interrogations of the relatively which he commanded, in the Peleliu assault . few prisoners of war taken on Peleliu also Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D . Coox. Kogun. provide a source of information, though in- Quantico : Marine Corps Association, 1959 . telligence obtained in this way is of a con- Translated from the Japanese, this account flicting nature, since prisoners frequently of the plans and activities of the Japanese made their disclosures with a view towards Army High Command during World War II pleasing their captors, so that material thus was prepared by a former staff officer in the obtained must be viewed with a grain of salt . Imperial General Headquarters. On a more professional level, the U .S. Ar- Maj Frank 0. Hough . The Assault on my monograph series prepared in Japan in Peleliu. Washington : Historical Division, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 745

HQMC, 1950. This official monograph contains and after action reports of the U. S. Army a detailed account of Operation STALEMATE corps and divisions involved are in the cus- including interesting appendices on Japanese today of the World War II Records Division, cave positions and the role of Marine Corps NARS, Suitland, Maryland . aviation on Peleliu. Records of the Marine Corps consulted George P. Hunt. Coral Comes High . New are predominantly those of aviation units on York : Harper and Brothers, 1946 . An ac- the aircraft group and squadron level . There count of Pacific operations including Peleliu is great variance in the coverage of events from the company commander's point of view . as to depth and scope between units, which More human interest than history, but never- resulted in gaps that had to be bridged through theless important in portraying the feelings the use of both official and unofficial publish- of men in battle . ed works . George McMillan . The Old Breed : A His- tory of the First Marine Division in World Unofficial Documents War II. Washington : Infantry Journal Press, Upon completion of a historical monograph 1949. A unit history describing the perform- on Marine Aviation in the Philippines, the ance of the units and men of the 1st Division, draft manuscript was circulated for com- without which the complete story of the Pe- ment and critique to interested parties who leliu operation could not be told . had taken part in the operation . Many of MajGen Paul J. Mueller (USA), Chairman, these individuals responded and their com- 81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee, ments have been cited throughout this sec- et al. The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in tion. Similarly, the draft chapters of this World War II. Washington : Infantry Journal volume were sent to key participants and to Press, 1948. A detailed account of the 81st the historical agencies of the other services, Division's operation on Angaur Island and and the replies received have been used as ap- the subsequent employment of its regiments plicable in revising the narrative . All such on Peleliu . comments are retained in the files of the Jeremiah A . O'Leary. "Hell in the Umur- Documentation Section, Reference Branch of brogol," True Magazine, v. 17, no. 101 (Oct45) . the Historical Division . Human interest story of the ferocious fighting By no means all of the material uncovered that took place on Peleliu . by draft comments has been used in this book or in the historical monograph that pre- PART IV ceded it. The files contain much unpublished MARINES IN THE PHILIPPINES information that may be of value to the future researcher or student of this phase Official Documents of Marine aviation activities, particularly with Beyond the employment of the V Amphibi- regard to the doctrine of Marine close air ous Corps Artillery on Leyte, the story of support that evolved from childhood to adoles- Marines in the Philippines is primarily one cence during this phase of the war . of Marine aviation in support of U .S. Army units. A variety of sources were consulted Japanese Sources in order to obtain a balanced product. On the Once again, the number of official Japanese strategic level, heavy reliance was placed on sources is quite limited when compared to minutes and records of the Combined and the U. S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Joint Chiefs of Staff, reports, plans, and of- records available dealing with this subject ficial correspondence on the CinCPac level . On matter. Nevertheless, the OCMH monograph the tactical level, records of the U . S. Sixth series does provide information in its Philip- Army proved valuable for the Leyte and Luzon pines Operations Record, Phases II and III, Campaigns, while Eighth Army records were that bridges the gap to some extent . Additional consulted for a reconstruction of operations in information is available from 35th Army the Southern Philippines. The bulk of this Operations, 1944-45 and the interrogation of material, including war diaries and journals senior Japanese commanders in the postwar 746 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

era. On the higher level of command, Mono- Philadelphia and New York : J. B. Lippincott graph No . 45, History of the Army Section, Company, 1947 . Relatively brief description Imperial General Staff, 1941-45 provides valu- of Marine aviation activities in the Philip- able clues in portraying the strategy em- pines is of primary importance in this con- ployed by the Japanese High Command dur- text. ing this period of the war . General George C . Kenney. General Kenney Reports. New York : Duel], Sloan, and Pearce, Books and Periodicals 1949. The personal history of the Commander In addition to the overall sources, particu- of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pa- larly the previously cited Morison volumes on cific. A sizable portion of this book deals with Leyte and The Liberation of the Philippines, the Philippines and thus serves as valuable Craven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn to background material for this section . Nagasaki, and Sherrod, History of Marine Capt Samuel H . McAloney, "Is Air Sup- Corps Aviation in World War II, the follow- port Effective?" Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, ing were extensively consulted : No. 11 (Nov45) . One of the members of an Maj Charles W . Boggs, Jr. Marine Aviation air liaison party discusses his experiences in in the Philippines. Washington : Historical Di- obtaining close air support for Army troops vision, HQMC, 1951 . An official monograph de- on Luzon . picting Marine close support of Army units Robert Ross Smith . Triumph in the Philip- in the Philippines, outlining in detail the pines-The War in the Pacific-United States development of the Marine doctrine of close Army in World War II . Washington : Office air suport . The narrative covers the entire of the Chief of Military History, Department period of liberation of the Philippines from of the Army, 1963 . The official Army history the Leyte landings to the end of the war . dealing with the liberation of the Central and John A. DeChant . Devilbirds : The Story of Southern Philippines was of great value for United States Marine Corps Aviation in World providing the setting in which Marine avia- War II . New York : Harper and Brothers, tion operated during the final phase of World 1947. Relatively brief but good description of War II. Marine dive bomber operations on Luzon . Maj Bertram C . Wright, USA . The First M. Hamlin Cannon . Leyte : The Return to Cavalry Division In World War II. Tokyo : the Philippines-The War in the Pacific- Toppan Printing Company, Ltd ., 1947. This United States Army in World War II. Wash- division history furnishes an excellent account ington : Office of the Chief of Military His- of the drive that culminated in the liberation tory, Department of the Army, 1953. Excel- of Manila and the support given to the divi- lent account and official Army history of the sion by Marine aviators. recapture of Leyte, the first island to be liberated in the Philippines. Useful as a back- PART V ground for the movements and operations of the VAC artillery on Leyte. MARINE AVIATION IN THE WESTERN General Robert L. Eichelberger and Mil- PACIFIC ton Mackaye . Our Jungle Road to Tokyo . New York : The Viking Press, 1950 . The march Official Documents across the Southwest Pacific as seen through The discussion of Marine aviation activities the eyes of the Commanding General of I in the Western Pacific is largely based on Corps and subsequently of the Eighth Army. the records of the units concerned . Included Based on an earlier series in the Saturday in the documents are special action reports, Evening Post, the volume furnishes interest- war diaries, and informal combat reports on ing details on Eighth Army operations in the the wing, aircraft group, and squadron level . Philippines . It should be remembered that the type of in- Frank O . Hough . The Island War : The formation contained in the official documents United States Marine Corps in the Pacific . is but a reflection of the mission entrusted BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 747

to Marine aviation in the Central and Western enemy air operations and defensive prepara- Pacific, which in 1944 and almost to the tions in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus . end of the war consisted primarily of neutral- Once again, an English translation of the of- izing Japanese bases and involved little of ficial Japanese Army history of World War the close air support envisioned by Marine II would have been invaluable, since official planners and subsequently used in the Philip- World War II records dealing with this sub- pines in support of Army units . There is also ject matter were not available . Much of the a wide variance in quality and detail of cover- information from the Japanese side was ob- age, depending on the skill of the personnel as- tained from postwar interrogations of Japa- signed to the task and the value placed by the nese officials contained in the USSBS Inter- command on the importance of maintaining of- rogations, and the postwar writings of Japa- ficial records . Nevertheless, despite occasional nese who had participated in these operations . gaps, the overall coverage is adequate to per- mit a comprehensive view of the part played by Marine aviation in the trek of the Ameri- Books and Periodicals can forces across the Pacific . All of the offi- Valuable background material for this sec- cial records used are in the custody of the tion was obtained from the previously cited World War II Records Division, National Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi- Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Mary- ous War; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral land and may be obtained from that agency, or King; Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in through the Historical Division, HQMC . World War II ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; and Morison, Victory in the Pacific. In addition Unofficial Documents to these, the following proved valuable in the There is no body of letters and interviews preparation of this section in the Marine Corps Historical Division ar- Major Carl W. Hoffman. Saipan-The Be- chives relating to air operations against the ginning of the End . Washington : Historical bypassed islands in the Central and Western Division, HQMC, 1950. A detailed historical Pacific as there is in the case of other cam- monograph dealing with the Saipan opera- paigns which have been covered in historical tion, of value as background material for the monographs . A few pertinent letters among establishment of an airfield that was to be- the papers acquired from the Sherrod aviation come of vital importance in the conduct of air history project are of limited value to a his- operations in the Pacific . tory of a wide scope . Major Carl W. Hoffman . The Seizure of During the preparation of this volume, the Tinian. Washington : Historical Division, two chapters comprising this section were sent HQMC, 1951 . Excellent account of the Tinian out to a number of individuals who had par- operation, which furnishes valuable back- ticipated in the operations covered therein . ground material for the subsequent use of the In response, numerous written comments were island as a base from which the major at- received to round out the strategical and tac- tacks against the Home Islands were launched tical picture . Certain key individuals in their that brought an end to the war. comments helped to clarify command prob- Major Orlan R . Lodge. The Recapture of lems that were encountered during this phase Guam. Washington : Historical Branch, G-3 of the war in the area involved . Generally, as Division, HQMC, 1954 . The official Marine seen from the vantage point of time and ex- Corps monograph concerning the Guam oper- perience, the comments received proved an in- ation, furnishing valuable background ma- valuable source of information to supplement terial for an appreciation of the air situation the material found in official sources. in the Central Pacific during the final phase of World War II . Japanese Sources Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Horikoshi, and Japanese records used in this account con- Martin Caidin. Zero! New York : E . P. Dut- sisted primarily of monographs touching upon ton & Company, Inc ., 1956. The title of this 748 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

well-researched and written work is mislead- In addition to the voluminous records deal- ing, in that its scope goes far beyond a dis- ing with Operation DETACHMENT, the very cussion of the well known Mitsubishi fighter, length and difficulty of the campaign gave its development, and its employment . The rise to much soul-searching on the division book dwells on Japanese air operations in the and corps level, which is reflected in very Pacific throughout the war and provides a detailed reports on the performance of men valuable insight into Japanese internal and and equipment under the conditions peculiar foreign policy during the war years . to the operation, as well as on organizational problems encountered. All of the official docu- PART VI ments pertaining to Operation DETACH- MENT are in the custody of the World War IWO JIMA II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland Official Documents . Operation DETACHMENT probably re- Unofficial Documents ceived closer study in its inception and plan- The vast lode of official material is supple- ning, more detailed analysis by the numerous mented by a large quantity of information staff sections of headquarters of varying levels from unofficial sources. Thus, in the course of for historical purposes, and extensive cover- preparing the official monograph Iwo Jima- age by the news and information media than Amphibious Epic, its author, Lieutenant Colo- any of the Pacific amphibious assaults pre- nel Whitman S. Bartley, requested comments viously executed in World War II . Since this from individuals who had taken part in the was an all-Marine operation involving three campaign . In response, approximately 175 divisions at the very threshold of Japan, in participants in the operation contributed to fact against a target administratively a part the finished product through written comments of the Home Islands, the importance attached or personal interviews . The information thus to DETACHMENT is reflected both in the obtained was used to supplement or corrobo- volume and quality of the available material . rate the hundreds of documents consulted dur- Where gaps are readily apparent in other ing the preparation of the monograph . In the operations, none appear in this instance ; to same way, valuable information was received the contrary, the data available for research that had never found its way into the official on Iwo Jima tends to be overwhelming . In- records, though time and space did not per- stead of being compelled to bridge gaps, the mit all of the personal recollections and anec- researcher is nearly overwhelmed with a pro- dotes to be incorporated into the narrative . fusion of action reports, unit diaries and jour- Similarly, comments from participants in nals, operation plans and orders, dispatches, the operation were solicited upon completion letters, and preoperation studies by units that of the draft chapters of this work . The pas- took part in the campaign. Mindful of criticism sage of time had taken its toll among the voiced as to excessive casualties after Tarawa, survivors of the operation, but nevertheless every precaution was taken at Iwo Jima to much additional information was obtained in avoid any gap in the planning of the opera- this fashion which otherwise might never have tion. This care is reflected in every facet of found its way into these pages . All of the the planning phase, from the amount of intel- comments, both for the historical monograph ligence collected to the evacuation of the and for this volume repose in the files of the wounded and burial of the dead . Documentation Section, Reference Branch of In order to avoid repetition and to obtain the Historical Division . a balanced account of the operation, the reports of the higher echelons were used to Japanese Sources reconstruct the "big picture," while on the There is some variety in the Japanese lower level the records of the unit most di- sources available for Operation DETACH- rectly involved in the action were utilized . MENT . First, a number of enemy documents, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 749 diaries, and letters were seized in the course Books and Periodicals of the campaign, which were translated, for The scope, size, and public awareness of the the most part on the division level, and either Iwo Jima operation have resulted in much filed with VAC or forwarded to higher head- published material on this campaign . As a quarters . Additional information on the de- result, only those sources consulted on a large fense of Iwo Jima was obtained through the scale are listed below. Valuable background interrogation of prisoners of war . For the material was contained in the previously cited most part, little information beyond that of Craven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn to a limited tactical nature could be thus ob- Nagasaki ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and tained with the exception that one of the pub- Amphibious War ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ; lishers of one of Japan's major dailies was, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; Smith and Finch, for reasons unknown, serving on Iwo Jima Coral and Brass ; Mills, The Forrestal Diaries ; in an enlisted status . He was well versed in and Morison, Victory in the Pacific. the realm of the big picture of the Japanese war effort and civilian morale in the Home Robert A. Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia . Islands, and from this vantage point was The Third Marine Division . Washington : In- able to contribute much to an overall appraisal fantry Journal Press, 1948 . One of the divi- sion histories published in the wake of World of conditions in Japan during this phase of War II . Of primary interest in this context the war. because of coverage of the Iwo Jima operation Time and resources did not permit the and the division's part in it . translation and use of the recently published official Japanese History of World War II, Howard M . Conner . The Spearhead-The which, beyond doubt, would have contributed World War II History of the 5th Marine Divi- much to balancing the narrative from the sion. Washington : Infantry Journal Press, enemy side of the hill. Comments by the War 1950. An excellent account of the first major History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan operation in which the division took part . Since also provided worthwhile information that was this was the only campaign for the division, incorporated into the narrative . the author was able to devote more detail to Help in bringing to life the major Japa- this narrative than is the case with the his- nese participants in the Iwo Jima campaign tories of the other two divisions on Iwo . He arrived from a totally unexpected source, and has put this advantage to good use. it is in this respect that the Iwo Jima chap- T. Grady Gallant . The Friendly Dead . New ters differ from others in this volume . In York : Doubleday and Company, Inc ., 1964 . writing an excellent book on the Iwo opera- A participant's account of the horrors of the tion, which will be cited below, Richard F . battle that saw heroism, gallantry, and brutal Newcomb had numerous interviews conducted death on an unprecedented scale . in Japan with members of the families of Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr . "Target Iwo," U. S. the long-deceased Japanese commanders, veter- Naval Institute Proceedings, v . 89, no. 7 (Jul ans of the campaign in Japan, and others who 1963) . Well written account of the factors af- in some way were either connected with these fecting the preliminary bombardment of the individuals or the planning for the defense objective, prepared by one who was intimately of the island . In making this voluminous file involved in this aspect of the operation . available to the Historical Division for use Capt Raymond Henri. Iwo Jima-Spring- in this volume, Mr . Newcomb made a major board to Final Victory . New York : U. S. Cam- contribution to removing the shadow of ano- era Publishing Corporation, 1945 . Pictorial nymity that cloaks these men who fought hard account with brief narrative of the Iwo cam- and gave all for their country. This material paign, outstanding for its pictorial coverage . has been alternately referred to in the narra- Capt Raymond Henri et al. The U . S. Ma- tive as the Newcomb File or Newcomb Notes ; rines on Iwo Jima . Washington : The Infantry a photostatic copy of it reposes in the archives Journal, 1945 . The operation as seen through of the Historical Division . the eyes of five official Marine combat corre- 750 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

spondents. An interesting human drama ac- CONCLUSIONS count of one of history's large, impersonal battles . Also contains numerous interesting Official Documents photographs of the action . The period covered by the ground operations Clive Howard and Joe Whitley. One Damned in this volume extends from mid-September Island After Another . Chapel Hill : The Uni- 1944 to the end of March 1945 . The Peleliu versity of North Carolina Press, 1946. The and Iwo Jima campaigns which fall within history of the U . S. Army Seventh Air Force, this time frame were not isolated operations ; written mostly from a public relations point momentous events were under way in other of view . Nevertheless of value to this nar- theaters of operations that eventually paved rative because of its account of pre-invasion the way for final victory. The road to Peleliu bombings of Iwo Jima . and Iwo Jima had begun as a tortuous path Robert Leckie. Strong Men Armed. New that led from Guadalcanal to Tarawa . The York : Random House, 1962 . Well illustrated lessons learned on each island and paid for human interest account of the Marines in with the blood of countless Americans paved World War II ; its coverage of Iwo Jima added the way for the seizure of the Marshalls and considerable flavor to the narrative . Marianas, which in turn served as spring- Capt Clifford P. Morehouse. The Iwo Jima boards for the continued advance into the west- Operation. Washington : Historical Division, ern Pacific . HQMC, 1946. Detailed historical monograph In itself, this volume shows neither the on the Iwo Jima operation containing some beginning of the war nor its conclusion . The information on units and casualties not cover- bloody battles fought in two major operations ed elsewhere . were but signposts pointing the way to the Richard F . Newcomb . Iwo Jima . New York, heart of the enemy's defenses . With the in- Chicago, and San Francisco : Holt, Rinehart, troduction of new defensive tactics by the and Winston, 1965 . An outstanding reconstruc- Japanese and progress made in the art and tion of the battle as seen from both sides, science of amphibious warfare by the Marines, covering both the operational aspects and the Peleliu was to become a struggle of endurance, human side. This book and the author's notes Iwo Jima a contest of the will . Beyond the made a major contribution to the writing of immediate tactical results of these operations, this volume . there were political overtones, both in Japan, Carl W. Proehl . The Fourth Marine Division the United States, and the Soviet Union . in World War II. Washington : Infantry Jour- Progress of the war in the Pacific influenced nal Press, 1946. Well written and illustrated Allied operations in Europe, where events, account of the division's exploits in World in turn, had a measurable effect on Allied War II, with good coverage of the Iwo Jima resources in the Pacific . campaign . The color photography is outstand- Since the concluding part of this volume ing and the map work superior . was designed to bring the two major opera- Saburo Sakai, Martin Caidin, and Fred Sai- tions described into balance with the big pic- to. Samurai! New York : Ballantine Books, ture of the war, the sources, of necessity, had 1957. An account by one of Japan's air aces to be obtained from the policy-making level . of his experiences on Iwo prior to the in- These include the records of the Combined vasion. A much needed bit of writing that and Joint Chiefs of Staff as cited in previ- helped to balance the account of the action . ously published official histories, as well as Col Donald M . Weller . "Salvo-Splash!- the minutes of such high-level and far-reach- The Development of NGF Support in World ing conferences as those held at Teheran in War II ." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1943 and Quebec in September 1944, pt 1, v. 80, no . 8 (Aug/54) . Valuable account not to mention the important Roosevelt-Nimitz- of the experiences of a Marine officer who MacArthur meeting in Hawaii in late July of played a leading part in this aspect of Oper- the same year. The Iwo Jima campaign nearly ation DETACHMENT . coincided with the Yalta Conference, which BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 751 set the tone for the overall strategic concept Amphibious War ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ; 'of the war, including that phase beyond the Leahy, I Was There, and Morison, Victory in unconditional surrender of Germany to the the Pacific. In addition, the following contrib- ultimate surrender of Japan to be brought uted substantially to this section . about in cooperation with other Pacific powers Hugh M. Cole. The Ardennes : The Battle and the Soviet Union . of the Bulge-The U. S. Army in World War II. Washington : Office of the Chief of the Military History, Department of the Army, Unofficial Documents 1965. An excellent account of the last major The brevity of this part of the volume did German counteroffensive of the war with re- not permit the discussion of foreign policy and sulting implications for the defeat of Ger- the political overtones dictating strategy dur- many. ing the phase of the war to be covered in more Benis M. Frank and Henry I . Shaw, Jr. than very general terms . The unofficial docu- Victory and Occupation-History of U . S. Ma- ments pertinent in this context are the numer- rine Corps Operations in World War II, v . V. ous comments received on the draft chapters of Washington : Historical Branch, G-3 Division, this volume, as well as some of those sub- HQMC, 1968 . The official Marine Corps history mitted on Volume III of this series, Central of the Okinawa campaign and the occupation Pacific Drive and Volume V, Victory and Oc- of Japan and North China . cupation. All of these comments are filed in Henry I. Shaw, Jr ., Bernard C . Nalty, and the archives of the Historical Division . Edwin T. Turnbladh . Central Pacific Drive- Books and Periodicals History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Among the books most widely used in the World War II, v. III . Washington : Historical preparation of this section were the previously Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1966 . The official cited Cline, Washington Command Post ; Marine Corps history of the campaigns in the Craven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn to Gilberts, Marshalls, and Mariannas, which Nagasaki ; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Hal- formed the basis for continued operations in sey's Story; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and the Western Pacific.

APPENDIX B

Guide to Abbreviations

A-1 (etc) Corps Artillery Staff Officer, AT ...... Antitank Personnel (See G-1) ATC ...... Air Transport Command A-20 ...... Army twin-engine attack (Army) plane, the Douglas Havoc Avn ...... Aviation AA ...... Antiaircraft AWS ...... Air Warning Squadron AAA ...... Antiaircraft Artillery B-17 ...... Army four-engine bomber, AAF ...... Army Air Forces the Boeing Flying For- AAR ...... After Action Report tress AcftCarrs Aircraft Carriers B-24 ...... Army four-engine bomber, AC of S Assistant Chief of Staff the Consolidated Liberator ADC ...... Air Defense Command ; As- B-25 ...... Army twin-engine bomber, sistant Division Comman- the North American Mit- der chell Adm Admiral B-26 Army twin-engine bomber, Admin Administrative the Martin Marauder Adv Advance B-29 Army four-engine bomber, AF Air Force the Boeing Super-Fortress AFB Air Force Base BAR Browning Automatic Rifle AFPOA Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Btry Battery Areas BB Battleship AirDel Air Delivery "Betty" Japanese two-engine Mitsu- AirFMFPac . ... Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, bishi bomber Pacific BGen Brigadier General AK Cargo vessel BLT ...... Battalion Landing Team AKA Cargo ship, attack Bn ...... Battalion Alex Alexandria Bomb Bombardment ALP Air Liaison Party Br ...... Branch Ammo Ammunition Brig Brigade Amphib Amphibian ; Amphibious Bu ...... Bureau Amtrac Amphibian tractor Bul Bulletin AN/VRC Army-Navy Vehicle, Radio BuMed Bureau of Medicine and Sur- Communication gery Anx Annex BuPers Bureau of Naval Personnel AP Armor-piercing C-1 (etc) Corps Staff Officer, Person- APA Attack transport nel (See G-1) APD High-speed transport C-47 Army twin-engine transport, App Appendix the Douglas Skytrain Ar Army C-54 Army four-engine transport, AR Action Report -the Douglas Skymaster ArmdAmph .... Armored Amphibian Cal Caliber Arty Artillery CAP Combat Air Patrol Asslt Assault Capt Captain Asst Assistant CAS Close Air Support 752

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 753

CASCU Commander, Air Support DDT ...... Insecticide made of dichloro- Control Unit diphenyl-trichloroethane "Catalina" PBY patrol bomber made by DE Destroyer Escort Consolidated-Vultee Def Defense Cav Cavalry Dep ...... Depot OCS Combined Chiefs of Staff Det Detachment Cdr Commander DETACHMENT Iwo Jima Operation CEC Civil Engineer Corps "Devastator" .. TBD, torpedo-bomber made CenPac Central Pacific by Douglas CG Commanding General Dir Director Chap Chapter Disp Dispatch CinCAFPac .... Commander in Chief, Army Div Division Forces in the Pacific DOW Died of Wounds CinCPac Commander in Chief, Pacific Dtd Dated Fleet DUKW Amphibian truck CinCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ech Echelon Ocean Areas Ed Editor ; edited CinCUS Commander in Chief, United Encl Enclosure States Fleet Engr ...... Engineer Cm centimeter Enl Enlisted CMC Commandant of the Marine Evac ...... Evacuation Corps Ex ...... Executive CMCS Commandant, Marine Corps ExO Executive Officer Schools ExTrps Expeditionary Troops Cmt Comment F-1 Force staff officer, Personnel CNO Chief of Naval Operations (See G-1) CO Commanding Officer F2A Marine single-engine fighter, Co Company the Brewster "Buffalo" CofS Chief of Staff F4F ...... Navy-Marine single-engine Col Colonel fighter, the Grumman Com Commander (Units) Wildcat ComCenPacFor Commander, Central Pacific Navy-Marine single-engine Forces fighter, the Chance-Vought Comd Command Corsair CominCh Commander in Chief, U . S. F5A Army photo plane version of Fleet the P-38 Conf Confidential F6F ...... Navy-Marine single-engine Const Construction fighter, the Grumman CP Command Post Hellcat Cpl Corporal FAdm ...... Fleet Admiral CT Combat Team FAirWest Fleet Air, West Coast CTF Commander Task Force FAirWing Fleet Air Wing CTG Commander Task Group FDC Fire direction center CV Aircraft carrier FEAF Far East Air Forces CVE Escort carrier FEC Far East Command CWO Chief Warrant Officer Fld ...... Field D Diary .. Marshall Islands Operation D-1 (etc) Division staff officer, Person- Flat ...... Flotilla nel (See G-1) Flt Fleet DA Department of the Army FMF Fleet Marine Force "Dauntless" .... SBD, scout-bomber made by FO ...... Field order ; forward ob- Douglas server

754 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

FRC Federal Records Center Inf ...... Infantry FSCC Fire Support Coordination Info ...... Information Center Intel Intelligence Fwd Forward Inter Interrogation G-1 Division (or larger unit) Per- Intvw Interview sonnel Office(r) IsCom Island Command G-2 Division (or larger unit) J2F Navy-Marine Corps single- Intelligence Office(r) engine amphibian, the G-3 Division (or larger unit) Grumman Duck Operations and Training JANAC Joint Army-Navy Assess- Office (r) ment Committee G-4 Division (or larger unit) JANIS Joint Army-Navy Intelli- Logistics Office (r) gence Study GarFor Garrison Forces JASCO Joint Assault Signal Com- G.B General Board pany Gd ...... Guard JCS ...... Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen ...... General JICPOA Joint Intelligence Center, GHQ ...... General Headquarters Pacific Ocean Areas GO General Order Jnl ...... Journal GPO ...... Government Printing Office "Judy" Japanese single-engine Aichi Gnd Ground bomber GroPac Group Pacific JWPC Joint War Plans Committee Gru Group "Kate" Japanese single-engine at- GSA ...... General Services Administra- tack aircraft tion KIA Killed in Action "Hamp" Japanese Mitsubishi fighter, Lb pound identical to "Zero" LCC Landing Craft, Control Hd Head LCI Landing Craft, Infantry HE High Explosive LCI(G) Landing Craft, Infantry HIP High Frequency (Gunboat) H&I Harassing and Interdiction LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized Hist History; historical or Medium HistDiv Historical Division LCS Landing Craft, Support HMS His Majesty's Ship LCT Landing Craft, Tank Hosp Hospital LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle and How Howitzer Personnel Hq Headquarters LD Line of Departure HQMC Headquarters, United States LFASCU Landing Force Air Support Marine Corps Control Unit HRS Historical Reference Section LMG Light Machine Gun H&S Headquarters and Service Loc Located; location IGHQ Imperial General Headquar- Log Logistics; logistical ters LSD Landing Ship, Dock ILIAC III Amphibious Corps LSM Landing Ship, Medium IJA Imperial Japanese Army LST Landing Ship, Tank IJN Imperial Japanese Navy LST(H) Landing Ship, Tank IMAC I Marine Amphibious Corps (Hospital) IMB Independent Mixed Brigade LSV Landing Ship, Vehicle IMR Independent Mixed Regiment Lt Lieutenant In Inch(es) LtCol Lieutenant Colonel Incl Including ; Inclosure (Army) LtGen Lieutenant General

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 755

Ltr ...... Letter NCB Naval Construction Battalion LVT ...... Landing Vehicle, Tracked NCO ...... Noncommissioned officer LVT(A) Landing Vehicle, Tracked N.d. No date (Armored) ND Navy Department M-1 Standard issue rifle, U . S., NGF Naval Gunfire World War II NHD Naval History Division M-4 Medium Tank, U . S. No Number M-5 ...... Light Tank, U . S. NorSols Northern Solomons MAG Marine Aircraft Group 0 Officer; order MAGsZam Marine Aircraft Groups, 0-1 Phase line designation Zamboanga 0•B Order of Battle MAHA Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Obi Objective Area OCMH Office of the Chief of Military Maj Major History MajGen Major General Ofc Office Mar Marine(s) OIC Officer in Charge MarFAirWest . . Marine Fleet Air, West Coast Op Operation MASG Marine Air Support Group OP Observation Post MAW Marine Aircraft Wing OPlan Operation Plan MAWG Marine Air Warning Group Ord Ordnance MAWPac Marine Aircraft Wings, Paci- Org Organization(al) fic OS2U Navy single-engine float MBDAG Marine Base Defense Air- plane, the Chance-Vought craft Group Kingfisher MBDAW Marine Base Defense Air- OY Navy-Marine single-engine craft Wing observation plane, the Con- MC Medical Corps (Navy) solidated-Vultee Sentinel P Page; pages MCAS Marine Corps Air Station ., pp Med Medical P-38 Army twin-engine fighter, .the Lockheed Lightning Memo ...... Memorandum P-39 Army single-engine fighter, MGCIS Marine Ground Control In- the Bell Aircobra tercept Squadron MIA Missing in Action P-40 Army single-engine fighter, MIAPD Missing in Action, Presumed the Curtiss Warhawk Army single-engine fighter, Dead P-47 the Republic Thunderbolt MID Military Intelligence Divi- P-51 Army single-engine fighter, sion the North American Mus- MIS Military Intelligence Sec- tang tion P-61 Army twin-engine night Misc Miscellaneous fighter, the Northrop Black MLR Main Line of Resistance Widow Mm Millimeter Pac Pacific Mov Movement PackHow Pack Howitzer

MP Military Police PB Patrol Boat Mph Miles per hour PBJ Navy-Marine twin-engine MS Manuscript bomber, the North Amer- Msg Message ican Mitchell MT Motor Transport PBM Navy twin-engine seaplane, NARS National Archives and the Martin Mariner Records Service PBO Navy twin-engine bomber, Nav Navy; naval the Lockheed Hudson

756 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

PB2Y Navy twin-engine seaplane, SB-24 Army night bombing version the Consolidated Coronado of the B-24 PB4Y Navy-Marine four-engine SB2C Navy-Marine single-engine bomber, the Consolidated dive bomber, the Curtiss- Liberator Wright Helldiver PBY-5A Navy-Marine two-engine pa- SB2U Navy-Marine single engine trol bomber with amphi- dive bomber, the Vought- bian boat hull, the Con- Sikorsky Vindicator solidated Catalina SCAP Supreme Commander Allied Per Personnel ; Periodic Powers PFC Private First Class SCAT South Pacific Combat Air Phib Amphibious; Amphibious Transport Command Forces SCR Signal Corps Radio PhibsPac Amphibious Forces, Pacific Set Scout Fleet See ...... Section Pion Pioneer SecNav Secretary of the Navy Plt Platoon Sep Separate POA Pacific Ocean Areas Ser Serial POW Prisoner of War Serv Service Prelim Preliminary Sgt Sergeant Prov Provisional SgtMaj Sergeant Major Pt Parts(s) Sig Signal Pub Public Sit ...... Situation Pvt Private SMS ...... Marine Service Squadron R-1 (etc) Regimental Staff Officer SNLF Special Naval Landing Force (See G-1) SoPac South Pacific R4D Navy-Marine twin-engine Spec Special transport, the Douglas Spt Support Skytrain Sqd Squad R5D Navy-Marine four-engine Sqdn Squadron transport, the Douglas S.S U. S. Merchant Ship Skymaster STALEMATE.. Palaus Operation RAAF Royal Australian Air Force Strat Strategic RB Reference Branch Subj Subject Rec Reception Sum Summary Recon Reconnaissance Sup Support; Supply Recs Records Suppl Supplement Regt Regiment Svc Service Reinf Reinforced SWPA Southwest Pacific Area Rev Revised T/A Table of Allowances RJ Road Junction Tac Tactical RLT Regimental Landing Team TAF Tactical Air Force RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force TAGO The Adjutant General's Office Rpt Report TBF Navy-Marine single-engine S-1 (etc) Battalion (or regimental) torpedo bomber, the Grum- Staff Officer, Personnel man Avenger (See G-1) TBM Navy-Marine single-engine SAR Special Action Report torpedo bomber, the Gen- SBD Navy-Marine single-engine eral Motors Avenger dive bomber, the Douglas TBS Talk Between Ships Radio Dauntless TBX Medium-powered field radio

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 757

TBY Portable low-power field VAdm Vice Admiral radio VB Navy Dive Bomber Squadron TCS Vehicle mounted, high fre- Veh Vehicle quency radio VF Navy Fighter Squadron T/E Table of Equipment VHF Very High Frequency TF Task Force Vic Vicinity TG Task Group "Vindicator" .. Scout bomber, the Vought- T.H Territory of Hawaii Sikorsky SB2U TIO Target Information Officer VLR Very Long Range Tk Tank VMB Marine Bomber Squadron TM Technical Manual VMD Marine Photographic TNT Trinitro-toluol, a high ex- Squadron plosive VMF Marine Fighter Squadron T/O Table of Organization VMF(N) Marine Night Fighter TO Theater of Operations Squadron TOT Time on Target VMJ Marine Utility Squadron TQM Transport Quartermaster VMO Marine Observation Squadron Trac Tractor VIMR Marine Transport Squadron Trans Transport VMSB Marine Scout Bomber TransDiv Transport Division Squadron Trk Truck VMTB Marine Torpedo Bomber Trng Training Squadron Trps Troops VP Navy Patrol Squadron U Unit VS Navy Scouting Squadron UDT Underwater Demolitions W-1 (etc) Wing Staff Officer, Personnel Team (See G-1) USA United States Army WarD War Diary USAF United States Air Force WD War Department USAFCP United States Army Forces, Wes West Central Pacific Area WesLandFor .. Western Landing Force USAFPOA United States Army Forces, WIA Wounded in Action Pacific Ocean Areas "Wildcat" Navy-Marine single-engine USMC United States Marine Corps fighter made by Grumman USN United States Navy WO Warrant Officer USNI United States Naval Institute WP White Phosphorus USNR United States Naval Reserve Wpns Weapons USS United States Ship WW World War USSBS United States Strategic "Zeke" Japanese single-engine Mit- Bombing Survey subishi fighter, also known USSR Union of Soviet Socialist as Zero . Republics "Zero.' Same as above V Volume ZofA Zone of Action VAC V Amphibious Corps APPENDIX C

Military Map Symbols

UNIT SIZE UNIT SYMBOLS

UNIT SYMBOLS EXAMPLES

K.W. White 758

APPENDIX D

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited 8 Sep ...... The President proclaims a to those coming within the scope of this book, "limited national emergen- and those forecasting events to be treated in cy". Marine Corps strength the volume to follow . increased to 25,000 men . 1935 1940 5 Jun Aviation Section of the Head- Jun ...... Congress authorizes the Navy quarters staff is taken to begin a 10,000-plane from the Division of Oper- construction program, with ations and Training and es- 1,167 aircraft allocated for tablished as an indepen- Marine aviation. Marine dent section in the Office Corps plans to organize of the Commandant. 4 groups of 11 squadrons 9 Jul Marine Corps Schools at each. Quantico, Virginia, pub- 50ct ...... Secretary of -the Navy puts lishes the Tentative Land- all organized Marine re- ing Operations Manual . serve ground units and avi- 1 Sep Headquarters, Fleet Marine ation squadrons on short Force, is transferred from notice for call to active Quantico, Virginia, to San duty. Diego, California . 1941 1936 15Mar ...... The Fleet Marine Force is 1 Apr Division of Aviation estab- divided, with the 1st Ma- lished at Headquarters Ma- rine Division at Quantico, rine Corps . Virginia, becoming part of 1937 the Atlantic Fleet and the 27 Jan The 1st and 2d Marine Bri- 2d Marine Division at San gades, the U . S. Army 1st Diego, California, becom- Expeditionary Brigade, and ing part of the Pacific the 1st and 2d Marine Air- Fleet. craft Groups conduct Jun ...... First Joint Training Force Fleet Exercise No . 3 near (JTF-1), consisting of the San Diego, California. 1st Marine Division, the 1938 1st Marine Aircraft Group, 1 Jul Marine Corps Reserve recon- and the U . S. Army 1st stituted to consist of a Infantry Division organ- Fleet Marine Corps Re- ized at Quantico, Virginia, serve, an Organized Mari- under the command of Ma- ne Corps Reserve, and a jor General Holland M. Volunteer Marine Corps Smith. Reserve. lNov ...... Second Joint Training Force 1939 (JTF-2), composed of the 1 Sep World War II breaks out in 2d Marine Division, the Europe. U.S. Army 3d Infantry Di- 759 760 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

vision, and the 2d Marine bee. CCS decide to attack Aircraft Wing organized at Japan along both Central Camp Elliott, San Diego, and Southwest Pacific California, to become a routes. part of the Pacific Fleet . 4Sep ...... V Amphibious Corps organ- 7Dec Japanese attack Pearl Har- ized under Maj-Gen Hol- bor. land M. Smith to train and 1942 control troops for amphi- 9Apr End of American resistance bious landings in the Cen- on Bataan . tral Pacific . 6May Japanese capture Corregidor . 20Nov ...... Marines land on Betio Island, 23May Training Center, Fleet Ma- Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Is- rine Force, organized at lands. Marine Barracks, New 21Dec ...... Dive bombers of the 4th Base River, North Carolina, to Defense Aircraft Wing include all Fleet Marine carry out an attack against Force units and replace- Jaluit Atoll, the first such ments except the 1st Ma- target in the Marshall Is- rine Division . lands. 7Aug 1st Marine Division lands on 30Dec ...... Advance Headquarters of the Guadalcanal . 4th Marine Base Defense 15Aug Marine Aircraft Wings, Pa- Aircraft Wing established cific, established at San Di- on Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert ego, California, under Ma- Islands. jor General Ross E . Rowell . 1944 1943 31Jan-7Feb U. S. forces invade and cap- 14-23Jan C a s a b l a n c a Conference . ture Majuro and Kwajalein Agreement reached to ad- Atolls in the Marshall Is- vance toward Philippines lands. through Central and South- 4Feb ...... Marine aircraft carry out west Pacific, and to ter- first photographic recon- minate hostilities only naissance of the Japanese upon unconditional sur- base at Truk in the Caro- render of Japan. lines . 21Jan Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 17Feb ...... Combined Marine-Army force (MarFAirWest) organized lands on Eniwetok Atoll in under Colonel Lewie G . the Marshalls . Merritt at San Diego, Ca- 12Mar ...... JCS direct seizure of South- lifornia. ern Marianas, target date 26Jan Headquarters of the 2d Ma- 15 Jun 1944. rine Aircraft Wing estab- 28Apr The 1st Marine Division lished at Efate, New He- (Rein), commanded by brides . Major General William H . 9Feb End of organized Japanese Rupertus, is relieved on resistance on Guadalcanal. New Britain and prepares 12-25May Trident Conference in Wash- to move to Pavuvu in the ington gives general ap- Russell Islands . proval to plan for a drive 15Jun ...... The Marine V Amphibious on Japan through the Cen- Corps under Lieutenant tral Pacific. General Holland M. Smith 14-24Aug Quadrant Conference at Que- lands on Saipan in the Ma-

CHRONOLOGY 761

riana Islands . U. S. Navy Leyte from 20 December carrier task force strikes to 20 October 1944 . Volcano-Bonin Islands in 17Sep 81st Infantry Division, as first raid on these groups . part of III Amphibious First B-29 strikes launch- Corps, lands on Angaur . ed from China bases 23Sep U. S. Army troops seize Uli- against mainland of Japan . thi as advance naval base . FEAF established under 28Sep The 3d Battalion, 5th Ma- Lieutenant General George rines (Rein), under Major C. Kenney. AirNorSols John H . Gustafson, lands formed under Major Gen . on Ngesebus and Kongauru eral Ralph J . Mitchell. Islands in the Palaus, sup- 19-2OJun Battle of the Philippine Sea. ported by VMF-114. Carrier aircraft of TF 58 30Sep Peleliu, Angaur, Ngesebus, engage planes from enemy and Kongauru declared oc- carriers and inflict crip- cupied. pling losses . 30ct JCS directive orders occupa- 24Jun U. S. Navy carrier task force tion of one or more islands again hits Volcano-Bonin in the Volcano-Bonins. Islands, including Iwo 90ct Admiral Nimitz informs Jima. General Smith that Iwo 4Jul Renewed carrier attacks Jima is to be the objective 14Jul against Volcano-Bonins . in the Volcano-Bonins. Joint Staff Study for Opera- 120ct Peleliu becomes a Marine is- tion STALEMATE (inva- land command similar to sion of the Palaus) issued . Guam and Tinian . 21Jul III Amphibious Corps lands 140ct V Amphibious Corps direct- on Guam in the Marianas . ed to prepare plans for the 24Jul 4th Marine Division lands on Iwo Jima operation . Tinian in the Marianas . 180ct Landing on Homonhon Is- lAug End of organized enemy re- land. sistance on Tinian . 200ct U. S. Army troops invade 10Aug End of organized Japanese Leyte. The 1st Marine Di- resistance on Guam . vision (Rein) on Peleliu is 15Aug III Amphibious Corps, upon relieved by the U . S. Army completing its operation in 81st Infantry Division. the Mariannas, is commit- 21Oct Marine Carrier Groups, Air- ted to invasion of -the Pa- craft, Fleet Marine Force, laus. Pacific, established at San- 15Sep The 1st Marine Division, un- ta Barbara, California, un- der Major General Ruper- der Colonel Albert D. tus, lands on the south- Cooley. Marine 5th and western shore of Peleliu 11th 155mm Artillery Bat- Island. U. S. Army troops talions as part of XXIV land on Morotai, Nether- Corps Artillery in general lands East Indies, and cap- support of the U . S. Army ture airfield on that island. 7th Infantry Division on JCS decide to invade Cen- Leyte. tral rather than Southern 23-260ct Battle of Leyte Gulf which Philippines and advance ends in U. S. naval vic- target date for invasion of tory. 762

4Nov ...... VMF-122, commanded by 5Jan ...... U. S . Navy vessels shell Iwo Major Joseph H . Reinburg, Jima . supports U. S. Army land- 9Jan ...... U. S. Sixth Army invades ing on Pulo Anna Island Luzon . south of the Palaus . 24Jan ...... U. S. naval surface force 5Nov ...... Marine Corsair fighter-bomb- shells Iwo Jima . ers based in the Marshalls 25Jan First Marine dive bombers . hit Nauru Island in the arrive on Luzon . Gilberts, setting a distance 27Jan Marine dive bombers fly their record for Corsairs with first mission in the Philip- full bomb loads . pines. 11-12Nov U. S. Navy surface forces lFeb ...... Aircraft of Saipan-based Ma- rock Iwo Jima with heavy rine Bombing Squadron bombardment . 612 begin nightly rocket attacks against enemy 16Nov ...... Marine Corsairs from Pele- shipping and installations liu and Avengers from Uli- in the Volcano Islands. thi launch a coordinated 1-4Feb Marine dive attack against Yap Island, bombers of MAG-24 and MAG-32 pro- west of Ulithi . tect the left flank of the 25Nov ...... CinCPOA issues operation 1st Cavalry Division dur- plan for invasion of Iwo ing its drive to Manila . Jima . Tentative date 3 13Feb Final rehearsals for Iwo February 1945 . Jima operation concluded 3Dec VMF(N)-541 and VMF-115, off coast of Tinian . -211, -218, and -313 of 15-16Feb V Amphibious Corps Land- MAG-12 arrive at Ta- Force departs Marianas af- cloban, Leyte, to provide ter final rehearsals for as- air defense. sault on Iwo Jima . 7Dec MAG-12 aircraft, under Colo- 16Feb ...... TF 58 under Admiral Mits- nel William A . Willis, sup- cher launches two day air port U. S. Army landings strike against the Japanese at Ormoc, Leyte. mainland to divert atten- 8Dec U. S. Navy surface units tion from the imminent shell Iwo Jima . Iwo Jima operation. 11Dec ...... Major Marine air attack on 16-18Feb Amphibious Support Force Japanese convoy, Ormoc (TF 52) bombs and shells Bay. Iwo Jima in the course of 15Dec ...... MAG-12 aircraft support the preparatory bombard- landing of U . S. Army on ment . Mindoro in the Philippines . 19Feb The 4th and 5th Marine Divi- 24-27Dec U. S. Navy surface units sion seize foothold on Iwo bombard Volcano-Bonin Is- Jima. lands including Iwo Jima . 21Feb 21st Marines of the 3d Ma- 25Dee ...... Leyte declared secured . rine Division committed in Eighth Army relieves zone of action of the 4th Sixth Army . Division. Enemy executes kamikaze attack on sup- MAG-14 with VMO-251 and port ships off Iwo Jima . VMF-212, -222, and -223 23Feb ...... Combat patrol of the 28th land at Guiuan, Samar . Marines raises Old Glory CHRONOLOGY 763

on Mount Suribachi . predawn attack against Manila falls to U . S. Army Hill 362C and captures this troops. objective later in the day . 25Feb ...... 3d Marine Division commit- 8Mar 4th Marine Division repels ted on Iwo Jima . General counterattack during the unloading of cargo gets un- night 8-9 March . der way. Elements of 9Mar General Holland M . Smith MAG-32 arrive on Min- transfers his command post doro, Philippines, to sup- from the Eldorado to the port U. S. Army troops. Auburn . Admiral Turner 26Feb ...... Two Marine artillery spotter and his staff on board El- planes from the USS Wake dorado depart for Guam . Island land on Iwo Jima Real Admiral Harry W . Hill and become the first Amer- assumes duties of Senior ican planes to land on the Officer Present Afloat, island . Iwo Jima. 10Mar MAG-12 and MAG-32 air- 1945 craft support U . S. Army 27Feb ...... 3d Marine Division captures the Central Airfield on Iwo landings on Zamboanga in the Philippines . American Jima and seizes Hills Peter troops land on Mindanao in and Oboe . the Philippines . 28Feb U. S. Army troops invade 11Mar Iwo-based Army Air Forces Palawan in the Philippi- fighters assume responsi- nes. bility for providing air de- 2Mar ...... 5th Marine Division captures fense and ground support Hill 362A on Iwo Jima . missions when last Navy 3Mar ...... Elements of MAG-12, MAG- escort carriers leave . 24, and MAG-32 support 14Mar Official flag raising ceremony U.S. Army landings on marks proclamation of Masbate, Burias, and Ti- U. S. Naval Military Gov- cao Islands in the Philip- ernment in the Volcano pines . Islands. Commander, Expe- 3d Marine Division clears ditionary Troops, departs Northern Airfield on Iwo for Guam . Jima . 15Mar Corsairs of MAG-12 arrive 4Mar ...... First B-29 bomber lands on on Zamboanga . Close sup- Iwo Jima after being dam- port of the U . S. Army aged over Japan. 41st Infantry Division gets 6Mar ...... U. S. Army Air Forces 15th under way. Fighter Group arrives on 16Mar Cushman's Pocket on Iwo Iwo Jima with P-51s and Jima eliminated. End of P-61s. organized resistance in 7Mar ...... Major General James E. zone of action of the 3d Chaney (USA), Island Marine Division . Commander, assumes re- Last enemy pocket in 4th sponsibility for Iwo Jima Division zone wiped out . base development, air de- Iwo Jima declared secured fense, and airfield opera- at 1800 . tion. 18Mar U. S. Army troops invade 3d Marine Division launches Panay in the Philippines. 764 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

20Mar ...... U. S. Army 147th Infantry lApr ...... Invasion of Okinawa gets Regiment arrives on Iwo under way . Jima for garrison duty . U. S. Army troops land in the Sulu Archipelago and 23Mar ...... Dive bombers of MAG-32 move from Luzon to Zam- on Jolo Island in the Phi- boanga. lippines . 14Apr ...... MAG-24 dive bombers fly last ...... 5th Marine Division elimi- 25Mar . Marine aviation mission on nates final enemy pocket Luzon . of resistance on Iwo Jima . 17Apr ...... MAG-12, MAG-14, and 26Mar Japanese launch early morn- MAG-32 support U . S. Ar- ing attack against Marine my landings on Mindanao and U . S. Army bivouac in the Philippines. areas on Iwo Jima . Cap- 18Apr ...... Last Marines depart from ture and occupation phase Iwo Jima. announced completed as of 20Apr ...... Dive bombers of MAG-24 0800. move from Luzon to Mala- Commander, Forward Area, bang. Central Pacific, assumes 22Apr MAG-24 dive bombers begin responsibility for defense operations from Malabang . and development of Iwo 7May End of war in European Jima . Theater. Major General Chaney as- 25May JCS direct invasion of Japan, sumes operational control scheduled for 1 November of all units on Iwo Jima . 1945. V Amphibious Corps com- 21Jun End of organized resistance mand post on Iwo Jima on Okinawa . closed. Major General 6Aug Atomic bomb dropped on Schmidt departs Iwo Jima Hiroshima . by air. 9Aug ...... Atomic bomb dropped on Na- U. S. Army troops invade gasaki. Cebu in the Philippines, Russia invades Manchuria . supported by aircraft of 2Sep Japanese sign instrument of MAG-12 . surrender in Tokyo Bay.

APPENDIX E

Fleet Marine Force Status 31 August 1944'

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

Outside U.S.A.

Hawaiian Area

Oahu

Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac 1,378 14 12 Transient Center, FMFPac 5,599 43 313 3d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac 205 38 9 13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 1,125 3 30 Headquarters Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 257 1 5 6th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 4,211 8 41 8th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 424 1 13 Headquarters and Service Battalion, VAC 601 8 22 Signal Battalion, VAC 534 9 8 Corps Transport Company, VAC 115 0 0 Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, VAC 288 0 12 Air Delivery Section, VAC 91 0 0 Headquarters, 2d Laundry Company VAC 24 0 0 4th Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC 61 0 0 Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific.... 110 2 0 Marine Bomber Squadron 611, 2d MAW 467 1 8 Marine Bomber Squadron 612, 2d MAW 477 1 8 Headquarters Squadron 3, 3d MAW 519 11 18 Marine Observation Squadron 5, 3d MAW 28 • 0 Air Warning Squadron 4, 3d MAW 233 0 5 Marine Airborne Aircraft Warning Squadron 5, 3d MAW 168 0 4 Service Squadron 15, 3d MAW 229 • 0 Marine Fighter Squadon 321, 3d MAW 248 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343, 3d MAW 292 1 8 Marine Transport Squadron 953, 3d MAW 369 0 0 Headquarters Squadron, MAG-32 350 9 13 Service Squadron 32, MAG-32 242 • 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142, MAG-32 296 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadrdn 313, MAG-13 j 245 1I 8 See footnote at end of table . 765

766 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U N

Off Enl Off Enl

Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-13 47 247 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-13 50 249 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 332, MAG-13 48 294 1 8

Area Sub-Total 1,821 19,976 156 577

Hawaii

2d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac 13 296 1 7 1st Service and Supply Battalion, FMFPac 22 477 0 4 Headquarters Battery, VAC Artillery 27 155 3 9 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery 34 591 1 9 5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery 35 711 1 12 10th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery 33 724 1 12 11th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery 54 847 4 21 12th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery 1 150 0 0 26th Marines (Reinforced) 188 4,188 18 224 27th Marines (Reinforced) 199 4,461 19 219 Special and Service Troops, 5th Marine Division 137 1,213 8 24

Area Sub-Total ...... 743 13,813 56 541

Kaui

1st Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac 18 288 2 0 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 51 1,029 4 27 3d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac 11 278 0 2 3d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC 1 61 0 0 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 49 1,227 4 32 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 63 1,230 3 32 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 63 1,214 4 32 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 56 1,219 4 29 Area Sub-Total ...... 312 6,546 21 154

Maui

3d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac 16 347 1 3 2d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, YMFPac 6 268 0 0 Medical Battalion, VAC ...... 1 90 28 218 1st Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC 1 61 0 0 See footnote at end of table. FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS 767

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U SN

Off Enl Off Enl

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less Company A), VAC 20 319 1 9 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (plus Companies D and E, less Companies A and C), VAC 21 523 2 9 Company C, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC 6 133 0 0 1st Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC 32 252 14 0 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion 28 568 1 11 4th Marine Division 757 13,133 123 969 Area Sub-Total 888 15,694 170 1,219

Midway 6th Defense Battalion 69 1,492 5 22 Headquarters Squadron 23, MAG-23 25 337 6 16 Service Squadron 23, MAG-23 11 255 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-23 61 249 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 333, MAG-23 50 298 1 8 Area Sub-Total 216 2,631 13 54

Southwest Pacific Auckland, New Zealand 3d Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 15 106 2 8

Russell Islands 4th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 94 2,613 7 26 30th, 31st and 32d Depot Companies, Supply Service, ,FMFPac 12 479 0 0 2d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC 1 61 0 0 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Prov), ILIAC 32 767 1 9 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC 29 473 1 10 6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC 24 462 1 9 4th and 5th Marine War Dog Platoons, ILIAC 3 191 0 0 5th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 1 43 0 0 6th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 1 44 0 0 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion,, ILIAC Artillery . .. 60 1,321 4 31 1st Marine Division 897 16,822 130 968 Marine Observation Squadron 3, MAWPac 9 28 0 0 Area Sub-Total 1,163 23,304 144 1,053 See footnote at end of table. 768 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U N

Off En] Off Enl

Emirau Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12 39 311 6 27 Service Squadron 12, MAG-12 17 265 1 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-12 47 238 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 215, MAG-12 45 222 1 1 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243, MAG-12 46 273 1 9 Headquarters Squadron 61, MAG-61 36 386 7 16 Service Squadron 61, MAG-61 10 249 0 0 Marine Photographic Squadron 254, MAG-61 53 470 2 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 433, MAG-61 67 411 1 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 443, MAG-61 69 410 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron 952, 2d MAW 66 375 1 8

Area Sub-Total 495 3,610 21 85

Green Island Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14 39 364 7 22 Service Squadron 14, MAG-14 14 266 1 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-14 45 227 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 235, MAG-14 57 280 2 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341, MAG-14 46 263 0 0 Marine Bombing Squadron 423, MAG-14 62 398 1 8

Area Sub-Total 263 1,798 12 46

Guadalcanal 16th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 43 1,204 3 16 29th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 4 148 0 0 9th Ammunition Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 7 248 0 0 1st Battalion, 29th Marines (Reinf) 34 817 2 39 Headquarters, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC 1 24 0 0 1st Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC 1 61 0 0 3d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC 1 61 0 0 4th Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC 1 61 0 0 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC 26 499 1 9 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, ILIAC 35 343 9 115 3d Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 1 32 0 0 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC 34 678 3 9 8th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC 39 730 2 12 9th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC 34 642 2 12 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC 60 1,279 5 31 See footnote at end of table. FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS 769

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN Off Enl Off Enl

4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC ...... 61 1,243 5 34 11th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC 57 1,283 4 30 29th Marines (Reinf) ...... 198 3,886 18 205 54th Replacement Battalion...... 9 612 1 9 Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAWPac 9 28 0 0 Area Sub-Total 655 13,879 55 521

Ellice Islands 51st Defense Battalion 54 1,326 6 32

Munda, New Georgia Marine Air Base Squadron 1, 1st MAW 15 380 4 10 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241, 1st MAW 26 255 1 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 413, 1st MAW 57 401 2 9 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244, MAG-14 29 262 1 8 Area Sub-Total 127 1,298 8 35

Torokina, Bougainville Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW 67 531 8 11 Marine Fighter Squadron 222, 1st MAW 32 221 1 6 Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24 30 365 7 23 Service Squadron 24, MAG-24 13 304 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133, MAG-24 47 286 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 212, MAG-24 14 235 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-24 44 238 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236, MAG-24 31 258 1 9 Marine Observation Squadron 251, MAG-24 50 239 1 8 Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25 68 385 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron 153, MAG-25 62 353 1 8 Area Sub-Total 458 3,415 22 89 Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides Marine Air Defense Squadron 1, 1st MAW 21 358 4 7 Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW 66 422 7 28 Air Warning Squadron 3, 2d MAW 18 248 0 6 Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232, 2d MAW 41 295 1 15 See footnote at end of table .

770 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U N

OS Enl Off Enl

Marine Fighter Squadron 312, 2d MAW 47 249 Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG-11 23 59 Service Squadron 11, MAG-11 36 578 Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-11 48 250 Marine Fighter Squadron 121, MAG-11 47 249 Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-11 47 249 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 134, MAG-11 47 312 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541, MAG-11 29 308 Area Sub-Total 470 3,577 25 125

Noumea and Tontouta, New Caledonia

Transient Center, Forward Echelon, FMFPac 17 408 5 Headquarters (SoPac-Admin), Supply Service, FMFPa C 3 10 0 1st Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 38 664 13 Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25 33 334 231 Service Squadron 25, MAG-25 15 348 0 Area Sub-Total 106 1,764 15 249

Central Pacific Engebi

Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22 39 365 Service Squadron 22, MAG-22 12 248 Air Warning Squadron 1, MAG-22 12 201 Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22 48 238 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151, MAG-22 51 311 Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22 49 229

Area Sub-Total 211 1,592 12

Eniwetok 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery ...... 65 1,403 4 29 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG-22 36 308 1 8

Area Sub-Total ...... 101 1,711 5 37 See footnote at end of table. FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS 771

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U SN

Off EnI Off Enl

Guam

1st Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac 52 379 33 123 5th Field Depot 64 1,447 4 16 Company A, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC 3 138 0 0 Company A, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC 5 130 0 0 Headquarters and Service Battalion, ILIAC 171 1,261 17 81 Signal Battalion, IIIAC 60 1,109 2 11 Motor Transport Battalion, ILIAC 32 609 2 11 Medical Battalion, IIIAC 1 151 35 312 Air Delivery Section, ILIAC 3 164 0 2 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, ILIAC 35 644 2 10 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC 36 777 2 12 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC 27 541 2 8 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, ILIAC 35 721 3 20 1st Marine War Dog Platoon, ILIAC 0 32 0 0 2d and 3d Marine War Dog Platoons, ILIAC 2 98 0 0 3d Joint Assault Signal Company, ILIAC 35 340 9 0 1st Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 1 41 0 0 Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, ILIAC 26 159 0 0 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion, ILIAC Artillery 34 631 2 16 7th 155mm Gun Battalion, ILIAC Artillery 37 664 2 12 9th Defense Battalion, ILIAC Artillery 67 1,388 4 31 14th Defense Battalion, ILIAC Artillery 71 1,488 4 25 3d Marine Division 872 16,057 139 988 1st Provisional Marine Brigade 445 9,012 46 433 1st Replacement Draft 86 1,462 60 415 Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-12 48 235 1 8 Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-15 67 333 0 0 Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21 38 322 8 19 Service Squadron 21, MAG-21 14 277 0 0 Air Warning Squadron 2, MAG-21 10 161 0 3 Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 131, MAG-21 47 328 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 216, MAG-21 46 234 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 217, MAG-21 47 229 1 7 Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-21 45 239 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 242, MAG-21 47 328 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 321, MAG-21 48 230 1 7 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-21 37 310 1 8 Area Sub-Total 2,694 42,669 384 2,610 See footnote at end of table. 772 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U SN

Off EnI Off Enl

Kwajalein Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG-15 42 351 6 21 Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-15 59 322 1 10 Marine Transport Squadron 353, MAG-15 93 413 1 8 Area Sub-Total 194 1,086 8 39

Majuro 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery 28 573 3 14 Headquarters Squadron 4, 4th MBDAW 90 635 11 20 Headquarters Squadron 13, MAG-13 31 351 7 22 Service Squadron 13, MAG-13 15 288 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231, MAG-13 51 299 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331, MAG-13 49 295 1 8 Marine Observation Squadron 155, MAG-31 44 248 1 8

Area Sub-Total 308 2,689 24 80

Makin Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245, MAG-13 51 285 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 111, MAG-31 53 347 1 8

Area Sub-Total 104 632 2 16

Roi-Namur 15th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 5 197 0 0 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery 48 1,164 4 21 Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31 34 407 8 18 Service Squadron 31, MAG-31 12 308 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-31 84 283 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-31 48 258 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 441, MAG-31 49 309 1 8 Area Sub-Total 280 2,926 15 63

Saipan 7th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 90 1,780 5 34 2d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC 1 61 0 0 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, VAC 33 771 2 14 See footnote at end of table.

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS 773

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U SN

Off Enl Off Enl

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC 584 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC 562 1st Amphibian Truck Company, VAC 174 2d Amphibian Truck Company, VAC 185 2d Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC 391 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC 54 2d Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC 54 17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 1,215 18th Antiaircaft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery 1,412 2d Marine Division 17,412 3d Replacement Draft 2,629 4th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 43 Marine Observation Squadron 2, 3d MAW 28 Marine Observation Squadron 4, 3d MAW 29 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MAG-31 249 Area Sub-Total 1,451 27,633 174 1,118 Tinian 2d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac 46 359 45 105 1st Separate Engineer Battalion, ILIAC 33 727 4 17 2d Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC 1 41 0 0 Area Sub-Total 80 1,127 49 122

Miscellaneous Aviation personnel attached to Marine divisions, amphibious corps, and JASCOs 78 227 0 0

West Coast, U.S.A. San Diego Headquarters Company, Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area 41 145 2 5 Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 56 332 3 1 Area Sub-Total 97 477 5 6

Camp Elliott Base Depot, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego 91 760 2 20 See footnote at end of table. 774 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off Enl

Camp Gillespie Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 141, MBDAG-41 48 302 1 8

Camp Pendleton Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command, SDA 172 1,847 45 256 Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA 178 2,573 9 0 Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA 170 2,162 46 866 Infantry Training Regiment (10 battalions), Marine Training Command, SDA 129 9,868 1 0 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion 26 510 0 0 5th Marine Division (less RCT 26 and RCT 27) 374 7,000 73 525 5th Joint Assault Signal Company 35 365 0 0 7th Replacement Draft 14 536 12 100 8th Replacement Draft 44 1,107 1 0 9th Replacement Draft 64 1,251 10 5 10th Replacement Draft 63 4,685 1 170 52d Defense Battalion 55 1,278 7 32 8th Field Depot (Rear Echelon) 46 770 0 0 Sound Ranging Sections (3-4-5) 3 66 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 471, MBDAG-43 49 277 1 8

Area Sub-Total 1,422 34,295 206 1,962 Corvallis Headquarters Squadron 35, MAG-35 185 857 8 30 Service Squadron 35, MAG-35 22 302 0 0 Area Sub-Total 207 1,159 8 30

Camp Kearney Marine Photographic Squadron 154, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 59 427 2 8 El Centro Headquarters Squadron 43, MBDAG-43 64 804 7 27 Service Squadron 43, MBDAG-43 8 319 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MBDAG-43 47 252 1 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 462, MBDAG-43 52 257 1 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 472, MBDAG-43 48 254 1 0

Area Sub-Total ...... 219 1,886 10 32 See footnote at end of table. FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS 775

Strength

US= U SN

Off Enl Off Enl

El Toro

Headquarters Squadron 41, MBDAG-41 42 378 7 30 Service Squadron 41, MBDAG-41 16 277 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 132, MBDAG-41 47 307 1 5 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 144, MBDAG-41 48 313 1 2 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 234, MBDAG-41 46 307 1 2 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 454, MBDAG-41 46 324 1 3 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 464, MBDAG-41 31 316 1 2 Headquarters Squadron 46, MBDAG-46 72 341 6 17 Service Squadron 46, MBDAG-46 15 324 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 474, MBDAG-46 30 348 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 481, MBDAG-46 151 328 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 482, MBDAG-46 155 350 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 484, MBDAG-46 30 364 1 8

Area Sub-Total 729 4,277 22 93

Miramar

Supply Squadron 5, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 16 299 0 0 Headquarters and Service Squadron 2, 2d AWG 12 105 0 0 Air Warning Squadron 6, 2d AWG 14 259 0 6 Air Warning Squadron 7, 2d AWG 13 251 0 6 Air Warning Squadron 8, 2d AWG 15 258 0 6 Air Warning Squadron 9, 2d AWG 16 255 0 6 Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 10, 2d AWG 14 166 0 4 Air Warning Squadron 11, 2d AWG 16 255 0 6 Air Warning Squadron 12, 2d AWG 18 261 0 6 Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 15, 2d AWG 13 167 0 4 Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 20, 2d AWG 14 167 0 4 Headquarters Squadron, Personnel Group 270 215 28 0 Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, Personnel Group 12 1,124 0 6 Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, Personnel Group 5 1,167 0 160 Marine Wing Service Squadron 3, Personnel Group 6 958 0 10 Marine Wing Service Squadron 4, Personnel Group 4 1,716 0 0 Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33 30 362 7 16 Service Squadron 33, MAG-33 11 258 7 16 Area Sub-Total 499 8,243 42 256

Oxnard

Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MBDAG-42 48 274 1 8 See footnote at end of table. 776 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off

Mojave

Headquarters Squadron 44, MBDAG-44 32 458 Service Squadron 44, MBDAG-44 10 396 Marine Fighter Squadron 124, MBDAG-44 49 246 Marine Fighter Squadron 213, MBDAG-44 49 252 Marine Fighter Squadron 451, MBDAG-44 47 243 Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MBDAG-44 48 252 Headquarters Squadron 51, MAG-51 38 309 Marine Observation Squadron 351, MAG-51 47 249 Marine Fighter Squadron 511, MAG-51 46 242 Marine Fighter Squadron 512, MAG-51 45 233 Area Sub-Total 411 2,880 24 90

Santa Barbara

Headquarters Squadron 42, MBDAG-42 478 Service Squadron 42, MBDAG-42 338 Marine Fighter Squadron 112, MBDAG-42 241 Marine Fighter Squadron 123, MBDAG-42 249 Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MBDAG-42 242 Headquarters Squadron 45, MBDAG-45 392 Service Squadron 45, MBDAG-45 248 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MBDAG-45 303 Headquarters Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44) 0 Service Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44) 0 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143, MBDAG-48 239 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233, MBDAG-48 303 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 943, MBDAG-48 223 Area Sub-Total 417 3,256 20

East Coast, U.S.A. Camp Lejeune Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command 28 811 0 0 Range Battalion, Marine Training Command 9 242 0 0 Coast Guard Detachment, Marine Training Command 0 0 39 1,409 Quartermaster Battalion, Marine Training Command 57 750 0 0 Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command 153 1,250 0 0 Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command 397 6,870 0 0 Infantry Training Regiment (7 battalions), Marine See footnote at end of table. 777

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

Training Command 157 7,402 0 11 Corps Evacuation Hospitals (I, II, III) 0 0 79 604 10th Ammunition Company 7 279 0 0 11th Ammunition Company 3 294 0 0 7th Separate Infantry Battalion 18 677 2 21 Area Sub-Total 829 18,575 120 2,045

Norfolk Marine Base Depot, FMF 20 426 0 8 Quantico Infantry Training Battalion, MCS 36 993 2 38 Field Artillery Training Battalion, MCS 22 582 0 0 Area Sub-Total 58 1,575 2 38

Bogue Air Warning Squadron 16, 1st AWG 15 260 Headquarters Squadron 93, MAG-93 25 330 Service Squadron 93, MAG-93 10 190 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 934, MAG-93 34 188 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 941, MAG-93 35 188 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 942, MAG-93 6 81 Area Sub-Total 125 1,237 8

Cherry Point Headquarters Squadron 9, 9th MAW 63 429 Marine Wing Service Squadron 9, 9th MAW 15 183 Marine Transport Squadron 352, 9th MAW 127 434 Marine Photographic Squadron 354, 9th MAW 59 449 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, 9th MAW 17 166 Headquarters and Service Squadron 1, 1st AWG 91 900 Air Warning Squadron 17, 1st AWG 11 245 Air Warning Squadron 18, 1st AWG 10 164 Headquarters Squadron 53, MAG-53 45 290 Service Squadron 53, MAG-53 7 264 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, MAG-53 29 307 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 544, MAG-53 32 279 See footnote at end of table. 778 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Strength

Units and Locations USMO USN

Off Eni Off Eni

Headquarters Squadron 62, MAG-62 686 Service Squadron 62, MAG-62 424 Marine Bombing Squadron 453, MAG-62 157 Marine Bombing Squadron 463, MAG-62 73 Marine Bombing Squadron 473, MAG-62 45 Marine Bombing Squadron 483, MAG-62 3 Marine Bombing Squadron 621, MAG-62 402 Marine Bombing Squadron 622, MAG-62 325 Marine Bombing Squadron 623, MAG-62 314 Marine Bombing Squadron 624, MAG-62 236 Headquarters Squadron 92, MAG-92 154 Marine Fighter Squadron 921, MAG-92 61 Marine Fighter Squadron 922, MAG-92 60 Marine Fighter Squadron 924, MAG-92 351 Headquarters Squadron 94, MAG-94 107 Service Squadron 94, MAG-94 43 Area Sub-Total 1,057 7,551 32

Congaree Headquarters Squadron 52, MAG-52 17 45 19 Service Squadron 52, MAG-52 13 669 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 521, MAG-52 48 158 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 522, MAG-52 45 156 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 523, MAG-52 48 161 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 524, MAG-52 50 155 8

Area Sub-Total 221 1,344 9 51

Eagle Mountain Lake Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 931, MAG-93 47 268 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 932, MAG-93 50 274 1 6 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 933, MAG-93 30 268 1 5

Area Sub-Total 127 810 3 19

Greenville Marine Fighter Squadron 913, MAG-91 42 177 1 8 779

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U N

Off Enl Off Enl

Kinston Headquarters Squadron 91, MAG-91 16 190 5 19 Service Squadron 91, MAG-91 8 169 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 911, MAG-91 44 183 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 912, MAG-91 44 180 0 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 914, MAG-91 39 145 0 0 Area Sub-Total 151 867 6 35

Newport Headquarters Squadron 34, MAG-34 26 487 6 22 Service Squadron 34, MAG-34 10 265 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 334, MAG-34 49 279 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 342, MAG-34 49 295 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 344, MAG-34 49 295 2 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 613, MAG-62 65 418 1 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 614, MAG-62 66 423 1 8 Area Sub-Total 314 2,462 12 62

New River Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 944, MAG-94 61 393 1 8 Oak Grove Air Warning Squadron 14, 1st AWG 16 248 0 6 Service Squadron 51, MAG-92 11 271 0 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 513, MAG-92 47 229 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 514, MAG-92 48 218 1 8 Area Sub-Total 122 966 2 30 Vero Beach Air Warning Squadron 13, 1st AWG 18 256 0 6

Total FMF (Ground) Overseas 8,810 163,333 1,191 7,855 Total FMF (Air) Overseas 4,477 31,696 208 1,070 Total FMF (Ground) in U .S.A 2,412 55,499 331 4,070 Total FiMF (Air) in U .S.A 4,980 39,376 208 1,031 Total FMF Overseas 13,287 195,029 1,399 8,925 Total IFMF in U .S.A 7,392 94,875 539 5,101 Total FMF 20,679 289,904 1,938 14,026 1 Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for August 1944 held in the Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps . Units en route or ordered to the indicated area are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations . APPENDIX F

Table of Organization F 100-Marine Division 5 May 1944 1

USMC USN Tot is Unit Off Enl Off Enl Off Enl Division Headquarters (66) (186) (4) (1) (70) (187) Headquarters Battalion 101 883 7 13 108 896 Headquarters Company (73) (394) (7) (9) (80) (403) Signal Company (17) (275) (17) (275) Military Police Company (6) (96) (6) (96) Reconnaissance Company (5) (118) (4) (5) (122) Tank Battalion 35 585 1 9 36 594 Headquarters & Service Company (14) (99) (1) (9) (15) (108) 3 Tank Companies (each) (7) (162) (7) (162) Service Troops 58 1,343 66 422 124 1,765 Service Battalion (29) (702) (2) (18) (31) (720) Headquarters Company (9) (48) (2) (9) (11) (57) Service & Supply Company (13) (483) (9) (13) (492) Ordnance Company (7) (171) (7) (171) Motor Transport Battalion (28) (501) (1) (9) (29) (510) Headquarters & Service Company (13) (171) (1) (9) (14) (180) 3 Transport Companies (each) (5) (110) (5) (110) Medical Battalion (1) (140) (63) (395) (64) (535) Headquarters & Service Company (1) (15) (28) (45) (29) (60) 5 Medical Companies (each) (25) (7) (70) (7) (95) Engineer Battalion 41 842 1 20 42 862 Headquarters & Service Company (23) (263) (1) (20) (24) (283) 3 Engineer Companies (each) (6) (193) (6) (193) Pioneer Battalion 38 672 3 32 41 704 Headquarters & Service Company (11) (81) (3) (32) (14) (113) 3 Pioneer Companies (each) (9) (197) (9) (197) Artillery Regiment 159 2,415 8 57 167 2,472 Headquarters & Service Battery (23) (193) (4) (9) (27) (202) 2 105mm Howitzer Battalions (each) (33) (556) (1) (12) (34) (568) Headquarters & Service Battery (15) (133) (1) (12) (16) (145) 3 Howitzer Batteries (each) (6) (141) (6) (141) 2 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions (each) .. (35) (555) (1) (12) (36) (567) Headquarters & Service Battery (14) (132) (1) (12) (15) (144) 3 Pack Howitzer Batteries (each) (7) (141) (7) (141) 3 Infantry Regiments (each) 137 2,936 11 134 148 3,070 Headquarters & Service Company (24) (218) (5) (14) (29) (232) Weapons Company (8) (195) (8) (195) 3 Infantry Battalions (each) (35) (841) (2) (40) (37) (881) Headquarters Company (14) (157) (2) (40) (16) (197) 3 Rifle Companies (each) (7) (228) (7) (228)

Division Totals 843 15,548 119 955 962 16,503

1 All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units. 780 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION F-100-MARINE DIVISION 781

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION-MARINE DIVISION

Weapons Number Transportation Number

Carbine, .30 cal ., M-1 10,953 Ambulance : Flamethrower, portable, M2-2 243 1/4-ton, 4 x 4 52 Flamethrower, mechanized, E4-5 24 1/2-ton, 4 x 4 12 Gun : Car, 5-passenger 3 37mm, M3, antitank 36 Station wagon, 4 x 4 3 75mm, motor carriage, M-3, Tractor : w/armament, radio-equipped miscellaneous 71 (TCS) 12 Trailer : Gun, Machine : 1/4-ton, cargo 135 .30 cal., M1919A4 302 1/2-ton, dump 19 .30 cal ., M1917A1 162 1-ton, cargo 155 .50 cal., M2 161 1-ton, water 74 Gun, submachine, .45 cal 49 miscellaneous 110 Howitzer : Truck 75mm pack 24 1/4-ton, 4 x 4 323 105mm 24 1/4-ton, 4 x 4, with radio 85 Launcher, rocket, antitank, M1A1 172 1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo 224 Mortar : 1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance 11 60mm 117 21/2-ton, 6 x 6, cargo 150 81mm 36 21/2-ton, 6 x 6, dump 53 Pistol, .45 cal 399 miscellaneous 68 Rifle, .30 cal., M-1 5,436 Rifle, Browning, automatic 853 Shotgun, 12 gauge 306 Tank, Army medium, with armament . 46 Vehicle, recovery, M32B2 3 APPENDIX G

Marine Task Organization and Command List'

MARINE GROUND UNITS III Amphibious Corps Troops (15Sep-140ct44) A. PELELIU (6 September-14 October 1944) CO Col Max D . Smith Expeditionary Troops 3d Base Headquarters Battalion CG MajGen Julian C . Smith (22Sep-140ct44) CofS Col Dudley S. Brown CO LtCol William 0 . Smith Col Harry E . Dunkelberger F-1 ...... 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion F-2 LtCol Edmund J . Buckley F-3 ...... Col Robert 0 . Bare (15Sep-140ct44) F-4 LtCol Jesse S . Cook, Jr . CO Maj Albert F . Reutlinger (to 21- Sep44) III Amphibious Corps Capt Arthur J . Noonan (from (15Sep-140ct)) 22Sep44 to 100ct44) CG MajGen Roy S . Geiger LtCol Maynard M. Nohrden CofS Col Merwin H. Silverthorn (from 11Oct44) C-1 LtCol Peter A . McDonald 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion C-2 ...... Col William F . Coleman (15Sep-140ct44) C-3 Col Walter A. Wachtler CO LtCol Kimber H . Boyer C-4 Col Francis B . Loomis, Jr . 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion III Amphibious Corps Headquarters (15Sep-140ct44) and Service Battalion CO LtCol Richard A . Evans (15Sept-140ct44) 6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion CO LtCol Floyd A . Stephenson (15Sep-140ct44) CO Capt John I. Fitzgerald, Jr 'Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organ- . ization titles, and periods of service were taken from the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion muster rolls of the units concerned, held in the Diary Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Depart- (6Sep-140ct44) ment, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units are listed only CO LtCol Henry R. Paige for those periods, indicated by the dates below parent unit designation, for which they are entitled to campaign par- 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ticipation credit. This information is derived from muster (15Sep-140ct44) rolls and the U . S . Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy and CO LtCol Charles B . Nerren Marine Corps Awards Manual-NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev. 1953) with changes (Washington, 1953-1958) . The muster 8th 155mm Howitzer Battalion rolls have been the final authority when there is a conflict (15Sep-140ct44) of unit entitlement within the overall campaign period as CO Maj George V . Hanna, Jr. cited by the Awards Manual. In the case of Marine air units, many of which participated in the campaigns as 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion flight or advance echelons only, the unit commander who was actually in the combat area is shown where muster (15Sep-140ct44) rolls reveal this information . In order to conserve space, CO LtCol Merlyn D . Holmes only units of battalion and squadron size, or larger, and 16th Field Depot sizable separate detachments are listed for each operation, although smaller organizations may have participated (15Sep-140ct44) also. CO LtCol Harlan C. Cooper 782

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 783

Headquarters, 1st Marine Division 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (15Sep-140ct44) CO LtCol Stephen V . Sabol CG MajGen William H . Rupertus 5th Marines ADC BGen Oliver P . Smith (15Sep-140ct44) CofS Col John T . Selden CO Col Harold D . Harris D-1 Maj William E . Benedict (to 23- ExO LtCol Lewis W. Walt Sep44) R-3 Maj Walter S . Mcllhenny (to 16- LtCol Harold 0 . Deakin (from Sep44) 24Sep44) Capt Donald A . Peppard (from LtCol John W. Scott, Jr . D-2 17Sep44) D-3 LtCol Lewis J . Fields D-4 LtCol Harvey C. Tschirgi 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Division Headquarters and Service Battalion CO LtCol Robert W . Boyd (15Sep-140ct44) 2d Battalion, 5th Marines CO Col Joseph F . Hankins (KIA 3- CO Maj Gordon D . Gayle Oct44) LtCol Austin C . Shofner (from 3d Battalion, 5th Marines 30ct44) CO LtCol Austin C . Shofner (WIA 15Sep44) 1st Engineer Battalion LtCol Lewis W. Walt (night 15- (15Sep-140ct44) 16Sep44) LtCol Levi W . Smith, Jr . CO Maj John H . Gustafson (from 16- 1st Medical Battalion Sep44) (15Sep-20ct44) 7th Marines CO Cdr Emil E. Napp, MC, USN (15Sep-140ct44 ) 1st Motor Transport Battalion CO Col Herman H . Hanneken (14Sep-20ct44) ExO LtCol Norman Hussa Maj Walter Holomon CO Capt Robert B . McBroom R-3 1st Pioneer Battalion 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (15Sep-140ct44) CO LtCol John J . Gormley CO LtCol Robert G . Ballance 2d Battalion, 7th Marines 1st Service Battalion CO LtCol Spencer S . Berger (15Sep-20ct44) 3d Battalion, 7th Marines CO Col John Kaluf CO Maj E . Hunter Hurst 1st Tank Battalion 11th Marines (15Sep-140ct44 ) CO LtCol Arthur J . Stuart (15Sep-140ct44) CO Col William H. Harrison 1st Marines ExO LtCol Edson L . Lyman (15Sep-20ct44) R-3 LtCol Leonard F . Chapman, Jr. Col Lewis B . Puller CO 1st Battalion, 11th Marines ExO LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr . CO LtCol Richard W. Wallace R-3 Maj Bernard T . Kelly 1st Battalion, 1st Marines 2d Battalion, 11th Marines CO Maj Raymond G . Davis CO LtCol Noah P . Wood, Jr. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines 3d Battalion, 11th Marines CO LtCol Russell E . Honsowetz CO LtCol Charles M . Nees 784 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

4th Battalion, 11th Marines V Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion CO LtCol Louis C . Reinberg (19Feb-16 Mar45 ) CO Capt Cyril M. Milbrath Island Command, Peleliu (1st Echelon) V Corps Troops (15Sep-140ct44) (19Feb-16Mar45 ) CO BGen Harold D . Campbell CO Col Alton A . Gladden

B. PHILIPPINES V Corps Signal Battalion (200ctober-11December 1944) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO LtCol Alfred F. Robertshaw Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps Artillery (200ct-29Nov44) V Corps Medical Battalion CG BGen Thomas E. Bourke (19Feb-16Mar45) ExO Col Bert A . Bone CO LCrd William B. Clapp, MC, USN Cof S Col Harold C . Roberts 2d Separate Engineer Battalion A-1 Capt George K. Acker (19Feb-16Mar45) A-2 Maj Leo S . Unger CO LtCol Charles 0 . Clark A-3 LtCol Floyd R. Moore A-4 LtCol Richard H . Crockett 8th Field Depot (19Feb-16Mar45) 5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion CO Col Leland S. Swindler (210ct-11Dec44) 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group LtCol James E. Mills CO (19Feb-16Mar45) 11th 155mm Gun Battalion CO Col John S . Letcher ExO LtGol Marin H . Floom (21Oct-11Dec44) G-3 Maj William D . Winters, Jr . CO LtCol Thomas S . Ivey 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion C. IWO JIMA (19February-26March 1945) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Maj Earl J. Rowse Expeditionary Troops 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CG LtGen Holland M. Smith CO LtCol Douglas E . Reeve CofS Col Dudley S . Brown G-1 Col Russell N . Jordahl V Corps Provisional LVT Group G-2 Col Edmond J . Buckley (19Feb-16Mar45) G-3 Col Kenneth H. Weir CO LtCol Harry W . G. Vadnais G-4 Col George R. Rowan 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, (19Feb-16Mar45) FMFPac CO LtCol Reed M . Fawell, Jr . (19Feb-16Mar45) 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion CO Maj James L. Jones (19Feb-16Mar45) V Amphibious Corps CO LtCol Sylvester L . Stephan (19Feb-16Mar45) 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion CG MajGen Harry Schmidt (19Feb-16Mar45) CofS BGen William W . Rogers CO Maj George L . Shead C-1 Col David A . Stafford C-2 Col Thomas R . Yancey, USA 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion C-3 Col Edward A . Craig (19Feb-16Mar45) C-4 Col William F . Brown CO Maj Victor J. Croizat MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 785

24th Replacement Draft 3d Engineer Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Maj Ralph E . Boulton CO LtCol Walter S . Campbell 3d Medical Battalion V Corps Evac Hosp No. 1 (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Cdr Anthony E . Reymont, MC, CO Capt H. G. Young, MC, USN USN 11th Amtrac Battalion 3d Motor Transport Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45 ) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO LtCol Albert J. Roose CO LtCol Ernest W. Fry, Jr. 27th Replacement Draft 3d Pioneer Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Capt Charles R . Puckett CO LtCol Edmund M . Williams 3d Service Battalion 28th Replacement Draf t (19Feb-16Mar45 ) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO LtCol Paul G. Chandler CO Maj Michael V. DiVita 3d Tank Battalion 30th Replacement Draft (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Maj Holly H. Evans CO Capt Donald J. Kendall, Jr. 3d Marines 31st Replacement Draft (19Feb-5Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Col James A. Stuart CO Capt Thomas B . Tighe ExO LtCol Newton B . Barkley R-3 Capt Paul H. Groth 34th Replacement Draft 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (19lFeb-16Mar45 ) CO LtCol Ronald R. Van Stockum CO Capt Neil A . Weathers, Jr. 2d Battalion, 3d Marines Island Commander, Iwo Jima CO LtCol Thomas R . Stokes (19Feb-16Mar45 ) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines MajGen James E . Chaney, USA CO CO LtCol Ralph L . Houser Headquarters, 3d Marine Division 9th Marines (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Col Howard N . Kenyon CG MajGen Graves B . Erskine ExO LtCol Paul W . Russell ADC Col John B . Wilson R-3 Maj Calvin W. Kunz Cof S Col Robert E . Hogaboom 1st Battalion, 9th Marines D-1 Maj Irving R . Kriendler CO LtCol Carey A . Randall (to 6- D-2 LtCol Howard J . Turton Mar45) D-3 Col Arthur H . Butler Maj William T . Glass (from 6- D-4 LtCol James D. Hittle 14Mar45) LtCol Jack F . Warner (from 14- Division Headquarters and Service Battalion Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) 2d Battalion, 9th Marines CO LtCol Jack F . Warner (to 14- 'LtCol Robert E . Cushman, Jr . Mar 45) CO LtCol Carey A . Randall (from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines 14Mar45) CO LtCol Harold C . Boehm 786 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

21st Marines Division Headquarters and Service Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Col Hartnoll J . Withers CO Col Bertrand T . Fay ExO LtCol Eustace R . Smoak 4th Engineer Battalion R-3 Capt Andrew Hedesh (19Feb-16Mar45) 1st Battalion, 21st Marines CO LtCol Nelson K. Brown CO LtCol Marlowe C. Williams (WIA 4th Medical Battalion 22Feb45) (19Feb-16Mar45) Maj Clay M. Murray (from 22- CO Cdr Reuben L . Sharp, MC, USN Feb45, WiA 22Feb45) Maj Robert H . Houser (from 22- 4th Motor Transport Battalion Feb45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO LtCol Ralph L. Schiesswohl 2d Battalion, 21st Marines 4th Pioneer Battalion CO LtCol Lowell E . English (WIA (19Feb-16Mar45) 2Mar45) . Ruby Maj George A. Percy (from 2- CO LtCol Richard G Mar45) 4th Service Battalion CO LtCol John E. Fondahl 3d Battalion, 21st Marines 4th Tank Battalion CO LtCol Wendell H . Duplantis CO LtCol Richard K . Schmidt 12th Marines 23d Marines (19Feb-16Mar45 ) (19Feb-16Mar45) LtCol Raymond F . Crist, Jr. CO CO Col Walter W . Wensinger ExO LtCol Bernard H . Kirk ExO LtCol Edward J . Dillon R-3 LtCol Thomas R . Belzer R-3 Maj Henry S . Campbell 1st Battalion, 12th Marines 1st Battalion, 23d Marines CO Maj George B . Thomas CO LtCol Ralph Haas (KIA 20Feb- 45) 2d Battalion, 12th Marines LtCol Louis B. Blissard (from CO LtCol William T . Fairbourn 20Feb45) 2d Battalion, 23d Marines 3d Battalion, 12th Marines CO Maj Robert H . Davidson (WIA CO LtCol Alpha L . Bowser, Jr . 7Mar45) LtCol Edward J . Dillon (from 4th Battalion, 12th Marines 7-11Mar45) CO Maj Joe B. Wallen Maj Robert H . Davidson (from 11Mar45) Headquarters, 4th Marine Division 3d Battalion, 23d Marines (19Feb-16Mar45 ) Maj James S. Scales CG MajGen Clifton B. Cates CO ADC BGen Franklin A. Hart 24th Marines Cof S Col Merton J. Batchelder (19Feb-16Mar45) D-1 Col Orin H . Wheeler CO Col Walter I . Jordan ExO LtCol Austin R. Brunelli (to 8- D-2 LtCol Gooderham L. McCormick Mar45) D-3 Col Edwin A . Pollock None shown (8-16Mar 45) D-4 Col Matthew C . Horner R-3 Maj Webb D. Sawyer MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 787

1st Battalion, 24th Marines 3d Battalion, 14th Marines CO Maj Paul S . Treitel (to 8Mar45) CO LtCol Robert E. MacFarlane LtCol Austin R . Brunelli (from (WIA 19Feb45) 8Mar45) Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 19- 23Feb45) 2d Battalion, 24th Marines LtCol Carl A . Youngdale (from CO LtCol Richard Rothwell 23Feb-lOMar 45) Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 10- 3d Battalion, 24th Marines Mar45) CO LtCol Alexander A . Vandegrift, Jr. (WIA 23Feb45) 4th Battalion, 14th Marines Maj Doyle A . Stout (from 23- CO LtCol Carl A . Youngdale (to 23- Feb45 ) -Feb45 ) Maj Roland J . Spritzen (from 23- 25th Marines Feb-10Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) LtCol Carl A . Youngdale (from CO Col John R . Lanigan 10Mar45) ExO LtCol Clarence J . O'Donnell R-3 Maj John H. Jones Headquarters, 5th Marine Division (19Feb-16Mar45) 1st Battalion, 25th Marines MajGen Keller E . Rockey CO LtCol Hollis U . Mustain (KIA BGen Leo D . Hermle 21Feb45) Col Ray A. Robinson Maj Fenton J . Mee (from 21Feb- Col John W . Beckett 45) LtCol George A . Roll Col James F . Shaw, Jr. 2d Battalion, 25th Marines Col Earl S . Piper CO LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr. (WIA 20Feb45) Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division LtCol James Taul (from 20Feb- (19Feb-16Mar45) 45) CO Maj John Ayrault, Jr . 3d Battalion, 25th Marines CO LtCol Justice M . Chambers (WIA 5th Engineer Battalion 22Feb45) (19Feb-16Mar45) Capt James C . Headley (from 22- CO LtCol Clifford H . Shuey Feb45) 5th Medical Battalion 14th Marines (19Feb-16Mar45) (19Feb-16Mar45) CO LCdr William W . Ayres, M C, CO Col Louis G . DeHaven USN ExO LtCol Randall M . Victory R-3 Maj Frederick J . Karch 5th Motor Transport Battalion (19Feb-16Mar45 ) 1st Battalion, 14th Marines CO Maj Arthur F . Torgler, Jr . CO Maj John B. Edgar, Jr. 5th Pioneer Battalion 2d Battalion, 14th Marines (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Maj Clifford B . Drake CO Maj Robert S . Riddell 788 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

5th Service Battalion Maj William H. Tumbelston (19Feb-16Mar45) (from 9Mar45, WIA 14Mar45) CO Maj Francis P. Daly (KIA 22- Maj William H. Kennedy, Jr . Feb45 (from 14Mar45) None shown (from 22-27Feb45) 2d Battalion, 27th Marines Maj Gardelle Lewis (from 27Feb- Maj John W 45) CO . Antonelli (WIA 9- Mar45) 5th Tank Battalion Maj Gerald F. Russell (from 9- (19Feb-16Mar45) Mar45) CO LtCol William R . Collins 3d Battalion, 27th Marines 26th Marines CO LtCol Donn J . Robertson (19Feb-16Mar45) CO Col Chester B . Graham 28th Marines ExO Col Lester S . Hamel (19Feb-16Mar45) R-3 LtCol William K . Davenport, Jr. CO Col Harry B . Liversedge ExO LtCol Robert H. Williams 1st Battalion, 26th Marines R-3 Maj Oscar F . Peatross (to 14- CO LtCol Daniel C . Pollock (WIA Mar45) 19Mar45) LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr . Maj Albert V. K. Gary (from 19- (from 15Mar45) Mar45) 1st Battalion, 28th Marines 2d Battalion, 26th Marines CO LtCol Jackson B . Butterfield CO LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (WIA 23Feb45) 2d Battalion, 28th Marines Maj Amedeo Rea (from 23Feb45) CO LtCol Chandler W . Johnson (KIA 3d Battalion, 26th Marines 2Mar45) Maj Thomas B. Pearce, Jr . (from CO LtCol Tom M . Trotti (KIA 22- 2Mar45 ) Feb45) Capt Richard M . Cook (22Feb45 3d Battalion, 28th Marines only) CO LtCol Charles E . Shepard, Jr. (to Maj Richard Fagan (from 23- 14Mar45 ) Feb45) Maj Tolson A . Smoak (from 14- 27th Marines Mar 45 ) (19Feb-16Mar45) 13th Marines CO Col Thomas A . Wornham (19Feb-16Mar45 ) ExO Col Louis C . Plain (WIA 19Feb- CO Col James D . Waller 45) ExO LtCol Kenyth A . Damke LtCol James P. Berkeley (from R-3 LtCol Jack Tabor 15Mar45) 1st Battalion, 13th Marines R-3 LtCol Justin G. Duryea (to 5Mar- 45) CO LtCol John S. Oldfield Capt Franklin L. Smith (from 2d Battalion, 13th Marines 5Mar45) CO Maj Carl W. Hjerpe 1st Battalion, 27th Marines 3d Battalion, 13th Marines

CO LtCol John A . Butler (KIA 5- CO LtCol Henry T. Waller Mar45) LtCol Justin G . Duryea (from 5- 4th Battalion, 13th Marines Mar45, WIA 9Mar45) CO Maj James F. Coady MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 789

MARINE AIR UNITS W-2 Capt Charles J . Greene, Jr. (to Headquarters Squadron Detachment, 100ct44) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing" . . Capt Thomas C. Andrews (from (C-10Mar-4Jul45)' 110ct44 ) CO, HQ W-3 Col Lawrence T . Burke (to 2 Feb- Sqn-1 .... Capt Robert W. Baile 44) Advance Echelon, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing Col Carson A . Roberts (from 3- (B-24 Sep-140ct44) Feb-12Apr44) CG MajGen James T . Moore Col Lawrence T. Burke (from 13- AWC BGen Harold D . Campbell Apr-16Jun44) Cof S Col John Wehle LtCol Lee C . Merrell, Jr . (from W-1 Maj William K . Lations 16Jun-15Sep44) W-2 (None shown) Col Calvin R. Freeman (from 16- W-3 Col Ronald D . Salmon Sep44-1Feb45) W-4 LtCol Walter T. Brownell Maj Elmer G . Glidden, Jr. (from CO, Hq 2Feb-14 Mar45) Sqn--2 .... Maj Charles C. Campbell LtCol Martin A . Severson (from 15Mar45) 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing (Redesignated 4th Marine Aircraft Wing W-4 ...... Maj Melville M . Nenefee (to 30- Sep44) effective 10Nov44) (A-25 Dec43-26Mar45 ) Maj Granville Mitchell (from 1- Oct44 ) CG BGen Lewie G . Merritt (to 15- May44) CO, Hq- Sqn-4 Maj Melchior B BGen Thomas J . Cushman (from . Trelfall (to 15- Oct44 ) 15May-20Aug44) MajGen Louis E . Woods (from Maj Charles C . Boyer (from 16- Oct-14Dec44) 21Aug44) LtCol Alfred C . Cramp (from 15- AWC (None shown to 20Aug44) Dec44-24Jan45) BGen Thomas J . Cushman (from 2dLt Robert J. Brown, Jr . (from 21Aug-310ct44 ) 25Jan-3Feb45) (None shown from 1Nov44) Maj George F . Webster (from 4- CofS Col Frank H . Lamson-Scribner W-1 Maj Maurice L . McDermond (to Feb45) 15Mar44) Marine Aircraft Group 11 Maj Lloyd E . Pike (from 16 Mar- Advance Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44) 5Sep44) Rear Echelon (B-25Sep-140ct44) Col Lawrence T . Burke (from 6- CO Col Caleb T . Bailey Sep-17Nov44 ) ExO Col John S . Holmberg LtCol Corey C . Brayton (from 18- GruOpsO . ... LtCol Jeslyn R. Bailey Nov44) 3 Under each unit listed below there will appear a letter CO, Hq- designation for each major area in which the unit oper- Sgn-11 .. Capt Cornelius Cole II ated, and dates of major involvement . Following are the CO, campaigns and dates of entitlements, though individual SMS-11 .. Maj Leslie T . Bryan, Jr . units may have continued operations beyond the cutoff dates, particularly during the final months of the war . A . Marshalls-Marianas-Bypassed Marine Aircraft Group 12 Islands 25Dec43-26Mar45 Advance Echelon (C-3Dec44-4July45) B. Peleliu 6Sep-140ct44 Rear Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45) C . Philippines 100ct44-20Jul45 CO Col William A. Willis (to 26Feb- D . Iwo Jima 15Feb-16Mar45 3 Headquarters, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing did not move 45) to the Philippines until August 1945, shortly before the Col Verne J . McCaul (from 27- end of World War II . Feb45) 790 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ExO LtCol John L. Winston Marine Aircraft Group 1 .4 GruOpsO .... LtCol Frederick E . Leek Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-15May45) CO, Hq- Rear Echelon (C-23Feb-28May45) Sqn-12 .. Capt Francis L . O'Melia CO Col Zebulon C . Hopkins (to 17- CO, May-45) SMS-12 .. Capt William B . Freeman Col Edward A . Montgomery (from Marine Aircraft Group 13 1-8May45 ) (A-31Jan44-26Mar45) ExO LtCol Curtis W. Smith, Jr. CO Col Lawrence Norman (to 16Dec- GruOpsO .... Maj William C. Humberd 44) CO, Hq- LtCol Chauncey V . Burnett (from Sqn-14 .. Capt Robert M . Crooks 17Dec44) CO, ExO Col Athur F. Binney (to 15Jul- SMS-14 .. Capt Droel H . Looney 44) Marine Aircraft Group 15 LtCol Avery R. Kier (from 16- (A-lApr44-25 Mar45 ) Jul-4Sep44) CO LtCol Ben Z . Redfield ('to 31May- LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. from 44) 5Sep-80ct44) Col Thomas J. McQuade (from 1- LtCol Chauncey V . Burnett (from Jun-30Sep44) 90ct-16Dec44 ) LtCoI Ben Z . Redfield (from 10- LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr . (from Oct44) 17Dec44-3Feb45) ExO Maj Neil R . Maclntyre (to 31May- LtCol Edward J . Moore (from 4- 44) Feb-11Mar45) LtCol Ben Z . Redfield (from 1Jun- LtCol John V. Kipp (from 12- 30Sep44) Mar45) LtCol George D . Omer (from 1- GruOpsO .... LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (to 9- 310ct44) May44) LtCol Stanley W. Trachta (from LtCol Avery R . Kier (from 10 1Nov44-28Feb45) May-15Jul44) LtCoI Edward F . Knight (from LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr . (from 1Mar45) 16Jul-4Sep44) GruOpsO .... Maj Ridgway Baker (to 1Oct44) LtCol Paul R . Byrum, Jr . (from Maj Clifford R. Banks, Jr. (from 5Sep-80ct44) 1-3,lOct44) LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from LtCol Edward F. Knight (from 1- 90ct-16Dec44 ) Nov44-21Jan45) Maj James C . Otis (from 17Dec- Maj Charles W . Sommers, Jr . 44-10Mar45) (from 22Jan-5Mar45) LtCol Edward J . Moore (from 11- LtCol Desmond E . Canavan (from Mar45 ) 6Mar45) CO, Hq- CO,Hq- Sgn-13 Maj Harlan Rogers (to 22Apr44) Sqn-15 Capt Louis F . Ferguson (to 15- Maj Stanley W . Burke (from 23- Oct44) Apr-3Dec44) Maj Melchior B . Trelfall (from 16- Capt Clement F. Hahn, Jr . (from Oct44-6Mar45 ) 4Dec44) Maj Peter Ficker (from 7Mar45) CO, CO, SMS-13 .. Maj David Ahee (to 9Jun44) SMS-15 .. Maj Thomas H. Ray (to 8Sep44) LtCol Corey C . Brayton, Jr. (from 1st Lt Thomas F. Wade, Acting 10Jun-7Nov44 ) (from 9Sep-5Nov44) Maj Joseph A . Gray (from 8 Nov- Maj Thomas H . Ray (from 6Nov- 44) 44)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 791

Marine Aircraft Group 21 CO, Hq- (A-27Jul44-26Mar45) Sqn-22 .. 1stLt John W . Hackner, Jr . (to 20- Co Col Peter P . Schrider (to 6Sep44) Nov44) Col Edward B . Carney (from 7- Maj Alfred C. Cramp (from 21- Sep44) Nov-18Dec44) ExO LtCol James A . Booth, Jr. (to 2- Capt Lindsay K . Dickey (from 19- Oct44) Dec44) (None shown 3Oct-28Nov44) CO, LtCol George D . Omer (from 29- SMS-22 .. Capt John A. Hood (to 15Aug44) Nov44-7Jan45) Capt Arthur Blakeney (from 16- LtCol Wilfred J. Huffman (from Aug44-25Jan45) 8Jan45) Maj Bruce Prosser (from 26Jan- GruOps0 .... LtCol Robert W. Clark (to 3Sep- 45) 44) LtCol James A . Embrey, Jr. (from Marine Aircraft Group 24 4Sep44-6Mar45) LtCol John S. Carter (from 7Mar- Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-8Apr45) 45) Rear Echelon (C-22Jan-8Apr45) CO, Hq- Sqn-21 .. Maj Robert F'. Higley (C-22Jan-4Jul45) CO, CO LtCol Lyle H . Meyer (to 31May- SMS-21 .. Maj Charlton B. Ivey (to 22Aug- 45) 44) Col Warren E . Sweetser, Jr. (from Capt Albert I . Haas (from 23Aug- 1Jun45) 44-3OJan45) ExO LtCol John H . Earle, Jr . LtCol George E . Congdon (from GruOpsO .... LtCol Keith B . McCutcheon 31Jan45) CO, Hq- Marine Aircraft Group 22 Sqn-24 .. Capt J. Devereaux Wrather, Jr . (A-19Feb44-26Mar45) CO, CO Col James M. Daly (to 90ct44) SMS-24 .. Capt Horace C . Baum, Jr . (to 21- Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. (from Jan45) 10Oct44) Maj William K . Snyder (from 22- ExO LtCol Richard D . Hughes (to 14- Jan45) Aug44) (None shown from 15-19Aug44) Col Edward B . Carney (from 20- Marine Aircraft Group 25 Aug-17Sep44) (C--300ct44-lApr45) LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr. (from 18Sep44-7Jan45) CO Col Allen C. Koonce (to 13Feb45) LtCol Elmer A. Wrenn (from 8- Col Harold C . Major (from 14Feb- Jan45) 45) GruOpsO .... LtCol Julian F . Walters (to 24Jul- ExO LtCol John P . Coursey (to 13Nov- 44) 44) LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 25- LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from Jul-3Aug44) 25Nov44-SFeb45) LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr . (from Col Warren E . Sweetser, Jr.. (from 4Aug-17Sep44) 9Feb45) LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 18- GruOpsO .... LtCol Theodore W. Sanford, Jr. Sep-9Nov44) (to 4Mar45) Maj Thomas C . Colt, Jr. (from LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from 1ONov44) 5Mar45)

792 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

CO, Hq- Marine Aircraft Group 32 Sqn-25 Capt LeRoy M . James (to 210ct- Group Echelon (C-27Jan-22Feb45) 44) Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-22Feb45) Maj Theodore E . Beal (from 22- Advance Echelon (C-10Mar-4Jul45) Oct-9Nov44) Rear Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45) Maj Charles J . Prall (from 10- CO Col Clayton C . Jerome Nov44) ExO LtCol John L. Smith CO, GruOpsO .... LtCol Wallace T . Scott SMS-25 .. LtCol Hillard T . Shepard (to 14- Nov44) CO, Hq- Sqn-32 .. Capt Harold L . Maryott (to 17- LtCol Albert S. Munsch (from 15- Mar45) Nov44) 1stLt Robert W. Mazur (from 18- Marine Aircraft Group 31 Mar45) (A-U644-26Mar45) CO, Col Calvin R . Freeman (to 12Sep- CO SMS-32 .. Maj Jack D. Kane 44) LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (from 13- Air Warning Squadron 1 Sep-13Dec44 ) (A-20Feb44-26Mar45) LtCol Martin A . Severson (from 13Dec44-5Mar45) CO Capt William D . Felder (to 20- Dec44) Col John C . Munn (from 6Mar45) Capt Edward R . Stainback (from ExO Col Edward B . Carney (to 16Aug- 21Dec44) 44) LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (from 17- Aug-13Dec44) Advance Echelon, Marine Observation Squadron 1 LtCol Richard D . Hughes (from 13Dec44-15Jan45) (D-19Feb-8Mar45 ) LtCol Gordon E . Hendricks (from CO Lt Anthony E . Barrett, Jr . 16Jan45) GruOpsO .... LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (to 16 Aug- Air Warning Squadron 3 44) (C-17Apr-4Jul45) LtCol Richard D . Hughes (from CO ...... Capt Harold W. Swope (to 1Jul45) 17Aug-12Sep44) Capt Freeman R . Cass (from 2- LtCol Kenneth D . Kerby (from 13- Ju145 ) 30Sep44) LtCoI Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (from Advance Echelon, Marine Observation 1Oct-21Dec44) Squadron 3 LtCol Kirk Armistead (from 22- (B-15Sep-140ct44) Dec44) CO, Hq- CO Capt Wallace J. Slappey, Jr . Sgn-31 .. Capt Warren S . Adams II (to 9- Apr44) Air Warning Squadron 4 Capt James C . Woodhull, Jr. (C-lOMar-4Jul45 ) (from 1OApr-31Dec44) CO Capt Charles T. Porter Capt William L. Thompson (from lJan--4Feb45) Marine Observation Squadron 4 Maj Leon A. Danco (from 5Feb45) CO, (D-19Feb-16Mar45 ) SMS-31 .. Capt Neil A. Vestal (to 14Mar44) CO 1stLt Thomas Rozga Capt John Zouck (from 15Mar44- 18Feb45) Marine Observation Squadron 5 Maj Archibald M. Smith, Jr. (from (D-19Feb-16Mar45) 19Feb45) CO 1stLt Roy G. Miller MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 793

Marine Fighter Squadron 111 Marine Fighter Squadron 124 (A-7Mar44-26Mar45 ) (USS Essex) CO Maj J. Frank Cole (to 6Apr44) (C-3-22Jan45 ) Maj William E. Clasen (7Apr- (D-15Feb-4Mar45) 270ct44) CO ...... Maj William A . Millington Maj William T . Herring (280ct44- 1'Mar45) Maj Robert D . Kelly (from 2Mar- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133 45) (C-22Jan-4Jul45 ) CO Maj Lee A . Christoffersen (to 8- Marine Fighter Squadron 112 Mar45) (USS Bennington) Maj Floyd Cummings (from 9- (D-15Feb-4Mar45) Mar45 ) CO Maj Herman Hansen, Jr . Marine Fighter Squadron 113 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134 (A-15Jan44-26Mar45) Ground Echelon (B-30Sep-140ct44) CO Capt Loren D. Everton (to 7Sep- Flight Echelon (B-6-140ct44) 44) CO Maj Russell R. Riley Maj Charles Kimak (from 8Sep- 18Dec44) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142 Maj Philip R. White (from 19Dec- Ground . Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45) 44-20Feb45) Flight Echelon (C-27Jan-4Jul45) Maj Hensley Williams (from 21- CO Capt Hoyle R . Barr (to 8Jun45) Feb45) Maj James L. Fritsche (from 9- Marine Fighter Squadron 114 Jun45) Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44) Flight Echelon (B-26Sep-140ct44) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151 CO Capt Robert F. Stout (A-29Feb44-26Mar45) CO LtCol Gordon H. Knott (to 300ct- Marine Fighter Squadron 115 44) (C-17Dec44-4Jul45 ) Maj Randolph C . Berkeley, Jr . CO Maj John H . King, Jr. (to 29May- (from 310ct-4Dec44) 45) Maj Bruce Prosser (from 5Dec44- Maj John S. Payne (from 30May- 25Jan45) 45) Maj Robert J . Shelley, Jr. (from Marine Fighter Squadron 121 25Jan45) Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44) CO Maj Walter J . Meyer Marine Observation Squadron 155 (redesignated MarineFighter Squadron 155, Marine Fighter Squadron 122 effective 31Jan45) Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44) (A-1Nov44-26Mar45) Flight Echelon (B-1-140ct44) CO Capt John P . Haines, Jr . (to 13- CO Maj Joseph H. Reinburg Jan45) Advance Echelon Marine Fighter Squadron 123 Maj John E . Reynolds (from 14- (USS Bennington) Jan-14Feb45) (D-15Feb-4Mar45 ) Maj Wayne M. Cargill (from 15- Feb45) CO Maj Everett V . Alward (to 25- Feb45) Maj Thomas E . Mobley (from 25- Marine Fighter Squadron 211 Feb45) (C-5Dec44-4Jul45) 794 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

CO Maj Stanislaus J . Witomski (to Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 223 30Jan45) (C-19Jan-15May45) Maj Philip B . May (from 31Jan- CO Maj Robert F . Flaherty (to 24Mar- 20Mar45 ) 45) Maj Angus F. Davis (from 21Mar- Maj Robert W. Teller (from 25- 45) Mar-16Apr45) Marine Fighter Squadron 212 Maj Howard E. King (from 17- (C-19Jan-14May45 ) Apr45 ) CO Maj Quinton R . Johns (to 27Apr- Marine Fighter Squadron 224 45) Maj John P . McMahon (from 28- (A-1Jan44-26Mar45) Apr45 ) CO Maj Darrell D . Irwin (to 24Aug- 44) Marine Fighter Squadron 213 Maj Howard A. York (from 24- (USS Essex) Aug-31Dec44) (C-3-22Jan45) Maj James W . Poindexter (from (D-15Feb-4Mar45) 31Dec44) CO Maj Donald P. Frame (to 28Jan- 45) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231 Maj Louis R . Smunk (from 29Jan- (A-4F644-lAug45 ) 4Feb45) CO Maj Elmer G . Glidden, Jr . (to 4- Maj David E . Marshall (from 5- Sep44) Feb45) Maj William E . Abblitt (from 5- Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Sep44-3Feb45) Squadron 216 Maj Joseph W . White, Jr . (from (USS Wasp) 3Feb45) (D-15Feb-4Mar45 ) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 233 Maj George E CO . Dooley (C-26Jun-6Ju145 ) Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter CO Capt Edmund W. Berry Squadron 217 (USS Wasp) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236 (D-15Feb-4Mar45) Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-4Jul45) CO Maj Jack R . Amende, Jr. (to 16- Rear Echelon (C-28Jan-4Jul45) Feb45 ) CO Maj Fred J . Frazer Maj George E . Buck (from 17Feb- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 24.1 45) Advance Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45) Marine Fighter Squadron 218 Rear Echelon (C-25Jan-4Jul45) (C-10Mar-4Jul45) CO Maj Benjamin B . Manchester, III CO Maj John M . Massey (to 19Feb45) Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Maj Jack L. Brushert (from 20- Squadron 221 Feb45) (USS Bunker Hill) Advance Echelon, Marine Torpedo-Bomber (D-15Feb-4Mar45 ) Squadron 242 CO Maj Edwin S. Roberts, Jr . (C-8-16Mar45 ) CO Maj William W Marine Fighter Squadron 222 . Dean (C-11Jan-14May45 ) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243 CO Maj Roy T . Spurlock (to 27Apr45) Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45) Maj Harold A . Harwood (from Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-0u145) 28Apr45 ) CO Maj Joseph W . Kean, Jr. MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 795

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244 CO Maj Paul R . Byrum, Jr . to 9May- Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45) 44) Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-4Jul45) Maj James C. Otis (from 10May- CO Maj Vance H. Hudgins 15Dec44) Maj John H . McEniry (16Dec44- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245 2Feb45) (A-1Jun44-15Aug45 ) Maj Winston E . Jewson (from 3- CO Maj Julian F. Acers (to 23Sep44) Feb45) Maj Robert F . Halladay (from 24- Sep44-30Jun45) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341 Maj John E. Bell (from 1Jul45) Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45) Flight Echelon (C-28Jan-4Jul45) Marine Fighter Squadron 251 CO Maj Christopher F. Irwin (to 3- (C-2Jan-12May45) May45) CO Maj William C . Humberd (to 9- Maj Robert J . Bear (from 4May- Feb45) 45) Maj William L. Bacheler (from lOFeb-14Apr45) Marine Transport Squadron 353 Maj Thomas W. Furlow (from 15- (B-6-140 ct44) Apr45) (D-8-16Mar45) Marine Transport Squadron 252 CO Maj John R. Walcott (D-3-9Mar45 ) CO LtCol Russell A. Bowen Marine Fighter Squadron 441 (A-1Jan44-6Apr45) Marine Transport Squadron 253 CO Maj James B . Moore (to 4Apr44) (D-3-16Mar45) Maj Grant W. Metzger (from 5- CO LtCol John V . Kipp (to 9Mar45) Apr44-20Jan45) Maj Jack F . McCollum (from 10- Maj Robert 0 . White (from 21- Mar45) Jan45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 311 Marine Fighter Squadron 422 (A-15May44-20Jan45) (A-24Jan44-25Apr45) CO Maj Harry B . Hooper, Jr . (to 23- CO Maj John S . MacLaughlin, Jr. Oct44) MIA 24Jan44) Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 24- Maj Edwin C . Fry (from 25Jan- Oct44) 1Feb44) Maj Elmer A . Wrenn (from 2Feb- Marine Fighter Squadron 313 31Dec44) Ground Echelon (C-3Dec44-1Jun45) Maj Elkin S . Dew (from 1Jan45) Flight Echelon (C-18Dec44-1Jun45) CO Maj Joe J . McGlothin, Jr. (to 26- Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Apr45) Squadron 451 Capt Jay E. McDonald (from 27- (USS Bunker Hill) 29Apr45 ) (D-15Feb-4Mar45) 1stLt John M . Lomac (from 30- CO Maj Henry A. Ellis, Jr. Apr45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 511 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331 (USS Block Island) Flight Echelon (A-25Feb44-lAug45) (C-26Jun-6Jul45) Ground Echelon (A-2Mar44-lAug45) CO Capt James L . Secrest 796 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Marine Fighter Squadron 512 CO LtCol Peter D . Lambrecht (to 20- (USS Gilbert Islands) Jun45) (C-26Jun-6Ju145) Maj Norman L . Mitchell (from CO Maj Blaine H . Baesler 21Jun-7Jul45) Maj Reynolds A . Moody (from 8Jul45) Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532 (A-27Feb-230ct44 ) Marine Bombing Squadron 611 CO Maj Everett H. Vaughan (to 23- Ground Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45) Sep44) Flight Echelon (C-30Mar-4Jul45) Capt Warren S . Adams II (from CO LtCol George A . Sarles (KIA 30- 24Sep44) May45) Maj Robert R . Davis (from 1-19- Marine Night Fighter Squadron 53.4 Jun45) (A-4Aug44-15Aug45 ) Maj David Horne (from 20Jun45) CO Maj Ross S . Mickey (to 23May45) Marine Bombing Squadron 612 Maj James B. Maguire, Jr . (from (D-15 Feb-16Mar45 ) 24May-15Jun45) CO Maj Lawrence F . Fox Maj Clair C. Chamberlain (from 21Jun45) Marine Bombing Squadron 613 (A-23 Dec44-26Mar45 ) CO Maj George W. Nevils Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541 Ground Echelon (A-15Sep44-28Aug45) Marine Transport Squadron 952 Flight Echelon (A-24Sep-3Dec44) (B-1-140ct44 ) Flight Echelon (C-4Dec44-lOJan45) (D-1-16 Mar45 ) Flight Echelon (A-11Jan-28Aug45) CO Maj Malcolm S . Mackay APPENDIX H

Marine Casualties'

KIA DOW WIA MIAPD TO AL

Location and Date Offi- En- Offi- En- Offi- En- Offi- En- Offi- En- cer listed cer listed cer listed cer listed cer listed

Marines

Peleliu 66 984 18 232 301 5,149 0 36 385 6,401 (6Sep-140ct44)

Iwo Jima 215 4,339 60 1,271 826 16,446 3 43 1,104 22,099 (19Feb-26Mar45)

Aviation' 66 49 3 6 91 212 44 32 204 299

Sea-duty 4 61 0 9 8 142 0 63 12 275

Total Marines 351 5,433 81 1,518 1,226 21,949 47 174 1,705 29,074

Naval Medical Personnel Organic to Marine Units`

Peleliu 1 49 0 11 11 238 0 0 12 298

Iwo Jima 4 183 0 22 19 622 0 0 23 827

Marine Aviation` 0 2 0 0 2 10 0 0 4 10

Total Navy 5 234 0 33 32 870 0 0 39 1,135

Grand Total 356 667 0 1,551 1,258 22,817 47 174 1,744 30,209

1 These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, Personnel Account- ing Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC . Figures for the Peleliu Operation were certified and re- leased on 1 June 1960 ; those for Iwo Jima in August 1952. Naval casualties were taken from NavMed P-5021 . The History of the Medical Department of the Navy in World War 11 (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1953) . The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows : KIA, Killed in Action ; DOW, Died of Wounds ; WIA, Wounded in Action ; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed Dead . Because of the casualty reporting method used during World War II, a substantial number of DOW figures are also included in the WIA column . 2Includes Ngesebus. 3 Includes bypassed Marshalls, Carolines, Palau, Philippines, and Volcano Bonin Islands, overall period covering February 1944 - June 1945 . A See Footnote (1) above . 6 Time frame identical to (3) above .

797 APPENDIX I

Unit Commendations

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

consisting of

FIRST Marine Division ; First Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF ; U.S. Navy Flame Thrower Unit Attached ; Sixth Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMF ; Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional), FMF ; Detachment Eighth Am- phibian Tractor Battalion, FMF ; 454th Amphibian Truck Company, U .S. Army ; 456th Amphibian Truck Company, U.S. Army ; Fourth Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF ; Fifth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF ; Sixth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at Peleliu and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944 . Landing over a treacherous coral reef against hostile mortar and artillery fire, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, seized a narrow, heavily mined beachhead and advanced foot by foot in the face of relentless enfilade fire through rain-forests and mangrove swamps toward the air strip, the key to the enemy defenses of the southern Palaus . Opposed all the way by thoroughly disciplined, veteran Japanese troops heavily entrenched in caves and in reinforced concrete pillboxes which honeycombed the high ground throughout the island, the officers and men of the Division fought with undiminished spirit and courage despite heavy losses, exhausting heat and difficult terrain, seizing and holding a highly strategic air and land base for future operations in the Western Pacific . By their individual acts of heroism, their aggressiveness and their fortitude, the men of the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

For the President, JOHN L. SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Navy

798

UNIT COMMENDATIONS 799

EXTRACT

GENERAL ORDERS) WAR DEPARTMENT No . 22 ) Washington, D . C ., 14 February 1947 Section BATTLE HONORS - Citation of Unit XV XV -BATTLE HONORS .

The Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541 is cited for extraordinary performance of duty in action against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 3 to 15 Decem- ber 1944 . During a critical period in the fight for the control of the Philippine Islands, the pilots and ground crews of this unit signally distinguished themselves by the in- trepidity and unyielding determination with which they overcame exceptionally adverse weather conditions and operational difficulties engendered by lack of ground facilities and incomplete radar directional coverage . Their superb airmanship and daring re- sourcefulness displayed in outstanding night patrol and interception work, which fore- stalled destruction of airfield facilities, and in the completeness of cover provided for numerous vital convoys and Patrol Torpedo boat patrols, effectively thwarted enemy attempts to prevent consolidation and further expansion of the foothold gained by United States forces in the Philippines . Achieving a record unparalleled at that time, the unit, composed of but 15 aircraft and 22 pilots, flew 136 sorties totaling 298 .6 combat hours, destroyed 18 enemy aircraft in aerial combat without unit loss or damage, and on numerous occasions pitted consummate skill and accuracy against overwhelming numerically superior enemy strength . The extraordinary performance of the air and ground personnel of the Marine Fighter Squadron 541 in overcoming the greatest of aerial hazards and maintenance difficulties reflects the highest credit on themselves and the military service of the United States .

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR :

OFFICIAL : DWIGHT D . EISENHOWER, Chief of Staff EDWARD F . WITSELL Major General The Adjutant General 800 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The President of the Unites States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE for service as set forth in the following

CITATION : "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Philip- pine Islands from December 3, 1944, to March 9, 1945 . Operating from the captured airfield at Tacloban, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE employed Corsairs as bombing planes to strike destructive blows at escorted enemy convoys and to prevent the Jap- anese from reinforcing their beleagured garrisons by landing troops and supplies on western Leyte . Undeterred by intense aerial opposition and accurate antiaircraft fire, these pilots provided effective cover for ground troops, shore installations and Fleet units and, on several occasions, when ground troops were held up by heavy enemy fire, bombed and strafed Japanese positions, thereby enabling our land forces to advance unopposed . As hostile resistance lessened on Leyte, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE expanded its sphere of operations to strike at enemy garrisons on the Visayan Islands and southern Luzon and to support the Lingayen beachheads, neutralizing the enemy's lines of communication, his harbors, airfields and escape routes, and ranging far from base to provide aerial cover for ships of the SEVENTH Fleet and merchant-ship convoys operating in the area . During February and the early part of March, this courageous Group gave direct support to Guerrilla units fighting on Cebu Island and aided in their rapid advance and the ultimate neutralization of the island . Well sup- ported by skilled and dependable ground personnel, the gallant pilots of Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE caused the Japanese severe losses in airplanes, installations and surface craft, contributing to the achievement of air superiority so essential to the success of the campaign and thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President, FRANCIS P . MATTHEWS, Secretary of the Navy UNIT COMMENDATIONS 801

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

ASSAULT TROOPS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, REINFORCED UNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE for service as set forth in the following

CITATION "For extraordinary heroism in action during the seizure of enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945 . Landing against resistance which rapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beaches with artillery, rocket and mortar fire, the Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps inched ahead through shifting black volcanic sands, over heavily mined terrain, toward a garrison of jagged cliffs barricaded by an interlocking system of caves, pillboxes and blockhouses commanding all approaches . Often driven back with terrific losses in fierce hand-to- hand combat, the Assault Troops repeatedly hurled back the enemy's counterattacks to regain and hold lost positions, and continued the unrelenting drive to high ground and Motoyama Airfield No . 1, captured by the end of the second day. By their individual acts of heroism and their unfailing teamwork, these gallant officers and men fought against their own battle-fatigue and shock to advance in the face of the enemy's fanatical resistance ; they charged each strongpoint, one by one, blasting out the hidden Japanese troops or sealing them in; within four days they had occupied the southern part of Motoyama Airfield No . 2 ; simultaneously they stormed the steep slopes of Mount Suribachi to raise the United States Flag ; and they seized the strongly defended hills to silence guns commanding the beaches and insure the conquest of Iwo Jima, a vital inner defense of the Japanese Empire ."

The following Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps, United States Fleet Marine Force, participated in the Iwo Jima Operation from February 19 to 28, 1945 :

9th Marines ; 21st Marines ; 3rd Engineer Battalion (less detachment) ; 3rd Tank Battalion ; 3rd Joint Assault Signal Company (less detachment) ; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, THIRD Marine Division ; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 12th Marines ; Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 1 ; 23rd Marines ; 24th Marines ; 25th Marines ; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Tank Battalion ; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Engineer Battalion ; 1st Joint Assault Signal Company ; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, Head- quarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division ; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Pioneer Battalion ; 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division ; Companies A and B and Detachment, 802 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion ; 7th Marine War Dog Platoon ; Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 4 ; Liaison and Forward Observer Par- ties, 14th Marines; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment ; 26th Marines ; 27th Marines ; 28th Ma- rines; 5th Engineer Battalion ; 5th Tank Battalion ; 6th War Dog Platoon ; 5th Joint Assault Signal Company ; 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Com- panies A, B, and C, 5th Pioneer Battalion ; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division ; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division ; 3rd Provisional Rocket Detachment ; Pilots and Air Observ- ers, Marine Observation Squadron 5; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 13th Marines ; Companies C, D, and Detachment, Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion .

For the President, JOHN L . SULLIVAN Secretary of the Navy UNIT COMMENDATIONS 803

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS SIGNAL BATTALION for service as set forth in the following

CITATION "For extremely meritorious service in support of military operations, while at- tached to the I Marine Amphibious Corps during the amphibious assault on Bougain- ville, and attached to the III Amphibious Corps during operations at Guam, Palau and Okinawa, during the period from November 1, 1943 to June 21, 1945 . The first Ameri- can Signal Battalion to engage in amphibious landings in the Pacific Ocean Areas ; the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion pioneered and developed techniques and procedures without benefit of established precedent, operating with limited and in- adequate equipment, particularly in the earlier phase of these offensive actions, and providing its own security while participating in jungle fighting, atoll invasions and occupation of large island masses . Becoming rapidly experienced in guerrilla warfare and the handling of swiftly changing situations, this valiant group of men success- fully surmounted the most difficult conditions of terrain and weather as well as un- familiar technical problems and, working tirelessly without consideration for safety, comfort or convenience, provided the Corps with uninterrupted ship-shore and bivouac communication service continuously throughout this period . This splendid record of achievement, made possible only by the combined efforts, loyalty and courageous devo- tion to duty of each individual, was a decisive factor in the success of the hazardous Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa Campaigns and reflects the highest credit upon the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion who actually participated in one or more of the Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa operations are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon. JAMES FORRESTAL Secretary of the Navy 804 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

THIRD 155-mm . HOWITZER BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION "For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Jap- anese forces on Peleliu, Palau Islands, from 15 to 29 September 1944 . Landing on an unestablished beachhead between 300 and 400 yards deep despite rugged terrain and fanatic opposition, the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion established a position across a 200-yard front and emplaced its weapons precariously on top of solid rock within 300 yards of heavily entrenched, well concealed Japanese fortifications on commanding ground. The Battalion effectively utilized its 155-mm . howitzers in the same method of operation as demolitions to pound hostile pillboxes, machine-gun positions and troop concentrations with heavy fire and succeeded in annihilating the enemy, breaking down the hillsides and closing the caves in the sheer coral cliffs with rubble . Ordered later to hold a defensive sector on the front lines, the men and officers of the Battalion func- tioned effectively as an infantry unit despite the lack of specific training, and reso- lutely held the line until relieved . Resourceful and daring in the unorthodox employ- ment of howitzers, the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion provided unfailing support vital to the conquest of this strategic enemy stronghold, thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion during this period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

FRANCIS P . MATTHEWS Secretary of the Navy UNIT COMMENDATIONS 805

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP ELEVEN

for service as follows :

"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Jap- anese forces during the Peleliu Campaign and the consolidation of the Western Caro- lines from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945. Performing valuable service during the early stages of the Peleliu Campaign by coordinating with ground units in unload- ing, establishing the air base and furnishing riflemen and stretcher bearers, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN commenced air operations on September 24 while the air- field was still under direct enemy fire . Assigned the mission of providing close support for ground troops which necessitated utmost precision because of close in-fighting between the opposing forces, the officers and men evolved new and unique tactics as exemplified in the development of steep-angle glide-bombing with varied fuse settings for diversified targets; low-level precision skip-bombing of almost impregnable caves in precipitous cliffs ; and the employment of napalm bombs without fuses to be fired simultaneously by phosphorus shells from infantry weapons . By their resourcefulness, courage and skill, the flight personnel and ground crewmen of Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN achieved an illustrious combat record in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN, consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN ; Marine Service Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN ; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN ; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE ; Marine Fight- ing Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY TWO ; Marine Night Fighting Squadron FIVE HUNDRED FORTY ONE ; and Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR, from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon. JOHN L. SULLIVAN Secretary of the Navy 806 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

EIGHTH 155-mm . GUN BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION : "For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces on Peleliu, Palau Islands, from 17 to 29 September 1944 . Landing heavy material over treacherous coral reefs in the face of fanatic opposition, the Eighth 155-mm . Gun Battalion pushed forward to the southern edge of the airfield where the enemy was concentrating the fire of heavy mortars and anti-boat and anti-tank guns . Undeterred by infiltrating Japanese troops and intense mortar barrages, this Battalion went into firing position and rendered effective support to the Eighty-First Army Division . Moving around the outlying islands in LVT'S equipped with radar, this gallant Battalion prevented the reinforcement of hostile defenses on Peleliu and, in the later stages, denied routes of escape to the remnants of the defending garrison . When the infantry was confronted by an almost impenetrable barrier of man-made and natural defenses which withstood the onslaughts of tank and demolition squads and the fire of mortars, machine guns and small arms, elements of the Battalion moved forward and boldly emplaced a 155-mm . gun in an unprotected position close to the enemy . Braving intense hostile fire which caused several casualties, this indomitable group courageously fired its weapon at point- blank range and succeeded in exploding concealed ammunition dumps, annihilating the enemy and completely eliminating the strong point, thus permitting the infantry to clear the area . By their valor, determination and fighting spirit, the officers and men of the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion rendered invaluable service in breaking down the enemy's resistance and in hastening the conquest of this strategic Japanese strong- hold, achieving a gallant combat record in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion during this period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

FRANCIS P . MATTHEWS Secretary of the Navy UNIT COMMENDATIONS 807

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE BOMBING SQUADRON SIX HUNDRED TWELVE for service as follows :

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during numer- ous offensive missions in the Central Pacific Area from November 1, 1944, to May 31, 1945. Aggressive and courageous in the execution of their manifold assignments, the pilots and aircrewmen of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE served heroically despite severe weather and relentless opposition in a series of air-sea rescues, special experimental operations and highly successful night, low-level rocket attacks against strongly defended shipping and shore installations . By their expert air- manship and superb skill, they saved the lives of several B-29 crews, developed and tested valuable new technical equipment and destroyed or extensively damaged 29 Japanese ships. This outstanding record of service and combat achievement, made pos- sible only by the teamwork and steadfast devotion to duty of the pilots, flight crews and maintenance men of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE, is in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

The pilots, aircrewmen and ground crews attached to Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUN- DRED TWELVE during the above mentioned period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL Secretary of the Navy 808 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP THIRTY-TWO for service as follows :

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTH Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands, Areas, from January 23 to March 15, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO operated continuously against Japanese forces, flying a series of more than 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relent- less air and ground force opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetrated numerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammu- nition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to our ground forces' sweeping victory in this area . The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of these courageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel of the United States Armed forces serving with Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY- TWO during the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDA- TION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL Secretary of the Navy UNIT COMMENDATIONS 809

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-FOUR for service as follows :

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTH Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands Area, from January 23 to April 10, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR operated continuously against Japaneses forces, fly- ing a series of more tha n 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relent- less air and ground force opposition . Dauntless and determined, these units penetrated numerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammu- nition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to the sweeping victory of our ground forces in this area. The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of these courageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel of the United States Armed Forces serving with Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR during the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL Secretary of the Navy 810 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

SUPPORT UNITS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS UNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE for service as follows :

"For outstanding heroism in support of Military Operations during the seizure of enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945 . Landing against resistance which rapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beaches with artillery, rocket and mortar fire, the Support Units of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps surmounted the obstacles of chaotic disorganization, loss of equipment, supplies and key personnel to develop and maintain a continuous link between thousands of assault troops and supply ships . Resourceful and daring whether fighting in the front line of combat, or serving in rear areas or on the wreck-obstructed beaches, they were responsible for the administration of operations and personnel ; they rendered effective fire support where Japanes pressure was greatest ; they constructed roads and facilities and maintained communications under the most difficult and discouraging conditions of weather and rugged terrain ; they salvaged vital supplies from craft lying crippled in the surf or broached on the beaches ; and they ministered to the wounded under fire and provided prompt evacuation to hospital ships . By their individual initiative and heroism and their ingenious teamwork, they provided the unfailing support vital to the conquest of Iwo Jima, a powerful defense of the Japanese Empire ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the following Support Units of the FIFTH Amphib- iius Corps, United States Fleet Marine Force, during the Iwo Jima Operation from February 19 to 28, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

Headquarters & Service Battalion; Medical Battalion ; Signal Battalion; Motor Transport Com- pany ; Detachment, 1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon ; Detachment, Signal, Headquarters, Air Warning Squadron 7 - Army Fighter Command ; Detachment, 568th Signal Air Warning Battalion - Army; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army ; Detachment, 49th Signal Construction Battalion - Army; Detachment 44 - 70th Army Airways Communications Service - Army ; Detachment, Communication Unit 434 (Group Pacific 11) ; Landing Force Air Support Control Unit No . 1 ; 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion ; 62nd Naval Construction Bat- talion ; 2nd Separate Topographical Company ; Detachment, 23rd Naval Construction Battalion (Special) ; 8th Field Depot (plus Headquarters Shore Party) ; 33rd Marine Depot Company ; 34th Marine Depot Company ; 36th Marine Depot Company ; 8th Marine Ammunition Company; Detachment, 8th Naval Construction Regiment ; Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 ; 2nd Bomb Disposal Company ; 156th Bomb Disposal Squad -Army ; Company B, Amphibious Reconnais- sance Battalion, Fleet Marine Force ; A and C Platoons, 38th Field Hospital - Army; Joint In- telligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Intelligence Teams No . 22, 23, 24, and 25 ; Detachment, 811

Joint Intelligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Enemy Materiel and Salvage Platoon ; Detach- ment, 1st Platoon, 239th Quartermaster Salvage and Collection Company - Army; Detachment, Headquarters, Army Garrison Forces, APO 86 ; Detachment Headquarters, 147th Infantry - Army ; Detachment, Headquarters, 7th Fighter Command - Army; Detachment, 47th Fighter Squadron - Army ; Detachment, 548th Night Fighter Squadron - Army ; Detachment, 386th Air Service Group (Special) - Army ; Detachment, Group Pacific 11 ; Detachment, Port Director ; Detachment, Garrison Beach Party ; Headquarters & Service Battery, 1st Provisional Artillery Group ; 2nd 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion ; 4th 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion ; 473rd Amphibian Truck Company-Army ; Detachment, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 138th Antiair- craft Artillery Group - Army; Detachment, 506th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion - Army ; Detach- ment, 483rd Antiaircraft Air Warning Battalion - Army; 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units) ; Headquarters Battalion, THIRD Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company) ; 3rd Marine War Dog Platoon ; 3rd Service Battalion (less detachment) ; 3rd Pioneer Battalion (less 2nd Platoon, Company C), 3rd Med- ical Battalion (less Company C) ; 3rd Motor Transport Battalion (less Company C) ; 12th Ma- rines (less detachment) ; Marine Observation Squadron 1 (less detachment) ; Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company) ; 4th Motor Transport Battalion ; 4th Medical Battalion; 133rd Naval Construction Battalion ; 4th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 4th Engineer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 4th Service Battalion ; 4th Pioneer Battal- ion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 442nd Port Company - Army ; 14th Marines (less detach- ment) ; 4th Marine Amphibian Truck Company ; 476th Amphibian Truck Company - Army; Marine Observation Squadron 4 (less detachment) ; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army (FOURTH Marine Division- Reinf .) ; 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units) ; Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Com- pany) ; 5th Medical Battalion ; 13th Marines (less detachment) ; 5th Marine Amphibian Truck Company ; 471st Amphibian Truck Company - Army ; Marine Observation Squadron 5 (less de- tachment) ; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army (FIFTH Marine Division . Reinf.) ; 5th Pioneer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 31st Naval Construction Bat- talion ; 592nd Port Company - Army; 5th Motor Transport Battalion ; 5th Service Battalion ; 27th and 31st Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units) .

JOHN L . SULLIVAN Secretary of the Navy

812 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS, ZAMBOANGA

consisting of the following Marine Aircraft Groups :

Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE March 10 - June 30, 1945 Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY TWO March 16 - June 30, 1945 Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY FOUR April 11 - June 30, 1945

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION "For exceptionally meritorious service and outstanding heroism in support of ele- ments of the EIGHTH Army during operations against enemy Japanese forces on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, and in the Sulu Archipelago . After landing with the assault forces, Marine Air Groups, ZAMBOANGA, effected wide coverage of battle areas in flights made extremely hazardous by dense jungles, precipitous cloud-obscured mountains and adverse weather conditions . The gallant officers and men of these Groups penetrated hostile defenses to press relentless attacks and reduce vital enemy targets, disrupt communications and troop concentrations, and destroy ammunition and fuel dumps despite intense antiaircraft fire over Japanese objectives . The vital service rendered during these campaigns in providing convoy cover, fighter defense and close aerial support of ground forces is evidence of the courage, skill and devotion to duty of the pilots, aircrewmen and ground personnel operating as a well coordinated team, and reflects the highest credit upon Marine Aircraft Groups, ZAMBOANGA, and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32 or 24 during their respective periods of service as designated are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COM- MENDATION Ribbon. FRANCIS P . MATTHEWS Secretary o f the Navy Index Abuyog, 310, 321-322 air superiority, 670, 728 ACETYLENE Island, 181n, 183-184 air supply, 725 Acker, Capt George K ., 314 air support, 63, 97, 101, 153, 180, 211, 256, Adams, Maj Hank, 248 283-284, 303, 306, 309, 350, 354, 356, 373, Admiralty Islands, 67, 83, 292, 315, 363, 407 384, 531, 538, 547, 555, 558, 611, 636, Advance Base Force, 14, 16 643, 684, 686, 691, 699, 717 Advance base warfare, 14 bombing support, 190, 221, 728 AGGRAVATE, 181n, 183 carrier-based support, 76-77, 106n, 283, Aineman Island, 414 292, 306, 340, 424, 436, 489, 491, 737 Ainsworth, RAdm Walden L ., 278 close air support, 17, 83, 99, 216, 283-284, Air activities 291, 304-307, 328, 332, 339-340, 343, American, 43, 95, 99, 227, 236, 340, 363, 347, 349, 352-353, 368, 370, 378, 384- 368, 373, 381, 388, 718, 735 385, 387-388, 390, 393, 397, 423, 435, air alerts, 624 440, 495, 512, 598, 640, 655, 699, 714, air attacks, 172, 450, 455-456, 735 718,735 air combat, 278, 378, 385, 434, 561 dive bombing, 305, 374, 388 air coordination, 305-306, 354, 377, 385 emergency landings, 325, 438, 464, 597- air cover, 328 598,601 air defense, 319, 326, 598, 708 fighter missions, 291 air drops, 597 ground controllers, 328, 385 air escort, 601 rocket strikes, 141, 506 air freight, 604 strafing, 190, 211, 221, 283 air gunfire, 280, 605, 719 Japanese air liaison officers, 171, 352-353, 390 air attacks, 71, 190, 318-319, 325, 328, air liaison parties, 106n, 277, 283, 306-308, 330, 335, 400, 413, 451, 570 342-344,349,351,353,356,368,370,378, air defense, 298 718,735 air efforts, 337, 375, 396 airlift, 723 air garrisons, 340, 734 air neutralization, 184 air neutralization, 309 air preparation, 210 air power, 309, 331, 405, 432, 597 air observation, 281, 317, 320, 373, 600, air strength, 298, 331, 336, 379, 393, 405, 668, 671, 686, 719 450, 466, 539, 601, 731 air observers, 660, 707, 718 air support, 70, 670 air offensive, 492 Aircraft air photography, 163, 368, 472, 474, 486 American, 81, 184, 199, 210-211, 224, 262, air raids, 717, 729 264, 329, 350, 361-362, 376, 381, 393, air reconnaissance, 382, 486 412, 417, 422-423, 493n, 548, 554, 644, air-sea rescue, 103, 717 716,720 air strikes, 135-137, 141-142, 157, 172, Types 177, 224, 226, 241-242, 249, 260, 282- B-24s (Liberators), 101-102, 193, 218, 283, 306, 314, 327, 332, 335, 342, 346, 399, 459, 473, 485 485n, 487, 495-496, 350-354, 366-367, 370, 372, 381, 383, 499, 504, 717 386, 399, 412, 415, 423, 430, 435, 453, B-25s (Mitchells), 353, 412 472-473, 485-486, 490, 500, 504, 534, B-29s (Super Fortresses), 429, 429n, 551, 558, 562-563, 586, 591-592, 601, 438, 462-464, 476, 479, 487, 597-598, 611, 638, 643-644, 648, 665, 668, 672, 600-601,679,683,731 676, 698, 714-715, 717-718, 735 bombers, 43, 58, 325, 400, 407, 413, 430, 813 814 INDEX

462,487,500,503-504,598,717,734 SBDs (Dauntlesses), 339, 342-344, 346, C-46s (Commandos), 199, 604 353-354, 356-357, 370-371, 378, 383- C-47s (Skytrains), 199, 326, 604 386,388,399,414 C-54s (Skymasters), 427 spotting planes, 317-318, 386, 436, 714 carrier-based, 5, 40, 64, 77, 82, 102-103, TBFs (Avengers), 193, 318, 371, 426, 108, 141-142, 152-153, 165, 232, 298, 429,, 433-434 301, 422, 436, 495-496, 500, 530, 574, TBMs (Avengers), 429 587, 595, 610, 621, 623, 633, 638-640, torpedo bombers, 43, 422, 424, 426-427, 718 429, 432, 576, 595 dive bombers, 43, 143, 340, 342-344, 346- transports, 325, 356, 632-363, 401, 412, 347, 350, 352, 359, 370, 378-379, 382- 422, 438, 480, 597, 604 383,385,393,407,412,422,718 utility planes, 429 escort fighters 439, 600-601 Japanese, 71, 259, 276, 278, 300, 312, 324, (F'4Us (Corsairs), 99, 143, 211, 228, 256, 328,366-367,382,429,450,484,732 284, 326-332, 335, 339, 365, 368, 371- Types 372, 375, 378, 383, 399, 401-402, 404, Bettys (medium bombers), 276, 356 408, 412-414, 416, 428-429, 432-433, bombers, 407, 411, 413, 452 436,503 carrier-based, 300 F6Fs (Hellcats), 100, 199, 326-327, 333, dive bombers, 330 371,399,412,427,429,436,451-452 fighters, 101, 327-330, 375, 400, 412, 451- F6F-Ns, 429, 432 452 FMs, 371 float planes, 71, 228, 259 fighter-bombers, 108, 386, 412, 416, 429 heavy bombers, 300 fighters, 58, 172, 328, 350, 362, 379, 382- Lilys (light bombers), 374 383, 399, 404, 407, 413, 422, 429, 435, medium bombers, 276 452, 495, 499, 503, 576, 597, 600, 691, night bombers, 326 718 night fighters, 326, 330 floatplanes, 101 torpedo bombers, 330, 451-452 flying boats, 367, 439 transports, 321-322 J2F-6s, 429 Zeros (fighters), 399, 404, 412, 451-452, L-4s, 317, 370 495 L-5s, 212 Airfield No . 1 (Iwo Jima), 449n, 459, 471, 479, medium bombers, 43, 325, 382-383, 429 495, 504, 514-516, 518-519, 525, 528, 547, night fighters, 193, 199, 326-328, 330, 549, 551, 557, 560, 563-565, 571, 595, 597- 333, 371, 400, 411, 413, 422, 425, 429, 598,600,603-604,633,651,716,720 5262 560 Airfield No . 2 (Iwo Jima), 447, 449n, 459, 471, OS2Us, 495 479, 509, 525, 548, 555-558, 561-563, 565- OYs, 429, 432, 595 567, 569, 574-576, 586, 595, 597, 600, 616, observation planes, 101, 426, 429, 436- 644-647,649,701,716,720 437,495,595,617,658,718,720 Airfield No . 3 (Iwo Jima), 459, 574, 578, 581- P-40s, 329 586,600,684,708 P-47s, 423 Airfields P-51s, 436, 464, 598, 643, 643n American, 58, 118, 152-153, 162, 173, 177, P-61s, 326, 328, 371, 526, 598 179, 181, 187, 189, 192-193, 199, 204, PBJs (Witchells), 371, 373-374, 380, 212, 214, 217, 222-224, 227-228, 237, 387, 429, 436, 485 241, 259, 268, 273-274, 277-281, 287, PBYs, 199, 371 298,314-315,319,323,325,339,361,363, R4Ds (Skytrains), 371, 408, 437-438, 365,463,485n,600-601,608 597 Japanese, 58, 117, 120-124, 126, 131, 134, R5Cs (Commandos), 437, 597 139, 141, 144, 156, 161, 180, 324, 336, reconnaissance planes, 415, 417 393,395-396,405 SB2Cs (Helldivers), 371, 389, 418 AK-98, 316 INDEX 815

Akalokul, 58 497, 501, 568, 589, 635 Akarakoro Point, 190 star shells, 152, 270, 281, 526, 589, 610, Aleutian Islands, 6, 21, 23, 467, 730, 734 678-679,725 Allender, LCdr Byron E ., 151n .30 caliber, 173 Allied tracer, 408 air effort, 736 12-inch, 610 invasion fleet, 340 20mm, 261, 315, 578 invasion, North Africa, 733 Japanese, 226, 249, 530, 654, 695 news service, 612 aerial bombs, 72, 193, 258, 375, 636n planners, 614 aerial torpedos, 565-566 powers, 613 antipersonnel bombs, 424 prisoners of war, 730 armor-piercing shells, 123, 513 ships, 336 artillery, 231, 367, 527, 545 Allied Forces, 5, 54, 179, 301, 382, 440, 448, .50 caliber, 415, 420 729, 730, 732, 734 gas shells, 624 Allies, Western, 729 illuminating, 258 AMAZEMENT Island, 181,181n, 183 mortar, 526, 662, 673, 675, 727 AMELIORATE, 181n, 183-184. See also Fala- Amoy, 293, 465 lop Island. Amphibious assault operations, 10, 13-17, 33- Amiangai, 208 34, 43, 71, 84, 168, 211, 278-279, 281, 286, 304, Ammunition 359, 448, 463, 478, 487, 505, 715 American, 87-88, 128, 152, 240, 269, 279, 318, Amphibious doctrine, tactics, 10, 268, 737 476-477, 492, 523, 553, 601, 611, 678, Amphibious exercises, 14, 162, 483 689, 720, 722 Amphibious Training Command, 304 artillery, 88, 127, 603, 610 Amphitheater, 568, 572, 595, 616, 646-648, 650, bombs, 108, 227, 408, 530, 534, 548, 551, 656-657, 661, 663-665, 667, 671-672, 681-682 565, 613, 644, 691 Anderson, Capt Carl E., 602 ; RAdm, 602 n 8-inch, 363, 587, 610 Angat River, 346 81mm mortar, 152, 209, 523, 526, 563, 597 Angaur, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62-63, 68-69, 79-80, 88, 15-inch, 587 134, 161-163, 165-166, 168-169, 171-175, .50 caliber, 414, 551 177-179, 181, 183-184, 187, 223, 279, 284- 5-inch, 610 287, 430-431, 433, 733-734 14-inch, 145, 563, 565, 610 operation, 166, 173, 177-178, 180 40mm, 261, 315, 497, 505 Annapolis, Maryland, 14 gas shells, 613 Anso, Maj Kenro, 659 high-explosive shells, 145, 156 Antonelli, Maj . John W . A., 508, 514, 618, 642- machine gun, 87, 127, 173 6,43 mortar shells, 597, 611 Apamama Island, 398-399, 413 napalm bombs, 224-225, 249, 254, 256, 271, Apennine Peninsula, 733 283-284,370,378-379,385-386,416,432, Apra Harbor, 426 436, 487, 499, 503, 506, 523, 530, 536, Arakabesan, 57 611, 638, 658, 677, 717 Ardennes, 729 155mm howitzer, 587 offensive, 735 105mm, 152, 587, 672 Arkansas, 493, 503 pyrotechnics, 258 Armor. See also Army Units ; Marine Units ; rockets, 241, 387, 418, 436, 481, 495, 497, Weapons. 503, 505, 530, 534, 551, 565, 590, 611, American, 153-154, 158, 172, 212, 235, 272- 623, 631, 638, 649, 674, 685, 707, 727, 273, 512, 514-515, 517, 519, 534, 549, 729 554, 565-567, 584, 592, 618, 621, 623, 75mm, 155, 587, 615, 644, 650, 672, 705 628, 631-632, 637, 639, 647-649, 662, 16-inch, 610 672-673,676,687,691,727 smoke, 154, 160, 206, 209, 230, 262, 352, Japanese, 123 816 INDEX

Armstrong, PFC P . E ., 344n XXIV Corps, 63, 65, 301, 314-321, 323 Army Air Forces, 102, 307, 309, 325, 332, 359, XXIV Corps Artillery, 314, 319, 323 361, 366, 377, 386, 393, 396, 407, 436, 462, 464, Americal Division, 375-377 486-487,496,500,640,699,712 1st Cavalry Division, 301, 310, 334, 342-344, Units 346-348,351-352,354 Far East Air Forces, 301, 303, 324-325, 1st Infantry Division, 20, 34, 353 359, 365, 388 3d Infantry Division, 34 Strategic Air Forces, 417 6th Infantry Division, 352-354 Fifth Air Force, 78, 101, 301, 307, 312, 7th Infantry Division, 34, 310, 315-318, 321, 326,328,332-334,339,353,382,389 400 Seventh Air Force, 396, 412, 473, 485, 717 9th Infantry Division, 34, 36, 315 Thirteenth Air Force, 301, 309, 334, 359, 11th Airborne Division, 322, 354 362, 366, 368, 377, 382, 384, 390 24th Infantry Division, 310, 365, 384, 387, Fourteenth Air Force, 334 390 Twentieth Air Force, 334 25th Infantry Division, 354 VII Bomber Command, 485, 485n 31st Infantry Division, 381, 384-386, 390 XX Bomber Command, 463-464 32d Infantry Division, 310 V Fighter Command, 333 37th Infantry Division, 307, 346, 354 VII Fighter Command, 603, 710 38th Infantry Division, 354 XIII Fighter Command, 388 40th Infantry Division, 354, 375-376 308th Bombardment Wing, 339, 342-344, 41st Infantry Division, 359, 362, 366-368, 346, 349, 354 370-371,373-374,378-379,390 310th Bombardment Wing, 331 43d Infantry Division, 354 313th Bombardment Wing, 487 77th Infantry Division, 63, 181, 310, 328, 15th Fighter Group, 598, 598n 332,427 21st Fighter Group, 708 81st Infantry Division, 63, 79, 96, 153, 162- 48th Bombardment Squadron, 412 163, 165, 170, 175, 177-180, 186-187, 419th Night Fighter Squadron, 368 250, 252, 254, 258, 260, 262, 264, 274, 28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squad- 282, 284-286. See also Wildcats . ron, 473 96th Infantry Division, 180-181, 310, 315- 9th Troop Carrier Squadron, 438, 597, 604 316,318,321 973d Aviation Engineer Battalion, 367 1st Cavalry Brigade, 354 465th Aviation Squadron, 708 Infantry Regiments 76th Fighter Control Center, 368 20th, 315 77th Fighter Control Center, 371, 383 33d,315 Army-Navy joint communications procedure, 124th,385 35 147th, 608, 708, 711 Army Units 162d,374 Chemical Warfare Service, 477, 613 163d,374 (Field Service Command, 30 321st, 166, 168-171, 173-176, 178, 180, 186- Pacific Ocean Areas, 476 187, 190, 192-193, 197, 201-202, 204, Southwest Pacific Area, 291, 293, 293n 209, 217-218, 221-224, 237, 242, 246, Garrison Force Zero, 603 249, 251, 254, 261 Sixth Army, 309-310, 315-316, 320-321, 325, 322d,166,168-173,176,178-180 334, 337, 339-340, 342, 348-349, 357-359 323d, 163, 168, 180-181, 183-184, 251, 257- Eighth Army, 332, 358-359, 365, 367, 374, 259,264 382 726th Amphibian Tractor Batallion, 254 Tenth Army, 38, 465 287th Artillery Observation Battalion, 314, I Corps, 20, 352 316-318,322 X Corps, 310, 315, 319, 321, 337, 359, 381- 506th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 603, 384,386-387 708 XIV Corps, 303, 337, 342, 352 154th Engineer Battalion, 254 INDEX 817

Field Artillery Battalions 671, 674, 677, 718, 723, 726 198th, 314, 316-317, 319 Asbill, Maj Edward L ., 671 226th, 314, 316-320 Asia, 294 Infantry Battalions Eastern, 735 1/162,371 Southeast, 51, 294, 463 1/321, 170-171, 173-176, 189, 192, 210, 254, Asias (village), 58-59, 148 256-257 Aslito Airfield, 423-424 1/322,171-174 Atlantic Ocean, 21, 444 1/323,250,254,256-257,262 Atomic warfare, 737. See also Weapons. 2/15,190,226 Atsuchi, Capt Kanehiko, 533n ; Col, 533, 533n, 2/162,371 536, 537n, 538, 542 2/321, 173-174, 176, 178, 189, 192, 195, Attu, 467, 734 197, 199, 201, 206-207, 214, 223, 250, Auburn, 605, 607, 619 254,256-257 Auckland, New Zealand, 431 2/322,171-174,176,187,193 Aur Atoll, 418 2/323,257,260-262' Auriga, 314, 316 3/124,385 Australia, 291, 444 3/321, 173-176, 187, 189, 192, 195, 198, Aviators . See Pilots . 200,206-207,250,254,257 Axis, 736 3/322,171-174,197,199 Aycrigg, Lt William A ., 403 6th Ranger Battalion, 310 Azores, 43 710th Tank Battalion, 174, 187, 224, 228- 229,240,254 Babelthuap Island, 57, 60-62, 68-69, 79, 162- 471st Amphibian Truck Company, 475, 516 163, 166, 175, 190, 193, 222, 225, 232, 241- 295th Joint Assault Signal Company, 384 242, 262, 264-265, 281, 432-433, 733-734 442d Port Company, 602 Baker, Maj Harry F ., 437 592d Port Company, 602 Baker, Col R . M., 15 38th Field Hospital, 603, 710 Baldy Ridge, 224, 226, 228, 234, 237-238, 241- Arnold, MajGen William H ., 377,463-464 ,242,244-245 Artillery Balete Pass, 357 American, 80-81, 84, 103, 129, 132, 135, 137, Baliuag, 346 142, 151-153, 157, 161, 173, 175, 187, Balkans, 443, 729 190, 195, 205, 208, 210, 224, 242, 244, Ballance, LtCol Robert G ., 84, 86 246, 254, 269, 272, 274, 281, 291, 300- Baltic Sea, 443 301, 314, 316-320, 322-323, 379-380, 416, Bangkal, 379 423, 484, 504, 508, 516, 521, 530-531, Bangkok, 463 534, 538, 549-550, 552, 554-556, 560, Banika Island, 89-90, 95, 393, 400 563, 565-567, 573, 576-585, 587, 589, Bard, Capt Elliott E ., 42 591, 605, 611, 617, 623-624, 626-627, Basilan Island, 374 632-635,638-639,648-652,654,658,661- Basilan Strait, 363, 366, 374 663, 666-669, 671-674, 676, 679, 681, Basilone, GySgt John, 514 684, 686, 691, 697-699, 704, 708, 714, 717, Bataan Peninsula, 348, 690 719-722,726-727 Batangas Peninsula, 342 Filipino, 348 Bates, Lt Wesley C ., 512 Japanese, 109, 115, 122, 127-128, 134, 141- Battle for Leyte Gulf, 312, 321, 323, 443 142, 156, 177, 278, 350, 407, 453-454, Battle of Midway, 430 454n, 456-457, 474, 493n, 497-498, 519- Battle of the Philippine Sea, 443 520, 525-526, 531, 533-534, 538, 545, Baybay, 310, 321 549-551, 553-554, 557-558, 561, 564, Bay field, 648 566, 568, 570, 575, 582, 584, 586-587, Bayug Airfield, 325 595, 597, 603, 617, 624, 626, 629, 647, Beach, Capt C . C., 415n 651, 653, 655-656, 658, 662, 666, 669, Beaches, 58, 72, 77, 79, 86-87, 94, 118, 121, 128, 818 INDEX

131, 259-260, 274, 472, 482, 527, 603, 617, Blessman, 500 623, 717, 722, 724 Blissard, LtCol Louis B ., 649, 652 Blue, 163, 165-166, 168-169, 508, 519, 525, Block Island, 435 557 Bloody Gorge, 616 Blue 1, 316, 471, 471n, 508, 519-521, 548 Bloody Nose Ridge, 157, 223-225, 228, 279 Blue 2, 471, 471n, 519-521, 525 Blow, Maj Rex, 382 Brown, 602 Boats. See Landing Craft ; Ships. Green, 165, 169, 471, 513, 516, 526 Boehm, Col Harold C ., 575, 575n, 582n, 588- Green 1, 471, 508, 510 590,591n,686 Green 2, 173 Bohemia, 9 Orange, 79, 81-82, 106, 108, 119n, 137, 187, Bohol Island, 327, 359, 361, 375, 377 232, 268, 602 Bollman, Capt Howard W ., 413 Orange 1, 80, 115 Bombardments, 71, 102-104, 108, 112, 132, 145, Orange 2, 80, 115-117, 121, 129 153, 165, 211, 221, 227, 278-281, 335, 386, Orange 3, 80, 116, 119, 119n, 120, 131, 152, 409, 452-453, 455, 486-487, 489, 491-493, 233 493n, 495-496, 498, 501-506, 509, 517, 526, Purple, 187, 201, 228, 236, 251, 258, 268, 274, 531, 533, 547, 565, 574, 576, 610, 646, 714, 602-603 726, 728, 731, 737. See also Naval gunfire . Purple 2, 603 Bongao Island, 378 Red, 163, 165-166, 168, 176, 472, 508, 514 Bonins, 64, 68, 102, 436, 444-445, 448, 450- Red 1, 471, 508, 512-513, 515, 552 451, 459, 461-462, 462n, 463-464, 466, 472, Red 2, 471, 508, 513, 515 475, 484-485, 505, 537, 597, 654, 716-717, Scarlet, 193 737 White, 79-82, 106, 108, 110, 144, 264, 268, Borneo, 6, 294, 309, 358, 366, 374, 378 274,602 Bougainville, 284, 305-307, 335, 342, 346, 362- White 1, 108-110, 112 363,388-389,393,467,735 White 2, 110 Bountiful, 723 Yellow, 424, 508-509, 517, 525, 555 Bourke, BGen Thomas E ., 291, 300-301, 314, Yellow 1, 471, 508, 517-518, 522, 526, 548, 316-318, 323 ; LtGen, 319n 552,560 Bowdoin, Maj George E ., 248n Yellow 2, 471, 508, 516-517, 519 Boyd Ridge, 221, 229, 231-237, 241-242, 250, Beachheads, 73, 85, 430 . See also Beaches. 254, 257, 260 Beachmasters, 85, 87 Boyd, LtCol Robert W ., 115,123 Beach parties, 282, 601. See also Shore party Boyer, LtCol Kimber H ., 93 activities. Bozarth, Capt Clyde L., 276n Belgium, 6 Brant, Capt Robert E ., 123 Bell, BGen Marcus B ., 187, 211, 264n Brayton, LtCol Corey C., 415n Benedict, LtCol William E ., 97n, 109n, Brisbane, 291-292, 301 Berger, LtCol Spencer S ., 92n, 147, 229, 253, British whaling captains, 445 275 Brodie gear, 436-437 Berlin, 730 Brown, Col Dudley S., 61 Betio Island, 396-397, 401 Brunelli, LtCol Austin R ., 680 Biak, 71, 457 'Buckley, Col Edmond J ., 474 Bismarck Archipelago, 438 Buckley, LtCol Joseph E ., 93n Bismarck Sea, 537 Buckner, LtGen Simon B ., Jr., 465 Bivouac areas, 151 Burauen, 310, 316-317, 319-320, 322 Blackburn, Capt Donald D ., 348 Buri Airfield, 322-323, 325 Blaha, Capt Nathan D . 424 Burma, 730 Blanchard, Capt Rolfe T ., 329n, 372 Burnette, Maj Robert W ., 91 Blandy, RAdm William H . P., 63, 165-166, 181, Burrfish, 78 278, 483, 492-493, 493n, 495-496, 498-502, Bushido, 69 714 Butler, LtCol John A ., 305, 508, 634 INDEX 819

Butterfield, LtGen Jackson B., 508, 513, 625, 177n, 179, 185, 208-209, 218, 226-227, 627 232, 253, 261, 265, 276, 300, 333, 350, Byers, SSgt A. A., 344n 352, 376, 385, 396, 409, 415, 426, 453, Bypassed islands, 412, 415, 418 531, 533, 536, 538, 545, 562, 605, 626, Byrum, Maj Paul R., Jr., 399 629, 639, 665, 679, 689 Catabato, 381-382 Cabanatuan,343,346 Cates, MajGen Clifton B ., 467, 505, 517, 519, Cagayan,381 521, 554, 557, 563, 579, 610, 645, 647, 652, Caldera Point, 366 661, 665, 669-670, 672, 677, 681-682, 694, California, 17, 437, 468, 500 700,708 Campbell, LtCol Harold D., 42 ; BGen, 46, 98, Catmon Hill, 319n 265, 398, 430, 595 Caves. See Terrain. Camp Dunlap, 23 Cebu, 294, 358-359, 361, 363, 374-3 7 3, 388 Camp Elliott, 20-21 Cebu City, 375 Camp Holcomb, 20 Celebes, 102, 294, 733 Camp Kearney Field, 437 Celebes Sea, 309 Camp Lejeune, 20, 39 Cemeteries, 712 Camp Pendleton, 23, 468 Central America, 8, 15 Camp Tarawa, 482 Central Intelligence Agency, 612 Cape Esperance, 94, 165 Central Pacific, 3, 23-24, 51-52, 54, 266, 293, Cape Gallatin, 169 309, 318, 393, 395-398, 400-401, 405, 407, Cape Gloucester, 89, 94, 268, 275 414, 416, 432, 437-438, 440, 462-463, 466, Cape Isabel, 409 478, 491, 723, 726, 731-733, 7.38 Cape Ngaramudel, 173 Chamberlain, Sgt Reid, 690 Cape Ngatpokul, 168 Chambers, LtCol Justice M ., 519-520, 559 Cape Pkulangelul, 172 Chaney, MajGen James E ., 603, 708 Capisan, 370 Chapman, LtCol Leonard F ., Jr., 92n Carey, Maj Roland, 662 Chappell, Maj C . J., Jr., 42 Cargill, Maj Wayne M ., 417 Charan Kano.a, 424-425 Caribbean, 15-17, 21, 36 Charlie Dog Ridge, 568, 645, 648, 682 Carleson, Maj Roger T., 42 Chase, BGen William C ., 343-344, 347 Carney, Col Edward B ., 429 Chateau-Thierry, 468 Caroline Islands, 3, 6, 16, 54, 67-68, 101, 395, Centaurus, 101 412, 733-734 . See also Western Caroline Chemical officers, 613 Islands. Chemical warfare, 91, 612-614 Castle, Capt Donald E ., 636 Chenango, 426 Catskill, 314 Chesapeake Bay, 36, 304 Casualties Chester, 493, 500 American, 113-114, 120, 124, 128, 130-132, Chichi Jima, 64, 445, 448-449, 451, 455, 462n, 136, 138, 141, 144, 147-148, 150, 154, 496,5432 561,598,7002 7022 705-707 161, 166, 179, 185, 189, 198-199, 208- Chidori Airfield, 449n, 453, 457 209, 212, 216, 218, 225, 227, 231, 236, Chilton, Cdr W . P., 499 242-243, 253, 257, 273-274, 281-282, China, 3, 6, 9, 16, 51, 62, 69, 293-294, 298, 309, 284-285, 322, 336, 356, 375, 386, 390, 334,458,463-464,467 408, 412, 438, 451, 471, 479, 504, 513, China-Burma-India Theater, 334 517, 520-521, 525, 525n, 531, 536-537, China Wall, 221, 241, 248, 250, 256, 260-264 545, 551, 560, 574-575, 597, 602, 604- Chinese, 54, 276, 730 605, 608, 612, 614-615, 617, 624, 630- Christianity, 294 631, 633-636, 636n, 644, 648, 659-660, Christmas Day, 438 665, 689, 695, 699, 701, 703, 705, 710- Clark Field, 342, 357 711, 715n, 722-723 Clark, RAdm Joseph J ., 451-453, 595 Japanese, 109, 113, 121, 126, 136, 138, 177, Clausewitz, 330 820 INDEX

Coady, Maj James F ., 515 Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Cobia, 455 Third Fleet, 64 Cole, Col J . Frank, 395n, 400 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pa- Coleman, Col William F ., 186n, 210n, 211n ; cific, 28-29, 31, 47, 477, 482, 491n, 492, 492n BGen, 221n Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, Colhoun,624 24, 490n, 491n Collins, LtCol William R ., 564-565 Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces, Colorado, 409 14th Naval District, 38 Columbia Victory, 602-603 Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, Columbus, Ohio, 610 477-478 Combat efficiency, 185, 227, 592, 608, 661, 694 Commanding General, Samoan Force, 46 Combat information center, 497 Communications Combat loading, 17, 83n American, 14, 17, 35, 151, 178, 204, 222, 241, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 15, 24, 27, 274, 277, 350, 368, 370, 377, 383-384, 29, 36, 46, 253 n, 428 402n, 411, 612, 615, 620n, 693, 703, 722- Commander, Air, Iwo Jima, 597-598 723,725 Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 362 Equipment, 94, 130, 139, 368 Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, 46 Radios, 207, 259, 277, 384, 390, 402, 404, Commander, Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, 29, 38, 486n, 589, 612, 620n, 626, 719 47, 99, 477 SCR-193, 308 Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, SCR-300, 277 48, 466, 473, 490, 490n, 491n, 492n SCR-542, 308 Commander, Beach Party Group, 602 SCR-610, 277 Commander, Fifth Fleet, 491, 492n tank, 154 Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific, Japanese, 278, 455, 586, 612, 646, 656-657, 64,710 Radios, 120, 202, 377, 449, 451, 456, 461, Commander, Forward Areas, Western Pacific, 487,702 184 Communism, 8-9 Commander, Garrison Air Force, Western Car- Congress, 445 olines, 99 Connolly, RAdm Richard L ., 25 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 26, 28-30, Cook, Capt Richard M ., 558 36,293, 421 Cooley, Maj Albert D ., 42 ; Col, 47, 423 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 26, Coolidge, President Calvin, 6-7 38-39, 60-61, 77-78, 83, 98, 101, 134, 301, Corregidor, 291, 296, 354, 690 417, 421, 464, 469 Court of International Justice, 4 Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 24 Craig, LtGen Edward A ., 608n, 624n Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, 486, Cram, LtCol Jack R ., 436 608 Crist, LtCol Raymond F ., Jr., 573 Commander, Landing Force Air Support Con- Crowl, Philip A ., 52, 279n trol Unit, 503 Crown, Maj John A ., 119, 204 Commander, Marianas Area, 36 Cuba, 14, 19 Commander, Marshall-Gilberts Area, 36 Culebra, 19 Commander, Service Forces, Pacific Fleet, 477- Cunningham, Maj Alfred A ., 41 478 Cushman's Pocket, 686-687, 689, 691-692 Commander, South Pacific, 99, 301 Cushman, LtCol Robert E ., 414, 416, 574, 577, Commander, Support Aircraft, 103, 108, 283 584,591 Commander, Ulithi Fire Support Group, 183 Commander, Western Pacific Task Forces, 62 D-Day, 86, 273, 280-284 Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Dagami, 316-317, 319-321 Force, Pacific, 47 Dagupan, 337, 339, 372 Commanding General, Army Forces, Western Daly, LtCol James M ., 401, 411 Pacific, 39 Danube River, 730 INDEX 821

Dardanelles, 33 booby traps, 156, 178, 199, 257, 407, 426, Dardanelles-Gallipoli operation, 14 562, 600, 697 Dark, Col Robert F ., 187, 192, 199, 250-251, bunkers, 135, 156, 171, 173, 273, 459, 528, 257 536, 545, 548, 558, 562, 572, 580, 590, Dato, 379 635,647-649,654,665 Davao, 366, 381, 384-385 buried aerial torpedoes, 565 Davis, Maj Raymond G., 145 camouflage, 548, 550 Davidson, Maj Robert, 508, 517, 654, 674 coastal, 321, 407, 493n, 496, 624-625 Day, Maj William R., 558 concrete fortifications, 73, 120, 135, 145, Dead Man's Curve, 232-233 376,454-455,629,646,666 Deakin, Col Harold 0 ., 95n, 150n, 274n dugouts, 171, 192, 201, 212, 242, 379, 550, Dean, Maj William W., 598 :555,642,685-686 Death Valley, 160, 221, 226, 232, 254, 261-263, emplacements, 75, 156, 160, 200, 280, 473, 707 486, 495, 523, 542, 550, 554, 567, 584, DeBell, Maj George J ., 233n 591, 618, 621, 635, 639-640, 665-666, Deep Passage, 409 672, 675, 694, 698, 716 Defenses fortifications, 75, 134-135, 138, 145, 154- American, 549 156, 165, 169, 171, 173, 185, 208, 216, antiaircraft, 101, 328, 330, 486n, 499, 708 274, 278, 448, 454-455, 458-459, 487, barbed wire, 675 531, 545, 627, 639, 673, 717 emplacements, 666 foxholes, 651 fire, 661 machine gun positions, 119, 127, 134, 136, field fortifications, 14 172, 242, 261, 636, 647 land mines, 14 mine fields, 251, 276, 375-376, 407, 479, sandbags, 246, 248, 256-257, 260, 508 498, 513, 517, 520, 550, 554-555, 572, Japanese, 66, 71-73, 101-103, 112, 134, 137, 600, 627, 640, 649, 676, 726 144, 152, 161, 168, 177, 185, 189, 192, observation posts, 75, 550 199, 207, 217, 221, 227 234, 237-238, obstacles, 72, 268, 271 240, 242, 244-246, 249, 256-257, 262- pillboxes, 73, 75, 79, 92, 112, 116, 118, 120- 264, 268, 276, 279, 284, 316, 346, 352, 121,134,136,138,145,152,154-157,163, 366, 379-381, 385-386, 407, 436, 453- 169, 171, 173, 176, 198, 200, 208, 212, 268, 454, 457, 474, 484, 491, 496, 499, 528, 271, 273, 350-351, 371, 379, 407, 453, 455, 531-538, 546, 549, 564, 570, 573, 627, 458-459, 473-474, 482, 485n, 486, 493n, 645, 684-686, 695, 697-698, 700-701, 714, 500, 508, 510, 513-514, 517-518, 520, 717, 766, 731 528, 530-531, 536, 538-539, 545, 548-550, antiaircraft, 102, 329, 400, 412, 415-417, 554-555, 558, 560, 562, 566-567, 572, 424, 428-429, 433-434, 495, 499, 506, 577, 590-591, 605, 610, 614n, 618, 621, 568 627, 631-632, 635, 639, 643, 647-651, antiboat, 110, 116, 119, 121, 474-475, 497- 654, 663, 665-666, 668, 672, 685, 687, 498, 506 693, 698, 716 antiinvasion mines, 72 pockets, 693-694, 706 antitank, 72-73, 116, 120, 139, 141, 156, rifle pits, 73, 136, 160, 171 171, 176, 205, 208, 268, 273, 346, 376, rocket positions, 655 459, 474, 513-514, 566, 572, 584, 625, spider foxholes, 698 627-629,655 spider-traps, 517, 528, 691, 701 barbed wire, 72, 120, 163, 454 tetrahedrons, 72, 79, 138, 163 beach, 71-72, 81, 108, 176, 267 trenches, 117, 120, 171, 376, 379, 566, 651, blockhouses, 104, 120, 134-135, 208, 211, 687 456, 459, 473-474, 485n, 486, 493n, 500, trip wires, 473 508, 510, 513, 517, 528, 530, 539, 545, tunnels, 75, 205, 221, 453, 456, 530, 538, 548, 550, 562, 572, 629, 636n, 644, 649, 540, 566, 572, 586, 613, 622, 637, 639, 698,717 645,663-664,689-690,692 822 INDEX

underground fortifications, 75, 154, 279, Eleventh Naval District, 21 453, 455-456 Eli Malk, 57 DeHaven, Col Louis G ., 472, 521-522 Eller, RAdm Ernest M ., 80n, 283,437n Deho, 379 Ellice Islands, 396, 398-401, 404 del alle, BGen Pedro A ., 428 Ellis, Maj Donald K ., 548 Demolitions. See Weapons. Ellis, Maj Earl H ., 16; LtCol, 66n Denmark, 19 Elmore, 278n Deputy Commander, Aircraft, Landing Force, Emirau Island, 363, 373, 416, 432, 435, 438 503 Emperor Meiji, 459 Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine Engebi Island, 408-413 Force, Pacific, 30-31 England, 6 DETACHMENT Operation, 435, 465, 467-469, English, 54 482,487,489-491,714,720,722-725 English, LtCoI Lowell E ., 558, 582 de Villalobos, Ruy Lopez, 54 Engineers. See also Army units ; Marine units. Digos, 395 American, 135-136, 156, 193, 204, 209, 224, Dillon, LtCol Edward J., 674, 678 226, 231, 234, 258, 263, 271, 282, 325, Dipolog, 365-367, 371-372 337, 376, 383, 398, 484, 514, 520, 531, Director of Marine Corps Aviation, 41 554, 595, 600, 602, 610, 627, 640-641, Disarmament conferences, 5-6 652, 765, 681, 705, 720-721 Disarmament treaty, 6 Japanese, 453, 647 Doe, MajGen Jens A ., 366, 373, 378 Eniwetok Atoll, 64, 83, 278, 314-315, 405, 408- Doherty, Capt. Albert J ., 204 409,412-413,420,438,526 Dominican Republic, 467 Enterprise, 560 Donlan, Capt Pat, 662-663 Equipment . See Supplies and equipment. Doswell, Maj Menard, III, 433 Ermilio, LCdr Dominick J ., 594 Downs, 1stLt Willis A ., 374n Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 467, 565, 573-574, Drake, Maj Clifford B ., 521-522 577-581, 583-585, 588-590, 592-593, 602, Drydocks, 83, 184 607, 610, 616-617, 627, 635, 647, 652, 659, Dulag, 310, 312, 314-317, 320, 325 686, 691-692, 700-701, 703-704, 708, 711, 719 Dunn, Col Ray A ., 179 Espiritu Santo Island, 98-101, 430-431, 433, DuPage, 108, 278n 438 Duplantis, LtCol Wendell H., 558 Essex, 335, 435, 503 Durgin, RAdm Calvin T ., 492, 495, 500, 560, Estes, 493, 499 717 Ethiopia, 9 Duryea, LtCol Justin G ., 634, 642 Europe, 5, 440, 729-731, 733, 737 Dutch East Indies, 358, 730 Europeans, 444-445 European Theater, 714, 733 East Boat Basin, 220, 353, 459, 469, 471, 474, Evans, Lt E. Graham, 635 500, 509, 547, 553, 555, 569, 646, 650, 711 Evans, Maj Holly H ., 574 East Indies, 287, 294 Everglades, 35 East Prussia, 443 Everton, Maj Loren D ., 400, 412, 416 East Road, 145-146, 157-159, 189, 198-202, Ewa, 21, 41-42, 45-47 206, 221, 224, 226, 228-233, 236-238, 240, 251 Fagan, Maj Richard, 558, 618 Eberhardt, Capt Fred C ., 526 Fais, 434 Edgar, Maj John B ., Jr., 521 Falalop Island, 433-434 Edmondson, Maj Robert W., 424 Fanshaw Bay, 424 Efate Island, 98, 430-431, 730 Far East, 6 Eichelberger, LtGen Robert L ., 332, 359 ; Gen, Farrell, BGen Walter G., 46 377, 386, 390 Fascism, 8 El Centro, California, 45 Fascist dictatorships, 4 Eldorado, 484 Fawell, LtCol Reed M ., Jr., 505, 618 INDEX 823

Feehan, Maj Harvey A., 522 Gayle, Maj Gordon D ., 208, 242 Ferguson, Capt, 197 Geiger, BGen Roy S ., 42, 45-46 ; MajGen, 25, Fertig, Col Wendell W ., 359, 381-382 61, 63-64, 79, 89, 104, 131, 165, 175, 185-187, Fields, Capt Thomas M ., 620 211, 246, 252, 278-279, 286, 428, 433 ; LtGen, Filipinos, 296, 347, 350, 381, 387 31-32 Forces, 348, 381, 407 Gela, 281 Guerrillas, 348-352, 359, 361, 363, 365, 370- Geneva, Switzerland, 6 371, 375-377, 379-384, 386, 690 Geneva Conference, 7 Fire direction centers, 153, 319, 611. See also Geneva Conventions, 377, 420 Artillery. German colonies, 3, 6, 55 Fitzgerald, Captain John I ., Jr., 93 German General's Plot, 729, 732 Five Brothers Ridge, 221, 224-226, 229-231, Germans, 395, 458, 675, 729-732, 735-736 233, 240, 244, 246, 254, 256-257, 260-261, German Siegfried Line, 443 441 German Sixth Army, 430 Five Sisters Hill, 157-158, 160, 221, 231, 237, Germany, 4, 8-9, 67, 408, 430, 443, 729, 732 248,250,256-257 736 Flag raising (Iwo Jima), 542-543, 543n, 545, Gilbert Islands, 6, 23, 288, 395-396, 399-401, 593 404, 407, 415, 422, 443, 462, 731 Fleet Anchorage, 181 Gilberts-Marshalls Operations, 407 Fleet War Plans Division, 465 Gilberts operation, 395-396, 399 FLINTLOCK Operation, 401 Glidden, Maj Elmer G ., Jr., 405 Flock, Lt Charles F., 370 Godolphin, Capt Francis B ., 343n, 344n Florida, 35 Gormley, LtCol John J ., 119n, 121, 137 Flyers. See Pilots . Gorokottan Island, 262 FORAGER Operation, 61, 301, 422 Goto, Major Ushio, 69, 163, 168-171, 176-177, Formosa, 6, 51, 62, 276, 293, 297-299, 321, 324, 177n,179-180, 335-337,435,450,464-465,476 Graham, Col Chester B., 471, 515, 557-558, 567, Forrestal, Mr . James V., 442, 484, 564 569, 617, 627, 639 Fort Bragg, N. C., 35-36 Great Britain, 4-6, 19 Fort, RAdm George H ., 63, 83, 95, 104n, 165, Great Depression, 9 186, 211, 278-280, 286 ; VAdm, 78n Green Island, 363 Fort Stotsenburg, 342 Green, Maj Thomas C., 42 Forward observers, 153, 597, 628, 719. See also Griffin, Maj David R ., 202n Artillery. Grinlinton Pond, 257-258, 261 Fourteen Points, 7 Griswold, MajGen Oscar W., 352 Frame, Maj Donald P ., 435 Guadalcanal, 44-45, 52, 61, 77, 89-90, 94-97, France, 4-7, 19, 443, 467 99, 101, 165, 237, 253, 266, 268, 284, 291-293, Frank, Mr . Benis M., 90n 305, 327, 389, 393, 410, 422, 428, 430-431, Freeman, Col Calvin B ., 398, 401, 407-408 438-439,457,466,514,678 Fremont, 165, 278 Guam, 6, 25, 30-32, 36, 60-61, 63-64, 79, 184, French Samoa, 398 277, 279-280, 282, 310, 323, 388, 425-429, Frogmen, 495, 497-498, 500 429n, 438, 444, 466-469, 473, 477, 480, 483- Fukudome, VAdm Shigeru, 298 484, 489, 505, 538, 564, 578, 597, 598n, 604, Funafuti, 396, 398, 401-404 612,711,731-734 Futrell, Dr. Robert F ., 486n Guimba, 342, 347 Guiuan, 335 Gabbert, LtCol John T . L. D., 389 Guiuan strip, 339 Gambier Bay, 405 Gustafson, Maj John H., 141, 212 Garakayo Islands, 242, 250 Garangaoi Cove, 173-174 H. L. Edwards, 190 Garapan Plain, 678 Haas, LtCol Ralph, 508, 517, 526 Garekoru, 59, 160, 190, 192-193, 195, 197-201 Hague Conventions, 377 824 INDEX

Haha Jima, 496, 598 Hill 357 . 583-584 Haiti, 467 Hill 362, 590, 687 Hale, MajGen Willis H., 414 Hill 362A, 220, 581n, 616, 618, 621-623, 625- Halsey, Adm William F ., 62-63, 65, 66n, 82, 630 102, 181, 245, 278, 286, 291, 293, 293n, 301, Hill 362B, 581, 582n, 583-584, 616, 629-632, 303,309,325-326,335,420,430,435,465 635,691 Hanneken, Col Herman H ., 119, 130, 135, 137 Hill 362C, 445, 58211, 583, 585-586, 588, 591, Hankins, Col Joseph F., 233 616,684-685 Hanlon, Capt B. Hall, 492 Hill 382, 447, 455, 568, 572, 646-647, 649-663, Hansen, Lt John E ., 402, 404, 536 665,668-669,682 Harding, President Warren G ., 5, 7 Hilo, Hawaii, 477, 482 Harmon, LtGen Millard F ., 417, 464, 483 Hiraiwa Bay, 474, 633 Harris, SSgt Charles E ., 536 Hirohito, Emperor, 732, 736 Harris, Col Harold D ., 115, 122, 139, 141-143, Hitler, Adolph, 9, 729, 732 208, 237-238, 240, 240n, 241, 245, 254, 303 ; Hjerpe, Maj Carl W ., 515 BGen, 115n Hobby, 402, 404 Harrison, Col William H ., 104-105 Hodge, MajGen John R ., 63, 318 Hart, BGen Franklin A ., 505, 556 Hoeck, 1stLt G . A., 638n Hawaiian Islands, 6, 16-17, 23-24, 30-32, 45, Hoffman, BGen Hugh, 344n 96, 162, 301, 314, 363, 400-401, 408-409, 436, Holcomb, Gen Thomas, 19, 44 438, 445, 462, 468, 477-478, 482-483, 604- Holland, TSgt R . B., 344n 605,612,708,713 Hollandia, 292, 310, 327 Hawkins Field, 401, 404 Home Islands, 39-40, 57, 428, 443-445, 448- Headley, Capt James C., 559, 650, 664 450, 463, 466, 484, 493, 496, 597, 611, 618, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23, 27, 38, 221 730-732. See also Japan . Heinl, Maj Robert D ., Jr., 589n Hong Kong, 6, 294, 435, 451 Hellzapoppin Ridge, 305, 346, 389 Honolulu, Hawaii, 476 Henderson, Col Frederick P., 426n Honolulu, 132 Henderson Field, 45, 393, 428 Honshu, 490 Heritage, Maj Gordon W ., 426-427 Honsowetz, LtCol Russell E ., 147,157 Hermle, BGen Leo D ., 505, 516, 706 Hoover, President Herbert, 7, 246, 401, 414, Higashi, 445, 673, 680 613,710 Higashi Rock, 495 Hoover, VAdm John H ., 184 ; Adm, 64 Higashiyama, 159, 260 . See also Walt's Ridge. Hope, Bob, 90n Hall, RAdm Harry W ., 466, 502, 524, 700, 714 Hopkins, Col Zebulon C ., 304n, 334 Hill B, 222 Hori, Col Shizuichi, 457-458, 533n, 539n, 706, Hill Oboe, 576-577, 616 706n, 707, 717n Hill Peter, 574, 576-577, 616 Hough, Maj Frank 0 ., 52, 150n Hill Row, 205 Houser, Maj Robert H ., 559n, 562, 588 Hill 3, 214 Hudson, LtCol Lewis C., 520, 548 Hill 80, 202, 204 Hungary, 8 Hill 100, 157, 199, 206-207 Hunt, Capt George P., 110, 112-113, 144 Hill 120, 234, 244 Hurst, Maj E . Hunter, 119-120, 137, 226, 229, Hill 140, 244-246, 249, 254 234; LtCol, 19711 Hill 165, 640 Hill 200, 146-147, 157 ICEBERG Operation, 465, 572 Hill 205, 147 Ichimaru, RAdm Toshinosuka, 454, 461, 499, Hill 210, 146-147 499n, 564, 586, 669-670, 680, 702, 706, 706n Hill 215, 637 Idaho, 493, 496, 498, 500, 563, 565 Hill 260, 157 IDENTICAL Island, 181n, 183-184 Hill 300, 224, 260 . See also Kansokuyama. Ikeda, Col Masuo, 453, 562, 566, 643, 701-705, Hill 331, 589-590 710 INDEX 825 Iloilo River, 375 Jaluit Island, 399, 405, 412, 415 Inaoka, Maj Masauru, 711 Jaluit lagoon, 399 Independence,396 Japan 4-6, 8-10, 16, 23, 30, 32, 51, 54-55, 62, Indianapolis, 281, 560 67, 76, 241, 265, 276, 293-294, 296-297, 300, Indochina, 453, 730 326, 377, 405, 421, 430, 435-436, 348, 444- Indonesia, 294, 358 445, 448, 451, 453-454, 462-465, 476, 484, Infantry 489-491, 495, 598, 600-601, 614-615, 669, American, 87,. 211, 240, 251, 273, 305, 307, 683,706,711,730-737 . 317,352,366-368,371,374-375,379,385- invasion of, 387-388 386, 423, 521, 531, 565, 567, 574, 576, Japanese, 57-58, 66, 117, 119, 121, 136, 138, 581-582, 584, 592, 608, 618, 621, 628, 144-145, 147, 158, 160, 177, 190, 201-202, 633, 639, 647, 649-650, 657, 681, 686, 207, 209, 212, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 716, 720. See also Army units and Ma- 227-228, 230-232, 234-235, 237-238, 240- rine units. 242, 246, 249-251, 253, 256-258, 261-264, Inoue, LtGen Sadae, 68-72, 76, 156, 159, 163, 267-268, 270, 276-277, 279, 285, 287, 296- 169-170, 179, 180n, 190, 222, 232, 259, 263, 297, 300, 306, 310, 312, 314-315, 317-318, 320- 265,285-286 325, 328-329, 332, 335-336, 340, 346, 348-352, Inouye, Capt Samaji, 457, 543, 586, 675, 677- 356-357, 359, 361, 366-367, 370, 372, 374, 680,702,706 376-377, 379, 382, 386-387, 389, 393, 395, Intelligence 399-400, 407, 409-11, 413, 415-418, 420, 426, American, 163, 173, 177, 183, 209, 271, 280, 430, 436, 445, 449n, 451, 474, 484, 490, 526, 284, 335-336, 340, 343, 349, 352, 359, 543, 558, 602, 613, 624, 670, 688, 697-698, 366, 368, 469, 472, 475-476, 489, 499, 700,710-711,735-737 523,570,638-639,646,651,693,698 Army-Navy relations, 732 Irwin, Maj Darrell D ., 400 bases, 52, 400, 417 Islamic religion, 294 civilians, 55, 265, 381, 445, 450, 453 Island Mail, 409 diplomats, 737 Isolationism, 5, 8, 15 Emperor, 8, 485, 730 Italy, 4-9, 530, 733 Empire, 451, 700, 737 Ivey, LtCol Thomas S., 314 food, 530, 695 Iwahig, 362 Imperial Government, 706 Iwo Jima Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476, installations, 101, 108, 143, 279, 383, 414, 435-438, 444-445, 447-449, 449n, 450-454, 417,490,498-500,514,550,719,726 454n, 455-459, 461, 462n, 463-469, 471-485, leaders, 443, 449, 730 485n, 486-487, 490-497, 500-504, 506, 510, mandated territory, 57 512, 514-519, 521-523, 525-528, 530-533, Military Academy, 457 535-543, 545-548, 550, 552-556, 559-565, military doctrine, 457 568-573, 577, 579-581, 586, 588, 592-593, Minister of War, 324, 451, 732 597-598, 598n, 600-605, 607-608, 610-614, morale, 332, 414, 682, 736 614n, 615-618, 620, 620n, 622-626, 628-631, policy, 445, 614 633-634, 636, 640-644, 646-647, 657, 669, 688, phosphate plant, 172-174, 208, 216 691, 693-695, 697-715, 715n, 716-719, 721- Prime Minister, 707 729,732,736-738 repatriation, 265 Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476, 482, 564, Samurai family, 450 482, 564, 579, 597, 601, 604, 617, 645, 710- secret weapon, 736 711, 713, 715, 715n, 720, 722-723, 726, 735, strength, 163, 175, 180, 189, 258, 276, 285, 737 336,340,381,458n,472-473 Izu Shoto, 444 surrender, 178, 222, 265, 421, 693, 704-705 thermal ray, 736 Jack, Maj Samuel S ., 42 Tokyo Prefecture, 445 Jaluit Airfield, 396 transportation system, 335 Jaluit Atoll, 412-414, 416, 420 war effort, 730 826 INDEX war production, 450 3/145,659 weather station, 449, 456 Antiaircraft units Japanese Units 126th, 69 Imperial General Headquarters, 67-68, 70- 144th, 69 71,76,297-298,706 Miscellaneous Army, 208, 221, 276, 297, 332, 361, 371, 383, 45th Guard Force Detachment, 69 407, 448, 457, 614n, 620, 726, 732, 736 Navy, 178, 208, 265, 276, 298, 300, 312, 319, Kwantung Army, 67 329, 439-440, 443, 449-450, 454n, 670, Southern Area Army, 76 677, 680, 732 First Combined Air Force, 298 . See also Air Fleets First Air Fleet, Fourth Air Army First, 298 Fourth Air Army, 298, 337 Second, 298 Fourteenth Area Army, 298, 300, 340, 348, Combined Fleet, 67, 76, 297-298, 407, 358 499,701 Twenty-Third Army, 451 Imperial Fleet, 64, 68, 297, 312, 319, 325, Thirty-First Army, 68, 76, 78, 449, 453 407, 461, 493 Thirty-Fifth Army, 298, 361 tFirst Mobile Fleet, 298 1st Infantry Division, 321 Second Fleet, 298 14th Infantry Division, 68 Third Fleet, 298 16th Infantry Division, 315 Fifth Fleet, 298 30th Infantry Division, 359 Sixth Fleet, 298 35th Infantry Division, 67-68 Chichi Jima Naval Base, 449 100th Infantry Division, 359 204th Naval Construction Battalion, 454 102d Infantry Division, 361 214th Naval Construction Battalion, 75, 109th Infantry Division, 433, 455, 475, 208 533n Naval Guard Force, 457, 475, 677 1st Amphibious Brigade, 68 Special Naval Landing Force, 379 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, 453, 457- Striking Force, 298 458,569,572,647,647n,654,693,711 Special Attack Unit, 537. See also Ka- 53d Independent Mixed Brigade, 68-69 mikazes. 54th Independent Mixed Brigade, 359, 361 Miscellaneous Infantry Regiments Angaur Sector Unit, 69, 166, 169 2nd, 264 Antitank Battalion, 454 15th, 68-69 Cavalry, 451 26th, 698 Chichi Jima Branch, Army Fortification 41st, 321 Department, 448 59th,68-69 Demolition detachment, 592 145th, 453, 562, 643, 701, 703, 705 Field Hospital, 647 26th Tank Regiment, 454-455, 590, 692 Garrison units, 138, 163, 169-170, 178, 10th Independent Antitank Battalion, 553n 222, 237, 278, 358-359, 361-362, 377, Independent Infantry Battalions 381, 387, 415, 448, 453, 493, 704 309th, 569, 647n, 651 Anguar, 163, 165, 175, 179-180, 184 310th, 572, 647 Chichi Jima, 449, 705 311th, 572, 647n Iwo Jima, 458n, 537, 670, 700, 702 312th,647n Leyte, 329 314th, 572, 647n Peleliu, 76, 134, 189-190, 214, 232, 265 346th, 69 Imperial Guards, 451 Infantry Battalions Korean labor force, 69 1/59,163,175 Naval engineers, 221 2/15,69,193,195 Palau Sector Group, 68-71, 76 3/15,69,135 Parachute units, 450 3/17,643 Peleliu Area Unit, 222 INDEX 827

Shimbu Group, 352 Kauffman, Cdr D . L., 498n Special Counterattack units, 267 Kavieng, 303, 444 Special Counterlanding Force, 134 Kazan Retto, 444 Stragglers, 376, 426, 664, 675, 692 KEENSET, 181n, 183-184 Suicide Squads, 156 Kellum, Maj William C., 433 Suicide Swimmers, 561 Kenney, LtGen George C ., 291-292, 301, 303, Suribachi Sector Unit, 533 326, 334, 362 ; Gen, 65n Volcano-Bonin Defense Sector, 475 Kenyon, Col Howard N ., 564, 573, 582, 584, 687 Java, 297 Keokuk, 537 Jeans, Capt Cloyd R ., 402-403 Kessing, Como Oliver 0., 434 Jerome, Col Clayton C., 219, 304, 336-337, 339, Kibawe Trail, 387 352, 356, 363, 366-368, 372-373, 382, 390 ; Kibbe, Cdr R . L., 102n BGen, 280n Kimes, Maj Ira L ., 42 Jeru, Capt George E ., 85n KING II Operation, 310, 315 Johnson, LtCol Chandler W ., 508, 539-540, 629 King, Adm Ernest J ., 35, 293, 395, 397, 462- Johnson, Capt Robert C ., 560 463,465 Johnson, Col Robert F ., 711 King, Maj John H ., 329 Johnston Island, 21, 438 Kingman, RAdm Howard F ., 278 Joint Army-Navy Board, 16 Kingsbury, Maj Robert T., III, 326n Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24, 38, 51, 60, 62, 65, 151, Kinkaid,, VAdm Thomas C ., 303, 309, 326, 334 286,292-293,303,462,465,733 Kiska Operation, 467 Joint Expeditionary Forces, 62 Kita village, 445, 455-456, 633, 639, 695 Joint Intelligence Center (Pacific Ocean Areas), Kitano Point, 447, 455, 459, 577, 593, 624, 640, 30,60 642-643, 684, 698, 691, 695, 698, 700 Joint Marine-Army training, 21 Knott, Maj Gordon H ., 411 Joint Navy-Marine planning, 83 Koiso, Premier Kuniaki, 707n Joint Planning, 468 Kojima, Cpl Kyutaro, 711 Joint Staff Planners, 464 Kolombangar.a Island, 393 Joint Staff Study, 50 Kongauru Island, 211-212, 223, 250 Joint Training Forces Korea, 730 1st, 20 Korean civilians and laborers, 206, 209, 216, 2d,21 222, 265, 276, 418, 420, 639, 711 Joint War Plans Committee, 462, 464 Korean War, 718 Jolo Island, 361, 378-380 Koror Island, 57, 62, 68, 71, 134, 166, 190, 232, Jordan, Col Walter I ., 471, 519, 563, 567, 569, 281,433 659, 663, 665, 667, 672 Koror Town, 101 June, Col Frank M ., 433 Kossol Passage, 57, 103, 232 Jungle Warfare. See Tactics. Kossol Roads, 152, 287 Koyatau, Riichi, 543n Kabacan, 381 Krueger, LtGen Walter, 309, 321, 339, 348, Kaempfer, Maj William P ., 548 351,357 Kaido, Col Chosaku, 456 Krulewitch, LtCol Melvin L., 681 Kalinin Bay, 401, 407 Kumamoto, 659 Kaluf, Col John, 86n, 282n Kuribayashi, Capt Tadamichi, 451 ; LtCol, 451 ; Kama Rock, 603, 698 Col, 451 ; BGen, 451 ; MajGen, 451 ; LtGen, Kamikazes, 323-325, 328, 331, 336, 340, 459, 450-451, 451n, 453-459, 475, 484, 493, 523, 537, 718, 736 525-528, 533, 537, 539, 546-547, 551, 556, Kamilianlul Mountain, 210 561, 568, 572, 584-586, 593, 615, 623, 628, Kamilianlul ridges, 202 630, 633, 641-644, 669-670, 679, 682-683, Kaneohe, Hawaii, 398 685,695 Kangoku Rock, 472, 603, 698 Kuribayashi, Yoshii, 451n Kansokuyama, 159, 235, 260 . See also Hill 300 . Kurihama, 484 828 INDEX

Kurihara, SgtMaj Masao, 237n LCI-469, 498 Kurile Islands, 415, 443 LCI-474, 497 Kuroda, LtGen Shigenori, 298, 300 LCI-479, 420 Kurpoat, Sgt Henry S ., 516 LCI-484, 420 Kwajalein, 400, 405, 407, 409, 411, 417, 438, LCI-491, 420 467 League of Nations, 4-5, 7, 9, 55, 66 Kyushu, 39, 659 Leek, LtCol Frederick E ., 372-373, 373n Lehnert, Lt Robert E ., 402 Lae, 451 Lejeune, MajGen John A ., 16 Lake Aztec, 176 Letcher, Col John S ., 652 ; BGen, 480n, 605n, Lake Pinalay, 385 614n, 624n Lake Salome, 174 Lethbridge Report, 612n Lambrecht, LtCol Peter D ., 326 Lentze, 497 Lanboyan Point, 365 Lexington, 40-42 Landing barges, 195 Leyte, 54, 181, 287, 291, 294, 301, 303, 309-310, Landing craft . See also Ships. 312, 315-327, 330-335, 339, 342, 358-359, American, 19, 35, 181, 184, 195, 241, 267, 361, 363, 366-367, 377-378, 381, 443, 443, 503, 508, 522, 548, 601, 607, 634, 725 461,734 Types Leyte Gulf, 300, 310, 312, 318, 330, 335-337, 366 LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), 108, Leyte Operation, 314, 318, 320, 323, 328, 332- 135,166,171,497-498,503,554,727 334,345,358 LCI(G)s Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun- Lighthouse Hill . See Palomas Hill . boat), 132, 166, 496-497, 503, 626, 708 Line of departure, 84, 505-506, 517, 522, 615, LCI(M)s (Landing Craft, Infantry, 649 (Mortar), 166, 504, 523, 555 Lingayen, 337, 339, 342, 348 LCI(R)s (Landing Craft, Infantry, Lingayen Airfield, 339 (Rocket), 315, 504, 530 Lingayen Gulf, 334-335, 337, 342 LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized), 88, Liscome Bay, 396 166,516 LITHARGE, 181n, 183-184 LCPs (Landing Craft, Personnel), 85 Little Slot, 221 LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank), 35, 84, Liversedge, Col Harry B ., 471, 509, 512, 528, 272, 459, 602 530, 539, 545, 625 LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Person- Logistics, 82, 476, 716, 725 nel), 19, 34-35, 85, 88, 127, 166, 516, London Naval Treaty, 7 518, 522, 542 Los Angeles, Calif., 454 Japanese, 195, 258, 278 Los Negros, 363 Landing exercises and techniques, 17, 19 LOSSAU, 183 Landing forces, 269, 731 Loud, Cdr Wayne R ., 63 Lang, Lt Frank C ., 413 Louisville, 106, 190, 278, 281 Lanigan, Col John R ., 471, 509, 519-520, 549- Lovell, Stanley P ., 612n 551,555,649-650,660,663,671,692,694 Low Countries, 19 Larkin, LtCol Claude A., 42 ; Col, 45 ; BGen, Lowery, Sgt Louis R ., 542 46 ; MajGen, 303, 388 LSM 216, 517-518 Larsen, MajGen Henry L., 428 LST 776, 436-437 Lauesen, Lt Christian F ., 402 LST 477, 537 LCI-392, 418, 420 LST 779, 543, 552 LCI-394, 420 LST 807, 560 LCI-438, 497 LST 929, 479 ILCI-449, 497 LST 930, 479 LCI-450, 498 LST 931, 479 LCI-457, 498 LST 1032, 552 LCI-466, 498 LST 1033, 479 INDEX 829

Lummus, 1stLt Jack, 640-641 Marianas Operation, 26, 60, 62, 64, 84, 86, 153, Lunge Point, 537 424,465 Luzon, 21, 62, 287, 291, 293-294, 296-298, 303, Marianas Turkey Shoot, 423 312, 324, 327, 331-332, 334-337, 339-343, Marine units 348-349, 351-352, 356-358, 361, 366, 368, 370, Air 377, 382-383, 433, 435, 443, 457, 465, 734- Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 27- 73-5,737 30,40,47,433 Luzon Operation, 332, 334, 348, 353, 357, 715 Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, 46 Lyman, Col E . L., 248n Marine Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 301, 303, 387, 388 Marine Aircraft, South Pacific, 46 MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 9, 24, 51-52, 54, 62, Marine Aircraft, Defense Force, Samoan 65, 181, 286, 296, 301, 303, 309, 326, 333, 336- Area, 46 337,342-343,358,386,390,465,732-735 Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, 27, 30, 45- MacFarlane, LtCol Robert E ., 521 46 Mackay, Maj Malcolm S ., 437 ; LtCol, 438, 597 Marine Garrison Air Force, Western Car- Magai Channel, 183 olines, 431 Main Valley, 221 Marine Air Support Control Units, Am- Major, Col Harold C ., 388 phibious Forces, Pacific, 48 Majuro Atoll, 400, 400n, 405, 407, 438 Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 28, 44-47, Makin Island, 396, 398-399, 400n, 408, 412 99 Malabang iField, 383 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-47, 301, Malabang landing, 373n 303-304,312,347,362,387-389 Malacanan Palace, 343 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-42, 44- Malakal, 57, 281 47, 98, 98n, 99, 212, 377, 388, 425, 430- Malanaphy, Cdr Michael J., 492 431 Malaya, 730 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 46-47 Malayan, 55, 294 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 44-47, 398- Malaybaley, 385 399, 401, 404n, 412, 414, 416, 420, 422, Maloelap Airfield, 396, 405 425 Maloelap Atoll, 412-413, 415 Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, Service Manchuria, 9, 67-68, 454, 458, 463, 730 Group, 44-45 Mangaldan, 337, 339-340, 342, 352, 356-357, Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet 370, 373, 381-383 Marine Force, Pacific, 47, 423, 434-435 Mangaldan. Field, 339, 354 Marine Aircraft Groups, 340, 342 Manila, 294, 296, 303, 334, 342-344, 346-347, Marine Aircraft Group 11, 42, 98, 100-101, 349,351-354 127, 282, 430 Liberation of, 348 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 326-333, 335, Manila Bay, 296, 354 339, 342, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 372-373, Manila Bay, 423 378,390 Manila, John, 514. See also Basilone, GySgt Marine Aircraft Group 13, 398, 400, 407 John . Marine Aircraft Group 14, 334-335, 339, Manus Island, 83, 315 359,362-363,375-376,390 Maps and charts, Japanese, 472 Marine Aircraft Group 15, 413, 437 Marakina Watershed, 354 Marine Aircraft Group 21, 42, 393, 426- Marcus Island, 283n, 444 429 Marianas, 3, 6, 25-26, 30, 51, 54, 60, 67-68, 70, Marine Aircraft Group 22, 401, 411 292-293, 301, 395, 397, 416, 422, 428-429, Marine Aircraft Group 23, 45 436, 443-444, 449, 453, 462-464, 466-468, Marine Aircraft Group 24, 303-304, 306- 477-478, 483, 485, 495, 500, 504, 527, 559, 308, 335, 337, 339, 342-344, 347-349, 592, 598, 600, 604, 614, 713, 717-718, 723, 354, 356-357, 362-363, 368, 373, 382, 731-733 384,387-389,735 830 INDEX

Marine Aircraft Group 25, 98, 430 VMF-151, 398 Marine Aircraft Group 31, 398, 400, 407- VMF-155, 417 408 VMF-211, 42, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 378, Marine Aircraft Group 32, 303-304, 335, 383 339, 342-344, 347-349, 352, 354, 356- VMF-212, 334, 340, 363 357, 359, 362-363, 366-368, 371, 373, VMF-213, 335, 435 378, 388, 390 VMF-216, 427, 429 Marine Aircraft Group 41, 45 VMF-217, 427, 429 Marine Aircraft Group 42, 45 VMF-218, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 383 Marine Aircraft Group 43, 45 VMF-221, 42 Marine Aircraft Group 44, 45 VMF-222, 334, 340, 363, 375-376 Marine Aircraft Group 45, 433-434 VMF-223, 334, 363, 375-376 Marine Aircraft Group 51, 47, 423 VMF-224, 398, 400, 408, 416 Marine Aircraft Group 61, 327, 363, 388 VMF-225, 427, 429 Second Marine Aircraft Group (Oahu), 20 VMF-241, 398 Marine Aircraft Group (Dagupan), 339, VMF-251, 363, 375-376 350, 354, 356, 368 VMF-252, 42 Marine Aircraft Groups (Mindanao), 368 VMF-311, 398 Marine Aircraft Groups (Zamboanga), VMF-312, 433 370-374,382,384,388 VMF-313, 326, 328-330, 363, 368, 378 Marine Aircraft Service Group 48, 435 VMF-321, 429 Marine Aircraft Support Groups, 47 VMF-422, 398, 401, 403-404, 409-411 Provisional Air Support Command, 47 VMF-441, 398, 400, 416 Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, VMF(N)-531, 400 503, 605, 611, 719 VMF (N)-532, 400, 408, 411, 413, 425 Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 45, VMF(N)-534, 427, 429 98n,433 VMF(N)-541, 99, 259, 326-328, 330, 333, Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 48 430, 432 47,423 VMF(N)-542, 433-434 Base Air Detachment 3, 42 VMJ-152, 42 AWS-1, 411 VMJ-252, 413 AWS-2, 429 VMJ-353, 397-398, 413 AWS-3, 363, 383 VMO squadrons, 718 AWS-4, 363, 366, 368 VMO-1, 426-427, 429 AWS-5, 425 VMO-2, 424-425, 429 Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft VMO-3, 153, 432 Wings, Pacific, 44-46 VMO-4, 424-425, 436-437, 595, 646, 650, HqSqn-11, 101 665,671 HqSqn-12, 45 VMO-5, 436-437, 595 VMB-413, 363, 388 VMO-151, 42 VMB-423, 388 VMO-251, 42, 334-335 VMB-433, 363, 388 VMR-253, 429, 438-439, 604 VMB-611, 363, 373-374, 380, 386 VMR-353, 438, 604 VMB-612, 429, 436, 485 VMR-952, 437-438, 597, 604 VMF-111, 42, 398, 400, 400n, 412 VMS-3, 42 VMF-113, 400, 411-412, 416 VMSB-131, 42 VMF-114, 99, 101, 210-211, 226, 232, 241- VMSB-132, 42 242,256,259,283-284,430,432-433 VMSB-133, 339, 346, 383, 385, 388 VMF-115, 326, 329, 363, 368, 378 VMSB-142, 339, 346, 353, 370, 380, 383 VMF-121, 42, 99, 101, 430 VMSB-151, 398, 411 VMF-122, 99, 101, 228, 430 VMSB-231, 42, 405, 412 VMF-124, 335, 435-436, 503 VMSB-232, 42 INDEX 831

VMSB-236, 339, 370, 378, 380, 388 471n, 472-473, 476-480, 482-483, 489, VMSB-241, 339, 346, 353, 383-385, 388 491-492, 504, 522, 522n, 523, 525-526, VMSB-243, 339, 353, 363, 380 528, 547-549, 554-557, 560-561, 563-565, VMSB-244, 339, 353, 383, 388 565n, 567-569, 571-573, 577-579, 579n, VMSB-331, 398-399, 407, 412n, 418 580, 583, 585-588, 593, 597-598, 603, VMSB-341, 339, 353, 380, 383 605, 608, 608n, 610, 624, 629, 633, 635, VMSB-354, 420 638, 643n, 644, 647, 670-672, 685, 700n, VMI1B-131, 367, 429 711-712,714,719-721,723,725 VMTB-134, 100-101 Administrative Command, 24-25 VMTB-232, 433-434 Supply Service, 25 VMTB-242, 429, 598 V Corps Artillery, 301, 314, 316-319, 323, Ground 565, 574, 580, 605, 708, 720 Fleet Marine Force, 10, 17, 19, 21, 23-29, I Corps Supply Service, 25 32-33, 36, 38-40, 44, 47-48, 464, 466- III Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27 467, -476, 489 V Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27 Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, 17, 26- 1st Marine Division, 19-20, 27, 34, 36, 63, 27,30-31,36,38-39,46 77-79, 83, 86, 89, 94, 96, 100, 106, 127, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, 20, 467 130, 138, 158-159, 161-162, 165, 185, Department of the Pacific, 38 187, 200, 209, 216, 218, 223, 225, 227, Administrative Command, Fleet Marine 232, 236, 240, 245, 249-251, 253-254, 266, Force, Pacific, 26-27, 30 269, 271, 274-275, 277, 281-283, 283n, Marine Garrison Force, 246, 475 284, 286, 430, 433, 734 Amphibious Training Staff, FMFPac, 21 2d Marine Division, 19, 27, 34, 97, 266, Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMF- 395-396,425,464 Pac, 27 3d Marine Division, 27, 389, 437, 464, 467- Marine Supply Service, FMFPac, 477 469, 471, 473, 478n, 483-484, 515, 525, Service Command, FMFPac, 30 537, 553-555, 558, 563-565, 565n, 572- Supply Service, FMFPac, 27-28, 30, 477 579, 579n, 580-582, 582n, 583-587, 589- Transient Center (Marianas Area), FMF- 593, 616-617, 623,626-627,630,634,638, Pac, 31 644n,645,647,649,652,655,659,672-673, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, 16-17 676, 680, 684, 686, 688-689, 691, 701- Marine Service of Supply, Amphibious 702,704,708,711,711n,712 Troops, Pacific, 24 4th Marine Division, 27, 400, 407-408, 423, Expeditionary Troops, 83, 162, 181, 469, 425, 437, 466-469, 471, 471n, 472-473, 471, 474, 484, 607, 714 478n, 479n, 482-483, 498, 502, 505-506, Force Amphibian Tractor Group, 27 508-509, 517-518, 521, 523, 525-526, Force Antiaircraft Artillery, 27 528, 549, 551-552, 554-558, 560-561, Force Artillery, 27 ,563-564, 565n, 569-571, 595, 602-603, Force Reserve, 27 605, 616, 636n, 642, 644n, 645-647, 649- Force Service Troops, 27 652, 654, 657-661, 665, 668-677, 680- Fleet Base Defense Force, 17 683, 692-693, 695, 702, 708, 711n, 712, FMF Transient Center, 27 714,725 I Marine Amphibious Corps, 3, 21, 23-25 5th Marine Division, 25, 27, 64, 437, 467- II Marine Amphibious Corps, 24 469, 471-473, 478n, 479n, 480, 482-484, X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps, 61, 498, 502, 505-506, 508-509, 512, 516- 64,78-79 517, 521, 525, 528, 549, 551-552, 554- Redesignated III Amphibious Corps, 66 558, 560-561, 563-565, 565n, 567, 569, III Amphibious Corps, 25-27, 30, 61, 63- 571, 573, 575-579, 579n, 580-581, 581n, 64, 79, 88, 96, 162-163, 165, 168, 177, 582n, 583-587, 591-592, 602-603, 605, 181,186-187,246,252,278n,430 616-618, 620, 622, 624, 626-627, 629- V Amphibious Corps, 23-27, 30, 38-39, 61, 636, 636n, 637-638, 640-641, 643-644, 162, 300-301, 425, 436, 466-469, 471, 644n, 645, 658, 676, 686, 688, 691, 695, 832 INDEX

697-698, 700-705, 707, 711n, 712, 714, 703,706-707 725 27th Marines, 471-472, 509, 513-515, 548- 6th Marine Division, 27 550, 554-557, 621-623, 625, 633-636, 638, 1st Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344n 642-643,686,697-702,707 2d Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344n 28th Marines, 471, 482, 509-510, 512-513, 1st Marines, 80-86, 91, 110, 116, 122, 126, 516, 528, 530-531, 533-534, 536, 538- 130, 134, 141, 143-146, 148, 155-159, 539, 542, 545, 547, 553, 624-628, 630, 632- 161, 186-187 . 189, 192, 201, 223-224, 633, 635, 637, 640, 642-643, 697, 699- 228, 237, 280, 467 701,703,707 3d Marines, 564, 565n, 573, 607-608, 608n 29th Marines, 39 5th Marines, 80, 91, 96, 115-116, 118, 122, Field Depots 126, 128-129, 134, 139, 141-143, 146, 1st, 28 148, 152, 155, 185, 201, 204-205, 207, 3d,28 210, 214, 218, 223, 236-238, 240, 242, 5th, 28, 477 249-250,252,254,593 7th, 28 6th Marines, 467 8th, 28, 478, 602, 708, 725 7th Marines, 19, 80-81, 96, 118, 121, 126- 16th, 28, 86, 99, 150, 225, 246, 282 127, 129-130, 134, 138, 146, 148, 153, 155, Base Depots 185, 192, 200, 207, 216, 222-228, 233- 4th, 28 234,236-238,252,269,276 6th, 28, 477 9th Marines, 564, 573-578, 581-585, 587- 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, 652 588, 590-592, 617-618, 648, 665, 667, Amphibian Tractor Battalions 672,686-687,690,711 1st, 28, 92, 229, 252, 271 11th Marines, 80, 91, 94, 105, 129, 153, 2d,28 202, 207, 233, 250 3d,28 12th Marines, 573, 579, 579n, 580, 587, 4th, 28 589,697 5th, 28 13th Marines, 472, 482, 515-516, 521, 548, 6th, 28, 93 554, 579n, 617, 621, 624-625, 627-628, 8th, 28 636, 643, 697, 701 10th, 28 14th Marines, 472, 545, 552, 560, 568, 579n, 11th, 28, 643 587,655,671,675-676,697 Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, 698 20th Marines, 408 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions 21st Marines, 305-306, 484, 515, 551, 554- 1st, 27 559,561-563,565-567,573-575,578,580- 2d,27 588, 590-591, 593, 623, 636, 647, 655- 3d,27 656,690-691,701,711 4th, 27 22d Marines, 408 5th, 27 23d Marines, 471, 509, 517-519, 521, 549- 7th, 27, 175, 179 551, 554-558, 647, 649-652, 654-656, 8th, 27 658-659, 661-662, 665, 667-670, 672, 9th, 27 67"78,680-681,692,694 10th, 27 24th Marines, 471-472, 519, 521, 557, 563, 11th, 27 565, 567-569, 647-648, 659-661, 663, 12th, 27, 265 666-668,671,673,675-681 14th, 27 25th Marines, 471, 471n, 509, 519-521, 15th, 28 648-551, 554-557, 560, 647, 649-651, 16th, 28 656, 658, 660-661, 664-665, 669-670, 17th, 28 673,67-5-676p678,680-682,692,694 18th, 28 26th Marines, 469-471, 484, 515, 549, 557- Armored Amphibian Battalions 558, 561, 565-567, 569, 575, 616-618, 1st, 28 620-621, 627, 629-636, 639, 643, 699- 2d, 28, 472, 505, 618, 648, 671, 698, 721 INDEX 833

3d, 28, 93, 242, 252 682,694 Artillery Battalions 1/26, 515, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567, 617, 1/11,80 621, 623, 633-635, 638-641, 697, 703, 1/12,575,686 706-707 1/13,515,639 1/27, 508, 513-514, 549, 554-555, 621- 1/14,521-522,555,573,575,661,668 623,633-634,636,642 2/11,80,116,123,195,228 1/28, 508-510, 512-514, 525n, 526, 530, 2/13,515 534, 536, 538, 543, 545, 625-626, 629- 2/14,521-522,652,668 630t 637,640,643,707 3/11,80,129,153,269 2/1, 110, 113-115, 123, 126, 134, 144- 3/13,515-516,531 147,157-159,229 3/14,521-522,552,668 2/5, 117-118, 123, 126, 139, 141-143, 4/11,86,248,252,254 201, 205-206, 208-209, 216-217, 232- 4/12,708 233,237-238,241-242,244-246 4/13,515,574,578 2/7, 80, 119, 130-131, 138, 144, 146-147, 4/14,47-2,522,552,668 157, 159-160, 190, 207, 224-231, 234, Base Headquarters Battalions 236,251-252 1st, 28 2/9, 574-575, 575n, 576-577, 581-582, 3d,28 585-586,590-592,684,686,688 Defense Battalions, 19, 21, 43 2/21, 558-559, 562, 566-567, 578, 580, 52d,28 582-587,591,686,691 Engineer Battalions 2/23, 508, 517-519, 550, 554, 558, 647, 1st Separate, 28, 114, 204 654-655, 658, 667, 672-674, 676-681, 2d Separate, 28, 595, 720 692 1st, 152, 156, 204, 240 2/24, 519, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567-568, 3d,573 636n, 647-648, 658-663, 665-668, 672, 4th, 647 675-676,680-682,693-694 5th, 545, 628 2/25, 520, 547-548, 550-551, 555, 559, Infantry Battalions 561, 567, 647-650, 654, 656-658, 664- 1/1, 114, 144-147, 157-159, 161, 189 665, 667, 669-670, 673, 681-682, 693- 1/5, 115-117, 122-124, 126, 139, 141, 143, 694 201-202, 204-205, 209, 214, 216-217, 2/26, 561, 567, 617-618, 620, 624, 626- 236-237,240,250 627t 629-631,635,699-700 1/7, 119, 119n, 121, 129n, 135-138, 159- 2/27, 508, 513-515, 549, 557, 561, 617- 160, 190, 200, 210, 212, 223-229, 231, 618,621,623,636-637,639-642 236,250-252 2/28, 508-510, 512-514, 530-531, 535- 1/9, 574-577, 581-582, 586, 590-591, 536, 538-540, 543, 625-630, 633, 637, 685-688 640-641,707 1/21, 306, 558-559, 559n, 562, 578, 580, 3/1, 110, 113, 144-145, 147, 156-157, 582-586, 588-589, 591-592, 626, 686, 159-160, 187, 189, 192, 197 691 3/4,522 1/23, 508, 517-519, 526, 548, 550, 554, 3/5, 116-117, 119-120, 126, 128, 139, 558, 647, 649, 652, 654-656, 658, 660, 141-143, 148, 201-202, 205, 210-212, 665, 667, 671-672, 674, 680, 687, 692, 214, 228-229, 231-232, 237, 240, 246, 779 249-251,433 1/24, 519-521, 547-548, 550-551, 555, 3/7, 116-119, 119n, 120-121, 134-138, 557, 559-560, 568-569, 647-648, 658, 141, 159-160, 192-193, 195, 197-200, 1660-662, 666-667, 672, 674-676, 680- 224-225, 227-229, 231, 234, 236-238, 681 252,697 1/25, 508, 519-520, 526, 547, 550-551, 3/9, 575, 575n, 576, 578, 580-583, 585- 554-555, 559, 650-651, 654, 656-657, 593t 626,629-631,685-687 660, 664-665, 667, 671, 673-675, 681- 3/21, 566-567, 576, 578, 580-581, 585- 834 INDEX

587,591-592,685-687 Provisional Battalion, 675, 681 3/23, 518-519, 547, 556, 558, 647, 649, 4th Provisional Battalion, 681 651-655,658,660,664,667,671-672 Amphibian Truck Companies 3/24, 520-521, 567-568, 647-650, 656, 4th, 521 659-661,665-667,672,676-677,681 5th, 516 3/25, 508, 519-521, 547-548, 550, 555, 2d Bomb Disposal Company, 600 559, 561, 650-651, 654, 657-658, 664, Joint Assaut Signal Company (JASCO), 667,669-671,673,680-682,693 103, 282, 332, 384 3/26, 558, 567, 617-618, 626-627, 630- 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, 277 631, 635-636, 639, 643, 699-700, 703, War Dog Platoons, 707 4th, 158 3/27, 515, 547, 549, 554, 621, 623, 625, 6th, 624 633,637,643,691,703,706-707 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, 662, 3/28, 512-513, 530-531, 534-536, 538- 655 540, 625-626, 629-630, 633, 637, 643, 3d Rocket Detachment, 621 701,703,706-707 Demolition teams, 135-137, 156, 169, 209, 1st Medical Battalion, 148, 251 214, 216, 226, 262, 271, 531, 621, 633, Motor Transport Battalions 636, 649, 667, 685, 689, 697, 706 1st, 88, 252 Marine Detachment (Provisional), U . S. 5th, 643 Army Forces, Western Pacific, 39 155m Howitzer Battalions Marine Detachment, Sixth Army, 39 1st, 27 Marine Detachment, Tenth Army, 38 2d, 27, 552 Marine Detachment (Provisional), Mari- 3d, 27, 80, 153, 254 anas Area, 31 4th, 27 1st Division Military Police Company, 233 5th, 27, 314-319, 320n, 322 7th Marines Weapons Company, 224, 227 155mm Gun Battalions Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C., 7th, 27 20,100 8th, 27, 80, 153, 254 Marine Corps Air Station, Mojave, Calif ., 45, 9th, 27 47,423 10th, 27 Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif . 17 11th, 27, 314, 316-317, 319n Marine Corps Equipment Board, 17, 35 12th, 27 Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va ., 17, 60 Pioneer Battalions Marshall, General of the Army George C ., 614 1st, 84, 86, 147, 152, 225, 282 Marshalls, 3, 16, 48, 54, 60, 67, 85n, 110, 279, 3d,573,602 288, 292, 315, 392, 395-396, 399-400, 400n, 5th, 703, 708, 710, 724 401, 405, 407-409, 411-414, 416-417, 420- 1st Seacoast Artillery Battalion, 28 422, 428, 449, 462, 466-467, 478, 713, 718, 1st Service Battalion, 86, 282 731,733 Service and Supply Battalions Masilay, 371 1st, 28 Mason, Col Arthur T ., 172n 2d,28 Matsunaga, RAdm Teiichi, 451 3d,28 Matsushita, Maj Nagahiko, 533n 4th, 28 Maui, 468, 482-483 Tank Battalions McAloney, Capt Samuel H ., 344n, 351n, 368, 1st, 88, 115, 124, 155, 228, 272 378-379 3d, 484, 573-574, 578, 581, 591, 685, 687- McBroom, Maj Robert B ., 89 '688 McCarthy, LCdr Daniel J., 538 4th, 472, 509, 517, 519, 548-550, 555, McCaul, Maj Vernon J ., 42; Col, 304, 363, 388 ; 560,647-648,650,666-668,676 LtGen,304n 5th, 472, 512-515, 531, 538, 549, 554, McConaughy, Capt James L ., Jr., 351-352, 379 560, 565, 618, 625-628, 631, 639, 641 McCutcheon, LtCol Keith B ., 304, 306-307, 337, INDEX 835

343, 372, 382, 389 ; MajGen, 343n, 373n Moret Field, 367-368, 3.70-374, 379-384, 388 McGlothlin, Maj Joe H ., 329, 401-402 Moret, Capt Paul, 42 ; LtCol, 367 McQuade, Maj Thomas J ., 42 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 715n Mears, Capt Dwayne E., 510 Mormacport, 101 Meat Grinder, 616, 645, 647-648, 651, 661, 682 Moro guerrillas, 379 Medical Activities, 55, 83, 139, 142-143, 148, Morotai Island, 52, 62, 65, 293, 309-310, 381, 150-151, 185, 225, 227, 234-235, 238, 266, 733-734 274-275, 398-399, 427, 431, 438, 477, 517, Mortimer Valley, 260 525, 536, 545, 551, 557, 567, 569, 597, 602- Moses, Col Martain, 318 604, 610, .613, 629, 635, 642, 648, 668, 677- Motoyama Plateau, 471, 571-574, 577, 579, 632 678,682,689,699,721-723,761 Motoyama tableland, 580, 593 Mee, Maj Fenton, 5 ; LtCol, 525n, 555, 650, 6,53, Motoyama village, 445, 447, 449n, 459, 539, 656, 660, 674 574,577-578,581,584-586,634,684,686 Megee, Col Vernon E., 47-48, 503-504, 504n, Mt. Bangkal, 379 597 ; Gen, 598n Mt. Daho, 379-380 Melanesian, 55 Mt. Dato, 379 Merritt, Col Lewie G., 45 ; BGen, 388, 398, Mt. Mataba, 353454 401, 414, 416 Mt. McKinley, 106,187 Meyer, Col Lyle H ., 303, 307, 339, 356, 387 Mt. Olympus, 106, 108, 278, 314 Micronesia, 16, 54-55 Mt. Oyama, 262 Middle Village, 174 Mt. Patikul, 379 Midway, 17, 21, 342, 401, 438-439 Mt. Suribachi, 453, 455-459, 469, 471, 473, 483, Mille Airstrip, 396 487, 49 5-498,1 500, 502-503, 508-510, 512- Mille Atoll, 400n, 405, 412-413, 415, 418, 421 513, 516, 525-526, 528, 530-531, 533, 533n, Miller, Sgt P . J., 344n, 479 534-540, 542-543, 545, 547, 553, 564-565, Miller, Lt Roy G., 320, 436 593, 604, 611, 618, 624-626, 634, 646, 677- Millington, LtCol William A., 435-436, 503- 679,700,726 504,506 Mudge, MajGen Verne D ., 343n, 344n, 347, 352 Mills, LtCol James E ., 314 ; Col, 319n Mueller, MajGen Paul J., 63, 165, 168-169, Minami village, 445, 447, 459, 568, 642, 646, 171-173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 186, 211, 232n, 648, 650, 660, 666, 673, 676, 682 237n, 252, 254, 259n, 260-262, 263n, 264, 278 Mindanao, 52, 64-65, 291-293, 303, 309, 321, Mugai Channel, 181 332, 356-359, 361-363, 365-366, 374, 380- Mulcehy, Col Francis P., 46 ; MajGen, 47, 388 388,390,733-734 Munda Airstrip, 428 Mindoro Island, 331, 334, 336, 358, 363, 381 Munday, Maj Jack R ., 123n, 129n Mississinewa, 434 Munich Settlement, 9 Missoula, 540 Murahori, 1stLt, 190 Mitchell, Maj Norman L ., 259 Murai, MajGen Kenjiro, 70, 259, 263 ; LtGen, Mitchell, MajGen Ralph J., 46, 301, 303n, 312, 264 314,326,334-335,362-363,387 Murphy, LCdr Raymond P., 595 Mitscher, RAdm Marc A ., 405, 493, 495-496, Murray, Maj Clay, 559n, 562 717 ; VAdm, 64,102 Murray, 420 Moluccas, 52 Mussolini, Benito, 9 Monte Cassino, 530 Mustain, LtCol Hollis U ., 508, 519, 550, 555 Monitor, 314 Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., Nakagawa, Col Kunio, 68-70, 72, 146-148, 307-308 156-157, 159, 161, 169, 179, 217, 219, 222, Moore, BGen Ernest, 598, 708 225, 229-230, 233, 235, 245, 248-249, 258, Moore, Maj James B ., 400 260-264 ; LtGen, 267 Moore, MajGen James T ., 47, 98-99, 430-431, Nakayama, 146 . See also Hill 200 . 433,598n Namur Island, 407. See also Roi-Namur . Moran, Lt Robert P ., 402-403 Nanomea, 396, 401-402, 404 836 INDEX

Nanpo Shoto, 444-445, 464 Joint Expeditionary Force, 483 Nansei Shoto, 465 Joint Expeditionary Force, 466, 483 Napalm, 92, 92n, 136, 153, 169 Pacific Forces Napp, Cdr Emil E ., 90n Central, 23 Nashville, 311 Southwest, 62 Natives, 265, 317, 365, 398, 402, 404, 418, 420 Service Force, Pacific, 477 Natoma Bay, 423 Fleet Air Wing 2, 398 Nauru, 396, 399, 415 Transport Division, 28, 316 Navajo Marine Code Talkers, 620, 620n, 621, Transport Division 32, 484 719 Amphibious Group 2, 476 Naval gunfire, 17, 34, 36, 63, 78, 83, 94, 103- Attack Groups 105, 108, 112, 119n, 135, 137, 146, 153, 162, Angaur, 63, 165 166, 168-169, 177, 190, 208, 210, 221, 278- Peleliu, 63 279, 280-282, 288, 314, 368, 404, 475, 483, Ulithi, 181 486-487, 489-493, 495, 501, 504-505, 512, Defense Group, 634 .534, 536, 547-550, 555-556, 558, 562-563, Escort Carrier Group, 96 567, 573, 576, 579n, 582, 584, 587, 589, 605, Fast Carrier Groups, 102 611, 617, 620-621, 623, 633, 638, 640, 643, Fire Support Group, 64, 102-103, 278 646, 648, 654, 658, 661-662, 668, 671-672, Mine Group, 492 674,684,714-719,726 Submarine Offensive Reconnaissance Group, Naval liaison officers, 282 102 Naval liaison parties, 308 Support Carrier Group, 492, 495, 500, 598 Naval losses, 312 Transport Groups, 95 Naval Treaty of 1922, 4, 6 Transport Group 3, 83 Naval War College, 15 Underwater Demolition Group, 492 Navy, 13, 24, 41, 63-64, 278, 307, 325, 334, 342, Air Evacuation Squadron 2, 597 388, 430, 436, 452, 670, 714, 732, 734 Destroyer Squadron, 54 Bureau of Aeronautics, 41 Interpretation Squadron 2, 473 Bureau of Naval Personnel, 279 Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees), General Board of the Navy, 14, 20, 40, 43 89, 204, 274, 335, 398, 408, 484, 517, 526, Navy Units. See also Task Organizations . 564, 595, 600, 701, 710, 712 U. S. Fleet, 17, 395, 735 9th, 560 Atlantic Fleet, 19-20 15th, 89 Pacific Fleet, 19, 23, 184, 734 31st, 479, 479n, 564, 594, 602 Third Fleet, 63-64, 102, 245, 278, 293, 300, 33d, 152, 204, 272 303,309,334-336,430,435 51st, 433 Fifth Fleet, 23, 68, 70, 77, 101, 422, 435, 466, 62d, 479, 595, 7.20 491,502 73d, 152, 204 Seventh Fleet, 300-301, 307, 309, 326, 335 93d,335 Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 20 98th, 708 Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 21, 23, 467 133d, 479, 479n. 594-595, 602, 634 Amphibious Support Force, 483, 492, 502 1054th, 152 Attack Forces Photographic Squadrons Eastern, 63 4th, 472 Luzon, 336 5th, 472 Northern, 25, 502 Service Squadron 10, 478 Southern, 25 Transport Squadrons Ulithi, 183 11,484 Western, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283 15,584 Covering Force, 63-64, 483, 492, 498, 500, 503 16,484 Fast Carrier Forces, 64, 101, 435, 495 Underwater Demolition teams (UDT), 78- Fleet Naval Landing Forces, 25, 63-64, 425 79, 83, 103, 110, 165, 183, 207, 268, 490, INDEX 837

493n,496-499,725 Nine-Power Treaty, 6 UDT 13,495 Nishi, LtCol Baron Takeichi, 454-455, 459, UDT 15, 500 590-591, 628, 646, 652, 655, 684, 692 ; Col, VC-21, 283n 706 VOC-1, 718 Nishi Ridge, 616, 625, 628-630 Air Support Unit, 492 Nishi Village, 618, 630, 632, 635, 637 Fire Support Unit One, 498 Nisshu Maru, 455 Fire Support Unit Two, 498 Noble, RAdm Albert G ., 381 Gunboat Support Unit One, 492 Noguchi, Capt Iwao, 711 Gunboat Support Unit Two, 492 Norfolk, Va., .53 Peleliu Fire Support Unit, 96 Norman, Col Lawrence, 398 Kossol Passage Detachment, 63, 103 Normandy, 731-732 Shore-Based Aircraft, Forward Area, 414 North Africa, 733 Navy Yard, 270 North Carolina, 20 Nazi Party, 732 North Carolina, 493, 503 Negro Marines, 150, 516, 602 Northern Solomons, 303 Negros Island, 294, 331, 358-359, 361, 374-378 Northrop Aviation, 326 Nemoto, Captain, 264 Norway, 19 Netherlands, 6 Noumea, 431 Netherlands Indies, 51, 55 Novaliches, 346 Nevada, 493, 496, 498, 500, 503, 624 Nui Island, 402-403 New Bern, N . C., 41 Nukufetau, 399 New Britain, 77, 89, 237, 266, 303, 363, 444 Nutting, Capt Lewis, 605 New Caledonia, 367, 438 Newcomb, Richard F ., 458n, 533n, 543n, 677n, Oahu, 21, 183, 417, 477, 483 678n Obata, Gen Hideyoshi, 449, 453 New Georgia, 305, 389, 393, 428, 430 Observers, Japanese, 128, 141 New Guinea, 51-52, 67-68, 97, 287, 291-292, Ocean Island, 415 309, 432, 439, 444, 730, 733 OCTAGON Conference, 65 New Hebrides, 95, 98, 100, 430, 433 Oder River, 730 New Ireland, 303, 363 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 612 New London, Conn ., 14 Ofstie, RAdm Ralph, 278, 281 New Mexico, 336 Ogasawara Gunto, 444 Newport, R.I., 14-15 Okinawa, 30, 32, 39, 47, 184, 266, 277, 309, 377, New River Base, N.C., 20 387-388, 465, 490, 572, 614, 715, 734-735, Newton, VAdm John H ., 293 737 New York, 493, 500, 503 Old Baldy, 260 Ngardololok, 59, 142-143, 201, 217 Oldendorf, RAdm Jesse B ., 103-104, 106, 287n, Ngarekeukl, 189-190 279-280 Ngarmoked Island, 57,135-138 Oldfield, LtCol John S., 515 Ngercheu Island, 265 Old Glory, 445 Ngeregong, 261-262 O'Leary, TSgt Jeremiah A ., Jr., 235n Ngesebus Airfield, 73, 211 Ommaney Bay, 336 Ngesebus Island, 58, 61, 73, 80, 148, 189, 202, O'Neill, Capt Donald D ., 425 205-212, 214, 219, 222-223, 242, 250, 276, 281, Ormoc, 321, 325, 327-328, 330 84, 306, 73.5 Orote Field, 426-428 Nicaragua, 16-17, 305, 467 ,Orote Peninsula, 425-426 Nichols Field, 354 Osaka Yama, 628. See also Hill 362A. Nimitz, Adm Chester W., 24, 26, 29-30, 38, 44- Osborne, 1slLt Stanley, 662-663 47, 51-52, 52n, 60-62, 65, 98, 278, 286, 292- Osuka, MajGen Kotau, 453, 457-458, 475 293, 326, 388, 395-396, 420, 427, 430, 462- Ota, Lt Hideo, 711 466,491n,612,712,714,733 Owi Island, 335, 432 838 INDEX

Oyama, 260 209-211, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 227- Oyanagi, Leading Private Yutaka, 683n 228, 232-233, 236-237, 241-242, 244-246, 249- Ozark, 723 250, 253-254, 258-263, 265, 267-269, 271- 273, 275-286, 288, 300, 306, 309, 326-327, Pacific Islands, 55 333, 335, 430-431, 431n, 432, 438, 443, 445, Pacific Ocean, 54, 439-440, 444, 713-714, 731, 489,505,729,733-734,738 737, 764 Peleliu Airfield, 66, 95, 98-99, 115, 152, 165, Pacific Ocean Areas, 24, 29, 38, 41, 54, 60 185, 236, 263, 276, 430, 432, 438 Pacific Theater, 21, 292, 504, 522, 588, 612- Peleliu Island Command, 86, 89, 98, 134, 152, 613, 620n, 726, 730 156,264-265,282 Pacific War, 54 Peleliu Operation, 94, 96, 100, 153-154, 161, Pagan Island, 429 185, 190, 207, 214, 266, 270-271, 273-274, Palampon, 332 278, 280-281, 284, 285n, 287, 324, 433, 735 Palaus, 16, 47, 52, 54-55, 57-62, 64-68, 71, Pennsylvania, 145 76-78, 82, 96-98, 101-102, 105, 134, 162, 165, Pensacola, 493, 495-497, 563, 565, 624 180, 183, 189, 193, 223, 227, 232, 245, 253, Peppard, Maj Donald A ., 237n 259, 265, 279, 286-287, 293, 326, 407, 430, Peralta, Col, 375 433,457,733-734 Percy, Maj George A ., 562, 582 Palawan Island, 358-359, 361-362, 365 Perry, Commo Matthew, 445, 484 Palmyra Island, 21, 438 Philadelphia, Pa ., 14 Palo, 310 Philippines, 3, 6, 14, 51-52, 54, 65, 67, 70-71, Palomas Hill, 174, 176. See also Lighthouse 76, 102, 179, 181, 184, 279, 287, 291-294, 296- Hill. 298, 303-304, 306-307, 309, 312, 324, 327, Palompon, 331 332-333, 335-337, 340, 342, 348, 354, 356, Panaon Straits, 310 358-359, 361-363, 366, 375-377, 380-382, Panay, 294, 358-359, 361, 363, 370, 374-376, 384, 387-390, 423, 433, 440, 443-444, 447, 378 457, 461, 463, 465, 469, 718, 718n, 730, 732- Panay Islands, 328, 331 736 Parang, 381-383 Philippines Operation, 286, 291, 300, 307, 334, Parangon, 381 351,358p374,377,387,389-390,416 Parker, Capt Elton C ., 492 Photographs, 221, 275, 318, 382 Parris Island, S.C., 35-36 Pilots Parry Islands, 408-409 American, 40-42, 48, 153, 225, 241, 274, 283, Password CHEVROLET, 620 291, 301, 312, 314, 327-328, 330-335, 342, Patikul, 379 346, 348-349, 351-352, 354, 356, 359, Patrick, MajGen Edwin D ., 352-354 362, 365, 367, 370, 374-376, 380, 383- Patrols, 269, 611, 637, 692 390, 393, 396-397, 400-401, 407, 411- antisubmarine, 100, 278, 433, 561, 598, 611, 413, 415-417, 420, 422-424, 427-428, 717 433-437, 440, 472, 485, 490, 493, 499- Pearce, Maj Thomas B ., Jr., 629 500,523,597,717-718,718n,735 Pearl Harbor, 20, 26, 30, 32, 41, 44-45, 60-61, Japanese, 399-400, 439, 452, 454 67, 94, 98-99, 220, 303, 315, 409, 423, 429, Pinckney, 479, 723 431, 449, 451, 465, 467-468, 476-477, 501, Pipes, Sgt Joe L., 516 537, 677 Plain, Col Louis C., 514 Japanese attack, 29, 40, 42, 44 Planning Peatross, LtCol Oscar F ., 513n American, 51-52, 57-58, 60, 98, 346, 483, Peleliu, 3, 36, 57-59, 62-63, 66, 70-73, 75-81, 485, 590, 542, 559n, 590, 593, 612, 721 83-84, 86, 88-89, 92-94, 97, 100-106, 116, Japanese, 300, 340, 450 118, 120, 122n, 124, 127-129, 131, 135-136, Plaridel, 346 138-139, 141-143, 150-51, 153, 155-156, 162, Poland, 8-9, 19 165, 169, 175, 177, 179-181, 184-197, 189- Pollock, LtCol Daniel C ., 515, 549 190, 192-193, 195, 198-202, 204-205, 207, Polynesian, 55 INDEX 839

Ponape Island, 407, 412, 415-416 586, 592-593, 602, 608, 633, 688-689, 699, Pontoon causeways, 152 702,724 Pope, Capt Everett P ., 157-158, 234 Rescue Activities, 401, 440 Portland, 281 Research and Development, OSS . See Office of Portugal, 6, 8 Strategic Services. Pratt & Whitney radial engine, 399 Reservoir Hill, 350-351 President Monroe, 409-410, 710 Reutlinger, Maj Albert F ., 93 Price, RAdm John D ., 398 Reynolds, Maj John E ., 417 Prisoners of War Rhineland, 9 Japanese, 134, 138, 175, 195, 199, 207-209, Richardson, LtGen Robert K ., Jr., 464 218, 222, 225, 236, 253, 258, 276-277, Ridderhof, Col Stanley E ., 388 285, 361-362, 370, 418, 522, 551, 626, Ridge 3, 242, 245 644,690,692-694,703-704,710-711 Ridge 120, 244 Korean, 209, 216, 276, 644 Ridlon, Capt Walter, 663 Psychological warfare, 276, 417, 693, 704 Roach, Capt Phil E ., 510 Puerta Princesa, 362 Roads, 202, 210, 325, 479, 634 Puller, Col Lewis B ., 110, 112, 114, 129-130, Roane, Capt Eugene S ., Jr., 322 134,144,147-148,157,187 Robertson, Capt Armand, 95-96 Pusan, Korea, 454 Robertson, LtCol Donn J ., 515, 549, 702 Putnam, Maj Paul A., 42 Robinson, Col Ralph R., 60 Rockey, MajGen Keller E ., 468, 512, 549, 554- Quantico, Va., 14, 16-17, 19, 21, 35-36, 39, 41- 555, 557, 579, 581, 598, 610, 617, 626-627, 42,304,388 630, 633, 635, 638, 642-644, 691, 695, 699- Quarry, Iwo Jima, 525 702,706 Quebec, Canada, 65 Rocky Point, 168-169, 171 Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, 60 Rodgers, RAdm Bertram J ., 483, 492, 498, 500, Quezon City, 354 502 Quezon, Manuel L., 296 Rogers, BGen Ford 0 ., 265 Rogers, Capt John F., 402 Rabaul, 303, 393 Rogers, Col William W ., 466 ; MajGen, 466n, Radar, 100, 259, 323-324, 326, 328, 330, 373, 522n, 565n, 579n, 608n, 700n, 714n, 404, 408, 411, 425, 486n, 487, 572, 611, 646, Roi-Namur, 400, 400n, 401, 405, 407-408, 411, 653,662 466-467,477,636n Radar Hill, 205, 214, 216-217 Roll, LtCol George A ., 638 Radio Tokyo, 499, 707 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 9, 19, 65, Railroads, 171, 171n, 172, 176 613, 614n, 673, 706, 706n, 727 Ramsey, LtCol Frederick A ., Jr., 130n Rosenthal, Joe, 543 Randall, LtCol Carey A., 574 Ross, Col Richard P ., Jr., 150n Rea, Maj Amedeo, 561, 618 Rota Island, 428-429 Reconnaissance activities, 318, 474 Rothwell, LtCol Richard, 519, 558, 562 Redfield, LtCol Ben Z., 413 Rowell, Col Ross E ., 41 ; BGen, 42 ; MajGen Rees, Col James E., 353 44, 44n, 45, 45n, 46 Reeves, RAdm John W ., Jr., 151 Rowse, Maj Earl J ., 552 Reich, 2dLt Richard, 662-663 Royal Air Force, 408 Reinberg, LtCol Louis, 248 Royal Australian Air Force Command, 301, Reinforcements 309,382 American, 155 Royal, RAdm Forrest B ., 366 Japanese, 190, 201, 281, 321-322, 324-325, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 39-40 328, 382, 453, 664, 670 Royal New Zealand Air Forces, 301, 362 RENO V Operation, 293n Rozga, Lt Thomas, 425, 436 Rentz, Maj John N., 445n Rue, Lt Charles C ., 370 Replacements, 86, 139, 147-148, 480, 483, 546, Ruhl, PFC Donald J., 535 840 INDEX

Ruhr Pocket, 730 Sarles, LtCol George H ., 373, 386 Rupertus, MajGen William H ., 63, 77, 79, 83, Saufley, 378 94, 97, 129-132, 151, 165, 185-186, 189-190, Savory, Nathaniel, 445 193, 199, 200-201, 204, 206, 210-211, 223- Sayers, LtCol Joseph C ., 561 224, 228, 236, 242, 251, 253n, 266, 278, 278n, Sayre Highway, 385-386 279, 284, 286, 433 Scales, Maj James S ., 518, 649, 652-653 Russell, Maj Gerald F ., 642 Scandinavia, 729 Russell Islands, 77, 88, 100, 115, 186, 393, 400 Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 466-468, 476, 482, Russell, MajGen John H ., 17 490-491, 491n, 492, 505, 515, 517, 547, 551- Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . 553, 563-564, 569, 576-577, 593, 603, 607, Ryukyus, 297, 335, 444, 464, 737 608n, 610, 627, 633, 635, 638, 670-671, 676, 700, 710, 714, 716, 720 Sabol, LtCol Stephen V ., 110, 113, 145 Schmidt, LtCol Richard K ., 509, 648 Saipan, 25, 32, 51, 59-61, 71, 76, 78, 105, 168, Schrider, Maj Peter P ., 304, 425, 429 173-174, 176, 184, 263, 267, 275-277, 323, Schrier, 1st Lt Harold G ., 540, 542 421,423-4 25, 428-430, 438, 443-444, 450, 453, Scott, LtCol Wallace T., 356, 373 457, 461, 464, 467-468, 472, 474, 476, 478, Sea Runner, 253 480, 484, 487, 489, 491, 498, 504, 573, 597, Sea Sturgeon, 251, 253 725,731-732,734 Seawolf, 78 Saipan Operation, 26, 225, 423-424, 462, 466 Secretary of the Navy, 484, 542, 713 Saito, Fred, 533n, 543n, 677n, 678n Selden, Col John T., 131 ; BGen, 131n Salt Lake City, 493, 498 Senda, MajGen Sadasue, 458, 569, 572, 586, Samar, 65, 294, 310, 312, 317, 330, 334-335, 647,654,680,693,693n,694-695,702 339,358-359p365,377-378 Sengebau, Kulas, 265n Samaritan, 479, 537, 723 Service and Supply Activities . See Army units ; Samoa, American, 21, 46, 398 Logistics ; Marine Units ; Supply and equip- Sample, RAdm William D ., 278 ment . Samurai, 677 Sevik, Lt Edward A ., 413 ,San Bernardino Straits, 312 Shanghai, 321 Sanderson, BGen Lawson H . M., 420 Shanley, Capt James V., 235, 244 San Diego, Calif., 17, 21, 23, 41-42, 44-45, Sharp, RAdm Alexander, 492 328,431 Sharpe, 1stLt Winfield S ., 372 San Diego Union ( newspaper), 400 Shepard, LtCol Charles E ., Jr., 513 San Fabian, 339, 356 Sherman, Capt Forrest P ., 465 San Fernando, 342, 350 Shimbu Line, 351, 353. See also Japanese De- San Francisco, Calif ., 286, 465 fenses. Sangamon, 426 Ships. See also Landing craft . Sanga Sanga, 378 American, 86, 169, 323, 445, 493n, 499, 548, San Ildefonso, 346 603, 714, 716 San Isidro, 331 amphibious command ships, 475, 523, 714 San Jose, Calif., 316-317, 353 battleships, 82, 103, 165-166, 210, 278, 475, San Jose del Monte, 346 493, 498-499, 574, 587, 625, 634, 644, 665 San Pablo, 325 barges, 87, 127, 184, 232, 269, 314, 367, 375 San Roque Airfield, 367 cargo vessels, 82, 87, 478, 573, 603, 722 Santa Barbara, Calif., 45, 47, 423 carriers, 97, 102, 278, 281, 283, 293, 312, Santa Cruz,439 317, 323-325, 336, 395, 397, 405, 407, Santa Maria, 346, 367 423-424, 426, 429, 435, 437, 451-452, Santee, 427 459, 475, 523, 537, 560, 565, 717 Santo Tomas, 343 cruisers, 82, 103, 160, 165-166, 181, 210, Santo Tomas University, 347 278-279, 336-337, 400, 407, 459, 475, Sarangani Bay, 382, 384, 387 484, 489, 498, 504, 551, 554-555, 574, ,$'aratoga, 40-42, 537 587,625,634-644,665 INDEX 841

destroyer escorts, 312-313, 420, 607 escorts, 329 destroyer minesweepers, 607 submarines, 259, 312, 366, 396, 415, 417, destroyers, 103, 108, 132, 162, 165-166, 434, 450, 484 181, 190, 195, 210, 261, 278-279, 312, tankers, 447, 735 329-330, 336, 378, 383, 400, 402, 404, tenders, 399 407, 420, 475, 484, 493, 496-498, 504, torpedo boats, 366, 407 530, 554-555, 591-592, 607, 634, 637, transports, 321, 328, 453 644, 658, 665, 668, 691, 699 hip-to-shore movement, 119n, 269 escort carriers, 424, 432 Shofner, LtCol Austin C ., 116-118 gunfire support ships, 81, 211, 493, 495- Sho-Go Operations, 297, 312, 321 498, 501, 503-504, 523, 554, 649, 658, Shore fire control parties, 35, 277. See also Air 671-672,679,714 activities ; Naval gunfire . liberty ships, 431 Shore party activiites, 17, 34, 84, 86, 88, 94, LSDs (Landing Ships, Dock), 84, 88, 96, 127, 143, 148, 152, 204, 282, 478, 480, 483, 607 523, 553, 592-593, 601-602, 708, 710, 724-725 LSMs (Landing Ships, Medium), 379, 475, Siari, 365 482, 509, 517, 520, 601 Siberia, 67 LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank), 84, 95-97, Sibert, MajGen Franklin C ., 381, 383 103, 129, 153, 162, 166, 187, 232-233, Sicily, 281, 733 270, 329, 356, 366, 436, 475, 477, 479- Silverthorn, LtGen Merwin H ., 32n, 27n 480, 480n, 482, 484, 503, 522-523, 560- Sindangan, 365 561,601,607,722 Singapore, 294, 337, 382 LST(H)s (Landing Ships, Hospital), 83, Siskin, Chaplain Edgar E ., 109n 479,480n,517,522-523,560,604,723 Slappey, Capt Wallace J ., 432 LSVs (Landing Ships, Vehicle), 314, 732 Smith, Sgt E . Payson, Jr ., 373n minelayers, 400, 530, 607 Smith, LtCol John, 379 minesweepers, 103, 165, 183, 335, 420, 491, Smith, Maj Holland M., 15, 19 ; Maj Gen, 20- 495-496,607 21, 23, 434n ; LtGen, 24-26, 29-31, 33-36, 304, motor torpedo boats, 327, 361 423, 428, 433, 464, 466, 487, 489-492, 492n, patrol craft, 84, 181, 261, 315, 497, 505, 501, 523, 542, 603, 608, 608n, 610-613, 700, 607, 665, 716 714 repair ships, 607 Smith, MajGen Julian C ., 61, 63-64, 76, 79, submarines, 381, 444, 453-455, 473 186, 211, 278 ; LtGen 80, 80n, 89, 162-163, supply and support ships, 233, 253, 502, 181,181n 531, 597, 648, 651, Smith, BGen Oliver P ., 77, 1.29-131, 211, 253 ; tankers, 82 MajGen, 60n tenders, 607 Smith, Maj Perry K ., 142 ; Col, 363 transports, 19, 85, 87, 96-97, 162, 168, 181, Smoak, Col Eustace, 588 212, 251, 274, 328-329, 335, 367, 429, Smoke screen 475, 498, 502-503, 522-523, 525, 540, American, 135, 231, 279, 322, 357, 385, 497- 552, 573, 597, 604, 607, 610, 714, 723, 498,637,660,652,660,666 736 Japanese, 227, 592, 698 tugs, 601, 607 Smyth, PFC George, 562 Japanese, 278, 281, 324, 327-330, 333, 399, Solace, 479, 542, 723 730 Solomons, 6, 67, 83, 87, 97, 291-293, 301, 326- barges, 166, 190, 259, 278, 420, 432, 526 327, 334, 342-343, 362-363, 393, 423, 466- battleships, 312 467,730 cargo vessels, 328-329, 399 Song of Iwo Jima, 700 carriers, 300, 312, 731 Sorol, 434 coast defense vessels, 321 South -America, 8 cruisers, 312 South China Sea, 334, 435 destroyers, 312, 321, 328 South Pacific, 21, 23, 45-46, 398, 431, 733 842 INDEX

Southwest Pacific Area, 24, 51-52, 101-102, 553, 600, 608, 658, 701, 720, 724 291-292, 301, 303, 334-335, 358, 416, 438, 457 equipment, 92, 152, 184, 208, 266, 269, Spain, 8, 9, 54, 294 272, 277, 325, 523, 611, 651 Spanish American War, 14, 54 explosives, 514, 531, 669, 711, 716 Spatz, Lt Donald, 413 food and rations, 83, 87, 128, 282, 398, Spearfish, 473 410, 477, 523, 553, 557 Spritzen, LtCol Roland J ., 553n fuel and lubricants, 87-88, 241, 476-477, Spruance, VAdm Raymond A ., 23, 422, 435, 526, 536, 607, 610, 612-614, 641, 664, 465-466, 469, 489-491, 492n, 501, 560, 713 ; 712,722 Adm, 465n gas masks, 638 Spurlock, Maj Roy T ., 327 matting, 333, 478, 601-602, 724 STALEMATE Operation, 52, 59-62, 162, 266, smoke pots, 256 278, 430, 733 spare parts, 155, 266, 277 STALEMATE II Operation, 59, 62-65, 82, 84, water, 87-88, 128, 129n, 135-136, 150, 89,97-98,100-101,180,287,315 190, 241, 257, 271, 275, 352, 398, 447, Stalingrad, 430 477, 480, 523, 553, 557, 602, 607, 634 Stark, Adm H . R., 40, 42-43 Japanese, 382, 415, 457, 473, 654, 659 Stars and Stripes, 207, 542, 564, 626, 678 . See dumps and storage, 150, 200, 275, 278, 281, also Flag raising and Old Glory . 331, 353, 383, 493n, 562, 617, 638, 641 Steele, 413 gas munitions, 614 Stein, Cpl Tony, 625 signal, 259 Stephenson, Capt Edward V ., 578 smokeless powder, 177, 584 Stiles, Maj Wilfrid H ., 431 water, 258, 262, 530, 611, 620, 695 St. Matthias Group, 373 Support Air Request Net, 718 Stout, Maj Doyle A ., 568, 648, 661 Surigao City, 382 Stout, Maj Robert F ., 225, 432-433 Surigao Straits, 312, 327, 330 Strategy, 395, 715n, 716 Sutherland, LtGen R . K., 293n Streit, Maj Victor H ., 226 Suwanee, 426• Stuart, LtCol Arthur J., 88n, 122n, 124n, 154n, Suzuki, LtGen Sosaku, 361 210n,272n Sweetser, Col Warren E ., Jr., 387-388 Stuart, Col James A ., 607 Swift, MajGen Innis P., 352 Subic Bay, 21, 342 Swindler, CoI Leland S ., 478 ; BGen, 724n Sudentenland, 9 Suifuzan Hill, 235, 260 Tachiiwa Point, 447, 459, 578, 642, 675-677, Sulphur, 444, 455-456, 572, 579, 600, 638 681 Sulphur Island, 444 Tacloban, 310, 312, 314, 316, 325-328, 330-331 Sulu Archipelago, 358-359, 361, 363, 371, 374, Tacloban Airfield, 310, 330, 333 378, 389, 385 Tactics Sulu Sea, 335, 368 American, 715n, 725, 737 Sumatra, 297 amphibious patrols, 260 Supplies and equipment. See also Ammunition ; armored support, 209, 518, 550, 564, 566, Logistics. 635 American, 85, 87, 128, 152, 273, 478, 478n, counterbattery fire, 202, 320, 554-555, 639, 522, 551, 553, 597, 601-602, 610, 612- 656, 660, 666, 669, 673, 719-720 613, 627, 722-725 gas warfare, 612-614 aviation, 477-478 harassing and interdiction fire, 153, 281, cargo, 721, 724 414, 651, 654, 661, 671 clothing, 610 infiltration, 705 communications, 308, 368, 370, 379, 383, jungle warfare, 305 389, 413, 515, 597, 719 night attacks, 91, 588, 590 dumps and storage, 86-87, 122, 126-128, sabotage, 349 151-152, 264, 269, 282, 318, 526, 551, search and kill missions, 318, 401 INDEX 843

supporting arms coordination, 134, 282, TF 33, 63 308, 320, 331, 333, 482, 555, 657-658, TF 38, 64-65 666, 684, 716, 719 TF 50, 466 TF 51, 466 tank-infantry assault, 110, 174, 177, 234, TF 52, 523 281, 514, 519, 536, 567, 580, 592, 623, TF 53, 2.5, 502, 724 627, 687,714 TF 54, 483, 493, 498, 500, 503, 654, 668, 671, Japanese, 278, 315, 322 TF 55, 25 Banzai attacks, 71, 122, 156, 169-170, 175, TF 56, 466 261, 263, 457-458, 522n, 525-527, 533, TF 57, 399 538,556,641-642,678-679,705,708 TF 58, 405, 408, 435-436, 475-476, 489, 493, chemical warfare, 614 495-496, 501, 503, 523, 560, 564, 717 counterattacks, 72, 115, 121, 126, 132, 147, TF 59, 11, 46 158, 170-171, 176, 198, 202, 205, 245, TG 32 .1, 63 257, 267, 350, 556, 559, 679, 682 TG 32 .2, 63, 165, 181 counterbattery fire, 279, 655, 661 TG 32 .9, 63, 103 counterlandings, 242, 261 TG 51 .5, 634 guerrillas, 461 TG 52.2, 492, 495 harassing and interdiction fire, 73, 320, TG 52.3, 492 726 TG 52.4, 492 incendiary balloons, 736 TG 56.1, 466 infiltration, 170, 174, 207, 220, 225, 249, TG 58.1, 451 261, 319-320, 322, 525-526, 539, 545, TG 58.4, 451 556, 558, 585-586, 630, 632, 638, 661, TG 58.5, 560 665, 677, 686, 697 TG 59.6, 431 rocket barrages, 660-664 TG 78 .1, 366 sniping, 135, 141, 168, 172, 187, 201, 208, TG 78 .2, 381 232-233, 246, 248, 251, 263, 320n, 351, TU 52 .2.2, 492 426, 543, 560, 564, 578, 595, 623, 625, Tawi Tawi Group, 378 635, 637, 639, 641, 646, 649-651, 656, Tennessee, 409, 493, 496, 498, 500 667,669 Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 17 suicide attacks, 156, 323, 330-331, 335- Tenzan, 260, 644 33,6,435,735 Terrain, 77, 723, 726 tank attacks, 123 caves, 57, 70, 73, 75, 92, 104, 112, 134, 138, withdrawal, 180 145-146, 154, 156, 160-161, 177, 192, 198, Tada, Col Tokechi, 232n, 263, 458, 508, 548, 201-202, 205, 208-209, 212, 214, 216- 550, 559, 650, 657 271,221-223,225-226,230,234,236,240- Takasago Maru, 420 242, 245-246, 248, 251, 256, 258, 261- Talevera, 342 265, 270-271, 276, 279, 351, 426, 432, Tanauan, 315, 320 453, 455, 459, 473, 493n, 508, 528, 530- Tanauan Airfield, 325, 331, 333, 339 531, 539-540, 542-543, 545, 548, 554, Tarawa, 32, 52, 78, 105, 287-288, 395-401, 560, 569, 572, 577, 580, 586, 589-592, 408, 438, 466-467, 487, 489, 505, 719, 730- 611, 613, 614n, 618, 620-621, 62 .6, 628- 731 629, 631-633, 635, 639, 642-643, 645- Taroa, 400 646, 468-650, 652, 663, 668, 672, 684- Taroa Airfield, 405. See also Maloelap Airfield. 687, 689, 691-692, 695, 697-701, 704, Task Organizations 706-707,716,720,726-727 Central Pacific, 469 escarpments, 721-722 TF 18, 20 hydrographic conditions, 165 TF 30, 63-64 jungles, 192 TF 31, 63 promontories, 73, 119, 134-136, 136n, 137- TF 32, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283 138,146,153 844 INDEX

ravines, 693 Twining, MajGen Nathan, 46 reefs, 58-59, 78-79, 81, 84-88, 94, 103, 108- Tutuila, 398 110, 113, 119, 127, 129, 131, 148, 152, 163, 183, 216-217, 241, 266, 268-270, Ujelang Atoll, 416 272, 41, 478, 496 Ulithi Atoll, 52, 59, 62, 66, 162-163, 180-181, ridges, 134, 141-142, 146-147, 153, 185, 189- 184, 250, 254, 257, 286-287, 430-435, 443, 478, 190, 193, 195, 198, 200-201, 204-205, 733-734 214,216-217,219 Umayam River Valley, 386 sand,721-722,724 Umurbrogol, 58, 73, 75, 108, 147-148, 156, 161, swamps, 141-142 190, 192, 200, 210, 219, 228, 237, 240, 248, terraces, 721, 724 258 tunnels, 695, 716 Umurbrogol Mountain, 57, 145, 177 volcanic ash and rock, 452, 455, 478, 483, Umurbrogol Pocket, 192, 206, 216, 218, 221, 506, 509, 516-517, 519, 538, 557, 600- 224, 227, 231, 236, 240-242, 244-246, 249- 601,686,690-691,721-724 251,254,257,259-262,270,284 Terrar, Lt Edward F ., 426 Umurbrogol Ridges, 58, 146, 189, 199, 219, Terry, 624 222-223,236-237,265 Texas, 493, 503 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 4-5, 8, Thompson, Lt Earl C ., 402 443,675,729-730,737 Thurnau, Lt Theodore, 403-404 United Press, 400 Timor, 297 United States, 4-8, 171n, 294, 296, 400, 429, Tinian, 25, 32, 36, 60, 184, 424, 429, 429n, 467- 444, 451, 467, 480, 483, 604, 612-614, 700, 468,484,598,731-732 734,736-737 Titcomb Field, 383-384, 388 aid programs, 274 Titcomb, Capt Jack, 344n, 351, 383 Armed Forces, 9, 348, 351, 462, 644 Tobiishi Point, 539, 545 Army, 17, 23, 161, 187, 200, 248, 291, 303, Tojo, Gen Hideki, 430, 450 ; Premier, 732 307, 332, 342-343, 361, 384, 393, 409, Tokyo, 67, 288, 294, 296, 377, 428, 435, 451, 484,708,710-711,714,718,721,724 458-459, 463-464, 487, 491, 493, 495, 537, Marine Corps, 9-10, 13, 15, 19, 39, 52, 397, 560p669-670,683,700,716,732,737 620n, 712, 721, 735 Tokyo Bay, 421, 444 doctine, 333, 714 Torokina, 301 history, 396 Totsuke, LtCol Ryoichi, 375 morale, 664 Toyoda, Adm Soemu, 297-298, 300, 499, 499n, replacements, 688 564,67O,680 strength, 15, 19-20, 39, 44, 688 Treitel, Maj Paul S ., 550, 560, 569, 680 training, 688, 714 Trotti, LtCol Tom M ., 558 shipping losses, 324, 556 Truk, 60, 67, 101, 292, 407-408, 449 units of fire, 83n Tryon,101 Urukthapel, 57 Tulagi, 95 Tulagi-Purvis Bay, 83 Valencia, 385 Tumatangas, 379 Vandegrift, LtGen Alexander A ., 186n, 252n, Tumbelston, Maj William H ., 642 247 ; Gen, 24-25, 29, 253, 288n, 423 Turkey Hill, 572 Vandegrift, LtCol Alexander A ., Jr., 521, 568 Turkey Knob, 353, 568, 595, 616, 646-647, 650- Vandegrift Letters, 158n 651, 654, 656-658, 660-661, 663-665, 667, Vaughan, Maj Everette H ., 400 ; Col, 401n 6699 672-673p675,680-682 Vegetation, 192 Turner, RAdm Richmond K., 23 ; VAdm, 25, Vehicles 466, 475-476, 484, 489-491, 501, 608, 608n, American, 722 612, 700, 714 Alligators, Roebling, 35 Tuscaloosa, 493 ambulances, 274 INDEX 845

amphibians, 87-88, 94, 127-128, 130-131, Vella Lavella Island, 393 139, 148, 156, 269, 273, 312, 721-723 Venable, Col Benjamin W ., 176 amphibian tractors, 13, 17, 3'5, 78, 84, 92- Versailles Peace Conference, 7 94, 106, 108-109, 148, 187, 224, 266-267, Versailles, Treaty of, 16 274, 282, 315, 321, 432, 473, 483, 503, Vicksburg, 493, 498 505, 508, 516, 548, 553, 573 VICTOR Operations, 358, 362 amphibian trailers, 88, 127-128, 269, 477- VICTOR 1, 358, 375, 377 478,482,721 VICTOR II, 358, 375, 377 amphibian trucks, 85, 87-88, 92-94, 103, VICTOR III, 359 109, 115, 127, 129, 131-132, 148, 228, VICTOR IV, 359, 365, 378 269-270, 274, 277, 282, 344, 477, 479, VICTOR V, 359, 380-382 482-483, 515-516, 521-522, 552-553, 573, Virgin Islands, 42 601-602,657,721-723 Visayan Islands, 309, 734 armored tankdozers, 699 Visayan Sea, 327, 332, 358, 374 bulldozers, 127, 138, 152, 168, 238, 242, Visayas, 65, 294, 298, 309-310, 321, 374, 377- 262, 480, 516, 521, 523, 459, 601-602, 378 605, 610-611, 615, 628, 647, 685-688, Vogel, MajGen Clayton B., 21 701, 705, 707, 712, 724 Vogelkop Peninsula, 292 cargo carriers (Weasels), 478, 482, 523, Volcano Islands, 436, 443-444, 484, 462n 536,601,722-723 Volckmann, Maj Russell W ., 348 ; Col, 349, cranes, 724 351; BGen, 348n jeeps, 308, 344, 350, 368, 378-379, 384, 701 LVTs (Landing Vehicle, tracked), 35, 85, 87, 92, 94, 104, 106, 108-110, 115-117, Wachi, Capt Tsunezo, 458n 127-128, 130-132, 136, 139, 144, 148, Wachtler, BGen Walter A ., 82n, 240n 151, 155, 166, 206, 210-211, 216-217, Wake Island, 6, 21, 42, 415, 420-421, 444 233, 240, 257, 262, 269, 271-273, 280, Wake Island, 437, 493, 595 375, 447, 472-473, 478, 503, 506, 508, Walker, Maj Thomas J., Jr., 42 516,518-519,523,551,601,721-723 Waller, Col James D ., 472, 515 LVT(A)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Ar- Wallis Island, 398-399, 411 mored) ), 35, 84-85, 92-93, 106, 108-109, Walsh, Senator Joseph, 288n 114, 116, 129, 137, 146, 158, 195, 209- Walsh, GySgt William G., 622 210, 212, 242, 266, 277, 472, 505, 508, Walt, LtCol Lewis W ., 118, 123, 141, 210 569, 618, 620,648, 650, 721 Walt's Ridge, 157-158, 160, 221, 224, 229-234, LVT(F)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked 237, 240, 244, 246, 248, 250, 254, 256-257, (Flamethrower)), 155, 157, 201, 206, 260 208,226,229-230,241,263-264 Walter Colton, 43.1 tank retriever, 156, 273, 518 War Dogs, 91, 143 . See also Marine units. tractors, 109, 127, 506, 552-553, 721 Washington, 493, 503 trailers, 722 Washington Conference, 6, 15 trucks, 151, 274, 350, 379, 513, 517, 522, Washington, D. C., 5, 279, 462, 613 5'34, 655, Washington, President George, 5, 445 wheeled vehicles, 447, 473, 478, 516-517, Wasp, 436 721-723 Watson, Col Arthur P ., 257, 264 Japanese Watson, Sgt Sherman B ., 539 armor, supporting, 177 Wattie Ridge, 224, 233, 246 bulldozers, 459 Wattie, Lt. Robert T., 238 motor vehicles, 641 Weapons prime movers, 617 American, 195, 655, 689 tanks, 687 antiaircraft guns, 356, 477, 501 trailers, 641 antitank guns, 91, 116, 687 846 INDEX

atomic weapons, 204 90mm guns, 603 automatic weapons, 91-92, 126, 132, 144, 155mm guns (Long Toms), 154, 209, 228, 589 230, 248, 301, 719 bayonets, 223, 566 155mm howitzers, 301, 477, 625, 638, 652, bazookas, 91-92, 115, 124, 135, 152, 214, 719 216, 266, 271, 566, 578, 633, 652, 659, 105mm guns, 240, 242, 516, 634, 691 666, 693, 708 105mm howitzers, 83-84, 129, 129n, 269- BARs, 266, 708 270,472,515,521,552,568,719-720 demolitions, 91-92, 114, 134, 138, 216, 266, 120mm mortars, 727 590, 629, 631, 650, 666, 681, 687, 689, rifles, 91, 109, 566, 613-614, 659, 689, 698 699,705 rocket launchers, 627, 631, 639, 655, 662, 8-inch howitzers, 500, 504 666, 676, 685 81mm mortars, 230, 270, 518, 568, 575, rockets, 108, 166, 534, 637 582,640, 648, 697 satchel charges, 652, 659 .50 caliber machine guns, 272, 463, 628, 7.2-inch rockets, 685 721 75mm guns, 108, 209, 214, 217, 269, 516, 5-inch guns, 500, 504 520,534,621,634,640-641,727 5-inch rockets, 503, 717 75 mm guns (self-propelled), 135, 176 flamethrowers, 91-92, 134-36, 138, 152, 75mm howitzers (pack), 84, 93, 116, 129n, 155, 169, 176, 200, 204, 209, 216, 223, 246,261,272,521,639,657,719-721 256-257, 262, 264, 266, 270-271, 273, 16-inch guns, 504 514, 531, 536, 567, 569, 576, 578, 589- 60mm mortars, 92, 126, 241, 270, 510, 568, 590, 614, 621, 631, 633, 666, 681, 687, 582, 666, 693 689-690,695,699,707,725,727 tank dozers, 156, 273, 512, 520, 652, 706- flamethrower tanks, 238, 273, 512, 531, 707 621, 626, 628, 641, 666-668, 673, 675, tanks, 81, 85, 88, 91, 110, 115-117, 120, 687-688,694,699,707,710 123-124, 134-139, 141, 143, 145-146, 4.2-inch mortars, 108, 270, 503, 554, 610, 153-161, 166, 168, 171, 173-74, 200-201, 727 205-206, 209-212, 214, 217, 226, 229- 4.5-inch rockets, 108, 503, 62 .1, 655 232, 235-236, 238, 241, 251, 256-257, 14-inch guns, 500 262-264, 272-274, 277, 281, 353, 472- 40mm guns, 166, 503, 654 473, 483, 509, 512-515, 517-520, 531, .45 caliber pistols, 708 534, 536, 538, 550, 553, 555, 558, 560, grenade launchers, 115, 124 563-567, 569, 574, 576-578, 582, 584, grenades, 144, 262, 514, 531, 569, 611, 614, 590-591, 618, 621, 626-628, 630, 633- 620, 636, 652, 659, 666, 678, 686, 689, 634, 639, 641, 644, 646-647, 649-653, 693-694,713,725 655-657, 659, 662, 664, 666-668, 672, guns, 156, 477 676-677, 681, 684-690, 693, 698-699, half-tracks, 136-138, 200, 230-231, 531, 706-707,727 534, 548, 630, 632, 657, 673, 684 .30 caliber machine guns, 272, 771 howitzers, 94, 116, 124, 246, 248, 482, 521- 37mm guns, 108, 115, 123-124, 136-137, 522,552,554-555,565,721 158, 251, 269, 531, 534, 568, 575, 621, M-1 rifles, 697, 707-708 629-630,632,636,640,667,684,727 machine guns, 91, 108-109, 123, 272, 472, toxic gases, 613-614 566, 635, 698, 701 20mm guns, 166, 463, 654 medium tanks, 208, 233, 649-650, 673 white phosphorus grenades, 235, 567 mines, 109, 134, 632, 656, 675, 691, 720 Filipino, 348 mortars, 87, 92, 109, 121, 142, 144, 157, Japanese, 73, 109, 137, 156, 193, 221, 231, 166, 171, 173, 187, 230, 270, 272, 477, 240, 256, 267, 449, 454, 498, 518, 531, 508, 523, 566, 575, 629, 635, 637, 698, 538, 553, 585, 587, 604, 617, 639, 655, 727 666, 668, 675, 681, 689, 723, 726 naval guns, 209, 376, 423, 540, 716 antiaircraft guns, 135, 415, 449, 493n, 549 INDEX 847

antipersonnel land mines, 667, 690, 726 naval mines, 367 antitank guns, 177, 209, 249, 316, 353, 90mm howitzers, 727 474, 493n, 513, 519-520, 536, 565-568, 150mm guns, 497 572, 574, 582, 587, 591, 634, 646-647, 150mm mortar, 221, 267, 454 684 140mm gulls, 533 automatic weapons, 75, 117, 136, 205-206, 120mm howitzers, 449, 727 209, 240, 256, 273, 320, 453, 456, 458, pistols, 630 575, 618, 625, 648, 655 rifles, 142, 177, 249, 449, 535, 568, 575, bamboo spears, 678 662, 697, 703 bangalore torpedoes, 154 rocket launchers, 407, 454, 459, 726-727 chemicals, 142, 614, 614n, 620, 638 rockets, 142, 267, 453-454, 519, 527, 550, coastal guns, 458, 474-475, 498, 500, 531 -592,649-651,655,677,692,726 demolitions, 154, 200, 320, 367,'526, 592, 691 sabers, 630 dual-purpose guns, 146, 474, 572 satchel charges, 628 80mm (naval) guns, 454 70mm guns, 202, 249 81mm mortars, 267, 454 75mm guns, 73, 205, 268, 316, 454 5-inch guns, 135, 500 6-inch guns, 530 57mm guns, 83, 646, 649, 727 60mm mortars, 510, 675 flares, 533 small arms, 206, 209, 617, 623, 625, 692 4.7-inch gun, 610 tanks, 122-124, 126, 267, 281, 316, 454- 40mm guns, 144, 415 4-55,523,586,591,652,655 47mm antitank guns, 73, 109, 112, 454, 37mm antitank guns, 73, 202, 205, 209, -562,591,628,646,649,665,684,727 268, 454, 591, 675 grenades, 134, 249, 259, 320, 514, 526, 535, 320mm mortars, 454, 727 542, 545, 614n, 622, 630-631, 637-639, torpedoes, 396, 452, 624-625, 636n 656, 659, 678, 688, 691, 708 20mm rockets, 267 guns, 473 20mm cannon, 139, 249, 379, 415, 454 knee mortars, 637-638, 676 25mm antiaircraft guns, 268, 449, 454 knives, 630 200mm (naval) guns, 26.7 light tanks, 684 Weather, 233 machine guns, 73, 112, 142, 160, 168, 177, humidity, 55 226, 249. 449, 474, 493n, 518-519, 535, rain, 55 539, 549-550, 554, 563, 568, 574, 584, temperature, 141 589, 617, 621-622, 650, 656, 660, 662, Weller, LtCol Donald M ., 489, 493, 499 ; Col, 664-665,675,678,689,697,703 279n medium tanks, 316, 684 Welles, 403 mines, 72, 79, 115, 119, 135-136, 152, 156, Wells, lstLt George G., 540 160, 163, 193, 199, 249, 258, 267, 269, Wensinger, Col Walter W ., 471, 509, 517-519, 320, 426, 473-474, 482, 486, 508-509, 549-550,647-649,656,670,680-681 512, 519-520, 528, 536, 545, 548-549, West Coast, 400, 411 564-566,584,641,647,726 Western Caroline Islands, 52, 55, 62, 97, 99, Molotov cocktails, 592 151, 184, 429, 431-434, 455, 734 . See also mortars, 118-119, 122, 127-128, 134, 141, Caroline Islands. 154, 156, 160, 168, 177, 205-206, 231, Western Pacific, 3, 59, 397, 465, 614 353, 367, 453, 459, 513-514, 519-520, West Field, 429n 1523, 525, 527, 531, 533-535, 538, 549- West Indies, 19 550, 553-554, 557-561, 566-568, 573- West Road, 189, 192, 195, 198, 200-202, 204, 575, 585, 587, 595, 603-604, 617-618, 206, 209, 222, 224, 226, 228, 232-233, 236- 621, 624-629, 634, 639, 648-651, 653- 238,240,242,246,249,254, 656, 685, 660-662, 664, 668-669, 671- White, Maj Philip R ., 326n 672,674-677,681-682,692,723,727 Whitehead, MajGen Ennis C ., 382 mountain guns, 146 White Plains, 424-425 848 INDEX

Wickel, 2dLt James J ., 232n, 259n, 263n World War II, 3, 55, 448, 467-468, 522, 543, Wildcat Bowl, 221, 256, 260-263 588, 612, 620n, 713, 715, 729, 736 Wildcats, 263-264, 399 . See also 81st Infantry Wornham, Col Thomas A ., 471, 509, 513, 549, Division under Army units . 556, 621, 639, 643 Wildcat Trail, 210 Wotje Atoll, 400, 405, 412-415, 417-418 Wilkinson, VAdm Theodore S ., 63-64, 103- Wright engines, 463 104,181,278 Wright, Lt Frank J ., 512 Williams, LtCol Marlowe C ., 558-559 ; Col, Wurtsmith, BGen Paul D., 333n 559n Williams, BGen Robert H., 543n Yamashita, Gen Tomoyuki, 300, 377 Willis, 2d'-Lt William A ., 112 Yap, 54, 59, 62, 64, 68-69, 101-102, 180-181, Willis, Col William A ., 326,363 184,286,430,432-434,444,783 Wills, Maj Donald H ., 372 Yap Air Base, 52 Wilson, Lt Walter A ., 402, 404 Yap Operation, 63, 65, 181, 301 Wilson, President Woodrow, 3-5, 7 Yokohama, 484 Wintle, 420 Yokosuka, 449 Withers, Col Hartnoll J ., 551, 555, 558 Yorktown, 399 Witomski, Maj Stanislaus J., 326n Youngdale, LtCol Carl A ., 552 Woleai, 101 Woods, MajGen Louis E ., 388, 41.6, 420 ; LtGen, Zambales Mountains, 342 404n Zamboanga, 356, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 371- Worden, LtCol Waite W ., 66n, 70n, 129n, 132n, 373,378-379,382,388,390 153n, 180n, 190n, 248n, 285n Zamboanga Peninsula, 361, 363, 365-366, 370- World Disarmament Conference, 7 371,374,381 World War 1, 3-5, 7-8, 14, 54, 448, 467, 504, Zeros. See Aircraft, Japanese. 613, 727 Zonne, Maj Edmund L ., 397

* U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1971 0 - 400- 219 SCENE OF BATTLE 1944-1945 MERCATOR PROJECTION PROGRESS! OF THE ATTACK, VAC I FRONT LINES D-DAY-D PLUS 5 3 D MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 25 FEB-I MAR 45

Map III E . L. Wi I son

3 D MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 1-10 MAR 45

Map IQ E .L.WiIson 5TH MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 24 FEB - 2 MAR 5TH MAR DI V ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 2-10 MAR 45 4TH MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 24 FEB-4 MAR 45

Map MI E . L . Wilson 4TH MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION PROGRESS LINES 5-10 MAR 45 3D MAR DIV FINAL OPERATIONS 11-16 MAR 45 4TH MAR DIV FINAL OPERATIONS 11-15 MAR 45

Map I E.L .Wilson 5TH MAR DIV FINAL OPERATIONS 12-24 MAR 45

Map ME E .L.Wilson