History of the US Marine Corps in WWII Vol V

VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II

VOLUME V

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

PCN 19000262800 Victory and Occupation

HISTORY OF U. S . MARINE CORP S

OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

VOLUME V

by BENIS M . FRANK

HENRY I. SHAW, JR .

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

1968 Other Volumes in this Serie s

LtCol Frank 0 . Hough, Maj Verle E . Ludwig, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr .

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcana l

Henry I . Shaw, Jr. and Maj Douglas T. Kane Isolation of Rabau l

III

Henry I . Shaw, Jr., Bernard C . Nalty, and Edwin T . Turnbladh Central Pacific Driv e

Library of Congress Catalog Card No . 58—60002

PCN 1900026280 0

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S . Government Printing Office Washington, D .C . 20402 - Price $11 .75 Foreword

This book represents the final work in the five-volume history of Marin e Corps operations in World War II . The story of the Okinawa campaign , told earlier in a separate monograph, has been reevaluated and rewritte n to detail events in proper proportion to each other and in a correct perspective to the war as a whole. New material, particularly from Japanes e sources and from the recorded interviews conducted with senior Marin e Corps officers who participated in the Marine Corps Oral History Program , has been included to provide fresh insight into the Marine Corps' contribution to the final victory of the Pacific War . These pages cover Marine Corps activities in the Okinawa invasion and the occupations of Japan and North China as well as the little-known story of Marine prisoners of war . The book relates the Corps' postwa r demobilization and reorganization programs as well . By 1945, amphibiou s warfare doctrine and techniques had become highly developed . While new and improved weapons were employed in the Okinawa campaign, th e landing operation itself realistically demonstrated the soundness of funda- mental amphibious doctrine developed over the years by the Navy and th e Marine Corps . Again, as at Guadalcanal, the battle for Okinawa clearl y reemphasized the fact that basic Marine Corps tactics and techniques wer e sound. An outgrowth of the lessons learned at Okinawa was the establishment of a balanced air-ground amphibious force in readiness which ha s become the hallmark of the present-day Marine Corps . Many of the senior officers and commanders at Okinawa were prewar teachers and plan - ners who had participated in the early operations of the war in the Pacific . The successful application at Okinawa of the knowledge, expertise, an d experiences of these individuals against a fanatic foe fighting a last-ditc h battle to protect his homeland was a vital factor in the final victory ove r Japan. The assault and capture of Okinawa represents the most ambitiou s joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps operation in the history of the Pacifi c War. Statistically, in comparison to previous assaults in this war zone, the numbers of men, ships, and planes as well as the tons of munitions an d supplies employed in this campaign stagger the imagination . But, had the enemy not capitulated in face of the American victories in the western Pacific and as a result of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Naga-

IV FOREWORD

saki, the personnel and logistics figures reflecting the requirements for th e planned assault on Japan would have been even more overwhelming . Fortunately for both sides, the war ended before more blood was shed . After participating in several Central Pacific landings, I returned t o the United States and was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps . From this vantage point, I observed the conduct of Marine Corps operations i n the late stages of the war, when ground, sea, and air forces drove relentlessly towards the heart of the Japanese Empire. I also viewed with grea t pride the outstanding performance of duty of Marine occupation troops i n Japan and North China . Here, small units and individual Marines prove d themselves and the validity of Marine Corps training and discipline unde r conditions that were often trying . The fund of command experience acquired by junior officers and noncommissioned officers in a variety of circumstances has since been drawn on constantly in peace and war . Similarly, the discipline and training of Marines captured at th e outbreak of the war and after was tried and found not wanting in face of trials that beggar the imagination . In their own way, against the ever- present threat of death, these men continued fighting the enemy by variou s means, including sabotage and escape . The heroism of such Marines equalled and at times surpassed the records of the men who were engaged in the march across the Pacific . The record of our Marine POWs in World War II is something we can all be proud of . Like other active duty Marines at the end of the war, I, too, experience d the period of transition when the Corps reverted to a peacetime role in the defense of this nation. Responsive to its combat experiences in Worl d War II, the Marine Corps made many tactical and organizational changes , as this book shows. Unchanged, however, was our highly prized esprit d e corps, which, even as this is written, is being as jealously guarded as whe n our Corps was first formed . When the roll of America's battle honors is read, the names of the World War II campaigns in which Marines fought—Wake Island to Oki- nawa—will strike a familiar ring to all who cherish liberty and freedom . I am proud of my association with the men who won these honors and t o have shared their hardships and their victories .

U ;to.rce.) J . /aJ /tiA Cnn ~. . N WALLACE M . GREENE, JR . GENERAL, U .S. MARINE CORP S COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS Reviewed and approved 29 November 1967 Preface

After the amphibious assault of Guadalcanal, which marked the opening of the American offensive in the Pacific, the steadily accelerating temp o of successful operations against the enemy inexorably led to an Allie d victory in the war . Highlighting American operations was the Navy- Marine Corps team's extensive reliance on the employment of amphibiou s warfare techniques developed in the years before the war and improve d upon under combat conditions . The Okinawa landing has been accurately depicted as representin g the culmination of amphibious development in the Pacific War and as th e most audacious and complex military effort undertaken by amphibiou s forces of the Pacific Fleet. This operation also marked the last majo r ground action of the war against Japan, and the touchstone to the decisive Allied victory here was the massive interservice effort which, as much as anything else, hastened enemy capitulation. Victory at Okinawa and the subsequent end of the war did not signa l any letdown in the number and types of missions facing the Marine Corps , for at the same time that the postwar demobilization program drasticall y reduced their strength, Fleet Marine Force units were assigned to occupation duty in Japan and North China and to re-establishing the Pacifi c garrisons. This book treats these and such other hitherto-unpublished matters as the tragic story of those Marines who became prisoners of war . Appearing here also for the first time is a full treatment of the developmen t and organization of the Marine infantry division and the many changes it experienced during the course of the war . In addition, this book presents an overview of the salient facts concerning Marine Corps campaigns in the Pacific War first discussed in the previously published volumes of thi s series. Our purpose in publishing this operational history in durable form i s to make the Marine Corps record permanently available for study by military personnel and the general public as well as by serious students o f military history . We have made a conscious effort to be objective in ou r treatment of the actions of Marines and of the men of other services who fought at their side . We have tried to write with understanding about ou r former enemies and in this effort have received invaluable help from th e Japanese themselves . Few people so militant and unyielding in war have, in

VI PREFACE

peace, been as dispassionate and analytical about their actions . We owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Susumu Nishiura, Chief of the War History Office, Defense Agency of Japan, and to the many researchers and historians of his office that reviewed our draft manuscripts . This five-volume series was planned and outlined by Mr . Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian, while Mr. Benis M. Frank was responsible for Volume V itself. Mr. Shaw wrote the story of Marines in North China and his earlier research and writing provided the basis for that part of th e book concerning Marines in the occupation of Japan . Mr. Frank wrote the rest of this book, revising and editing it for publication. In his research on the Okinawa operation, Mr . Frank frequently consulted the materia l assembled for the monograph Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific by Major Charles S . Nichols, Jr., and Mr. Shaw. Mr. Frank also prepared all the appendices. Successive Heads of the Historical Branch—Major John H . Johnstone, Colonel Thomas G . Roe, Colonel Joseph F. Wagner, Jr., Lieu- tenant Colonel Richard J . Schening, and Colonel Frank C . Caldwell—made the final critical review of portions of the manuscript. The book was completed under the direction of Colonel Caldwell, current Head of the Branch . A number of leading participants in the actions described have commented on the preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of the book . Their valuable assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Several senior officers, i n particular General Alexander A . Vandegrift, General Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr., General Gerald C . Thomas, Lieutenant General Keller E. Rockey, Lieu- tenant General Louis E . Woods, Lieutenant General Pedro A . del Valle , Lieutenant General Francis P. Mulcahy, Major General DeWitt Peck, Major General William A . Worton, Major General Ford 0. Rogers, Major General Wilburt S . Brown, and Rear Admiral Charles J . Moore made valuabl e additions to their written comments during personal interviews . A number of these interviews were conducted by Mr . Frank in his capacity as Head of the Oral History Unit, Historical Branch, which administers the Marin e Corps Oral History Program . Special thanks are due to the historical agencies of the other service s for their critical readings of draft chapters of this book. Outstanding among the many official historians who measurably assisted the authors were : the late Dr. John Miller, Jr ., Deputy Chief Historian, and Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History , Department of the Army ; Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head, Operational Archive s Branch, Naval History Division, Department of the Navy ; and Dr. Robert F. Futrell, Historian, Historical Studies Branch, U . S. Air Force Historical Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base . Chief Warrant Officer Jo E . Kennedy, and his predecessors as His- torical Branch Administrative Officer, Second Lieutentant Gerald S . Duncan and First Lieutenants John J . Hainsworth and D'Arcy E . Grisier, ably

PREFACE VII

handled the many exacting duties involved in processing the volume from first drafts through final printed form. A number of the early preliminary typescripts were prepared by Mrs. Miriam R . Smallwood, Mrs . Joyce E. Bonnett, and Miss Alexandria Jozwick, while the remainder were done b y Miss Kay P . Sue, who expertly handled the painstaking task of typing th e final manuscript for the printer . Miss Sue also did much of the meticulou s work demanded in preparing the index . The maps were drafted by Sergeant Thomas L . Russell. Unless otherwise noted, official Department of Defense photographs have been use d throughout the text.

H. NICKERSON, JR . MAJOR GENERAL, U .S. MARINE CORP S ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Contents

PART I PROLOGUE TO THE EN D

CHAPTER PAG E

1. Strategic Background 3 2. The Japanese Situation 14 3. Marine Corps Order of Battle 23

PART II OKINAWA

1. The Target and the Enemy 3 1 2. Project ICEBERG 57 3. Assault Preparations 83 4. The First Days Ashore 109 5. Phase I Continued 157 6. The Defense Stiffens 188 7. Forging Ahead 214 8. Reduction of the Shuri Bastion 244 9. Breakout to the South 288 10. Battle's End 325 11. ICEBERG Dissolves 367

PART III THE END OF THE WA R

1. Future Operations 397 2. The Closing Days 41 0 3. Return to the Islands 449

PART IV OCCUPATION OF JAPA N

1. Initial Planning and Operations 475 2. Kyushu Deployment to December 1945 497 3. Last Months in Japan 510

X CONTENTS

PART V NORTH CHINA MARINE S

CHAPTER PAGE

1. Background for Military Assistance 521 2. Ashore in North China 537 3. An Extended Stay 57 1 4. Abortive Peace Mission 594 5. Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division 615 6. Withdrawal 635

PART VI CONCLUSION

1. Amphibious Doctrine in World War II 653 2. A Final Accounting 677

APPENDICE S

A. Marine POWs 731 B. Bibliographical Notes 790 C. Guide to Abbreviations 804 D. Military Map Symbols 810 E. Chronology 811 F. Fleet Marine Force Status—30 April 1945 819 G. Fleet Marine Force Status—31 October 1946 . . 835 H. Table of Organization G–100—Marine Division . 840 I. Comparison of Organization—Marine Division . 843 J. Comparison of Equipment—Marine Division . . 847 K. World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment 849 L. Marine Task Organization and Command List 852 M. Marine Casualties 884 N. Unit Citations 885

Index 893

ILLUSTRATION S

Admiral Nimitz Briefs the President at Pearl Harbor 10 Combined Chiefs of Staff Meet at Quebec 10 Thirty-second Army Officers Sit For a Portrait 42 North Bank of the Bishi Gawa 42

CONTENTS xI

ILLUSTRATIONS—Continued PAG E

Landing Craft Form Up For the Run to Kerama Retto Beaches 10 1 155mm Guns of the 420th Field Artillery Group on Keise Shima 10 1 Main Batteries of USS Tennessee Hurl Tons of Explosives . 110 Aerial View of the Hagushi Anchorage 110 Bewildered Civilians 124 Two Marines Safeguard a Young Okinawan 124 Heavy Undergrowth on the Ishikawa Isthmus 133 Grinning Troops of the 29th Marines Heading For Chuta 133 Japanese 105mm Gun Captured on Yae Take 137 Suicide Boats Found at Unten Ko 137 USS Enterprise Is Hit By a Kamikaze 156 Tracers Fill the Sky 156 Yellow Beach 3 On L Plus 2 161 Causeways Relieve Logistical Problems 16 1 Marine Reconnaissance Personnel Prepare Rubber Boats 165 Dominating Ie Shima is Iegusugu Yama 165 Marine Rocket Launchers in Support of the Drive South 170 Awacha Pocket 170 Sugar Loaf Hill 246 Tanks Evacuate the Wounded 246 Wana Ridge 258 105mm Howitzer of the 15th Marines 258 Aerial View of Shuri on 28 April 279 Shuri, One Month Later 279 Corkscrew 285 Blowtorch 285 Air Delivery Section Marines 294 VMTB—232 TBM Drops Supplies 294 6th Division Marines Land on Oroku Peninsula 317 Final Sweep of Oroku Peninsula 317 Marine Casualties Are Evacuated by Spotter Plane 336 8th Marines Landing on Iheya Shima 336 Marine Tanks Shelling Positions in the South 355 Cooperative Prisoners 35 5 Men of the Tenth Army Pay Homage 366 Surrender of All Japanese Forces in the Ryukyus 366 VMF(CVS)—511 Corsair Ready to be Launched . . 420 An Explosion Rips the Critically Damaged Franklin . . . 420 Among the Few Marines Present At the Surrender Ceremony 440 Corsairs and Hellcats Fly in Formation Over Tokyo Bay 440 To The Colors 458

XII CONTENT S

ILLUSTRATIONS—Continued PAGE

Fleet Landing Force Personnel Are Transferred 480 Members of the Yokosuka Occupation Force 486 General Clement Looks Over Yokosuka Naval Base 486 The "New" 4th Marines Passes in Review 491 26th Marines Moves Into Sasebo 491 Battered Buddhist Figures 504 More Than 200 Japanese Planes Are Destroyed 504 1st Marine Division Troops Landing at Taku 554 Tientsin Citizens Welcome First Marines To Return 554 Navy Carrier Planes in a "Show of Force" 562 Repatriated Japanese Soldiers Salute American Flag 562 Arrow Directs Corsairs to Village 587 Communist Mine Damages Roadbed 587 Chinese Nationalist Sentries 646 A Portion of the Marines Remaining in Tsingtao 646 North China Marines 735 POW Quarters at Fengt'ai 735 Shadow of a B–29 on a Supply Drop 784 American and British POWs 784

MAPS

1. Nansei Shoto 33 2. Okinawa Shima 35 3. Japanese Defensive Positions 52 4. ICEBERG Scheme of Maneuver 59 5. Seizure of Kerama Retto 105 6. Landing Plan 113 7. Severing the Island 119 8. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 14 April 1945 143 9. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 15–16 Apri l 1945 147 10. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 17–23 April 1945 153 11. Reconnaissance and Capture of the Eastern Islands 163 12. Assault and Capture of Ie Shima 168 13. 1st Marine Division Advances 20 0 14. Dakeshi–Wana 21 5 15. Capture of Naha 255 16. Thirty-second Army Dispositions 291

CONTENTS XII I

MAPS—Continued PAGE

17. Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 4—6 June 1945 . . 30 1 18. Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 7—9 June 1945 . . 312 19. Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 10—11 June 1945 . 319 20. Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 12—14 June 1945 322 21 . Seizure of Kunishi Ridge 334 22 . Outlying Islands 349 23. End of Organized Resistance 359 24. Scheme of Maneuver, Operation OLYMPIC 405 25 . Marine Surrender and Occupation Duties 451 26. Operations BLACKLIST, CAMPUS—BELEAGUER 477 27 . Yokosuka Occupation 482 28 . Maximum Deployment of VAC 494 29 . VAC Deployment, 8 December 1945 513 30. 2d Marine Division Deployment 515 31 . Typical Deployment of a Marine Regiment 517 32 . China, 1945 523 33. North China 538 34. Hopeh Deployment 549 35. Anping Ambush 611 36. Attack on Hsin Ho 626

I. 14th IIB Defensive Dispositions Map Section II. 6th Marine Division Progress in Northern Okinawa Map Section III. XXIV Corps Progress, 5—30 April 1945 . . . . Map Section IV. Japanese Counteroffensive and Tenth Army Prog- ress, 5—21 May 1945 Map Section V. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 13—15 May 1946 Map Section VI. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 16—17 May 1945 Map Section VII. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 18—19 May 1945 Map Section VIII. Tenth Army Progress, 21—31 May 1945 . . . Map Section IX. Breakout to the South, 1—12 June 1945 . . Map Section X. Tenth Army Progress, 14—21 June 1945 . . . . Map Section XI. Significant Marine Corps Activities in World War II Map Sectio n PART I

Prologue to the End

CHAPTER 1

Strategic Background

In a report submitted to Secretary of separate approach axes would establis h the Navy James V. Forrestal on 12 bases from which a massive effort could March 1945, the Commander in Chief , be launched against the Formosa-Luzon - United States Fleet (CominCh) , Fleet China coastal areas in the spring of Admiral Ernest J . King, stated that : 1945. The amphibious operations of the spring , One drive, to be mounted by Al- summer and autumn of 1944 carried ou r lied forces under General Douglas forces such great distances across th e MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Pacific that in February 1945 they wer e Southwest Pacific Area (CinCSWPA), 3 e enabled to begin the assault upon th was to move along the northern coast of inner defenses of the Japanese Empir e itself.' On 3 March 1942, the Combined Chiefs o f Recognizing all that had been accom- Staff approved for the Western Pacific a di- plished to the date of his report, Admira l viding line that separated assigned spheres o f . Burma and all South - King at the same time cautioned agains t command in that area east Asia west of a north-south line betwee n complacency and warned of "a long , Java and Sumatra were added to General Si r tough and laborious road ahead ." 2 Archibald V . Wavell's India Command re- Among the many factors leading to sponsibility, and the British Chiefs of Staff the favorable Allied posture in the Pa- were charged with the strategic direction o f w e this theater. The whole Pacific east of the ne cific at the beginning of 1945 was th line was assigned to American Joint Chiefs o f strategic concept for the prosecution of Staff control . The JCS then divided the Pa- the Pacific War adopted at the Cairo cific into two strategic regions ; the one i n Conference (SEXTANT) in December which the Navy would have paramount inter- r 1943. In essence, President Roosevel t ests was the Pacific Ocean Areas, and the othe in which the Army would be dominant was th e d and Prime Minister Churchill agree Southwest Pacific Area . On 18 March 1942, upon a grand plan that dictated the MacArthur was designated CinCSWPA ; on 3 thrust of two concurrent and mutuall y April, Admiral Chester W . Nimitz, Commander supporting series of operations acros s in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was confirmed as th e . Se e the Pacific towards the heart of the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas LtCol Frank 0 . Hough, Maj Verle E . Ludwig, g Japanese Empire. These drives alon and Henry I . Shaw, Jr ., Pearl Harbor t o Guadalcanal—History of U . S. Marine Corps 'The War Reports of General of the Army Operations in World War II, v. 1 (Washington : George C. Marshall, General, of the Army H . H. HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1958) pp . 86-87, here- Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J . King after Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbo r (Philadelphia : J. B . Lippincott Company , to Guadalcanal, and Map I, Map Section of tha t 1947), p . 613, hereafter War Reports. volume, for additional information concernin g Ibid., p . 649. these two American commands . 3 310-224 0 - 69 - 2

4 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

New Guinea and thence to the Philip- the naval attack on and immobilization of pines ; in the second, forces of Admira l Truk, the capture of Guam, Saipan, and Chester W . Nimitz, Commander in Tinian in the Marianas during the sum- Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPOA) , mer of 1944, and the defeat of the Japa- would push through the Central Pacifi c nese fleet in the First Battle of the to the core of Japanese island defense s Philippine Sea, the Central Pacific driv e guarding the heart of the Empire. Dur- cut the inner ring of Japanese island ing this two-pronged advance, the major defenses in several places and consoli- components of the Pacific Fleet, under dated footholds from which the drive Nimitz as Commander in Chief, Pacifi c westward was to continue . After the Fleet (CinCPac), would support, as as - amphibious assaults on Peleliu an d signed, specific amphibious operation s Angaur and the unopposed capture of within both strategic command areas, Ulithi for use as a fleet anchorage and and at the same time contain the Japa- an advance base, Admiral Nimitz' force s nese fleet . stood poised on the threshold of the Almost immediately after the two Japanese defenses ringing the Hom e heads of state had approved at SEX- Islands.5 TANT the revised plan for the defeat of By the end of July, Admiral Willia m Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , F. Halsey's South Pacific troops ha d forwarded the directive to MacArthu r advanced up the Solomons, an d and Nimitz, whose §taffs and command s MacArthur's forces along hundreds of took steps to implement it. January miles of the northern coast of Ne w 1944 opened with a landing at Saidor in Guinea, in a series of leapfrogging op- New Guinea. At the end of the month, erations. Thousands of Japanese soldiers Central Pacific forces landed in the on Bougainville, New Britain, Ne w Marshalls and spent February thrusting Ireland, and New Guinea itself were deeply into the island group to collapse neutralized and isolated, and beyon d those outposts of the imperial defenses .4 hope of being effectively employe d By the end of March, the Bismarck elsewhere . In September, MacArthur' s Archipelago barrier had been perma- forces occupied Morotai, southeast of nently breached and airfields and the Philippines, before the planne d harbors seized in the Admiralties . landing on Mindanao . MacArthur's forces began the drive u p In the course of naval covering strike s the New Guinea coast in April, with prior to the landings on Morotai and i n landings at Aitape and Hollandia. With the Western Carolines, Admiral Halsey' s

' For the story of the Marshalls landing an d For the Peleliu operation and the story of the Central Pacific drive, see Henry I . Shaw, Marine aviation in the Central Pacific, se e Jr., Bernard C . Nalty, and Edwin T . Turnbladh , George W . Garand and Truman R . Strobridge , The Central Pacific Drive—History of U . S. "Operations in the Western Pacific—History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. U . S . Marine Corps Operations in World III (Washington : HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC , War II," v . IV, to be published in 1969, here - 1966), hereafter Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh , after Garand and Strobridge, "Western Pacifi c The Central Pacific Drive. Operations."

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 5

fast carrier forces had discovered sur- planners were confronted with the prob- prisingly weak enemy resistance in the lem of whether American forces should : central Philippines . In a follow-up to (1) move on to Luzon and the rest of the this discovery, the line of advance Philippines, (2) invade only Luzon in th e through the Southwest Pacific was re- Philippines and also strike at Formosa oriented northwards. Fully aware of and the China coast, or (3) attack th e "the necessity of being alert for symp- Philippines, Formosa, and the China toms of enemy weakness and of bein g coast. Arising out of the third optio n ready to exploit them," Halsey recom- was an additional thorny problem— mended an early return of American which area to attack first . troops to the Philippines in the Leyte- While Admiral King and some plan- Samar area and cancellation of certain ners in Washington considered the pos- operations scheduled elsewhere .6 His sibility of entirely bypassing the Philip- recommendation was approved by the pines, this concept was apparently only JCS. a minor aspect of the major effort by In the overall planning for the defeat many officers to have Luzon, in particu- of Japan, the strategists anticipated that lar, bypassed. The alternative to this the final phase of the Pacific War woul d was the seizure of Formosa . On the othe r involve a massive assault against the hand, ample evidence exists to indicate industrial heartland of the Empire b y that those who sought the Formosa ob- means of amphibious landings on the jective did not intend this to be an ex- southern coast of Honshu in the area clusive operation, for they believed that bounded by Shimonoseki in the sout h the invasion of Luzon could procee d and the Kanto Plain near Tokyo in the simultaneously with the Formosa opera- north. Successful Allied operations in tion or take place at a later date.? 1944 had brought ultimate victory int o Determined to return to the Philip - sight, and submarine blockade and ai r pines, MacArthur doubted the necessity bombardment both had the Japanes e of the Marianas campaign but generally viewing ultimate defeat, but some approved the Palaus landings since they American commanders doubted the wis- would directly support his impending dom of using the Formosa-Luzon-Chin a operations . Admiral King took just the area as a springboard from which t o opposite view ; he concluded that the launch the attack against Japan in 1945. occupation of the Marianas was essen- More importantly, they believed that tial and that the necessity of recapturin g valuable time was being wasted and that all of the Philippine Islands was ques- a decision had to be made . In view of th e tionable. Furthermore, he was firmly SEXTANT Plan, and the advanced stat e convinced that the main American effort of the operations against Japan, JC S should be bent in mounting a driv e FAdm William F . Halsey, USN, and LCd r across the Central Pacific to Formosa J. Bryan, III, USNR, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York : Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Dir, Naval Hist, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Book Company, Inc., 1947), p . 199, hereafte r Div, HQMC, dtd 4Nov65, hereafter Dir, Naval Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story . Hist ltr I .

6 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and then on to the China coast .$ Al- many times, and finally designated th e though various subordinate commander s task force commanders . Admiral in the Pacific Ocean Area held conflict- Raymond A . Spruance, Commander , ing views regarding what course should Fifth Fleet and Central Pacific Tas k be taken for the final phases of the war, Forces was to be in overall charge . Vice the SEXTANT decision made it impera- Admiral Richmond K . Turner was to tive that their staffs spend most of 1944 command the expeditionary forces, an d in planning for Operation CAUSEWAY , Lieutenant General Simon B . Buckner, the invasion of Formosa, projected fo r Jr., USA, was to command the expedi- the spring of 1945. tionary troops and the Tenth Army . 1 1 On the basis of a JCS directive issued Further discussion regarding what on 12 March 1944,9 the prevailing con- the nature of Pacific strategy was to be flict was partially allayed . Admiral Nim- following the Marianas operation con- itz was directed to land on 15 June in tinued after the JCS had directed the the Southern Marianas and on 1 5 preparation of plans for CAUSEWAY. September in the Palaus . General This topic was the subject of one of th e MacArthur was instructed to seize Hol- periodic conferences which Admirals landia in April and make plans for a King and Nimitz and their key deputies landing on 15 November on Mindanao . held throughout the war, either at Pear l Contained in the JCS order was a state- Harbor or San Francisco . At one such ment of long-range objectives that re- meeting on 6 May 1944, Vice Admiral quired Nimitz as CinCPOA to prepare Charles M . Cooke, Jr., King's chief of the plans for an assault early in 194 5 staff, pointed out that, although the JC S on Formosa, and assigned CinCSWP A directive envisioned a landing on For- the responsibility of planning for th e mosa in February 1945, the best time recapture of Luzon "should such opera- for this operation—in view of other con- tions prove necessary prior to the mov e siderations—would probably be Novem- on Formosa." to ber-December 1944 .12 Cooke also noted that once Japan had been cut off from In view of the March JCS directive , the mainland, her islands could b e which outlined the general concept o f bombed and perhaps Kyushu even CAUSEWAY, Nimitz reconsidered and revised the troop list for the operation invaded. During 1944, the Joint War Plan s 8 FAdm Ernest H . King and Cdr Walter M . Committee (JWPC) had also considere d Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King : A Naval Rec- ord (New York : W . W . Norton & Co ., Inc., 11 CinCPOA msg of 10Aug44 to addees, cite d 1952), p . 537, hereafter King and Whitehill , in History of USAFMidPac and Predecesso r King's Naval Record. Commands During World War II, 7Dec41 — 'JCS 713/4, dtd 12Mar44, cited in Maj 2Sep45, Hist of G—5 Sec, n .d ., p . 174, (OCMH) , Charles S . Nichols, Jr ., and Henry I . Shaw, Jr., hereafter USAFMidPac G—5 Hist . Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific (Washington : 12 Minutes, 2d meeting, CominCh—GinCPac HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, 1955), p . 12, here - Pacific Conference, 6May44, p . 14 (OAB , after Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa Victory. NHD), hereafter Minutes CominCh-CinCPac 10 Ibid. Conference with date .

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 7

what the nature of future Pacific strat- Kyushu 1 October and on the Tokyo egy should be. In early June, it issued Plain on Honshu on 31 December. This a comprehensive study which far ex- planning paper was passed to the Joint ceeded in scope and perspective the Staff Planners, who approved and for - previous strategic positions taken by warded it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs and the Combine d who likewise favored the revised con- Chiefs of Staff (CCS), and outlined a cept. On 11 July, the CCS received the series of campaigns that would lead to study along with a JCS recommendation an assault on the Tokyo Plain by the en d that the SEXTANT timetable for opera- of 1945. 13 In this study, the JWP C tions in the Pacific be changed to re- pointed out that in view of the present flect the suggested JWPC schedule. and anticipated rate of advance of in- At one of the meetings held during creasingly stronger American forces in the CominCh—CinCPac conference in the the Pacific, it would appear that the "In- period 13—22 July 1944, Admiral King ner Zone Defense of Japan" would be informed the conferees of the JCS action reached by spring 1945. The study con- regarding the JWPC study. He also indi- cluded that the overall strategy ap- cated that he believed Luzon could no t proved at SEXTANT was inadequate, be invaded before Formosa or Japa n i.e., future operations as planned ex- without the Americans first investigat- tended only to the perimeter of the ing what Saipan and Guam could offer in Formosa-Luzon line. the way of fleet anchorages and bas e Instead, the JWPC recommended a facilities for the support of the Luzo n new schedule or strategic concept for invasion forces. 14 Vice Admiral John H . ending the war in the Pacific . The com- Tower, Commander, Air Forces, Pa- mittee suggested that three phases pre - cific Fleet, stated that neither the areas cede the invasion of Japan : (1) During in American possession at that time o r the period 1 April to 30 June 1945 , prospectively available would permit th e American forces would seize positions establishment of naval and supply base s in the Bonins and the Ryukyus fro m which would be adequate for the support which they would launch an invasio n of the future operations contemplate d against the central China coast in th e in the JWPC study.15 Hangchow Bay area ; (2) They woul d Along these lines, it was suggeste d spend the time from 30 June to 30 Sep- that the feasibility and advisability of tember in consolidating and initially exploiting the China beachhead ; and (3) "Minutes, CominCh-CinCPac Conference , The forces would land in Southern 13-22Ju144, p . 10 . It should be noted that Saipan, invaded on 15 June, was not secure d 13 JPS 476, dtd 4Jun44, Subj : Operation s until 9 July, when the general mop-up began . Against Japan, Subsequent to Formosa, cited The invasion of Guam, which had been delaye d in Ray S . Cline, Washington Command Post : until 21 July, had caused a backup in the The Operations Division—United States Army supply pipeline and it was contemplated that in World War II (Washington : OCMH, DA , this situation could adversely affect subsequent 1951), p . 337, hereafter Cline, Washingto n operations . Command Post . 13 Ibid., p. 13 .

8 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

taking San Pedro Bay in Leyte Gulf a s troops became available, they should b e a fleet anchorage be investigated . Al- employed to supplement those already though considerable discussion of thi s assigned to the landings on Leyte an d recommendation resulted, no firm de- Formosa. In no case, should they b e cision was made at this time . diverted for such "minor operations" Regarding the invasion of the Bonins , as the occupation of Iwo Jima and Admiral Tower stated that, because the Chichi Jima." United States plans for the establish- Admiral King agreed with this lin e ment of VLR (very long range) bomber of thinking, and added that it would b e bases in the Marianas were close to unwise to assault the Bonins unti l being realized, steps to enhance their American forces were ready to invad e effectiveness should be taken at the Japan following the Formosa operation . earliest practicable date . This meant th e Nonetheless, at this time, he directe d seizure and development of positions in CinCPac to prepare plans for the in- the Bonins, where fighter and bombe r vasion of the Bonins. aircraft stationed on fields develope d As for determining those objective s there could supplement and support th e that were to follow the capture of th e planned air raids on Japan . On the Southern Marianas and the Pal us an d other hand, Admiral Tower added that a were to be mounted before the vasion study of the prospective employment o f of Japan, even President R osevelt' s fleet and assault forces did not indicat e visit to Pearl Harbor late in July to con- the Bonins could be taken until 1945, fer with MacArthur and Nimitz faile d unless the timing of then currently to resolve the impasse. When the con- planned operations could be drasticall y ference began, Admiral Nimitz, the revised. Because these were of greate r first to speak, presented the Navy importance in the overall scheme for the position . defeat of Japan, the occupations of Iwo Contrary to general belief, no rea l Jima and Chichi Jima would have to b e controversy arose between Nimitz an d deferred.ls MacArthur regarding the conduct o f Most of the others present at thi s future operations against Japan . Nimitz meeting generally agreed with Admira l made this quite clear in a letter to Ad- Tower's conclusions. Rear Admiral For- miral King, summarizing in a fe w rest P. Sherman, Nimitz' chief of staff words the discussions at the Pear l and head of his War Plans Division , Harbor meetings . Nimitz told CominC h pointed out that for the invasions o f that : Leyte and Formosa—the two major op- . . . our conferences with the Commande r erations of a decisive nature schedule d in Chief of the Army and Navy [Presi- following the completion of the landings dent Roosevelt] and the Commande r in the Palaus—American forces had in Chief, Southwest Pacific Are a [MacArthur] were quite satisfactory . Th e been tailored down considerably. Sher- general trend of the discussion, like ou r man emphasized that if more ships and own, was along the line of seein g

16 Ibid., p . 14 . 17 Ibid.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 9

MacArthur into the central Philippines , egy, he was still operating under a JC S thereafter going direct to the Formos a directive relative to the Formosa op- Strait, and leaving the SWPA forces to eration work into Luzon under the cover of the . On 23 August 1944, the CinCPa c Formosa operation. It was made clear joint staff study of CAUSEWAY wa s that the time has not yet arrived for firm published. In this document Admiral decisions on moves subsequent to Leyte .18 Nimitz indicated that he intended to It is possible, however, that Nimitz invade Formosa after SWPA forces ha d and some of his staff had some doubts o n established positions in the south an d the feasibility of the Formosa operatio n central Philippines. Following the suc- and the concept underlying the Formosa - cessful operations on Formosa, the first policy . Partial evidence for this is Ryukyus and the Bonins or the China found in the fact that CinCPac staff coast were to be invaded as a prelude to members had prepared plans to seize the assault on Japan itself . A Luzon Okinawa as a substitute for Formosa operation, as such, was not mentioned i n "well before such an operation gaine d this plan. serious consideration among high-leve l The dispute remained unresolved until planners in Washington ." 1 9 9 September, when, at the Quebec Con- After listening to the views of both ference (OCTAGON) , the Combine d MacArthur and Nimitz, the President Chiefs of Staff formally adopted an d returned to Washington without render- incorporated the JWPC concept within ing a decision on the courses of action to the SEXTANT schedule for the defeat be followed after the landings on Leyte . of Japan, and in effect revised it. For Nor does it appear that a firm decision planning purposes, the CCS then ap- for post-Leyte operations was expected . proved a new schedule of operations, Although Nimitz may have entertaine d which ended the campaigns of 1945 with other opinions concerning future strat- a landing on Kyushu in October and on the Tokyo Plain in December .20 18 Adm Chester W . Nimitz ltr to Adm Ernes t The Combined Chiefs also agreed that, J. King, dtd 31Ju144 (OAB, NHD) . This let- if the Formosa operation materialized , ter also indicates that King favored the estab- it would be preceded by invasions of th e lishment of positions in the southern or central Bonins in April, the Ryukyus in May, Philippines. and the China coast in the period Marc h 19 Robert R . Smith, Triumph in the Philip- . On 15 September 1944, th e pines—United States Army in World War II to June 1945 —The War in the Pacific (Washington : JCS further clarified impending Pacific OCMH, DA, 1963), p . 9. For a thorough dis- operations by cancelling the scheduled cussion of the Luzon-Formosa controversy, see invasions of Mindanao and Yap and Ibid., chap 1, "The Debate Over Luzon," and Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the 2 ° CCS 417/8, dtd 9Sep44, title : Opn for th e Philippines—Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas : Defeat of Japan ; CCS 417/9, OCTAGON, dtd 1944–1945—History of United States Nava l 11Sep44, title : Over-All Objective in Wa r Operations in World War II, v. XIII (Boston : Against Japan ; Min 173d Meeting CCS, Little, Brown and Company, 1959), chap 1 , 13Sep44, all cited in Cline, Washington Com- "Planning for Luzon, October–December 1944 ." mand Post, p . 339 . 10 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ADMIRAL NIMITZ briefs General MacArthur, President Roosevelt, and Admiral Leahy at the July 1944 Pearl Harbor conference . (USA SC207297)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF meet with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec, September 1944 . (USA SC194469)

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 1 1

setting 20 October as the date for the order to husband resources and to ac- invasion of Leyte . 2 ' celerate the march toward Japan, Har- On 11 September, Lieutenant General mon believed that the capture of Luzo n Millard F. Harmon, Commanding Gen- for its airfields was imperative . Air eral, Army Air Forces (AAF), Pacific operations launched from Luzon coul d Ocean Areas, proposed the abandonmen t neutralize Formosa and effectively cut of the Formosa operation in favor o f Japanese communications to Sout h amphibious landings in the Bonins and China and Malaya .2 3 the Ryukyus. Harmon recommended the Less than a week later, after a capture of Iwo Jima by 1 January 194 5 review of the plans contemplated fo r and Luzon by 1 June 1945 . Further, he the CAUSEWAY operation, Admiral suggested that POA troops seize Oki- Nimitz set forth his thoughts in a lette r nawa and Amami 0 Shima after circulated to his senior commanders . In MacArthur's forces recaptured Luzon ; a key section of this letter, CinCPac Kyushu was to be invaded in September recommended to consider the possibility : 1945. Harmon also stated that he be- . . . of a re-orientation of a strategy i n lieved that the seizure and use of Luzo n the Pacific which will provide for an ad- was an important consideration in the vance northward with eventual assaults on the Empire itself, rather than intermediate overall strategy of the Pacific War an d action along the China Coast, thus indi- that the launching of a major operatio n cating the probability of occupation of against Formosa would dilute some o f Iwo Jima and Okinawa with targe t the force being applied against th e dates as early as practicable after Japanese in other action areas.22 In CAUSEWAY.2 4 He also directed Admirals Spruance an d 21 The invasion of Mindanao was restored to Turner and General Buckner to recom- , the plans for the recapture of the Philippines e and MacArthur's X Corps landed on th e mend suitable physical targets in th beaches of Illana Bay on 17 April 1945 . Formosa-Amoy-Pescadores areas for " General George C . Marshall, Chief of Staff Operation CAUSEWAY . Criteria for of the Army, had favored the Formosa-firs t the selections were the number of naval plan, and like Admiral King "had expresse d and air bases that would have to be the opinion that Japan itself, rather tha n established and the type and total o f Luzon, should be considered the substitute fo r Formosa." Smith, op. cit., p. 9 . In September , major troop units required . On 26 Sep- General Marshall revised his opinion and be- tember, General Buckner submitte d lieved, that, in view of existing facts, th e what he considered to be the primar y choice for the next operation would have to b e objection to the entire projected opera- e Luzon. It seemed more logical to him to secur tion ; he said that the shortage of avail- Luzon—which MacArthur promised to take i n six weeks—than to concentrate on Formosa , able supporting and service troops in the which would take longer to capture . Marshal l reasoned that if all of the resources that wer e " CGAAFPOA ltr to CinCPOA, dtd 11Sep4 4 d to be poured into Formosa were diverted t o (no file or serial number), cited in Nichols an Luzon, Admiral Nimitz could get ready to at - Shaw, Okinawa Victory, p. 15 . tack the Bonins and Ryukyus all the sooner , ' CinCPOA ltr to ComFifthFlt, ComGenTen , and the timetable for the invasion of Japa n and ComPhibsPac, Ser 000113, dtd 16Sep4 4 could be advanced. (OAB, NHD) .

12 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

POA for CAUSEWAY made it infeasi- ures. Nimitz then submitted a memo- ble.25 In an afterthought, on 4 October randum recommending changes fo r Buckner wrote Nimitz that the need for future Pacific operations based on th e invading Formosa would be diminished non-availability of necessary resources greatly if plans for the invasion o f and the favorable results of recent car- Luzon came to fruition .26 rier operations. Admiral Nimitz recom- The minutes of the CominCh-CinCPac mended that CinCPac forces support the conference held in San Francisco from SWPA invasion of Luzon with a target 29 September to 1 October 1944, indicate date of 20 December 1944, and the in- that by this time, Admiral King had vasions of Iwo Jima on 20 January 1945 given serious thought to bypassing For- and of Okinawa on 1 March by PO A mosa. He told Nimitz that, at his pro- Forces.27 posal, the Joint Logistics Committe e CinCPac stated that the proposal fo r (JLC) had made a survey of th e the SWPA forces to work up throug h resources available for the Formosa op- the Philippines from Leyte by shore-to- eration, and that the report of thi s shore operations had been discusse d committee was very discouraging. At the with President Roosevelt and Genera l time of its survey, the JLC found that MacArthur at the Pearl Harbor con- resources were not available fo r ference in July. Because MacArthur ha d CAUSEWAY, and would not be avail - stated that he could not undertake thes e able unless Germany capitulated a long operations and in view of the insufficient time before it was expected to do so . resources for Formosa, Nimitz believe d CinCPac then told King of General that the best way to keep pressure on the Buckner's requirements for additional Japanese was for him to support the men and equipment and that he, Nimitz , Lingayen Gulf operation proposed b y was in no position to dispute these fig- MacArthur and to take the Bonins and the Ryukyus with POA forces .28 CG, Tenth Army ltr to CinCPOA, dtd 26Sep44, Subj : Feasibility of CAUSEWAY , Admiral Sherman then told King that cited in USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, p. 177 . Con- Nimitz expected to take Iwo Jima with cerning the Marine troop requirements fo r two divisions and then to send in larg e Formosa, Lieutenant General Alexander A . numbers of construction personnel t o Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marin e build up the airfields rapidly. Following Corps, informed Admiral King that many o f the service forces General Buckner had said that, assuming that enemy air power on were needed to support the Marine component Formosa had been neutralized by carrie r of the Tenth Army were, in fact, alread y strikes assisted by shore-based air from organic to the Fleet Marine Force or else wer e Luzon, it was expected that Okinaw a neither suited nor required for Marine Corp s would be invaded on 1 March . King amphibious operations . CominCh-CNO Memo to JCS, dtd 4Sep44, Subj : Employment of asked Nimitz why he was going to seize Marine Divisions in "Formosa" Operation s the Bonins if Okinawa was to be taken . (OAB, NHD) . 27 28 CG, Tenth Army ltr to CinCPOA, dtd Minutes, CominCh–CinCPac Conference , 40ct44, Subj : CAUSEWAY Objectives, cited 29Sep–lOct44, p . 4 . in USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, p. 179. 28 Ibid., p . 5 .

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 13

Nimitz replied that fighters based in the affected by the : (1) Capture of Iw o Bonins could give protection to th e Jima in time for the prompt release of B—29s raiding Japan, and that the AAF fire support units and close air support wanted this added protection. squadrons required at Okinawa ; (2) King returned to Washington and o n Prompt release of supporting naval 2 October proposed to the JCS a course forces and assault shipping from th e of action for the Pacific. He stated that Luzon operation ; and (3) Attainment in view of the lack of necessary re - of undisputed control of the sea and air sources in the POA for CAUSEWAY , in the target area in preliminary strike s and because of the inability of the War against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Department to make up the deficit befor e Japan. 3 1 the end of the war in Europe, he believe d With all attention and efforts now that operations should be mounted focused on the new objectives, th e against Luzon, Iwo Jima, and th e Formosan venture was reserved as a Ryukyus in succession. He also added strategic goal for possible future recon- that CAUSEWAY might be feasible a t sideration.32 Although the basic com- a later date if conditions in the Pacific mand concept and troop list organization and Europe warranted .29 Concurring that had been set up for CAUSEWA Y with King's proposal, the next day the were retained for employment in ICE- JCS ordered MacArthur to invade Luzon BERG,33 there was much to be done on 20 December 1944 and Admira l between the time that the JCS ordere d Nimitz to land Marines on Iwo Jima on the capture of Okinawa and the actua l 20 January 1945 . Following these opera- date of the invasion . tions, Operation ICEBERG was to be 81 CinCPOA Joint Staff Study—ICEBERG , launched on 1 March 1945.3° This date dtd 250ct44, p . 1 (Okinawa AreaOp File , was flexible, however, since it would be HistBr, HQMC), hereafter ICEBERG Study . "= JCS 713/19, dtd 30ct44, cited in Nichols 29 CominCh—CNO Memo to JCS dtd 20ct44 , and Shaw, op . cit., p . 17. Subj : Future Operations in the Pacific (OAB , " Tenth Army AR, Ryukyus, 26Mar- NHD) . 30Jun45, dtd 3Sep45, chap 3, p . 3 (Okinaw a 30 JCS 713/19, dtd 30ct44, cited in Nichol s Area Op File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter and Shaw, Okinawa Victory, p. 17 . Tenth Army AR . CHAPTER 2

The Japanese Situation 1

As early as the spring of 1944, th e what Japanese strategy should be at high commands of the Japanese Arm y this critical time . and Navy in the Imperial General Head- Faced with an impending accelerate d quarters (IGHQ) 2 had, with some ac- American drive in the Central Pacific , curacy, predicted the trend of America n IGHQ issued an Army-Navy agreemen t strategy in Pacific War. The Japanes e for Japanese operations in that area . foresaw that the turning point of th e The Navy was given primary responsi- conflict would begin developing in Marc h bility for denying the Allies bases from or April in the Marianas . Further, the which further operations could be military chiefs were concerned with launched against other islands and finally Japan itself. By the spring of 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material i n 1944, defenses in the Carolines, Ma- this chapter is derived from : Foreign Historie s rianas, and Volcano Islands were to be Div, G-3, Hq, U . S. Army Japan, Japanes e completed . Japanese Army units were Monograph No . 45, rev . ed . 1959, Histor y to reinforce the island defenses and of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Sec- tion (OCMH), hereafter IGHQ Hist; Robert would operate under overall naval con- J. C . Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrende r trol in conducting ground operations .3 (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1954) , A broader aspect of Japanese strateg y hereafter Butow, Japan's Decision ; Takushir o was the decision to try to entrap an d Hattori, Dai Toa Senso Zenshi [The Complete History of The Greater East Asia War], M S defeat decisively a major portion o f trans, 4 vols (Tokyo : Matsu Publishing Co ., U. S . naval forces. As island defense s 1955), v . IV (OCMH, DA), hereafter Wa r were being strengthened, the Japanes e History ; Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox , Navy committed the bulk of its aeria l Kogun (Quantico : Marine Corps Association , 1959), hereafter Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ; strength—about 1,000 aircraft of which Toshikasu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, Davi d only 650 were operational— 4 to the N. Rowe, ed. (New Haven : Yale Universit y Marianas and part of the remainder to Press, 1950), hereafter Kase, Journey to the the Carolines. Meanwhile, surface force s Missouri ; USSBS, Japan's Struggle to End th e War (Washington : July 1946), hereafter were to remain alert and ready to steam USSBS, Japan's Struggle. into combat when the time to strike

2 IGHQ was only a term used to denote the arose. co-equal status and existence of the Tokyo- Most IGHQ officers and governmen t based headquarters of the Army General Staff officials alike were supremely confiden t and the Navy General Staff and their subordinate general and special staff sections . This of winning the war and directed every duality of command typified the Japanese military system not only at the highest level, bu t IGHQ Hist, p . 154 . in the lower echelons also. J Hayashi and Coox ; Kogun, p . 106 . 14

THE JAPANESE SITUATION 15

effort to ensure an ultimate Japanese doomed, for it did not have the resource s victory. Not so certain that Japan was to continue the war after that time . going to be the victor was an oppositio n Takagi's study and his conclusions group composed of former ministers , were based on an analysis of fleet, air , cabinet members, and elder statesmen and merchant shipping losses as of th e (Jushin) who had opposed the war in last of 1943. He pointed out the serious the pre-Pearl Harbor period . Also in difficulty Japan was facing in importin g this group were some other influentia l essential materials, high-level confusion Japanese leaders who, while not hold- regarding war aims and the direction ing positions of power, had given mere of the war and the growing feelin g lip service to their nation's involvemen t among some political and military leadin a conflict . Rounding out the opposi- ers that General Hideki Tojo, Prim e tion were other formerly powerful men , Minister since 1941, should be remove d who had "retired" in the early years of from office. the war. The original doubts of the op- Takagi stated also that both the pos- position gave it a basis for believing a s sibility of American bombing raids o n early as the spring of 1944 that Japa n Japan and the inability of the Japanes e was faced with inexorable defeat . These to obtain essential raw and finishe d beliefs were buttressed by a demonstra- products dictated that the nation shoul d tion of the American determination to seek a compromise peace immediately . fight aggressively and an ability t o In March he presented his findings mount successful operations in the Pa- orally to two influential naval officers , cific even before a second front had been Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, a former opened in Europe . Alone, these tw o prime minister, and Vice Admiral Seib i factors gave portents of disaster t o Inouye, who employed the facts of the those Japanese who were able to inter- study to induce other members of the pret them.5 opposition to take firm steps to help Between September 1943 and Febru- change the course that Japan was travel - ary 1944, Rear Admiral Sokichi Takagi, ling.6 chief of the Naval Ministry's researc h Less than two months after the in- section, prepared a study of Japanes e vasion of Normandy in June 1944 , lessons learned in the fighting to tha t Japanese leaders began receiving re- date. He maintained that it was im- ports of the massive numbers of men possible to continue the war and that and amount of materiel that the Allie s it was manifestly impossible for Japan were able to land unopposed each day to win. He thus corroborated an esti- on the French coast . As a Japanese mate made by top Japanese naval of- foreign ministry official later wrote : ficers before 1941 . At that time, the y That was more than enough to dis- concluded that unless the war was wo n hearten us, the defenses of our hom e islands were far more vulnerable than th e before the end of 1943, Japan wa s European invasion coast. Our amazemen t

USSBS, Japan's Struggle, p. 2. Ibid., p . 3.

16 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

was boundless when we saw the America n carrier task force struck back violently forces land on Saipan only ten days after the next day, sinking another enemy D day in Europe. The Allies could execute simultaneous full-scale offensives in both carrier and downing many Japanese European and Asiatic theaters 1 7 planes . According to American estimates, their opponents suffered stag- By all accounts, Japanese and other , gering losses in the two days : 426 what really tipped the scales in favo r carrier planes and 31 float planes . In of an eventual Allied victory in the Pa- addition, the Americans claimed that cific, and more immediately caused th e approximately 50 Guam-based aircraf t fall of the Tojo government, were th e had been destroyed .9 landings at Saipan and Japanese losse s Japanese sources confirm the loss o f in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea. carriers and state that four others of Only 1,350 miles from Tokyo, Saipan the nine committed in the fight wer e constituted one of the most vital points damaged. Enemy records show that of in the Japanese outer defense system. the 360 carrier-based aircraft sent to Toshikasu Kase, the foreign ministry attack the American fleet, only 25 sur- official quoted above, wrote that th e vived. "Although no battleships or island : cruisers were sunk, . . . the loss of air- . . . was so strongly defended that it wa s craft carriers proved an almost fata l considered impregnable. More than once I blow to the Japanese navy. With the was told by the officers of the General Staff loss of the decisive aerial and nava l that Saipan was absolutely invincible . Our Supreme Command, however, made a stra- battles, the Marianas were lost ." 10 Des- tegic miscalculation . Anticipating an early pite this thorough defeat, most Japanes e attack on Palau Island, they transferre d were told that it was a glorious victor y there the main fleet and the land-based ai r for them ; "it was customary for G H forces in order to deal a smashing blow [IGHQ] to make false announcements to the hostile navy. The result was that Saipan, lacking both naval and air proof victory in utter disregard of facts , tection, proved surprisingly vulnerable .8 and for the elated and complacent public to believe in them ." 1 1 An even greater disaster befell the Japanese in the Battle of the Philippine Although the Japanese government Sea, 19–20 June 1944 . This two-day did not announce its losses in the Battle conflict began when carrier-based air - of the Philippine Sea—or that it ha d craft of the Japanese First Mobile Fleet even lost the battle—news of the fall o f attacked Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet Saipan was made public. Upon learning while it covered the Saipan operation . this in July, an opposition group con- On the first day, two U. S. battleships, sisting mainly of Jushin determined to two carriers, and a heavy cruiser wer e ° Samuel Eliot Morison, New Guinea and damaged ; the Japanese lost over 300 the Marianas—History of United States Nava l aircraft and two carriers. Pilots from Operations in World War II, v . VIII (Boston : Vice Admiral Marc A . Mitscher's fast Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp . 319- 321 . ° Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 90 . 10 IGHQ Hist, p. 172 . ° Ibid ., p . 73. 11 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p . 74 .

THE JAPANESE SITUATION 17

overthrow the Tojo regime, and force d ment in strategy and troop dispositions the Prime Minister to resign from of- in one area after another as the Allied fice on 18 July 1944. threat to the Home Islands intensifie d The problems facing Japan wer e and accelerated . On the other hand, it hardly resolved with the appointmen t is possible to understand their reluc- and installation of General Kuniaki tance to view the situation realistically . Koiso as premier. The Japanese Arm y From their earliest days, Japanese citi- was still a political power, capable o f zens were taught to believe that the dictating the rise, fall, and course o f one alternative to victory was death and government, and Tojo and his follower s that surrender was so disgraceful as to remained uncontrite in their adherenc e be unthinkable . And the high comman d to a chauvinistic program of Japanes e planned, therefore, to continue the war , conquest and supremacy. Although the even on Japanese soil if necessary, bu t Home Islands had not yet experienced to fight to the finish in any case . the devastation and chaos to be brough t Even lower ranking Japanese Arm y by the vast Allied air raids, after th e and Navy officers, many of them prod- fall of Saipan a number of critical do- ucts of a prewar conscript system, wh o mestic problems affecting the war effort very often came from peasant families , faced the Japanese government . The held the same beliefs as their senior s output of a number of essential item s regarding honor and obedience and th e fell below peak requirements, and sever e disgrace of surrendering . The code of shipping losses reduced the amount o f the samurai had been all-pervasive for raw and finished material reaching many years and had influenced the at- Japanese shores to a point far short of titude and outlook of nearly every face t needs. of Japanese society . On the home front, despite its unhap- IGHQ took steps for the defense of piness with Tojo and his handling o f the homeland as early as the beginnin g the war, the Japanese public was con- of 1944, when it perceived the cours e s fident in ultimate victory. Those leader that the war was taking and judged in government opposed to the war, op - what future American strategy was to position leaders behind the scenes, and be. Japanese strategists believed tha t some of the war hawks, too., began t o r have greater misgivings as they learne d Allied forces would attack Japan prope of previous defeats and potential disas- from the direction of the Marianas and o ters. As this knowledge spread, the through the Philippines . The Toky military factions slowly lost face and headquarters prepared for this even- became discredited, but not until the tuality by setting up a defense line along last months of the war did they lose the sea front connecting the Philippines , power. Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, the Jap- Nonetheless, confident of their abilit y anese homeland, and the Kurile Islands, to guide Japan to what they considered and strengthened the garrisons on each . would be a just victory, the militar y According to this plan, the Japanes e leaders made adjustment after adjust- would concentrate their full strength

18 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

to destroy the Allied threat at whateve r which land-based planes could pumme l point it developed. Japan unmercifully. A schedule of four prepared reactions , Seeing that no good purpose would called the Sho-Go operations, was draw n be served by prolonging the Leyte op- up. For the defense of Formosa and th e eration, IGHQ decided to withdraw Nansei group, Sho-Go No. 2, IGHQ Japanese forces from the island and to placed the Thirty-second Army under conduct delaying tactics elsewhere i n the command of the Formosa Army in the Philippines . The Luzon landing in July 1944, and added two divisions to January 1945 made it apparent tha t the order of battle of the former . In there was no further way of holding off the 10 months between the landing on the Americans. From November 194 4 Saipan and the invasion of Okinawa , on, American air attacks on Tokyo, Japanese strength was built up in the Nagoya, Osaka, and northern Kyush u Ryukyus from an estimated 10,000 to increased in intensity, destroying grea t approximately 155,000 air, ground, an d sections of these areas and seriousl y naval troops.1 2 impeding the war effort . For the defense of the Philippines , In January, the overall IGHQ esti- the high command had planned Sho-Go mate of the situation concluded that No. 1 . Based on a decision of the Im- although Japan and Germany had suf- perial War Council on 19 August 1944, fered many reverses, the Axis ha d Japan staked her national destiny on exacted a heavy penalty of their enemy . the outcome of the impending battle o f In viewing the Japanese cause in th e Leyte.13 It was here that the Army and same way that the viewed the Empero r Navy had to destroy the Americans . and sacred homeland—through an emo- The critical losses sustained by the Com- tional and reverent haze— 14 the senior bined Fleet in the four-day battle fo r commanders concluded that "the final Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944, three victory will be for those who will stand days after the invasion of Leyte, and th e up against increasing hardship and wil l inability of ground forces to contai n fight to the last with a firm belief in the invaders, created a grave threat t o ultimate victory ." 15 While it acknowl- Japanese hegemony in the Western Pa- edged that the defeat of Germany woul d cific and even more so to the safety of mean the unleashing of tremendousl y Japan proper . Allied task forces dom- powerful forces against Japan, IGHQ inated the waters surrounding Japa n believed that one of the major America n proper and the East and South China problems would be in the area of man- Seas as well. An additional liability re- power mobilization. The Japanese com- sulting from American successes was manders hoped that, tiring of the war , the concomitant loss of airdromes fro m the American people would favor its end.1 6 12 MID, WD, Disposition and Movement of Japanese Ground Forces, 1941-1945, dtd 14 USSBS, Japan's Struggle, p . 2. 10Dec45 (OAB, NHD) . 16 IGHQ Hist, p . 236. la Hattori, War History, p. 1 . " Ibid.

THE JAPANESE SITUATION 19

Believing that the United States Further, at this late stage in the war , wanted to terminate the war quickly , all branches of science were mobilize d IGHQ speculated that American force s in the faint hope that they could develop would take the shortest possible route surprise attack weapons . Unfortunatel y leading to Japan . This estimate fore - for this program, students at Army saw that after the landings in the Phil- schools and serving officers were not ippines, the Allies would move to For- very well trained in scientific and tech- mosa, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima . Based nological subjects ; because of the nature on the fact that most Japanese suppl y of their duties and the weapons whic h lines to the south had been well inter- the Navy employed, naval officers were dicted early in 1945, and an interpreta- in a little better position. The Army, tion of radio intelligence reports, it however, was and always had been th e seemed very likely that Iwo Jima was dominant military authority in Japan , to be attacked in the very near future ." and as in the past, determined how th e IGHQ also speculated that America n country would fight a war . Neverthe- forces would land on mainland China i n less, as the Japanese war situation dete- southern Kwantung and Hongkong ." riorated, military leaders optimisticall y In the face of the impending invasio n sought the development of miraculously and to strengthen homeland defense s effective weapons . further, IGHQ planned a large-scale Nonetheless, it became abundantly clear mobilization of all segments of the pop- that the low scientific level of the nation ulation. In October 1944, when th e could not possibly yield elaborate weapons . government invoked general mobiliza- . . . The Army's attitude toward technology incurred many kinds of great tion, there were 6,390,000 reservists criticism from private sources at the time , available for call-up. Of these, 4,690,00 0 the major points being the following : were ready for immediate assignmen t The Army keeps matters tightly secret . to active duty . There was a problem , The Army has a great predilection for however, of achieving a proper balanc e bamboo-spear tactics, and has little under - standing of technology . . . .2 0 in the armed forces, since a shortage o f trained technical personnel existed . Despite the many imposing obstacle s Moreover, of the approximately 87 per- looming ahead, IGHQ prepared to exe- cent of the Japanese adult populatio n cute a protracted war in the Japanes e already employed in the vital food an d islands. The command headquarter s munitions industries, 47 percent wer e made itself the supreme authority for reservists and not available unless the the operation of the war and took step s war effort was to be damaged . " to see that the governmental structure would be revised so that the Prime 1R Ibid., p. 239. Minister would have comparable au- " Chief, War History Office, Defense Agency thority over political matters . In addi- of Japan, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , tion, the entire nation was to be mobil- dtd 4Feb66, hereafter War History Offic e ized and all citizens capable of bearin g Comments. 19 Ibid. 20 Hayashi and Coox, Kgun, pp. 118-119.

310-224 0 - 69 - 3

20 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

weapons were to be armed. Key indus- a large proportion of Japanese troop tries as well as the communications an d strength overall was tied down in Chin a transportation facilities were to be re- and Manchuria, however, and a smalle r organized and operated by the stat e portion was isolated in the Central an d along rigidly controlled lines .21 Southwest Pacific, where replacements , As Japan was already a corporate reinforcements, and replenishment coul d state, i.e., a nation in which the govern- not be sent. Nor could these units b e ment controlled every facet of industr y withdrawn to Japan or elsewhere, so and all other productive areas, and sinc e complete was the Allied encirclement . military control of the state had bee n For all practical purposes, the units i n a fact of life from the time that Japan the Pacific were lost to Japan and ou t embarked upon her course of conques t of the war for good. in the early 1930s, there was little ne w In late 1944 and early 1945, American in this revised policy, except for one bombings, fast carrier task force raids , phrase, " . . . in a military manner." and especially the submarine blockad e This was a naked declaration of military had increased in intensity and reduced ascendancy and control over all govern - the Japanese north-south maritime ship- mental functions . Even Tojo had given ments to a mere trickle, so that the eco- lip service to civilian primacy in non- nomic structure of that country was military matters. But opposition ele- slowly forced to a halt. Undoubtedly, ments were not yet strong enough to the single most effective agent in this take over the reins of government an d action was the blockade imposed by th e to begin steps to sue for a negotiated ships of the U. S. Pacific submarine fleet. peace ; the militarists were still in American submarines torpedoed or de- power, and they continued preparations stroyed by gunfire 60 percent of th e for a last-ditch fight. 2,117 Japanese merchant vessels, total - IGHQ remained convinced the Amer- ling 7,913,858 tons, sunk by American ica was wearying of the war and that , forces during the war . In addition, U. S. even if this were not so, Japanes e underseas forces accounted for 201 of ground strength of some 4,747,000 men the 686 enemy warships sunk in World in uniform—a million and a half o f War II.23 whom were based in Japan— 22 was On 13 January 1945, IGHQ was enough to prevent the Americans from startled to learn that an entire convo y reaching Japanese shores . If invaders of nine tankers and its escort squadro n did attempt to come ashore, homelan d had been sunk off Qui Nhon, a tow n defense forces would drive them back on the east coast of French Indo-China . into the sea. At the beginning of 194 5 In face of this crowning blow and t o

21 Hattori, War History, p. 5. 23 JANAC, Japanese Naval and Merchan t OCMH, DA Estimate of Japanese Strengt h Ship Losses (Feb47), pp. vi, vii, cited in and Disposition of Forces, dtd Oct55, File No . Samuel Eliot Morrison, Leyte, June 1944 — 320.2, Geographic V—Japan (OCMH) . Thi s January 1945—History of United States Nava l collation was derived from authoritative Amer- Operations in World War II, v. XII (Boston : ican intelligence sources published in 1945 . Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p . 413 .

THE JAPANESE SITUATION 21

evade American planes and submarines , area, Army and Navy air elements the Japanese devised a new system em- would mount massive attacks agains t ploying small convoys guarded by dis- the convoys. Included in the Japanese persed escorts instead of the large r aerial formations were to be special convoys and concentrated escorts sen t aircraft flown by pilots trained in sui- out previously . Even this method faile d cide tactics. when air and naval bases on Luzon be- At the end of the month, Japanes e came operational and American attacks air strength available for the defens e from the island quickened in pace with of Okinawa was as follows : the submarine attacks . 8th Air Division (Army), Formosa ; At the beginning of March 1945 , 120 fighters, 60 bombers, 10 reconnais- IGHQ stopped sending convoys to the sance planes, 250 special attack planes . south ; northbound convoys carrying The targets of the latter were American essential war material continued the at- transports. tempt to reach Japanese ports, however . Sixth Air Army (Army), Japan ; 90 Some 70 to 80 percent of the ships neve r fighters, 90 bombers, 45 reconnaissanc e made it. Later in the month, Tokyo aircraft, and 300 special attack plane s ordered shipping halted altogether .24 were assigned to attack American trans- The noose around Japan was drawin g ports ; 60 fighters, 30 bombers, 20 recon - tighter and tighter . naissance aircraft, and 100 special at - Since February, IGHQ had received tack planes were assigned to strike task a mounting influx of reports of increas- force carriers, and Ryukuyan airfields ingly larger numbers of American con- when captured by the Americans . An voys operating in the vicinity of th e additional 400 fighters and 45 recon- Marianas and Ulithi . On 12 February, naissance planes were assigned to fl y Tokyo was alerted to the movement of a combat air patrols . sizable task force heavily protected b y First Air Fleet (Navy), Formosa ; 40 carriers and headed towards Iwo Jima . fighters, 40 bombers, 5 reconnaissance On the 16th, IGHQ was certain that th e planes. ; 4 Bonins were the American target. When Third Air Fleet (Navy), Japan 0 the actual invasion of Iwo began three fighters, 30 bombers, and 20 reconnais- days later, there was litle doubt that sance planes . Okinawa would be next . 2 5 Fifth Air Fleet (Navy), Japan ; 200 fighters, 310 bombers, and 10 reconnais - In March, the Army and Navy con- sance aircraft . cluded yet another agreement concern- Tenth Air Fleet (Navy), Japan ; 700 ing joint defense operations, this one combat planes, 1,300 training planes . establishing responsibilities for con- This fleet was a reserve force, and its taining Allied advances into the Eas t aircraft were to be employed as specia l China Sea. According to the plan, when attack planes . According to the Army- American task forces approached thi s Navy agreement, the Navy planes were =4 Hattori, War History, p. 6. to attack the U. S. task forces and the 26 IGHQ Hist, p . 256 . escort shipping guarding them. To en-

22 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

large the number of special attack units , with a major assignment in the defens e both the Army and the Navy were t o of the Ryukyus, had been soundl y indoctrinate their pilots "in the spiri t crushed in February when America n of suicide attacks ."-'" fast carriers visited Kyushu . The othe r From early January until the middl e major air commands slated for impor- of March, American carrier-based pilot s tant roles in protecting Okinawa either had battered Formosa and Okinawa i n were not yet deployed in positions fro m an aerial onslaught that showed no signs which they could fly out to hold back of letting up. It seemed inevitable t o the impending invasion or, having been the Imperial General Headquarters that severely punished in earlier American the U. S. move following Iwo would b e attacks, were unable to strike back . against the Ryukyus. Late in March, Japanese naval strength was hardl y the Tokyo command received word tha t in better condition. The fleet was in woe- American forces had steamed out o f fully sad shape and unbalanced . The anchorages at Ulithi and in the Mari- high toll in the loss of its carriers, de- anas. During the same period, fast car- stroyers, and aircraft had left it in a rier task force aircraft pummelled pitiable condition, while the overal l Okinawa with from 500 to 700 sorties shortage of fuel would have immobilize d daily. The prologue to the grand climax it in any case. By March 1945, it "was was reached on 26 March when the nothing but a partially paralyzed sur- Kerama Retto was invaded ; Okinawa's viving unit." 2 7 time was not far off. Following the news of the fall of Iwo Despite the clear indication that Oki- Jima, the Thirty-second Army on Oki- nawa was the major U . S. target, Jap- nawa stood wary—listening, waiting , anese air strength had dwindled to th e and watching for an invasion force to point where it was in no condition to appear over the horizon. Its expecta- contest the landing. The Fifth Air Fleet, tions were soon to be fulfilled .

"e IGHQ Hist, pp. 274-275, 277-278. 27 Hattori, War History, p. 26. CHAPTER 3

Marine Corps Order of Battle 1

In July 1940, the Marine Corps ha d hospital corpsmen, and other naval per- 28,000 men in uniform . The Januar y sonnel assigned to the Marine Corps . 2 1945 strength figure of the Corps re- In the beginning of 1945, no major flected some 421,605 Marines, men an d Marine ground force as such was en- women ; before the end of the war., this gaged in a major operation against th e number was to become even larger . enemy. The 2d Division on Saipan an d Broken down, the Marine Corps Jan- the 3d on Guam, where veterans an d uary strength figure represented : FMF new replacements alike participated i n ground forces, 212,165 ; aviation, 125,- on-the-job training, however, were mop - 162 ; sea-going Marines, 9,430 ; foreign ping up survivors of the major Japanese and domestic naval and shore activities , defense garrisons which were defeated 54,483 ; Women's Reserve, 18,365. In when those islands were officially de- addition to the above and not include d clared secured in 1944 . in the overall total were 16,017 doctors , The senior Marine commander in the Pacific at this time was Lieutenant Gen- 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material in eral Holland M . Smith, Commandin g this chapter is derived from : CMC AnRpt t o General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacifi c SecNav for the Fiscal Year Ending 30Jun45 , hereafter CMC Rpt 1945 (CMC Rpts for othe r Robert A . Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia . The years will be cited CMC Rpt with year) ; Third Marine Division (Washington : Infantr y DivAvn, HQMC, OpD, Jan45 (AdminFile , Journal Press, 1948), hereafter Aurthur an d HistBr, HQMC), hereafter DivAvn OpD with Cohlmia, 3d MarrDiv Hist ; Carl W . Proehl, ed ., date ; G—1 Sec, Div P&P, HQMC, OpDs, The Fourth Marine Division in World War I I 7Dec4l-31Dec44 and Jan45 (AdminFile Hist- (Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 1946) , Br, HQMC), hereafter G—1 OpD with date ; hereafter Proehl, 4th MarDiv Hist ; Howar d CO, 1st ProvHistPlat, FMF, MS, "Historica l M. Conner, The Spearhead : The World War II Outline of the Development of Fleet Marin e History of the 5th Marine Division (Washing- Force, Pacific, 1941—1950 (Preliminary)," 195 1 ton : Infantry Journal Press, 1950), hereafter (HistBr, HQMC), hereafter FMFPac Hist ; Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist ; Bevan G . Cass, ed ., Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, an d History of the Sixth Marine Division (Wash- Edwin T . Turnbladh, Marine Corps Groun d ington : Infantry Journal Press, 1948) here - Training in World War II (Washington : after Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist ; Robert Sherrod, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, 1956), hereafte r History of Marine Corps Aviation in World Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps War II (Washington : Combat Forces Press , Training ; George McMillan, The Old Breed : 1952), hereafter Sherrod, Marine Air Hist . A History of the First Marine Division in 2 G—1 OpDs, 7Dec4l-31Dec44 and Jan45 ; World War II (Washington : Infantry Journa l FMF Status Rpts, Ground and Air for Jan45 , Press, 1949), hereafter McMillan, The Ol d prepared by G—3 Sec, Div P&P, HQMC (Per s Breed ; Richard W. Johnston, Follow Me! The and Loc File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter FMF Story of the Second Marine Division in Worl d Grd (or Air) Status Rpt with month . See App War II (New York : Random House, 1948) , F for a complete location and strength break - hereafter Johnston, 2d MarDiv Hist ; IstLts down of the FMF as of 30Apr45 . 23

24 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

(FMFPac) .3 His was a type command assignments and were actively engage d which involved administrative control in preparing for them . Authorized only over FMFPac units .4 The majority strength for a Marine division at this of Marine combat troops were located time was 856 officers and 16,069 enliste d in the Central Pacific under Admira l Marines. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions Spruance's control. By January 1945 , were short a few officers, while the 3d six Marine divisions had been activated, Division was short 271 enlisted men an d grouped three each in two corps. Head- the 6th Division, 513 . Replacemen t quarters of Major General Roy S . drafts had been assigned to the divi- Geiger's III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC ) sions, however, and were in transit to was on Guadalcanal, where Major Gen- join them either before or just after th e eral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., based his impending landings. In January 1945 , 6th Marine Division . On Pavuvu in th e 11 replacement drafts, containing 14, - Russells, approximately 65 miles north - 331 Marines and naval corpsmen an d west of Guadalcanal, was the 1st Marin e doctors, were either en route to or i n Division commanded by Major General the process of joining the six Marin e Pedro A. del Valle . Also in IIIAC wa s divisions at the staging areas .° Major General Thomas E . Watson's 2d In addition to the combat divisions, Marine Division on Saipan . The other there were other FMF organizations major Marine ground command unde r spread throughout the Pacific under- FMFPac, V Amphibious Corps (VAC) , taking assigned support, garrison, o r was headed by Major General Harry defense missions . A total of 74,47 4 Schmidt, whose headquarters wa s Marines and naval personnel was in- located on Maui, Hawaiian Islands . volved in the operations of these units .? Also on Maui in VAC was Major Gen- Two provisional field service commands , eral Clifton B. Cates' 5 4th Marine Divi- one at Guam and the other at Guadal- sion. On the island of Hawaii was Majo r canal, and seven field depots and fou r General Keller E . Rockey and his 5th service and supply battalions based i n Marine Division, and on Guam was th e close proximity to the Marine divisions 3d Marine Division of Major General provided major supply support in th e Graves B . Erskine. Pacific. Also available from FMFPa c All six divisions had long been in refor support of and attachment to th e ceipt of orders for their next combat two corps for upcoming operations wer e a variety of other units ' . These included For the history of FMFPac, see Garand 11 antiaircraft artillery battalions, 6 and Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations ." 155mm gun and 6 155mm howitzer ' Generally, a type commander has an admin- battalions, 3 armored amphibian bat- istrative mission only and has no tactical responsibilities. For the Iwo Jima operation , talions, 9 amphibian tractor battalions, General Smith was assigned an additiona l and 6 amphibian truck companies . tactical responsibility as Commander, Ex- In January, most of these organiza- peditionary Troops . tions were a part of the III and V ' Generals Cates and Shepherd later became the 19th and 20th Commandants of the Marine ° FMF Grd Status Rpt, Jan 45 . Corps, respectively. 7 Ibid.

MARINE CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE 25

Amphibious Corps, although a few o f group, and the portions of the other tw o the antiaircraft artillery battalions wer e not committed in the Philippines, wer e still fulfilling island defense missions . based on Emirau, Green Island, Manus , Within FMFPac also were such othe r and Cape Torokina at Bougainville . 8 types of organizations as defense bat- (See Map XI, Map Section .) A trans- talions, Joint Assault Signal Companies port group, MAG–25 also had anothe r (JASCOs), provisional rocket detach- designation, SCAT (South Pacific Com- ments, war dog platoons, motor trans- bat Air Transport Command), and a s port battalions, corps evacuation hos- such, with a few AAF transport squad- pitals, bomb disposal companies, an d rons assigned from time to time flew separate engineer battalions ; not all of many extensive air supply missions al l them would be employed in future oper- over the Pacific from the time it wa s ations. activated, 24 November 1942, until the The highest level Marine aviatio n end of the war. When available for suc h echelon in the Pacific, Aircraft, Flee t an assignment, the group also evacu- Marine Force, Pacific (AirFMFPac) , ated casualties from captured islands was commanded by Major Genera l which had strips capable of sustaining Francis P. Mulcahy, whose headquarters the operations of transport-type air - was at Ewa, on the island of Oahu . A craft. type command like FMFPac, AirFMF- Headquarters of the 2d MAW was at Pac organized, administered, supplied , Ewa. Major General James T . Moore and deployed all Marine aviation squad- had only one MAG within his command rons in the Pacific, but controlled at this time, and it was based on none. The four Marine aircraft wing s Espiritu Santo, in the New Hebrides . (MAWs) in AirFMFPac were based o n The reason that the wing was so de- islands at widespread points in the pleted in January was that in mid-1944 Pacific. Included in the four wings wa s most of Moore's squadrons had bee n a total of 16 Marine aircraft group s transferred to the 4th MAW, and at th e (MAGs) holding 70 tactical squadrons end of the year his command becam e broken down as follows : 28 fighter the nucleus for Tactical Air Force , (VMFs) ; 14 scout bomber (VMSBs) ; 7 Tenth Army, and assigned as a task bomber (VMBs) ; 7 transport (VMRs) ; unit for the invasion of Okinawa . 5 night fighter (VMF(N)s) ; 5 obser- The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing was vation (VMOs) ; and 3 torpedo bombe r commanded for the first seven days i n (VMTBs) . January 1945 by Colonel Ford 0 . Major General Ralph J. Mitchell's 1st Rogers, who was relieved on the 8th b y MAW headquarters was on Bougain- Colonel Byron F. Johnson. The wing ville. He had under his command si x had its headquarters command and a MAGs ; three of the groups and part of group at Ewa, and a MAG based o n a fourth were assigned to CinCSWP A ' Green Island is approximately 80 miles for the Philippines campaign ; and one north of the tip of Bougainville, and Manus i s squadron of a fifth group was en route 280 miles southeast of Emirau and 80 mile s to join MacArthur. MAG–25, the latter north of the northeast coast of New Guinea .

26 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Midway. Four fighter squadrons of the izations on the west coast ; it also chan- Ewa-based group were on carriers an d nelled personnel and materiel to Air - supported the Lingayen landings in Jan- FMFPac for further deployment in th e uary and later flew strikes against Pacific. The east coast training com- Luzon, Formosa, and Indochina . Essex mand was the 9th MAW, with head - carried two of the VMFs, and Wasp the quarters at the Marine Corps Air Sta- other two. The primary mission of 3d tion, Cherry Point, N. C. Within these MAW was to train AirFMFPac tactica l two commands were 14 groups—6 on squadrons and pilots in night-fighting , the west coast and 8 on the east. There air-warning, and radar-bombing tech- were in turn a total of 100 tactical and niques. 29 training squadrons of various type s Major General Louis E . Woods' 4t h in the groups . On the west coast wer e MAW was based on Majuro in th e 22 carrier squadrons, 16 fighter Marshalls, and with seven group s (VMF(CVS)) and 6 torpedo bombin g located on islands all over the Central (VMTB(CVS)), that were slated to g o Pacific, his was the largest of the fou r aboard new Commencement Bay-class AirFMFPac wings. From airfields o n escort carriers as soon as the latter had such widely separated islands as those completed shake-down trials . in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus, At the beginning of 1945, Marine Woods' squadrons took off day after da y Corps aviation had already passed to neutralize bypassed Japanese de- through a period of expansion and wa s fenses. Although boring and seemingly entering an era of consolidation with prosaic in nature, important benefit s respect to its ultimate objectives in the derived from the operations of the 4th war effort. Three months earlier, i n Wing squadrons in neutralizing the October 1944, the Chief of Naval Oper- Marshalls. "The 4th MAW's perfection ations had approved a plan to man fou r of the napalm fire jelly formula was a of the new class of escort carriers with big contribution to the rest of the Marine squadrons . Accordingly, that Pacific. Also important was the develop- same month, the Marine Corps redesig- ment of the fighter bomber, that trusty nated two groups already in existenc e weapon so sorely needed when more on the west coast as Marine Air Sup- planes had to be had to save the fleet port Groups (MASGs) . By Januar y 1945, the VMF (CVS) s and VMTB - from the Kamikaze." 9 (CVS) s were ready to begin a period o f There were two other major aviation intense training from the decks of th e commands in the Marine Corps ; these carriers and at their former home bases , were based on each coast of the United the Marine Corps Air Stations at E l States and held similar missions . At Centro and Mojave, in California . To San Diego, Marine Fleet Air, West each MASG was attached a Marine Coast, administered, operated, trained , Carrier Group (MCVG), composed of and equipped all Marine aviation organ - a fighter and a torpedo bombing squadron ; one of six Carrier Aircraft Serv- Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p. 246. ice Detachments was to complete the

MARINE CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE 27

Marine complement in the carriers after replacement drafts, a total of som e the detachments had been organized o n 5,000 Marines, who were awaiting ship- the west coast in February. ment to the Pacific . With the recor d To enable Marine Corps aviation "to number of six Marine divisions in the give support to the Fleet Marine Force field, the constant demand for replace- in landing operations" more effectivel y ments and the heavy burden impose d in the future, the Navy approved a upon the training command continue d major revision of the Corps aviatio n incessantly. structure at the beginning of 1945 . As IIIAC and VAC completed their Marine Corps planners envisioned a training phases and began combat load- program encompassing balanced land - ing for the trip to the target areas, the based and carrier-based aviation forces, anticipated demands for replacement o f which would be soundly supported b y expected casualties on Iwo Jima and shore activities. Not all of the Marin e Okinawa were already being met by th e carrier program went into effect befor e organization and training of new re- the end of the war, but its progress wa s placement drafts. As each Marine such that the validity of basing Marin e destined for assignment to a comba t squadrons in the flattops was proven . organization in the Pacific left th e Fleet Marine Force ground training United States, he was aware that hi s facilities in 1945 had advanced far be- was the same path taken by fellow yond those in existence at the beginning Marines who had fought at such now - of the war . In addition to base command famous places as Guadalcanal, Bougain - housekeeping and training units, Camp ville, and Tarawa. His sole consolation, Lejeune had 10 battalions undergoing if one was needed, was the knowledg e infantry training in January 1945 an d that, although he had not participated Camp Pendleton had 12 . Besides thi s in the beginning of the fight, he migh t number, Camp Pendleton housed four possibly be there to help end it.

PART II

Okinawa

CHAPTER 1 The Target and the Enem y

BACKGROUND ' files already bulging with a store of knowledge of the Ryukyus group . Oki- Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide d nawa soon became the focus of attentio n on Okinawa as a future target, intensive of the CinCPac-CinCPOA headquarters planning and preparations were begu n and staff members who, in compliance for the assault on this once obscure with the JCS directive to Admiral island . Large amounts of information of Nimitz ". . . . to occupy one or more posi- varying importance poured into the in- tions in the Nansei Shoto," 2 filled in telligence centers concerned with the the details of an outline plan. A flurry impending operation, and were added to of disciplined activity immediately engulfed the commands and staffs of the 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material in expeditionary forces assigned to the this chapter is derived from : HQUSAFPO A assault as they began their operationa l G–2 Study of Okinawa Gunto, n .d ., hereafter HQUSAFPOA Study ; MIS, WD, Survey of th e studies for ICEBERG, the code-name Nansei Shoto, dtd 15Feb43, hereafter WD given to the approaching invasion . Survey ; War Reports ; USSBS (Pac), Nav- The strategic importance of Okinawa AnalysisDiv, The Campaigns of the Pacific was its location, and all other consider- War (Washington, 1946), hereafter USSBS , ations stemmed from this . The Japanes e Campaigns ; Roy E . Appleman, et. at., Oki- nawa : The Last Battle—U. S. Army in World viewed it as an integral link in a chai n War II—The War in the Pacific (Washington : of islands, the Ryukyus or the Nanse i HistDiv, DA, 1948), hereafter, Appleman, et. Shoto, which formed an effective bar- at., Okinawa Battle ; Wesley Frank Craven and rier to an Allied advance from the east James Lea Cate, eds ., The Pacific : Matterhor n or southeast towards the Chinese main - to Nagasaki—The Army Air Forces in World War II, v. 5 (Chicago : The University o f land, Korea, or the western coast o f Chicago Press, 1953), hereafter Craven an d Japan. This group of islands was ideally Cate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki ; Jeter A . Isely situated to aid in the protection of th e and Philip A. Growl, The U. S. Marines an d Japanese maritime lines of supply an d Amphibious War (Princeton : Princeton Uni- communication to imperial conquests i n versity Press, 1951), hereafter Isely an d southeast Asia . The island chain als o Growl, Marines and Amphibious War ; Nichol s and Shaw, Okinawa Victory. Documents not provided the Japanese Navy with the otherwise identified in this part are located i n only two substantial fleet anchorage s the following files of the HistBr, HQMC : Unit south of the Home Islands 3 between Historical Reports ; Okinawa Area Operations ; Publications ; Aviation ; and Okinawa Mono- 2 ICEBERG Study, p . 1. graph and Comments . Because Appleman, ' The Home Islands were generally consid- et. at., Okinawa Battle, and Nichols and Shaw, ered to consist of the four principal islands an d Okinawa Victory have served as guidelines for the hundreds of smaller islands immediatel y pt II, hereafter they will be cited in direct adjacent to Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and reference only. Kyushu, which formed Japan . 31

32 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Kyushu and Formosa, and numerous 1944 soon shed some light on this all- operating bases for aircraft of all types but-unknown area. as well. (See Map 1 . ) The course of Okinawa history— From the Allied point of view, th e from the Chinese invasions about 60 0 conquest of Okinawa would be mos t A. D. until Japanese annexation in 1879 lucrative. As the largest island in the —was dominated by an amalgamation o f Ryukyus, it offered excellent locations Chinese and Japanese cultural an d for military and naval facilities . There political determinants. For many years , was sufficient land area on the island on the Chinese influence reigned supreme . which to train and stage assault troop s After the first Chinese-Okinawan con- for subsequent operations against the tacts had been made, they warre d heart of the Empire. Kyushu was only against each other until the islan d 350 nautical miles away, Formosa 33 0 peoples were subdued. Shortly afte r miles distant, and Shanghai, 450 . Two 1368, when the Ming Dynasty came t o other major purposes of the impendin g power, China demanded payment of invasion were to secure and develop air - tribute from Satsudo, the King of Oki- base sites from which Allied aircraft nawa. The payment was given along could operate to gain air superiorit y with his pledge of fealty as a Chines e over Japan. It was expected that b y subject. taking Okinawa, while at the same tim e In the midst of incessant Okinawa n subjecting the Home Islands to blockad e dynastic squabbles, Chinese control re- and bombardment, Japanese militar y mained loose and intermittent until forces and their will to resist would b e 1609, when the Japanese overran th e severely weakened. island, devastating all that stood i n their way. The king of Okinawa then OKINAWA : HISTORY, LAND, reigning was taken prisoner, and a AND PEOPLE 4 Japanese local government was established temporarily. Before Commodore Matthew C . For the next 250 years, the Okinawa n Perry, USN, visited Okinawa in 1853- Kingdom, as such, was in the unenviable 54, few Americans had ever heard of position of having to acknowledge both the island . This state of ignorance did Chinese and Japanese suzerainty at th e not change much in nearly a century , same time. Finally, in May 1875, Japan but American preinvasion studies i n forbade the islanders to send any more tribute to China, whose right to invest ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s the Okinawan kings was now ended . In , section is derived from : JICPOA Bul 63-44 - Nansei Shoto, dtd 15May44 ; CinCPac-CinC- the face of mounting Okinawan pro POA Bul 161-44, Okinawa Gunto, dtd 15Nov44 ; tests against this arbitrary action, EngrSec, FMFPac, Engrintellnfo, Okinaw a Japan followed its decree by dethronin g Gunto, n.d . The terrain description presented the king in March 1879 ; he was reduced in this section is that of Okinawa as it existed in rank, becoming a marquis of Japan . at the time of the American invasion an d s before engineer and Seabee units performe d Okinawa and its neighboring island their earth-transforming feats . were then incorporated within the

122• 124• 126• 126• 130• 132• 1

30• NANSEI SHOTO 30• o » loo

STATUTE MILES

d'KIKAI JIMA

2B' AO 26 •

c7 4~ IHEYAQ 4 EAS T OKINAWA 'Tr GUNTO sHIMA=n TORT SH1MA• .AGUN I CHINA OKINAWA J 4S KUME' A KERAMM%° ° 26• SEA RETTO 26•

MIYAKO RETTO PACIFI C YAEYAMA RETTO ,*I'' 24• 4c Il OCEA N SA 24•

122• 124• 126• 126• 130• 132•

MAP I T. L RUSSELL

34 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Japanese political structure as th e in nature from a precipitous and rocky Okinawan Prefecture. Over the years , shore in the north, through a generally China remained restive at this obvious reef-bound lowland belt just below th e encroachment, until the question was isthmus, to an area of sea cliffs an d one of many settled in Japan's favor b y raised beaches in the south . Landing its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of beaches suitable for large-scale am- 1894. phibious operations were neither numer - The islands to which the Japanes e ous nor good. The most extensive fla t successfully gained title, the Ryuky u areas and largest beaches on the eas t Retto, were in the southernmost of tw o coast were found along the shores o f groups which make up the Nansei Shoto . Nakagusuku Wan (or bay) and, on th e The shoto is a chain of islands which west coast, in the area between Zampa stretch in a 790-mile-long arc betwee n Misaki (or point) and Oroku Peninsula . Kyushu and Formosa, separating th e Two major fleet anchorages existed , Pacific Ocean from the East China Sea. both on the eastern side of the island : One of the groups which make up the Nakagusuku Wan (later named Buckner Ryukyu Retto is the Okinawa Gunto .5 Bay by the Americans in honor of th e The other four major island groups in Tenth Army Commander) and Chimu the retto are Osumi, Tokara, Amami , Wan. The leading port of the Okinaw a and Sakishima. Okinawa Gunto is Gunto was on the west coast at Naha, located at the half-way point in the ar c the major city of the island group . Port and consists of Okinawa and numerou s facilities elsewhere were limited to smaller islands. These include Kumi small vessels . Shima, Aguni Shima, Ie Shima, and th e Okinawa is easily divisible into three Kerama Retto in the west ; Iheya Retto geographical parts, each one physically and Yoron Shima in the north ; and a different from the other. The territory group of small islands, named the north of the Ishikawa Isthmus, consti- Eastern Islands by the Americans , tuting about two-thirds of the island roughly paralleling the east centra l area, is largely mountainous, heavily coast of Okinawa . wooded, and rimmed with dissecte d The island of Okinawa is narrow and terraces—or one-time flatlands whic h irregularly shaped throughout its 60 - became deeply ravined by the ravages mile length . (See Map 2 .) In the north, of erosion . About 80 percent of th e the Motobu Peninsula juts out into th e north is covered with a dense growth o f East China Sea and extends the islan d live oak and conifers, climbing vines , to its maximum breadth, 18 miles ; im- and brush . The highlands, rising to rugged peaks, 1,000 to 1,500 feet i n mediately to the south is the narrowest height, dominate the area . Small, swift part, the two-mile-wide Ishikawa Isth- streams drain the clay or sandy-loam mus. The coastline of the island ranges topsoil of the interior which is traffic- able under most conditions . Cross- Gunto, retto, shoto all are Japanese geographic terms for group or chain of islands ; country movement is limited mainly b y jima or shima is translated as island. the steepness of the hills and the lush

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 35

Vi f ANA

IE SHIMA

ZAMPA MISAKI

OKINAWA SHIM A SNOWING PRINCIPAL GOADS. TOWNS. AND VILLAGES SCAL E

NILES

MAP 2 T. L . RUSSELL

310-224 0 - 69 - 4

36 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

vegetation . The few roads that existed highway connecting the cities of Shuri in 1945 were mostly along the coast . and Naha, could support two lanes o f The middle division, consisting o f traffic. In this area, the road net wa s that area lying between Ishikawa augmented by a narrow gauge railway , Isthmus and an east-west valley run- with approximately 30 miles of track . ning between the cities of Naha and This system provided the major trans- Yonabaru, is broadest in its northern - island communications net, running most part. Just south of the isthmus i s from Naha to Yonabaru on the eas t an area resembling northern Okinawa , coast, via the towns of Kobakura and but the rest of the sector is, for the mos t Kokuba, while trunk lines linked Koba- part, rolling, lightly wooded countr y kura and Kokuba with the west coas t interrupted by steep cliffs and ravines . towns of Kadena and Itoman, respec- The few streams, flowing through hill s tively. which rarely exceeded a height of 50 0 Okinawa's climate is tropical, with feet, are generally narrow and shallow , moderate winters, hot summers, and so they could be easily bridged or high humidity throughout the year . The forded. annual temperature range is from a The southernmost tip of the island , minimum of 40 degrees to a mean maxi - triangular in shape, is extremely hill y mum of 95 degrees in July. The months and was dominated by extensive lime- of May through September are marke d stone plateaus, some reaching over 500 by a heavy and erratic rainfall . During feet in height. At each angle of the bas e the typhoon season (July-November) , of the triangle is a peninsula, Orok u torrential rains and winds of over 75 on the west, and Chinen on the east. miles-per-hour have been recorded .6 The primary roads built by the Jap- During the rest of the year, except fo r anese were little more than coral- o r brief downpours, good climatic condi- limestone-surfaced trails, varying in tions generally prevail. width from 12 to 16 feet, on a sand The inhabitants of Okinawa in 1945 and clay base . Use of these roads de- were heirs to a complex racial mixture . pended largely upon the weather, since The original population is believed to rain reduced them to sticky and slow - have been a branch of the hairy Ain u drying morasses. In the dry season, and Kumaso stock which formerly in- the slightest movement on the road s habited Kyushu and other Japanes e threw up dense clouds of dust. The islands. A Mongoloid strain was intro- major arteries threaded along the coast- duced when Japanese pirates, who made lines, branching off into a few cross - Okinawa their headquarters, engaged in island roads which then broke down their time-honored habit of kidnappin g into a capillary system of trails con- women from the Chinese mainland . necting the small villages, settlements , and individual farms. The central sec- ° A typhoon in late September 1945 recorded winds of up to 120 miles per hour . LtGen tor, the densely populated part of th e Edward W . Snedeker ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 island, contains an intricate network o f Div, HQMC, dtd 150ct65, hereafter Snedeker roads . Only one, the broad stone-paved ltr 1965.

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 37

Malayan blood was infused into this language families of both Okinawa an d melting pot through intermarriage, im- Japan, there were at least five Ryukyuan migration, and invasion. This evolutio n dialects which rendered the two lan- produced a people with the same basic guages mutually unintelligible . The characteristics as those of the Japanese , Japanese attempted to reduce the lan- but with slight physical differences . guage barrier somewhat by directin g The Okinawans are shorter, darker, an d that standard (Tokyo) Japanese was to are inclined to have more body hair . be part of the Okinawan school cur- The 1940 census gave an estimate of riculum. Several decades of formal edu- slightly over 800,000 people in th e cation, however, failed to remove th e Nansei Shoto as a whole, with nearly a influence of many generations of Chines e half-million of these on Okinawa proper . ethnic features which shaped the Oki- Farmers constituted the largest singl e nawan national characteristics. The population class, with fishermen form- Chinese imprint on the island was such ing a smaller, but important, group . that one Japanese soldier noted tha t Approximately 15 percent of the Oki- "the houses and customs here resemble nawa populace lived in Naha, and those of China, and remind one of a within this community were most of Chinese town." ' The natives retained the higher officials, businessmen, and their own culture, religion, and form of white collar workers—most of them ancestor worship . One outward mani- Japanese who either had emigrated or festation of these cultural consider- been assigned from the Home Islands. ations were the thousands of horseshoe- During the period of the Okinawan shaped burial vaults, many of impres- monarchy, there was an elaborate sive size and peculiar beauty, which social hierarchy dominated by nobles were set into the sides of numerou s and court officials . After Japanese cliffs and hills throughout the island . annexation, the major social distinc- The basic Okinawan farm settlemen t tions became those that existed between consisted of a group of farmsteads, eac h governing officials and natives, betwee n having the main and other buildings urban and rural inhabitants, and be- situated on a small plot of land . The tween the rich and the poor—with th e farmhouses were small, thatch-roofed , latter in the majority . Assimilation o f and set off from the invariably winding the Japanese and Okinawan societies trailside by either clay or reed walls. was minimal, a situation that was The agricultural communities generall y further irritated by the preferentia l clustered around their own individua l treatment tendered by the Japanese t o marketplaces . Towns, such as Nago an d their fellow-countrymen when the more Itoman, were outgrowths of the vil- important administrative and political lages, differing only in the fact that posts were assigned . these larger settlements had several Another chasm separating the Jap- modern business and government struc- anese and Okinawan was the differenc e 'Diary of a Superior Private, 272d IIB, " in languages . Despite a common archai c in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45, Translation s tongue which had branched into the and Interrogations No . 32, dtd 16Jun45, p . 48.

38 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tures. The island's cities, Naha and ing trade, of some importance, centered Shuri, were conspicuous by their many around Naha and Itoman . There wer e large stone and concrete public struc- also small numbers of fishing craft tures and the bustle that accompanie s based at all of the other usable harbors an urban setting . Shuri was the ancien t on the island ; however, lack of refriger- capital of the Ryukyuan kingdom and its ation, distance to the fishing grounds, citadel stood on a high hill in the mids t and seasonal typhoons all hindered th e of a natural fortress area of the island. development of this industry and pre- The fundamentally agrarian Oki- vented its becoming a large source of nawan economy was dependent upo n income for the Okinawans . three staple crops. About four-fifths of From the very beginnings of the 1879 southern Okinawa was arable, and half annexation, the Japanese government of the land here was used for the culti- made intensive efforts to bring th e vation of sweet potatoes, the predomi- Ryukyuan people under complete dominant foodstuff of both men and animals . nation through the means of a closel y Sugar cane was the principal commer- controlled educational system, militar y cial crop and its cultivation utilized the conscription, and a carefully supervise d second largest number of acres . Some system of local government . The pre- rice was also grown, but this crop con- fectural governor was answerabl e sistently produced a yield far below only to the Home Minister in Tokyo . local requirements . Since rice produc- Although the elected prefectural assem- tion was sufficient to satisfy only two - bly acted as the gubernatorial advisor y thirds of the population's annual con- body, the governor accepted, rejected , sumption needs., more than 10 million or ignored their suggestions as he sa w bushels had to be imported annually fit. On a local level, assemblies elected from Formosa . 8 in the cities, towns, and townships i n Industrial development on the islan d turn elected a mayor. All local admin- was rudimentary . The Naha-Shuri area istrative units were, in effect, directly was the leading manufacturing center under the governor's control, and thei r where such items as alcoholic beverages , acts or very existence were subject to lacquerware, and silk pongee were pro- his pleasure. duced. Manufacturing was carried ou t In every aspect—social, political., and chiefly in small factories or by workers economic—the Okinawan was kept in a in their homes . The only relatively im- position inferior to that of any othe r portant industry carried on outside of Japanese citizen residing either on Oki- the Naha-Shuri complex was sugar re- nawa or elsewhere in the Empire . This fining, in which cattle supplied th e did not prevent the government fro m power in very primitive mills . The fish- imposing on the Okinawan a period o f obligated military service .° The periodic e MilHistSec, Japanese Research Div, HQ- USAFFE, Japanese Monograph No . 135 , ° Military conscription was first enforced on Okinawa Operations Record, revised editio n Okinawa in 1898, although in Japan proper , dtd Nov49, p . 60, hereafter Okinawa Operations conscription had been in effect since 1873 . War Record . History Office Comments.

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 39

call-ups of age groups was enforce d other at Naha, and a few small Arm y equally upon the natives of Okinawa garrisons such as the Nakagusuku Wa n and the Ryukyus as on the male inhabi- Fortress Artillery Unit on Okinawa. " tants of Japan proper. This provide d Acting with an alacrity born of dis- Japan with a reservoir of trained re- tinct necessity, IGHQ took steps to cor- servists from which it could draw when - rect this weakness in the Empire's inne r ever necessary. defensive positions by expediting an d With the exception of those drafts of intensifying : reservists leaving for active duty else - . . . operational preparations in the are where, Okinawa, for all practical pur- a extending from Formosa to the Nanse i poses, was in the backwash of the early Islands with the view of defending ou r stages of World War II . The island re- territory in the Nansei area and securin g mained in this state until April 1944 , our lines of communication with ou r when Japan activated the Thirty-second southern sector of operations, and thereb y build a structure capable first, of resist- Army, set up its headquarters on Oki- ing the enemy's surprise attacks' and , nawa, and assigned it responsibility second, of crushing their attempts to seiz e for the defense of the island chain . the area when conditions [change] in our favor.1 2 THE JAPANESE FORCES " In order to improve Japanese de- Following the massive and devastat- fenses in the Ryukyus, IGHQ assigned ing United States naval air and surface this mission on 22 March 1944, to th e bombardment of Truk, 17–18 February Thirty-second Army, the command o f 1944, and the breaching of the Marianas which was assumed formally on 1 Apri l line shortly thereafter, the Japanes e by Lieutenant General Masao Wata- Imperial General Headquarters awak- nabe. At Naha, headquarters of the ened to the obviously weak condition of new army, staff officers hoped that the Ryukyus' defenses. Prior to 1944 , enough time would be available for ade- little attention had been paid to th e quate fortification of the island . All arming of the Nansei Shoto . The island planning was tempered by memories o f group boasted two minor naval bases the immediate past which indicated that only, one at Amami 0-Shima and th e "an army trained to attack on any an d every occasion, irrespective of condi- 10 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s tions, and with no calculation as to the section is derived from : Tenth Army Intel - real chances of success, could be beaten Mono, dtd Aug45, pt I, secs A and B, hereafter soundly." 18 Added stimuli to Japanes e IntelMono ; Tenth Army G–3 POW Interroga-

tion Summaries Nos . 1–19, Jul-Aug45, here - 11 after POW InterSum ; Tenth Army G–2 Inter - Actually, there were three garrisons lo- rogation Rpt No . 27, Akira Shimada, dt d cated in Nansei Shoto : one on Amami 0-Shim a 24Ju145, hereafter Shimada Interrogation ; founded in 1922 ; and two founded in August 1941—Funauki Fortress at Nishi Omote-Jima Tenth Army Interrogation Rpt No . 28, Col Hiromichi Yahara (Senior Staff Officer , and the Nakagusuku Wan Fortress noted Thirty-second Army), dtd 6Aug45, hereafter above . War History Office Comments . 12 Yahara Interrogation ; Hayashi and Coox, Okinawa Operations Record, p . 1. Kogun ; Okinawa Operations Record. "IntelMono, pt I, sec A, p . 3.

40 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

preparations were the American in- One Plane for One Warship vasions of Peleliu and Morotai on 1 5 One Boat for One Shi p September 1944 . By this time, the Jap- One Man for Ten of the Enemy anese high command became quite cer- or One Tank.15 tain that either Formosa, the Ryukyus , The command of the Thirty-second or the Bonins, or all three, were to be Army was assumed by Lieutenant Gen- invaded by the spring of 1945 at the eral Mitsuru Ushijima in August 1944 , latest. Initially, Japanese Army and when General Watanabe was forced to Navy air forces were to blunt the retire because of a continuing illness . assaults in a major air counteroffensive. Because of the importance of the im- The establishment of Allied air superi- pending Okinawa battle, IGHQ assigned ority and demonstrated weaknesses o f General Ushijima one of the most com- Japanese air forces, however, cause d petent officers of the Japanese Army, the military leaders in Tokyo to down- Major General Isamu Cho, as his chie f grade the aviation role in the comin g of staff. On 21 January, army head- struggle for the defense of the Home quarters was split into two groups . Islands. The ground forces, then, would Ushijima's operations staff moved t o carry the major burden . Shuri where the general was to direc t The Thirty-second Army staff plan- his army for the major portion of th e ners wasted no time in organizing th e campaign. A "rear headquarters" com- ground defenses of Okinawa . They had posed of the ordnance, veterinary, learned by the cruel experiences of Jap- judicial, intendance, 16 and the greate r anese forces on islands which had been part of the medical staff set up near invaded by the Americans that a stan d Tsukasan, south of Shuri . at the shoreline would only result i n Lieutenant Generals Ushijima an d complete annihilation and that thei r Cho 17 complemented each other's mili- beach positions would be torn to pieces tary qualities and personality, an d in a naval bombardment. It became formed a command team that reflected apparent, therefore, that the primar y mutual trust and respect . They were defensive positions had to be set up in- ably abetted by the only holdover fro m land. Then, should the invaders escap e destruction at sea under the guns an d 15 "Thirty-second Army Battle Instructions , torpedoes of Japanese naval forces, or dtd 15Feb45," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 122– at the beachhead under the downpou r 45, Translations and Interrogations No . 30, dtd 1Jun45 . of artillery shells, the death blow woul d 18 The intendance service, which had no exac t be administered by the ground forces ' U . S. military equivalent, controlled clothing, assumption "of the offensive in du e rations, forage, pay, and the upkeep of Arm y course." 14 To steel the troops' determi- buildings. In effect, it combined the functions nation to fight and to keep their moral e of the U . S. Army Quartermaster Corps and Finance Department . WD, Handbook o n at a high peak, army headquarters de- Japanese Military Forces, TM–30–480 (Wash- vised the following battle slogans : ington, 10ct44), p. 50 . 1' On 1Mar45, at the age of 51, Cho was 14 Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p. 116. promoted to lieutenant general .

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 41

the old staff, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, ment the force already on the island .2 ° who retained his billet as Senior Office r The majority of the reinforcement s in Charge of Operations,' 8 and Major arrived from their previous stations i n Tadao Miyake as the logistics oflicer .1 ° China, Manchuria, and Japan between Ushijima, a senior officer slated for pro- June and August 1944 . motion to general in August 1945, wa s The veteran 9th Infantry Division , reputedly a man of great integrity an d first to arrive, possessed battle honor s character who demonstrated a quie t dating from the Russo-Japanese War competence which, in turn, inspire d of 1904-5. Coming directly from Man- great confidence, loyalty, and respec t churia, and scheduled by the high com- from his subordinates . Cho, in compari- mand as the backbone of the defense son, was a fiery, ebullient, and hard - force, the 9th's stay on Okinawa wa s driving individual with a brilliant, in- short-lived . The critical situation on quiring mind. He spared neither him - Leyte required the assignment of th e self nor his staff. His abounding energ y 9th there, and Ushijima, " . . . in accord- was effectively counterbalanced by hi s ance with orders of Imperial Genera l senior's calm outward appearance . This Headquarters, decided on 17 November combination of personalities was served to redeploy the 9th Division in order to by comparatively young and alert staff send an elite unit with a proud and glor- members who were allowed a grea t ious war record to a battlefield where latitude of action and independence o f the Imperial Army would engage in a thought. decisive battle ." 2 1 The new commander of the Thirty- Probably, the most important of al l second Army inherited a combat organ- of the factors which may have influenced ization which had been specially estab- the course of the coming battle for the lished for the expected invasion of Oki- Japanese, and favored an Allied vic- nawa. Many independent artillery, tory, was the loss of this division and mortar, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) , the fact that it was never replaced. It antitank (AT), and machine gu n left in late December for the Philippine s groups supplemented the fire power o f by way of Formosa where it sat out th e the basic infantry units assigned to th e rest of the war, prevented by Allied army. As a result of the IGHQ decision submarines and airplanes—and Mac - a in June 1944 to reinforce the Okinaw Arthur's landing on Luzon in Januar y garrison, nine infantry and three artil- —from either continuing on to its desti- lery battalions were to be sent to aug- nation or returning to Okinawa .22

is Colonel Yahara's professional background included a preponderence of staff assignments . 20 "Empire Defense Operations Plan, dt d , He had been a military attache in the United 15Jun44," in CinCPac—CinCPOA Bul 194—45 . 86, dtd 7Aug45, pp . States and Thailand, returning to the latter Special Translation No country as a participant in the Burma cam- 5—6 . 21 paign . MIS, HistDiv, GHQ, FEC, Persona l Okinawa Operations Record, p . 33 . History Statements, n .d ., p. 56 . 22 MIS, WD, Order of Battle for the Japanese 10 War History Office Comments . Armed Forces, dtd 1Mar45, p . 32 . 42 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

THIRTY-SECOND ARMY OFFICERS sit for a formal portrait in February 1945. Numbers identify : (1) Rear Admiral Minoru Ota, Commander, Naval Base Force ; (2) Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, Commanding General, Thirty-second Army ; (3) Lieutenant General Isamu Cho, Army CIS ; (4) Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, Army Senior Staff Officer. (Photograph courtesy of OCMH, DA)

NORTH BANK of the Bishi Gawa shows the typical integrated tomb-cave-dugout defenses which characterized Japanese organization of Okinawan terrain . (USA SC183743)

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 43

Since the 9th Infantry Division was Tai or "have-nothing-unit." 24 The 1st no longer available to the Thirty-secon d Infantry Unit was never rebuilt and Army, and in order to carry out his de- existed merely as a headquarters organ- fensive plans, Ushijima asked for re - ization. Instead, the 15th Independen t placements . He was notified by IGHQ Mixed Regiment (IMR), a unit newly on 23 January 1945 that the 84th Divi- raised in Narashino, Chiba-ken, was sion in Himeji would be sent to Oki- flown directly to Okinawa during th e nawa. This notification was cancelle d period 6–11 July and added to the 44th that same day with the explanation that IMB in September, bringing its strengt h the greatest possible supply of muni- up to about 5,000 men . tions would be sent, but replacement s The next unit of importance to arrive neither could nor would be sent to th e was the 24th Infantry Division which army. 23 This, in effect, put Ushijima on landed in August . Since its initial organ- notice that the means to improve hi s ization as part of the Kwantung Army situation had to be found locally . in October 1939, the 24th had been re- In June 1944, the Thirty-second Army sponsible for the security of the easter n was to have been reinforced by Majo r boundaries of Manchuria . The division , General Shigeji Suzuki's 44th Inde- commanded by Lieutenant General pendent Mixed Brigade (IMB), a unit Tatsumi Amamiya, was well-equippe d of approximately 6,000 men organize d and well-trained, but not battle-proven , that very month on Kyushu . It was before it joined the Thirty-second Army . originally composed of the 1st and 2d The 24th was a triangular divisio n Infantry Units (each essentially of regi- which had been stripped of its infantr y mental size) and attached artillery, group headquarters, one battalion from engineer, and signal units . While en each infantry regiment, an artillery route to Okinawa, the Toyama Maru, battalion, and an engineer company, all the ship carrying the brigade, wa s of which had been added to expedition- torpedoed by an American submarine ary units sent from Manchuria to th e off Amami 0-Shima on 29 June . More Central Pacific in early 1944 . Until a than 5,000 men were lost and only general Thirty-second Army reorgani- about 600 survivors of the ill-fate d zation in February 1945, the 24th's in- brigade landed on Okinawa ; these were fantry regiments (22d, 32d, and 89th used as the nucleus of a reconstitute d Infantry) functioned with only two 2d Infantry Unit. Other replacement s battalions each . The division set up its were obtained from Kyushu as well as headquarters at Kadena, and in October , from the ranks of conscripted Okina- it assigned 300 Okinawan conscripts , wans, but the reorganized unit was received from the Thirty-second Army, never fully re-equipped . As a result, thi s to each of its infantry regiments fo r lack of basic infantry equipment caused training and retention later by th e the 2d Infantry Unit to be known among training unit . The February reorgani- other soldiers on the island as the Bimb o zation brought the 24th nearly up to it s

23 Okinawa Operations Record, pp. 44-45. 24 IntelMono, pt I, sec B, chap 3, p . 9 .

44 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

original strength and made it the largest and an infantry gun company armed tactical unit in the Thirty-second Army , with two 75mm guns and two 70m m with more than 14,000 Japanese troop s howitzers. The 272d and 273d IIBs were and Okinawan draftees assigned to in- reported later as having a strength of fantry, artillery., reconnaissance, engi- 700 men each, but with one or two les s neer, and transport regiments, and divi- rifle companies per battalion . sional troops. Some variance in strength was foun d The final major unit assigned to Gen- in the infantry components of the othe r eral Ushijima's command was the 62d two major fighting organizations of th e Infantry Division, commanded by Lieu- Thirty-second Army . The 2d Infantry tenant General Takeo Fujioka . This was Unit and 15th IMR of the 44th IMB had a brigaded organization which had see n in common three rifle battalions, a n action in China following its activatio n antitank company (four 37mm or 47m m there in June 1943. Its table of organi- AT guns), and a regimental gun com- zation, considerably different from th e pany (four 75mm guns) . Each of the 24th Division's, was similar to that of battalions listed a total strength of 70 0 like units in the Chinese Expeditionary men who were assigned to three rifl e Army. Both of the 62d's brigades ha d companies, a machine gun company, served as independent commands in and an infantry gun unit (two 70mm China since 1938, while the division a s howitzers) . The 24th Division regi- a whole fought in the April–June 1944 mental organization was similar except campaigns in northern Honan Province. for the replacement, in one battalion o f Each brigade had four independent in- each regiment, of the 70mm howitzer s fantry battalions (IIBs) ; the 63d Bri- by a mortar platoon manning fou r gade had the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th 81mm mortars. IIBs, while the 15th, 21st, 22d, and 23d Since the Japanese high command IIBs were assigned to the 64th Brigade . envisioned the coming battle for Oki- In 1944, two additional IIBs were sent t o nawa as developing into one of fixe d Okinawa as reinforcements and attache d position defense, the defenders wer e on 15 December to the division which , not assigned any appreciably strong in turn, assigned them to the brigades . armored force . The entire Japanese The 272d IIB went to the 64th Brigade , tank strength, given to the Thirty-sec- while the 273 JIB went to the 63d. ond Army in July, consisted of the 27th The 62d Division lacked organic artil- Tank Regiment, organized originally in lery and had few other supporting arms. Manchuria in April 1944, from elements It never attained a strength greate r of the 2d Armored Division . It was a than 12,000 troops, the largest propor- regiment in name only, as one of it s tion of whom were infantrymen . The medium tank companies was sent to th e infantry battalions of the 62d were the garrison at Miyako Jima. What re- strongest units of their type on Oki- mained was an armored task force with nawa, as each battalion mustered a total a strength of 750 men who filled th e of 1,200 men organized into five rifle ranks of one light and one medium tan k companies, a machine gun company, company, a tractor-drawn artillery bat-

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 45

tery, an infantry company, a mainte- pendent Heavy Artillery Battalion . This nance company, and an engineer pla- unit was formed in June of 1944 i n toon. The regiment's heavy weapon s Yokosuka and sent to Okinawa in July included 14 medium and 13 light tanks , with 500 men and 8 150mm guns . 4 75mm guns, 2 47mm AT guns, and 1 0 Besides artillery units, Genera l machine guns . The heaviest tank- Wada's troop list included a mortar mounted weapon was the 57mm gun on regiment and two light mortar bat- the medium tanks . talions. The 1st Independent Heavy As the Japanese position in the Mortar Regiment's 320mm spigot mor- Philippines became hopeless, shipments tars were an unusual type of weapon s of weapons to be sent there wer e which Marines had first encountered on diverted by IGHQ to Okinawa. The re- Iwo Jima.25 These awesome weapons, sult was that the Thirty-second Army firing a 675-pound shell dubbed a "fly- possessed a heavier concentration o f ing ashcan" by Americans, were th e artillery power, grouped under a singl e basic armament of this unit. Only hal f command, than had been available t o of its six batteries were on Okinawa , any Japanese force in previous Pacific as the other three had been sent to campaigns. The total artillery strength Burma in mid-1942. Although the 96 on Okinawa, with the exception of th e 81mm mortars of the 1st and 2d Light 24th Division's organic 42d Field Artil- Mortar Battalions were nominally under lery Regiment, was grouped within the command of General Wada, actually Major General Kosuke Wada's 5th they were assigned in close support o f Artillery Command. Besides the com- the various infantry units and usuall y paratively weak 7th Heavy Artillery operated under the direction of thei r Regiment (formerly the Nakagusuku respective sector defense commanders . Wan Fortress Artillery Unit), General The infantry was strengthened wit h Wada's command included two medium other types of artillery weapons from regiments, a heavy battalion, and th e antiaircraft artillery, antitank, an d artillery units of the 44th IMB and 27th automatic weapons units which wer e Tank Regiment. Combat-tested at attached to them during most of th e Bataan in the Philippines, the 1st campaign . A dual air-ground defense Medium Artillery Regiment had one of role was performed by the 72 75mm its two battalions assigned to Miyako guns and 54 20mm machine cannon i n Jima upon arrival from Manchuria in 4 independent antiaircraft artillery, 3 July. The other medium regiment wa s field antiaircraft artillery, and 3 ma- the 23d which, until its departure fo r chine-cannon battalions. In addition, 4 8 Okinawa in October, had been stationed lethal, high-velocity, flat trajectory in eastern Manchuria from the time o f 47mm guns (located in 3 independent its activation in 1942 . The two medium antitank battalions and 2 independen t artillery regiments together mustere d 26 a total of 2,000 troops who manned 36 LtCol Whitman S . Bartley, Iwo Jima : Amphibious Epic (Washington : HistBr, G–3 150mm howitzers . The artillery com- Div, HQMC, 1954), pp. 13–14, hereafter Bart - mand also contained the 100th Inde - ley, Iwo Jima.

46 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

companies) were added to the defense . Japanese naval base activities on Completing the infantry fire support of Okinawa were under the command o f the Thirty-second Army were 4 inde- Rear Admiral Minoru Ota . Admiral Ot a pendent machine gun battalions whic h was commander of the Naval Bas e had a total of 96 heavy machine guns . Force for the Okinawa area, commander The rest of General Ushijima's army of the 4th Surface Escort Unit, and also consisted of many diverse units and was in charge of naval aviation activ- supporting elements . The departure of ities in the Nansei Islands. Army-Nav y the 9th Division created a shortage o f relations and the chain of command o n infantry troops which had to be mad e Okinawa were based locally on mutua l up in as expeditious a manner as pos- agreements between the Thirty-second 26 sible. The reserve of potential infantry Army and the Naval Base Force . replacements on the island varied i n Admiral Ota directed the activities o f quality from good, in the two shippin g approximately 10,000 men, of who m engineer regiments, to poor, at best, in 3,500 were Japanese naval personnel the various rear area service organiza- and the other 6,000–7,000 were civilia n tions. The 19th Air Sector Command , employees belonging to sub-units of th e whose airfield maintenance and con- Naval Base Force . Of the total number struction troops were stationed at the of uniformed naval troops, only abou t Yontan, Kadena, and Ie Shima airstrips , 200 were considered to have received provided the largest number of replace- any kind of infantry training. Upon the ments, 7,000 men. activation of the base force on 15 April Another source of troops to fill in- 1944, a small number of naval officers fantry ranks was found in the sea-raid- and enlisted men, and most of the civil- ing units . These organizations, firs t ians, were formed into maintenance , encountered by American forces in th e supply, and construction units for th e Philippines, were designed for the de- large airfield on Oroku Peninsula and struction of amphibious invasion ship- the harbor installations at Naha . At ping by means of explosive-lade n Unten-Ko, on Motobu Peninsula in the suicide boats . There were a total of north, were stationed a torpedo boat seven sea-raiding squadrons in the Oki- squadron and a midget submarine unit . nawa Gunto, three of which were base d In organizing for the defense of the at Kerama Retto . Each of the squadrons island, the greater portion of regula r had assigned to it 100 hand-picked naval troops were formed into antiair- candidates for suicide and martyrdom , craft artillery and coastal defense bat - whose caliber was uniformly high since "Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 57–59 ; each man was considered officer mate- for a discussion of the Japanese high comman d rial . When one of these men failed t o setup, see Henry I . Shaw, Jr. and Maj Dougla s return, it was presumed that his had T . Kane, Isolation of Rabaul—History of U . S . been a successful mission and, re- Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v . II (Washington : HistBr, Div, HQMC . portedly, he was therefore given a G–3 1963), hereafter Shaw and Kane, Isolation o f posthumous promotion to second lieu - Rabaul, especially that section in chap I en- tenant. titled "Japanese Strategy ."

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 47

teries. These were broken down into each unit had a cadre of several com- four battery groups which were em - missioned and noncommissioned officers . placed mainly in the Naha-Oroku - When war broke out, certain designate d Tomigusuku area. The antiaircraft unit s reservists reported to the above units t o manned 20 120mm guns, 77 machine which they had been previously as- cannon, and 60 13mm machine guns , signed. 27 while the 15 coast defense batteries , Even the youth of the island were no t placed in strategic positions on th e exempt from the mobilization . About coastline under the control of Army 1,700 male students, 14 years of age an d local sector commanders, stood read y older, from Okinawa's middle schools, by their 14cm and 12cm naval guns. were organized into volunteer youth Although the total strength in numbers groups called the Tekketsu (Blood and was impressive, the Okinawa Naval Iron for the Emperor Duty Units) . Base Force did not have a combat poten- These young boys were eventually as- tial commensurate with its size . signed to front-line duties and t o Continually seeking means to bolste r guerrilla-type functions for which they his defenses, General Ushijima receive d had been trained . Most, however, wer e permission to mobilize a home guard o n assigned to communication units . the island . In July 1944, the Okinaw a It has not been conclusively deter- Branch of the Imperial Reservists Asso- mined how many native Okinawan s ciation formed a home guard, whose were actually added to the forces of th e members were called Boeitai. They wer e Thirty-second Army, or to what extent organized on a company-sized basis b y they influenced the final course of battle . town or village and were mainly com- What is known, however, is that thei r prised of reservists . Since the Boeitai greatest contribution was the labor they represented a voluntarily organize d performed which, in a period of nin e group, it did not come under the Japa- months, transformed the island land- nese Military Service Act, althoug h scape into hornets' nests of death an d their training and equipment cam e destruction. from the regular forces into whose ranks they were to be integrated when THE JAPANESE DEFENSES 28 the battle was joined . The total number of Boeitai thus absorbed by the Thirty- Continuing American successes i n second Army has been estimated be- the conduct of amphibious operation s . tween 17,000 and 20,000 men forced the Japanese to recognize the s On Okinawa there were certain unit increasing difficulties of defending which have often been confused with against assaults from the sea . The loss the Boeitai. These were the three Spe- cial Guard Companies (223d, 224th, and "War History Office Comments. 225th) and three Special Guard Engi- 28 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n neer Units (502d, 503d, and 504th) this section is derived from : IntelMono ; PO W which were special components of th e InterSum ; Shimada Interrogation ; Yahara Thirty-second Army. During peacetime, Interrogation ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun .

48 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

of some islands in 1944 reportedly hopeless, holding out in strong position s caused Japanese garrison units at othe r for as long as possible .30 Imperial bases in the Pacific to lose con- In order to deceive the assaulting fidence in themselves and their ability forces as to Japanese intentions, a to withstand an American seaborne in- Thirty-second Army battle instruction vasion. The Japanese high command warned the troops to "guard against hastily published the "Essentials of opening fire prematurely." 31 A later Island Defense," a document which battle instruction explained that "th e credited Americans with overwhelmin g most effective and certain way of [th e naval and air power, and emphasize d Americans'] ascertaining the existence that the garrisons should "lay out an d and organization of our firepower sys- equip positions which can withstan d tem is to have us open fire prematurel y heavy naval and aerial bombardment , on a powerful force where it ca n and which are suitable for protracte d maneuver." 3 2 delaying action . . . diminish the fightin g These instructions were a forewarn- effectiveness of landing units . . . seize ing that, rather than forcing the issue opportunities to try to annihilate th e on the beaches, "the Japanese soldie r force in one fell swoop ." 29 would dig and construct in a way and t o This document may have influence d an extent that an American soldier ha s General Ushijima's decisions when h e never been known to do ." 33 Japanese settled on a final defense plan, although organization of the ground paralleled his particular situation was governed that which assault troops had discovered on Biak, Saipan, and Peleliu i n primarily by the strength of the Thirty- 1944 and Iwo Jima in 1945 .34 General second Army and the nature of the are a Cho, a strong advocate of underground it was to defend . Captured on Okinaw a and cave fortifications, took an active were a set of instructions for the defense of Iwo Jima, which were appar- ""Land Defense Doctrine (Provisional) , dtd 1Dec44," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147–45 , ently a blueprint also for the defense of Translations and Interrogations No. 32, dtd critical areas on the coasts of the 16Jun45, p . 4. islands of Japan. It is assumed that ""Thirty-second Army Battle Instruction s Ushijima may have seen these instruc- No . 3, dtd 15Feb45," in CinCPac-CinCPO A Bul 122–45, Translations and Interrogation s tions, for they bore directly on his No. 30, dtd 1Jun45, p. 2 . problem : ""Thirty-second Army Battle Instructio n In situations where island garrisons No. 8, dtd 8Mar45," in Ibid., p . 7 . cannot expect reinforcements of troops IntelMono, pt I, sec A, p . 5. from rear echelons, but must carry on th e For a discussion of Japanese defenses on battle themselves from start to finish, the y these islands, see Robert R. Smith, The Ap- should exhaust every means for securing proach to the Philippines—U. S. Army in a favorable outcome, disrupting the ene- World War II (Washington : OCMH, DA, my's plans by inflicting maximum losse s 1953), pp. 300–302 ; Maj Frank O . Hough, The on him, and, even when the situation i s Assault on Peleliu (Washington : HistDiv , HQMC, 1950), pp . 192–197 ; Bartley, Iwo Jima, 29 Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp . 115–116 . pp . 5–18 .

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 49

part in designating where defensive in addition, by covering fire from posi- positions were to be placed . The most tions outside the cave. favorable terrain for the defense wa s Integrated within the whole Japanese occupied and honeycombed with mutu- defensive system, these cave strong - ally supporting gun positions and pro- holds were, in turn, centers of smal l tected connecting tunnels. Natural and unit positions . Item Pocket, one of th e man-made barriers were effectively in- most vigorously defended sectors o n corporated to channel attackers int o Okinawa, was typical of the ones Ameri- prepared fire lanes and pre-registere d can forces ran into . (See Map I, Map impact areas . The reverse as well as the Section.) The area encompassed by this forward slopes of hills were fortified, position, roughly 2,500 by 4,500 yards i n while artillery, mortars, and automati c size, was in the vicinity of Machinat o weapons were emplaced in cave mouths, Airfield. Both the 1st Marine and 27th with their employment completely inte- Infantry Divisions fought bitterly t o grated within the final protective fir e gain it. Disposed within the caves and plan. bunkers of the pocket was a reinforced Each unit commander., from brigade infantry battalion which manned ap- down to company level, was made re- proximately 16 grenade launchers, 83 light machine guns, 41 heavy machin e sponsible for the organization of the guns, 7 47mm antitank guns, 2 81m m ground and fortification of the sector mortars, 2 70mm howitzers, and 6 assigned to him. The need for heavy 75mm guns. A minefield and an anti - construction was lessened, in some tank trench system completed the de- cases, by the abundance of large cave s fenses. This sector was so organize d on Okinawa which required but sligh t that there were no weak points visibl e reinforcement to enable them to with - to the attacker . Any area not swept by stand even the heaviest bombardment . automatic weapons fire could be reache d Once improvements were made, these by either artillery or mortars . These de- natural fortresses served either as hos- fensive positions formed a vital link in pitals, barracks, command posts, or al l the chain of the tough outer defense s of these combined when the size of the guarding Shuri . cave permitted. There were generally Based on the dictum that "the islan d two or more entrances to the caves, must be divided into sectors according which sometimes had more than on e to the defense plan so that command level if time and manpower was avail - will be simplified," 35 each combat ele- able for the extensive digging neces- ment of the Thirty-second Army was sary. Tunnels led from the caves t o assigned a sector to develop and defen d automatic weapons and light artillery as it arrived on Okinawa. By August positions which, in conjunction with the 1944, the 44th IMB's 2d Infantry Unit pillboxes and rifle pits in the area, domi- (400 troops) under Colonel Takehiko nated each defense zone . The approaches ""Combat Regulations for Japanese Gar- and entryway to each cave were in- rison Units," n .d ., in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bu l variably guarded by machine guns and, 115-44, dtd 18Aug44 .

50 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Udo had occupied its assigned area , spring of 1944, the urgency of the wa r Kunigami Gun (County), and had as- situation and the expectance of an im- sumed responsibility for all of the minent invasion compelled the defender s island north of the Ishikawa Isthmus , to reevaluate their plans of deploymen t and also for Ie Shima and its airfields. for blunting the assault. The exact dat e Upon its arrival on Okinawa, the of the new Thirty-second Army plan is 24th Division had begun to construct not known, but a reasonable assumptio n field fortifications around Yontan an d is that the loss of the 9th Division in Kadena airfields in an area bounde d November which triggered the shuffling by Ishikawa Isthmus in the north an d of units also forced a decision on a fina l a line from Sunabe to Ozato in the defense plan . At the end of the month, south. Below the 24th's zone of defense, General Ushijima and his staff pondere d the 62d Division was unflagging in its the following alternatives before set- efforts to alter the ridges, ravines, an d tling on the one which they believed hillsides north of Shuri . Responsibilit y would guarantee the success of thei r for the entire southern portion of Oki- mission : nawa below Shuri had been assumed by Plan I : To defend, from extensive under- the 9th Division commander . ground positions, the Shimajiri sector, th e The receipt of orders in Novembe r main zone of defenses being north of Naha , . Landings north of for the transfer of the 9th Division Shuri, and Yonabaru these defenses were not to be opposed ; forced a redeployment of Thirty-second landings south of the line would be me t Army troops and strained a defens e at the beaches . Since it was impossible to that was already dangerously weak. defend Kadena airfield [with availabl e The 24th Division began moving sout h troops], 15cm guns were to be emplace d y to take over some 9th Division positions so as to bring fire on the airfield and den the invaders its use . while the 44th IMB, leaving two rein- Plan II : To defend from prepared posi- forced battalions of the 2d Infantry tions the central portion of the island , Unit behind on Ie Shima and Motob u including the Kadena and Yontan airfields . Peninsula, occupied an area which Plan III : To dispose one division aroun d reached from Kadena airfield south - the Kadena area, one division in the south - ern end of the island, and one brigad e ward to Chatan . The 62d Division posi- between the two divisions. To meet th e tions were likewise affected by the with- enemy wherever he lands and attempt t o drawal of the 9th's 14,000 combat annihilate him on the beaches . troops, as the northern divisional Plan IV : To defend the northern par t boundary of the 62d dropped to the of the island, with Army Headquarters a t Nago, and the main line of defense base d e Chatan-Futema line . In the south, th on Hill 220, northeast of Yontan airfield .3 6 62d zone of responsibility was increase d Realistically appraising the many tremendously to include all of Naha , factors which might effect each one of Shuri, Yonabaru, and the entire Chinen the alternate plans, the Japanese settle d Peninsula . on Plan I. Plan III was abandone d - Although the construction of fortifi simply because the Thirty-second Army cations, underground positions, and cave sites had been going on since the 38 IntelMono, pt I sec A, pp . 1-2 .

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 51

did not have the strength adequate t o rain of its type on Okinawa and, as realize all that the plan encompassed . such, it was hoped that the invaders Plan IV was rejected because it con- could be met and defeated here . Since, ceded the loss of the militarily im- from the standpoint of actual man - portant south even before the battle ha d power, the Chinen sector was the weak- been joined . Plan II, the one whic h est area in the final defense plan, a American staff planners feared as offer- goodly portion of the artillery and in- ing the greatest threat to a successfu l fantry strength of the Thirty-secon d invasion, was regretfully relinquishe d Army—which could have been bette r by the Japanese . Ushijima, recognizing employed in reinforcing Shuri position s his troops' capabilities and limitations , —was diverted to the peninsula, re- realized that his forces, in the main, ha d maining there out of action during th e not been trained to fight this type of first weeks of the campaign .3S delaying action which would prolon g Among Ushijima 's most pressin g the battle, bloody the invaders, and per- needs were additional troops and tim e mit the bulk of his army to withdra w in which to train them. Extra time was to the more heavily fortified souther n needed also to provide for expandin g portion of Okinawa. Yet, in effect, thi s and strengthening existing fortifica- is exactly the strategy he was forced t o tions as well as the communications net . employ after the initial American land- With the exception of a drastic fuel ings. shortage, the army was in good logisti- Placing Plan I into effect, the Japa- cal shape. Although the Thirty-second nese centered the main battle positio n Army itself had no provisions in rein the Shuri area, where the rugged serve, enough had been distributed to terrain surrounding the ancient capita l subordinate units, and stored by them was developed with the strongest instal- in caves near troop dispositions, to las t lations oriented north toward the until September 1945. This system was Hagushi beaches . (See Map 3.) The satisfactory in that the strain on th e Hagushi region, coincidentally, evolve d overworked transportation facilities was as a secondary target to the Japanese removed, but when an area was overru n and a primary target to American staff by Americans and the Japanese were planners. In addition, "handicapped b y their lack of ability to make a logistics aB In the Thirty-second Army staff there wa s estimate for a landing operation," 37 the sharp disagreement as to the probability of thi s Japanese believed that the major effort additional landing . Colonel Yahara, senior staff officer, insisted that a diversionary landing , would be made in the southeast with an possibly the principle one, would be made i n assault across the Minatogawa beaches . the Minatoga region . Major Yakamaru, the in- Overlooking both the Minatogawa an d telligence officer, held that the only America n Nakagusuku Wan beaches, Chine n landing would be in the Hagushi area . Prestige and seniority won the argument . `Yakamaru , Peninsula heights presented the de - bitterly disappointed at the final decision, went fenders with the most favorable ter - off the next few days to inundate his sorrow s in prolonged draughts of expensive sake .' 37 Ibid., p. 3 . Shimada Interrogation .

310-224 0 - 69 - 5

52 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

JAPANES E DEFENSIV E DISPOSITION S I APRIL 1945 2 3 0 3

MAP 3 T. L . RUSSEL L

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 53

forced to withdraw, the supplies were their basic assignment of cave an d lost. suicide boat site construction, the arm y Unable to halt the inexorable press decided to utilize these men in an are a of time, General Ushijima now found i t where they were critically needed . Be- imperative to beef-up his infantry com- ginning 13 February 1945, these bat- ponent from sources on the island, for talions, although retaining their origi- he knew that he could expect no outsid e nal numerical designations, were re- help. In addition to the mobilized assigned as the 1st, 2d, 3d, 26th, 27th , Boeitai and a continuing stream of Oki- 28th, and 29th Independent Battalions nawan conscriptees, the Japanese com- (each averaging about 600 men) to the mander attempted to free his uniforme d 24th and 44th IMB for thorough train- labor and service personnel for fronting and subsequent absorption .41 Only line duty by replacing them with able- the maintenance company of each bat- bodied males from the large populatio n talion was to remain with its respectiv e of the island . In February 1945, more sea-raiding suicide unit . In comparison than 39,000 Okinawans were assigne d with the regular infantry of the Japa- to Japanese Army units on the island . nese Army, the new battalions were The natives were placed into such cate- poorly trained and equipped, but these gories as Main Labor (22,383), Auxil- 4,500—5,000 men invested enemy force s iary Labor (14,415) , and Student Labo r with an additional source of strength . (2,944) .39 The Japanese attempted to During the next month, March, a fina l evacuate to the northern part of th e army reorganization took place, at island all of the rest of the populatio n which time the Thirty-second Army who were incapable of aiding the wa r directed "the various shipping, air, an d effort or who were potential obstacles in rear echelon forces [to] set up organi- the battle zone.4 0 zations and dispositions for land com- 42 General Ushijima found the addi- bat." Besides their basic missions, tional infantry troops he required in th e these units now had to give infantr y ranks of Thirty-second Army special training and field fortification construc- and service units. The first elements tion priority in their schedules . The affected by an army-wide reorganiza- March reorganization supplied the army tion at this time were seven sea-raidin g with two brigades and a regiment which base battalions . Each suicide squadron appeared more significant on paper than was supported by a base battalion of actually was the case . These lightly 900 men, and since they had completed equipped and untrained service troop s could serve only as combat replacements ""Thirty-second Army Assignment of Con - with slight tactical value . script Labor, dtd Feb45," in CinCPac-CinC- POA Bul 161-45, Translations and Interroga- 'l IntelMono, pt I sec A p . 10 . tions No . 34, dtd 27Jun45 . 42 "Thirty-second Army OpOrd A-113, Re- 40 "Standards for the Establishment of Nan- organization of Service Units into Comba t sei Shoto Garrison Plans, dtd 1Jan45," i n Troops, dtd 21Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPO A CICAS Trans No . 83 ; Okinawa Operations Bul 107-45, Translations and Interrogation s Record, pp. 59-60. No . 28, dtd 14May45, p. 15 .

54 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Units from the 19th Air Sector Head- transformed into an 81mm mortar bat- quarters were funneled into the 1st tery and two independent machine gu n Specially Established Regiment which, battalions and, thus armed, were th e under 62d Division control, was respon- only adequately weaponed units in th e sible for the defense of the areas in the naval garrison . vicinity of Kadena and Yontan airfields. In less than two months after the Support positions in the Naha-Yonabaru first reorganization order had been pub- valley were assumed by the 1st Spe- lished, General Ushijima had nearl y cially Established Brigade, composed of doubled the potential combat strengt h three regiments and formed from of his army by the addition of approxi- Thirty-second Army transport, ord- mately 20,000 Boeitai, naval, and serv- nance, construction, and supply troop s ice troops. Hurriedly, the concerte d formerly within the 49th Line of Com- efforts of this determined Japanese munications Headquarters command. A force converted the Shuri area into 2d Specially Established Brigade of what was to be an almost impregnabl e three regiments, culled from the 11th bastion, for the final defensive plan was Shipping Group Headquarters shipping, strengthened by the defenders' deter- sea transport, and engineer rosters, wa s mination to hold Shuri to the last man. deployed in support of the 24th Division Concurrent with the February army mission—the defense of southernmos t reorganization, the troops were de- Okinawa. "Army rear echelon agencie s ployed in their final positions . General not included in this order and their per- Ushijima's main battle force was with - sonnel will be under command of th e drawn to an outpost zone just north o f front line unit in the vicinity wher e Futema, while elements of the 1st their duties are carried on, and wil l Specially Established Regiment were reinforce it in combat," stated the all - loosely disposed in the area immediately inclusive 21 March order which put th e behind the Hagushi beaches . Although entire Thirty-second Army in a status this was the least likely place where th e of general mobilization for combat .43 Americans were expected to land, th e By 26 March, Okinawa Base Forc e Japanese troops defending this area naval and civilian personnel had been were to fight a delaying action in any formed into the same type of jerry-built, such eventuality, and then, after de- poorly equipped, and undertrained destroying the Yontan and Kadena air - fense units as had been the servic e fields, were to beat a hasty retreat to the troops of the Thirty-second Army. On Shuri lines. Oroku Peninsula, naval lieutenant s In the suspected invasion area, th e commanded those units designated a s Minatogawa beaches, the bulk of the battalions while lieutenants (junio r Japanese infantry and artillery force s grade) became company commanders . were positioned to oppose the landings . Admiral Ota's 13mm and 25mm anti - The 5th Artillery Command observation aircraft batteries were re-equipped an d post was established near Itokazu in control of all of its major components , 43 Ibid. which had been emplaced in defense of

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY 55

the Minatogawa sector. Since landing s The isolated north was defended by further north on Chinen Peninsul a the Udo Force, so-called after its leader would give the invaders a relatively un- and commanding officer of the 2d opposed, direct route into the heart o f Infantry Unit—Colonel Takehiko Udo . the major Japanese defense system, the Its mission was twofold, defense of bot h 44th IMB was assigned control of the Motobu Peninsula and Ie Shima . The rugged heights of the peninsula. The reinforced battalion on Ie Shima was 24th Division, taking over the defens e assigned secondary missions of destroy- works begun by the 9th Division, oc- ing the island's airfield and assisting i n cupied the southern portion of Okinaw a the transfer of aviation materiel to th e from Kiyan Point to an area just nort h main island . Upon completion of thes e of Tsukasan. The whole of Oroku duties, the unit was then to return to Peninsula was assigned to Admira l Okinawa where it would be assigned to Ota's forces, who were prepared to figh t the control of the 62d Division. Udo's the "Navy Way," contesting the inva- battalion on Motobu Peninsula, in ex- sion at the beaches in a manner remi- pectation of an invasion of Ie Shima niscent of the Japanese defense o f followed by a landing on the peninsula , Tarawa.4 4 was disposed with its few artiller y Since the heart and soul of the Jap- pieces so placed as to make its positions anese defenses were located at Shuri , and positions on Ie Shima mutually sup - the most valuable and only battle-tested porting. As a result of its detachmen t organization on the island, the 62d Divi- earlier from the larger portion of th e sion, was charged with the protection of Thirty-second Army, Udo's comman d this vital area. The Japanese had was destined to fulfill a hopeless under - shrewdly and industriously constructe d taking to the very end . a stronghold centered in a series of con - Air defense was not included in the centric rings, each of which bristle d Thirty-second Army plan, nor was any with well dug-in, expertly sited weap- great aviation force available t o ons. Regardless of where the American s Ushijima. He had expected that ap- landed, either at Hagushi or Mina- proximately 300 airplanes would be sen t togawa or both, the plans called fo r to Okinawa, but feared that their pro- delaying actions and, finally, a with- jected time of arrival, April, would b e drawal into the hard shell of these well - . disguised positions . too late to influence the local situation The American preinvasion air and " Although the Base Force was under com- naval bombardments in March, command of the Thirty-second Army and Admira l bined with planned Japanese destruc- Ota sincerely attempted to cooperate with the tion efforts, had rendered the Ie Shima , army, classic interservice rivalry apparent in many Japanese Pacific operations, on a lowe r Yontan, Kadena, and Oroku airfield s echelon in the case of Okinawa, hampered th e unusable. naval commander's desires . "Naval Units on The army did expect, however, that Okinawa," in POW InterSum No . 16, dt d 28Ju145. its exertions would be complemented by

56 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

the combat activity of its organic sui- "it's like a frog meeting a snake, jus t

cide sea units . The sea-raiding squad- waiting for the snake to eat him ." 4 8 rons located at positions in Keram a Between 20 and 23 March 1945, the Retto and along the Okinawa coast , Japanese command on Okinawa made would "blast to pieces the enemy trans- an even more realistic estimate than had port groups with a whirlwind attack i n the troops of what the future held fo r the vicinity of their anchorages ."'" the garrison. The Japanese reacted to Unfortunately for the Japanese, thei r news of a conference held in Washington midget submarines and motor torped o between Admirals King and Nimitz in boats at Unten-Ko could not join thi s early March by placing a general aler t offensive endeavor, for, by the day of into effect "for the end of March an d the American invasion, they had al l early April," since statistics demon- been destroyed by American carrier strated "that new operations occur strikes or scattered in the aftermath o f from 20 days to one month afte r an unsuccessful attack on the destroye r [American] conferences on strategy ar e held." 49 This estimate of when the Tolman of Task Force 52 . 4 6 Americans were expected was reduce d The significance of Thirty-secon d three days after its publication follow- Army deployments and redeployments, ing receipt of reports of increased ship- the frenzied last-minute preparations, ping in the Marianas, and when repeate d and the general air of expectancy were submarine sightings and contacts wer e not lost upon even the lowest ranks. One made. All of this enabled the Japanes e private wrote as early as February, "i t intelligence officers to predict withou t appears that the army has finally de- hesitation that the target was to b e cided to wage a decisive battle on Oki- "Formosa or the Nansei Shoto, especially Okinawa ." 5 0 nawa." 47 Another soldier noted tha t 40 "Diary of a radioman, 5th Harbor Bas e ""Thirty-second Army OpOrd A 115, dt d Unit," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 161-45 , 23Mar45," in CICAS Trans No . 321 . Translations and Interrogations No . 34, dtd 40 " Naval Units on Okinawa," in POW Inter- 27Jun45, p . 50 . Sum No . 16, dtd 28Ju145 ; CTF 52 AR, Okinawa 48 " Thirty-second Army Estimate of the Sit- Gunto, 21Mar-20Apr45, dtd 1May45, chap III , uation, dtd 20Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPOA p. 9, hereafter CTF 52 AR. Bul 140-45, Translations and Interrogation s ""Diary of a superior private, 272d IIB," No . 31, dtd 7Jun45, p . 5. in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45, Translation s 50 "62d Division IntelRpt on Findings Since and Interrogations No . 32, dtd 16Jun45, p. 48 . the 2OMar Rpt, dtd 23Mar45," in Ibid., p . 6 . CHAPTER 2

Project ICEBERG

THE TASK DEFINED ' scheduled for 20 January 1945, was no w given the concurrent assignment of Three weeks after receipt of the planning for Okinawa . Joint Chiefs of Staff directive ordering Certain assumptions governed task the Okinawa invasion, Admiral Nimitz' planning and the assignment of assault headquarters published and distribute d and garrison forces for ICEBERG. Ad- the ICEBERG Joint Staff Study . This herence to the scheduled 1 March 194 5 study served as a planning guideline for invasion date (L-Day) for Okinaw a the units assigned to the campaign an d was based on the presupposed seizure of defined for them the objectives, the al- Iwo Jima at a date early enough to per- lotment of forces, and roughly outlined mit release of naval gunfire and ai r the scheme of maneuver ashore . support units for the second operation . Although Operation CAUSEWAY , It was further assumed that ICEBER G the invasion of Formosa, had been can - commanders would be able to secure th e celled in favor of ICEBERG, the princi- prompt release from General MacArthu r pal commanders for CAUSEWAY were of assault shipping, support shipping , retained for the Okinawa landing an d supporting naval forces, and Arm y redirected their staffs' efforts towards troops assigned to the Philippines opera- planning for the assault on the newl y tion which had been earmarked for us e assigned target . Admiral Raymond A. later at Okinawa. Finally, before Oki- Spruance, whose Task Force 50 (TF nawa was invaded, Allied air and sur- 50) contained the Fifth Fleet and the face superiority had to be gained in th e Central Pacific Task Forces, was mad e target area . responsible for the Ryukyus operation . This last point was one of the most His staff, previously charged with pre - important in the overall concept of the paring plans for the Iwo Jima invasion operation, for it was believed that air attacks on Japan, together with the con - ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s quest of Iwo Jima, would force a concen - section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ; tration of Japanese air strength on th e CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 14–44, dtd 31Dec44 , bases which ringed the Home Islands . It ; USAFMid- hereafter CinCPOA OPlan 14–44 would be necessary, therefore, to destro y Pac G–5 Hist ; ComFifthFlt OPlan 1–45, dtd 3Jan45, hereafter ComFifthFlt OPlan 1–45 ; enemy air installations at Japanese stag - CG, Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1–45, ICEBERG , ing areas in Kyushu and Formosa, and dtd 6Jan45, hereafter Tenth Army TntvOPlan neutralize those at Okinawa, since it wa s 1–45 ; Samuel Eliot Morison, Victory in th e a basic assumption that enemy aircraft l Pacific, 1945—History of United States Nava would vigorously oppose any invasio n Operations in World War II, v . XIV, (Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1960), hereafter attempt. For this reason, the scheme o f Morison, Victory in the Pacific. maneuver ashore included plans for th e 57

58 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

early securing of airfields on Okinaw a As strategic commander of the in- and their equally early use by Allied vasion forces, Admiral Nimitz directed land-based aircraft. Japanese sea com- that the chain of command woul d munications in the Ryukyus area were t o descend to Admiral Spruance, thence to be severed before the operation by sur- Vice Admiral Richmond K . Turner who face and air attacks on enemy shipping would command Task Force 51 (Joint and by a maximum effort mounted b y Expeditionary Force), and then to Lieu- American submarines . tenant General Simon B . Buckner, Jr., According to the ICEBERG staff study , USA, who would command the Army , operations ashore were to be conducted Navy, and Marine units comprising the in three phases. To be accomplished i n Expeditionary Troops . When Spruance the first phase were the capture of th e had determined that the amphibiou s southern portion of Okinawa and smal l phase of the invasion had ended, he adjacent islands and the initial develop- would pass the command of all force s ment of base facilities. In Phase II, I e ashore to Buckner . As Commandin g Shima and the remainder of Okinaw a General of the Tenth Army, Buckne r were to be seized and the base build-up would assume responsibility for the de- continued with the construction of in- fense and development of positions cap- stallations in favorable locations desig- tured on the island . When the situatio n nated in the development plan . Phase permitted, he would also relieve Admira l III required the exploitation of Allied Spruance of the responsibility for the positions in the Nansei Shoto and, whe n defense and development of the Ryukyus Admiral Nimitz directed, the seizure an d as a whole and, at that time, he woul d development of additional position s be directly responsible to CinCPOA fo r with forces then locally available . (See the captured island positions and fo r Map 4. ) the waters within a 25-mile radius . Con- It was envisoned that an army of two currently, responsibility for the estab- corps, each composed of three reinforce d lishment of an Island Command and a infantry divisions, would be required i n military government on Okinawa woul d the initial assault. In addition, two di - be General Buckner's also . visions were to be assigned as area reserve. Okinawa's proximity to th e ALLIED COMMANDERS AND heart of the Empire as well as to other FORCES 2 major Japanese bases, and the expectation of fanatic resistance by enemy Many units of Admiral Nimitz' com- troops on a battleground of such large mand not directly assigned Task Forc e dimensions, presaged a prolonged perio d 50 were to support the Okinawa landin g of fierce combat . For these reasons, a new command relationship was estab- 2 Unless otherwise noted the material in this lished for the Okinawa operation differ- section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ; CinCPOA OPlan 14-44 ; USAFMidPac G- 5 ing, in some respects, from that whic h Hist ; ComFifthFlt OPlan 1-45 ; Tenth Army had been effective in previous Pacific TntvOPlan 1-45 ; Morison, Victory in th e campaigns. Pacific.

PROJECT ICEBERG 59

ICEBER G SCHEME OF MANEUVE R

e AIRFIELD

IE-SIIIMA

INITIAL OBJECTIV E

RES)

3E2 (CORPS RESI AKASUSUK(/-

MII, toyo

T L. RUSSELL MAP 4

60 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

from bases widespread in the Pacifi c tasks were allocated, in turn, to th e Ocean Areas . Additionally, from thei r Amphibious Support Force (TF 52 , airdromes in China and the Southwest Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy) Pacific, Army Air Forces elements were which provided direct air and naval to assist the ICEBERG effort, both prior support, and to the Gunfire and Cover- to and during the course of the cam- ing Force (TF 54, Rear Admiral Morto n paign. In all, about 548,000 men of the L. Deyo) .4 The Northern Attack Force Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, to- (TF 53, Rear Admiral Lawrence F . gether with 318 combatant and 1,13 9 Reifsnider) and the Southern Attack auxiliary vessels—exclusive of numer- Force (TF 55, Rear Admiral John L. ous small personnel craft of all types 3 Hall, Jr.,) contained the transports —and a profusion of strategic and tacti- which were to lift the assault troops cal aircraft were to strike some of the to the objective and the tractor unit s last blows dooming the Japanese at- which were to land them on L-Day . tempts to gain supremacy in Asia an d The assault of Okinawa and its sur- the Pacific. rounding islands was to be accomplished In the Fifth Fleet were the Coverin g by the landing forces of Buckner's Ex- Forces and Special Groups which in- peditionary Troops (TF 56) . The as- cluded the Fast Carrier Force (TF 58 , sault force of the Northern Attack Vice Admiral Marc A . Mitscher) and th e Force was Major General Roy S . British Carrier Force (TF 57, Vice Ad- Geiger's III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) , miral Sir H . Bernard Rawlings, RN) . composed of the 1st Marine Division These two forces were to conduct ai r (Major General Pedro A. del Valle ) strikes and neutralize Japanese ai r and the 6th Marine Division (Major power prior to the landing, and preven t General Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr.) . The enemy air and surface interference wit h Army XXIV Corps (Major General the Allied landing and subsequent occu- John R. Hodge) would be lifted by th e pation of Okinawa. Southern Attack Force and would con- The units more directly concerned sist of the 7th Infantry Division (Majo r with the landing were components of General Archibald V. Arnold) and th e Turner's Task Force 51. Its comple x 96th Infantry Division (Major Genera l composition reflected its many assign- James L. Bradley) . ments incident to the capture, occupa- One other major Marine echelon in tion, and defense of Okinawa. Any the Tenth Army was Major General enemy attempt to disrupt the movemen t Francis P. Mulcahy's joint air task to the target or landing on the beach 4 Vice Admiral Jesse B . Oldendorf, originall y would be handled by the force's support the commander of TF 54, was injured at elements . These naval units would als o Ulithi shortly before the operation. "Fortu- undertake air support and minesweep- nately, Rear Admiral Morton L . Deyo, veteran ing operations once the beachhead ha d gunfire support commander in Operatio n OVERLORD [Normandy invasion] and DRA- been gained. Assignments for these GOON [invasion of southern France], wa s available to relieve Admiral Oldendorf ." 3 War Reports, p. 664. Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 109 .

PROJECT ICEBERG 61

command, Tactical Air Force (TAF) , formerly been AirFMFPac Chief of which was to provide land-based ai r Staff. Wallace's squadrons were to be - support for the operation once its squad- gin operations from previously desig- rons were ashore . The elements ini- nated airfields on Okinawa as soon a s tially assigned to TAF were to come they had been captured by the ground primarily from the 2d Marine Aircraft troops. Initially, General Wallace's com- Wing (2d MAW) . Although TAF wa s mand consisted of a headquarters established under the Tenth Army on squadron and a service squadron, and 21 November 1944, its staff was not three MAGs with a total complement really organized until late in December . of nine fighter, two night fighter, and By that time, much of the earlier, basic , four air warning squadrons . The radar and important preinvasion planning had installations of the units last named been completed without TAF participa- would give early warning of enemy ai r tion. As a matter of fact, the last o f attacks. An Army Air Forces fighter the personnel assigned to TAF staff did wing was also part of ADC, but only not even report until after the assault one group was to join TAF before the echelon had already left for the target . 5 campaign was brought to a close. Although he had not taken part in ICE - General Mulcahy's Bomber Comman d BERG planning, General Mulcahy was was made up wholly of AAF flight and kept fully abreast of Tenth Army activ- support elements, none of which arrived ities and decisions by his chief of staff , on Okinawa before the beginning of Colonel Perry O. Parmelee, who dail y June. Photographic coverage of enemy visited Buckner's headquarters and at - installations, interpretation of the pic- tended briefings and conferences there .6 tures thus obtained, and an aerial photo- A most important element of TAF graphic survey of the island for map- was its fighter arm, the Air Defense ping purposes were to be the mission s Command (ADC), headed by Brigadie r of an AAF photo-reconnaissance squad- General William J . Wallace who ha d ron which was also part of the TA F organization. 'Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IV, pp . 2–3 ; Rounding out the Tenth Army ai r r TAF WarDs, 290ct44-31Jan45 ; Tactical Ai force were two Marine torpedo-bomber Force, Tenth Army, AR, Ph I, Nansei Shoto , 8Dec44-30Jun45, dtd 12Ju145, pt I, chap 3, p . 2 , squadrons which were to conduct anti - hereafter TAF AR. submarine warfare operations together a MajGen Ford O . Rogers interview with with the carrier-based naval aircraft a t HistBr, HQMC, dtd 14Apr66, (Oral Histor y the target . The Marine squadrons wer e Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Rogers also prepared to conduct bombing at- o interview. General, then Colonel, Rogers, wh r was the Air Defense Command Chief of Staff , tacks on ground targets and any othe did not arrive at Pearl Harbor to take over hi s missions when the need for them arose . new job until early January 1945. In comment- Marine aviation, other than that ing on the fact that TAF and the Air Defens e which was organic to TAF, was to pla y Command had not participated in planning fo r an important part in the invasion . the invasion, General Rogers said that it had d no serious or visible effect on the conduct of Artillery spotting was the assigne Marine air operations at Okinawa . mission of Marine observation squad-

62 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

rons attached to the Marine division s 2d Marine Division (Major General and corps. Scheduled to control all air- Thomas E . Watson) ; and the Floating craft in support of the ground force s Reserve Group (TG 51 .3, Commodore were Colonel Vernon E. Megee's Land- John B. McGovern) which carried 27th ing Force Air Support Control Units Infantry Division (Major Genera l (LFASCUs) . When directed by Ad- George W. Griner, Jr .) . miral Turner, LFASCUs, set up ashor e at the headquarters of Tenth Army an d JOINT PREPARATIONS AND its two corps, would take over contro l PLANNING 8 from their shipboard naval counterparts. Intensive joint planning attested t o In addition to the tactical units as- the immensity of the future operation . signed to the Tenth Army for the assault Smooth Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and consolidation phases of the opera- coordination of operational, logistical , tion, General Buckner was to have di- and administrative matters was impera- rect command of the defense and service tive. Since the Tenth Army, under troops assigned for the garrison phase . CinCPOA, would consist of an Arm y Major General Fred C . Wallace, USA, corps and a Marine amphibious corps, was designated Island Commander, Oki- and a large naval contingent, General nawa, 7 while the Naval Forces, Ryu- Buckner believed that it was important kyus, were to be commanded by Rea r for him to have a joint staff. He there- Admiral Calvin H . Cobb, who would as- fore requested Admiral Nimitz to au- sume his command upon completion of thorize a Marine and naval augmenta- the amphibious phase of the operation . tion of his staff. When this request was Although strategic air force and nava l granted, approximately 30 Marine an d search squadrons were to be based o n 30 Navy officers, and enlisted assistants Okinawa, they would remain under th e from each of these services, were as- operational control of the Commanding signed and integrated within the Tent h General, Army Air Forces, Pacifi c Army staff . "There was no Marine o r Ocean Area, and Commander, Fifth naval section of the staff." 9 One of the Fleet, respectively. Marine officers was Brigadier Genera l Infantry units were assigned also to Oliver P. Smith, who became the Marin e the Western Islands Attack Group (T G Deputy Chief of Staff ; he had been the 51.1, Rear Admiral Ingolf N . Kiland) Assistant Division Commander of th e which had the 77th Infantry Division (Major General Andrew D . Bruce) as Unless otherwise noted the material in thi s its landing force ; the Demonstratio n section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR, Nansei Shoto, lApr-31Jun45 Group (TG 51 , .2, Rear Admiral Jeraul d dtd 1Jul, hereafter 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th Wright) whose landing force was th e MarDiv SAR, Okinawa Operation, Phases I and II, dtd 30Apr45, hereafter 6th MarDiv ' This command also was to include the Ie SAR, PhI&II. Shima garrison, and, on Okinawa, the Naval s Gen Oliver P . Smith, Personal Narrative , Operating Base and the Naval Air Bases . n. d., p. 4, hereafter Smith, Personal Narrative .

PROJECT ICEBERG 63

1st Marine Division in the Peleliu cam- port the ICEBERG landing . Admiral paign. His counterpart on the Tenth Turner's operation plan assumed tha t Army staff was Brigadier General there would be bitter Japanese air re - Lawrence E . Schick, who filled the billet action to the Okinawa invasion ; that of Army Deputy Chief of Staff . enemy submarines would be very active When General Smith arrived at Tenth in the target area ; that the Japanes e Army headquarters, he found that Cin - surface fleet might possibly sortie out CPOA had already approved the Marine from its bases in Japan ; and, that at- augmentation for the Army staff. The tempts might be made to reinforce the Marine general believed that this aug- garrison on Okinawa. The first thre e mentation was overly large, for : assumptions proved correct ; the fourth was not tested because, in accordance This padding would result in Marin e with the JCS directive ordering the in- officers doing clerical duty at Army Head- quarters as there were manifestly no t vasion of Okinawa, Allied air and sur- enough bona fide billets to take care of al l face superiority had been gained prior the Army officers on the staff as well as to L-Day. lo the Marine and naval officers. Based on Admiral Turner's plan, th e After considerable discussion with the Tenth Army staff drew up Plan Fox , Army officer responsible for the assign- which committed the assault forces to ment of staff billets, General Smit h a landing on the west coast. Plan Fox managed to have the number of Marin e also included the pre-L-Day capture o f officers on the Tenth Army staff reduce d Keise Shima, since a study of this small by nearly 30 percent .11 island indicated the feasibility of its us e A tactical concept based upon the as a fixed emplacement for artiller y directive stated in the ICEBERG join t which would first augment the naval staff study, and later incorporated i n and air bombardment of the main ob- the TF 50 operation plan, required jective before the landing, and after- "early use of sufficient airdrome capac- wards provide support during the lan d y ity in Okinawa, together with unloading campaign . This plan, approved b facilities adequate to support its devel- Buckner, was presented to Turner a t opment and to maintain positive contro l the initial joint conference held at Pear l of the air in the area." 12 In a study of Harbor on 1 November 1944. all landing beach areas in southern Oki- Following this presentation, Turner nawa, those beaches on the west coas t stated his views of the operation and which lay north and south of Hagush i outlined what would be the require- were deemed to be best suited to sup - ments of the Navy during the course o f ICEBERG . He believed that, prior to 10 Ibid., p . 25 . the landings on Okinawa, the adjacen t 11 A list of the names of Marine officers o n islands had to be neutralized . Once this the Tenth Army staff when ICEBERG force s had been done, the major landings on landed on Okinawa is located in Ibid., pp. 25-26 . Okinawa would be more secure and th e 13 ComFif thFlt OPlan 1-45, Anx B, p. 2. fleet could be replenished in a safe an-

64 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

chorage without danger from enemy of the operation or a landing on the surface vessels or submarines . southeast coast on the. date originally Two provisions of Plan Fox particu- scheduled for the assault . All other pos- larly concerned the Fifth Fleet com- sible courses of action were re-examined , mander. Because of the suspected pres- with the result that the Hagushi beache s ence of Japanese mines and submarine s were recommended again as the site fo r immediately west of Okinawa, shoul d the landings. Final approval was with- the Hagushi beaches be used for the in- held by Turner because he retained vasion, the landings here would perforce doubts as to the practicality of landing require the fleet to steam into a hazard- and supporting the proposed assaul t ous area. The second apprehension force of four divisions over the Hagush i arose because 1 March had been sched- beachhead . In spite of the objections of uled as L-Day . He feared that unfavor- Admiral Turner, the Plan Fox estimat e able weather conditions, which generall y was distributed on 5 November.14 When prevailed in March, might possibl y completed on 9 November, another de- affect the conduct of the landings an d tailed study upheld the original conten- unduly prolong the unloading of sup- tion that Hagushi held the only beache s plies on exposed beaches. Available in southern Okinawa adequate to re- meteorological data justified this con- ceive four divisions abreast and, sub- cern, for from October to March th e sequently, to handle sufficient logistical Ryukyus experienced strong northerl y support for the operation. winds with a mean velocity of 17-1 9 In the face of these convincing argu- miles-per-hour as well as frequent gales. ments, Admiral Turner accepted th e A generally moderate wind, averagin g plan with the proviso that both Keram a 11 miles-per-hour, marked the begin- Retto and Keise Shima were to be cap- ning of the summer monsoon period an d tured prior to the main landing . With characterized the weather of Okinaw a minor exceptions, General Buckner con- in April, which was a more suitable tim e curred with these modifications, and th e for the invasion .13 In any case, Turne r revised plan was forwarded to Turne r requested that the possibility of landings on 11 November . The original target along the east coast be restudied . At the same time, he suggested that th e date of 1 March was changed twice value of a feint landing be determined within the next month, first to 15 Marc h and, if valid, should be incorporated i n and finally to 1 April . The first chang e the plan finally adopted for ICEBERG . was made on 19 November in anticipa- After a lengthy discussion of the prob- tion of bad weather at the target at th e beginning of March , lems inherent in the proposed plan, the . On 7 December conferees concluded that a landing on Admiral Nimitz advanced L-Day two the western beaches on 1 March wa s more weeks when doubts arose as t o fraught with considerable risk. The al- whether the shipping assigned to Gen- ternatives were either a 30-day delay eral MacArthur's Lingayen Gulf opera-

13 HQUSAFPOA Study, sec XX, p . 1 . 1' Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 13 .

PROJECT ICEBERG 65

tions could be returned in time to permit parties would retire after destroying its reemployment at Okinawa.15 enemy coastal artillery . Later plans for Since the naval planning staff rec- their capture grew out of Admiral ommended a sustained seven- or eight - Turner's proposal that, once taken, the day bombardment of the assaul t Keramas provide a protected anchorage beaches, the resulting expenditure o f for the establishment of a small-boa t Navy supplies and ammunition woul d pool and a seaplane base. force the bombardment group to eithe r Because the Kerama assault was no w withdraw from the area for resuppl y to be a full-scale invasion instead of a and refueling or to conduct these opera- raid., the assignment of a larger force tions under dangerous conditions in the was indicated and Major General open sea offshore of the objective . Thomas E. Watson's 2d Marine Divisio n Basically, it was this consideration that was chosen initially. This unit, desig- prompted Turner's insistence on th e nated IIIAC Reserve, had been slate d pre-L-Day capture of the entire Keram a for early commitment in support of group. At first, these islands appeare d operations on Okinawa, and so the tas k to be only worthy as targets for am- of capturing the Keramas was given in- phibious raids in which the raiding stead to the 77th Infantry Divisio n while the Marine division was assigne d USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, pp. 183, 201 . "The tentatively to a feint landing off south- deferment of the target date to April 1 wa s eastern Okinawa ." most fortunate from the logistic angle . Unde r As the scope and importance of pre- CinCPOA procedures, all maintenance supplie s for Okinawa were to be shipped from the West liminary operations grew, the reserve s Coast to the control point at Ulithi (3d and which had been made available to Gen- subsequent echelons were staged throug h eral Buckner originally decreased i n Eniwetok) for call forward as required . Requi- number, and it was found necessary t o sitions for these supplies had to be in th e secure from CinCPOA release of the hands of West Coast supply agencies 60 days y prior to sailing date of the shipment . Due t o area reserve division (27th Infantr the sailing time required, requisitions for th e Division) . This unit was then desig- first maintenance shipment to support a 1 nated as the Tenth Army floating re- March target date had to be on the West Coas t serve and was replaced by the 81st In- by 20 November. With no firm tactical pla n fantry Division which remained in New until after the conference with Admiral Turne r on 9 November, and lacking a firm troop basis , Caledonia under Admiral Nimitz' con- the determination of supply requirements had trol. to be based on very rough estimates . The 30-day The alternate plan for the operation, delay in target date enabled supply agencie s Plan Baker, was approved on 3 Januar y to make a more careful estimate of the suppl y 1945. It envisioned first the capture o f requirements of the assault force. This delay also enabled critical supplies and augmentation "Tenth Army AR, chap 3, pp . 11–12 . Th e personnel, required for the assault, to be original concept of the operation anticipated shipped to mounting points of the division s that the 2d Marine Division would come out (some had to be shipped by air) prior t o of army reserve, pass through the 1st Division , mounting date." BGen David H . Blakelock, and take the Katchin Peninsula to the south - USA ltr to CMC, dtd 30ct54, hereafte r east of the latter's zone . 1st MarDiv SAR, chap Blakelock ltr . III, OperAnx, p . 1 .

66 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Kerama Retto, followed by a sweep o f might be able to concentrate consider- the Eastern Islands by General Wat- able strength against IIIAC troops be- son's Marines . Both of these actions fore they could even contact the XXI V were to be conducted prior to the assault Corps. General Smith was convinced a t of Okinawa itself . A mixed Marine this time that "in the advent of ba d and Army corps artillery group was to weather on the west coast, landings support both the XXIV and III Am- would have been delayed rather than re - phibious Corps assault of the east coast . sort to the east coast landing as provided On L-Day, General Geiger's Marine s in the alternate plan." 1 7 would land between Chinen Point and General Geiger became involved i n Minatoga, secure the high ground be- the planning for ICEBERG in Novem- hind the beaches, and, following the ber 1944, when he was directed to re- Army landing two days later, tie-in with port to General Buckner for plannin g XXIV Corps at Yonabaru . After effect- purposes . Upon receipt of this order, ing this juncture, both corps were t o the IIIAC commander immediately re- make a rapid advance across the islan d ported by dispatch . Shortly thereafter , during which time the Marines were to IIIAC headquarters received a copy o f take the airfield on Oroku Peninsula an d the tentative Plan Fox together with all the Army was to capture the unfinishe d available intelligence on the prospective field at Yonabaru . Included in the alter- target, and a request that Geiger pre- nate plan were provisions for the cap- pare a tentative corps operation plan . ture of Ie Shima, feints against Chimu When the IIIAC plan was completed , Wan on L plus 3 or 4, and, overall, th e and at the request of Buckner, Geiger, maintenance of flexibility of action in accompanied by his chief of staff, Colo- the commitment of Army reserves to nel Merwin H . Silverthorn,18 his G-2, either of the corps zones or for the pro- Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S . Wade, his tection of XXIV Corps' northern flank. G-3, Colonel Walter A . Wachtler, hi s Although the principal advantages of G-4, Colonel Francis B . Loomis, Jr., and Plan Baker were that the approach t o other members of his staff, departe d the east coast of Okinawa was more di- Guadalcanal for Pearl Harbor, arrivin g rect and the weather here was vastly at Schofield Barracks on 9 December . superior to that of the west coast, they After personally contacting their oppo- were outweighed by the disadvantages. site numbers on the Tenth Army staff, These included : (1) the difficulty of the IIIAC staff officers prepared to pre- providing optimum naval gunfire sup- sent their plan to General Buckner . port because of the interposition of th e Geiger planned to employ the 1st and Eastern Islands and off-shore islets, (2 ) 6th Marine Divisions in the assault , the paucity of good beaches, (3) th e with General del Valle's division on th e length of time it would take to uncove r right or south flank. The choice of thes e airfields, located, for the most part, o n 17 Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 30. the west coast, and, (4) because o f 1s Silverthorn was promoted to the rank of Plan Baker landing zone assignments , brigadier general on 19 December while stil l the possibility that Japanese forces in Hawaii .

PROJECT ICEBERG 67

divisions was logical since they wer e of the airfields so that land-based ai r both located in the Solomons and ther e supremacy over the target could b e would be no problem in establishing gained and held. An additional divi- liaison. The 2d Division, based on dend derived from the capture of th e Saipan, would be the floating reserve of airfields would be their use as staging the army, according to the IIIAC plan. bases for continuing mass air raids o n The question then arose regarding wha t both Japan and those areas within fly- steps would be taken if the Japanes e ing range of Okinawa under enem y were encountered in strength as IIIA C control. As in the case of earlier am- advanced eastward across Okinawa, for phibious landings in the Pacific, certai n there was no doubt that an additional preliminary softening-up steps had to division would have to be inserted i n be taken before the main assault was the line before the east coast wa s launched. reached. General Smith took this ques- Kerama Retto was to be seized by the tion up with the Tenth Army com- 77th Infantry Division (Reinforced) o n mander, who agreed that IIIAC woul d 26 March 1945, or six days before L - have first call on the 2d Marine Divi- Day. Following the first day of opera- sion. la tions in the Kerama Retto and begin- General Watson's division was sched- ning the night of the 26th, Marines o f uled to make the feint landings on th e the FMF Amphibious Reconnaissanc e southeast coast of Okinawa on L-Day Battalion were to reconnoiter the reef and L plus 1, and it was not contem- islets of the island group . First they plated that Geiger would need it before were to investigate Keise Shima for th e the third day of the operation . The presence of enemy troops, and in th e IIIAC staff presented their plan orall y following days and nights prior to L- to General Buckner on 19 December , Day, they were to land on Aware Shima , when it was approved . According to Mae Shima, and Kuro Shima . To sup- General Smith, who was present on thi s port the landing on Okinawa, a field occasion, Geiger's staff members "did a artillery group of XXIV Corps Artillery very creditable job . . . ." 20 was to land and be emplaced on Keis e Shima prior to L-Day . While these SCHEME OF MANEUVER 2 1 operations were underway, Okinawa l Basically, the scheme of maneuver would receive increased air and nava ashore was designed to attain early use gunfire bombardment which woul d mount in intensity until the first assault t0 Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 28 . waves neared the beaches . At this time , 20 Ibid. the fire would lift from the beach area "1 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi s section is derived from : Tenth Army TntvO- and continue inland. Plan 1—45 ; IIIAC OPlan 1—45, dtd 1Feb45 , The Army and Marine divisions were hereafter IIIAC OPlan 1—45 ; 1st MarDi v to land on the Hagushi beaches, General OPlan 1—45, ICEBERG, dtd 10Feb45, here - Geiger's corps on the left. The mouth after 1st MarDiv OPlan 1—45 ; 6th MarDi v of the Bishi Gawa marked the begin- OPlan 1—45, dtd 10Feb45, hereafter 6th Mar- Div OPlan 1—45 . ning of the corps boundary, which

910-229 0 - 69 - 6

68 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

roughly followed the course of the rive r Artillery support for the Marines wa s to a point just north of Kadena ; here, to come from IIIAC Corps Artillery and the line headed almost due east to bisec t those artillery units organic to the di - the island. (See Map 4 . ) visions. General Geiger's guns were to Once landed north of Hagushi town , land on his order to support the attack the Marine assault divisions were to and, once ashore, corps artillery woul d move rapidly inland, coordinating thei r coordinate all supporting arms in the advance with that of XXIV Corps . On Marine sector. XXIV Corps Artillery, the Marine left flank was the 6th Divi- less the group on Keise Shima, would sion ; the 22d Marines on the left an d land on General Hodge's order and sup - the 4th Marines, less its 2d Battalion i n port the attack with long-range inter- division reserve, on the right . The 29th diction, counterbattery, and harassin g 22 Marines, the third infantry regimen t fires. of the 6th Division, was corps reserve Following the initial landing, opera- and was to be ready to land on an y tions were designed to isolate the of the beaches. It was also to b e Phase I objective, which consisted of prepared to revert one battalion landin g that part of the island lying south o f team to the 6th Division on order . a general line drawn across the Ichi- General Shepherd's initial mission was kawa Isthmus, through Chimu, and in- the capture of Yontan airfield whil e cluding the Eastern Islands. In order protecting the northern flank of the to prevent enemy reinforcement from Tenth Army . the north and to fulfill its assignmen t General del Valle's division, landin g in Phase I, IIIAC was to gain contro l to the right of the 6th, was to assist in of the isthmus as swiftly as possible . the capture of Yontan by quickly seiz- To seal off the Japanese in the south, ing the high ground northeast of China. General Hodge's troops were to drive The attack was then to continue, wit h across the island, his right flank units major emphasis placed on maintainin g holding a line that ran through Futem a contact with General Hodge's corps an d to Kuba Saki. Once the central portion assisting his advance . The 1st Marine of the island had been captured an d Division scheme of maneuver placed th e secured, the direction of attack would be 5th and 7th Marines in the assault, 7th faced to the south and continued unti l on the left, and the 1st Marines in divi- all of the objectives of the first phase sion reserve . had been achieved . Adjoining the 1st Marine Divisio n Phase II, the seizure of northern Oki- was to be the 7th Infantry Division , nawa and the capture of Ie Shima, wa s with one regiment in division reserve to be executed with Tenth Army troop s but under the operational control of locally available when Buckner was sat- XXIV Corps. The other Army assault isfied that Phase I had been accom- division was to be 96th, which was to plished. The first major military objec- land with two regiments abreast an d '2 XXIV Corps F1dOrd 45, dtd 8Feb45, pp . a third in corps reserve . 4-8.

PROJECT ICEBERG 69

tive in the north was Motobu Peninsula , to begin fulfilling their assigned mis- which was to be taken by means o f sions. From these fields, ADC was t o simultaneously launched attacks from provide air defense to ground units on sea and land . Once the peninsula ha d the island and naval forces in its en- been gained, a shore-to-shore assault virons. Combat air patrols, close ai r would be made against Ie Shima . The support, and other related flight mis- end of Phase II would be signalled when sions were considered the means by the rest of northern Okinawa had been which the defense was to be maintained . captured . Although it was a function of ADC , While higher echelon air planning for close air support is not normally a part ICEBERG detailed both strategic an d of air defense ; it is more closely asso- tactical missions, the Tenth Army wa s ciated with a ground offensive concept. more immediately concerned with th e Despite this fact, however, Okinawa' s latter. Carrier-based tactical aviation, terrain and the nature of the Japanese aboard the TF 52 escort carrier grou p defenses were to provide Marine avia- (TG 52.1, Rear Admiral Calvin T . tors of the Air Defense Command with Durgin), was to provide the invasion ample opportunities to display close ai r force with air support until Genera l support techniques born of experience Mulcahy's squadrons were establishe d accumulated in earlier Pacific cam- ashore and could take over. At this time, paigns. TAF would also be responsible fo r overall air defense. LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING 2 3 When this responsibility was assumed, TAF operations would be base d Fortunately for those preparing ICE- on the following order of priority : (1) BERG, much in the logistical plans for attainment of air superiority by anni- the cancelled Formosa operation coul d hilation of enemy aircraft in the ai r 23 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi s and on the ground, and destruction of section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ; enemy air installations ; (2) interdic- CTF 51 OPlan Al—45, dtd 16Feb45, hereafte r tion and destruction of enemy troop and CTF 51 OPlan A1—45 ; CTF 51 General Action supply movements immediately withi n Report, Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases I r or heading towards the target area ; and II, 17Feb-17May45, dtd 25Ju145, hereafte CTF 51 AR ; CinCPOA OPlan 14—44 ; Tenth and (3) execution of combined air - Army TntvOPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR ; ground attacks on specific frontline ob- USAFMidPac G—5 Hist ; IIIAC, AR, Ryukyu s jectives. The importance of the first Operation, Phases I and II (Okinawa), dt d priority lay in Tenth Army recognition 1Ju145, hereafter IIIAC AR ; Tactical Ai r , h Force, Tenth Army, OPlan 1—45, dtd 10Feb45 of the yet-existing Japanese air strengt hereafter TAF OPLAN 1—45 ; TAF AR ; and the threat it posed to the invasion IsCom OPlan No . 1, LEGUMINOUS [cod e force. name assigned to island of Okinawa], dt d . 1 ; As soon as Air Defense Command 1Feb45, hereafter IsComOPlan No IsCom, Okinawa, AR, 13Dec44-30Jun45, dtd fighter squadrons were established 30Jun45, hereafter IsComAR ; War Reports ; ashore on captured airfields, they were 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I & II .

70 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

be salvaged and adapted for the inva- staff, "for the mere loading of mor e sion of Okinawa with but few changes . ships led only to congestion at the re- Without competent logistics plannin g ceiving end unless the development o f of the highest order, and utilization of unloading facilities kept pace." 27 a resupply and shipping support sched- It had been decided that the Hagushi ule designed to function with clockwor k beaches were sufficiently large to handl e precision, the target date for the Oki- the supply tonnage required by the as- nawa operation could not have been met . sault echelon of two corps and their sup - This would have caused all related port troops ; however, it was impossible planned strategy to have been eithe r to prophesy exactly how soon after th e nullified or advanced to a later date. landings the beachhead would be secure d The logistics plan for Okinawa "wa s and the advance continued inland, or ho w the most elaborate one of its kind de- soon thereafter base development could veloped during World War II, involving begin and the supplies for this aspec t prearranged movement of both assaul t of Phase I would be required and and cargo shipping over vast ocean dis- available. Nor was it possible to fore - tances."24 The plan required establish- cast the possibility that Phase II woul d ment of a 6,000-mile-long supply line, be completed before the accomplishmen t stretching across the Pacific, with 1 1 of Phase I. Nonetheless, estimates o f different ports-of-call,25 to support th e troop progress had to be made in order mounting of 182,821 troops encumbere d to prepare a logistics plan at all. with some 746,850 measurement tons 2 6 The main features of the ICEBER of cargo loaded into 434 assault trans - G ports and landing ships. logistics plan required an initial suppl y level to be taken to Okinawa by the as- A great limitation imposed upon pre - sault troops who were mounted at suc h invasion logistical planning was th e distantly scattered points as Leyte , shortage of shipping and the delay in Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, Banika the return from the Philippines of th e , vessels which were to be used for Oki- Pavuvu, Saipan, Eniwetok, Oahu, and the west coast of the United States nawa. Seeking a solution to lift and . Upon completion of the assault phas e timetable problems was not the only of the landing, a staggered series o f concern of the Tenth Army logistics supply shipments would replenish th e °4 Robert W . Coakley and Richard M . Leigh - Tenth Army in accordance with a sched- ton, "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–194 5 ule established earlier. This timetable —U . S. Army in World War II" (unpublished had been based on the estimated time MS, OCMH), pt VI, "Shift to a One-Fron t War," chap XXIV, p . 26. required to conduct combat operation s 2E Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, New Georgia , ashore and, in turn, on how quickly the Makin, Kwajalein, Saipan, Ulithi, Manus , beach and port capacity could be ex- Milne Bay, Finschhafen, and Hollandia . panded. 2e Measurement ton is defined as a unit o f carrying capacity of a ship, usually equal t o 27 Coakley and Leighton, op . cit., pt V, "The 40 cubic feet; it is sometimes designated a War Against Japan, 1943–1944," chap XVIII , freight ton . p. 3.

PROJECT ICEBERG 71

Beginning on 20 February 1945, ICE - as envisioned in the planning stage s BERG replenishments were to leave th e should govern the nature of the supplie s west coast every 10 days for regulatin g requisitioned, and the number, types , points at Ulithi, Eniwetok, and Saipan , and frequency of shipments . Tenth the first shipments to arrive at each Army considered the Marine system to place on L minus 5 (27 March) . The be more flexible than the Army's be- supplies would remain at these points cause the requisitioning agencies were until they were called-up by Genera l better able to make the several auto- Buckner. It was planned to continue matic resupply shipments conform t o these automatic resupply shipments for their view of how the campaign would a period of 210 days beyond L-Day. The progress. Tenth Army was also to have emer- Each service was responsible for ini- gency reserves located at Saipan, Ti- tial support of its own elements in th e nian, and Guam. Okinawa task force, with the exceptio n The prediction of supply require- of troops mounting in the South an d ments depended upon completed tactica l Southwest Pacific. Area commanders plans, a firm troop basis, and other there would be charged with logistica l necessary items of information whic h support of units assigned to ICEBERG . either were nonexistent or had not ye t After the landing had been accom- been made available to the logistic s plished, and when directed by Admira l planners. Adding to the logistics di- Turner, Island Command would tak e lemma was the factor of time, for i t over as the Tenth Army central suppor t look 120 days for supplies to be requisi- agency charged with funneling supplie s tioned, procured, and shipped from th e to all of the assault forces. Pacific Coast of the United States t o Early in January 28 it became obvious the objective . that ICEBERG had been allocated in - To facilitate the preparation and ship- sufficient shipping to accomplish the ment of resupply items in accordance tactical mission, to support base devel- with the scheduling of the various in- opment, and to lift to the target thos e vasion echelons, Army commanders es- air units which were to be committed tablished a standard unit of supply, o r early in the campaign . An inadequate "block requisitions," tailored specifi- transport quota for engineer units , cally to the organization of each of th e whose services would be needed in th e support and assault elements. The composition of the individual block " Actually, questions regarding the alloca- requisition was determined by estimat- tion of shipping had appeared earlier, for o n ing the logistic support required by a 24 November 1944, Colonel Francis B . Loomis , Jr., the G—4 of IIIAC, reported in at the Tenth particular unit for a given number of Army headquarters for a short tour of tem- days regardless of the combat situation . porary duty . General Geiger apparently was In contrast to this approach, Marine concerned about the shipping problem an d believed it necessary to have a G—4 representa- supply agencies, drawing on their ex- tive with the army . Smith, Personal Narrative , perience, felt that the combat situation p. 9 .

72 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

early development of airfields, roads, soned that since the division was no t and waterfront facilities, was improve d going to be committed immediately, i t slightly by scheduling the immediate could acquire whatever additional ship- return of assault LSTs to Saipan afte r ping it needed within a short time the initial landings to shuttle eight naval following the initial assault . Further construction battalions (Seabees) to th e lift capacity was gained by loading target. In the same manner, other LST s landing ships to their rated limits, b y would be sent to Leyte to pick up an y the addition to the invasion flotilla of XXIV Corps equipment not carried i n newly constructed attack transports assault shipping . 29 (APAs) with greater cargo-carryin g Of the overall inadequate shippin g characteristics, and by an increased al - situation and its effect on the combat location of landing ships, tank, (LSTs ) divisions, the former G–4 of the Tent h and landing ships, medium (LSMs) . Army recalled that, if needed, ICE - The shipping allocation for the garri- BERG was to get all shipping availabl e son forces was governed by the esti- in the Pacific, because : mated capacity of Okinawan beach and port unloading facilities. Past experi- the amount of assault shipping assigned ence, however, resolved the size of the for the operation was far below that re- lift necessary to transport an assault quired to properly lift the assault elements of the Tenth Army . This resulted in [th e echelon of three reinforced Marine di - Tenth Army being given] authority t o visions, three reinforced Army divisions , modify Combat Loading Doctrine so that a Marine amphibious corps headquar- the most essential equipment and supplie s ters and corps troops, and an Army could accompany the assault echelon . Ad- corps headquarters and corps troops. ditional items that should have been i n the assault echelon were loaded in a sub- Thus, the required assault tonnage wa s sequent shipping echelon .30 a firm figure from the beginning and was deducted from that allotted to the The overall assault lift was aug- ICEBERG forces overall . The remainder mented by other means also. Vessels to was assigned as the lift for Tenth Army be used for the Luzon and Iwo Jima support troops, which included air, landings were made available later for naval, and airfield construction units. Okinawa through adherence to a strin- After the Marianas and Palau opera- gently monitored and thoroughly regu- tions, it was found that one transpor t lated shipping schedule . Additional group (12 APAs and 3 cargo ships, space for Tenth Army troops was gained attack (AKAs) ), made up of thre e by reducing the tonnage requirements transport divisions, had sufficient lift of IIIAC, substantially at the expens e capacity for a combat-loaded reinforce d of the 2d Marine Division . It was rea- infantry division . For the ICEBER G

=° Blakelock ltr . lift, however, a new shipping echelon, the transport squadron (transron) was '° BGen David H. Blakelock, USA, ltr to Asst G-3, HQMC, dtd 6Nov65, hereafter formed to carry a proportionate shar e Blakelock ltr 1965 . of assault forces, corps troops, and ele-

PROJECT ICEBERG 73

ments from corps and army headquar- two and a maximum of eight week s ters. The transron was nothing but th e would be evacuated in APHs during the old transport group augmented by thre e initial assault phase and, after that , APAs and three AKAs. would receive further treatment i n Each transron was to be accompanie d hospitals established on Okinawa . Those by one APH, which was a troop trans - men who could be returned to duty port specially rigged as a hospital an d within two weeks after being wounde d equipped to treat casualties and then would be treated and held in the hospita l evacuate them from the battle zone.31 transports or landing ships until the y There were to be six hospital ships had fully recovered or until the land- (AHs) assigned to ICEBERG ; one was based hospitals had been established . to be on station L minus 5 with the The LST (H) s were to remain on sta- Kerama Retto invasion group, three tion until released by Admiral Turner , were assigned to the main attack forces at which time the medical officers aboar d and were to arrive off Hagushi on L plu s would land and assign casualties directl y 1, while the other two were scheduled to the ships from aid stations set up o n to reach Okinawa three days later . the beaches. When General Buckner as- Improved casualty evacuation wa s sumed command ashore, he would planned for this invasion by assigning become responsible for the establishmen t four hospital landing ships (LST (H) s ) and administration of medical services to each of the two naval attack force s on the island, and for air evacuatio n h in the major assault. Assigned to eac of casualties, when airfields becam e vessel was a naval medical officer who operational. functioned as an evacuation control The equipment and supplies to be officer and, as such, was responsible for taken to Okinawa by the corps and the screening the wounded as they arrived , divisions had been specifically desig- giving treatment and classifying them nated by Tenth Army order . After carg o with reference to their estimated recov- space in assigned shipping had been allo - ery time, and transferring the casualtie s cated to this material, any other avail - in accordance with the provisions of a able space would be filled by additional system related to their recovery classi- items which the corps and division com- fication. Accordingly, hospital ship s manders had decided the troops coul d would evacuate those men wounde d carry. Logistical planning on the di - seriously enough to require hospitaliza- vision level was influenced by the suppo- tion for two months or more . Casualtie s sition that the beaches would be heavil y requiring treatment for a minimum o f defended and that the inland advance a1 The APH should not be confused with th e stubbornly resisted. As a result, only better-known hospital ship (AH), which i s "hot cargo," predetermined blocks of l unarmed and protected only by internationa high-priority supplies, was to be lande d recognition of the provisions of the Genev a Convention. on L-Day . Included in a block of cargo

74 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

were one CinCPOA unit of fire 32 for stocking agency and had to obtain it s all weapons and rations and water fo r requisitioned items from the 4th Bas e one day. Moreover, all organic division Depot. As a result of the cumbersome motor transport would be taken to th e and time-consuming administrative pro- target in available shipping space be- cedures involved in processing requisi- cause the prospect of prolonged operations through the several service tions over a relatively large land mas s echelons in the area, the 6th Divisio n envisioned wide-spread use of vehicles .33 experienced many delays in the delivery To assist in Marine logistical plannin g of much of its needed equipment an d and preparations, Fleet Marine Force , supplies.34 Both assault divisions, how - Pacific, established the 2d Field Service ever, embarked for the target with bu t Command on Guadalcanal . Here rela- few shortages, none of which affected tively close liaison could be maintained combat readiness and efficiency. with Marine ICEBERG elements mount- By the time that the TAF logistics sec- ing from the Solomons. This service tion had been activated, AirFMFPac command was empowered to coordinate had already issued warning orders an d the efforts of the supply agencies of was in the process of preparing subordi- both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions nate units for the impending campaign . and to deal with Army and Navy sources The basis for logistic support of Marin e of supply directly. In the same manner, aviation units was different, in certai n the Marianas-based 1st Field Service ways, from that of Marine ground ele- Command assisted the 2d Marine Divi- ments. While items peculiar to the Ma- sion. Re-equipment of General del Valle' s rine Corps were drawn by both ground division on Pavuvu was relatively simpl e and air units from the same sources, al l since its primary supply source, the 4t h technical aviation materiel was receive d Base Depot, under the 2d Field Servic e through Navy supply channels or, i n Command, was on the other majo r some cases, from the Army . Since thi s island in the Russells, Banika. General was the case, the TAF logistics staff Shepherd's division experienced some difficulties, however, because its suppl y established liaison with representative s source was a transfer rather than a of Commander., Aircraft, Pacific Flee t (ComAirPac) , the agency responsible "' CinCPOA Unit of Fire Table, dtd 6Dec44 , for fulfilling the fuel and installation included in Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45, Anx requirements at the Okinawa air field s 13, App B, was based on the successful criteri a the TAF units were to occupy . The sup- established by use during the Central Pacifi c landings . Allocation of ammunition for various ply section of Commander, Naval Ai r ordnance was, for example : 100 rounds for Bases, Okinawa (ComNABS) was made each M—1 ; 1,500 rounds for .30 caliber and 60 0 rounds for .50 caliber machine guns ; 275 "° 6th MarDiv SAR, Okinawa Op, Ph III, dt d rounds for 60mm and 81mm mortars ; 250 30Jun45, pp . 5-6, hereafter 6th MarDiv SAR , rounds for 105mm howitzers ; 150 rounds fo r Ph III, and including the SARs of the following 155mm howitzers . units : 4th, 15th, 22d, and 29th Marines, here- "1st MarDiv SAR, pp. 1-2. after (unit) SAR, Ph III .

PROJECT ICEBERG 75

the ComAirPac type command logistics BASE DEVELOPMENT AND representative for these matters . MILITARY GOVERNMENT All other supply requirements wer e PLANNING 3 5 to be handled by the supply section o f the Navy's Pacific service command . A second logistic mission given to Liaison was also established with Arm y ICEBERG, separate yet related to th e Air Forces logistics representatives to assault effort, was the immediate de- determine the nature and extent of sup- velopment of Okinawa as an advanced port required by Army elements in Gen- air and fleet base . In order to support all eral Mulcahy's command . Arrangement s of the aircraft assigned to the invasion , were then made to obtain special comba t eight airfields and one seaplane base clothing and equipment for the AA F were to be built almost immediately personnel to be assigned to TAF . Based and during the later phases of the opera- upon the latter's recommendations, auto- tion this number would be increased . matic resupply shipments for the Arm y Also, two ports were to be developed— squadrons were adjusted to coincid e one, Nakagusuku Wan, by the Navy an d with the schedule established for the the other, Naha harbor, by the Army. Marines. Since Okinawa was to serve merely as a The organization and general admin- staging base for final operations agains t istration of the supply system on Oki- Japan, it was not contemplated that th e nawa was to be an Island Comman d installations on the island were to b e function, in which it would receive and of permanent construction . Ie Shima distribute Tenth Army supplies . The was included in the base developmen t Marine groups in TAF, however, woul d program as the island was to hold fou r support their own squadrons and woul d airfields and to garrison ground and draw Marine Corps supplies from the antiaircraft artillery defense troops . 2d Wing or other designated Marine Base development would proceed right sources. Air base commanders woul d on the heels of the assault troops as two provide aviation fuel and lubricants t o of Okinawa's airfields were to be seized , squadrons operating from their strips ; improved, and made operational by L all technical aviation supplies were to plus 5, while two more fields were to be be requisitioned through ComNABS , available by L plus 20. The preparation Okinawa. of Okinawa as a mounting and stagin g Service units organic to the AA F point was to be undertaken concurrently . fighter and bombardment groups woul d First priority was given the early de- support the flying squadrons of each . All velopment and activation of airfields ; supplies other than the technical items next in order of importance was th e peculiar to AAF planes would be requisi- construction of bulk fuel storage facili- tioned from sources designated by the ties ; and the third most important mat - Island Commander. Until an Air Servic e s - 35 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi Command Depot was established on Oki section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ; nawa, the one at Guam would supply th e USAFMidPac G—5 Hist ; War Reports ; Tent h remainder. Army AR ; IsCom OPlan No . 1 ; IsCom AR.

76 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ter was the development of waterfront assault, service, and construction troop s installations. Reflecting the urgency of had to be precise. these tasks, every effort was made to In addition to its other functions, schedule the shipments of supplies re- Island Command was also to establish a quired to support base improvement so military government on Okinawa . Since that they would arrive at the island this was to be the first Pacific operation in when they were needed . Accordingly , which large numbers of enemy civilian s garrison troops and the materials whic h would be encountered by combat troops, they were to employ were to arrive i n it was expected that the island woul d 17 successive echelons . The timing of serve as a valuable testing ground of their arrival was governed not only b y civil affairs and military governmen t the preplanned work schedule but also procedures which would be applied by the projected unloading capacity o f later when Japan itself was occupied . the captured beaches . In 1943, the JCS gave the Navy basi c To establish this schedule, a series of responsibility for establishing military echelonment conferences were held government on certain outlying islands between the staffs of the Tenth Arm y of the Japanese Empire, once they had and the different type commanders wh o been captured . Included in this group were furnishing troops for the opera- were the Ryukyus . Because the Tenth tion. In any large amphibious operation , Army would be in overall control of th e it is neither possible nor feasible, be- Okinawa land campaign, Admira l cause of shipping limitations, to trans - Nimitz believed that General Buckner port to the target in the assault convoy should be responsible for military gov- both those troops required to undertake ernment on the island . Accordingly, once the campaign to its end and the troops , the War Department concurred in thi s equipment, and supplies required to de- transfer of authority, CinCPOA wa s velop the captured base . Even if all re- able to get the 1943 JCS order reversed . quired shipping had been made availabl e Because of its European commitments , for an operation of the size of Okinawa, the Army was unable to furnish all of it would have been patently undesirabl e the civil affairs personnel needed t o to schedule the simultaneous arrival a t round out the entire Tenth Army mili- the target of both assault and . garrison tary government component. Therefore, troops. Until the assault forces ha d the Navy supplied Brigadier Genera l landed, unloaded their shipping, an d William E. Crist's command with naval gained enough room on the beaches fo r officer and enlisted personnel so that the landing of the garrison elements and Military Government would have well - equipment, the shipping in which garri- balanced teams. son troops were embarked would have Direct naval participation in militar y had to lie off Okinawa, where it would government planning for Okinawa be- have been vulnerable to enemy subma- gan in July 1944, when work was begun rines and aircraft . For these reasons, i t in New York City by the research staff was imperative that echelonment plans of the Chief of Naval Operations' mili- covering the movement of thousands of tary government section . The pooled

PROJECT ICEBERG 77

efforts of the staff resulted in the Civil Assigned to General Crist's jointly Affairs Handbook for the Ryukyu staffed military government section Islands, a publication which proved to b e were such varied Army and Navy unit s of inestimable value to Tenth Army civil as a military police battalion, a truck affairs administrators during both th e company, 20 Navy dispensaries, and 6 ICEBERG planning phase and the reha- Navy hospital units. In addition to these bilitation period after Okinawa had bee n and some purely administrative ele- secured.36 ments, 350 officer and 890 enlisted civil The ICEBERG joint staff study origi- affairs personnel were organized int o nally anticipated that, within the Oki- four types of teams, each of which ha d nawan population to come under Tenth been tailored for specific functions . One Army control, a small element would b e of the teams was assigned to each of th e "antipathetic" and would have to be assault divisions and, after landing, was "placed under detainment pending to conduct preliminary reconnaissanc e screening and probable internment." No missions relating to military government as the attack advanced . Teams in figures were available to determine ho w another group, attached to the two corp s many mainland Japanese civilians o n and all divisions also, were to take Okinawa might possibly be captured , charge of civil affairs behind the front but preparations had to be made for th e lines as civilians were encountered b y construction of an internment camp the combat forces . A third type of team whose facilities were flexible enough to was made up of refugee camp adminis- provide for upwards of 10,000 island trators, while in the fourth category natives and Japanese civilian internees . there were six teams, each of which wa s It was expected that by L plus 40 thi s to take charge of one of the six military number would skyrocket to an approxi- government districts into which Oki- mate total of 306,000 captured civilians , nawa was to be divided . whose food, clothing, and housing woul d The Chief Military Government Offi- have to come from captured stocks o f cer was to be directly subordinate to the salvagable material, since there was n o Island Commander and would function as his deputy. The importance of thi s room aboard assault ships for supplie s close relationship and the emphasi s . By the time ICEBER G of this nature placed on intensive civil affairs plannin g had reached the garrison phase, 12 mili- was justified later during the campaign, tary government camps were to be when, by 30 April, there were approxi- in operation, each unit staffe d mately 125,000 civilians under militar y and equipped to handle 2,500—10,00 0 government jurisdiction on Okinawa . civilians. This figure climbed steadily following this date, reached 147,829 by 31 May, a9 Deputy Commander for MilGovt ltr t o 172,670 by 15 June, and totaled 261,11 5 ComNOB, Okinawa, and Chief MilGovt Officer, 37 Ryukyus, dtd 1Ju145, Subj : Rpt of MilGovt on 30 June. Activities for Period from 1Apr45 to 1Ju146 , hereafter MilGovt AR . 34 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVII, p . 4.

78 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 38 for navigational studies of the water s surrounding Okinawa. In October 1944, the statement that For a terrain study, a determinatio n "information as to enemy defensive in- of the location and nature of enemy de- stallations on Okinawa Jima i s fenses, and an estimate of enemy meager," 39 was indisputable. Despit e strength, most of the data at hand was the early lack of information concernin g inadequate and an aerial photographi c the island, the various intelligence gath- mission over the target had to be lai d ering and processing agencies in the on. In conjunction with other informa- Pacific, as well as those in the United tion of the enemy received right up to States, began to sift through availabl e L-Day, the thorough interpretation an d material and soon were able to clarif y evaluation of these photographs enable d the enemy situation for ICEBER G Tenth Army to issue detailed intelli- forces. In keeping with the establishe d gence studies which contained an ac - principle of coordinated planning, th e curate estimate of the Japanese situ- corporate activities of all intelligence ation. agencies in the various Pacific com- Aerial photos were required also fo r mands quickly resulted in the productio n use in the production of a map of the of urgently needed basic intelligence . target. It was difficult to obtain ade- Currently valid military information quate photographic coverage at first be- of the Japanese situation was difficul t cause of the distance of Okinawa from to obtain because of the location of Oki- the closest Allied air base, some 1,20 0 nawa within the Empire's well-pro- nautical miles. This factor limited the tected, strategic, inner defense line. conduct of such missions to either car- For the most part, captured documents , rier aircraft, whose ships could carry interrogations of prisoners as well as o f them close to the target, or B-29s . former island inhabitants, and old Jap- Other obstacles to the amassing of a anese publications provided the basi s complete intelligence picture of Oki- for the intelligence estimates initiall y nawa were the notoriously poor weathe r issued.40 In addition, the Navy was able over the target, the vastness of the lan d to make use of both captured and pre- mass to be photographed, and th e viously available hydrographic chart s schedule of carrier strikes against th e target—few of which were timed to 39 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n this section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ; coincide with immediate Tenth Army CTF 51 OPlan A1—45 ; CTF 51 AR ; Tent h intelligence requirements. Army TntvOPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR ; On 29 September 1944, the first ICE - ILIAC OPlan 1—45 ; ILIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv BERG photographic mission was flown OPlan 1—45 ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDi v by B-29s . While they covered all of SAR, PhI&II . Okinawa, and the outlying islands to a 'B ICEBERG Study, App A (Enemy Strength degree, the results of this flight were and Capabilities), p . 19 . 40 Admiral Turner's intelligence staff dis- divulge much valuable information . "He worke d covered the existence in the United States of with this section and later worked with bot h an American civilian who, having spent many the Army and the Navy at the objective ." CT F years in Japan and Okinawa, was able to 51 AR, pt V, sec A, p . 1 .

PROJECT ICEBERG 79

limited by clouds which obscured abou t After L-Day and while the fightin g half of the area photographed, mainly was still in progress, the island was com- the northern portion of the majo r pletely rephotographed, the results o f island . Because of this inadequate photo which enabled a more accurate map t o coverage, the first map produced an d be printed and distributed .42 A scale o f distributed had many blank portions i n 1 :25,000 was used for the basic map which there was little or no topographi c originally issued from which maps o f detailing. Modifications of this first ma p the initial zones of action, scaled at were made later in the campaign, when 1 :10,000., were produced for the use of captured Japanese maps provided more the lower echelon assault units. At the thorough contouring information. same time, smaller scale maps were re - During the first fast-carrier strikes produced for use as road maps in traffic on Okinawa Gunto of 10 October 1944, control planning . large scale vertical and oblique aeria l The Tenth Army made rubber relief photographs were acquired, giving 9 0 maps on a scale of 1 :10,000, which wer e percent coverage of the area . From 29 issued to General Geiger's troops i n September 1944 to 28 March 1945, a sufficient quantity to permit distribu- total of 224 photo-reconnaissance tion down to and including assault bat- . In sorties were flown over the target - talions. The mapping sections of IIIAC , formation gained from these photo- and the 1st and 6th Marine Division s graphs was collated and analyzed, an d - the resultant intelligence summaries worked together to produce plastic ter were distributed to Tenth Army units . rain models of the corps zone of action . In the week preceding L-Day, escort Made to a scale of 1 :5,000 and con- carrier-based photographic aircraft structed with a 2 :1 vertical exagger- flew daily missions over the island . ation, these models facilitated the brief- Careful interpretation of the photo s ing of commanders and their troops for thus obtained permitted bomb damage the prospective operation . Wholesale assessments and, at the same time, com- distribution of these relief models wa s parison of these photos with ones take n made soon after the troops embarke d earlier enabled the interpreters to locate for the target, at which time some 60 0 many enemy installations previously copies of a 1 :5,000 map of the landin g concealed by effective camouflage . From beaches, specially prepared by the 1st a close study of successive sorties, it wa s possible to determine each displacemen t 42 ". . . the absence of an adequate one over of the enemy's defensive positions, to twenty five thousand map during the plannin g e hazard guesses of his relative strength , phase, and even during the early phases of th operation, served greatly in influencing every - and to compile a preliminary target in- thing the landing force did. It was often a formation list for distribution to artil- critical impediment. As a matter of fact, the lery units.41 area in which the 6th Division operated a s early as L-plus 4 had large blank segments o n 41 IIIAC Artillery Action Report, Phase I , the map." CMC [Gen. Lemuel C . Shepherd , Nansei Shoto, lApr-30Jun45, dtd 25Ju145, p . 7 , Jr.] Memo to G-3, dtd 18Jan55, hereafte r hereafter IIIAC Arty AR . Shepherd memo I.

80 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Marine Division., were issued to its as- exerted his maximum reinforcement sault units. capability, he could then oppose the To supplement aerial photographs , landing with four infantry divisions the USS Swordfish, a specially equippe d constituting the principal combat ele- submarine, was dispatched to Okinawa ments of the defense . Total Japanese from Pearl Harbor on 22 Decembe r strength would then be 87,000 men . 1944 with the mission of photographin g All possible Japanese courses o f Okinawa's beaches and Japanese defen- action were considered, and troop dis- sive installations on the island coasts . positions for each course were ana- After making her last known radi o lyzed in light of what was known o f transmission on 3 January 1945, th e current Japanese tactical doctrine and submarine was never heard from agai n its evolution to date. All indications and was reported missing. As a result, pointed to the fact that the enemy woul d no beach photographs were taken be- most likely organize the southern third fore L-Day for, as succinctly stated in of Okinawa for a defense in dept h the TF 51 AR, "no information fro m while the bulk of his troops were with- submarine reconnaissance was avail - held as a mobile reserve . This course of able." 4 3 action would present a potentially mor e In October 1944, enemy strength on dangerous situation to the landing forc e Okinawa was set at 48,600 . It was esti- than would the more commonly experi- mated that two well-trained and experienced alternative of a determined de- enced infantry divisions, and a tank fense of the beaches . regiment, comprised the major defense An interpretation of aerial photo- force on the island . At this time, it was graphs in February revealed that th e recognized that an additional threat to enemy force on Okinawa comprised two the landings was posed by the size o f infantry divisions and an independent the civilian population located in south - mixed brigade, service and support ern Okinawa. This manpower potential troop reinforcements for the infantry, of more than 300,000 individuals woul d all totaling an estimated 56,000–58,00 0 swell the enemy strength figure if they men. It also appeared that, while th e were used to form a home guard o r far northern sector was defended by a militia, or to conduct guerrilla activ- single battalion only, the main forc e ities. In January 1945, the Tenth Army was disposed in the south in the pro- estimate assumed that the Japanese jected XXIV Corps area.. In the III reinforcement capability could increase Amphibious Corps zone of action, it was the regular force figure to 66,000 by estimated that two infantry regiment s L-Day, at which time enemy defense defended . Conceivably, these six or forces on Okinawa would be two and a seven thousand men could be reinforced half infantry divisions . If the enem y by local auxiliaries . While the small garrison in the north 'g Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarin e was given the capability of mountin Operations in World War II (Annapolis : g United States Naval Institute, 1949), pp . counterattacks against the invader left 446—447 ; CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec A, p . 1 . flank, it was expected that the most

PROJECT ICEBERG 81

violent enemy reaction would come fro m 75,000 men. In the week preceding the heavily defended south, on the L-Day, while the assault elements sortie d XXIV Corps' right flank, where th e for the target, still another estimate o f Japanese mobile reserve would be main- enemy strength in the IIIAC zone wa s tained in considerable strength . It was issued. In this supplementary revision., anticipated that, as soon as the Japa- it was stated that the principal Japa- nese had appraised the landing force' s nese opposition now would come fro m dispositions, a counteroffensive in force two reinforced infantry regiments wit h would be mounted by the enemy reserve. a strength of 16,000 men . The estimate of Japanese strength Air and naval capabilities assigne d was again revised in mid-February, thi s to the Japanese remained relatively un- time downwards to 37,500—39,500, whe n changed all during the planning phase s information was received that a full of ICEBERG . At all times it was ex- division had been withdrawn from Oki- pected that the enemy would be capable nawa. In view of this reduction, an d of mounting heavy and repeated air supplemented by indications that th e attacks against invasion shipping . It enemy was concentrating in the Naka , was expected that this vigorous ai r gusuku Bay area, it was presumed that effort would include continued employ- the two Marine divisions would be op - ment and intensification of the suicide posed in their zones by no more than bombing tactics which first had appeared one infantry regiment deployed in posi- during the invasion of Leyte in October tion, and that the total number of Japa- 1944. The Japanese were credited with nese troops in the overall sector woul d an air strength of approximately 3,00 0 be more than 10,000 . planes which were based within rang e This numbers guessing game con- and capable of blunting the Okinaw a tinued when, a month later, the esti- landing. Along with this air capability, mate of Japanese defense forces was the enemy was believed able to moun t revised upwards to 64,000 . It appeared an airborne counterattack, for "as air that the enemy had been able to rein- action is practically the only assistanc e force the garrison with an under - he can give the Okinawa garrison from strength infantry division as well a s outside [the island], he may expend with some miscellaneous units of un- considerable aircraft and endeavor t o known origin, in all about 20,000 men. land several thousand troops within ou r 4 4 It was believed that an additional force beachhead." of 4,000—6,000 men had arrived in It was known that the Japanese had March, having been lifted by shippin g suicide motor torpedo boat units at Oki- which successfully evaded the Allie d nawa and it was assumed that midge t blockade. The Tenth Army assume d submarines were based there also . that, if the March enemy reinforce- Added to the possible tactical employ- ments were the advance elements o f ment of these suicide organizations wa s another division, it was reasonable to the potential use of suicide swimmer s assume further that by 1 April the land- "Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45, anx 3, sec ing force would be opposed by at least V, p . 14 .

82 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

whose mission was also disruption o f Three months after Admiral Nimitz the invasion fleet at anchor off the ob- had received the JCS directive for Oki- jective. Although the Japanese Nav y nawa's invasion, General Buckne r was a mere shadow of its former self , issued the initial operation order set- it still retained operational forces ting the ICEBERG juggernaut's wheel s strong enough to pose a threat to th e into motion. During the course of thi s landing's success . For that reason, it planning period., each Tenth Army gen- was deemed necessary to maintain a eral and special staff section prepare d strong surface cover at the objective . that portion of the operation order fo r While the southern part of Okinaw a which it was responsible while main- was ideally suited for the tactical use of taining liaison with the subordinat e tanks, the enemy was not given an units which were preparing to put armored capability . This was because words into action. Although most of th e the relation of estimated tank strength ICEBERG assault, support, and garri- to the total estimated garrison strength son forces did not issue their own oper- was too low, and it was not felt that thi s ation orders until January 1945, warn- support arm would offer any great ing orders had already alerted them to opposition . the impending invasion. CHAPTER 3 Assault Preparations

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS ' This was especially true in the case of XXIV Corps units already in combat i n The Pacific-wide dispersion of troop s the Philippines . Many of the garrison and shipping assigned to ICEBER G and service units which were to be prevented the Tenth Army from con - attached to the various assault forces ducting either training or rehearsals as were also handicapped by the time fac- a cohesive unit . Because of the vast dis- tor because they, too, were either fight- tances separating General Buckner an d ing or heavily committed in support o f his corps and division commanders, th e operations in the Philippines. In order latter were invested with the responsi- that Tenth Army staff planners coul d bility for training their respective better evaluate the combat readiness of organizations along the lines of Tenth all organizations within the command , Army directives . With these orders as a each of General Buckner's commanders guide, all Marine units committed to th e submitted a monthly training status re- operation were trained under the super- port to ICEBERG headquarters on vision of FMFPac . Oahu.`-' Since the reports lacked what an Assault preparations of ICEBER G inspection at first-hand could provide, Army divisions were hindered by th e Buckner and some of his principal staff limited time available for their rehabil- officers made a series of flying trips to itation, reorganization, and training. each of the corps and divisions . These personal visits at the end of January 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s 1945 "did much to weld the far-flun g section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ; Tenth Army AR ; TAF AR ; XXIV Corps AR , The voluminous training status report s Ryukyus, lApr-30Jun45, n .d., hereafter XXIV were in reality check-off lists for newly forme d Corps AR ; ILIAC AR ; ILIAC Arty AR ; IsCom divisions . When the Marine Deputy Chief of AR ; MilGovt AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2d Staff of the Tenth Army learned that th e MarDiv AR, Phase I, Nansei Shoto, dt d IIIAC assault divisions, whose troops had 15Apr45, hereafter 2d MarDiv AR ; 6th MarDiv recently been in combat and were in an ad- SAR, Ph I & II; 7th InfDiv OpRpt, Ryukyu s vanced state of training, had to submit thes e Campaign, dtd 30Ju145, hereafter 7th Inf Div reports, he pointed out that preparation "o f OpRpt ; 27th InfDiv OpRpt, Phase I, Nanse i these reports merely harassed the divisions an d Shoto, 1 Jan-30Jun45, dtd 19Ju145, hereafte r served no useful purpose." Once Genera l 27th InfDiv OpRpt ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Phas e Buckner "saw the training being engaged i n I (in 3 parts—Kerama Retto, Keise Shima ; by the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions . . . the Ie Shima ; Okinawa), n .d., hereafter 77th word was passed to [Brigadier General] Silver- InfDiv OpRpt and appropriate part ; 96th thorn to forget about the submission of the InfDiv AR, Ryukyus Campaign, dtd 28Ju145 , Status Reports ." Smith, Personal Narrative , hereafter 96th InfDiv AR . p. 43 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 7 83

84 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

units of the Tenth Army into a unified for ICEBERG . Nevertheless, suppor t whole." s unit commanders carried out adequate One determinant forcing the post- individual weapons' qualification an d ponement of the Formosa-South Chin a physical conditioning programs whic h invasion in favor of the Okinawa assaul t met Tenth Army training requirements. had been the shortage of service and Although they were released to Genera l support troops, a shortage that stil l Buckner's control only a few days before mounting for the target, a numbe r existed when the Tenth Army began it s of garrison organizations were able t o final training and rehearsal phases .4 conduct limited training with the com- Many of these specialist units were bat outfit to which they were attached . slated to reinforce corps and division s The major assault components of the for the assault and then to augmen t Tenth Army were battle-experienced for Island Command during the initial bas e the most part, but they needed to under- development . Because they were to o take an intensive training schedule i n deeply involved otherwise, often with order to bring veterans and newly ab- primary missions related to the buildu p sorbed replacements alike to peak com- for the operation, the support troop s bat efficiency. To accomplish this task, could not train with the assault unit s Army and Marine Corps units in th e they were to reinforce. The time bor- South Pacific, and the 2d Marine Divi- rowed for training would seriously dis- sion on Saipan, conducted extensiv e rupt the mounting and staging efforts programs which fulfilled the training requirements stipulated by Genera l Blakelock ltr . Of Buckner's visit to hi s Buckner's directives . General Hodge' s Marine units in the Solomons, General Geiger XXIV Corps, however, was engaged i n wrote : "General Buckner and five of his staff spent about three days with us the latter part operations on Leyte, and his division s of January . You know how difficult it is to were not released to Tenth Army by make a very favorable impressiart in the mu d General MacArthur until 10 February down here, especially in cleanliness of equip- 1945,5 just two months before L-Day. ment ; but I believe he and his staff were satisfied with what they saw. They spent a day with After the extended period of bitter each division observing training. We took them fighting in the Philippines, however, the over to the 1st Division in a PBY-5A ." MajGen combat units slated for ICEBERG were Roy S . Geiger Itr to LtGen Alexander A. understrength . General Hodge's prob- Vandegrift, dtd 2Feb45 (Vandegrift Persona l lems were further aggravated when his Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC) . ' General Oliver P . Smith recalled that in infantry divisions were required to fur- order to obtain at least a minimum of additional service troops, the Tenth Army "had t o 5 In 1944 when the JCS approved the recom- comb the entire Pacific Ocean Area and resort mended invasion of Leyte, the XXIV Corps was to considerable improvisation . For example, a fully combat loaded, already at sea, and e n veteran tank battalion was broken up to make route for the invasion of Yap . As a result of Quartermaster Truck Companies . I happene d the decision to land at Leyte, the Yap landin g to talk to the battalion commander of thi s was cancelled and the XXIV Corps was re - tank battalion, who was heartbroken over th e assigned to General MacArthur, who ordered matter . . . ." Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 12 . it to invade Leyte on 20 October 1944 .

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 85

nish the Leyte Base Command 6 with some of its new troops arrived during large working parties as soon as the mopping-up stages on Leyte . At that troops returned from mopping-up oper- time, the replacements were given a n ations at the front . The servicing, crat- opportunity to take an "active part i n ing, and loading of organic division combat and reconnaissance patrols , equipment siphoned off the services o f gaining valuable battle indoctrination other infantrymen as well as making i t through physical contact and skirmishe s impossible to impose a major trainin g with small isolated groups of Japa- program on any of the divisions . nese." 8 Finally, as one command reported, th e According to the Tenth Army Marin e "deterioration of the physical an d Deputy Chief of Staff, General Smith : mental condition of combat personne l The conditions of the Army division s after 110 days of continuous contact on Leyte gave General Buckner considera- with the enemy made it plain tha t ble concern. This was not the fault of the rigorous field training in the wet an d divisions ; they were excellent divisions. muddy terrain would prove more detri- However, they had been in action on Leyte mental than beneficial ." ' for three months and two of the divisions were still engaged in active operations . Th e Besides undertaking the many othe r divisions were understrength and adequate incidental duties preparatory to mount- replacements were not in sight . There wer e ing for Okinawa from Leyte, some Army [numerous men suffering from] dysenter y units had to construct their own camp s and skin infections . Living conditions wer e very bad . A considerable number of combat and make their own billeting arrange- troops had been diverted to Luzon an d ments as soon as they arrived in the converted into service troops . There wa s rear area from the front lines . What some doubt as to whether reequipment little time was available to the Souther n could be effected in time .9 Landing Force before L-Day wa s The fighting record of the XXIV divided between training in small-uni t Corps on Okinawa indicates how well i t tactics and practice for breaching and overcame great obstacles in preparin g scaling operations, in anticipation of for its ordeal. Once they had reconsti- the conditions to be found at Okinaw a tuted their combat organizations, beaches. Because of the large influx o f trained their fresh replacements, and raw replacements into the divisions , attended to the many details incident t o great emphasis was placed on develop- mounting for the target, the vetera n ing the teamwork of riflemen and thei r units of this corps were able to give supporting weapons. good accounts of themselves against th e Of the three divisions in XXIV Corps, enemy. the 96th was the most fortunate in tha t In the South Pacific and the Mar- ianas, Tenth Army units were not a s ° This logistical organization suffered fro m heavily committed as the units of th e a chronic shortage of service troops which Southern Landing Force, and complete d threatened the dual mission of the command a more comprehensive training pro - of supporting both the Luzon and Okinaw a invasions. e 96th Inf Div AR, chap V, p . 1 . 7 7th Inf Div OpRpt, p . 28 . ° Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 47 .

86 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

gram. The 27th Infantry Division, ICE - ments. Marine training overall empha- BERG floating reserve, arrived at sized the development of a tank- Espiritu Santo in the New Hebride s infantry-artillery team and focuse d from Saipan during September and attention on tactical innovations such as October 1944. The division was un- the use of the armored amphibian's divided in its opinion that this base wa s 75mm howitzer for supplementary artil- a "hellhole," unfitted for the division's lery support. While other Tenth Arm y rehabilitation and training because o f units were required to undertake am- the island's torrid climate, its topog- phibious training, General Geiger's raphy, and lush, tropical vegetation ." troops did not have to, since General Upon receipt of advance informatio n Buckner considered his Marine divi- that it was to take part in the Okinawa sions eminently qualified in this aspec t assault, the 27th instituted an acceler- of warfare. ated combat training program which Following the Peleliu campaign, Gen- was calculated to qualify it, by 30 eral del Valle's 1st Marine Division had January 1945, for a period of prolonge d returned to Pavuvu for rest and re- operations against the enemy . Launched habilitation. The division was firs t on 23 October, the level of the progra m based on the island in April 1944, advanced progressively from individua l arriving there after completion of th e schooling to combined company and bat- New Britain operation . At that time, talion exercises and, finally, to a two- and with some difficulty, the Guadal- week stretch of regimental combat team canal and Cape Gloucester veterans con- (RCT) 11 maneuvers. During this stag- verted the overrun coconut groves int o ing period, in which 2,700 replacement s some semblance of a habitable canton- arrived and were assigned, the divisio n ment. Because of its small size, Pavuv u stressed training for offensive and de- was not particularly suited for training fensive night operations. as large a unit as a division ; its terrain Most Marines in IIIAC assault divi- limited the widespread construction of sions had recently been in combat, ye t machine gun and mortar firing ranges.1 2 their training programs were stringent All artillery firing had to be conducte d and comprehensive . Like all othe r on Guadalcanal . veteran ICEBERG forces, the Marin e 12 During the division training phase, physi- divisions were confronted with the nee d cal conditioning hikes were made on the shor e to obtain, integrate, and train replace- road which encircled only that part of th e island occupied by the division . Both sides of 10 Capt Edmund G . Love, The 27th Infantr y the road were used as units followed on e Division in World War II (Washington : Infan- another, the group on the inside track march- try Journal Press, 1949), p. 521, hereafte r ing in a clockwise direction, while the oute r Love, 27th Inf Div Hist . group hiked counterclockwise—both group s 11 An RCT in an amphibious operation wa s passing each other several times as the y an infantry regiment reinforced by supportin g crowded the limited road net . At mealtime, th e arms, i.e., artillery, tanks, engineers, etc ., unmistakable smell of New Zealand-grow n which made up a balanced team for specifi c sheep being cooked filled the air, and the missions and whose services were required for Marines, as if one, would curse, "Mutton again , initial operations ashore. dammit."

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 87

After its return from the Palaus, the ever. The majority of the latter were ranks of the 1st held some 246 officer s replacements who had arrived at and 5,600 enlisted Marines who ha d Pavuvu while the 1st was at Peleliu . already served overseas nearly 30 As soon as the training cycle of Gen- months. Within that time, the division eral del Valle's infantry units reached had made three assault landings and it the regimental level and outgre w was now to make a fourth . If the divi- Pavuvu's facilities, each RCT was sion was to go ashore at full strength, rotated to Guadalcanal, about 65 mile s it appeared, at first, that it would b e to the southeast, for two weeks of more necessary for the veterans of Guadal- intensive combined-arms training . Spe- canal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu to cial emphasis was given to preparing fight at Okinawa too . A potentiall y the division for warfare of a type and serious morale problem was alleviate d on a scale differing in almost every re- when the division received four replace- spect from that which it experienced i n ment drafts by 1 January . These drafts, the tropical jungles of Guadalcanal an d plus a steady flow of individual replace- New Britain, and on the coral ridges o f ments, brought officer strength to equatorial Peleliu. As an integral part slightly above the authorized figure of a much larger force, this division wa s and exceeded the authorized enliste d to invade, for the first time, a land mass strength figure by more than 10 per - "which contained extensive road nets , cent. As a consequence, all eligible en- large inhabited areas, cities and vil- listed Marines were able to return t o lages, large numbers of enemy civilians , the States. and types of terrain" 14 not found in the At the same time, an extensive leav e South Pacific. Besides being schooled to program was established for officers fight under the conditions anticipated at who, though eligible, could not be spare d Okinawa, the troops were trained to de- for rotation. Fifty-three of them wer e fend against paratroop attack and in- permitted to take 30 days leave in the doctrinated in the techniques of dealin g United States, after which they were t o with hostile civilians . return to Pavuvu . "In addition, six went In commenting on the personnel situ- to Australia and one to New Zealand . ation of his regiment during its trainin g Some fifty key enlisted men [eligible period, the former commanding office r for rotation] also elected to take leave of the 11th Marines stated : in Australia in order that they could The heavy casualties suffered a t continue to serve in the First Marin e Peleliu, plus the rotation without imme- Division." 13 By the time the division diate replacement of all officers and men embarked for Okinawa, approximately with 30 months' service in the Pacific after . Onl y one-third of its Marines had been in tw o that battle, posed a severe problem one battalion commander remained of the invasions, one-third had faced the four who went to Peleliu . There were onl y enemy once, and the remainder were eight field officers in the regiment includ- men who had seen no combat whatso - ing myself and the [naval gunfire] officer . Fourteen captains with 24 months' Pacifi c 13 1st MarDiv SAR, chap III (Personnel Anx), pp . 2-3 . 14 1st MarDiv SAR, chap IV, p . 1.

88 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

service were allowed a month's leave plu s the case with other IIIAC units, in very travel time in the United States, and the y few instances did the classification o f left Pavuvu at the end of November and the replacements received by Genera l were not available for the training maneuver at first. I recall that the 4th Shepherd correspond to his actual Battalion (LtCol L. F . Chapman, Jr .) ha d needs. Paralleling other instances, only 18 officers present including himself . where the composition of stateside - He had no captains whatever. The other formed replacement drafts did not battalions and [regimental headquarters ] satisfy critical shortages in specific spe- were in very similar shape . The 3d Bat- talion had to be completely reorganized du e cialist fields, the 15th Marines wa s to heavy casualties on Peleliu and was th e assigned and forced to retrain antiair- only one with two field [grade] officers . craft artillerymen from disbanded de- But it had only about 20 officers of al l fense battalions whose previous experi- ranks present.15 ence and training was not considere d General Shepherd's 6th Marine Divi- the same as that needed by field artil- sion was activated on Guadalcanal in lerymen. September 1944, and was formed essen- Most of the men in the 6th Divisio n tially around the 1st Provisional Marin e had fought in at least one campaign , Brigade. This unit had taken part in th e while others were Pacific combat vet- Guam invasion and had been with - erans who were now beginning a secon d drawn from that island late in August . tour of overseas duty . The division was The infantry components of this ne w based on Guadalcanal, where kuna i division were, with a few exceptions, grass and steaming tropical jungle pro- veterans of the Pacific fighting . The 4th vided an excellent environment in which Marines was made up of the disbanded General Shepherd's men could fulfill a Marine raider battalions, whose troop s rugged training schedule . The program had fought on Guadalcanal, New began on 1 October and proceeded from Georgia, and Bougainville ; the infantry small-unit exercises through large-scal e regiment as a whole had landed o n combined-arms problems employing bat- Emirau and Guam. The 22d Marines talion landing teams (BLTs) 16 and had participated in the Eniwetok and RCTs ; all training culminated in an Guam campaigns, and the 1st Battalion, eight-day division exercise in January 29th Marines had augmented the 2 d 1945. Anticipating how the division wa s Marine Division for the Saipan assault. to be employed on Okinawa, General After its relief on Saipan, 1/29 was sen t Shepherd emphasized the execution o f to Guadalcanal to await the arrival from large-unit maneuvers, swift movement, the United States of its two sister bat- and rapid troop deployment . talions, and eventual assignment to the The IIIAC Artillery faced the same 6th Division. replacement retraining problems that At the time of the 6th Marine Divi- plagued the 15th Marines . When the 6th sion activation, the division was som e 155mm Howitzer Battalion and th e 1,800 men understrength and, as was 10 The BLT was reinforced for the assault i n 15 MajGen Wilburt S . Brown ltr to CMC, dt d a manner similar to that of an RCT, but on a 10Oct54, hereafter Brown ltr. lesser scale.

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 89

Headquarters Battery, 2d Provisional barkation, the commanding officer of Field Artillery Group, were formed in the 2d Provisional Field Artillery October and November 1944, thei r Group joined . Despite these hitches t o cadres were withdrawn from existin g IIIAC Corps Artillery pre-combat prep- units of corps artillery . The latter was arations, General Nimmer considered further drained when 500 combat vet- all of his embarked artillery units erans, mostly valuable noncommis- ready, although "both individual and sioned officers, were rotated home in unit proficiency were not up to th e November. There were few experience d standards that could have been obtaine d artillerymen in the group replacing under more favorable circumstances ." 1 4 them. As soon as General Geiger's staff be- At the same time that rehearsal s gan planning for the Marine Corps rol e were being conducted for the comin g in ICEBERG, the commanders of th e operations, Brigadier General David I . IIIAC Corps Artillery and the 11th an d Nimmer's Corps Artillery battalions 15th Marines established liaison with were forced to conduct training sessions one another in order to coordinate their (retraining classes in the case of rada r unit training programs. These senior technicians and antiaircraft artillery- Marine artillery officers "resolved tha t men coming from disbanded defense in this operation we would take ad - battalions) in order to ensure that al l vantage of all previous experience, good firing battery personnel would be com- and bad, and give a superior perform- pletely familiar with the weapons to ance. Accordingly, great care was given which they were newly assigned . to . . . the ability to rapidly mass fires Another matter adversely affecting th e of all available guns at any critica l artillery training program was the de - point." 1 8 lay, until 15 November and 10 Decem- Artillery training was directed to- ber respectively, in the return of the 3 d ward attaining this capability . General 155mm Howitzer and the 8th 155mm Nimmer's staff devised and wrote th e Gun Battalions from the Palaus oper- standard operating procedures to be ation. General Nimmer's organizational used by all Marine artillery units as- and personnel problems were compli- signed to ICEBERG. These procedures cated further by the fact that approxi- established the techniques to be used for mately 10 percent of his unit strength requesting and the subsequent deliver y joined after active training ended in of reinforcing fires. During the training February, while 78 communicators and period, firing batteries constantly put 92 field artillerymen did not join unti l the new doctrine into practice. after Corps Artillery had embarked for With the exception of the 12th Okinawa. Marines, the 2d Marine Division artil- VMO-7, the Marine observatio n lery regiment, all other Marine artillery units in the Tenth Army conducted a squadron assigned to Corps Artillery, did not arrive before General Nimmer's " IIIAC Arty AR, p . 10. units mounted out, but joined them later '8 Col Frederick P . Henderson ltr to CMC , at the target. Three days before em - dtd 11Mar55, hereafter Henderson ltr .

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combined problem on Guadalcanal, 11 – In the course of his inspection trip t o 13 January . A majority of the firin g Tenth Army units, General Buckne r missions were spotted by aerial ob- visited the 2d Marine Division . On the servers. Conditions anticipated on. Oki- morning of 3 February, he trooped th e nawa were simulated as closely as pos- line of the 8th Marines and then in- sible, although the large military spected the regimental quarters an d population and the consequent pro- galleys. It seemed to General Smith tha t fusion of various installations on the men of the 2d Division looked ver y Guadalcanal necessarily limited the siz e fit, and that they had made a tre- of the artillery ranges available for the mendous impression on the Tenth Arm y big guns . By the end of the combine d commander . Buckner was particularl y problem, when a firing mission was impressed with the battalion com- called in, the Marines "were able to manders, and told his deputy chief o f have all artillery present, laid and ready staff that "he had never before had th e to fire in an average of five minute s privilege of meeting such an alert from the time it was reported." 1 9 group. . . ." 2 0 General Watson's 2d Marine Division, A lack of suitable beaches on Saipan reserve for IIIAC and its third major confined final division rehearsals to element, was in garrison on Saipa n simulated landings only. Because of th e where a division-wide training program indefinite nature of its employment once was effectively integrated with mop- it had made the feint landings on L-Day ping-up operations against enemy and L plus 1, the 2d Division had to forces remaining at large on the island . select an arbitrary landing scheme o f More than 8,000 Marine replacement s two RCTs abreast for the rehearsal received valuable on-the-job experience pattern. Bad weather prevented LV T routing Japanese holdouts during th e launchings on two days, neither air no r first months of the division trainin g naval gunfire support was available , program which began 15 September. and, finally, on 19 March—the last day Saipan's rapid build-up as a suppl y of the exercises—only the naval por- center and an air base restricted th e tion of TG 51 .2 (Demonstration Group ) training efforts of the division, how - was able to participate in the demon- ever, and maneuver room and impact stration rehearsal. areas were soon at a premium. On Espiritu Santo, the Tenth Army' s 10 Henderson ltr . After the 11th Marines other relatively isolated unit—the 27th arrived on Guadalcanal, 15 December 1944, i t Infantry Division—conducted rehears- joined the 15th Marines to train with IIIA C als from 20 to 25 March while its trans Artillery for seven straight weeks with onl y - one break, Christmas Day. In this joint train- port squadron was being loaded. This ing effort, great stress was placed on suc h division was in the same position a s artillery tactics as proper conduct of fire, with General Watson's in that it faced a pro - the battalions registering, firing missions, an d fusion of potential missions . The re- displacing several times a day "to overcom e the improvised jungle methods heretofore use d hearsals of both reserve divisions were by the division in previous campaigns ." Brown ltr . 20 Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 52 .

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based, therefore, on a number of hypo- waves, and then landed on the beaches . thetical landing assignments . General Geiger's corps artillery unit s Satisfactory practice landings were did not participate in these final re- made by all of the other Tenth Arm y hearsal exercises except to land bat- asault divisions . IIIAC rehearsals took talion, corps, and group headquarters place off the Cape Esperance-Doma reconnaissance parties . The shortage o f Cove beaches on Guadalcanal from 2 time prevented the landing of any of through 7 March . Although reefs do the artillery pieces which were to go not exist here, a transfer line was simu- ashore at the target. lated 200 yards from the shore in a n Nearly 3,000 miles away fro m attempt to duplicate actual landin g Guadalcanal, in the Philippines, assault conditions in the corps zone on Okinawa . elements of XXIV Corps conducted re- During the six days of rehearsals, Rea r hearsals in Leyte Gulf from the 15th to Admiral Reifsnider's staff officers made the 19th of March under the watchful certain that assault wave control wa s eyes of Admiral Hall and his attack emphasized and that the training o f force staff officers . Because the missions communications elements was intensi- assigned XXIV Corps divisions varie d fied at all command levels. so widely, the nature and conduct o f Because naval gunfire and air-support their rehearsals tended to reflect thi s units assigned to ICEBERG were com- variance. mitted elsewhere at this time, the toke n The 77th Infantry Division was to prelanding bombardment furnished by make the initial ICEBERG assault, th e vessels in the area, and the air suppor t landing on Kerama Retto . In order to supplied by F6Fs (Hellcats) and TBM s familiarize the troops with condition s (Avengers), flying in from Henderso n at their impending target, practice Field and nearby carriers, only approxi- landings were made in southeaster n mated the tremendous volume of fire t o Leyte's Hinunangan Bay on islands that be laid on the Hagushi beaches. Prac- closely resembled some of those in the tice landings were made by IIIAC units Keramas. For two days, 14 and 1 5 on 3 March, followed the next day by a March, adverse weather conditions and critique aboard the TF 53 flagship, US S heavy swells prevented any landings a t Panamint. Other preliminary landings all, but adherence to any firm rehearsa l on the 5th preceded the landing of th e schedule was not considered necessar y entire IIIAC assault echelon on 6 since the mission of the 77th involve d March. Corps and division comman d several landings independent of each posts were set up ashore, a primary other. communications net was established, Poor weather on the 15th forced the and some equipment was unloaded. On cancellation of a planned rehearsal fo r 7 March, the reserve regiments—th e the Ie Shima invasion, while only th e 1st Marines for the 1st Division and division reserve (307th Infantry) mad e the 29th Marines for the IIIAC— any practice landings on the 16th . climbed down the nets into invasion Although General Bruce was satisfied craft, which were formed into boat with the rehearsals since "all elements

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scheduled for a specific mission satis- Guadalcanal and Leyte. Their troop factorily executed a close approximatio n training, for the most part, was con - of their mission," 21 Admiral Kilan d ducted aboard ship en route to the stag- was not so confident. The Western ing areas, and consisted of familiariza- Islands Attack Group Commander felt tion lectures about the enemy, hi s that "considering the complexity of the tactics, and his equipment. operation and the relative inexperience Like the other Okinawa-bound Tenth of naval personnel involved, the curtail- Army units mounting from Pearl ment of these exercises by weather con- Harbor., Island Command troops con - ditions made the training provide d ducted individual and unit training 2 2 entirely inadequate ." programs which consisted of specialist On 16 March, the 7th and 96th Divi- as well as combat subjects . The Island sions landed under perfect weather con- Command assault echelon was com- ditions and on the 18th held unit posed chiefly of headquarters person- critiques, in which certain basic dis- nel who were to initiate the base devel- crepancies and difficulties discovered i n opment plan as soon as practicable afte r the first exercise were ironed out . The the landing. Within this echelon also following day, the two divisions lande d were shore party, ordnance, ammunition, again. A high-level critique was held on supply, signal, quartermaster, truck, the 21st for the major Army and Nav y and water transportation units, whos e commanders on Admiral Hall's flagship , support services would be required im- USS Teton. Also present were Admiral mediately after the initial assault. Turner and General Buckner. At this At Fort Ord, California, officers to time, all of the XXIV Corps rehearsal s staff military government teams began were evaluated, and efforts were made assembling in late December 1944 . A to ensure that the actual landing woul d number of these officers had already re- be better coordinated . ceived approximately three months of As the normal duties of most of the military government training at eithe r flying squadrons assigned to TAF con- Princeton or Columbia Universities. In stituted their combat training, and since California and at the staging area s they would not begin operations at where they joined the assault forces, Okinawa until after the landing, whe n these Army and Navy officers received the airfields were ready, they were no t instructions pertinent to the ICEBERG required to conduct rehearsals for ICE - military government plan . Many in the BERG. TAF ground personnel sched- Navy enlisted component in the mili- uled to travel to the target with th e tary government section had never re- assault echelon, participated in th e ceived any specialized civil affairs train- landing rehearsals that were held at ing before they arrived at Fort Ord , where they were assembled just in time =' 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Kerama Retto, Keise Shima, p . 20 . to embark with the teams to which the y == CTG 51 .5 AR, Capture of Okinawa Gunto , were assigned.2" Phases 1 and 2, 9Mar-2Apr45, dtd 26May45 , chap II, p . 2, hereafter CTG 51 .1 AR. MilGovt AR, p . 3.

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By 1945, the roll-up of enemy posi- increased the efficiency of loading and tions in the Pacific had progressed t o unloading operations, that he requested the point where some Tenth Army unit s the formation of a similar corps ship - were able to mount and stage on th e ping group for future IIIAC oper- threshold of Japan . XXIV Corps pre- ations.25 pared for Okinawa in the Leyte Gul f The commanding generals of the 1st area, only 1,000 miles from the Ryu- and 6th Marine Divisions were mad e kyus, while in the Marianas, just slightl y responsible for the loading and em- farther away from the target, other barkation of their respective organic ICEBERG forces made ready for th e and attached units, while IIIAC itsel f attack. Northern Attack Force units, supervised the loading of corps troops . however, had a considerably longer In addition, General Geiger was respon- journey to the Ryukyus as they pre- sible for embarking Marine Air Group pared in the Solomons . 33 (MAG–33) of TAF, which was base d on Espiritu Santo., 555 miles southeast MOUNTING AND STAGING THE of Guadalcanal. ASSAULT 2 4 Although some Northern Attac k Force vessels were partially combat - Each attack force of the Joint Ex- loaded before the rehearsal period, al l peditionary Force was organized differ- required additional time off the Guadal- ently for loading, movement, and un- canal, Banika, and Pavuvu beaches t o loading at the target . The nine transport take on vital cargo and to top-off wate r divisions in the three transrons o f and fuel tanks . The Northern Tractor Admiral Hall's Southern Attack Forc e Flotilla was the first increment of TF 53 were reorganized and expanded to num- to leave the Solomons for the stagin g ber 11 transport divisions (transdivs) . area at Ulithi . Departing on 12 March, Assigned to these two additional trans- the holds and above decks of the landin g divs were those ships slated to lift ships in the convoy were solidly packed XXIV Corps troops at Leyte and those with amphibious vehicles, tanks, artil- which were to load Tenth Army an d lery, and various other combat gear . Island Command forces waiting o n For this invasion, IIIAC wanted to Oahu. The Northern Attack Force , avoid subjecting assault troops to th e which was to carry IIIAC troops, wa s crowded conditions and debilitating not so augmented . General Geiger wa s effects of prolonged confinement aboard so impressed with how well the reorgan- LSTs and LSMs. ization of Admiral Hall's transpor t While APAs were hardly luxurious, d force had eased movement control an their accommodations were far better 24 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n than those of the landing ships . To ease this section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ; the first leg of the journey to Okinawa , Tenth Army AR ; TAF AR ; IIIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2d MarDiv AR ; =G CNO, Amphibious Operations—Capture o f 6th, MarDiv SAR ; 7th InfDiv OpRpt ; 27t h Okinawa, 27Mar-21Jun45 (OpNav 34-P-0700) , InfDiv OpRpt ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Kerama dtd 22Jan46, chap 7, p . 20, hereafter CNO Retto, Keise Shima ; 96th InfDiv AR . Record .

94 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

many assault wave Marines were em - smaller combat vessels departed fo r barked on the faster attack transports strikes against the enemy or returne d which, together with the rest of the from completed missions . In the mids t Northern Attack Force transport of this activity, the scattered elements groups, left from the mounting area o n of the Expeditionary Troops filtered in 15 March to join the ICEBERG forc e to join those forces which had arrived gathering at Ulithi . earlier. The immense lagoon at Ulithi Atol l Despite the relaxing effect of sun , was the westernmost American fleet sand, and surf at Ulithi, the nightly anchorage, staging base, and repair alerts to the presence of Japanes e depot in the Pacific. Midway betwee n snooper planes was a continual re - the Marianas and the Palaus, Ulithi was minder that a war still .existed. This captured without opposition in Septem- grim fact was brought home to many ber 1944, and was developed immedi- men in the invasion force on the gloomy, ately to support naval operations in th e fog-bound Saturday afternoon of 2 4 western Pacific as well as to serve as March when the battered carrier an advance base for the Philippines in- Franklin limped into the anchorage vasion. Once occupied and built up, th e shepherded by the USS Santa Fe. islets of the atoll served also as limite d On the next day, a brilliantly sunli t recreation areas where personnel of al l Sunday, the bruised and battere d services could regain their landlegs an d Franklin could be seen more clearly as participate in a somewhat restricte d she lay at anchor . Her top rigging, physical conditioning program . aerials, and radar towers were gone o r On 21 March, both the transport twisted completely out of shape . Her group and the tractor flotilla of TF 5 3 flight deck was buckled and undulating . arrived at Ulithi, anchored, and on the These were the external damage s following day, APA-borne assault wrought by the internal explosions o f troops were transferred to the landing bombs that had penetrated to lower ships which were to carry them the re- decks when Japanese suicide planes maining 1,400 miles to Okinawa . Once furiously attacked the carrier on 1 9 the transfer was completed, small boat s March, during TF 38 strikes against began ferrying recreation parties enemy shipping at Kure and Kobe . As ashore. Here the rigors of shipboar d the most heavily damaged carrier to b e confinement were forgotten by a com- saved in the war, the Franklin was able bination of organized athletics and an to make the 12,000-mile trip to New issue of not-too-cool cokes and beer . York for repairs under her own power , For many of the troops, this stopover stopping only at Pearl Harbor on th e on the long voyage towards the un- way. known was made exciting by the fasci- The Northern Tractor Flotilla sortied nating sight of the constantly shiftin g from the Ulithi anchorage for Okinaw a fleet groupment whose makeup change d on 25 March and, two days later, th e from day-to-day and hour-to-hour as remainder of the assault echelon se t carriers, battleships, cruisers, and forth in its wake . Saipan was the scene,

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 95

on the same dates., of the Demonstratio n assault echelon were the headquarters Group departure. squadrons of the 2d Marine Aircraft Loading operations of the 2d Marin e Wing and MAG-43, and Air Warning Division were eased by the fact that its Squadrons (AWSs) 7 and 8 . Head- lift, Transron 15, had laid over briefly quarters Squadrons 2 and 43 became the at Saipan in February while en rout e headquarters commands of TAF an d to Iwo Jima. At that time, divisio n General Wallace's Air Defense Com- transport quartermasters (TQMs) ob- mand, respectively . The TAF transport tained ships' characteristics data which quartermaster coordinated the mount- proved more accurate than the infor- ing out of the Oahu-based units with hi s mation provided earlier by FMFPac. opposite numbers on the staffs of th e As a result, the TQMs were better abl e Tenth Army and the 2d MAW . The to plan for a more efficient use of cargo Marines from AWS–8 and the forwar d and personnel space . echelons of Mulcahy's and Wallace' s In addition to the responsibility fo r headquarters commands left Pearl Har- loading his reinforced division, General bor on 22 February, while AWS–7 de - Watson was given the duty of coordi- parted Pearl the same month in two nating the loading of all ICEBER G increments, one on the 10th and the sec - Marine assault and first echelon force s ond on the 21st. elsewhere in the Marianas and at Ro i Colonel John C . Munn's MAG–31 em - in the Marshalls .2 6 barked from Roi and Namur in th e Marshall Islands. The group service In preparing for Okinawa, the only f real problem confronting General Mul- squadron and ground personnel o cahy's Marine air units was the coordi- Marine Fighter Squadrons 224, 311 , o nated loading of ground and flight ele- and 441 boarded transport and carg vessels which, in turn, joined the ICE - ments. According to the logistical plan- BERG convoy forming at Saipan . ning, planes and pilots were to be lifte d to the target on board escort carriers , Flight personnel and their planes went aboard the escort carriers Breton on the while ground crews and nonflying units Sitkoh Bay on 24 were to make the trip in assault and night of 22–23 March, March and were staged through Ulithi first echelon shipping. As the organi- e zations comprising the Tactical Ai r where they were joined by Marin Force were widely dispersed, their load- Night Fighter Squadron 542 . ing and embarkation was supervised, o f MAG–33 (Colonel Ward E . Dickey) necessity, by local commanders of th e mounted from Espiritu Santo in the areas where the air groups and squad- New Hebrides . While IIIAC was re- rons were based . sponsible for the embarkation of th e Mounting from Oahu in the TA F MAG, the group itself supervised th e loading of its ground and service ele- =8 Units involved were : MAG—31 at Roi ; 1st ments which joined the Northern SepEngrBn and 16th AAA Bn at Tinian ; Attack Force off Guadalcanal. The . 2 and 2d AAA Bn at Corps EvacHosp No w Guam ; and 7th F1dDep, 1st Prov MP Bn, and pilots of VMF–312, -322, and -323 fle LFASCU—1 at Saipan . their F4Us (Corsairs) to Manus via

96 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Guadalcanal and Green Island. There converging on Okinawa . Soldiers and they boarded the escort carriers White Marines aboard the transports and Plains and Hollandia. Already on boar d landing vessels had already made them - the latter was VMF (N) -543 which had selves as comfortable as possible under boarded the vessel at Pearl Harbor o n the crowded conditions and had settled 11 March. Its ground personnel had de - down to shipboard routine . Officers and parted from the same port three week s key NCOs reviewed their unit operatio n earlier. plans, examined maps and terrai n Outside of the TAF chain of com- models of the landing area, and held mand, but closely related to its combat daily briefing sessions with their men . functions, were Landing Force Air Sup- At the same time they squared away port Control Units 1, 2, and 3 . Two their combat gear for the invasion, mos t weeks after returning to its Saipa n of the men of Hebrew and Christia n base from the Iwo Jima operation , faiths also prepared themselves for re- LFASCU–1 loaded aboard ship for an ligious observances of Passover o r immediate return engagement with th e Good Friday and Easter, all three holi- enemy at Okinawa . The other two days falling within a few days of eac h LFASCUs were based at Ewa, T . H., other in 1945 . where they trained for ICEBERG, and 7 mounted for the invasion in Februar y NEUTRALIZING THE ENEMY 2 1945, later staging for the target through Leyte . After the first carrier strike of 1 0 October 1944, Naha's fire- and explo- As it had no need for an intermediat e sion-gutted ruins furnished the Japa- staging area, the XXIV Corps departed nese defenders with visual evidence o f for Okinawa directly from Leyte . Gen- the effectiveness of American naval ai r eral Bruce's 77th Infantry Division , power and served as an ominous portent which was to open the Ryukyus oper- of the future. One observer, a Japanese ation with the assault on Kerama Retto , soldier, complained in his diary that , finished loading its landing ships on 1 8 "the enemy is brazenly planning to com- March and its transports on the 20th , pletely destroy every last ship, cut ou r each echelon leaving for the target on supply lines, and attack us." 28 the day following . The 7th and 96th Divisions conducted their own loading Okinawa was not visited again b y under the supervision of XXIV Corps Vice Admiral John S . McCain's Fast TQMs, who spotted Southern Landing Carrier Force (TF 38) until 3 and 4 Force shipping at the most satisfactory =7 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n point on the landing beaches. The this section is derived from : CinCPac WarD s Southern Tractor Flotilla departe d Jan-Mar45 ; CTF 52 AR ; Tenth Army AR ; Leyte during the morning hours of 2 4 War Reports ; Okinawa Operations Record ; March ; the transport groups followed Morison, Victory in the Pacific . three days later. ""Diary of a radioman, 5th Harbor Bas e Unit," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45 , By the evening of 27 March, all ICE- Translations and Interrogations No . 32, dt d BERG assault elements were at sea, 16Jun45, p . 50 .

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January 1945, when, in conjunctio n force was changed and Admiral s with a heavy attack on Formosa, the Spruance and Mitscher relieved Halse y Ryukyu and Sakashima Islands were and McCain . When Mitscher's carrier s also struck. Commenting on this raid, a departed Ulithi on 10 February, it was Japanese replacement confided in hi s in the guise of Task Force 58, which was diary that "seeing enemy planes for the destined to continue the work that T F first time since coming to Okinaw a 38 had begun . somehow or other gave me the feeling As a diversion for the 19 Februar y of being in a combat zone ." 29 The re- Marine landing on Iwo Jima, and to turn of the Navy planes on 22 January reduce the Japanese capability fo r reinforced his first impression and launching air attacks against the ex- further shook his seeming complacency , peditionary force, Mitscher's Fast Car- as that day's diary entry implied resent- rier Force struck at the Tokyo area on ment. "While some fly around overhea d 16–17 February and again on the 25th . and strafe, the big bastards fly over th e In between these attacks, Mitscher's airfield and drop bombs . The ferocity o f planes and ships supported the Iwo the bombing is terrific . It really make s assault from D-Day until the 23d, a t me furious. It is past 1500 and the rai d which time they sortied for the 2 5 is still on. At 1800 the last two plane s February Tokyo strike . As TF 58 re- brought the raid to a close . What th e tired to Ulithi on 1 March, planes of hell kind of bastards are they? Bom b Task Units 58.1, 58.2, and 58.3 photo- from 0600 to 1800!" 3° graphed Okinawa, Kerama Retto , Minami Daito, and Amami 0 Shima , During January, TF 38 struck For- and bombed and strafed targets of op- mosa and the Ryukyus twice, and mad e portunity. These three units returned some uninvited calls on South China to Ulithi on the 5th. coastal ports, all while covering th e At the same time that the fast car- , Luzon landings. After its last attack riers were making their forays, Ameri- the force retired to Ulithi where rein - can submarines and naval patrol forcing carriers were waiting to join . bombers ranged the western Pacifi c On 27 January, the same day that Ad- taking a steadily increasing toll of Japa- miral Nimitz arrived at his new ad- nese shipping . The bottom of the China vance headquarters on Guam,31 the Sea was littered with the broken hull s command of the Pacific fleet's strikin g and loads of enemy transports an d cargo ships which never reached thei r 2° "Diary of an unidentified superior private , destinations . Almost complete isolation 273d IIB," in Ibid., p . 70 . of the Okinawa garrison was accom- 3° Ibid. plished by mid-February 1945 through 31 Because Pearl Harbor was too far fro m the combined efforts of Navy air and the war area, the recently promoted Fleet submarine forces . It soon became ap- Admiral Nimitz transferred his flag to Gua m parent to General Ushijima that his on 2 January in order to direct the Pacific war effort from a vantage point closer to the scen e Ryukyus command stood alone since of' the fighting. "communications between the mainland

98 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

of Japan and Formosa had been prac- abandon and a wanton disregard fo r tically severed ." 3 2 their lives . Five carriers and other ships The neutralization and isolation o f in the task force were hit hard . A tem- Okinawa was furthered by the con- porary task group composed of th e tinuous series of strategic air strikes on damaged carriers Wasp, Franklin, and the Japanese industrial network by Enterprise, the cruiser Santa Fe, and Army Air Forces bombers, which Destroyer Squadron 52 returned t o mounted attacks from bases in China, Ulithi for necessary repairs . The ships India, the Philippines, the Marianas , remaining in TF 58, the carriers, the and the Palaus . Massive raids on th e battleship force, and the protective factories of the main islands as well a s screen, were reorganized into three task on outlying sources of raw materials groups of relatively equal strength on hindered Japan's ability and will to con- 22 March. With this force, Admiral tinue the war. Giant super-fortresse s Mitscher then began the final run on also rose from airfields in the southern Okinawa for the beginning of the pre - Marianas in steadily increasing num- invasion bombardments . bers to hit Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, an d Kobe, widening the fire-swept circl e PREINVASION PREPARATIONS around the expanse of previously devas- AND THE KERAMA RETTO tated areas. During the interludes be- LANDING 3 4 tween carrier-plane attacks on the Ryukyus, B–29 appearances over Oki- The first elements of the ICEBER G nawa became so commonplace that th e force to appear at the target were the Japanese defenders referred to thei r doughty sweepers of Mine Group One , visits as "regular runs." 3 3 which began operations off Kerama With the approach of L-Day, th e Retto and the southeastern coast of tempo of covering operations was ac- Okinawa on 24 March, just two days celerated throughout the Pacific . For its before the 77th Infantry Division was final strike on Japan prior to the Oki- to land in the Keramas . After the mine- nawa landing. TF 58 steamed out of th e craft cleared a channel outside the 100- Ulithi anchorage on 14 March . Four fathom curve off the Minatoga beaches , days later, carrier-launched planes in- part of Admiral Mitscher's battleshi p terdicted Kyushu's heavily-laden air- force, temporarily organized as TF 59 , fields, and attacked installations o n steamed through the swept area and Shikoku and Honshu islands on th e bombarded Okinawa while TF 58 planes 19th. The task force did not escape uncovered and neutralized enemy shore scathed this time, however, for th e 31 Unless otherwise noted, the material i h n enemy was ready and retaliated wit this section is derived from : CinCPOA OPla n heavy counterstrikes during which the 14—44 ; CTF 51 OPlan AI—45 ; CTF 51 AR ; Japanese pilots displayed reckless CTF 52 AR ; CTG 51 .1 AR ; Tenth Army AR ; 77th Inf Div OpRpt ; PhibReconBn, FMFPac , "Okinawa Operations Record, p. 62. AR, Phase I and II, Nansei Shoto Operation , 33 "Diary of an unidentified superior private , n.d ., hereafter PhibReconBn AR ; War Re- 273d IIB," op. cit., p. 49 . ports ; Morison, Victory in the Pacific .

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 99

installations . By late afternoon, as T F tration of naval strength . With ample 59 withdrew to rejoin the carrier force , sea room and sufficient fighting powe r the mine vessels finished that day' s to eliminate any or all of the remnant s planned program of preliminary sweeps . of the Japanese Navy, TF 58 lay to the During these operations, the Amphib- east of the Ryukyus in the Pacific ious Support Force, with elements of Ocean. In the East China Sea, to the the Gunfire and Covering Force (Ad- west of Okinawa, the majority of the miral Deyo serving as Officer in Tactica l combat ships of the Amphibious Sup - Command), had completed the run from port Force was concentrated, ready t o Ulithi and deployed into approach for- stop any attempt to reinforce or evac- mation. Two fire support units left TF uate the garrison. At night, the ship s 54 to begin their respective assignment s assigned to the bombardment of Oki- —one unit to cover the sweep conducte d nawa's southeastern coast retired to- between Tonachi Shima and Kerama gether so that their mission could b e Retto, and the other to cover the min e resumed without delay the following sweepers off Okinawa and to begin morning . In the event of any surface bombarding the demonstration beaches . action, each of these task groups wa s An important TF 52 element was th e able to operate and support itself inde- Underwater Demolition Flotilla, con- pendently. sisting of 10 underwater demolition As vaster areas surrounding Okinaw a teams (UDTs) organized into tw o were swept clear of mines, destroyer s groups, Able and Baker . On the after - and gunboats began patrol operations noon of 24 March, the high spee d and made the beleaguered enemy's iso- destroyer transports (APDs) of Grou p lation a certainty . Shipborne radar Able and destroyers of TF 54 forme d picket stations, disposed from 15 to 100 for the next day's UDT and NGF oper- miles offshore, encircled the island to ations at Kerama . The remainder o f protect the invasion force from the con- Admiral Deyo's force was concentrate d stant threat of surprise enemy ai r and ready to repulse all Japanese sur- attacks. Aboard the destroyers an d face or air attacks .35 destroyer minesweepers serving as A carefully planned feature of th e picket vessels were fighter-directo r ICEBERG operation was this concen - teams which controlled the combat ai r patrols (CAPs) of carrier planes which ,5 The command relationship between Ad- orbited overhead during the hours of mirals Blandy (CTF 52) and Deyo (CTF 54 ) daylight. When Japanese flights were requires clarification . Blandy, as a Senior Offi- detected on picket radar screens, th e cer Present Afloat (SOPA), was responsibl e for the execution of all operations at the target CAP was vectored out to intercept and while Deyo, although Blandy's senior, was re- destroy the enemy. The bulk of the sponsible for the TF 54 movement and ap- heavy losses incurred by the Navy dur- proach to the target (and for any TF 52 ship s ing the battle for Okinawa was born e moving with TF 54), for the conduct of sur- by the vessels comprising the radar face actions should there be any, and for th e night deployments . CNO Record, chap 1, pp . picket fleet. The value of their services 33-34 . in protecting the vulnerable transport

310-224 0 - 69 - 8

100 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and service areas is measured by the trainers, liaison craft, and planes of a large number of Japanese planes shot Special Attack Unit which managed to down before they had reached their ob- fly in from Kyushu, led to the complete jectives. elimination of the air strength of the Although the destructive TF 58 raids Okinawa garrison by 29 March .38 on Kyushu had temporarily disrupted Claims of enemy airmen who sur- enemy plans for air attacks from the vived to return to home bases wer e home islands, the Japanese managed to grossly exaggerated, but their destruc- mount an increasing number of raid s tiveness was extensive . A summary of from fields in the Formosa area . Once it damages to American forces for the became apparent that Okinawa was to period 26 to 31 March reveals that si x be invaded and that Okinawa water s ships, including Admiral Spruance' s held lucrative targets, forward ele- flagship Indianapolis, were crashed by ments of the 8th Air Division rose from suicide-bent enemy pilots. Near misses their fields in the Sakashimas to make accounted for damage to 10 other ves- their first Kamikaze attack on ships sels, while floating mines sank 2 ships standing off Kerama Retto at dawn o n and an encounter with a Japanes e 26 March.36 torpedo boat gave another American Beginning with this first, hour-long ship minor damage. Despite costly harassment from Japa- enemy air raid, the loss of lives and damage to ships mounted as Japanese nese air attacks, Admiral Blandy's force bombers and suiciders made sneak proceeded with its primary task of pre - . Four attacks on the amphibious force in th e paring the target for the assault dawn and dusk twilight hours.37 As part Group Able UDTs cleared beach approaches in Kerama Retto on 26 March of its planned schedule of preliminary and began blowing Keise Shima reefs operations supporting ICEBERG, Vice Admiral Sir H. Bernard Rawling's the next day . Because Okinawa's offshor e waters had not been completely cleared British Carrier Force (TF 57) struck - Sakashima Gunto on the 26th and 27th. of mines, the reconnaissance and demoli tion work scheduled for the 28th wa s Since the carriers had blocked the us e e of Sakashima and Kyushu, the Japanese delayed a day. Elements of Group Abl scouted the demonstration beaches o n had to use Okinawa-based planes t o attack the American invasion forces . the 29th, while Group Baker teams reconnoitered the Hagushi beaches The employment in three suicidal foray s . During this reconnaissance of the of all available aircraft, including west coast landing area, Group Baker swimmers discovered approximately " Okinawa Operations Record, "Record o f the 8th AirDiv," Chart 1 . 2,900 wooden posts embedded in th e " More correctly known as morning an d reef near its seaward edge and stretch- evening nautical twilights, these are the brie f ing for some distance on either side of periods preceding sunrise and following sunse t the Bishi Gawa . These posts, which when general outlines may be visible, although were on the average six inches i n the horizon cannot be distinguished, and approaching aircraft are virtually invisible . '8 Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 65-66. ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 101

LANDING CRAFT form up for the run to Kerama Retto beaches on 26 March 1945 . Viewed from USS Minneapolis . (USN 80-G-816830)

155MM GUNS of the 420th Field Artillery Group are set up on Keise Shima to shell enemy main defenses prior to the Tenth Army assault landing . (USA SC205503)

102 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

diameter and from four to eight feet i n scheduled NGF bombardment did not height, were generally aligned five fee t begin until 25 March (L minus 7) whe n apart in rows of three or four. Although TF 54 fire support vessels were able t o some of these obstacles were loose, a close to ranges of maximum effective- few were set in concrete and the res t ness. Carrier air was able to pound Oki- wedged into the coral. On 30 March the y nawa repeatedly, however, and was me t were blown up with hand-place d by only ineffectual and desultory fir e charges. All but 200 posts were de- from enemy antiaircraft defenses . In stroyed by L-Day and it was believed the course of the 3,095 sorties that th e that the landing would not be hindere d TF 52 Combat Air Support Control Uni t by those that remained .3° (CASCU) directed against Okinaw a Accompanying the UDTs during the prior to L-Day, special attention wa s beach reconnaissance and initial demoli- given to the destruction of submarin e tions operations were assault troop ob- pens, airfields, suicide boat installations, servers, who acted as liaison and recon- bridges over the roads leading into the naissance personnel .40 Their primary landing area, and gun positions . After function was to brief the UDTs on th e the pilots were debriefed, each day' s schemes of maneuver and location of strike results were evaluated by th e the landing areas of their respectiv e CASCU on board Admiral Blandy' s assault units, to make certain that spe- flagship, USS Estes, and considered to- cific beaches were cleared, and to ob- gether with damage estimates of ships' tain current intelligence concerning th e guns . The schedule of air missions an d beaches and surrounding terrain . As the NGF plans were revised and co - soon as these preinvasion operations ordinated, and plans for the next day's had been completed (29 and 30 March) , sorties and shoots were then issued. the observers were returned by ship to Initial target lists compiled by the join their parent organizations in th e Tenth Army artillery section and TF 5 4 approaching attack groups . In general, intelligence section were constantly re- the intelligence reports submitted b y vised as analyses, based on aerial ob- the observers favored a successful land- servation and photo reconnaissance , ing across the entire Tenth Army front . were received . As new evaluations were Because the waters surrounding Oki- made of the destruction of enemy posi- nawa had been heavily mined, 41 the tions and installations, and new targets tabulated, cards listing the correcte d '° CTF 52 AR, pt V, sec G, p . 3 . data were delivered to the target infor- " ° The allocation of Tenth Army observer s to the UDTs was based on the assignment o f mation centers (TICs) of IIIAC an d one officer for each battalion in the assault , XXIV Corps. From the time that the one for each RCT, division, and corps, and one bombardment of Okinawa began unti l for the army . Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45 , L-Day, General Nimmer's TIC receive d Anx 4, App A, p . 1 . copies of all dispatches sent from th e " TF 52 estimated that its minecraft swep t objective by CTF 54. From these re- and reswept over 3,000 square miles in the si x days before L-Day. In this period, 257 mines ports., all information relative to the were destroyed . discovery, attack, damage, and destruc-

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 103

tion of targets in the IIIAC landin g Keramas provided a sheltered flee t zone was excerpted and used to brin g anchorage in the objective area wher e the target map and target file up-to- emergency repairs, refueling, and re - date.4 2 arming operations could be accom- Although Admiral Blandy's bombard- plished. Once the envisioned seaplan e ment force expended 27,226 rounds o f base was established, Navy patro l 5-inch or larger-caliber ammunition o n bombers could range from Korea to Okinawa, extensive damage was don e Indochina in search and rescue mission s only to surface installations, especiall y and antisubmarine warfare operations . those in the vicinity of the airfields. As With the emplacement of XXIV Corps the ground forces were to discove r Artillery guns on Keise Shima and thei r later, the Japanese sustained little de- registry on Okinawa, preliminaries for struction of well dug-in defenses, an d the main assault would be complete . few losses among the men who manned Even if the Keramas had had no them. On the day before the landing, as value as an advanced logistics base, they a result of his evaluation of the effect of would have been taken . The suspected air and NGF bombardment, CTF 5 2 presence of suicide sea raiding squad- could report that "the preparation wa s rons in the island chain was confirme d sufficient for a successful landing." 4 3 when the 77th Infantry Division landed , Admiral Biandy also stated that "we di d and captured and destroyed 350 of th e not conclude from [the enemy's silence ] squadrons' suicide boats . Their threat that all defense installations had been to the Okinawa landing was undeniable , destroyed . . . . " 4 4 for these small craft were to spee d A prerequisite which Admiral Turner from their hideouts in the Keramas ' felt would guarantee the success of ICE - small islands to the American anchor- BERG was the seizure of Kerama Retto ages. Here, "The objective of the attac k and Keise Shima prior to L-Day . Be- will be transports, loaded with essentia l cause of the advantages to be gained b y supplies and material and person- all ICEBERG assault and support ele- nel . . .," ordered General Ushijima . ments., the taking of these islands was "The attack will be carried out by con- made an essential feature of the Tenth centrating maximum strength immedi- Army operation plan. Naval units, par- ately upon the enemy's landing." 45 The ticularly, would benefit since th e surprise thrust into the Keramas frustrated the Japanese plan and undoubt- 42 "At H-Hour on D-Day it is estimated that edly eased initial ICEBERG operation s the TIC files showed about 500 active target s suitable for attack by artillery, naval gunfire , at the Hagushi beaches . At the time and support aircraft, all located in the III Phi b that the 77th was poised to strike th e Corps zone of action for Phase One of the Keramas, the islands were defended by operations." LtCol John G . Bouker ltr to CMC , approximately 975 Japanese troops, of dtd 9Jan48, Subj : Operations of III Amphibi- whom only the some 300 boat operator s ous Corps Target Information Center on Oki- nawa, hereafter Bouker ltr . ""Thirty-second Army OperO No . 115, dt d 43 CTF 52 AR, pt V, sec C, p . 5 . 23Mar45," in Tenth Army Trans No . 231, dt d 44 Ibid. 6Ju145.

104 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

of the sea raiding squadrons had an y defenders offered little resistance, it combat value . The rest of the defense was secured by 1341 . By the end of the was comprised of about 600 Korea n day the 77th had done quite well, hav- laborers and nearly 100 base troops . ing seized three Kerama islands out - On 26 March, the day following th e right and established a firm foothold o n sweep of Kerama waters by the mine- two others. craft and reconnaissance of its beache s Within a six-day period, 26–31 March, by UDT personnel, Admiral Kiland' s at a cost of 31 killed and 81 wounded , Western Islands Attack Group moved the 77th Infantry Division completely into position for the assault. A battle- fulfilled its mission as the vanguard of ship, two large cruisers, and four ICEBERG Expeditionary Troops . In destroyers had been assigned to provid e the process of removing. the threat NGF support for the landing, but only posed by the Japanese to operations in the 5-inch guns of the destroyers were the Kerama anchorage, General Bruce' s used extensively . The capital ships were troops killed 530 of the enemy, captured not called on to fire but remained on 121 more, and rounded up some 1,19 5 standby. As LSTs disgorged their cargo civilians. All of the enemy were not dis- of armored amphibians and troop-laden posed of, however, for scattered Japa- assault tractors for the run to the nese soldiers remained hidden in the beaches, carrier planes orbited the hills of the various Kerama islands an d transport area to ward off Japanese even occasionally communicated with suicide planes which were beginning t o units on Okinawa.47 filter through the outer fighter screen . Marine participation in pre-L-Da y Aircraft bombed the beaches as th e activities was confined to the operation s assault waves were guided toward th e of Major James L. Jones' FMF Amphib- target by LCIs assigned to give close-i n ious Reconnaissance Battalion . For the support.46 (See Map 5. ) Keramas invasion, it was split into two At 0801, the first of the four assaul t tactical groups, one under the battalion battalions of the 77th hit its target and commander and the other under hi s in a little over an hour's time the other executive officer . Only two companies of three had attacked their own objectives. the battalion were available for antic- Before noon, General Bruce saw tha t ipated missions, since Company B had the rapid progress of his landing teams been assigned to the V Amphibiou s ashore would permit yet another land- Corps for the Iwo Jima landing and did ing that day, so he directed the 2d Bat- not return to its parent organization talion, 307th Infantry, a reserve unit, until after L-Day. to take Yakabi Shima . Since this island' s On the night of 26–27 March, while the 77th consolidated its conquests an d 9e The Support Craft Flotilla was compose d prepared for the next day's battles , of two mortar, three rocket, and four gunboa t divisions . The 42 LCIs and 54 LSMs in thi s Major Jones' men landed on and recon- unit were organized into teams of various type s noitered the reef islets comprising and assigned to a specific beach and landing. PhibGru 7 AR, dtd 26May45 . " Okinawa Operations Record, p . 66.

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 105

SEIZURE OF KERAMA RETT O MARCH 1945

LANDINGS 26 MARC H LANDINGS 27 MARC H

ZAMAM I SHIMA d

EAST CHINA SE A

MAP 5 T. L. RUSSELL

106 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Keise Shima .49 When reconnaissance of obstacles to the landing of XXIV Corp s the small group revealed no trace of th e Artillery units on Keise Shima on 3 1 enemy., the Marines reboarded thei r March., UDTs blasted a path through APDs with information of reef, beach, the off-shore coral reefs early that and terrain conditions . Their findings morning, and this completed the work were then forwarded to the 77th Divi- they had begun on the 27th. Then, after sion intelligence officer for evaluation 2/306 landed unopposed and determine d and distribution to the units which wer e that no enemy had slipped back to to land on Keise Shima. Keise after the Marine reconnaissance , During the night of 27–28 March , men and equipment of the 420th Field scouts from Company A landed o n Artillery Group went ashore and im- Aware Saki, a small island off the mediately set up to fire. By 1935, th e group's 155mm guns ("Long Toms") be- southern tip of Tokashiki Shima . Again gan registering on preselected targets there was no evidence of the enemy . The in southern Okinawa . There, the Japa- only encounter with the Japanese oc- nese later reported, they "incessantl y curred on 29 March, during early morn- obstructed our movements by laying an ing landings on Mae and Kuro Shima , abundant quantity of fire inside ou r two small islands which lie between th e positions, the fire being directed mainl y Kerama Retto and Keise Shima . At to cut off our communications ." 40 Also 0630, a suicide boat, apparently manne d landing on Keise were part of a tea m by only one soldier, was observed head- from an Army air warning squadro n ing at high speed for Mae Shima's beac h and an AAA (automatic weapons ) from Tokashiki Shima . The one-ma n platoon which, when ashore and set up , regatta was brought to a speedy an d became part of the area antiaircraft defense system. spectacular end as the explosive-lade n craft disintegrated under a hail o f Already beset by American carrier- machine gun fire . A reconnaissance o f based strikes and by ships' gunfir e Kure Shima shortly thereafter indi- which blasted Okinawa in a precise and cated no troops or civilians, nor an y businesslike manner, the Japanese fel t installations. that the artillery fire from Keise wa s In order to remove some of the overdoing it a bit . A special attack unit was formed to raid the island artiller y "e Keise Shima or Keisan Sho (sho, i n emplacements., and the 5th Artillery Japanese, is shoal or reef) is five miles WN W Command's 15cm guns were ordered to of Naha and consists of three sand-and pebble - islands ; Kuefu Shima, Naganna Shima, an d conduct counterbattery fire in an Kamiyama Shima, the last-named being tw o attempt to destroy the American Long low sandy islands separated by a 100-yard-wide Toms. Neither measure attained suc- strait. For simplicity, and in keeping with th e usage established by action reports and previ- cess, and the Thirty-second Army was ously written histories of the Okinawa cam- never able to enforce its order to "sto p paign, this small island grouping will be referred to as Keise Shima in this account also . " Okinawa Operations Record, pp. 66-67 .

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS 107

the use of enemy artillery on Keis e 6th Marine Division was told that "th e Shima." 5 0 Hagushi beaches were held in grea t Before L-Day, the floating naval bas e strength ." 5 2 in the Kerama Retto was functioning The factor which tipped the scales i n at a high pitch . From watery take-off favor of an unopposed Allied landing o n lanes, seaplanes rose to harass enem y the Hagushi beaches was General submarines and shipping in the Chin a Ushijima's decision to defend the south- Sea. Kamikaze-damaged vessels wer e east coast of Okinawa in strength . salvaged and repaired on an around-the- When the 2d Marine Division made its clock schedule, while the rearming, re- feint landings on D-Day and D plus 1 , fueling, and revictualling of health y the Japanese commander's staff believe d ships kept pace. Without this frontlin e its earlier estimate that "powerful ele- logistical facility, "many more ships an d ments might attempt a landing [on the personnel of the service force than wer e Minatoga beaches]" was fully justi- available in the Okinawa area would fied.J3 Consequently, a substantial por- have been required at sea to make re- tion of the artillery and infantr y plenishment an accomplished fact fo r strength of the Thirty-second Army was all fleet forces." 5 1 immobilized in face of a threat in th e In contrast to the conspicuous pre- southeast that never materialized. landing operations of ICEBERG force s Although Ushijima's command had in the target area, the Thirty-second prepared for an American landing else - Army was able to surround its tactical where, from the Japanese point of view dispositions with a greater degree of the Hagushi beaches remained the most secrecy. Not until after the landing on obvious target . Even while propagand a Okinawa and relentless probing by th e reports—mostly untrue—of successfu l assault forces did the Tenth Army learn Kamikaze attacks against the invasion what the strength of the enemy was an d fleet bolstered Japanese morale, th e where his positions were . Before commander of a scratch force formed L-Day, American knowledge of enem y from airfield personnel on the islan d dispositions was sketchy, and as late as warned his men not "to draw the hasty L minus 1 (31 March), the G–3 of th e conclusion that we had been able to ""32d Army OperO A #127, dtd 6Apr45, " destroy the enemy's plan of landing o n in CICAS Trans No . 266. Although this orde r Okinawa Jima." 54 The commander of directed the CO of the shipping engineers to organize a raiding unit and attack Keise on 52 the night of 6 April 1945, no contemporar y Capt Edward F . Townley, Jr., ltr to Asst records show that this operation was carrie d G-3, HQMC, dtd 4Dec65 . through . '" Okinawa Operations Record, p . 67 . RAdm Worrall R . Carter, Beans, Bullets, '1st Specially Established Regt Oper O and Black Oil (Washington : GPO, 1953), p . No . 1, dtd 30Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPO A 353, hereafter Carter, Beans, Bullets, an d Bul 107-45, Translations and Interrogation s Black Oil . No. 28 dtd 14May45 .

108 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the 1st Specially Established Regiment, been distributed, the Northern an d Lieutenant Colonel Tokio Aoyangai, Southern Attack Forces were moving proved himself clairvoyant, for in less into their transport areas ready to than 24 hours after his message had launch the assault . CHAPTER 4 The First Days Ashore

SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD ' debark troops. Off the Minatoga beache s on the other side of the island, the same Optimum weather conditions for a n preparations were conducted concur- amphibious landing prevailed at th e rently by the shipping that carried the target on L-Day when the Central 2d Marine Division . Pacific Task Forces launched the attac k Admiral Turner unleashed his force s against Okinawa on 1 April 1945 , at 0406 with the traditional order , Easter Sunday. The coming of daw n "Land the Landing Force," 2 and Oki- revealed cloudy to clear skies and a cal m nawa's ordeal began with a percussiv e sea with but a negligible surf at the overture of naval gunfire . (See Map 6 . ) shore . Moderate easterly to northeast- The enemy reacted to the landing erly winds were blowing offshore, jus t shortly after dawn as he mounted scat- enough to carry the smoke away fro m tered air attacks on the convoys . In the the beaches. To the many vetera n continuing belief that the main effort jungle fighters among the invadin g was directed at the Minatoga area, th e troops, the 75-degree temperature few Japanese aircraft not destroyed b y seemed comfortably cool. American carrier air or ships' antiair- At the target, the major naval lift craft guns disregarded the more lucra- and support elements moved into thei r tive targets off Hagushi and con- assigned areas off the Hagushi beaches . centrated on Demonstration Group Once in position, the ships prepared t o shipping. Kamikazes struck the transport Hinsdale and LST 884 as troops, Unless otherwise noted, the material i n mostly from the 3d Battalion, 2d Ma- this section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ; rines 3 and its reinforcing elements, Tenth Army AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; ILIAC AR ; were disembarking for the feint run int o 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 28Feb - 13Ju145, hereafter 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, with the beaches. Reported killed were 8 Ma- appropriate date ; 1st Mar SAR, Nansei Shoto , rines ; 37 were wounded, and 8 were dtd 25Ju145, hereafter 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar S—3 Jnl, 15Jan-26Ju145, hereafter 5th Mar S—3 2 CTF 53 AR, pt III, p. 12 . Jnl, with appropriate date ; 7th Mar SAR , Throughout this campaign narrative, th e Phase I and II, dtd 1May45, and Phase III , designation "3d Battalion, 1st Marines" will be dtd 11Ju145, hereafter 7th Mar SAR ; 6th used interchangeably with "3/1" or "BL T MarDiv SAR, Ph 1&II; 6th MarDiv Unit Jnl , 3/1," the latter number depending upon which Phase I and II, 1-22Apr45, hereafter 6th Mar- regimental unit is involved . Also, 4th Marines Div Jnl, Ph I&II, with appropriate date . The or 5th Marines is synonymous with RCT 4 o r action reports of the major component unit s RCT 5 . Reinforcing troops which make an of the 6th Marine Division are included a s infantry regiment an RCT are considered to b e annexes to the division SAR and will be cited included in the RCT designation. A BLT's separately as 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II ; 1/4 SAR, reinforcement is likewise to be included in th e Ph I&II ; 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II; etc. BLT designation . 109 110 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MAIN BATTERIES of USS Tennessee hurl tons of high explosives at Okinawa as assault amtracs head for the beachhead . (USN 80-G-319325)

AERIAL VIEW of the Hagushi anchorage and Yontan airfield on L plus 2, looking southeast from Zampa Misaki. (USN 80-G-3392.42)

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 111

listed as missing in action .4 It is some- range of this fire, neither troops nor in- what ironic that units not even sched- vasion craft were hit . During the early uled to land on Okinawa on L-Day sus- morning hours, the two battalions of th e tained the first troop casualties. 420th Field Artillery Group on Keis e Air support arrived over the target Shima received heavy enemy counter- in force at 0650 5 and the assault forces battery fire, which stopped America n began to debark ten minutes later . The unloading operations on the reef fo r transport areas became the scenes o f four hours but caused no damage. purposeful activity as troops climbe d Lying off each Okinawa invasion down landing nets into waiting landing beach were control vessels marking th e craft, while armored amphibians, an d lines of departure (LD) . Landing ve- amphibian tractors preloaded wit h hicles quickly formed into waves behin d troops and equipment, spewed forth the LD and at 0800, when the signa l from the open jaws of LSTs . At the pennants fluttering from the masts o f same time, tank-carrying LCMs (land- the control vessels were hauled down , ing craft, mechanized) floated from the the first wave, composed of LVT (A) s flooded well decks of LSDs (landing (landing vehicle, tracked (armored) ) , ships, dock) . Other tanks, rigged with moved forward to the beaches in an T–6 flotation equipment, debarked from orderly manner behind a line of support LSTs to form up into waves and make craft. Following on schedule, hundred s their own way onto the beaches. ° of troop-carrying LVTs, disposed in In reply to the murderous pounding five to seven waves, crossed the lines o f of the Hagushi beaches by 10 battle- departure at regular intervals and ships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 17 7 moved determinedly towards the shore . gunboats, the Japanese returned only Despite the ferocity of the prelanding desultory and light artillery and morta r bombardment, enemy artillery an d fire. Even though the assault wave s mortars continued scattered but ineffec- formed up in assembly areas withi n tual fire on the invasion waves as they made the 4,000-yard run to the beach . 4 2d MarDiv AR, Anx A–N. In the same attack, ships' crews sustained casualties of 1 On approaching the shoreline, the killed, 34 wounded and 10 missing. LVT (A) s fired upon suspected targets , e More than 500 planes of the Fifth Fleet while naval gunfire lifted from th e were engaged in troop support missions be- beach area to hit inland targets . Carrier tween 0700 and 1000 on L-Day. fighters that had been orbiting lazily e Medium tanks fitted with T–6 flotation de - over the two flanks of the beachhea d vices were able to proceed to the beach under began diving over the landing area and their own power, utilizing their tracks fo r propulsion . The equipment consisted of flotatio n neutralized it with repeated strafing , tanks welded to the outside of the armore d bombing, and napalming runs . vehicle, an improvised steering device, elec- As the assault waves hit the beaches, trical bilge pumps, and electrically detonate d smoke was laid down on the hills east o f charges to jettison the flotation tanks whe n Yontan to prevent enemy observation they were no longer required and once th e beach was reached . 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II , of the landing zone. On the other sid e pp. 39-41 . of the island, Demonstration Group

112 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

landing craft raced toward the Mina - wave guide officers failed to follow cor- toga beaches only to reverse thei r rect compass courses or when they di d course and retire to the transport are a not guide by clearly recognizable terrai n behind a smoke screen as the fourt h features on the shore . Some troops wer e wave crossed the line of departure. thus landed out of position . For ex- Neither the reef fringing the beache s ample, Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A. nor enemy mortar fire on the beaches Hochmuth's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines themselves interfered with the success- —assigned to Red Beach 1—was lande d ful XXIV Corps landing south of th e on the right half of Green 2 in the zon e Bishi Gawa. The eight Army assault of the 22d Marines (Colonel Merlin F. battalions were landed by six successive Schneider), and on the rocky coast lin e waves of LVTs and moved forward between Green 2 and Red 1 . (See Map without opposition . 6.) The sea wall, which had caused som e Elements of Colonel Edward W . concern to XXIV Corps planners, ha d Snedeker's 7th Marines were landed i n been breached by naval gunfire. In relatively insignificant numbers on th e anticipation of the early build-up beach of the 4th Marines (Colonel Alan ashore, engineers, landing in the first Shapley) . On the extreme right flank waves, blasted additional beach exits of the 1st Marine Division, however, the in those portions of the wall which fourth wave of RCT–5 was diverte d remained standing . Upon landing, across the corps boundary and lande d the LVT(A)s poured through thes e on the right flank of the 7th Infantry breaches, hard on the heels of the in- Division. The Marine wave consisted fantry, and moved to protect the flanks , principally of Lieutenant Colonel while amphibious trucks (DUKWs) , Charles W . Shelburne's 1/5 reserve — preloaded with 4 .2-inch mortars, an d Company B—and part of the battalion tanks rolled inland . command post group. By 0930, a suffi- Off the Marine landing zone, north o f cient number of LVTs had been sent t o the Bishi Gawa, the reef was raggedl y pick up all but one lieutenant and tw o fissured and became smoother only as it squads, who did not rejoin their paren t neared the beach . A rising tide floate d unit until. L plus 3.7 The fifth and sixth the landing vehicles over a large por- waves of the 5th Marines landed on tion of the reef and the boulders which 7 1/5 SAR, Ph I&II, dtd 29Apr45, p . 5, and fringed it. On the northern flank of the Ph III, dtd 9Ju145, hereafter 1/5 SAR . Re- 1st Marine Division, however, the larg e lating to this mixup in landing beaches, the 1s t circular section of the reef off the Blue Division Shore Party Officer wrote, "there is a point here which should not be missed Beaches presented difficulties to the . 1s t MarDiv beaches were designated Blue an d tractors attempting to cross at that Yellow and 7th Div's were Purple and Orange point, and delayed their arrival at th e from left to right as you came in from th e beach. sea. Some of the ships mounting out the 7t h During the approach of IIIAC assaul t Div did not have Purple and Orange buntin g and substituted Blue and Yellow ." Col Robert waves to assigned beaches, several in- G. Ballance ltr to CMC, dtd 22Mar55, here - stances occurred when inexperienced after Ballance ltr .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 113

MAP 6 T L. RUSSELL

114 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

their assigned beaches after the guid e All tanks in the 1st , Division assault officers of these waves corrected th e wave, landing from LCMs and LCTs , faulty course heading followed by the were on the beach by noon . One excep- fourth wave . tion was a tank that foundered in a reef Despite these unexpected deviations pothole. The captain of LST 628, carry- from the landing plan, all the LVT (A) s ing the six T—6 flotation-equipped tank s spearheading the IIIAC attack reached of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenan t the beach by 0830 and all eight assaul t Colonel Arthur J . Stuart), disregarded battalions were ashore by 0900 . The the operation plan and refused to allo w beaches had not been mined and opposi- them to launch until H plus 60 minutes .' tion to the landing consisted only of At that time, he set them in the wate r sporadic mortar and small arms fire . 10 miles off the landing beaches. These This resulted in but few casualties an d tanks finally reached shore after being caused no damage to the LVTs . "With afloat for more than five hours, but two utter consternation and bewilderment of them were hung up on the reef be- and with a great deal of relief the as- cause of the ebbing tide . Because th e sault wave landed against practically LSMs carrying Lieutenant Colone l no opposition ." 8 Stuart's reserve tanks had great diffi- As the assault troops surged up the culty in grounding on the reef on L-Day, terraced slopes behind the beaches and the first tracked vehicle off the ramp of sped inland, the center of invasion activ- one was lost in an unseen pothole . Of ity shifted from the line of departure to the four LSMs employed, two finall y the transfer line at the edge of the reef. landed their cargo late on L-Day , There, small boat, LVT, and DUKW another at noon on L plus 1, and the last control was established to unload sup - on 3 April. port troops and artillery units on call. Tanks were landed early in the 6th Supporting units continued to pou r Division zone, where each of the thre e ashore during the morning as the attack companies of the 6th Tank Battalion progressed against only slight resist- (Lieutenant Colonel Robert L . Denig, ance. At the transfer line, reserve in- Jr.) employed a different landing pro- fantry elements shifted from ships ' cedure. Tanks equipped with flotation boats into the LVTs which ha d gear swam to the reef, easily negotiated landed assault troops earlier . Flotation- the rugged coral, continued on to the equipped tanks made the beaches unde r beaches, where they jettisoned their their own power., others were landed a t pontoons and became operational by H high tide from LCMs, and the re- plus 29 minutes . The company in LCM s mainder were discharged directly ont o the reef from LSMs and LSTs. DUKWs ° In his action report, the LST captai n brought the 75mm and 105mm how- stated that he did not hold a complete copy o f the basic Fifth Fleet plan . He also commente itzers of the light field artillery bat- d that the plans held aboard his ship were dis- talions directly ashore. tributed so late that there was insufficient tim e for "`adequate planning, preparation an d 4th. Mar SAR, Ph I&II, pp. 6-7. training .' " Dir, Naval Hist ltr I.

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 115

came in at high tide (0930) and lande d pockets, built around light machine guns , without incident. The third compan y slowed the regiment only slightly as i t successfully landed directly from th e penetrated several hundred yards in - LSMs grounded on the reef but forde d land and made contact on its right with the deep water between the grounding the 7th Marines at the division bound- point and the shore with difficulty.lo ary. By midmorning, the 4th reached Soon after landing, the accelerated the airfield and found it unguarded . pace of the 6th Division assault to the Only intermittent sniper fire coming north overextended Colonel Schneider' s from beyond the field opposed the 4th 22d Marines. Troops were taken fro m Marines as it swept across the air facil- his left battalion, 2/22 (Lieutenant ity and secured its objective by 1300 . Colonel Horatio W . Woodhouse, Jr.) , The airfield was found to be essentially to guard the exposed flank. This, in turn , intact, but all buildings had been weakened the 22d attack echelon and stripped and the antiaircraft emplace- gave it a larger front than it could ade- ments contained only dummy guns . quately cover . Consequently, a consider - As this rush carried Colonel Shapley' s able gap developed between the 2d Bat- regiment beyond adjacent units, a wid e talion and the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant gap developed between its left flank and Colonel Malcolm "0" Donohoo), ad- the right of the 22d Marines, then in th e vancing on the right. In less than 20 vicinity of Hanza . Shapley's regiment minutes after the landing, Colone l jumped off again at 1330 against onl y Schneider ordered his reserve, 1/2 2 light resistance on its left . Tanks were (Major Thomas J . Myers), ashore . Upon called in to reduce several cave position s landing, the 1st Battalion (less Com- in this area . After these positions wer e pany C, remaining afloat as regimental neutralized, the attack continued slowl y reserve) was committed in the cente r through rugged, wooded terrain . In of the regimental zone . order to maintain contact with the 7th d Still meeting no opposition while i t Marines and to rectify the overextende continued the rapid move inland, b y condition of the 4th, 2/4 was release d 1000 the 22d Marines found its left from division reserve at 1500 and im- flank unit stretched dangerously thin . mediately committed on the regiment 's As he pressed the division attack to ex- left to establish contact with the 22d ploit initial success, General Shepherd Marines. anticipated Schneider's request for re- Because the division left flank wa s inforcements to cover the exposed flank , still dangerously exposed, General and asked corps to release one BLT o f Shepherd regained 1/29 (Lieutenant the 29th Marines . Colonel Jean W . Moreau) from corps . Released by IIIAC at 1300, the battalio n s During the unopposed 22d Marine landed at 1500 and, with its left flank advance on Hanza, the 4th Marines anchored on Green Beach 1, completed moved on Yontan airfield against ligh t tying in with 22d Marines at 1700. to moderate resistance. Isolated enemy The 1st Marine Division, to the 10 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II, pp. 15-16, 39-41 . south of the 6th, met with the same sur-

310-224 0 - 69 - 9

116 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

prising lack of resistance . By 0945 on flanks, the 1st Division continued its the division left, Colonel Snedeker's 7t h steady advance over the rolling checker- Marines had advanced through the vil- board terrain. In addition to having de- lage of Sobe, a first priority objective , veloped the numerous caves that honey- and the 5th Marines (Colonel John H . combed the many hillsides in the zone , Griebel) was 1,000 yards inland stand- the Japanese had begun to organiz e ing up. With the beaches clear, and in other positions throughout the area an d order to avoid losing any troops as a the Marines encountered innumerabl e result of anticipated enemy air attack s field fortifications in varying stages of against the congested transport area, th e development . These defenses, however, division reserve was then ordered were only held by small, scattered ashore. Colonel Kenneth B . Chappell' s groups of service troops and hom e 1st Marines embarked two BLTs, and guards. According to a postwar Japa- the third was to land as soon as trans- nese source, these troops comprise d portation became available. " . . . a hastily organized motley unit . . . Reserve battalions of both assault facing extreme hardship in trying to regiments were picked up by LVTs at achieve an orderly formation ." 1 2 the transfer line and shuttled to th e The principal bridge over the Bish i beach before noon. The 3d Battalion, 7th Gawa below Hiza was undamaged and Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Edward standing, 13 and local defense forces had H. Hurst), landed in the center of the made little or no effort to destroy the regimental zone of action and the n narrow bridges that spanned lesse r moved to the rear of Lieutenant Colone l streams. What proved a greater hin- Spencer S. Berger's 2/7, the left flank drance to the advance than the desultory unit. At 1400, 3/5 was positioned 40 0 enemy attempts at halting it was wha t yards behind 1/5 on the division right one observer described as "an excellen t boundary. When the 5th Marines re - network of very poor roads ." 1 4 serve was moved up behind the assaul t By 1530, the majority of IIIAC sup - battalions, the commanding officer of porting troops and artillery was ashore . 3/5, Major John A . Gustafson, went One howitzer of Colonel Robert B . forward to reconnoiter . An hour later, Luckey's 15th Marines and three of th e at 1500, his group was fired on by a 11th Marines (Colonel Wilburt S. small bypassed enemy pocket an d Brown) were lost when the DUKW s Gustafson was wounded and evacuated. carrying them foundered on the reef, His executive officer, Major Martin C . but the remaining divisional artillery of Roth, took over temporarily until 4 IIIAC was landed successfully . Even April, when Lieutenant Colonel John C . 12 Miller, Jr., assumed command .11 Okinawa Operations Record, p . 69 . " Thus disposed in depth with its re- In commenting on this section, Brigadier serve elements echeloned to guard th e General Robert G . Ballance, the shore part y officer of the 1st Marine Division, noted tha t 11 3d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 1-21Apr45, dtd the "bridge was a stone arch affair, dating 30Apr45, and 22Apr-22Jun45, dtd 10Ju145 , back around 1200 A .D." Ballance ltr. hereafter 3/5 SAR. 14 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, pp. 1-2.

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though the artillery arrived early, a blocking position to close the open flank. combination of the rapid infantr y Two 1st Marines battalions, 1/1 and advance and the resulting strain on com - 2/1 (commanded by Lieutenant Colo- munications made it difficult for for - nels James C. Murray, Jr., and James ward observers to register their bat- C. Magee, Jr ., respectively) , landed at talions. Corps artillery reconnaissanc e 1757. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. parties began landing at 1300, and Sabol's 3d Battalion was on the transfe r found that "selection of position area s line at 1800 but, unable to obtain LVTs, from map and photo study proved suit- remained in the boats all night. The 1st able in every case ."15 Battalion was attached to the 5th The advance was halted between 1600 Marines for administrative control an d and 1700, and the attacking infantr y moved inland to Furugen, while 2/1 , dug in, established contact all along th e similarly attached to the 7th Marines, IIIAC line, and carried out extensiv e dug in east of Sobe by 1845 .17 patrolling to the front . To maintain the Artillery support for the Marine in- impetus of the attack of his division o n fantry was readily available by night - L-Day, General Shepherd had com- fall . The 15th Marines had established mitted his entire reserve early. The 6t h its fire direction center (FDC) by 1700, Marine Division remained in good shap e and its batteries were registered by and was well disposed to resume the ad- 1830. All of Colonel Brown's artillery vance on the 2d. Both the 4th and 22d battalions were prepared to fire nigh t Marines still maintained a company i n defensive missions, though two of the reserve, while the corps reserve (29th 11th Marines battalions did not com- Marines, less 1/29) was located north- plete their registration because of the late arrival of spotter planes . Since west of Yontan airfield, in the vicinity - of Hanza, after its landing at 1535 . enemy action was confined to unsuccess ful attempts at infiltration of the line s General del Valle's division was un- and to intermittent mortar and machine able to close the gap on the corps gun fire in the 4th Marines sector, there boundary before dark and halted some were relatively few requirements for 600 yards to the rear of the 7th In- artillery support that first night on fantry Division on the right .16 A com- Okinawa. pany was taken from the reserve bat- ICEBERG's L-Day had been success- talion of the 5th Marines and put into a ful beyond all expectations . In conjunction with the extended initial advance 15 Henderson ltr . The same source stated : of IIIAC, XXIV Corps had capture d "The [Japanese] failure to fight for the beach - Kadena airfield by 1000, driven inland head never gave us a chance to see how well to an average depth of 3,500 yards, an d the artillery would have performed in th e assault phase. I am convinced however that it advanced south along the east coast to would have been the best field artillery suppor t the vicinity of Chatan . On 1 April, th e of the war ." le LtCol John D. Muncie ltr to CMC, dt d 17 Col Russell E . Honsowetz ltr to CMC, dt d 27Mar47 . 90ct54, hereafter Honsowetz ltr .

118 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Tenth Army had landed an estimated Major Anthony Walker's 6th Recon- 50,000 troops in less than eight hour s naissance Company was then ordere d and established a beachhead that was to reconnoiter the beaches on the north 15,000 yards wide and varied from coast of Zampa and the villages of 4,000-5,000 yards in depth . (See Map Nagahama and Maeta Saki . Walker's 7.) For the entire day's operations by scouts accomplished this mission befor e four assault divisions, casualties were noon without opposition, and whil e reported to Admiral Turner as 28 doing so, encountered 50 civilians, who killed, 104 wounded, and 27 missing . were taken into custody and transferre d to stockades. The Nagahama beach was PROGRESS INLAND reported satisfactory for landing sup - plies. Following a relatively quiet night , On the 6th Division right, the 4th which was punctuated only by sporadi c Marines advanced through rugged ter - sniper, machine gun, and mortar fire, Tenth Army units resumed the attack rain, meeting intermittent enemy re - on L plus 1 at 0730 . Perfect weathe r action. As the day wore on, however , again prevailed, as the early morning pockets of stiff resistance were increas- was cool and a bright sun soon dispelle d ingly encountered, and at 1100, 3/4 came the ground fog and haze to provide un- up against strong enemy positions, con- limited visibility . While no artillery sisting of mutually supporting caves on preparation preceded the jump off on both sides of a steep ravine . When the the second day, all guns were availabl e leading platoon entered the draw, it was on call for support fires, and registra- met by a hail of small arms fire so heavy tion of all battalions, including those o f that the Marines could not bring out the 11th Marines, had been completed . their 12 wounded until four hours later . Carrier planes were on station at 0600 "Every means of painlessly destroyin g before the attack began . the strongpoint was unsuccessfully With the resumption of the advance, tried and it was finally taken by a typi- the 6th Marine Division continued to cal `Banzai' charge with one platoo n the east, while its left flank unit, 1/29 , entering the mouth of the draw and on e began clearing operations to Zamp a platoon coming down one side of th e Misaki. Admiral Turner wanted th e two noses that formed the pocket ." 1 8 point captured as a site for a radar station. He also wanted the Black Beache s The speed of the second day's advance uncovered so that unloading operation s again caused the assault units to become could begin. Throughout the day, the overextended. About midmorning, Colo- 22d Marines and 1/29 advanced rapidly nel Shapley reported that there was a against light resistance . By 1025, the gap between his regiment and the 7t h latter unit had seized Zampa Misaki an d Marines, which he believed to be som e found that the beaches there were un- 1,000 yards south of the division bound- suitable for use by IIIAC . 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 8.

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Tenga n

o b oo t#+ ~ o o

Kadena o Airfield 0 EAS T XXx +Gushikawa o we r ., CHIN A 7 Sunabe ss oo" S E A ~;;•~°Z°o o 0 .0 o,, or, Awase

Chalon

~ • 000% . 0 ° Afanniya ( NA KA G USUKV 0°00 WA N ° Fyfeo 00 . °3

SEVERING THE ISLAN D TENTH ARMY PROGRES S 1-5 APRIL 1945 Scal e 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7

Thousands Of Yard s 0000 Daily Progress . xxxx MAC Phase Lines . T.L. RUSSELL MAP 7

120 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ary,19 and an adjustment was requested runways were ready for emergenc y by Shepherd . The 7th was ordered to landings. cover the gap, a movement that place d Spearheaded by extensive advance it ahead of 1/4. In sideslipping back to patrolling, the 1st Marine Division its own zone, 1/4 met with stiff opposi- moved out on L plus 1 unopposed excep t tion from strongly entrenched enemy for the slight interference presented b y forces similar to those that had held u p local defense units, which were part of 3/4. With the aid of a platoon of tanks , a force officially designated the 1st this position was finally reduced . The Specially Established Regiment. Acti- two battalions killed some 250 Japanes e vated by the Thirty-second Army on L in the course of the day's operations be- minus 4, it was composed of 3,473 air- fore the 4th Marines attack ceased at field service troops and Boeitai, less 1830, some 1,000 yards ahead of the L than half of whom were armed with plus 3 line. rifles. In addition, the equipment of this During the day, Major Paul F . regiment consisted of 55 light machine Sackett's 6th Engineer Battalion re - guns, and 18 grenade launchers. The paired the strips on Yontan and place d heaviest weapons of this unit were 1 0 one taxiway in good enough condition heavy machine guns and 5 20m m to permit a VMO–6 spotter plane to lan d dual-purpose machine cannon . For the at 1500. By 4 April, all three Yontan most part, the troops were completel y untrained, and even the regular Arm y ""Lack of readily identifiable terrain features made it impossible to quickly identify th e service troops had not been given such boundaries of zones of action in the rapid ad- basic infantry training as firing a vance. Maps at this time were also poor an d machine gun. difficult to follow . Hill 165 [3,600 yards west When Ushijima pulled his combat of Yontan airfield] and certain towns, how - troops south, the ever, were unmistakable . [The] 7th Marine s 1st Specially Estab- ZA was approximately 2,000 yards wide. Whil e lished Regiment had been assigned the there was some slippage to the right all along mission of servicing final air traffic o n the front, I know that 2/7 on the left and the Yontan and Kadena fields. The regi- 1/7 on the right substantially covered thei r ment was to destroy those fields on order [zone of action] . My opinion is that the left after the Americans had landed an flank of the 7th was not over 400 yards fro m d the division boundary at any time. The slant then to retire to positions from which it distance from the actual right flank of th e could deny their use to the invaders . 4th Marines and the left flank of the 7t h The 1st Battalion was located in the Marines may have been greater as the attack s 6th Division zone ; the 2d and part of of the two regiments were not at an eve n the 3d Battalion rate." BGen Edward W . Snedeker ltr to CMC , in the 1st Marine Divi- dtd 180ct54, hereafter Snedeker ltr I . "The sion area ; the remainder of the 3d Bat- maps were not accurate . The 7th felt that the y talion faced the 7th Infantry Division ; were on the boundary and so did the 4th . Who and the 5th Company of the 12th Inde- was right was never determined ." Honsowetz pendent Infantry Battalion was assem- ltr. "There was a gap, but it never was de- bled in regimental reserve at Hanza termined how much or in what area . In any . case it was not a serious gap for a maneuverin g Uniquely enough, upon interrogation of assault." Snedeker ltr 1965. some troops captured from these organ-

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 121

izations, it was found that not one knew against light opposition, hundreds of that he was in this paper organization , dazed civilians filtered through the line s and only one had ever heard of it. With- and into the paths of the assault forces . out exception, the prisoners gave as When the Marines met these Oki- their unit the service or home guar d nawans, they interrogated, screened , element with which they had served a t and sent natives back to division stock- the airfields. ades. Attempts to obtain information o f Despite their motley makeup, thei r the enemy from the older inhabitant s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colone l were stymied because of the difficultie s Tokio Aoyanagi, determined to emplo y imposed in translating the Okinawan them in slowing the advance of the in- dialect. Younger natives of high school vaders. At 1400 on L-Day, he issued an age, who had been forced to learn Japa- order directing all of his battalions to nese by the Nipponese overlords, proved hold every strongpoint, to carry out to be a lucrative source of information, night raids, to destroy all bridges, and however. to construct tank obstacles . The colonel Even though most civilians were co- pleaded for "each and every one [to ] operative with the Americans, they carry out his duty with the conviction could provide very little information of of certain victory." 20 immediate tactical importance. None- His men were poorly armed and theless, the Okinawans confirmed th e mostly leaderless. Moreover, they lacke d picture of the Japanese withdrawal to communications . When the escape the south., clarified the presence or ab- routes to the organized forces in the sence of units suspected of being in th e south were cut off, therefore, this hap- area, aided in establishing an order of hazardly organized group collapsed. battle, and revealed the general and The greater portion of these troop s specific areas to which the rest of the apparently fled to the northern hills , civilian population had fled . while a few, undoubtedly, escaped to the Military government personnel soon south ; 26 were captured and 663 killed discovered that local inhabitants had by the 1st Marine Division alone . Most moved with all their belongings to caves of those who remained in the combat dug near their homes to escape from th e area quickly divorced themselves from path of war. Although interpreters rov- the military, but other operated a s ing the area in trucks mounted wit h snipers or guerrillas dressed in civilian loudspeakers assured the natives tha t attire. they would be saved and induced them Reliable intelligence was meager an d to leave their refuges voluntarily, other hard to come by owing to the lack o f Okinawans continued to believe Japa- contact with the enemy regular forces . nese propaganda and viewed the Ameri- As tactical operations developed rapidly can "devils" as barbarians and cut- throats. In many cases, particularly i n 2° "1st Specially Established Regiment Oper O isolated regions, it was necessary fo r A2, dtd 1Apr45," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bu l 107-45, Translations and Interrogations No. language and civil affairs personnel "to 28, dtd 14May45, pp. 12-13 . enter the caves and verbally pry the

122 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

dwellers loose ." 21 Sometimes this re- creed that all able-bodied males betwee n sulted in troops coming upon a tragi c the ages of 15 and 45 years were to b e scene of self-destruction, where a father , detained for further screening togethe r fearing for the lives of his family an d with bona fide prisoners of war.23 himself at the hands of the invaders , Special agents from Army Counter- had killed his wife and children an d intelligence Corps detachments as - then had committed suicide . Fortu- signed the division assisted the Marines nately, there were no instances of mas s in interrogating and screening each mal e suicide as there had been on Saipan o r Okinawan detainee . Eventually, after in the Keramas .22 their clearance by the American agents , Specifically organized patrols wer e cooperative and intelligent natives were dispatched to round up civilians and enlisted to aid in the interrogations. transfer them to stockades in areas pre- Specially qualified Okinawans were designated in military governmen t moved to liberated villages and dis- plans. These patrols were often accom- tricts to serve as informants for the panied by language officers searchin g Island Command . for documents, but most of the materia l Even more of a problem than the in - found was of no military value . When a ability of the Marines to come to grips rewarding find was made, pertinent in - with the enemy or their difficulty in ob- formation was orally translated t o taining usable intelligence was the dis- the regimental S-2, who took down mat- location of the logistical plan and the ters of local significance . The paper was subsequent strain on supporting units then sent to the division G–2 language that resulted from the unopposed and section . rapid troop advance . The logistics annex The 1st Division learned from docu- of the operation plan had been based o n ments captured in its zone that the the premise that the landings would b e Japanese authorities had actively con- stubbornly contested, and unloading scripted Okinawan males between the priorities were assigned accordingly . ages of 17 and 45 since the bombings of When the uncontested landing permitted 10 October 1944. After their induction, the immediate debarkation of troops these men were placed into three type s who had not been scheduled ashore unti l of organizations ; regular Thirty-Second 2 or 3 April, landing craft originally Army units, specially organized engi- allocated to move cargo were diverte d neer units, and labor forces . In order t o for this troop movement. As a result, neutralize the effects that might resul t the unloading of supplies was delayed from the presence of such a large hostil e on L-Day. group in its midst, the Tenth Army de- Because the road net ranged in degree from primitive to nonexistent and in '1 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VIII, p. 2 . 22 For examples of Japanese-induced mas s ""The wisdom of these precautions wa s hysteria among civilians see : Appleman, et. at., illustrated by several incidents which confirme d Okinawa Battle, p. 58; Maj Carl W . Hoffman , our suspicions. Many a Kimono hid a uniform , Saipan : The Beginning of the End (Washing - and a number of civilians were found to b e ton : HistDiv, HQMC, 1950), p . 245 . armed ." 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VIII, p . 7.

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order to prevent traffic congestion , lieved of mine removal tasks by the un- LVTs were not sent too far inland . The finished state of Japanese defenses, but front lines were supplied, therefore, by there was no Ietup in their workload. individual jeeps, jeep trailers, weasels, Owing to the accelerated movement for - and carrying parties, or a combination ward, the "narrow and impassabl e of all four. As forward assault elements stretches of roads [and] lack of road s moved farther inland, the motor trans- leading into areas in which operation s port requirement became critical and a against the enemy were being con - realignment of unloading priorities was ducted, the engineers were called upo n necessary . As a consequence, the unload - more than any other supportin g ing of trucks from AKAs and APAs wa s unit." 25 A priority mission assigned to given the highest priority. the engineers was the rehabilitation o f By the night of L plus 1, all of the the airfields after they had been cap- units supported by the 11th Marine s tured. Their early seizure permitte d had moved beyond artillery range, an d work to begin almost immediately, an d Colonel Brown's regiment had to dis- after the engineers had reconditione d place forward. The movement of 1/1 1 Yontan airfield beyond merely emer- (Lieutenant Colonel Richard W . Wal- gency requirements, the first four - lace), in particular, was long overdue . engine transports arrived from Guam Artillery displacements were not yet on 8 April to begin evacuating th e possible, however, since organic regi- wounded .2 5 mental transportation had not lande d The only real problem facing Gen- and no other prime movers were avail - eral del Valle's units during the secon d able. Two battalions were moved for - day ashore, and one that tended to check ward on L plus 2 by shuttle movements a more rapid advance, was "the diffi- and an increased transportation capa- culty of supply created by the speed with bility, which resulted when more truck s which our units were moving and by came ashore and were made available . lack of good roads into the increasin g The other two battalions moved up o n rough terrain." 27 In viewing the lac k the 4th. Although it had been planne d of any formidable resistance to eithe r to have the bulk of Corps Artillery on one of his assault divisions, General the island by the end of L plus 1, an d Geiger gave both of them permission to all by the end of L plus 2, it was no t advance beyond the L plus 5 line with - until 10 April that General Nimmer' s out further orders from him . force was completely unloaded . "This 25 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 29 . melee resulted from the drastic change 26 Blakelock ltr . This source continues : in unloading priorities." 24 Fortunately , "These planes were required to make the re - unloading operations were improved by turn flight to Guam without refueling at Oki- L plus 2. nawa due to the shortage of AvGas ashore t o refuel the planes . Okinawa had five flights Engineer battalions organic to the daily from Guam on a nonfueling basis unti l Marine divisions were generally re - 12 April, when 500 gal/plane was furnishe d for the return flight ." 27 24 Henderson ltr . 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p . 4. 124 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

BEWILDERED CIVILIANS wait to be taken to military government camps in the wake of the swift American advance across the island . (USMC 117288)

TWO MARINES of the 6th Division safeguard a young Okinawan until he can be reunited with his family. (USMC 118933)

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By 1500 of L plus 1, the progress of planned for the second night ashore , the 5th Marines had caused its zone of they were not called for. action to become wider, and in order t o On this day in the XXIV Corps zone , secure the division right flank and main- the Army divisions also were able t o tain contact with the 7th Infantry Divi- exploit unexpectedly light resistance . sion, the 1st and 2d Battalions of th e The 7th Infantry Division had reached 1st Marines were echeloned one behin d the east coast at Tobaru overlookin g the other on the corps boundary. Upon Katsuren Wan (Bay), effectively cut- landing that morning, 3/1 moved inland ting the island in half and severing th e to a point east of Sobe and remained enemy line of communications . Units of there in division reserve . the 96th Division had advanced to the As the 1st Marine Division had not east and south, and succeeded in pene- yet located the center of the enemy de- trating irregularly defended positions, fenses or determined his strength, "th e some of which consisted merely of road weakness of the resistance . . . [re- mines and booby-trapped obstacles . At mained] a source of astonishment" to the end of L plus 1, General Bradley' s y General del Valle.28 During the day , front lines extended from the vicinit attempts at infiltration and the occa- of Futema on the west coast to approxi- sional ambushing of patrols by smal l mately one mile west of Unjo in the hostile groups had little effect on th e east. tactical situation. When the troops du g By the close of 2 April, all assault in at 1600, the division position wa s division command posts had been estab - stabilized for the night on a line gen- lished ashore, and the beachhead and erally conforming to the L plus 5 line in the bulk of the high ground behind th e the 7th Marines zone, while the 5th wa s landing beaches firmly secured . Enemy slightly short of it . observation of Tenth Army movemen t and dispositions was thus limited, an d t To search out enemy positions, the 1s any land-based threat to unloading Reconnaissance Company (1st Lieuten- operations removed . o ant Robert J. Powell) was ordered t Commenting on the conduct of scout the division zone on 3 April, tak- Marine operations for the two days , ing a route that followed along th e General Buckner signalled General e corps boundary to the base of th Geiger : Katchin Peninsula on the east coast . On this same day, the assault regiments I congratulate you and your comman d were to continue the attack with an ad- on a splendidly executed landing and substantial gains in enemy territory. I have vance to the L plus 10 line. Because full confidence that your fighting Marine s there had been only slight activity on will meet every requirement of this cam- the 1st Division front during L plus 1 , paign with characteristic courage, spirit , the 11th Marines fired only five mis- and efficiency .2 9 sions. While night defensive fires were During the night of 2—3 April, enemy activity was confined to sporadic sniper, 28 LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to CMC, dt d 29Sep54, hereafter del Valle ltr. 29 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 3Apr45 .

126 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire , by a reinforced platoon from the 6th and intermittent infiltration attempt s Tank Battalion, the tank-infantry re- by individuals and small groups. Unde- connaissance force completed the as- terred by this harassment, General signment and returned to its lines be - Geiger's corps jumped off at 0730 on the fore nightfall . In the course of the 3d and again found slight opposition t o patrol, the Marines made no enemy con- the attack. tacts and were fired upon only once The 6th Marine Division resumed the from the vicinity of Ishikawa . offense in the same lineup with whic h While 1/4, the right battalion, had it had ended the previous day . (See Map relatively easy going most of the day, 7.) Both the 4th and 22d Marines ad- 3/4 on the left lagged behind because of vanced an average of more than 7,00 0 the increasingly difficult terrain . When yards through difficult and heavil y the division attack ceased at 1700, Gen- broken terrain to seize the dominatin g eral Shepherd's troops were tied in with Yontan hill mass and the division objec- the 1st Division nearly a mile northeas t tive beyond. While the 22d Marines of Kubo. moved forward, 1/29 patrols covere d Following its sweep of Zampa Misaki , the entire Zampa Misaki without dis- Lieutenant Colonel Moreau's 1/29 oc- covering any enemy troops on the cupied new reserve positions east o f peninsula. There was no repetition o f Yontan airfield from which it could sup - the fierce clashes experienced by the 4th port either division assault regiment . Marines the preceding two days. At 2000, when IIIAC warned of an im- Throughout the day, the division wa s minent enemy airborne attack, Moreau supported by tanks, which operated was reinforced with a tank company , along the hazardous narrow trails exist- which was deployed to defend the air - ing on the precipitous ridge tops to th e field by 2300 ; no Japanese paratroops front. or airborne infantry landed that night . By midmorning, the axis of advanc e The only notable enemy activity ex- of the 6th Division began to swing to perienced by the 1st Division during the the north as the towns of Kurawa and hours of darkness, 2–3 April, occurre d Terabaru were gained. Scattered rear- in the 7th Marines sector where th e guard action from withdrawing enem y Japanese attempted extensive infiltra- troops was the only resistance en - tion. In the fire fight that ensued, 7 countered by the 22d Marines advanc- Marines were killed and 7 wounded , ing on Nakadomori. In order to develop while approximately 20–25 of th e the situation on the division front and would-be infiltrators perished. to determine the nature of Japanese This brief flurry was not an indica- defenses in the Ishikawa Isthmus, Gen- tion of an imminent major engagement, eral Shepherd ordered his reconnais- for when del Valle's three combat teams sance company to scout the coastal road pushed forward on 3 April they met from Kurawa to Nakadomori, and, a t only light opposition on the left and that point, to cross the isthmus to virtually none on the right . "Our ever- Ishikawa. Supported and transported widening zone of action prohibited the

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`hand-in-hand' advance of some small fire had been received . Shortly there- island operations and our units were after, Colonel Snedeker received per - able to maintain contact and clear their mission to exploit what appeared to b e areas only by patrolling to the flanks an apparent enemy weakness and to and front." 30 With the resumption o f continue the attack after the rest of th e the advance, motorized units of the 1st division had ended it for the day. He Reconnaissance Company began a series then ordered his reserve battalion to of patrols which were to encompas s pass between 1/7 and 2/7 and advanc e almost all of the division zone of action. towards the village of Hizaonna, on th e In the morning, the Ikebaru-Napunj a high ground overlooking the eas t area was reconnoitered, after which th e coast.32 company was ordered to proceed dow n The major fighting in this advance the Katchin Peninsula. Completing thi s occurred when the 81mm mortar mission by 1300, Lieutenant Powell' s platoon was unable to keep up with th e scouts were ordered up the east coast rest of 3/7. Company K, following the to Hizaonna and to return to divisio n mortars, became separated from th e lines before dark . During the entire main body upon reaching a road fork trip the only sign of enemy activity wa s near Inubi after night had fallen . When a lightly held tank trap . he became aware of the situation, Lieu - All units of the division were ordere d tenant Colonel Hurst radioed the com- to halt at 1700 on ground most favor- pany to remain where it was and to di g able for defense . On the left, the 7th in after its repeated attempts to rejoin s Marines had pushed forward against the battalion were defeated by darknes . An estimated moderate opposition over increasingl y and unfamiliar terrain platoon-sized enemy group then en- difficult terrain . As the regimenta l gaged the Marines in a heavy fire fight, commander later stated : which continued through the night as The movement from the west coast land- 32 ing beaches of Okinawa across the islan d 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 3Apr45 ; Col Edwar d to the east coast was most difficult becaus e H. Hurst, interview with HistBr, G—3 Div , of the rugged terrain crossed. It was phys- HQMC', dtd 3Mar55 . "The forced march of over ically exhausting for personnel who had three miles of the Third Battalion, Seventh been on transports for a long time . It als o Marines to Hizaonna, late on 3 April is note - presented initially an almost impossibl e worthy. Orders for the march were not issued supply problem in the Seventh's zone of until about 1430 on that date . Information reaction because of the lack of roads.31 ceived from the Division Reconnaissance Com- pany indicated no substantial enemy strength Despite these hardships, Snedeker' s on the east coast in the Seventh's zone . What troops gained 2,700 yards of enemy might be encountered from the front line to territory and dug in for the night afte r the east coast was unknown . The march was h made over rugged unfamiliar terrain, with the overrunning a strongpoint from whic probable expectancy of meeting enemy forces heavy mortar, 20mm, and small arms at any time, and it resulted in advance elements, including the battalion CO reachin g 30 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p . 5 . Hizaonna at 1830, 3 April . Hizaonna was at 31 Col Edward W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, dtd that time well beyond our front lines . . . ." 27Mar47, hereafter Snedeker ltr 1947 . Snedeker ltr 1947.

128 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the Japanese effectively employed By the end of L plus 2, the 1st Marin e mortars, machine guns, and grenades Division had driven to the coast, ad- against the isolated unit . By noon on 4 vancing 3,000—5,000 yards, and thu s April, a rescue team from 3/7 was abl e placed its lines 8—13 days ahead of the to bring the situation under control an d ICEBERG schedule . The 6th Division , the company was withdrawn after hav- meanwhile, had moved through difficult ing sustained 3 killed and 24 wounded .33 and heavily broken terrain honey- With its right flank anchored o n combed with numerous caves to gain Nakagusuku Wan, 1/1 held a line seal- 3,500—7,000 yards of enemy ground in ing off two-thirds of the Katchi n its zone. Peninsula . The 2d Battalion, 1st At dark on 3 April, the 6th Division Marines, meeting negligible resistance left flank was anchored at the base of from armed civilians., occupied the high the Ishikawa Isthmus, thereby placin g ground immediately west of Gushikawa , the Tenth Army 12 days ahead of where the eastern shore could be cov- schedule in this area. During this same ered by fire . During the day's gains, day, the XXIV Corps had reached th e "supply had been almost nonexistent eastern coast in force and its units ha d and the troops were without water an d begun reorganizing and regrouping fo r still depending on the food they landed the attack to the south . The 7th Infantry with." 3 4 Division had secured the Awashi Pen- The advance of the 5th Marine s insula, and pivoting southward in a co - gained momentum throughout the day , ordinated move with the 96th Division , the troops having met only a four-man secured an additional 3,000 yards befor e enemy patrol . The 1st Battalion reache d the end of the day. In the vicinity of Agina, where 3/5 was committed on the Kuba-saki, the 32d Infantry came u p right to contact 2/1 . One thousand against its first real opposition on Oki- yards away, on the left of the regiment nawa, when it made contact with an 2/5 occupied the village of Tengan and enemy force estimated at 385 men. The then advanced to the east coast of Oki- regiment overran the enemy positio n nawa.3 and finally took Kuba-saki. After com-

" Hurst interview, op . cit. ; 1st MarDiv Inter- pleting the wheel to the right, the 96t h views, Co K, 7th Mar . This last source consists Division reorganized its front lines , of a series of interviews conducted by Ser- putting its units in position for the geants Kenneth A . Shutts and Paul Trilling, southerly drive . historians assigned to the 1st Marine Divisio n While observation planes, OYs (Con- for the Okinawa operation . These interviews form a valuable record of the importan t solidated-Vultee Sentinels), operate d actions of the campaign at the small-unit level . from Yontan airfield during the day, '* 1st Mar SAR, p . 6. the 6th Engineer Battalion and the 58t h ""This was accomplished by 1700 on 3 Seabees continued working on the field . April . 2/5, commanded by LtCol W . E. Bene- An F6F (Grumman Hellcat) from th e dict, had marched approximately eight mile s carrier Hancock made an emergency over hilly country since 0800 when they lef t their 2 April position near Ishimine ." Col John landing at 1110, and the pilot reported H. Griebel ltr to CMC, dtd 18Oct54 . that, in his opinion, the runway could

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 129

satisfactorily accommodate all types o f west coastal road . All the while, he sent carrier planes . The other runways wer e patrols inland along the route to main- expected to be operational for fighter - tain contact with 1/22 patrol columns type aircraft by noon on the 4th . in the interior of the regimental attac k Because of the very favorable situ- zone. On the right, the 3d Battalion ation that had developed during the day , reached Ishikawa before noon, having General Buckner removed all restric- gradually pinched out the 4th Marine s tions he had placed on movement pas t when that regiment reached the coas t the L plus 10 line and ordered IIIAC to at about the same time . Colonel Shapley seize the L plus 25 line at the earliest was then ordered to reconsolidate his possible time. Geiger then ordered the unit in the Ishikawa area, and to pre - 6th Marine Division to continue the pare to support either division flank attack on 4 April and to take the L plus unit in the attack northward. In the 15 line, prepared to continue the ad- course of the morning operations, ex- vance to the L plus 20 line. General de l ceedingly rough terrain, and the logisti- Valle's division was ordered to advance cal support problems it posed, created to the L plus 20 line . (See Map 7 . ) greater obstacles to the advance tha n The continuing cool and clear weather did the enemy . on 4 April again served as a welcome At 1300, the attack up the Ishikawa change from the torrid humidity of th e Isthmus was resumed, with RCT–22 and Philippines and the Solomons. Follow- 1/29 attached 36 taking over the entir e ing a quiet night, broken only by th e division front from the west to the east fighting in the Inubi area, the IIIAC coast. Advance was rapid in the after- jumped off on schedule at 0730 on L noon as patrols met only scattered re- plus 3. sistance until 1730, when a Japanes e As the 6th Division pushed forward, strongpoint, built around several heav y no enemy hindered the 4th and 22d machine guns, fired upon a 3/22 patro l Marines advance to the L plus 15 line . north of Yaka . Night defenses were not General Geiger's reserve, the 29th taken up until after this obstacle wa s Marines (Colonel Victor F . Bleasdale) , reduced by units of Donohoo's 3/22 an d less its 1st Battalion, had reverted to Moreau's 1/29, the latter having as- division control earlier, and Shepherd sumed the 1/22 sector when Majo r assigned it as his reserve . When it be- Myers' unit was placed in regimenta l came apparent that the day's objectives reserve. would be reached by noon, the assault When the 6th halted for the day, its regiments were ordered to continue be- Marines had advanced over 7,500 yards yond the L plus 15 line to additionally and held a line that stretched across the assigned division objectives . isthmus from a point just south o f With all three battalions in the as- Yakada on the west coast to Yaka o n sault, the 22d Marines reached their ae After being relieved of its Yontan airfiel Phase I objective at 1250 . Organized a s d defense mission, 1/29 moved to Nakadomari a fast tank-infantry column, Lieutenant in the morning and was attached to the 22 d Colonel Woodhouse's 2/22 sped up the Marines at 1155, when it moved up to the lines.

130 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

the east. In this day's fighting, the in- regarding the units represented by creasingly rugged terrain forecast th e these men, who employed rifles, gre- difficulties to be faced during the march nades, bayonets, and sharply pointe d northward . Supply lines were strained bamboo spears, which the Marines almost to their limit as they were ex- promptly dubbed "idiot sticks." 37 tended across numerous ravines and In the center of the division line, th e steep valleys in the mountainous in- 5th Marines reached the shores of terior. Despite this, the troops were fe d Kimmu Wan by early afternoon, when and logistical replenishment continued the battalions consolidated their posi- as the division prepared to continue the tions and established firm contact wit h advance the next day. all flanking units. The same day, the 1st With the exception of the few enem y Marines occupied Katchin Peninsula in positions encountered in its push to th e orderly fashion by noon and set up its east coast, the 1st Marine Division stil l defenses. Once these two regiments were did not have a clear picture of what in position on the L plus 15 line, they Japanese defenses lay ahead on 4 April . initiated patrolling to the rear to elimi- As on the day before, the attack jumped nate bypassed positions, a task in which off without artillery preparation. Rapid the reconnaissance company and the di - progress with little resistance was th e vision reserve (3/1) also participated . general order, except on the left where That evening, 3/1 was ordered to tak e the 7th Marines was still busy with the over the defense of Yontan airfield fro m enemy in the vicinity of Inubi . The 2d the 29th Marines on 5 April . Tentative Battalion reached the east coast by 113 0 plans were formulated to release the 7th and, shortly thereafter, made firm con - Marines to IIIAC in order to assist th e tact with the 4th Marines. On the ex- 6th Division in its drive north . The next treme right of the regiment, light bu t day, the 7th Marines (less Hurst's 3/7, stubborn enemy fire enfiladed the 1/ 7 which was attached to the 5th Marines ) right flank, and delayed its arrival a t went into IIIAC reserve with orders t o the coast until 1700 . Because of th e occupy and defend the village of rapid advance of the regiment over a Ishikawa, pending further tactical de- roadless terrain, Colonel Snedeker re- velopments.38 quested supply airdrops during the day. In the course of its four-day drive The first drop was made at Hizaonna at across Okinawa, the 1st Marine Divi- 1400, about the same time that Genera l sion found only negligible resistance , del Valle's new CP was opening at a and this from Japanese units of unde- point between Ikebaru and Napunja. termined strength employing delayin g After dark, when the 7th Marines or rearguard tactics. The question re- was consolidating its positions on the L mained : Where was the enemy? The plus 15 line, the enemy began numerou s division had killed 79 Japanese, cap- attempts at infiltrating American lines . 3' 1st MarDiv SAR, chap . VII, p . 6. Although 45 Japanese were killed as " "A History of the 7th Marines on Okinaw they probed the regimental positions, i a t Shima," p . 7, end A to Snedeker ltr 1947 , was difficult to obtain any information hereafter 7th Mar Hist.

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tured 2 prisoners of war (POWs), an d An increasing volume of enemy de- encountered 500–600 civilians, wh o fensive fires was placed on the Arm y were quickly interned. divisions as they moved out for their To the south of the 1st Division, th e fifth day of ground action. On the XXIV tactical situation in the XXIV Corps Corps left flank, resistance came mainl y zone had been undergoing radica l from small, scattered enemy groups i n change. (See Map 7.) Army assault the hills and ridges bordering the east divisions had aggressively exploite d coast. In the 96th Division zone to the the initial lack of enemy resistance. right, both assault regiments became During the same time, they wer e heavily engaged with Japanese outpost hampered less by supply difficultie s strongpoints during L plus 4 . About than the Marine divisions had been . noon, an enemy counterattack wa s Once General Hodge's divisions ha d broken up by tank-artillery supported wheeled to the right on 3 April for the infantry action just when the right drive southward, the lines were reorgan- flank regiment of the 96th, the 383d In- ized and preparations made for fresh fantry, drove unsuccessfully against the assault units to effect passage of the first of a series of prepared ridge posi- lines the next day. The corps was now tions guarding the approaches to ready for the Phase I southern drive. Kakazu. Four tanks were lost during The 7th Division pushed forward on the day's fighting, one to a mine and 4 April only to meet stiffening re- the others to enemy antitank fire . Com- sistance from hostile artillery-sup- pared to the long advances of the previ- ported infantry at Hill 165.39 After a ous four days of ground action, the 96th day's fighting, the division drove th e Division was able to take only 400 yards Japanese from this dominant piece o f on L plus 4 . terrain and continued forward to net THE SWING NORTH 4 0 approximately 1,000 yards for the day. Meanwhile, in the 96th Division zone , Although the Japanese forces in the Army infantry battalions were held up south offered an increasingly stiff de- by reinforced enemy company strong - fense as their positions were uncovered , points several times during the day . the exact whereabouts of the main Heavy Japanese machine gun, mortar, enemy strength in the northern part o f and artillery fire impeded the advance , the island remained as clouded as wa s but by the night of 4 April, the XXIV his order of battle. Even though Phase Corps had seized the L plus 10 line , I of the ICEBERG plan did not specif y which had been originally designate d any action beyond isolation of the are a the southernmost limit of the Tenth Army beachhead . 40 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n this section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ; ae The reader should keep in mind the fact Tenth Army AR ; ILIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; that elevation was expressed in meters on the 1st MarDiv G–3 Jnl; 1st Mar SAR ; 6th Mar- basic 1 :25,000 map used for Okinawa. When Div SAR, Ph I&II ; 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II ; Hill 165's metric height is converted to feet , 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph 544, it becomes a sizable hill. I&II; 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II . 310-224 0 - 69 - 10

132 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

above the Ishikawa Isthmus for the patrols . . . often under fire, added greatl y IIIAC, General Buckner believed that to the ability of the leaders of smal l units.41 it would be profitable to exploit initia l Marine successes . As a result, on 5 Because it was necessary to mov e April he ordered IIIAC to reconnoiter supplies forward to support the ad- Yabuchi Shima, to conduct a vigorous vance, the 6th Division delayed H-Hour reconnaissance northwards to th e on the 5th until 0900. At that time, Motobu Peninsula, and to initiate prep- armor-supported infantry columns wer e arations for the early completion of dispatched on deep reconnaissances up Phase II. (See Map II, Map Section .) both sides of the isthmus, the 6th Recon- naissance Company on the left (west ) At the same time that the 6th Divi- flank and Company F, 4th Marines on sion conducted its reconnaissance u p the right. The latter advanced 14 miles the isthmus, the 1st Division entered a before turning back in the late after- period devoted primarily to defensive noon. During the day, the patrol had activity. Supplies were brought up been delayed three times by undefended from the rear, positions were improved roadblocks but met no opposition unti l and camouflaged, and all units began the tanks entered Chimu., where two of heavy patrolling to the rear. At noon on the enemy encountered were killed and L plus 4., a 1st Marines patrol waded a Japanese fuel truck was destroyed . across the reef to Yabuchi Shima fro m The drive up the other side of the islan d the Katchin Peninsula, captured fiv e was unopposed, but the tanks could no t Boeitai, and reported the presence of bypass a destroyed bridge at Onna. The some 350 civilians . reconnaissance company, forced to con- The nearly perfect weather which tinue on to Nakama by foot, returned to had prevailed since L-Day, deteriorate d the lines that evening. with light rain over scattered areas in While 6th Division mobile coverin g the early evening of the 5th . Although forces searched out routes of advance , there was no evidence that it was organ- the assault battalions rapidly move d ized, enemy activity behind the line s forward, detaching companies as neces- increased during the day but only fro m sary to reduce bypassed enemy pockets small separated groups apparently oper- of resistance inland . Although the ter- ating independently of each other . Of rain had become more difficult to nego- this period, a regimental commander tiate and the enemy increasingly active , noted : the division gained another 7,000 yards . There [were] almost daily patrol con- The 22d Marines held the general lin e tacts with well-armed enemy groups . . . . Atsutabaru-Chimu, with the 4th Ma- Some of these groups were wanderin g rines (less 1/4 bivouacked at Ishi- aimlessly about while others occupied wel l kawa) 42 located in assembly areas jus defended, organized, and concealed posi- t tions . These patrol operations were ex- behind the front line, prepared to pas s tremely valuable in giving to the officer s through early the next day. At 1000 on and men of the regiment added confidenc e 41 in each other and helped all to reach a peak Snedeker ltr 1947 . of physical perfection . . . independent " 1/4 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 7. THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE

HEAVY UNDERGROWTH on the Zshikawa Isthmus hinders the progress of a 4th Marines patrol advancing to the north of Okinawa. (USMC 116527)

GRINNING TROOPS of the 29th Marines in M-7s heading for Chuta in their drive towards Motobu Peninsula. (USMC 117507)

134 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the 5th, the 29th Marines were release d usual by the fact that three bridges to parent control by IIIAC and moved t o along the route had 'been bombed out an assembly area in the vicinity of Onna. earlier by friendly air . As the 6th Division began its dash The 4th Marines resumed operations up the isthmus on 6 April, the 7th the next morning deployed in the same Marines in corps reserve patrolled th e manner in which it had halted the night division zone south of the Nakadomari- before-3/4, 1/4, and 2/4 in that order . Ishikawa line 43 while the 6th Recon- The advance on L plus 6 was virtuall y naissance Company mopped up enemy a repeat of the previous day as th e remnants from this boundary north t o regiment continued the push up the east the Yakada-Yaka line. After its lines had coast, the lead battalion dissipating its been passed by the 29th Marines on th e strength with the dispatch of patrol s left and the 4th Marines on the right, into the interior . As a result, the 1s t the 22d reverted to division reserve an d Battalion (Major Bernard W . Green ) began patrolling back to the area of passed the 3d at noon and led the way responsibility of the reconnaissanc e to the regimental objective, opposed company. only by the difficult terrain, poor roads , Because there were only a few road s and fumbling enemy defense measures . inland, Colonel Shapley planned to move Nearly all such efforts failed, how- rapidly up the main road along the ever, for in very few instances was the shore, detaching patrols from the ad- 6th Division drive slowed . Enemy de- vance guard to reconnoiter to thei r fensive engineering efforts were almost source all roads and trails into the amateurish, for abatis, with neither mountainous and generally uninhabited mines nor booby traps attached or wire d interior . In order to maintain control in place, were pushed aside easily by during the anticipated rapid advance , tank-dozers or bulldozers. Even basic the regimental march CP moved out i n defensive combat engineering principle s a jeep convoy at the head of the main were violated by the Japanese, who di d body. By 1300, 2/4 had been used u p not distribute their mines in roads an d by the detachment of small patrols, an d defiles in depth. They even failed to the 3d Battalion then passed through i n cover with either infantry fire or wir e accordance with the prearranged pla n what they had placed . On the whole, the of leapfrogging the battalions . When the mines were little more than a nuisanc e regiment halted for the day at 1600, it and caused but few casualties .44 Bridges had advanced seven miles, encounterin g were often incompletely destroyed b y only scattered enemy stragglers . The Japanese demolitions, and Marine engi- supply operations of the 4th Marines neers were able to save valuable time on L plus 5 were hampered more tha n by utilizing the remaining structural

43 members as foundations for new span s Effective at 0600 on 7 April, the rea r boundary of the 6th Division was readjusted to in hasty bridge construction . exclude the area south of this line. IIIA C OperO 2-45, dtd 6Apr45 . 44 6th EngrBn SAR, Ph I&II, chap VIII, p . 3.

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 135

When the 6th Division drive toward s April, again with little difficulty . Ad- the north began, each assault regiment vance armored reconnaissance element s was assigned one company of the 6t h reached Nago at noon to find the town Engineer Battalion in direct support . A leveled by naval gunfire, air, and artil- platoon from each of these companie s lery. Before dark, the regiment had was attached to advance guards to clea r cleared the ruins and organized posi- roadblocks, remove mines, and build by- tions on its outskirts . passes for combat vehicles aroun d As the advance northwards continued , demolished bridges . The remainder of the difficult road situation had made i t each company followed up the advance, imperative to locate forward unloading repairing and replacing bridges an d beaches from which the 6th Divisio n widening narrow thoroughfares wher- could be supplied . (See Map II, Map ever possible to accommodate two-way Section.) When Nago was uncovered, it traffic. Following closely in the wake of was found suitable for this purpose, and the assault regiments, the third com- IIIAC requested the dispatch to thi s pany of the engineer battalion further point of Marine maintenance shippin g improved roads and bridges . from the Hagushi anchorage. On 9 At the end of the Ishikawa Isthmus , April, cargo was discharged for the first where the mountains came down to the time at Nago, relieving the traffic con- sea, engineer services were in eve n gestion on the supply route up the coast greater demand as they were required from Hagushi .46 to widen roads that were little more tha n When planning for ICEBERG, Gen- trails.45 The infantry advance was eral Shepherd had determined that slowed by the terrain as well as by the Major Walker's company would be em- near-physical exhaustion of the patroll- ployed only in the reconnaissance mis- ing Marines, who had been going u p sion for which it was best fitted an d and down the thickly covered broke n trained. In effect, the unit was intended ground. Despite this tortuous journey, to serve as the commanding general' s the 4th Marines had made another seve n miles by the late afternoon of 7 April . mobile information agency . Pursuant to Then, just north of Ora, the 1st Bat- this decision, the reconnaissance com- talion set up a perimeter defense with pany, supported and transported by its flanks secured on the coast . Colone l tanks, was dispatched up the west coast Shapley's CP and weapons company road ahead of the 29th Marines in an were located in the village itself, whil e effort to ascertain the character o f 3/4 and 2/4 were deployed in defensiv e Japanese strength on Motobu . After the perimeters at 1,000-yard intervals dow n company scouted Nago, it swung up the the road . coastal road to Awa, and then, after re - On the west coast, the 29th Marine s tracing its steps to Nago, crossed th e had seized its next objective on 7 base of the peninsula in a northeasterl y

46 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 4e Blakelock ltr 1965 .

136 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

direction to Nakaoshi.47 Before return- of the drive up the Ishikawa Isthmus. ing to Nago for the night, the patrol un- Four days later, when resistance on covered much more enemy activity tha n Motobu Peninsula began to stiffen, the had been previously revealed in the 15th Marines was reinforced further by division zone of action and had me t the attachment of the 1st Armored several enemy groups that were eithe r Amphibian Battalion as artillery. The destroyed or scattered . following day, the corps artillery sup- From the very beginning of the drive porting the advance was moved to to the base of the Motobu Peninsula, th e Besena Misaki, a promontory at the 15th Marines was employed so that each southern extremity of Nago Wan, wher e assault regiment had . one artillery bat- it remained throughout the period of talion in direct support and one in gen- Marine operations in the north .48 eral support. The rapidity of the 6th Division advance during this phase o f MOTOBU UNCOVERED the campaign forced the artillery regiment to displace frequently, averaging Owing to the lack of intelligence about one move a day for each battalion and the location of the enemy, and a Tent h the regimental headquarters . To keep Army order to avoid unwarranted de- up with the fast moving infantry, the struction of civilian installations unles s artillerymen were forced to strip thei r there was a clear indication or confirma - combat equipment to a bare minimum ; tion of enemy presence, naval gunfire they substituted radio for wire com- support was not used extensively in the munications and by leapfrogging units , drive up the Ishikawa Isthmus . After managed to keep at least one artiller y 5 April, however, all IIIAC naval fir e battalion in direct support of each as- support was diverted to the 6th Division sault infantry regiment throughout the zone of action. As the Marines moved advance up the isthmus.48 north, these ships kept pace, firing u p the numerous ravines leading down t o Augmenting the 15th Marines, 6t h the beach. Each assault battalion was Division artillery support was rein- , forced by the 2d Provisional Field Artil- furnished a call-fire ship during the day and each regiment was furnished a shi p lery Group (Lieutenant Colonel Custi s .5° Burton, Jr.) which displaced to posi- to fire illumination at night tions north of Nakadomari on the ev e The Tenth Army gained land-base d air support when TAF squadrons fro m " It was later revealed that, as the 6th MAG–31 and -33 arrived ashore on 7 Reconnaissance Company moved westward toward Awa, the Japanese were close on th e '° IIIAC Arty AR, pp . 20-21 . At this time , company's northern flank, observing its move- LtCol Burton's group consisted of only th e ment, and holding fire . CMC [Gen Lemuel C . Headquarters Battery and the 7th 155mm Gu n Shepherd . Jr .] memo to Head, HistBr, G- 3 Battalion, as the remainder of the IIIA C Div, HQMC, dtd 2Mar55, hereafter Shepherd Artillery gun and howitzer battalions ha d memo II ; LtCol Anthony Walker ltr to CMC , passed to XXIV Ccrps control on 7 April . Ibid., dtd 3Jun55. p. 19 . " 15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, n .p. '° Ibid., p . 39. THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 137

JAPANESE 105MM GUN captured .in the heart of Mount Yae Take had previously commanded the entire coastal road along southern Motobu Peninsula . (USMC 122207)

SUICIDE BOATS found at Unten Ko on 10 April by Marines of 2129. Note warning that boats had been booby trapped . (USMC 127905)

138 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and 9 April.51 The 6th Division did not During the next five days, the 4th an d need them immediately during the first 22d Marines combed the interior and two weeks in the north, however, for th e patrolled in the north, while the 29th division advance had been rapid an d probed westward to uncover the enemy suitable targets scarce . Daylight com- defense.53 On L plus 7, 2/29 move d bat air patrols were flown almost as soo n northeast from Nago to occupy the smal l as the squadrons landed, but strikes i n village of Gagusuku . The 1st Battalion , support of ground operations did no t initially in reserve, was ordered to send begin until L plus 12, and then they were one company to secure the village of directed at Japanese targets in the Yamadadobaru, a mission accomplished XXIV Corps zone in the south . As enemy by Company C at 0900 . An hour later , resistance stiffened on Motobu Penin- the battalion as a whole was ordered t o sula, Marine air was called upon to the aid of Company H, 3/29,54 which destroy emplacements, observatio n had encountered heavy resistance in th e posts, and troop concentrations.5- vicinity of Narashido . By 1500, 1/29 After the division had gained the bas e had converged on this point and, despit e of the Motobu Peninsula and had ,begu n heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire , extending reconnaissance operations t o had reduced two strongpoints, afte r the west on 8 April, aerial observation and photo studies confirmed the fact ^' In this five-day sparring period "the 29t h had a platoon of war dogs attached. These dogs that the enemy had chosen to make hi s gave an excellent account of themselves . final stand in the rugged mountains of Twenty-nine alerts were noted by the regi- the peninsula. In order to reduce this mental S—3 section . All [alerts] enabled the Japanese bastion, and at the same tim e Marine patrol involved to avoid a Japanese e maintain flank security and continue th e ambush . In one instance a patrol leader chos to ignore the dogs and was badly wounded ." drive to the northernmost tip of Oki- LtCol Angus M . Fraser Ur to CMC, dtd nawa, General Shepherd needed to re - 24Mar55, hereafter Fraser ltr . 2/29 SAR, P h orient the axis of operations and re - I&II, p . 4 . deploy his forces . Consequently, the 22 d " "Prior to a reorganization of Marine divi- Marines was taken out of division re - sions in the spring of 1944, each infantr y serve and set up on a line across the battalion had five companies : headquarters, weapons, and three rifle companies . When the island from Nakaoshi to Ora to cove r weapons companies (D, H, and M) were ab- the right and rear of the 29th Marines sorbed [by their respective battalions], th e attacking to the west . Assembled nea r rifle companies retained their original alpha- Ora, also, was the 4th Marines, whic h betical designations, so that the three battalions of a regiment had companies lettered : was positioned to support either the 1st Bn, A, B, and C ; 2d Bn, E, F, and G ; 3d 29th Marines on Motobu or the 22d i n Bn, I, K, and L . The 2d and 3d Bns of the 29th the north . Mar, formed after this reorganization too k place, were lettered straight through in se- " TAF WarD, Apr45 . quence after 1/29 . Therefore, the rifle com- 52 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, p . 14 . panies of the 29th Mar were A, B, and C i n The 6th Division received its first TAF support the 1st Bn, D, E, and F in the 2d Bn, and G , missions of the campaign on L plus 16 . TA F H, and I in the 3d Bn ." Nichols and Shaw , Periodic Rpt No . 2, dtd 20Apr45, p. 3 . Okinawa Victory, p . 94n .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 139

which Lieutenant Colonel Moreau's me n enemy force and compelled to dig in fo r dug in for the night . the night in place . The north coast was Intending to locate the main enemy patrolled as far as Nakasoni by Robb' s force on Motobu, the 29th Marines move d 2d Battalion, which destroyed suppl y out on 9 April in three columns ; the 3d dumps and vehicles and dispersed small Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Erma A . enemy groups . The battalion also scouted Wright) on the left flank, the 2d Bat- Yagachi Shima with negative results. talion (Lieutenant Colonel William G . The next day, L plus 9, Robb's me n Robb) on the right flank, and Moreau' s seized Unten and its harbor, where the 1st Battalion up the mountainous center Japanese had established a midget sub - of the peninsula. All three columns en - marine and torpedo boat base. The base countered opposition almost immedi- had been abandoned and large amount s ately. This was an indication that the of equipment and supplies were left be- division may have at last hit the majo r hind by approximately 150 Japanes e enemy resistance in the north, and it naval personnel, who were reported to was located in the area from Itomi west have fled inland to the mountains . to Toguchi . Toguchi, on the other side of the penin- In the 3/29 zone on the left, road s sula, was captured by 3/29, which sent , were found to be virtually impassable as patrols inland to Manna. On 10 April a result of effective enemy use of road - 1/29 pushed forward through Itomi, an d blocks, mines, and demolitions . The 6th on the high ground north of the town i t Engineer Battalion reported that from uncovered numerous well-prepared posi- Nago westward on the Motobu Penin- tions from which the enemy had fled . e sula the enemy had been even more During the first two days of the driv destructive. They had demolished every to clear Motobu Peninsula, frequent en- bridge and blasted numerous tank traps emy contacts were made in the difficult f in the roads. The Japanese had been terrain northwest and southwest o n careful to place these obstacles at points Itomi . Night counterattacks increased i , where no tank bypass could be con- intensity ; one particularly strong attack e structed. Traps that had been made i n supported by artillery, mortars, machin , the narrow coastal roads were put at th e guns, and 20mm dual-purpose cannon e foot of cliffs where back fill was unavail- struck the 1/29 defense perimeter on th n able. Those in the valleys were alway s night of 10-11 April and was not broke located where the road passed through up until dawn . n rice paddies. When the crater was in a Patrols from 2/29 were sent out o r cliff road, trucks had to travel long dis- 11 April to make contact with 1/29 nea . They met little opposition but tances to obtain fill for the hole .55 Itomi substantiated previous intelligence esti- d In the center, 1/29 was to occupy an mates locating the main Japanese battl e ; about defend Itomi before nightfall position in an area between Itomi and 600 yards short of the objective, how - Toguchi. As a result of this verification, g ever, the battalion was met by a stron 2/29 (less Company F) was recalle d ^' 6th EngrBn SAR, Ph I&II, pt VII, p . 4. from the north coast and ordered to set

140 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

up defensive installations and tie them ceeded on their missions, they came in with 1/29 on the high ground near under intense fire that prevented the Itomi. Company F continued patrolling . completion of their assignments unless During the day, 1/29 patrols scoute d they were to risk sustaining unaccept- just to the north and northeast of Itom i able casualties. Under cover of prompt and met only light resistance . On the call fires from the destroyer Preston, other hand, 3/29, moving inland to con - LVT (A) fire, and an 81mm mortar bar - tact the 1st Battalion, ran into heavily rage, Company I was withdrawn whil e defended enemy positions at Manna and Company H served as rear guard. Both was forced to withdraw under fire to companies had organized a perimeter Toguchi. defense at Toguchi by midafternoo n In compliance with Admiral Turner' s when the battalion CP received con- expressed desire that Bise Saki was to b e siderable artillery and mortar fire . The captured early for use as a radar site, day's action cost the battalion 9 kille d the 6th Reconnaissance Company was and 34 wounded.5 7 ordered to explore the cape area on Because of this significant enemy re - 12 April, and to seize and hold the poin t action in the Toguchi area, Company G, unless opposed by overwhelming force . upon its arrival at Imadomari at 1415, As anticipated, resistance was light, an d was recalled by the battalion. When the area was captured and held . That Company H had been hit in the morning, evening, Company F, 29th Marines, re- 3/22 was alerted for possible commit- inforced the division scouts. Overall ment, and in the afternoon it wa s command of this provisional force was ordered to assemble in division reserve then assumed by the reconnaissance at Awa. Battalion headquarters an d company commander.66 Companies I and K completed the motor- In order to fix more definitely the ized move after 1700, and L arrived a t hostile battle position, the 29th Marines 0900 the following morning . continued probing operations. On the By the night of 12 April, General 12th, the 1st and 2d Battalions were dis- Shepherd's division was confronted with posed in positions near Itomi, and 3/2 9 a fourfold task : to continue occupation was located in the vicinity of Toguchi . and defense of the Bise area ; to secure (See Map 8 .) Company G was sent the line Kawada Wan-Shana Wan an d north to contact the reinforced divisio n prevent enemy movement through that reconnaissance company and to mee t area ; to seize, occupy, and defend Hed o 2/29 at Imadomari . Company H was Misaki, the northernmost tip of Oki- ordered east to meet 1/29 at Manna , nawa ; and to destroy the Japanese and Company I was ordered to patrol forces on Motobu Peninsula. 58 On 10 to the high ground south and east April, 1/22 had established a perimete r of Toguchi and to remain there over- defense at Shana Wan from which i t night. As these last two companies pro- 5T 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 4 . fie 6th MarDiv Jrtl, Ph I&II, 12Apr45 . 58 IIIAC OperO 4-45, dtd 12 Apr45 .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 141

conducted vigorous patrolling eastwar d ices were held on board American ves- to the coast and north towards Hed o sels and behind Tenth Army lines ; those Misaki. By the 12th, battalion patrol s who could attend these services did so if had contacted the 4th Marines on th e the fighting permitted . One senior officer east coast ; 3/4 was ordered to move to of the 1st Marine Division said later : Kawada the next day. It was amazing and very striking how During the period 8–12 April, the 4th the men reacted. We held services, but Marines, located near Ora, patrolled al l services did not seem enough. The men areas within a 3,000-yard radius of th e were peculiarly sober and quiet all that regimental bivouac. On the 10th, Com- day and the next. Plainly each of them was carrying an intimate sorrow of th e pany K was sent north along the eas t deepest kind, for they paid it their highest coast on extended patrol after which i t tribute, the tribute of being unwilling t o was to rejoin its battalion at Kawada . talk about it, of leaving how they felt While in the field, the company relied o n unsaid.61 LVTs for daily support and evacuation . In a week's time, the patrol had travelle d THE BATTLE FOR YAE TAK E 28 miles up the coast. While three of its four assigned mis- Assigned the capture and defense o f sions in the north were being accom- Hedo Misaki, Woodhouse's 2/22 move d plished by extensive patrolling against rapidly up the west coast on 13 April i n little or no opposition, the 6th Marine a tank- and truck-mounted infantry Division found that destroying th e column, "beating down scattered an d firmly entrenched bulk of the enemy wa s ineffective resistance ." 59 At 2110, the becoming an increasingly difficult prob- 2/22 commander reported that a patro l lem. Company I had apparently touched had entered Hedo by way of the coasta l a sensitive nerve during its probing s road and that the entry had been oppose d near Toguchi, judging by the immediate only by 10 Boeitai.60 As soon as the rest enemy reaction. This assumption wa s of the battalion arrived, a base was set confirmed on the night of 12–13 April , up and patrols were sent out to make when the 29th Marines encountered contact with the 4th Marines advancin g some English-speaking Okinawans, wh o up the east coast . had at one time lived in Hawaii . At the end of the second week on Oki- The Marines were told that there was nawa, on Friday, 13 April (12 April i n a concentration of 1,000 Japanese on the the States), ICEBERG forces learne d high ground overlooking the Manna- Toguchi road south of the Manna River . of the death that day of President The civilians said further that the enem y Franklin D . Roosevelt. Memorial serv- force was commanded by a Colonel Udo , and that it contained an artillery uni t 5B Cass, 6th MarDivHist, p. 57. General Buck- Previous ner wanted this area captured early to gain a under a Captain Kiruyama. 82 radar and fighter-director site . CTF 51 AR, pt III, p. 37. 81 Quoted in McMillan, The Old Breed, p . 368. e0 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 . ez 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 .

142 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

reports of enemy order of battle were Motobu, on Ie Shima, and all of Nag o corroborated by the operations of stron g Wan. 64 combat patrols ; the 6th Division no w General Shepherd's estimate of th e firmly fixed the Japanese defenses in a n situation indicated that reduction of th e area some six by eight miles surround- Yae Take redoubt was beyond the capa- ing the rugged and dominating Mount bilities of a single reinforced infantr y Yae Take.63 (See Map 8.) regiment. In face of this conclusion, the The ground around this towering 4th Marines (less 3/4) was ordered to 1,200-foot-high peak prohibited exten- move from the east coast to Yofuke. sive manuevering and completely fav- The 29th Marines was ordered to con- ored the defense . Yae Take was the tinue developing the enemy positions by peninsula's key terrain feature and it s vigorous patrolling on 13 April and t o heights commanded the nearby land- deploy for an early morning attack on scape, the outlying islands, and all of the next day.65 Nago Wan. The steep and broken ap- Complying with General Shepherd' s orders, Colonel Bleasdale again at - proaches to the mountain would den y tempted to clear the Itomi-Toguch i an attacker any armor support . Infantry road 66 and join his 1st and 3d Bat- was sure to find the going difficult ove r talions. As elements of 1/29 moved ou t the nearly impassable terrain. The Japa- of Itomi towards Manna, they were am - nese defenses had been intelligentl y bushed and hit hard again by the 20mm selected and thoroughly organized ove r cannon fire coming from the commandan obviously long period. All natural or ing heights. Probing north from Awa , likely avenues of approach were heavil y 3/22 patrols also came under fire . Before mined and covered by fire . these patrols could withdraw under th e It was soon concluded that approxi- cover of their battalion 81mm mortars , mately 1,500 men were defending th e an hour-long fire fight ensued . Adding area and that the garrison, named the to the general harassment from the enemy, artillery fire was placed on 3/22 Udo Force after its commander, wa s positions in the afternoon. built around elements of the 44th Inde- pendent Mixed Brigade . Included in this At this same time, Japanese counterbattery fire was delivered against the group were infantry, machine gun units , light and medium artillery, Okinawa n 84 "The 77th Infantry Division on le Shim a conscripts, and naval personnel from was pleased when 'Mt . Yae Take' was captured Unten Ko . In addition to 75mm and with its two 6-inch naval guns ." LtGen Andrew D. Bruce ltr to Asst G-3, HQMC, dtd 280ct65 , 150mm artillery pieces, there were tw o hereafter Bruce ltr 1965 . At the time that the 6-inch naval guns capable of bearing o n battle for Yae Take was shaping up, the 77th the coastal road for 10 miles south of was fully involved with landing operations o n Ie Shima . " Since "take" translated is mountain, Mount 65 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 . Yae Take is redundant, but was commonly 99 MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr ., memo used by participants of the battle. for the OIC, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 30ct47 .

Nakaosai Ima0omarl Sn_ KusaithIn

Fuiskla

Jahana Jana i

Nasak

Hamamot

YAGACHI SHIMA

SESOKO SHIMA

Hamasa

0 SHIN A

Sokima opuwku Majiya Nakoos

3 6TH MARDIV PROGRES S (RES MOTOBU PENINSUL A Yamanura 14 APR 45 Stol e Mile s Contour Interva l 100 Meters

MAP 8 IL. RUSSELL

144 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

emplaced artillery of 2/15 (Major Nat Based on his original estimate of th e M. Pace) . This heavy bombardment in- situation, General Shepherd planned a flicted 32 casualties, including two bat- coordinated attack for 14 April whe n tery commanders and the executiv e the 4th Marines, with 3/29 attached , officer of a third battery, and destroye d would advance inland to the east. At the the battalion ammunition dump and tw o same time, the 29th Marines (less 3/29 ) 105mm howitzers .07 Air strikes wer e would drive to the west and southwest called in on the suspected sources of the from the center of the peninsula . In ef- fire and 3/22 dispatched patrols in an fect, this was a situation where two attempt to locate the enemy mortar bat- assault regiments attacked a target teries. Fires and exploding ammunition from directly opposing positions . The made the Marine artillery position un- danger of overlapping supporting fire s tenable, so Pace's men withdrew t o was lessened, in this case, by the inter- alternate positions.68 vention of the high Yae Take mass . Earlier in the day, the 4th Marines Nevertheless, success of this rare ma- (less 3/4) began its move to Yofuke wit h neuver required close and careful coordi- Hayden's 2d Battalion in the lead . The nation of all supporting arms . (See west coast was gained after a difficul t Map 8. ) hike over primitive roads, but Hayde n In the 4th Marines zone of action , was ordered to continue the march to a Colonel Shapley's troops were ordere d point on the southwest corner of th e initially to seize a 700-foot-high ridge peninsula just below Toguchi, and th e about 1,200 yards inland and dominatin g battalion arrived there at 1700 . Green's the west coast and its road . It was im- 1st Battalion arrived at Yofuke at 1630 mediately behind this ridge that Com- and, while digging in for the night, wa s pany I of 3/29 had been mauled on th e ordered to move to a position just west 12th. Intermittent machine gun fire ha d of Awa. This displacement was accom- been received from this area since that plished just prior to darkness by shut- time. tling the battalion by truck, a company The attack jumped off at 0830 on the at a time . When nightfall came, the 4th 14th with 3/29 on the left, 2/4 on the Marines was disposed with the 1st an d right, and 1/4 initially in regimental 2d Battalions in perimeter defense, a reserve. Preceded by an intense artil- little less than three miles apart on the lery, aerial, and naval bombardment , southwest coast of Motobu ; the 3d Bat- the Marines advanced against surpris- talion was 20 miles away on the eas t ingly light resistance. Disregarding coast ; and regimental headquarters wa s scattered Japanese machine gun, mor- set up at Yofuke with the Weapons Company.69 tar, and light artillery fire, the Marine s gained the ridge before noon with the "15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap X, n .p . ; left flank of 3/29 anchored to a very LtCol Nat M . Pace ltr to CMC, dtd 22Mar55 . steep slope.70 °B Ibid. 80 Maj Orville V . Bergren ltr to CMC, dtd 7 °4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 12 ; 2/4 SAR , 6Feb48, hereafter Bergren ltr. Ph I&II, p . 7 ; 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 4 .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 145

In order to protect his open righ t his headquarters section, the machin e flank, Colonel Shapley moved 1/4 up t o guns opened up, killing him and severa l an assembly area to the right rear of 2/4. other nearby Marines . There were man y Company C was ordered to take a officer casualties . It was in this manne r dominating ridge 1,000 yards to the that the commander of 1/4 was killed i n right front of the 2d Battalion . By noon an area where there had been no firin g the company made contact with smal l for over half an hour. No one else was enemy groups and soon thereafter bega n hurt, though Major Green's operations receiving mortar and machine gun fire. and intelligence officers were standin g Company A was then committed on the on either side of him. Lieutenant Colo- left of Company C and the advance was nel Fred D . Beans, regimental executiv e continued. officer, assumed command of the bat- At the same time, 2/4 and 3/29 re- talion. sumed the attack to seize the next ob- Although the hills and ravines were jective, another ridge 1,000 yards t o apparently swarming with Japanese, i t the front. As the troops headed into the was difficult to close with them . "It was low ground approaching the height, like fighting a phantom enemy," state d enemy resistance began to stiffen ap- one Marine officer.71 The small enemy preciably even though the advance wa s groups, usually armed with a heav y again preceded by heavy naval gunfir e Hotchkiss machine gun and several and artillery barrages, and two air light Nambu machine guns, frequentl y strikes. The ground, ideally suited for changed positions in the dense under - defense, consisted of broken terrai n growth. When fired upon, furious covered with scrub conifers and tangled Marines raked the area from where th e underbrush, and the Japanese exploited volleys had come. After laboriousl y this advantage to the utmost. working their way to the suspecte d The enemy defense was comprised o f enemy position, the Marines came upon small, concealed groups which formed only an occasional bloodstain on th e covering screens to the main positions . ground ; they found neither live no r The Japanese employed every possibl e dead Japanese . stratagem to delay and disorganize th e Company G of 2/4 made the firs t advance, and to mislead the attackers strong contact with the enemy at 1350 as to the location of the main battle when it came under rifle, machine gun, position. Enemy soldiers would lie in a mortar, and artillery fire . Less than five concealed position with their weapon s minutes later, Company E began re- zeroed in on a portion of the trail ove r ceiving similar treatment . After bein g which the Marines would have to pass . spotted, a Japanese artillery piece wa s After allowing a sizable force to pas s silenced by naval gunfire and artillery without interference, the enemy woul d open up on what they considered a " Maj Orville V . Bergren, "School Solution s on Motobu," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29, no . choice target. When a company com- 12 (Dec45), p . 3, hereafter Bergren, "School mander passed the ambush point with Solutions."

146 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

brought to bear on it.72 Despite heavy turned to its patrol base at Majiya . casualties in Company G and stubborn The following day, L plus 14, Colone l enemy delaying tactics, Hayden's bat- William J. Whaling assumed comman d talion drove the covering forces back of the 29th Marines from Colonel Bleas- and took the ridge with a frontal attack dale, and the regimental CP displace d combined with an envelopment from the to Itomi.73 During the day, the regiment right. By 1630, the attack had halte d consolidated its position and organize d with both 3/29 and 2/4 on the regi- defensive positions on the high ground. mental objective and 1/4 on the high (See Map 9 .) Constant pressure in th e ground to the right. Contact was then rear of Yae Take was maintained b y established all along the line. vigorous patrolling which assisted th e East of Yae Take, the 29th Marines 4th Marines on the other side of th e jumped off from Itomi in a column o f mountain. At 1600, heavy 20mm cannon battalions to clear the Itomi-Toguchi fire began raining down on the battalion road and to eliminate the strongpoints command posts 74 and, about the same that patrols had discovered the previous time, enemy forces unsuccessfull y four days. (See Map 8 .) As the attack attempted to infiltrate 2/29 lines unde r developed, it became apparent that an the cover of grenade, rifle, and morta r advance in a westerly direction woul d fire. By 1700, 2/29 had tied in with th e be both difficult and costly. The axis of 1st Battalion, and shortly after was abl e the attack was reoriented, therefore, to to stem the forces of the attack, but not the southwest in order to take advantag e before 35 Marines had become casual- of the high ground. With Lieutenant ties. 75 Artillery and mortar fire, an d Colonel Moreau's 1st Battalion leading , naval gunfire from the main and sec- the 29th Marines advanced 800 yards ondary batteries of the Colorado were up steep slopes against determined placed on the suspected 20mm canno n enemy resistance. By late afternoon, emplacements and silenced them for a 1/29 had become pinned down by over- time. 7 6 whelming fire from the high ground to When the 4th Marines began its its front. The 2d Battalion was com- attack at 0700 on the 15th, it was in th e mitted on the left flank to strengthe n same formation in which it had halte d the defense and the troops dug in for the the previous night. The advance wa s night. resisted by small scattered groups such When it was relieved during the day as those that opposed the Marines th e by 1/22, 3/4 made a motor march from day before. At noon, as the regiment its east coast position to relieve 3/22 i n approached the half-way mark to that division reserve . The latter then re- day's objective, Japanese resistance be -

" The piece, however, was not destroyed a s " Col William J . Whaling ltr to CMC, dtd the Japanese had employed their familiar tacti c 16Dec47, hereafter Whaling ltr . of firing three or four rounds from a positio n " 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 2. at the mouth of a cave, and then withdrawin g the weapon back into the tunnel, where counter - " Ibid. battery fire could not reach it . 2/4 SAR, Ph Se CO, USS Colorado (BB—45) Rpt, ser 002 , I&II, p . 5. dtd 6Jun45, p . 29 (OAB, NHD) .

Kueaiakin

Fol.Mo I

Nakaso n

Hamamata

L+15 YAGACHI SHIMA

s Hamasok

0 SHIMA( )

Gagueuku MoIiyo Nakao .

6TH MARDIV PROGRES S MOTOBU PENINSULA 15-16 APR 45 Saut e

Miles Contour niterva i IO0 Meters NAGO

MAP 9 i L . RUSSELL

148 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

came markedly stiffer . From caves and covered by fire. In the late afternoon, in pillboxes emplaced in dominating ter - the area immediately southwest of Ya e rain, the enemy poured down effective Take, 1/4 finally seized a key hill mass fire as the assaulting units climbed th e from which it had been driven back steep mountainside . (See Map 9.) earlier in the day . As 3/29 pushed forward some 900 When the attack ceased at 1630, the yards to the east and south, it engage d center and right battalions were o n in numerous fire fights while it receive d their objectives and 3/29 was slightly intense machine gun, mortar, and artil- behind them, organizing ground favor- lery fire. An enemy strongpoint on Hill able for defense . During the day, re- 210, 500 yards to the battalion right supply operations and the evacuation o f front, held up the advance. In addition the mounting number of casualties over to well-dug-in machine guns and mor- the tortuous terrain became more an d tars, the position also contained the more difficult, and the troops had be - mountain gun that had been pinpointe d come very tired. Nonetheless, many the day before . For the second day , caves had been sealed and there were attempts were made to destroy thi s 1,120 enemy dead counted . Colonel Ud o devastating weapon with naval gunfire apparently foresaw defeat ; that night and artillery, as well as air strikes whic h he decided to resort to guerrilla oper- employed 500-pound bombs and napalm . ations and also to move his command t o Despite these efforts, the piece continue d the mountain strongholds of norther n functioning and causing considerable Okinawa by way of Itomi .77 damage. The 4th Marines knew by this time All along the line, bitter fighting en - that it was attacking a force of at leas t sued as 2/4 again bore the brunt of th e two companies which had organized th e rugged going in attempting to capture terrain to their best possible advantage . the high ground dominating the right Moreover, it became apparent that th e flank. Although it jumped off with three Japanese had oriented their defenses to companies abreast (less one platoon i n face the anticipated direction of the battalion reserve), 2/4 was able to mak e attack. Owing to these circumstances, only small gains against intense smal l and since the advance was still toward arms fire. After a day's fighting, th e friendly troops and artillery, it was de- battalion managed to place two com- cided to contain Udo's mountain force panies on Hill 200, while the third one , and envelop his defenses by a flankin g despite severe casualties (65, includin g 3 company commanders), eventually " Okinawa Operations Record, p. 138. "Dur- ing the period 16-19 April while pressure wa s advanced three-fourths of the way up being applied to the Udo force on Mt. Yae Take a hill to the right of 200. In order to a considerable number of the enemy either wer e establish a better position, Company G directed to disband and directed to infiltrate withdrew partway down the hill where through our lines or were cut off by our it tied in with Company F. On the right columns. They followed the natural line of drift, were engaged by our CP at Itomi, par- of the regimental line, a 200-yard ga p ticularly at night. Many were killed at ou r between the 2d and 1st Battalions was perimeter defenses ." Whaling ltr .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 149

action from the south ; this shifted th e company, 70 was ordered to patrol thor- direction of the main Marine effort to oughly the right rear of Beans' an d the north. Implementing these deci- Wright's battalions, since 1/22 was not sions, 3/4 reverted to regimental con- scheduled to start from Majiya unti l trol and was to be committed in th e first light. attack the next day, and 1/22 wa s Because of resupply difficulties, 80 the ordered into division reserve at Awa . attack did not resume until 0900 on the On 16 April, the 6th Marine Division 16th. By 1200, 3/29 had seized its ob- was deployed to wage a full-scale attack jective with a perfectly executed basic on the enemy from three sides . (See maneuver, a single envelopment . As the Map 9.) As the 29th Marines continue d attack began, Company H, on the 3/2 9 pressuring in from the east, the 4th right flank, faced Hill 210 frontally. Marines with 3/29 would complete the Company G in the center was ordered squeeze play from the west and south - to break contact with Company I on its west. A juncture between the 4th and left and to make an end-around play 29th Marines would be effected when assaulting the enemy from the south. A 1/22 sent strong patrols north into the Company H support platoon moved into gap between the two regiments . Each of the gap left by G and supported that these three principal assault elements company by fire, as did 2/4 from its was assigned an artillery battalion i n commanding position on the right . direct support. The artillery was so de- Supporting fires effectively neutral- ployed that the fires of two battalions ized the Japanese defenders and kep t of the 15th Marines, one company of their heads down until Company G the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, Marines had gained the top of 210 and and a battery of the 7th 155mm Gu n swarmed over the forward slope . Battalion could be placed in any of th e Grenades and demolitions blasted th e three zones of action. 7 8 shocked enemy from their caves and In the 4th Marines zone, 3/29 was t o 40 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 14 . seize the high ground 500 yards to its 80 "Supply and evacuation soon became a dif- front, including the redoubtable Hil l ficult problem . The road net was far from 210. To the right of this battalion, 2/4 adequate, and engineers were working fever- was to remain in position and suppor t ishly to build new roads where necessary . How- the attacks of Wright's 3/29 and Beans ' ever, the rugged terrain prevented them fro m e 1/4 by fire, while units on the right catching up with the infantry, and usually th last 500 to 1,500 yards of the trip of the chow , flank of 1/4 wheeled to the north . The ammunition, and water from the forwar d 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was to attack dumps to the front lines could be negotiate d to seize the division objective, establish by no other means than manpower . For the contact with 1/4 on the left, and to pro- next three days this was the case . Division tect the right flank until 1/22 drew sent up as many replacements from the division pool as could be spared . Battalion head- abreast of the line . Weapons Company , quarters companies were used . Support pla- 4th Marines, organized as an infantry toons were used . Evacuation of wounded men was equally difficult if not more so ." 4th Ma r 'e 15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, n .p. SAR, Ph I&II, p . 13 .

150 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

they retreated hastily, pursued all th e reverse (north) slope. The battle waged while by effective fire from both the fiercely at close quarters as neither sid e assault and support units. In capturing was able to hold the height for long. At this objective, the Marines had silence d last the tide turned in the Marines ' the troublesome mountain gun an d favor, helped mainly by supporting fire s killed 147 of the enemy . The positions of 2/4 coming from the high ground of Companies H and G were now in- overlooking the enemy. verted, with Company H in the cente r The victory was not bought cheaply ; of the line and G on the right flank even though the two companies pos- firmly holding Hill 210. sessed Yae Take, the situation was criti- While 3/29 was securing its objec- cal . Over 50 Marine casualties had bee n tive, 1/4 completed its pivot northwards sustained in the assault and the am- and had established contact with 3/4 . munition supply was nearly spent . It Well to the rear, Myers' 1/22 advance d also appeared that the Japanese were to cover the open 4th Marines flank. regrouping for a counterattack . Fortu- With 3/29 and 2/4 solidly established a s nately, effective 15th Marines artillery landlords of the high ground facing fire and the excellent mortar an d east, 1/4 and 3/4 looked north in posi- machine gun support of 2/4 held th e tions at a right angle to the other tw o enemy in check until ammunition could battalions. When the attack resumed a be brought up. half-hour later, 3/29 and 2/4 remaine d Recalling this phase of the battle for in position providing fire support to th e Mount Yae Take, the operations office r advancing 1/4 and 3/4. At this time, the of the 4th Marines wrote : formidable Mount Yae Take was in th e 1/4 zone. If the supply problem was difficult be - The 1st Battalion moved out with fore, it was a killer now. That 1 .200-foo t hill looked like Pike's Peak to the tired , Company A on the left attacking sweaty men who started packing up am- frontally up one nose, and Company C munition and water on their backs . Prac- working up a draw on the right . Prog- tically everyone in the 1st Bn headquarter s ress up the steep slope was arduous an d company grabbed as much ammunition as not helped by enemy small arms fire, he could carry. A man would walk b y carrying a five-gallon water can on his light and scattered though it was . As shoulder and the battalion commander Company A reached the crest, the Japa- would throw a couple of bandoleers of nese met it with withering fire at very ammunition over the other! . . . The Bat- close range . In the face of the rifle , talion commander, on his way up to th e machine gun, grenade, and knee mor- front lines to get a closer look at the situation, packed a water can on his way up . tar 81 drumfire, the Marines withdrew Stretchers also had to be carried up, and below the summit, and in turn, employed all hands coming down the hill were their own 60mm mortars and grenade s employed as stretcher bearers .8 2 against the enemy entrenched on the Additional assistance in resupply an d 81 "Knee mortar" was a misnomer American s evacuation was afforded the 1st Bat- commonly applied to the Japanese grenade launcher . 82 Bergren, "School Solutions," p . 6. THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 151 talion when Company K, coming up and pits and concealed by natural from the rear in late afternoon to revert camouflage . Of all the weapons that th e to the control of 3/4, took out the 1/ 4 enemy employed effectively, his use of wounded and returned with water an d the 20mm dual-purpose cannon was ammunition . The resupply of the 1st most noteworthy . Marine battalion CP s Battalion occurred just in time, for at received a daily ration of fire from thes e 1830, an hour after Yae Take had been weapons, and all roads and natural ave- seized, the enemy reacted with a fanati c nues of approach were covered . Any Banzai charge across the battalio n Marine attempt to move over these front. An estimated 75 Japanese mad e easier routes often proved disastrous . up the wildly attacking group, but again Since there was no alternative, "the the supporting fires of artillery and 2/ 4 method of reducing the enemy position s stemmed the rush and virtually annihi- followed a pattern of `ridge-hopping'," 83 lated the force . As the Marines dug i n in which all supporting arms covered for the night, Mount Yae Take was hel d the attacking force as it enveloped hos- securely. tile defenses and reduced them in detail . Lieutenant Colonel Beans' battalio n In some cases, the 29th discovered consolidated its holdings in the after- abandoned positions and weapons, sug- noon while receiving small arms and gesting that the Japanese determination mortar fire. On the left, Company B was to resist was considerably diminishe d committed to tie in 3/4 with the 1st when attacked on the flank . The action Battalion. Because its progress was in the 29th Marines zone was character- slowed more by the terrain than th e ized by simultaneous attacks which, i n enemy, 1/22 on the right was unable to effect, consisted of a series of local gain contact with either the 4th or th e patrol actions to seize critical positions, 29th and established a defense perim- followed by mopping-up activity within eter for the night. the area. While the 4th Marines was stormin g A heavier-than-usual artillery prep- Yae Take, Colonel Whaling's regiment aration was laid down before the jump e maintained unrelenting pressure against off on the morning of 17 April . (Se the enemy's rear positions. As the Map 10.) At 0800, the 29th Marine s attack rolled forward, the Japanese re- began an advance to join up with th e sisted stubbornly from log-revetted 4th Marines along the Itomi-Toguchi s bunkers and occasional concrete em - road. From here, the two regiment placements, and from machine gun , would then sweep northward abreast of mortar, and artillery positions con- each other. Moving out over difficul t cealed in ravines and in caves on th e terrain against light resistance, 1/2 9 d heights. made slow progress, but by 1300 ha secured its objective, the highest hill i n In this phase of the 6th Division' s its area. northern campaign, the Japanese ex- The enemy positions which confronte d hibited their well-known ability to ex- 1/29 were on the crest and face of thi s ploit the terrain and gain maximum benefit from weapons emplaced in caves 83 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, pt VII, p. 5.

152 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

hill and presented a problem in preci- Manna. Upon completion of that mission naval gunnery to the Tennessee, sion, the flight was radioed by the whose line of supporting fire was almos t ground commander that "the town wa s parallel to the target . As troops rapidly wiped out. One hundred per cent o f advanced, the ship's main and second- bombs and rockets hit target area ." 85 ary batteries delivered such an intens e VMF–312, -322, and -323 flew a tota l bombardment that the hill was take n of 47 sorties during the day. In the without Marine casualties . On the way afternoon, one mission of eight planes to the top, the infantry killed 8 Japa- was cancelled when the assigned target nese and 32 more on the crest itself, bu t was overrun by Marine infantry . " the huge craters produced by the Ten- As it still faced a critical suppl y nessee's guns contained in excess of 10 0 shortage on the 17th, the 4th Marines more enemy dead .84 did not launch its attack until 1200, Within an hour after 2/29 had re- after replenishment . Then the advanc e sumed its attack, some 50 enemy troops toward the Itomi-Toguchi road was re- had been flushed out and were observed sumed with the 1st and 3d Battalion s fleeing to the northwest . Shortly after, on the right. In reverse of the previous the battalion was able to move forward day's situation, 2/4 and 3/29 on the left against negligible opposition, stopping faced east at a right angle to the fron t only to destroy large enemy stores of of the other two battalions in assault . equipment, ammunition, and supplies . They were, therefore, ordered to remain Before noon, physical contact had been in place and to support the assault fro m established with 1/22, which had represent positions until the attackin g duced the positions met in its zone an d units masked their fires. had captured a considerable amount o f The attacking element made rapi d enemy clothing and ammunition . After progress as their downhill path was having made contact with the 4th blocked only by isolated enemy strag- Marines on its left, 1/22 was pinched glers. Without too great an effort, th e out of the line and withdrew to Awa, Marines overran elaborately fortifie d where it set up defenses for the night . positions, intricate communications sys- The first missions flown by TAF tems, and bivouac areas. The hastil y squadrons in support of Marine groun d departing enemy left behind a scene of forces during the Motobu campaig n an undisciplined retreat—for dead struck enemy targets early in the morn- bodies and military paraphernalia were ing of the 17th. At 1000, eight VMF – strewn all over the area. Large stores 322 aircraft attacked and destroye d of equipment, food, weapons, and clothing were either captured or de- " In appreciation of this naval gunfire support, General Shepherd sent to the Commander , stroyed. As 1/4 swept across the 3/29 Northern Attack Force, a message, whic h front, 2 8-inch naval guns, 5 artiller y stated in part : " . . . the effectiveness of you r gunfire support was measured by the large " ADC Daily Intel Sum, 161800 to 171800 , number of Japanese encountered . Dead ones ." dtd 17Apr45, hereafter ADC IntelSum with Quoted in VAdm Lawrence F . Reifsnider ltr to date . CMC, dtd 21Mar55 . "e Ibid .

Kusktckln

uisklc

Jano s akason Urn sob L+ Hamomot L+20 PATROL a OP U P IT Manna

Homo sat

0 SHIN A

Goausuku Maliyo Nakoos

6TH MARDIV PROGRES S MOTOBU PENINSUL A Yamanuw a 17- 23 APR 4 5 Gott a

Contour Intwvol 100 Meters NAGO

MAP 10 tL . RUSSELL

154 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

pieces, 8 caves full of ammunition, an d ground troops later reported that all o f over 300 dead Japanese were found be- the hits were in the target area and th e fore the Company G position on Hil l enemy trenches were completely de- 210.8 Although the 1st Battalion met stroyed. During the rest of the day , but few of the enemy during the day, VMF–312 and -322 flew 12 additional Hochmuth's 3d Battalion killed 56 sorties in support of General Shep- without losing a Marine .S8 herd's troops .89 After their attack axes had shifte d The now-bypassed 3/29 was detached northward, the 4th and 29th Marines from the 4th Marines and moved made contact with each other in late around the base of the peninsula by afternoon on the high ground overlook- truck to rejoin its parent organizatio n ing the Itomi-Toguchi road . At that at Itomi. In the same way, 1/22 rejoine d time, 2/29 was withdrawn from the line its regiment at Majiya. In the 4th to clear out any bypassed enemy pocket s Marines area, the 1st Battalion went In the regimental zone. By the end of into reserve, bivouacking near Manna. 17 April, a review of that day's oper- Upon its reversion to regimental con- ations indicated that the enemy was trol, 3/29 took up blocking positions on unable to maintain his position and was , the right flank, north of Itomi, to pre - in fact, attempting to retreat in order vent any enemy escaping to the east . to escape annihilation. There was little The 29th Marines left flank was pushed doubt that the 6th Marine Division ha d northward to straighten out the divisio n broken the back of enemy resistance o n lines. As 3/4 conducted local patrols , the peninsula, an assumption that wa s the 2d Battalion patrolled the area confirmed when an enemy map captured through which the 1st and 3d Battalion s by the 4th Marines showed that the Yae had attacked the previous day. Resup- Take position was the only organized plying the assault regiments continued Japanese defense on Motobu. to be difficult for the enemy had thor- After four days of vigorous fighting, oughly mined the area now held by th e activities on the 18th were confined t o division and had denied the Marines use reorganizing, resupplying, and consoli- of the Itomi-Toguchi road by digging dating the gains of the previous day, tank traps there. In addition, many and patrolling the Itomi-Toguchi road . trees had been felled across the road, (See Map 10.) In an attempt to prevent which was pockmarked with numerous the further escape of any of the enem y shell craters . and to destroy his trenches and camou- On L plus 18, the final drive to th e flaged emplacements in front of the northern coast of the peninsula began lines, at 0750, four VMF–312 plane s with the 4th and 29th Marines abreast. attacked targets with general purpose (See Map 10.) Preceding the 0800 jump (GP) and napalm bombs, rockets, and off, four Corsairs from VMF–312 struck then strafed the smoking positions . The at a hillside containing gun emplacements and strongpoints that oppose d 81 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p. 4. the ground attack. Again napalm, GP 88 1/4 SAR, Ph I&II, p. 6 ; 3/4 SAR, Ph I&17, p. 7. 88 ADC IntelSum, 18Apr45 .

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE 155

bombs, rockets, and strafing attack s killed, 757 wounded, and 6 missing in were employed to ease the infantry ad- action. The Marines counted over 2,00 0 vance. When the Marines pushed for - Japanese dead, men who had forfeite d ward against negligible resistance, they their lives while defending their posi- came across elaborate cave and trench tions with a tenacity that was character - systems filled with numerous enemy istic. dead, undoubtedly the victims of the Of the 6th Division drive up the artillery, naval gunfire, and air bom- isthmus and into the peninsula, Brig- bardments . All organized resistance adier General Oliver P . Smith noted : ended on Motobu Peninsula when the The campaign in the north should dispel 4th and 29th Marines gained the north the belief held by some that Marines ar e coast on 20 April. General Shepherd beach-bound and are not capable of rapi d assigned garrison and patrol sectors t o movement. Troops moved rapidly ove r his units on Motobu ; 00 at the same time, rugged terrain, repaired roads and blow n bridges, successively opened new unload- mopping-up operations continued in th e ing points, and reached the northern ti p rest of the IIIAC zone. of the island, some 55 miles from the In the course of the fighting for the original landing beaches, in 14 days. Thi s was followed by a mountain campaign o f peninsula, the 6th Marine Division had 7 days' duration to clear the Motob u sustained casualties amounting to 20 7 Peninsula.9 1

90 6th MarDiv OperO 41-45, dtd 20Apr45 . B` Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 82 . 156 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

USS ENTERPRISE is hit on 14 May 1945 by a Kamikaze which dove out of low cloud cover . (USN 80-G-331011)

TRACERS fill the sky as AAA gunners repulse a Japanese raid over Yontan Airfield . (USMC 118775) CHAPTER 5

Phase 1 Continued

PROGRESS OF LOGISTICA L few scattered places on the beaches . SUPPORT ' Low tide, however, exposed the coral outcroppings, and necessitated the estab- Shortly after the L-Day landings, lishment of offshore transfer points to Radio Tokyo predicted that the beach- maintain the flow of supplies to the head on Okinawa would be wiped out .2 beach. Barge cranes required at th e From L-Day on, the impressive flow o f transfer points to transship cargo wer e troops and supplies ashore gave littl e not available in appreciable number s support to this optimistic enemy fore - until L plus 2. cast, however, as the Tenth Army hol d Increasingly intense Kamikaze raids on the island rapidly tightened . While posed a threat to the transport group s the assault units fanned out to gain as - and caused delays in the buildup o f signed initial objectives, battalion shore supplies ashore. Additionally, the unex- party commanders assumed control of pected rapid infantry advances dis- their beach sectors . During L-Day, suc- rupted the unloading schedule. Mean- cessively higher command echelon s while, shore party officers faced such landed, and, by nightfall, division s other problems as the lack of suitable had assumed control of shore party beach exits and the scarcity of engineer- operations . ing equipment to prepare them . Another A coral reef extending the length o f critical matter of note was the shortag e the beaches was the only real obstacl e of transportation to clear the beaches o f to early unloading operations. During supplies. As the volume of cargo being floodtide, a steady procession of landed increased, the number of truck s DUKWs and LVTs shuttled cargo across available for hauling to inland dump s the reef, and only within this 4-to-5 decreased. According to the operation hour period of high tide could ships ' plans, organic assault division moto r landing craft make runs directly to a transport was to have supported the efforts of the shore parties initially. When 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s frontline troops began to outdistance section is derived from : CNO Record ; CTF 51 AR ; Tenth Army AR . their support elements, the division s IIIAC G—2 PeriodicRpt No. 2, dtd 3Apr45 . were forced to withdraw their trucks 157

158 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

from the beaches to resupply forward ing operations. The barges were em- assault units.3 ployed in various ways, essentially at The effort beginning on L-Day to the discretion of the division command- bridge the reef barrier off the Hagush i ers. One barge was assigned to eac h beaches bore fruit by 4 April . In place LST(H) as a landing float onto which opposite Yontan airfield on Red Beach 1 the bow ramps of the landing ships were were ponton causeways that had bee n dropped to ease the transfer of casual - side-lifted to the target by LSTs . Earth ties from small boats or amphibians . The fill ramps were constructed across the majority of the barges served as floating reef to Purple Beach 1 and the Orange supply dumps. These were particularly Beaches near Kadena . Within the mouth valuable for supplying critical items to of the Bishi Gawa, close to Yellow Beach the units ashore at night when carg o 3, a small sand bar had been cleared o f ships carrying needed supplies retire d surface obstructions and enlarged. A from the transport areas . loop access road was then cut throug h IIIAC mounted cranes on 12 of these the beach cliff to the bar by engineer s self-propelled units and positioned them with Seabee assistance . As soon as these at the reef where netted cargo was facilities were ready, cargo from land- transferred from boats to LVTs or ing craft as large as and including LCTs , DUKWs for the final run to inshor e could be unloaded directly over the two dumps. Referring to the demonstrated causeways and the improved sand bar.4 success of this method, one Marine shor e A total of 80 self-propelled barges, party commander commented : also side-carried to Okinawa, was in us e This was the [1st Marine Division's] constantly from the beginning of unload - innovation, first practiced successfully at Peleliu . Two of these barge-mounted ' During logistics planning, it was assume d cranes were loaned to [the] 6thMarDiv on that, because of the immensity of the ICE - [L plus 1] to facilitate their cargo han- BERG operation and the number of forces an d dling, and XXIV Corps took up the equipment involved, there would be a com- method . That method accounted for the mensurately huge consumption of fuels an d comparative lack of clutter on the 1st lubricants (Class III supplies) by both groun d MarDiv beaches . That [the 1st Marine] and aviation units . Therefore, supplies for the Division had no beach dumps is a fact o f construction of bulk storage facilities, and off - prophetic import for future operations, for shore pipelines to connect with tankers, were I believe establishment of such will invit e loaded for early delivery . Because the initial their destruction in an assault landing.5 advance was so rapid and the resultant consumption of motor fuel unexpectedly high, the Encouraged by the satisfactory tac- construction of these bulk handling facilitie s tical picture, Admiral Turner authorize d was expedited . Beginning 19 April, gasoline the use of floodlights and night unload- and diesel fuel was pumped to dumps from beached large gasoline barges. Four days later, ing on all beaches starting 2 April, an d tankers began pumping Class III supplies directed that ships' holds be cleared of ashore ; by 26 April, bulk storage facilities fo r all assault cargo immediately . On the aviation fuel had been established at Yontan same day, he ordered that the personne l and Kadena airfields . Blakelock ltr 1965. 4 Ballance ltr . ' Ibid.

PHASE I CONTINUED 159

and equipment of the aviation engineer There seemed to exist on the part o f battalions and the MAGs be expedi- most coxswains an almost fierce determi- tiously unloaded. On 3 April, General nation to be first ashore with their individual boats, regardless of the orderly assign- Geiger recommended to Turner that al l ment to unloading points, which it is the priorities established for LSTs unload- function of the control vessel to carry out . ing over IIIAC beaches be suspended Coxswains simply would not follow order s until every member of the airfield head - to form and remain in cargo circles, bu t jockeyed for positions of advantage from quarters, service, construction, an d which to come along side the control ves- maintenance units had arrived ashore . sel. Many even attempted to ignore the Planned unloading priorities were up - control vessel and bypass it, proceedin g set, however, by Tenth Army insistence directly to whatever beach they had a on getting Yontan and Kadena airfields preference for.6 operational at the earliest possible time, Despite this, the control of ship-to- and by General Buckner's authorizatio n shore traffic was probably handled bet- on L plus 2 for corps commanders to ter at Okinawa than in previous Pacific bring garrison troops ashore at thei r operations, except those at Peleliu an d discretion. Those on board control ves- Iwo Jima. After observing the assault sels and shore party personnel soo n landings in the Marianas, Admira l viewed many situations wherein lo w Turner was convinced that only "th e priority units and equipment inter - most experienced personnel obtainabl e mingled with the shoreward flow o f should be used in the Control Partie s essential assault materiel . This inter- for assault landings ." ' Consequently , ruption of supposedly firm unloading the key members of the control groups schedules was due, in part, to the natural which operated in the Palaus and desires of ships' captains to unload their Bonins served on board the control ves- vessels and to clear the vulnerable Ha- sels at Okinawa, where their collectiv e gushi anchorage as quickly as possible . experience helped make ICEBERG a The inadequacy of the motor transport more efficient operation. available to the shore parties and the Although the ship-to-shore cargo radical change in the unloading priori - transfer procedures were soon ironed out, problems at the beaches still existed. ties, however, forced many ships t o Organization of the northern landin g stand off shore with half-empty holds beaches, for example, progressed slowly . while awaiting the return of boats which In a critical but friendly evaluation of were, meanwhile, stacked up at the con- Marine shore party operations, experi- trol vessels . enced British observers stated that : Further complicating the critical con- There seemed to be little or no traffic trol problem were the efforts of indi- control, no sign posting of roads or dumps , and no orderly lay-out of the beach areas vidual landing boat coxswains who, . It has been said already that the speed disregarding their instructions, at- of advance inland outran the landing of tempted to "get to the beaches at al l CNO Record, chap 7, p . 55. costs." Commenting on this matter, on e CTF 51 OpRpt FORAGER, dtd 25Aug44 , transport group commander said : Recommendations, p . 2.

160 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

vehicles. The rapid landing of [motor sponsible fleet and troop logistics officer s transport] therefore became an imperative on board Admiral Turner's flagship on need and there is no doubt . . . that the 8 April, arrangements were made fo r rate of landing could have been greatly accelerated by proper organization. For Tenth Army to take over all shore party instance, although vehicles were -able to activities on the Hagushi beache s wade ashore at low tide on Yellow 2, the y the following morning. Major General were only using one exit. This had n o Fred C. Wallace, the Island Commander , beach roadway on it, although its gradien t was placed in charge and his 1st Engi- and surface were such that a tractor was frequently required to pull vehicle s neer Special Brigade was directed to through it. This considerably retarde d assume control of all beaches, with the progress . (It was noted both here and at exception of the one which had recently other beaches that where beach mattin g been opened at Nago. In order to operate had been laid down, it had usually been a much-needed forward supply dump for cut up by tractors . Separate exits for wheels and tracks is not one of the Marine the far-ranging infantry units of the 6th Shore Party rules! ) Marine Division, the IIIAC Service It is easy to be critical, but the general Group retained control of this northern impression remains that unloading organi- landing point . zation in this sector was insufficiently flex- Many of the shore party troops in the ible to cope with the unexpected military situation. However, the Shore Party work IIIAC zone of action were from replace- in this Corps [IIIAC] must be judged by ment drafts. They had trained with the results, and the fact is that after L-plus 1 divisions as infantrymen and accompa- day, no serious criticism of the unloadin g nied the assault echelon to the target . progress was made by the Corps Com- Until needed to replace casualties in th mander .$ e combat units, these Marines fulfilled a The planned and orderly transition of vital function while assigned to shore shore party control to progressively party and ships ' working parties. higher troop echelons continued as th e Although the weather remained per- beachhead expanded . On 3 April, the fect until the afternoon of L plus 3, XXIV Corps commander took charge o f heavy rain and winds during that nigh t the southern beaches, and, three day s and most of the following day hampere d unloading activities . With the abatemen t later, the commander of the III Am- of high winds on 6 April, a stepped-u p phibious Corps Service Group assumed control for the unloading of the Marin e ice group especially established for the landin g on Guam, a like unit was organized for ICE- divisions.9 After a conference of re - BERG . Its mission was to operate all of the IIIAC shore installations and facilities re- British Combined Operations Observer s quired for debarkation, supply, and evacuatio n POA Rpt to Chief of Combined Operation s activities, and to provide local security in th e Representative, British Joint Staff Mission , service area . About 1 February 1945, the staffs Subj : Operations for the Capture of the Oki- of this service group and the Corps Shore nawa Gunto, dtd 18Apr45, p . 16 (OAB, NHD) , Party assembled at Guadalcanal . Officers for hereafter British Observers Rpt. these staffs came from IIIAC headquarters, ° Based on the post-operation recommenda- FMFPac, and Tenth Army, and, on a tem- tions of Lieutenant Colonel Francis M . McAlis- porary duty, status, from the 1st and 6th ter, the commander of the Marine corps serv- Marine Divisions . IIIAC AR, chap 3, p. 21 . PHASE I CONTINUED 161

YELLOW BEACH 3 on L plus 2 . As soon as LCTs and LCVPs are unloaded, others arrive to take their place. (USMC 118214)

CAUSEWAYS relieve logistical problems as tons of supplies are transported inland . (USMC 118304)

162 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

unloading pace resulted in the emptying the two bays had to be determined . To of 13 APAs and AKAs, and 60 LSTs . acquire this information, the FMFPac The day before, in the midst of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion storm, 32 empty cargo and transport was attached to the Eastern Island s vessels left the target area. Betwee n Attack and Fire Support Group and as - L-Day and 11 April, when the first sub- signed the mission of scouting th e stantial increment of garrison shippin g islands. (See Map 11 . ) arrived, unloading over the Hagush i Tsugen Shima, the only island sus- beaches was confined primarily to as- pected of being heavily defended, wa s sault shipping. By noon of 11 April , the first target of the battalion. Although 532,291 measurement tons of cargo had Tsugen is relatively small, its position been unloaded, an amount greater than southeast of the Katchin Peninsul a had been put ashore during the entire effectively controls the entrances to course of the Marianas campaign." Nakagusuku Wan . Aerial observers re - ported that the village of Tsugen an d SECURING THE EASTERN the high ridge overlooking it containe d ISLANDS AND IE SHIMA 1 1 extensively developed strongpoints. After midnight, early on 6 April, high - Since the rapid sweep of the Tenth speed APDs carrying the battalion Army had cleared the shoreline of arrived off the objective, and Com- Chimu Wan and a large section of the panies A and B embarked in rubber upper portion of Nagagusuku Wan by boats to land on the western coast o f 5 April, Admiral Turner was anxiou s the island at 0200 . Just a short way in- to utilize the beaches and berths on th e land from the landing point, four east coast as soon as possible. Although civilians were encountered ; two were minesweepers were clearing the exten- made prisoner, but the other two sive reaches of both anchorages, befor e escaped to alert the garrison .12 unloading operations could be safel y Enemy reaction came almost immedi- started the Japanese strength on the si x ately. Company A began receivin g small islands guarding the mouths o f machine gun fire from the vicinity of Tsugen, while Company B was similarly 10 "The first garrison shipping to arriv e carried assault cargo that could not be lifted taken under fire from a trench syste m in the assault shipping" and, by 15 April, 577, - in the northwest part of the island . 040 measurement tons of cargo, mostly assault Japanese mortars soon found the rang e supplies, had been unloaded against an esti- of the landing party, whereupon the mated beach capacity of 529,070 measurement tons . Blakelock ltr. Marines withdrew to the beach unde r 11 an unceasing shower of shells . Since th e Unless otherwise noted, the material i n this section is derived from : CTF 52 AR ; CTF battalion assignment was to uncove r 53 AR ; 27th InfDiv OpRpt ; 77th InfDivOpRpt , enemy opposition and not engage it Ie Shima ; PhibReconBn AR ; LtCol Max Myer s Major Jones reembarked his unit at (ed.), Ours to Hold It High : The History o f the 77th Infantry Division in World War I I 12 Company B had rejoined the battalion o n (Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 1947) , 3 April after its release at Iwo Jima b y hereafter Myers, 77th InfDiv Hist. V Amphibious Corps.

PHASE I CONTINUED 163

[2:] RECONNAISSANCE* Reoon OOt5-0530,7APR USMC 5 RECONNAISSANCENA;;• , e Recog 0530-0800,7APR } USMC

;} ''I,,'' ,," ~,,,,,' UKIBAR U SHIMA a'MINAMI UKIBARU SHIMA

t{if RECONNAISSANC E •00200-0300,6 A P

Reoon ASSAULT AND CAPTUR E USMC 0840,10 APR-1800,11 APR

3105 NAKAGUSUKU WA N

RECONNAISSANC E AND CAPTURE OF THE EASTERN ISLAND S RECONNAISSANC E 2230-0100,7- 8 AP R 6-.II APRIL 194 5

2 n Reco M I r'\ USMC

MAP II T. L . RUSSELL

310-224 0 - 69 - 12

164 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

0300. Although the Japanese claimed an the east coast of Tsugen Shima pre- easy victory over an "inferior" force, 1 3 paratory to the assault there . The cap- the scouts had accomplished their mis- ture of. the Eastern Islands had been sion. Company A lost two Marine s assigned to the 27th Infantry Division killed and eight wounded. as its part in Phase I of the Tent h On the evening of 6 April, Majo r Army preferred invasion plan . The in- Jones' men resumed their investigation formation gained from the 6–7 April of the rest of the islands in the offshor e reconnaissance indicated that commit- group. At 0015 on 7 April, the entir e ment of an entire division was not battalion landed on Ike Shima, th e warranted, and only one regiment wa s northernmost island . When no sign of assigned for the operation .l5 enemy troops or installations and onl y As the main body of the Army divi- one civilian was discovered there, Com- sion was landing over the Orange pany B went on to Takabanare Shima . beaches near Kadena on 9 April, th e Landing at 0530, it discovered that 20 0 ships of the 105th RCT were rendez- thoroughly frightened Okinawan civil- vousing at Kerama Retto with the com- ians were the island's only inhabitants . mand ship of the Eastern Island s At about the same time, two platoon s Attack and Fire Support Group. The of Company A went to Heanza Shim a assault unit selected for the landing o n and, using their rubber boats, crossed Tsugen was 3/105, while the other two over to Hamahika Shima . Dayligh t battalions of the RCT were designated patrols confirmed the absence of enemy floating reserve to be called up from soldiers, but 1,500 more civilians were Kerama if needed . Although Tsugen added to those already counted . These had been pounded intermittently by ai r islands were occupied later in April by and naval gunfire since L-Day, th e 14 3/5. ships' guns again blasted the island o n After nightfall on 7 April, Compan y 10 April, the day of the landing. Initial B reboarded its APD, which then resistance was light when the soldiers circled Tsugen Shima to land the Ma- landed at 0839, but the enemy, strongl y rines on Kutaka Shima, opposite enemy - entrenched in the stone and rubble of held Chinen Peninsula . As the company Tsugen, soon engaged the invaders in a paddled in to shore, the heavy surf cap- day-long fire fight. The battle continue d sized three of the boats and one ma n throughout the night, during which drowned . The island had neither enemy time the Army battalion sustained man y troops, installations, nor civilians, and casualties from the incessant enem y the scouts withdrew shortly after mid- mortar fire coming from the height s night. above the village. While the reconnaissance battalio n At daylight on the 11th, the rifle com- was searching the rest of the Easter n panies of 3/105 made a concerted Islands on 7 April, UDT swimmers " checked the proposed landing beach on In response to General Hodge's request, o n 8 April General Buckner ordered the remainde r i3 Okinawa Operations Record, pp. 72—73. of the 27th Division landed on Okinawa to " 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 17-23Apr45 . reinforce the XXIV Corps offensive . PHASE I CONTINUED 165

MARINE RECONNAISSANCE personnel prepare rubber boats for landings on Eastern Islands . (USMC 120002)

DOMINATING Ie Shima is Iegusugu Yama, beyond which are the airfields-the primary objectives of the operation . (USN 80-G-315059)

166 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

attack against stubborn oppositio n issued the attack order directing the which gradually died out. Organized re- seizure of the island and its vital air - sistance was eliminated by 1530, and field, and designated the Northern the battalion was ordered to embark Attack Force commander, Admira l shortly thereafter to join the rest of th e Reifsnider, as Commander, Ie Shim a regiment at Kerama Retto . In a day and Attack Group. a half of fighting, the battalion lost 1 1 Ie Shima was important because its men, had 80 wounded, and 3 missing . " size and physical features permitted ex- An estimated 234 Japanese were kille d tensive airfield development. Three and and no prisoners were taken. The seiz- a half miles northwest of Motob u ure of Tsugen Shima opened the ap- Peninsula, the island plateau wa s proaches to Nakagusuku Wan, and mostly fiat land, broken only by low ensured that XXIV Corps would receive hills and scattered clumps of trees . supply shipments over the eastern a s Located in the middle of the eastern well as the western beaches . This oper- part of the island was a rugged an d ation also uncovered beaches in Chim u extremely steep 600-foot-high limestone Wan which were developed by the Sea- mountain, Iegusugu Yama . There wer e bees and used for unloading the LST s few obstacles to widespread construc- which brought construction supplies tion of airdromes besides this promi- and equipment from the Marianas. nent terrain feature . This factor This action relieved the load which ha d escaped the attention of neither Japa- been placed on the Hagushi beaches , nese nor American planners . The enem y expedited base development, and has- had already laid out three runways , tened the building of additional unload- each a mile in length, on the central ing facilities.1 7 plateau, and the ICEBERG plan calle d In its rapid advance leading to th e for the expansion of these existing capture of the Motobu Peninsula, the strips as well as the addition of other s 6th Marine Division demonstrated that which would eventually accommodat e Okinawa north of the Ishikawa Isthmu s an entire wing of very-long-range could be taken by an attack overland . fighter aircraft . ICEBERG commanders were forced i n The landing force selected for the in- turn to reappraise the original plans vasion was General Bruce's 77th In- for Phases I and II . They found that fantry Division . After the Keramas naval requirements were now reduce d landing, this unit spent two weeks o n to resupply and fire support operations , board ship in a convoy which steame d and that the ships which might hav e in circles approximately 300 mile s been needed for an amphibious assault southeast of Okinawa. Without warn- of Motobu Peninsula—a possibility con- ing, on 2 April enemy aircraft dove ou t sidered in all advance planning—were of clouds which had hidden their ap- now available for the capture of I e proach and crash-dived four ship s Shima. Losing no time, Admiral Turne r (three of which were command ships) , 18 27th Inf Div OpRpt, p. 30. before antiaircraft fire could open u p 1' Blakelock ltr 1965. on the intruders . The entire regimental

PHASE I CONTINUED 167

staff of the 305th Infantry was killed planes made a strafing and napal m and wounded, and the total number of attack on the beaches while othe r casualties listed in this one attack wa s fighters and bombers orbited over th e 17 soldiers killed, 38 wounded, and 1 0 island, ready to protect the attack grou p missing.'8 Ten days after this disaster, and support the ground assault. the division was committed to land o n Although there was little oppositio n 16 April, its second assault landing i n to the landing, the troops experienced less than a month. (See Map 12 . ) stiffening resistance by afternoon whe n Major Jones' Amphibious Recon- enemy delaying groups, concealed in naissance Battalion was assigned t o caves and fortified tombs, started to con - execute the first mission of the oper- test every yard of advance. For a period ation. His unit was directed to seize of six days, 77th Division ground forces and occupy Minna Shima, a smal l struggled. Initially making only slight crescent-shaped island lying 6,50 0 gains, in many cases, they fought hand - yards southeast of the main target. Two to-hand with defenders who conteste d 105mm and one 155mm howitzer bat- every inch of ground. As the battle un- talions from 77th Division artillery folded, it was found that Japanese de- were to be emplaced there to provide fenses were centered about Iegusug u supporting fires during the Ie Shima Yama and the small village of Ie, which battle. lay at the foot of the southern slope o f The Marine scouts landed at 0445 on the mountain. A masterful camouflag e 13 April and within two hours had job had been performed by the Ie Shima swept the island . They discovered 3 0 garrison, for nearly 7,000 people wer e civilians but found no enemy soldiers . concealed on the island. The mountain The battalion remained on the island contained a maze of hidden firing posi- the rest of the 13th and, on the morn- tions ; Ie itself had been converted into ing of the 14th, occupied positions fro m a veritable fortress . The ground ap- which it covered UDT preparations o f proaching the mountain and the town the reef and beach for the landing o f was honeycombed with caves, tunnels, artillery. By noon of 14 April, Majo r bunkers, and spider holes on which the Jones had reembarked his men on boar d Japanese had expended their great in- the APDs. Three days later, the bat- dustry and defensive skills . The ad- talion was released from attachment t o vance route to the core of enemy de- the 77th Division and attached to IIIAC . fenses was open land and uphill all th e As scheduled, the preliminary bom- way, flanked by Japanese positions i n bardment of Ie Shima began at dawn the village and dominated by emplace- on 16 April and was stepped up at 072 5 ments located in a reinforced concret e when missions in direct support of the building on a steep rise facing the . Five minutes before landing were fired attacking troops . The infantry soo n S-Hour (as the landing time was desig- named this structure "Governmen t nated for this operation), 16 fighte r House" and the terrain on which i t " 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Ie Shima, p. 7. stood "Bloody Ridge ."

168 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Et) 306 Ek305(–) '

MINNA SHIM A 307(- ) LANDED 17 APR 4 5

RECONNAISSANC E 0445-0640,13 APR4 5 kReco n USMC

ASSAULT AND CAPTUR E OF IE SHIM A Scal e 0 I 2 3 4 Mile s

MAP 12 T. L. RUSSELL

PHASE I CONTINUED 169

On 20 April, after a grim grenade offensive operations in April . A lesser and bayonet battle, the top of Blood y but continuing Marine task during the Ridge was finally gained and Govern- period was ridding the area of the pesky ment House taken . The island was de- and omnipresent guerrillas. Irregulars clared secure on 21 April after the 77th attempted to harass, delay, and wea r Division had won a victory for which a down American units by partisa n heavy price was exacted ; 239 Ameri- tactics classically employed agains t cans were killed, 879 wounded, and 1 9 patrols, convoys, or isolated detach- missing.19 Japanese losses were 4,70 6 ments. killed and 149 captured . Once Yae Take fell and Marines ad- For the next four days, scattered vanced to the northernmost reaches of Japanese and Okinawan soldiers were Okinawa, guerrilla activities increase d hunted down and, on the 25th, LSTs in scope and intensity. Under the con- began shuttling units of the division t o ditions offered by the rugged and prim- Okinawa, where their extra strength itive wilderness of the north, the lack was needed in helping the XXIV Corps of roads there, and a shortage of infor- maintain pressure on enemy defenses i n mation, a modern force of superio r front of Shuri. Remaining in garrison strength and armament was unable t o on Ie Shima were the regimental head- engage the guerrilla decisively in his quarters and the 1st Battalion of the own element. 305th. This force was considered ade- e quate to handle the rest of the cleanup In the southernmost area of th IIIAC zone, aside from picking off oc- operations in the island . casional stragglers, Marines were kep t THE MARINES' "GUERRILL A busy improving the road net, sealin g WAR" 20 burial vaults, and closing the honeycomb of caves . To the north, however, The capture of Motobu Peninsul a as advance elements of General Shep- constituted the major portion of IIIAC herd's fast-moving division approached Motobu Peninsula, and the lines of 1D Tenth Army AR, Corrections by CG, 77th InfDiv, dtd 11Oct45 . Amongst those killed communication were extended progres- during the 18 April fighting was Ernie Pyle , sively, guerrillas took advantage of the the renowned war correspondent . He wa s situation. During the night of 8— 9 buried on Ie Shima in the 77th Division ceme- April, a group of marauders broke int o tery . The division erected a marker in hi s the area of IIIAC Artillery, near Onna, memory near the spot where he was shot by a Japanese machine gunner . Inscribed simply , and destroyed a trailer and a small the marker reads : "On this spot the 77th In- power plant . Following this attack a t fantry Division lost a buddy, Ernie Pyle, 1 8 dawn, other enemy groups attempted to April 1945." Myers, 77th InfDiv Hist, p. 265. disrupt north-south traffic passing 20 Unless otherwise noted, the material con- through Onna by rolling crudely devised tained in this section is derived from : IIIA C demolition charges down upon passing AR ; IIIAC G—2 PeriodicRpts Nos 1—30, 1Apr— 21 1May45 ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G— 3 vehicles from the cliffs above . Jnl; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II ; 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II. 21 Tenth Army G—2 Rpt No. 15, 10Apr45 .

170 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MARINE ROCKET LAUNCHERS in support of the drive south . (USMC 121342)

AWACHA POCKET, showing the gorge which was the scene of hard fighting by the 5th Marines . (USMC 121104)

PHASE I CONTINUED 171

In the south of the 6th Division zone, up by the heavy vegetation, deep gorges , on 7 April the 7th Marines (less 3/7) , and spiny ridges of the complex terrain. in corps reserve at Ishikawa, was as - After spending a quiet night on th e signed to patrol tasks.22 The northern twin peaks of the heights, the tw o half of the regimental patrol sector wa s companies, E and F, were withdrawn to covered by Lieutenant Colonel John J . approach the guerrilla lair from a Gormley's 1/7, which had moved to different direction . While retiring, the Chimu, while Berger's 2d Battalion an d Marines were fired upon from above b y certain designated regimental troops , the reappearing enemy, and a number in a perimeter defense around th e of men were hit . After circling to th e bombed-out ruins of Ishikawa, had a far (west) side of the island and estab- related mission of patrolling north an d lishing a skirmish line, the two com- inland from the village .23 panies moved in on the commanding One 7th Marines task was wardin g ground where the guerrillas were wel l off nightly infiltration attempts by in- dug-in and concealed . The irregulars dividual or small groups of Japanes e were engaged, but "did not appear to and Okinawan irregulars in search of be well organized ." 24 Those of the food. Most of them were killed o r enemy who escaped were hunted dow n wounded either entering the village or by patrols. leaving it. The initial patrols in the This task proved to be painstakin g region were without incident, but, a s and time-consuming, for the vegetatio n pressure was applied to Colonel Udo' s on the western slopes of Ishikawa force in the mountain fastnesses of Isthmus seriously hampered effectiv e Motobu Peninsula, the quiet that had patrolling despite the fact that this sec- prevailed in the supposed-rear zone wa s tion was the least precipitous in the e dispelled. On 12 April, a 2/7 patrol fel l neck of the island . Visibility off th victim to a well-planned ambush on trails frequently was limited to five feet, d Ishikawa Take, the highest point on th e at most, by dense stands of bamboo an isthmus. By the time that the entrapped scrub conifer. Since flank security was Marines were able to pull out under impractical in this terrain., the war d cover of the fires of the regimental dogs accompanying the Marines prove weapons company, 5 men had been a valuable asset in alerting their mas- killed and 30 wounded. ters to enemy hidden in the undergrowth.25 Lack of roads and the difficul t The next day, Lieutenant Colonel terrain here raised resupply problem s Berger sent two companies into the am- which were solved by the organization bush zone and occupied it against onl y of supply pack trains 26 to support 2/ 7 token resistance. In customary partisan 24 fashion, the elusive guerrillas had de- IIIAC G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 15, dtd 16Apr45 . parted the area, seemingly swallowed 25 Capt Verle E . Ludwig memo for HistBr , G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 280ct54. 22 BGen Edward W . Snedeker ltr to CMG, 2e Because of the difficulty of resupply under dtd 10Mar55, hereafter Snedeker ltr II. these conditions, a previous Tenth Army ban 23 7th Mar SAR, pp . 2—3. on the use of captured native horses was lifted .

172 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

patrols. Enemy resistance continue d military forces appeared to be a factor here for nearly two weeks, during which in these incidents, when evidence o f time Berger's Marines killed about 11 0 native sabotage was uncovered durin g of the guerrilla force.27 an investigation of the series of fires o n As the 6th Marine Division closed i n the west coast . on the main Japanese position in the The security threat presented by Oki- Motobu heights, the tempo of guerrilla nawan civilians appeared to be per- activity on the fringe of the battle in- vasive, for it arose within the 1st creased proportionately. A daily occur- Marine Division zone also . As early a s rence at dusk was the harassing o f 9 April, Lieutenant Colonel Miller, the artillery positions by irregulars, wh o 3/5 commander, reported that many caused the registration of night defen- civilians were destroying their passes sive fires to be delayed .28 When Major and appeared to be roaming abou t Pace's 1/15, in direct support of the 22d freely at night . It was reasonable t o Marines, displaced to cover the infantry assume that they were contacting th e drive to the northernmost limit of the Japanese at this time .30 island, its perimeter was hit almos t For better zonal security control, th e nightly by sporadic sniping and kne e 1st Marine Division began rounding up mortar fire. In addition, grenades, all civilians on 11 April and herdin g demolition charges, and even antiper- them into stockades built on Katchin sonnel land mines were thrown into th e Peninsula . The following day, all able- defensive installations encircling th e bodied Okinawan males were taken battalion area. The hills in the rear of into custody in order to determine their the 1/15 position afforded the enemy military status. The prevailing tactical excellent observation and apparentl y situation in the north, at this time, re- permitted him to coordinate his attacks quired that organized resistance be on the Marines .2s broken before Marine control over From 14 through 16 April, as th e civilians could be established and com- battle for Yae Take was coming to a bat troops spared for this duty . climax, fires mysteriously broke out i n From the beginning of the 6th Divi- various west coast villages from the sion drive north, an increasing number southern extremity of Nago Wan to th e of Okinawans was encountered on the northern tip of the island . On 17 April roads. Only a few men were of obvious at dawn, Nakaoshi was struck by a n military age and were detained . The enemy hit-and-run attack that simul- others, stopped and questioned, were taneously swept over the 6th Engineer allowed to continue on with their affairs . Battalion command post (CP), water At the height of operations in the point, and supply installations nearby . north, 12–16 April, the division wa s Civilian collaboration with Japanese unable to collect able-bodied male s methodically in the manner of the 1s t " 7th Mar SAR, p. 3. Division in central Okinawa . Civilian s =8 4/15 SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, n .p . 29 1/15 SAR, Ph I&II, chap III, n.p . 90 5th Mar S-3 Jnl, 9Apr45.

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of doubtful character and background , Battalion, part of IIIAC since 17 April, however, were seized . When hostilities was attached with a mission of seizin g on Motobu ceased, the 6th Division and occupying the small islands lyin g organized a civilian control center at off Motobu Peninsula . Taira where, beginning 16 April, from In a period of two days, 21–22 April , 500 to 1,500 natives were interned the battalion reconnoitered the island s daily until operations in the north were of Yagachi and Sesoko with negative ended. results. Though no enemy forces wer e On 15 April, Hurst's 3/7 (attached encountered, the Marines found a lepe r earlier to the 5th Marines) reverted t o colony containing some 800 adults an d parent control and began active patrol - 50 children on Yagachi Shima . Before ling from its base at Chuda on the west they landed on Sesoko, the scouts met coast. General del Valle regained the more than 100 natives moving by cano e 7th Marines the next day, and, as the from islands to the west in search o f 6th Division began meeting increased food, and "considerable difficulty was resistance, the boundary between th e involved in coralling and controlling " Marine divisions was readjusted along them.32 On the 23d, Walker's 6th Recon- 31 the Chuda-Madaira road. naissance Company scouted Kouri Shim a From 17 to 19 April, it appeared that , and found no enemy. parallel to the steady reduction of thei r While the battle for Yae Take raged , positions on Yae Take, the Japanese and even after it had ended, 6th Divi- were shifting from a tactical policy o f sion rear area patrols began makin g defense to one based on partisan war - contacts with enemy troops attemptin g fare. After the 6th Division took th e to escape from the fighting on Motobu . - mountain redoubt, and following a re On 22 April, near Nakaoshi, 1/22 organization of Marine units, General patrols killed 35 enemy in a fire fight . Shepherd's command moved to assigne d On the next day, this battalion met a garrison areas . Here it began patrolling strong force, estimated at three rifl e vigorously to fix and destroy remaining squads, three light machine gun squads , pockets of enemy resistance . To assist the division in securing northern Oki- and one mortar squad, firmly entrenched nawa, the Amphibious Reconnaissanc e in previously prepared positions, including caves and pillboxes, in the moun- 31 Lieutenant Colonel Sabol's 3d Battalion , tainous area east of Nago . Two Marine 1st Marines, passed to General Shepherd's con- companies assaulted the Japanese killin g trol this same day. After moving north, 3/ 1 52, before an ammunition shortage was attached to the 22d Marines and ordere d e to Kawada . From this point, the battalion forced the battalion to break off th assisted the 22d Marines in patrolling the vast action. It returned to the battle scene regimental zone of responsibility, an are a on 24 April, this time with 4/15 (Lieu - which covered 140 square miles and include d tenant Colonel Bruce T . Hemphill) in a 95-mile coast line . On 16 April, 1/22 moved s to the vicinity of Awa, where it became 6t h direct support, and the strongpoint wa Division reserve on Motobu Peninsula . 22d Mar SAR, Ph I&II, pp. 12, 14 . " PhibReconBn AR, p . 12 .

174 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

reduced .33 The engagement ended to - point just south of Ichi, which had bee n wards evening with the deaths of a the 3/22 patrol base since 16 April . Japanese officer and two NCOs and th e The mountainous interior of the remainder of the group fleeing. The bat- north was combed continually b y talion continued patrolling the region Marine patrols for Udo Force survivors on the next day and cleaned out the and semi-independent guerrilla bands . enemy pocket.34 The 6th Division learned from civilians Intensified patrolling of the Ishikaw a in the area that small groups of Oki- Isthmus began on 23 April after a smal l nawan home guardsmen were in th e IIIAC military police group was extri- hills of the northern part of the islan d cated from an ambush by a 7th Marine s and had been preparing to wage partisa n detachment. The 2d Battalion, 1st warfare for nearly a year . As part of Marines, reinforced the 7th, and all the preparations, they had reportedly available 1st Division war dogs were established stockpiles of supplies in the attached to that regiment . At the same interior. The civilians further stated time, stricter travel regulations within that some of the guardsmen had re - the IIIAC area were enforced, and the turned to their homes and civilian pur- movement of a single vehicles in the suits. They also said that home defense corps zone during hours of darkness was units were being trained in the village s forbidden . by Okinawan veterans who had served In the 6th Division zone, while th e previously in China with Japanes e 29th Marines remained on Motob u forces. 35 Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to its Until the afternoon of 27 April, how- assigned area in the northern part of ever, patrol results were negative with the island. At Kawada, 3/1 was relieve d the exception of an occasional flushing by Hochmuth's 3/4 and returned to out of individuals or small groups . At parent control on the 23d . During the this time, a 3/4 reconnaissance patrol next two days, the rest of Colonel sighted a 200-man enemy column mov- Shapley's regiment was disposed with ing through the northeastern corner o f Hayden's 2/4 at Ora, and Beans' 1/4 , the Marine regimental zone toward th e regimental troops, and the headquarter s east coast. It was believed that these complement bivouacked in the vicinity Japanese had survived the Motobu of Genka, a small west coast village Peninsula fighting by infiltrating i n located about five miles north of th e groups of 20 to 40 from the combat are a juncture between Motobu Peninsula and by way of Taira and that they were the rest of the island. From this point , going to try to join up with the main Colonel Shapley's mission was to see k enemy force in the south . and exterminate stragglers in the south- Steps were taken immediately t o ern half of what had been the 22 d destroy the group . Two battalions of the Marines area . Upon being relieved, 1/2 2 22d Marines were ordered to the sout h prepared to move to the west coast to a to block the column, while 3/4 move d " 22d Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p. 14 . " IIIAC G-2 PeriodicRpt No. 28, dt d " Ibid. 29Apr45.

PHASE I CONTINUED 175

inland from Kawada . Further ringing of combat troops employed was out o f the escape-minded enemy was Donohoo' s proportion to the size and number of 3/22, which proceeded toward the in- guerrillas hunted. In most cases, it was terior on a cross-island trail 1,000 yard s a one-sided fight, for a substantial per- north of, and parallel to, the 1/22 ad- centage of the partisan ranks were fille d vance from Hentona. Since it was antic- with the poorly trained and equipped ipated that the fugitives would be ap- Boeitai. The primary contribution o f prehended in the 22d Marines zone, 3/ 4 native Okinawans to the guerrilla effort was attached to that regiment, Addition - was a knowledge of the land over which ally, two artillery battalions were to they fought ; their offensive efforts were support the pursuers. limited mainly to night forays against The first contact was made just prior supply installations, disrupting com- to noon on 28 April, when one of 3/4's munications systems and centrals, and companies engaged the escaping Japa- attacking water points and hospitals. nese in a fire fight . At the end of the Although these destructive attempts three-hour contest, 109 enemy soldier s usually ended in failure, they forced were dead ; 1 Marine was killed and 8 friendly units to maintain extensive wounded.3" The other pursuing unit s security detachments, sometimes in were unable to reach the scene of the platoon or company strength. action because of the difficult terrain ; As of the 20th, when Motobu Penin- 1/22 encountered small scattered group s sula was reportedly cleared of enem y as it advanced, while 3/22 was stil l troops, the Tenth Army began to pa y underway when 3/4 radioed that it had greater attention to the native popu- destroyed the enemy. Thereupon, Colo- lation in occupied sections of the island . nel Schneider ordered his 3d Battalio n All civilians., irrespective of age or sex , to continue on to the east coast, an d found in the areas of combat units were Colonel Shapley's 3/4 returned to to be interned. Furthermore, Okinawans Kawada and parent control .3 7 were prohibited from moving about Even though the guerrillas in th e freely unless accompanied by an arme d IIIAC area had forced the Marines t o guard .38 General Geiger establishe d remain constantly on the alert, Genera l eight internment camps in the IIIAC Geiger was able to declare the end of zone, but the number of collection organized resistance in the north on 20 points in the Marine area was later re - April. Continuous patrolling remaine d the general order, however . As usual in 38 This order could not be complied with im- counterguerrilla operations, the number mediately by the 6th Marine Division becaus e of the large numbers of civilians in its zone , and emphasis continued to be directed toward sa s 3/4 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 8. the detention of able-bodied men . Adding to th e " Regarding this small operation, Genera l difficulties in this area was the fact that man y Smith commented that it "was an excellen t of the civilians "were already in the categor y example of alert patrolling ; [a] rapid decision of displaced individuals, having fled to th e by the commander ; and very effective execu- north from Naha and other southern area s tion of a difficult approach ." Smith, Persona l well in advance of the assault ." IsCom AR, Narrative, p . 91 . chap 8, sec XXIV, pp . 2-3 .

176 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

duced to three ; Katchin Peninsula, Mulcahy and his staff went ashore an d Chimu, and Taira . selected a CP site midway between th e Although tighter security control s two fields. General Wallace's ADC head - prevailed in the corps zone, isolated in- quarters was dug in nearby. cidents behind the battleline still oc- While TAF personnel were kept bus y curred. In the last week of April, a 7t h constructing camp and repair facilities , Marines patrol killed a Japanese cor- Marine engineers and Seabees began poral who was wearing a kimono ove r repairing the runways on Yontan an d his uniform. Intelligence agencies found Kadena. The airfields were found to b e evidence of a Japanese-planned an d lightly surfaced and badly damaged by -sponsored program of espionage and naval gunfire and bombings . Hurried sabotage for the rear areas . In the grading permitted the use of Yontan b y XXIV Corps zone, the following docu- 7 April, but the problems at Kaden a ment was recovered : were more extensive . Damage here was greater, and the source of coral for sur- Permi t facing was at some distance from th e Army line probational officer Inoye field. Nevertheless, the strips on Kaden a Kuchi and two others : The above mentioned are permitted to wear plain clothe s were ready for dry-weather use two for the purpose of penetrating and raidin g days after those on Yontan and, by 1 enemy territory from April 25, 1945, unti l May, they were all-weather operational. the accomplishment of their mission .39 Three weeks earlier, the ADC Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) had TAF OPERATIONS IN APRIL AND come ashore and, on 7 April, begun THE KAMIKAZE THREAT 40 operating from three LVTs speciall y rigged to serve as the defense command Owing to the early and unopposed CP and to function as both an ADC C capture of Yontan and Kadena air- and the Air Defense/Fighter Command fields, Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army, operations center. On 19 April, the began land-based operations soone r center moved to more spacious quarter s than expected . On 2 April, General in an abandoned farmhouse nearby .

" Translated in IIIAC G—2 PeriodicRpt No. hereafter USSBS, Air Campaigns ; MilAnal- 28, dtd 29Apr45 . ysisDiv, USSBS, Japanese Air Power (GPO , 90 Unless otherwise noted, the material con- Ju146), hereafter USSBS, Japanese Air Power ; tained in this section is derived from : CinCPac Craven and Cate, The Pacific ; Hayashi and WarD, Apr45 ; Fifth Flt AR, lApr-17May45 , Coox, Kogun ; Capt Rikihei Inoguchi and Cd r Ryukyus Op, dtd 10Ju145, hereafter Fifth Flt Tadashi Nakajima, former IJN, with Roge r AR ; CTF 51 AR ; Tenth Army AR; 2d MAW Pineau, The Divine Wind : Japan's Kamikaze WarD, Apr45 ; TAF AR ; TAF Periodic Rpts, Force in World War II (Annapolis : USNI , Apr45 ; ADC (MAG—43) WarD, Apr45 ; ADC 1958), hereafter Inoguchi, Nakajima, and IntelSums, Apr45 ; G—2 Sec, ADC, TAF, His- Pineau, Divine Wind ; Morison, Victory in the torical Summary of the Organization an d Pacific ; Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Hori- Activities of the ADC, Okinawa, n.d., hereafter koshi, with Martin Caidin, Zero! (New York : ADC Hist; MAG—31 WarD, Apr45 ; MAG—33 E . P. Dutton & Co., Inc ., 1956), hereafte r WarD, Apr45 ; MilAnalysisDiv, USSBS, Air Okumiya, Horikoshi, and Caidin, Zero! ; Sher- Campaigns of the Pacific War (GPO, Ju147), rod, Marine Air Hist .

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When General Wallace opened his C P ing and stopping the destructive enem y on Okinawa, the air defense commander air attacks. The fighter squadrons of became the land-based agent of CASCU, MAG–31 and -33 mounted combat ai r which continued operating on board patrols from Yontan and Kadena field s Admiral Turner's flagship . Under ADC on the first days that they arrived at operational control were land-based air - these bases. craft, radar air warning and control As the battle was joined on Okinaw a installations, and antiaircraft artillery by the Tenth Army and General units. It was the air defense com- Ushijima's forces, the American flee t mander's primary mission to coordinat e in surrounding waters was engaged i n the combined efforts of these three dis- a desperate battle of its own . The Japa- parate support activities so that the y nese air attacks on the Kerama Rett o meshed with the operations of the over - invasion group merely heralded eve n all air defense system of the expedition- greater enemy attempts to destroy th e ary force. ICEBERG plans had stipu- radar pickets and support vessels safe- lated that TAF would assume ful l guarding the troops on Okinawa. Many responsibility for the air defense of of these enemy aircraft were on either Okinawa when the amphibious landings conventional bombing or reconnaissance were completed, but, because of "the missions ; others in the aerial attack s all-out efforts of Japanese aircraft and were part of the Special Attack Force, the success of their kamikaze suicide the Kamikazes. attacks directed against naval units , As the success of American oper- operational control of aircraft in th e ations in the Philippines became ap- Ryukyus remained with the Navy unti l parent and MacArthur's air strength the area was secured." 4 1 reigned supreme, enemy naval air com- General Wallace believed that th e manders saw that there was no prospect major tactical task of ADC was to meet of any advantage to be gained in the the Kamikaze threat. From 7 April , sky while Japanese squadrons continued when VMF–311 pilots scored the first employing orthodox tactics. The Kami- TAF kill 42 of a suicider as they flew in kaze effort evolved as a result of thes e to Yontan from their CVE lift, AD C considerations. Appearing first in the efforts were directed toward confront - Philippines ,43 this was an organized an d 43 The authors of the official AAF histor y Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec VII, p. 5 . suggest that the first Kamikaze attack took " This event marked another "first" also, for place in April 1944 in the area of the Andaman it was the first time that Marine pilots had shot Islands, when a Japanese pilot dived his plan e down an enemy plane with the package of fou r into an American torpedo aimed at shipping in 20mm cannon newly installed in Corsairs i n an enemy convoy . In official recognition of thi s lieu of the six .50 caliber machine guns hereto - act, the hapless aviator was posthumously dec- fore mounted in the planes . "All of the pilots orated by Field Marshal Count Hisaich i expressed enthusiasm over the great destruc- Terauchi, the commander in chief of the tive power of the new and heavier armament ." Southern Area Army. Craven and Cate, The IntelSec, DivAvn, HQMC (OpNav-37), Marine Pacific, p. 352 . The point here is that the Kami- Air Intel Bul, May45, p . 2, hereafter Airintel - kaze attacks in the Philippines were the firs t Bul, with date . so organized of their type.

178 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

desperate attempt by suicide-bent Japa- At the outset, it was determined tha t nese naval aviators to deprive Ameri- operations of this combined force o f can shipping at Leyte of aerial protec- about 1,815 planes 47 were to be well tion by crashing the flattops of the planned and organized—a definite con- covering carrier force. The enemy antic- trast to the sporadic, albeit somewha t ipated that the success of their tactic s successful, Kamikaze attacks at Leyte . would then guarantee a Japanese sur- One of the first opportunities for the face victory in the event of an all-ou t Japanese to mount coordinated suicid e engagement with United States naval and conventional air attacks occurred forces. Although Japanese commanders during the TF 58 raids of 18–19 March felt that suicide missions were a "tem- 1945 on Japan . Although the carriers porary expedient" only, used "becaus e were damaged and there were som e we were incapable of combatting yo u American casualties, the enemy lost 16 1 by other means . . .," 44 initial succes s aircraft. Most of this damage, strangel y gave added impetus to their fuller em- enough, was not caused by Kamikazes. ployment. An important result of this raid was the Correctly anticipating that the next destruction, while still on the groun d invasion attempts would be at Iwo Jima on Kyushu, of many of the Japanes e and, after that, Okinawa, Imperial Gen- planes scheduled to be employed in th e eral Headquarters withdrew the rem- defense of the Ryukyus . This disaste r nants of some Army and Navy air units forced the Fifth Air Fleet to reevaluat e from the Philippines in early January its plans. Moreover, a Tenth Army land- 1945 to strengthen the defense of the ing relatively unharassed by enemy ai r Home Islands and the Ryukyus. Upon raids was guaranteed, for Toyoda's completion of this transfer, designed to squadrons were unable to mount a majo r "produce a more unified [defense ] air offensive until after the beginnin g strategy, " 45 brigades and regiments of of April.48 the Sixth Air Army and naval squad- Scattered conventional and Kamikaz e rons of the Fifth Air Fleet were com- flights from Japan and Formosa carried bined into a single tactical command on the attack to the Western Islands Attac k 19 March under Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Group of the ICEBERG force first ; Commander in Chief., Combined Fleet.46 later these planes began swarming al l

47 RAdm Toshiyuki Yokoi, IJN, "Kamikaze s 44 LtGen Torashiro Kawabe, IJA, quoted i n and the Okinawa Campaign," USNI Proceed- USSBS, Japanese Air Power, p. 60 . ings, v . 80, no. 5 (May54), p . 508, hereafte r 46 LtGen Michio Sugawara, IJA, quoted i n Yokoi, Kamikazes . Ibid., p . 66. 48 HistSec, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Japanes e 4e MilHistSec, Japanese Research Div., HQ- Studies in the World War II, Monograph No . USAFFE, Japanese Monograph No . 123 , 86, History of the Fifth Air Fleet, Operational Homeland DefNavOps, pt II, Mar43-Aug45, dt d Record lOFeb-19Aug45, n .d ., p . 35 (OCMH , Jun49, p . 73, hereafter Homeland DefNavOps . DA), hereafter Fifth AirFlt Hist .

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over the transports and picket line off Spearheading the Kamikazes were 14 Okinawa. During the first few days of planes sent to bomb and strafe Okinawa April, the toll of ships damaged and airfields before dawn in order to destroy sunk grew at a steady rate while nava l Allied aircraft suspected of being there . casualties mounted in consequence . By Apart from their nuisance value, the 6 April, Admiral Toyoda was prepared raids did little damage to the runway s to launch from Kyushu the first of ten and none to TAF planes, for the squad- carefully planned Kamikaze attacks, rons had not yet flown ashore. Follow- which were to be flown over a period ing the first group of enemy heckler s ending 22 June. A total of 1,465 sortie s were more than 100 fighters an d emanated from Kyushu to sink 2 6 bombers sent to engage TF 58 off American ships and damage 16 4 Amami-O-Shima in order to draw others.4° Not included in these loss American carrier-based planes away figures are the victims of small-scal e from the suiciders heading for Oki- Kamikaze efforts by another 250 plane s nawa. which rose from Formosa air bases, For a 36-hour period, 6–7 April, the and the 185 additional sorties flow n Japanese flew 355 suicide sorties, whic h from Kyushu, independent of the mas s were accompanied by nearly an equa l 5° attacks. amount of conventional cover, recon- The Japanese decision to turn t o naissance, and bombing planes . As these large-scale air operations was arrive d aircraft bore in to crash, torpedo, an d at after Toyoda had studied both hi s bomb the ships at anchor in Hagushi and the Thirty-second Army situations transport area, crewmen in expose d and had found that "it would be futil e positions and troops on the beache s to turn the tide of battle with presen t were subjected to a deadly rain of anti - 5' tactics." He therefore dispatched the aircraft artillery shell fragments . first and largest coordinated suicide Friendly fighters were not immun e 52 attack—Kikusui Operation No . 1— from the effect of the hundreds of gun s against ICEBERG forces on 6 April . firing from the beaches and ships ; three American pilots were shot down whe n 4e USSBS, Campaigns, p . 328 . they followed Japanese planes to o "° USSBS, Japanese Air Power, p. 23 . closely into the murderous barrage . u1 Fifth AirFlt Hist, p . 41 . The main attack, which began abou t The attacks "were given the cover nam e Kikusui . . ." which ". . . literally mean s 1500 on 6 April, spread out all over the `chrysanthemum water' and the characters combat zone with the outer ring of making up the word were used in the crest o f radar pickets and patrol craft—lacking a 15th Century Japanese hero who took th e a protective smoke-screen cover—catch- side of the Emperor in a prolonged civil wa r against heavy odds ." USSBS, Japanese Air ing the full fury of the battle . Ships of Power, p. 66. all types, however, were fair game for

310-224 0 - 69 - 13

180 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the Kamikazes. u3 Before the Okinawa place the losses in Kikusui No. 1 at landing, the Japanese confined the direc - 335.55 tion of their suicide attack efforts to As a sidelight to the air battle ove r American carrier task forces . After 1 and the land fighting on Okinawa, th e April, the attacks were mounted against Japanese mounted their only real sur- convoys, and, just prior to the first face threat to the success of the Ameri- Kikusui, the enemy began hitting all can invasion. Intending to attack Allie d surface forces. After the time of th e shipping at Okinawa, the 69,100-ton battleship Yamato and a covering group 6–7 April attack, the Japanese reserved steamed out of the Tokuyama Naval the carrier forces for Kamikaze atten- Base, on Honshu, at 1500 on 6 April . tion while their conventional bombers Less than two hours later, the enem y and fighter craft were directed to hi t vessels were sighted by two U . S. sub- other American vessels and transport s marines in the screen lying off the eas t around Okinawa .J4 In this first mass coast of Kyushu . Within 24 hours, TF suicide attack, Admiral Turner's forces 58 pilots had administered death blow s claimed to have shot down at least 13 5 to the Yamato and a part of her group , Japanese planes, while the pilots fro m and had forced the remainder to scurr y the Fast Carrier Task Force reported home. splashing approximately 245 more, Since TAF pilots had not yet begu n bringing the total American claims of operations from Okinawa when Kikusui enemy losses to nearly 400 pilots and No. 1 struck, the four Marine squadrons planes. Contemporary Japanese source s on board the carriers Benningto n (VMF–112 and -123) and Bunker Hill (VMF–221 and -451) carried the bal l 57 In the Kerama anchorage, an LST an d for Marine aviation during the time two merchant cargo ships, the Logan Victory and the Hobbs Victory, were hit and eventuall y that General Mulcahy's planes and sank. The sinking of these two Victory ship s pilots were still on board their carrie r was a serious matter and could have affected transports. Until late in April, as much the course of the campaign critically. Becaus e as 60 percent of the ground suppor t they had been loaded on the west coast wit h missions flown for Tenth Army units most of the 81mm mortar ammunition the n were carried out by Navy and Marine available in the United States, these sinking s carrier pilots, while the primary con- created a shortage of this type of ammunitio n in subsequent resupply shipments . In order to cern of TAF flyers was to blunt the make up for the loss, at least partially, Arm y 55 and Navy transport planes airlifted 117 tons Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Pineau, Divine of 81mm ammunition to Okinawa before th e Wind, pp. 225—226 ; Hattori, War History, v. end of the campaign. To satisfy immediate IV, (table facing p . 132) . Despite the extensive needs, LSTs were loaded and dispatched to th e American and Japanese material available relating to their respective air losses in World target with stock taken from Marianas an d War II, it is still difficult to reconcile this num- South Pacific supply reserves. Blakelock ltr ; bers conflict. For a discussion of this matter, Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IV, p . 12 . see Shaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, pt V, 59 Homeland DefNavOps, p. 113 . "Marine Air Against Rabaul," passim .

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Kamikaze menace. To at least one TA F Kamikaze attacks—General Wallace's air group commander, "it seeme d fighter command was ordered on 14 strange for planes off the carriers to April to maintain a continuous two- come in for close-support missions, pass - plane daylight CAP over each of th e ing [Okinawa-based] Marine pilots fly- three picket ships that were statione d ing out for CAP duty. . . ." 5 6 offshore northeast of TAF airfields . Almost as soon as Colonel Munn' s Each flight leader was to report directl y MAG–31 squadrons touched down at to the captain of the ship he was guard- Yontan, a 12-plane combat air patrol ing. In turn, the naval officer woul d was organized and launched to remai n control the flight and ensure that its airborne until dark. Prior to the time planes were kept out of range of th e that TAF joined the fighting, CAPs had ship's antiaircraft guns. Two days afte r been flown by planes from both th e this mission was first initiated, the num - Support Carrier Group and TF 58 . ber of ships protected by this CAP wa s Originally, a large CAP, varying from increased by two . 48 planes in relatively quiet periods t o By the time that TAF had been estab- 120 or more during critical times, was lished ashore, the three Marine Landin g flown to protect the surface forces fro m Force Air Support Control Units, com- air attacks. Basically, the aircraft wer e manded overall by Colonel Vernon E . deployed "in a circle in depth" over th e Megee, had landed also . Although they invasion and picket craft.57 were shore-based representatives o f Generally, TAF planes were airborn e CASCU and outside of the TAF chai n from dawn to dusk on CAP flights, an d of command, by the very nature of they flew special early morning an d their functions the LFASCUs worked twilight CAPs as well . On 14 April, th e closely with the Marine aviation units . commander of the ICEBERG operation Once air support operations began, co- transferred the responsibility for flyin g ordinating agencies relayed all orders night CAPs from TF 58 to TAF . In concerning aircraft missions directly t o addition, TAF was to maintain anothe r General Mulcahy's command in a four planes constantly on patrol durin g smoothly functioning system . At Tenth the hours of darkness. This last mission Army headquarters, Megee's LFASCU– was assigned alternately to the night 3 screened all requests for air suppor t fighters of VMF(N)–542 and -54 3 received from LFASCU–1 (Colone l commanded by Majors William C. Kenneth H . Weir) and -2 (Colone l Kellum and Clair "C" Chamberlain, re- Kenneth D . Kerby) which were work- spectively. In order to guard the radar ing with IIIAC and XXIV Corps respec- picket ships—special objects of th e tively. If a review of TAF and carrier " aircraft commitments indicated that a n A fuller story of the operations of Marine h carrier squadrons is found in pt III, chap 2 , air support request was consistent wit infra., and Sherrod Marine Air Hist, pp. 357- priority requirements, the mission wa s 368. approved . At that time, if Marine planes CNO Record, chap 1, p. 47 . were assigned, LFASCU–3 relayed the

182 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

order for the mission directly to the run nevertheless, but directed by th e TAF operations section .58 ALP. Frontline control of the ground sup- It took time to establish land-base d port missions flown by both land- and radar reporting, control, and homin g carrier-based aircraft was provided by stations on Okinawa and the outlyin g Air Liaison Parties (ALPs) from the islands. In addition to the problems in- Joint Assault Signal Companies at- volved in getting the Air Warning tached to each division . Ground uni t Squadrons (AWSs) and their equip- requests for air support were reviewed ment ashore rapidly, initially it proved first with respect to the capabilities and difficult to net the ground-to-groun d availability of the other supporting communications systems with the over- arms to fulfill a specific mission, and all ship-to-shore warning system . Prior then passed on to the LFASCU at corp s to the establishment of the ADCC, th e headquarters. If the request was ap- individual radar stations had reporte d proved here, the LFASCU would requi- directly to CASCU aboard the Eldorado . sition the necessary number and type s After 8 April, the day on which the con- of planes, and stipulate the armament trol center first began to provide shore- they needed for successful completio n based operational homing facilities , of the mission. In addition., the LFASCU AWS early warning teams began re- provided strike direction and super- porting directly to the ADCC which, i n vised the scheduling of all air support turn, passed on to Navy control the rein unit fire support plans .59 ported enemy and friendly plots. Not all close air support mission s Early warning teams were also as- were ground controlled in this cam- signed temporarily to each assault divi- paign. Employed at Okinawa was an sion and corps headquarters . They the n air coordinator, or airborne traffic direc- operated in coordination with the AAA tor, who spotted and marked the ground units already assigned to the defense of target for the planes flying the mission. corps and division sectors . Here, the The coordinator would direct the flight teams monitored ships' radar tellin g to the best target heading, observe circuits and local air warning and inter - attack results, and correct subsequent fighter director nets, from which ai r runs if he decided that they were raid warning information was obtaine d needed.60 At times when smoke and and passed on to the ground units . In weather conditions over the target addition to radar coverage, the ai r denied the airborne controller suitabl e warning squadrons provided radi o visibility, the support mission would be monitoring services, the results of which figured prominently in and as- u8 TAF AR, chap 6, sec III, p. 1 . sisted the operation of the Air Defens e 58 IIIAC Rpt, Air Support, encl H to CG , Command. AirFMFPac ltr to CMC, Subj : Air Support, dtd 28Aug45. The AWSs also worked very closely 80 ADC Hist, p . 16 . with and were, in fact, supervised by

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the senior Marine AAA officer, Colone l were the 2d (Lieutenant Colonel Max Kenneth W. Benner, commanding th e C . Chapman) and 16th (Lieutenant 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Group . He Colonel August F . Penzoll, Jr.) Antiair- was responsible for coordinating th e craft Artillery Battalions, which sup - disposition and operation of his organi c ported the 6th and 1st Marine Division s radar with that of the AWSs in orde r respectively. Scheduled to land on order to ensure maximum surface and low - at later dates, the 5th (Lieutenant Colo- angle electronic surveillance for defens e nel Harry O . Smith, Jr .) and 8th (Lieu- against enemy air attacks.°' tenant Colonel James S . O'Halloran) Because theirs was a vital role in th e AAA Battalions were to reinforce th e overall air defense of the ICEBER G group and extend antiaircraft defense s forces, land-based AAA units, although already existing. attached to the assault corps, were Because of the rapid progress of th e directly under the operational control infantry and the assignment of highe r of General Wallace's ADCC . On 20 priority to items needed ashore im- April, the antiaircraft units reverted to mediately., the landing of the Marine the Tenth Army which then assigned AAA battalions was delayed . Group and the 53d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigad e battalion reconnaissance parties landed the mission of coordinating all AA A on L plus 2 to select sites, and beginnin g activities. At the same time, the brigade on 5 April, the units themselves were became the TAF agency for providing given an unloading priority . By 12 the ground forces with early air raid April, the battalions were in position warning services while continuing to ashore. fulfill its AAA defense mission. Initially, one heavy and two light Initially, the 1st Provisional Antiair- AAA batteries of the 2d Battalion were craft Artillery Group was assigned to assigned a defense sector on 6th Marine support IIIAC during Phases I and I I Division beaches ; the 16th Battalio n of the operation by providing AAA de- supported the 1st Division with tw o fense for corps units, installations, and heavy and two light batteries . The re- beaches, and the captured airfields i n maining five 90mm gun batteries of th e the corps zone.62 Additionally, the group group defended Yontan airfield .64 was to provide anti-boat defense o f When the 53d Antiaircraft Artillery y corps beaches, supplement field artiller Brigade assumed control of Tenth Army units in both direct and general support AAA units, it found that the defenses mission, and be prepared to fire seacoast in the IIIAC and XXIV Corps zones artillery missions.63 were unbalanced . On 27 April, th e The assault elements of the group brigade adjusted the dispositions and,

01 Tenth Army TntvOplan 1-45, anx 9, p. 4 - 84 LtCol Peter J . Speckman ltr to CG, FMF- '2 1st Prov AAA Gru Gen AR, Okinawa Pac, Subj : AAA Observer's Rpt on Okinaw a Shima Op, Ph I&II, 1-22Apr45, dtd 18May45 , Shima Op, n .d ., end A to CG, FMFPac ltr t o p. 1, hereafter 1st Prov AAA Gru AR . DistrList, dtd 28Jun45, p . 4, hereafter Speck- '2 Ibid. man rpt.

184 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

in addition, extended AAA defenses age. 67 Usually, the illumination or across the island to the east coast i n visual sighting of an enemy plane, and order to break up enemy raids coming sometimes even an American one, wa s from that direction . The 1st Provisiona l the signal for a wave of wild uncon- Group continued the Yontan area de- trolled firing both from shipboard an d fense, but was made responsible for de- the island. "Carbines, rifles, and even fense of the entire Yontan-Kadena sec - .45 caliber pistols enthusiastically joined tor also. To aid in this last mission, the fun on occasion." 68 Under these Colonel Benner's group was augmented conditions, casualties and materiel dam- by two Army AAA-Automatic Weapons age resulted from falling shell frag- battalions.65 ments and wild shots until the Tenth Lieutenant Colonel O'Halloran's 8t h Army insisted upon the enforcement of Antiaircraft Battalion landed at Nago greater fire discipline by all unit com- Wan on 17 April to defend IIIAC units manders. and supply dumps in that area. Its most From the beginning of ADCC oper- immediate problem, in view of th e ations, there was no satisfactory com- tactical situation on the Motobu Penin- munications and control system linking sula, was achieving ground security . ss the fighter command and the antiair- For that reason, battalion .50-calibe r craft artillery units . When ADC was heavy machine guns and some .30- heavily engaged with enemy air attacks , caliber light machine guns obtaine d liaison with AAA units weakened or locally were assigned a primary missio n broke down completely. At times, per- of ground defense . mission for the guns to fire on uniden- Enemy air attacks on shore instal- tified or enemy planes was withheld , lations were directed at Yontan an d even when the area was definitely unde r Kadena airfields mainly, and usuall y attack. On several occasions, air rai d took place at night . The only firing op- warning flashes were not relayed to the portunities afforded shore-based anti- AAA command until after the infantr y aircraft artillery during daylight oc- and shore party units had been incurred when Japanese aircraft, with formed.69 Of necessity, an efficient con- the obvious intention of attacking th e trol system was soon initiated . By the transport area, made their approaches end of the month, Marine AAA units from the landward side of the anchor- were credited with the destruction o f 15 planes and 8 assists, 5 probably 65 It should be noted that Marine AAA bat- destroyed, and 6 damaged.70 talions were a composite type of unit, containing both heavy and light AA weapons. The B7 Speckman rpt, p. 1 . Army groups consisted of heavy and ligh t AAA battalions, the former containing onl y e8 1st Prov AAA Gru AR, p . 14 . the 90mm gun batteries and the latter being 66 53d AA Brig After-Action Rpt, dtd comprised entirely of automatic weapons units . 21Jun45, p . 48, hereafter 53d AA Brig AAR . "8th AAA Bn AR, dtd 22Apr45, end E to "1st Prov AAA Gru AAA ARs for 6 - 1st Prov AAA Gru AR, p. 6, hereafter 8th 16Apr45, dtd 23Apr45, and 17-30Apr45, dtd AAA Bn AR . 10May45 .

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It was noted that, during enemy ai r warfare .73 During the remainder of the attacks, Japanese aviators showed an month, the squadron flew numerou s increasing knowledge of radar evasio n artillery observation missions daily , measures, and frequently used "win- bombed and strafed enemy lines and in- dow" 71 in both conventional and Kami- stallations in southern Okinawa, and kaze attacks. In commenting on th e conducted heckling raids in the same enemy failure to mount air attacks on areas almost nightly . the ground forces, one observer state d The second mass Kamikaze attack that "it was difficult to understand wh y took place during 12–13 April. Although they had not resorted to formation as frenzied and almost as destructive a s bombing from low altitudes," 72 since the first attack, it was mounted by only low-angle radar detection of approach- 392 planes, on both conventional and ing aircraft was almost impossible. He suicide missions, 74 as opposed to the 69 9 concluded that the concentration on total in the first attack . As in Kikusui suicide attacks was too great ; he might No. 1, TF 58 pilots downed most of the have added that the Japanese just di d enemy, but carrier-based Marine flyer s not have enough planes by this time t o were active also . Flying Leatherneck s divert their air strength to mission s from the Bennington shot down 26, and other than the Kamikaze attacks. Bunker Hill Marines downed 25 . Oki- While TAF fighter pilots added to th e nawa-based TAF pilots accounted for 1 6 expanding bag of downed enemy planes , more. other types of air missions in support o f During the interval between the first the Tenth Army were performed at th e and second mass raids, the Japanes e same time by General Mulcahy's com- command had recognized the threat mand. Upon its arrival, the Army Ai r presented to their air attacks by Forces' 28th Photo Reconnaissanc e American land-based aircraft, so Ka- Squadron rephotographed the entir e dena was bombed early on the 15th by planes that preceded the Kamikazes. Okinawa Gunto area to obtain more TAF personnel and airplanes were en- accurate and complete coverage tha n dangered further when both of the had been available for the maps used on fields occupied by Tenth Army squad- L-Day. The squadron also provided in- rons were fired upon by an artillery fantry commanders with enlarged aeria l piece, or pieces, nicknamed "Kadena photographs of masked terrain features Pete" in not-too-fond memory o f to their zones. As soon as Major Allan L. Feldmeier's VMTB–232 arrived on °' On their arrival, the squadron pilots were 22 April, it was given tasks other than pleased to discover that their primary missio n had been cancelled since their planes were not its original mission of antisubmarine equipped with sound-ranging equipment and they themselves had not been trained in its use . 71 "Window" is the name given to strips of This mission was then given to Kerama-base d cut metal foil, wire, or bars usually dropped seaplanes . VMTB—232 WarD, Apr45 ; CT? 5 1 from aircraft as a radar counter-measure . AR, pt V, sec E, p . 5. 72 Spec/man rpt, p . 1. °' Hattori, loc. cit.

186 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

" `Pistol Pete' at Henderson Field o n bomb 76 in its maiden appearance over Guadalcanal." 7 6 Okinawa. This small, single-engined, TAF reports evaluating Kikusui No. wooden craft, powered by rockets, car- 2 noted that the evasive tactics employe d ried a one-man crew and over a ton and by the enemy "do not tend to indicat e a half of explosives . Carried by a twin- that the flyers were top-flight fighter engined bomber to a point near the tar - pilots," and that "a definite lack o f get, the Baka was released when its pilo t aggressiveness" seemed "to confirm the had verified the weapon's target an d belief that the pilots were green ." 76 position, oriented his own position, and started the rocket motors . Although the A third mass raid of 498 aircraft (19 6 destructive powers of the Baka were suiciders) occurred 15–16 April . As the real, its employment was erratic and it furious air battle carried over into th e appeared too late in the war to be in- second day, TAF planes began to score fluential . heavily. The largest bag made by land - based aircraft to that date was ac- TAF operations for the rest of Apri l complished by VMF–441 (Major Rober t tended to fall into a routine of CAPs 0. White) pilots, who had shot down 1 7 and support missions . On 22 April, the of the 270 Japanese pilots and plane s dusk air patrol was vectored to a point allegedly splashed on these two days .77 over part of the radar picket line then being attacked by enemy aircraft . When In this attack, a TAF pilot made the the half-hour battle had ended, Marine first sighting of the so-called "Baka " pilots claimed 33% Japanese planes . Five days later, during the fourth mass 45 Henderson ltr. General Henderson contin- Kamikaze ues with a narration of the steps taken to dis- attack (27–28 April), 11 5 cover and neutralize the artillery menace , suicide-bent Japanese pilots wer e which turned out to be not one but six 15c m launched against friendly shipping an d guns cleverly hidden from aerial observation . the steadfast radar pickets . On the sec- "As I recall our attack, we first pounded al l ond day of the attack, at about 1600, th e FA and AAA positions heavily with masse d 155mm fire to immobilize the guns, so the y airborne TAF CAP and an additional 3 6 couldn't be moved that night and also [to] Corsairs were vectored out 40 miles cause maximum casualties and incidental dam - northwest of Okinawa to intercept a n age. Then we went to work with the 8-inch approaching Kamikaze formation. After howitzers and 155mm guns to get positiv e dark, when the two-hour fight was over , destruction of each piece . When darkness came, we put heavy interdiction fire on the position s the Marine fighters were credited with to keep [the guns from being moved] durin g downing 35½ enemy planes . Upon the night . The next morning at first light we found them still there and went to work polish- 78 This was a derisive term, meaning "fool- ing them off . Kadena Pete didn't bother us an y ish," given the weapon by Americans. The more and the flyers and brass were all happy ." Japanese named it Ohka (cherry blossom), an d "e G—2 Sec, ADC, Analysis of Ops of Okinaw a put it into full production late in 1944. Based Fighter Aircraft, 1-30Apr45, n .d ., here - Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Pineau, Divine Wind, after ADC AcftOpAnalysis with month . pp . 140, 141 . See also USSBS, Japanese Air " Hattori, op . cit., notes 182 planes were Weapons And Tactics (GPO, Jan47), pp . downed . 20-22.

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being congratulated by the Tenth Army admiration of and inspiration to all ." 79 commander on the accomplishments of By the end of April, TAF pilots ha d his pilots, General Mulcahy sent a mes- flown 3,521 CAP sorties and shot dow n sage to the ADC : "Not only brilliant or assisted in the downing of 143 3/4 work by fighter pilots but excellent enemy aircraft . command control and most efficient re- servicing by ground personnel were MAG-31 WarD, Apr45 . CHAPTER 6 The Defense Stiffens

APPROACH TO SHURI 1 fields. Unknown to the Americans, th e In the days immediately following th e enemy was prepared to fight a "pro - facing movement of the XXIV Corps longed holding action" here . 3 and the beginning of its drive to the Limited gains through highly devel- south, increasingly stiff and bitter re- oped defenses in the Nakama-Kakazu- sistance gave proof that the prepared Ouki area were made on 7 April. In the enemy defenses were being uncovered. 96th Division zone, Army troops ad- The nature of the contacts with th e vanced over broken ground and woode d Japanese also heralded the end of th e ridges to reach the approaches of relatively easy and fast-moving XXIV Kakazu. By 1600, after a furious strug- Corps advance. By the morning of 6 gle, one infantry battalion—supporte d April, it was evident that the Japanes e by three air strikes, four artillery bat- "lines were drawn for a full-scal e talions, and the 14-inch rifles of th e battle." 2 (See Map III, Map Section . ) New York—managed to penetrate to a What the 7th and 96th Divisions ha d point within 500 yards of the northern encountered was a strong enemy posi- limits of Kakazu . tion that extended the width of the To break through the increased re- island and roughly followed the line sistance, General Hodge had conclude d through Machinato, Kakazu, Kaniku , that additional artillery support wa s Minami-Uebaru, and Tsuwa . With essential, and on 5 April he had re- flanks anchored on the East China Se a quested that Tenth Army give him and the Pacific Ocean, the Japanes e whatever battalions were available . Be- barrier was the outermost of a series of cause III Amphibious Corps Artillery defense rings centering about Shuri, could not be employed with maximum headquarters of the Thirty-secon d effect in the north, General Buckne r Army. The veteran troops of the 62 d ordered most of the 155mm units of Division were entrenched in this out- IIIAC Artillery to be attached to XXIV post sector, which was composed o f Corps. On L plus 6 and 7, the 8th and 9th well-prepared positions on high groun d 155mm Gun Battalions and the 1st, 3d , that was liberally studded with machin e and 6th 155mm Howitzer Battalions guns and mortars, and surrounded by were detached from IIIAC and dis- barbed wire, antitank ditches, and mine - placed south to support the attack there . ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s The howitzer battalions were as - section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; signed to the 419th Field Artillery XXIV Corps AR ; XXIV Corps Arty AR ; 7th Group and paired off with Army artil- InfDiv AR ; 27th InfDiv OpRpt ; 96th InfDiv lery battalions to form three firing AR. Okinawa Operations Record, p . 72 . Ibid .

188

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 189

groupments, which were controlled b y vocates of an all-out offensive woul d the Army battalion commanders . The have their day .5 Marine gun battalions, a IIIAC Artil- When it could no longer be employe d lery headquarters detachment, and th e profitably in the north, the 11th Marine s 749th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inc h was also sent south to provide additional howitzers) were formed into a provi- Marine artillery in answer to Hodge's sional group, named The Henderso n request of 5 April . The three 105mm Group after its commander, Lieutenant howitzer battalions of Colonel Brown' s Colonel Frederick P . Henderson, IIIA C regiment displaced southward on 9 Artillery Operations Officer .4 Brigadier April to reinforce the direct support General Josef R . Sheetz' XXIV Corp s battalions of the 7th and 96th Divisions . Artillery could now support the drive This reinforcement was in addition to against the Shuri defenses with four the IIIAC artillery dispatched earlier . 155mm gun battalions, one 8-inch and si x The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 11th 155mm howitzer battalions, and two Marines were attached to the 96th Divi- 155mm gun battalions from the 420t h sion, and the 4th assigned to the 7th g Field Artillery Group . Division. On 12 April, the remainin battalion of the 11th Marines, 1/11 , During the night of 7–8 April, XXIV (75mm pack howitzers) was als o Corps units repulsed minor enemy in - attached to the 96th Division . ° filtration attempts. The Japanese had Moving south at the same time as the planned that their first major counter- Marine artillery were elements of th e attack against Tenth Army troops would 27th Infantry Division (less RCT 105) , coincide with the Kikusui attack on 6 which had landed at noon that day. April, but when aerial reconnaissance Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 70-76 . reported the presence of a more lucra- ° 11th Mar SAR, n .p . The 11th Marines com- tive target for aircraft, a large Ameri- mander noted later that when his 105mm bat- can convoy steaming south of Okinawa , talions joined the Army divisions : "The two and ground attacks wer e Division Artillery Commanding Generals . . . the Kamikaze did not want the 75mm Pack Howitzer Bat- rescheduled for the night of 8 April. talion . The Army had very little respect fo r This attack was cancelled indefinitely 75s then . . . ." Shortly after the 11th displaced when another large convoy was spotte d to the south, Colonel Brown "again asked Brigadier General [Robert G .] Gard of th e off the west coast of Okinawa just prio r 96th Division Artillery to use 1/11 . Then, a s to the jumpoff . Because the situatio n happened throughout the campaign, there wa s was not favorable in either case, cooler a surplus of 75mm ammunition, and Brigadie r General Gard was finally convinced that th e heads amongst the Thirty-second Army Battalion would be valuable for harassing and staff prevailed and were able to stave interdiction fires, thus saving on his scarce off the launching of an unsupported 105mm ammunition." After 1/11 finally wen t Army counterattack . It was only a ques- south, Colonel Brown joined the staff of Gen- eral Sheetz as liaison officer and remained there tion of time, however, before the ad - until 20 April, when his battalions reverted to his command. MajGen Wilburt S . Brown ltr to HMO Arty AR, pp. 20-21 . CMC, dtd 26Feb55, hereafter Brown ltr II .

190 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Released from Tenth Army reserve, th e for a counterattack to be mounted on 12 division moved to a bivouac area just April . Encouraged by the overly opti- east of Kadena airfield, where it awaited mistic reports of the success of Kikusui a combat assignment. No. 1 during the 6–7 April raids, the Heavy enemy opposition and torren- Japanese planned the counterattack to tial rains driven by strong winds coincide with the second mass Kamikaze hampered the efforts of XXIV Corp s raid. Although the suicide flights began when it resumed the attack on the 10th . to pour into the skies above Okinawa a t On the corps front overall, the 7th Divi- 1300 on 12 April, it was not until more sion was able to advance approximately than nine hours later that the ground 400 yards in its zone, but an antitank effort was launched . The mission of th e ditch and a minefield near Ouki, and enemy assault units was to inflict as mutually supporting caves and pillboxes much damage as possible in rear areas , on the right flank, seriously limited the where their close proximity to Tent h division attack . Army troops would protect them from The 96th Division, which had begu n the devastating fire of American naval the battle for Kakazu Ridge on th e guns and artillery. previous day, continued its attack Under the cover of a mortar barrage , against this key feature in the enemy' s Japanese troops attempted the penetra- Shuri defense system . On 9 April, th e tion of American lines . They were division had attempted to take the posi- thrown back as artillery and small arm s tion with two battalions in a predawn fire caught them fixed in the light o f surprise attack . Frequent Japanese star shells thrown up by gunfire sup - counterattacks and withering fire cause d port ships . The enemy made several heavy casualties and forced the soldier s more attempts, but XXIV Corps unit s to relinquish their gains at 1630 an d repulsed each one. On the night of 13–14 withdraw to positions from which the April, two lesser attacks occurred, bu t attack was launched. Nothing was left these also were driven off. In the tw o to chance on L plus 9, as all three regi- days' action, XXIV Corps reporte d ments attacked after an intense artil- 1,584 Japanese troops killed and fou r lery and naval gunfire bombardmen t captured .'' lasting 30 minutes was placed on pre- A partial explanation for the failur e viously located positions . Air cover was of the counterattacks is found in the not available because of the continuin g strength of American reaction to them . bad weather, which turned the groun d In addition, Japanese sources offer into a quagmire and bogged down th e another approach : tanks scheduled to support the advanc- When the Army chief of staff, after th ing infantry. When the day's fighting e opening of the offensive, visited the head - ended, the division had made an average quarters of the 62d Division, he learne d gain of 300 yards along the entire front. that the senior staff officer [of the Thirty - As night fell and the fighting died second Army], Colonel Yahara, after the down all along the XXIV Corps lines , ' Tenth Army G—2 Rpt Nos . 18-20, dtd 13 - the Thirty-second Army issued orders 15Apr45 .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 191

issuance of the Army order for the attack , rarily, or permanently in some cases, personally communicated to the responsi- into the existing defensive lineup, an d ble operational officers of both the 24t h were given the designation of the uni and 62d Divisions that commitment of a t few shock troops would suffice for the into which they had been incorporated . attack instead of employing a major force , The first reorganization of the 12th since the attack was bound to fail .$ Independent Infantry Battalion on 23 Colonel Yahara's opposition to th e March serves as an excellent exampl e attack sprung from his belief that it of this practice . At that time, its organic was not in keeping with the defensive strength was 1,043 ; attached special mission of the Thirty-second Army and guard, labor, and naval elements raised that it would result in a sheer waste o f the total to 1,333. The battalion wa s manpower. He was right, for, in effect , armed with 49 light and 9 heavy ma- the attack was very costly to the Japa- chine guns, 42 grenade launchers, and 2 nese, who concluded that "the night as- 75mm guns. On 12 April, after mor e sault resulted in a complete failure ." 9 than a week of continuous fighting Although XXIV Corps estimated that against the XXIV Corps, 12th Inde- its troops had destroyed 6,883 of the pendent Infantry Battalion strength was enemy by 14 April, 10 its order of battl e listed by the Japanese as 1,257 . Only 414 maps still indicated that the 12th, 13th, men remained of the original battalion and 4th Independent Infantry Battal- and 61 from the unit attached originally , ions of the 62d Division's 63d Brigad e but the battalion had been strengthene d opposed the corps advance . Although by the addition of the 2d Battalion, 22 d Tenth Army intelligence agencies kne w Regiment (less one rifle company) an d that elements of four new battalions the entire 1st Light Mortar Battalion .'" had been added to the enemy line afte r Surprisingly enough, the battalion was the 12–13 April counterattack, th e more heavily armed than it had been Americans were unable to explain the before L-Day, for it now had 45 light continued identification of those in- and 13 heavy machine guns, 45 grenade fantry units that had received enough launchers, 19 90mm mortars, and 3 casualties to be considered destroyed . 75mm guns.' 2 Actually, the inability of the Tenth By the end of the second week of Army to maintain a current order o f April, Tenth Army intelligence officer s battle file stemmed directly from th e had obtained a fairly accurate picture replacement system of the Thirty-sec- of Japanese defense plans from cap- ond Army . The Japanese gradually fed tured enemy maps and documents. The individuals and small groups coming Americans were forced to revise thei r from service and support assignment s L-Day estimate of enemy strength up - , into forward units . At the same time ward by 7,000 to a total of 72,000, entire companies and battalions—as yet uncommitted—were absorbed tempo - 11 IIIAG G—2 Rpt No . 38, JOB Suppl, dtd 9May45 . Okinawa Operations Record, p . 82. 12 "Organization of the 12th IIB, dtd ° Ibid . 12Apr45," in 1st MarDiv G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 10 Tenth Army G—2 Rpt No . 10, dtd 14Apr45 . 37, dtd 8May45, Trans No . 46 .

192 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

which was "deemed a conservativ e that housed and protected the defending minimum." '3 It was apparent that th e troops. Since their operations were no t bulk of the Thirty-second Army had not subject in the same degree to the re- yet been met . strictions of inclement weather an d As the Tenth Army prepared for thi s enemy air attacks, as were air an d encounter, it became evident that th e naval gunfire, corps and divisiona l ammunition supply chain could not kee p artillery, of necessity, served as the up with the demand, and it was neces- support workhorses for assaults . sary to apply command restrictions o n Because General Hodge knew that a ammunition expenditure as early as 9 maximum effort would be needed if April .14 Concerning this shortage, the Thirty-second Army lines were to be Marine Deputy Chief of Staff of th e penetrated, he scheduled a corps attack, Tenth Army noted : three divisions abreast, for 19 April . The artillery, in fact, was used too Beginning 15 April, four days were freely. For a considerable period, artiller y spent in preparation for the attack . ammunition was being unloaded over the While guns and howitzers steadily beaches at the rate of 3,000 tons per day. hammered at enemy forward positions . . . It was considered normal to fire a concentration of four or five battalions . A and troop concentration areas, artillery good bit of TOT [time on target] firin g ammunition reserves were stockpiled was done .15 both at the batteries and distribution The nature of the Shuri defenses de- points. In the pre-attack period, plane s from TAF, and Task Forces 51, 52, an d manded the fullest employment possible of all available weapons . Artillery, 58 flew a total of 905 sorties in direct support missions for XXIV Corps e especially, was needed to reduce pre - . Th pared positions and denude them o f pilots dropped 482 tons of bombs an d expended 3,400 rockets and over 700,00 0 their skillfully prepared camouflage, t o rounds of seal off the firing ports ., and to collapse .50 caliber and 20mm am- the labyrinth of interconnecting tunnel s munition on Japanese installations .16 Added to this firepower was that com- 13 JOB Sum for 8-14Apr45, in Tenth Arm y ing from the strong force of TF 5 1 G–2 Rpt No . 22, dtd 17Apr45 . battleships, cruisers, and destroyers 34 For amplification of this artillery ammuni- that remained offshore both day an d tion shortage, see section entitled "Logistical night.'' Progress" in chap 7, infra . 1' Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 95. Time o n Prior to the attack, the frontlin e target is an artillery technique in which severa l units attempted to improve their posi- units fire on the same target and so time thei r tions with small local attacks, whil e fire that all projectiles hit the target simul- patrols were sent forward in order t o taneously . The point here is not that five bat- pinpoint enemy positions and weapon s talions firing one volley will expend more emplacements. When the 27th Divisio ammunition than one battalion firing fiv e n volleys, but that the five-battalion TOT is much entered the line on 15 April, a general more effective . BGen Frederick P . Henderson 16 ltr to Asst G–3, HQMC, dtd 280ct65, hereafte r XXIV Corps Arty AR, Anx C, enc 2, p . 4. Henderson ltr 1965 . 17 CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec C, pp . 39–42 .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 193

reshuffling of the XXIV Corps front tem that rapidly enabled us to mass al l took place . (See Map III, Map Section . ) guns within range on a target, we equalle d On that date, General Griner assumed or exceeded the Russians in effective avail - able fire support .1 8 responsibility for the corps right flan k and, on the following day, regained hi s Equally impressive was the air sup - 105th Infantry, which had been released port provided the ground troops during from army reserve following the cap- this offensive . At one time alone during ture of Tsugen Shima. All initial XXIV 19 April, "we had 375 aircraft on sta- Corps assault deployments were com- tion, and . . . LFASCU-2, controlling pleted two days before the jump-off . seven simultaneous air strikes on a ten - The support provided by air, naval mile front, had literally reached the gunfire, and artillery prior to the 19 point of saturation ." Commenting on April attack might seem pallid in com- this, the commander of the LFASCUs parison with the destructive potential stated that "I do not believe that we of the nuclear weapons of a later era. have ever exceeded, or since equalled , To the assault force leaders and their this magnitude of close air support on 1 9 troops, however, the immensity of th e any given day ." preparatory and supporting fires wa s To the troops poised for the attack, it awesome. The firepower of 6 battleships , seemed incredible that anyone could sur - 6 cruisers, and 9 destroyers was as - vive in that terrible downpour of steel , signed to direct support of the attackin g yet it soon became apparent that almost corps, and 650 Navy and Marine air- all of the enemy did. The Japanese were craft were directed to hit enemy de- hidden in caves and protected by soli d fenses, assembly areas, and suppl y limestone walls deep within the hill - points. ridge complex astride the XXIV Corps route of advance . 7 Beginning at 0600 on 19 April, 2 Initially, the assault infantry made battalions of artillery, covering the five - moderate gains, but when the enemy re - n mile front with a density greater tha manned his positions, the attack slowe d one weapon to every 30 yards, fired i n and then halted under the resumption - their pre-attack bombardment every of intense mortar, machine gun, and . thing from 75mm to 8-inch howitzers . Generally, all along th e , artillery fire Regarding this massing of battalions line, advances were negligible to non- one observer remarked : existent as enemy resistance stiffened . Not many people realize that th e Kakazu Ridge, the formidable bastio n . . . artillery in Tenth Army, plus th e opposing the 27th Division, proved to b e LVT (A) s [mounting 75mm howitzers ] as difficult to take at this time as it had and NGF equivalent gave us a guns/mil e been when the 96th Division made the of front ratio on Okinawa that was probably higher than any U . S . effort in world attempt. The 27th mounted a battalion - war II. We look with awe on the Russian size infantry attack, supported by a re - doctrine of 300 guns/mile of front for a n 19 attack. But if you take our Okinawa fig- Henderson ltr . ures, and apply a reasonable multiplication 'B Gen Vernon E . Megee ltr to Asst G-3 , factor for our flexible fire direction sys - HQMC, dtd 19Oct65 . 194 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

inforced tank company, in an attemp t punished and considerably reduced in to bypass the ridge through a cut be- size. Only the sheer courage and fanatic tween Kakazu and Nishibaru . Antic- determination of the enemy and the ipating the probable use of this route, strength of his natural defenses kep t on the night of 18 April the Japanes e the XXIV Corps at bay . Action during had emplaced mortars, machine guns, the period 20–23 April consisted o f antitank guns, and antiaircraft cannon heavily supported local attacks against to cover the Ginowan-Shuri road, which key strongpoints . crossed through the cut . The enemy cut When General Hodge renewed th e off the tank company from its coverin g XXIV Corps attack on 24 April, he was infantry by planned protective fire .20 ready to throw the full weight of its The tanks were able to get behind th e power against the forces holding Shuri' s ridge to shoot up the village of Kakazu, outer defense ring. During the night of but without infantry support, they were 23–24 April, however, unknown to th e forced to withdraw to their own lines . Americans and under cover of "the most Only 8 of the original 30 tanks in the intensive artillery fire yet experienced foray made it back through the cut ; the on the XXIV Corps front," 21 General remaining 22 fell victim to the fire of Ushijima had withdrawn his defending antitank and antiaircraft guns, mines i n units from the line that had held up the Kakazu village, and satchel charges 7th and 96th Divisions for two weeks . borne to the tanks by suicide-bent All along the front, American force s enemy soldiers . now made sweeping and significant By the end of the day, on the corps gains, and the heretofore-difficul t right flank, the 27th Division was Kakazu Ridge was taken with littl e halted at the western end of the Urasoe - effort. Mura escarpment ; the 96th Division, i n After the 27th Division had entere d the center, had pushed through Kaniku the lines on the corps right flank i n to gain positions on the forward slope s mid-April, 2/11 and 3/11 were re - of Nishibaru Ridge ; and the 7th Divi- assigned from support of the 96th Divi- sion, on the left, was held up by fanati c sion to reinforce the fires of 27th Divi- opposition and heavy fire, with the net sion artillery. This change was made result that it made no progress at all. because "General Sheetz thought, even As the XXIV Corps ground out the then, that the 1st Marine Division woul d second day of its offensive, the pattern be needed in the south, on the coast ." 2 2 of future fighting emerged—little yard - At this time, the 11th Marines com- age gained at a high cost in lives to both mander., Colonel Brown, heavily rein - sides. Heavy casualties were sustaine d forced his three 105mm battalions wit h by all the attacking divisions, but the regimental headquarters personnel s o Japanese frontline units also were that as many men as possible could gai n battle experience.23 20 "62d Div Battle Lessons, Priority Dispatc h "1 No 19, dtd 20Apr45," in CinCPac-CinGPO A Tenth Army G—2 Rpt No. 30, dtd 25Apr45 . 22 Bul 212—45, Translations and Interrogation s Brown ltr II . No . 39, dtd 30Aug45, pp . 47—49 . 23 Ibid.

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 195

Firing battery crewmen were not th e compunction about his Marines fighting only Marines in the 11th to gain on-the - in the south, he was not happy at the job training in the south, for regimental prospect of their being committed piece- communications personnel were kep t meal.25 If Marine assistance was needed exceptionally busy . Although radio was in the south, it was Geiger's opinion depended upon primarily, wiremen lai d that the entire 1st Marine Division telephone wires from Army fire direc- should be committed .26 Although a warn- tion centers to the Marine units sup - ing order for the tank battalion dis- porting XXIV Corps after frequen t placement had been dispatched to the interference in 11th Marines radio cir- 1st Division, the actual movement order s cuits had made reliance on wire com- were never issued and the matter wa s munications necessary . apparently dropped by Tenth Army .27 Owing to a shortage of trained wire- General Buckner acknowledged th e men in the Army battalions, these sam e need for a substantial infusion of fresh Marines in addition had to lay an d troops into the main battleline, an d maintain all lateral wire communica- directed General Geiger, on 24 April, to tions for three Army divisional artillery designate one IIIAC division as Tenth headquarters . This communication sys- Army reserve. One regiment of that tem permitted the rapid massing of al l division was to be ready to assembl e XXIV Corps and attached artillery fir e and move south on 12 hours' notice . whenever all other means of communi- General Geiger selected the 1st Marin e cation broke down .24 Forward observer Division, and General del Valle place d teams of the 11th Marines also gained the 1st Marines on alert status . 28 valuable experience when they wen t At this point, the question arises wh y forward to the XXIV Corps infantry the 2d Marine Division, in Tenth Army units their artillery battalions were sup - reserve, was not committed in actio n porting. The knowledge gained by th e on Okinawa when it was apparent that teams supporting the 27th Division wa s it was needed . On 9 April, Admiral especially useful later when the 1s t Nimitz authorized General Watson' s Marine Division relieved the 27th in th e division to return and debark at Saipan ; same general area . on the 14th, the division was release d Indications that greater Marine par- from Tenth Army reserve and reverte d ticipation in the Shuri battle would be to IIIAC control, although it remaine d forthcoming occurred on 21 April whe n on Saipan. Both at this time, and in later Tenth Army ordered General Geiger t o critiques of the fighting on Okinawa , make the 1st Tank Battalion availabl e there was a strong body of senior offi- for attachment to the 27th Division . 2' Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 88 . Although the IIIAC commander had no 20 Ibid. 27 Ibid. ; IIIAC G—3 Jnl, lApr-30Jun45 , 24 Ibid. General Brown added that "the 11t h 22Apr45 entry, hereafter IIIAC G—3 Jnl with Marines used well over 1,000 miles of wire from April 29th to June 22d, having as a peak date of entry cited . as much as 262 miles in operation at one time ." 28 IIIAC AR, p . 4 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 14

196 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

cers who felt that there was no sound Kelly Turner, whose transports were being 29 reason why the 2d Marine Division hurt by the kamikaze tactic. could not have been employed to make Although General Bruce had als o an amphibious assault on the south - pressed for a second landing, for hi s eastern coast of Okinawa. Possibly, a troops had all but captured Ie Shima , second landing could have succeeded in Buckner refused because his G—4 ha d cracking the Shuri barrier where the told him that food but not ammunition could be supplied for this project . In attack of the XXIV Corps in mid-Apri l addition, the site of the proposed 77th failed. Division landing was so far south of th e General Vandegrift suggested that main Tenth Army line at that time , the 2d Division be employed when he neither XXIV Corps artillery nor troop s visited Okinawa on 21 April with could support it. Besides, at the time Brigadier General Gerald C . Thomas, that the 77th was available, it was Admiral Nimitz, and Nimitz' chief o f needed in the line as the 7th, 27th , staff, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sher- and 96th Divisions were in bad shap e man. When, during a meeting at because of casualties and fatigue . Nor Geiger's CP, Buckner stated that he did Buckner want to use the 2d Marine Division for a second landing, for it was going to commit IIIAC divisions in was scheduled to invade Kikai Shima, the south shortly, Vandegrift : north of Okinawa, in July . did not object to the Marines being com- The Tenth Army commander was mitted to the main fight—they were o n evidently convinced that the greater Okinawa for this purpose . But I did ques- need was for fresh troops on the Shur i tion Buckner's tactical plan . Instead of front and that a landing on the south - trying to slug it out with the enemy , Geiger, Thomas, and I argued for a n eastern beaches was logistically in- amphibious landing in the rear or anywa y feasible. Despite the arguments pre- on the flank of the enemy by Buckner' s sented by General Vandegrift in favor reserve, the 2d Marine Division on Saipan . of such a tactic, he was not supported Forrest Sherman, among others, ob- by either Nimitz or Sherman, and jected to a landing on the far east coas t as impractical . We replied that the bay of Buckner remained unmoved in hi s our choice was the alternate landing are a decision. for the original operation, so apparentl y He faced the basic alternatives of a Buckner had thought it quite practical . two-corps frontal attack against Shur i Having been shot down on this point , or an envelopment of the enemy forces Sherman claimed it would take too long to load out the 2d Division from Saipan . facing his troops . Having decided We promised him it could be underway in against the landing in the enemy rear, six hours. his next step was to commit IIIAC in th e Despite these and other arguments south. Sherman refused to back us, nor did Buck- ner seem impressed . I learned later that =e Alexander A . Vandegrift and Robert B . General Bruce, commanding the 77th Army Asprey, Once a Marine (New York : W . W. Division which had fought so well on Norton and Company, Inc., 1964), p . 290, here - Guam, proposed a similar plan as did after Vandegrift and Asprey, Once A Marine.

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 197

The Marines were available to the that same day . Upon its relief, the 27th Tenth Army commander as a result of was to move north to relieve the 6t h change in the ICEBERG plan of oper- Marine Division, which would then ations. On 26 April, General Buckne r move to an assembly area near Chiban a was informed that Phase III of the plan, to await further orders for the move- . It was planned that, on or the projected invasion of Miyako Shima ment south about 7 May, the IIIAC was to take in the Sakashima Group east of Taiwan, over the zone held at that time by the was cancelled . This high-level decisio n 1st Marine Division and, simultane- by the JCS freed IIIAC from the ously, Tenth Army would then assume Miyako operation and permitted Buck- tactical control of the two-corps front . ner to insert that corps into the south- A coordinated army attack would b e ern Okinawa line.30 The next day, the made soon thereafter.32 army commander declared his intent t o attach the 1st Division to XXIV Corps 1ST MARINE DIVISION JOINS at an early date in order to relieve th e XXIV CORPS 3 3 understrength and badly battered 27t h Division for garrison duty under Island While the XXIV Corps made prep- Command.31 Also on 27 April, the 77th arations to relieve two of its frontline Infantry Division completed its move divisions, the attack to the south con- from Ie Shima to Okinawa, and it s tinued. The enemy reacted savagely to leading elements moved into position t o the grinding advance of the 96th Divi- sion, throwing counterattacks, repeate d relieve the 96th the next day. artillery and mortar barrages, an d Matters concerning the future em- never-ending infiltration attempts in th e ployment of IIIAC units were discussed soldiers' path . The division objective at a conference held at Tenth Army was the Maeda Escarpment. Retention headquarters on 28 April . Colonel of this position was vital to Thirty- Walter A. Wachtler, General Geiger' s second Army defense plans, because th e G-3, was informed that the 1st Marin e terrain offered a commanding view of Division was to be attached to XXIV all of the Japanese positions as far as Corps on the last day of April. General the Shuri foothills, and at the same del Valle's troops would begin movin g time guaranteed continued enemy ob- south to relieve the 27th Division o n 32 IIIAC AR, p . 44 . 30 Of this assault, the FMFPac commande r ' Unless otherwise indicated, the material i n informed the Commandant of the Marine Corp s this section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; that it was his "opinion that the target is un- XXIV Corps AR ; TAF AR ; TAF PeriodicRpts , necessary—practically in a [Japanese] rear Apr-May45 ; ADC Daily IntelSums, Apr- area and its capture will cost more than Iw o May45 ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 7th InfDiv AR ; 27t h .Jima ." LtGen Holland M . Smith ltr to CMG, dt d Inf Div OpRpt; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 27Mar45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondenc e 96th InfDiv AR ; 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR , File, HistBr, HQMC) . 22Apr-23Jun45, n .d ., hereafter 5th Mar SAR ; 1st MarDiv G–3 .Inl, 27Apr45 . 7th Mar SAR .

198 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

servation into American lines.34 The of Nakanishi. No orders were issued for region surrounding Maeda, therefore, the resumption of the attack in thi s became the focus of ferocious fightin g area, so the Marines spent the rest o f when the enemy attempted to retain th e 30 April digging in, improving existing dominating ground of the second Shuri defenses, and registering defensiv e defensive ring. On 29 April, units of the fires.35 (See Map III, Map Section .) 77th Division began relief of the 96t h The commander of 3/1 had been in- Division and immediately took up th e formed by the commander of the re- attack. The soldiers of the 77th wer e lieved Army battalion that some Japa- very tired from the fighting they ha d nese were still holed-up in Miyagusuku. just experienced on Ie Shima, and the Marines, dispatched to mop up, move d division was far understrength becaus e towards the village, whereupon enem y of casualty losses . As a result, it could artillery and mortar fire began fallin g make but slight gains against the highl y on them. Under this cover, Japanese developed defenses . troops began infiltrating back into The 27th Division lines on the 29t h Miyagusuku in some strength . After had been pushed through Kuwan an d being pinned down in the village ruins Miyagusuku during a daylong drive , by the concentrated fire, the Marines which exposed deeply dug-in, heavil y were forced to withdraw ; they set up mined Japanese positions . These ex- north of the village for the night. At tended throughout the rugged hills and dusk, the 3/1 reserve was committed on ridges that bordered the east and south- the left of the line, where it tied in with east sides of Machinato airfield . At 0600 the one yet-unrelieved unit of the 27th on the following day, the 1st Marin e Division.3s Division was attached to XXIV Corps. The 77th Division completed the re - Immediately thereafter, march serial s lief of the 96th at the same time the 1st of the 1st Marines and 1st Tank Bat- Marines took over the right of the 27th talion began moving to the 27th Divi- Division lines. At noon, General Bruce sion area in the south. The Army divi- assumed command of the zone from sion, meanwhile, continued its attack General Bradley and, throughout the south of Machinato airfield . At 1000, the first of the Marine units began mov- day, 77th Division troops attempted to improve their positions on the escarp- ing into 27th Division lines even as i t halted its forward progress and disen- ment. Despite heavy supporting fires, gaged its advance patrols, which had the sheer fury and fanatic determina- been caught in a heavy fire fight . tion of the defenders forced the attackers back to defensive positions o f On the extreme right of the corps the previous night . line, beginning at Kuwan, 1/1 took up positions, which made a half-circl e ' 1st Bn, 1st Mar SAR, 23Feb-21Jun45, n .d . , around the south of Machinato an d p. 3, hereafter 1/1 SAR . joined up with 3/1 just to the northeas t ae 3d Bn, 1st Mar SAR, Phase I and II of th e Nansei Shoto Operations, dtd 10Ju145, p . 9 , 3' Okinawa Operations Record, p . 91 . hereafter 3/1 SAR .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 199

By midafternoon of 1 May, two o f tions south of Awacha, 2/5 Marines ob- the 1st Division assault regiments, the served about a platoon of Army tank s 1st Marines on the right and the 5th moving south in the town . As soon as Marines on the left, had relieved th e the tanks had emerged from the town , 27th Division ; General del Valle as- they were hit by 47mm AT fire withi n sumed command of the former Arm y 20 yards of the Marine line .39 Perhaps zone at 1400 . (See Map 13 .) Although even more disturbing to the Marines this action marked the official entry o f was the news that their unit identifica- the 1st Division into the southern front , tion and the location of their front had the 11th Marines had been in the van - already been noted on an enemy map guard when it supported the 7th, 27th , captured just that day .4 0 and 96th Divisions throughout most of General del Valle's men continued the fighting in April.37 The artillery their defensive activities on their first battalions of the 27th Division remaine d day in the south . By 1700, all lines had in position to continue supporting th e been tied in, and 1/5 had taken up posi- 1st and 77th Divisions in their attack tions in a reserve area . As the frontline to the south.3 8 Marines dug in, preparations were made Even before completing relief of th e for a fully supported division attack 27th Division on 1 May, General del scheduled for the following day, with Valle's Marines saw clearly the result s the north bank of the Asa Kaw a of combat in southern Okinawa, and (River) as the objective . The corp s soon learned of the tenacity of the de- commander instructed General del fenders. When the 5th Marines relieved Valle to exert constant pressure against the remaining Army regiments during the enemy and to support the 77th Divi- the afternoon of the 1st, they learned sion attack with fire and maneuver.4 1 how hard these units had been hit. Each Because it flanked the Army division , 2/5 infantry company replaced one de- the 5th Marines was assigned this task. pleted battalion of the 105th, and 3/ 5 In order to prevent an America n took over the area held by the 106th . penetration after the 27th Division had At 1400, while consolidating their posi - taken Gusukuma, the Japanese had bee n forced to reform their west coast battle- 3T "On 29 April, Headquarters, 11th Marine s line. It now was held by a major por- n assumed command of its scattered battalions i tion of the 62d Division, which was posi- the zone of and reinforcing the 27th Division , the two battalions with the 7th and 96th Divi- tioned along a line that ran generally sions displacing into that area . All four bat- from Jichaku and Uchima through the talions of the 11th Marines were commende d ridges north of Dakeshi to Awacha . In by the Army divisions with which they served ." addition, there were "powerful ele- Brown ltr II, copies of commendations ap- ments of the Division scattered and re - pended . " One battalion, the 249th Field Artillery, 3B 2d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, Okinawa, lApr - accompanied the 27th Division when it wen t 22Jun45, n .d ., pp . 2—3, hereafter 2/5 SAR . north and furnished support during infantr y mop-up activities . This unit returned south on '° 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 1May45 . 29 May to reinforce the fires of IIIAC Artillery. 91 Ibid.

200 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1ST MARINE DIVISION ADVANCE S 1-3 MAY 194 5 Showing Boundary Change Around Awacha Pocke t Scal e

MAP 13 T. L. RUSSELL

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 201

maining in the cave positions within On the left of the regiment, mean- the [American] lines still offering re- while, 3/1 prepared for a second at- sistance." 42 It was these forces wit h tempt to secure Miyagusuku, this time which the 1st Marines would have t o with the support of seven tanks from contend . the 1st Tank Battalion, four of the m The 1st of May brought cloudy an d mounting flamethrowers. The flat tra- cooler weather, and sporadic showers jectory tank cannon fire blasted th e heralded the Okinawa rainy period , houses and walls still standing, and 30 0 which, in itself, serves as a harbinge r gallons of flaming napalm set the entir e of the approaching typhoon season pyre aflame.43 At 1045, when the fire s (July—November) . During the previ- had died down, a small patrol passed ous night, all 1st Marines battalion s through without enemy opposition . had received intermittent mortar an d Approximately two and a half hour s artillery fire . The day was devoted by 1/1 to patrolling its front and attempt- later, the rest of the battalion followed , ing to readjust its lines. A reconnais- and, as it cleared Miyagusuku, ther e sance patrol discovered that a deep was a step-up in the intermittent Japa- L-shaped ravine cut across the entir e nese mortar and artillery fire that ha d battalion front and that it formed a been falling since before dawn. Added natural barrier to the next logical ob- to this fire was that of enemy rifleme n jective. The Marines also found that th e and machine gunners . Increased casual- retreating enemy had blown out the fill ties and the difficulties encountered i n where the main north-south highway evacuating them forced the assault crossed this chasm. Added to the enemy companies to withdraw under a smok e artillery and antitank guns registere d screen and mortar barrage once the on the area, this obstacle obviousl y would prohibit an armor-supporte d battalion commander had given permis- infantry penetration. sion for such a move. By 1900, the battalion returned to the positions it had A patrol sent from one of the Marin e rifle companies to the west of the ravin e occupied on 30 April . to scout out other approaches was taken " 1st TkBn Summaries of Tank Action , under extremely heavy fire that cam e 15Apr-23Jun45, hereafter 1st TkBn Sum, with from the steep cliffs along the far side dates of action . According to the 3/1 SAR, of the declivity. It was apparent that the p. 10, the tanks supporting this action were Army mediums, but the 1st Tank Battalio n enemy, from positions on the high lists them as belonging to its own Company A . ground to the south and southeast of the The flame tanks came from Company B, 713t h Asa Kawa, had excellent observation o f Tank Battalion, which was attached first to th e the battalion approach route and that 1st Marine Division and later to IIIAC . This the Marines were going to have a diffi- battalion was one of the first Army armored units to be equipped with and trained in the cult time reaching and crossing th e use of an improved tank-mounted flame river. thrower, which replaced the 75mm gun in the medium tank. Appleman, et. al., Okinawa Okinawa Operations Record, p. 97. Battle, p . 256 .

202 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

The 1st Division attack to the Asa on reasoned that the new attack direction , 2 May began in driving rain which seri- which would hit the flank of many of ously limited visibility and reduced the the positions holding up the 5th amount of effective air support supplie d Marines, would enable both Company L that day. The two frontline Army divi- and his left regiment to continue th e sions in XXIV Corps attacked enemy - advance. held ridge positions containing pill - After new attack orders had bee n boxes and mutually supporting small issued, battalion boundaries adjusted , arms and automatic weapons emplace- and a 10-minute artillery barrage laid , ments. Added to these barriers and th e the 1st Marines attack was resumed a t destructiveness of Japanese artillery 1630 against very heavy fire . By dark, fire was the foe's determined and 3/1 had fought its way to a small serie s ferocious refusal to yield any ground. of hills approximately 300 yards sout h When the 5th Marines jumped off at of Miyagusuku . Pouring rain, machine 0900, following artillery, naval gunfire, gun fire, and grenades began falling on and some air preparation, 2/5 on the the leading elements of the assault as extreme left came under flanking fire the troops gained this ground . Here they from positions in front of the 307th' s began digging in at 2000 for the night . lines. Within an hour, the 2d Battalion Almost immediately, the enemy began was pinned down, and, by 1100, heavy the first in a series of infiltration casualties forced its withdrawal under attempts which were to mark the hour s a smoke cover to its original positions . of darkness. The violence of the hand- As soon as the 3d Battalion crossed it s to-hand clashes on the hill held by Com- line of departure, it too came under th e pany K was reflected in a comment the frontal and flanking fire that had drive n next morning by one of the Marines, 2/5 back . "The advance was untenable who said that this had been the grim- mest night he had spent so far on Oki- and had to be withdrawn to initial posi- nawa.45 tions." 44 Because the 5th Marines wa s On the extreme right of the division , unable to advance, Company L of 3/ 1 1/1 ran into equally heavy resistance i n (on the battalion left) was stopped in its effort to cross the ravine facing it. its attempt to move beyond Miyagusuk u Although one company had already with Company K . The latter, however , passed through Nakanishi, and was i n was not pinned down and was able to position by 1000 to plunge into th e progress beyond the edge of the ruin s ravine where it angled north toward s that were once a village . At 1446, the Miyagusuku, the slowness of the attac k 1st Marines commander, Colonel Chap- to the left of the 1st Marines presage d pell, was ordered to change the axis of caution, and the 1/1 commander wa s the regimental attack from due south t o told to be wary of exposing his troops to the southeast. General del Valle had enfilade fire. " LtCol Martin C . Roth 1tr to CMC, dt d 18Mar55. " 3/1 SAR, p . 13 .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 203

Despite all precautionary measures , objectives to the 1st Marines . The first including the blasting of enemy posi- began at the railroad spur bridge cross- tions by self-propelled assault guns at ing the Asa River between Asa and the beginning of the attack, Japanes e Uchima, and extended northeast, gen- fire continued to pour from the caves erally following the spur initially an d and heights overlooking the defile to then the main line itself, to a point just catch the advancing troops . Disregard- east of Miyagusuku. The second began ing this fusilade and the casualties re- at the same bridge, but ran generall y sulting from it, Company B managed t o east along the high ground between gain a defiladed position just short of Dakeshi and Wana to the divisio n the initial objective . At this point, how- boundary. The line between the attack- ever, the Marines were cut off bot h ing regiments, bent back to reflect the front and rear by enemy fire . At 1300 , assignment given the 1st Marines, gav e orders for a general withdrawal wer e to the 5th the thankless task of clearing issued, and the company disengaged an d out the confused terrain that soon woul d pulled back to high ground under the be called Awacha Pocket . cover of smoke . Although the 5th Marines gained At 1630, when the attack was re- about 500–600 yards in its zone, the 1st sumed in the new direction, the 1st became heavily engaged in fire fights al l Battalion attacked straight across th e along the line and was restricted to ravine in order to ensure flank protec- limited gains. Forward elements of 1/ 1 tion before making the southeasterly ran into difficulty in every direction ; move. The impetus of the drive carrie d Company F,46 attacking Jichaku, was Company A to the outskirts of Jichaku , - where it dug in. By the end of a quie t held up by a stubborn defense, and Com but wet night, the assault units ha d pany A was cut up in its attempt to re - established a firm line where the divi- duce the ravine position that had stymied sion awaited the joining of RCT–7 . the battalion on the previous day . The 7th Marines had displaced south Neither company was able to move for - on the morning of the attack, its bat- ward and both were forced to withdraw talions moving to the vicinity of Uchi- under the cover of smoke late in th e tomari. On the following day, 3 May, morning, carrying with them the large the regimental CP displaced forward to number of casualties they had sustained . a point about 200 yards north of Because it appeared that the attack Gusukuma, while the 1st and 2d Bat- would, not succeed without armor sup- talions took up beach defense position s port, plans were made to use tanks afte r in the vicinity of Machinato airfield . the road south of Kuwan had bee n The 3d Battalion was attached to the cleared of mines. After dark, an engi- 5th Marines to assist the advance of that regiment. 4e Because both Companies B and C were badly shot up on the previous day, Company F Continuing the attack on 3 May, th e was attached to 1/1 prior to the redirected division assigned intermediate and final attack that had begun at 1630 on 2 May .

204 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

neer mine-clearing team, protected by Marines, was able to gain some 500–60 0 infantry began reconnoitering the pro- yards, but was forced in late afternoon 47 posed armor attack route. to bend its lines back to tie in with 3/5 . Company L, on the left of the 1st Immediately upon being relieved, 2/ 5 Marines line, was unable to move unti l swung over to its left to take over par t 3/5 had seized a high hill to the left of the 307th Infantry lines on the out- front of the company . After it took th e skirts of Awacha . (See Map 13 . ) hill, the battalion was driven off at 155 5 by a heavy enemy artillery concentra- Once its 2d Battalion was relieved b y tion. Company L was ordered to retak e 2/5, the 307th Infantry moved it to the the objective, and, following a 10-minute left and, with all three of its battalions 81mm mortar barrage, gained the hill - on line, mopped up the top of the escarp- top 20 minutes later . Here, the company ment—and the upper part of its revers e was pinned down by Japanese fire com- slope—during the day . By nightfall, the ing from high ground to the front and Army regiment held positions command- on its flanks. When Company K was ing the Japanese defensive alignmen t unable to close in on L and had to fall all the way back to the Shuri foothills . back, Company I was committed on th e Despite having been pushed back, th e right of K to close a gap that had de- enemy still determinedly refused the veloped along the battalion boundary . Americans further gains and fanati- The regiment then assigned Compan y cally resisted from reverse-slope caves , G of 2/1 to back-up the 1,200-yard front sometimes counterattacking in company of 3/1. and platoon strength to regain critica l To escape the furious machine gu n terrain. and mortar fire that had followed i t The ferocity of Japanese resistance after it was driven off the hill on the continued unabated all along the XXIV right of 3/1, 3/5 was forced to fall back Corps line, for as veteran units were another 100 yards ; its advances on 3 annihilated, they were quickly rebuilt May were limited to 200-300 yards . with fresh rear area troops, or re- Passing through 2/5 that morning to placed with new infantry elements . begin its attack with two companies i n General Hodge's dire prediction at the the assault, the 1st Battalion, 5th beginning of the 19 April attack tha t "it is going to be really tough . . . and " This team removed all mines in the road until it came to a spot where a shell crater , that I see no way to get [the Japanese] flanked by rice paddies, would effectively bloc k out except blast them out yard b y tank traffic . Upon returning to its lines, th e yard. . . ." 48 was being all too griml y troops were nearly cut off by a large enem y unit that had attempted to work its wa y substantiated . around the rear of the patrol . After a bris k fire fight in which there were some Marin e 98 CG, XXIV Corps ltr to CGAFPOA, dtd casualties, the patrol regained its lines . 1st 17Apr45, quoted in Appleman et. al., Okinawa Mar SAR, p . 10 . Battle, p. 185 .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 205

THE JAPANESE end of April, the steady attrition of the COUNTERATTACK 4 ° forces manning the Shuri outer defens e ring caused General Ushijima to re- During the grueling see-saw battle in appraise his situation and reexamin e the south, both sides suffered heavily . his mission. Since he had been ordered The slow but perceptible American to prolong the battle as long as possible gains were costly, but the Japanes e and inflict heavy casualties on the in- paid the higher price. The 62d Division vaders, Ushijima decided to utilize th e bore the brunt of the April attack an d units immobilized in the southeast to by the end of the month its combat reinforce the Shuri positions . strength was less than half of what it Implementing this decision, the 24th had been originally . Although man y Division and the 44th IMB were ordered Thirty-second Army officers viewed th e to begin a movement north on. 22 April. Japanese cause on Okinawa as hope- The 24th, recovering control of its 22d less, they were buoyed up by the fact Regiment from the 62d Division, was to "that after thirty consecutive days of occupy defensive positions in a line systematic fighting the main body of from Gaja on the east coast to Maed a [our] fighting forces should remain in- at the eastern end of the Urasoe-Mur a tact. . . ." 50 Not yet bloodied in the escarpment. The depleted battalions of fight for Shuri were most of the units the hard-hit 62d Division were to con- of the 24th Division, 44th IMB, and centrate in the area from Maeda to th e 5th Artillery Command. An attitude west coast near Gusukuma . Taking up favoring the offense permeated Gen- blocking positions behind the 62d on the eral Ushijima's command, whose mem- high ground to the south and east of th e bers considered that commitment o f Asa River, the 44th IMB was to cover these fresh troops in one major effor t Naha and the ridges and draws flankin g would effectively blunt the American to the west of Shuri . drive. To protect the area south of the l Prior to the landings on the west Naha-Yonabaru valley, and to forestal t coast, the expectation of an American further American landings on the wes a amphibious assault at Minatoga ha d coast, both Admiral Ota's force and provisional guard group, formed to caused the Thirty-second Army com- guard the Chinen Peninsula, were kep t mander to deploy a considerable portio n . The Chinen units were not to of his strength in that area . But, by the in place make a last-ditch stand, but were to make a fighting withdrawal to Shuri i f 49 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; the southeastern beaches were invaded. XXIV Corps AR; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 7th Inf - In less than a week, by 27 April, th e Div AR ; 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Okinawa ; 1st new enemy defensive setup had bee n Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; Okinawa Operation s established. But even small local Japa- Record ; IntelMono ; Shimada Interrogation ; Yahara Interrogation ; Hayashi and Coox , nese counterattacks failed, despite th e Kogun . reconstitution of the frontlines and so Okinawa Operations Record, 92-93 . the infusion of fresh troops . Steadily,

206 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

XXIV Corps units encroached upo n (See Map IV, Map Section.) enemy positions and forced their de- The counterattack was to begin at fenders back. In the Thirty-second 0500 (Y-Hour) on 4 May (X-Day) . The Army headquarters deep below Shur i Japanese believed it would be success- Castle, General Cho led other firebrands ful because they knew a relief of the in an attempt to convince the army American lines was then taking place .53 commander that conditions were favor - At Y-Hour, the 89th Regiment (on the able for an all-out, army-sized counter - right) would begin a penetration of the attack, employing the relatively intact 7th Division front to gain its objective , 24th Division as the spearhead. the Minami-Uebaru foothills, by sunset. Colonel Yahara was a lone dissenter t o In the center, the 22d Regiment was to the plan. His belief that the Japanese hold its positions near Kochi and Onaga , attack would end in abject failure and where it would support the assaulting certain defeat was based on several fac- units with fire. When the 89th Regiment tors. He noted that the Americans, posi- formed an east-west line at Tanabaru , tioned on commanding ground, were the initial objective, the 22d would move materially and numerically superior . out, destroying any American unit re- Fatalistically prophesying an inevitable maining to its front, and follow up i n Japanese defeat no matter what, the rear center of the division main effor t colonel reasoned that the army shoul d to be made by the 32d Regiment . At "maintain to the bitter end the prin- Y-Hour, the 32d would drive forwar d ciple of a strategic holding action." 5 1 to seize 77th Division positions south- Any other course of action would doo m east of Maeda, and then continue on to the army, be detrimental to its mission , gain the heights west of Tanabaru b y and open the way for an otherwis e sunset also. earlier invasion of the Japanese home- Armored support of the attack was land. to be supplied by the 27th Tank Regi- Despite Colonel Yahara's impas- ment, after it had moved from positions sioned and reasoned arguments, Gen- near Ishimmi to penetrate the 77th Divi- eral Cho, backed by other proponents o f sion lines west of Kochi. Here, the the offensive—the division and brigad e tanks would take up new positions to commanders—swayed Ushijima to thei r assist the 22d and 32d Regiments . The way of thinking, and, in the end, pre- day before the attack, the 44th IMB was vailed. In scope and desired objectives , to move to the area northwest of Shuri, the attack plan was exceedingly am- where the brigade would provide left- bitious ; it called for nothing less than flank security until the initial objectiv e the destruction of XXIV Corps an d was taken. Immediately thereafter, th 52 e capture of Futema and its environs. 44th would swing north to Oyama an d 51 Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 76-77 . the coast just beyond, to isolate the 1st "Mistakenly, the Japanese believed that Marine Division from the battle . This Tenth Army headquarters was located at task would be supported by the hereto- Futema ; actually, this is where the 96th Divi- sion CP was sited . "Hayashi, Kogun, p. 142.

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 207

fore-uncommitted 62d Division. To attacks were to be made unless assaul t make certain that the Marines would b e groups numbered more than 100 men. cut off, the Japanese planners had re- If all went according to plan, the tw o inforced the 44th IMB with a consider- counterlanding elements would join up able number of armored, artillery, an d near the center of the island to assist th e antitank elements . On the night of 3–4 24th Division advance.5 4 May, the guns, mortars, and howitzer s A never-changing assumption in ICE - of the 5th Artillery Command were to BERG intelligence estimates was an move out of their hidden positions into enemy capability to mount a large-scal e the open to provide the Japanese attac k counterattack. As of the evening of 3 with full gunfire support. The Thirty- May, however, an analysis of recen t second Army also called upon Admiral enemy tactics indicated that he was Ota to participate in the massive counter- more likely to continue fighting a serie s attack, for he was directed to form of delaying actions from successive from his naval command four infantry positions, defending each one "until th e battalions to be used as army reserve i n troops on the position are nearly an- exploiting the breakthrough. nihilated ." 55 Since the American order The Japanese attack plan provide d of battle of enemy elements facing also for hitting the open flanks of th e XXIV Corps was then current, and each XXIV Corps. Embarking from Naha o n enemy move and countermove had bee n the night of 3–4 May, a makeshift navy viewed with respect to the related tacti- of landing barges, small craft, an d cal situation, indications of an immi- native canoes was to land a major por- nent major attack were not perceptible . tion of the 26th Shipping Enginee r Local counterattacks and stiffened re- Regiment behind 1st Marine Division sistance were merely attributed to the lines at Oyama. Concurrently, elements infusion of new strength into Japanese of the 26th, 28th, and 29th Sea Raiding lines. XXIV Corps troops were not Squadrons were to wade the reef on th e caught offguard, however, when the Marine flank, go ashore in the vicinity attack was finally mounted . of Kuwan, and more inland to support Preceding the two-day struggle — the counterlanding of the 26th. Com- called by Colonel Yahara "the decisiv e mitted to the west coast attack was a action of the campaign" 56 —the fifth total of approximately 700 men . Another envelopment was to b e mass Kamikaze attack struck at dusk o n attempted on the east coast where abou t 3 May. Tokyo had notified the Fifth Air 500 men from the 23d Shipping Engi- Fleet on 30 April of the impendin g neer Regiment and the 27th Sea Raiding Squadron would land behind the 7th " "POW Interrogation No . 38, Superior Pvt, Hq, 2d Co ., 26th ShpgEngrRegt (CO's or- Division at Tsuwa . The mission of both derly)," in 1st MarDiv G—2 Periodic Rpt No . regiments was to infiltrate American 39, dtd 10May45 . -rear areas in small groups and to J5 Tenth Army G—2 Rpt Nos . 33 and 39, dt d destroy equipment and harass CPs with 28Apr and 4May45 respectively. grenades and demolitions . No concerted " Yahara Interrogation.

208 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Thirty-second Army attack. 57 The Japa- erratic. A string of bombs fell near nese air command then issued order s Sobe, however, and crashed through the for a mass suicide raid to be launche d overheads of IIIAC Evacuation Hospi- on 3 May, prior to the beginning of the tal No. 3, destroying two dug-in surgery ground assault. Kikusui No. 5 targets wards, killing 13 and wounding 36 were to be American supply areas, air - patients and medical personnel.62 Radar- fields, and the ever-suffering radar directed TAF night fighters were unable pickets.68 to close with the enemy bombers be - Although they were to have played cause American electronic early-warn- only a secondary role in the overall ing equipment was disrupted by "win- attack, the Kamikaze pilots were more dow" that had been dropped by fou r destructive and successful in what they Japanese reconnaissance aircraft . 63 did than was the Japanese infantry . Beginning on 4 May at 0600, and for In two hours, however, 36 of the 12 5 four hours thereafter, the Kamikazes suiciders in this raid were shot dow n pushed a murderous onslaught agains t according to the claims of antiaircraf t the radar pickets to coincide with th e gunners ashore and afloat, and those of Thirty-second Army ground effort . By carrier- and land-based America n the time that the morning forays and pilots. 59 Japanese sources note that a the one later at dusk against the escort total of 159 planes of all types partici- carrier group were over, the number pated in the 3–4 May raid . 60 of naval casualties and ships damage d Although a barrier of antiaircraft and sunk was sobering. There were 91 fire kept the conventional bombers at Americans killed, 280 wounded, and 283 such heights over the airfields and th e missing on the 4th, 64 and on the picket anchorage that they could cause only line, two destroyers and two LSMs were superficial damage, the suiciders bor e sunk ; two other destroyers, a mine- in to inflict wide-spread havoc on the sweeper, a light minelayer, and an LC S radar pickets . A destroyer and an LS M were damaged .65 A turret on the cruiser were sunk ; two minelayers and a sup - Birmingham was hit by a suicider in the port landing craft (LCS) were dam- morning attack, and another enemy pilot aged. 61 Enemy bombers again appeared succeeded in crashing the flight deck of over the island shortly after midnight the carrier Sangamon in the afternoon, to hit Tenth Army rear area instal- causing an explosion which damaged lations, but as before, accurate AA A both elevators and destroyed 21 planes . fire kept them high over their potentia l 9 targets and caused the bombing to b "` Tenth Army G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 40, dtd e 5May45 . "Fifth AirFlt Hist, p. 68. "Fifth AirFlt Hist, p . 72 . Japanese use of 58 Ibid. "window" enabled many of their night sorties to reach Okinawa relatively unscathed . 59 CTF 51 AR, pt III, pp . 75—76 ; TAF pilot s "CTF 51 AR, pt III, pp . 77—79 ; pt V, se c downed 3 planes to bring their claimed total t o H, pp . 7—10 . 145% kills . TAF Periodic Rpt No. 4, 3May45 . 55 For a closer view of the radar pickets' 5o Hattori, op. cit., table facing p. 132 . sufferings, see Morison, Victory in the Pacific, 51 CTF 51 AR, pt III, pp . 75—76 . pp. 251—256 .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 209

Enemy air did not go unpunished o n steadily accelerating rate of artiller y the 4th, for American pilots claimed t o fire placed mainly on the frontlines o f have destroyed a total of 95 Japanese the 7th and 77th Divisions . As Ameri- aircraft. ADC flyers had their second can guns replied in kind, the norma l most successful day, next to 12 April, battlefield sounds became an almost un - for their claims totalled 60 3/4 kills, bearable cacophony. In a comparatively bringing TAF claims overall to 206 i n less noisier sector near Machinato air- less than a month of operations .66 field, LVT (A) crews on guard opened The Navy was not concerned solely up on unidentified individuals they with helping to beat off the aerial heard on the beach, and shortly there- attacks, for Admiral Turner alerted hi s after, support chaft were seen firing at surface force to the possible threat ac- targets in the water just offshore.6 8 cruing from suiciders in the enemy Sea Less than an hour after this outbreak o f Raiding Squadrons . He cautioned his firing, the 1st Marines reported enemy . "flycatcher" 67 screen of cruisers, de- barges heading in for shore at Kuwan.89 stroyers, and gunboats on both coasts to The landing took place here, instea d be especially watchful. It was this of at Oyama as originally planned, be- screen that discovered the shipping en- cause the landing craft carrying the gineer regiments attempting to slip be- bulk of the attack force had troubl e hind American lines and assisted th e negotiating the route through the reef s ground forces in combating the counter- and lost their way .70 This error was landings by illuminating and shellin g further compounded by the fact that the them. When daylight of 4 May revealed troops went ashore at the exact point the extent of the Japanese ground effort, where Company B, 1/1, had anchored the two battleships, five cruisers, an d its night defense position. eight destroyers assigned as daytime The stealthy enemy approach wen t gunfire support for XXIV Corps joined undetected by beach sentries and becam e with artillery and air to blunt the Japa- known only when a clamorous babbl e nese infantry advance and silence it s signalled the opening of the Japanes e weapons support . attack. This alert resulted in an im- ; The Japanese ground offensive began mediate response from the Marines e shortly after dark on 3 May with a they opened up immediately at th overcrowded barges with fire from 00 TAF PeriodicRpt No. 5, 4May45 . machine guns and mortars, previousl y " The supporting force assigned craft sited to cover the reef. A combination nightly to a anti-small boat screen. The heavier of burning barges, flares, and tracer s fire support ships were designated to control soon gave the battle scene an infernal the screen, to illuminate points of activity o n f request, and to harass suspected boat locations . glow. This illumination over the ree These ships were nicknamed "flycatchers" as O8 3d ArmdAmphBn SAR, Nansei Shot o the result of their success one night followin g Operation, dtd 1Ju145, pp. 12-13 . Admiral Turner's admonition to "be par- 00 ticularly alert as this looks like a fine nigh t 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 4May45. to catch flies." CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec C, pp. 70 "POW Interrogation No . 38, Superior Pvt, 6, 16 . Hq, 2d Co, 26th ShpgEngRegt," op . cit.

210 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

revealed Japanese heads bobbing in the water amidst the flotsam of the early - water and provided the Marine rifle - morning battle. Lieutenant Colonel men and machine gunners with target s Berger's battalion, assigned to mop up which they raked unmercifully, blunt- the counterlanding area, began relieving the raid.71 The 1st Marines coming the right flank elements of 1/1 a t mander immediately reinforced the 0645 so that the 1st Battalion could threatened area, and LVT (A) s from continue the attack to the south .73 the 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion Other enemy landings were attempted took up blocking positions on the reef before dawn behind 1st Division line s above Kuwan. farther up the west coast . Most of thes e By 0245, those survivors of the ill- Japanese efforts were doomed to failur e fated landing attempts who had gained either when the combined fire of naval the beach were. being pounded steadil y vessels, LVT (A) s, infantry, and serv- by all available weapons . Despite the ice troops caught the boats in the water immediate Marine reaction to the at- or when, by light of day, the few Japa- tempted Japanese envelopment from the nese able to reach shore were hunte d sea, some enemy troops managed to in - down and killed. An estimated 65 enem y filtrate to the rear of 1/1 before th e landed near Isa in the vicinity of the fighting began on the beach. These division CP ; some who hid in the cane raiders were engaged by Company F, fields survived until dawn, only to be 2/1, in an intense fire fight, which ended tracked down by 1st Reconnaissance with 75 enemy dead lying where they Company scouts accompanied by war had fallen around the Marine posi- dogs and their handlers . 72 tions. On the east coast, the counterlandin g Because he was left with but on e met with the same lack of success, for rifle company as his regimental reserve , the "flycatchers" and 7th Divisio n Colonel Chappell requested the attach- troops cut the shipping engineers t o ment of a 7th Marines battalion to hi s pieces, killing an estimated 400 . 74 Thus, regiment. Division approved the request the Thirty-second Army gambit failed ; and ordered 2/7 to move south to report there was little indication that the rest to 1/1 for orders . Preceding the rest o f of Ushijima's counterattack plan coul d his battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Berge r be fulfilled. and his staff arrived at the 1/1 CP at Japanese artillery fire continue d 0500 to find all in order and the Japa- through the night of 3–4 May, reachin g nese threat contained . With the excep- a deafening thunder at 0430., when a tion of scattered enemy remnants holed half-hour cannonade was fired in prep- up in Kuwan, most of the 300–400 Japa- aration for the 24th Division attack. nese who had attempted the landin g Added to the bursting fragments of th e were dead, and were seen either lying high-caliber shells were those of man y on the beach or floating aimlessly in th e 13 2d Bn, 7th Mar SAR, 2May-22Jun45, dt d 11 1 /1 SAR, p . 8. 2Ju145, p . 4, hereafter 2/7 SAR. 1= 14 2d Bn, 1st Mar Narrative Rpt-ICEBERG , Tenth Army POW Interrogation Rpt No . 23Feb-22Jun45, n .d ., p . 4, hereafter 2/1 SAR. 10, Sgt Hiroshi Tamae, Hq, 23d ShpgEngRe_gt .

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 211

thousands of mortar projectiles whic h army command post at the opening o f fell on the frontlines when the attacker s the attack. attempted to breach XXIV Corps de- The initial impetus of the attack o n fenses. The Japanese assault units the Tenth Army left flank by the 89th suffered heavily as they moved throug h Regiment was blunted by 7th Division their own fire to gain the America n troops, who had begun mopping up iso- lines. The attack was blunted, however , lated pockets by noon. In the center, the under a blanket of steel laid down by 22d Regiment, unable to maintain attack naval gunfire, air, and 16 battalions o f divisional artillery, backed up by 12 momentum by following up what were to have been "successful" advances b battalions of 155mm guns and 155mm y and 8-inch howitzers from XXIV Corp s right flank units, spent the day locke d artillery. in a violent fire fight with 7th Divisio n Beginning at daybreak, the first o f infantry in the Kochi-Onaga region. 134 planes to fly support for XXIV The major drive of the .24th Division , Corps made its initial bombing run. By mounted by the 32d Regiment, was 1900, 77 tons of bombs, 450 rockets, an d towards the Urasoe-Mura escarpment, 22,000 rounds of machine gun and can - where the 44th IMB was to exploit an d non ammunition had been expended o n pour through the break it made to hit Japanese troop concentrations and the rear of the 1st Marine Division . A artillery positions.75 Even in the face of day-long series of enemy attacks in the Kamikaze attacks, gunfire suppor t strength all along the line fell far short vessels, from battleships to patrol an d of General Ushijima's goals, and dark- landing craft, ranged the coastal waters ness found Tenth Army units still in delivering observed and called fires o n firm control of the escarpment . An in- enemy targets.76 escapable conclusion was that the Japa- The heavy smoke that Thirty-second nese push had failed . Not only had Army had ordered laid on America n XXIV Corps troops securely retained lines obscured from the Shuri heights their original positions, but in some the enemy's view of the progress of th e cases, even in the face of withering battle. Despite the fact that it was a enemy fire and stubborn Japanese re- bald-faced lie, good news, telling of "th e sistance, the Americans had attacked success of the offensive carried out b y and captured some enemy territory . the 24th Division," 77 poured into th e The 1st Marine Division attack on 4 "XXIV Corps Arty AR, p. 8 ; Anx C, enc l May was delayed twice, from 0800 t o . 2, p. . No 8 0900 and then to 1000, owing to the need ,e CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec C, p. 53 . for its units to be reorganized and re- " Okinawa Operations Record, p. 98 . Stu- dents of the Pacific War will note that, in gen- supplied. As soon as the assault bat- eral, Japanese battle commanders consistently talions of the 1st and 5th Marines were unable or refused to report their failures resumed their advance, heavy and well - or the prospect of an imminent defeat unti l placed fire from the 62d Division pinned long after these were all but accomplishe d facts. down the left flank company of 1/1 east

310-224 0 - 69 - 15

212 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

of Jichaku, and caused heavy casualties . and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the The left flank of 3/1 received machin e regiment had been wiped out .7 8 gun fire from both its front and from its The survivors of the several counter- flanks, and was unable to advance . By attacks were hunted down by Tenth 1700, however, except for a short Army troops at the same time th e stretch of enemy territory extendin g frontline divisions consolidated thei r from the gap in the left center of 3/ 1 positions and prepared to resume the lines to the eastern edge of Jichaku, the advance. Only in the 1st Marine Divi- leading elements of the 1st Marine s sion zone was the pattern of enemy op - were only a few hundred yards away position consistent with that occurring from the final regimental objective, the before the counterattack of the 4th . north bank of the Asa Kawa. In mid- Desperation arising from the failure o f afternoon, division attached 3/7 to th e the major 24th Division effort further 5th Marines, and Colonel Griebel moved spurred the shaken troops of the 62d the battalion into blocking positions be- Division to make a more steadfast stan d hind his 3d Battalion . against Marine advances . Japanese As darkness fell on the evening of 4 strength was concentrated on the left May, its gloom was no greater than that of the 1st Division zone, where last- already pervading Thirty-second Arm y ditch attempts were made to guard th e headquarters. As the shambles of th e vital western approaches to Shuri . thwarted counterattack were surveye d Attacking platoons were hit from al l by the staff, it was quite apparent that sides by fire emanating from caves, pillboxes, and fortified tombs . the effort was a failure. The commander of the 24th Division, General Amamiya, Overcoming this opposition with nonetheless, ordered the 32d Regiment difficulty, General del Valle's troop s made substantial gains during the day to try again after dark what it had . On the left flank, the 5th Marine failed to accomplish earlier that day. s registered encouraging progress, ad- Following an extremely heavy artiller y vancing up to 600 yards in some parts and mortar barrage, the regiment hi t of its zone . Following close behind th e the frontlines of the 77th Division at 1st Marines, the 7th filled the gap on th e 0200 on 5 May in an attempt to pene- right flank which resulted from the east - trate the 306th Infantry positions . ward swing of the division . In the Despite the blunting of its initial attack course of the day's action, the 1st Marin e by American artillery, the 32d returned Division succeeded in reaching the Asa at dawn, this time with armored sup- Kawa ; and by evening, frontline units port. The assaulting force received the began digging in on the commandin g same reception it had been given earlier ; ground overlooking the river line, six tanks were destroyed and the remnants of the regiment forced to with - °8 Okinawa Operations Record, "Record o f the 24th Division," pp draw. In the course of these attacks , . 174, 177, states : "The 2d Battalion was completely enveloped by the 3/32 had suffered crippling casualties enemy and its escape became impossible ."

THE DEFENSE STIFFENS 213

awaiting new enemy counterattack s the doomed enemy counterattacks . The which never materialized. net result of this two-day Japanese Casualty figures following these tw o effort was that the Thirty-second Arm y days of battle revealed that the 7th and was compelled to abandon the offensive 77th Divisions, which had felt the ful l on the evening of the 5th and to return fury of the counterattack, lost a total to its old positions . 8 2 of 714 soldiers killed, wounded, and In the end, the decisive defeat of th e missing in action . 79 The 1st Marine Japanese counterattack bore out th e Division, which had continued its south- dire predictions of Colonel Yahara . The d erly drive in the same period, suffere senior operations officer also won a tear- 9 corresponding losses totalling 64 ful promise from his army commande r Reflecting the fury with Marines. 80 that his, Yahara's, counsel would b e which the enemy had fought and the followed in the future. The defensiv e punishment that he had sustained, th e pattern then in effect in the 62d Division Japanese losses were at least 6,22 7 zone was to be duplicated across the men, 81 all dead and almost all of them entire army front. Additionally, the irreplaceable veteran infantry troops. 24th Division and the 5th Artillery Checked by the tremendous firepowe r were to reorganize ; their of the Tenth Army, each Japanese divi- Command tactics would be revised to consist o f sion in the attack had been chopped down to approximately 20 or 25 percent holding actions in previously prepared of its original strength, and enemy artil- and strongly fortified positions . This o lery strength was halved . In addition to revision would force the Americans t these losses, Ushijima lost 59 artiller y advance in the face of withering fire , pieces destroyed in American air-naval gaining little. The final judgment on gunfire-artillery bombardments . As a the worth of the Japanese counterattac k result, never again in the Okinawa cam- was given by its strongest proponent, paign did Tenth Army troops receiv e General Cho. "After this ill-starre d such intensively destructive Japanes e action," Ushijima's chief of staff was artillery fire as that which had precede d reported by a reliable observer as having "abandoned all hope of a successfu l 1e Appleman, et. at ., Okinawa Battle, p. 302. outcome of the operation and declared B0 1st MarDiv WarD, May45 . that only time intervened between de - 81 This is the number of enemy dead that wa s ." 8 3 counted in front of XXIV Corps lines . It ma y feat and the 32d Army be considered a minimum figure, since th e 142-143. Japanese undoubtedly evacuated some of thei r 82 Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp . dead and some of the wounded who died later. 83 Shimada Interrogation. CHAPTER 7

Forging Ahead

ILIAC ON THE LINES ' General Geiger ordered the 1st Divi- sion to attack south on the 7th, with the On 5 May, Tenth Army ordered the main effort on its left . The 6th Division attack to the south continued on the 7th was to relieve the 1st on the right of the with two corps abreast ; IIIAC on the corps zone with one regimental combat right, XXIV Corps on the left .2 (See team before 1600 on 8 May . Both Map IV, Map Section.) With two corp s Marine divisions spent 6 May readyin g now poised for the assault, Tenth Army for the next day's work ; General Shep- assumed direct command of the south - herd's division moved to assembly area s ern front. The day before the attack, 6 preparatory to its commitment, and th e May, General Geiger's CP opened at a 1st maintained pressure on the enemy . new location near Futema, where the During the course of this day, as 2/7 ' operation order was received . Effective stood fast along the Asa River estuar y at 0600 on the 7th, the 1st Divisio n line, other elements of the division wer e would revert to IIIAC control and the unable to budge virtually a stonewall latter would then take over the zone o f defense. Despite accurate counterbat- action for which General del Valle ha d tery fire, enemy artillery activity in - been responsible previously.3 The 7 Ma y creased noticeably . Two tanks working attack was a prelude to a second an d in front of the 5th Marines lines wer e major assault to be launched on 11 May . knocked out by well-placed Japanes e (See Map 14.) The objective of the first antitank fire as they blasted enemy cav e attack was to gain favorable jump-off positions at close range . positions for the second one, which was The 1st Marines attack zone was nar- to be directed against the Shuri de- rowed considerably when new regi- fenses. Before IIIAC units could get mental boundaries were established . A into position for the scheduled 7 May concentration of the force of the Marine attack, the Marines had to get across attack against enemy positions in th e the Asa River estuary. western approaches to Dakeshi hill defenses was necessary because the 1s t ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in this Marines line cut back sharply from th e section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; Asa Gawa to the 5th Marines positions XXIV Corps AR ; IIIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 7th InfDiv AR ; north of the Awacha Pocket. This situ- 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDi v ation subjected attacking units of the AR ; 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar 1st Marines to punishing frontal an d SAR ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III . 2 Tenth Army OpOrd 7-45, dtd 5May45, in ' The 7th Marines took over the division Tenth Army AR . right (coastal) flank at 0730 on the 6th, at 'MAC AR, p. 46 . which time 2/7 relieved 1/1 .

214

FORGING AHEAD 215

MAP 14 T. L. RUSSELL

216 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

flanking fire from a well-organized maze Nimmer then reorganized his command of hills and ridges protecting Dakeshi . into three groups : the IIIAC artillery In a downpour which lasted two days, battalions comprised the first ; XXIV 3/1 attacked on 6 May . Its attempts to Corps Artillery made up the second ; breach the Dakeshi defenses were un- and the third group consisted of the availing and easily fended off by 62d 27th Infantry Division Artillery (104th , Division troops. Similarly, the efforts of 105th, and 106th Field Artillery Bat- 2/1 were stymied . Fierce enemy fire talions), which had remained in posi- held up the attacking Marines and tion when the rest of the divisio n forced elements that had been able t o headed north to relieve the 6th Marin e gain even a little ground to withdraw . Division. The purpose behind Nimmer's Despite an intense four-battalio n action was to provide IIIAC divisions artillery preparation, and air and naval with maximum effective tactical sup- gunfire bombardment, the 5th Marine s port. could penetrate only slightly into the Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Awacha Pocket, then held by 23d Inde- Custis Burton, Jr., the 2d Provisional pendent Infantry and 14th Independen t Field Artillery Group (3d and 6th Machine Gun Battalions.6 155mm Howitzer Battalions and XXI V On the left, 2/5 moved its lines for- Corps 145th Field Artillery Battalion ) ward about 200 yards to tie in with the was given the mission of providing gen- 307th Infantry, after which the Marines eral support to the 1st Division and re- coordinated their advance with that of inforcing the fires of the 11th Marines . the soldiers . When 2/5 resumed the Similarly, the 27th Division Artiller y assault, it called for mortar and artillery under Brigadier General William B . fire on enemy reverse slope position s Bradford, USA, was to support the 6th impending the advance of the units o n Marine Division and the 15th Marines .8 the regimental right flank . Lieutenant Colonel Ernest P . Foley At 0600 on 7 May, General Geiger commanded the third group—named assumed IIIAC command responsibilit y after him—consisting of the 7th, 8th , for the 1st Marine Division zone and and 9th 155mm Gun Battalions, whic h regained control of his corps artillery were to deliver long-range reinforcing, battalions which had been attached t o counterbattery, interdiction, and harass- XXIV Corps up to this time.? General ing fires in support of IIIAC generally. The Marine 1st 155mm Howitzer Bat- This was just one of the many examples o f talion remained under XXIV Corps interservice artillery missions fired in support of the southern drive . In this particular case , ° 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 7May45 . e the fires of 2/11 (1st Marine Division) were "If the wording of the orders didn't spell reinforced by those of the 104th Field Artillery this out—this is what happened in practice. . . . Battalion (27th Infantry Division), 3d 155m m The heavier calibers (2d Provisional Fiel d Howitzer Battalion (IIIAC Artillery), and th e Artillery Group) were put in support of th e 145th Field Artillery Battalion (XXIV Corp s 1st MarDiv because [the latter's] 105s an d Artillery) . 11th Mar SAR, S—3 Periodic Rpt 75s couldn't blast out the Jap caves an d for 7May45 . bunkers on the Shuri Hill mass." Henderson Okinawa Operations Record, p. 107 . ltr 1965.

FORGING AHEAD 217

Artillery control until 23 May, when i t troops. In less than half an hour, Com- reverted to its parent unit, IIIAC Corps pany E, spearheading the attack, swept Artillery. During the period tha t to the hilltop in a practical application Marine artillery units had supported of "the effect of properly massed sup - XXIV Corps (7 April to 6 May), they porting fires in front of the assault fired 53,988 rounds in a total of 2,344 troops." 12 A hand-grenade duel ensue d missions.9 when the enemy defenders emerged As the 1st Marine Division once agai n from their caves after the fires support- came under IIIAC control, it could look ing the attack were lifted . Almost im- back on the six difficult days of combat mediately, the volume of Japanese fire it had been with XXIV Corps . During of all types "grew noticeably stronge r this period, the division sustained 1,40 9 and progressively more intense so that battle casualties, including 199 men who it was evident that the enemy was re- were either killed or subsequently die d ceiving large reinforcements ." 13 In of wounds in the fighting to gain the view of this potential threat, the posi- northern bank of Asa Kawa and the tion was adjudged untenable by the bat - outer reaches of the Dakeshi defense talion commander, who withdrew hi s system.10 company to their lines of the previou s The attack of the 1st Marines, sched- night. uled to begin at 0900 on 7 May, was held It had become apparent by the morn- up because muddy terrain prevented ing of 7 May that the deep draw cutting supporting armor from arriving on across the front of 1/5 and to the righ t time. In the meanwhile, Colonel Arthur of 2/5 positions contained the bulk of T. Mason, the 1st Marines new com- the enemy's Awacha defenses. At 0900, mander, ll ordered his 3d Battalion to General del Valle and Colonel Griebe l support the attack of 2/1 on Hill 60 — conferred with the commanders and a height commanding the battalion fron t staffs of the two assault battalions, an d —by bringing all available fire to bear discussed the methods by which th e on the reverse slope positions of this Japanese positions rimming the dra w enemy-held hill . The supporting fires and studding its steep slopes were to be continued until 1400, when tank s reduced . It was decided that an exten- arrived at the front to assist in the sive air, artillery, and rocket prepara- attack. tion would precede the infantry jump- As mortars and assault guns pounde d off scheduled for 1200 ; a reinforced the top and reverse slope of the hill, an d tank company was moved up in time to artillery fire covered the foot of the ob - support the assault . jective, the coordinated tank-infantry assault was launched against deter - 11 2/1 SAR, p . 5 . mined, fanatic, and well dug-in Japanese 13 Ibid. It was- at this time that Genera l Ushijima attached the 3d Battalion, 2d Infan- ° IIIAC Arty AR, pp . 22-26 . try Unit to the 62d Division "in order to re- 10 XXIV Corps AR, p . 29 . lieve the crisis of the troops fighting in th e 11 Colonel Mason relieved Colonel Chappel l vicinity of Dakeshi ." Okinawa Operations Rec- on 6 May. ord, p . 106 .

218 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

The fighting that afternoon wa s ascertained, but, in the words of one ob- marked by tactics which "General server, "It made one hell of a big Buckner, with an apt sense of metaphor , noise." 1 7 called . . . the `blowtorch and corkscrew' Heavy, driving, and cold rains on the method. Liquid flame was the blow- 8th continued to immobilize Tenth torch ; explosives, the corkscrew." 1 4 Army troops . The attack was bogge d Marine flamethrower and demolition down in the 1st Marine Division zone ; teams burnt out and sealed many of the but in the area directly in front of th e enemy cave installations in their zone. lines, numerous caves and pillboxe s By 1700, the time the battalions dug in were destroyed in a general mop-up . for the night, 1/5 had gained 300—400 The 1st and 5th Marines each received yards in the center, but 2/5 and 3/ 5 a battery of 75mm pack howitzers tha t could do little more than attempt to were manhandled up to the front in an straighten their lines . Even though unsuccessful attempt to place direc t 62d Division troops holding this are a fire on enemy dispositions .1 8 gave way slightly during the day, it was General Shepherd's 22d Marines , obvious that Awacha Pocket was not selected to lead his 6th Division drive in going to be taken quickly or easily . the south, moved out from Chibana o n News of the collapse of Nazi Germany 8 May, and by 1530 the same day its 1st and the announcement of V—E Day o n and 3d Battalions had relieved the 7th 8 May, the day of the Allied victory i n Marines along the Asa Kawa .19 At 1600, Europe, drew little response of any sort the 6th Division commander assume d from either side on Okinawa. Most of " CTF 51 AR, the cold, rain-soaked Americans an d pt V, sec C, p . 21 . Japanese in the frontlines were con- " 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, p. 3. "One battery was sent to the 1st Marines, another to the 5t h cerned only with that very small bu t Marines (over artillery protest) . Since neither vital part of the war where their own the organic M–7's of the infantry nor the tank s lives were at stake . Still, V—E Day did would function satisfactorily [in the mud], it not go unnoticed. The Americans con- was obvious that the truck-drawn pack howitzers could not ducted Thanksgiving services on boar d . Neither battalion accomplishe d anything. The battery with the 5th Marine many of the ships off Okinawa s . In addi- was never used . Both batteries were returned tion, the voices of naval guns and artil- on 11 May, but their parent battalion wa s lery pieces helped in the celebration . At emasculated throughout the period of their exactly noon, every available fire sup- absence . 1/11 was then built up to a strengt h of 24 guns by adding LVT(A)'s port ship directed a full-gun salvo at . 75mm ammunition was plentiful, as contrasted with the the enemy ; 15 in addition, three bat- heavier calibers, so 1/11 (reinforced) was use d talions from IIIAC Artillery masse d to fire interdiction, harassing, and 'appease- fires on a suspected Japanese CP .18 The ment' missions across the front . Later, tw o results of the noontime shoot were no t more batteries of LVT(A)'s were formed as artillery to thicken the fires of 2/11 and 3/11." Brown ltr II . Appleman, et. al ., Okinawa Battle, p . 256 . 19 The 7th Marines moved to an assembly "CTF 51 AR, pt III, p. 84 . area just east of Nakama where it became 1s t " IIIAC Arty AR, p. 23. Division reserve .

FORGING AHEAD 219

responsibility for his zone in the corps cross the river with 1/22 in support , front. Once in position opposite the As a and then attack the high ground over- Kawa estuary, the 6th spent 9 May i n looking the south bank of the Asa a t patrolling and reconnoitering before the dawn. The 2d Battalion was to provid e crossing was attempted . A patrol fro m fire support from a strongpoint set up 3/22 (on the division right) inspecte d on high ground southwest of Uchima . a ruined bridge crossing the river and This river crossing was only a part of later reported that it was not passable the all-out army attack scheduled for 1 1 to either foot or vehicular traffic, that May. Envisioned in the objectives of the the water in the estuary was four fee t plan were the envelopment and destruc- deep at high tide in its most shallo w tion of enemy forces occupying th e portion, and that the river bed had a Shuri bastion, and finally, the total thick mud cover. Other patrols, als o annihilation of General Ushijima' s from 3/22, were sent out at noon to dis- command . 2° cover possible crossing sites and to de- General del Valle's division mad e termine enemy strength and disposi- fairly substantial gains on 9 May, eve n tions. These patrols drew fire fro m in the face of miserable weather condi- positions across the river, but noted tions which prevented the attack fro m that other caves and pillboxes farther being launched until 1200 . When armor south appeared to be unmanned . The support became available and was able Marines also reported that the sof t to move forward over the muddy ter - stream bed could not support a tank rain, the troops advanced 200—300 yard s ford . and generally straightened the divisio n To the left of 3/22 was the 2d Bat- line. Until this attack, Colonel Maso n talion in positions near Uchima . Its only had kept 1/1 in reserve, where th e enemy contact during the day took plac e battalion took in 116 replacements fo r when a patrol that crossed the river the 259 casualties it had sustained in th e drew heavy enemy fire . Before with - period between 30 April and 6 May . drawing, the Marines rescued both the On 9 May, the immediate objectiv e pilot and observer of an artillery spot- of 1/1 was to penetrate and destroy ting plane that had been shot down in enemy defenses on Hill 60 . Just befor e enemy territory. As a result of the in- the attack began, the assault battalio n formation collected by the patrols, both moved behind 2/1, which was to exploit the division and regiment were better the successful penetration by seizin g able to plan for an effective exploitatio n and consolidating the captured posi- of a beachhead following the crossing o f tions ; 3/1 was to support all of this the Asa River. action with fire. The 6th Engineer Battalion move d Because there was no contact with th e light bridging material up to the 22 d 5th Marines on the left, a general shift Marines line in daylight, and under the was made into its zone to wipe out the cover of darkness began constructin g =0 Tenth Army OpO 8—45 was placed int o a footbridge near the site of a ruine d effect on 9 May . Tenth Army AR, chap 7, se c bridge. At 0300, 10 May, 3/22 was to III, p. 19 .

220 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

sources of enemy fire that were taking To overcome the determined stand of a heavy toll of troops in 1/1 . As a result Awacha's defenders, and spurred on b y of a combination of heavy casualties an d the need to continue the division attack exhaustion occurring in the ranks of to gain the objectives assigned by Tenth 1/1, its attack almost bogged down, bu t Army, General del Valle issued a new was revitalized at 1600, when the Ma- operation order late in the afternoon o f rines swept forward over the difficult the 9th. Assigned a limited zone on the final 150 yards to gain the initial ob- left of the division front, the 5th Ma- jective line.21 rines (less 3/5) was to reduce the Following a thorough air, artillery , Awacha Pocket beginning with an naval gunfire, and mortar preparation , attack the .next morning . New bound- the 5th Marines attacked the mouth o f aries were given the 1st and 7t h Awacha Draw at noon on the 9th, with Marines (with 3/5 attached) whic h 3/5 and 3/7 in the assault ; 1/5 and 2/ 5 placed them in jump-off positions acros s furnished fire support from position s the division front for the planned 1 1 facing the draw . Initially, the attac k May attack.23 Colonel Snedeker assume d moved rapidly and the first objective— responsibility for the new 7th Marine s the same ridgeline that had faced 1/1— zone at 1855, relieving the 5th, an d was soon reached, but fire in large vol- placed 3/5, 3/7, and 1/7 on line for the ume on 3/7 from the left of its expose d 10 May attack. (See Map 14. ) flank held up the attack . At 1515, 1/7, As an aftermath to the unsuccessful which had moved up from Gusukum a 4-5 May counterattack, the Japanese that morning, was committed in the line attempted to readjust and reinforce to fill the gap that had appeared be- their lines against expected American tween 3/7 and 1/5 .22 reprisals and a continuation of the Tenth Army onslaught . To gain the tim e 21 In late afternoon, the battalion commander , and breathing space needed to rebuild Lieutenant Colonel James C . Murray, Jr ., wa s inspecting his night defenses when he was hi t the 62d Division somewhat, Genera l by a sniper. Before being evacuated to the Ushijima gradually withdrew the divi- rear, he appointed the Company B commander , sion from the tangled Maeda-Asa Kawa Captain Francis D . Rineer, temporary bat- complex toward Shuri where replace- talion commander ; Rineer directed the 1/ 1 ments from the Naval Base Force, serv- night defense until relieved the next mornin g (10 May) by the 1st Marines executive officer , ice and supply troops, and Boeitai could Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Ross, Jr . Th e join. Remaining in front of the 96th In- latter, in turn, was relieved by Lieutenan t fantry Division in positions extending Colonel Austin C . Shofner, formerly Divisio n from Dakeshi to Gaja were the 22d and Provost Marshal, on 13 May, and then returne d 89th Regiments of the 24th Division, to his duties as regimental executive officer , 1/1 SAR, p . 14 ; 1st Mar SAR, p. 14 . which had been reinforced in the second == 1st Bn, 7th Mar SAR, 22Apr-22Jun45, dtd week of May by division troops and th e 29Jun45, p . 5, hereafter 1/7 SAR . On 9 May , now-defunct sea raiding base battalions. both 1/7 and 3/7 were attached to the 5th IIIAC forces were opposed by the Marines. The CP of the 7th Marines (—) re- 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, which mained near Nakama . Late that afternoon, 3/ 5 was attached to the 7th . 23 1st MarDiv WarD, May45, p. 8.

FORGING AHEAD 221

was built around a nucleus composed o f Less than an hour after the attack the 15th IMR, now at full strength, an d began, 1/5 was pinned down by heavy fresh replacements from the 3d Bat- enemy machine gun and mortar fire tha t talion, 2d Infantry Unit, 7th Independ- skyrocketed casualty figures . At 1700, ent Antitank Battalion, 1st and 2d Inde- the battalion was withdrawn under the pendent Battalions, and the 26th cover of smoke. Although 1/5 was un- Shipping Engineer Regiment. Although able to move forward, the rest of th e American forces were in close contact regiment made inroads into enemy posi- with the enemy and fully engaged b y tions . Supported by artillery and flame - them at Dakeshi, it was difficult to de- thrower tanks, 2/5 overran all enemy termine Japanese troop strength in the resistance in that portion of Awacha area because the core of this strength Draw which lay in its zone . This action was screened by outposts and scattered placed the regiment in the heart of th e strong defensive positions still held b y Awacha defenses ; it did not account for remnants of the 62d Division . the many other remaining Japanese During the night of 9–10 May, the pockets which the 5th Marines was t o enemy was particularly active in th e meet in the next few days . 1st Marine Division zone, and he mad e As the 5th fought its battle, the 7th numerous attempts to infiltrate the 5t h Marines attacked with the 1st and 3d Marines area. Between 0200 and 0300, Battalions in the assault, 2/7 and 3/5 i n 1/5 fought off two counterattacks i n reserve. On the right, 3/7 was im- which the Japanese had closed t o mobilized at its line of departure b y bayonet range ; enemy troops were accurate mortar and artillery shelling, driven off only after an extended hand - and heavy small arms fire from pill - to-hand battle. After daybreak, upward s boxes and caves to its front. The 1st of 60 enemy bodies were found in front Battalion, however., attacked on time ; of the battalion lines. Despite this early- by noon, its forward elements were o n morning action, the division continue d the low ground north of the Dakesh i the attack at 0800, following a heavy Ridge, where visual contact was re- artillery and smoke preparation, with established with 1/5 . Japanese fire o n three infantry regiments abreast . this advanced postion increased as th e Although General del Valle's troop s morning wore on, and shortly before encountered stiff opposition all alon g noon, machine gun fire from a draw i n the line, the 5th Marines, on the corp s the 5th Marines zone began hitting the left, received the most violent enemy re - 1/7 assault company. This fire con- action from positions centered around tinued unabated and finally halted the the Dakeshi Ridge and the high groun d attack. When 1/5 was forced to with- running generally along the corps flank . draw, 1/7, exposed on both flanks, foun d Armor assigned to support the 5th its position untenable. The 7th Marines Marines attack did not arrive in time assault units were pulled back to thei r for the jumpoff ; poor roads had again original lines at 1754. bogged down the tanks and prevente d For the 10 May attack, Colonel them from aiding the infantry . Mason's 1st Marines was given the task

222 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

of gaining the road leading west out of the cover of darkness, and to position s Dakeshi. Although 3/1 jumped off an d for a continuation of the attack to th e reached its planned intermediate objec- south. The loss of the bridge, therefore, tive on time, it was forced to hold u p posed no great hardship ; included in th e and wait for the 1st Battalion, which attack plans were contingency provi- did not begin its scheduled advance be- sions that were to go into effect if this , cause of the late arrival of its supportin fact, took place. Therefore, when th e ing armor .24 At 1020, both battalion s bridge was blown up, engineer demoli- resumed the attack, now supported b y tion teams with the assault elements armor, and reached a low ridge over- breached the seawalls on the south ban k looking the Dakeshi road at 1600. of the river to permit immediate acces s All attempts by assault companies to to the frontlines to supply- and troop- move beyond this point were met b y laden LVT (A) s . extremely heavy machine gun fire from At 0520, under the cover of a protec- Dakeshi ridge, driving back the combat tive smoke screen and an artillery patrols attempting to bypass the nose o f preparation, the attack south of the As a the ridge. It soon became painfully evi- began. The assault companies were at dent that no further advance would b e first hampered by fog and the smoke of possible until the ridge was taken . battle. During the early morning hours, While the 1st Division set in its de- enemy resistance was moderate an d fenses for the night, the 6th Division re- limited to small arms and machine gu n mained active. As soon as it became fire. Soon, however, Japanese artillery dark on 9 May, the 6th Engineer Bat- shells began falling on the bridgehead talion began building a footbridge for area. the planned infantry crossing over th e By noon, the Marines had succeeded Asa Kawa estuary. At 0530, two and a in driving only 150 yards into enemy half hours after 22d Marines assault defenses, while, at the same time, the elements had crossed over to the south volume of both small arms and artiller y bank of the river, a Japanese two-man fire increased steadily. Under the cove r suicide team rushed out of hiding to of heavy supporting fire, each assault throw themselves and their satchel battalion brought its reserve company charges onto the south end of the foot - across to join the attack. Even with bridge ; both the bridge and the enemy continuous artillery and naval gunfire soldiers were destroyed. Prior to thi s support, the ground troops could not destructive act, however, 1/22 25 and crack the Japanese line . 3/22 each had succeeded in moving tw o The only weapons capable of breach- assault companies across the river under ing these defenses—tank-mounted fla t

2. trajectory cannon—were not availabl e The 1st Battalion was held up when a because supporting armor was unable tank from the 6th Tank Battalion hit a mine and blocked the only tank road into the 1/ 1 to ford the mud- and silt-bottome d area. stream despite its numerous attempts to =6 Company A of 1/22 crossed over by wading do so. The tanks were then forced t o the shallow eastern portion of the stream. withdraw to the northern bank of the

FORGING AHEAD 223

Asa, there to await the construction o f ally served to preface the 11 May groun d a Bailey bridge, which the 6th Engi- attack of the Tenth Army. There wa s neers were to begin building after dark no indication that the Japanese had on the night of 10–11 May . prior knowledge of the impending The 22d Marines advanced alon g attack or that their air assault had been their entire front during the afternoon ; planned to forestall the American push. the 1st Battalion made the greates t An enemy air raid should have bee n gain, 350 yards . As darkness fell, th e anticipated, however, because the first division halted and forward companie s relatively clear weather since the dug in for the night . The engineers be- previous Kikusui attack appeared at gan work on the Bailey bridge at 2200, this time. stopping only when the crossing site was Between midnight of 10 May an d shelled. This intermittent shelling suc- 0420 on the following day, the Air De- cessfully delayed completion of the fense Control Center plotted 19 enemy bridge by six hours . The first Marin e raids approaching Okinawa, each on e tanks did not cross the river until 110 3 ranging in size from one to nine air- on 11 May, some four hours after th e craft. Most of the planes orbited ove r coordinated, two-corps Tenth Army the water about 40 miles northwest of attack had begun .26 the island, where they formed up for a furtive pass at American targets . None, AIR OPERATIONS IN MAY 2 7 however, approached any closer than 1 0 miles to Okinawa. A mass Kamikaze raid on 10–11 May , This situation soon changed on the the fifth of the campaign, unintention- 11th, when, at 0630, TAF pilots intercepted the first in a series of suicider s 29 6th MarDiv Unit Jnl, Okinawa Operation , Ph III, 23Apr-30Jun45, dtd 11May45, hereafte r attempting to crash targets in the Ie 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph III . In commenting later Shima and Hagushi anchorages . By the on the 6th Engineers' effort, the 6th Division time of this mass raid, enemy air tactics Commander noted that "the task of construct- generally followed the pattern previ- a ing the Bailey bridge across the Asa Kaw ously observed during the major land- Estuary was a splendid feat of, combat engi- n neering . It was not only built under observe d ings in the Philippines, but with a fire, both artillery and small arms, but it wa s increased emphasis on the use of th e built in a difficult locality where the actua l Kamikaze. Like the tactics employed at engineering constituted a considerable prob- Leyte, at Okinawa attacking groups lem . Even the dump site where the bridgin g approached at altitudes ranging fro m material was stacked was occasionally unde r fire ." Shepherd memo H . 9,000 feet to sea level ; the low-level ap- " Unless otherwise noted, the material i n proach was usually made during period s this section is derived from : CNO Record ; of limited visibility . Japanese pilots als o CTF 51 AR ; TAF AR ; ADC AcftOper- would approach a target at low altitudes Analysis, 1-31May45 ; ADC IntelSums, May45 ; if their attack was covered by cloud s Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Sherrod , and poor visibility, or when they fel t . Also, May45 WarDs of fol- Marine Air Hist that American radar units could not de- lowing organizations : TAF, 2d MAW, ADC , and MAG-14, -22, -31, and -33. tect their planes. While this indicated

224 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

some training in low-level evasive missing., 31 while ICEBERG forces tactics, it did not show that enemy pilot s claimed only 93 . Of this number, th e had a proper appreciation of the range two destroyers that were under attack and coverage of American radar .28 have been credited with blasting 34 At Okinawa, enemy air activity usu- enemy aircraft out of the sky ; ships' ally began when the final night CAP ha d AAA and defending air patrols claime d withdrawn to home fields, and ende d the remainder . TAF pilots downed 1 9 when the early morning patrol fligh t planes of this last portion in slightly approached. As successful as the alert more than two hours of fighting in the American air patrols had been in pro- morning, and increased the score of th e tecting assault shipping and radar Tenth Army air arm to 234 .32 picket vessels, it was impossible to pre- A sidelight of the 11 May raid oc- vent losses as long as even a single curred when USS Hugh W. Hadley, a Japanese plane penetrated the ICE - radar picket, was under direct attac k BERG air screen. In at least five in - from Kamikazes . Protecting the de- stances in May, Kamikazes that had stroyer overhead was a two-plane CAP been so seriously damaged by fighter maintained by VMF–323 pilots.33 The aircraft that they could not have pos- conduct of these Marine flyers is best sibly returned to home bases—and con- described by the ship's action report : ceivably could not have even recovered "One very outstanding feat by one o f level flight—managed to remain o n these two planes . . . was that, though course, break through the America n out of ammunition, he twice forced a screen, and hit their targets.29 suicide plane out of his dive on the ship , and the third time forced him into suc On-station planes from TF 51 an d h a poor position that the plane crashe d TAF fended off the raids of 11 May, bu t through the rigging but missed the ship , not before a Dutch merchantman, two going into the water close aboard . This American destroyers, and an LCS ha d was done while all guns on the ship been hit. A total of 217 Japanese planes were firing at the enemy plane . . . His were employed in Kikusui No. 6 ; 104 of wingman also stayed at masthead these were suiciders .30 The claims of height in the flak and assisted in driv- opposing sides regarding the number o f ing planes away from the ship ." 3 4 planes their pilots had downed conflict similarly in this particular engagemen t 31 Ibid. as they did in others 33 TAF PeriodicRpt No. 6, 11-17May45. . Uniquely enough, 33 the number the Japanese admitted los- VMF—323 WarD, May45 ; Sherrod, Marin e Air Hist, p . 394 . Although the Aircraft Action ing in this air battle was in excess of th e Report for this particular sortie, included in number that the Americans claimed that the war diary, did not specifically describe th e they had shot down. A Japanese source feat noted above, Sherrod deduced that thes e lists 109 of their planes shot down or were VMF—323 planes because he later identified the call letters, which appeared in the 1 1 May ship's log entry relating to this action, a °e CNO Record, s chap 3, p . 1 . theirs. ADC AcftOpAnalysis, 1-31May45, p . 7 . 34 Quoted in ADC AcftOpAnalysis, 1-31May- 30 Hattori, op. cit., table facing p . 132 . 45, p . 8.

FORGING AHEAD 225

On the day before, Captain Kenneth intact and without injury to himself . 3 " L. Reusser and First Lieutenant Robert An almost tragic aftermath to thi s R. Klingman of VMF–312 destroyed an encounter occurred two days later, when enemy plane in a manner described a s Klingman was flying another mission . "one of the most remarkable achieve- His plane's hydraulic system failed an d ments of the war." 35 Several time s he chose to bail out over the water earlier in the month, extremely fast rather than attempt a crash landing on Japanese reconnaissance craft—appar- one wheel . A destroyer escort recovere d ently on photographic missions—ha d the lieutenant from the water and car- been encountered at high altitudes , ried him to the Eldorado, where he had usually 30,000–38,000 feet . Klingman dinner with the Expeditionary Forc e was flying wing on Reusser, divisio n commander, Admiral Turner. leader of a four-plane CAP, which was Marine and Navy night fighter air - then at an altitude of 10,000 feet. craft came into their own during May , Reusser noticed the presence of vapor especially with the arrival at Okinawa trails at about 25,000 feet, and obtaine d on the 10th of Lieutenant Colone l permission to investigate . He led his Marion M. Magruder's VMF (N) -533 division in a climb to 36,000 feet, wher e following its long over-water fligh t two of the planes were forced to disen- from Engebi, Eniwetok Atoll, in 1 5 gage after reaching their maximum F6F–5Ns (radar-equipped Grumman altitude. Klingman and Reusser con- Hellcats) and 5 transport planes ." tinued to climb and close with the Japa- '° Ibid. ; ADC AcftOpAnalysis, 1-31May45 , nese intruder only after they had fired p. 8 . most of their ammunition to lighten 3' VMF(N)—533 WarD, May45 . Before Lieu- their aircraft. tenant Colonel Magruder had received order s to take his squadron to Okinawa, the pilots At 38,000 feet, they intercepted the who had been with the unit since arrival over - enemy and Reusser opened fire first . seas in May 1944 were scheduled to be replaced . Expanding all of his remaining am- The relief pilots arrived at Engebi on the sam e munition in one burst, he scored hits in day that VMF(N)—533 was ordered to th e l y Ryukyus. According to Lieutenant Genera the left wing and tail of the enem Louis E. Woods, who commanded the 4th plane. Klingman then closed in, but was MAW, of which the squadron was a part : "Th e unable to fire because his guns had higher echelon of command did not feel tha t frozen at this extreme altitude . After a [Magruder's planes] had the range to fly from e two-hour air chase, he finally downe d Engebi, but [the squadron] had very accurat fuel consumption records that proved beyon d the Japanese plane by cutting off its a doubt that they could ." After Magruder re- tail control surfaces with his Corsair's ceived permission to fly the squadron to Oki- propeller. Although Klingman's plan e nawa, Woods "went to Engebi personally an d had holes in the wing and engine, and talked to all the pilots, telling them they wer e r e badly needed in the war zone even though thei the propeller and engine cowling wer tour of duty was up and their replacements damaged, he managed to land the plan e were present . All concerned agreed that th e original members of the squadron should go ." " Unknown source quoted in MAG—33 WarD , LtGen Louis E . Woods ltr to Asst G—3, HQMC, May45 . dtd 300ct65, hereafter Woods ltr I.

226 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Prior to the Okinawa operations, th e One of the most spectacular, unique , quality of the direction and conduct of and perhaps the only air-to-air rocket night CAPs was poor and the results of kill in the war occurred in the early- most operations negligible. As an ex- morning darkness of 17 May, when ample, in the first year of night fighte r VMTB–232 pilot First Lieutenant Fred operations—November 1943 through C. Folino spotted an unidentified plane October 1944—Navy and Marine pilot s while flying his TBM (Avenger) on a accounted for only 39 enemy aircraft ; night heckling mission . He radioed a n in less than two months of the Okinaw a ICEBERG control ship for informatio n campaign, night fighters shot down 3 5 and identification of the stranger, all Japanese planes, 38 and VMF(N)–533 the while climbing to gain altitude to fliers claimed 30 of them . Noteworthy is get into attack position . Assured by th e the fact that, with six enemy planes to controller that there were no friendl y his credit, Captain Robert Baird of 53 3 planes in the area, and having requeste d was the only Marine night fighter ac e and received permission to attack, the in the war .39 Marine pilot dove on the now-fleein g enemy. Folino expended all of his am - The drastic change for the better i n munition as the torpedo bomber straine d night fighter squadron operations re- to close the gap. He then began firin g sulted from improved electronic equip- his rockets. The first was short of the ment, techniques, and performances o f target, the next one struck the plane , both pilots and the ground director and a third tore off a large portion o f crews. The new Hellcats also were a the wing. "Momentarily lost to the large factor in this improvement. With TBM, the plane next appeared on th e the arrival of additional air warning beach below, a blazing wreck ." 40 squadrons and their radar equipmen t Acknowledging this act, Admiral Spru- on Okinawa, and their establishment o n ance sent his personal congratulation s outlying islands as they were captured , to Lieutenant Folino. the intricacies of guiding night fighter s After dark on 17 May, TAF pilot s to targets were overcome . Within a extended the range of their operation s short time after their appearance in the to Japan for the first time. The arrival Okinawa battle zone, fighter director s of AAF fighter squadrons and their could bring a pilot to within 500 feet of Thunderbolts (P-47s) on Ie Shima i n an enemy plane, at which point the flyer mid-May provided General Wallace's could establish visual contact with the ADC with a long-range strike capabil- intruder aircraft and down it . ity. This was demonstrated when a pai r of Thunderbolts rocketed and strafed 38 Naval Aviation Confidential Bul No . 4-45 , three airfields on southern Kyushu on pp . 11-13, quoted in ADC AcftOpAnalysis , 1-31May45, pp . 10-11 . this first extended mission, and then added to the insult by strafing th "For a more complete story of the earl y e development and organization of Marine nigh t brightly lit streets of Kanoya befor e fighter squadrons, see Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, chap 11, pp . 159-169 . '° TAF WarD, May 45 .

FORGING AHEAD 227

returning to home base unchallenged b y American planes rising from crowde d enemy pilots. Following this night run , fields on Yontan and Ie Shima success - AAF pilots began making daylight run s fully blunted the suicide attacks, and as over southern Japan. Judging by th e a result, Special Attack Force aircraft quality of the opposition they received, and pilot losses mounted all out of pro- it became apparent that the Japanes e portion to the results achieved. IGHQ had been holding back their more skill- then decided that the only way to re - ful pilots and newer and faster aircraf t verse the situation was by destroyin g for the close-in defense of the Empire . the U. S. planes at their Okinawa fields . The American pilots reported that they A surprise ground attack mission wa s were encountering "pilots who were . . . therefore assigned to the Giretsu (Act skillful and aggressive . . . ." 4 1 of Heroism) Airborne Raiding Force. The majority of the enemy planes ris- Armed with demolition charges, gre- ing to meet the Army Air Force's flyers nades, and light arms, the commando s were Zekes, but some were the newer of this unit were to land on Kadena an d single-seat fighters, the faster Jacks Yontan fields, where they would mak e and Franks, 42 which had just begun t o one desperate effort to cripple American appear in the air war over Okinawa an d air operations—even temporarily—b y Japan. In the final analysis, the AAF destroying or damaging planes and air- Thunderbolts outperformed the Japa- field facilities. The men undertaking n nese aircraft without exception . They this raid were to be flown to Okinawa o outclimbed and outturned the enemy the night of 24 May 43 in planes that planes and especially excelled in th e would accompany those in the formatio n 44 high altitudes, where Japanese aircraf t of Kikusui No. 7. performance had been superior earlie r The Giretsu, consisting of 120 men , in the war . If nothing else, these per- was divided into five platoons and a com- formance factors and the raid on mand section, and was transported to Kyushu further dramatized the com- the assigned target in 12 twin-engine plete ascendancy of American ai r power. This evidence, however, did not ' While intercepting an enemy flight in th e convince the Japanese that continuation early evening twilight of 24 May, a VMF—31 2 pilot reported sighting and downing a Tony of the mass Kamikaze raids was merel y (single engine fighter) . Interestingly enough , an exercise in futility . the Marine flyer reported that the Japanese plane was dark gray and had a black cross h1 TAF, Tenth Army, AirOpNotes, No . 2 , painted on the underside of each wing, ver y dtd 15Jun45. much like the Maltese Cross markings on Ger- For a fuller discussion of America n man military aircraft . VMF—312 WarD, May— nomenclature for Japanese aircraft, see Sha w 45, Although the configuration of the Tony an d and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. 450 ; also , the Messerschmitt ME—109 were similar, a Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, pp. xiv, 135n . A search of available records does not indicate the primary source of information for both of th e presence of either German pilots or planes in books noted above was Vern Haugland, The the Pacific, nor is any reason given for a AAF Against Japan (New York : Harper & Japanese plane to be painted in this fashion . Bros ., 1948), pp . 367—371 . " Hattori, War History, p . 129 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 16

228 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bombers.45 The general attack began a t ican rifle and machine gun fire laced th e about 2000, when Yontan and Kadena airfield and vicinity, and probably fields were bombed as a prelude to th e caused most of the ICEBERG casual- airborne raid . Approximately two and a ties. TAF pilots and ground personnel, half hours later, antiaircraft artillery- as well as the men in the units assigne d men and aviation personnel based at to airfield defense, took part in the gen- Yontan were surprised to see several eral affray, which saw the death of 2 Japanese bombers purposely but rashl y Marines and the wounding of 1 8 attempting to land . With one exception, others.46 the planes that were shot down over th e When the attack was over, no pris- field either attempted to crash ground oners had been taken and 69 Japanese facilities and parked aircraft or went bodies were counted . Despite his losses , plummeting down in flames, carrying the enemy accomplished one part of hi s entrapped troops with them . mission : he had destroyed 8 planes (in- The plane that was the one exceptio n cluding the personal transport of Major made a safe wheels-up landing, an d General James T. Moore, Commanding troops poured out even before it ha d General, AirFMFPac, who had arrive d come to a halt. As soon as the raiders that morning), damaged 24 others, an d deplaned, they began to throw grenade s set fire to fuel dumps, causing the los s and explosive charges at the neares t of some 70,000 gallons of precious parked aircraft, and sprayed the are a aviation gasoline.47 with small arms fire. The confusion Meanwhile, approximately 445 air - which followed this weird gambit is craft, of which nearly one-third were difficult to imagine. Uncontrolled Amer- suiciders, struck at the American naval forces, concentrating on the radar "Ibid. There is some discrepancy regardin g pickets. The first phase of the attack the number of men and planes involved in thi s abortive foray . ADC IntelSums states tha t was broken off about 0300 on the 25th, there were three planes, 2d MAW WarD , only to resume at dawn with a renewe d May45, counts four, and Tenth Army AR, chap fury that continued during the day . At 7, sec III, pp . 23—24, indicates five planes the end, the enemy planes had damage attacked the field . Hattori, op . cit ., notes tha t d four of the planes in the airborne missio n an APD and a LSM, both so severel y either made forced landings elsewhere — that the former capsized later and th e Japanese territory assumed—or turned back , latter had to be beached and abandoned . and that the remaining eight succeeded i n landing their passengers . The last part of thi s Eight other vessels, generally destroyer statement is contradicted by the numbers cite d types, were also damaged, but in vary- above in the American sources, which all agre e ing degrees . In this action, the Japanes e that only one plane landed, a crash landing pilots exacted a toll of 38 American at that, to disgorge its shaken passengers, an d s that the other aircraft—whatever their numbers, two, three, or four—were shot down 2d MAW WarD, May45 . while approaching Yontan field . " Ibid.

FORGING AHEAD 229

killed, 183 wounded, and 60 missing i n sonnel losses to the fleet were great : 52 action.43 men killed, 288 wounded, and 290 miss - The raiders suffered also, for friendl y ing. 52 The enemy did not escape un- air claimed the shooting down of ove r scathed, for ICEBERG forces claime d 150 enemy planes. Of this number, AD C to have splashed more than 100 in- planes claimed an all-time high to date , truders, and of these, TAF fliers claime d 75 destroyed in this 24-hour period, t o 40. Japanese sources again show figure s bring the total of TAF claims to 370 . that differ from those in American High scorer during the 24–25 May rai d records, and show losses of only 8 0 was the 318th Fighter Group with 3 4 planes for Kikusui No. 8.53 kills listed, followed by MAG-31 .49 Post- By the end of May, ADC fighter war Japanese sources dispute these pilots had added 279 1/4 claimed kills to statistics, stating that only 88 plane s April figures. This gave TAF a total o f failed to return to base.50 Regardless of 423 enemy aircraft destroyed in the ai r this conflict in numbers, enemy air con- in 56 days of operations.54 In this same tinued to suffer . period, 7 April through 31 May, only The last mass Kamikaze attack in three American planes were shot dow n May began just two days later, 27 May , by Japanese pilots out of the 109 air - and lasted until the evening of the 28th . craft lost to such other causes as pilo t The raid caused TAF to establish the error, aircraft malfunctions, and cases longest single enemy air alert of the of mistaken identity by friendly AAA campaign thus far—9 hours and 16 units. minutes. Japan sent up 292 aircraft, o f Prevailing bad weather during most h which nearly one-third again wer e of May had limited air activity, althoug both sides flew a number of missions suiciders.51 Heavy antiaircraft artillery even under minimal flying conditions . fire and combat air patrols fought off TAF records for this period indicate the invaders, but not before a destroye r that its planes were grounded nine days had been sunk and 11 other ships dam - in May, while cloud cover of varying aged in varying degrees. As before, per- degree existed during the other 2 2 days.55 In addition, the continuing rai n ' ComFifthPhibFor AR, Capture of Oki- that bogged down wheeled and tracke d nawa Gunto, Phases I and III, 17May-21Jun45 , pt III, pp . 20-26, hereafter CTF 31 AR . On 17 vehicles also turned fighter strips int o May, Vice Admiral Harry W . Hill, who ha d quagmires . On Ie Shima, for example , earlier relieved Admiral Turner as Com- a total of 20.82 inches of rain fell from mander, Fifth Amphibious Force, in addition 16 May to the close of the month, caus- became Commander Task Force 51 . Thi s ing one Marine air unit to note that "the numerical designation changed 10 days late r to Task Force 31, when Admiral Halsey too k resultant mixture of water and Ie over the Fifth Fleet and it became the Thir d Fleet. CTF 31 AR, pt III, pp . 30-34 . '° ADC IntelSums, May45 . " Hattori, op . cit. ro Hattori, War History, table facing p . 132 . ' ADC Act tOpAnalysis, 1-31May45, p. 1. G1 Ibid. " Ibid.

230 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Shima soil produces mud of a character support effort became increasingly effec- that surpasses description ." 5 6 tive. By the middle of May, TAF ha d Towards the middle of May, TA F reached the state where it was full y strength was increased when pilots an d prepared to assist the forces of th e planes of Marine Aircraft Group 22 an d Tenth Army, then poised to strike th e the Army Air Forces' 318th Fighter heart of the Shuri defenses . Group arrived and began operations.57 Although the ground troops showed a ON SHURI'S THRESHOLD 59 partisan interest in the aerial dogfights Although the enemy chose 11 May t o high above them and the vivid pyro- mount a mass Kamikaze attack and technical displays occurring during th e many Japanese planes were, in fact, air raids at night, the infantry was then diving on American surface forces more vitally concerned with winning its off Okinawa, both corps of the Tenth own battle and with the assistance the Army launched a coordinated assault at air units could give in the drive south - 0700. Two and a half hours earlier, ward . Out of a total of 7,685 sorties enemy infantry units had attempted a flown by TAF pilots in May, 71 6 counterattack following a heavy mortar (against an April figure of 510) wer e and artillery barrage on the center o f in support of the ground forces. In- the 1st Marine Division line . Un- cluded in the May figure were night fortunately for the attackers, the bar - heckler and intruder missions flow n rage lifted too soon and they were away from Okinawa. The majority of caught by American prearranged de- the ground support sorties were directe d fensive fires while still forming . Though against enemy troop concentrations , the enemy force sustained heavy casual- caves, and truck parks.58 As the cam- ties, the remnants attempted to refor m paign progressed, and as the pilots and continue the assault, only to be gained experience with their planes and wiped out by Marine close-range smal l improved ordnance and a greater arms fire. familiarity with the area, the groun d The 6th Engineers had not yet bridged the Asa Kawa when the attack "° MAG-22 WarD, May45 . was to begin ; nevertheless, the 6th Divi- " Both groups were based on Ie Shima . Th e sion jumped off on time before this vital flight echelon of the AAF group (19th, 73d , and 333d Fighter Squadrons) began arrivin g support route was completed . With the on the island on 13 May ; Colonel Daniel W . 22d Marines in the lead, the assault Torrey, Jr.'s Marine squadrons flew in over troops advanced slowly against a stub- a 10-day period, 21-30 May, from Engebi wher e born and well-organized defense built the group had been part of the 4th MAW. MAG-22 consisted of HqSqn-22, SMS-22 , "° Unless otherwise noted, the material i n VMF-113, -314, and -422, and VMTB-131—al l this section is derived from : CTF 31 AR ; CTF of which were to operate from fields on Ie—an d 51 AR ; Tenth Army AR ; ILIAC AR ; 1st Mar - VMF(N)-533, which was based at Yonta n Div SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 77t h airfield on its arrival . ADC AcftOpAnalysis , InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDiv AR ; 1s t 1-31May45, p . 1 . Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar SAR ; 22d "ADC AcftOpAnalysis, 1-31May45, p. 15. Mar SAR, Ph III ; 29th Mar SAR, Ph III.

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around machine guns and mortars con- Marines made slower progress in th e cealed in cave mouths . In early after- center and left of the line as it reache d noon, enemy troops hidden in a par- positions west of the high ground pro- ticularly formidable coral hill formatio n tecting Shuri . held up the movement of 1/22 on th e As 2/1 attacked towards its objec- left. All attempts to envelop the positio n tive, the high ground west of Wana, it from either flank failed. The battalio n began receiving some of the heavies t then halted to permit a heavy naval gun - enemy resistance experienced in the fire shelling of the Japanese defenses , division zone that day . When the bat- after which the Marines resumed the talion passed the nose west of Dakeshi , advance under the cover of armor sup - troops on the left came under heavy port which had crossed the now-com- flanking machine gun fire from the pleted bridge shortly before noon . village. Unable to continue the advance Flamethrowers, demolitions, an d in the direction of the objective, the bat- direct tank fire were employed when th e talion attacked in column down the wes t attack again began ; the position was side of the railroad, taking advantag e reduced after a bitter close-in fight . of the cover furnished by the high em- Upon inspection, this hill proved to be bankment. At 1600, 2/1 had advance d a key feature of the Asa Kawa defense about 900 yards and was partially on system, and contained a vast network of its goal, but held up so that the 22 d headquarters and supply installation s Marines could come up on the right . within a large tunnel and cave complex . Here, the 2d Battalion became subject Continuing on, the 22d Marines took to accurate long-range flanking artillery nearly 1,000 yards of strongly defende d fire which soon took a heavy toll i n enemy territory by 1800, after which casualties . The situation became mor e mopping up operations continued well difficult when supply and evacuatio n into the night . All during the day, th e were prevented because all possibl e Bailey bridge had remained under con- routes of approach were covered . It tinuous enemy artillery and sniper fire, finally became necessary for the comin the face of which reinforcements an d panies to dig in for the night where they supplies poured over the crossing to stood . support forward elements and maintai n The 3d Battalion jumped off at abou t the momentum of the advance. the same time as 2/1, and moved out t o To the left of the 6th Division, th e cover a gap that had occurred betwee n 1st Marine Division attacked followin g the latter and the 7th Marines, whic h an intense air, artillery, and naval gun- was still fighting in the middle of fire preparation . Substantial gains were Dakeshi. As the foremost elements o f made all along the line against a defiant 3/1 reached the point where 2/1 was enemy who contested every inch of the first fired upon, they were likewise hit advance. Behind the continuing bom- and their supporting tanks were unabl e bardment, the 1st Marines pushed for - to get past the draw because of heav y ward along the railroad near the divi- and accurate 47mm antitank fire . sion right boundary, while the 7th Finally, the 3d Battalion negotiated the

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gap and took up positions just east o f by Marines, meant that one more bar- the railroad embankment, where it wa s rier to the heart of the Shuri defenses subjected to frequent artillery and had been raised . In addition, the Japa- mortar shelling for the rest of the after - nese were now denied the use of com- noon and all through the night. manding ground from which the terrai n Meanwhile, the 7th Marines con- from Shuri and Naha to Machinat o tinued the attack on Dakeshi, where Ridge, and the entire coastal area i n enemy reaction to all forward movement between, could be covered by observa- proved costly to both sides . Because 3/7 tion and fire. The taking of Dakesh i had been held up throughout most of 10 Ridge effectively and decisively breache d May, the regiment jumped off the next the enemy's Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru line , day with 1/7 and 2/7 in the assault t o and raised some question as to how much envelop the strong positions in front of longer he could hold it before Shuri it - the 3d Battalion . While 3/7 contained self was threatened. the enemy to its front and the regi- Dakeshi was further endangered by mental reserve, 3/5, protected the rear, the manuever of 1/7, which swung to- attacking forces pushed forward to gain wards the town from the northeast an d troublesome Dakeshi Ridge . placed the fanatically defended village On the right of the 7th's zone, 2/7 in between a rapidly closing pincers . advanced in the face of Japanese mor- Although Dakeshi was now ripe for tars, grenades, and automatic weapon s capture, positions on the reverse slope fire—the latter coming from pillboxe s of the ridge, in the village itself, and a and coral caves—to gain approximately pocket of resistance to its north con- 800 yards and seize the ridge overlook- tinued to be held by soldiers who were ing and running through Dakeshi . At determined to defend to the death . 1800, the battalion attack was halted on In the 1st Division rear, 2/5 elimi- the positions then occupied . As the men nated the last remaining organized re- dug in for the night, some of th e sistance in the Awacha Pocket, and 1/5 veterans of the Peleliu campaign wer e moved up behind 1/7 to wipe out scat- reminded of how much the fight for th e tered enemy remnants bypassed during ridge that day resembled the action at the day. At 1800, 3/5 reverted to paren t Bloody Nose Ridge .°0 Throughout th e control. night of 11–12 May, the new defender s Tanks providing close-in fire support of Dakeshi Ridge fought off numerous to the 7th Marines on 11 May had bee Japanese attempts to infiltrate unde r n cover the constant artillery and morta r pressed into service to evacuate casual- barrages coming from enemy emplace- ties. Some wounded were taken up int o ments on Wana Ridge . the tanks through the escape hatches ; The fall of aggressively defended and others rode on the rear deck of th e vital Dakeshi Ridge, and its occupation tracked vehicles, which backed out o f the battle area in order to provide an 80 2/7 SAR, p . 4 ; also, see that part dealin g with the Peleliu campaign in Garand and armored shield between the stretcher Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations ." cases and enemy fire.

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By nightfall, 1/7 was positioned and ably over that of previous nights . Amer- linked on its left with the 305th Infantr y ican patrol boats reporjed makin g of the 77th Infantry Division to form a many radar and visual contacts off solid line at the division boundary . The Naha, and some enemy craft wer e major effort of XXIV Corps was made spotted apparently heading for th e in the left center of its zone by the 96th Hagushi transport area . The "fly- Infantry Division, which had complete d catchers" remained vigilant, however, the relief of the 7th the previous day . and efficiently thwarted these Japanese While the 77th pressed the enemy surface ventures. Seven enemy boats through central Okinawa toward s were sunk between midnight of the 11th Shuri, the 96th approached a hill mas s and 0400 the next day . Several other directly northwest of Yonabaru . This Japanese craft were fired upon with un- terrain feature controlled the eastern known results." reaches to Shuri, completely dominate d These coastal skirmishes were tam e the east-central coastal plain, and was in comparison to the bloody land battl e the easternmost anchor of the enemy' s which continued with unabated violence. main battle position . All natural route s When the Tenth Army attack re- to the hill were constantly under ob- sumed on the 12th, Marine assault ele- servation and thoroughly covered by ments found Japanese resistance un- Japanese fire. diminished . On the right of the 6th Conical Hill, as this bastion was soo n Division zone, 3/22 moved out in the named, commanded a series of ridge s face of small arms fire pouring down and other lesser hills, whose captur e from positions in rocky cliffs overlook- was to be costly and time-consuming . ing its route of advance, and from th e Murderous fire during the 11 May mouths of Okinawan tombs dug in th e attack forced the frontline units of th e hillsides that lined it . By 0920, the bat- 96th Division to relinquish whatever talion reached its objective, the high gains were made that day, although the ground commanding a view of Naha 383d Infantry on the division left had below, and sent out patrols through th e battled forward 600 yards to establis h suburbs of the city to the banks of th e a foothold on the northwest slopes of Asato Gawa. Here, the Marines found Conical . On the same day, assault bat- the bridge demolished and the river talions of the 77th Division gained but bottom muddy and unfordable. Patrols 400–500 yards. Strongly entrenched from 1/22 also were sent down to the enemy took advantage of the broken river bank after the battalion ha d terrain to take the flanks, and at time s reached the heights in its zone at 1400 . the rear, of the advancing soldiers Both battalions dug in for the night in under fire. At nightfall, the divisio n firm control of the terrain on the north- halted, consolidated its gains, and dug i n ern outskirts of Naha. to the accompaniment of sporadic mor- The 2d Battalion was unable to kee p tar and artillery fire. pace with or match the advances of th e Enemy small-boat activity during the night of 11–12 May increased notice - 01 CTF 51 AR, pt III, pp. 91-92.

234 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

troops coming down the west coast ; for, all companies reported that they ha d in addition to fighting the enemy in it s run into a swarm of sniper and heav y path, 2/22 was forced to contend with machine gun fire coming from position s the telling effect of Japanese fire coming in the vicinity of Wana . Casualty evacu- out of the 1st Division zone from posi- ation and resupply soon became increas- tions on the dominating terrain stand- ingly difficult because all routes were ing between the division boundary an d exposed to enemy observers located o n the Shuri hill mass . Nevertheless, at the heights to the left of the 2/1 ad- 1400 Company G reached the battalio n vance. As the day wore on, the assaul t objective, the high ground overlookin g companies were forced to dig night de- Naha. Because the left flank of 2/22 wa s fenses on ground then held, not to o overextended, at 1350 General Shepher d many yards ahead of their 11 May posi- attached 3/29 to the 22d Marines an d tions. alerted the rest of the regiment fo r Attacking to the southeast on the left commitment into the lines . By the end of 2/1, the 3d Battalion was partially of the day, 6th Division troops occupie d protected by the overhanging bank of positions from which they were to fight an Asa Kawa tributary, and penetrate d for pretty much the rest of the month . 300 yards towards the mouth of Wan a After first having repulsed a counter- Draw. Forward movement ceased at attack, at 0730 on 12 May, 1/7 together 1630 and the 1st Division dug in for the with 2/7 launched a converging attac k night, 2/1 tying in with 3/29 on th e aimed at closing a 400-yard gap existing right. All the while, 2/1 remained in a n between the two battalions . As this as- isolated forward position . An undeter- sault force moved into the ruins o f mined number of the enemy counter- Dakeshi village, the enemy mortar an d attacked the Marines at 2230, causin g artillery fire that had been falling General del Valle to alert the 5th steadily since the Tenth Army advanc e Marines for possible commitment i n had begun increased sharply . At 1522, support of the 1st, but 3/1 contained the however, the adjacent flanks of the two attack without need of reinforcement . units made contact, and the battalions Enemy small boats were again activ e consolidated their positions for the night on the night of 12–13 May . An attempted along the northern outskirts of the vil- counterlanding on the coast between th e lage and on the high ground to its east Asa and Asato Rivers was broken up by and west. American patrol craft . The approxi- The 1st Marines attack to improv e mately 40 surviving Japanese wer e positions west of Wana was held up fo r eliminated by 3/22 at the edge of th e three hours, while 2/1 was given an air- reef. drop of rations, water, ammunition, and When the 6th Division attack re- medical supplies. During the interim, sumed at 0730 on the 13th, the task of this battalion came under extremely 3/22 was to reconnoiter the northern heavy and accurate mortar and small outskirts of Naha . As one patrol ap- arms fire, which caused many casualties . proached a village that another patro l At 1030, the battalion jumped off, but had passed through safely on 12 May,

FORGING AHEAD 235

it was turned back by enemy fire . Bat- 200–300 yards. Just before dark, Com- talion 81mm mortars were laid on th e pany H, 3/29, rushed and seized th e settlement's houses, and an infantr y troublesome hill on the left, quieting the platoon accompanied by a tank platoo n heavy flanking machine gun fire that was sent in at 1400 to overcome all re- had been coming from that sector . sistance. Well-concealed and determine d At the close of the day, it was clea r defenders, however, stymied this attack. that the 22d Marines had been worn ou t One tank was disabled by a satche l and its battle efficiency sapped in th e charge placed by a suicidally incline d fighting that brought the division down Japanese soldier and the rest of th e to the outskirts of Naha . During th e Shermans were forced to turn back . 2,000-yard advance south from the As a Another infantry and tank platoo n Kawa, the regiment had suffered ap- teamed up, this time attacking from th e proximately 800 Marines killed and north of the village, but this effort, too , wounded. Therefore, General Shepherd was thwarted by the combination of ordered the attack resumed on 14 Ma y heavy machine gun fire, an enemy deter- with the 29th Marines making the mai n mination to hold, and the narrow vil- effort on the left, supported by th e lage streets which restricted tank move- 22d Marines on the right. The 3d Bat- ment. Regiment then ordered the enemy talion, 29th Marines, reverted to parent blasted out and the village burned. control at 1800, at which time the regi- After levelling the buildings., and killing ment officially assumed responsibilit y approximately 75 defenders, the Marin e for its new lines . To take over the posi- tanks and troops withdrew at 1630 . In tions vacated by the 29th, the 4th its zone, 1st Battalion Marines met re- Marines—IIIAC reserve—moved south, sistance from enemy outposts holed u p where it would guard the division rea r in houses on the north bank of th e and back up the LVT (A) s guardin g river. the open seaward flank of the 6th Divi- The main division effort was made on sion. the left by 2/22, with 3/29 assigned t o In the 1st Marine Division zone on 13 clear high ground overlooking the Asato May, the 1st Marines was forced to re- River from which the enemy fired int o pel two predawn counterattacks i n the left flank elements of 2/22. Because platoon to company strength before of the difficulty in getting essential sup - launching its own attack . The Marine plies and the rocket trucks scheduled assault was first delayed until support- for preparation fires forward to th e ing tanks got into positions, and the n front, the attack was delayed unti l held up again until the 7th Marines had 1115. Despite the heavy rocket and cleared Dakeshi . Organic crew-served artillery preparation, intense enemy re- weapons of the 1st Marines fired upon sistance grew yet more determined a s observed enemy positions in the villag e the day wore on, making the tank- in support of the 7th . The 1st Marine s infantry assault teams' way difficult . attack finally began at 1230, when 3/ 1 By the end of the day, the two assault jumped off to extend the battalion line battalions had gained no more than to the right into the 2/1 sector and to

236 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

clean up bypassed enemy positions. survivors of the last-ditch stand to Primarily, the 3d Battalion objectiv e attempt to infiltrate American lines i n was the high ground at the mouth of order to reach Shuri and reform." Wana Draw. Heavy machine gun fir e In the XXIV Corps zone, assault ele- from three sides and a deadly hail of ments of the 96th Infantry Divisio n mortar, grenade, and rifle fire greete d executed a flanking maneuver west o f the tank-infantry assault teams as they Conical Hill and gained a foothold from gained the hill . Finding the position un- which the stronghold could be reduced . tenable, the attackers were forced to On 13 May, the division captured th e withdraw under the cover of smoke an d western and northern slopes of Conical , fire furnished by the tanks, which also thus opening the way for the capture of evacuated casualties. The same formid- Yonabaru and the unlocking of anothe r able obstacle of flying steel that met door to Shuri's inner defenses . 3/1 forced 2/1 back and prevente d the latter from moving its left flank up Both corps of the Tenth Arm y attacked at 0730 on 14 May to clear th to extend its hold on the high ground e west of Wana. eastern and western approaches to Shuri and to envelop the flanks of that After first blunting a predawn enemy bastion. Fighting was especially bitter attack on 13 May, Colonel Snedeker' s in the IIIAC zone, where the Marine 7th Marines jumped off at 0730 with divisions were unsuccessful in thei r 2/7 in the assault, 1/7 and 3/7 in re- attempts to break through the enemy serve. The 2d Battalion cleaned out line west of Wana and northwest of Dakeshi, the 1st Battalion eliminate d Naha. It soon became apparent that th e snipers and sealed caves on the ridge Marines had run into the Japanese mai n overlooking the village, and the 3d Bat- line of resistance. This assumption was talion protected the rear of the regi- borne out by the heavy losses sustaine d ment. Despite the employment of tanks , by attacking infantry units and th e self-propelled 75mm guns, and 37mm number of tanks, 18, in the two Marine antitank guns, the enemy was not sub- tank battalions destroyed, disabled, or damaged by enemy antitank, mortar , dued until late in the afternoon . and artillery fire, mines, and suicide Opposing 2/7 on the reverse slope of attacks. Dakeshi Ridge was a honeycomb of General Shepherd's troops had caves centering around one which wa s jumped off at 0730 on the 14th to seize later found to be the command post of the high ground running generall y the 64th Brigade . These positions wer e along the north bank of the Asato Gawa. discovered late in the afternoon and From the very beginning of this attack, taken under close assault ; so close, in the assaulting forces met strong, well - fact, that Japanese postwar record s coordinated., and unremitting opposi- note that even the brigade commande r tion. Attacking in conjunction with th e and his CP personnel took part in th e fighting. After dark, the enemy ordered e= Okinawa Operations Record, p . 107 .

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29th Marines, the 22d succeeded in seiz - Nonetheless, despite the factors whic h ing approximately 1,100 yards of the forced the halt, 2/22 received direct bank of the Asato, despite the presence orders from division at 1515 to seize, of numerous machine gun and sniper occupy, and defend the battalion objec- positions in the path of the advance . tive—including Sugar Loaf Hill—thi s It was on the regimental left, how - day at any cost.63 In answer to the bat- ever, that the going was roughest an d talion commander's earlier request for the fighting most savage . In the face of reinforcements, Company K, 3/22, wa s mounting casualties during the day, th e attached to back up the attack. Moving attack of 2/22 finally ground to a halt out at 1722 behind a line of tanks and at 1500, when the battalion ran into a an artillery-laid smoke screen, Company system of strongly defended and thor- F attacked Sugar Loaf for the second oughly organized defenses. These time on the 14th . In a little more tha n guarded a rectangularly-shaped hill, two hours later, some 40 survivors of dominating and precipitous, that wa s Companies F and G were in position at quickly dubbed "Sugar Loaf ." (See Map the foot of the hill under the command V, Map Section.) This hill itself was at of the battalion executive officer, Major the apex of an area of triangularl y Henry A. Courtney, Jr. shaped high ground that pointed north . Snipers were everywhere, and the A concentration of Japanese power her e group also came under fire from mor- had turned back 2/22 in the two previ- tars on the flanks as well as the revers e ous days. Enemy dispositions on Sugar slopes of Sugar Loaf . To carry supplie s Loaf were so organized that the de- and much-needed ammunition up to the fenders could cover the front, rear, an d exposed Marines, and to reinforce flanks of any portion of the position Major Courtney's pitifully small force, c with interlocking bands of automati Lieutenant Colonel Horatio C. Wood- weapons fire and devastating barrage s house, Jr., 2/22 battalion commander, from mortar, artillery, and grenad e sent 26 newly arrived replacements launchers. Although the intensity of Japanes e forward. All during this time, the Japa- resistance increased proportionally as nese were rolling grenades down on the Marine position from the heights above, assault troops approached this bastion and Courtney saw no other alternativ e —already recognized as a key defensiv e o position—it was not realized at first that to remaining where he was than t . All this bristling terrain feature and its en- attack up the hill to seize its crest s virons constituted the western ancho r American illumination of the area wa stopped when Courtney and his 40-odd of the Shuri defenses . At the time that Marines stormed the hill at 2300, throw- the 22d Marines reached Sugar Loaf , ing grenades as they scrambled up th e the regimental line was spread thinl y . As soon as they carried the crest , and excessive casualties had reduce d slopes they dug in to wait out a night of ex- combat efficiency to approximately 6 2 percent. 93 2/22 SAR, Ph III, pp . 5-6.

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pected counterattacks and the enemy's point within 100 yards of Wana Ridge . customarily heavy mortar fire. Before they could take cover, concen- On the left of 2/22, enfilade fire fro m trated enemy machine gun and mortar flanking hills in the zone of the 29th fire inflicted heavy casualties upon these Marines undoubtedly contributed to the leading elements of 2/7, and they were battalion's hard going during this day . ordered to hold their positions until re- After 3/29, the regimental assault bat- lieved by 1/7. talion, had jumped off at 0730 on the At 1107, Colonel Snedeker ordered 14th, it tried to bypass Japanese strong- the relief of the 2d Battalion by the 1st , points on its left to draw abreast of which was ready to effect the relief at 2/22 on its right. The 3d Battalion was 1252. At that time, however, the com- forced to halt and fight around this mander of 1/7 requested that all sup - center of resistance the rest of the porting arms under the control of 2/ 7 morning and part of the afternoon, be transferred to him, and before the when Japanese fire on its rear proved transfer had been completed the re- troublesome . At about 1630, the 29t h newed attack was delayed until 1615 . Marines' commander regrouped his as- When this designated H-Hour arrived , sault elements and moved 1/29 into th e and following an intensive naval gun- line on the left of 3/29 . The attack was fire, artillery, rocket, and 4 .2-inch mor- renewed with Companies A and H work- tar preparation, 1st Battalion assaul t ing over the flanks of the enemy posi- units moved out behind tanks and unde r tion, slowly compressing and neutraliz- the cover of a protective smoke screen . ing it. Company G, in the meanwhile , The main effort was made by Company continued the attack southward, and , B, which advanced through Dakeshi to after fighting its way 200 yards acros s the south into open terrain . Immediately open ground, gained the forward slope s upon coming into this clearing, these of a hill northwest of Sugar Loaf , Marines were taken under the same fire where it tied in with the lines of 2/22 . that had pinned down Company E In the 1st Division zone, the objec- earlier. tive of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, o n When enemy fire from Wana and 14 May was Wana Ridge . The battalion Shuri prevented the company from ad- jumped off at 0730, with 1/7 prepare d vancing further, it was ordered to with- to pass through and continue the draw to Dakeshi to set up a night de- attack if 2/7 was unable to continue . As fense. In the meanwhile, moving south soon as the left element of 2/7 cleared in unfamiliar territory to take over the past Dakeshi village and entered ope n positions of Company G, Company A terrain, it was pinned down by Japa- ran into numerous enemy groups nese fire. While Company E was hel d attempting to penetrate Marine lines . up, Company G, followed by F, swun g The relief was finally effected at 1900 , through the zone of 1/1 to approach a but not before the commander and

FORGING AHEAD 239

executive officer of Company A had be - received permission to withdraw. After come casualties.64 doing so in good order, the company se t Coordinated with the attack of the up a strong line for night defense on th e 7th Marines against Wana Ridge wa s battalion left, where contact was mad e the one launched that same day by the with the 7th Marines . Units of the 5th 1st Marines. The regiment's major Marines began relieving assault com- effort was made by 1/1, with the west- panies of the 1st at 2200, so that the 1st ern tip of the ridge as the initial objec- Division could renew its attack agains t tive ; the 2d and 3d Battalions supporte d Wana the next morning with a rela- the assault by fire. By noon, Company C tively fresh regiment. secured the objective and began dig- With the coming of darkness on 1 4 ging in and consolidating the newl y May, Tenth Army assault troops wer e won position despite heavy enemy fire . probing deeply into the Japanese main There was no contact on the left with line of resistance all along the island . the 7th Marines, which was moving up Almost flying in the face of indisputable slowly against bitter opposition. Mean- evidence indicating that nearly half o f while, the portion of the ridge to hav e the enemy garrison had been killed— been occupied by the 7th soon was the heaviest losses consisting of first- swarming with Japanese soldiers form- rate infantrymen—was the undeniabl e ing for a counterattack. Because he fact that there were no signs of Japa- could not be reinforced in time, the com- nese weakness anywhere along th e mander of Company C requested and Tenth Army front. Conversely, the nature of operations in the south " In commenting upon the Japanese machin e promised that enemy defenses were no t gun fire that prevented Company C from com- going to be breached without grinding, ing up to the line to fill in the gap and tie i n gruelling, and unrelenting tank-infantr y with Companies A and B, the S-3 of 1/ 7 stated that this was "a standard Japanes e combat. tactic that gave our forces trouble throughout the war . There was always a reluctance o n LOGISTICAL PROGRESS 6 5 our part to withhold [hold back] an attack that was continuing to gain ground. Also , All ICEBERG assault and first eche- there was a general tendency to tie in th e defenses and establish ourselves in a defensiv e lon transports and landing ships ha d posture prior to dark . These two factors ofte n been unloaded by the end of April an d overlapped and we found ourselves in th e released for other assignments . Com- position of frantically establishing a night de- pared to that provided in Central Pacific fense in the few remaining minutes of twilight . The Japanese, of course, had long since operations earlier, the magnitude of the reacted to this procedure and were wont to logistical support furnished the Oki- send infiltration groups and LMG team s nawa invasion force can be best seen i n against us in the awkward period betwee n BENT [Beginning of Evening Nautical Twi- the following table : light] and EENT [End of Evening Nautica l Twilight] . It was in this period that the relie f 95 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n of G/2/7 by A/1/7 took place ." Maj Don P. this section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ; Wyckoff ltr to CMC, dtd 25Mar55 . Tenth Army AR .

240 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

been based on an ,estimated 40 days of No. o f Measuremen t Operation ships Personnel ton s combat," 67 it was necessary to revis e shipping schedules upwards drastically Gilberts 63 35,214 148,78 2 in order to meet the increased demands . Marshalls 122 85,201 293,79 2 On 17 April, General Buckner made th e first of many special requests for ammu- Marianas 210 141,519 437,75 3 nition in short supply. Specifically, he asked CinCPOA to load five LSTs a t Leyte 66 110 57,411 214,55 2 Saipan with 155mm howitzer and gu n Palaus 109 55,887 199,963 ammunition for arrival at Okinawa by 27 April. The fulfillment of this request Iwo Jima 174 86,516 280,44 7 was a stop-gap measure and in no way guaranteed that the critical artillery Okinawa 458 193,852 824,567 ammunition shortage would be alleviated for the rest of the campaign . As stated earlier here, the complexi- Kamikazes played a large part i n ties of logistical support operations were creating this shortage by sinking a tota l compounded by several factors, not the of three ammunition ships in April wit h least of which was the disrupted unload- a loss estimated at being well in excess ing schedule. Additionally, the jamme d of 22,000 tons of vitally needed cargo . condition of the beach dumps and th e Even after the release of a considerabl e shortage of shore party personnel an d amount of ammunition late in April , transportation gave the Tenth Arm y when contingent operations for Phas e supply problems, also . The primary con- III of ICEBERG were cancelled, th e cern, however, was with the inability of shortage remained critical throughout the Tenth Army to maintain an adequat e the fighting. Artillery commands were artillery ammunition reserve on th e never able to maintain more than a mini- island. This situation arose because of mally satisfactory reserve level of shell s the rapid expenditure of shells of all cali- in their ammunition points. bers and types needed in the drive to re - Although initial shipments consisted duce the positions protecting Shuri . Be- of "balanced loads" of ammunition, as ginning with the major XXIV Corp s the supply requirements of the Tenth attack on 19 April, the initial Tenth Army became clearer it also became ap- Army ammunition support was quickl y parent that there would be a greate r expended and replenishment shipment s were gobbled up as soon as they arrived . eT Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IV, p. 21 . "In the preliminary planning the Tenth Arm y Although "ammunition resupply ha d Ordnance Officer envisaged heavy ammunitio n expenditures . Original requests far exceede d e8 "The number of ships and cargo tonnage the supplies made available initially and ha d listed under `Leyte' represents that loaded for to be drastically modified downward to fi t the Palau-Anguar-Yap Operation which wa s availability of ammunition stocks and shippin g diverted to the Leyte Operation but which to transport same ." BGen David H . Blakelock, was unloaded under direction of Com3dPhib - USA, ltr to CMC dtd 22Mar55, hereafter For." CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec I, p . 33 . Blakelock ltr 1955.

FORGING AHEAD 241

demand for artillery shells than fo r Because Phase III was cancelled an d small arms ammunition . Accordingly, the mission of IIIAC changed, General logistics officers were able to schedul e Buckner could mount a four-division at - resupply shipments that more suitabl y tack on Shuri . This increased groun d filled the needs of the ground forces on activity vastly accelerated the consump- Okinawa. tion of all classes of supplies, and caused But even as L-Day ended, unloading more supply ships to be called up than facilities on the Hagushi beaches were could be handled efficiently.66 In essence, already overtaxed . Because some of th e this move was a calculated risk in th e assault beaches were not capable of sus- face of numerous mass and individua l taining heavy and continuous shor e Kamikaze attacks on the transpor t party operations, and other sites se- areas. Nonetheless, the risk had to b e lected for eventual use were either not taken if an adequate reserve of essentia l suitable or not uncovered on schedule , supplies was to be maintained in th e the program of beach unloading as set immediate area . up in the logistics plan proved totall y As the insatiable appetites of the unrealistic. The most satisfactory ton- ground units for supplies increased in nage unloading figure that could be at- late April and early May, quartermaster tained under the then-present condi- and shore party units made extensive tions was reached on 5 May, and the efforts to speed the unloading and proc- figures never equalled the planned goal s essing of all goods . To help ease the thereafter .68 situation, Rear Admiral John L . Hall, Four new beaches were opened up be- Jr., Senior Officer Present Afloat a t tween 17 April and 17 May on the eas t Hagushi, and General Wallace, the coast of the island in Chimu and Naka- Island Commander, recommended t o General Buckner that more cranes , n gusuku Wan to support the souther transportation, and personnel be em- drive of XXIV Corps and base develop- ployed to empty beached landing ship s ment activities. Unfortunately, the ga p and craft ; that more LVTs and cran e between actual and planned unloadin g barges be used at the reef transfer line ; tonnage was never closed, even with th e that intermediate transfer dumps be es- addition of these new points. tablished to prevent excessively lon g hauls by shore party vehicles ; and that es "One of the most important factors in pre - the requirements for ammunition an d venting the unloading from reaching planne d fuel oil dispersion be modified somewhat goals after 5 May was the weather . Frequen t to conserve personnel and transport. interruptions were also caused by Red alert s and enemy air raids . During May there were The admiral made one other recommen- 17 days of heavy seas and torrential rain s dation : that the beach at Nago Wan b e (14.68 inches fell in May with over 11 inches transferred from the control of IIIA C falling between 20 and 30 May) which materially interfered with unloading operations. 66 According to the resupply schedule estab- During June there were 15 days when typhoon lished before the landing, a six-day delay warnings and heavy weather materially inter- occurred between call-up and arrival of the fered with unloading." Ibid. replenishment echelons .

242 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

to that of the Island Command . General miral Hill was directed to report to Gen- Buckner approved these recommenda- eral Buckner, who took command of all tions almost immediately, but any gain s forces ashore and assumed Turner' s made by these improvements were former responsibility to Admiral Spru- quickly minimized by the increasing size ance for the defense and development o f and variety of logistics tasks .70 captured objectives . At this time, all of At no time after the landing was there Turner's former logistics duties wer e any prospect that the Tenth Army ha d taken over by a representative of Com- not come to Okinawa to stay, but th e mander, Service Squadron Ten, th e problem of sustaining the momentum of Navy logistical support force in forwar d the ground offensive became quite acute areas. in late April and early May. In additio n Admiral Turner's successful period o f to his tactical responsibilities as com- command responsibility at Okinawa was mander of the Joint Expeditionary marked by his direction of the larges t Force, during this early phase of the amphibious operation of the Pacific War. campaign Admiral Turner also had a Forces under his command had killed g logistic responsibility for maintainin 55,551 and captured 853 Japanese troop s , adequate levels of all classes of air in ground action, and had claimed th e ground, and naval replenishment stock s destruction of 1,184 enemy aircraft . needed to support a successful Tenth Army operation. During the first 46 days of the cam- - Admiral Spruance, acting in accord- paign, i.e., until 16 May, 1,256,286 meas ance with the ICEBERG operation plan, urement tons of assault, garrison , announced that the amphibious phase o f maintenance, and ground ammunition the Okinawa landing was ended on cargo had been unloaded over islan d 17 May. At 0900 on that day, Vice Ad- beaches. Gunfire support force guns , miral Harry W . Hill, Commander, V from 5- to 16-inch in caliber, had fire d Amphibious Force, relieved Admiral over 25,000 tons of ammunition while Turner as Commander, Task Force 51, covering Tenth Army ground troop s and took over the control of his naval and protecting the ships of TF 51.71 activities, and of air defense . In the In the course of six weeks of incessant shift of command responsibilities, Ad- fighting, the enemy had exacted a ter- ""Another factor contributing to the lower rible price for every inch of ground h e rate of unloading was the increased need o f service troops, particularly engineers, to im- P1 The immensity of this support may be see n prove roads and to endeavor to make existin g in comparing the Okinawa figure with the ton s roads passable as a result of the extremel y of naval ammunition expended in Central heavy rains . These additional troops came fro m Pacific operations earlier : Tarawa (1,833) ; airfield construction projects and the beac h Makin (1,800) ; Kwajalein (3,937) ; Roi-Namur areas, the latter causing [a] correspondin g (2,251) ; Eniwetok (2,020) ; Saipan (10,965) ; slow down of unloading. The arrival of engi- Tinian (3,627) ; Guam (8,000) ; Peleliu (5,- neer and service troops on the island never kept 579) ; and Iwo Jima (14,190) . ComPhibsPa c pace with the requirements for unloading." Amphibious Gunnery Bul No . 2, Assault o n Blakelock ltr 1955 . Okinawa, dtd 24May45 .

FORGING AHEAD 243

yielded. On 17 May, Tenth Army casu- ships sunk or damaged in action with alty figures included 3,964 men killed , the enemy. 18,258 wounded, 302 missing, and 9,29 5 Despite the fact that a major portio n non-battle casualties . Of these casualties, of Okinawa had been taken, and Tenth hospital ships had evacuated 10,188 ; Army ground units had punished th e APAs 4,887 ; and air transport, 5,093 . enemy unmercifully, all evidence pointe d The hard-hit naval forces had lost 1,00 2 to a continuation of the hard fighting . men killed, 2,727 wounded, and 1,054 Nevertheless, the tactical situation on missing. Air defense units, both TA F the fringes of Shuri almost imper- and carrier-based squadrons, lost 8 2 ceptibly showed signs that the Japanese planes to all causes, while TF 51 had 156 defenses were slowly giving way .

310-224 0 - 69 - 17 CHAPTER 8 Reduction of the Shuri Bastion

As conceived in Tenth Army plans, th e In analyzing these defenses, the 6th Ma- object of the full-scale attack beginnin g rine Division pointed out that : on 11 May was to destroy the defense s guarding Shuri . In the end, this massiv e . . . the sharp depression included withi n the Horseshoe afforded mortar position assault took the lives of thousands o s f that were almost inaccessible to any arm men in two weeks of the bloodiest fight- short of direct, aimed rifle fire and han d ing experienced during the entire Oki- grenades . Any attempt to capture Suga r nawa campaign. For each frontline divi- Loaf by flanking action from east or wes t sion, the struggle to overcome enemy is immediately exposed to flat trajector y fire from both of the supporting terrai n troops on the major terrain feature i n features . Likewise, an attempt to reduce the path of its advance determined the either the Horseshoe or the Half Moon nature of its battle. Facing the front of would be exposed to destructive well-aime d the 96th Infantry Division was Conica l fire from the Sugar Loaf itself . In addi- Hill ; the 77th Division fought for Shur i tion, the three localities are connecte d by a network of tunnels and galleries , itself. Marines of the 1st Division had t o facilitating the covered movement of re- overcome Wana Draw, while Sugar Loaf serves. As a final factor in the strength o f Hill was the objective of the 6th Marin e the position it will be seen that all sides Division. (See Map V, Map Section.) of Sugar Loaf Hill are precipitous, an d there are no evident avenues of approac h into the hill mass . For strategic locatio n BATTLE FOR SUGAR LOAF HILL 1 and tactical strength it is hard to conceiv e of a more powerful position than th e Sugar Loaf Hill was but one of three Sugar Loaf terrain afforded . Added to al l the foregoing was the bitter fact tha enemy positions in a triangularly shape d t troops assaulting this position presente d group of hills which made up the west - a clear target to enemy machine guns , ern anchor of the Japanese Shuri de- mortars, and artillery emplaced on th e fense system . Sugar Loaf was the apex Shuri heights to their left and left rear.2 of the triangle, which faced north, its Following its successful charge t o flanks and rear well covered by extensiv e seize the crest of Sugar Loaf, Major cave and tunnel positions in Half Moo n Courtney's small group had dug in . An Hill to the southeast and the Horsesho e unceasing enemy bombardment of th e to the southwest . The three elements o f newly won position, as well as the first this system were mutually supporting . in a series of Japanese counterattacks t o regain it, began almost immediately. At ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; midnight, 14-15 May, there were sound s ILIAC AR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 6th Mar- of enemy activity coming from the othe r Div Jnl, Ph III ; 4th Mar SAR, Ph III ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III; 29th Mar SAR, Ph III . 2 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 5 . 244

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 245

side of the crest, signifying an impend- ganized on the high ground just in front ing banzai charge to Courtney . He fore- of Sugar Loaf . stalled the charge by leading a grenade- The enemy counterattack was the be - throwing attack against the revers e ginning of a series which soon reached slope defenders, in the course of which battalion-sized proportions, and which , he was killed. by 0900, had spread over a 900-yar d At 0230, only a handful of tired an d front extending into the zones of 1/22 wounded Marines remained on the top o f and 3/29 . An intensive naval gunfire , Sugar Loaf, and Lieutenant Colone l air, and artillery preparation for the Woodhouse ordered his reserve, Com- division assault that morning tempo- pany K, to reinforce the depleted group . rarily halted the enemy attack, but it With the coming of dawn, the forces o n soon regained momentum. By 1315, how- Sugar Loaf had been reduced again b y ever, the Japanese effort was spent, enemy action and fire, while 2/22 itsel f though not before the 22d Marines in had been hit by numerous Japanese the center of the division line had take n counterattacks and attempts at infiltra- a terrific pounding. In an incessant tion all along the battalion lines. At mortar and artillery bombardment sup - 0630, Company D of 2/29 was attache d porting the enemy counterattack, the to the 22d Marines to help mop up th e battalion commander of 1/22, Major enemy in the rear of 2/22. Thomas J. Myers, was killed, and all o f There were less than 25 Marines of his infantry company commanders—an d Courtney's group and Company K re- the commander and executive officer o f maining in the 2/22 position on Suga r the tank company supporting the bat- Loaf when daylight came ; at 0800, th e talion—were wounded when the battal- seven survivors of the Courtney grou p ion observation post was hit.3 were ordered off the hill by the battalio n Major Earl J . Cook, 1/22 executive commander . Within a short time there- officer, immediately took over and reor- after, the enemy launched another ganized the battalion . He sent Com- attack against the battered position . Dur- panies A and B to seize a hill forwar d ing the height of this attack, a rein - of the battalion left flank . When in forced platoon of Company D arrive d blocking positions on their objective— on the hilltop and was thrown into the northwest of Sugar Loaf—the Marines battle. Suffering heavy casualties while could effectively blunt counterattacks ex- en route to the position, the Company D pected to be mounted in this area. platoon was hit even harder by the Because the possibility existed of a charging Japanese as soon as it arrive d breakthrough in the zone of 2/22, th e at the top of the hill . At 1136, the few regimental commander moved Compan y survivors of Company K and the 11 Ma- rines remaining of the Company D pla- a Upon learning of the death of Major Myers , toon were withdrawn from Sugar Loaf. General Shepherd commented : "It's th e greatest single loss the Division has sustained . r The Company D men rejoined thei Myers was an outstanding leader . Whenever I parent unit, which was manning a called on him for a job he never failed me.'" hastily constructed defensive line or- Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, p . 117 . 246 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

SUGAR LOAF HILL, western anchor of the Shuri defenses, seen from the north . (USMC 124983)

TANKS evacuate the wounded as the 29th Marines continue the attack on Sugar Loaf . (USMC 122421)

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 247

I of 3/22 into position to back up th e Several of the tanks were hit, but littl e 2d Battalion. At 1220, Lieutenant Colo- damage resulted. At the end of the day, nel Woodhouse was notified that hi s the lines of the 29th Marines were firml y exhausted battalion would be relieved b y linked with the 22d Marines on the righ t 3/22 as soon as possible, and would in and the 1st Division on the left . turn take up the old 3d Battalion posi- Facing the 6th Marine Division was tions on the west coast along the banks the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, of the Asato . The relief was effected at whose ranks were now sadly depleted as 1700 with Companies I and L place d a result of its unsuccessful counterat- on the front line, and Company K posi- tack and because of the advances of 1/22 tioned slightly to the right rear of th e and the 29th Marines . More than 58 5 other two. Company D, 2/29, reverte d Japanese dead were counted in the divi- to parent control at this time . sion zone, and it was estimated that a n During the ground fighting on the additional 446 of the enemy had bee n night of 14–15 May, naval support craft killed in the bombardments of support- smashed an attempted Japanese landing ing arms or sealed in caves durin g in the 6th Division zone on the coast just mopping-up operations .4 Expecting that north of the Asato Gawa . Foreseeing the the Americans would make an intensive possibility of future raids here, General effort to destroy his Sugar Loaf de- Shepherd decided to strengthen hi s fenses, General Ushijima reinforced the beach defenses. In addition to a 50-man 15th IMR with a makeshift infantry bat- augmentation from the regiment, 2/2 2 talion comprised of service and suppor t was also reinforced by the 6th Recon- units from the 1st Specially Establishe d naissance Company to bolster its night Brigade. 5 defenses. To further strengthen Lieuten- The success of the 6th Division attack ant Colonel Woodhouse's command, h e plan for 16 May depended upon the was given operational control of 2/4 , seizure of Half Moon Hill by the 29th which was still in corps reserve. Marines. (See Map VI, Map Section .) The objective of the 29th Marines o n Once 3/29 had seized the high groun d 15 May was the seizure of Half Moon east of Sugar Loaf, 3/22 was to make Hill. The 1st and 3d Battalions encoun- the major division effort and capture the tered the same bitter and costly resist- hill fortress. Immediately after the at- ance in the fight throughout the day that tack was launched, assault elements o n marked the experience of the 22d Ma- the regimental left flank encountere d rines. A slow-paced advance was made heavy fire and bitter opposition fro m under constant harassing fire from th e enemy strongpoints guarding the objec- Shuri Heights area . By late afternoon, tive. The 1st Battalion was spearheade d 1/29 had reached the valley north of by a Company B platoon and its sup- Half Moon and became engaged in a gre- porting armor . After the tank-infantry nade duel with enemy defenders in reverse slope positions. Tanks supporting ' 6th MarDiv G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 45, dtd the Marine assault elements came unde r 16May45 . direct 150mm howitzer fire at this point . 5 Okinawa Operations Record, p. 109.

248 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

teams had passed through the right of Half Moon Hill against slight resist- flank to clear the reverse slope of the ance. The picture changed drasticall y ridge held by Company C, devastatin g at 1500, however, when the Japanese small arms, artillery, mortar, and anti - launched a violent counteroffensive to tank fire forced them to withdraw . The push the Marines off these advance d fury of this fire prevented Company C positions even while they were attempt- from advancing over the crest of the ing to dig in. The enemy poured machine ridge and the other two platoons of gun, rifle, and mortar fire into the ex- Company B from moving more than 30 0 posed flanks and rear of the Americans, yards along the division boundary before who also were hit by a flurry of grenades they too were stopped by savage fronta l thrown from caves and emplacements on and flanking fire . the south, or reverse, slope of the hill . The night defenses of the battalio n As evening approached, increasing in- remained virtually the same as the night tense enemy fire penetrated the smok e before ; however, the units were reor- screen covering the digging-in opera- ganized somewhat and their dispositions tions of the troops and they were readjusted . At 1400 that afternoon, ordered to withdraw to their earlier Lieutenant Colonel Jean W . Moreau, jump-off positions to set in a night commander of 1/29, was evacuate d defense. after he was seriously wounded by an On the right of the division, when the artillery shell which hit his battalio n 22d Marines attack was launched at OP ; Major Robert P. Neuffer assume d 0830 on the 16th, assault elements of th e command. 1st Battalion were immediately taken Continuously exposed to heavy enemy under continuous automatic weapons fir e artillery and mortar bombardment, 3/2 9 coming from the northern edge of th e spent most of the morning moving into ruins of the town of Takamotoji, just a s favorable positions for the attack on they were attempting to get into posi- Half Moon . Following an intensive artil- tion to support the attack of 3/22. The lery and mortar preparation, tanks fro m fact that this previously quiet area no w Companies A and B of the 6th Tank Bat- presented a bristling defense indicate d talion emerged from the railroad cut that the Japanese had reinforced thi s northeast of Sugar Loaf and lumbered sector to confound any American at - into the broad valley leading to Hal f tempt to outflank Sugar Loaf from th e Moon. While Company A tanks provided direction of Naha . In the end, because of Company B with direct fire support the criss-crossing fires coming from th e from the slopes of hills just north of village, Half Moon Hill, and the objec- Sugar Loaf, the latter fired into revers e tive itself, the 3d Battalion was unabl e slope positions in the ridge opposit e to fulfill its assignment. 1/29, and then directly supported th e The battalion commander, Lieutenan t assault elements of the 3d Battalion . Colonel Malcolm "0" Donohoo, had At about the same time that their planned to attack Sugar Loaf from the armor support appeared on the scene, east once the flank of the attacking unit , Companies G and I attacked and quickl y Company I, was safeguarded by a suc- raced to and occupied the northern slope cessful 3/29 advance. Company L, 3/22,

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 249

was to support the attack by covering cessful." 6 One infantry regiment, the the south and east slopes of Sugar Loaf 22d, had been so sorely punished that, i n with fire, while 1/22, in turn, would take assessing his losses for the day, Colonel the high ground west of Sugar Loaf , Schneider reported that the combat effi- where it would support the Company L ciency of his unit was down to 40 per- movement by fire . The success or failure cent.7 Because the fighting of the preced- of the attack on the hill hinged on the ing eight days had sapped the offensive success or failure of 3/29 . capabilities of the 22d Marines and re- At 1500, despite the fact that 3/2 9 duced the regiment to a point where its had not fully occupied the high ground, continued employment was inadvisable , Company I moved out with its tank sup - it became apparent that the 29th Ma- port and reached Sugar Loaf without rines would have to assume the burden serious opposition. Once the troops in the of taking Sugar Loaf . On 17 May, th e van attempted to gain the crest, how- regimental boundary was shifted west t o ever, they began receiving heavy enemy include the redoubt in its zone an d mortar and machine gun fire . In an ef- thereby lessen control problems in the fort to suppress this fire, the tank s attacks on both it and Half Moon . began flanking the hill, but ran into a In an effort to neutralize the seem- minefield where one tank was lost. Com- ingly impregnable Japanese defenses pany I, nevertheless, gained the top o f here, the attack of 17 May was precede d the hill at 1710 and began digging in . by an intensive bombardment of 29t h The situation was in doubt now, becaus e Marines objectives by all available sup- both 1/22 and Company L were pinned porting arms. In this massive prepara- down and 3/29 was forced to withdra w tion were the destructive fires of 16-inc h from Half Moon . Company I, therefore , naval guns, 8-inch howitzers, and 1,000 - was in an exposed position and its pre - pound bombs. Following this softenin g carious hold on Sugar Loaf had become up, and spearheaded by a heavy and con- untenable. With both flanks exposed and tinual artillery barrage, the 29th Ma- its ranks depleted by numerous casual- rines launched a tank-infantry attack ties, the company had to be pulled back with three battalions abreast. The 1st from the hill under the cover of fire of and 3d Battalions on the left had th e both division and corps artillery . As mission of taking Half Moon, whil e 3/22 reorganized for night defense, en- 2/29, with Company E in assault, was to emy batteries bombarding the Marin e take Sugar Loaf . lines wounded Lieutenant Colonel Company E made three attempts to Donohoo, who was replaced by Major take its objective, and each proved costl y George B. Kantner, the battalion execu- and unsuccessful . The first effort, in- tive officer . volving a wide flanking movement in This day was categorized by the 6th which the railroad cut was utilized fo r Division as the "bitterest" of the Oki- cover, was stymied almost immediately nawa campaign, a day when "the regi- when the troops surged onto ope n ments had attacked with all the effort ° 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 7. at their command and had been unsuc- 7 22d Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 5 .

250 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ground. A close flanking attack around one hill was seized without the others the left of the hill characterized the being neutralized or likewise captured , second effort, but the steep southeaster n effective Japanese fire from the uncap- face of the height precluded a successful tured position would force the Marine s climb to the top. The axis of the attack to withdraw from all. This, in effect, was then reoriented to the northeast was why Sugar Loaf had not been slope of Sugar Loaf, and the lead platoon breached before this, and why it was began a difficult trek to the top, all th e not taken on the 17th . while under heavy mortar fire coming A combination of tank fire, flame, and from covered positions on Half Moon . demolitions had temporarily subdued Three times the assaulting Marines the Japanese opposing the 1/29 ap- reached the crest, only to be driven off proach on the 17th and enabled Com- by a combination of grenades and bayo- panies A and C to advance swiftly acros s net charges. Almost all fighting was at the valley and up the forward slopes o f close range and hand-to-hand . Half Moon . While Company C mopped After quickly reorganizing for a up remaining enemy defenders, Com- fourth try, the now-fatigued and de- pany A renewed its attack across th e pleted company drove to the hilltop a t valley floor and raced to the forward 1830, when it was met again by a deter- slopes of Half Moon. When Company B mined Japanese counterattack . This attempted to cross open ground to ex- time, however, the Marines held, but tend the battalion lines on the left, it heavy casualties and depleted ammuni- was stopped cold by accurate fire com- tion supply forced the battalion coming from the hill, Sugar Loaf, an d mander to withdraw the survivors of Shuri. At this time, the positions held the company from Sugar Loaf . Thus, by the exposed platoons of Company A the prize for which 160 men of Com- became untenable . The battalion company E had been killed and wounded o n mander authorized their withdrawal to that day fell forfeit to the Japanese . a defiladed area approximately 15 0 Some small sense of just retributio n yards forward of their line of departure was felt by Company E Marines whe n that morning. the enemy foolishly and boldly attempte d By 1600, 3d Battalion companies had to reinforce Sugar Loaf at dusk by mov- fought their way to Half Moon under ing his troops to the hill along an un- continuous fire and begun digging in on covered route. Artillery observers im- the forward slope of the hill . They were mediately called down the fire of 1 2 not able to tie in with 1/29 until 1840 , battalions on the unprotected Japanese , two hours after Company F had been decisively ending their reinforcement ordered forward to fill in the gap be- threat. tween the battalions. Following a crush- So well integrated were the enemy de- ing bombardment of these hastily estab- fenses on Half Moon and Sugar Loaf, lished positions on Half Moon and the capture of only one portion was mean- exposure of the right flank of 3/29 to ingless ; 6th Division Marines had to direct and accurate fire from enemy- take them all simultaneously. If only held Sugar Loaf, the entire battalion

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 251

was pulled back when Company A wa s mitted on the battalion right. Supported withdrawn from its left. Strong posi- by fire from 1/22 on its right an d tions were established for night defens e Marines on Sugar Loaf, the company —only 150 yards short of Half Moon . pressed forward to the ridge marking The gaps on either side of 3/29 wer e the lip of the Horseshoe ravine . Here it protected by interlocking lanes of fire was stopped by a vicious grenade an d established in coordination with 1/29 mortar barrage coming from the deeply on its left flank and 2/29 on its right. entrenched enemy . Because of this in- On 18 May at 0946, less than an tense resistance, the company wa s hour after the 29th Marines attacked, forced to withdraw slightly to the for - Sugar Loaf was again occupied by 6t h ward slope of the ridge, where it estab- Division troops. (See Map VII, Ma p lished a strong night defense . Section.) The assault began with tanks Implicit in the 6th Marine Division attempting a double envelopment of thi s drive towards the Asato Gawa was a key position with little initial success . threatened breakthrough at Naha. To A combination of deadly AT fire an d forestall this, General Ushijima moved well-placed minefields quickly disable d four naval battalions to back up the six tanks. Despite this setback and in- 44th Independent Mixed Brigade . Few creasingly accurate artillery fire, a com- men in the rag-tag naval units were trained for land combat, much less company of medium tanks split up and man - bat at all, since the battalions wer aged to reach and occupy positions o n e comprised of inexperienced service either flank of Sugar Loaf, from whic h troops, civilian workers, and Okinawan s they could cover the reverse slopes o f who had been attached to Admiral Ota' s . the hill Naval Base Force . The commander of In a tank-infantry assault, Company the Thirty-second Army thought that D, 2/29, gained the top of the hereto- the lack of training could be com- fore-untenable position, and held it dur- pensated in part by strongly arming th e ing a fierce grenade and mortar duel men with a generous allotment of auto- with the defenders . Almost immediatel y matic weapons taken from supply dump s y after subduing the enemy, the compan on Oroku and the wrecked aircraft that charged over the crest of the hill and dotted the peninsula's airfield .8 down its south slope to mop up and destroy emplacements there . Disregard- 8 IntelMono, pt I, sec B, pp . 15—16 ; CICA S ing lethal mortar fire from Half Moon Trans No . 202, Naval Attack Force T/O&E, dt d that blanketed Sugar Loaf, Company D 4May45 . No standards for the organization or dug in at 1300 as well as it could to con- equipping of these units had been establishe d prior to their organization ; but the makeup of solidate and organize its newly won con - one of them, found in the translation of the quest. above-noted T/O&E, fairly well reflects the All during the attempts to take Sugar composition of the others . As of 4 May 1945 , Loaf and Half Moon, the enemy o n the 3d Battalion of the Iwao Force, a three - Horseshoe Hill had poured down never - battalion group organized to reinforce the Thirty-second Army, was composed of 41 5 ending mortar and machine gun fire o n men in two companies armed with a total o f the attacking Marines below . To destro y 28 machine guns, 258 rifles, 27 grenade dis- these positions, Company F was coin - chargers, and 1,744 grenades .

252 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Despite their lack of combat experi- uled relief, a strong Japanese counter- ence, the naval force was to perform a attack hit the open right flank of Com- three-fold mission with these weapons : pany F, 2/29, poised just below the li p back up the Sugar Loaf defense system , of the Horseshoe depression . The fury hold the hills northwest of the Kokuba of the enemy attack, combined with an River, and maintain the security o f excellently employed and heavy bom- Shuri's western flank in the event that bardment of white phosphorous shells, the defenses of the 44th IMB collapsed . eventually forced the advance elements The furious Japanese defense of th e of Company F to withdraw to the north- buffer zone stretching from the Nah a ern slope of Sugar Loaf .1 ' At first light , estuary of the Kokuba to the western relief of the three exhausted battalions outskirts of the town of Shuri indicated of the 29th began, with 2/4 taking u p their concern with the threat to the left positions on the left, 3/4 on the right . flank of the Shuri positions .9 Despite the difficult terrain, constan t The coming of darkness on 18 Ma y bombardment of the lines, and opposi- was not accompanied by any noticeabl e tion from isolated enemy groups which waning in the furious contest for pos- had infiltrated the positions during th e session of Sugar Loaf, a battle in which night, the relief was effected at 1430 at the combat efficiency of the 29th Marine s a cost to the 4th Marines of over 7 0 had been so severely tested and drained. casualties—primarily from mortar an d In the nearly nine days since the Tenth artillery fire . At approximately 1530, a Army had first begun its major push , counterattack was launched against 2/4 , the 6th Marine Division had sustained which then was in a precarious position 2,662 battle and 1,289 non-battle casual - on Half Moon Hill, on the division left tiesy 10 almost all in the ranks of the 22 d flank. After nearly two hours of fight- and 29th Marines . It was patently obvi- ing, the attack was broken up . The ad- ous that an infusion of fresh blood int o vance Marine company was then with- the division lines was a prerequisite fo r drawn from its exposed point to an are a the attack to be continued with un- about 150 yards to the rear, where th e diminished fervor . Accepting this fact , battalion could reinforce the regimental General Geiger released the 4th Marines line after tying in with 3/5 and 3/4 . to parent control effective at 0800 on 1 9 The area from which the attack ha d May, at which time General Shepherd been launched against Company F, 2/29, placed the 29th Marines in division re - was partially neutralized during the da y serve, but subject to IIIAC control . by the 22d Marines . Under its new com- At 0300 on the morning of the sched- " "Close examination of the aerial photo available was the cause of some concern sinc e e Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 110-111 . it appeared that the long ridge occupied by 10 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 9 . The divisio n Co F was honeycombed with caves at, an d defined battle casualties as killed and wounded ; slightly above, the level of the valley floor . . . . non-battle casualties included the loss of me n The counterattack which dislodged Co F ap- due to exhaustion, sickness, and combat parently was initiated by Japanese from thos e fatigue . caves." Fraser ltr.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 253

mander, Colonel Harold C . Roberts,1 2 flanks of the objective rather than its the regiment pushed its left flank for - front. While the company in the center ward 100–150 yards to the high groun d of the battalion line remained in posi- on the left of Horseshoe. Disregarding tion and supported the attack by fire, heavy artillery and mortar fire as well the flank companies were to attempt an as they could, the Marines dug in new armor-supported double envelopment . positions which materially strengthened At 1245, when coordination for thi s the division line. maneuver was completed, the attack After a night of this heavy and ac- was renewed . curate enemy bombardment, the two Company G, on the right, moved out assault battalions of the 4th Marine s smartly, and, following closely behin d jumped off at 0800 on 20 May . Preceded the neutralizing fires of its supporting by a thorough artillery preparation an d tanks, it seized and held the western end supported by the 6th Tank Battalion , of Half Moon. While traversing more the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment , exposed terrain and receiving fire from and the Army 91st Chemical Morta r three sides, the left wing of the envelop- Company, the Marines moved rapidl y ment—Company E—progressed slowl y ahead for 200 yards before they wer e and suffered heavy casualties. Although slowed and then halted. The determine d subjected to a constant barrage of mor- refusal of the Japanese infantry en- tars and hand grenades, the compan y trenched on Half Moon and Horsesho e reached the forward slope of its portion Hills to yield, and fierce machine gu n of the objective, where it eventually du g and artillery fire from hidden positions in for the night . The night positions o f in the Shuri Hill mass, where enemy 2/4 were uncomfortably close to those gunners could directly observe th e of the Japanese, and separated only b y Marine attack, blocked the advance. a killing zone along a hill crest swept b y It soon appeared as though the fight both enemy and friendly fire . Nonethe- for Half Moon was going to duplicate less, the battalion had made fairly sub- the struggle for Sugar Loaf. To rein- stantial gains during the day and it force the 2/4 assault forces and to main- was set in solidly. tain contact with the 5th Marines , Earlier that day, as 3/4 attacked Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds H . Hay- enemy positions on the high ground den, commander of 2/4, committed hi s forming the western end of Horseshoe , reserve rifle company on the left at it had received fire support from the 1000. In face of a mounting casualty 22d Marines. The 4th Marines battalion toll, at 1130 he decided to reorient the employed demolitions, flamethrowers, axis of the battalion attack to hit the and tanks to burn and blast the honey - comb of Japanese-occupied caves in th e 12 Colonel Roberts and Lieutenant Colonel forward (north) slope of Horseshoe August C . Larson had relieved Colonel Hill. When the regiment halted th e Schneider and Lieutenant Colonel Karl K . attack for the day at 1600, 3/4 ha d Louther, as commander and executive officer , n respectively, of the 22d Marines at 1430 o n gained its objective. Here, the battalio 17 May. was on high ground overlooking the

254 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Horseshoe depression where the Japa- fire support ships provided constant nese mortars, which had caused so man y illumination over the battlefield. Com- casualties that day, were dug in . pany B was committed to the fight, an d To maintain contact with 2/4 and to "with perfect timing, " 14 moved into th e strengthen his line, Lieutenant Colonel line to help blunt the attack. Bruno A. Hochmuth, 3/4 commander, Star shells and flares gave a sur- had committed elements of his reserve , realistic cast to the wild two-and-a-hal f Company I, shortly after noon . Antici- hour fracas, fought at close quarter s pating that a counterattack might pos- and often hand-to-hand . The fight was sibly be mounted against 3/4 later that over at midnight ; the few enemy who evening, Colonel Shapley ordered 1/4 to had managed to penetrate the Marin e detail a company to back up the newl y lines were either dead or attempting to won positions on Horseshoe . Company withdraw. The next morning, unit iden- B was designated and immediately tification of some of the nearly 500 Jap- briefed on the situation of 3/4, routes o f anese dead revealed that fresh units— approach, and courses of action to be fol- which included some naval troops—ha d lowed if the Japanese attack was made the attack. The determination of launched . the attackers to crush the Americans re- The sporadic mortar and artillery emphasized the extremely sensitive and fire that had harassed 4th Marines lines immediate Japanese reaction to an y suddenly increased at 2200, when bursts American threat against Shuri's west- of white phosphorous shells and colore d ern flank. smoke heralded the beginning of th e On 21 May, the main effort of the anticipated counterattack . An estimated 6th Division attack was made by th e 700 Japanese struck the positions of 4th Marines, with the 22d Marines pac- Companies K and L of 3/4 . As soon as ing the attack and giving fire support . the enemy had showed themselves, the y The objective was the Asato River line . were blasted by the combined destruc- (See Map 15 .) Under its new com- tive force of prepared concentrations mander, Lieutenant Colonel George B . fired by six artillery battalions .13 Gun- Bell, 1/4 attacked in the center of the line.15 Forward progress down the " The commanding officer of 4/15, who con - southern slopes of Sugar Loaf towards trolled the artillery fires directed at the counterattack and whose unit was in direct suppor t the easternmost limit of Horseshoe wa s of the 4th Marines, related an interesting inci- slowed by both bitter fighting and the dent of the action . He said that "I was able to talk directly to the front line commander of action from his OP, we were able to pick a 3/4, LtCol Bruno Hochmuth, during the entire lull in the fight, straighten out our `shorts,' action . . . . This proved to be very handy in- and still continue the very heavy artillery sup - deed, because as usually happens when a larg e port he had requested early in the attack ." number of artillery units are firing in close Col Bruce T . Hemphill ltr to CMC, dt d proximity to our own front [15 battalions wer e 28Feb55. 14 firing by 2315], 3/4 started receiving an un- 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 3 . comfortably large number of our own rounds . 15 Lieutenant Colonel Beans had been re - Because of the fact that I was talking directl y placed on 1 May, when he resumed his dutie s to LtCol Hochmuth, who was observing the as executive officer of the 4th Marines .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 255

MAP 15

256 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

rain that fell during the morning and from Shuri . The division commande r most of the afternoon. This downpou r believed that this new maneuver woul d turned the shell-torn slopes into slick both relieve his forces of a threat to mud-chutes, making supply and evacu- their left flank and at the same time ation over the treacherous footin g give impetus to a drive to envelop Shuri almost impossible. But the fresh bat- from the west. talion overcame the combination of The sporadic rain which fell on the obstacles placed in its way by the 21st, came down even more heavily and weather, terrain, and numerous remain- steadily that night . Resupply of assaul t ing enemy pockets all along the rive r elements and replenishment of forward front, to advance 200 yards . supply dumps proved almost impossible . Demolition and flamethrower team s The unceasing deluge made southern blasted and burned the way in front o f Okinawa overnight a veritable mudhol e 3/4 as it drove into the extensive an d and a greater obstacle to all movemen t well-prepared enemy positions in th e than the unrelenting enemy resistance. interior of Horseshoe . By midafternoon, Companies K and L had destroyed th e THE BATTLE FOR WANA DRAW " deadly mortars emplaced there, an d were solidly positioned in a defense line When the 1st Marine Divisio n that extended approximately halfway smashed the Japanese outpost line at between Horseshoe Hill and the Asat o Dakeshi, the battleground for General Gawa. del Valle's Marines shifted to the fore - Intensive mortar and artillery fire boding Wana approaches to the Shur i from the heights of Shuri combined hill mass . (See Map 14 .) All evidence with the rugged terrain within the 2/4 now signified that the main Japanese zone of action restricted the use of tank s defenses in southern Okinawa consiste d and prevented that battalion from ad- of a nearly regular series of concentri c vancing appreciably on 21 May . After rings whose epicenter was protected b y five days of furious fighting and limite d some of the most rugged terrain yet en - gains in the Half Moon area, General countered in the drive south . The mis- Shepherd concluded that the bulk o f sion of breaching the Wana defense s enemy firepower preventing his divisio n fell to the 1st Marine and 77th Infantr y from retaining this ground was centered Divisions at the same time that the 6th in the Shuri area, outside of the divisio n Marine and 96th Infantry Division s zone of action. attempted to envelop enemy flanks . Thoroughly estimating the situation, A somewhat crude Japanese prop- he decided to establish a strong reverse aganda attempt appeared in a leaflet slope defense on the division left, to con- discovered on the body of an infiltrator centrate the efforts of the division on a in the rear of the 1st Division on 1 4 penetration in the south and southwest , 30 Unless otherwise noted, the material in and to make no further attempts at this section is derived from ILIAC AR ; ILIA C driving to the southeast, where hi s AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl ; troops had been meeting withering fire 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar SAR.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 257

May. Purportedly a letter from a its mouth, Wana Draw narrowed per- wounded 96th Division soldier in enem y ceptibly as the stream flowing through hands, it warned in fractured English it approached the city . Hill 55,19 a that : dominating piece of terrain at the southern tip of the ridge, guarded the . . . the battles here will be 90 times as severe as that of Yusima Island [Iwo western entry into the draw. Bristling Jima]. I am sure that all of you that have with nearly every type of Japanese in- landed will lose your lives which will be fantry weapon, the positions on the hil l realized if you come here . The affairs of had clear fields of fire commanding al l Okinawa is quite different from the islands approaches to the draw . Manning these that were taken by the Americans.17 guns were troops from the 62d Divi- An analysis made of the Wana posi- sion's 64th Brigade, and an ill-assorted tions after the battle showed that the lot of stragglers from remnants of the Japanese had "taken advantage of ever y 15th, 23d, and 273d Independent Infan- feature of a terrain so difficult it coul d try Battalions, the 14th Independent Ma- not have been better designed if th e chine Gun Battalion, and the 81st Field enemy himself had the power to do so ." 1 8 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, all Utilizing every defense feature pro- under command of the Brigade.20 vided by nature, General Ushijima ha d By 0400 on 15 May, elements of th e so well organized the area that an as- 5th Marines had relieved 2/1 and mos t sault force attacking to the south would of 3/1. At 0630, the relief was com- be unable to bypass the main line of re- pleted and Colonel Griebel assumed com - sistance guarding Shuri, and would in- mand of the former 1st Marines zon e stead have to penetrate directly into th e west of Wana . The 5th Marines com- center of the heretofore unassailable mander placed 2/5 in assault with th e defenses of the Thirty-second Army. 3d Battalion in support and the 1st i n The terrain within and immediately reserve. Acting on the recommendations bordering the division zone was both of battalion and regimental commanders varied and complex . The southernmost of both the 1st and 5th Marines, Gen- branch of the Asa Kawa meandere d eral del Valle decided to neutralize the along the gradually rising floor of Wan a high ground on both sides of Wana Draw and through the northerly part of Draw. Tanks and self-propelled 105mm Shuri. Low rolling ground on either howitzers were to shell the area thor- side of the stream offered neither cover oughly before 2/5 tried to cross the nor concealment against Japanese fir e open ground at the mouth of the draw . - coming from positions along the re 1° Because the first two versions of the offi- verse slope of Wana Ridge and the mili- cial battle map had incorporated incorrec t tary crest in the southern portion of th e topographical data, this terrain feature was ridge. Approximately 400 yards wide a t identified first as Hill 57 and then 59 . A third and more accurate map, issued in late May " 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpt No . 44, dtd designated this point as Hill 55, which shal l 15May45 . be used in this text. 18 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpt No . 47, dtd 2° 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpts Nos 44-50 , 18May45 . dtd 15-21May45 . 258 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

WANA RIDGE, rugged barrier in the path of the 1st Division, is shown looking southeast toward Shuri . (USMC 148651)

105MM HOWITZER of the 15th Marines is swamped, but still in firing order after ten days of rain . (USMC 122785)

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 259

Fire teams from Company F pro- operations of the 15th repeated the next tected nine Shermans of the 1st Tan k day. Battalion against possible attacks from Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines spent suicide-bent enemy soldiers as the tank s the 15th in reorganizing its infantry worked over the Japanese positions in companies, improving occupied posi- the mouth of the draw during the morn- tions, and mopping up in the vicinity of ing. Because tanks invariably dre w Dakeshi." During the day, air liaiso n heavy artillery, mortar, and AT fire , parties, gunfire spotters, and forwar d the Marines guarding them were forced observers were kept busy directing con- to take cover. Nevertheless, the open centrated artillery and naval gunfir e ground of the battle area permitted th e bombardments and air strikes on known infantry teams to cover the tanks wit h enemy strongpoints on Wana Ridge . At fire from protected positions at lon g 2100, 1/7 was ordered to prepare a feint range. The mediums received heavy and attack on 16 May, when all supportin g intense fire from the sector to their arms were to fire a preparation and front and from numerous cave positions troops were to concentrate as though on both sides of the draw . Some respit e preparing to jump off in an assault . was gained when naval gunfire de- The battalion was already positione d stroyed a 47mm AT gun which had hi t for the feint when preparatory fire three tanks at least five times each. s began at 0755 . At this time, 4.2-inch About midafternoon, the tanks with- and 81mm mortars smoked the area im- drew to clear the way for a carrier-plan e mediately in front of 1/7 to heighten strike on the draw. Following this the deception . Fifteen minutes after i t attack, the nine original tanks, now re- had begun, the barrage was lifted for inforced by six others, continued th e another fifteen-minute period in a n process of neutralizing the draw. attempt to deceive the Japanese. The Another 47mm AT gun opened up late Marines believed that the enemy, foole d in the afternoon, but it was destroyed into thinking that an attack was im- before it could damage any of the tanks . minent, would rush from covered cave s After a day spent probing the mout h to reoccupy their battle positions, where of Wana Draw, 2/5 infantry companie s they would again be blasted . When there set up night defenses east of the rail - was no apparent reaction to the feint , road, dug in, and established contact al l supporting arms resumed firing at 082 5 along their front. At the CP that night, with undetermined results . the 5th Marines commander observed " While returning to his jeep from a visit to that "Wana Draw was another gorge the 7th Marines OP near Dakeshi, Brigadier like the one at Awacha . . . . It was obvi- General Smith "passed a battalion coming up ous that the position would have to b e to go in the lines . . . . These men were not going thoroughly pounded before it could b e into combat for the first time . They were veterans. There was no singing and laughing . taken," 21 and ordered the softening-up They were deadly serious and business like . The men had already been separated from th e " 5th Mar SAR, p . 4 . boys ." Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 110 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 18

260 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

At 0950, regiment notified Lieutenant lished on the right with 2/5 and on th e Colonel John J. Gormley, the 1/7 com- left with 3/7. At 2400, 3/7 effected a mander, that an air strike on Wan a passage of the lines to relieve the 1s t Ridge was scheduled for 1000, immedi- Battalion, which then went into regi- ately following which he was to sen d mental reserve . patrols forward to determine what re- During the 16th, 15 tanks, two o f maining enemy resistance existed on them flamethrowers, had supported th e the target. Having learned that the attack of 1/7 from positions on Dakesh i strike was delayed, at 1028 Lieutenant Ridge, while a total of 30 tanks—in- Colonel Gormley requested that the mis- cluding 4 flamethrowers — supported sion be cancelled and sent the patrols 2/5 by burning and blasting enemy out after he had ordered a mortar bar - strongpoints in Wana Draw . At 0900, rage placed on the ridge. the 2/5 armored support drew antitank, The Company C patrols moved for- mortar, and artillery fire that disabled ward unopposed until they reached th e two tanks, and damaged two others , western end of Wana Ridge. Here they which withdrew after evacuating th e received intense grenade and machin e crews of the stalled cripples . Two of the gun fire which was answered by their AT positions which had been spotted in battalion 81mm mortars and supportin g the morning were destroyed that after - fire from the 5th Marines. Rushing for- noon when the main battery of the USS ward when this fire had been lifted, th e Colorado was brought to bear on them . patrols carried and occupied the trouble - Generally, when a Marine tank was some objective. damaged and abandoned temporarily, Lieutenant Colonel Gormley then efforts to retrieve it later were usuall y ordered the newly won position hel d stymied by enemy fire. Disabled tanks and reinforced by troops he sent for- remaining in the field overnight usuall y ward for this purpose. Once leading were either destroyed by enemy demoli- elements began to move out again, tion teams or occupied by snipers, wh o enemy troops lodged in burial vaults converted them into armored pillboxes . and rugged coral formations showere d Before retiring at nightfall on 1 grenades down upon the advancing Ma- 6 May, the 1st Tank Battalion had ex- rines. Unsuccessful in halting the advance, the enemy tried but failed to pended nearly 5,000 rounds of 75m m mount a counterattack at 1605 . Although and 173,000 rounds of .30 caliber am - supporting arms of 1/7 blunted thi s munition, and 600 gallons of napalm on attempt, enemy resistance to the Marin e targets on Dakeshi Ridge and in Wan a attack continued . Draw that day .23 Following the two-day Nightfall forced the battalion com- process of softening up provided by al l mander to withdraw the troops spear- supporting arms, the 5th Marines pre- heading the assault and move them t o pared to run the gantlet of Wana Draw more secure positions on a platea u on 17 May . almost directly north of the ridge for night defense . Contact was then estab - '3 1st TkBn Summary, 16May45 .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 261

"Under the continued pounding of Extremely heavy resistance plagued one of the most concentrated assaults in Company K efforts to move forward, a s Pacific Warfare," 24 cracks appeared i n the enemy concentrated his fire on the the Shuri defenses on 17 May . On that leading infantry elements . Attempting day, 2/5 made the main regimental to lessen the effectiveness of the Marin e effort, sending tank-infantry teams t o tank-infantry tactics, the Japanese em- the mouth of Wana Draw, where the y ployed smoke grenades to blind the worked over the caves and pillboxe s tanks and drastically restricted thei r lining its sides. The 2/5 attack wa s supporting fires. Before the tanks could made in conjunction with a 7th Marine s be isolated in the smoke and cut off effort to gain the pinnacle ridge form- from their infantry protection, and ing the northern side of the draw . when the flanks of Company K became When a terrific mortar and artiller y so threatened as to make them unten- barrage drove the 7th back at 1200 , able, both tanks and infantry were 2/5 assault troops—also under heav y withdrawn—the latter to Dakeshi to fire—were forced back to their origina l become 3/7 reserve. Late in the after - positions, where they could protect th e noon, the 3/7 commander ordered Com- exposed flank of the 7th Marines bat- pany L forward to reinforce I for the talion. night and to assist in the attack the nex t On the right of 2/5, Company E morning . finally succeeded in penetrating the Following a period of intermitten t Japanese defenses . After having been shelling from enemy mortars and artil- driven back earlier in the day, the com- lery during the night 17–18 May, 3/ 7 pany established a platoon-sized strong- again attacked Wana Ridge . Supportin g point on its objective, the west nose o f arms delivered intense fire on the for- Hill 55. Because the low ground lying ward slopes and crest of the ridge al l between this point and battalion front- morning ; the attack itself began at lines were swept by heavy enemy fire , noon. Reinforced by a platoon from L, tanks were pressed into use for supply Company I succeeded in getting troop s and evacuation purposes . on the ridge, but furious enemy grenad e Having relieved 1/7 at 0600, 3/ 7 and mortar fire inflicted such heav y attacked towards Wana Ridge from casualties on the assault force that n Dakeshi Ridge with two companies i Lieutenant Colonel Hurst was forced t o assault : Company I on the right, K on withdraw them to positions held th e the left. A total of 12 gun and 2 flamethrower tanks supported Company K a s previous night, where he could consoli- it attempted to secure the low ridge date his lines. An abbreviated analysi s crest northwest of Wana . Meanwhile , by the division fairly well summarize d Company I gained and held a plateau that day's fighting : "gains were meas- that led to the western nose of the Wana ured by yards won, lost, then wo n Ridge line. again." 2 5

24 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, p . 25 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, p . 6.

262 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Pinned down by heavy enemy fire on before, attacking Marines were sorel y the reverse slope of its position on Hil l beset by enemy fire, which answerin g 55, the isolated platoon from Compan y artillery, tank, mortar, and regimental E, 2/5, could neither advance nor with- 105mm howitzer concentrations had draw. Tanks again supplied ammunitio n failed to neutralize. and rations to the dug-in troops . Six The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, at- mediums initially supported the early- tacked that afternoon in a column of morning operations of 2/5 by firing int o companies, Company I in the lead, fol- caves and emplacements in the terrai n lowed by Companies L and K in tha t complex comprising the draw. This order. Resistance to the attack was im- tank fire was coordinated with tha t mediate, although the vanguard man- coming from Shermans in the Wana aged to reach the nose of the coral ridge Draw sector. In addition to this day- to its front under a blanket of mortar long tank firing, the artillery battalions shells falling all about. Then, becaus e expended over 7,000 rounds of 105m m 3/1 was to relieve 3/7 and it was to o and 75mm artillery ammunition o n risky to effect a relief right on the ridg e selected point targets .26 under the conditions then prevailing, Under the cover of tank fire, at 120 0 the leading elements withdrew about 75 Company F sent one infantry platoon yards to the rear . and an attached engineer platoon wit h Earlier in the day, 1/7 and 2/7 had flamethrowers and demolitions into th e been relieved in position near Dakesh i village of Wana to destroy enemy instal- by 1/1 and 2/1 respectively . With th e lations there. The party worked effec- relief of the 3d Battalion, the 7th Ma- tively until 1700, when it was recalle d rines relinquished the responsibility fo r to Marine lines for the night because the capture of Wana Ridge to Colone l Wana Ridge, forming the northern sid e Mason's 1st Marines, and Colonel of the draw behind and overlooking th e Snedeker's regiment went into divisio n village, was still strongly infested by reserve. In the five-day struggle fo r the enemy. Before leaving Wana, Ma- Wana, the 7th Marines had lost a total rines destroyed numerous grenade dis- of 44 men killed, 387 wounded, 91 non- chargers, machine guns, and rifle s battle casualties, and 7 missing. Of this found in the village and in the tomb s number, the 3d Battalion sustained 2 0 on its outskirts . Marines killed and 140 wounded . In a The 1st Marine Division's bitter con - supporting and diversionary role for the test for possession of Wana Draw con- five-day period, the 5th Marines suf- tinued on 19 May along the same bloody fered 13 men killed and 82 wounded . lines it had run on the four previous Despite the punishment they had re- days. Colonel Snedeker's regiment agai n ceived from the 5th Marines and its made the major effort for the division , supporting tanks, the Japanese buil t and the 5th Marines continued to new positions in Wana Draw daily, an d punish the mouth of Wana Draw . As reconstructed and recamouflaged b y night old ones that Marine tank fire had 26 2/5 SAR, p . 13 . exposed and damaged by day . As the

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 263

assault infantry plunged further into rine left was covered by interlockin g the draw, and as the draw itself nar- bands of machine gun fire and morta r rowed, an increasing number of Japa- barrages set up by both units . Con- nese defensive positions conspired with fronted by intense enemy fire from re- the rugged terrain to make passag e verse slope positions, 2/1 riflemen wer e more difficult. Dominating the eastern unable to take the hillcrest and dug i n end of Wana Ridge, on the northwester n for the night, separated from the enemy outskirts of Shuri, was 110 Meter Hill,27 by only a few yards of shell-pocke d commanding a view of the zones of both ground. the 1st Marine and 77th Infantry Divi- After it tied in with 2/1 for the nigh t sions. Defensive fire from this position of 19–20 May, Lieutenant Colone l thwarted the final reduction of Japa- Stephen V . Sabol's 3d Battalion move d nese positions in Wana Draw an d out at 0845, and was again within eventual capture of the Shuri redoubt. grenade-throwing range of Wana Ridge Tanks, M–7s (self-propelled 105m m defenders. Burning and blasting, tank s howitzers), 37mm guns, and overhea d supported the assault by destroyin g machine gun fire supported the attack s enemy-held caves and fortified positions which jumped off at 0815 . The assault blocking the advance. When 3/1 had troops moved rapidly to the base of th e gained the northern slope of the ridge objective, tanks and flamethrowers and could not budge the Japanese troop s clearing the way, while enemy morta r in reverse-slope defenses, Colonel Maso n and machine gun fire inflicted heav y decided to burn them out by rolling casualties in the ranks of the onsurgin g split barrels of napalm down the hill int o Marines. Japanese emplacements in Wana Draw , Initially, 3/1 moved to the southeast and then setting them afire by exploding and up the northern slope of Wan a white phosphorous (WP) grenades on Ridge, where it became involved in hand - top of the inflammable jellied mixture . grenade duels with Japanese defenders . Working parties began manhandling The Marines prevailed and managed to drums of napalm up the hill at 1140, an d secure approximately 200 yards of thi s had managed to position only three o f portion of the ridge. By 1538, 2/1 re- them by 1500. At 1630, these were split ported to regiment that it was on top of open, sent careening down the hill, an d the objective and in contact with 3/1, set aflame by the WP grenades . An and had secured all of the rest of the enemy entrenchment about 50 yards northern slope of the ridge with the ex- down the incline halted the drums ; in ception of the summit of 110 Meter Hill. the end, the Japanese sustained littl e A considerable gap between the flanks of damage and few injuries from thi s 2/1 and the 305th Infantry on the Ma - hastily contrived field expedient . The proximity of the combatants that night -1 Variously named 100 Meter Hill, Kno b led to considerable mortar, hand gre- Hill, and Conical Hill by combat troops wh o nade, and sniper fire, as well as th e viewed it from different points on the ground , the designation found in the 2/1 SAR will be usually lively and abusive exchange of used hereafter . curses, insults, and threats of violence

264 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

that often took place whenever the pro- Once in position, 1/5 was ordered to tagonists were within shouting distanc e patrol aggressively towards Shur i of each other . Ridge and on the high ground east o f On the division right, 2/5 jumped off Half Moon Hill . It maintained a suffi- in attack on 20 May at 0900, supporte d cient force in the vicinity of Wan a by artillery and M—7 fire and spear - Ridge and Hill 55, at the same time, t o headed by tanks. The battalion objective assist the 1st Marines attack . Tank- was the area running roughly from Hill infantry teams again reconnoitered the 55 southwest to the Naha-Shuri road . area south of the division line agains t A continuous artillery barrage was laid a hail of machine gun and mortar fire . on Shuri Ridge, the western extension In addition to providing the tanks proof the commanding height on which tection from Japanese tank-destroye r Shuri Castle had been built, as assaul t and suicide units, Marine ground troops units quickly worked their way towards directed the tank fire on targets of op- the objective . At 0930, lead elements portunity. Tank commanders in vehicles were engaged in close-in fighting with that were sometimes forward of foo t enemy forces in dug-in positions border- troops often called down artillery fire on ing the road . Under constant and heav y point targets at extremely close ranges . enemy fire, engineer mine-clearing per- In spite of fierce resistance that became sonnel preceded the tanks to make the most frenzied as Marines closed in o n road safe for the passage of the medi- Shuri, the 5th Marines positions on Hill ums. Working just in front of the ad- 55 were advanced slightly in order to vancing troops, the Shermans flushed a give the division more favorable number of enemy soldiers from their jumping off points for a concerte d hidden positions and then cut them down effort against General Ushijima' s with machine gun fire . Close engineer- headquarters. tank-infantry teamwork permitted the At dawn on 21 May, 2/1 moved out Marines to secure the objective by noon . against heavy opposition to secure the Heavy small arms and mortar fire summit of 110 Meter Hill and the rest of poured into the advance 2/5 position , Wana Ridge. Although some small gains which Company E held all afternoon. were made, the objectives could not be The sources of this fire were emplace- reached. Tank support, which heretofore ments located on Shuri Ridge . Continued had been so effective, was limited be - artillery and pointblank tank fire, an d cause of the irregular and steep natur e two rocket barrages, finally silenced th e of the ground. Though armor could pro- enemy weapons. By 2000, Company E vide overhead fire, the vehicles were un- had established contact all along the lin e able to take reverse slope positions under and dug in for the night . Except for th e fire because a deep cleft at the head of usual enemy mortar and artillery har- the draw prevented the Shermans fro m assment, there was little activity on the getting behind the enemy. Reconnais- front. Just before dawn, 1/5 relieved the sance reports indicated that as the draw 2d Battalion in place ; 2/5 then went approaced Wana, it walls rose to sheer into regimental reserve . heights of from 200 to 300 feet. Lining

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 265

the wall faces were numerous, well-de- Under its new commander, Lieutenan t fended caves that were unapproachabl e Colonel Richard F . Ross, Jr.,29 3/1 at- to all but the suicidally inclined . It was tempted to clear out reverse slope posi- readily apparent that no assault up the tions on Wana Ridge in a concerte d draw would be successful unless pre - tank-infantry effort . According to the ceded by an intense naval gunfire, air , plan, Company L and the tanks—each t o and artillery preparation . Included also be accompanied by one fire team—woul d in the reports was the fact that the stee p attack up Wana Draw . Supporting thi s terrain forward of Wana did not favo r assault from the crest of the ridge woul d tank operations. be the other two infantry companies i n On the left of 2/1, Company G moppe d the battalion, prepared to attack straight up opposition in the small village on th e across the ridge on order . Their objec- northern outskirts of Shuri . Resisting tives were Hill 55 and the ridge line to the attempts of the company to turn the the east. flank of 110 Meter Hill were elements o f Company C, 1/1, was ordered to take the 22d Independent Infantry Battalion , over the 3d Battalion positions, when the sole remaining first-line infantry Lieutenant Colonel Ross' men jumpe d reserve of the Thirty-second Army— off in the assault . At about 1415, Com- thrown into the breach to hold the area pany L began the slow advance against around the hill.28 Advancing down the bitter opposition. Almost immediately, draw were two companies abreast, E several of the escorting tanks wer and F, whose attack was initially sup - e ported by the massed fires of battalio n knocked out by mines and AT guns. mortars and then by all other supporting Company K moved across the draw t o arms. Hill 55 at 1500, followed by I, which was Darkening skies and intermittent rai n pinned down almost immediately by ex- squalls obscured the battle scene to tremely heavy mortar and machine gu n friendly and enemy observers alike . Al- fire and unable to advance beyond th e though it was apparent that 2/1 wa s middle of the draw. By 1800, Compan y right in the middle of a preregistere d K was on Hill 55 and tied in with 1/5 , impact area, judging from the accurac y but could not push further east towards of enemy mortar and artillery fire, the Shuri. battalion held its forward positions Because the rampaging enemy fire despite mounting casualties. A gap exist- prevented Companies I and L from ing between 2/1 and the 77th Divisio n reaching the ridgeline and advancing u p was covered by fire, and Company F Wana Draw, they were withdrawn to linked with Company C of 1/1, which that morning's line of departure posi- had been temporarily attached to the tions. Company C of 1/1 was placed

3d Battalion for night defense . 2° Lieutenant Colonel Sabol was relieved o n 21 May, when he was transferred to the 7t h 28 1st MarDiv G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 50, dtd Marines to become regimental operations offi- 21May45 . cer.

266 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

under the operational control of 3/1 fo r THE ARMY'S FIGHT 3 1 the night and occupied the positions held by Company I on 20 May. Here, it tied For IIIAC, the period 15–21 May wa s in with Company L on the right and on marked by the struggles of its division s the left with Company F, 2/1 . to capture two key strongpoints—Wana The miserable weather prevailing all Draw and Sugar Loaf Hill. During this day on 21 May worsened at midnight same seven days, XXIV Corps units when the drizzle became a deluge and fought a series of difficult battles to gain s visibility was severely limited. Taking the strongly defended hills and ridge blocking the approaches to Shuri an d advantage of these conditions favoring Yonabaru. (See Map IV, Map Section . ) an attacking force, an estimated 20 0 These barriers, incongruously name d Japanese scrambled up Wana Ridge to Chocolate Drop, Flat Top, Hogback , strike all along the Company C line . In Love, Dick, Oboe, and Sugar, gaine d the midst of a fierce hand grenade battle, fleeting fame when they became the the enemy managed to overrun a fe w scenes of bitter and prolonged contests . positions. These were recaptured a t But, when XXIV Corps units had turne d dawn, when the Marines regrouped, re- the eastern flank of Shuri defenses and occupied the high ground, and restore d anticipated imminent success, the Army their lines. In the daylight, approxi- attack—like that of the Marines—be- mately 180 enemy dead were counted i n came bogged down and was brought t o a standstill when the rains came . front of Marine positions. 3 ° Torrential rains beginning the night On 15 May, the 77th Division con- of 21–22 May continued on for man y tinued its grinding advance in the mid- days thereafter . This downpour almos t dle of the Tenth Army line against the halted the tortuous 1st Division drive hard core of Thirty-second Army de- towards Shuri. Seriously limited before fenses at Shuri ; 96th Division troops, t by terrain factors and a determined in coordination with their own assaul against Dick Hill, supported the 77th stand by the enemy in the Wana area, Division attack on Flat Top Hill . Fight- tank support became nonexistent whe n ing on the left of the 96th, the 383d In- the zone of the 5th Marines, the only fantry found it difficult and dangerous ground locally which favored armored to move from Conical Hill because of tactics, became a sea of mud. Under overwhelming fire coming from a hil l these conditions aiding the Japanese de- complex southwest of their location . In fense, the 1st Division was faced with addition, the 89th Regiment tenaciously the alternatives of moving ahead agains t held formidable and well-organized de- all odds or continuing the existing stale - fenses on the reverse slope of Conical , mate. To make either choice was difficult, for both presented a bloody prospect . 31 Unless otherwise noted, the material contained in this section is derived from : Tent h 30 1st MarDiv G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 52, dtd Army AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 77th InfDiv 23May45. OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDiv AR.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 267

and prevented the soldiers from advanc- full weight of all of its supporting arms ing farther south.3' behind the attack of the 3d Battalion . On 16 May, 2/383 attacked down the Flamethrower tanks and medium tanks southeast slope of the hill, but mur- mounting 105mm howitzers slowl y derous enemy crossfire again prevented edged along the ridges leading to Shuri' s the soldiers from making any significant high ground. Barring the way in this gains. A supporting platoon of tanks , broken terrain were Okinawan burial however, ran the gantlet of fire sweeping vaults which the Japanese had occupied , the coastal flat and advanced 1,000 yard s fortified, and formed into a system of to enter the northwestern outskirts of mutually supporting pillboxes. At the Yonabaru, where the Shermans lashe d end of a ferocious day-long slugging the ruins of the town with 75mm an d match, this armored vanguard had pene - machine gun fire . Heavy Japanese fire trated 200 yards of enemy territory to covering the southern slopes of Conical bring the 77th Division to within 50 0 prevented the infantry from exploiting yards of the northernmost outskirts of the rapid armor penetration, however . Shuri. After having exhausted their ammuni- A very successful predawn attack b y tion supply, the tanks withdrew to the the 77th Division on 17 May surprise d line of departure. the Japanese, forcing them to relinquis h On the division right flank, the 382 d ground. Substantial gains were made Infantry attempted to expand its hold o n and commanding terrain captured, in- Dick Hill . In a violent bayonet and gre- cluding Chocolate Drop Hill and other nade fight, American troops capture d nearby hills. Advancing abreast of each some 100 yards of enemy terrain, bu t other, 3/305 and 2/307 dug in at the en d heavy machine gun fire from Oboe Hil l of the day only a few hundred yards -500 yards due south of Dick—so com- away from Shuri and Ishimmi . Al- pletely covered the exposed route o f though outflanked by 3/307, Flat To p advance, the soldiers were unable to defenders sent down a heavy volume of move any farther . machine gun and mortar fire on the Fire from many of the same enem y soldiers as they attempted to move positions which had held back 96th Di - across exposed country south of the hill . vision forces, also effectively prevente d Troops following the assault element s the 307th Infantry from successfull y spent daylight hours mopping up, seal- pushing the 77th Division attack on ing caves and burial vaults, and neu- Flat Top and Chocolate Drop Hills . Both tralizing those enemy strongpoints by - frontal and flanking movements, spear - passed in the early-morning surpris e headed by tanks, were held up by ex- maneuver. tremely accurate and vicious Japanese Practically wiped out that day was th e machine gun fire and mortar barrages. enemy 22d Regiment, which had de- Somewhat more successful on the 16th fended Chocolate Drop, and whose rem- was the 305th Infantry, which threw th e nants were still holding the reverse slopes of Flap Top and Dick Hills . Re- "Okinawa Operations Record, "Record o f the 24th Division," p . 177 . inforcing these positions was the 1st

268 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Battalion of the 32d Regiment . On the attack by placing direct fire on ma- 17 May, this regiment was ordered by chine gun positions on Hogback Ridge , the 24th Division commander, Lieuten- a terrain feature running south from ant General Tatsumi Amamiya, to take Conical Hill . Hogback's defenders dis- over the ground formerly held by the regarded the tank fire to place heavy 22d Regiment, and to set in a Shuri de- machine gun and mortar barrage s fense line that would run from Ishimmi against the battalion attacking up finge r to Dick and Oboe Hills . Taking advan- ridges sloping down to the ocean . Al- tage of the natural, fortress-like prop- though this heavy resistance limited th e erties of the region which they were t o advance to only 400 yards, the divisio n defend, the depleted 32d Regiment and commander believed he could success - survivors of the 22d were disposed in fully attack through Yonabaru to out- depth to contain potential American flank Shuri . penetrations .33 Few reserves were avail- Both frontline divisions of XXI V able to the defenders should the Ameri- Corps progressed on 18 May . Units of cans break through . the 77th penetrated deeper into the On 17 May, the 96th Division ordered heart of Shuri defenses by driving 15 0 the 382d Infantry to attack and capture yards farther south along the Ginowan- the hill mass south of Dick Hill and cen- Shuri highway and advancing up to 30 0 tering about Oboe. The failure of this yards towards Ishimmi . On 19 May, th e effort indicated that the ground here 77th Division began a systematic elimi- needed to be softened up further befor e nation of Japanese firing positions i n the infantry could advance. In the secto r 110 Meter Hill, Ishimmi Ridge, and th e of Conical Hill held by the 383d, steady reverse slopes of Flat Top and Dick pressure from reverse slope defender s Hills. All of these positions provided forced the division to commit into th e the enemy with good observation and line a third regiment—the 381st In- clear fields of fire, commanding terrai n fantry—to maintain the positions al- over which the American division wa s ready held by the 96th. At this time , advancing. Every weapon in the 77th 3/381 assumed control of the left portio n arsenal capable of doing so was assigne d of the 2/383 sector on the eastern slop e to place destructive fire on the enem y of the hill, and brought up its supporting emplacements. While these mission s weapons in preparation for a new were being fired, the infantry fought off attack. a series of counterattacks growing in While the remainder of 96th Divisio n size and fury as darkness fell . The en- assault battalions held their lines an d emy was finally turned back at dawn on tank-infantry, demolition, and flame- 20 May when all available artillery wa s thrower teams mopped up in their im- called down on them . mediate fronts, 3/381 made the divisio n In the 96th Division zone on the 19th , main effort. Operating to the west of the the left regiment again made the main coastal road, medium tanks supporte d effort while the center and right regiments destroyed cave positions and gu n a' Ibid., pp. 179-181, Map 5. emplacements in the broken ground be-

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 269

tween Conical and Dick Hills . Hogback without opposition . (See Map VIII, Map Ridge and Sugar Hill, which rose Section.) An hour later, leading elements sharply at the southern tip of this ridge had entered the northern suburbs of to overlook Yonabaru, were bombarde d Shuri and were fighting their way up the by two platoons of medium tanks, six eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill . The platoons of LVT (A) s, artillery, and 306th Infantry, which relieved the 305th organic infantry supporting weapons . later that morning, sent its 2d Battalio n The attack following this preparation to the right of the line where visual con- failed, however, in the face of over- tact was made with the 1st Marines . By whelming enemy fire . Destruction of nightfall, having spent most of the da y enemy positions spotted the day before mopping up bypassed positions, the did serve, however, to weaken furthe r 306th set up a night defense on a lin e the faltering 89th Regiment defense. running from the forward slopes o f Returning to Hogback Ridge o n Ishimmi Ridge, through the outskirts of 20 May, the attacking infantry made a Shuri, to 110 Meter Hill. grinding, steady advance down the east- The assault battalions of the 307th ern slopes of the ridge and finally Infantry, the other 77th Division front- reached Sugar Hill . Other 96th Division line regiment, jumped off at 0300 to take units also registered some significan t the regimental objective, a triangularly gains that day ; 383d Infantry assault shaped mass consisting of three hills battalions fought to within 300 yards o f located in open ground about 350 yards Love Hill, destroying those strongpoint s south of Flat Top. The lead elements that had blocked their progress for a reached the objective at dawn, but fol- week. The 382d Infantry finally reduced lowing units were unable to exploit th e all enemy defenses on the southern an d successful maneuver when they were eastern slopes of Dick Hill, while it sup - discovered by the enemy and pinned ported a successful 77th Division attack down by his frontal and flanking fire . on Flat Top at the same time . Any further move forward was pro- On gaining Flat Top Hill, the 307th hibited by this continuous and accurate Infantry was then ready to continue the fire, and the battalion was forced to dig attack south to Ishimmi Ridge and then in at nightfall on the ground then held . on to Shuri. Coordinating its attack with Overall, the most important advances the 1st Marines on its right, the 305th on 21 May in the XXIV Corps zone were advanced down the valley highway 100 – made by 96th Division units . As 1/383 150 yards or to within 200 yards of the moved out against moderate opposition outskirts of Shuri . As a result of these to take Oboe Hill, 2/383 paced the ad- gains, the 77th Division commander vance by attacking over exposed ter- planned another predawn surprise at- rain to its southeast to take a hill ap- tack, only this time on a coordinate d proximately 400 yards from Shuri . At division-wide level across the front . 1130, when enemy elements were notice d Assault troops of the 307th Infantry pulling out of their positions in front of jumped off at 0415 on 21 May in the the attacking infantry, the Japanese zone of the 305th, advancing 200 yards were fired upon as they retreated to-

270 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

wards higher ground . Despite this with- soaking torrents before the assault in- drawal of the enemy, American force s fantry of the 7th Division was in jump - were prevented from advancing an y off positions . In no time at all, "the roa d further during the day by isolated en- to Yonabaru from the north—the only emy counterattacks along the regimental supply road from established bases in lines . the 7th Division zone . . . became impass- On Love Hill, enemy defenders who able to wheeled vehicles and within tw o had successfully refused to yield groun d or three days disappeared entirely an d during the past week again steadfastl y had to be abandoned ." 34 Like the Tenth maintained their positions on the 21st. Army divisions on the west coast, thos e They called down heavy and accurat e on the east were effectively stymied b y artillery concentrations on America n the mud and the rain, which now seeme d tank-infantry teams reaching the bas e to be allied with General Ushijima an d of the hill and forced them to turn back . his Thirty-second Army . The western slopes of Hogback Ridg e were secured by 2/383 as the 3d Bat- FIGHTING THE WEATHER " talion, 381st Infantry, fought its way up the eastern slopes to the top of Suga r The Naha-Yonabaru valley served a s Hill. Every yard acquired during the da y a funnel through which American force s came because of the individual soldier' s could pass to outflank Shuri . A major efforts in the face of fanatic enemy de- obstacle blocking the entrance to this termination to hold. Nevertheless, ad- route is the Ozato Hills, a rugged an d vance elements of 3/381 were in position complex terrain mass paralleling Naka- about 200 yards from the Naha-Yona- gusuku Wan and lying between Yona- baru highway by nightfall. As a result baru and the Chinen Peninsula. Since of this hard-won success, a 700-yard- strong blocking positions were needed i n long corridor down the east coast o f the Ozato Hills to safeguard the left Okinawa was secured, giving promise flank and rear of the force assigned to that the final reduction of the Shuri re- assault Shuri, the 184th Infantry of th e doubt might be launched from this 7th Division was ordered to take Yona- quarter. baru on 22 May and secure the hig h To strengthen the attack on Shuri , ground overlooking the village . which General Hodge believed could b e In a surprise attack at 0200, 2/184 outflanked when he viewed the progress spearheaded a silently moving assaul t of the 96th Division, he alerted the 7th force which passed through Yonabar u Infantry Division and ordered it to mov e XXIV Corps AR, p . 31 . to assembly areas immediately north of "'Unless otherwise indicated, the materia l Conical Hill on 20 May . Two days later, in this section is derived from : Tenth Army the division was committed in the line AR; ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDi v and attacked to take the high groun d SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 7th InfDi v south of Yonabaru . AR; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDi v AR; 1st Mar SAR ; 4th Mar SAR, Ph III ; 5th Intermittent rain beginning on Mar SAR ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III ; 29th Mar 21 May increased steadily to become SAR, Ph III .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 271

quickly, and was on the crest of it s line Marines dug in reverse slope posi- objective—a hill south of the villag e tions along the northern bank of the —by daylight. When the enemy arose at river under the sporadic fire of heav y dawn and emerged from cave shelter s caliber artillery weapons and mortars . to man gun and infantry positions, h e At 6th Division headquarters, plan s met sudden death under American fire . were drawn for a river crossing on The Thirty-second Army was completel y 23 May. taken aback, for an American night at- Although the flank divisions of the tack was totally unexpected in thi s Tenth Army were making encouraging sector, much less an attack unsupporte d progress, the three divisions in the by armor.36 When the commander of th e center of the line found success to be a n 184th saw that his initial effort was suc- elusive thing during the week of 22 May. cessful, he committed a second battalion A fanatic Japanese defense compounde d and drove forward to secure other ke y the difficulties arising because of th e points in the zone. By the end of the day, steady rain . Supply, evacuation, and re- the regiment had advanced 1,400 yards inforcement were all but forestalled b y and gained most of its objectives, eve n the sea of mud, which caused the troop s though rain and mud drasticall y to wallow rather than maneuver. Under hampered all phases of the operation . these conditions, infantry units coul d While the 7th Division scored for th e only probe and patrol ahead in their im- Tenth Army on the east coast, IIIAC mediate zones. units pushed forward on the west . In the The rain continued for nine days, an d 6th Marine Division zone, the 4th Ma- ranged from light, scattered showers to rines attacked to gain the northern ban k driving deluges. In the end, the entir e of the Asato Gawa. (See Map 15 .) The southern front became a morass that 1st and 3d Battalions advanced as 2/4 bogged down both men and machines . maintained positions on Half Moon Hil l Footing was treacherous in the mu d and kept contact with the 1st Marine swamps appearing in valley floors, an d Division. Assault troops seized the ob- all slopes—from the gentlest to the most jective by 1230, when patrols crossed the precipitous—were completely untraffic- shallow portion of the Asato and move d able. Because TAF planes had bee n 200 yards into the outskirts of Nah a grounded and could not fly airdrop mis- before drawing any enemy fire .37 Front- sions, all supplies had to be manhandled to the front . Tired, wornout foot troop s 39 Yahara Interrogation. from both frontline and reserve unit s 34 By this time, "Naha was no longer tenable were pressed into action and formed by the Japanese as it had been thoroughl y into carrying parties . flattened by prior bombardment and its fla t terrain offered no cover from our fire from th e Despite the unrelenting round-the- high ground north of Naha. However, the clock efforts of engineers to keep th e Japanese held the hills south of the narro w road net between forward supply dumps harbor of [the city] and to have put any great number of troops in Naha would have invite d captured, Naha itself [was] a no-man's lan d severe casualties. Therefore, until such tim e in which only patrols operated ." Smith, Per- as the hill mass south of the harbor . . . was sonal Narrative, p . 105 .

272 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and the frontlines in operating condi- tial envelopment and isolation of th e tion, continued use by trucks and am- main forces of the enemy, and force d tracs finally caused the roads to be the two coastal divisions into the sam e closed, but only after the mud itself ha d sort of deadlock the rest of the Tent h bemired and stalled the vehicles . As a Army was experiencing . result, division commanders found it Attacking to the west on 23 May, th e impossible to build up and maintain re - 7th Division immediately ran into heav y serve stocks of the supplies needed to resistance in the hills just north of th e support a full-scale assault. With the Yonabaru-Naha road. Both division as- movement of American forces all but sault regiments met increasingly stiff stopped, the entire front became stale - opposition during the day, because : mated. "The Japanese realized that this ad- During the advance to the south, re- vance along the Yonabaru-Naha roa d sponsible Tenth Army agencies had threatened to cut off the Shuri defend- reconnoitered both the east and wes t ers. . . ." 39 Even in the midst of the coasts of Okinawa behind the America n American attacks, the enemy attempted lines in an attempt to find suitable land- to infiltrate and counterattack . ing and unloading sites . When dis- At the same time that the 184th In- covered and found secure from enemy fantry moved into the Ozato Hills an d fire, they were developed and LSTs and towards the mouth of the valley leading other landing vessels were pressed int o to Shuri, the 32d Infantry struck out t o use to bring supplies down the coasts the west and southwest through Yona- from the main beaches and dumps in th e baru to isolate the forces protecting the 33 north. The two divisions deriving th e Thirty-second Army redoubt. Units major benefits from use of the over - spearheading the regimental drive were water supply routes were the 6th Marine slowed and unable to advance in the and 7th Infantry Divisions anchored on face of the considerable machine gu n the open coasts. Behind the 1st Marine and mortar fire coming from position s and 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions, in the low hills east of Yonawa . Here, a in the center of the Tenth Army line , mile southwest of Yonabaru, the regi- was a mired road net which prevented ment was forced to halt and dig in a lin e any resupply effort by vehicles coming for the night because tanks, urgently both from the north and laterally fro m needed to sustain the drive, had become the coasts . immobilized by the mud. A sanguine outlook for continued ad- On the west coast, despite the con- vances by the Tenth Army flanking divi- tinuing rain during the night of 22–2 3 sions was dispelled when they ran int o May, 6th Division patrols crossed and resistance of the same type and intensity recrossed the Asato almost at will t o offered to the center units . A combina- feel out the enemy. (See Map 15. ) tion of this increased resistance and the Scouts from the 6th Reconnaissanc e appalling weather forestalled the poten- Company patrolled the south bank of

38 Blakelock ltr 1965 . 3e Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 111.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 273

the upper reaches of the river, and re - yards short of the objective, where the ported back at 0718 that the stream was troops were ordered to organize and de - fordable at low tide, resistance wa s fend the high ground they held . light, and no occupied positions had Although the Asato could be waded 4° been found. at the time of the assault crossing, 42 Because the patrol reports of this and strong, steady rain had turned it int o other units indicated "that it might b e a chest-high raging torrent by the nex t feasible to attempt a crossing of the day. Supply and evacuation, difficult Asato without tank support," 41 early enough over the muddy terrain, now be - that morning General Shepherd ordere d came almost impossible. At least 12 men the 4th Marines to increase the numbe r were required to carry a stretcher cas e of reconnaissance patrols south of th e safely across the river to the rear .43 river, and to be ready to cross it i f Supplies were sent forward under th e enemy resistance proved light . same conditions ; men stood in the water Between dawn and 1000 on the 23d , hour after hour under intense artillery Marine lines received long-range ma- and mortar fire, forming a human chai n chine gun and rifle fire from high in a successful attempt to supply the ground near Machisi, but the patrol s advance companies .44 By midnight, the met no determined resistance at th e 6th Engineer Battalion had constructe d river bank. General Shepherd decide d two footbridges and was to have begu n to force a crossing here with two assault building a Bailey bridge, but heavy battalions of the 4th wading through enemy fire during the afternoon pre- ankle-deep water to the other side . At vented the engineers from bringing the 1130, a firm bridgehead was established components of the bridge forward . against only light resistance ; 1/4 was General Geiger shifted the boundary dug in and prepared to continue the between the two IIIAC divisions attack on the right, 3/4, on the left . slightly to the right (west) to concen- The regimental objective was a low trate the corps attack on the right flank . ridge, running east to west, about 50 0 At the same time, 2/4 could both con - yards south of the river in the vicinity tract its overexpanded lines and bette r of Machisi. The attacking Marines ap- protect the left flank and rear of the proaching this point began to meet regimental bridgehead . As a result of sharply increased opposition . Previous this change, 3/5 relieved 2/4 at 1400, suspicions concerning the nature of the and the latter moved laterally to its defenses here were confirmed when th e right to ease the tension on the strained infantry neared the height. In addition lines of 1/4 . to reverse-slope mortar emplacements, No forward progress was marked i n the face of the height was studded with the center of the Tenth Army line on 2 3 many Okinawan tombs that had been May by the assault regiments of the 1st fortified . Darkness halted the attack 10 0 42 6th MarDiv G-3 Jnl, Ph III, 23May45. 4° 6th MarDiv G-3 Jnl, Ph III, 23May45. 43 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 4. 4' 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p. 12 . 44 Ibid.

274 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Marine and 77th and 96th Infantr y a few American patrols progressed Divisions . Activity in the immediat e slightly towards the Chinen Peninsul a front of each division was limited to against only sporadic interference . patrol action. A break in the weather on 24 May Assessing the threat to Shuri by th e was too short-lived to enable the Tenth American advances down both coasts , Army to build up supply reserves, re- General Ushijima, his commanders, and pair roads, or to attack in any grea t his staff believed that the Thirty-secon d force. The enemy, however, took ad- Army was "still able to halt the collaps e vantage of the brief respite to counter - of all positions by holding positions i n attack the 7th Infantry Division . In depth to the line of Shichina and Ko- support of this ground action wa s kuba" even though Marines "had broke n Kikusui No . 7 and the airborne attack into the city of Naha." 46 This evalu- against Yontan airfield on 24–25 May . ation was tempered somewhat by th e Although their participation in th e realization that Thirty-second Army air defense of Okinawa was often more troops would "be unable to maintain glaringly spectacular than destructive, their Shuri front" 46 if the American on the night of 24 May, Marine an d spearhead in the Naha-Yonabaru valley Army antiaircraft artillery battalion s was not blunted. To stem the tide of the guarding Yontan and Kadena airfield s XXIV Corps attack against his posi- scored heavily against Kamikaze raiders tions north and east of Shuri, Genera l over the island . Marines manning Ushijima threw every available man 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artiller y into a defense line that began on th e Group guns were credited with destroy- southwest slopes of Conical Hill, ran ing five planes, damaging six, downin g through Yonawa, and was anchored a t one probable, and assisting in the de- the road junction in the village of struction of another plane during thi s Chan. action.4 7 When the 7th Division attempted to In the entire month of May, Marine expand its hold on the valley and the AAA gunners destroyed 8 planes, dam - high ground to the south, the soldiers aged 15, scored 5 probables, and had 1 received ample proof of the presence of assist.48 For the same period, the 53d enemy reinforcements. Following in - AAA Brigade was alerted to 53 ai r creased and determined Japanes e raids in which 88 planes were tracked stands, which reach a climax in a serie s by its radar, gun directors, and guns . of counterattacks on the night of 24–2 5 The May score of the brigade overal l May, the 7th Division ground to a halt , unable to push any further west. In was 24 planes destroyed, 15 damage d sharp contrast to the stubborn and im- (all by Marine AAA units), and 5 49 mediate reaction aroused by these probables. efforts to gain the road net east of Shuri, 47 53d AA Brig AAR, pp . 40-43 . 4EOkinawa Operations Record, p. 111. "Ibid ., pp . 39-43 . 40 Ibid. "Ibid ., p . 34 .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 275

The clear weather permitting the was open, the commanding officer of the flurry of enemy air activity held for a engineer battalion matter-of-factly brief time only. The rains came again . added : " . . . tanks should cross as soo n Gravely concerned over the effects the as possible as arty [artillery] is falling weather was having on his divisio n in area.5 2 supply system, General Shepherd be- To intensify 4th Marines efforts lieved it necessary to establish firm south of the river, 3/22 moved into th e vehicular and foot crossings over the line on the division left, relieving 2/4 now-rampaging Asato if 6th Divisio n at 1000 on the 24th . Once in position , assault battalions were to be provide d Lieutenant Colonel Clair W . Shisler's with adequate rations, ammunition, an d battalion tied in with 3/5 and 1/4 . At medical supplies. In addition to replen- this time, the 2d Battalion moved acros s ishing Marine forces at the bridgehead, the river "to relieve the battered 3/4 on a well-stocked supply reserve would b e the right" of the 4th Marines line. 5 3 required to support a continued attac k The 3d Battalion became regimental re- to the south. serve and moved to an assembly area i n At the same time that the 4th Marines the rear where it held muster ; none of sent probing patrols south to the its companies had over 90 men .54 Major vicinity of Machisi on the 24th, th e Walker's 6th Reconnaissance Company , regimental objective was bombarded by which had been attached to the 4th a heavy artillery concentration and an Marines on 23 May as regimental re - air strike—one of the first to be flown serve, reverted to division control whe n in clearing skies that day in support o f the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, wa s ground forces. The 6th Engineer Bat- ordered to an assembly area just sout h talion bridge builders who had labore d of the Asato . In order to beef up Colo- throughout the night to erect some sort nel Shapley's reserve for the continu- of crossing over the Asato, 50 began put- ation of the drive south, 1/29 wa s ting together a Bailey bridge at dawn . attached to the 4th in place of th e Working all morning and part of th e scouts. afternoon under enemy artillery and With the rain beating down once mortar shelling, the Marine engineer s again, the 4th Marines attacked on 2 5 finished the bridge at 1400 and opened May to capture that part of the regi- it for traffic 45 minutes later.51 A pile mental objective near Machisi not taken bridge, to be utilized as a tank bypass, on the 23d. Although severely restricte d was completed at 1840 . Informing the by the deep mud and limited visibility , division commander that the passag e assault infantry seized the greater part of the north-south ridgeline lying west ""An attempt . . . made during the night t o of the village . At 1030, the 4th overcame install a makeshift bridge built on LVTs . . . determined Japanese defenders en - was unsuccessful due to the large number of enemy mines encountered along the river bank . 12 During the effort two LVTs were seriously Ibid. damaged ." 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p. 12 . 63 4th Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 5 . 61 6th MarDiv G—3 Jnl, Ph III, 24May45 . 64 Ibid.

310-224 0 - 69 - 19

276 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

trenched on the reverse slope and oc- the defense perimeter 'of the scouts, and cupied the objective. Once the captors on the northern bank in front of 2/22 , had reorganized their forces and con- which manned the lines of the 22 d solidated the newly won positions, the y Marines . Company G of the battalion prepared to carry on further. The attac k was assigned as a clutch unit to reliev e now progressed slowly as assault troops or support the reconnaissance compan y forged ahead against a storm of fronta l upon order . and flanking fires. Although the reconnaissance company When the regiment halted for the day had experienced a relatively quiet night, at 1630, the battalions established firm the two assault battalions of the 4th contact along the line and dug in nigh t Marines spent the hours of darkness i n defenses. During the preinvasion re- fighting off counterattacks . At 2000, hearsal phase, 6th Division training ha d 1/4 reported that the enemy was form- emphasized village and street fighting. ing up approximately 200–250 yards in This training was first put into practi- front of its positions and had begun cal use on the 25th when attacking smoking Marine lines. A Japanese mor- troops entered the eastern outskirts o f tar barrage preceded the counterattack , Naha and came under fire from Japa- which was broken up almost immedi- nese-defended houses. The heavy fire ately under a mixed artillery and morta r from these as well as from the man y shelling that continued on for another burial vaults along the ridges in thi s two hours without letup. Later, at mid- area inflicted numerous casualties in th e night, when Company E, 2/4, was hit by Marine units . a counterattack, it was immediately re- Effectively dividing this section o f inforced by a platoon from 1/29 . After Naha into two separate zones of actio n a two-hour-long hand grenade duel, i n was a canal connecting the Asato River which the Marines suffered only ligh t and the estuary of the Kokuba . The casualties, the enemy was successfull y waterway was 20 yards wide, had a repelled . thick mud bottom, and stone bank s Across most of the rest of the Tenth 3 to 5 feet high . Army front on the 25th, high water an d As the 4th Marines fought in th e mud limited activity to patrol actions. eastern portion of Naha, the 6th Recon- The 7th Infantry Division, however, naissance Company crossed the Asat o which had forced the enemy from com- to enter the once-urban, now-razed, are a manding terrain features and inserted of Naha west of the canal. Major an opening wedge into the southeaster n Walker's men quickly cleared a sector defenses of Shuri on 24 May, continue d of snipers and a few disorganized its vigorous drive on the 25th . Addi- troops, and set up defenses for the night . tional key positions were secured agains t At 1900, the engineers completed con- ever-stiffening resistance and under struction of a footbridge across the conditions of terrain and weather tha t mouth of the Asato . The bridge wa s favored the enemy . Limiting the 7th anchored on the southern bank behind Division attack was the problem of get-

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 277

ting supplies forward, after its only sion G–2 to request air observation of 5 supply route to the front sank in a sea the suspected area at 1200. 6 of mud under the ravages of continuous Despite hazardous flying condition s use. in rain and poor visibility, which i n themselves would limit the value and In the 96th Division zone, troops hold- amount of information gained, a spotter ing positions south and west of Conical plane was catapulted from the New Hill were all but isolated from rear are a York almost immediately after receip t facilities of the division . Suffering seri- of the G–2 request . Upon arrival over ous losses under a rash of small counter - the target area, the airborne observer attacks and continual attempts by the confirmed the presence of a large num- enemy to infiltrate, the depleted in- ber of Japanese troops and vehicle s fantry companies holding the line wer e clogging the roads leading south from forced to utilize all available manpowe r Shuri. from battalion and regimental servic e Within 13 minutes after this sighting , and support units . The frontline units the USS New Orleans had fired the first put these soldiers into the line as rifle- salvo in a continued devastating bar - men or assigned them to the tre- rage that was brought to bear on th e mendously wearing task of hand-carry- withdrawing enemy by artillery, mor- ing supplies forward over the muddy tars, the main and secondary batteries of gunfire support ships, and the ma- ground. Descriptive of these agonized chine guns and bombs of Marine air- efforts is a comment made by one of the craft that had risen from rain-sodde n 96th's officers, who said : "Those on the fields to harry the enemy from above.57 forward slopes slid down . Those on the Commenting on the part played by gun- reverse slopes slid back . Otherwise, no fire support ships at this point, the nava l change." 5 5 gunfire officer in the IIIAC staff re- A happy change in these gloomy recalled :

ports of a bogged-down campaign—an d . . . the New York was some distance possibly a favorable portent for th e from the beach but the New Orleans was future—occurred on 26 May, when i t close in. The New Orleans heard the report of the New York's plane and asked th e appeared as though the enemy was pull- spotter for coordinates . She positioned her- ing out of Shuri . Observers at the 1st self and began adjustment by full salvos and 5th Marines regimental observatio n of main battery. . . . Other firing ships and support craft with H&I [Harassing and posts (OPs) reported that there was a Interdiction] missions or otherwise in the good deal of enemy movement south , area, noticed the increased activity, sent and thus prompted the 1st Marine Divi - up planes, and got into the act. Ship s without planes asked to be cut in wit h 66 Quoted in Orlando R . Davidson, et. at., The ships that did have them and often a plan e Deadeyes : The Story of the 96th Infantry Di- 68 vision (Washington : Infantry Journal Press , IIIAC G–2 PeriodicRpt No. 56, dtd 1947), p . 159, hereafter Davidson, et. at ., 96t h 27May45 . Inf Div Hist . " CTF 31 AR, pt III, p. 27 .

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spotter was firing two or more ships a t east, where patrols of the 184th Infantry the same time.5 8 approached Chinen Peninsula . Enemy hopes for a successful with- Following the discovery of the enemy drawal under the inclement weather withdrawal and the initial bombard- conditions were shattered by the masse d ments placed on his movements, artil- fires which caught and blasted, som e lery batteries and gunfire support ships 3,000–4,000 Japanese troops with thei r fired continuous harassing and inter- tanks, vehicles, and artillery pieces i n diction missions on all routes, road junc- the open. The pilots of observation tions, and crossroads in the area leadin g planes zoomed through the overcast t o south from Shuri . To keep the enemy treetop height and lower to count and disorganized and unable to make a report back an estimated 500 enemy stand, and to exploit the implications killed. 59 inherent in the Japanese withdrawal , The continuing stubborn reluctanc e General Buckner sent the followin g on the part of some Japanese to give message to his two corps commanders way to the Americans seemed to beli e on 27 May : the fact that General Ushijima's force s Indications point to possible enemy re- were indeed withdrawing . The Tenth tirement to new defensive position with Army found that only local attacks an d possible counteroffensive against ou r forces threatening his flank . Initiate with - patrols could be accomplished in th e out delay strong and unrelenting pressur e rain against enemy resistance . Even to ascertain probable intentions and keep limited forward movement directe d him off balance . Enemy must not repea t towards the heart of Shuri arouse d not be permitted to establish himsel f heavy and immediate response, and in- securely on new position with only nomina l interference.6 0 dicated that Japanese inner defenses were holding firm. Light resistance was Continued rains and their subsequen t found only along the coasts ; in the effect on the terrain precluded a full - IIIAC zone on the right, where the 6th scale attack all along the front . There- Reconnaissance Company held the fore, the Tenth Army settled for aggres- levelled and deserted Naha, and in the sive patrol action against the remaining Japanese strongpoints facing its lines. ;e LtCol William M . Gilliam ltr to CMC, dtd Apparently contradicting what influ- 16Mar55 . During this and other incidents in the ence the previous day's withdrawa l Okinawa campaign, gunfire support from al l arms was superb . "It was not uncommon fo r eo Tenth Army AR, chap 7, sec III, pp . a battleship, tanks, artillery, and aircraft t o 24-25 . "During the period of May 22d to 30t h be supporting the efforts of a platoon of infan- when the southern front was engulfed in mud , try during the reduction of the Shuri position ." General Buckner chafed at the slow progress Ibid. being made" and constantly urged his corp s " Commending TAF and the LFASCUs fo r commanders to greater speed . "He was unde r their day's work . General del Valle sent a mes- considerable pressure to make faster progress , sage reading "Congratulations and thanks fo r as the Navy was sustaining heavy casualties prompt response this afternoon when Nips by being forced to remain in the vicinity of were caught on road with kimonos down ." 2d Okinawa," exposed to the damaging Kamikaze MAW WarD, May 45 . raids . Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 123 .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 279

AERIAL VIEW of Shuri on 28 April before it was bombed . (USAF 83751)

SHURI, one month later. (USAF 83752)

280 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

should have had on the tactical situ- filled in on the left flank between 3/2 2 ation, patrol reports reading "Does no t and 1/4. appear that resistance has lessened," o r Following a pre-attack nine-battalio n "No indication of Japanese with- artillery preparation, 6th Divisio n drawal," implied that Shuri would not forces advanced abreast at 1230 against yet, if ever, fall easily .61 light opposition, reached the objectiv e Assault units of the 7th Infantry at approximately 1700, and dug in for Division, driving west from Yonabaru , night defense at 1900, when regimental ran into 62d Division elements hastily lines were tied in all around.63 Actually, committed by General Ushijima to shore occupation of the objective in force up his threatened right flank . On the amounted to the same thing that had far left flank of the Tenth Army, ad- been accomplished by patrols that morn- vance patrols of the 184th Infantr y ing. Badly in need of rest after a 10-day reached Inasomi, approximately two tour in the lines, the 4th Marines was miles southwest of Yonabaru, without alerted that it would be relieved by th e meeting any organized resistance . To 29th Marines ; the changeover was contain the overall threat this poten- scheduled to begin at 0630 the next tially deep penetration posed to Japa- morning. nese defenses in the south, the Thirty- Another important change in the ICE - second Army moved additional troops BERG command structure occurring i n 62 of the 62d Division down from Shuri. May took place on the 27th, when the On the opposite flank of Tenth Army, Fifth Fleet once again became the Third early on the 27th, Company G, 2/22, Fleet and Admiral Halsey took over the moved across the Asato, passed throug h responsibility for supporting the reconnaissance company lines, an d ICEBERG campaign from Admiral pressed well into Naha against only Spruance. As in February, when th e slight resistance. At the same time, latter had taken over from Halsey, the patrols from the 4th Marines move d ships and men of the fleet remained th e 200–300 yards ahead of regimental line s same, only the numerical designation s to take advantage of the apparent enemy of the task groupings changed (i.e., TF weakness here. Lieutenant Colonel 58 became TF 38, etc .) . At the sam e Woodhouse was ordered at 0915 to move time that this command change was the rest of his battalion across the river , effected, General Buckner became and nearly two hours later 2/22 wa s directly responsible for CinCPOA for directed to attack and seize the high the defense and development of cap- ground approximately 100 yards north tured positions in the Ryukyus .64 of the Kokuba estuary . The 4th Marines received the same order to seize the res t 81 At 1630, Major Walker's company was of Naha. Colonel Shapley attacked wit h attached to 2/22 for the night ; at 2000, 1/29 reverted to parent control . 1/4 on the left, 2/4 on the right ; 3/4 B4 ComFifthFlt AR, lApr-27May45, Ryukyu s Operation, dtd 21Jun45, pt III, p . 7 ; see also B1 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 27May45. section entitled "The Task Defined" in chap 2 , B3 Okinawa Operations Report, pp. 116—119 . supra.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 281

Large-scale movements were still im- only to be thrown back by mortar bar- practicable on 28 May because of the rages coming from reverse slope em- mud, although : "The morning . . . was placements and vicious machine gun fir e clear with no rain ." 66 Despite the raking positions on the crest from three limited trafficability of both roads an d directions. Lieutenant Colonel James C . terrain, local commanders hewed to th e Magee, Jr., believed that, even if his concept of General Buckner's directive battalion succeeded in carrying the hill, of the previous day and maintained con- "it could not possibly hold it against a stant and continuous pressure on enemy strong counterattack." 66 Heavy casual- forces. In the XXIV Corps zone, the ties had depleted the size of the bat- 184th Infantry deepened the 7th Divi- talion to a point where its total effective sion salient in the Ozato Hills by mov- strength was 277 men ; no rifle coming to within 1,000 yards of Shinzato, a pany could muster more than a total of village located where Chinen Peninsula 99 Marines .6 7 joined the mainland . At first glance, it would appear as Less satisfactory progress was reg- though reinforcement of the battalio n istered for the units driving west, a s at this time might possibly have tippe d 62d Division blocking forces held u p the scales of victory in favor of the other 7th Division troops. Strongly hel d Marines and enabled them to captur e positions southwest of Conical Hill 110 Meter Hill. Replacements wer e frustrated 96th Division attempts available ; the 1st Marine Division ha d altogether, and the 77th Division made received a total of 53 officers and 1,255 little or no headway against a deter - enlisted men in the three-day period of mined defense of Shuri heights . At the 27–29 May, when the 57th, 59th, and 63 d end of the day, XXIV Corps gains were Replacement Drafts arrived at Oki- negligible and inconclusive. Despite re- nawa.68 The division was precluded by ports of increased troop withdrawals , IIIAC orders, however, from insertin g the enemy's obstinate reluctance to these fresh troops into the line during a yield indicated that General Ushijim a battle situation, the course of which de- either had established a strong rear- pended upon close teamwork by experi- guard to protect the withdrawal or that enced veterans. Only after several days he was in fact not abandoning Shuri . of indoctrination and training in reserve areas could the men be sen t In the IIIAC sector, Marines were no . Infantry replacements were at more successful in prosecuting thei r forward a premium in any case because of the portion of the war and had no easier heavy losses sustained by the rifle time of it than had the Army units . In . This condition existed even its attack on 110 Meter Hill, 2/1 was regiments though over 350 emergency replace - covered by the fires of 3/1 and 3/306 . Once 2/1 had gained its objective, 3/1 69 Ibid. was to advance down Wana Draw . The 67 Ibid. The authorized T/O strength of a 2d Battalion gained the hilltop twice, Marine rifle company at this time was 7 officer s and 235 enlisted Marines. 98 99 2/1 SAR, p. 11 . 1st MarDiv SAR, Pers Anx, p. 7.

282 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ments had been assigned from divisio n to that morning's jump-off position, or- special and service troops to the in- ganic crew-served weapons of 2/ 1 fantry regiments in mid-May and the worked over the reverse slopes of 11 0 regular "flow of Marine replacement s Meter Hill as the battalion lines were was beyond expectations . . . ." 69 None- themselves raked by the continual fire o f theless, despite this constant infusion of Japanese flat-trajectory cannon. With new Marines, at no time during the unabated fury and determined fanati- drive to the south were 1st Division in- cism, the enemy stood his ground and fantry regiments able to exceed mor e even sought to infiltrate 2/1 lines after than 85 percent of effective T/ O dark when many Japanese soldiers were strength.70 killed. To the commanders of undermanned Also on 28 May, patrols from 3/1 pen- companies and battalions in this period etrated some 300 yards into Wana Dra w of the campaign, immediate reinforce- under intense machine gun and rifle fire . ment was not only desirable—it was of At 1600, Colonel Mason ordered the bat- paramount importance. From the point talion to clear all Japanese troops fro m of view of senior commanders, such a s the draw, but the battalion commander' s the regimental commander of the 1st request that the attack be delayed unti l Marines : the following morning instead, in orde r . . . the existence of a replacement poo l that he might organize and concentrate which could not, at the moment, be used fo r his forces for the drive, was approved . combat proved to be extremely valuable . At the end of May, when the rainy perio d The 1st Division concluded that : "The had rendered the roads and the countryside beginning of the end for Shuri came o n impassable to anything on wheels or the 28th." 72 Although rear-guard actio n tracks, the supply of forward troops be - continued unrelentingly in the high came most critical . Something like 50 0 replacements, if any recollection is correct , ground north of the city in the 77th were available to the 1st Marines ; these Division zone, the 5th Marines attacke d men were formed into man-pack trains , at 0730, captured the village of Asato , under the direction of the executive officer. and 1/5 patrolled 300 yards beyond that Their exhausting struggles, heavily laden , without appreciable opposition. During through mud which even an unburdene d man found difficult to negotiate were the the same day, the 306th Infantry man- solution to the supply problem at this time , aged to mop up the area approximately though with no margin to spare.7 1 150 yards in front of its lines . On the Even though 2/1 and other assaul t corps boundary, 3/306 sent strong pa- units could not be reinforced, supply trols forward, coordinating their move- support from non-committed element s ments with those of 2/1 . By dark, 1/307 permitted them to concentrate on the im- —to the left of the 306th—attacked th e mediate problem of fighting the enemy . high ground east of Shuri against de- Late on the 28th, after being withdrawn termined opposition. Despite the fact eB Ibid., p . 8 . that it was bitterly opposed and repulse d '° Ibid. by heavy mortar fire initially, the bat- '1 Col Arthur T . Mason ltr to CMC, dtd 10Mar47. '2 1st MarDiv SAR, p . 7.

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 283

talion inched forward under the cover talion to take up the assault in the direc - of smoke and managed to dig in for th e tion of the banks of the Kokuba estuary , night. 73 west of the canal running through Naha . While the 1st and 77th Divisions wer e Moving rapidly against only slight removing slowly forward, the 29th Ma- sistance, its flanks and rear protected rines began relieving the 4th in position . by 2/22, the battalion captured its ob- Enemy shelling during the relief adde d jective by 0845 . to the more-than 1,100 casualties alread y General Shepherd then assigned th e sustained by Colonel Shapley's regiment. task of defending western Naha to hi s Beginning at daylight, 3/29 relieved 1/ 4 reconnaissance company in order to re - and 3/4, the elements on the left of the lease the 22d Marines for further offen- 4th Marines line, 1/29 moved into the sive action to the east against Japanes e western portion of Naha relieving 2/4 , positions in the Kokuba hills. Major and 2/29—in regimental reserve—moved Walker was first notified of the scouts' to an assembly area near Colonel Whal- new assignment at 1030, when he re- ing's CP. Upon its relief, the 4th Marines ceived the following message from th e marched and motored to beach areas division G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Victo r near Machinato airfield, where it becam e H. Krulak : 6th Division reserve . e Reposing great confidence in your integ- Continuing to advance after passag rity and political ability you are hereby of the 2/4 lines, 1/29 moved abreast of named acting mayor of Naha . The appoint- and then paced the attack of the 22d ment effective 281600 carries all pay an d Marines . The direction of the battalio n emoluments accruing to office . To be col- attack changed to the southwest whe n lected from Imperial Treasury.7 5 Company C pivoted on Company A-- Shortly after midday, the 6th Engi- on the right boundary—and gained 250 neer Battalion was ordered to recon- yards through the rubble of Naha . noiter all bridge crossings over the canal . Heavy small arms fire and a scattered Also, it was to install a jeep crossing mortar and artillery shelling followe d and at least two foot bridges over the the Marines, who finally set in a night canal prior to 0400 on the 29th to facili- defense along a line 800 yards from th e tate the 22d Marines attack east of the Kokuba. Here visual contact was estab- Kokuba. The engineers worked in the lished with the 22d Marines across th e dark in front of Marine lines under a canal on the right, and with 3/29 on the constant downpour of rain and shells , left flank.7 4 as they manhandled the bridge con- The 22d Marines had moved out on struction material up to the various the 28th before dawn . At that time, 1/22 bridging sites. The task was completed passed through the lines of the 2d Bat- at 0420. At 0430, elements of 1/22 were across the canal and organized on the "77th Inf Div OpRpt, Okinawa, p . 61 . " 1/29 SAR, Ph III, p . 3. Lieutenant Colonel " 6th MarDiv G—3 Jnl, Ph III, 28May45 . Th e Samuel S . Yeaton relieved the temporary bat- new "Naha City Command" was reinforced b y talion commander, Major Robert P . Neuffer, 1 officer and 40 Marines from the 6th Moto r who then became battalion executive officer . Transport Battalion . Ibid.

284 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

eastern shore . This was the division's mud precluded the use of vital armo r third opposed river crossing in 20 support. It still remained an infantry - days.76 man's war. The attack began a half hour later and On the same day, 29 May, the 29th the Marines made some immediat e Marines attacked to the south and then progress against scattered machine gu n cut east in order to come abreast of th e and rifle fire. Supporting the assault 22d Marines ; the 29th's objective was was 2/22, while the 3d Battalion fol- the high ground immediately northwest lowed in reserve. At 0845, 1/22 mad e of Shichina . Like the 22d Marines ap- contact with 1/29 and the two infantr y proach route, that of the 29th was over battalions pushed on abreast of each low and open ground, causing the regi- other. As spearhead elements ap- mental commander to comment that th e proached the hills north of Kokuba, in - terrain was "about as suitable to fight- creased resistance indicated that the ing as a billiard table." 77 The 1st Bat- enemy was positioned there in strength . talion maintained a slow, steady pace Because of the hard fighting and numer- against moderate resistance, and dug i n ous casualties experienced by 1/22, at at dark slightly to the left rear of 3/22 , 1500 2/22 was alerted to relieve it, when on the regimental boundary. The 3d the situation permitted, on the ground Battalion of the 29th paced the advanc e then held. Since the 1st Battalion was of 1/29, but 3/5 on the left had ad- heavily engaged at the time, its com- vanced so rapidly during the day tha t mander advised against the relief being 3/29 was forced to bring its lines for- effected then. Instead, Companies E an d ward some 600 yards at the end of the G were committed into the line at 180 0 day to maintain firm contact with th e to reinforce the night defenses of th e 5th Marines. regiment. Tuesday, 29 May 1945, is a significant Until darkness fell the 6th Divisio n date in the history of the Okinawa cam- assault regiments continued the attac k paign, for it was on this day elements of in an effort to reduce the strong enem y the 1st Marine Division captured Shur i position encountered earlier that after - Castle. This ancient redoubt, once th e noon. Aggravating the situation was the seat of the rulers of Okinawa, had served fact that the routes of approach to these as General Ushijima's center for con- Japanese emplacements were acros s trolling the defense of the island . open ground that afforded the attacking The 5th Marines attack began at Marines little or no cover from the fire 0730 ; 1/5 on the left, 3/5 on the right. of well-dug-in machine guns and mor- The 3d Battalion jumped off with Com- tars. The position itself was centered o n pany L in assault. Enemy machine gun, a small group of hills on which wer e mortar, and small arms fire was place d located several radio towers that ha d on the attacking Marines but was un- been demolished in air raids when th e able to prevent them from advancing a rest of Naha was razed earlier. Rain an d total of 600 yards at day's end. Follow-

Pe 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, pt III, p. 14. 77 6th MarDiv G—3 Jnl, Ph III, 29May45 . REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 285

CORKSCREW : Marine assault team attacks a Japanese cave after a satchel charge has exploded . (USMC 120272)

BLOWTORCH : A flame tank burns out Japanese positions in hillside tombs during the drive for Naha . (USMC 122153)

286 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ing Company L, Companies I and K Bowling over the few Japanese that moved out later in the morning in a n were in their way, Marines from Com- attempt to strengthen and protect th e pany A, 1/5, drove east along the ridge left of the battalion line, but enem y and right into the castle itself, securin g mortars positioned west of Shuri fire d it at 1015 . The 77th Division had pro- a furious barrage that seriously limite d grammed an air strike and a heav y forward movement . Despite the efforts artillery bombardment on the bastio n to destroy them by bazooka fire, the for 29 May and had received warnin g mortars remained active and held th e of the attack of the 5th Marines only a companies back . The battalion night de - few short minutes before it wa s fense set up at dusk showed 3/5 line s mounted . Fortunately for the Marines , cutting back sharply from the left of General Bruce and his staff worke d Company L's exposed position to tie i n frantically to contact all supportin g with 1/5 at Shuri Ridge . arms and were just "barely able to avert The 1st Battalion moved rapidly over called strikes in time ." 78 muddy terrain against little oppositio n The air and artillery preparation o f and immediately occupied Shuri's ridge Shuri by the 77th Division resulte d crest in close proximity to the castle. from General Bruce's decision on the From this position, at approximatel y 28th to attack the next day, weather 0930, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. permitting. The 1st Marine Divisio n Shelburne, the battalion commander, re- had given him no indication that i t quested permission to send one of hi s planned to enter the zone of the 77th, assault companies to storm the appar- for : "Had timely notice been given and ently lightly manned fortification . De- the move been properly coordinated, " spite the fact that the castle itself wa s the Army commander believed "the 77 within the zone of the 77th Infantry Div could have rendered adequate sup - Division, General del Valle granted th e port to the Marines . . . ." S0 request when it was forwarded to hi m Overshadowing this near tragedy for approval. He believed that the cap- was the fact that Company A succes s ture of this enemy strongpoint would resulted from the close teamwork of favorably effect and shorten the cam- Tenth Army support and assault troop s paign ; this opportunity, therefore, ha d who had not permitted the enemy to re - to be seized at once . Shortly after the lax for an instant . Without this unre- island was secured, General del Vall e lenting pressure, the breakthrough offered the opinion that "at that tim e would not have been possible . the position of the 77th Division was To profit from the 1/5 gain, Genera l such that it would have taken severa l del Valle quickly revised his attack pla n hard days' fighting through enemy re- and sent 3/1 through the lines of th e sistance," 78 if he had waited for the tactical situation to unfold normally. 'B Myers, 77th Inf Div History, p . 357 ; "How- ever, arrangements had been made to see tha t P9 MajGen Pedro A. del Valle, "Old Glory on our own artillery did not come down on thes e Shuri," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 troops ." Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 114. (Aug45), p . 17 . 80 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Okinawa, p. 62 .

REDUCTION OF THE SHURI BASTION 287

5th Marines to relieve 1/5 . At 1400, the ments. To augment and increase this relief had been effected and 1/5 con- effort, "all battalion headquarters per- tinued the attack south . The commander sonnel, cooks, wiremen, and stretche r of 3/1 immediately set up his battalio n bearers were sent forward to help ma n in perimeter defense around the bat- the lines." 81 tered walls of the castle . Augmentin g At no time after the capture of Shur i this defense were two companies from Castle was there any indication that the 1/1 which fought their way into as - Japanese defenders of the hills north of signed positions that faced north, and the city were either being worn down or tied in with the lines of 3/1 . concerned with the Americans posi- Upon the 5th Marines sweep into tioned in their rear . Reports from Tenth Shuri, the 1st Marines was ordered to Army units all along the line gave proo f follow the attack closely ; 3/1 was to re- that Japanese resistance remained un- lieve 1/5, and 1/1, tailing 3/1 aroun d diminished. Only in a goodly portion of Hill 55, was to attack east into the yet - Chinen Peninsula, scouted by 7th Divi- unoccupied sector north of Shuri. Mov- sion troops during the day., was there ing out in a column of companies, th e little or no opposition . battalion crossed the line of departur e Offsetting the relatively unhindered in front of Hill 55 where the leading advance down the coasts by Tenth Army element came under intensive fire from flanking divisions, a vividly contrasting a heavy machine gun hidden in a dee p picture was presented by the massive and rugged cut a few hundred yards struggle down the center of the island . south of bypassed Wana Draw. Unable Despite the efforts of General Buckner's to either silence the weapon or attac k forces to execute a mass double envelop- through its curtain of fire, the battalio n ment successfully and encircle the bulk axis of advance was angled to the right of General Ushijima's troops at Shuri , and the troops eventually made contact all signs pointed up the fact that th e with 3/1 south of Shuri . While 1/1 and Japanese rear guard had accomplishe d ; the greatest portion of 3/1 hit Shuri from the west, the 2d its mission well the units defending Shuri had indee d Battalion was ordered to hold Wan a escaped to the south. Ridge, from which it was to provide fire support to regimental assault ele- 81 2/1 SAR, p . 12 . CHAPTER 9 Breakout to the South

JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL 1 tive defense, but would, in fact, mak e the defenders "easy prey" 2 for the mas- Threatened by an American frontal sive American fires which would un- encroachment upon their Shuri defenses doubtedly seek them out from all direc- and an envelopment of their flanks by tions. Although many Japanese long- the Tenth Army divisions driving down range artillery pieces were still in firin g the east and west coasts of Okinawa, condition, the constricted space factors the Japanese were forced to reevaluat e around Shuri prevented their prope r thoroughly the battle plans adopted i n emplacement and subsequently efficient March. On the night of 22 May, Genera l employment. Ushijima convened at his headquarters In a discussion of the alternatives to a conference of his principal com- remaining at Shuri, Ushijima's staff manders and staff officers . The majo r considered two other defensive areas— and only item on the agenda of thi s Chinen Peninsula, and the Kiyamu momentous meeting was a discussion of Peninsula at the southern tip of Oki- how best to prevent—or at least to post- nawa. (See Map 2 .) The hills, cliffs , pone—the disaster engulfing the Thirty- and lack of roads on Chinen presented second Army. a group of formidable natural defenses , Contingency plans calling for a mas- especially against tank-infantry tactics . sive defense centering about Shuri ha d Militating against a choice of this area been included in final battle prepara- were the lack of sufficient caves an d tions completed before 1 April 1945 . prepared positions to hold the entir e All Japanese units located elsewhere Thirty-second Army and the inadequacy on Okinawa and still able to fight would of ammunition supplies that had been withdraw on order for a last-ditch stan d stockpiled there . Another disadvantage in the vicinity of the Thirty-second ruling out Chinen was the poor road net, Army headquarters. Tactical conditions which would equally hamper the Japa- at the time of this conference indicated nese and the Americans . Finally, in that, to hold Shuri, approximatel y face of these considerations and th e 50,000 Japanese soldiers would have t o route that would have to be taken to be compressed into a final defense sec - the peninsula, Thirty-second Army tor less than a mile in diameter . These units would find it difficult to recon- close quarters would not permit an effec - centrate and reorganize speedily at the same time that they would undoubtedly ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in be waging a hard fight during disen- this section is derived from : Okinawa Opera- gagement and withdrawal . The weight tions Record ; Yahara Interrogation : Shimada Interrogation. 2 Okinawa Operations Record, p. 111 . 288

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 289

of the evidence against Chinen ruled i t who had taken the brunt of American out quickly . attacks on the city. He contended, there- It appeared to the Thirty-second fore, that their desire to fight to the last Army staff that Kiyamu Peninsula was in their present positions should be ful- the best area in which to develop a solid filled. defense for prolonging the battle. This Supporting the anticipated with- area, dominated by the Yaeju Dake- drawal was General Suzuki, commande r Yuza Dake 3 Escarpment, contained a of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, sufficient number of natural and man- who tempered his approval with th e made caves in which to store supplie s stipulation that the army move into the and protect troops against American Chinen Peninsula positions that his bombardments. The terrain on the forces had previously developed . Fully peninsula had been defensively organ- supporting the move to Kiyamu wer e ized earlier by the 24th Division, which Generals Amamiya and Wada, com- also had cached a large store of am- manders of the 24th Division and 5th munition and weapons there before i t Artillery Command, respectively. Gen- was ordered north into the Shuri de- eral Amamiya reinforced his argument fenses. As opposed to the poor road net with information that his 24th Trans- into Chinen, all roads south led directly portation Regiment had been able both to the proposed new positions and woul d to salvage and to preserve enough permit the army to make a rapid mas s trucks to transfer the army ammunitio n movement. On the other hand, Tenth reserve in five nights' time if weather Army tanks also could move south conditions permitted. quickly over these roads, but only to th e Not long after weighing all of thes e outpost defenses of the sector . Ameri- arguments, General Ushijima ordere d can tanks would be denied passage be- the move to Kiyamu . The first trans- yond this point by the sheer cliffs, stee p portation to head south left Shuri at hills, and deep ridges of the region. In midnight, 23 May, carrying wounded this broken terrain, the infantry woul d and a portion of the ammunition supply. be on its own. The main body of the Thirty-secon d Not all of the senior Japanese leaders Army was scheduled to begin the trek approved the planned withdrawal . One southward on 29 May . dissenter was General Fujioka, com- According to the army plan, the new mander of the 62d Division. His objec- defensive dispositions would be as fol- tion was based on a compassion for the lows (See Map 16 .) : thousands of severely wounded men who could not be taken south . General 1. The 44th IMB was to move from po- Fujioka felt most strongly about thi s sitions on the westernmost flank of th e Shuri front to take up defense positions o n point because it was his division that a line running from Hanagusuku on th e had originally been assigned to defen d east coast to Yaeju Dake. Shuri, and it was his officers and me n 2. The 24th Division would occupy th e commanding heights of the Yaeju Dake- 3 Dake means peak. Yuza Dake escarpment, the ridges of

290 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Mezado and Kunishi, and Nagusuku, on primary fail, was to slow or stop th e the west coast. American advance for a period lon g 3. Elements of the above two unit s enough to permit the main body of th e would establish and defend an outpos t line—and the zone forward of it—which Thirty-second Army to escape. would run from Itoman through Yunagu- To give General Ushijima time t o suku to Gushichan . organize his new dispositions on Ki- 4. The heavily depleted forces of the yamu, the force remaining on the Shuri 62d Division would occupy defenses along front was to hold until 31 May . Behind the coast in the rear of the main battle line ; at these positions the division coul d it, withdrawing units would leave othe r reorganize, and, at the same time, be pre- rear guard elements to hold a stron g pared to reinforce threatened sections of defense line running along the Kokumba the line . River to the hills north of Tsukasan 5. The firing batteries of the 5th Artil- and Chan until the night of 2 June . At lery Command were to be emplaced within the confines of a triangularly shaped area that time, the line would then cut sout h formed by Kunishi, Makabe, and Medeera, through Karadera to the east coast . in direct support of the defense line . Approximately 2,000 yards furthe r 6. Admiral Ota's Okinawa Naval Bas e south, another temporary line—this one Force was assigned as reserve and woul d centered on Tomusu—would be estab- move on order to an assembly area in the center of the Kiyamu defense sector. lished and held until the night of 4 7. Each unit breaking contact with th e June. Thirty-second Army staff plan- Americans on the Shuri line was to leav e ners believed that the time gained dur- a sufficiently strong force in position t o ing holding actions along these lines keep the Americans occupied long enoug h would permit the organization an d to permit a successful withdrawal . manning of the final outpost zone . Be- Posing a threat to this plan was the fore beginning its own retreat south, penetration of 7th Infantry Divisio n the composite naval unit on Oroku elements through Yonabaru . To oppos e Peninsula was to guard the wester n them, remnants of the 62d Division were flank of the withdrawal route. to disengage and pull out of the Shur i All available replacements wer e front on the night of 25 May, and the n thrown in the disintegrating Shur i move through Tsukasan to counter- front on 23 May, when the onsurgin g attack the Tenth Army spearhead . Re- Tenth Army forced the enemy to bolste r placing the 62d in the line was th e his defenses . On 24 May, the first Japa- comparatively strong and rested 22d nese walking wounded began leavin g Independent Infantry Battalion, which caves that passed as hospitals. Many had been in reserve during the fighting terminal cases, too seriously wounded t o in April and May. The orders to Genera l be moved, were either killed with a Fujioka were both explicit and simple : lethal injection of morphine, or—less " . . . annihilate the enemy rushing fro m mercifully—left behind to suffer a mor e the Yonabaru area ." ' In addition, a lingering end without the relief-givin g secondary mission laid on, should the drug. Limited medical care of the wounded because of circumstance s Okinawa Operations Record, p. 116 . rather than willful neglect appears to

EAS T CH/N A SEA O O um., 111 0:010 ruse III I®I89 ®I5 SDI Es t 111 111 gash . .. 0 I23I32 241( 44 I1IIIArtyMort O XX a .aou .ux a X ®I24 nexa.e O I®II IIIX IoIS X s Ill 144 Io142 ` 0 Mme.r . XXXX

62 X 4 N — L 12 ‘% PAC/F/C OCEA 11 Komar. 1i: 1 14 0 Maaa . p ,+JJi,.u,uyJ JJY A.

THIRTY-SECOND ARMY DISPOSITION S 4 JUNE 194 5

Adopted from o Japanese s0elch map in OCMS Japanese Monograph No .13 5

MILE S

T. L . RUSSELL t1 MAP 16

292 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

have been commonplace, judging from Base Force, misinterpreting the order , the following description of conditions : jumped the gun by withdrawing to Kiyamu ahead of time. Admiral Ota' s At one time there were almost 90 me n force was intercepted and sent back t o in the cave, lying on the ground in the mud in pitch darkness, except when a Oroku Peninsula to take up its assigne d doctor or corpsman would come aroun d positions west of the Japanese escape with a light and ask them how they felt. route. Medical supplies were very low, so very On the night of 29 May, the 24th little could be done to care for the wounded. Men died on all sides. Filth Division moved out of the lines in accumulated. In the heavy rains, water orderly fashion, leaving one-third o f poured into the cave and the wounded al- the 32d Regiment and the 22d IIB as a most drowned . The smell was so bad that covering force. While the division they could hardly breathe .5 evaded the Tenth Army and heade d In accordance with the schedule o f south, the 44th IMB remained in block- the withdrawal plan, on the night of 25 ing positions outside of Naha and th e May some 3,000 men remaining in th e 62d Division was likewise defensively 62d Division moved into positions block- disposed near Chan and Karadera . ing the drive of the 7th Infantry Divi- With the arrival of dawn on Wednes- sion. The enemy expected that the con- day, 30 May 1945, the greater portio n tinuing bad weather would aid thei r of the Thirty-second Army had success- efforts in this sector considerably. fully postponed its final reckoning a t This expectation was valid, but onl y the hands of the Tenth Army by with - to the degree that the rain put greate r drawing from Shuri and out of the obstacles in the way of the successfu l grasp of General Buckner's flanking American drive than did the Japanes e divisions. Having taken advantage o f infantry. Reinforcing the 62d and com- the heavy rains and the accompanyin g ing under its command were the 7th poor visibility, General Ushijima had Heavy Artillery and 23d Shipping Engi- neer Regiments, which left their de- executed a "properly deft with- 6 fenses on Chinen Peninsula to occupy drawal" to establish new army head- holding positions on the right of th e quarters outside of Mabuni, 11 mile s division. Owing to the failure of th e south of Shuri, in a cave deep within 62d Division to accomplish its mission, Hill 89. By then, his covering force s General Ushijima was convinced that it were in position to slow down a Tenth was necessary to evacuate Shuri whil e Army pursuit and thereby give the he still had the time . On 28 May, he Thirty-second Army a bit more time t o ordered that the withdrawal was to be- organize the defense of Kiyamu Penin- gin on the following evening. The Naval sula.

"Interrogation of Superior Pvt, 5th Co , "Matters for the Attention of Unit Com- 22d IIB, POW Interrogation Rpt No . 54," in manders During the Change in the Direction of 1st MarDiv G–2 PeriodicRpt No . 63, dtd Advance, n . d .," Translation No. 85, in 1st 3Jun45. MarDiv G–2 PeriodicRpt No . 64, dtd 6Jun45 .

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 293

THE PURSUIT 7 The weather situation changed so abruptly at the end of the month that American attempts to exploit the "For the first time no enemy plane s successful breakthrough at Shuri and were detected in the area for the 24- maintain incessant pressure on the reel- hour period" ending at midnight, 3 0 ing Thirty-second Army were frustrated Maya° The heavy rain, however, di d on 30 May by an electrical storm ac- not completely stop ground activity o n companied by torrential rains on a n the 30th, for attacks were made al l already-saturated landscape . Movement along the Tenth Army front. In the of all Tenth Army units was effectivel y XXIV Corps zone, the 96th Divisio n halted by the mud . Amphibious craft and the right flank regiment of the 7t h and vehicles were employed on both Division—the 17th Infantry—attacke d coasts to give logistic support to the tw o west and captured the high ground i n corps and enabled the ground com- the rear of the Shuri positions, one an d manders to maintain at least minimum a half miles west of Yonabaru. Other supply levels. elements of the 7th Division passe d Out of a total of 916 missions of al l through Shinzato and Sashiki against sorts flown by VMTB–232 in May, 7 4 little opposition, and moved deeper into were supply air drops in support of the Chinen Peninsula . The 77th Divi- frontline troops and advance patrols . sion ran into determined holding action In spite of the submarginal flying con- by the 32d Regiment, but managed ditions and limited visibility on 30 May , nevertheless to capture all of the high the squadron flew 12 air drop mission s ground and key defensive positions oc- to the 1st Marine Division . General del cupied by the enemy immediately to the Valle expressed his appreciation to northeast and east of Shuri.11 Major Feldmeier's pilots in a messag e In the 1st Marine Division zone, a which read in part : "Those pilots hav e grave situation confronting 3/1 on 3 0 guts !" 8 This congratulatory message May was rooted in events that had oc- could have been repeated just as well curred the day before, when the bat- the next day, when the squadron' s talion broke off contact with the enemy Avengers flew 37 missions over south - in Wana Draw and headed for Shuri ern Okinawa to drop water, medical Castle. At the time of the disengage- supplies, rations, and ammunition to the ground forces .9 10 CTF 31 AR, pt III, p. 41 . 11 Effective at 1200 on 31 May, the 77th ° Unless otherwise indicated, the material i n Division was pinched out of the line when th e this section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; direction of its attack and that of the 96t h ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; TAF AR ; 1s t Division was oriented towards the corps MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 7th boundary below Shuri . The 77th moved to a n Inf Div AR ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; assembly area in the rear on the next day, an d 96th Inf Div AR ; 1st Mar SAR ; 4th Mar SAR , its 305th Infantry was taken out of divisio n Ph III; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar SAR ; 22d Mar reserve to cover the right rear of the corp s SAR, Ph III; 29th Mar SAR, Ph III. advance . The 7th Division was assigned th e VMTB—232 WarD, May 45 . zone below the Naha-Yonabaru valley and in- 0 Ibid. cluding the Chinen Peninsula, also on the 30th . 294 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

AIR DELIVERY SECTION Marines and ship's crew of USS Sargent Bay load a TBM with supplies to be dropped to Tenth Army troops . (USN 80-G-338840)

VMTB-232 TBM drops supplies to troops near Shuri . (USMC 126402)

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 295

ment, all battalion assault companie s While attempting to locate the head - badly needed food, water, and ammuni- quarters of the Thirty-second Army at tion. An air drop scheduled at 1800 on Shuri Castle, representatives from th e the 29th at the castle was not made , 1st Division G–2 Section had discovere d with the result that the frontline troop s numerous caves containing many enemy were without food and water for 3 6 documents of intelligence value. To- hours.12 Commenting on this later, the gether with these intelligence people , battalion commander noted : General del Valle had sent the divisio n During this period the battalion wa s colors to Lieutenant Colonel Ross wit h operating under the worst imaginabl e a request that they be raised over th e conditions, no food, water, little ammuni- castle. After locating the remnants of a tion, the battalion CP 2500 yards to th e Japanese flagpole, the battalion com- rear of the lines, battalion dump 100 0 mander had it erected near the south- yards to the rear of the CP and all transportation hopelessly mired with the result s ern wall, raised the American flag, an d that no food of any type was available an d then ordered all observers to evacuat e the men had resorted to drinking water the area rapidly because he expected th e from shell-holes due to their extreme Japanese to use the flag as an aimin g thirst .13 point and to fire an artillery concentra- Early in the morning of the 30th , tion on the position almost immediately . Lieutenant Colonel Ross was informe d Continuing supply problems pre- that an air drop was scheduled fo r vented the 1st Marines from making 0600, and shortly thereafter he learne d any concerted attack on 30 May unti l that a very low ceiling had grounded th e the 1st and 2d Battalions had receive d planes . The battalion's Marines had supply air drops . On the left of the 1st now been without food and water fo r Marines, the 306th Infantry extende d two days and a night. This situation to the right, allowing Colonel Mason' s and an inadequate ammunition supply left battalion, 2/1, to move its left com- forced the battalion commander to tel l pany to the right, relieving Compan y Colonel Mason that unless this logistics C, 1/1 . Patrols from 1/1 ventured into problem was solved, it would be mos t the ruins of northern Shuri, but wer e difficult for the battalion to undertak e any extensive operations . Finally, at weight, compact, wax-wrapped cardboard con- tainer measuring 7 inches by 3% inches by ap- 1335 an air drop was made, but anothe r proximately 2 inches . This unit could be easily one had to be scheduled since most of carried in either a haversack or field pack . Fo r the first had fallen outside of the drop variety, there were three different types of zone and in enemy territory . Enough units or components—breakfast, dinner, an d of the supplies were recovered, however , supper—furnishing about 3,750 calories for the s - three meals . The ration contained such item to issue each man one-third of a K as biscuits, enriched chocolate bars, chewing Ration 14 and one canteen of water. gum, cigarettes, a packet of one of severa l types of beverage powder, and the main course 12 3/1 SAR, pp . 35-36. —a canned protein food consisting of one of 33 Ibid., p. 36. the following : chopped ham and egg, pork an d " This emergency ration, officially described veal loaf, cheese, pork luncheon meat, or as "Ration, Field K," was packed in a light- corned beef hash .

296 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

forced back by machine gun and 47mm The 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 AT fire from well-entrenched position s and then jumped off abreast of 2/22 , in a ravine southwest of Wana Draw . meeting the same heavy resistanc e On the right of the division zone, the along the way . Blocking the 3/22 path 5th Marines was also limited to loca l to the Kokuba was commanding terrain patrol action by its need to bring sup - in which Knob Hill, Hill 27, and a num- plies forward over muddy routes . ber of radio towers were located . At On 30 May, in torrential rains, th e approximately 1530, 3/22 secured this 22d and 29th Marines pressed the 6th area, but only after the ground troop s Division attack east to clear the north had fought a number of small arms and bank of the Kokuba . Heavy enemy re- grenade-throwing duels while clearing sistance, built around a framework o f the enemy out of an intricate system of mutually supporting machine guns em - tunnel-connected caves . Following th e placed in the mouths of Okinawan tombs, seizure of this high ground, Lieutenan t was made even more effective by the Colonel Clair W. Shisler reorganized his fact that the Marines had no armor 3d Battalion and continued the advanc e support for the greater part of the day . to the high ground north of and over- Jump-off time was advanced one hou r looking the Kokuba. As his troops dug to 1000 to permit division interpreters in for the night, they were subjected to and cooperative prisoners to broadcast intense mortar and artillery fire . surrender inducements over loud - Advancing alongside of 3/22, 1/2 9 speakers to enemy holdouts in front of made the main regimental effort . Dur- the 22d Marines. A barrage of small ing the attack, a Marine threw a satche l arms and mortar fire signified a nega- charge or a grenade into one of th e tive response to this effort. After a tombs along the advance route, settin g 15-minute artillery, rocket, and nava l off an estimated ton of explosives an d gunfire preparation, the division attack began at 1010 . causing approximately 25 casualties i n Company C ; B immediately passed On the right of the division line, Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse wa s through to maintain the attack.15 killed by sniper fire while in the van of Although machine gun and small arms 2/22 controlling its attack . The bat- fire from the numerous caves and forti- talion executive officer, Major John G . fied tombs in the battalion zone slowe d Johnson, assumed command and main- the progress of the attack, 1/29 wa s tained unit pressure against the cave s able to advance under the cover of fire and the improvised tomb-pillboxe s support from 3/29 . The latter also ad- thwarting the Marine advance. By vanced slowly, meanwhile maintaining nightfall, after a series of costly local contact with the 5th Marines on its left . attacks and mopping-up activities, th e At the end of the day, both 6th Divisio n battalion possessed hill positions over- assault regiments had gained 800 yard s looking the Kokuba estuary and the and were in firm possession of the ke trans-island rail line between Naha an d y Yonabaru. 15 6th MarDiv G-3 Jai, Ph III, 30May45.

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 297

high ground overlooking the Kokuba reality at 1255 on the 31st, when patrol s from the south. from 3/383 and 1/5 made contact sout h During the night of 30–31 May, the of the city . 18 volume of enemy artillery and mortar In a coordinated sweep with the 77t h fire on Tenth Army positions was notice - Infantry Division, the 1st Marine Divi- ably lighter in comparison to that which sion cleared out the enemy-infested had fallen previously in the battle for areas immediately surrounding Shuri . Shuri . When assault troops surged to - Mopping up of bothersome pockets in wards troublesome Japanese pockets the northern outskirts of the city and i n remaining about Shuri on the mornin g the stubborn Wana Draw was completed of the 31st, they were pleasantly sur- by noon. Later in the day, the 1st prised by the almost complete lack of Marines was ordered into division re- opposition . Only sporadic sniper and serve and given a primary mission o f machine gun fire broke the weird silenc e patrolling Shuri . in an area that had just recently been Despite supply and evacuation prob- filled with the din and crackle of battle . lems, the 5th Marines continued its Adhering to the Thirty-second Army southeasterly advance towards the hills withdrawal plan, rearguard forces fro m just north of Shichima, overlooking the the 44th IMB, 32d Regiment, and 22d Naha-Yonabaru highway. The 3d Bat- IIB had pulled out of their positions dur- talion made the main effort for the regi- ing the night to occupy the second hold. ment, jumping off at 1445—15 minute s ing line north of Tsukasan.16 Another after it had received an air drop of aspect of the completely reversed situ- water and ammunition. Upon reaching ation was the break in weather, which the hills, rifle and machine gun fir e changed the seemingly unending perio d from Japanese blocking units forced th e of rain and solid overcast into a day of battalion—on the corps boundary—to sunshine and high scattered clouds . dig in for the night. A gap existing between the 1st and 3d Battalions was American ground units moved into plugged by Company F of 2/5. Shuri, later described as "a perfect The heretofore steady progress of 17 and found it final defensive position," Tenth Army flanking units was slowed . Soldiers from to be nearly abandoned on 31 May when enemy resistance to the XXIV Corps quickly advanced and oc- 6th and 7th Divisions became stronger. cupied assigned objectives, and spent General Shepherd's assault regiment s most of the time thereafter mopping u p jumped off at 0730 and rapidly moved . Only on isolated pockets of resistance forward for several hundred yards be - n the extreme left of the 96th Divisio fore encountering unyielding Japanese d line, where attack elements encountere positions in the hill mass west of Shi- e the Tsukasan line defenses, was th chima and Kokuba . These were oc- . The encircle- corps objective not taken cupied by Admiral Ota's ragtag naval ment and occupation of Shuri became a troops and units of the 32d Regiment. The Marine advance was held up unti l 1e Okinawa Operations Record, p. 120 . 1P 3/1 SAR, p . 38. 18 1 /5 SAR, p . 9 .

298 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

about 1300, when a coordinated assault army were being driven . The battle so was launched under the cover of long - far had cost the Americans 5,309 men range support fire furnished by a com- dead, 23,909 wounded, and 346 missing pany of tanks situated as close to th e in action.1 9 line of departure as a minefield and a On 1 June, as though in anticipatio n sea of mud would permit. of an imminent end to the fighting bu t Although the division had some evi- in fact on the date stipulated in the ICE- dence that the enemy defense was crum- BERG logistics plan, unloading oper- bling here, the Marines had gained onl y ations off Hagushi changed from th e 400 yards by nightfall and were stil l assault to the garrison phase.20 This short of their objective. In night defense same day, the second consecutive clear lines that were consolidated along a one, the direction of the attack was re- series of low hills immediately west o f oriented in the XXIV Corps zone. In the the objective, the assault battalions 96th Division zone, the 381st and 383 d made preparations for a coordinate d Infantry Regiments relieved the 32 d attack on 1 June. All through the night, Infantry north of Chan on the line artillery batteries fired concentrations paralleling the corps boundary, where on suspected Japanese gun positions i n it turned east to end at a point 1,10 0 an attempt to destroy them. yards north of Karadera. A day later , On the left flank of the Tenth Army, General Griner's two regiments were to the 7th Division continued its two - attack to the south ; their objective, the pronged attack . One assault force drove hill complex approach to the Tomui - up the Naha-Yonabaru valley against a Aragusuku-Meka area. Guarding the chain of well-defended hills to reach the right rear of the corps advance was corps boundary at Chan ; the second sent 2/305, which had moved out to th e strong combat and reconnaissanc e boundary when the 77th and 96th Divi- patrols into the hills and valleys guard- sions had exchanged zones of respon- ing the neck of Chinen Peninsula . Little sibility. opposition was met there. With its 32d Infantry in reserve, th e By the end of May, the Tenth Arm y 7th Division attacked to the south in a had overcome the seemingly impreg- much narrower zone than it had been nable Shuri redoubt, only to run int o assigned before . During the previou s newly organized defenses positione d two days, combat patrols had thor- along the Kokuba River and north o f oughly scouted and prepared the way , Tsukasan. Since the initial landings on enabling the division to gain an aver- L-Day, General Buckner's forces had age of 1,100 yards against steadily ris- killed an estimated 62,548 Japanese ing opposition . Facing the American s soldiers and captured 465 others in 6 1 were elements of the 7th Heavy Artil- days of bloody endeavor . The Tenth lery and 23d Shipping Engineer Regi- Army had seized all but eight squar e ments, which slowly pulled back toward s miles of the island, and that parcel was Itokazu during the day . becoming a pocket of doom into whic h ' Tenth Army G—3 Rpt No . 67, dtd 1Jun45 . the remnants of General Ushijima's "0 CTF 31 AR, pt III, pp . 44—45 .

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 299

Maintaining constant pressure, bot h Major Walker's 6th Reconnaissance IIIAC assault divisions made substan- Company was to reconnoiter the penin- tial gains on 1 June in a coordinated sula after dark on the 1st . The company attack, which resulted in the capture of was to move out at 2100 and cross Nah a all the high ground commanding th e harbor in rubber boats to the northern cross-island highway running throug h part of Oroku . At 1110 that morning , the Kokuba River valley. The 1st Divi- General Shepherd received a IIIA C sion attack was made by 1/5 and 3/5, warning order alerting him that the 6th which overran enemy positions in th e Division axis of attack would probabl y hills east of Shichina to advance 1,500 – be reoriented in the direction of Oroku 1,800 yards before halting for the night . Peninsula, where the division woul d (See Map IX, Map Section.) land to secure the harbor and seize the In the 6th Division Zone, the 22d an d airfield. 22 To prevent disclosure of the 29th Marines broke through the de- presence of the reconnaissance company fenses that had held them up the da y Marines on Oroku, all IIIAC units wer e before and advanced swiftly in a directed to restrict the use of illuminat- smoothly functioning tank-infantr y ing and parachute flares between 203 0 attack. By late afternoon, the assault and 0300, 1–2 June .23 regiments possessed the high ground on Four scouting teams of four men each the northern bank of the Kokuba, an d spent six hours on enemy-held Oroku , sent patrols across the northern fork where they heard considerable Japa- of the river to select suitable crossin g nese activity and were fired upon . On sites. Having accomplished their mis- their return, the reconnaissance team s sion of slowing the American advance , reported that the peninsula was Japa- Japanese holding forces in the secon d nese-occupied, but that the enemy wa s defense line had withdrawn the previ- not there in great strength . ous night. Their action paved the way Besides ordering the Oroku attack , for the Tenth Army to continue th e General Geiger directed the 1st Divi- pursuit and to make an unopposed sion to assume responsibility for an d tactical river crossing. occupy the zone of the 6th, excluding According to oral instructions Gen- Naha, on 2 June. Colonel Snedeker' s eral Geiger gave him in the early morn- 7th Marines relieved the 22d and 29th ing of 1 June, General Shepherd was Marines shortly after noon of this date , given 36 hours to prepare his divisio n and General del Valle assumed contro l for an amphibious operation . For as of the overall zone at 1215. On the left , complex an operation as this, consider- 2/7 took over the 22d Marines line alon g ably more preparation time was usually the north bank of the Kokuba, and 3/ 7 allotted. Nevertheless, division planners replaced the 29th Marines in hill posi- were "to study the practicality of a tions west of Kokuba village . shore-to-shore landing on Oroku ." 2 1 22 6th MarDiv G-3 Jnl, Ph III, 1Jun45. Zt 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p. 15 . 23 Ibid.

300 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Immediately after arriving at the through Japanese defenses to the west o f Kokuba, 2/7 was ordered across th e Kamizato and Karadera, 96th Divisio n river and into the hills bordering its assault regiments advanced 800-1,20 0 south bank . Company E was the first t o yards. Farther west the 7th Divisio n cross. Utilizing a damaged but still- succeeded in pushing forward 2,40 0 standing bridge in the battalion zone, 24 yards against slight opposition from re- the company gained the heights north treating Japanese garrison troops . At of Tomigusuku and fought off an esti- the end of 1 June, Army infantry troop s mated 50 to 100 Japanese who tried to were positioned for a final drive to clos e turn the Marine right flank while Com- off Chinen Peninsula entirely . Rain dur- pany G was filing over the bridge. By ing the night of 1-2 June again resulted nightfall, Company F had joined the in the mud and supply problems ex- other two companies in establishing a perienced by all Tenth Army units firm bridgehead south of the river, an d earlier, and forced them to accommodate thus safeguarded the crossing site . their operations more to the obstacles Early in the morning of 2 June, th e posed by the rain and mud than the 5th Marines crossed the north branch enemy. of the Kokuba over a railroad bridge By noon of 2 June, the 6th Marine that the retreating Japanese had ne- Division had received final instructions glected to blow up . While attempting regarding the Oroku operation, and to advance beyond a seized ridge guard- General Shepherd's staff had already being the approaches to the village o f gun detailed planning . After examinin g Tomigusuku, the 5th Marines assault possible courses of action and schemes units were pinned down by intens e of maneuver for the landing—and elim- frontal and flanking rifle and machine inating those that seemed least likel y gun fire, which prevented their makin g to be successful—the division com- even limited gains for the rest of the mander decided to land on the Nishikoku day. Despite this bitter enemy reactio n beaches on the northeast coast of the here, the 5th Marines advance put the peninsula and drive south, generally fol- final segment of the Naha-Yonabar u lowing an axis of attack astride the highway into Tenth Army hands. Just high ground in the center of the penin- before midnight, the enemy launched a sula. (See Map 17 . ) determined counterattack—the first Governing the acceptance of this land- since his withdrawal from Shuri- ing plan was the fact that Nishikoku had against Marine lines. The Japanese wer e low rolling ground leading from th e driven back, but left behind 20 dead . most suitable beaches on Oroku to th e To the left of the IIIAC zone, XXIV airfield and Naha harbor . In addition, an Corps units made large gains all along attack inland from this beachhead woul d the line. In the process of cleaning out be angled in the best direction for com- Chan, seizing the high ground north prehensive, massed artillery support of Tera and Kamizato, and penetrating from the mainland.25 Other landing site s

=' 7th Mar Hist, p. 21 . 25 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 16 . BATTLE FOR OROK U PENINSUL A 4- 6 JUNE PROGRES S Adapted From A Sketch Map in The 6th Mar Dlv SA R

••••• 4JUNE 4*** 5JUNE 000 6JUNE

EEAS T

~/ ~o CHIN A

SE A

MAP 17 T. L . RUSSEL L

302 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

on Oroku under consideration were re- talions to spearhead the attack . The jected because the high seawall ringin g regiment was to drive rapidly inland t o the peninsula would have to be breached, seize dominating terrain near Kagami- which time limitations prohibited . Also sui, just north of the airfield, from which the enemy had direct observation of it was to cover the movement ashore of these other prospective beachhead sites the rest of the division . As soon as the from high ground inland. 4th Marines had moved beyond the Owing to a shortage of amphibious beachhead area onto its objective, an d tractors then existing at Okinawa, Gen- when LVTs had made the return trip eral Shepherd could count on having only and were available, the 29th Marines 72 LVTs available for the landing.26 would land. After this phase of the as- Most of the other amtracs were in poor sault had been completed, tanks and condition as a result of continued ex- supplies would be unloaded from landing tensive employment during the heavy craft. rains in ship-to-shore supply operation s The 6th Division assault forces were and in coastal runs supplying the flank- to mount out from assembly areas nea r ing divisions of the Tenth Army, and a n the mouths of the Asato and Asa Rivers , almost-complete reliance on the LVTs and supplies and tanks would be loade d for overland supply of frontline units . at a point that had been developed near Nevertheless with the LVTs he was Machinato and named Loomis Harbor given, General Shepherd planned to land after Colonel Francis B . Loomis, Jr., his division in a column of regiments , the G–4 for III Amphibious Corps .27 Be- the 4th Marines in assault. Colonel Shap- cause it would be difficult to maintain a ley in turn, chose his 1st and 2d Bat- waterborne resupply operation continuously during the peninsular fighting, 2e At the beginning of the campaign, the 4th and 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalions with a General Shepherd decided to seize On o total of 205 LVTs were attached to the 6t h Yama concurrently with the Oroku as- Marine Division . Added to those in the 1st sault. This small island in the middle of and 8th Battalions attached to the 1st Marine Kokuba Channel, across from the south - Division, the total number of LVTs availabl e ern end of the Naha Canal, served as a n to IIIAC was 421 . ILIAC AR, chap VII, p. 101 . The resupply of spare parts for LVTs wa s anchor for bridges from the mainlan d totally inadequate, especially in the case o f and the peninsula . Once a task force o f such vitally needed basic items as tracks, trac k reconnaissance company Marines rein- suspension system parts, front drive assem- forced by a company of LVT (A) s ha d blies, and transmission parts . The lack of al l taken the island, it would provide secu- of these deadlined a good many LVTs an d rity for an engineer detachment tha t severely limited the amount of support the y could have provided during the drive to the was to repair the damaged bridges. south and in the Oroku landing . At the end of After its capture, Ono Yama served th e the campaign, 75 LVTs had been completel y 6th Division as a logistic support base destroyed as a result of enemy action, or, that was located fairly close to th e having been badly damaged, they were canni- balized for spare parts. Of the 346 vehicles fighting. remaining, 200 were deadlined for lack of spare parts . Ibid ., p . 102 . 27 Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 126.

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 303

Both logistical and personnel prepara- ments had taken 1,400 yards of enemy tions for the assault were increasingl y territory, even though the combination complicated by the almost-complet e of continuing bad weather and almost breakdown of the road net as a result insurmountable supply problems seeme d of the resumption of heavy rain . There- to conspire against further American fore, all division tactical and support successes. At sunset, 96th Divisio n movement had to be made over water . troops overwhelmed determined enemy "Even the division CP, deploying to a defenders to seize commanding terrai n forward location near Amike was rein the hill mass north of the road and quired to move entirely by DUKWs." 28 rail junction at Iwa . Because an already - Despite these handicaps, all 6th Division existing gap between Marine and Army assault and support units made ready units had been widened by the acceler- for the amphibious landing on K-Day , ated pace of the XXIV Corps, the 305th 4 June ; the reinforced reconnaissance Infantry continued its role of guardin g Marines were to land at 0500 on Ono the exposed flank of the corps at th e Yama, and the main assault force 4 5 boundary between it and IIIAC . minutes later on Oroku . To the right of the 305th, from mid- While the 6th Division was tempo- night, 2 June, to dawn the next day, th e rarily out of the fighting and preparing 5th Marines frustrated persistent enemy for the Oroku invasion, the attack south attempts to infiltrate its lines . After increased in impetus and force. By late sunrise, the Marines spent the mornin g afternoon of 3 June, the 7th Infantry probing the front with patrols, which Division had reached the east coast o f soon were pinned down by scattered but Okinawa below Kakibana and cut off well-placed enemy fire from positions the Chinen Peninsula completely . The south of Tsukasan and west of Gisushi . 32d Infantry then moved into the hill When the 1st and 3d Battalions could complex of the peninsula to destroy any move forward no further, 2/5 was members of the Japanese garrison still alerted to its possible commitment t o remaining. General Arnold consolidated ease the situation . the lines of the 17th and 184th Infantry At 1230, Lieutenant Colonel Benedict in the hills overlooking Itokazu and To- was ordered to circle around the left yama, where the soldiers poised for an battalion—1/5--by moving in a wid e attack to the southwest against Kiyamu arc through the XXIV Corps zone, an d Peninsula positions . (See Map IX, Map to outflank and come up behind enemy Section. ) strongpoints on the high ground nea r To the right of the 7th, the 96th Divi- Tomusu and Gishusi. Taking only equip- sion also scored gains on 3 June. Kamiz- ment that it could carry, the battalio n ato, Tera, and then Inasomi fell after moved out at 1330. At 1800, after having only a perfunctory enemy defense . Be- trekked over a difficult, muddy, and cir- fore halting the attack to set up night de- cuitous route, it arrived at a jump-off fenses, General Bradley 's assault regi - position 400 yards east of its objective . Twenty minutes after arriving here, 2/ 5 28 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p. 16 . attacked with Companies E and G in

304 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the assault and quickly secured the tar- flank during the day, however, with mor- get against only slight enemy resistance . tar, machine gun, and machine canno n As 2/5 Marines began to dig in, the y fire from emplacements in the hills found that the entire ridge contained guarding the entrance to Oroku Penin- a well-organized cave defense system , sula. This steady enemy fire constantl y and began blowing up cave entrances to menaced supply and evacuation partie s seal them. A white phosphorous grenad e traveling a well-worn route into th e thrown into one cave set off what ap- regimental zone from the only bridge parently was a Japanese ammunition over the Kokuba River. A combination dump ; the resulting explosion blew up of this harassment and the difficulty o f the entire side of the hill in the Compan y negotiating over rain-damaged roa d E sector, killing 3 Marines and wound- nets again forced the Marines to depend ing 17. The exposed 2/5 position ahead upon air drops as a source of supply fo r of the 1st Division line presented th e rations and ammunition. battalion with a most difficult task o f To fulfill the logistic requirements o f evacuating casualties, which was accom- the ground forces, the Avengers o f plished only "by invaluable assistance" VMTB–232 were kept as busy in June a s provided by 2/383 on its right.29 they had been in May air dropping pre - While 2/5 was outflanking the Gis- packaged loads to IIIAC and XXIV ushi position, at 1530 the 1st and 3 d Corps units that could not be replenished Battalions resumed the regimental at- through normal supply channels . The tack under enemy fire which had less- squadron made 24 drops on 1 June ; 32 ened considerably since the morning. on 2 June ; 24 on 3 June.30 Having re- When these two battalions halted at ceived a supply replenishment fro m 1900, they had advanced 1,500 yards and planes during the day, both assault bat- through Tsukasan, placing the 5th Ma- talions of the 7th Marines were across rines south of the former rear comman d the Kokuba by nightfall of the 3d and post of the Thirty-second Army . The solidly set in the hill mass south of th e relative ease with which the 1st Division river ; 3/7 was in contact with 1/5, an d had advanced on 3 June indicated that the regiment was tied in across its front. the Japanese rear guard had once again Well within the period it had bee n withdrawn towards fixed positions on allotted, the 6th Division completed ar- Kiyamu. rangements for its shore-to-shore opera- Spearheaded by 1st Reconnaissance tion by the end of 3 June . Beacon lights Company patrols, assault units of the to mark the line of departure were set 7th Marines rolled up 200 yards in the division right. This advance established in place 1,200 yards north of the Nishi- Marine control of virtually the entire koku beaches at 1215 that day, and divi- hill mass south of Kokuba. Scattered sion assault forces were en route to enemy holding groups constantly ha- board the LVTs at embarkation points rassed advancing Marines on the right on the west coast. The 22d Marines were

20 2/5 SAR, p. 16 . 80 VMTB-232 WarD, Jun45 .

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 305

placed in IIIAC reserve in and aroun d June, troops and equipment loaded Naha ; its regimental weapons company aboard the tracked amphibians accord- moved to the shore of the Kokuba estu- ing to plan. An intense prelanding bom- ary, where it set up its 37mm and self- bardment was laid down on the target propelled assault guns in position to for an hour's duration before H-Hour ; support the 4 June landing . Supplement- over 4,300 rounds of high explosive ing the massive fire support provided b y shells ranging in caliber from 75mm t o artillery, naval gunfire, air, and its own 14-inch blasted suspected enemy posi- organic weapons, the 4th Marines woul d tions on the high ground immediately have the additional fire support of a behind the Nishikoku beaches.32 (See company of LVT(A)s, a company of Map 17. ) tanks, and a mobile rocket launcher de- Once loaded, the invasion flotill a tachment. All preparations were com- headed south towards the target in two pleted at 2300, and the 6th Marine columns, 400 yards apart ; 1/4 in the Division stood poised for the Orok u seaward column since it was to land on Assault. Red 2, the westernmost beach . Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the THE CAPTURE OF OROK U bombardment of Oroku, 3/5 began blast- PENINSULA 31 ing Ono Yama, and 15 minutes later th e 6th Reconnaissance Company landed o n As directed in the landing plan, the schedule, supported by LVT (A) s of the 4th Marines were to land on beaches Army 708th Amphibious Tank Bat- designated Red 1 and Red 2 with 1/4 on talion.33 the right, 2,/4 on the left . The total During their approach to the line of length of the beaches was approximately departure, assault Marines were treate d 600 yards. Offshore, a rough coral shelf to the spectacle of the furious lashing about 200 yards long was a not-insur- given the beach area by the guns of 1 mountable barrier to the landing site. battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 destroyer , The assault wave was to be followed b y and 15 battalions of artillery which the other waves in LVTs. As envisioned, joined in the cannonading . At the line o f the shore-to-shore movement would b e departure, the lead LVT (A) of each a comparatively simple operation. In column signalled a column left, where - addition to the beacon lights marking the upon the following LVTs executed the line of departure, the only other contro l movement, formed up into seven waves, measure was to be the normal radi o and headed towards the beach . Four communication between the assaul t LCTs carrying 20 tanks and 10 LCM s units. carrying elements of the 4th Marine s In the early morning darkness of 4 Weapons Company followed in the wake of the assault waves. 31 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s Before they had reached the line of section is derived from : 6th MarDiv SAR, P h departure, mechanical failures forced al l III; 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph III; 4th Mar SAR, P h III; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III ; 29th Mar SAR, Ph 32 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 16. III. "Ibid., p . 17 .

306 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

of the tractors carrying 1/4 to slo w battalion came ashore during the re- down and some to fall out of the forma- mainder of the morning. tion. Radio communication as well as Once ashore, the assault forces found overall contact was lost. By the time that the terrain very open and generally flat, the battalion had reached the line of de- with several 50 to 100-foot tall hillock s parture, nine tractors had dropped ou t breaking up the landscape . As the attack and only six were able to make the final moved inland to the central, southern , run into the beach . Some of the cripples and western portions of the peninsula , got underway again, but troops in the the Marines encountered many ridge s other amtracs had to be picked up by and steep hills—the highest of which spare LVTs in the wave carrying the was some 183 feet in height. The small regimental headquarters . The battalio n hills initially captured were unoccupie d commander's request for a delay of H - by the enemy, but close inspection Hour was refused by Colonel Shapley, showed that the terrain was honey - who ordered the attack to proceed ac- combed with tunnels and numerou s cording to schedule. As a result, only firing ports, which, when manned, ha d two platoons of the right assault com- given the defenders commanding all- pany of 1/4 and one from the left around views of the area. landed on time . The 2d Battalion ex- Following its surge beyond the beach- perienced no difficulty during its ap- head, 2/4 met mounting resistance o n proach and landing . the left. Extensive minefields on the Intelligence estimates had indicate d plateau immediately adjoining the land- that the peninsula was defended by ing site and the rain-soaked ground 1,200–1,500 enemy troops . At 0600 , held up the tank-infantry advance as when the first Marines went ashore the y well . Both obstacles restricted tank op- saw no Japanese defenders on the beach , erations and forced the Shermans to however, and were able to rush inlan d remain roadbound . Many sections of the 300 yards to high ground against onl y roads had been blown up by the enem y scattered machine gun fire. All 2d Bat- and the mediums were unable to bypas s talion units were ashore and reorganize d these spots over the bemired fields ; the in little more than a half hour after th e ground troops were thus threatened first elements had landed . with having their armor support severely curtailed .34 The job of filling i n By 0650, all tanks of Company A, 6th the cratered roads soon surpassed the d Tank Battalion, in support of 2/4, an capabilities of the tank dozers. attached engineer mine removal team s Although the 1/4 reserve, Company B were ashore . Four self-propelled 105mm o howitzers of the regimental weapons was the only element of the battalion t . It was then company also landed at this time . Except land in near-full strength committed at once on the right of 1/ 4 for one tank lost in a pothole, Compan y and ordered to take the high ground C tanks landed at 0800 and began sup - overlooking Kagamisui . The company porting those troops of 1/4 already on the peninsula. The rest of the infantry 34 6th TkBn SAR, Ph III, p . 15 .

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 307

promptly overran the objective main- 2/4 by 1300 ; 3/29 took over the rest o f taining the momentum of the battalio n the zone at 1430, whereupon 2/4 wen t attack and permitting 1/4 to gain its into regimental reserve . objective, 1,000 yards inland, at 1100 . At 0900, 6th Division wiremen ferried In regimental reserve, 3/4 was never- a four-trunk cable across the mouth o f theless committed to the right of 1/4 a t Naha Harbor in rubber boats, strung i t approximately 0905, within 20 minute s over the mast of a sunken ship, and had after it had landed . The 3d Battalion it tied at the terminals of assault uni t immediately pushed forward to the edge switchboards on Oroku at 1100. At the of Oroku airfield. Observers noted that same time that this task was underway, the field was overgrown with rough division engineers worked rapidly to re- grass, was swampy, and appeared i n pair the bridges between Naha, On o very poor condition overall. Large re- Yama, and the peninsula . Bridging oper- vetments were ranged along the edges ations began immediately after the har- of the three runways. Even though they bor island had been secured at 0600 . provided excellent concealment an d After 30 minutes of sharp fighting dur- some cover, it would have been danger- ing which it killed an estimated 2 5 ous to use them since the enemy seeme d enemy soldiers, the 6th Reconnaissanc e to have had them well ranged in with Company deployed to positions where th e mortars. The wreckage of several scouts could protect engineers who were planes, apparently strafed and bombed assembling the Bailey bridge . earlier by American aircraft, was Elsewhere on Ono Yama, other engi- strewn over the field. Running along neers inflated rubber pontoons that were the right (west) edge of the field wa s to be placed into the water to support a a seawall, heavily overgrown with bridge spanning the wide estuary be- palmetto and brush. On the eastern edge tween the island and Oroku . It was not of the airdrome was a series of foothill possible to establish this link until Ma- ridges that were crisscrossed with caves rines on the peninsula had neutralize d and aircraft revetments .35 heavy enemy machine gun fire aimed at An hour after 3/4 had landed, Gen- puncturing and sinking the pontoons . eral Shepherd believed that the beach - By nightfall, 1/29 was landed and in head had been sufficiently enlarged t o regimental reserve, 2/4 was set up in a n the point where it could accept the land- assembly area as its regiment's reserve, ing of a second regiment . Accordingly , and the attack had halted for the day . he ordered the 29th Marines to begi n At this time, the invasion force ha d moving to Oroku immediately . Two of pushed inland 1,500 yards against Colonel Whaling's battalions were steadily increasing resistance. In addi- quickly transported to the peninsula and tion to this Japanese opposition, the at- moved into the lines on the left of th e tack had been slowed in the afternoo n 4th Marines . The 2d Battalion was by very heavy rain storms as well as ashore and relieving left flank units o f numerous minefields, whose neutralization and destruction taxed overworke d 3a 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 5. mine-disposal teams .

310-224 0 - 69 - 21

308 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

During the first day on Oroku, th e cans, had been employed only briefly assault forces had received a considerabl e earlier in the Okinawa campaign and amount of fire from a variety of auto- had not appeared again until this time . matic weapons ranging up to 40mm i n At 0700 on 5 June, 1/22 reverted t o caliber. It was later learned that these the 6th Division from corps reserve, and , weapons had been stripped from the as division reserve then, was deployed damaged aircraft on and around Oroku on the division boundary in the right airfield and distributed to the groun d (west) flank of the 7th Marines attack- defense force, which then was able t o ing south. At 0730, the Oroku assault offer a more formidable response to the resumed and moved slowly against de- Marine invasion. From early evening termined stubborn opposition unti l and on through the night of 4–5 June, noon, when the 4th Marines was halte d Marine lines were subjected to sporadic by an enemy strongpoint near Toma. enemy artillery and mortar fire . Muddy ground on the right of the A startling new Japanese weapon me t 4th Marines zone made it impossible to by Marines on Iwo Jima36 was brought employ tanks, so a platoon of the tracke d into the Okinawa campaign when th e vehicles skirted the seawall to come up 6th Division was introduced to the en- on the airfield behind 3/4—in whos e emy's 8-inch rocket. Dubbed a "Scream- zone Toma lay—to assist the infantry ing Mimi" or "Whistling Willie" by th e attack. As the armor drew near ope n troops, 37 because of the noise it made terrain on the field, it began receivin g while tumbling through the air end over enemy artillery fire . The 15th Marines end, the projectile was more a source o f was called upon to provide counterbat- annoyance than danger and caused fe w tery fire against suspected enemy posi- casualties. Its explosion was loud and tions revealed by gun flashes ; a tank concussion great, but this rudimentary officer adjusted this artillery fire from missile's fragmentation was ineffectual his forward position .39 An inspection and its accuracy was poor. "It was later disclosed that the 15th Marines ha d launched from a pair of horizontal rails silenced four 120mm dual purpose, on e about 15 feet long, aiming was strictl y 6-inch, and several field guns of smalle r hit or miss, a process of sandbags, guess- caliber. Blown roads and bridges in the work, and luck ."38 The rockets continued 3/4 zone, not yet repaired by the engi- to fall in rear areas during the night, neers, forced the battalion to attack while enemy snipers and would-be in- Toma without accompanying tanks , filtrators were active. which provided direct fire support, how - Troops on Ono Yama received ma- ever, from positions in the rear of the chine gun and spigot mortar fire in the lines. darkness. These 320mm mortar shells , The enemy was well dug in in this nicknamed "flying ashcans" by Ameri - sector and located in deep, strongly for- se tified caves that were impervious to al l See Bartley, Iwo Jima, pp. 13, 13n . but pointblank fire . Since tanks were ' 3/29 SAR, Ph III, p. 4 ; 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p. 6. bogged down and not available, 37m m 3B Ibid. " 6th TkBn SAR, Ph III, p . 16.

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 309

guns were brought to the front and em- Overcoming both bitter enemy resist- ployed to good advantage against th e ance and problems of supply and evacu- enemy positions . After having bee n ation, the 4th Marines advanced the di - stymied through most of the day, 3/ 4 vision line 1,000 yards on the 5th . finally overran the Japanese defenses Frontline units experienced considerable late in the afternoon with the aid of th e small arms and automatic weapons fir e fire from M–7s in the 1/4 zone and th e as well as many grenade launcher bar- support of tanks that had rumbled int o rages, "but very little heavy mortar and position behind the 3d Battalion earlier. no artillery fire, which was a relief to al l By nightfall, the battalion held 75 per- hands."43 The enemy placed the artillery cent of the airfield and favorable jump- and mortar concentrations on rear areas off positions for the resumed attack on instead, however, preventing LVTs the next day . from using the tank route leading to In the right center of the 4th Marines 3/4 positions to give that battalion sup - zone, 1/4 became pinned down by ply and evacuation support . A 50-man frontal and flanking fire almost immedi- working party, organized at regimental ately after it attacked the morning of the headquarters to replace the amphibiou s 5th. When 3/4 cracked open the Toma tractors, hand-carried urgently needed defenses, the 1st Battalion was able to supplies up to 3/4, and took out evac- take up the attack again. As it did so , uees on its return to Colonel Shapley's 1/4 moved forward over terrain that CP 44 was broken by a number of steep hill s The 29th Marines made slow but containing many extensive tunnels in steady progress on 5 June against enemy the mouths of which machine guns wer e opposition that was moderate to heavy. emplaced and sited for all-around de- By 1400, the regimental advance wa s fense.40 The 4th Marines' commande r slowed when assault units encountered noted that the heavy resistance met al l a strong center of resistance near Hill along his line was reminiscent of that 57, at the southeast outskirts of Oroku 41 encountered in the battle for Naha . Mura. This strongpoint gave trouble to When the attack for the day ended at left flank elements of the 4th Marines 1700, 1/4 held positions on high groun d also. A Japanese counterattack launche d overlooking Ashimine and Toma on the against 3/29 before the battalion ha d right, and an unnamed village, desig- moved forward 1,000 yards was easil y nated "Oroku Mura,"42 on the left. blunted, but fire from enemy position s located in the areas of adjacent bat- 4th Mar SAR, Ph III, p. 9. 40 n 41 Ibid. talions finally forced the 3rd Battalio 421/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 5, Literally translated , to hold up . "mura" means township, or in this case pre- The 2nd Battalion continued to push fecture ; Oroku Mura referred to the politica l its left flank southeast along the banks subdivision in which the peninsula resided . The naming of this village was a matter of happen - of the Kokuba, and finally secured a stance since the map designation OROKU MURA was printed directly above the village' s 48 4th Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 9 . location on the map . 44 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p. 6 .

310 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bridgesite area opposite Ono Yama. This of a series of small temple-like hills, permitted the engineers to float a 300 - each of which had been converted into a foot pontoon bridge into position. Paus- fortress by construction of innumerabl e ing only to leave security detachment s caves, from which mutually supporting at the bridge as a guard against enem y automatic weapons could cover adjacen t attempts to destroy it, the battalion con- positions and deny the open ground be- tinued the attack. At 1810, the first LVT tween the hills [to the Americans] ." 4 8 crossed over the bridge to Oroku from Naval personnel from Admiral Ota' s Ono Yama, opening a direct ground sup - force manned the machine guns an d ply line to the assault troops.46 20mm cannon guarding the sector . After In the course of their operations on 6 a day of bitter fighting without armore d June, the two assault regiments of the support—the narrow roads in the bat- 6th Division uncovered major enemy de- talion zone were heavily mined an d fenses that were centered along the cratered, and impassable to tanks—th e axial ridge running northwest-south- gains of 3/29 were limited to a scan t east along the length of Oroku Penin- 150 yards. sula. The terrain of this hilly region Immediately fronting the 1/4 line o f favored the defenders, not only by its attack was a hill the Marines called complexity but also by a heavy over- "Little Sugar Loaf," that 3/29 had been growth of tangled vegetation . Immedi- unable to take earlier. Lieutenant Col- ately after they had resumed their at - onel George B. Bell planned for his in- tacks on the 6th, both the 4th and 29t h fantry to capture it by means of a doubl e Marines were held up by determined envelopment coordinated with a tank enemy opposition from concealed and drive up the center of the valley leading well-camouflaged defenses. to the objective. Assault companie s A platoon of tanks supported the at - forming the wings of the envelopment tack of the 2/29 with overhead fire at were pinned down as soon as the y ranges of up to 1,200 yards from a high jumped off. The attack did not begin ridge overlooking the battalion objective until 1530, when support tanks arrive d —the village of Oroku . Left flank ele- and were in position . Although the ad- ments of the 2d Battalion pushed for- vance began to gain momentum, the ward and captured the high ground i n battalion commander thought that night the village itself, but were unable t o would fall before the objective wa s advance much farther in the face of taken and ordered his assault element s heavy enemy fire . A second platoon of back to the lines occupied that morning, tanks moved along the river bank an d with little to show for the day's efforts . attempted to get into position to subdu e Although 1/4 had demonstrated how th e this fire, but it was unable to bypass a enemy defenses could be breached in thi s destroyed bridge in its path . sector, it was not to have the satisfactio n On the right of the 29th Marines zone, of doing it itself ; early the next day it 3/29 moved over terrain that "consiste d was relieved by 2/4 .

6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph III, 5Jun45. 4e 29th Mar SAR, Ph III, p. 8.

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 311

To the right of 1/4 on 6 June, Lieu- 3/22 joined the 1st Battalion on the tenant Colonel Hochmuth's 3d Battalio n division east boundary, adjoining the attacked following an air strike on th e west flank of the 7th Marines driving many ridges in front of the battalion . south ; and 2/22 was alerted to move to As Company I on the right prepared a new defense position elsewhere on the to move out, its right flank was subjected division boundary. to some 20mm and heavier caliber fir e Considerable resistance continued to from Senaga Shima, a small rocky island plague the 6th Division as it unrelent- flanking the Marine lines and lying ap- ingly swept across the peninsula on 7 proximately 1,000 yards off the souther n June. (See Map 18.) The 4th Marine s coast of the peninsula. Tenth Army ar- again made the most satisfactory prog- tillery and naval gunfire support ships ress of the day, but its right flank, which blasted the island, silencing all but th e had advanced against only slight oppo- 20mm weapons. An air strike was ur- sition on the previous day, was con - gently called for and arrived a half hou r fronted with a much stronger defense in later. "As rack after rack of bombs fell," the vicinity of Gushi . As 3/4 tried to scoring direct hits on the Japanese em- take the last section of high ground on placements, "the troops stood up an d the west coast, its leading company came cheered."47 (See Map 17.) under a deadly machine gun and rifle Disregarding the 20mm fire from crossfire at the same time that extremel y Senaga as best they could, Marines from accurate and heavy mortar barrages fell 3/4 moved rapidly forward as soon a s on the only route of approach to th e the last plane in each of a series of ai r battalion goal. Both direct and indirect strikes made its final run over a target supporting fires bombarded Japanes e in front of the battalion. Scattered small positions to no avail . At the end of th e arms fire paced the troops attackin g day the battalion commander, faced wit h over comparatively flat terrain, but 3/4 the prospect of sustaining heavy cas- succeeded in securing the rest of the air - ualties if he pushed on, decided to pul l field by the end of the day . his forwardmost elements back and hol d Engineer road-construction crews an d the ground already taken . mine-disposal teams worked on 6 Jun e Colonel Shapley's 2d Battalion passed in warm and clearing weather. Discov- through 1/4 at 0730, and began its at- ered and disarmed on the main north- tack on Little Sugar Loaf with the sup- south road bisecting the peninsula wer e porting fires of 37mm guns, tanks , . 83 mines of all types. At noon, Compan y and self-propelled 105mm howitzers - B of the tank battalion landed from Left flank elements of 3/4 also sup - LCTs with the rest of the battalion's ported the attack as Company G maneu tanks and immediately went into re- vered around to the right of the enem y . serve.48 Also on 6 June, the 22d Marine s position and took it at 1100 as a whole reverted from corps reserve ; Following its capture of Little Suga r Loaf, the 4th Marines pushed ahead 47 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 6. slowly against machine gun fire comin g 48 6th TkBn SAR, Ph III, p. 16. from all directions and ever-stiffening

BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSUL A 7- 9 JUNE PROGRES S Adapted From A Sketch Map In The 6th MarDiv SA R ••••• 7 JUNE * * * * 8 JUNE 0 0 0 9 JUN E

MAP 18 t L . RUSSELL

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 313

enemy opposition . Frontline Marines , three days, the battalion gained little already expert in the technique of seal- ground, but killed an estimated 500 ing caves, furthered their expertise troops, destroyed a large variety o f while closing the many caves on Oroku weapons, and sealed many caves con- with a deadly combination of direct fire , taining enemy soldiers, supplies, an d flame, and demolitions . Unit commanders equipment.49 soon surmised that the peninsula was be - Two factors served to restrict the ing defended by an enemy force greater progress of the 29th Marines on 7 June . than the 1,500–2,000 soldiers and naval Hostile enemy concealed in the rocky troops previously estimated. Captured outcroppings of the coastal ridge paral- documents and POWs substantially con - leling the Kokuba pinned down the at- firmed the fact that the Oroku defense tackers with a drumfire from automati c had been reinforced by a number o f weapons . Secondly, the positions of th e naval troops, which had originally enemy in a confined area and the prox- moved south to Itoman and then had imity to the 29th of adjacent friendl y been ordered back to the peninsula . This troops severely limited the employmen t information also indicated that the orig- by the regiment of its supporting fires . inal American strength estimate of naval To destroy the Japanese weapons posi- personnel was faulty and now had to tions and the soldiers manning them, be revised upward because many Oki- gun crews from 2/29 manhandled thei r nawan conscripts had been dragooned 37mm weapons up steep slopes to the into the ranks of Admiral Ota's force. ridge overlooking the enemy emplace- Although many of the Japanese on ments and effectively raked them wit h Oroku had been killed after three days murderous direct fire. of fighting on the peninsula, the stub - In the zone of the 2d Battalion, tank- born opposition of those still alive cause d infantry teams made satisfactory prog- casualty figures in the 4th Marines to ress towards their village objective. The mount. Frontline units could only be boggy, steep, and difficult terrain an d supplied after dark because of the lethal heavy concentrations of minefields that fire covering approach routes . By night- limited tank employment elsewhere o n fall, the lines of 3/4 extended in a the peninsula were not in evidence in southeasterly direction and faced north, the east coastal zone, where the Sher- while on the left, 2/4 still attacked to- mans proved their worth . After crossing wards the southeast. The boundary be- the newly constructed bridge at the sit e tween the 4th and 29th Marines ran in a where a destroyed one had held up the southeasterly direction down the middl e tanks on the previous day, and rollin g of the peninsula . along the southern shore of Naha har- Just to the left of the 4th Marines, bor, the tank platoon attached to 2/29 3/29 began the first of three days of assisted the infantry in capturing Orok u extremely vicious fighting by a grenade village. Without pause, the battalio n and bayonet assault without armored continued its attack and seized the hig h support on the hill to its immediate front. During the period following these 4a 3/29 SAR, Ph III, p . 5.

314 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ground in the immediate vicinity of the taking. By this time, the 4th Marine s village. Accurate and heavy enemy ar- on the right had advanced much further tillery fire and an extensive minefield than the stalled 29th had in its zone on then held the tanks up. the left. Colonel Shapley's regiment wa s Along the division boundary, on 7 in the process of pivoting on the righ t June the 22d Marines continued sendin g flank elements of the 29th Marines i n patrols out into the high ground im- a counterclockwise movement that, whe n mediately east of Chikuto . Having fixed ended, would head the 4th in the direc- the approximate center of enemy tion of the hard core of Japanese resist- strength in this area, 3/22 moved two ance. In effect, the elements on the right companies into position to attack th e wing of the 4th would sweep in front high ground designated Hill 103 . By of the 22d Marines and continue on t o 1400, the Japanese stronghold was over - the northeast. Neither the 22d nor th e run, which effectively eliminated fir e 29th Marine lines would remain static , from that area on the 1st Division west however, for at this point all three in- flank, and gave it an additional measur e fantry regiments were moving and in- of security . exorably tightening the circle around Hill 103 proved to be an importan t Admiral Ota's hapless force . enemy observation post occupied by a During the evening of 7 June, 1/4 large number of Japanese troops. By was alerted and prepared to enter th e choosing to remain in their caves, these line the next morning on the right of soldiers sealed their own doom since 3/4. For the 8 June attack, battalion this ineffectual defensive tactic confine d boundaries were changed to reflect th e their fields of fire and permitted the new direction in which these two unit s Marine attackers to outflank the position were to head. Early on the 8th, Marin e over covered routes of approach .60 mortars laid a smoke screen over the According to the original scheme of route 1/4 was to take as it skirted along maneuver established for the Oroku in- the eastern edge of the airfield while vasion, the 4th and 29th Marines would getting into jump-off positions . The 1st drive towards the base of the peninsul a Battalion's objective was the hig h in a southeasterly direction . But, th e ground located approximately midwa y rapid pace of the division attack during between Uibaru and Gushi . At 1030, the its first four days on the peninsula ha d assault elements attacked and immedi- forced the enemy to withdraw to the ately were pinned down by a hail o f south of Oroku village and, with his bac k fire from rifles, machine guns, and to the Kokuba Gawa, into the hills which mortars. were honeycombed with strong defen- Bitter enemy reaction to the Marine sive positions . General Shepherd's orde r assault was unallayed despite the mason 8 June reorienting the axis of attack sive fires of American tanks, M–7s an d to the northeast was a formal recogni- organic infantry crew-served weapons . tion of the course that the battle was The attacks of the 1st and 3d Battalion s were so coordinated that one could ai d u0 3/22 SAR, Ph III, pp. 8-9. the other at any given time. Because the

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 315

tanks were unable to deliver direct sup- just 200 yards short of that day's ob- port fire from their masked positions, jective. Taking time out only to regroup , they lumbered forward into the open the battalion continued its advance, bu t shortly after midday and blasted the was slowed by ever-increasing Japanes e 1/4 objective for 20 minutes. After this fire from well-constructed positions i n preparation, Company A again attacke d the mouths of caves. Nevertheless, by the high ground, this time overrunning 1530, 2/4 assault elements had capture d enemy machine gun and mortar em - the objective and began organizing fo r placements . At 1430, Company C night defense . Before dark, patrols wer e jumped off to the south with armor sup - sent back to mop up bypassed positions port and proceeded to clean the enemy in the battalion rear . out of the high ground in its sector an d To effect a junction with the 4th Ma- down to the seawall . Meanwhile, Com- rines, the 22d Marines pivoted on its pany B entered the battalion line to th e right flank unit, while the 3d Battalio n left of Company A and swung north, ty- on the left moved in a clockwise direc- ing in for the night with 3/4 . After tion to tie in with 3/4 . A 3/22 patrol clearing the ground in the battalion moved to the seawall and made contact rear, Company C moved into positio n with the right flank element of the 4t h on the right rear of A to cover the ex- at 1550. Shortly thereafter, another bat- posed battalion flank overlooking th e talion patrol scouted potential LVT north-south Itoman road . Thus, the 1st landing beaches on the East China Se a Battalion commander had the uniqu e coast north of Itoman . Reinforced by an experience of having his three infantr y infantry company from the 2d Battalion, companies make successful attacks in 1/22 sent out strong combat patrols to as many different directions . take two hills . One, Hill 55, was approxi- While the 1st Battalion headed for th e mately 500 yards east of Chiwa, and the seawall, 3/4 began a cross-peninsular other, designated Hill 55-1, was almos t attack over extremely rugged terrain the same distance east of the first . that was marked by a maze of interlac- Throughout the day, the patrols received ing ridges. "Every slope had its allot- light small arms fire which increased ment of caves, each covering the other in intensity as the hill objectives were from flank and rear."51 Many of thes e neared. At 1800, the easternmost height, caves were filled with enormous store s Hill 55-1, was in possession of the Ma- of explosives, which created a hazard- rines, who were forced to withdraw un- ous condition for the demolition team s der cover of darkness because of an attempting to seal them . Nonetheless, ammunition shortage coupled with the indomitable teams set off hundred s heavy incoming enemy mortar fire . of pounds of demolitions to destroy th e Originally scheduled to jump off at honeycomb of cave entrances . 0830, on 9 June, the 22d Marines attack At 1300 on 8 June, an hour and a hal f was delayed until 0900. The 1st Bat- after it had resumed its attack, 2/4 wa s talion was to retake Hill 55-1, 2/22 was to seize Hill 55, while 3/22 was ordered 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 7. to capture Hill 28 on the outskirts of

316 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Chiwa. The plan of attack called for the from an enemy rail-mounted 75mm gun , 1st Battalion to seize its objective, and firing from cave ports on the side of a for the 2d Battalion to pass through and cliff near Chiwa .53 capture its target. Not until late after- Despite the temporary loss of its sup- noon was 1/22 able to complete its mis- porting armor, 1/4 attacked in the fac e sion, and the few daylight hours remain - of intense machine gun and mortar fire. ing did not give 2/22 enough time to Progress was slow and casualties in- capture its objective. As a result, Colonel creased steadily as the battalion ad- Harold C. Roberts concurred in the bat- vanced over ground that was honey- talion commander's recommendation to combed with caves, all of which had t o postpone the attack. be blown before they could be passed. Intense fire coming from Hill 55 pre- At dusk, the right flank of 1/4 was vented Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3/2 2 anchored on a ridge northwest of Chiwa, from outposting Hill 28 until after dark. while the battalion left flank extende d But Hill 26, just south of the primary to the outskirts of Uibaru, which ha d battalion objective, was secured and oc- been taken earlier that day by 3/4 . cupied at 1000 by Company I, which A rocket barrage preceded the morn- soon made firm contact with 4th Marine s ing attack of 3/4 on 9 June. After the patrols after the latter had cleaned out 3d Battalion moved out, difficult terrai n Chiwa. prevented the battalion commander In the course of its fighting on 9 June , from maintaining unit control as his the 4th Marines found little that wa s men worked closely with 2/4 to take th e different from previous days' experi- latter's objective, Uibaru . Upon occu- ences on the peninsula, for : pying the village, the 3d Battalion re- The advance was still slow and tediou s ceived 20 casualties when a heavy enem y against bitter resistance . Every Ja p mortar concentration blasted its posi- seemed to be armed with a machine gun , tions. and there was still some light and heav y mortar fire . Casualties continued to mount As the three infantry regiments of the and the number of Japs killed soared over 6th Division converged on the Oroku the maximum of 1500 which were suppose d garrison from different directions, and to have been defending, and there were completely isolated it from the mai n still plenty left.5 2 body of the Thirty-second Army at Ki- The 1st Battalion was ordered to seize yamu, Admiral Ota's mixed defens e high ground near Hill 55–2—the third force was slowly compressed into a smal l hill so designated in the 6th Divisio n pocket in the southeast region of th e zone—in the vicinity of Uibaru . The peninsula. On all levels, Marine corn- Marine attack was delayed until supporting armor could get into firing posi- " 1/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 6 ; "The gun seemed as surprised by the arrival of the tanks as th e tions on the road paralleling the righ t tanks by fire from the gun, because it fired onl y flank of 1/4. Once ready to fire, th e HE [High Explosive projectiles] and no A P tanks were driven off by a bombardmen t [Armor Piercing] and the tanks were able to get to cover without loss ." Maj John R . Kerman " 4th Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 12 . ltr to CMC, dtd 7Jan48, hereafter Kerman ltr. BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 317

6TH DIVISION MARINES land on Oroku Peninsula. Note the medium tank with flotation gear. (USMC 122601)

FINAL SWEEP of Oroku Peninsula in the last stages of the battle . (USMC 126176)

318 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

manders found it increasingly difficult to move through the now-demolished vil- to maintain unit control and to coordi- lage and on to the road leading south nate the employment of their supportin g to Itoman. Once in position on the flank fires with those of adjacent friendl y of the cliff-emplaced enemy 75mm gun , units because of the limitations impose d it knocked the Japanese field piece out of by restricted zones of action. These con- commission . Only two shots were fired— ditions conspired with the stubborn ter - one from the enemy gun, which misse d rain and the no-less yielding defense and one from the tank, which didn't.64 to slow to some degree all of the attack- On 10 June, the momentum of the 6th ing Marine battalions. Division attack was accelerated. (See One of these units, 2/4, was ordered Map 19.) Early that morning, heavy to capture the last remaining Japanese- construction equipment began clearing held high ground in its zone . To com- all tank approaches to the 2/4 frontlines, plete this mission, the 2d Battalion was and by 0815 tanks and self-propelle d required to mount a frontal attack up a howitzers were moving into position to 400-yard wide valley over terrain that support the infantry attack . In coordina- offered little cover or concealment. After tion with the 29th Marines on the left , the battalion jumped off at 1145 on 9 2/4 jumped off at 0945 with three com- June, supported by tanks, M-7s, an d panies abreast in assault . Less than an 37mm guns, its initial progress was hour later, all attack elements were o n slow. Further inhibiting the advance the objective and organizing defensive was the fact that a lack of tank ap- positions from which they were to sup - proaches to the objective lessened the port the attack of the 29th Marines fo r amount of close armor support given t o the next two days . the infantry . Also, 2/4 had to mov e From all appearances, the end of the ahead cautiously, for it was attackin g battle for Oroku was near. At the same in the direction of its own artillery an d time that 2/4 had broken through the across the front of the 29th Marines . Japanese lines, the 1st and 3d Battalion s Supplementing the natural tank ob- advanced against lessening resistance . stacles in this sector, the Japanese had By 1400 on 10 June, the battalion constructed a tank trap in front of thei r boundaries of the 4th Marines had con - well-prepared ridge position and furthe r verged to squeeze 3/4 out of the line, and safeguarded the area by a liberal sprin- it went into regimental reserve . kling of mines . Since the Marines had While the 4th Marines pressed east no armored bulldozers or tank dozers - immediately available, they were unabl e ward, the 22d Marines drove northeast towards Tomigusuki, with 2/22 making to construct a bypass in time to permit the main regimental effort . This 1st and tanks to move ahead to support 2/4. At 3d Battalions provided fire support fro 1530, therefore, the battalion com- m mander decided to halt the attack for positions they then held. When 2/22 had the day. seized its objective, 3/22 was ordered forward and coordinated its attack with Late in the afternoon, after 1/4 had pushed through Gushi, a tank managed 64 Ibid.

BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSUL A 10-11 JUNE PROGRES S Adopted From A Sketch Mop In The 6th MarDiv SA R

•00000 10 JUNE *4** II JUN E

W MAP 19 T. L. RUSSELL GO

320 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

that of 1/4 on the left . The 4th and 22d ing its path, and captured it before dark . Marines made slow but steady progres s By this time, Company K on the battal- on 10 June, but 29th Marines battalion s ion right still was 300 yards short o f continued to meet stubborn resistance establishing contact with 3/22 . and could report only limited gains . The 22d Marines, led by 2/22, at- Moving slowly through Oroku villag e tacked Hill 62—north of Tomigusuki- behind flame tanks, 2/29 was held u p following an intense 30-minute artillery and its way blocked when the lead tank preparation fired by six battalions of was destroyed by a direct hit from a 105mm and one battalion of 155mm Japanese 8-inch shell . The regiment , howitzers.55 Once 2/22 had seized Hill therefore, was unable to reach the las t 62, 3/22 was to support the 4th Marine s major enemy defense pocket in the sec- until the latter masked its fires, afte r tor, which was located on the high which it would pass through 2/22 and ground west of Oroku village . The capture Hill 53, overlooking Kokub a Japanese troops trapped here began a Estuary. The 2d Battalion was unable number of frantic attempts to break out. to carry the hill in its first attempt and During the night 10–11 June, a series did not, in fact, seize the hilltop until of local counterattacks hit all along th e 1220, after a heavy fire fight . front. The heaviest of these took place At 1300, 3/22 effected a passage o f in the sector of 1/4, which counted ove r the 2d Battalion lines and was in posi- 200 enemy dead in front of its lines after tion to attack 45 minutes later . Despite dawn. In reaction to the unfaltering the lack of an artillery preparation on and determined opposition of the Jap- the objective,56 the assault elements at- anese defenders, General Shepherd tacked, following a heavy mortar con- launched an all-out armor-supported at - centration . One factor preventing the tack, committing the greater portion o f tanks from gaining more favorable fir- eight infantry battalions to destroy th e ing positions or even advancing with last vestiges of enemy resistance o n the infantry was the presence of well - Oroku. concealed minefields along the route they In the 4th Marines zone, 3/4 resumed were to travel . A mine-removal tea m its attack at 0730, passing through th e worked under direct enemy fire an d right elements of 1/4 ; the latter alon g finally cleared a lane through which the with 2/4 remained in position to sup- tanks could pass to provide limited sup - port the attack by fire. As the leadin g port. At 1450, Company L occupied Hill company began moving forward over a 53, giving the 6th Division high groun d route that ran between Hill 58 (east of that overlooked not only the Kokub a Uibaru) and Tomigusuki, it was hel d Estuary, but also the entire Oroku area up by a hail of fire coming from Hill 62 , on the right front. Covered by snipe r 6G 22d Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 12. fire from 1/4 on the left and tank sup - ""As the three regiments came closer together, it became dangerous and finally im- porting fire from the rear, Company I possible to use even 60mm mortars, and som e spent the better part of the day attempt- casualties were incurred from friendly fire o n ing to overcome the fortified hill block- both flanks ." Bergren ltr .

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 321

to the north where the 29th Marines Though my body decay in remot e had been unable to make any headway . Okinawa, My spirit will persist in defense of the That regiment attacked to seize the com- homeland . manding terrain west of Oroku village Minoru Ota repeatedly throughout the day, but was Naval Commander 57 unable to find a way to overcome the Four days after the transmission of series of small, mutually supporting hil l the above, Admiral Ota released his las t positions that comprised the defense dispatch to his immediate commander, system here. General Ushij ima : Undoubtedly aware that his end an d Enemy tank groups are now attackin g that of the Oroku garrison force was our cave headquarters. The Naval Base not far distant, Admiral Ota had sen t Force is dying gloriously at this moment . . . . We are grateful for your past kind- the following communique to his supe- nesses and pray for the success of the riors in Tokyo on 6 June : Army.58 More than two months have passed since Marine artillerymen killed or dis- we engaged the invaders. In complete unity persed a group of Japanese soldiers at- and harmony with the Army, we hav e tempting to break out of their entrap- made every effort to crush the enemy . 59 Despite our efforts the battle is goin g ment during the night 11–12 June, against us. My own troops are at a dis- and the 22d Marines dispatched 51 o f advantage since all available heavy gun s the enemy attempting to infiltrate the and four crack battalions of naval landin g regimental line . Obvious signs of a forces were allocated to Army command . break in the enemy's stubborn and well - Also, enemy equipment is superior to ou r own. coordinated defense appeared on 1 2 I tender herewith my deepest apology June, when the 4th and 29th Marines to the Emperor for my failure to bette r compressed an already compact enem y defend the Empire, the grave task wit h pocket west of Tomigusuki, while the which I was entrusted. 22d pressed to the north in the direction The troops under my command have fought gallantly, in the finest tradition o f of Oroku village. (See Map 20. ) the Japanese Navy. Fierce bombing and The 4th Marines advanced slowly un- bombardments may deform the mountain s der heavy machine gun fire from posi- l of Okinawa but cannot alter the loya tions in the hills and draws surroundin g spirit of our men . We hope and pray fo r the perpetuation of the Empire and gladly Hill 62 and from well-concealed caves give our lives for that goal . on the hill itself. At 1225, the hill was To the Navy Minister and all my supe- captured and the attack continued with rior officers I tender sincerest appreciatio n the Marines systematically cleaning ou t and gratitude for their kindness of many all pockets of resistance as they ad- years. At the same time, I earnestly beg you to give thoughtful consideration to the vanced. Three hours later, 3/4 tied i n families of my men who fall at this out- Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Pineau, Divine post as soldiers of the Emperor. 64 With my officers and men I give three Wind, p . 147 . cheers for the Emperor and pray for the 6a Okinawa Operations Record, p . 126. everlasting peace of the Empire. " IIIAC Arty AR, p . 30.

MAP 20 T. L . RUSSELL

BREAKOUT TO THE SOUTH 323

with the 22d Marines for the night, 500 anese from the marshy grassland s yards from Naha Bay and with onl y along the river bank. A number of en- one more large hill to be seized . emy soldiers gave themselves up, some The same day, the 29th Marines committed suicide, others fought to the cracked open the firm enemy defenses bitter end, and a few stoically awaite d that had held it up for almost a week. their deaths . Oroku village was cleaned out by 2/29 , During the liquidation of this pocket , as 1/29 began the first in a series o f Colonel John C . McQueen, 6th Marine coordinated attacks at dawn to neutral- Division Chief of Staff, and Colonel Ro y ize the enemy's mutually supported po- N. Hillyer, Tenth Army Chaplain , sitions west of Oroku.60 By late after- viewed the fighting from the north shor e noon, Easy Hill—the last Japanese of the Naha Estuary at a point approxi- strongpoint in the zone of the 29th mately 1,000 yards across the water Marines—was taken . Having lost this from Oroku . "They saw the Marine s key terrain feature, enemy troops were come up over the high ground from th e forced to flee to the alluvial flatlands south and close in on the Japanese . . . along the river coast between Hill 5 3 The last survivor was a Japanese officer and Oroku. At this time, they "bega n who calmly walked over to the seawall, displaying flags of surrender . Language sat down, lit a cigarette, and waited for officers equipped with loudspeaker sys- the Marines to kill him ." 62 tems were dispatched to the front lin e Marine assault troops reached the sea- areas to assist in the surrender of thos e wall at noon and spent the rest of the Japanese who desired to [do so] . The day ferreting out small enemy groups attempt was partially successful, 8 6 attempting to evade death or capture enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down 61 by hiding in the cane fields and rice their arms ." paddies near the river . At 1750, General The 6th Division made a final sweep o f Shepherd reported to General Geige r the remaining Japanese-held area with that all organized resistance on Orok u 3/29, which relieved the 1st Battalion , Peninsula had ended .63 During the day , and 2/29 jumping off to destroy all 6th Division troops had killed 861 enemy enemy still existing in their zone . Ad- soldiers and captured 78 prisoners .64 e vancing rapidly to the southeast, th The 6th Reconnaissance Company re- 29th Marines battalions swept past the ceived orders at noon on 13 June to seiz e 1st and 2d Battalions of the 4th Marines , troublesome Senaga Shima—the island pinching them out of the line ; 3/4 also that had been scouted the night of 1 0 . As they approache raced to the beach d June—at 0500 on 14 June . To accom- the river flats, the attackers formed into plish the task, a company from 1/29 was skirmish lines, flushing the routed Jap- attached. For four days preceding the 00 After the 29th Marines first attack on 1 2 assault, the island had been subjected June, the last company of the 3d Battlaion 02 still on the line was squeezed out and passed t o Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 127 . 1/29 as reserve. 3/29 SAR, Ph III, p. 5. °3 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph III, 13Jun45 .

°1 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p. 21 . °' Ibid.; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 21.

310-224 0 - 69 - 22

324 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

to a heavy and continuous bombard- During ten days ' fighting, almost 5,000 ment. At the scheduled time, the LVT- Japanese were killed and nearly 200 take n prisoner (A) -borne attack was launched and pro- . Thirty of our tanks were disabled, many by mines . One tank wa s ceeded according to plan . There was no destroyed by two direct hits from an 8" resistance to the landing. As the recon- naval gun fired at point blank range . naissance Marines combed the island, Finally, 1,608 Marines were killed or they found only dead bodies and silence d wounded .65 guns—all victims of the intense preland- A most noteworthy aspect of th e ing preparation. Oroku operation was the ability of the The battle of Oroku ended on 14 June . Tenth Army to exploit the amphibiou s General Shepherd noted that : capability of one of its Marine division s The ten-day battle was a bitter one, during a critical phase of the Okinawa from its inception to the destruction of th e campaign despite the extremely limite d last organized resistance . The enemy ha d time available for assault preparations. taken full advantage of the terrain which Overcoming most obstacles and dis- adapted itself extraordinarily well to a deliberate defense in depth . The rugged counting others, the 6th Marine Division coral outcroppings and the many small planned and launched an amphibious as- precipitous hills had obviously been organ- sault within the 36-hour period allotted ized for defense over a long period of time . to it."s In an after-action analysis of the Cave and tunnel systems of a most elab- operation, General Shepherd stated that orate nature had been cut into each terrain feature of importance, and heavy "with trained troops and competent weapons were sited for defense against staffs in all echelons, the amphibiou s attack from any direction . landing of a division is not of excessiv e Despite the powerful converging attack complexity."87 of three regiments, the advance was slow , laborious, and bitterly opposed. The cap- " Ibid., p . 22 . ture of each defensive locality was a prob- ee lem in itself, involving carefully thought Shepherd memo II. out planning and painstaking execution . " 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, p . 60. CHAPTER 1 0 Battle's End

ON TO KUNISHI RIDGE1 could have gotten them across the inlet." 3 At the same time the 6th Marine Divi- On the division right on 4 June, the sion was landing on Oroku Peninsula , 7th Marines pushed forward to close off the 1st Marine Division was rolling up the neck of Oroku Peninsula and further gains totalling 1,800 yards in its drive entrap Japanese forces there . The hill south from the Naha-Yonabaru valley . mass at the base of Oroku in the divi- (See Map IX, Map Section.) General sion zone held the commanding terrain del Valle's regiments made this advance feature of the area, Hill 108 . This height while a faltering division supply system overlooked the East China Sea and the behind them threatened to break down next major division objective, Itoman . completely because of the mud and the Although the exposed right flank of th e rain. The roads had become such quag- 7th Marines came under constant ha- mires that even tractors and bulldozers rassing fire from high ground to th e became stalled when they attempted right of the division boundary, the divi- to drag division vehicles out of or sion left flank was generally secure over the mud. Tanks and trucks were since the adjacent 96th Infantry Divi- unable to cross the Kokuba ; the ap- sion had moved forward steadily sinc e proaches to the bridge at the mouth of its advance from the Kokuba River line . the river were untrafficable for a dis- After the Japanese defenses at Shuri tance of over 500 yards.2 In an effor t had collapsed, the 1st Marines remained to facilitate resupply and evacuation behind in the vicinity of the city to pa- operations, tanks were ordered off the trol and mop up, and the 5th Marines roads. In general, forward units were pursued the fleeing enemy . Before the logistically supported by Marines who dawn of 4 June, the 1st joined in the hand carried supplies up to dumps be - pursuit ; 3/1 made a wide swing throug h hind the lines ; the "trails were only the zone of the 96th Division in order negotiable for foot troops—vehicles to take the high ground north of Iwa could not have been used if we [2/7 ] and Shindawaku while 1/1 passed through the lines of the 5th Marines and ' Unless otherwise noted, the material con- 7 tained in this section is derived from : Tenth took up positions in front of Hills 5 Army AR ; IIIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1s t and 107. MarDiv G—3 Jnl ; 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; By 0930, 3/1 had reached the small 7th Mar SAR ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III ; 7th Mar village of Tera, just north of Chan.4 At Hist ; MajGen Pedro A. del Valle, "Southwar d From Shuri," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 3 2/7 SAR, p . 7 . 10 (Oct45), hereafter del Valle, "Southwar d ' This Tera is not to be confused with a sec- From Shuri." ond village of the same name located nea r 3 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 4Jun45. Itoman on the east coast . 325

326 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1300, the battalion point was pinne d nawa by the men of this battalion ." 6 down by fire coming from high groun d In addition, 3/1 found itself all but iso- just west of the Tomusu-Iwa road, an d lated from its regiment, since there was the advance guard attempted without neither communication with nor a sup- success to clean out the enemy position . ply route to the 1st Marines CP, som e Just before 1400, the time scheduled fo r 11,000 yards to the rear.? 3/1 to make its coordinated attack with The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1/1, a cloudburst occurred . The supply passed through the lines of 2/5 at ap- problems here were further aggravated proximately 1000 on the 4th . This was by the rain, and because of a communi- nearly three hours after Company F o f cations blackout between the battalio n 2/5 had attacked and seized Hill 10 7 and its artillery and naval gunfire sup - without opposition, and completed it s port, 3/1 broke contact with the enemy occupation of the high ground acros s and withdrew to a bivouac area in a the entire front of the regiment . When draw behind the 383d Infantry. 1/1 took over from 2/5 at noon, the At 1730, Lieutenant Colonel Ross' en- latter passed into corps reserve wit h tire battalion was in defilade, protected the rest of the 5th Marines, but main- from enemy artillery fire. Contact wit h tained its positions as a secondary line .8 the artillery battalions and naval gun- Although the downpour on 4 June ha d fire support ships was still lacking at forced General del Valle to cancel th e this time and a mortar ammunition attack of 1/1 scheduled for 1400 that shortage existed . The afternoon down- afternoon, the 7th Marines on the right pours had turned the roads int o had already jumped off . An hour later, morasses and the fields into calf-deep the cancellation order was rescinded, mud wallows in which the suction of and Lieutenant Colonel Shofner's bat- the ooze pulled the soles off of the shoes talion was again ordered to attack, to of men walking in it. contact the 7th Marines, and to seize its Since food as well as mortar am - original objective—the high groun d munition was in short supply, the 383 d north of Iwa and Shindawaku . Infantry generously supplied the bat- At 1630, the assault companies of talion with enough K-rations to enable 1/1 moved out to secure their target , 3/1 to issue two meals to each Marine .5 some 1,500 yards away. The route of It was the general consensus of the attack was up a valley floor, at the end members of 3/1 that "taking all things of which a number of lesser hills rose in into consideration, this day probabl y front of the objective . A creek that ra n was the most miserable spent on Oki- east to west across the valley was no t 6 The commanding general of the 96th Divi- visible from the LD ; but a map recon- sion believed that these Marines "were not naissance indicated that the assault equipped or organized for a protracted cam- 0 paign . I was glad to assist in supply, air drops , 3/1 SAR, p . 41 . and the care of their wounded . They were fin e 7 Ibid. comrades and cooperated to the fullest extent ." 2/5 SAR, p . 16 ; 5th Mar SAR, p . 9 . At thi s MajGen James L. Bradley ltr to GMC, dt d time, the 5th Marines CP was moved to the 220ct54 . vicinity of Giushi .

BATTLE'S END 327

forces would be able to cross it with, behind to evacuate the wounded afte r little difficulty . The Marines met no dark. The next morning, the 1st Bat- opposition after jumping off until reach- talion was ordered to bypass the enemy ing the "creek," now swollen into a rag- strongpoint by swinging into the zon e ing torrent by the day's rains. It pre- of the 96th Division and follow closely sented a formidable barrier to furthe r in the trace of the 3/1 attack on Iwa . 12 progress. A reconnaissance of th e Colonel Mason anticipated the prob- stream banks uncovered a rudimentar y lem of maintaining radio and wire con- bridge for carts to the left of the bat- tact with his battalions as they raced talion position.° The assault troops were south. His movement order provided ordered to move upstream, cross th e that, in case of a complete communica- bridge, and redeploy on the other side. tions breakdown between regiment and As soon as the first Marine elements the assault battalions, the most senio r had crossed and were wallowing in mu d battalion commander of the committe d towards firm ground, the heretofore- units would assume tactical comman d silent Japanese opened up with mortars overall until contact was establishe d and point-blank machine gun fire , with regiment once more. 13 Following a sweeping the ranks of the onsurgin g mud-slogging and wearying march troops. The Marines pushed on, none- south on 5 June, 50 men from 1/ 1 theless, and two platoons made it acros s dropped out of ranks from exhaustion . to the south bank of the creek, only to During the trek, the battalion lost con - become pinned down . tact with regimental headquarters for The 7th Marines on the right was un- a brief time and temporarily came able to negotiate the swiftly flowing under control of Lieutenant Colone l waters and was held up on the nort h Ross.'' bank,10 and the bridge-crossing site was Out of contact with regimental head- fully covered by enemy defensive fires quarters from the time he had led his coming from a 200-foot-high ridge i n battalion south from Shuri, and with , front of 1/1 . Therefore, the battalio n the battalion objective yet uncaptured commander ordered his troops to with- Lieutenant Colonel Ross decided to com- draw to the sector of 2/5 for the night .1' plete his mission nevertheless. He took his command group forward early in th e Because 1/1 had sustained a number o f morning of 5 June to make a visual casualties, a covering force remaine d reconnaissance of the target. While this inspection was taking place, the Marine s ' LtCol Austin C . Shofner interview by Hist- Div, HQMC, dtd 19Mar47 hereafter Shofne r of 3/1 built fires in an attempt to war m interview . themselves and dry as much of thei r ""There was no bridge in the 3/7 Zof A clothing as possible before mounting [Zone of Action] . Several men were drowned the attack. Prior to the jumpoff, 3/ 1 attempting to carry lines across the stream i n an attempt to get troops across ." LtCol Walte r 12 1 /1 SAR, p . 21 . Holomon ltr to CMC, dtd 22'Mar65, hereafte r "Col Arthur T . Mason ltr to CMG, dt d Holomon ltr . 10Mar47 . 11 Shot ner interview. "1/1 SAR, p. 21 .

328 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

received 19 supply air drops from formed a battalion skirmish line ove r VMTB–232 aircraft. In between th e an extremely wide front . The Marines day's intermittent showers, the squad- then swept northward and past the zon e ron flew a total of 41 resupply sorties ; where 3/7 was preparing to attack in a its all-time high to that date .15 The bat- southwesterly direction . Lieutenant talion departed its bivouac area at Colonel Shofner's troops accomplishe d 1030 and arrived at the assembly are a their sweep at 1400 and then attacke d shortly thereafter ; Lieutenant Colonel and seized the ridge overlooking the Ross then issued his attack order for stream. The few enemy soldiers still the capture of the Iwa-Shindawaku manning positions on this objective, not ridge. expecting an attack from the rear, were Before jumping off at 1230, 3/ 1 surprised while changing into civilia n learned that patrols from 2/383 had clothes. After taking the position with passed through Iwa without opposition. little effort, 1/1 went into reserve nea r As soon as the Marine attack began, Tomusu.ls lead elements were held up for a shor t Because 3/1 had not been resupplie d time by sporadic machine gun and before its attack at 0900 on the 6th, th e sniper fire, but took the ridge befor e 383d Infantry again issued the Marine s dark. In the two days spent to envelo p K-rations ; this time, enough to provide the objective, the battalion had travelle d each man in the battalion with one an d more than 3,000 yards . By this time, th e a half meals.17 After jumping off, 3/ 1 advance CP of the regiment had move d advanced west and reached the outskirts far enough forward to enable Colonel of Shindawaku at 1030, when enemy Mason to issue attack orders personally troops were discovered occupying com- to his battalion commanders . manding ground on the ridge running The plan for the next day's attack northwest from the village. By 1800, called for 3/1 to continue the advance however, the battalion had secured the and seize Shindawaku . The 1st Battalio n ridge after a brief fight and 2/1 had would destroy all bypassed enem y moved to an area northwest of Iwa . pockets in the regimental zone and to Although the left flank of 3/1 was tie d the rear of 3/1, and would backtrack in with 2/383 for the night, the Marin e to the stream where the 4 June attack battalion had not been able to contact had been stymied . the 7th Marines on the right . Early the To the relief of all, the rain stoppe d next morning, 2/1 was moved into posi- during the night of 5–6 June. At dawn tion to plug this gap . of the 6th, 1/1 moved out of its bivouac During its drive south, the 1st Marin e east of Iwa, swung down to the village, Division was sporadically halted fo r and then turned north . At this point, brief periods before a number of block- all three of its infantry companies ing positions organized and manned by small enemy groups 16 VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45. The squadron . Each of these parachuted more than 20 tons of supplies t o 19 1st Marine Division troops on 5 June . 1s t 1/1 SAR, p . 21 . MarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p. 10. " 3/1 SAR, p. 43 .

BATTLE 'S END 329

groups was generally the size of a com- valuable information. The company, pany, and all of them together com- however, found that its operations wer e prised a force equaling no more than severely restricted by its limited com- two battalions. The Japanese holding munications system and supply organ- units had been ordered and were deter- ization. 19 mined to delay the Tenth Army as long Like the 1st Marines, the 7th found as possible . The tactical situation and the enemy less difficult than such othe r the nature of their mission, however , problems as those caused by the weather prohibited their setting up anythin g and the terrain. Marine wounded were more permanent and stronger than evacuated in the rain over a five-mile hastily contrived defensive positions , sea of mud ; sniper fire generally which were unable to hold back th e harassed the 8 to 10 litter bearers re- aggressive Marine offensive for long . quired for each casualty during the en- When reconnaissance patrols uncov- tire trip to the rear . Each day's attack ered these strong points, infantry com- was usually delayed until the weather manders deployed their forces to take was clear enough for land- and carrier- the objective by a combination of fir e based 20 planes to make a supply drop ; and maneuver. In most cases, the major so many sorties were flown for the 7th attack force maneuvered into position Marines as it trekked southwards that to assault the objective from its flank the trail of the regiment was blazed or rear. At this time, Marine element s with brightly colored cargo para- in front of the target supported the chutes.21 attack by firing on the objective to kee p The initial attack of the 7th Marines the enemy fixed in position. At times, southwards from the Kokuba Rive r the enveloping force provided fire sup - bridgehead on 4 June gained the regi- port for a frontal attack. Regardless of ment approximately 1,100 yards. That the methods employed, the weather situ- same day, 2/7 captured Takanyuta. On ation, and the condition of the terrain , the next day, the formerly raging tor- General del Valle felt that "it was re- rent in front of 3/7 had receded to un- freshing to be able to maneuver again , cover a causeway over which part o f even on a modest scale ." 18 the battalion crossed ; the remainde r On the critical right flank, the 7th moved to the zone of the 2d Battalion Marines paced the division advance o n and crossed the stream from there .22 5 June with the 2d and 3d Battalion s Once beyond the south bank, the assaul t attacking against increasing opposition ; 1° 1/7 followed behind, mopping up the Snedeker ltr 1947 . rear area. Acting as a screen to the =° During the course of the entire campaign , carrier-based planes often joined the Avenger s right of 2/7 along the division right of the two TAF VMTBs in making supply boundary, the 1st Reconnaissance Com- drops . Air Delivery Section, H&S Bn, Corps pany dispatched patrols far ahead of th e Troops, IIIAC, ICEBERG Op AR, dtd 24Jun45 , battalion advance, which sent back in - end A, hereafter AirDelSec AR. 21 7th Mar Hist, pp . 22-23 . " del Valle, "Southward From Shuri," p . 39 . 22 Holomon ltr.

330 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

battalions of the 7th drove forward lowing up a thorough combined arm s 1,000 yards to a point just north o f preparation, 2/7 overran Hill 108 to Hanja village. command a view of the island south to When furious machine gun and mor- Kunishi. The former defenders of 108 tar fire from a hill mass in the zone of were seen fleeing south in small groups the 6th Division held up the 7th Ma- ranging in size from 10–20 men each . rines, General del Valle received per- The fire of Marine support weapons an d mission from IIIAC to lay the artiller y machine guns relentlessly pursued th e fire of the 11th Marines on the sus- Japanese troops, killing many . After re- pected enemy positions . General Shep- ceiving an air drop of supplies, 3/7 herd was authorized to cancel the fir e attacked at 1430, overran Hanja, mad e when it threatened his troops. As the contact with 2/1 on its left, and dug i n 1st Division continued its drive past th e for the night on a ridge just north o f neck of the Oroku Peninsula, expandin g Zawa. the already-lengthy right flank of th e Following receipt of still another division, 1/22 was ordered into defen- supply air drop early on 8 June, 3/7 sive positions along this flank . resumed its attack with a sweep through On the next day, 6 June, the 22 d Zawa as advance elements of 2/7 probe d Marines battalion had not yet occupied the Japanese positions guarding Ito - its assigned flank security positions . It man. Besides positioning the division became necessary, therefore, to orde r for a final drive south, the breakthroug h 1st Division troops into the 6th Divi- to the seacoast uncovered beaches o n sion zone to capture Hill 103 an d which LVTs could land when a water - destroy the enemy automatic weapon s borne supply system was established . and mortars harassing the right flan k When the first LVTs touched down o n of the 7th Marines . Lieutenant Colonel the coast approximately 500 yards north Berger's battalion had already attacke d of Itoman shortly after noon on 8 June, and was, in fact, within a few yards o f General Hodge congratulated General the crest of the hill when elements o f del Valle "for cutting the island i n the 22d Marines arrived . Reorienting two." 23 Use of this new water route the direction of its attack to the sout h brought in enough rations to permit towards Hill 108, 2/7 advanced 1,00 0 distribution of the first full issue to 7t h yards before encountering stiff opposi- Marines troops in more than a week . As tion near Dakiton, where it dug in fo r the weather improved, some vehicular the night. On the left, the 3d Battalion traffic appeared over slowly dryin g pushed to the high ground southeast of roads in the south. A few new bridges the same town and likewise dug in . were constructed across the once- Clearing skies on 7 June heralded a swollen streams in the north to hel p 1st Division success in breaking throug h speed supplies of all sorts to assaul t to the coast that day and isolating Ad- troops driving to the southern tip of th e miral Ota and his ill-fated troops on island. Oroku from the rest of the doome d

Thirty-second Army in the south. Fol- =' 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 8Jun45 .

BATTLE 'S END 331

Advancing abreast of and pacing th e pushed ahead against perceptibl y march of the 7th Marines to the sea o n stiffening resistance. The 1st Marines 7 June, the 1st Marines also reporte d rolled forward ; 3/1 secured its objec- substantial gains. Early in the morning, tive near Yuza at 1600, when it was re- 2/1 filled the gap existing on the right lieved by 1/1 and went into regimenta l between 3/1 and 3/7, while 3/1 main- reserve near Shindawaku . Slightly later tained contact with 3/383 . By 1800, 2/1 that day, 2/1 secured the high ground was in possession of the height over - overlooking the Mukue River . On 9 looking Zawa, and the 3d Battalion had June, division assault units spent th e moved 1,200 yards along the corp s day probing enemy positions to their boundary to occupy the high ground front in preparation for a major attac k 1,000 yards north of Yuza ; 1/1 had on the 10th. moved to Iwa preparatory to relievin g Improved weather conditions and 3/1.24 correspondingly better road nets ove r All infantry battalions had been which supply convoys could trave l plagued by the supply situation, but i t served to release the VMTBs for other seemed to members of 2/1 that they had assignments. Following 6 June, when been especially dogged since leavin g VMTB–232 made 49 drops, ground Shuri. Their only source of supply had units requested paradrop missions o n been the air drops, and by the time that only eight other days in the rest of the one could be made, the assault com- month.27 By this stage of the campaign, panies were several thousand yard s the Marine pilots had become quite pro- forward of the drop zone .25 The sup- ficient and accurate in paradrop oper- plies then were recovered by head- ations. In reference to a drop Major quarters personnel, who carried them Allen L. Feldmeier's VMTB–232 had to forward dumps. At this point , made on 8 June to its soldiers, the 383d Marines from the reserve company Infantry sent him the following mes- would pick up the supplies and carr y sage : "Your drops have excellent re- them to assault units .26 sults. We received 95 of the 97 packs Sustained by supplies brought ashor e which you dropped ." 28 Later in the by the LVTs, in the continuing goo d month, VMTB–131 flew 3 missions weather of 8 June, 1st Division troop s totalling 20 sorties in which 70 packs— each averaging 1,000 pounds of foo d 24 1st Mar SAR, p . 21 . and ammunition—were dropped . 26 2/1 SAR, p . 13 . Ground units receiving the supplies re- 29 Since a means of delivering water ration s by air drop had not been perfected, the troop s 2'! were given permission to drink stream water VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45 . only after each Marine had made the content s 28 "A History of MAG—22 in the Okinawa of his filled canteen potable by treatment wit h Campaign," Anx A in MAG—22 WarD, Aug45 . halazone . Halazone is a white crystalline chem- VMTB—131 arrived on Okinawa on 29 May ical compound used to disinfect water suspected when it began antisubmarine warfare patrol - of being or known to be impure . The compound ling, its primary mission. During the late r was compressed into tablets and became a stages of the campaign the squadron made major medical supply item in the war . some supply air drops.

332 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ported that they had recovered 90 per - to the far side of the river where it wa s cent or more of the packs . pinned down immediately by accurat e Increased enemy opposition arose on frontal and flanking fire . 9 June as 1st Marine Division unit s Operating a combination CP-OP whil e approached the Tera-Ozato area, whic h aboard an LVT (A) floating 100–20 0 had been outposted by the Thirty-second yards offshore of the battalion flank , Army. Patrols from both the 1st an d Lieutenant Colonel Berger had a grand- 7th Marine received heavy rifle an d stand view of the fighting. When he saw machine gun fire while attempting to that the advance platoon was pinne d cross to the south bank of the Muku e down, he went ashore to order the rest Gawa. Small infiltration groups finally of the company to cross at the river forded the stream, but were unable to mouth and reinforce the stricken unit . advance beyond the bank. The 2d Bat- Steady Japanese machine gun fire pre- talion, 1st Marines, sustained moderat e vented the Marines from wading acros s casualties during this day's fighting, and shortly thereafter denied passag e but was unable to evacuate them until to troop-laden LVTs attempting th e after dark because accurate enemy fire s same route. At nightfall, the battalio n covered evacuation routes . commander ordered the exposed units In the 7th Marines zone, 1/7 relieve d to withdraw to the northern bank of th e 3/7, which then went into regimental Mukue River under the cover of LVT- reserve. No appreciable gains were mad e (A) fire. as 1/7 companies mounted two unsuc- The 2d Battalion jumped off on th e cessful attempts to seize high ground 10th with Companies F and G passin g overlooking Tera. The second effort wa s through the night defenses of Company repulsed by extremely heavy small arm s E, dropping onto the beach from the fire, which forced the assault element s top of a 10-foot-high seawall, and wad- to withdraw under the cover of a smoke ing 400 yards across the stream mout h screen. On the extreme right of the divi- to a point on the south bank opposit e sion, 2/7 patrols crossed the Mukue the ridge. Shells from LVT (A) s Gawa and attempted to seize the ridge pounded this high ground and Itoman north of Itoman, 29 but were thwarted by beyond it. Following this preparation , enemy fire coming from emplacement s the assault troops scaled the seawall to fronting the 1st Battalion zone . One attack these two objectives . Although platoon of Company E was able to ge t the battalion lost five officers in the firs t

29 30 the onsurg- Actually, the town of Itoman was south o f seven minutes of fighting, the Mukue Gawa, although the 1 :25,000 battl e ing Marines swept over the ridge, map used during the campaign indicated that through the ruins of Itoman, and on to the large inhabited area north of the river wa s the high ground beyond the southern Itoman. Snedeker ltr 1947, encl D ; 2/7 SAR , edge of the town . p. 8. The latter spot was an undefended subur b of Itoman and did not hold up the advance o f At the same time that the 2d Battalion 2/7. Capt Verle E . Ludwig interview b y had crashed through Itoman, 1/7, spear- HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 27Jan55, here - after Ludwig interview . ao 2/7 SAR, p . 8.

BATTLE ' S END 333

headed by Company A, made a rapid an d The task assigned to 1/1 was the cap- unopposed rush to the crest of the hill ture of Yuza Hill, the high ground ap- north of Tera, where the Japanes e proximately 700 yards west of Yuza and strongpoint that had opposed the 7th about 450 yards directly north of Ozato ; Marines on the previous day was 2/1 was to support the attack by fire, located. From this newly gained height , while units of the 96th Division were t o the battalion called for an artillery con- provide security to the left flank of the centration on the high ground immedi- 1st Marines . When the tank fords over ately east of Tera. Battalion 81mm mor- the Mukue were opened on 10 June, tars blistered the village with a barrage Shermans also moved forward to sup- of white phosphorous shells, burning to port the 1st Marines attack. the ground all buildings still standing . Another support element, the 11th Although few Japanese troops were Marines, assisted the infantry assault. found in the area, numerous dazed Following a rolling barrage, tank-in- civilians, who had miraculously escaped fantry teams from 1/1 swept onto th e death in the bombardment, were discov- western nose of the hill and Company C ered wandering aimlessly among the swarmed up to its crest in the face of ruins. After sending the Okinawans to blazing enemy machine gun and artil- stockades in the rear, 1/7 prepared lery fire. The company lost 70 of its 17 5 night positions and organized for the men in this charge .32 Lieutenant Colonel scheduled 11 June attack on Kunish i Shofner's attack plan called for Compan y Ridge. (See Map 21.) B to follow in the left rear of the lea d By 10 June, the rains had ended an d elements and then to attack straight up the transportation problem, although the hill after first having worked its way not so critical as it had been previously, through Yuza into jump-off positions. was still not completely alleviated . The Upon reaching the crest, B was to tie ground was drying and once-overflowin g in with Company C on its right and wit h streams had lowered to a point wher e the Army units on the left . Although the the road-construction and bridge-build- latter had begun the attack abreast o f ing efforts of the engineers could open 1/1, Japanese troops entrenched in the the way to tracked and wheeled vehicles . extremely well-fortified Yuza Dake es- Division engineers had converted oi l carpment prevented the soldiers fro m drums into culverts and built tank ford s advancing beyond their line of de- over the fire-swept Mukue Gawa. In ad- parture. Company B was unable to mov e dition, the engineers provided round - forward because of the intense artiller y the-clock maintenance for these fords and mortar fire coming from the front so that the heavy traffic south could of the Army zone, and could not hel p continue unabated. One especially im- Company C, which was isolated in an portant ford was built at the point wher e exposed and extremely tenuous position . the Zawa-Tera highway crossed the Late in the afternoon, Shofner sent Mukue.31 Company B around to the right to join

3i 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, pt III, p. 13 . "1/1 SAR, p. 21.

334 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MAP 21 T. L. RUSSELL

BATTLE 'S END 335

the company on the hill . Both assault These mounting losses graduall y companies had sustained heavy casual - slowed the momentum of the Marine ties in the fighting, but C was hit hard- assault, which the battalion commande r est ; all of its officers were either dead o r attempted to revive by placing a secon d wounded. More Marines were lost dur- company in the line of attack to the ing the night, 10–11 June, as a result of right of the first. Despite the increasin g the constant deluge of enemy mortar and volume of the massed fires provided b y artillery fire placed on the hill . Added to 2/1 supporting arms, enemy fire con- this heavy toll were the casualties cause d tinued unabated. Disregarding their by grazing machine gun fire coming slowly ebbing strength and the loss of from weapons emplaced on Yuza Dake . three supporting tanks, the assault units Twenty more men were wounded in the surged forward to capture the objective dawn of 11 June, when at 0400, the shortly before sundown . By dark, the Japanese mounted an unsuccessfu l battalion had consolidated the positio n counterattack. For the next two days , and set in night defense lines from which 1/1 waited on Yuza Hill for the 96th it repulsed numerous infiltration at- Division infantry to reduce the escarp- tempts and blunted one counterattac k ment to the east . The Marine battalion before 11 June dawned . had little trouble in maintaining its hill In preparation for the many casual - position despite the persistent Japanes e ties anticipated during the fighting ye t artillery fire harassing it the entire time . remaining, a light plane landing strip While the 1st Battalion fought to gain was placed into operation approximately its objective on the 10th, 2/1 with the 2,000 yards north of Itoman on 11 June . help of armor support successfully It was noted at the time that, for main- cleaned the enemy out of the command- taining morale and obtaining immediate ing ridge between Tera and Yuza. The medical treatment for critical cases , next day, because 1/1 had been stymied "the value of this means of evacuatin g 3 3 on Yuza Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Ma- casualties cannot be overstressed." gee's battalion was ordered to captur e Now casualties were flown almost di- s Hill 69, the commanding terrain featur e rectly from medical clearing station immediately behind the front to hos- directly west of Ozato . At 1030, the pitals in the rear, a distance of 12 miles , closely coordinated tank-infantry-artil- in an average time of 8 minutes . This n lery attack began when the battalio brief flight obviated a long and ofte n moved out in a column of companies. body-racking haul in an ambulance Initial progress was rapid, but when jeep over roads that were practically the infantry vanguard entered the valley nonexistent . From 11 to 22 June, VMO– leading to Ozato, well-placed Japanes e 3 and -7 flew out 641 casualties from mortar and artillery concentrations this strip.3 4 caused many Marine casualties . As the left flank of the spearhead approached 22 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, Logistics Anx, Ozato, enemy machine gun and rifle fire p. 9. began mowing down the attackers . 34 Ibid. 336 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MARINE CASUALTIES are evacuated by a spotter plane from a temporary airstrip north of Itoman. (USN 80-G-498161)

8TH MARINES landing on Iheya Shima. (USMC 126988)

BATTLE 'S END 337

On the same day the landing strip than the infantry since they were re- became operational, Colonel Snedeker's stricted to two routes leading into the 7th Marines advanced 400 to 1,000 yard s objective area—both covered extremely against ever-stiffening enemy opposi- well by Japanese antitank guns. One tion. The 1st Battalion, having cleare d road followed the coast line ; the second Tera, attacked to gain the high groun d cut across the center of the ridge at immediately south of the village . After a right angle, dividing it. (See Map 21 . ) mopping up in Itoman, 2/7 pushed 50 0 Having pushed through Itoman an d yards southward. Confronting the regi- Tera during the morning of 11 June, 2/ 7 ment now, approximately 800 yard s and 1/7 prepared to continue on to equidistant from the outskirts of Tera Kunishi Ridge . Immediately after mid - and Itoman, was Kunishi Ridge, to b e day, tank-infantry teams from both as- "the scene of the most frantic, bewilder- sault battalions moved out towards th e ing, and costly close-in battle on the objective . Two hours later, withering southern tip of Okinawa ." 3 5 frontal fire from the ridge, enfilade fire from the yet-uncaptured Hill 69, and BATTLE FOR KUNISHI RIDGE 36 accurate artillery concentrations on the tanks forced the attack to a halt. Be- Running from the northeast to the cause of these fires, and more coming southwest for a distance of perhaps from Japanese-held Yuza Dake, th e 1,500 yards, the sheer coral escarpment commander of the 7th determined that of Kunishi Ridge held Japanese posi- it would be too costly to continue th e tions which comprised the western an- attack in the daylight, so at 1447, he chor of the last heavily defended line ordered the assault forces to withdraw. in front of Kiyamu. Both the forward After making an aerial reconnaissanc e and reverse slopes of the ridge were of the ridge in a low-flying observation replete with caves, weapons emplace- plane,37 Colonel Snedeker concluded ments, and fortified tombs, all of whic h that a night attack would be the cours e reinforced natural defenses provided by of action most likely to succeed .38 the complex and difficult terrain fea- That afternoon, as the battalions dug tures of the ridge itself. In front of the in a night defense and prepared to con- 7th Marines line, a broad valley contain- tinue the attack on the following day , ing grassland and rice paddies led t o the two assault battalion commander s this crag and afforded the defenders were thoroughly oriented on the general unobstructed lanes of fire and the at- 37 Maj John S . Hudson ltr to CMG, dtd tackers little cover and concealment. 27Mar47 . Approaching tanks would fare no better 38 General del Valle had visited Snedeker' s CP that day "in order to see how we coul d Ss Appleman, et. al., Okinawa Battle, p . 451. break the deadlock, stop our heavy losses an d 39 Unless otherwise noted, the material con- get on with the war. When he suggested a bat- tained in this section is derived from : 1st talion night attack for a limited objective, I MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl ; 1st Mar agreed." LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to Ass t SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar SAR ; 7th Ma r G—3, HQMC, dtd 10ct65, hereafter del Valle Hist ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III . ltr 1965 .

338 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

scheme of maneuver at the regimental On the afternoon of 11 June, General CP. Colonel Snedeker decided to attack Buckner sent a Tenth Army receptio n straight across the valley, using the roa d party, fully empowered to negotiate leading into the ridge as the boundary with any Japanese parley group, to th e separating the battalion zones and the 2/7 observation post overlooking Ito- telephone poles bordering the road as a man. At 1700, all American firing cease d guide. The assaulting battalions were t o in the 7th Marines zone in dubious bu t penetrate the enemy defenses at the hopeful anticipation of an enemy part y point where the road entered the ridge . bearing white flags. No such group ap- There the battalions were to peel off t o peared, although six Japanese soldier s their zones of attack and roll up the did surrender about an hour later to enemy's line . Until the hour of attack, Marines in the lines . The battlefield' s 0330, on 12 June, normal artillery fire s unnatural silence was shattered at 180 4 would be placed alternately on Kunish i when hostile mortar fire fell on the sur- Ridge and then Mezado Ridge (500–60 0 render point and American artillery re- yards southwest of Kunishi) , and there- sumed fire on Kunishi in answer.41 after only on the latter. In order to Both battalions were poised to attack maintain deception and guarantee tha t Kunishi Ridge with one company lead- the enemy would be surprised, the divi- ing the assault. At H-Hour minus 1 sion issued an order prohibiting the use (0230), Companies C and F proceede of flares and illumination of any kind— d except in emergencies—after 0245 .39 to assembly areas and contacted each Before the night attack began, how - other on the line of departure. At 0500, ever, the Tenth Army decided to employ when reinforcing Companies B and G another type of weapon . Prior to an d moved out in their trace, the two assault following the 1 April assault landings , units had already reached the crest o f the Japanese on the island had been sub- the ridge, achieving complete surprise. jected to a massive psychological war- Company C, for example, destroye d fare effort in which propaganda leaflet s several small enemy groups in the act were delivered by aircraft and artillery of preparing their breakfasts . shells. Also, Japanese-language broad - casts were directed at the enemy ove r 41 1/7 SAR, p . 20 . General Ushijima did not loudspeakers placed near the fron immediately receive the message affording hi m t an opportunity to surrender to General Buck- lines.40 For a period of several days pre- ner . It arrived at Thirty-second Army head - ceding 11 June, this war of paper an d quarters on 17 June, a week after it first had words had been accelerated and an em- been dropped behind Japanese lines . Colonel phasis placed on the hopelessness of th e Yahara stated that this was the normal amount Japanese position and the futility o of time required for a message to be passe d f from the front to the rear at this stage of the continued fighting. Both the leaflets and campaign . Yahara Interrogation. Upon de- the broadcasts called upon General livery of the Buckner communique, "Cho an d Ushijima to surrender. Ushijima both laughed and declared that, as Samurai, it would not be consonant with thei r "1st MarDiv G–3 Jnl, 11Jun45 . honor to entertain such a proposal ." Shimada '° Tenth Army AR, chap 11, pt II, p . 21 . Interrogation.

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At daybreak, while en route throug h stead. On arrival ' at the ridge, men and the valley to reinforce the Marines dig- supplies were unloaded through tank ging in on the ridge, intense enemy fir e escape hatches and casualty evacuee s caught the two follow-up companies an d embarked in their place. pinned them down. It became painfull y No further trips to the ridge were apparent that the Japanese defenders possible because of approaching dark- had quickly recovered from their initia l ness. In addition, the road leading to the setback. In no mood to relinquish their front lines had caved in under the last hold on Kunishi Ridge without a last- tank in the column returning from the ditch fight, they began lobbing han d third trip. This tank bellied up, and grenades on the Marines situated in th e neither the crew nor the casualties insid e forward positions . Here, Company F could leave through the escape hatch . was consolidating at a point approxi- After Marine mortars had fired a smoke mately 400 yards due north of Mezado cover for the tank, another came along - village and was tied in on its left wit h side to evacuate the troops it held . The Company C, whose line was extende d disabled tank was then disarmed an d some 450 yards to the northeast. abandoned for the night. In all, 1st Tank Under the cover of smoke and wit h Battalion vehicles evacuated 22 wounded the assistance of tanks, the companies from the ridge .42 stalled in the valley made three attempts The darkness precluding furthe r to reach the ridge during daylight o n tank operations enabled the remainde r the 12th. Meanwhile, the troops already of the 1st and 2d Battalion of the 7th there needed rations, medical supplies, Marines to move to the ridge without ammunition, and reinforcements ; there incident. In regimental reserve, the 3 d were wounded to be evacuated also . Battalion patrolled to the rear an d Tanks attempting to get into firing po- guarded the flanks of the other two . sitions south of Tera to silence the enemy With three companies now up front , weapons and relieve the companies each of the two forward battalions ex- pinned down were themselves fired tended its lines further . By midnight , upon, and in fact were unable even to the battalion commanders were con- leave the cover of the village. vinced that their positions were reason- In midafternoon, the Shermans were ably secure, 43 and reassured that "th e pressed into service to carry rations an d large amount of artillery support avail- personnel up to the ridge. At 1555, con- able could destroy any enemy counter- cealed in Tera from enemy observation , attack which might be made against th e the tanks were loaded with supplies an d initial ridgehead . . . ." 44 As General de l Marines for the trip forward . Before Valle described it, "The situation was dark, a total of nine tankloads in three one of the tactical oddities of this runs had carried a reinforced platoon peculiar warfare . We were on the ridge . of 54 Marines and critical replenishment items up to the line. By displacing the 42 1st TkBn Summary, 12Jun45 . assistant driver of each tank, it wa s 43 7th Mar Hist, p. 30. possible to cram six riflemen inside in- 44 Snedeker ltr 1955 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 23

340 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

The Japs were in it, both on the for - they were in the minority." 47 The rest ward and reverse slopes ." 4 5 were right on target and fell into a drop Patrols from the 1st Marines range d zone under Marine control . Sometimes south along the corps boundary and it was even dangerous for the Marine s into the outskirts of Ozato on 12 June . to recover supply containers in thes e Although furious fighting was the n supposedly safe areas because of th e going on in the 7th Marines zone, the many enemy snipers awaiting such 1st encountered relatively little opposi- targets of opportunity . One Japanes e tion except for sporadic fire from sharpshooter alone killed and wounde d Kunishi Ridge that was placed on cave - 22 Marines before he was finally located sealing and mopping-up teams working and eliminated .48 in the vicinity of Hill 69 . On the follow- Despite the inviting target their shee r ing day, combat patrols began recon- bulk offered, tanks had to be used and noitering towards Kunishi Ridge in did yeoman work in hauling supplie s preparation for a predawn attac k forward to the ridge . On their retur n scheduled for the 14th . trip, they evacuated casualties, some of Throughout the division zone, al l whom were strapped to the side of th e efforts on 13 June were concentrated on Shermans and then sandbagged as pro- preparing for this large-scale operation. tection against enemy fire . In the morn- The incessant cannonading of artillery ing of the 13th, a tank dozer constructed pieces and naval rifles gave the forces o f a bypass around the place where the General Ushijima in the southern par t road had caved in on the previous day . of the island no respite. Two rocke t Upon completion of the detour, the launching craft took positions off the lumbering mediums began shuttling southern tip of Okinawa to rake reverse back and forth to the ridge. Some of the slope defenses of the Thirty-second tanks placed point-blank fire on enemy Army. More than 800 5-inch rockets ridge positions covering the supply ripped into the towns of Makabe an d route in the 1/7 zone, and other tank s Komesu in an hour's time alone . operated in the 2/7 zone, working ove r In the four days following its seizure the western end of Kunishi Ridge . On of Kunishi Ridge, the 7th Marines was the supply/evacuation runs, tanks lifte d somewhat isolated from other friendly some 50 Marines from Company A to ground units by "No Man's Valley," 4 6 reinforce the rest of 1/7 on the ridge , the 800-yard approach to its positions . and took out 35 casualties on the retur n This broad expanse was thoroughly trip.4 8 covered by the fire of Japanese soldiers During the course of the day, the as- infesting the lower slopes and crests sault battalions continued consolidatin g flanking the ridge . Supplies were either their holdings on Kunishi, and 1/7 sen t paradropped or brought in by tanks . patrols east along the ridge to contact Some air drops fell in the valley, "but " Snedeker ltr 1947 . 4" del Valle, "Southward from Shuri," p . 40 . 48 7th Mar Hist, loc . cit. 48 7th Mar Hist, loc . cit. 48 1st TkBn Summary, 13Jun45 .

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the enemy and uncover his positions. firing of flares proved fruitless.51 For The battalion advanced only slightly. tunately, the Marines advanced undis- When a Japanese smokescreen ob- covered by the enemy and initial prog- scured Kunishi village to friendly ob- ress was unopposed . By 0500, two servation, 81mm mortars hammered th e platoons from Company E had reached area to disrupt enemy activity sus- the topographical crest of the ridge ; the pected there. Shortly after twilight, a support platoon and company head- group of enemy troops was sighted on quarters were stopped well below thi s Mezado Ridge and was quickly dis- point by extremely severe enemy fire . persed by a heavy concentration of mor- Half an hour later, Company G ha d tar and small arms fire. Marines from worked one of its platoons up to a point 2/7 patrolled along the west coast bu t on the ridge where it tied in with th e were soon pinned down by long-range left flank of Company E . At daybreak, enemy fire coming from the easter n increasingly active enemy sniping an d part of the ridge ; they had to be with- intense fire on the flanks and rear of th e drawn under the cover of smoke . assault companies served to isolate these An increasing number of tanks be - platoons from the rest of their battalion . came disabled by the accurate fire of A T Tanks then rumbled forward to suppor t guns well hidden in the ridge. A salvo the beleaguered Marines, whose casual - from the main battery of a supporting ties were mounting rapidly. One com- battleship scored four observed direc t pany lost six of its seven ofcers .52 Be- hits on enemy emplacements, but did cause routes to the advance position s little to subdue other Japanese position s were under accurate and direct enemy in the area . This particular barrage ex- fire, the mediums were again presse d ploded on targets within 250 yards o f into action to haul supplies up to th e friendly troops.6 ° line and carry casualties to the rear , much in the same manner as they ha d During the night of 13 June, the 1s t for the 7th Marines elsewhere o n Marines was ordered to attack the front Kunishi Ridge . At the end of the day, of Kunishi Ridge in its zone befor e an estimated 110 wounded Marines had dawn the next day ; H-Hour was set fo r been evacuated by the tanks .6 3 0330. Following a 30-minute artillery preparation, 2/1 jumped off with tw o Even though the enemy attempted to companies in assault. Despite an earlie r dislodge them, the Marines held onto division order prohibiting the use of their tenuous position . After dark, th e flares by units adjacent to the assault- reserve company was moved up and a ing force before and during an attack perimeter defense was established fo r at night, the attack area and the the night. Japanese small arms, mortar, attackers were nonetheless illuminated . and artillery fire, and recurring shower s Many urgent calls to higher echelon s of hand grenades poured on the Marin e for an immediate ban placed on th e 61 2/1 SAR, p . 15.

66 Marginal comment by the battalion com- 63 1st Mair SAR, p . 22. 6' mander in 2/7 SAR, p . 9. 1st TkBn Summary, 14Jun45 .

342 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

positions throughout the hours of dark- of the ridge. As a result of this situation , ness. In addition, the enemy made man y the commanders of 2/1 and 2/5 agree d attempts to infiltrate all along the line. that the relief should begin only after i t As the sun rose on 15 June, 2/1 foun d had become dark . In order to maintain enemy pressure to be as constant as it tight control over the move and preven t had been the day before, and battalion matters from becoming confused in the casualties reaching alarming propor- restricted area where the relief was to tions . Although the tanks continued to take place, Lieutenant Colonel Benedict carry supplies and evacuate the decided to commit only one of his com- wounded, 2/1 critically needed ammuni- panies initially . The relief of 2/1 wa s tion and rations. A requested air drop completed at 2030, a half hour after it scheduled for 0900 was delayed until the had begun. The 1st Marines as a whole middle of the afternoon, and then more went into division reserve at 2300, after than two-thirds of the packs dropped having been in the division line for 1 2 into enemy territory and could not be straight days during which it suffered recovered. The efforts of 2/1 assault nearly 500 casualties . companies notwithstanding, Kunish i On the day before fresh troops ha d Ridge was far from secured when 2/ 5 joined in the fight for Kunishi, the 7th relieved 2/1 after dark on the 15th .54 Marines resumed its grinding advanc e Earlier that day, 3/5 55 had relieved by "the slow, methodical destruction o f 1/1 on Yuza Hill, following which, th e enemy emplacements on the ridge, to latter moved to an assembly area near which the descriptive word `processing ' Dakiton ; 3/1 had already set up in th e had come to be applied." 56 The 2d Bat- vicinity of Shindawaku. With 2/5 on talion was ordered to seize the rest of the line, Colonel Griebel had complete the ridge in its zone and to be prepare d responsibility for the zone formerl y to continue the attack to Mezado Ridge . held by the 1st Marines . Company A attacked east to seize the During the afternoon before 2/5 wa s remainder of the reverse slope of Kuni- to go into the lines, its company com- shi Ridge within the 7th Marines zone, manders were taken by tank to the fron t while B and C provided fire support an d lines to: make a personal reconnaissanc e mopped up behind the assault company . of the area they were to take over . When Despite difficult terrain and an unre- they arrived at the positions of 2/1, lenting enemy opposition, Company A they discovered that the tactical situa- succeeded in closing to the outskirts of tion precluded a daylight relief . They Kunishi village . also found that 2/1 held only a 75-yar d At 1247, Company B was ordered to section on the crest of Kunishi Ridge , continue the advance through Kunishi , with a portion of the battalion occupy- and then to attack north to secure the ing a small pocket on the forward slope s forward slope of the easternmost sector " 2/1 SAR, p . 15. of Kunishi Ridge. Although the com- G6 Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Hill assumed pany passed through the village and command of the battalion on 8 June, when 3/5 had been in reserve . 7th Mar Hist, p . 31 .

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began heading for the high ground with patrolling . Company C attacked directly only slight interference, withering ma- east along the ridge while B moved chine gun fire soon pinned down all but through Kunishi village and then turned two rifle squads, which were able to north towards the high ground again . climb the height . Once the Marines ha d Heavy Japanese fire from prepared gained the crest of the ridge, the Japa- emplacements prevented the Marine s nese launched a strong counterattack , from advancing across the open ground forcing the squads from their temporar y between the village and the ridge line , holding. The company as a whole then and Company C was unable to relieve withdrew to lines held the previous the pressure on B . At 1600, the tw o night. units were withdrawn once again t o To the right of 1/7, the 2d Battalion positions held 13–14 June . was subjected to increasingly intense During the night 15–16 June, small enemy fire despite suppressive America n enemy groups were active in front of counter-barrages ; 2/7 reported only 1/7 lines harassing the Marines with limited gains that day . At 1530, th e small arms fire and lobbing hand gre- logistic and tactical support of the 7t h nades into their foxholes. Before dawn Marines by tanks ended when the armo r on 16 June, the troops on the left (east ) began assisting the 1st Marines . On the flank were pulled back to the west ap- 14th, the tracked vehicles had carrie d proximately 200 yards to permit a 48 men of the 7th Marines forward an d massive artillery preparation on the ob- evacuated 160.57 jective which had stymied 1/7 the pre- During the following two days, 2/7 ceding two days. An extremely heavy was supported by naval gunfire, artil- concentration of artillery, mortar, an d lery, air, rockets, and 81mm mortars , rocket fire drummed that day's target which mercilessly pounded the enemy . for nearly three hours before the assaul t Both gun and flame tanks furnished di- forces jumped off. By 1345, 1/7 ha d rect close-in support, but could make n o completely seized the rest of the ridge appreciable dent in Japanese defenses . in its zone and immediately began mop - A stubborn enemy notwithstanding, 2/ 7 ping up and consolidating its newly won moved its lines some 500–700 yards t o ground. Shortly thereafter, battalio n the right and in front of the first hig h troops "repeatedly encountered and de- ground leading to the Mezado Hill mass , stroyed numerous groups of the enemy the division objective after Kunishi. wandering through the town of Kunishi The 1st Battalion fared no better in in a confused, disorganized, and bewil- its attempt to seize the rest of Kunishi dered state . It was evident that the en d Ridge in its zone on 15 June than it ha d was not far off ." 68 on the 14th. Notified that 15 artiller y One other major accomplishment that battalions were on call for supportin g afternoon was the capture by Company fires, 1/7 moved out at 0945 followin g A of "The Pinnacle," a particularly diffi- an artillery preparation and preliminar y cult enemy strongpoint situated so that

" 1st TkBn Summary, 14Jun45 . "8 7th Mar Hist, p . 32 .

344 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

it could be neither destroyed nor neu- rives was able to make physical contact tralized by any type of support weapon with the 5th. immediately available . It was in this As 1st Division troops prepared fo r area that the enemy sniper who had shot the final drive south, mopping up opera- 22 Marines earlier was hunted down an d tions on Oroku Peninsula neared an end . killed. Approaches to The Pinnacle were Concurrently, General Shepherd's staff swept by Japanese fire, and its seizur e drew up plans for the eventual commit- by the infantry was slow, tortured, and ment of the 6th Division in the southern costly. 5 9 front. Initially, the 22d Marines was to To the right of 1/7, the 2d Battalio n pass through right flank elements of lines were extended some 400 yards the 7th Marines on 17 June to relieve further west to where the battalion held 2/7 ; 3/7 would come out of reserve to the first high terrain approaching th e relieve the 1st Battalion . (See Map 21 . ) Mezado hills. This progress was accom- In the 5th Marines zone on 16 June, plished even while the battalion ha d 2/5 attacked at 0730 and spent the day sustained heavy casualties and lost it s working over that portion of the regi- valuable armored support, which fell mental area that lay between Kunishi victim to Japanese land mines and 47mm Ridge and Hill 69 . At approximately AT guns. Expert employment of its sup- 1800, a reinforced company reached th e porting arms enabled 2/7 to make slight crest of the ridge and tied in with th e gains on the 16th . For example, salvos left flank unit of the 7th Marines . Bitter, from the main battery of USS Idaho close-quarter fighting had been the order were called down on targets located of the day for 2/5, whose assault com- within 400 yards of frontline troops . In panies had received continuously heavy addition, air liaison parties controlled small arms fire . Rising casualty figures air strikes, often consisting of 25–3 0 again required tanks to be employed a s planes each, which successfully de- evacuation vehicles ; this task was in ad- stroyed stubborn pockets holding up th e dition to their shuttling ammunition and advance. s o rations forward. In face of Japanes e No longer was Kunishi Ridge a major holding action to its front, 2/5 mad e obstacle in the way of the 1st Marin e slow but steady progress. Division, for the terrain that the Japa- Although enemy infiltrators attempte d nese had so doggedly defended here, in- to breach 5th Marines lines during th e cluding the approaches to Mezado, ha d night 16–17 June, they were thoroughl y been virtually cleaned out by the end o f discouraged. As 2/5 resumed the attack 16 June. Only that portion of the ridge on the 17th, oppressive enemy small on the far left of the division, in the 5t h arms fire coming from the vicinity o f Marines zone, still presented some prob- Aragachi in the XXIV Corps zone pun- lems. With the reduction of enemy op- ished the front and flank of the battalion . position on The Pinnacle, the 7th Ma- Its task was to seize that portion of Ku- nishi Ridge still held by the enemy . At- " Ibid., p . 31. tacking with a two-company front, the 80 2/7 SAR, p . 10 . 2d Battalion faced the problem of coping

BATTLE 'S END 345

with Japanese reverse-slope positions With this infusion of fresh troops i n and destroying them. To smooth the way its line, 2/5 surged eastward along th e somewhat, a rocket barrage was lai d ridge ; by nightfall, the battalion held on the objective . A short time later, a t approximately three-fourths of the 1,200 1030, tanks moved out and clambere d yards of Kunishi Ridge in the regimenta l over the ridge route, which had been zone.62 Because the position of the bat- opened earlier by an armored bulldozer . talion was somewhat precarious, at dusk Murderous enemy fire criss-crossed Colonel Griebel attached Company K, the crest of the ridge as 2/5 grimly 3/5, to the 2d Battalion with a missio n pushed on. All tanks were pressed int o of protecting the battalion rear. At 2315 , action as armored ambulances once an estimated company-sized counterat- again, but only the walking wounded tack hit 2/5 positions, but was thor- could be taken inside of the vehicles and oughly blunted ; Company K troops evacuated. Stretcher cases presented a killed the few Japanese that succeede d serious problem because they could not in penetrating the lines. be taken up through the tank escape On the coastal flank of the IIIAC zone , hatches, but had to be lashed to their 6th Division Marines had become full y rear decks . Often, wounded were hit a involved in the drive to the south by th e second and third time on their trip to end of 17 June . Moving forward during the aid station. the afternoon of the previous day to re- Throughout the afternoon, the volum e lieve 2/7, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the and intensity of enemy fire as well as the 22d Marines attempted to cross the valley between Itoman and Kunishi, but ferocity of the enemy opposition re- were forestalled by the severe enemy fir e mained undiminished . Tank, artillery, covering this route. Forced to turn back f and mortar fire, and the ripple fire o to their previous positions, the two bat- several rocket barrages were directe d talions waited until dark to begin th e at suspected Japanese strongpoints and relief. 63 The uneventful passage of th e weapons emplacements in an attemp t lines began at 0300, 17 June, and b y to open the way for Marine tank-in- dawn assault elements were in jump-off fantry teams . At 1700, Lieutenant Col- positions at the base of the norther n onel Benedict decided to commit his slope of Mezado Ridge, prepared to at- reserve company and further strengthe n tack at 0730 in coordination with 3/ 7 the assault companies by sending for - on the left . r ward 133 replacements, which had been An artillery, naval gunfire, and ai bombardment of Mezado Ridge, and o f assigned to the battalion three days Hill 69 64 and Kuwanga Ridge beyond it , earlier.61 preceded the attack . Once the fires ha d 61 2/5 SAR, p . 21 . On 11 June, the division lifted, the 22d Marines moved out with received 369 officers and enlisted from the 55t h Replacement Draft, which arrived that day . e' 2/5 SAR, loc. cit . With the arrival of the 62d Replacement Draft °a 7th Mar Hist, p . 32 . five days later, the division absorbed 295 mor e 04 This is not to be confused with the Hil l Marines . 1st MarDiv SAR, PersAnx, p . 7. 69 west of Ozato, or the Hill 69 east of Mezado.

346 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

two assault battalions abreast—3/22 o n dump trucks and fill dirt were used the left. Machine gun and intermitten t to plug the craters because only ar- mortar fire paced the advance up th e mored-plated vehicles could weather the slope of the ridge, but as the mornin g severe enemy fires . wore on, the Marine progress becam e After two craters in the road had increasingly difficult in the face of stif- been filled, it was discovered that the fening resistance . approaches to a small bridge further u p To support the attack of 1/22, 6th the road had been mined . Sniper and Division tanks moved around the right machine gun fire prevented enginee r flank of the regiment and through the clearing teams from neutralizing th e water towards an off-shore reef to gai n mined area, and the road project was firing positions commanding direct ob- abandoned temporarily . Nonetheless, servation of the caves on the western the tanks advanced as far forward a s tip of Mezado Ridge. As one armore d possible to deliver overhead supportin g platoon began to negotiate the route, the fires. unexpected depth of the water prevented By noon, 3/22 had secured the highes t it from working its way forward far point on the ridge and maintained the enough to enfilade the ridge, and its momentum of its attack to clean out tanks were forced to deliver supportin g the town of Mezado as well . Before dusk, fire from the most advanced points tha t the battalion had captured the key ter - they had been able to reach . G5 Tank rain around Hill 69 and was in comman d weapons could not suppress the heav y of the ground overlooking the next ob- machine gun fire coming from the re - jective, Kuwanga Ridge. With the ex- verse slope of the hill mass holding u p ception of an attempted enemy counter- 1/22. As a result, the battalion was un- attack in the sector of 1/22 at 2210, a able to gain more than a foothold on th e generally quiet night was passed by th e forward slope of Mezado Ridge unti l 22d Marines. 1700, when it positioned two companies When 1st Division troops jumped off on the crest of the ridge for night de- on the 17th, 3/7 attacked in a column of fense. companies, Company K leading, to tak e Inadequate maneuvering room to th e the Hill 69 east of Mezado . Company I front also limited the employment of maintained contact with the 22d Ma- supporting armor. Besides the flan k rines, and Company L took up positions route through the water, the only othe r to protect the left flank of K. Following suitable tank road ran through a ric e an unopposed 1,400-yard drive across paddy which had been cratered in fou r the plateau just east of Mezado to seiz e places and heavily mined as well . Once Hills 69 and 52, 3/7 halted for a shor t the mines were removed or neutralized, time to reorganize, and then attempte d tanks lumbered up to these craters an d to continue the drive to the crest of Hil l dumped into them bundles of large log s 79—the last remaining barrier before that had been attached to their front Makabe. Heavy Japanese fire from po- slope plates . Tanks and logs instead of sitions on the high ground commanding e6 6th TkBn SAR, Ph III, p. 20. the Kuwanga-Makabe road forced the

BATTLE 'S END 347

battalion to dig in for the night befor e L plus 1, the 2d Marine Division re- it could gain the hill. Once dug in, 3/7 mained on board its transports which Marines quickly organized to blunt al l steamed in the vicinity of the targe t enemy attempts to infiltrate and coun- area until 11 April . On that date, the terattack in the darkness . Demonstration Group set out for Saipan , When the Japanese 22d Regiment did arriving there four days later . On 14 launch its counterattack, it was directe d May, CinCPac ordered the division (less against 1/22 . This determined effort one RCT) detached from the operationa l born of despair was doomed from its in- control of the Tenth Army and desig- ception because that portion of the nated it as the area reserve under control enemy regiment scheduled to exploit the of CinCPOA. In addition, General Wat- counterattack had been almost com- son received an alert for his division to pletely destroyed that afternoon. In ef- conduct Phase III (d) of the ICEBERG fect, the near annihilation of the 22d Plan, the landing on Kikai Jima . Once Regiment meant that the left flank of captured, this small island north o f the Japanese outpost line had all bu t Okinawa was to be utilized as a north - collapsed, and that the 32d Regiment , ern outpost for the Ryukyus area, an d holding positions near Makabe, was was to base four fighter groups, tw o faced with the threat of having its lef t night-fighter squadrons, and one tor- flank rolled up.66 pedo-bomber squadron .68 The 8th Ma- The Marines were prepared to tur n rines (Reinforced) remained under the this threat into reality by exploiting the control of General Buckner for the im- successes of 17 June with the commit- pending landings on Iheya and Aguni ment of fresh troops into the battle on Shimas, and was ordered to reembar k the next day. While the 7th Marine s immediately . finished "processing" Kunishi Ridge, the For the entire month after its arriva l 8th Marines (Reinforced), commanded at Saipan, the division remained o n by Colonel Clarence R . Wallace, pre- board the transports . A warning order pared to relieve 3/7 to continue the at- for the Kikai invasion had been issue d tack southward . Before the dawn of 18 on 6 May,69 but this alert was reduce d June, this 2d Marine Division infantr y in urgency four days later by a messag e regiment, now attached to the 1st Divi- that indicated that Phase III (d) migh t sion, entered the lines . not be conducted . With the arrival of the 14 May message releasing the divi- IHEYA-AGUNI OPERATIONS 6 7 sion from Tenth Army control, the Marines began unloading and rehabili- After its feint landings on the south- tating their equipment ashore in prepa- eastern coast of Okinawa on L-Day an d ration for the time when it was to b e

ee Okinawa Operations Record, p. 134 . 8th Mar AR, Iheya-Aguni ; Combat Team 8 AR , Okinawa Operation (11-22Jun45), n .d., here - B7 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n after 8th Mar AR . this section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; 98 2d MarDiv WarDs, Apr-Jun45 ; Combat Tea m USAFMidPac G—5 Hist, p . 245 . 8 AR, Iheya-Aguni Operations, n .d., hereafter ° D Ibid., p . 258.

348 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ordered to mount out for Kikai . On 3 conferring with Tenth Army staff offi- June, the landing was deferred for a n cers about the proposed operation plan . indefinite period, and on the 19th, th e By 30 May, when the 8th Marines ar- 2d Marine Division (less RCT 8) was rived at Okinawa, a complete naval released from its role as Ryukyus area gunfire and air support schedule had reserve and reverted to the control of already been established, and detailed FMFPac. contingency plans drawn up to meet an y Once again, on 24 May, the 8th Ma- situation that might arise from enemy rines departed Saipan headed for Oki- sea or air action. nawa ; its eventual target, the islands of The attack force, commanded by Ad- Iheya and Aguni . Because of the heavy miral Reifsnider, steamed from the Ha- damage that had been sustained by the gushi transport area early on 2 June fleet and especially the radar pickets and set a course for the target, locate d during Kamikaze raids, early in May 15 miles northwest of Hedo Misaki . The Admiral Turner asked General Buckner bombardment prior to the H-Hour o f to begin a study of outlying islands to 1015 proceeded as scheduled ; 7° 2/8 and determine where long-range radar an d 3/8 landed on Iheya 27 minutes later .7 1 fighter director facilities could be in- Neither enemy opposition nor enemy stalled. Resulting from this study was troops were encountered. The Marines the decision that Tori, Aguni, Iheya , only found some 3,000 confused but doc- and Kume Shimas could be captured in ile natives who were taken under tow by that order. A special landing force, a military government teams supplied b y reinforced company from the 165th In- the Tenth Army Island Command . Late fantry, made an unopposed landing o n in the afternoon of the 3d, the troop s Tori on 12 May and a detachment from began general unloading and the island Air Warning Squadron 1 began opera- was officially declared secure the next tions almost immediately. (See Map 22 .) day. Since the Okinawa campaign was now The landing on Aguni Shima, 30 miles reaching a crucial stage, General Buck- west of Okinawa, was delayed until 9 ner believed that the forces already com- June by inclement weather . On that day, mitted in the fight southward should not 1/8 went ashore under circumstances be diverted to such secondary action s similar to those found at Iheya. The as the proposed landings on the other only Marine casualties of the two am- outlying islands noted above. He re- phibious assaults were sustained a t quested, therefore, that the reinforced Iheya ; 2 Marines were killed and 1 6 8th Marines be returned to Okinawa t o wounded by aerial rockets and shor t effect the Iheya-Aguni landings . Brig- rounds of naval gunfire . In accordanc e adier General LeRoy P. Hunt, ADC of with the instructions it had receive d the 2d Marine Division, was designate d from Tenth Army before the operation , the landing force commander for these the 8th Marines stood ready for im- operations . Flying to Okinawa with key S0 ComPhibGru 4 AR, Iheya-Aguni, Ser 0327 , members of his staff on 15 May, Genera l dtd 3Aug45, pt VI, p . 8. Hunt spent the 16th and part of the 17th S1 Ibid., pt I, p. 1.

LANDINGS ON OUTLYING ISLAND S OF OKINAWA GUNT O

Iheye Ma e Jima

12 MAY~ Close(+) Teri ! —~RO h Sh'me =I YAWS .' %NYC

W' IP MAP 22 T.L . RUSSELL CO

350 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

mediate commitment on Okinawa upon fighting spirt in their men. completion of the two landings. When Their unflagging belief in a final Japa- fresh units were needed for the final nese victory was unrealistic in view of thrust against the Japanese dug in o n the alarming losses of weapons and Kiyamu Peninsula. Colonel Wallace and equipment that the Thirty-second Arm y his troops were available. had sustained since the American landing on 1 April. Hand grenades and ex - THE FINAL PUSH 72 plosives either were in short supply, o r in the case of some units, non-existent . By 4 June, the remnants of the Thirty- Only 20 percent of the original number second Army had fully manned the out - of heavy machine guns owned by the post line of Kiyamu Peninsula . Concen- army remained, and few of its heavy trated in this area were approximatel y infantry cannon and mortars were stil l 30,000 Japanese troops, distributed a s firing. Although the army ammunitio n follows : 24th Division and attachments, supply along with 2 150mm guns, 1 6 12,000 ; 62d Division and attached units , 150mm howitzers, and 10 antiaircraf t 7,000 ; 44th IMB and attached units, artillery pieces had been transporte d 3,000 ; 5th Artillery Command and at- south to Kiyamu when Shuri was tached units, 3,000 ; and troops attached abandoned, the stock levels of artillery directly to Thirty-second Army Head- ammunition precluded more than 1 0 quarters, and the command itself, 5,000 . days of sustained firing. "Attrition during retirement opera- Despite these outward signs of it s tions," 73 was the official Japanese ex- imminent defeat and impoverished con- planation for the 20,000-man differential dition, the belief held by General Ushi- between their estimated strength figure jima's army in ultimate victory wa s of 50,000 in late May and the total derived from deep-seated tradition , number of effectives available at the strongly enforced discipline, and th e beginning of June. historically pervasive influence of Japa- Of General Ushijima's remaining nese military doctrine throughout th e forces, approximately 20 percent were Empire. These intangibles, almost com- survivors of the original, first-rate in- pletely alien and incomprehensible to fantry and artillery defense garrison ; Americans, promised that Kiyamu the rest were either untrained rear - Peninsula was not to fall and the battl e echelon personnel or Boeitai. Leading for Okinawa was not to end before a this motley force at battalion level an d final, violent climax . above were many of the original senio r Influenced by the location and relative commanders who had remained aliv e strength of enemy strongpoints facin g and were still capable of arousing a the Tenth Army, and the availability and " Unless otherwise noted, the material con- status of his assault forces, General tained in this section is derived from : CTF 3 1 Buckner had shifted the corps boundar y AR; Tenth Army AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 7th west on 4 June. In the now-narrower Inf Div AR ; 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDiv AR ; Okinawa Operations Record . IIIAC zone, General Shepherd's divi- Okinawa Operations Record, p . 122 . sion sought to capture the Oroku Pen-

BATTLE'S END 351

insula while the 1st Marine Division wa s an effort to reduce the natural bastion . to cut off the peninsula from the rest The defense of the Yuza Dake-Yaej u of the island, capture Itoman, seize both Dake outpost line had been assigned to Kunishi and Mezado Ridges, and drive two units . Guarding the escarpment to Ara Saki, the southernmost point o f from Hill 95 on the east coast to Yaej u the island. The assignment given XXIV Dake was the 44th 1MB; the remainder Corps included the capture of the Yuz a of the high ground, including Yuz a Dake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment as a pri- Dake, was the responsibility of the 24th mary objective . On line facing this fore- Division. Added to the tenacious de- boding terrain were the 96th and 7th termination of the foe was the natural , Divisions . fortress-like quality of the terrain he Nearly two weeks of punishing an d guarded. This combination enabled the brutal fighting were to ensue before the Japanese to defend the Yuza Dake are a two army divisions could eliminate al l with only one regiment, the 89th. enemy resistance in this Thirty-second Facing the 7th Division were enemy Army defense sector . (See Map IX, Map troops who compared unfavorably with Section.) XXIV Corps units spent the the veterans defending Yuza Dake. Com- period 4–8 June in regrouping and ating from miscellaneous shipping engi- tempting to gain favorable jump-off neer, sea raiding, mortar, and line o f positions for the attack on the escarp- communication units, the soldiers wer e ment on the 9th . All supporting arm s loosely organized into provisional in- were employed to soften the well - fantry regiments and put into the 44th organized enemy defense system . IMB line. The vital Hill 95-Nakaza Val- Armored flamethrower, tank, assault ley area was held by survivors of th e gun, and artillery fires were added to 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, the point-blank blasts of experimenta l which first began to give way under the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles 74 in repeated pounding of the 7th Divisio n " These newly developed weapons had bee n attack. General Arnold's soldiers resent to Okinawa in late May by the War De- lentlessly pushed forward on 11 June, partment for test firing under combat condi- the second day of the all-out corps as- tions . After the limited supply of ammunitio n sault on the escarpment, and threatene d accompanying the weapons had been expended , the rest of the Thirty-second Army line air shipments of the special ammunition were rushed to the island in time for employmen t by breaking into the 44th IMB defenses. by XXIV Corps units at the escarpment . Fiel d An attempt by General Ushijima t o commanders who had the opportunity to use shore up this section of his rapidly these weapons were unanimous in their praise crumbling outpost by committing jerry - and recommended that the recoilless rifle be built infantry units comprised of service adopted as a standard infantry weapon . Ac- and support troops proved to be "as cording to the former commander of the 7th Marines, these weapons " . . . could have bee n ineffective as throwing water on parche d 7 5 used to great advantage by the 7th in it s soil." seizure and processing of Kunishi ridge . The y The 89th Regiment continued to with - were asked for but the reply came back [that ] stand the inroads of 96th Division in - all their ammunition had been used up ." Snedeker ltr 1965 . "'Okinawa Operations Record, p . 129 .

352 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

fantry on 12 June, but this day marke d naval guns, and air-delivered napal m the beginning of the end for the 44th and bombs thoroughly disrupted the Independent Mixed Brigade . Although it deployment. Few, if any, of the enem y had been reinforced with two battalion s troops arrived at their destination. from the 62d Division as a result of the The 96th Division took advantage o f brigade commander's urgent pleas, the this confused situation to rush its in- time for decision was already past, as fantry through the Yuza Dake perime- was the chance for these newly com- ter. On the left, the 7th Division surged mitted units to affect the ultimate cours e down the coast. By the end of 17 June , of the battle. XXIV Corps regiments held firm contro l Clear weather on 13 June, followin g of all commanding ground on the Yuza a night of abortive enemy counterat- Dake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment . Com- tacks, permitted General Hodge to em - pressed between the front lines of th e ploy fully all of his supporting arms . corps and the southern tip of Okinaw a Units of the 62d Division attempting to were the remnants of the Thirty-secon d reach and revive the hapless 44th IMB Army—a hodge-podge of units and indi- were themselves blasted by America n viduals from the 62d Division, 44th IMB, air, artillery, and naval gunfire . Al- and 24th Division. Before the island had though the 89th Regiment—reinforced been secured by the Tenth Army, mos t by the 24th Reconnaissance Regiment— of these Japanese troops would di e still maintained its hold on Yuza Dake , violently in a forlorn attempt to protect its rear and flank were threatened thi s the headquarters of General Ushijima . day by the impending penetration sout of Yaeju Dake. (See Map X, Map Sec- DEATH OF AN ARMY 7 8 tion.) Further advances on 14 Jun e forced General Ushijima to commit the The death throes of the Thirty-second 13th Independent Infantry, which was Army became even more obvious as the almost immediately smashed by 7t h Tenth Army advanced against steadily Division troops . Also committed and de- lessening resistance on 18 June . Al- stroyed on the 14th were the remaining though most sections of the Japanese reserve battalions of the 62d . Division line proved softer than before, two iso- Elsewhere, as Japanese positions be- lated centers of opposition develope d gan to give way under the pressure o f during the day—one around Medeer a the American onslaught, Thirty-second and the other in the area of Mabuni . Army headquarters lost all contact with The first was held by the remnants of the the 15th IMR—the last infantry element of the IMB 44th able to maintain unit P6 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s integrity. To stave off the last stages o f section is derived from : CTF 31 AR ; Tent h a crushing defeat, General Ushijim a Army AR ; ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st ordered the 62d Division into the de- MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III; 7t h teriorating Japanese line from reserve InfDiv AR ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa; 96t h InfDiv AR ; 4th Mar SAR, Ph III ; 5th Mar positions southwest of Makabe, but a SAR ; 8th Mar AR ; 29th Mar SAR, Ph III ; savage lashing from American artillery, Okinawa Operations Record.

BATTLE 'S END 353

24th Division, and the second, aroun d Harold C . Roberts, commanding Officer o f Hill 89, was defended by elements of th e the 22d Marines) . Roberts urged Genera l Buckner not to go to the front at this par- headquarters and troops of the remain- ticular point as the rapid advance had by - ing Thirty-second Army units. (See Map passed a good many Japanese, and , 16.) further, there was considerable flankin g Leading the 1st Marine Division at - fire coming from the high ground in front tack was the 8th Marines, which had of the 96th Division . General Buckner di d relieved the 7th Marines the previous not heed this advice. (Roberts was killed night. At 0730, 2/8 (Lieutenant Colonel an hour or so later on another part of th e Harry A. Waldorf) jumped off from front.) The General got up on a ridge where Lieutenant Colonel Paul E . Wallac e Mezado Ridge to head south and occup y [commanding 3/8] had an OP . Tanks and a line west of Makabe from which it infantry were operating ahead. A rifle could launch a "quick decisive thrust" company was on the ridge preparing to to the sea.77 Light machine gun and rifle move forward. General Buckner took po- fire, later mixed with sporadic morta r sition behind two coral boulders separate d and artillery rounds, hit the left front by a slit through which he could look. and flank of the battalion as it made a His position was slightly forward of the rapid 1,400-yard advance to cap its firs t crest. He had not been in this position e day in the lines . By dark, the battalio n long when a Japanese 47mm shell hit th . The first shell was had secured its objective and began dig- base of the boulders followed by five more in rapid succession . . Since its left flank ging in for the night Either a fragment of the first shell or a was well forward of 1/5, Company B , piece of coral rock thrown out by the 1/8, was attached to fill the gap. detonation hit General Buckner in the Early on 18 June, General Buckner chest. This wound was . mortal . Hubbard had gone forward to witness the fight- [General Buckner's aide], with the assisting, and "probably chose the 1st Divi- ance of others in the vicinity, dragged sion front on this date because h e General Buckner over the crest to a def- n wanted to see the 8th Marines in action," iladed position . A Navy hospital corpsma was there and a doctor arrived withi n as he thought well of the regiment.78 As three minutes . Plasma was available, bu t . Smith recalled : General Oliver P the General had lost blood so rapidly tha t 7 9 On his way to the front [to the 3/8 OP] , plasma could not save his life . l General Buckner met Bob Roberts (Colone Upon being informed of General Buck- '7 LtGen Pedro A . del Valle ltr to CMC, dt d ner's death, Brigadier General Elwyn D . 9Mar55, hereafter del Valle ltr 1955 . "When Post, Tenth Army Chief of Staff, sen t General Geiger gave me the 8th Marines, a fresh regiment at full strength, I conferred a message to CinCPOA reporting the with Colonel Wallace and we agreed upon hi s death. In addition, General Post, know- leapfrog attack, 3 battalions in column, with ing General Buckner's expressed desire s limited objectives, while I would cover his concerning the succession of command , flanks with my exhausted troops. This was th e `coup de morte' [death blow] which broke the recommended in the message that Gen- remnant of the 32d Japanese Army ." del Valle eral Geiger be designated the new Tenth ltr 1965 . 48 Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 135 .

354 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Army commander . 80 On 19 June, Gen- 0730.52 As soon as the attack began, th e eral Geiger was appointed a lieutenant assault units were pinned down by fir e general and was officially designate d coming from the objective and unable to Commanding General, Tenth Army move until 1100, when tanks arrived and (CTF 56) , the same day, making hi m rumbled into support positions . A co- the senior officer present on Okinawa . ordinated tank-infantry assault wa s This was the first time that a Marine launched soon after, and the Marine s officer had commanded a unit of thi s were on the hill by noon . Following i n size. General Joseph W. Stilwell, U. S. the wake of the attack was 3/5, up fro m Army, former deputy commander of the reserve, which moved into support posi- Southeast Asia Command, arrived o n tions behind the 1st Battalion for night the island at 0700, 23 June, succeedin g defense. General Geiger the same day, 81 after Enemy AT fire forced the Marine the Marine general had successfully di- tanks to operate cautiously, but did not rected the final combat operations on slow them down . Artillery-delivere d Okinawa. smoke on a suspected antitank gun posi- Early in the morning on which Gen- tion on Hill 81 just north of Makabe eral Buckner died, the 5th Marines wa s blinded the enemy gunners and per- to take Hill 79, northwest of Makabe . mitted the Shermans to operate withou t At dawn, 1/5 moved out around the being fired upon . Other AT guns wer e western nose of Kunishi Ridge and the n destroyed during the day after havin g south through the 8th Marines zone i n been spotted from the air by an experi- order to get into positions to jump off at enced tank officer, who was flown ove r the battlefield for that purpose .83 By "Ibid., pp. 135-136 . During the planning phase of ICEBERG, General Buckner state d dark, 1/5 had gained the lower slopes o f that a second-in-command of the army should Hill 79 with armored assistance, but be designated prior to the operation, and tha t could not advance beyond that point he felt General Geiger capable of handling a because of heavy enemy fire from high field army . A letter recommending this appoint- ground in the 96th Division zone an ment was sent to CinCPOA—the strategic com- d mander of the area in which the operation was Hills 79 and 81 . At the end of the day, to be held—via Lieutenant General Robert C . tank-infantry teams from 2/5 elimi- Richardson, Jr ., the Commanding General , nated the last large pockets of enem y U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas . The latter returned the letter with a note stating '2 The right (east) flank of the 5th Marine s that this assignment was one for the War had been exposed by the rapid advance of th e Department to decide . No further action was 8th Marines . Therefore, "the battle-weary and taken until the time of General Buckner's decimated infantry of the 1st MarDiv had t o death. Ibid., pp. 34-35. The right of Admiral be employed in attacking the various hill posi- Nimitz to make this assignment evolved fro m tions along the [eastern] flank simply to cove r the fact that the Tenth Army, Task Force 5 6 it . . . . We knew that the XXIV Corps coul d for the Okinawa campaign, was a task unit not keep up with the penetration executed b y within the Fifth Fleet, and not under the con- fresh troops, so we planned our maneuver t o trol of General Richardson's command . provide for this expected contingency ." del Si LtGen Merwin H . Silverthorn comments Valle ltr 1955 . to HistBr, HQMC, dtd 250ct65 . " Ibid. BATTLE'S END 355

MARINE TANKS shelling positions in the south, where the enemy is holed up in a last-ditch stand. (USMC 126411)

COOPERATIVE PRISONERS call upon other Japanese to surrender. Note man at water's edge preparing to swim out to the LCI . (USA SC2095.33)

310-224 0 - 69 - 24

356 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

resistance on Kunishi Ridge, and dug 153 to sweep past Medeera and ende d in on commanding ground for the night . its attack at the corps boundary near In the 6th Marine Division zone, 2/2 2 Komesu. Three battalions abreast spear- passed through the lines of 3/22 on headed the second prong of the attack , 18 June to attack Kuwanga Ridge . Mov- advancing slowly down the coast to- ing rapidly ahead despite steady auto- wards Mabuni. During the night of 18– matic weapons fire, the battalion gaine d 19 June, at least 340 Japanese soldiers a foothold on the high ground and began were killed in attempted infiltrations simultaneous drives to the east and wes t and scattered attacks all along the Tenth to clear the ridge of enemy. Although Army front .8 4 fired upon by rifles, machine guns, an d With the realization that "his Army' s mortars, the battalion possessed th e fate had been sealed," 85 General Ushi- greater part of the ridge before mid- jima began spiritual and physical prepa- afternoon. At this time, General Shep- rations for a Samurai's death. On 16 herd saw that the understrength 2/2 2 June, he sent the first of his farewel l was spread too thinly over the 1,800 - messages, this a report to IGHQ in yard-wide ridge to withstand a con- Tokyo, which read : certed enemy counterattack, so he With a burning desire to destroy th e ordered the 4th Marines to attach on e arrogant enemy, the men in my comman d battalion to the 22d for night defense ; have fought the invaders for almost thre e Colonel Shapley ordered 3/4 forward . months . We have failed to crush th e enemy, despite our death-defying resist- The other two battalions of the 22 d ance, and now we are doomed . Marines spent the day hunting down an d Since taking over this island our force s destroying numerous enemy groups in- have, with the devoted support of the loca l festing the reverse slopes of Mezado population, exerted every effort to build u p Ridge. Forward observation posts be - defenses . Since the enemy landing, ou r air and land forces, working in concert , came especially plagued by all sorts o f have done everything possible to defen d fire coming from these bypassed Japa- the island. nese soldiers. Colonel Roberts, the regi- To my great regret we are no longe r mental commander of the 22d Marines , able to continue the fight. For this failure I was killed at his OP by sniper fire at tender deepest apologies to the empero r . . . . I pra y 1430. The regimental executive officer and the people of the homeland , for the souls of men killed in battle an d Lieutenant Colonel August Larson, as- for the prosperity of the Imperial Family . sumed command . Death will not quell the desire of m y Assault forces of XXIV Corps also spirit to defend the homeland . made important gains on the 18th . The With deepest appreciation of the kindness and cooperation of my superiors and 96th Division push on Medeera posi- my colleagues in arms, I bid farewell to tions from the east was coordinate d all of you forever. with the 1st Division attack on the sam e Mitsuru Ushijima 8 6 objective from the west. The 7th Divi- 84 Tenth Army G—2 Rpt No . 86, dtd 20Jun45 . sion continued its drive with a two - 8" Okinawa Operations Record, p. 133 . pronged attack . One assault element 88 Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Pineau, Divine dashed down the reverse slope of Hill Wind, pp . 148-149 .

BATTLE'S END 357

Three days later, he sent a last mes- successfully convinced 3,000 civilians t o sage to all Thirty-second Army units surrender. with which he still had contact, congrat- A more significant result of thes e ulating the survivors on having per- messages occurred on 19 June, for informed their "assigned mission in a stance, when 106 Japanese soldiers and manner which leaves nothing to regret" 283 Boeitai voluntarily laid down thei r and calling upon them "to fight to th e arms and gave up in the face of the 7th last and die for the eternal cause o f Division advance .90 At this stage of the loyalty to the Emperor ." 87 General Ushi- campaign, the broadcasts influenced in- jima then directed most of his staff offi- creasing numbers of the enemy to sur- cers to leave the Mabuni command post , render as the conviction that all was to disguise themselves as island natives, lost and their cause was hopeless sank and to infiltrate the American lines i n into their war-weary minds. order to escape to northern Okinawa . Their forward progress now slowe d Some of his key advisors, like Colone l by fleeing civilians as well as the en- Yahara, were assigned the mission o f trenched enemy, 7th Division troops , reaching Japan in order to report to nonetheless, advanced to within 200 Imperial General Headquarters ; others yards of the outskirts of Mabuni b y were ordered to organize guerrilla oper- nightfall of 19 June. Tanks accompany- ations in the rear of Tenth Army tactical ing the assault infantry placed direct 88 units and the Island Command . fire on caves fronting Hill 89, not know- Despite their having been thoroughly ing that at that very time, General indoctrinated with the tenets of Japa- Ushijima was giving a farewell dinner nese military tradition, there were some for his departing staff officers . enemy soldiers who did not particularl y Farther inland, on the right of the wish to die for Emperor and Homeland . division zone, 184th and 381st Infantry Psychological warfare teams had inter- units drove towards Medeera from the 89 preters and cooperative prisoners south and east against considerabl y broadcast surrender inducements in lessened fire and resistance . Neverthe- Japanese over loudspeakers mounted o n less, small fanatic groups, defending the tanks operating at the 7th Division complex terrain protecting the 24th Di- front and on LCIs cruising up and down vision headquarters, had to be overcome the southern coast . These broadcasts before the major objective could be seized. To the northwest of Medeera, 87 Okinawa Operations Record, p. 134 . 96th Division soldiers pushing toward s 88 Yahara Interrogation ; Shimada Interroga- Aragachi from the north found the same tion. enemy reluctance to withdraw, encoun- 88 Commenting on this after the campaign , tered elsewhere along the Tenth Army the 6th Division noted that "By far, the most potent propaganda messages are those com- front, before they could reach the hig h posed by local civilians and prisoners of war , ground overlooking the village . While and the most satisfactory broadcasts are thos e observing the 384th Infantry fighting in which such persons are utilized ." 6th Mar- Div SAR, Ph III, chap VI, p . 13 . eo Tenth Army G–2 Rpt No. 86, dtd 20Jun45 . 358 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

to gain these heights, the ADC of th e lead, was forced to double time over th e 96th Division, Brigadier General Clau- entire route in order to reach some dius M. Easely, was killed by enem y cover in Makabe. During this race fo r machine gun fire.9 1 life, the company sustained some cas- The advance of IIIAC assault forces ualties from the fire as well as 20 ex- on 19 June was highlighted when the 8th haustion cases . Marines completely penetrated Japanes e To maintain the momentum of the defensive positions to reach the sea. Less attack, the battalion commander passe d successful, however, were the efforts o f Company F through G at 1950 and he the 5th Marines in a day-long attack himself accompanied the assault pla- on Hills 79 and 81 . With a company of toon, which was pinned down as soon as tanks in support, 1/5 jumped off at 073 0 it attempted to move up the slope of to take Hill 79 first and then 81 . Despit e Hill 81. The condition of his men, th e the direct fire placed on the initial ob- lateness of the hour, and the intensity jective by the Shermans and M-7s, th e of the enemy fire compelled him to cal l battalion was unable to take Hill 79 an d off the attack and organize his battalion was forced to return to positions held into a defense perimeter near Makabe . the previous night. More satisfactory progress in the 1s t As he observed the course of the Division advance was made by the 8th fighting and judged that neither Hill 79 Marines. (See Map 23 .) After moving nor 81 were going to be taken, Colone l through 2/8 at 0800, 3/8 continued Griebel ordered 2/5 to take the latter south to attack Ibaru Ridge followin g from the south in order to lift some o f an hour-long artillery preparation and a the enemy pressure on 1/5 . Lieutenant 15-minute smoking of the target . At Colonel Benedict's 2d Battalion, which 1024, the battalion was on the ridge . had been relieved on Kunishi Ridge a t Quickly it reorganized and resumed it s 1315 that day by 3/7, moved out in a drive by passing Company K, 3/8 re- march column at 1515, made a wide serve, through the initial assault ele- swing to the southwest through the 8th ments more "for the experience rathe r Marines zone, and halted at a point som e than for any tactical necessity ." 92 By 300 yards southwest of Hill 79 at 1700. 1634, the entire battalion line was i n Moving out some 15 minutes later, the place on the seacoast in its zone. The battalion headed towards Makabe pre- 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which had paratory to attacking Hill 81 . As the bat- taken Makabe that morning, kept pace talion cleared the southern slope of Hil l with the rapid 2,500-yard advance of 79 and began to maneuver across th e 3/8 and reached the coast in its zon e 1,000 yards of exposed flat terrain ly- at approximately the same time. With ing between that hill and Makabe, th e 3/5 attached, Colonel Wallace's regiment entire column was taken under sniper took charge of the night defense of th e fire from the hill . Company G, in the coastal zone, and tied in with the 5th Marines and the 4th Marines along a 01 Davidson, et. al., 96th InfDiv Hist, pp . 182-183 . °2 3/8 AR, p. 6, encl to 8th Mar AR .

BATTLE'S END 359

MAP 23 I L . RUSSELL

360 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

curving line reaching from Komesu t o marching south from Oroku Peninsul a the boundary between the Marine divi- at 0800 on the 19th. Its former sector sions. was then occupied by the 6th Reconnais - The 4th Marines made the major ef- sance Company. At 1415, Colonel Whal- fort of the 6th Division on 19 June, wit h ing received orders to attack immedi- the 22d Marines mopping up behind . ately in coordination with the 4th Colonel Shapley's battalions kept pace Marines. The regiment jumped off from with the 8th Marines most of the day , Kuwanga Ridge at 1705 with 1/29 o n but strongly defended enemy position s the left, 2/29 on the right . Moving in the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass pre - rapidly against light enemy resistance, vented the 4th from reaching the coast the troops reached the Kiyamu-Gusuk u on the 19th . Mortar fire from defiladed Hill mass before dark and immediately emplacements behind the hill, and ma - tied in with the 4th Marines for the chine gun fire as well, increased in vol- night. ume as the 1st and 3d Battalions move d Unperturbed by night-long disorgan- into the low ground leading from Ibar u ized enemy infiltration attempts al l Ridge to the Kiyamu-Gusuku plateau . along its front, the 6th Division jumpe d With the approach of night, the two bat- off with four infantry battalions abreast talions dug in at the foot of the stee p -3/4, 1/4, 1/29, and 2/29 from left to rise leading to the hilltop . At 1845, 2/4, right—to take the hill complex on 2 0 which had covered the open right flank June. Again making the division main of the regiment and had taken part i n effort was the 4th Marines, in whos the attack on the ridge, was relieved b y e 1/29.93 zone lay Hills 72 and 80, the key terrai n Before moving into the 6th Division features on the objective . Directly in line on 20 June, the 29th Marines began front of 1/4 line of departure was Hill 72, but the battalion could not place as At 1600, a POW revealed that there was a n enough men on the crest of that height enemy force of about 20 entrenched on the small island approximately 300 yards off at one time to maintain a solid foothold . Nagusuku, and that these men were armed Japanese defenders hidden among the with mortars and light machine guns, which brush and boulders lining the narro w had fired on the 4th Marines flank that day . approach to the top frustrated all efforts Following a short but intense Marine artiller y to gain the hill . Tanks attempted to cut concentration on the islet, five soldiers wade d to the mainland and surrendered. One was sen t a road to the crest from the flank of th e back to induce the others to do the same, bu t position, but this scheme was foile d without success . "The answer that came back when an armored dozer was completel y was a definite no, and also included a remar k destroyed by a satchel charge thrown that was not exactly complimentary ." 4th Mar SAR, Ph III, p . 15 . A task force, hastily organ- from a distance of 15 feet. After a day ized from the regimental weapons company, of bitter fighting at hand-grenade range , LVT(A)s, and the 1st War Dog Platoon, the battalion dug in for the night at the stormed the island . Five prisoners were taken, same place it had been the night before , 20 enemy killed, and several machine guns an d mortars destroyed without a single Marin e less than 20 yards away from the enem y casualty. on the ridge above .

BATTLE 'S END 361

Steep rock cliffs, ranging from 50 to on 20 June against little opposition ex- 200 feet in height and covered with cept for heavy fire received on the left heavy undergrowth, faced 3/4. Since a flank of 1/29 from enfiladed positions frontal attack was clearly infeasible, th e on the reverse slope of Hill 72 . Later in battalion commander sent a company to the afternoon, when General Shepher d the left through the 8th Marines zone decided to envelope the Kiyamu-Gusuku to take the ridge by attacking up its nose sector from the left (east), he shifte d on the east ; this sector appeared to be the the boundary of the 29th Marines to the one most susceptible to attack. Clearing east to include all of Ara Saki. The regi- out several bunkers and numerous caves mental line was then tied in with the 4th to make way for Company L followin g Marines for the night. The 29th Marines in its wake, Company I mopped up th e positions barred escape to the sea fro m eastern slope while Company L tied i n the tip of the island. with the 8th Marines in order to extend On 20 June, psychological warfare de- the battalion's hold on the ridge . By tachments on board a LCI equipped wit h late afternoon, 3/4 held strong positions a loudspeaker broadcast surrender in- on the left flank of Hill 72 and was read y ducements to the many civilian and mili- to close in on that strong point. tary personnel hiding in inaccessible Although it was in regimental reserve cave refuges lining the coastal cliffs . A when the attack had begun, 2/4 was feeling that further resistance was alerted to support either of the othe r futile as well as a sense of impendin g two assault battalions . At 1040, it wa s doom impelled over 4,000 island natives committed on the right of 1/4 with and some 800 soldiers to heed the mes- orders to take Hill 80 . Attacking with sage and to surrender. These POWs two companies abreast, the battalio n were then herded through the front lines reached its objective at approximately before dark to stockades in the rear .94 1230, when Company G fought its way By 20 June, 1st Marine Division actio n to the top against only moderate resist- centered about Hills 79 and 81. While ance. Company E, the other assault ele- 1/5 and 2/5 concentrated their effort s ment, was held up at the base of the hill by an enemy pocket, which th e °' IIIAC G–2 PeriodicRpt No . 81, dtd 21Jun - battalion commander decided to bypass , 45. A large number of the enemy surrendere d leaving a Company E platoon behind to in the zone of 3/4, which detailed some of it s guard it. At 1520, the two-platoon com- Marines to strip and search the military pris- pany passed through the right elemen t oners . Before they were escorted to the rear , the POWs were employed to distribute the last of Company G to seize the remainder of supply air-drop made during the campaign . Hill 80 from the west . By 1645, all units 3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 10 ; VMTB–232 WarD , of the battalion were on the hill an d Jun45 ; AirDelSec AR . Some of the supplies i n digging in. Possession of Hill 80 gav e the drop were for 6th Division tanks, also . the battalion terrain commanding th e Pilots flying the mission reported that th e tanks were so close to enemy troops that th e right flank of the stubbornly held Hill 72 . Marine armor was "obliged to use their flam e On the extreme right of the division, throwers to keep the Japanese away from th e the 29th Marines advanced to the coast provisions." MAG–33 WarD, Jun45 .

362 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

in this area, extensive mopping up oper- it was forced, therefore, to withdraw . ations were conducted by the 7th Ma- In possession of most of Hill 79, 1/ 5 rines at Kunishi Ridge, the 8th Marine s dug in for the night, fully expecting t o along the coast north of Ara Saki, and secure the entire objective the next day . 3/5 around Komesu . These exercise s At 1230, when the 2/5 tank-infantry added approximately 50 military and assault on Hill 81 began, the tracked 2,000 civilian POWs to those already vehicles reported that road blocks i n captured by IIIAC forces .s5 Makabe denied them passage to the hill. After 3/5 gave fire support to the 7th An armored dozer cleared the way b y Division from positions on Komesu 1400, and tanks moved along the roa d Ridge, its patrols linked up with 1/184 on the corps boundary to positions at 1520. Physical contact was not main- where they could fire into the right o f tained for the night, but both battalions Hill 81 . The infantry battalion move d occupied high ground near Komesu and to and jumped off from the norther n Udo and were able to cover the gap be- edge of Makabe at 1520 with Companies tween battalions by fire. E on the right, F on the left, and G i n reserve. Twenty-five minutes later, Com- A brief but soaking downpour befor e dawn turned the roads around Makab e pany F was pinned down in the low ground south of the hill into knee-deep quagmires, and the ; a smoke screen tanks and M–7s supporting 2/5 were was required to cover the evacuation of prevented from moving into position casualties . Company E, attacking from until shortly before noon. A more the southeast, pushed forward for abou t 100 yards along the eastern slope of th e favorable situation existed in the 1/5 zone, where tanks lumbered forward a t hill before it too was pinned down . First Company F, and then G was ordered 0730 to join the infantry in the attack on Hill 79. The battalion commander to pass through E and continue the swung the axis of attack from th e attack. Enemy machine gun and morta r fire pinned down these two companie northwest to the southeast and as- s saulted the objective with three com- also. When tanks supporting the at - panies abreast. By 1300, Company C on tack ran out of ammunition at 191 0 the right flank was 75 yards from th e and withdrew, the assault companie s attempted without success to garner hillcrest, while the other two companies, A in the center and B on the left, wer e more ground on their own. His troop s destroying snipers and machine gu n stymied, the battalion commander pulled nests on the hillside with the aid of flam e them back to more favorable positions and gun tanks . At 1635, Company A for night defense . announced that some of its troops were To the left, in the XXIV Corps zone , on the hill, but less than two hours later only two strong enemy pockets remained it reported that heavy small arms fir e at the 'end of 20 June. One was centere d had prevented it from consolidating it s about the caves containing the Thirty- slight hold with the few men available ; second Army headquarters in Hill 89 , and the other was in Medeera and wes t "MAC G—2 PeriodicRpt, supra. of the village on Hills 79 and 85, which

BATTLE 'S END 363

together with Hill 81 in the 1st Marine ance had ended in the 6th Marine Divi- Division zone formed the Makabe Ridg e sion zone of action . Beginning this las t defenses. The last courier contact be- official day of the Okinawa campaign, tween the two strongpoints was made the 4th Marines enveloped troublesom e on the night of 20 June, after the com- Hill 72. While 2/4 and 3/4 worked mander of the 24th Division, Lieutenant around to the south of the ridge, 1/4 held General Amamiya, urged his soldiers "t o its position to support the attack by fire. fight to the last man in their present Linking up at 0930, the two assault bat- positions." 9 0 talions and supporting armor worked This exhortation fell on deaf ears for north to the objective, and then drov e the general had few live men remainin g over its top and down the reverse slope . to defend the Medeera sector at the time By 1020, the Marines and both flame an d of proclamation . The 1st Marine Divi- gun tanks were mopping up the last sion had just about annihilated the 22d vestiges of enemy resistance on the hill. and 32d Regiments during its march to At the tip of the island, the 29th Marines the coast, and the 96th Division had de- met only light opposition during its stroyed the 89th Regiment and its rein- sweep of Ara Saki ; Company G, 2/22 , forcements when taking Yuza Dake an d attached to 1/29, raised the divisio n Aragachi. The only troops left to Gen- colors on the southernmost point of the eral Amamiya were a motley conglom- island later in the day .98 eration of artillerists, drivers, medical Both the 7th and 8th Marines were attendants, engineers, Boeitai, and per- assigned the task of flushing out enemy sonnel from almost every headquarters holdouts in the IIIAC zone and of ac- unit of the forces that had made up the cepting the surrender of an ever-increas- island garrison on L-Day. Despite th e ing number of soldiers and civilians . growing numbers of the enemy whic h Hill 79 was finally taken by 1/5 at 1735 ; surrendered and others who committe d more difficult, however, was the captur e suicide, the Tenth Army still had to of Hill 81 . contend with some Japanese who fought Although scheduled to jump off at to the last with fanatic determination . 0900, the attack of 2/5 was delayed un - An attack to destroy these soldiers hold- til 1104 in order that tank routes coul d ing the Makabe Ridge defenses wa s be prepared and so that the battalion scheduled for noon of 21 June. could take immediate advantage of a At 1027 that day, General Shepher d blistering rocket barrage on the hill ob- notified the Tenth Army commander , Be This company thus duplicated what it ha d General Geiger,97 that organized resist- done earlier in the campaign when it had been the first unit to raise the same flag over th e Be Okinawa Operations Record, "Record of northernmost point on Okinawa, at Hed o the 24th Division," p . 194 . Misaki . Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, pp . 174-175. B' General Geiger retained command of It appears as though the 22d Marines had a IIIAC during the period he temporarily com- predilection for securing the extremities of manded the Tenth Army . LtGen Merwin H . island objectives, for it had done the sam e Silverthorn comments to HistBr, HQMC, dt d thing during the retaking of Guam . Lodge , 250ct65. The Recapture of Guam, p . 154 .

364 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

jective. 99 The attack plan called for noticeably. At 1700, all companies re- Company E to lead the assault on the ported their portion of the objective se- hill, and to be followed successively by cured ; all organized enemy resistance Companies F and G, which were to be in the IIIAC zone had ended .lo o fed in from the left until Hill 81 was In the XXIV Corps zone, a heavy taken. Company E encountered only 4.2-inch mortar concentration on Hil l light and scattered small arms fire as i t 79 preceded the attack of 305th Infantr y jumped off, and finally fought to and oc- elements at 1200. The crew-served weap- cupied its assigned objective after hav- ons organic to the infantry battalions ing destroyed two machine gun position s supported the tank-led attack . At 1630, that had halted it on the way up . Almost following an afternoon of withering immediately, Company F began fighting rifle and machine gun fire coming fro m its way up the slope to the hilltop, burn- caves and pillboxes on Makabe Ridge , ing out and sealing caves along the the infantry launched a final, successful route. Shortly thereafter, Company G surge to the top of the hill . Before XXIV made its tortuous trek up the incline t o Corps units could report the end of or- join the other two at the top, all com- ganized resistance in the army zone , panies received heavy fire from caves , they had to come to grips with a bitter , which honeycombed the enemy position, last-ditch Japanese defense ; objective s The effort to secure the objective was were captured only after enemy defend- spurred on by information received a t ers had been killed to the last man . The the battalion CP of that Hill 81 was th e soldiers first secured Mabuni and then last organized enemy position on Oki- Hill 89. General Buckner's doctrine of nawa ; this story later proved untrue. "corkscrew and blowtorch" was em- After having made several unsuccessfu l ployed effectively by flame tanks and requests for reinforcements, and been demolition teams burning and blasting ordered in turn to continue the attac k the "palace guard" defending the cave with the forces at hand, at 1430 Lieu- entrances leading to General Ushijima's tenant Colonel Benedict was relieved and headquarters. By the end of the day, ordered to report to the regimental com- Hill 89 had been secured, and its inhab- mander. He then turned over command itants were frantically attempting to of the battalion to his executive officer , escape a death by entombment . lo l Major Richard T. Washburn. At 1500, the commander of 3/5 reported in at 100 2/5 SAR, p. 25. the 2/5 OP and assumed joint comman d 101 It was surprising that there were an y of the two battalions ; his Company L Japanese alive in the vicinity of Hill 89 at thi s began moving to Makabe soon after t o point . Discovered earlier in the month, th e Thirty-second Army CP had been a prime support the attack on Hill 81 . target for TAF aircraft ever since . On 13 June, All companies advanced slowly dur- for instance, a total of 64 planes—23 from ing the afternoon, and as 2/5 reache d VMF–323, 24 from VMF-441, and 17 from the crest of the hill, enemy fire slackene d VMF–314—burned and blasted the hill and it s environs with 124 napalm bombs and 33 5 as LtCol William E. Benedict ltr to CMC, dtd 5-inch rockets in less than an hour . ADC 27Mar47. IntelSums, Jun45 .

BATTLE 'S END 365

After 82 days of bloody and bitte r Following the official announcemen t fighting, the rapid advance of the Tenth on 21 June of the ending of organized Army in the final stages of the campaign resistance on Okinawa, Tenth Arm y brought about irrevocable collapse of all headquarters began receiving congratu- major Japanese opposition . General latory messages from statesmen an d Geiger could thus announce at 1305 o n military commanders throughout the 21 June that the island of Okinawa ha d world. Though heartfelt and sincere , been secured by American forces. The none of these commendations to the me n official end of the Okinawa campaign who had fought the Battle of Okinawa was marked by a formal flag-raising could match the simple accolade be - ceremony at Tenth Army headquarter s stowed on Marines of the IIIAC by the at 1000, 22 June, attended by representa- commander who had led them, for a s tives of all units in that command . As General Geiger wrote : described by General Smith : "A large metal flagpole had already been erecte d This has been a hard campaign. Th e officers and men have simply been marve- at Army Headquarters. . . . The only lous . They have carried on day and night , band available 102 was that of the 2d mud and battle, without a murmur and Marine Aircraft Wing. Prior to playing could have continued had it been necessary . the National Anthem," 103 the band They have carried out every missio n played "Anchors Aweigh," "The Ma- assigned by the Tenth Army and hav e broken through every position of th e rines Hymn," and an appropriate Army Japanese defenses which stood in thei r tune. Brigadier General Lawrence E . way in a minimum of time . The Marin e Schick, USA, Tenth Army Deputy Chie f Corps can ever be proud of the two divi- of Staff, read the official dispatch de- sions which fought on this island. The cost claring the end of organized resistance , has been high, but the time element wa s essential and I am sure you will be happ y and General Geiger then gave the signa l to know that the Marines required n o for the flag to be raised . urging to attack, attack, and again attack , until the Japanese were completely anni- 10Y Each Tenth Army division had its ow n hilated. You will never know how I regret band, which participated in the campaign ac - leaving the III Corps .10 4 cording to the combat functions assigned it by the parent division . None of the bands 104 LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to CMC, dtd functioned as musical units until after Oki- 26Jun45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondenc e nawa had been secured . During the fighting, File, HistBr, HQMC) . Shortly thereafter, Gen- the bandsmen performed as stretcher bearers . eral Geiger became the Commanding General, 10' Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 138. FMFPac . 366 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MEN of the Tenth Army pay homage to their fallen leader, Lieutenant General Simon B . Buckner, Jr. (USN 80-G-498161)

SURRENDER of all Japanese forces in the Ryukyus takes place at Tenth Army headquarters on 7 September 1945 . (USA SC211950) CHAPTER 1 1

ICEBERG Dissolves

MOPPING UP I At noon on 22 June, Ushijima dresse d himself in his full field uniform an d With his defenses overrun and force s shattered, there was little hope of di- Cho donned a white kimono on which verting or lengthening the path leadin g he had written "The offering of one' s to the inevitable fate of his Thirty-sec- life is to fulfill the duties towards th e ond Army. Lieutenant General Mitsur u Emperor and the Country . Cho, Is- Ushijima decided, therefore, to end his amu." 3 As the two led a party of aides life according to the dictates that gov- and staff officers out to a ledge at th e erned his living of it, the traditiona l mouth of the cave headquarters, Ch o way of the Samurai. Joining him in ful- was quoted as saying, "Well, Command- filling his obligation to the Emperor an d ing General Ushijima, as the way ma y dying in the symbolic way of bushido be dark, I, Cho, will lead the way." Ushi- t was the army chief of staff, Lieutenan jima replied, "Please do so, and I'll take General Isamu Cho . along my fan since it is getting warm." 4 Following a meal late on the night of 21 June, Cho and Ushijima composed Ten minutes after leaving the cave, their last farewell messages and the fol- first Ushijima and then Cho died in th e lowing valedictory poems written in the Japanese time-honored ritual of hara- classic Japanese style : kiri. Each in turn bared his abdomen to the knife used in the ceremonial dis- The green grass of this isle Withers untimely before fall , embowelment and thrust inward ; as Yet it will grow again each did so, there was a simultaneous In the warm spring of the Empire . shout and flash of a sword as the head - Smearing heaven and earth with our blood, quarters adjutant decapitated first on e We leave this world with our ammunitio n general and then the other. The bodies gone , - Yet our souls shall come back again and were then secretly buried in graves pre agai n pared earlier. Three days later, 32d In- To guard the Empire forever . 2 fantry patrols discovered them at the ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s foot of the cliff of Hill 89 where it section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; faced the sea. On the white beddin g ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; ' 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 7th InfDiv AR ; 77t h Gugeler, 7th Inf Div Hist, p . 497. The ac- InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDiv AR ; Capt count of the deaths of the two generals in thi s Russell A . Gugeler, USA, The Operations o f work was derived from a POW interrogation . the 7th InfDiv on Okinawa, lApr-22Jun45, 3 The Japanese officer who told this story had vols, n.d ., (OCMH), hereafter Gugeler, 7th learned the details from other prisoners and InfDiv Hist . prepared this account. 2 Quoted in Hattori, War History, p. 131 . Ibid., p. 498 . 367

368 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

cover which served as his winding sheet highway to bar the way to enemy sol- after death, General Cho had written : diers who were attempting an escape t o

22d Day of June, 20th Year of Showa northern Okinawa. The American swee p I depart without regret, fear, shame, o r northwards was mounted by the fiv e obligations . assault divisions that had made the fina l Army Chief of Staff, Army Lt. Gen . Cho , drive in the south and had been on lin e Isamu when the war ended ; they began the Age at departure, 51 years . sweep by merely making an about-face At this time and place, I hereby certif y in position. As the soldiers and Marine s the foregoing .5 drove towards the Tenth Army blocking On 25 June also, the Imperial General positions, they smashed all remaining Headquarters in Tokyo announced the enemy opposition, blew and sealed Japa - end of Japanese operations on Okinawa, nese caves, buried all Japanese dead , and, in effect, of the Thirty-second and retrieved all salvageable enemy an d Army.6 IGHQ then put all of its effort s friendly equipment along the way . To into preparations for the defense of the coordinate and pace the 10-day sweep , Home Islands against an anticipated three phase lines were established. American invasion . Flanking divisions were to guide on the Although the commander and chief 96th Division as it progressed up th e of staff of the Thirty-second Army were center of the island. General Stilwell re- dead, and many Japanese officers an d tained control of the entire operation . enlisted men were surrendering, othe r On 30 June, in less than the time al - enemy soldiers both in groups and in- lotted, the mop up was successfully com - dividually continued a fanatic, last - pleted. Elements of the 77th Divisio n ditch stand until they were destroyed. reduced the final defensive positions of General Stilwell believed it necessary t o the 24th Division near the ruins of eliminate these isolated Japanese pock- Medeera ; the 96th Division thoroughl y ets to safeguard the Island Command cleaned out enemy pockets in the forces that were developing the addi- Medeera-Aragachi sector ; the 1st and tional supply, training, airfield, and por t 6th Marine Divisions worked over Japa- facilities required to convert Okinawa nese survivors in the Kiyamu-Gusuku into a massive base for further opera- and Komesu Ridges ; and the 7th Divi- tions against Japan. He ordered, there - sion did the same to the Hill 89-Mabun i fore, the Tenth Army to begin an in- area. Several brief but bloody fire fight s tensive, coordinated mop-up of souther n flared during the methodical, workman - Okinawa on 23 June ; 10 days were like sweep of the objective area when allotted to this task. strongly armed enemy bands tried futilely to break through the America n The 1st Marines and 307th Infantry were deployed in a line of blocking posi- line and were smashed . tions paralleling the Naha-Yonabar u Results of the sweep indicated that a n estimated 8,975 Japanese had been kille d Ibid. and 2,902 military prisoners and 906 e Hattori, loc. cit. labor troops had been added to those

ICEBERG DISSOLVES 369

already in Tenth Army stockades. En- casualties of all types.8 Between 1 Apri l emy losses for the entire Okinawa cam- and 30 June, Army units received 12,277 paign, were placed at 107,539 counted replacements ; Marine units joine d dead and an estimated 23,764 more 11,147 Marines and naval corpsmen in which were assumed to have been sealed the same period. in caves or buried by the Japanese them- Both British and American naval selves. In addition, a total of 10,755 of forces took heavy casualties while sup- the enemy had been captured ; some of porting and maintaining the Tenth this number had surrendered . As the Army. During the 82 days of groun d overall Japanese casualty total o f operations, 34 ships and craft were sunk 142,058 was "far above a reasonable and 368 damaged ; 763 carrier-based air- estimate of military strength on the craft were lost to all causes . In addition, island," Tenth Army intelligence agen- 4,907 sailors were killed or missing in cies presumed that approximately 42,00 0 action and 4,824 were wounded . At the of these casualties were civilians that time that these losses were sustained, had been unfortunately killed or ships and ground antiaircraft artiller y wounded in American artillery, naval and planes controlled or coordinated b y gunfire, and air attacks on enemy troop s the Navy claimed the destruction of and installations while the natives ha d 7,830 Japanese aircraft and 16 combat - been in the proximity .? ant ships.° American losses were heavy also. The In accordance with the planned suc- total reported Tenth Army casualty fig- cession of operational control estab- ures were 7,374 killed or died of wounds, lished for ICEBERG, 10 Headquarters, 31,807 wounded or injured in action , Ryukyus Area superseded the Tenth and 239 missing . There were 26,221 non- Army on 1 July 1945. At that time, Gen- battle casualties in addition . The combat eral Stilwell became a joint task force divisions alone reported a total of 38,006 commander directly responsible to Ad- miral Nimitz for the defense and de- IntelMono, pt I, sec B, chaps 2, 3 . One velopment of all captured islands and Japanese source indicated that approximatel y the defense of the waters within 2 5 75,000 soldiers and 50,000' Okinawan noncom- . Concurrently, after batant civilians were killed during the battl e miles of Okinawa for the island and that half of the survivors 6 Sources for these figures are the appro- were wounded. Okinawa Operations Record , priate annexes in the Tenth Army AR and the . A second and more recent Japanes e p. 152 ARs of the combat divisions . See Appendix M s account, contradicting the casualty figure for the final compilation by unit of all Marine noted above as well as those cited by America n casualties . sources, stated that about 90,000 Japanese B e troops and Okinawan volunteers were killed USSBS Campaigns, p . 331 . A Japanes Kami- and that there were as many as 150,000 islan d source states that 7,852 aircraft (2,393 Kikusui and smallscale attack s natives killed . This source said also that kazes) in both slightly more than 7,800 troops had survive d were sent against American forces between 6 the battle, but half of these were wounded . The April and 22 June . Of this number, 2,258 neve r War History, table facin g other half continued to resist from under- returned . Hattori, ground positions and by operating as guer- p. 132 . rillas . Hattori, War History, p. 132 . 10 Tenth Army Tntv OPlan 1-45, Anx 1, p . 4.

370 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

CinCPac had dissolved Task Force 31 , claimed a total of 118 enemy planes Admiral Hill and his staff departed for downed during Kikusui No. 9 ; the Ma- Pearl Harbor and Rear Admiral Calvin rine pilots of TAF claimed 35 of this H. Cobb took over as Commander Naval number.l2 Forces, Ryukyus, under General Stil- At the same time that Generals Ch o well. TAF at this time came under the and Ushijima began their suicide prepa- Ryukyus command. All of these forces, rations, Japanese pilots flying the final and others that were to be sent to Oki- mass Kamikaze raid of the Okinawa nawa, were to be commanded by Genera l campaign arrived over the island, pre - Stilwell. He was to coordinate and con- pared to die according to the philosophy trol the massive effort supporting the of the Samurai, but in a more modern impending operations against the center fashion. Approximately 68 of the 257 of the Japanese Empire. Slated to be - aircraft launched in Kikusui No. 1 0 come a major force in carrying the ai r were suiciders. The first group of raid- war to Japan was the Tactical Ai r ers appeared over Kerama Retto o n Force. 21 June at 1830, and correctly replie d to friendly recognition signals .13 One TAF FIGHTS 01\1 11 Kamikaze dived headlong into the sea- Only five days had intervened between plane tender Curtis to start night-long fires that severely damaged the ship . the eighth mass Kamikaze raid of Shortly after, planes from this flight 27–28 May—Kikusui No. 8—and th e attacked LSM–59 as it was towing the ninth, which began on the evening o f hulk of decommissioned Barry 14 away 3 June and lasted until 7 June . As be- from the Kerama anchorage to act as a fore, TAF fighter aircraft rose from Kamikaze decoy, and both vessels were fields on Okinawa and Ie Shima to mee t sunk. approximately 245 Japanese planes com- On 22 June, Marine pilots from MAG ing from the Home Islands . American 22 were flying a barrier combat ai r pilots and antiaircraft artillery units patrol over Amami 0 Shima, when they 11 Unless otherwise noted, the material in were jumped by approximately 60 en- this section is derived from : CNO Record ; emy planes heading for Okinawa alon g AirintelBuls, May-Sep45 ; CTF 51 AR ; Tent h the well-travelled Kamikaze air route Army Tntv OPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR ; TAF WarD, Jun45 ; TAF PeriodicRpt, Jun45 ; AD C 12 WarDs, Jun-Ju145 ; ADC Acf tOpAnalysis , CTF 31 AR, pt III, pp . 51—61 ; TAF WarD , Jun45 Jun45 ; ADC IntelSums, Jun45 ; ILIAC AR ; . Japanese sources claim that only 5 4 XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2d MA W planes did not return . Hattori, War History , WarDs, Jun-Ju145 ; 6th, MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; table facing p . 132 . 13 1st Prov AAA Gru AR ; 53d AAA Brig AR ; CinCPac WarD, Jun45, p . 75 . MAG—14 WarD, Jun45 ; MAG—22 WarD , 1{ The APD Barry had been crashed by a Jun45 ; MAG—33 WarDs, Jun—Ju145 ; VMTB— Kamikaze and gravely damaged late in May . 131 WarD, Jun45 ; VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45 ; A Navy Board of Inspection and Survey recom- AirDelSec AR ; Hattori, War History ; Sherrod , mended that it be decommissioned and can- Marine Air Hist . nibalized. Ibid.

ICEBERG DISSOLVES 371

from Kyushu . The skies immediately A. Montgomery, did not arrive on Oki- buzzed with a frenzy of darting and div- nawa until 8 June, too late to participat e ing aircraft. One pilot was later heard to in the "turkey shoots" against the Kami- say over the radio, "Come on up and hel p kaze attacks, once the group began op- me, I've got a Frank and two Zekes erations on the 11th, its pilots and planes cornered." 15 No further word was heard took part in the stepped-up tempo of from him, and he was later listed a s TAF strikes on such scattered targets missing. as Sakashima Gunto to the south of Oki- During the debriefing after this en- nawa, Kyushu to the north, and the coast gagement, the MAG–22 fliers reporte d of China to the west. On 22 June, Cap- that the enemy had tried to decoy them tain Kenneth A . Walsh, an ace at into unfavorable positions. Four of the Guadalcanal and winner of the Medal Japanese planes were first sighted at of Honor for achievements during th e 20,000 feet, and as a division of Cor- same campaign, shot down his 21st sairs went after them, the decoy plane s enemy plane . In its brief combat tour i n made a run for safety, but pulled up the Ryukyus, the group as a whol e "and dropped their belly tanks in front claimed nine kills . of and above the Marine planes . Our Whenever the weather permitted in pilots had to [maneuver violently] in June, TAF greatly expanded its offen- order to evade the falling tanks. The sive operations and strikes on outlying F4Us turned to press home their attack targets. The primary mission of the far- when the larger force of enemy planes ranging American planes was to seek jumped in and a general melee re- out and destroy enemy planes and sup- sulted." 16 In evaluating the enemy, the port installations. These operations in- Marines reported that the Japanese pilots volved flights of large numbers of single flew a good, tight division formation of engine aircraft over water for distances four planes abreast, and "they seeme d nearly equalling their maximum ranges . to be good pilots but maneuvered Because of their long-range capability, poorly." 17 Of the 51 planes American s the P–47 Thunderbolts of the AA F claimed to have shot down in this en- fighter squadrons attached to TAF 18 counter, TAF pilots listed 44 . performed a dual role as both fighter s Although MAG–14 (VMF–212, -222 , and bombers. On some missions, the -223), commanded by Colonel Edward P–47s bombed and strafed targets o f opportunity as well as assigned targets ; 16 MAG—22 WarD, Jun45 . The Zeke, known they escorted light, medium, and heav y earlier in the war as the Zero, was a single engine fighter manufactured by Mitsubishi. ie The 318th Fighter Group joined TAF The Frank, likewise a single engine fighter about 30 April and began operations from th e but manufactured by Nakajima, was a newer field on Ie Shima almost immediately there - and faster plane that appeared during the late after. The other two groups of the 301st stages of the war. Fighter Wing arrived in Okinawa in succeed- 19 Ibid. ing months ; the 413th on 19 May and the 507th " Ibid. on 24 June .

310-224 0 - 69 - 25

372 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bomber missions after Bomber Com- Tenth Army. On 1 July, when the command joined TAF in June and July.19 mand change occurred, ADC assume d At this time, existing airfields on Oki- complete responsibility from TF 31 fo r nawa were expanded, and new ones built the air defense of the Ryukyus . At this at Awase on the east coast and Chimu i n time, TAF aircraft strength was sub- the north in accordance with base de- stantially increased, especially by th e velopment planning. The influx to these bomber squadrons, and General Wood s and the other fields of newly joining could send his planes to better objectives squadrons increased ADC aircraft further away from Okinawa than those strength from 432 planes at the begin- attacked previously. In its first rai d ning of June to 711 at the end . 20 With under TAF, on 1 July the 41st Bombard- these additional aircraft, TAF mounted ment Group sent its Mitchell bombers t o increasingly stronger air attacks against blast Kyushu . On that same day, TAF the Japanese Home Islands . Marine inaugurated a combat air patrol over fighter planes from ADC hit Kyush u Kyushu in hope that Japanese pilots installations for the first time o n would take off from island airdromes t o 10 June, the day before Major General engage the American planes . Few enem y Louis E. Woods relieved Major General pilots rose to the occasion . 21 Mulcahy as TAF commander . In another phase of TAF operations , There was little change in the mis- Thunderbolts began hitting Japanese in- sions of TAF, Ryukyus Command, fro m stallations on the China coast near th e those it had fulfilled as an agency of th e Yangtze Estuary on 1 July. A landmark " Four AAF bomber groups of the Bomber the losses from the Kamikaze attacks wer e Command joined TAF, beginning with the 41st heavy and he was going to withdraw all ship which arrived in Okinawa on 7 June . The 494th s as soon as possible . Upon my arrival [at Oki- Bombardment Group arrived on 24 June, the nawa], I found that Admiral Hill and his flag - 319th about 2 July, and the 11th actually on 2 July. ship were responsible for the air defense of the area, and that the ADC of TAF was reall y " ADC WarD, Jun45 . only a fighter command and not responsible " "My assignment as General Mulcahy's refor keeping track of friendly aircraft in th e lief was a most unexpected one for me . I was i n area . When I took command . . . I ordered the Pearl waiting to see [Major] General [Ralp h ADC to get set up to take over the complet e J.] Mitchell, whom I was relieving as CG o f responsibility for the air defense . . . without the First Air Wing, then at Bougainville, whe n delay . . . . Why the ADC hadn't been called AirFMFPac gave me immediate orders to g o upon to [keep track] of the friendly plane s there . I took off with double crews and flew in the area long before this has always bee n continuously until arrival . Upon arriving, I a mystery to me, for how can an outfit provid e reported to General MacArthur's Headquarter s air defense properly unless it has full infor- by dispatch . Several hours after my arrival I mation about all friendly and enemy aircraf t received immediate orders to proceed to Guam in the area ? and to report to Admiral Nimitz . I did a s To deepen the mystery was the fact that i t ordered and Admiral Nimitz personally briefe d has been reliably reported to me that neithe r me, and told me to take the necessary steps to AirFMFPac nor Headquarters Marine Corp s have the ADC of TAF take over the air de- knew of my being sent to Okinawa until afte r fense of the area in the very near future as my arrival ." Wood ltr I.

ICEBERG DISSOLVES 373

in TAF operations occurred on the 9th , control of FEAF ; the three other squad- when B–24s attacked Japan from Oki- rons were assigned to the control o f nawa. All together, the 47 heavy bomb- Fleet Air Wing 1 .25 2 ers—and the 25 Mitchells and 3 In the period 7 April through 13 July, Thunderbolts acting as bombers ac- TAF amassed a creditable record . A companying them—spread 1,880 clusters of fragmentary bombs and 280 clusters Marine aviator himself, General Geiger of incendiary bombs over dispersal area s wrote General Woods that the air sup- and field installations of Omura airfiel d port provided by TAF pilots was "out - on Kyushu. Another 92 Thunderbolts standing and contributed materially to escorting the mission acted merely as a speedy and successful completion o f spectators ; no enemy interceptors ap- the campaign ." 26 By the end of 13 July, peared. TAF claimed a total of 625 Japanese In accordance with orders from planes destroyed in the air and 29 proba- CinCPOA, TAF, Ryukyus was dissolve d bles ; MAG–33 pilots were the high scor - on 14 July.22 On that date, all Marine air units reported to the 2d MAW, which squadron trained to operate at night employin g was then designated Task Group 99.2, radar-operated bomb sights and search gear , and assigned to the Ryukyus Command . and to launch rockets from its PBJs (Mitchells , AAF squadrons and groups that had twin engine bombers), the Navy-Marine Corp s been temporarily assigned to TAF wer e designation for the B-25 . The squadron arrived on Okinawa in July, and operated from Chim u transferred to the Far East Air Forces airfield until the end of the war. (FEAF), which assumed control of th e 25 2d MAW WarD, Ju145 . Before this change mounting number of air attacks agains t took place, General Stilwell had received a Japan. different set of orders from CinCPac head - Under the Ryukyus Command, Ma- quarters concerning the future disposition of rine squadrons continued flying the the 2d MAW . According to Admiral Nimitz ' types of missions they had flown previ- first directive, which assigned " . . . all th e ously, but they now ranged much furthe r Fighter Squadrons to the [FEAF] Fighte r e away from the island than when they Command, and the VMTB squadrons to th l e Fleet Air Wing . That left only my [Genera had been committed to the air defens Woods] command headquarters without any of ICEBERG forces. On 19 July, AD C units . . . under General Stilwell. On the las t flyers made their first visit to the Chin a day I was under his command, I went . . . to coast, when 59 F4Us flew cover for T F see him, and told him I was a General `withou t 95, then operating off the enemy-hel d portfolio' and asked permission to fly to Guam . littoral .23 At 0001, 1 August, the 2 d I told him that I would be back in comman d MAW and all of its squadrons with the of the units of the Wing or I wouldn't be back. o exception of VMTB–131 and -232, and He wished me luck and I left . When I got t Guam, I saw Vice Admiral [Charles H .] passed to the operational VMB-612,24 McMorris [CinCPac Chief of Staff] and afte r y 22 TAF WarD, 1-13Ju145 . some discussion all units were returned to m control and new orders were issued." Woods 22 2d MAW PeriodicRpt No . 1, 14-20Ju145 . ltr I. 2d VMB-612, commanded by Lieutenant Colo - 29 nel Jack R . Cram, was the first Marine bomber 2d MAW WarD, Jun45 .

374 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ers with claims of having shot down 21 4 tainers took up the rest of the weight.3 1 enemy aircraft.2 7 Handling these supplies on the carrier s Of particular interest is the fact that first and at the airfields on Okinaw a Marine night fighters came into thei r later was the IIIAC Air Delivery Sec- own in the air above Okinawa ; tion. Consisting of 1 officer and 82 en - VMF (N) -533 registered claims o f listed Marines, the section was attache d 35 enemy planes downed, 2S while to Tenth Army and worked very closel y VMF(N)–542 claimed 17, and -543 , with the TAF squadrons . 11 .29 Some overwhelming statistics ap- Although seemingly prosaic when peared in the course of the Okinawa air compared to combat air patrols, suppl y operations . For example, while flyin g drop missions were very often just as 118,982 hours and 38,192 sorties, TA F hazardous. For optimum results, the pilots expended 4,102,559 rounds of .50 Avenger pilot had to maintain an air caliber ammunition and 445,748 rounds speed of 95 knots, very close to a stall, of 20mm. In addition, the flyers released at an altitude of about 250 feet while 499 tons of napalm, 4,161 tons of bombs , trying to spot a drop zone that was sup- and 15,691 rockets .3o posedly marked by colored smoke, WP The pilots and planes of VMTB–131 grenades, or panels, either separately and -232 recorded some amazing sta- or together . At the same time, he wa s tistics during their supply drop opera- being fired upon by Japanese weapon s tions to ground troops . In addition to of all sorts—antiaircraft guns as well as the 70 supply sorties carrier-based air - small arms . Some pilots had to fly under craft flew in support of IIIAC groun d an arc of friendly artillery and naval units, the two TAF squadrons flew 76 0 gunfire.32 sorties for the Tenth Army--80 of these In attempting to drop supplies on tar - went to XXIV Corps, the rest to IIIAC . gets, Marine aviators often found that The total weight that the TBMs carrie d the drop zone had not been properl y on these missions was 668,984 pounds ; marked or correctly identified, or that the supplies weighed 495,257 pounds , the Japanese were using the same colo r cargo paracutes and air delivery con - of smoke that Tenth Army ground unit s were supposed to have employed . As a 27 The pilots of the "Death Rattlers," VMF– result, the drop mission either was 323 commanded by Major George C . Axtell, Jr., aborted until the zone could be properly contributed over half, 124 1/2 planes, to the MAG–33 score. One unusual feat in the ai r identified, or the pilots made an edu- campaign of Okinawa took place during the cated guess—in which case, the supplies Kamikaze attack on 22 April, when, in a 20 - sometimes were dropped into enemy minutes period, Axtell shot down five raiders territory. and his two wingmen—Major Jefferson D . Dorroh, squadron executive officer, and Firs t When the drop zone was particularl y Lieutenant Jerry J . O'Keefe—destroyed six difficult to spot, Air Liaison Parties fro m and five enemy aircraft, respectively . 28 VMF(N)–533 WarDs, May-Ju145 . 31 AirDelSec AR, p. 2 . 29 Ibid., Ju145 . 2Y See discussion of LFASCU operations be - '° Ibid. low for further comments on this problem .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES 375

the Joint Assault Signal Companies 3 3 developed great trust and confidence in attached to frontline infantry unit s the ability of close air support to coached the TBM pilots to their target strengthen attacks on particularly stub- by radio. The primary mission of the born enemy strongpoints and to clear ALPs was to direct TAF and carrier- the way for assaults in general. Sur- based aircraft to the target. Coordinat- prisingly enough in view of the many ing the requests from lower echelons support sorties flown, there were bu t were the three Marine Landing Forc e few instances when friendly troops Air Support Control Units (LFASCUs ) were bombed, strafed, or rocketed by commanded by Colonel Vernon E . Me- accident, even though strikes were often gee. Colonel Megee wore two other hats : conducted less than 100 yards away fro m he was representative ashore of th e friendly lines. After getting their first Navy Close Air Support Control Uni t taste of what close air support could d o (CASCU) that was on board Eldo- for them, Army units were soon "insa- 3 4 rado, and he commanded LFASCU—3 tiable in their demands ." which was the control unit at Tenth Throughout the course of the war i n Army headquarters . LFASCU—3 co- the Pacific, senior Marine commanders ordinated the air requests forwarde d became and remained staunch adherents to and supporters of the close air sup- from the IIIAC infantry regiments b y port doctrine. As it developed, they be- LFASCU—1 and from XXIV Corps came convinced that more extensive us e units by LFASCU—2. Each of thes e of the ALPs at the division, regimental , control units operated at the headquar- and battalion levels would increase th e ters of the corps to which it was at- quality and quantity as well as the ef- tached. fectiveness of air support. Although close air support technique s After the Okinawa campaign, the con- and the methods for their control wer e sensus of the Marine commanders pres- rudimentary at the beginning of Worl d ent there was that, with proper commu- War II, during the latter stages of th e nications equipment and more intensiv e war and especially on Okinawa, im- and complete training, ALPs coul d proved aircraft, proven control pro- easily take over control of strike mis- cedures, and pilots skilled in providin g sions from LFASCUs and "talk" th e close air support served together t o pilots directly to their targets .35 This make this supporting arm one of th e " Col Vernon E . Megee quoted in Sherrod, most powerful that was available to the Marine Air Hist, p . 411 . infantry. On Okinawa, ground troops "IIIAC AR, pp . 197—198 ; 1st MarDiv SAR, Air Support Anx ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II, " The JASCO was a joint Navy-Marin e pt X, pp . 24—26 ; CG, AirFMFPac ltr to CMC , Corps organization ; the naval component con- ser 002233, A16—3/G—3/eas, Subj : Air Support , tained the shore fire control parties, whic h dtd 28Aug45, with encls A—H, Rpts of 1st operated with the frontline infantry battalions , MarDiv (Rein), 6th MarDiv, XXIV Corps, 7th spotting targets for and controlling the naval InfDiv, 27th InfDiv, 77th InfDiv, 96th InfDiv , gunfire support of these ground units. The and IIIAC, hereafter CG, AirFMFPac ltr . Marine ALPs functioned similarly, but con - These reports duplicate the comments controlled the close air support provided the cerning air support each command made in its infantry. Okinawa action reports.

376 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

procedure of direct air-ground contro l rive general for the establishment of between ALPs and the planes above the balanced air-ground amphibious them had been developed by the Marin e force in readiness which has become the Corps prior to the Okinawa invasion an d hallmark of the present-day Marine was used in the 1st and 6th Marine Di - Corps. vision training cycles. Colonel Mege e That the ready acceptance of Marine later explained that this system was no t aviation by Marine ground forces as an used at Okinawa because : equal or supporting partner in amphibious operations was not an immediat e . . . to have permitted each battalion ai r liaison party to control striking aircraf t thing is indicated by General Woods , on a corps front of only ten miles, whe n who said : many simultaneous air strikes were bein g run, would obviously have led only to All senior ground generals in World pandemonium and grave hazard for al l War II believed in the air-ground team those concerned. On the other hand, where but when in the combat area, they were conditions approximated those in the never able to keep aviation under thei r Philippines, i .e., battalion or regimenta l command . Maybe it is because they gave actions in an uncrowded area, actual con- only lip service to the doctrine. Even as trol of aircraft was frequently delegated early as Guadalcanal, the First Wing was to the air liaison party .'° not under the command of General Vande- grift, and when the First Division left the After having read the comments and combat area, all [Marine] aviation unit s recommendations of both Army and Ma- were left behind! 3 8 rine commanders concerning the air sup- A review of Marine air activities i s port they received in the Okinawa not complete without mention of the campaign, Major General James T . Marine observation squadrons, th e Moore, commander of Aircraft, Fleet VMOs. Although their exploits were not Marine Force, Pacific, forwarded them so spectacular as those of the fighter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps . and torpedo bomber squadrons, nor thei r In a covering letter, General Moore rec- planes so swift and deadly, the VMOs ommended "that Marine Air and Ground attached to IIIAC performed as vitally be organized and combined under on e important a role in the successful prose- command with the primary mission of cution of the Okinawa campaign . As- Marine Air being the support of Marine signed to the Marine components of the Ground Forces ." 37 This might very wel l ICEBERG forces as artillery spotters , be interpreted as the first definitiv e VMO—2,39 -3 and -6 and their OY recommendation made by a senior Ma - "Grasshoppers" were ashore and operat- 'e Quoted in Isely and Growl, Marines an d ing from Okinawa fields by 3 April . The Amphibious War, p. 567. For the story o f squadrons were soon flying other type s Marine close air support operations in the of missions, however, and not neces- recapture of the Philippines, see Maj Charle s W. Boggs, Jr ., Marine Aviation in the Philip - 98 Wood ltr I. pines (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1951) ; sa Until 15 April, when they returned to see also Garand and Strobridge, "Western Saipan, VMO–2 pilots flew missions for th e Pacific Operations," passim. 11th Marines with VMO–3, but used VMO–6 37 CG, AirFMFPac ltr. planes . Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec VI, p . 59 .

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sarily for the Marine artillery regi- we were fighting our way uphill on th e ments. Within two days, for example, Shuri massif . Without our AOs [Aerial both VMO–2 and -3 were serving a tota l Observers], IIIAC Artillery would hav e been blind .44 of 11 Army and Marine artillery battalions—the equivalent of nearly three Colonel Henderson continued : full regiments .40 As soon as VMO–7 arrived in early May, it, too, was kept The courage and daring of our AOs an d the VMO pilots was an outstanding fea- busy. ture of the campaign . I think that VM O In addition to spotting missions, pilots are the unsung heroes of Marine Grasshopper pilots and their aerial ob- Aviation . . . . servers flew photographic and reconnais- When they wanted to really investigat e something . . . they would go right down sance missions. Sometimes, line routes on the deck . Often they would fly past cave for ground communications were se- openings at the same level so they coul d lected after the observers had reporte d look in and see if there was a gun there .45 the number and location of telephon e poles still standing.4' In early June an d This tactic was most important becaus e of the difficulty that often arose in lo- until the end of the campaign, the VMO s made many evacuation flights . During cating Japanese artillery positions, especially those sited in cave mouths the 12-day period from 11–22 June in- . clusive, VMO–7 made a total of 36 9 Considered more a hindrance than a evacuation flights from the strip behin d safeguard by both artillery and air sup - 1st Division lines ; these were in additio n port units, restrictive fire Plans Nega t to the 243 spotting and 17 photo-recon- and Victor46 greatly diminished the effect naissance missions flown in the same of artillery and naval gunfire bombard- period.42 ments during the early part of the campaign. Colonel Henderson noted that By the end of the Okinawa battle, the -"They were supposed to protect our ow n four VMOs had flown 3,486 missions .43 close air support planes from friendly The most valuable of these, in the view artillery fire, but more often served to of artillery commanders, were the spot- protect the Japanese from our fire ." 4 7 . As the G–3 of IIIAC Artil- ting missions In addition, the plans were invoked too lery noted later : often, and then remained in effect far If there was any group of indispensabl e officers in IIIAC Artillery on Okinawa, i t " Henderson ltr. was our air spotters. The nature of th e "Ibid . terrain in southern Okinawa seriously lim- 48 Containing safety factors that were con- ited ground observation—especially whil e tingent on specific danger conditions, Plan s Victor and Negat were invoked either sep- 40 Air IntelBul, Jun45, p. 11 . arately or jointly whenever an air strike was 41 Ibid . to be delivered on the same target being fired 42 Ibid., Aug-Sep45, p. 22 ; VMO—7 WarD , upon by artillery and naval guns. The effect o f Jun45. the plans was to protect the pilots and plane s y 42 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec VI, p . 59 . flying the close support mission . Tenth Arm Included in this number are the ones flown b y Tntv OPlan 1-45, Anx 5, p . 5 . VMO—2 from 3—15 April . 44 Henderson ltr .

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too long. Colonel Kenneth H . Weir, com- of the service and support troops in the mander of LFASCU-1, agreed in prin- Tenth Army . As Tenth Army note d ciple with this complaint. He said that later : "In effect, Island Comman d "if air support units could have bee n [served] as a combined Army Service given the maximum ordinates and azi- Area and advance section of a Communi - muths of the artillery and naval gunfire cation Zone." 5 1 falling into an area in which air strikes The degree and scope of the function s were to be made," 48 in many instances delegated by Tenth Army to General the aircraft could have attacked o r Wallace increased in an almost direct continued an attack without invokin g proportion to the decrease in fightin g the restrictive fire plans . This contro- and subsequent narrowing of the comba t versial point was settled on 16 May zone. Before the beginning of July, when Tenth Army cancelled the use o f Island Command controlled some 153,00 0 Plans Negat and Victor, except i n men and had become responsible fo r unusual circumstances.49 the defense and development of ever y major island in the entire Okinawan ISLAND COMMAND ACTIVITIES " chain of islands.52 Subordinate and reporting to General Wallace were th e The tasks to be carried out by Islan d commanders of Naval Operating Base , Command during both the combat an d Ryukyus ; Joint Communication Activi- the garrison phases of the Okinaw a ties ; Hydrographic Survey ; Army and campaign were more complex and stag- Navy Air Bases ; Construction Troops ; gering in many ways than those as- Military Government ; and Ground De- signed to other Tenth Army combat fense Forces. Additionally, General Wal- organizations. Major General Fred C . lace exercised control over a large num- Wallace was responsible for providing ber of service troops which had been administrative and logistic support to assigned directly to his headquarters . combat units, executing the CinCPO A When ICEBERG Plan Phase III op- base development plan, and assuming— erations against Miyako and Kikai were when directed by Tenth Army—the re- cancelled in late April, all base develop- sponsibility for the garrison and defens e ment efforts, and troops scheduled for of Okinawa and its outlying islands . To employment on these and other island s achieve the objectives required in thes e of the Ryukyus, were reassigned to various assignments, Island Comman d Okinawa. In the planned revisions, had been organized so that it woul d " Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVI, p . 1. direct, control, and coordinate a join t Patrols of the 2d Marine Division recon - task force comprised of a large portion naissance company scouted Izena Shima—t o the north of Okinawa—from their base o n "8 Quoted in AirintelBul, Aug-Sep45, p . 24 . Iheya Shima, on 23 June . No enemy soldier s 4° Henderson ltr. were found ; the island held some 4,000 natives, " Unless otherwise indicated, the material in however, who were friendly to the Americans . this section is derived from : IsCom AR ; Mil- On 29 June, Island Command took over Kume GovtSec, IsCom, Histories of MilGovt Ops on Shima, which had been captured by the FM F Okinawa, Apr-Aug45 rpts ; 27th Inf Div OpRpt . Reconnaissance Battalion earlier in the month .

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the number of airfields originally needs of hundreds of thousands of sol- scheduled for development on the island diers and civilians . Other pipelines were was doubled, and a corresponding in- laid and tank farms built to handle th e crease in supply installations and troop tankerloads of aviation fuel necessary t o staging, rehabilitation, and training maintain current and act as a reserve areas was envisioned . All of these im- for projected air operations . Construc- pending developments, however, were tion of the hundreds of storage, admin- held in abeyance until remnants of th e istration, and hospital buildings to b e Thirty-second Army had been destroyed . used by invasion-bound troops paced th e As an example of his single-minded buildup elsewhere on the island . determination to pursue the basic ob- As the end of organized resistanc e jective, General Buckner had ordered on Okinawa neared, Island Command all airfield construction units to concen- shifted the weight of its logistical sup- trate on maintaining and reconstructin g port from Tenth Army to preparation s supply roads to frontline organizations for approaching operations. One base de- when the heavy rains and resultant mu d velopment phase influenced by planne d of late May and early June threatene d future operations resulted in the pre - to bog down but failed to halt the Tenth emption of vast areas of arable land in Army attack . In spite of the weather southern Okinawa and on the Motobu and incident delays, the first American- Peninsula . Not only was the topography built airstrip on Okinawa—a 7,000-foo t of the island altered, but the way o f runway at Yontan—was completed by life, means of subsistence, and source s 17 June. Before the end of the month, 5 of sustenance of island natives were airfields were operational on the island, irrevocably changed. Ejection of the and 8 of the 18 proposed fields were sited natives from generations-old family and were in the midst of being rehabili- holdings and removal of other islander s tated or constructed to meet the needs of from more populated areas meant that the increased numbers of newly arriving they became, in effect, wards of the B-29s. Island Command. Besides air base development an d The agency responsible to Island Com - road maintenance, the Island Command mand and taking over its role as guard- engineering troops fulfilled other im- ian for the displaced Okinawans wa s portant tasks . They widened over 16 0 Military Government. Like so many of miles of existing native roads into two- , the other agencies directed by General three-, and four-lane highways to ac- Wallace, this one was a joint service commodate the burgeoning load of sup - effort. Even during the initial stages o f ply and troop traffic. Island Command the battle, military government team s also opened new beaches, constructe d functioned as though they were conduct- piers, and cleared dump areas to handl e ing a "disaster relief operation," 53 in the influx of supplies to be used in th e which they had to clear the islanders ou t impending operations against Japan of the way of the course of the fighting proper. Engineers developed a massive " Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVII, pp. water system capable of answering the 3-4.

380 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

for reasons of mercy as well as for the Upon passing to Island Command con- purpose of keeping them from hamper- trol and moving to the areas in northern ing Tenth Army operations. In this pe- Okinawa formerly occupied by the 1s t riod, as the native population became and 6th Marine Divisions, the 27th Divi- concentrated in stockades and resettle- sion began patrolling extensively, assist- ment areas in northern Okinawa, the ing the military government collection Americans gave assistance to the Oki- teams, and blowing caves as well as nawans as the natives reconstituted the fortified and prepared positions foun d normal functions of civil government in its assigned zone of responsibility. and developed a self-sustaining local When the toll of enemy dead rose fro m economy. Primary emphasis was on in - an average of 3 or 4 to 15 a day an d creased Okinawan participation in both Army troops found evidence of increas- areas. An idea of the magnitude of the ing numbers of recently occupied an d job that was performed by a relatively prepared bivouac positions, General small group of military government per- Wallace decided to make a thorough sonnel is reflected by the fact that it sweep of northern Okinawa to kill o r was in charge of 261,115 civilians o n capture the Japanese remaining there . 30 June, and 100,000 more by the end On 19 May, the division began a sweep . of the war northwards from the base of Ishikaw a Complementing the sweep that Tenth . Army forces made in the south after th e Isthmus with three regiments abreast end of organized resistance, Island Com- Within five days, the soldiers met heav y mand garrison forces in occupied area s resistance at Onna Take, the heavily of northern Okinawa conducted mop- forested hill mass rising to 1,000 feet ping-up operations, which lasted well from the center of the isthmus . Here, into August and assumed the proportion 1st Division Marines had fought guer- of pitched battles at times . The majority rillas in April while the 6th Division wa s of the flare-ups occurred north of th e fighting the battle on Motobu Peninsula . Ishikawa Isthmus, garrisoned by the Since that time, the enemy had added to 27th Infantry Division on 2 May . Army the natural defenses of the area and forces on Kerama Retto also felt th e backlash from survivors of Japanes e extensively fortified the region . The sol- units that had been defeated but did not diers fought a 10-day pitched battle her e know it.64 without benefit of air or artillery support. After it was over, there was evi- G° A provisional infantry battalion, formed from the 870th Antiaircraft Artillery (Auto- dence that a sizable number of Japanes e matic Weapons) Battalion, relieved 2/305 as had escaped the trap and headed further the Kerama Retto garrison on 23 May. The north. The 27th Division continued its former AAA gunners were given some rudimentary infantry training by experienced 27t h sweep and followed the Japanese . The Infantry Division officers and noncommissione d mop up was finally completed on officers, and then began operations which lasted 4 August, when Army troops reached until the end of the war to destroy the numer- Hedo Misaki . The division reported at ous survivors of the sea raiding battalion s hidden out in the rugged hills of the island . the end of the nearly three-month drive

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that it had killed over 1,000 Japanese battalion in case the Japanese force en - and captured 500 .55 countered was larger than expected . As the fighting on Okinawa drew to a Leaving the company from 1/7 behin d climax, preparations for another off- to guard the beachhead, Major Jones island operation began . Like Tori, Ibeya , and his battalion set out to contact the and Aguni Shimas, Kume Shima had been enemy. After five days of intensive pa- one of the targets originally selected for trolling, no Japanese were found and capture during Phase III (d) of the ICE - no opposition was developed. On 30 June, BERG operations.56 The priority of Jones declared the island secure.57 these targets was downgraded later as Although the Kume assault force had the ground campaign unfolded, and thi s encountered no enemy in the late Jun e phase of the ICEBERG operation wa s operation, the garrison troops only sev- finally cancelled . A Tenth Army study in eral days later became involved in tw o late May resulted in the choice of these fire fights with Japanese soldiers. Six of islands as radar and fighter directo r the enemy were killed and three of thei r sites. The first three were captured i n four machine guns were captured . Con- early June, and Kume was targeted fo r stant aggressive patrolling forced th e seizure during the mop up phase on Oki- survivors to scatter into the hills i n nawa. Largest of the outlying islands the interior of the island, where they selected for early-warning facilities— offered no threat to the successful opera- some 40 square miles in size—it i s tion of air warning facilities . Air Warn- approximately 55 miles west of Naha . ing Squadron 11 arrived at Okinawa o n Assigned to capture the island was the 4 July, and its units were set up o n FMF Amphibious Reconnaissance Bat- Kume Shima two days later. By 12 July, talion, which had been attached to Islan d the radar and fighter director sections of Command for garrison duty in the East - the squadron had begun operations and ern Islands after the Marines had seized been integrated into the system con- them. On 21 June, the battalion was re- trolled overall by the Air Defense Con- leased to Tenth Army control for the trol Center on Okinawa .5 8 Kume Shima assault landing. (See Map 22.) EVALUATION OF OPERATIONS 59 Kume was scouted in the night of 13–14 June by Company B patrols . In- As some scholars in the field of mili- formation received from capture d tary history and tactics have noted, th e civilians indicated that only a 50-man Ph III, encl A, The enemy garrison held the island . This "PhibReconBn AR, Assault and Capture of Kume Shima, dtd intelligence proved correct after the 15Aug45 . d landing on 26 June, but Company A an " ADC Hist, p . 6 . the 81mm Mortar Platoon from 1/7 "Unless otherwise noted, the material i n were attached to Major Jones' 252-man this section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDi v "Love, 27th Inf Div Hist, p. 649 . SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; Isely an d "ICEBERG Study, App H. Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War .

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Okinawa operation represents "the cul- "the Navy's participation was vital to mination of amphibious development i n both throughout." 64 The target infor- the Pacific war." 6° Shortly after the mation center (TIC) was the primary initial landings, British observers ac- Tenth Army agency that coordinated th e companying the ICEBERG force re- request for and assignment of support- ported that "This operation was the ing arms. In the TICs existing at divi- most audacious and complex enterprise sion, regimental, and battalion levels which has yet been undertaken by the throughout the Tenth Army, a central- American Amphibious Forces, . . ." 6 1 ized target information and weapons And they were undoubtedly right, for assignment system gave unit command- "more ships were used, more troops pu t ers the ability to mass the maximu m ashore, more supplies transported, more amount of firepower on both assigne d bombs dropped, more naval guns fired targets and targets of opportunity . against short targets" 62 than in any At each infantry echelon down to bat- previous campaign in the Pacific. De- talion level, the artillery liaison office r spite the immensity of all of the factor s was also in charge of the TIC and involved in the ICEBERG operation, worked very closely with the operations the Okinawa landing realistically dem- officer. Utilizing previously collated in- onstrated the soundness of the funda- telligence pinpointing enemy positions mental amphibious doctrine that the and screening support requests, the TIC Navy and the Marine Corps had de- section head—an artillery liaison of- veloped over the years and had tempere d ficer—and the naval gunfire and ai r in the Pacific fighting . This thesis was liaison officers allocated fire missions t o amplified by General Geiger, who each of the three support elements which pointed out that the battle for Okinawa they represented. A primary considera- "reemphasized most clearly that ou r tion in making each assignment was the basic principles of tactics and tech- capability of the weapon or weapons t o nique are sound, `in the book,' and nee d be employed . only to be followed in combat." 63 The target information center at The touchstone to success at Okinawa IIIAC headquarters was controlled b y was interservice cooperation, wher e the Corps Artillery commander—wh o "Army artillery supported Marine in- made it one of his special staff agencie s fantry and vice versa," and "Marin e —and its mission was to provide sup- and Army planes were used interchange- porting arms with target information . ably and operated under the same tacti- Colonel Henderson, the operations of- cal command," and "each contiguou s ficer of IIIAC Corps Artillery, de - infantry unit was mutually supporting scribed the TIC as General Nimmer's and interdependent," and finally, when S–2 Section :

B0 Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious . . . expanded to meet the needs of artil- War, p . 551 . lery, NGF and CAS [close air support ) 61 British Observers rpt . on a 24 hour basis . The Corps Arty S— 2 02 Isely and Crowl, loc. cit. was the IIIAC TIO [target informatio n e3 IIIAC AR, p . 194. 84 Isely and Crowl, op. cit., p. 578 .

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officer] . The working responsibility for planes to fly strike missions until the coordinating arty, NGF and air lay with later stages of the campaign ; Marine- the Corps Arty S–3 for both planned fires piloted Avengers on supply drops were and targets of opportunity . The Corps Arty S–3, S–2 (TIO) and an exception. The majority of the close Corps AirO and NGFO were all located i n support missions in the Okinawa cam- a big hospital tent adjacent to IIIAC head- paign were pre-planned ; strike requests quarters most of the time . The S–3 an d were submitted to the LFASCUs, which S–2 (TIO) had 'hot line' phones to Corp s assigned them . well enough in advance G-3 and G-2 . The Corps Arty FDC [fire direction center] and the Corps fire sup- so that the strike pilots could be thor- port operations center were one and the oughly briefed before the mission wa s same facility—with NGF and air added .°5 flown. When a ground element urgentl y The TIC was given radio jeeps and op- needed close air support, its air liaiso n erators from the Corps Signal Battalion party submitted a request through th e and Corps Artillery to man the Support chain of command to the LFASCU a t Air Request, Support Air Observation , corps headquarters, which approved the and Support Air Direction (SAD) radi o request or turned it down, if, in fact, nets. As all division and corps command - this action had not taken place earlier a t ers commented favorably on the TIC regimental or division level . system, Tenth Army recommended tha t Tenth Army unit commanders were it be adopted for all future operations. favorably impressed also by the aeria l supply drop system that was of such In writing about the fire support vital assistance to the attackers whe n functions of the TIC, the commander of supply routes had become bogged down . the 11th Marines noted : They recommended that a unit similar t o For the first time in the Pacific, coordi- the IIIAC Air Delivery Section b e nation of naval gunfire and air support formed to work with each field army o r with artillery was prescribed in army independent corps . Tenth Army also orders, a forerunner of the present FSC C [Fire Support Coordination System] . recommended that the JASCOs assigne d Examination of the record will show tha t to each combat division be disbanded.87 each division and corps, Army and Marine , Motivating this proposal was the feelin g used a different modification of it. It is that when the marked dissimilarity i n worthy of note that the system used by th e the training and functions of the variou s First Marine Division was most like wha t we have today .66 components of the JASCOs were taken into account, separate air liaison, shor e Until the Kamikaze threat waned in fire control, and shore party communica- late May and early June, most of th e tions parties would operate more effi- close air support missions were flown by carrier-based planes rather than the 87 It will be noted in the discussion of th e . The latter Marine division in pt VI, chap 2, infra, that TAF aircraft on Okinawa this is what in fact took place with the publica- were too fully committed flying combat tion of the G-Series Tables of Organization i n air patrols and intercepting Japanes e late 1945 . An Assault Signal Compan y (ASCO) was made organic to the Marine divi- e6 Henderson ltr 1965 . sion and placed in the division headquarters B8 Brown ltr. battalion.

384 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ciently. The naval gunfire spotting and artillery guns and LVT (A) howitzer s liaison teams were specially commended to supplement their regular fires, the for competently handling the staggering Shuri and Kiyamu defenses remained in - volume of naval shells fired in suppor t vulnerable for long periods at a time. of the land forces . One artillery weapon that was organi c The shore bombardment of Okinawa to the infantry regiments and immedi- on L-Day was "the heaviest concentra- ately available for employment unde r tion of naval gunfire ever delivered in optimum frontline conditions was the the support of the landing of troops ." 68 105mm self-propelled howitzer, th e Some 3,800 tons of shells poured in from M–7. This field piece was found in th e battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, an d 105mm howitzer (self-propelled) pla- from the rocket racks and mortars of the toon containing four gun sections, whic h support vessels to explode on enem y replaced the 75mm howitzer (self-pro- shore targets . During most of the cam- pelled) platoon, in the regimental paign, each frontline regiment was as - weapons company when it was reorgan- signed one call fire ship and one illumi- ized on 1 May 1945 according to the nation ship. In certain instances, such as G-series Table of Organization (T/0) . during the 6th Marine Division drive t o The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions had the Motobu Peninsula, each assault bat- received the T/O change, revamped talion had a destroyer on call. Most fire their weapons companies, and were sup - support ships remained on station fo r plied with the M–7s before embarking the entire campaign and were not ro- for Okinawa .69 tated to other duties . As the operatio n No other Tenth Army units remained progressed, the quality and results of continuously on line so long a period a s their shooting improved immeasurably . the artillery battalions of both Marin e On certain occasions, however, th e and Army divisions during the battle i n ground units encountered intricatel y southern Okinawa . In this period, the sited and deeply dug-in enemy position s artillery of all six infantry division s which were impregnable to even th e supported the attack . Marine and Army weight of naval gunfire salvos . At these corps artillery units supplemented the times, the Japanese positions woul d fires of the 24 divisional battalions wit h withstand the fires of individual sup - 12 of their own in general support . porting arms or all of them together . Augmenting the Marine artillery wer e Then, assault forces began a wearing - the guns of two LVT (A) battalions, down process involving the employment which had been organized and trained a s of flame and gun tanks, demolitions, an d field artillery before the landing . Be- infantry all together in what General Buckner referred to as "the corkscrew " Prior to the T/O change, the regimental and blowtorch" method . Although artil- weapons company consisted of a 75mm howitzer (self-propelled) platoon and three 37mm lery utilized every expedient conceiv- gun platoons . After the new T/O went int o able, including the use of antiaircraft effect, the company was comprised of th e 105mm self-propelled howitzer platoon and tw o 08 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec V, p . 6 . 37mm gun platoons .

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cause of its organization, each LVT (A ) target with little effort in a minimum battalion had the fire support capabilit y of time. of a four-battalion regiment of 75m m In an analysis of Marine artillery op- howitzers. erations on Okinawa, General Geige r Prior to Okinawa, General Geiger had discovered that there had been instance s become convinced that the armore d when 155mm guns and howitzers wer e amtracs could be trained as field artil- unable to destroy certain well-buil t lery and used as such immediately after Japanese defenses when called upon t o landing on L-Day at H-Hour and until do so. Further, both corps and divisio n direct support battalions arrived ashore . artillery often found it difficult to reduce Thereafter, the LVT (A) s would rein- natural cave positions, which fell only force corps and divisional artillery. under the direct fire of self-propelled After landing on L-Day, the LVT (A) s guns or when artillery of a larger cali- had their "batteries laid and ready t o ber than that found in Marine artillery shoot for forward observers as early as battalions were employed. H plus 30 minutes—but the Japa- The expectation that the invasion o f nese wouldn't accommodate us with Japan would require a vastly increase d targets." 70 fire potential in the existing Marine A total of 2,246,452 rounds were fire d artillery organizations led General in support of the infantry by tanks, Geiger to recommend changes in it s LVT(A)s, M-7s, and field artillery makeup. Accordingly, he proposed a new pieces ; this was more than triple th e setup consisting of a field artillery obser- 707,500 rockets, mortars, and rounds o f vation battalion and four group head - 5-inch shells or larger fired by the gun- quarters and headquarters batteries, and fire support ships.71 In either case, the the following firing batteries : one figure is staggering. Because Tenth 105mm howitzer (self-propelled) ; three Army had established a centralized sys- 155mm howitzer ; two 155mm gun ; one tem of target assignment and fire direc- 155mm gun (self-propelled) ; two 8-inch tion, unit artillery commanders were howitzer ; one 8-inch howitzer (self - able to mass the fires of all their guns propelled) ; and one 240mm howitzer . that were within the range of a specifi c unit in which a specific weapon was organic ; " Henderson ltr . the reports of the LVT (A) battalions, attache d '1 A breakdown of the first figure by type of to the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, were shell fired reveals : 75mm guns (tanks) — incorporated within the division reports . The 199,522 ; 75mm howitzers (including LVT (A) s) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, alone fired a tota l - 387,112 ; 105mm howitzers (including M-7s ) of 100,339 rounds of 75mm ammunition , - 1,119,210 ; 155m howitzers—375,241 ; 155mm "which was the largest number of rounds fire d guns—146,359 ; 8-inch howitzers—19,008 . Be - by Marine 75mm pack howitzer battalion in cause of discrepancies appearing between th e any of the Pacific campaigns during Worl d figures given in the appropriate ammunitio n War II." LtCol Robert C. Hilliard comment expenditure sections of the section reports o f to HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 6Apr65 . Colone l the Tenth Army, the two corps, and the divi- Hilliard is an artillery officer who served wit h sions, these totals represent those given by the the 11th Marines at Okinawa .

386 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

General Geiger was particularly im- other Pacific island battles, tanks were pressed by the penetrating and destruc- more widely employed, on Okinawa be - tive power of the 200-pound shell of th e cause its terrain, for the most part, 8-inch howitzer when compared with favored armored operations. Tenth the results achieved by the 95-pound pro - Army units lost a total of 153 tanks to jectile fired by 155mm guns and accurate enemy AT fire, vast and thickly howitzers, the largest caliber pieces sown minefields, and demolitions-laden organic to Marine artillery units . The Japanese soldiers who attempted to Marine commander asked that some of destroy both the tanks and themselves , these 8-inch battalions be included whe n but who failed in their efforts for the task organizations were formed for most part, however, because of the ac - future scheduled Marine operations curate fire of the infantrymen protecting against Japan scheduled for the future. the tanks . Individual Japanese damaged Teamwork was a most important in- seven tanks from the five Army bat- gredient in the formula for reduction o f talions, disabled one from the 6th Ma- heavily fortified Japanese positions. rine Division, and none in the 1st During the course of the Okinawa cam- Marine Division where "the alertness of paign, the work of supporting arms, in- the covering infantry and the tank fantry-engineer, air-ground, and tank- crews prevented the successful comple- infantry teams played a vital role in th e tion of these attacks ." 74 defeat of the enemy. Ground assault Tanks from the Army 713th Armored operations, however, were the especia l Flamethrower Battalion, the first uni t province of the tanks and the infantry . of its type to be formed and take part Concerning the armored support of 6t h in sustained action, supported Army Division Marines on Okinawa, General and Marine units alike. After the cam- Shepherd wrote that "if any one sup - paign, the battalion was highly praised porting arm can be singled out as having for "a consistently outstanding record contributed more than any others dur- of performance ." 7 5 ing the progress of the campaign, the While covered by infantrymen and tank would certainly be selected ." 72 In a standard tanks, flame tanks were par- battle lesson issued to the Thirty-second Army, General Ushijima supported thi s °' Ibid., pp . 23-24. opinion, stating that "the enemy's power 75 Ibid., p . 41 . A few tanks in each of the lies in his tanks. It has become obviou s standard tank battalions on Okinawa were that our general battle against the equipped with small, limited-range flame- American forces is a battle against thei r throwers, which were mounted either on th e periscope mounts or where the bow machin e 7 3 M–1 and M–4 tanks ." gun had been . Both were inferior to the gu n In comparison with the factors limit- tube flamethrower of the 713th Armore d Flamethrower Battalion, which had "a greate ing armored support during some of th e r range in addition to being an all-around bette r weapon and the most practicable of the three ." 72 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, pt III, p. 28 . Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IX, p . 12 . Se e " Quoted in the preface to the Tank Support also pt VI, chap 2, infra, for a discussion of Anx, 1st MarDiv SAR. armored flamethrowers.

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ticularly successful in burning the tion and recommended that the Marine enemy out of rocky outcroppings, re- Corps thoroughly field test both weap- verse slope positions, and ruins . The ons with a view of adopting them i n commanders of both the XXIV Corps place of the 37mm guns and 2 .36-inch and the IIIAC favored the increase d bazookas in the infantry regiments at employment of flame tanks . Genera l that time.76 Hodge suggested the addition of two Few startling innovations to accepted battalions to each corps in future op- infantry tactical methods appeared out erations ; General Geiger recommende d of the Okinawa fighting. Concerning that one company of these tanks b e this, General Geiger commented : "No made organic to each Marine tank bat- new or unusual features of infantry talion. combat were disclosed or developed dur- Both Marine combat divisions ha d ing the campaign on Okinawa which Army 4.2-inch chemical mortar com- would tend to modify or annul curren t panies attached for the campaign . The standard principles or doctrines ." " division commanders reported that they Those facets of the battle sometime s were very satisfied with the perform- cited as having reflected the emergenc e ance of the large-caliber mortars, which of new concepts in the Pacific war— could furnish high angle fire on target s such as the employment of night attack s not otherwise suitable for 81mm mor- and refinement of tank-infantry tactics tars and artillery howitzers . After not- —were actually just the logical out- ing the successful results that had growth of existing tactical doctrine that followed employment of the 4 .2-inch evolved after the Americans had becom e mortars attached to his division, Gen- familiar with the enemy and his wa y eral del Valle was convinced that their of fighting. accuracy, long range, and tremendou s For the most part, in the early year s destructive power were such that he of the war, there was little inclination recommended the inclusion of this typ e toward night offensive action ; Marines of company in the T/O of a Marine division. were too intent on tying in their lines Two other new Army support weap- before darkness in order to blunt in- ons impressed Marine leaders for the evitable Japanese counterattacks an d same reasons as had the heavy mortars ; infiltration of the lines. During the they were the 57mm and 75mm recoil- Okinawa campaign, however, Marin e less rifles. Although neither had been units took part in night operations mor e issued for testing by Marine units, no r extensively than ever before, and with were the rifles employed extensively by a great degree of success . Approxi- the Army, after viewing a combat dem- mately 21 patrols and attacks wer e onstration of the effectiveness of the mounted at night by Marines ; 13 of this d new weapons, IIIAC observers reporte number were conducted by the Amphib- that the recoilless rifles held consider - able promise for tactical employment . 40 IIIAC AR, p. 214 . General Geiger acted on this informa - " Ibid., p. 103.

310-224 0 - 69 - 26

388 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ious Reconnaissance Battalion.78 In caught them both physically and psycho - commenting on this aspect of Marine logically off-guard.8 0 tactics on Okinawa, General Geiger In general, a study of the Marine con - said : duct of night operations on Okinaw a revealed no new, startling doctrine, for All night operations were characterize d it indicated the following : by the fact that they were performed i n an orthodox manner . Previous training i n 1. Orthodox methods are good methods . such maneuvers and existing doctrines o n 2. A correct estimate of the situation i s the subject were employed and prove d a major contributing factor toward suc - sound . Daylight reconnaissance, a limited cess. objective of a prominent terrain feature, 3. Night operations need not be confine d explicit orders for all echelons, noise disci- to highly specialized units . pline, and contact were as prescribed i n 4. Such operations afford echelon com- the training manuals . In every case sur- manders with an excellent tactical device . prise was achieved and the night attack 5. Present doctrine is quite satisfactor y 70 or movement was successful. for the training and indoctrination o f troops .8 1 Regarding the American night attacks , Colonel Yahara commented that they In reviewing the success of those nigh t were : attacks launched during the Okinawa campaign, it seems surprising that . . . particularly effective, taking th e American commanders did not employ Japanese completely by surprise . The Japanese had so accustomed themselves to this offensive tactic more often. ceasing organized hostilities at nightfall , Immediately after the fighting for and . . . reorganizing and relaxing durin g Shuri had intensified, severe gaps ap- the night that attacks in these hour s peared in the ranks of the assault elements. Although replacements wer e P8 Major Jones' Marines conducted the following night patrols and operations as follows : fed to Tenth Army continually durin g Keise Shima, Aware Saki, Mae Shima, an d the course of battle, they were often to o Kuro Shima, all pre-L-Day ; Tsugen Shima , poorly or incompletely trained to go 5—6 April ; Ike Shima, Taka Banare, Heanz a into the frontlines immediately . Yet, Shima, and Hamahiki Shima, all 6—7 April ; h Kutaka Shima, 7 April ; Minna Shima, 7—8 they were needed to beef up the strengt April ; Yagachi, 20 April ; and Sesoko, 21 April . of the hard-hit units . Nevertheless, The following IIIAC units conducted night Tenth Army issued an order to the corp s operations on Okinawa proper as noted : As a commanders directing that newly ar- Kawa crossing by 22d Marines, 10 May ; Relie f riving personnel were to be indoctri- of 1st Marines at Dakeshi-Wana by 5th o Marines, 13—14 May ; Naha Canal crossing b y nated and oriented before assignment t 22d Marines, 29 May ; Reconnaissance of Oroku frontline units . It was very often diffi- by 6th Reconnaissance Company, 2 June ; cult to adhere to this directive, espe- Kunishi Ridge attack by 7th Marines, 12 June ; cially when the situation demande d Kunishi Ridge attack by 1st Marines, 14 June ; Kunishi Ridge relief by 22d Marines, 17 June ; 84 Yahara Interrogation. and Mezado Ridge relief by 8th Marines, 1 8 81 Capt James R . Stockman, "Night Opera- June. tions on Okinawa," Marine Corps Gazette, v . '9 111AC AR, p . 103. 30, no . 9 (Sep46), p . 28 .

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that the replacements be committed into and the 6th Marine Division arrived at the lines before they were completely the target with a 5 percent overage . "shaken down ." Because they had participated in th e General Geiger "had only two divi- training and rehearsal phases of ICE - sions to fight" on Okinawa and found BERG, the replacements could be as - it impossible to guarantee the "relief o f signed to line regiments when required . front line divisions for rest and assimi- Most of the replacements who arrived lation of replacements ." To remedy at Okinawa during the later stages o f this, he suggested that a corps on ex- the battle had come directly from State- tended operations should have a trian- side. Since they were not so well trained gular organization much like that of th e as the earlier replacements, the infantry Marine divisions to provide for an units to which they were assigned had "automatic reserve ." Without this, his to divert some of their efforts to in- two Marine divisions had to remai n doctrinate and train the new arrivals constantly on line until the end of the for battle rapidly. operation. Based on the knowledg e Possibly influenced by the Marine regained at Okinawa, a corps of at least placement system, Tenth Army recom- three divisions was considered a must mended that, in future operations, a for future joint operations of a simila r large-sized replacement company should nature.82 be assigned to and train with an infan- Some serious personnel problem s try division before an invasion, and the n arose before and during the campaign accompany that division to the target for Army and Marine divisions alike . area. General Hodge suggested that Most deeply concerned was XXIV infantry battalions be permitted to Corps, which had been deeply involve d carry a 25-percent-strength overage to in the Philippines operation during th e the target, and that balanced infantry time that preparations for ICEBERG replacement battalions, each consistin g were underway. General Hodge favored of 1,000 men, be attached to and loaded the Marine replacement system in which out with every invasion-bound infantr y Marine replacements were attached t o division. and trained with infantry units durin g Both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions the preinvasion phases, and then trav- contained a large number of comba t elled with these units to the target area, veterans who had participated in two where they worked as shore party labo r or more campaigns in the Pacific .S3 As units until needed in the lines to replace of 30 June 1945, the 1st Marine Division infantry casualties. had 205 officers that had served over - Including the replacements they had seas 24 months or more ; over half o f received before departing Pavuvu and these had been in the Pacific area for Guadalcanal respectively, the 1st Marin e more than 30 months . Nearly 3,200 Division landed at Okinawa approxi- enlisted Marines had been in the fiel d mately 10 percent over T/O strength , 83 See pt II, chap 3 above, section entitle d ez ZIIAC AR, p. 195. "Training and Rehearsals."

390 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

for two years or more ; almost 800 of assaults against strongly fortified posi- these had been in a combat zone for 30 tions .8 8 or more months. General del Valle con- Logistical planning too required sidered that these facts reflected th e teamwork, and the problems facing th e approach of a serious personnel an d logistics planners reflected the magni- morale problem in the division . By the tude of the Okinawa operation . Con- fall of 1945, 1st Marine Division per- sider for example, that in Phase I of sonnel already in or entering the two - ICEBERG alone, a total of almost 183, - year category "will have spent their 000 troops and 746,850 measurement entire time in a coconut grove or jungle tons of cargo had to be loaded into 43 3 with not a single opportunity for leav e assault transports and landing ships b y or liberty." 84 Steps were taken later, 8 different subordinate embarkatio n however, which alleviated the situation commands at 11 widely separated port s before it reached a crucial point . 8 5 from Seattle to Leyte over a distance The immediate replacement of infan- of some 6,000 miles . try losses was a problem common to The Joint Expeditionary Force alone commanders of all assault echelons. contained 1,200 ships of all kinds .87 By They believed that the solution was to the time that the island was secured , be found in the establishment of a "About 548,000 men of the Army, Navy, smoothly working replacement systems, and Marine Corps took part, with 31 8 wherein replacements would be attache d combatant vessels and 1,139 auxiliar y to and train with an infantry unit be- vessels exclusive of personnel landin g fore an invasion . Experienced troop craft of all types ." 88 These figure s leaders knew that long hours of closely coupled with the long distances ove r coordinated training were needed be- which supplies had to travel, create d fore assault and replacement organiza- logistics problems of an immense nature tions could be considered combat ready . beyond all that which had transpired Arduous hours of team training served in earlier Pacific operations . as the basis of American successes at Some concept of the size of the un- Okinawa. The final action report of th e loading job at Okinawa may be seen in Tenth Army noted : the table in chapter 7, p . 240, whic h depicts the amounts of assault and first The support rendered the infantry by naval gunfire, artillery, air and tanks wa s echelon cargo unloaded in all the Cen- adequate in every respect . Without such tral Pacific campaigns from the Gilbert s magnificent support, little progress coul d through Okinawa. This chart dramat- have been made by the infantry in thei r ically indicates that in the overall ton- advance against the heavily organize d enemy positions in southern Okinawa . Sup - nage of supplies and equipment un- porting fires enabled the infantry to carry loaded, the total for Okinawa was out the tremendous task of repeated almost double that for the entir e

88 84 1st MarDiv SAR, PersAnx, p . 4. Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IX, p. 1. B3 See pt III below, section dealing with the "War Reports, p . 665. rotation home of combat veterans. 88 Ibid., p . 664 .

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Marianas operation and three time s It can be fairly stated that these ship s that for the Iwo Jima campaign . Errors were not combat loaded . It is true that of omission and commission in the logis - cargo was landed according to priority . However, the 60 per cent combat load a s tics program seemed critical at the time expressed in Transport Doctrine wa s that they appeared, but none was grave greatly exceeded. All ships were, in th e enough to effect the fighting for long . opinion of the squadron [TQM] 'commer- Some problems arising from the nature cial loaded, according to a definite prior- of operations began before L-Day and ity.' This was due to the fact that a n inadequate number of vessels were as - continued thereafter ; they were impor- signed by higher command to lift the First tant enough, however, to cause uni t Marine Division .89 commanders to comment on them and make recommendations for improve- During the preinvasion preparatory ment in their action reports . period, Marine divisions, especially the In the logistics planning phase, em- 6th, found the Marine Corps supply barkation officers too often found that system on the Pacific overly cumber - ships' characteristics data for assigne d some. Two basic factors aggravated the ships was incorrect or out of date ; at situation. One was the fact that the times, it was either not furnished or relations of the Marine Supply Service, unavailable . When division staffs bega n FMFPac, to the several combat and completing loading plans, they found service commands in the Guadalcanal that, for the uninitiated and non-special - area—where the greater portion o f ist, there were too many forms . These IIIAC strength was based—caused were too complicated and often repeti- many delays because of the many agen- s tive. During the loading phase, ships ' cies through which supply requisition captains often received confusing and had to pass before the requestor re- . In ad- contradictory orders, which on several ceived the items requisitioned occasions resulted in their ships arriv- dition the 6th Division was located to o ing in loading areas or appearing at far away from the stocking agency , e places other than those to which they which in this case was the 4th Bas were to have gone . In most cases, the Depot on Banika in the Russells . confusion arose from poor coordination General Shepherd believed : between Marine and Navy staffs . Supply problems, many requiring writ- A sequel to this liaison gap at time s ten correspondence and decisions by hig h appeared in the improper loading o f authority, were not simplified by the addi- assault transports. The commander o f tion of another senior echelon, the South Pacific Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pa- the transport group that lifted the 1st cific . The recent change in the concept of Marine Division to the target from the operations of the Corps, by which admin- Russells reported that plans for load- istration of divisions is theoretically ing some of his ships were not even divorced from the Corps, has not benefited begun until the vessels were alongsid e the Division. Supply and administration waiting to take a load . In reference to 88 Commander, Task Group 53 .2 (Transport the loading of his entire group, he also Group Baker) rpt in CNO Record, chap 7, said : p. 32 .

392 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

cannot, in practice, be separated from com- recommended that, in future logistical mand .90 planning, provisions should be made for A built-in problem, inherent in th e the inclusion of an ample supply of nature of the organization and equip- spare parts in resupply shipments .9 3 ment of a Marine division, appeare d According to an officer who wa s on L-Day. The initial lack of resistance deeply involved in shore party and sup - beyond the beachhead permitted the ply operations at Okinawa : landing of many Marines who would Logistically, the touchstone of succes s otherwise not have gone ashore until was . . . interservice cooperation . In many scheduled. This caused a shortage o f instances, shortages of . . . supplies suf- landing craft slated to move cargo to fered by one service was made up b y another service . It was a unique exampl the beaches and in turn brought abou t e of the unification that was developed a delay in the landing of such selecte d throughout the campaign through the Cen- items of division cargo as motor trans- tral Pacific .9 4 port and prime movers, which were In the end, hasty field expedients an d ticketed for unloading on L-Day . the overwhelming superiority of Ameri- The truth is that neither Marine division can materiel strength, as well as th e ever had enough motor transportation interservice collaboration, overcame an y either to supply itself adequately or to move its artillery . An allotment of moto r obstacle to the capture of Okinawa that vehicles and prime movers which migh t logistical problems may have caused. have been sufficient to the normal small The story of the Okinawa campaign island type of fighting to which Marine s is incomplete without a brief investi- were accustomed was insufficient for a gation of enemy tactics . Contrary to the long operation such as Okinawa .9 1 Japanese beachhead defense doctrin e At the end of the campaign, General encountered in earlier Pacific landings , del Valle recommended that each infan- when the enemy strongly defended hi s try regiment be furnished five prim e beaches or ferociously attacked the in- movers with trailers to supplement vader before he could organize the motor transport already organic to th e beachhead, at Okinawa, the Tenth Army division. He also recommended that the met a resistance in depth similar to tha t infantry regiments be given in addition experienced by Americans in the Philip- two bulldozers for "initial road, trail, pines invasion. IGHQ had ordered Gen- dump clearance. . . ." 92 The 1st Division eral Ushijima to fight a long holdin g commander noted that motor transport, action to buy the time necessary fo r tractors, and engineering equipment, Japan to complete Homeland defenses . urgently needed for combat operation s If the Americans sustained a high attri- were often deadlined for lack of spare tion rate while attempting to batte r parts. To alleviate this situation, he down the Thirty-second Army defenses, so much the better ; there would be that 80 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II, chap III, p. 6 . fewer Americans in the anticipated in 01 - Isely and Growl, Marines and Amphibious War, p . 574. 93 Ibid. 92 1st MarDiv SAR, chap X, p. 19 . 0' Blakelock ltr 1965.

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vasion of Japan . From the time that the chine gun fire. Also, the Japanese made Tenth Army landed over the Hagush i mass Banzai charges only infrequently , beaches until it encountered the north - but with a hopeful view either of ex- ern outposts of the Shuri line, it was ploiting a successful attack or of just harassed, harried, and delayed by small keeping the Americans off-balance . The provisional units and somewhat stronge r enemy did, however, fritter away his blocking forces, the latter comprised o f strength and dwindling forces in small- veteran regulars . sized counterattacks, which had littl e The fall of Saipan in 1944, if nothing chance of success and which were, i n else, brought home to IGHQ the military most cases, blunted easily by the Ameri- potential of the United States . This loss cans. caused the Japanese command to ac- Despite the obvious fact that hi s celerate the construction of defense Thirty-second Army was decisively positions in Japan as well as on Iwo beaten, General Ushijima must b e Jima and Okinawa . The fast carrie r credited with having successfully ac- task force air raids on Okinawa begin- complished his assigned mission . He did ning in October 1944 spurred Genera l provide Japan with valuable time t o Ushijima's Thirty-second Army on to complete the homeland defense . strengthen Okinawa defenses further. The final act of the Okinawa story Beginning in mid-April, when the Tenth unfolded on 26 August 1945, when Gen- Army encountered the maze of con- eral of the Army Douglas MacArthur— centric defense rings encircling Shuri , appointed earlier as Supreme Com- Americans became painfully aware of mander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) the results of these efforts . —authorized General Stilwell to negotiate the surrender of enemy garrisons i n n The rugged and complex ridgelines i the Ryukyus . Responding to orders t the Shuri area were defended from vas issued by Stilwell, top enemy com- entrenchments, from a wide variety of manders reported at the headquarter s fortified caves employed as pillboxes , of the Ryukyus command on 7 Septem- and from elaborate, multi-storied weap- ber to sign "unconditional surrende r ons positions and gun emplacements documents representing the complet e that had been gouged out of the ridge s capitulation of the Ryukyus Islands an d and hills and connected by tunnels, over 105,000 Army and Navy forces ." 96 which usually opened on the revers e Witnessing the ten-minute ceremony i n slopes. "The continued development and addition to those officiating were Arm y improvement of cave warfare was the and Marine infantry units and tan k most outstanding feature of the enemy' s platoons, while above it all hundreds of tactics on Okinawa ." 9 5 planes flashed by . f Among other outstanding features o "1st Information and Historical Service , Thirty-second Army defense tactics was Documents Relating to the Surrender of the use of a considerable amount o f Japanese Garrison in the Ryukyus and th e reinforcing artillery, mortar, and ma- Occupation of that Area by Elements of the Tenth Army, September and October 1945, dtd "Tenth Army AR, chap 8, p . 4. Dec45, attached news release .

394 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

In a report to the Secretary of th e leading to the defeat of Japan, the Oki- Navy, Fleet Admiral Ernest J . King, nawa invasion was a prime example o f CominCh, stated that "the outstandin g a successful amphibious operation, an d development of this war, in the field o f the culmination of all that Americans joint undertakings, was the perfection had learned in the Pacific War in the of amphibious operations, the most art of mounting a seaborne assaul t difficult of all operations in modern war- against an enemy-held land mass. This fare." 97 As the next to last giant step knowledge was to serve well in prepar- 07 War Reports, p . 658. ing for the invasion of Japan . PART III

The End of the War

CHAPTER 1 Future Operations

Following its participation in th e lery and the 1st Marine Division re- sweep of the southern portion of Oki- mained on Okinawa and set up rehabili- nawa in June, on 2 July IIIAC wa s tation camps on Motobu Peninsula . released from taking part in furthe r About a thousand of General del mop-up activities. Thereafter, corp s Valle's 1st Division Marines had been units not already in the process of doin g sent to Motobu during the last week of so, moved to rehabilitation areas tha t June to begin building campsites fo r were either on the island or at base s the rest of the division, which had re- elsewhere in the Pacific. mained in southern Okinawa until th e IIIAC was detached from Tent h early part of July, when the new cam p Army and came under the operational areas were ready for occupancy. Be- control of FMFPac on 15 July, the sam e tween 1 and 15 July, some troops an d day that the corps CP closed on Oki- light equipment were moved overlan d nawa and opened on Guam. l During the to Motobu ; heavy equipment was move d period 13—18 July, Corps Troops, less over a water route by way of Oroku in the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, the same period . On the 20th General a portion of IIIAC Signal Battalion, and del Valle opened his CP at the Motob u a small detachment from the IIIAC camp area. 2 staff redeployed to Guam . Genera l Originally, the division was to hav e Shepherd's 6th Marine Division had be- been rehabilitated in the Hawaiian gun the move to Guam on 4 July and Islands and a number of units of the completed it on the 11th. The 8th rear echelon, which had remained on Marines (Reinforced) had left Okinaw a Pavuvu, had embarked for the new rest on the first of the month and by 12 July area before the Okinawa campaign was the whole of the regiment and its rein- over ; a few had actually arrived i n forcements had rejoined the 2d Marin e Hawaii before the remainder was Division on Saipan . IIIAC Corps Artil - diverted to Okinawa . When the rumor ' IIIAC WarD, Ju145 . On 30 June, Majo r that the division would remain on Oki- General Keller E . Rockey took over as com- nawa and build its own bivouac are a mander of IIIAC, relieving General Geiger , was confirmed, "there was outright dis- who shortly thereafter relieved Lieutenant may and discouragement in high and General Holland M . Smith, Commanding Gen- low ranks ." 3 Of the six Marine divi- eral, FMFPac . Brigadier General William A . Worton relieved Brigadier General Merwin H . Silverthorn as IIIAC Chief of Staff . Ibid. O n 1st MarDiv WarD, Ju145. Major Genera l the 25th, Major General Thomas E . Bourke DeWitt Peck assumed command of the divisio n had relieved General Rockey as commanding on 9 August, relieving General del Valle . Ibid., general of the 5th Marine Division . VA C Aug45 . WarD, Jun45 . ' McMillan, The Old Breed, p. 424. 397

398 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

sions, the 1st had been away from civili- was ordered by CinCPac to begin plan- zation and in the Pacific for the longest ning for Phase III (c) of Operatio n period. As the troops began the displace - ICEBERG, the invasion of Miyako Jim a ment to the north : in the Sakishima Gunto, southwest o f . . . the feeling of persecution had begu n Okinawa. The VAC command post to go through its classic transformation . opened on Maui on 29 March, and o n `Well, dammit,' said one man above th e the next day its staff officers flew t o rumble of the truck, 'if they can dish it Pearl Harbor for a conference at out, I can take it! ' FMFPac headquarters concerning fu- And as he straightened the straps o f his pack and turned to look out toward ture VAC operations, primarily the the sea, there were grunts of belligeren t Miyako Jima landing . Following thei r agreement behind him .4 return from Iwo Jima to rest camps o n Even while IIIAC Marines took a Guam and in the Hawaiian Islands, th e breather before preparations for the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions bega n final operation of the war, the size of a period of rehabilitation and filled i n the Corps continued to grow . Marine their depleted ranks with replacements. Corps strength on 30 June 1945 was Some replacement drafts that had bee n 476,709 men and women, nearly a seven- slated to restore VAC infantry regi- teenfold increase over the size of the ments to full strength were diverted t o Corps in July 1940.5 Over half of the Okinawa, where there was an eve n Marines represented by the 1945 total greater need for fresh troops. Within a were serving overseas, most of them i n short period of time, other replacements the Pacific ; 184,800 alone were in FM F arrived, however, and the three VA C ground units. By June, final plans had divisions were steadily built up . been initiated to commit them and othe r When the Iwo Jima veterans wer e forces in the massive assault against rested and most infantry regiment s Japan. were again near-T/O strength, Genera l Schmidt's three divisions embarke d OPERATIONS OLYMPIC AN D upon an extensive training program CORONET S based upon a VAC schedule for th e period 23 April to 1 July . By 1 July, all While en route to Hawaii from Iwo VAC units were to be ready for "am- Jima, General Harry Schmidt's VAC phibious operations involving oppose d Ibid. landings on hostile shores. . . ."' Despite CMC Rpt, 1945. the cancellation on 26 April of the Saki- ° Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s shima Gunto operation, 8 VAC adhere d section is derived from : CinCPac WarDs , to the 1 July readiness date, and its Jan-Aug45 (OAB, NHD) ; USAFMidPac G- 5 divisions keyed their preparations to Hist; IIIAC WarDs, Jun-Aug45 ; VAC WarDs , the requirements of Operation LONG - Apr-Aug45 ; War Reports; McMillan, The Old TOM, which directed assault landing s Breed ; Johnston, 2d MarDiv Hist ; Aurthu r and Cohlmia, 6d MarDiv Hist ; Proehl, 4th MarDiv Hist ; Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist ; Cass , ' VAC TrngO 1-45, dtd 15Apr45 . 6th MarDiv Hist. ' USAFMidPac G-5 Hist, p . 257 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS 399

on the China coast south of Shanghai . Schmidt to report by dispatch to th e The FMFPac warning order issued VAC Commanding General, Sixth Army, for gave a target date of 20 August, an d purposes of planning for a future oper- also said that should this operation b e ation—OLYMPIC . cancelled, another would take place at The many changes in strategic plan- some date after October. ning during the final year of the war As reflected in the CinCPOA Joint with Japan, and particularly in the las t Staff Study LONGTOM, issued on 2 7 six months, reflected the constantly February 1945, 9 Admiral Nimitz' plan- changing aspects of the conflict itself ners assumed that ICEBERG had been during those 12 months. None of the completed, Luzon had been captured , adjustments that were made, however, and that necessary service forces woul d deflected from the aims of the Cairo be made available for LONGTOM from Declaration of 1943, in which the Allies the United States or sources outside o f stated their determination to end th e the Pacific Ocean Areas . The purpose s war by forcing Japan to surrender un- of LONGTOM were "to intensify ai r conditionally. At the various major con- attacks against Japan" and "to seiz e ferences and in their innumerable meet- approaches to increase the effectivenes s ings, the wartime heads of governmen t of the blockade against Japan . . . ." 1 0 and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were The assault forces assigned to LONG- faced with the problem of deciding jus t TOM consisted of three Marine divi- how Japan was to be defeated. sions in VAC, three Army infantr y Events during the winter of 1944 an d divisions in IX Corps, and two Army spring of 1945 provided a variety of in- parachute regiments . Once their objec- dications of the course that the wa r tive was captured, a garrison air forc e might take in the Pacific in the summer consisting of three Marine aircraft of 1945. The atomic bomb project was groups, two Army Air Forces medium near completion but its future was un- bombardment groups, and other naval certain. It seemed possible that Russia and Marine aviation organizations would enter the Pacific battle because would be established. On 16 May, Cin- Stalin had committed his country to CPac assigned VAC the duty of develop- this action at the Yalta Conference ing plans for a future operation based in February 1945, but this matter on a Joint Staff study ; on 27 May Cin- was equally uncertain . Although the CPac informed all of the commands successful invasion of Luzon had un- concerned that the JCS had ordere d doubtedly made the collapse of Japan Operation OLYMPIC—the invasion of that much more imminent, American southern Kyushu — executed on 1 planners were faced with the urgent re- November 1945, and consequentl y quirement of deciding the strategy b y LONGTOM was deferred for an in- which the enemy was to be brought to definite period. It was finally cancelled . his knees . Two of many alternatives On 31 May, CinCPac ordered Genera l particularly favored by the JCS were : e ° Ibid ., p . 263 . first, to rush the defeat of the Japanes 10 Ibid . by continuing and intensifying the

400 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

existing blockade and bombardment of Fleet Admiral William D . Leahy, Chief the Home Islands, and, second, to in- of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt an d vade Japan and force the enemy to Truman, who wrote of the Quebec Con- capitulate when he was left with no ference : other resource. Actually, these two con- . . . here the coming Battle of Japan was cepts were not so much alternatives a s at the top of the agenda . Nothing had they were parallel steps by which the happened to alter my conviction that th e Allies planned the defeat of Japan. United States could bring about the sur- In July 1944, the JCS had submitted render of Japan without a costly invasio n of the home islands a proposed revision of the SEXTANT . . . although the Arm y believed such an offensive necessary to in - timetable of operations against Japan sure victory.1 4 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration at the OCTAGON Conference Leahy never was in agreement with to be held at Quebec in September.1' the proposition that an invasion of The American leaders had based their Japan was a prerequisite to a final recommendations on one concept, Allied victory, reasoning that : among others, that envisioned an inva- A large part of the Japanese Navy was sion into the industrial heart of Japa n already on the bottom of the sea. The same following the capture of Formosa . The was true of Japanese shipping . There was every indication that our Navy woul JCS stated : d soon have the rest of Tokyo's warships While it may be possible to defeat Japan sunk or out of action . The combined Navy by sustained aerial bombardment and the surface and air force action by this tim e destruction of her sea and air forces, this had forced Japan into a position that mad e would probably involve an unacceptable her early surrender inevitable . None o f delay.1 2 us then knew the potentialities of th e atomic bomb, but it was my opinion, an d The JCS recommendations were ac- I urged it strongly in the Joint Chiefs , cepted at OCTAGON, where the Com- that no major land invasion of the Japa- bined Chiefs approved for planning pur- nese mainland was necessary to win th e 1 5 poses a new schedule of operations for war. 1945 ; Kyushu was to be invaded in Leahy credits the early pressure for October and the Tokyo Plain in Decem- an invasion of Japan to the Army , ber.1 3 which : The Navy view of an invasion of . . . did not appear to be able to under- Japan has been stated succinctly b y stand that the Navy, with some Army ai r assistance, already had defeated Japan . " See pt I, chap 1, supra, for a discussion of The Army not only was planning a hug Allied strategic planning in 1944 . e 12 land invasion of Japan, but was convinced GCS 417/3, 11Jul44, title : Over-All Objec- that we needed Russian assistance as well tive in War Against Japan, cited in Cline , to bring the war against Japan to a suc- Washington Command Post, p. 339. cessful conclusion . "CCS 417/8, 9Sep44, title : Op for Defeat of Japan ; CCS 417/9, OCTAGON, 11Sep44, 14 FAdm William D . Leahy, I Was There title : Over-all Objective in War Against (New York : Whittlesey House, 1950), p . 2, Japan ; Min 173d Meeting CCS, 13Sep44, al l hereafter Leahy, I Was There . cited in Ibid. "Ibid., p. 245 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS 401

It did not appear to me that under th e Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific (Cin - then existing conditions there was an y CAFPac) on 3 April 1945 and gave hi m necessity for the great expenditure of lif e control of all Army units in the Pacifi c involved in a ground force attack on th e numerically superior Japanese Army i n except those in the North and Southeast its home territory. My conclusion, with Pacific Areas. This new appointmen t which the naval representatives [on JC S was in addition to the position he hel d and JCS planning staffs] agreed, was tha t as commander of SWPA . Admiral America's least expensive course of actio n Nimitz was to retain his position and was to continue and intensify the air an d sea blockade and at the same time t o title as CinCPac–CinCPOA, and woul d occupy the Philippines . have under his control all naval re - I believed that a completely blockade d sources in the Pacific with the exceptio n Japan would then fall by its own weight. of those in the Southeast Pacific . The Consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff Twentieth Air Force, with its B–29 s supported this proposed strategy, and President Roosevelt approved ." based in the China-Burma-India Theater as well as in the areas controlled by Leaders of the Army Air Forces took Nimitz and MacArthur, was to be sub- the Navy view that the Japanese coul d ject to the requirements of both com- be forced to surrender—without an in- manders under the new setup, but would vasion of the Home Islands—under th e remain under the direction of the JCS.I" "persuasive powers of the aerial attac k In addition, the directive stipulate d and the blockade." 17 It appeared that that the JCS would issue directions for other military planners, however, future operations, assign missions, an d ". . . while not discounting the possibil- fix the command responsibility fo r ity of a sudden collapse, believed tha t major operations and campaigns . The such a cheap victory was not probable, JCS also stated that hereafter Mac- at least within the eighteen months Arthur would be responsible for the allotted in the planning tables" estab- conduct of land campaigns and Nimitz lished in the revised strategy agree d for naval operations . upon at OCTAGON .18 In the end, th e On the same day that this directiv e concept that an invasion was necessary went out to the Pacific commanders, th e prevailed and vigorous efforts were ap- JCS sent them another operational di- plied in planning and preparing for it. rective which among other things, in-

As the basic directive ordering the in- I8 JCS 1259/4, dtd 3Apr45, cited in Ibid, p. vasion of Japan took shape, it became 682 ; JCS msg to CinCSWPA, CinCPac, an d obvious that the command relationship CG, Twentieth AF, dtd 3Apr45 in Ibid, and in established between MacArthur an d LtCol Henry G . Morgan, Jr., "Planning th e Nimitz in the Pacific in 1942 needed re - Defeat of Japan : A Study of Total Wa r . 152 . . Recognizing this need, the JCS Strategy" (unpublished MS, OCMH), p vision The Twentieth was a strategic air force estab- designated MacArthur Commander in lished in 1944 to operate under the direct control of the JCS . General H . H. Arnold, com- " Ibid., p . 259 . manding the AAF, was the executive agent of " Craven and Cate, Matterhorn to Nagaski, the JCS to implement its directives concernin g p. 703 . the deployment of the very-long-range bomber s 18 Ibid. of the Twentieth.

402 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

structed Nimitz to continue and destroy the enemy forces there, and cap- complete the Ryukyus operations i n ture the airfields and bases required to accordance with his earlier orders . In- support the second step, Operatio n cluded in this followup message was the CORONET—the invasion of Honshu , provision that the two theater com- tentatively set for March 1946 . manders would continue to comman d At a series of White House confer- forces of the other services then allotte d ences following the issuance of the 2 5 to them and would not transfer thes e May directive, its contents were dis- forces except by mutual consent or b y cussed but not altered appreciably . The order of the JCS . MacArthur was di- JCS determined at their 14 June meet- rected to complete the liberation of th e ing that, pending the approval of Presi- Philippines, to plan to occupy North dent Truman, the invasion and seizure of Borneo, and to provide Army force s objectives in the Home Islands woul d needed by Nimitz. Both MacArthur and constitute the major effort in OLYMPI C Nimitz were to make plans for the in- and that no other operations would b e vasion of Japan, cooperating with each considered if they did not contribute other in the task .20 substantially to the success of the Kyu- On 30 April, Admiral King proposed shu landings. On the other hand, the to the JCS that they issue the order fo r JCS agreed that while preparations for the land-sea-air assault of Kyushu .21 the invasion were taking place, aeria l Less than a month later, on 25 May, th e and naval blockades and bombardments JCS issued the order setting forth th e of Japan were "to be maintained with provisions for Operation OLYMPIC an d all possible vigor ." 2 3 assigned a target date of 1 Novembe r In their meeting with the Presiden t 1945 for the invasion .22 on 18 June, both Marshall and Kin g This document presupposed that Ja- strongly recommended an invasion of pan would be forced to surrender un- Kyushu at the earliest possible date . Ad- conditionally as the Allies lowered both miral King had evidently modified hi s its will and its ability to resist, and as preference for an invasion of the China the Allies later seized objectives in the coast in the vicinity of Amoy, and de- industrial heartland of Honshu . The decided to go along with Marshall in feat of Japan would be accomplished i n recommending the landings on Kyu- two steps. The first, OLYMPIC, was the shu.24 In accepting Marshall's views , invasion of Kyushu on 1 November, King noted that the more he had studie d which was designed to isolate this south- the matter, the more he was impressed ernmost island of the Japanese chain , with the strategic location of Kyushu, whose capture he deemed a necessary 2° JCS msg to CinCSWPA, CinCPac, and CG, prerequisite to any siege operation s Twentieth AF, dtd 3Apr45, cited in supra. against the rest of Japan.25 CominCh—CNO Memo to JCS, "Propose d Issue of `OLYMPIC' Directive," dtd 30Apr45 . 23 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record, (OAB, NHD ) p. 605 . =' JCS 1331/3, dtd 25May45, cited in Craven =' Leahy, I Was There, p. 384 . and Cate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 686. King and Whitehill, op . cit ., p. 606 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS 403

Despite his concurrence in the plans The JCS charged General of the Army for the Kyushu landings, King retained MacArthur, 30 in his capacity as his earlier belief that Japan could be CinCAFPac/CinCSWPA, with the pri- defeated by the sea-air power combina- mary responsibility for conducting Op- tion and without the necessity of inva- eration OLYMPIC including control, i n sion. He was fully aware of the fact that case of exigencies, of the actual am- planning for an amphibious operatio n phibious assault through the appropriate was a slow and painstaking process, and naval commander . In addition, Mac - posed no objection to the preparation of Arthur was to make plans and prepara- contingency plans for the invasions o f tions for continuing the campaign i n Kyushu and the Tokyo Plain . It was ap- Japan and to cooperate with Flee t parently for this reason that in June Admiral Nimitz in planning and prepar- 1945 he joined in the majority decisio n ing for the naval and amphibious phases of the JCS "to make plans for the inva- of this aspect of OLYMPIC . sion and seizure of objectives in the On his part, CinCPac was responsibl e Japanese home islands without sharing for the conduct of the naval and am- the Army conviction that such opera- phibious phases of OLYMPIC, subjec t tions were necessary." 2 6 to the JCS-imposed provision concernin g Marshall advanced the opinion tha t exigencies. Nimitz was required to cor- OLYMPIC "would not cost us more tha n relate with and assist MacArthur in the 63,000 casualties of the 193,000 com- preparation and planning for the cam- batant troops estimated as necessary fo r paign in Japan and its conduct. The After hearing all argu- the operation ." 27 JCS directive of 25 May enjoined both ments and absorbing the estimates , senior commanders to remember that President Truman approved the Kyushu "The land campaign and requirement s operation, but withheld his approval of . . . are primary in the OLYMPIC Opera- a general invasion of Japan for consider- tion. Account of this will be taken i n ation at a later date. He also said that he the preparation, coordination and exe- was in complete favor with any plan cution of plans ." 31 that would defeat the enemy with the smallest loss possible of American lives . Prior to publication of this JCS order , "It wasn't a matter of dollars . It migh t representatives of MacArthur and Nim- require more time—and more dollars—if itz had met in Manila on 16 May 1945 to we did not invade Japan . But it would cost fewer lives." 28 On 29 June, the JC S 3e On 11 December 1944, Congress had met again to prepare the military agend a authorized President Roosevelt to appoint fou r . , Fleet Admirals and four Generals of the Army for the impending Potsdam Conference The President immediately named King, Leahy , and firmly set 1 November as the date and Nimitz to the naval five-star rank, and for OLYMPIC 29 Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Arnol d to the corresponding Army grade . Halsey wa s 2e Ibid., p. 605n . named later as the fourth fleet admiral . Ibid., 27 Leahy, op. cit ., p . 384 . p. 582. 26 Ibid., p . 385. 31 JCS 1331/3, dtd 25May45, cited in Crave n 2e King and Whitehill, op. cit., p. 606 . and Cate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p . 686.

310-224 0 - 69 - 27

404 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

discuss OLYMPIC plans and preparation of beaches in southern Kyushu.34 tions. Especially, they were to establis h Quite simply, the overall OLYMPIC for the record a set of principles o r scheme of maneuver called for three o f division of responsibilities that woul d the four corps assigned to the Sixth govern whatever action would be take n Army to make separate landings on the by either commander or his deputies i n east and west coasts of the southern organizing for the invasion of Japan . tip of Kyushu on 1 November, X-Day . Primarily, these principles concerne d (See Map 24.) The fourth corps woul d impending and future deployments, at- not land until at least X plus 3 ; it was tachments and detachments from bot h to prepare to make a contingent landing commands, and logistical plans an d or to reinforce other landing forces on troop buildup tasks charged to each order. After they had captured the commander .32 Upon mutual agreement beachheads, the landing forces were t o of these coordinating decisions and after fan out, link up, and drive northward the publication of the JCS implementing to form a line from Sendai to Tsuno . order for OLYMPIC, the stage wa s After this deployment had been accom- fairly well set for the moves that would plished, further operations were to b e lead to the invasion itself . based on expediency influenced by the Assigned to conduct the Kyushu land- course of events .35 Because the primary ings was General Walter Krueger, USA , objectives of OLYMPIC forces were air- and his Sixth Army . The following units fields and sites for the establishment of comprised the OLYMPIC assault force : bases to be used for staging and mounting CORONET, the conquest of th I Corps, V Amphibious Corps, IX Corps, e entire island of Kyushu did not appea r XI Corps, 40th Infantry Division, 11t h necessary . On the other hand, because Airborne Division, 158th Regimenta l plans for the conduct of the campaign Combat Team, Sixth Army Troops, an d after the establishment of the Sendai- Army Service Command OLYMPIC . In- Tsuno line were fluid, the possibility cluding the personnel in aviation an d that all of Kyushu could or should b e follow-up echelons, a total of 815,54 8 captured was not excluded . troops was to participate in the opera- The most critical part of the amphib- tion.33 ious phase of OLYMPIC, aside from th e The fast carrier task groups of Ad- miral Halsey's Third Fleet were to pro - " CinCPac-CinCPOA Joint Staff Stud y Kyushu Island for OLYMPIC, Ser 0005081, dt d vide strategic support for the landings 18Jun45, App C . For OLYMPIC, the Third while Admiral Spruance's Fifth Flee t and Fifth Fleets, which previously had been conducted the operations immediatel y alternative organizational titles for much the same groupment of ships, became separat e concerned with the seizure and occupa- entities . " A chief source, in addition to the OLYM- " CinCPac WarD, May45 . PIC plan and the operation orders based on " Sixth Army F1dO 74, dtd 28May45, An x this plan, has been Drs . K . Jack Bauer and 3 ; CinCAFPac Staff Study—OLYMPIC Op- Alvin D. Coox, "Olympic vs Ketsu-Go," Marine erations—Southern Kyushu, dtd 28May45. Corps Gazette, v. 49, no . 8 (Aug65), p . 32 if.

FUTURE OPERATIONS 405

0 a

SCHEME OF MANEUVER OPERATION OLYMPIC

MAP 24 T.L . RUSSELL

406 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

assault itself, was thought to be the units, would be withheld for the defens e capture of Kagoshima, near the south- of Honshu, 60 airfields—and 5 more un- western tip of Kyushu . The importanc e der construction—had been spotted o n of this objective lay in the fact that the Kyushu ; 22 of these were located sout h American planners had selected enor- of the Sendai-Tsuno line . The Japanese mous Kagoshima Bay to become the response to American air attacks on th e primary port through which troops and Home Islands in the latter period of the supplies intended for the buildup o f Okinawa campaign and following it s CORONET would pass . In addition, Ka- conclusion indicated that the enem y goshima and its landlocked bay were t o either did not have the available ai r serve as an advanced naval base. strength or the will to fight, or that he The Kyushu landings were not ex- lacked both. Another possibility was that pected to be easy, for all intelligence Japan was husbanding its resources for estimates had predicted that the islan d a massive air attack on the anticipated would be heavily defended . Japanese American invasion forces. The reported strength on Kyushu was placed at Japanese air strength and the number of 450,000 troops, of whom nearly hal f fields on which it was based led OLYM- were deployed south of a line between PIC planners to believe that enemy air Minamata and Nobeoka . Intelligence posed a real threat to the landings . Re- agencies believed that another three or ports of the presence of numerous sui- four divisions were in the northernmos t cide submarine and boat bases on th e portion of the island and available a s coasts of Kyushu led the Americans to reinforcements, and that other troop s expect trouble from these craft during could be brought over from Honshu . the assault phase of the operation . OLYMPIC planners did not expect tha t Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet, a s this reinforcement would be a facto r composed for OLYMPIC, was the largest to be concerned with, since the enem y and most formidable array of its kind would undoubtedly be reluctant to re - yet to appear in the Pacific war . It con- lease any of the forces needed on Honshu tained two groups of fast carriers, a to defend against future landings there . gunfire support and covering force, a n The Americans also expected that the escort carrier force, and a composite Japanese would exploit the complex force containing the Third, Fifth, and mountainous terrain inland of Kyushu Seventh Amphibious Forces . This was and build formidable defenses to be hel d the first time in the war that three by the existing garrison force . amphibious forces had been assigned to Besides the resistance anticipated a single operation. The Fifth Fleet also from Japanese ground forces, OLYM- contained a minecraft group and a large PIC intelligence estimates indicated tha t assortment of service units . the enemy had approximately 5,00 0 Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet wa s Kamikaze planes and pilots availabl e comprised of the Second Carrier Task with which to attack the landing forces . Force and the British Carrier Task Although most of the Special Attack Force as well as numerous supportin g squadrons, like a portion of the ground elements. First of the OLYMPIC forces

FUTURE OPERATIONS 407

to go into action before the invasion, the seized the beachhead and had seized o r Third Fleet was to make widespread at- built airfields inland, and when a suf- tacks on all of the Home Islands in the ficiently large garrison force had lande d period between 28 July and 23 October and was ready to maintain airfields an d to destroy the Japanese air potential , aircraft, Kenney would take over air interdict communications between Kyu- support of the ground forces from the shu and Honshu, and to sink anything Navy. that was afloat. For 10 days in this Differing only in the size of the force s preinvasion period, the British contin- and the area involved, preinvasion op- gent would strike at the Hong Kong- erations would be conducted along the Canton area. From X minus 14 to X same successful patterns that ha d minus 8, the Third Fleet would concen- evolved from other Marine and Army trate on targets in and around Honshu , landings in the Pacific . Because the in- Kyushu, and Shikoku to create a diver- vasion of Kerama Retto prior to that o f sion and to isolate the scene of the im- Okinawa had demonstrated the value o f pending invasion. On 23 October, air- obtaining a base on islands that were craft from two of Halsey's carrier task offshore of the major target, OLYMPIC groups were to join Fifth Fleet plane s plans provided for the seizure of Ko- in a series of last-minute strikes shiki Retto and other small islands west against targets in the landing zone whil e of Kyushu on X minus 5 by the 40th the rest of the Third Fleet would con- Infantry Division . The OLYMPIC di- tinue to pound installations and target s rective provided also for the capture o f of opportunity along the Japanese coast - the northern portion of Tanegashima- lines. When directed by CinCPac after south of Kyushu—by the 158th RCT o n X-Day, Halsey's two groups would b e or after X minus 5 if Japanese guns o n returned to the Third Fleet.36 the island threatened minesweeping op- Third Fleet aircraft were to operat e erations. If they did not, the RCT woul d generally east of a boundary drawn land as a reinforcing element on X down Honshu to the eastern tip of Shi- plus 3. koku. Attacks west of that line and Most of the Army troops assigned to diversionary strikes along the China land on X-Day would mount out of, re- coast would be flown by the Far East hearse, and stage in the Philippines ; the Air Forces (which included the Fifth, Marines would hold rehearsals in the Seventh, and Thirteenth Air Forces and Marianas after their units mounted ou t the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing) com- of that area and the Hawaiian Islands . manded by General George C . Kenney Because the assault forces were to land from a forward CP established on Oki- on three different and widely separated nawa. In the period following X minu s beaches, there were to be three differen t 10, FEAF was to cut communication s H-Hours. between the target area and norther n At 0600 on X-Day, Admiral Turner's Kyushu. When the ground forces ha d advance force, after conducting pre - d 38 CinCPac OPlan 1E-45, dtd 8Aug45, p . 8 invasion operations was to be absorbe (OAB, NHD) . by Task Force 40, OLYMPIC Amphib-

408 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ious Force, also commanded by Turner . the beachhead to Sendai. In addition, At some time shortly thereafter," th e VAC forces were to set up a line be- three attack forces would land their tween Sendai and Kagoshima to bloc k landing forces. any Japanese drive down the west coas t The Third Attack Force (Third Am- and the southwestern leg of Kyushu . phibious Force, Vice Admiral Theodore After consolidating the beachhead, VA C S. Wilkinson) was to land XI Corps (1s t would join the other two corps in th e Cavalry, 43d Infantry, and Americal general drive to the north . Divisions) on the east coast of Kyush u Besides the X-Day landings, OLYM- on the beaches at the head of Ariake PIC plans called for the reserve force , Wan in the Shibushi-Koshiwabaru area. IX Corps (77th, 81st, and 98th Infan- After the consolidation of the beach - try Divisions) , to land in the vicinit y head and the capture of Shibushi and its of Kaimon-Dake on X plus 3 or later , airfield, XI Corps was to drive inlan d depending on the situation ashore . Once and to the north to make contact wit h the whole of IX Corps had landed, i t I Corps. Upon establishing contact, the would clear the southwestern shore of two corps, and VAC also, would for m Kagoshima Wan and prepare FEA F a line and advance northwards to es- facilities and installations for othe r tablish the Sendai-Tsuno line. (See Map OLYMPIC garrison units. 24. ) The 13 assault divisions of the OLYM- North of the XI Corps beachhead, I PIC force would carry the full burde n Corps (25th, 33d, and 41st Infantry of the fighting until on or after X plus 22 Divisions) was to be landed by the (23 November), when the 11th Airborn e Seventh Attack Force (Seventh Am- Division, Sixth Army reserve afloat, wa s phibious Force, Vice Admiral Daniel E . scheduled to be off Kyushu and ready to Barbey) on beaches in the vicinity of land. General Krueger's planners be- Miyazaki to secure a beachhead in the lieved that, based on intelligence esti- Yamazaki-Matsuzaki area . I Corps was mates of the size of the Japanese de- then to push inland and to the north fense forces, Sixth Army combat together with XI Corps . strength would be superior to that of The third OLYMPIC landing, and the the enemy and would be able to advanc e only one to be conducted on the west to the Sendai-Tsuno line . coast, was that of General Schmidt' s The war ended while CORONET was VAC (2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divi- still in the planning stages and there sions), which was to be lifted to th e was little material distributed on that target by the Fifth Attack Force (Fifth operation . A broad outline had been Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral Harry drawn, however, which established that W. Hill) . Following its seizure of th e two armies, the Eighth and Tenth, num- Kushikino-Kaminokawa beaches, th e bering nine infantry and two armored assault Marines would fan out to exten d divisions and three Marine Divisions of " The exact time for the three major land- IIIAC, would land on the Pacific beaches ings had not yet been determined when OLYM- of Honshu leading to the Kanto Plain— PIC planning ended . between Choshi and Ichinomaya—in

FUTURE OPERATIONS 409

March 1946 . Immediately following the Marine Division, for instance, orig- assault armies ashore would be the Firs t inally called for it to be in either th e Army, redeployed from Europe, with assault or the reserve, General Bourk e one airborne and ten infantry divisions . formed nine BLTs in his division an d The primary objectives of CORONE T prepared each one to land at any stage were to crush Japanese resistance on th e of OLYMPIC . Division artillery and plain and to occupy the Tokyo-Yoko- tanks also trained to land on short notic e hama area. If the accomplishment of on any designated beach in the VAC tar- these objectives did not force the enemy get area and to operate under divisio n to surrender, the three armies were to control. During the summer, 5th Divi- fan out and secure the rest of the Home sion BLTs rehearsed intensively an d Islands. Ultimately, an air garriso n made many practice landings. Their equalling 50 groups was to support these training for operations inland stressed final operations. the assault of fortified positions, village On 2 June 1945, shortly after receip t and street fighting, and the removal o f of the OLYMPIC plan, VAC reported t o mines and demolitions.ss the commander of the Sixth Army fo r The 2d and 3d Marine Divisions als o further orders in the impending Kyu- prepared vigorously, and like the 5th, shu operation.38 Even before the actual rotated their combat veterans home operation order had been published, when due, brought their regiments up enough of the proposed plan had been to strength as they received replace- known and made available to the assaul t ment drafts, including many second - forces to permit them to begin prepara- timers, and refurbished their equipment tions for the landings. Planning and for OLYMPIC . While VAC prepared for training for OLYMPIC on a division this operation and IIIAC awaited it s level continued through June and July. further orders, Marine carrier plane s Because the tentative mission of the 5th and pilots, along with the Third Fleet and FEAF squadrons, carried the war 39 CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC, dtd 13May46 , straight to the heart of the Empire . end A, Administrative History of FMFPac , p. 7 . ae Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p. 130 . CHAPTER 2 The Closing Day s

MARINE AIR ON CARRIERS 1 In all other operations, landings wer e made so far away from the nearest air On 18 January 1939, the Secretary of base that Marine squadrons had to wait the Navy approved the following mis- for an airstrip to be completed or a sion and organization of Marine Corp s captured one to be put into operation aviation : again before they could fly in to begin supporting the ground troops . Assign- Marine Corps aviation is to be equipped , ment to carriers was the only solutio n organized and trained primarily for th e by which Marine aviation could carr support of the Fleet Marine Force in land- y ing operations and in support of troop out the principal missions assigned t o activities in the field; and secondarily as it. As soon as it was feasible, Marin e replacement squadrons for carrier-based squadrons landed on Henderson Field on naval aircraft; Guadalcanal, but their basic role was in The organization, personnel comple- the air defense of the island, with a ments, and other details of Marine Corp s aviation are to conform as closely as prac- secondary emphasis placed on air sup - ticable to similar naval aviation organiza- port. When the American offensive be- tions ; gan climbing up the Solomons ladder , The Bureau of Aeronautics is to exer- Marine pilots flew missions under the cise supervision over their respectiv e control of the Strike Command, Com- activities connected with Marine Corp s aviation in the manner provided for sim- mander Air Solomons . ilar naval aviation units .2 With the beginning of the Central Pacific campaigns in late 1943, Marin Until carrier-based Marine squadron s e ground commanders became increas- supported Tenth Army landings on ingly dissatisfied with the type and Okinawa in 1945, Leatherneck pilots ha d amount of air support they received. At been in a position to support an amphib- Tarawa, defense against air attack an d ious assault from its beginning only the close support of ground troops were twice in World War II : at New Georgia both entrusted to carrier planes flown and Bougainville . And not until the lat- by Navy pilots. In the opinion of both ter part of 1944, when a few squadron s Navy and Marine officers, the air sup - were assigned to carriers did Marin e port at Tarawa left much to be desire d aviation fulfill its secondary mission. in the way of accomplishment. Many apparent shortcomings in this operatio n ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s indicated that, among other things, trul y section is derived from : AirintelBul, Aug— Sep45 ; Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphib- effective air support was impossible un- ious War; Sherrod, Marine Air Hist . less the pilots and ground troops ha d 2 DivAvn OpD, dtd 1Jun45 . trained as a team . 410

THE CLOSING DAYS 41 1

After the operation General Hollan d CinCPac's views as to the following pla n M. Smith recommended that Marine avi- to avoid this situation in the future : ators, thoroughly schooled in the prin- (a) Embark in CVE's Marine air - craft squadrons whose sole duty will b e ciples of direct air support, should be direct support of ground troops . assigned to escort carriers and included (Training in carrier operations will in any future amphibious operation un- obviously be a preliminary requisite .) dertaken by a Marine division . If this (b) As soon as airfields are availabl e request could not be granted, he con- ashore, transfer those same squadron s ashore to continue direct support of tinued, the Navy airmen selected for ground troops .4 the task should be carefully indoctrinated in the tactics they would employ.3 During the 13–22 July 1944 confer- Granting the validity of Genera l ence, Admiral Nimitz addressed the Smith's recommendations concernin g question of assigning Marines to car- the assignment of Marine squadrons t o riers. In essence, he did not consider the carriers, no one else in the Marine Corps proposal desirable because he believe d seemed disposed to push for such a that "it would require a great deal of program at that time . Earlier in the war , extra training and equipping of Marine many factors, such as the shortage of squadrons for carrier operations, anti- manpower and the need to send increas- submarine warfare, navigation, etc ." 5 ing numbers of air units to inland bases In addition, Nimitz believed that the in the Solomons, militated against the personnel and equipment of the squad- employment of Marine air in support o f rons would have to be revised consider - ground operations . The pressure for the ably to make the Marine units suited for employment of Marine Corps planes an d both ship-based and advance base opera - pilots in ground support operations in - tions. He also believed that, if Marine s creased as the war progressed and the were to be assigned to carriers, there need for such support became apparent. would be a surplus of Navy CVE squad- The criticism of the conduct of ai r rons. As a final thought, CinCPac state d support at Tarawa was later echoe d that the Navy CVE pilots were rapidly following the end of the Marianas cam- gaining experience in ground support paign, where Marines believed that th e operations, and therefore, there was n o Navy system of controlling close ai r real need for Marine CVE squadrons . support missions was too rigid and tim e Admiral King then stated that, in hi s consuming. This matter was made an opinion, the Marine ground forces coul d agenda item to be discussed during on e be supported adequately without employ- of the King-Nimitz Pacific conferences . ing Marine aviation squadrons—an d The item noted that : "thus prevent two air forces in th e Navy." ° For some time, CominCh had During the Saipan operation T .F . 58 was necessarily withdrawn from the im- Item 68, CominCh Agenda for conferenc e mediate area, leaving 8 CVE's to perform with Adm Nimitz, dtd 10Ju144 (OAB, NHD) . t a multiplicity of missions, including direc Minutes, CominCh–CinCPac Conference , support of ground troops . What are 13–22Ju144 . ' VAC AR GALVANIC, dtd 11Jan44, p . 16 . 6 Ibid.

412 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

been concerned that the expansion o f eral Vandegrift in late July 1944 t o Marine Corps aviation strength had ex- make an inspection trip, in which he ceeded the point where it could be gain - covered : fully employed, because there were not that many missions available for Leath- . . . 22,000 miles in eighteen days, saw all the force, corps, and division com- erneck pilots. In view of the location o f manders and practically all the regimenta l Marine squadrons and the nature an d and battalion commanders in the field . I location of U . S. operations in the Pa- went to Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, gettin g cific, he was right. As of 30 June 1944 , to Guam just before the show was over . Marine Corps aviation strength con- Our people did a superb job on all three o f those islands, the fighting on all three o f sisted of 5 wings, 28 groups, 128 squad- them being entirely different . . . . rons, and 108,578 personnel, of which I went from Guam to Kwajalein to slightly more than 10,000 were pilots .' Guadalcanal then up to the Russells to see Lieutenant General Alexander A . my old division and to Bougainville to see Vandegrift, who became Commandan t Ralph Mitchell and his crowd. Then back to Pearl for a three-day session with of the Marine Corps on 1 January 1944 , Nimitz.1° also was concerned with the status of hi s air units and had consulted with Ad- Accompanying the Commandant wer e miral King regarding the future em- Brigadier Generals Field Harris—the ployment of those squadrons and pilots newly appointed Director of Aviation— sitting in the backwash of the war o n and Gerald C . Thomas, the Director, Di - South Pacific islands . He proposed that vision of Plans and Policies. Upon their one of the five wings be eliminated, but return to Pearl, they went into confer- also argued that to employ the fliers and ence with Nimitz, Vice Admiral John H . planes based in the rear areas of the Tower, Deputy CinCPac–CinCPOA, South and Central Pacific gainfully Ma- Rear Admiral Forrest P . Sherman, rine pilots should be assigned to carriers . Nimitz' deputy chief of staff and head King agreed in principle to this compro- of his War Plans Division, and Major mise, but stated that Nimitz' approval General Ross E. Rowell, since 1941 head had to be gained before any final action of MAWPac (the forerunner of could be taken.$ AirFMFPac) . The decisions they made A desire to visit his Marines in th e in the course of these talks determine d Pacific as well as to determine at first the course that Marine aviation was t o hand the facts surrounding the Saipan take in the Pacific for the remainder of command controversy ° impelled Gen - the war.

7 FMF Air Status Rpt, 30Jun44 . Vandegrift broached the subject o f 8 Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift comment s the future employment of Marine squad - to Robert Sherrod, dtd Sep49, cited in Sherrod, rons, and informed Nimitz of what ha d Marine Air Hist, p . 327 . been said in the course of conversation s For the story of the relief of the 27th In- fantry Division commander by Lieutenant Gen- 10 LtGen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr t o eral Holland M . Smith, see Shaw, Nalty, an d Gen Thomas Holcomb dtd 5Sep44 (Vandegrif t Turnbladh, The Central Pacific Drive, pt IV, Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ - chap 5. MC) .

THE CLOSING DAYS 41 3

about the matter with CominCh, es- Concerning another aspect of the Ma- pecially the recommendation that Ma- rine aviation problem, the conferee s rines be assigned to carriers. Although agreed that Marine aviation shoul d Towers argued that there had been no gradually take over the responsibilit y indication in the past that Marine s for controlling aircraft in direct support wanted to operate from carriers, Vande- of ground troops in amphibious opera- grift and Harris persuaded him that tions. Gradually, and as practicably a s times and attitudes had changed. possible without impairing the conduct It was agreed at this conference that of combat operations then in process , the primary mission of Marine Corp s Marine Corps personnel would replace aviation was to support the Marin e their Navy counterparts in the existing ground forces and to participate in am- Air Support Control Unit organizations . phibious assaults. Therefore, in orde r One other recommended change wa s to focus the activities of Marine avia- to effect the reorganization of Marin e tion on its mission more effectively, th e aviation in the Pacific, wherein Marine following package of proposals sub- Aircraft Wings, Pacific, would becom e mitted to Admiral King were concurre d Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in in by Nimitz with an endorsement stat- order to identify the Marine air coming that it would "more firmly integrat e ponents more closely with the ground Marine Corps aviation within the Ma- elements . This proposal also established rine Corps and is therefore in the inter- the relationship of AirFMFPac with est of the naval service ." 1 1 ComAirPac and FMFPac under th e Essentially, it was recommended tha t overall command of CinCPac . a complement of Marine squadrons to b e In addition, the strength and composi- employed in the close support of am- tion of Marine aviation forces in the phibious operations be assigned to one Pacific was to undergo change. Here- CVE division of six Commencement after, MAGs would be comprised of Bay-class carriers. This complement wa s three 24-plane squadrons instead of fou r to consist of six 18-plane fighter (F4 U 18-plane squadrons, and the number o f or F6F aircraft) and six 12-plane tor- Air Warning Squadrons would be cu t pedo bomber squadrons whose pilots from 32 to 24 or less in view of the num- were to be specially trained in the use o f ber of Army units of the same type that. rockets with which their planes were to were scheduled to arrive in the Pacifi c be armed. It was further recommende d for future operations. that a Marine aviator of suitable rank be General Vandegrift signed the basi c directed to organize and prepare thes e memorandum listing the proposed rec- squadrons for carrier operations . He ommendations and stated in the last later would be assigned to duty on the paragraph of this report that "Every carrier division staff. effort will be made to increase the mo- bility and effectiveness of marine avia- "CinCPac enforsement, ser 002567, dt d tion by accomplishing such readjust- 22Aug44, on CMC secret memo to CominCh , Subj : Marine Aviation in the Pacific, n.d. ments of personnel and equipment (OAB, NHD) . among Headquarters, Service and Tac-

414 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tical Squadrons as may be indicated ." 1 2 Following up the approval of Admiral King approved the proposal s CominCh for placing Marine planes on on 10 September 1944 with the proviso carriers, on 28 October 1944, the Chief that when Army Air Forces units were of Naval Operations directed the forma- available in the Pacific to replace certai n tion of the Marine Air Support Divi- Marine Corps aviation squadrons, Ma- sion.lG To comprise this organization , rine Corps aviation strength would be the Commandant of the Marine Corps reduced by or up to the equivalent of on e selected MAG–51, MBDAG-48, and the wing.13 In a bucktag comment on the following squadrons : VMO–351,1 7 conference proposals, Admiral King VMF–112, -511, -512, -513, and -514 , wrote : "Good, but does not go far and VMTB–132, -143, -144, -233, -234, enough towards reducing MarCorps avi - and -454. All of these units were at- ation. K." 14 In notifying General Hol- tached to Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, comb of what had transpired regardin g (MarFAirWest) at San Diego and wer e the future of Marine Corps aviation , redesignated as follows : MAG–51 be- General Vandegrift wrote : came MASG–48 (Marine Air Suppor t Group), and MBDAG–48 similarly be Another thing we have done, which I - pinch myself now and then to see if I am came MASG–51 . All of the squadrons at- still awake, we have gotten both Nimit z tached to these groups were furthe r and King to approve a division of th e identified with the following letter s larger CVEs for use of Marines. That wil l "CVS," meaning Carrier Support, a s give us four carriers with a carrier grou p of Marines aboard, and I can assure yo u VMF (CVS) -112 . that took some days of hard talking.15 The overall designation given to the all-Marine carrier force was Marine 1 ° CMC memo to CinCUS [CominCh], Subj : Marine Aviation in the Pacific, n .d . (OAB , Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet Marine NHD) . Force, Pacific . The next subordinate " CominCh ltr FF1/A4—3 serial 002624 t o echelon to this was the MASG, which CinCPac and CMC, Subj : Marine Aviation in the Pacific, dtd 10Sep44 (OAB, NHD) . was comprised of the fighter and torped o " CominCh bucktag comment dtd 10Sep44 o n bomber squadrons for a CVE division of CinCPac End to Ibid (OAB, NHD) . six ships . Each of the escort carriers, " LtGen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to Gen in turn, was to have as its air comple- Thomas Holcomb dtd 5Sep44 (Vandegrift Per- sonal Correspondence File ; HistBr, HQMC) . ment a Marine Carrier Group (MCVG ) General Vandegrift was perhaps, being unduly consisting of a Marine Carrier Aircraft modest, for as General Gerald C. Thomas , former Director of the Division of Plans an d 10 CNO ltr Op—37—C—fgd serial 08837 to Policies and later Assistant CMC, recalled : ComAirPac, Chief BuAer, ComFairWest, "General Vandegrift's relations [with King ] CGAirFMFPac, and MarFAirWest, Subj : were pleasant, not familiar, but always on a Marine Air Support Division, formation of , really good sound basis, and never in my thre e dtd 280ct44 (OAB, NHD) . and a half years with him there [Headquarter s " Although VMO—351 was an observation Marine Corps], did I see him lose a battle . H e squadron earlier in the war, its mission was won every one of them ." Gen Gerald C. Thomas changed later and it became a fighter squadro n interview with HistBr, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 . without a redesignation in its unit identifica- (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) . tion.

THE CLOSING DAYS 415

Service Detachment (MCASD), a VMF - F4U a suitable aircraft for carrier opera- (CVS), and a VMTB(CVS) . tions because of the known difficulty i n take-offs and landings on CVs . When yo u MASG–51 was given four VMFs and consider that these [Marine] squadrons four VMTBs to form four active groups, were literally picked off the beach with and MASG–48 was given the VMO, a very little CV training to operate unde r VMF, and two VMTBs, which were to war time conditions, our operational losses were expected and accepted . It is necessary . comprise the two replacement groups to have experience in carrier operations t o Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac, appreciate the magnitude of making this was officially activated on 21 Octobe r transition in such a short time and espe- 1944 at Marine Corps Air Statio n cially in this type aircraft. The plane crews (MCAS), Santa Barbara, California, should also be mentioned, as they wer e operating under conditions foreign to man y with Colonel Albert D . Cooley as com- of them and kept a high aircraft availabil- manding officer. ity, even by Navy standards . For more than a month before the firs t When the decision was made to pu t MASG squadron went on board its CVE , Marine squadrons with F4Us on board the CVEs, it was thought that the opera- however, other Marine squadrons had tional losses, in view of our experience on been flying combat missions from the fast carriers, would be prohibitive . Here decks of fast carriers on a temporary again, we were using aircraft which wer e basis. The appearance of the Kamikaze not initially considered suitable for the . And now, we were expected to menace during the Leyte operation in large CVs operate from CVEs . Colonel Albert Coole y the fall of 1944 created the need for ad- was the officer responsible for the success- ditional fighter-type aircraft aboard the ful operations of this venture and prove d carriers of the Third Fleet . Brigadier it could be done. 19 General Frank G . Dailey, then a colonel It was not until the end of 1944 that assigned to TF 58 as Vice Admiral the first of the VMFs boarded a big car- Marc A. Mitscher's Marine Air Offi- rier in the Pacific . Between January and commented that in addition to cer,18 June 1945, 10 Marine fighter squadron s the requirement for more fighters on the flew from the decks of 5 CVs in major CVs : fast carrier task force operations . On 28 . . . another primary consideration i n December 1944, VMF–124 (Lieutenant putting Marine squadrons aboard wit h Colonel William A . Millington) and -21 3 F4Us was due to the fact that the Nav y (Major Donald P. Frame) boarded the squadrons with their F6Fs did not hav e D the speed or altitude to intercept a Essex at Ulithi, "equipped with F4U–1 Japanese light bomber designated `Betty, ' Corsair fighters, the initial introductio n which appeared about this time. Conse- of this type aircraft in the Fleet." 2 0 quently the Marine squadrons were als o Two days later, in company with the used as fleet combat air patrols ; in fact , rest of the Third Fleet, the Essex for a time, this was their primary duty. I think it should be emphasized that, prio r 16 BGen Frank G . Dailey ltr to Hd, HistBr , to this time, the Navy did not consider the G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Nov65, hereafter Dailey 18 Col Frank G . Dailey ltr to Robert Sherrod , ltr. dtd 2Jun50, cited in Sherrod, Marine Air Hist , 2° BGen William A . Millington ltr to Hd, p. 343 . HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18Nov65 .

416 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

steamed out of the anchorage bound fo r photographic mission over Okinawa on a series of strikes on Formosa and Lu- the 22d, the Third Fleet retired from the zon in the period 3–9 January 1945.21 South China Sea and set a course for The weather during that week of opera- Ulithi, arriving there on the 25th . At tions was foul and solidly overcast for 0001, 27 January, the Third Fleet be- the greater portion of the time. At the came the Fifth Fleet when Admira l end of their first days aboard the Essex, Spruance assumed tactical comman d 9 of which were spent at sea, the two from Halsey. Marine squadrons had lost 7 pilots and In their first month of carrier opera- 13 F4Us solely as a result of operational tions, the two Marine squadrons claime d accidents during instrument flight con- a total of 10 Japanese planes destroye d ditions. One Marine aviator stated : "We in the air and 16 on the ground . Marine just can't learn navigation and carrie r pilots flew 658 sorties . Operational losses operations in a week as well as the Navy of the squadrons, 7 pilots and 15 air - does it in six months ." 2 2 craft, were considerably greater than On 10 January, Admiral Halsey' s the 1 pilot and 2 planes lost in combat. Third Fleet entered the South China Se a By 10 February, TF 38—now TF 58 to log 3,800 miles in an 11-day series of —was ready to sortie against the enemy strikes against targets on the coast of once more . The target this time was Indochina and on Hong Kong and For- Tokyo, some 1,500 miles due north of mosa.23 Both Marine squadrons on the Ulithi. Joining the Fifth Fleet were Essex participated in the TF 38 raids o n three other large carriers, each with two Saigon, Hainan, Hong Kong, Swatow, Marine fighter squadrons in its comple- and Formosa . Lieutenant Colonel Mil- ment. On the Bennington were VMF– lington, the VMF–124 commander, be - 112 (Major Herman Hansen, Jr .) and came the air group commander of the -123 (Major Everett V . Alward) ; the Essex on 15 January, when Commande r Wasp had VMF–216 (Major George E. Otto Kinsman, the naval officer holdin g Dooley) and -217 (Major Jack R . that position, was killed in action.24 Amend, Jr.) ; and VMF–221 (Major Edwin S. Roberts, Jr.) and -451 (Majo r After a last series of strikes on For- Henry A . Ellis, Jr.) were on the Bunke r mosa, the Pescadores, and Sakishima Hill. Admiral Spruance's fleet now had Gunto on 21 January, and following a a total of eight VMFs on four large carriers. Based on the lessons learned in the 21 For Third Fleet operations in this period, see Samuel E . Morison, The Liberation of th e January operations, all of the Marine Philippines—History of United States Nava l pilots "had received intensive naviga- Operations in World War II, v . XIII (Boston : tional training at Ulithi" before board- Little, Brown and Company, 1959), pp . 87–92 , ing the carriers "and would get more e n hereafter Morison, Liberation of the Philip - route to Japan 'in weather no t pines. previously considered suitable for CV 22 Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p. 333. operations .' " 2 5 2' Morison, Liberation of the Philippines, pp. 164–174. 25 Col Frank G. Dailey ltr to Robert Sherrod , 24 VMF–124 WarD, Jan45 . dtd 2Jun50, op. cit.

THE CLOSING DAYS 417

After the task force had departed of prelanding strikes on the target. For Ulithi, all hands learned that their target 20 minutes, between H minus 55 an d was to be Tokyo, and that these first H minus 35, 120 fighters and bomber s carrier-plane raids on the enemy capita l from the fast carriers hit the landin g were to precede by three days the beaches and adjacent areas .27 At 0642, 19 February invasion of Iwo Jima b y Lieutenant Colonel Millington led a VAC troops . It was also announced tha t flight of two Marine and two Nav the Marine squadrons in TF 58 woul d y furnish air support for the Iwo landing fighter squadrons—flying F4Us an d forces beginning on D-Day. F6Fs, respectively—on a mission to napalm, rocket, and strafe the flank On 16 February, Vice Admiral Marc s A. Mitscher's carriers launched their and high ground along the beaches . planes to hit the airfields and aircraf t The attacks were delivered from a factories around Tokyo Bay. Lieutenant double-column approach with the division s Colonel Millington led the first fighter of planes breaking to port and starboard , strike from the deck of the Essex as dropping napalm on the first run, pullin g out to seaward and repeating attacks wit Major David E . Marshall, skipper of h rockets and .50-caliber bullets until th e VMF-213, took off with his squadro n time limit expired. The 48-plane flight then from the same carrier to lead the escor t rendezvoused for an H minus 5 strafin g for torpedo and photo-reconnaissance attack along the landing beach . These planes headed for the Tokyo area . The attacks were delivered from north to south in steep dives, all planes pulling out other Marine squadrons were give n sharply to the right to rejoin the tai l equally important missions. Although element for repeated runs. The attack wa s the weather on the 16th was abominable , moved inland gradually as the landin g the fifth air sweep of the area launched craft approached the beach so that the bullet-impact area remained 200 yard s that day by the Essex and the Bunker ahead of the troops. As the troops hit th e Hill found clear weather over their tar- beach, the bullet-impact area was shifte d get and had the honor of being "the firs t 500 yards inland to smother the fire from Navy [and Marine] fighter planes to that area against the shore line. Becaus e of naval gunfire in the same area, pull-out s arrive over Tokyo." 26 Additional strikes were ordered at 600 feet [altitude] . The were launched before and shortly after flight was ready to stand by for close - dawn on the 17th, but with the weathe r support missions but none was immedi- worsening rapidly and restricting fur- ately assigned .2 6 ther flight operations, Admiral Mitscher Millington and Marshall had worked ou t cancelled the remaining planned strikes, the plan for this low-level attack with recovered all of his airborne planes, an d the commander of the Landing Force laid a course for Iwo Jima . Air Support Control Unit, Colonel Ver- When, on the morning of 19 February , non E. Megee, who later said that this TF 58 was approximately 100 miles was "one of the outstanding examples of away from Iwo, its planes began a series 27 Bartley, Iwo Jima, p . 49 . 29 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 22. 2B Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p . 347 .

418 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

effective precision beach strafing see n almost routine ." 31 Following the Oki- during the Pacific War." 2 9 nawa strikes, the carriers returned to For several days following D-Day, Ulithi, arriving there on 4 March, and Marine carrier pilots supported groun d refitted for an immediate return to sea. operations, and then TF 58 moved on to The destination of Mitscher's carrier s launch strikes at Chichi Jima . After one was Kyushu, where TF 58 pilots were t o day at this target, the fast carriers set a hit the airfields in a series of strikes northerly course for a high-speed run to prior to the invasion of 0knawa. At the Japan and another round of attacks on Ulithi fleet anchorage, VFM–124 and Tokyo. The first planes were launched on -213 were detached from the Essex on 25 February when the carriers were ap- 10 March and were returned to th e proximately 190 miles from the Japa- United States in the escort carrier Long nese capital .30 Again the weather wa s Island. Three days later, the entire Wasp bad, even worse, as a matter of fact, air group—including VMF–216 and than that which had been experienced -217—was replaced by an all-Nav y during the attacks of 16–17 February . group. Upon their detachment, the two Most of the strikes were diverted to hi t Marine squadrons were transferred secondary targets or targets of oppor- stateside by way of Ewa . tunity. When flying conditions becam e The ground crewmen of the fou r impossible before noon, Admira l VMFs remained on the Wasp and Essex Mitscher cancelled other sweeps that to service the Navy Corsairs, primaril y had been scheduled for later that day . because the Navy crewmen were largel y Because weather forecasts for the foI - unfamiliar with that type of plane . With lowing day boded no better conditions, the exception of those in the carrier- Mitscher decided to strike Nagoya and based VMFs, there were no other F4Us headed the task force in that direction . in TF 58 fighter squadrons up to that Early on the 26th, he realized that high time. The Essex Marines remained with winds and heavy seas would prohibit the carrier until early June ; the Marines him from launching aircraft . The task in the Wasp retired from the fightin g force commander then cancelled th e much earlier when that ship was hit off strikes, headed for a refueling area, re- Shikoku on 19 March and returned to fueled, and then steamed towards Oki- Ulithi, and then steamed to Bremerton , nawa for a series of attacks on that Washington, via Pearl Harbor, fo r island on the 1st and 2d of March . repairs.32 The weather over the Ryukyus was a Although two of Admiral Mitscher's considerable improvement over that ex- carriers lost their Marine squadrons be - perienced in the Home Islands, and al l fore TF 58 steamed out of Ulithi on TF 58 pilots "accomplished the usual pattern of devastation, which now was " Frederick C . Sherman, Combat Command : The American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacifi c =e BGen Vernon E . Megee ltr to Dr. Jeter A . War (New York : E. P. Dutton & Company , Isely, dtd 10Feb50, cited in Isely and Crowl, Inc., 1950), p . 342. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 507. 32 USS Wasp (CV—18) WarDs, Mar, Apr4 5 80 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 57 . (OAB, NHD) .

THE CLOSING DAYS 419

14 March, the loss was made up whe n penetrated the flight deck to the hanga r the Franklin, carrying VMF–21 4 deck, exploded a plane, and caused grea t (Major Stanley R . Bailey) and -45 2 damage and many casualties . Within 15 (Major Charles P . Weiland), joined the minutes after the attack, damage con- Fifth Fleet. Following a refueling at trol parties had repaired vital facilities sea on the 16th, Spruance's fleet began a and put out the fires ; by 0800, the Wasp high-speed run to its target, Kyushu . was recovering her planes. A total of The force was within 90 miles of the 101 men were killed or died of wounds , island when, just prior to dawn on the and 269 were wounded .34 Despite her 18th, the first planes were launched damage, the Wasp continued to operate against Kyushu airfields. The TF 58 with the fleet several more days befor e pilots found few enemy planes on the 'limping to Ulithi and on to the State s ground at the target area, and none i n for repair. the air, and so they bombed hangars and Just two minutes before the Wasp installations instead . Shortly after 0700, was attacked, the Franklin received two the missing Japanese aircraft appeared bombs from an enemy plane which ha d over the launching areas and began to approached undetected . The "Big Ben," attack the carriers . The Yorktown, En- as she was called by her crewmen, wa s terprise, and Intrepid were hit but not in the midst of launching her second damaged badly enough to put them out strike of the morning, and her flight of commission. The bomb that struck deck was studded with planes warming the Enterprise did not explode, and the up and ready to take off. The aircraft Intrepid suffered only minor damag e were fully armed with bombs an d from a near miss when a Japanese plane rockets, and their fuel tanks loaded crashed and exploded alongside . Seven with highly flammable aviation gasoline . crewmen were killed and 69 wounded i n The first of the two bombs tore through 33 the Kamikaze attacks this day. the flight deck and exploded in th e On the next day, Mitscher sent his hangar deck, wrecking the forward ele- planes against Japanese shipping in the Inland Sea and in the harbors of Kobe a' Ibid., p . 95 . General Dailey commented on the carriers' Marine guard, "whose duties in- and Kure. A short time after the car- cluded manning the 40mm AA batteries, an d riers had launched their sweeps, sneak at least on the Bunker Hill were given credit raids began to punish the force . In the for several enemy aircraft shot down . The y case of nearly every carrier that wa s in turn had their casualties by bombings ." H e t e also noted that "it was SOP in the fleet tha hit, the damage was caused by a singl if an interception of an enemy aircraft wa s suicide plane that approached unde- made but not completed before coming over th e tected and dove out of the clouds in an fleet, contact was to be broken and the ships attempt to destroy the flattop below . At AA fire would take over. At times, both Marin e d r and Navy pilots would be so intent they woul 0709, a suicider suddenly appeared ove follow an enemy aircraft over the fleet regard - the Wasp and landed a bomb whic h less of the AA fire and if they didn't get a kill , follow right down until they (the enemy ) 39 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 94. splashed in the water." Dailey ltr .

310-224 0 - 69 - 28 420 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

VMF(CVS)-511 CORSAIR ready to be launched by catapult from the deck of USS Block Island. (USMC 43750)

AN EXPLOSION rips the critically damaged Franklin as crewmen run for safety . (USN 80-G-237900)

THE CLOSING DAYS 421

vator ; the second bomb hit the flight either on the Hancock or the Benning- deck and immediately started fires that ton, from whose decks they continue d spread to the planes that were warmin g attacks on Kyushu until 19 March, when up. The bombs on the planes began ex- the task force retired from the area . ploding, and then the 11.75-inch rockets, The two Marine squadrons were sent to "Tiny Tims," with which the aircraf t Marine Corps Air Station, El Centro , were armed, began going off : California, where they remained unti l Some screamed by to starboard, some to the war ended . port, and some straight up the flight deck . From 23 to 25 March, TF 58 bega n The weird aspect of this weapon whooshin g the last of the softening-up operations by so close is one of the most awful spec- tacles a human has ever been privilege d on Okinawa before the scheduled in- to see. Some went straight up and som e vasion . Together with the other squad- tumbled end over end . Each time one went rons of the Bennington air group, VMF– off the fire-fighting crews forward would 112 and -123 flew many sorties over the 35 instinctively hit the deck . target area. On L-Day, only four Marin e Three hours after being hit, th e squadrons—VMF–112 and -123 in the Franklin had lost all way and lay dea d Bennington and VMF–221 and -451 i n in the water. By noon, most of the fire s the Bunker Hill—remained in the task had been extinguished or brought unde r force. All four squadrons together with control and all of the wounded had bee n the Navy pilots napalm bombed an d evacuated to other ships standing clos e strafed Hagushi beaches on 1 April, and by. The Pittsburg passed a towline to then later in the day hit targets beyond the carrier and gradually began towin g the beachhead. Following the Okinawa w the critically wounded vessel out of th e ground support missions of the first fe days of the operation, TF 58 planes, danger area . By 0300 on 20 March, the pilots, and ships were kept busy fending Franklin had begun to work up her own off the destructive Kamikazes. The power and nine hours later she slippe d battle against the Japanese suiciders wa s her tow and headed for Ulithi an d to keep the Fifth Fleet occupied for th e eventually New York. rest of its stay in Okinawa waters . On In the flaming and exploding infern o 11 May, the Bunker Hill became the following the bombing, Franklin lost hapless target of a successful suicid e 724 killed or missing and 265 wounded .3 6 attack, in which the carrier sustained In these casualty figures, 65 of the dead such widespread damage that it was were pilots and ground crewmen fro m forced to limp to Bremerton for exten- the two Marine squadrons . Airborne at sive repairs. After three months of the time of the attack on the Franklin, almost continuous action, VMF–221 VMF–214 and -452 pilots landed late r and -451 were out of the war. VMF–112 and -123, the last remaining Marine 3' Report of the Executive Officer of th e squadrons in TF 38 (the tactical desig- quoted in Morison, Victory in th e Franklin n Pacific, p. 96. nation changed again on 27 May, whe 38 Ibid., p. 98 . Halsey replaced Spruance and the Fifth

422 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

once more became the Third Fleet), " further Marine squadrons should b e operated from the carriers until 8 June , commissioned at that time.39 when, following strikes on Kyushu, th e Admiral King's senior staff officers Bennington was detached from the agreed with the Commandant's recom- force and headed for Leyte . mendations for several reasons. One Even before the VMFs had begun was that it had become obvious that the decommissioning of the 15 squadrons operating from the decks of the larg e had adversely affected the morale of carriers with the fleet and the CVE pro - Marine aviation personnel . King's Dep- gram had gotten underway, other de- uty CNO (Air) stated further that h e cisions affecting the future role o f did not believe it was the proper tim e Marine Corps aviation were being made . to decommission four squadrons arbi- Growing out of the deliberations of the trarily in view of the critical shortag e Pearl Harbor conferees and the direc- of air support in the forward area an d tives of Admiral King, the compositio n especially in the Philippines. He then and strength of Marine aviation was t o recommended that no action be taken be adjusted . regarding the VMBs until future re- On 2 November 1944, CominCh issued quirements for Marine and Army aircraft in the Pacific had been more firmly an order directing the decommissioning fixed, because the results of the Leyte of four Marine medium bomber squad- campaign could be a determining fac- rons (VMBs) . In reply, the Com- tor.40 The Deputy CominCh–CNO, Vice mandant pointed out that the Marin e Admiral Richard S . Edwards, concurre d Corps had, at that time, 12 tactical in these recommendations and furthe r VMBs and 4 in the replacement training recommended that the matter be studie d program, and that CinCPac had indi- before a final decision was made.4 1 cated he needed 8 of these squadrons in Admiral King agreed, directed that th e the forward area . General Vandegrift Deputy CNO (Air) and the CMC ap- further noted that, instead of the 1 1 point action officers to conduct the agreed upon, 15 Marine squadrons had study, and ordered the decommissionin g been recently decommissioned (11 in the of the VMBs held in abeyance pending a report from these officers .42 9th MAW and 4 in MarFAirWest) 38 in A satisfactory solution to this prob- compliance with Admiral King's direc- lem, answering both the needs of Marine tive on 10 September. In view of these facts, the CMC recommended that no CMC memo serial 008A30844 to CominCh , dtd 2Nov44 (OAB, NHD) . 4° "Regarding these changes in designations, Capt Wallace M . Beakley, USN, memo for Halsey commented, "Instead of the stagecoach Adm Cooke, dtd 4Nov44 (OAB, NHD) . system of keeping the drivers and changing th e 41 Deputy CominCh—CNO memo to Ad m horses, we changed drivers and kept th e King, dtd 7Nov44 (OAB, NHD) . horses . It was hard on the horses, but it wa s CominCh memo FF1/A16—3, serial 003246 , effective." Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, to Vice CNO and CMC, Subj : Decommission- p. 197 . ing of 4 Marine Bombing Squadrons, dtd 38 FMF Air Status Rpts, Oct—Nov44. 8Nov44 (OAB, NHD) .

THE CLOSING DAYS 423

aviation and improving the morale of Proposed Marine pilots, was found in the requirements of the CVE program . On 31 Jan-

uary 1945, VMB—621 and -622 of bo MAG—62, 9th MAW, were redesignate d F N Y VMTBs and assigned to escort carriers . F a, a The next month, on 15 February, VMB— o a F m 0 C 623 and -624 of the same organization U Cl) 0. H U were similarly redesignated and re - VM F assigned. At the same time, all four squadrons were transferred from th e VMFB 540 504 252 34 1330 -122 east to the west coast .43 VMTB 360 72 36 20 488 +152 As of 21 December 1944, Marine aviation was organized into 5 wings VMB 96 96 — 9 6 with 93 tactical squadrons, 29 replacement training squadrons, 3 operationa l VMF (N) 72 30 102 + 6 training squadrons, and was assigne d VMR 120 45 165 2,342 aircraft as follows : VMD 12 24 12 48

MOTG—81 65 65 + 1 2

TOTAL 912 888 440 54 2294 — 484 6 3 a o F a o U Uri Reflecting the increased emphasis on

VM F the Marine CVE program, the Marine VMFB 108 960 384 1452 Corps proposed an aviation structur e which reduced the number of land-based VMTB 72 168 96 336 tactical squadrons from 93 to 52 and th e VMB 144 48 192 replacement and operational training squadrons from 32 to 20 . It was also VMF (N) 72 24 96 proposed that the squadrons in the CVE VMR 120 45 16 5 program should be increased from 1 2 VMD 36 12 48 to 61, and also that they should be augmented by 2 fleet training squadrons . MOTG—81 53 53 In effect, while the total Marine aircraft TOTAL 180 1500 662 234244 requirement would be reduced by 4 8 planes, the table above indicates that "DivAvn OpDs, Jan—Feb45 ; FMF Air the fighters and torpedo bombers as - Status Rpts, Dec44—Feb45. " Dir, DivAvn, HQMC, memo Op—37—C—fg d signed to the CVE program would be for F—15 [AvnSec, Planes Div, CominCh] , increased from 180 to 912 planes . Al- Subj : Proposed Program of Marine Corp s Aviation, dtd 21Dec44 (OAB, NHD) . "Ibid.

424 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

though it was also proposed that th e Immediately after the formation o f 9th Wing, a training unit, be decom- Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac, missioned, and a Marine Air Trainin g its squadrons began training at th e Command, East Coast, formed in its Marine Corps air stations at Mojav e place, this change did not take plac e and Santa Barbara, California . In ac- until after the war, in early 1946 . cordance with CominCh instructions, a In approving the proposed changes , Commencement Bay-class CVE was CominCh directed that, hereafter, th e made available on the west coast to training program of Marine Corps permit the pilots to train for carrie r squadrons was to emphasize close sup - qualification. Four CVEs were to be i n port of ground troops in amphibiou s operation by 15 February 1945 . Each operations . In addition, he stated tha t ship was to have an air complement a sufficient number of squadrons wer e consisting of a VMF(CVS) with 1 8 to be trained in carrier operations Corsairs and Hellcats, and a VMTB to permit an ultimate total of 1 6 (CVS) with 12 Avengers . CVE groups to be embarked simulta- This aircraft strength figure was not neously, and to furnish adequate spar e adhered to, however, for MCVG—1 o 46 n groups." February 1946 was the tar - the Block Island had "12 TBM, 10 F4U, get date set for the completion of the 8 F6F night fighters and 2 F6F planes, carrier training program. planes, "because the Block Island was Concerning other aspects of the Ma- equipped with an SP (height finder) rine aviation program, Admiral Kin g radar suitable for night intercepts, henc e stated that the remaining tactical squad- the day-night character of her assigne d rons were to be organized in two combat air group." 48 The MCVG—4 air comple- wings which would operate from shor e ment on the Cape Gloucester consisted bases ; their primary mission was to b e of 12 TBMs, 16 F4Us, and 2 F6F photo support of Marine ground troops an d planes. By careful spotting of the air - defense of bases to which they were as - craft on the carrier deck, it was foun d signed. He made it clear that the transi- that two additional F4Us could be added tion to the new program was not to in- to the strength of the group., and when terfere with the tactical employment of it passed through Hawaii en route t o Marine squadrons in current and futur e the West Pacific, the Cape Gloucester operations . Finally, King stated that, took on board these two extra planes to when CinCPac so recommended, the 4th give it a total of 32 operating aircraft.49 MAW was to be decommissioned and it s squadrons gradually absorbed into th e Before going on board the carriers, CVE program .4 7 the Marine fliers underwent the same

"° CominCh—CNO memo FF1/Al, serial "° Been John F . Dobbin ltr to Hd, HistBr , 00130, to CMC, Subj : Marine Corps Aviatio n G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Nov65, hereafter Dobbi n Program, Revision of, dtd 15Jan45 (OAB , ltr. NHD) . BGen Donald K. Yost ltr to Hd, HistBr, " Ibid. The 4th Wing was not disbanded unti l G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 30Nov65, hereafter Yost after the end of the war . ltr.

THE CLOSING DAYS 425

type of carrier training that Navy pilot s much larger and faster CVs, the Com- experienced. The training of the Marines mencement Bay-class escort carriers additionally emphasized the tactics and made a top speed of only 19 knots, an d techniques to be employed during clos e had flight decks that were only 75 feet support missions . Besides taking part wide and 553 feet long. in the regular squadron training pro- The length of both Corsair models was gram, the new carrier pilots had to lear n slightly more than 33 feet and their win g or refresh their knowledge of the follow- span was nearly 41 feet . Both F4U types ing subjects : communications and fligh t were powered by 2,000-horsepower Pratt deck procedures ; recognition, surviva l and Whitney radial engines . Driving a and first aid ; map reading and naviga- three-bladed propeller slightly more than tion ; ordnance and gunnery ; and escape 13 feet in diameter, these powerful Cor- from submerged aircraft procedures ef- sairs were the first naval aircraft oper- fected from a training device called a ating in the war with a speed capabilit y "Dilbert Dunker." Subjects included in in excess of 400 miles per hour. In the the flight training syllabus were air tac- opinion of one Marine ace who flew the tics, night flying, carrier landings, rocket plane in the Pacific : "The Corsair was a firing, navigation, fixed and free gun- fine carrier plane, and most of us pre- nery, and bombing. The flight syllabus ferred it to the F6F . It was always calle d for VMTB pilots and crews also include d `The Bent Wing Widowmaker.' " 02 radar search and torpedo drops .50 Once The cockpit of the Corsair lay well the squadrons were assigned to the back in the fuselage, behind a long nose , CVEs, as part of their shakedown prepa- which severely limited the vision of the rations, the pilots had to make eight pilot while the plane was in a landing satisfactory carrier landings to becom e attitude. The inverted, low gull wing fully qualified . It was during this period , located forward of and below the pilo t when the squadrons were training on the restricted his vision during the criti- CVEs, that a considerable number of cal carrier landing approach . The high operational accidents occurred. torque characteristics of the engine, that These were caused by a combination is, the tendency of the plane to roll to of pilot error and aircraft failure aris- the left and sometimes out of control ing almost directly out of the design of if power was applied when the plane wa s the F4U–1s and F4U–1Ds, the Cor- travelling at slow speeds, gave the pilot sairs,51 flown by Marine fighter squad- a very small margin of error .53 In land- rons and the flight deck characteristics based operations, hard right rudder an d of the carriers . In comparison with th e judicious application of full throttl e when the plane was taking off, landing , G0 Ibid. or being waved off were required ; aboard " The F4U—1 was assigned to Marine aviation in 1942 and the F4U—1D in 1944 . HistBr , the small carriers, these aircraft-han- G—3 Div, HQMC, Marine Corps Aircraft, 1913— 1960—Marine Corps Historical Referenc e 52 Dobbin ltr. Series, No . 20, reprinted 1964 (Washington, " Capt Harvey D . Bradshaw comments to 1962) . HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr65.

426 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

dling techniques became even mor e of the flight deck into the sea ahead o f critical. the carrier . For this reason, the F4Us Despite the aversion of the Navy were launched by catapult in almos t to use of Corsairs on carriers, many every case . changes had been made in the plane Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln's which made it suitable for such employ- MCVG-3 pilots on USS Vella Gulf, soon ment. These included : found : . . . raising the pilot's cabin to improve . . . that in practically any external loa d visibility (November 1942), improve d condition the risk was too unfavorable to aileron action (January 1943), larger try a fly away launch with the F4U . We bearings in the tail wheels (March 1943) , therefore immediately adopted a SOP tha t installation of a spoiler on right wing to all F4Us and F6Fs [launched] would b reduce violence of stalls when under accel- e catapult shots rather than fly aways. eration and to provide new stall warnin g TBMs which were usually spotted all th (November 1943), new oleo strut-fillin e g way aft and under 28–30 knots relativ procedure (May 1944) .54 e wind with a 2000 pound internal load coul d The relative inexperience of the new fly off with reasonable safety. We als o MCVG pilots in CVE landing operations found that with this system we could do a total launch of all aircraft in much less and the inherent difficulty in flying th e time.57 Corsair resulted in numerous other training and operational accidents. Although MCVG-1 Corsairs on the Block Island the average number of carrier landing s were "almost always catapulted," fo r required for pilot qualification was 8, a the carrier "had two Cats . An H4 on Corsair pilot had to make a minimum the Port and an H2 on the Starboar d of 20-25 before he could attain a real- bow. The H4 gave you a 4G slam an d istic proficiency level.55 was the greatest feeling a pilot eve r Takeoffs from the carrier while at sea had, especially on a black night . You were the source of another major prob- knew you were going all the way the 5 lem to the Corsair pilots . At best, th e minute you felt it ." 8 top speed of the CVE would provide onl y Sometimes the hydraulic-powered 19-19½ knots of headwind on a cal m catapults failed to accelerate the air- day. Under optimum takeoff conditions, craft to flying speed by the time th e the Corsairs required a minimum head - Corsair left the flight deck—a "cold-cat wind of from 20 to 26 knots ; a 30-kno t shot" in carrier pilot's parlance . In headwind was ideal .56 Unless optimum those cases, the pilot often was unabl e wind and speed conditions existed, a to keep the tail of his plane from drag- Corsair, heavily laden with bombs, rock- ging. If he could not gain the require d ets, armament, and fuel could not attai n flying speed, the plane would "mush " flying speed and would drop off the end right into the water directly in the path of the sharp-prowed carrier before the Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p. 330. " Col Louis H . Steman comments to HistBr , G' Col Royce W. Coln Ur to CMC dtd 16Nov65 , G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr65 . hereafter Coln ltr. 56 Ibid. " Dobbin ltr.

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pilot could extricate himself from his conducted strikes against Kagoshima , Corsair. It was in these cases tha t and as an alternate target when it wa s Dilbert Dunker training proved its weathered in, Amami 0 Shima . At no worth. More often than not, however, time did Block Island aircraft encounter pilot and plane were lost. Despite the opposition over their targets, nor wa s occurrence of these shake-down prob- the carrier itself subject to Kamikaz e lems, the CVE program was soundl y attacks. launched." Following these operations, the CV E The first of the Marine escort carriers went to Leyte for replenishment. On 25 commissioned was the USS Block Island , June, it went to sea again to participate which embarked Lieutenant Colone l in a three-day series of strikes in sup - John F. Dobbin's MCVG—1 (VMF port of the landings at Balikpapan , (CVS)—511, VMTB (CVS)—233, and Borneo. Immediately after Japan's sur- CASD—1) at San Diego on 19 Marc h render, in company with another Marin e and then headed for Pearl Harbor an d CVE, the Gilbert Islands, and five duty with the fleet. " destroyer escorts, Block Island partic- On 29 April, the Block Island arrived ipated in a POW rescue operation . at Ulithi and was ordered to suppor t These ships steamed to Formosa befor e the Okinawa operation . From 10 Ma y the island commander had formally to 19 June, as a component of Task Uni t capitulated, and took on board approxi- 32.1.3 the carrier alternated between mately 1,000 Allied POWs who had been targets in the Sakishima Islands and on imprisoned there . Okinawa itself. MCVG—1 planes helpe d The USS Gilbert Islands, the second reduce Shuri Castle with 2,000-pound Marine CVE commissioned, embarke d bombs, "and did some close air support Lieutenant Colonel William R . Camp- work with the Marine Divisions o n bell's MCVG—2 (VMF(CVS)-512, VM- Okinawa." ("Not as much as we woul d TB (CVS)—143, and CASD—2) on 6 have liked," Dobbin noted .) 61 March at San Diego, and left for the In the six-week period of operation s Pacific the following month .82 On 25 in the vicinity of Okinawa, the tas k May, the carrier arrived off Okinawa unit sortied northward, where its planes and flew its first CAP and close ai r support strikes. On 1 June, the Gilbert 69 Not all Marine aviators were enthused Islands joined the Block Island in TU about being stationed aboard carriers, for a s 32.1.3, then neutralizing enemy instal- m General Rogers recalled, he "despised the lations in the Sakishima Gunto, an d more than anything in the world. I was scare d of them, actually. Well . . . I'd been flying so later participated in the Balikpapa n much longer than almost anyone else, and I preinvasion strikes . would not trust myself to a [landing] signal Two more Marine CVEs arrived i n officer. I couldn't believe that the signal office r the Pacific before the end of the war. was correct. I knew that I was correct ." Rogers The Cape Gloucester, with Lieutenan t interview. Colonel Donald K . Yost's MCVG—4 °° USS Block Island (CVE—105) WarDs , Mar—Apr45 (OAB, NHD) . B2 USS Gilbert Islands (CVE—107) WarDs , B1 Dobbin ltr. Mar—Apr45 (OAB, NHD) .

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(VMF (CVS)—351, VMTB (CVS)—132 , While flying a reconnaissance mission and CASD—4) embarked, arrived at over Kyushu, the MCVG commander , Okinawa on 4 July and was attache d Lieutenant Colonel Yost, flew his air - to Task Group 31 .2 for duty. 63 After craft into high tension power lines spending a few days covering mine - strung across a valley which, becaus e sweeping operations, the Marine CVE of rain and a low ceiling, he was follow- joined three other carriers, and steame d ing back to the coast and the carrier . from Okinawa on 1 August to conduc t The engine of his Corsair failed and h e antishipping operations in the Eas t was forced to make a wheels-up landing China Sea and to launch strikes agains t at Omura airfield, "and he became a shipping in the Saddle and Parker one-man premature `invasion' force" 6 5 Island groups near Shanghai at the which preceded the occupation o f mouth of Hangchow Bay. Kyushu by approximately a week . The fighter complements on the Navy The fourth Marine CVE commis- CVEs in the task group consisted pri- sioned was the Vella Gulf, which had marily of FM—2s (the General Motor s Lieutenant Colonel Royce W . Coln's "Wildcat," a single engine fighter) , MCVG—3 (VMF(CVS)—513, VMTB which did not have the high-altitude (CVS)—234, and CASD—3) on board. performance characteristics of th e It sailed from San Diego on 17 June fo r Marine Corsair. The performance of Pearl Harbor, where it conducted fur- the Corsair was improved by removal ther training. On 9 July, the carrier of its rocket rails and one pylon, per- left for Saipan by way of Eniwetok and mitting "VMF—351 pilots to bag four Guam. On 24 and 26 July, the Marine fast high-flying Japanese reconnais- pilots flew strikes north of Guam sance planes in addition to the one against Pagan and Rota, two island s transport they caught on a course be- which Allied fliers had attacked many tween Shanghai and the Japanese home- times before . The Vella Gulf then pro- land." 6 4 ceeded to Okinawa, where it arrived on Following the surrender of Japan , 9 August, the day that the second the Cape Gloucester debarked its Marine atomic bomb was dropped . Followin g aircraft group at Okinawa and proceeded to Nagasaki where it took o n °'Ibid. Soon after he landed, a Japanese board and transported to Okinawa 26 0 staff car drove up and an officer notified the liberated Australian POWs Marine that the commanding general of the . MCVG—4 district wished to see him . The Japanese were then reboarded the carrier which re - very amicable and set up a guard around th e turned to Japanese waters, over whic h plane upon request. At the Japanese head- the Marine pilots provided an air cover quarters, Lieutenant Colonel Yost was abl e for Fifth Fleet minesweeping and oc- to send a message to the American forces i n Tokyo and to the Fleet notifying them of hi s cupation forces en route to Sasebo . whereabouts . Although the airfield was in poo r shape a TBM from the Cape Gloucester wa s USS Cape Gloucester (CVE–109) WarD, able to land and pick him up the next day . Ju145 (OAB, NHD) . BGen Donald K . Yost comments to HistBr , 84 Yost ltr. G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Mar67 .

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the surrender of Japan, the CVE was Like many other projects that were bor n assigned to participate in the occupa- during the last stages of World War II, tion. the concept underlying the program wa s The Salerno Bay, carrying MCVG— 5 soundly enough organized and firml y (VMF(CVS)-514, VMTB(CVS)—144, enough established, however, to become and CASD—5), and the Puget Sound, an important and integral facet of post - carrying MCVG—6 (VMF (CVS)—321 , war Marine Corps amphibious warfar e VMTB (CVS) -454, and CASD—6), ha d doctrine. not yet arrived in the war zone when th e conflict with Japan ended .66 Thus, only FINAL OPERATIONS 68 four Marine CVEs saw any action i n the Pacific. Although the Marine CVE Allied air and naval pressure o n project had been established to provid e Japan continued unremitting followin g Marine fliers for close support of am- the fall of Okinawa and in the period phibious landings and ground opera- that the ground and amphibious force s tions, except for a few instances at of both the Central Pacific and South - Okinawa and Balikpapan, the carriers west Pacific commands prepared fo r did not fulfill their intended functions . OLYMPIC . At the 29 June meeting of the JCS, when 1 November was con- The Marine CVE program was confirmed as the date for the invasion of ceived and activated too late in the wa r Kyushu, 69 the service chiefs also de- to do more than just begin to prove it - termined that the blockade from ai r self. On the other hand, the Block Is- bases not only on Okinawa and Iwo land and Gilbert Islands Marine pilots Jima but also in the Marianas and Phil- could probably have been employed to ippines was to be intentified. They also a greater extent in support of groun d agreed upon the following courses of operations at Okinawa, for both CVE s action in the Pacific : defeat of enemy were in the combat area for a long units in all of the Philippines ; alloca- enough period . As one of the carrier group com- as Unless otherwise noted, the material i n manders observed, the significant aspect this section is derived from : CinCPac Ops , of the carrier program was : Jun–Aug45 ; CinCPac WarDs, Jun–Aug 4 5 (OAB, NHD) ; USAFMidPac G–5 Hist ; The fact that, for the first time, Marine USSBS, Japan's Struggle ; Butow, Japan's De- aviation would operate within its idea l cision ; Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Prince- `conceptual' role. This being that Marine ton : Princeton University Press, 1961), here - Air would perform pre-D-Day operation s after Feis, Japan Subdued ; Halsey and Bryan , from carriers, then participate in the Halsey's Story ; King and Whitehill, King's amphibious phase. . . .67 Naval Record ; Leahy, I Was There ; Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions—Memoirs, v . I 69 In addition to those operating squadron s (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday & Company, already assigned to carriers, a number of othe r Inc., 1955), hereafter Truman, Memoirs ; War squadrons, destined for carrier assignment Reports . were undergoing training in California at E l ea On 30 June, CinCPac sent out a warnin g Toro, Santa Barbara, and Mojave . order for OLYMPIC to his entire command. eR Coln ltr. CinCPac WarD, Jun45 (OAB, NHD) .

430 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tion of all of the forces necessary to Force on Okinawa to conduct operations guarantee the security of Western Pa- in conjunction with the Eighth Ai r cific sea lanes prior to OLYMPIC ; and Force. Kenney's FEAF was expanded on acquisition of a sea route to Russia n 13 July, and was composed at this tim e Pacific ports,70 very likely a prepara- of the Fifth Air Force, which was, for tory measure for the impending entry the most part, based in the Ryukyus, of Russia into the war with Japan . and the Thirteenth Air Force, which During July, further steps were take n was based in the Philippines . For OLYM- to revise and strengthen the prepara- PIC, FEAF was to conduct tactical oper- tions and forces for the final operatio n ations in support of the invasion, and against Japan. On the 10th, the JC S USASTAF was to conduct the strategic ordered the China-based XX and XXI bombing of the Home Islands . Bomber Commands deactivated . The per- Based on the JCS directive of 3 April sonnel and planes of the former wer e to Nimitz and McArthur, on 19 Jul y transferred to Lieutenant General Jame s CinCPOA transferred to CinCAFPac th e H. Doolittle's Eighth Air Force, whic h control of U. S .-held areas in the Ryuk- had deployed from Europe to Okinawa . yus. In turn, Nimitz retained responsi- XXI Bomber Command squadrons wer e bility for the operations of naval units transferred to Lieutenant General and installations in this area . On 26 Nathan F. Twining's 71 Twentieth Air July, General Stilwell was ordred t o Force, which was based in the Marianas . report to MacArthur with the Army The Eighth and Twentieth together forces under his command at 1200 o n would comprise the United States Arm y 31 July, at which time control of the Strategic Air Force in the Pacific Ryukyus passed from CinCPac-CinCPO A (USASTAF), commanded by Genera l to CinCAFPac. 7 2 Carl A. Spaatz. Strategic control of While these administrative and com- USASTAF would remain with the JCS mand changes were taking place, air- in the same manner as it had controlled craf' from carrier task forces and land - Twentieth Air Force, and similarly Gen- based commands embarked upon an eral Arnold would be its executive agent . accelerated program of attacks designed On 10 July, Nimitz turned over the to weaken Japan before the invasions o f Seventh Air Force, which had squadron s Kyushu and Honshu . From bases in the on Iwo, in the Marianas, and in th e Marianas, B-29s averaged 1,200 sorties Ryukyus, to the commander of the Far a week in July. These large bombers East Air Forces (FEAF), General dropped 42,711 tons of explosives on 3 9 George C. Kenney, who had been air Japanese industrial centers during th e chief of the SWPA throughout the Pa- month ; a large percentage of the mis- 73 cific war. CinCPac also ordered Major sions were mass incendiary raids . General Louis E. Woods' Tactical Ai r Okinawa airfields captured during the campaign, and others constructed late r "° Leahy, I Was There, p. 385. " General Twining is the brother of retired '2 CinCPac WarD, Ju145 (OAB, NHD) . Marine General Merrill B . Twining . S3 CinCPac 0 ps, Ju145, p. 16.

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on almost all of the suitable space o n shot down by carrier aircraft circling the island, were filled to overflowing wit h overhead . For the rest of the month in aircraft of all types by July. Bombers company with TF 37, the fast carrie r taking off from Okinawa to hit Japanes e task force of the British Pacific Flee t targets were often covered by Iwo Jima- which joined on 16 July, TF 38 ranged based AAF fighters, which also fle w up and down the Pacific coast of the fighter-bomber sweeps over the Empire . Japanese islands, maintaining a series Kenney's fighters and medium bombers , of heavy air strikes and surface bom- and Marine F4Us and TBMs (operatin g bardments against selected targets . with, but not under, the AAF) struck "The enemy's failure to hit us implied Japan day and night in July, hitting a that he was hoarding his air power wide assortment of vital targets on Kyu- against an expected invasion, but mos t shu, Shikoku, and Honshu in accordance of us believed that he had little air with OLYMPIC preinvasion plans . In power to hoard ." 7 5 completion of the transfer of Okinawa As soon as possible after he had as- forces from CinCPac to CinCAFPac, o n sumed office following the death of Presi- 31 July the Seventh Air Force assumed dent Roosevelt, Truman concentrate d operational control of the 2d MAW and his efforts on finding a way to end the ADC. war in the Pacific. As the American For the Navy, the final phase of th e Commander in Chief, he was kept war against Japan opened at dawn o n abreast by his military and civilian ad- 1 July, when the Third Fleet, stated visers of all developments in the wa r Halsey : and briefed on plans proposed for future operations. He also faced the problem . . . sortied from Leyte under a broad of getting to know the two other major directive : we would attack the enemy' s home islands, destroy the remnants of hi s Allied heads of state and establishing a navy, merchant marine, and air power, an d rapport with them. Truman's heavy cripple his factories and communications . workload and the necessity of finding Our planes would strike inland ; our big immediate solutions to pressing prob- guns would bombard coastal targets ; together they would literally bring the war lems prevented him from leaving Wash- home to the average Japanese citizen.74 ington for a Big Three meeting . Instead, as an interim measure, he sent Harry L . Halsey's Third Fleet accomplishe d Hopkins and W. Averell Harriman, the what it set out to do. Strike day was 10 Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to mee t July, when the fast carrier task forc e with Stalin and his advisers in May .7 6 arrived at launching positions an d Basically, their assignment was to in - fighter sweeps were sent over Tokyo . form Stalin that "we wanted to carry Not a single enemy interceptor was in the air ; two snooper planes, which in- "Ibid., p . 260. vestigated the American ships from be- " Hopkins was sent because, as Roosevelt's yond the ships' AA range, were quickly trusted advisor, he had met Stalin earlier i n the war, when he had made several trips to " Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p. 257. Moscow to carry out missions for the President .

432 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

out the Roosevelt policies." 77 Addition- a conference with Stalin and Churchill , ally, Harriman and Hopkins were to tr y Truman agreed to meet with them on to get Stalin to commit himself to Rus- 15 July at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin . sia's early entry into the war agains t On the day after the meeting had Japan and to obtain from him a firm dat e convened, Truman was informed that for that event . On 28 May, the two diplo- the first atomic bomb had been success- mats advised Truman that Stalin had se t fully exploded in a test on 16 July a t 8 August as the date he would declar e Alamogordo, New Mexico . The next day, war on Japan . Secretary of War Henry L . Stimson Stalin also told the Americans that, flew to Potsdam to give the President while he would remain a party to th e the full details of the test. Truman re- policy of unconditional surrender, he be- called that : lieved that Japan would not surrender easily if the Allies insisted upon enforc- We were not ready to make use of thi s weapon against the Japanese, although we ing the provisions of this policy . Stalin did not know as yet what effect the new concluded that if Japan sued for peac e weapon might have physically or psycho - in hopes of obtaining terms that might logically, when used against the enemy. possibly be less stringent than those im- For that reason the military advised tha t we go ahead with the existing military plied in an unconditional surrender, the plans for the invasion of the Japanes e Allies should accept the offer and en - home islands.80 force their will upon the defeated enemy by occupying his homeland . The atomic bomb project had been kept so secret that the JCS first learned of i t Truman stated later that he was : as a group only after completion of the . . . reassured to learn from Hopkins test. Marshall, however, had kept King that Stalin had confirmed the understand- abreast of the progress of the project .8' ing reached at Yalta about Russia's entry On 24 July, Truman casually mentioned into the war against Japan . Our militar y experts had estimated that an invasio n to Stalin that the United States had "a of Japan would cost at least five hundre d new weapon of unusual destructive thousand American casualties even if th e force. The Russian Premier showed no Japanese forces then in Asia were held o n special interest . All he said was that he the Chinese mainland . Russian entry into was glad to hear of it and hoped that w e the war was highly important to us .78 would make `good use of it against th e As the Allies drew closer to the heart Japanese.' " 8 2 of the Empire, Truman believed that Despite the vast potential suspecte d this Russian action " . . . would mean th e of the new weapon—and all the possibl e saving of hundreds of thousands of implications inherent in its use—an d American casualties ." 79 With further the fact that OLYMPIC preparations discussion of this matter as one of his and preinvasion operations were wel l more compelling reasons for attendin g e° Ibid., p. 415 . " Truman, Memoirs, p. 258. 81 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record, Re Ibid., p. 265. p. 621 . 48 Ibid. 82 Truman, Memoirs, p . 416 .

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under way, Admirals Leahy and King War-Navy Coordinating Committee . and proponents of strategic bombing The latter was a group of senior State , still held reservations about the need War, and Navy Department officials for invading Japan. They were even les s who assisted their chiefs in handling in favor of dropping an atomic bomb o n politico-military matters . When Grew's that country. They believed that Japa n recommendation was approved in prin- had already been defeated and was ciple, he further recommended that the ready to surrender. King felt that the President's message to the Japanese President gave his approval for the people be issued at once to coincide with bomb to be dropped because the Chief the fall of Okinawa. The JCS demurred , Executive feared that too many Ameri- for they wanted to wait until the United can troops would be killed in an inva- States was ready to follow up a Japa- sion. King agreed with this estimate , nese refusal of the peace offer with an but he thought that : actual invasion. Truman then decided not to publish the proclamation unti l . . . had we been willing to wait, the after the Potsdam Conference had be- effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese gun in order to give his declaration into submission through lack of oil, rice, greater weight by including Grea t medicines, and other essential materials . Britain and China, 84 two of our cobel- The Army, however, with its underestima- ligerents in the war against Japan, as tion of sea power, had insisted upon a the joint issuing powers, and by issuin g direct invasion and an occupational conquest of Japan .83 it from the scene of a conference of vic- torious Allies . Faced with the prospect of either in- After he had become President, an d vading Japan or destroying that countr y when he first learned of the development with atomic bombs, Truman was pre- of the atomic bomb, Truman determine d sented with the suggestion that Japa n that the bomb was to be employed might choose or even be induced to sur- strictly as a weapon of war agains t render and end the war sooner than ex- purely military targets . The final deci- pected . Late in May, Acting Secretar y sion to drop the bomb was to be hi s of State Joseph C. Grew, a veteran alone. Before the Potsdam Conference, diplomat who had been American Am- he had been given a list of suggested bassador to Japan for a 10-year period targets and the choice was finally nar- before the war, suggested that Truman rowed to four cities in which were issue a proclamation which called upon located important industrial and mili- the Japanese to submit and guaranteed tary complexes, according to intelli- the continuation of the Emperor as hea d gence reports. Hiroshima, Kokura , of state. The President favored the idea Niigata, and Nagasaki were chosen in and instructed Grew to send his recom- that order, and on 24 July, General mendation through regular channels for Spaatz was directed to send the B–29 s consideration by the JCS and the State- of his USASTAF against one of th e

88 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record , 84 China was neither a party to nor presen t p. 621 . at the Potsdam Conference .

434 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

targets on the first day after 3 Augus t Cairo Declaration . As for the Government, 1945 that weather conditions would per- it does not find any important value in it, mit visual bombing. and there is no other recourse but to ignor e it entirely and resolutely fight for the On 26 July, the United States, in com- successful conclusion of this war .S7 pany with the United Kingdom and th e Republic of China, issued what has With this tacit rejection, Truman de- come to be known as the Potsdam Dec- cided that the fastest way of ending th e laration.85 This surrender ultimatum war with a minimum of U . S . casualties gave Japan the opportunity to end the was to drop the bomb. war voluntarily or to face utter destruc- The Potsdam Conference was recesse d tion. The terms offered the Japanese briefly from 26 to 28 July, while Prime government included assurances that it s Minister Churchill left for London to people would not be enslaved by the vic- learn that, following the counting o f tors. On the other hand, Japan's leader s the absentee ballots holding the vote of were told that their country was to be British servicemen, he had been de- disarmed, shorn of its conquests of feated in the general elections and ha d 50-years' standing, and deprived of it s been replaced by Clement Atlee . At the war-making potential in all sectors . The first evening session following the end authority and influence of the militarists of this recess, Stalin stated that on 13 were to be eliminated, and "until a ne w July, Japan had approached the Soviet order is established and until there is Union with a request that it mediate an conclusive proof that Japan's war-mak- end to the Pacific War, but that Russia ing power is destroyed, Japan shall b e would refuse to do so. Truman thanked occupied by the Allies ." S6 Further, th e him in the name of the signatories to enemy was told that his countryme n the Potsdam Declaration, and restate d would be permitted access to sources of their determination to hew to the ulti- raw materials and be given an oppor- matum delivered in that document. tunity to develop their own form of This was not the first time that Japan democratic self-government. Upon re- made peace overtures. In September ceipt of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan 1944, the Swedish Minister in Tokyo could choose to surrender uncondition- had been approached by an unnamed ally or face complete annihilation . Dis- high-level Japanese official, who sai d regarding all reality by not accepting that, in order to obtain peace, Japan the terms of the declaration, Japan was prepared to surrender territories chose the suicidal course . On 28 July, that were taken from Great Britain and Radio Tokyo broadcast Prime Minister would recognize all former British in - Suzuki's statement that he believed : vestments in East Asia . The Tokyo- based Swedish foreign officer passe . . . d the Joint Proclamation by the thre e word of this encounter to his seniors i countries is nothing but a rehash of the n Stockholm, ending his report with the 8G See Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender comment : "Behind the man who gave pp. 243-244, for full text . me this message there stands one of the 88 Ibid., Article 3 (b) of the Potsdam Dec- laration. " Quoted in Feis, Japan Subdued, p . 97.

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best known statesmen in Japan an d spread damage caused by this bombing there is no doubt that this attempt must did not impel the Japanese governmen t be considered as a serious one ." 8 8 to take any steps to end the war, Gen- Stockholm passed the information on eral Spaatz was ordered to continue to London, which had Lord Halifax, th e operations as planned . A second atomic British Ambassador to the United bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 States, notify Secretary of State Cordel l August. During the interval between Hull of the conversation. these atomic attacks, 550 B–29s an d Hull concurred both with a British carrier aircraft struck at Japan in day proposal to make no reply to the indirect and night raids, and on 8 August the Japanese approach and with London' s Soviet Union delivered a declaration o f suggestion to the Swedish Minister for war on Japan, effective the next day . Foreign Affairs that he "reply, if he so On 10 August, Japan sued for peace on wishes, that the Swedish Government the basis of the terms enunciated in the considered it useless to deliver such a Potsdam Declaration. message to His Majesty's Government The next day, in reply to the Japa- in the United Kingdom ." S9 Although nese suit, President Truman told the nothing further came from this attemp t defeated power that a supreme com- of the Japanese another message wa s mander would accept its surrender . In received in Stockholm from its Minister addition, Japan was told that the Em- in Tokyo to the effect "that he had been peror and the Japanese High Command advised that the Japanese Foreign would have to issue a cease fire to al l Minister was himself preparing to ap- Japanese armed forces before the Allie s proach the British Government ." 9 0 could accept its capitulation . Three day s Despite the fact that no additional ma- of frantic discussions ensued in Toky o terial on this matter has appeared, it i s before the Mikado's government coul d safe to assume that the reaction of th e agree on how best to accept Potsdam Allies to this second approach woul d terms and what reply to give to Tru- have been the same as it was to the first . man's note of the 11th. On 6 August, the first atomic bom b Meanwhile, on 13–14 August, B–29 s was dropped on Hiroshima . When th e dropped 5½ million leaflets, printed in apparently heavy loss of life and wide- Japanese, which contained a text of the Japanese surrender offer, the American 88 Paraphrase of a telegram from the reply, and the terms of the Potsda m Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs to th e . Other leaflet drops wer e British Foreign Office, dtd 24Sep44, quoted i n Declaration Department of State, Foreign Relations of th e scheduled for 15 and 16 August . United States : Diplomatic Papers, 1944 . The Up to 13 August, the Japanese people Near East, South Asia, and Africa . The Far were only vaguely aware of the fact that East, v . V (Washington : GPO, 1965), p . 1184 . their country was losing the war, an d 80 Ibid. had no idea that the government was 80 Chief, Div of British Commonwealth Af- suing for peace . Now that this was . Department of State, memo to Adm fairs, U . S common knowledge, the Emperor's han d William D . Leahy, CofS, U . S . Army and Navy , dtd 100ct44, cited in Ibid., p. 1186. was strengthened and he could take final

310-224 0 - 69 - 29

436 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

action without worrying about ex- 1900 that same day, President Truman tremists, who might have otherwis e announced that a cease fire was in effect , attempted to keep Japan in the war . and that the war was over. Further strengthening the Emperor' s position was the fact that Japan was to THE SILENT GUNS 9 2 be permitted a conditional surrender , the condition being that the institution Almost immediately after announcin g of the Emperor would be retained. the capitulation of Japan, Presiden t Truman issued a directive to General On 14 August, Hirohito asked th e MacArthur, designating him Supreme Swiss government to relay to the Allie s Commander for the Allied Powers a message stating that he had issued a n (SCAP) and giving him the power t o Imperial Rescript that denoted Japa- accept the surrender of Japan for the nese acceptance of the provisions of th e governments of the United States, Re- Potsdam Declaration. The message also public of China, United Kingdom, and stated that he was ordering his com- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . manders to cease fire and to surrender Each of the heads of state of these gov- their forces to, and to issue such order s ernments was to designate a represen- as might be required by, representatives tative to be with MacArthur at th e of the Supreme Commander for th e surrender ceremony and to sign th e Allied Powers, General MacArthur. instrument of surrender for his country ; President Truman then notified the Truman chose Admiral Nimitz as the Japanese government that he regarde d American signatory . From the moment this message as a full acceptance of the that the Japanese signed the surrender Potsdam Declaration and ordered the document, the authority of the Emperor Emperor to command all Japanese and Japanese government to rule wa s forces everywhere to cease fire immedi- subject to MacArthur, who, as SCAP, ately. The Japanese were ordered als o had supreme command over all Allie d to send envoys to Manila to discuss land, sea, and air forces that were to b e arrangements for the formal surrender allocated for employment on occupa- with MacArthur and his aides . On 14 tion duty in Japan . August, CinCPOA issued the followin g On 20 August, when the Japanes e message to all of his forces in th e emissaries arrived in Manila to review Pacific Ocean Areas : "OFFENSIVE the instructions relating to the sur- OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPANESE render, they received MacArthur's Gen- FORCES WILL CEASE AT ONCE X eral Order No . 1, which had been pre- CONTINUE SEARCHES AND PA- pared earlier in expectation of the en d TROLS X MAINTAIN DEFENSIVE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MEAS- "Unless otherwise noted, the material i n URES AT HIGHEST LEVEL AN D this section is derived from : CinCPac Ops , Aug—Sep45 ; CinCPac WarDs, Aug—Sep45 ; BEWARE OF TREACHERY." 81 At USAFMidPac G=5 Hist ; Butow, Japan's De- cision; Feis, Japan Subdued ; Halsey and 01 Quoted in Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Bryan, Halsey's Story; Truman, Memoirs ; Story, p . 272. War Reports .

THE CLOSING DAYS 437

of the war. Under the terms of thi s munists had fought the Japanese, they document, Japanese commanders o f had been fighting the Nationalists as forces in the Pacific islands south of well, and were in fact, still trying to Japan were to surrender to Nimitz or gain the upper hand in China when the his representatives, and commanders o f war against Japan ended . To prevent forces in Japan proper, the Philippines , large stores of Japanese arms and equip- and the southern section of Korea were ment from falling into the hands of th e to surrender to MacArthur or to hi s Communists, the Japanese forces i n representatives . On 15 August, the JCS China were instructed to surrender onl y amplified General Order No . 1 by to Chiang Kai-shek or his representa- directing the occupation of the ke y tives. areas of Japan, Korea, and the China The conflict between the Communists coast. Under a system of priorities, th e and the Nationalists had been going on swift occupation of Japan was to be refor many years before and slackene d garded as the supreme operation an d only slightly during World War II, whe n would have first call on all available re - in the interests of national unity, both sources. Next in order was the earl y parties turned their attention to oustin g occupation of Seoul and acceptance o f the Japanese from the country . With the surrender of Japanese forces in that the end of the war and the impending area. Operations to be undertaken on surrender of large Japanese forces, th e the coast of China and on Formosa wer e Chinese civil war threatened to break to follow when forces and transport out anew and on a larger scale than be - were available. fore, but this time with international The immediate purpose of occupying implications which threatened the newl y the China coast by gaining control of won peace . This, then, was what faced key ports and communications center s the Allies in China. was to extend such assistance to Chiang When Lieutenant General Albert C . Kai-shek's Nationalist forces in Chin a Wedemeyer, commander of U.S. forces as was practicable without American in China, apprised Washington of the involvement in a major land campaign . explosive situation then existing i n As the first of the Allies to go to war China and of the need to take vigorou s against Japan, the Chinese governmen t action there to assist Chiang Kai-shek was expected to accept the surrender of in re-establishing the authority of hi s the Japanese on the mainland . The situ- government, he was directed to arrange ation on Chinese soil, and especially in for the movement of Chinese troops o n those great sections of the nation unde r American transport planes and ship s Japanese control, was so confused, how - into all areas in China and Formos a ever, that it appeared impracticable, i f held by the Japanese in order to disarm not altogether impossible, for the Na- and repatriate the defeated enemy . Pre- tionalist Government to fulfill its func- viously prepared plans were then ap- tion as stated in MacArthur's Genera l proved for sending in Marines an d Order No. 1, viz., to take the Japanese soldiers to help Nationalist force s surrender. Although the Chinese Corn - secure key Chinese ports and communi-

438 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

cation centers.93 At this time, while at- bers of the IGHQ. Further airborne an d tention was focused on the situation i n naval landings were to continue on th e China briefly, MacArthur's head- 29th and 30th, and on the 31st, as addi- quarters in Manila prepared for the tional occupation forces landed, the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay an d surrender ceremony was to take place on prepared to implement plans approve d the Missouri. Because a typhoon struck earlier for the occupation of Japan . the Home Islands during the latter part At Manila, the Japanese delegation of August, the entire schedule for the was informed that MacArthur would occupation was postponed two days, and formally accept the surrender of Japa n the surrender ceremony was rescheduled in Tokyo Bay on 31 August on board th e for 2 September . USS Missouri. According to the prelimi- On 27 August, however, the trans- nary plans, 150 AAF technicians were t o ports carrying the Fleet Landing Force land on 26 August at Atsugi Airdrome , and its components had already arrived 14 miles southwest of Tokyo, to prepar e in Sagami Bay to find it congested with the way for a subsequent large-scal e the warships making up the Fleet Flag - landing two days later by the 11th Air - ship Group, which was waiting to ente r borne Division and advance headquar- Tokyo Bay for the surrender ceremonies . ters of the Eighth Army, FEAF, an d To relieve the congestion, Missouri and Army Forces, Pacific—a total of ap- three destroyers steamed towards the proximately 7,500 men in all . channel leading to Tokyo Bay in order Elements of the Third Fleet were to to pick up the Japanese pilots who woul d enter Sagami Bay on the 26th also, whil e navigate the ships to their anchorage s Japanese harbor pilots were to maneu- in the bay. After the Fleet Flagshi p ver other naval units directly into Toky o Group had entered the bay, TG 30 .2 Bay on the same day. (British Flagship Group), TF 35 (in- Two days later, the Fleet Landin g cluding TG 35 .90 (Support Force) , Force (TG 31 .3), comprised of the 4t h TF 37 (British Support Force), an d Marines (Reinforced) and commanded TF 31 (Yokosuka Occupation Force ) by Brigadier General William T. followed in that order. While an air um- Clement, ADC of the 6th Marine Divi- brella of hundreds of planes from TF 38 sion, was to go ashore on Miura Pen- carriers covered the task forces and insula, 30 miles southwest of Tokyo , groups slowly moving in Sagami Wan , and take over the Yokosuka Nava l many more land-based fighters and Base.94 On the same day, MacArthu r bombers from Okinawa and Iwo Jim a was to land at Atsugi to discuss the con- patrolled the skies over Japan proper . duct of the full occupation with mem- The 150 technicians from the Fifth Air Force landed at Atsugi on the 28t 93 h See pt V below, "North China Marines, " with their emergency communication s for a continuation and fuller exposition of thi s story. and airfield engineering equipment an d " The occupation of Yokosuka by the 4t h began operations preparatory to subse- Marines will be treated in fuller detail in p t quent landings . On the 30th, the 11t h IV, "Occupation of Japan," below . Airborne Division and the various ad-

THE CLOSING DAYS 439

vance headquarters staffs arrived a t of China, the United Kingdom, th e Atsugi from Okinawa. Meanwhile, in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, th e conjunction with the arrival of the air - Commonwealth of Australia, the Do - borne division, an amphibious landing minion of Canada, the Provisional Gov- force comprising U. S . Marines and ernment of the French Republic, th e sailors, British sailors, and Royal Ma- United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and rines went ashore at Yokosuka an d the Dominion of New Zealand . As these occupied the harbor forts off Miur a signatories fixed their names to the tw o Peninsula. documents—one for the Allies, and a During the last day of the month, duplicate for Japan—a mass flight of Fleet Landing Force troops consolidated 450 aircraft from TF 38 "roared over their hold on the occupied naval base the Missouri masthigh ." 99 After all had and prepared to send patrols down the signed, General MacArthur ended th e peninsula to demilitarize outlying in- ceremonies, saying :"Let us pray that stallations. By the close of 1 September , peace be now restored to the world and as the hour for the Japanese surrende r that God will preseve it always. These approached, Allied troops had gained proceedings are now closed ." 9 6 control of most of the strategic are a In addition to the principals and th e along the shores of Tokyo Bay, excepting signatories present at the signing many Tokyo itself. Allied flag and general officers who had At 0908, the instrument of surrender participated in the war against Japa n was signed on board the Missouri. Sign- were witnesses. Ship's personnel from ing first for Japan on behalf of the the Missouri and Marines from her de- Emperor and the Japanese Government tachment manned every possible vantag e was Foreign Minister Mamouri Shige- point. The Marine officers present were mitsu. Next was General Yoshijiro Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger and Umezu, Chief of Staff of the Army, wh o his aide, Major Roy Owsley from signed for the Imperial General Head - FMFPac ; Brigadier General William T . quarters. General MacArthur then Clement, commander of the Fleet Land- signed as Supreme Commander for the ing Force ; Brigadier General Joseph H. Allied Powers. Flanking him were two Fellows, from the staff of CinCPac– officers who had been recently release d CinCPOA ; and the officers of the Marine from a prison camp near Mukden an d detachment of the Missouri, Captain invited by him to witness the surrender : John W. Kelley, and First Lieutenant s Lieutenant General Jonathan M . Wain- Francis I. Fenton, Jr., Alfred E. W. wright, the defender of Bataan and Cor- Kelley, and Josiah W . Bill .9 7 regidor, and Lieutenant General Arthur Although the signing of the surrender E . Percival, the British commander of document formally ended the war in th e . Singapore at the time of its capture "Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 283 . r Following his signing, MacArthu °° Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 366 . called upon the representatives of the s' Records Group 24, Records of the Burea u Allied Powers to sign in the following of Naval Personnel, Log of USS Missouri, order : the United States, the Republic entry of 2Sep45 (National Archives) . 440 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

AMONG THE FEW MARINES present at the surrender ceremony on USS Missouri are (1) Lieutenant General Roy S . Geiger and (2) Brigadier General Joseph H . Fellows . (USA SC211066)

CORSAIRS AND HELLCATS fly in formation over Tokyo Bay during the surrender ceremonies. In the left foreground is the Missouri . (USN 80-G-421130)

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Pacific, it did not mean that the worl d serving overseas . The major portion of would return to normalcy or that al l the overseas figure-190,945--consisted Marines would once again take up peace- of ground forces in six Marine divisions, time types of duty . A drastic reduction a Fleet Marine Force headquarters, in Marine Corps strength in the immedi- three amphibious force headquarters, ate postwar era did not necessaril y and supporting service and tactica l mean a commensurate reduction in the units. Total Marine Corps aviatio n number and types of responsible mis- strength on 31 August 1945 was sions assigned the Corps, for the in - 101,182 ; 61,098 Marines in this figur e creased role of the United States in in- were serving overseas in four Marin e ternational affairs after the war had a aircraft wings, an Air, Fleet Marin e direct bearing on what Marines were Force headquarters, and supporting to do and where they were to do it . In service and headquarters squadrons. addition to the assignment of part of th e The major Marine ground commands VAC to occupation duty in Japan an d in the Pacific at this time consisted o f the deployment of IIIAC troops to FMFPac at Oahu, IIIAC on Guam, and China, some Marines participated in the VAC on Maui . The Marine division s surrender of Japanese-held islands an d were located as follows : 1st on Oki- their later occupation, other Marine s nawa, 2d on Saipan, 3d on Guam, 4th were assigned to reactivated peacetim e on Maui, the 5th at sea en route to Japan , garrisons in the Pacific Ocean Areas , and the 6th, less the 4th RCT at Yoko- and the majority was rotated back to th e suka, on Guam . Of the Marine aviation United States and released or discharge d organizations, AirFMFPac was based from active duty. at Ewa, the 1st MAW was at Mindanao, the 2d on Okinawa, the 3d at Ewa, and THE MARINE CORPS AT THE the 4th on Majuro . The groups an d END OF THE WAR 9 8 squadrons of these four wings wer e based either with the wing headquarters By V-J Day, the day that the sur- or on various islands throughout th e render was signed, the Marine Corp s Pacific. Attached to the 3d Wing was a had reached a peak strength of 485,833 . Marine carrier group in four escort car- Of this figure, 242,043 Marines were riers that were under the operationa l control of Carrier Division 27 . 9A Unless otherwise noted, the material i n Fleet Marine Force ground and train- this section is derived from : CMC Rpt, 1946 ; ing-replacement activities on the eas t FMFPac Hist ; FMF Grd and Air Status Rpts , Aug45 ; USMC HistDiv, Administrative His- coast of the United States in Augus t tory of the United States Marine Corps in th e 1945 consisted of the Marine Training Post-war Period (lSep45-10ct46), dtd 19Aug - Command and the 7th Separate Infantr y 47, hereafter USMC Admin Hist ; CG, FMF- Battalion at Camp Lejeune, the Marine Pac, Administrative Activities of the Flee t Corps Base Depot at Norfolk, and th e Marine Force, Pacific, lSep45-10ct46, end A Training Battalion and the Field Artil- to CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC, ser 2863, dtd 24May47, hereafter FMFPac Admin Hist , lery Training Battalion at the Marin e 1945-1946 . Corps Schools, Quantico . On the west

442 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

coast, the Marine Training and Replace- On 11 August 1945, the Commandan t ment Command, San Diego Area, wa s submitted to the Secretary of the Navy responsible for training and replacement a general plan, commonly known later a s functions at Camps Pendleton and the Point System, which governed the Elliott. discharge and separation of enlisted Ma- Marine aviation operations in the rines.99 Approved on the 15th, this plan United States were under the control of was intended to supplement, but not re - two commands. The 9th MAW, with place, existing Marine Corps policy an d headquarters at the Marine Corps Ai r directives concerning discharges an d Station, Cherry Point, N .C., was re- releases. It also provided the most equi- sponsible for aviation training and re - table means of establishing the priorit y placement activities on the east coast. in which Marines 100 were to be release d Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, with head - by computing their service credits . Each quarters at the Marine Corps Air Marine received 1 point for each month Station, Miramar, Calif., held similar of service from 16 September 1940 ; 1 responsibilities on the west coast . point for each month overseas or on Besides these Marine air and groun d duty afloat from 16 September 1940 ; training and replacement commands i n 5 points for each decoration and for each the United States were Marine Corps campaign or engagement for which a recruit depots at Parris Island, S . C., battle star was awarded ; and 12 point s and San Diego, California, and nu- for each child under 18 years of age, but merous posts, stations, and independen t not more than 36 points for children . guard detachments attached to variou s With 12 May 1945 as the cutoff date for naval facilities . All of these, as well as computations, the critical score to be the FMF organizations, were to face used when the plan first went into effec t drastic revision as the Marine Corp s on 1 September was 85 points for mal e began to revert to a peacetime status . Marines and 25 points for Women Re- Four major personnel problem areas servists. The original plan provided tha t facing the Marine Corps, like the othe r the critical scores would be reduced t o Services at the beginning of the postwar reflect changes in the missions, and period, concerned demobilization, dis- therefore the personnel requirements, of bandment of activities and suspension the Marine Corps. The plan also pro- program ; personnel procurement ; and vided that enlisted personnel with suffi- postwar, fiscal, and mobilization plan- cient discharge points could remain o n ning. The most immediate problem fac- active duty for as long as they wante d ing the Commandant in the perio d to, and for the time that their services 1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946— were required, without their having to when wartime and immediate postwar sign an enlistment contract. Conversely, exigencies had eased—was the rapi d the Marine Corps found it necessary to demobilization of his Corps, for, in ef- °° G—1 OpD, Aug45 ; USMC Admin Hist, p . 2. fect, all of the personnel problems o f 100 The provisions of this plan did not apply the Marine Corps related in one way o r to regular enlisted Marines serving under a another to demobilization. four-year contract or the extension thereof.

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retain on active duty, until their reliefs made it possible for inductees or reserv- were procured and trained, certain key ists with 30 months of active duty to be- personnel who otherwise had amasse d come eligible for discharge, regardles s the required score for release an d of the number of points each of them discharge. had acquired . The required discharg e Since the number of officers to be re- score for Women Reservists was com- leased was relatively smaller than the parably reduced each time that the score number of enlisted men involved, the for male Marines was revised . Finally Marine Corps gave individual considera- on 1 October, all reservists and selectee s tion to the case of each officer . Because it became eligible for discharge regardles s had obtained its officers from variou s of length of service time. 10 2 sources during the war, the Corps ha d By the end of June 1946, the Marine to provide for either the demobiliza- Corps demobilization program was en- tion, integration into the regular com- tering its final stages and the strength ponent, or return to enlisted ranks of of the Corps had been reduced to 155, - each officer concerned. 592 Marines. This was a decrease of 68 On 10 October 1945, Marine Separa- percent from the September 1945 figure tion Centers were activated at the and 87 percent of the entire net decrease United States Naval Training Centers required to bring the Corps to the at Bainbridge, Maryland, and Grea t planned postwar limit of 108,200 . The Lakes, Illinois . Initially, the Bainbridge Fleet Marine Force, which had carried center was set up to handle a maximu m the offensive combat burden of the Corps of 400 discharges a day, but by during the war, was the hardest hit of 19 November its quota had been ex- all Marine activities during the demobi- ceeded, and two months later the center lization. At the end of the fighting, was processing 500 discharges a day .10' FMFPac immediately took steps to be- From time to time, as the current sit- gin reducing the strength of its force s uation permitted, the Marine Corps de- commensurate with its commitments . mobilization plan was revised to increas e On 1 October 1946, FMFPac was approx- the flow of discharges. In effect, the imately 8 percent of its 1 September speed-up was accelerated by reducing 1945 size, or to put it another way, there the number of points required for sepa- was a total of 21,343 Marines in air an d ration. On 8 October, barely more than ground units in the Pacific in late a month after the program had begun , 1946.103 the critical score was lowered to 6 0 During the 13-month period from 1 points and all enlisted personnel with September 1945 to 1 October 1946, three or more dependent children unde r FMFPac received 30,071 replacements . 18 years of age could request discharge. In turn, 102,115 Marines were returne d The point score was further reduced to to the United States from the Pacifi c 50 on 1 November and 45 on 1 Februar y 1946. By 1 July 1946, the Marine Corp s ALMAR 117, dtd 16Aug46 . 101 FMF Air and Grd Status Rpts, Aug45 , 10' USMC Admin Hist, p . 4 . Sep46 .

444 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

and Far East. This unusually rapid rat e to perform their missions properly be- of demobilization stripped FMFPac unit s cause of the excessive personnel turn- of the majority of their experienced per- over. Moreover, insufficient transporta- sonnel—officer and enlisted—and cause d tion to rotate home eligible Marines, who a situation in which an insufficient num- were scattered throughout the Pacific, ber of trained regulars remained over- created additional problems. Instances seas to perform specialist duties prop- occurred when the return home of man y erly. On-the-job training of remaining of these Marines, whose early discharg e Marines and the arrival of replacemen t was desired by the Marine Corps because drafts containing some experienced per- of existing postwar plans, was delaye d sonnel partially, but not sufficiently, al- because troop transports were not im- leviated the situation . mediately available. Nonetheless, FMFPac faced a partic- The second major problem facing th e ularly acute situation in this period be - Marine Corps in the postwar era wa s cause it was heavily committed with to convert a greatly expanded wartime units carrying out either occupation, organization into a competent peacetime garrison, or repatriation duties in China instrument of national security. This and Japan, and on many of the Pacific changeover resulted ultimately in th e islands, such as Truk, Guam, Kwajalein, consolidation or disbandment of many and Eniwetok . During the immediat e Marine activities, and a reduction in th e postwar months, many Marine units had mission of others to reflect their lessene d been disbanded, some new ones activate d size. From 1 September 1945 to 30 Sep- on either a temporary or a permanent tember 1946, 368 Marine organizations basis, and some garrison detachments were disbanded and 104 activated . A ma- formed and transferred to island and jority of the latter, such as replacement area commanders for operational con- or rotation drafts, had been activated on trol.1o4 All units under FMFPac wer e a temporary basis only, and some of th e reorganized to reflect currently effectiv e others actually were redesignated rather tables of organization and prescribed than activated . One of the most impor- personnel ceiling strengths . In the face tant aspects of the disbandment of ac- of the various administrative and organizational changes occurring durin g tivities and suspension program was it s this time, all units found it most difficul t sensitivity to the progress of the de-

104 As an example, appearing in FMF groun d two detachments named were to revert to th e status reports for the first time in April 194 6 Post-War Shore Establishment upon order . are the following units : Marine Detach- FMF Grd Status Rpt, Apr46. Appearing in th e ment (Provisional), Headquarters, Com- May status report was a provisional detach- mander, Philippine Sea Frontier, which wa s ment on Bikini. By October, only the Kwaja- attached to the FMFPac Representative, Mari- lein, Truk, and Eniwetok detachments re- anas Area for operations ; Marine Detachment mained, and the time left to them was limited . (Provisional), Eniwetok, attached to Atol l A more complete review of the organizatio n Commander, Eniwetok, for operations ; and and deployment of Marine security forces i n Marine Detachment (Provisional), Samar, at- the Pacific will be found in the next chapter , tached to FMFPac for operations. The last "Back to the Islands ."

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mobilization program. Because of this, Personnel procurement was the thir d close coordination in the conduct of both problem to confront the Marine Corp s programs was essential, and Marin e at the end of the war. Even with a mas- Corps personnel allowances had to b e sive separation and discharge progra m constantly revised in order to maintain underway, the Corps had to return to a a proper balance between Marine Corp s peacetime status almost immediately , missions and the number of Marine s and to reach its required manning level available to conduct those missions suc- of 108,200 Marines . The officer procure- cessfully. ment program in the postwar perio d An example of how one program af- featured the cessation of the mass office r fected the other may be seen in the close candidate programs of the war years an d relationship of demobilization with th e the return to peacetime methods for th e base roll-up program in FMFPac . That recruitment and training of regular per- headquarters held the mission of closin g sonnel. The huge task of selecting 4,40 0 down Marine supply installations and outstanding reserve and temporary offi- bases in the Pacific, and of disposing of cers for transfer to the regular estab- millions of dollars of surplus propert y lishment began after V-J Day, and wa s and goods therein . The early loss of large in its final stages by 30 September 1946 . numbers of experienced supply, service , One of the important sources for Ma- and clerical personnel from FMFPac lo- rine Corps officers had been the Nav y gistics agencies imposed a particula r V–12 College Program, which provide d hardship on those units which had th e a number of billets for Marines . At the actual duty of closing out scattered bases end of the war, approximately 1,900 and receiving from disbanding line or- men remained on active duty in the Ma- ganizations vast quantities of material rine Corps portion of the V–12 program . which had to be stored, maintained, safe- The Corps, however, had no desire t o guarded, and finally disposed of .105 At- bear the expense of educating office r testing to the enormity of the task is th e candidates who would not be part of th e fact that on 1 July 1945, the Marin e peacetime establishment . Finally, afte r Corps had on hand in the Pacific prop- considerable study, the Marine Corps erty valued in excess of $400 millio n offered individuals who had complete d at cost. In the following year, Marine seven or eight semesters of study a n Corps supply activities had disposed of opportunity to accept reserve commis- some $207 million worth of items . At sions and choose between immediate re - the end of the fiscal year, on 1 July lease to inactive duty or a brief tour o f 1946, the Marine Corps still had $68 active service. Those who chose the lat- million of surplus property to dispos e ter might apply for a regular commis- of, but fewer Marines were available t o sion if they so desired . Undergraduates not eligible for a commission were per- do the job.10 6 mitted either to resign, transfer to gen-

1 ° 5 FMFPac Admin Hist, p. 5. eral duty, or transfer to an NROTC 106 CMC Rpt, 1946. unit. On 30 June 1946, the Marine Corps

446 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

phase of the V–12 program was deacti- major problem with which the Marin e vated. 1 ° 7 Corps had to contend . There were two Another source for officers along wit h distinctive phases in this planning—th e the V–12 program was the wartime offi- recession phase and the postwar devel- cer candidate course at Quantico . This, opmental phase. The first of these con- too, was allowed to lapse and so the prin- cerned the period September 1945–March cipal postwar sources of permanent Ma- 1946, when most of the measure s rine officers were both the vast number adopted for expediency during the war of men who had been temporarily com- by the Marine Corps expired . The secon d missioned during the war and reservist s phase was a period in which the entir e mobilized at its beginning . Marine Corps began to function in ac- One important goal in the postwa r cordance with its established postwar period was to build up enlisted strengt h roles and missions . The most important by recruiting as many enlisted regular event of 1946 insofar as those objective s Marines as possible and by reenlistin g were concerned was the publication of all of the regulars whose enlistment con- the Navy Basic Post-War Plan No . 2. 10 8 tracts had been or were about to be com- This plan was to be used for planning pleted. On V-J Day, 72,843 Marines were purposes only, but Admiral Nimitz, wh o serving on regular enlistment contracts ; replaced Admiral King as CNO on 15 by 30 June 1946, however, 60 percent December 1945, indicated in his covering of these contracts were scheduled to ex- letter that, the Marine Corps would b e pire. Since a postwar level of 100,000 fairly well established along the line s male regular Marines had already been of the plan as it then stood. A note of established, the Marine Corps found it the future was sounded in the final para- necessary to initiate an intensive pro- graph of CNO's covering letter, which curement program to recruit replace- read : "In all planning, it is essential tha t ments for men scheduled for discharge an effective, balanced, mobile fleet, in- and to acquire an additional number s o cluding air components, have first prior- that the postwar manning level could b e ity. Economy in men, money, and mate- achieved . By 1 October 1946, this goa l rials is mandatory ." 10 9 had nearly been reached with a total o f General Vandegrift, Commandant o f 95,000 regulars on active duty, and ver y the Marine Corps since 1 January 1944 , few of them due for discharge until determined from this plan that the gen- 1948. As a result of all of this sound eral task of the Marine Corps would b e planning, the Marine Corps personnel to perform the following functions : picture was consonant with postwar plans that had been developed . (a) To provide a balanced Fleet Marin e The establishment of postwar, fiscal , Force, including its supporting air corn - and mobilization plans was the fourt h 108 CNO ltr to distr list, dtd 21Mar46, Op— 10i For a fuller story on the Marine Corp s 001/mac, (SC) A16—3/EN, Ser : 051P001, V—12 program, See Condit, Diamond, an d Subj : Basic Post-War Plan No . 2 (OAB, Turnbladh, Marine Corps Training, chap 15 , NHD) . pp. 288—316. 108 Ibid.

THE CLOSING DAYS 447

ponent, for service with the Fleet in th e The Fleet Marine Force, in conjunction seizure or defense of advanced Naval with Headquarters Marine Corps and th e Bases or for the conduct of such limited Marine Corps Schools, will continue its land operations as are essential to th e role in the- development of these aspect s prosecution of a Naval campaign . of amphibious operations which pertain t o (b) To continue the development o f the tactics, techniques, and equipment those aspects of amphibious operation s employed by landing forces . which pertain to the tactics, technique, and (b) Detachments Afloat : equipment employed by landing forces . On carriers, battleships, and cruisers , (c) To provide detachments and organ- Marine detachments will provide a traine d izations for service on armed vessels o f nucleus for the ship's landing force, gu n the Navy . crews as required, and local security fo r (d) To provide security detachments the vessels. On amphibious command ships , for protection of Naval property at Naval Marines will perform duty on staffs unde r stations and bases .ilo the direction of amphibious force commanders, and communications duties as di- To ensure that the Marine Corps rected by the commanding officer of th e would adequately perform these func- vessel. Marine detachments on transports tions, it was determined that th e will perform transport quartermaste r strength of the Corps would be 108,200 , functions and provide local security a s directed. or approximately 22 percent of the over- (c) Security Forces : all Navy postwar strength of 487,700 . Marine Corps personnel will be assigned With this number, the Marine Corps was the task of providing necessary interna l to maintain the Fleet Marine Force, security for Naval Shore Establishments ships' detachments, security forces for within and beyond the continental limit s of the United States, and of providing the naval establishment, Headquarters external security in accordance with spe- Marine Corps, and Marine supporting cifically assigned missions in such estab- activities. lishments outside the United States . In his annual report for the fiscal yea r (d) Supporting Activities : In order to maintain the Corps, it wil l 1946 to the Secretary of the Navy, the be necessary to procure, equip, train, an d Commandant expounded on the func- administer Marine personnel in such a tioning of these four tasks as follows : manner that assigned missions can b e accomplished . Marines within supportin g (a) Fleet Marine Force : activities will therefore be serving at Experience in the war gives incontro- Logistic Establishments, Recruit Trainin g vertible evidence that amphibious warfar e Depots, Personnel Procurement offices , is an essential adjunct of naval warfare . Headquarters establishments, training ac- . . . In the war in the Pacific, the Flee t tivities, and in non-available duty was able to play its historic role . . . onl y status.l l i because of the existence of the Flee t Marine Force . . . . According to Basic Post-War Plan o 110 CMC Rpt, 1946. Also see Col Thomas G . No. 2, the Fleet Marine Force was t Roe, et. al . A History of Marine Corps Role s consist of two Marine divisions and on e and Missions : 1775–1962—Marine Corps His- Marine brigade, reinforced, and sup - torical Reference Series, No. 30 (Washington : - HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1962) for a survey o f porting naval units when and as re these functions during the period indicated i n the title. "CMG Rpt, 1946 .

448 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

quired. Normal locations would be : one Marine Corps and supporting establish- division at Camp Lejeune and one a t ments were to be composed of th e Guam., and the brigade on the west coast Marine headquarters at Washington, at Camp Pendleton . Marine aviation the recruit depots at Parris Island an d was to consist of two aircraft com- San Diego, school activities, logistic s mands : one, AirFMFPac, with respon- activities, Marine barracks and camp s sibility in the West Coast-Hawaii - located outside of naval establishments , Marianas area ; and the other in overal l Marine air stations in the continental command of six Marine carrier group s United States, and Marine air station s aboard as many escort carriers. The in the Hawaiian area and the Marine final components of the FMF were to be Air Facility (in caretaker status) at St . Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force , Thomas, Virgin Islands. Pacific, and Headquarters, Fleet Marin e These then, were the first postwa r Force, Atlantic (FMFLant), with Forc e plans of the Marine Corps, and th e Troops assigned to each command . forces with which they were to be ac- Ships' detachments were to consist o f complished. In the months immediatel y Marine detachments assigned to the following V-J Day, Marine plans had larger combatant naval vessels, amphib- frequently been revised to reflect ne w ious command ships, transports o f requirements, and the plans were the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, an d changed even more drastically as each transports of the Naval Transportatio n postwar year passed . Necessary steps Service. Small Marine aviation servic e were taken to reorganize the Marine detachments were to be assigned to th e Corps each time that the need arose . CVEs that had Marine carrier squad- As the situation changed, the continuin g rons in their air complements. The se- reduction in the strength of the Corp s curity forces would consist of interior overall had to be considered before new guards for naval establishments withi n missions were assigned . As best it could , and outside of the continental United the Marine Corps built up its forces i n States, and air warning and antiair- the Pacific, the area where new peace - craft artillery units. Headquarters time responsibilities were waiting. CHAPTER 3 Return to the Islands

At war's end, Marine units not des - Washington and at Pearl Harbor were tined for an occupation assignment o r specially constituted to work on plan s deactivation went ashore to accept th e for implementing the surrender of iso- surrender of Japanese forces on island s lated Japanese garrisons on the man y throughout the Pacific . After supervis- islands and occupied areas in the Pacific . ing the demilitarization and repatri- The question facing these staff planner s ation of the former enemy, the Marin e was whether the Japanese island an d units involved in these activities eithe r area commanders would follow the lea d were returned to the control of paren t of their government and surrender o r organizations, redesignated to reflect whether they would put up fanatic renew duties as barracks or guard detach- sistance that could continue long afte r ments., or deactivated . V-J Day. On 14 August, the Empero r Primarily, the story of the Marine had issued an Imperial Rescript callin g Corps in the Pacific following the end upon his commanders to surrender and . After they of the war concerns Marine surrender cooperate with the victors and occupation duty, the activation of had received their Emperor's orders postwar garrison forces, and the many and were convinced of their authentic- ity, the outlying garrison commander s changes that the FMF underwent be - fore the Marine Corps attained a peace - were more than willing to comply with time stance. them. To provide for an orderly and sys- SURRENDER AND OCCUPATIO N tematic program of accepting the sur- DUTY 1 render of Japanese island garrisons an d later occupying the islands, CinCPOA Long before Japan had indicated a organized two task forces from th e willingness to sue for peace, staffs in Marianas and Marshalls-Gilberts Are a commands . These were : TF 94 (Com- 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s section is derived from : CinCPac Rpt of Sur- mander, Marianas), established to op- render and Occupation of Japan, dtd 11Feb46, erate the bases of that area and to hereafter CinCPac Surrender and Occupatio n occupy the East, Central, and Western Rpt (OAB, NHD) ; FMF Grd Status Rpts ; Guam Island Comd WarDs, Aug45—May46 ; Carolines (notably Truk, Yap, th e Peleliu Island Comd WarDs, Sep44—Feb46 ; Palaus, and the Bonins), and to evacu- Occupation For, Truk and Central Carolin e ate enemy nationals from the Marianas ; Tru k Islands, WarDs, Dec46—Apr46, hereafter and TF 96 (Commander, Marshalls - WarD, with date ; MarDet, Truk and Eastern Caroline Islands, AnnRpt of Activities, 1946. Gilberts), organized for the same pur- 449

450 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

poses as TF 94, but scheduled to oper- scribed by the numbers involved- ate in the Marshalls-Gilberts Area.2 100,000 military and 50,000 civilians . Prior to V-J Day, American forces Aggravating the situation was the fac t in the Marshalls and Gilberts had that most American and other shipping gained control of Eniwetok, Kwajalein , was employed to return home liberate d Majuro, and Tarawa Atolls . After Allied POWs and veterans scheduled fo r Japan surrendered, Task Force 96 unit s demobilization, and to carry back to the had to set up occupation forces on such Far East replacement drafts and ma- bypassed atolls and islands as Mille , Jaluit, and Wake, following the capitu- terial required by the occupation forces lation of the former enemy garrison s in Japan and China. The solution to located there. In the Carolines; Ulithi, the shipping problem was eventually Peleliu, and Angaur had been in Ameri- found in the employment of war-weary can hands since late 1944 . Facing Cin - LSTs and demilitarized Japanese ships , CPac elsewhere in the Pacific at th e none of which were suitable for other beginning of September 1945 was the transportation requirements . surrender of Japanese forces in th e The vast majority of the island gar- Bonins, the rest of the Marianas an d risons that were to surrender were i n Palaus, and the formerly important the area under the control of Vice Ad- strongholds of Yap, Truk, and Woleai , miral George D. Murray, Commander, and their lesser satellite island garri- Marianas . To standardize the conduct sons. The occupation of some of these of the surrender and occupation pro- places, their demilitarization, and the gram, on 20 August he organized fro m evacuation of Japanese nationals was within his force the Marianas Surren- the responsibility of units of the Fleet der Acceptance and Occupation Com- Marine Force and small naval surface mand (TG 94.3) . Comprising this forces assigned to support them . As group were the following task units and their tasks were accomplished, the their commanders : Truk Occupatio n Marine units either were gradually re- Unit, Brigadier General Robert Blake ; duced in size until disbanded, with- Bonins Occupation Unit, Colonel Pres- drawn, or eventually replaced by smal l ley M. Rixey ; Palau Occupation Unit , naval and Marine garrison forces . (See Brigadier General Ford O. Rogers ; Map 25 . ) Guam Evacuation Unit, Major Genera l The job of evacuating and repatriat- Henry L. Larsen ; and three other units ing Japanese military personnel an d commanded by naval officers .3 civilians was almost overwhelming . The A plan was devised standardizing th e enormity of the problem is best de - operations of these units and standard- On 5 January, Task Force 96 was dissolve d izing such specifics as the format of th e as a separate command under CinCPOA . Th e subordinate commands formerly under TF 9 6 3 ComMarianas OPIn 4-45, dtd 20Aug4 5 were absorbed by the Marianas command. (OAB, NHD) .

I 165°

30° P A C I F I C O C E A N • ° BONIN ISLAND S

VOLCANO ISLAND S c55 I°IO°E T R O P I_ C _O F_ C AN C E R

, w ° xa I,l °° a MARIAN A ISLANDS PHIL IPPINE SEA 5 °°

MARSHAL L ISLAND S

=.HAL L .alISLANDS ulu SENYAVIN ISLAND S 6,555555550.115.55 2 Mal ! 66i 2 .55 55 PALAU ISL ANDS ,55, i u TRUK naa °r ISLANDS MORTLOCK ISLAND S ks.

C A R O L I N E I S L A N D S

.„w?,ILBERT ISLAND S T HALMAHERA E Q U A T O R `•w !, ~ .05555 15155 E v7 ~ 11 e, ° MERCATOR PROJECTION 120 200 300 E00 500 600 700 600 MARINE SURRENDER AN D 60 °

111111111111'--5 ° 15°___M_ -__ OCCUPATION ACTIVITIE S EOUOT C 636703E MILES 1= SITE OF MARINE OCCUPATION 1945 -1946 CT‘ T. L . RUSSELL 1 MAP 25

452 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

surrender document 4 and the conduc t courtesies were to be observed both be - of the surrender ceremony, the Ameri- fore and after each surrender and flag- can flag raising, and the demilitariza- raising ceremony had been completed . tion of enemy forces, which were to be Japanese interpretation of these orders called thereafter "disarmed military often resulted in more than one enliste d personnel." In addition, the directiv e Marine or sailor being saluted by all ordered each task unit commander to Japanese ranks. determine whether any Allied or Ameri- The garrison on Mille Atoll, southwest can prisoners were present on the is - of Majuro in the Marshalls, surrendere d land being surrendered or if any ha d on 22 August—11 days before the Japa- been kept there . The commanders also nese government signed the surrender on were to conduct spot interrogations and the Missouri—and thus became the first investigations to determine whether an y enemy group in the Pacific Ocean Area s war crimes or atrocities had been com- to do so. On the same day that Mille gav e mitted during the Japanese occupation . in, the garrison commander on Ak a According to the task force directive, Shima in the Ryukyus surrendered to relations between the victors and the elements of the Tenth Army, which also vanquished were to be properly con- accepted the surrender of the forces on ducted at all times and all military Tokashiki Shima in the same islan d . On 29 August, th ' Brigadier General Ford O . Rogers becam e group the next day e Peleliu Island Commander on 7 August 1945 , Japanese commander on Morotai, who the day after the first atomic bomb was dropped controlled the garrisons of the entire on Japan. He recalled that his first conclusio n Halmahera group, capitulated to the after hearing of this bombing was that th e commander of the 93d Infantry Division . war was all but over. Because he had not at Two days later, the garrison on Mar- that time received instructions from Com - Marianas regarding how he was to conduct cus Island, located between Wake an d the surrender of Japanese forces in the Palaus , the Bonins, was the next major Japanes e General Rogers directed his Chief of Staff , group to give up. Marcus figured prom- Colonel Charles L. Fike, and his Assistant inently in Navy postwar plans . It was Chief of Staff for Operations, Captain Melvi n estimated that when the naval air base H. Bassett, USN, to prepare , a surrender and terminal proposed for the island document to be used for that purpose . Whe n the end of the war was announced, Rogers flew began operations, it would shorten the to Guam and submitted to Admiral Murray Honolulu-Tokyo air route by 1,049 miles . for approval the document his staff had pre - To administer the air base, CinCPac pared . "He took my surrender . procedure wor d planned to establish a Marcus Island for word, and used it in all the other surrender s Command, but the numerous Japanes e conducted under his command ." Rogers inter - - view . After ComMarianas had approved thi s on the island had to be repatriated be document, Colonel Fike flew a spotter-type fore the island could be developed . At plane over Babelthuap, the headquarters of the the time of the surrender, there wer e Japanese Palaus command, and dropped a cop y 2,542 Japanese Army and Navy per- of the surrender terms to the enemy below . sonnel and a number of Japanese civil- Fortunately, he was not shot at, although he ians remaining—the majority suffering had expected to receive ground fire . RAdm Melvin H. Basset, USN, comments to HistBr, from all forms of tropical maladies an d G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 270ct66. most of them severe malnutrition cases .

RETURN TO THE ISLANDS 453

Not only were they unfit as laborers , command of Brigadier General Harold their continued presence on the island D. Campbell ; it was redesignated Island presented a threat to the health of th e Command, Peleliu, on 16 November . occupation forces . Brigadier General Christian F . Schilt In order to evacuate the Japanes e relieved General Campbell as Island garrison as quickly and expeditiousl y Commander on 19 March 1945, and h e as possible, the Marine 11th Militar y was in turn relieved on 7 August by Police Company (Provisional), of th e General Rogers . 5th Military Police Battalion, Island Beginning 15 September, elements o f Command, Saipan, was sent to Marcu s the 111th Infantry occupied Koror , on 2 September. Arriving two days later , Malakal, and Arakabesan, and liberate d the unit remained on Marcus as the 539 Indian and Javanese POWs, most island guard until it was disbanded on of them suffering from marked malnu- 16 April 1946.5 Two months earlier, o n trition and beri-beri . By 5 October, all 18 February, the Heavy Antiaircraft Japanese had been removed to Babel- Artillery Battery (Provisional) ha d thuap, the largest island of the Palau been formed on the island . It was regroup. A month later, the Indian and designated Marine Barracks, Marcus , Javanese troops were repatriated . At on 10 April and passed to the adminis- the end of September, General Roger s trative control of the Department of the sent a small force to reconnoiter island s Pacific (MarPac) that same day .° On and atolls in the vicinity of the Palaus 12 May, the Marine Barracks was dis- to search for missing Allied personnel ; banded, the same day that the Nava l none was found . 8 Air Base, Marcus, was deactivated. ' General Rogers knew that the Japanese The next Japanese area commander had taken one prisoner, the member of a B—2 4 to yield was Lieutenant General Sada e crew which had been shot down. This man ha d Inoue, who surrendered on 2 Septembe r jumped and crewmen of another plane in the raid had observed a Japanese boat pickin g 1945 the entire Palau Group and al l up the American, who appeared alive an d forces under his command, including well. Rogers' first question to General Inou e those on Yap, to Brigadier General For d after the surrender had been signed was : "You O. Rogers, island commander on Pele- have one prisoner, where is he?" The Marin e general was told that the prisoner had been liu.? The Peleliu Island Command ha d killed by a Japanese officer, the commander been organized on 16 July 1944, as th e of an antiaircraft battery, who had been given 3d Island Base Headquarters under th e custody of the flyer in order to practice his English in conversations with him. The FMFPac Admin Hist, pt I, end A, Sched- Japanese took the American "out to where ou r ule of Demobilization of FMFPac, 1Aug45 — bombers had killed almost his entire antiair- 1Oct46, p. 1 . craft command, began to brood over that, de- See section, "Peacetime Garrison Forces, " cided to punish him, and he shot him, burie d below for further information concerning this him on the spot, and prayed over him ." General and other provisional and barracks detach- Rogers ordered Inoue to produce the officer , ments in 1946 and later . but on the next day all he received was a pic- ' See also Garand and Strobridge, "Western ture of that individual laying on the groun d Pacific Operations," pt III, "The Peleliu Cam- with a hole in his head . He had committe d paign ." suicide . Rogers interview .

454 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

On 26 October, less its 2d Battalio n the steps to be taken for the surrende r which had been disbanded, the 26th Ma- of all personnel and areas under thei r rines arrived to relieve the 111th Infan- command . try as the Peleliu garrison force . The Regarding his part in the presur- following March, the Marine Detach- render discussions with the Japanese , ment (Provisional), Peleliu, was acti- General Hermle recalled : vated and on the 15th, the 26th Marines was disbanded . The provisional force I carried out this mission under th e orders of Vice Admiral Murray wh o was redesignated Marine Barracks , furnished me a staff of about 12 officers , Peleliu, on 15 April 1946, when admin- mostly technicians such as aviators, har- istrative control of the unit passed t o bor defense [experts], engineers and tw o the Department of the Pacific. interpreters, etc. Contact with the Jap- On the same day that the Palaus anese on Truk was made from Guam vi a radio. We left Guam in the evening, on e surrendered, the commander of Japa- half the staff with me aboard a destroye r nese forces on Rota, located northeast and the other half aboard a D .E. [de- of Guam, capitulated to Colonel Howar d stroyer escort] . We anchored off Dublon , N. Stent, the representative of the Is - Truk, the next morning . land Commander of Guam, Major Gen- Japanese officials had been instructed , via radio, to approach the destroyer aboard eral Henry L . Larsen. Rota was formally a small boat displaying a white flag . An occupied on the 4th, and shortly there- admiral and a general came aboard ac- after all of the 2,651 disarmed Japanes e companied by a small staff. None of th e military personnel, except for 5 patients , Japanese would admit that they under - were transferred to POW stockades o n stood English, so all negotiations were con - Guam ducted through the interpreters . I in- . Colonel Gale T . Cummings wa s formed the Japanese that Vice Admiral appointed the temporary island com- Murray would take their formal surrende r mander of Rota, and Marine and Seabe e aboard his flagship and that they woul d forces under his command immediatel y receive further instructions concernin g began to repair the airstrip on th e this matter by radio . They were informe d that at the surrender they would be re- island, completing the task by the 1st quired to furnish lists of personnel, ships , of October. planes, harbor defenses, etc. . . . At all The largest enemy force in the Centra l times, they were very cooperative and the Pacific submitted on 2 September, when conference proceeded to a satisfactor y senior Japanese Army and Navy officer s conclusion in a few hours . During the conference, the captain of the destroyer gav e on Truk signed the instrument of sur- them a light lunch for which they ex - render. Preparations for this act and th e pressed great satisfaction .° occupation of the former enemy territory were initiated on 30 August, when By signing the terms of surrender on Brigadier General Leo D . Hermle, 2 September on board USS Portland, Deputy Island Commander, Guam, dis- Admiral Murray's flagship, General cussed with Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara, Mugikura committed the troops on the commander of the Fourth Fleet, and following islands under his control to Lieutenant General Shunsaburo Mugi- ° LtGen Leo D . Hermle Itr to Hd, HistBr, kura, the Thirty-first Army commander, HQMC, dtd 1Nov65 .

RETURN TO THE ISLANDS 455

lay down their arms and await Ameri- them had to be either treated and re- can occupation : Truk, Wake, the Palaus , patriated or evacuated. Mortlake (Nomoi), Ponape, Kusaie , Except for receipt of their regula r Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, Puluwat, an d share of American naval and air bom- Woleai, and Mille, Rota, and Pagan, bardments, some of the bypassed Japa- which had already capitulated . In addi- nese island garrisons did not fare too tion to these Army-controlled islands , badly, especially if they had been based the following bases under the control o f on one of the lush and fertile Pacific the Navy were pledged to surrender at islands where they could raise their own the same time by the signature of Ad- food. There are some cases on recor d miral Hara : Namoluk, Nauru, and where Japanese commanders upon sur- Ocean. When the military capitulated , rendering refused offers of food fro m Rear Admiral Aritaka Aihara, IJN the Americans because the garrison ha d (Retired), head of the Eastern Branc h a supply that was sufficient to maintai n of the South Seas Government—a Japa- its members until they were embarked nese agency with headquarters on Tru k for return to the Home Islands. e —signed for the 9,000 civilians ther Moen, one of the chief islands of Truk, and for those on the other islands withi n was not a tropical paradise . When the .lo his jurisdiction occupation forces went ashore there , When an actual survey of the force s they found that bugs and worms had s o on Truk was made later, a total of ravaged the sweet potato crop, on which 38,355 soldiers and sailors—including the Japanese garrison had so largely de- 3,345 Korean military personnel—wa s pended for subsistence, that all of the counted. In addition, a census of the troops were suffering from malnutri- civilians in the islands totalled 11,486, of tion. which 1,338 were Japanese, 252 Korean , Rank upon rank of `living scarecrows 9,082 native Caroline Islanders, 79 3 lined up along the route of the inspecting natives of Nauru, 8 Germans, 7 Span- party—men with ankles as thin as skinny iards, and 6 Chinese. wrists, with sunken cheeks, and with ever y 1 1 On the larger islands of Truk wer e rib showing sharply .' such major Japanese military installa- Three days before the surrender date, tions as bomber and fighter strips , Brigadier General Robert Blake was seadromes, submarine and torpedo boat designated Prospective Island Com- s bases, ammunition magazines for weap- mander, Truk, a designation which wa changed on 27 September to Prospectiv e ons of all calibers and types, coast artil- Commanding General, Occupatio n lery defense installations, and other mil- Forces, Truk and Central Carolines. The itary facilities . All of these had to b e mission of his command was to occupy demilitarized, dismantled, or destroyed . and develop Truk "as a fleet anchorage But first, the many sick Japanese o n with facilities ashore limited to recrea- tional purposes and for the support o f 10 CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt , pp. 180—181 . "Ibid ., p . 181 .

456 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

assigned aircraft and the servicing o f to Truk in September to supervise the transient aircraft." 12 With the aid of evacuation of Japanese personnel an d a small staff under the jurisdiction of Koreans, Okinawans, and Formosans , the Island Commander, Guam, Genera l who had been members of Japanese - Blake organized the unit that was to controlled forces. On 28 October, Spur - comprise the Truk Occupation Force. lock was relieved by his executive officer , Because of the urgency of the Marin e Major Robert J . Picardi, who remained Corps demobilization program, the unit in charge of the evacuation program was formed slowly. Initial administra- until Lieutenant Colonel Spurlock re - tive duties were undertaken by the staff turned to Truk on 25 November with th e of the 2d Provisional Antiaircraft Ar- rest of 2/21 and the occupation force. tillery Group before it was disbanded . To that date, 6,696 Japanese civilian The headquarters of this group, how - and military and Japanese-controlle d ever, provided the nucleus for the staff forces, and their wives and children , of the occupation force. The first detail had been repatriated ; by December, thi s of the new force to report in was the number had risen to 20,410, leaving military government unit. A Base Head- 19,575 remaining in the islands. In Janu- quarters Company (Provisional), was ary, 14,298 more evacuees left Truk , activated on 1 October 1945. It was and in February, 1,426. At the end of formed according to the T/O of a Pro- April 1946, only 3,811 disarmed military visional Brigade Headquarters Com- personnel and their families remained , pany, and did not reach full strength most of them working as laborers an d until shortly before it departed for Truk . assisting in the destruction of Japanese In keeping with the future tasks of arms, fortifications, and munitions. The the force, elements of the 29th Nava l remarkable factor in the history of all Construction Battalion and Acorn 52 13 of the former Japanese possessions in were assembled from bases all over the the Pacific that were surrendered to and western Pacific. Both of these units also occupied by American forces is the high suffered from the loss of skilled and degree of cooperation, docility, and lack experienced artisans. of rancor on the part of the losers. There On 14 November, the 2d Battalion , were few incidents of Japanese intransi- 21st Marines, 3d Marine Division (then gence ; those that did occur took plac e still on Guam), came under the contro l among the accused war criminals, who of the occupation force. The commander were usually more confused and contrit e of 2/21, Lieutenant Colonel Lyman D . than sullen and unremitting . Spurlock, and a small detachment of One mission common to all Allied Marines from the battalion had been sen t occupation and surrender groups was to investigate alleged Japanese war crimes "G—3 WarD, end (B) to Truk WarD , and atrocities, and hunt down and im- Dec45 . prison until their trial those accused of "An acorn was a naval unit designed to such acts.14 By the time that war crimes construct, operate, and maintain an advance d landplane and seaplane base and to provid e 14 See below, this chapter, for Marine involve- facilities for operations . ment in the conduct of war crimes trials .

RETURN TO THE ISLANDS 457

tribunals had been convened, a consider- the additional duties and title of Com- able number of accused Japanese were mander, Naval Air Base, Truk . In July being held in stockades on the various 1946, the complement of the provisiona l islands under Allied control throughou t Marine detachment was reduced fro m the Pacific. If evidence of an alleged a strength of 256 to 42 men . On 12 Octo- crime was discovered after the accused ber, administrative control of the de- had been repatriated to Japan, deposi- tachment passed to MarPac . tions were taken and presented to Allie d Wake Island, which had been captured tribunals convened in that country . by the Japanese on 24 December 1941 , During the first few months of the Tru k was regained by the Americans on 4 occupation, General Blake's investi- September 1945, when Rear Admira l gators had uncovered evidence suffi- Shigematsu Sakaibara surrendered th e ciently damning to warrant apprehen- forces under his command to the com- sion and detention of 42 individuals . mander of the 4th MAW, Brigadier Since no tribunals were held on Truk, General Lawson H . M . Sanderson, who the detainees were tried elsewhere, de- was the representative of the Com- pending upon which of the Allied gov- mander, Marshalls-Gilberts Area, fo r ernments had paramount jurisdiction .15 the ceremony.16 Following the raising of the American Following his appearance on th e flag on 25 November over the islan d Levy (DE–162) on 4 September to regroup formerly held by the Japanese, ceive and sign the surrender documents , General Blake's forces conducted a Admiral Sakaibara departed from th e search of Truk and its neighborin g ship to make preparations ashore fo r islets for missing Allied personnel ; the American flag to be raised tha t none were found. same afternoon . The first America n l On 26 February 1946, the Base Head - again to set foot on Wake when Genera quarters Company, Occupation Forces , Sanderson's party arrived was Colone l t Truk and Central Caroline Islands, wa s Walter L . J . Bayler, famed as the "las redesignated the Marine Detachment man off Wake Island." 17 At 1330 : (Provisional), Truk . Personnel to ex- 10 This narrative of the Wake surrender an d pand the new detachment to its author- occupation is derived from : Comdr, Wake ized strength were low-point personnel Island Surrender Acceptance Unit, ltr to CT G transferred from 2/21 . The next day, 96.14, dtd 7Sep45, Subj : Surrender Acceptanc e , l of Wake Atoll on 4Sep45, Narrative of (OAB the battalion was detached from Genera NHD), hereafter Wake Island Surrende r Blake's command and returned to Guam , Rpt; CinCPac Surrender and Occupatio n where it was disbanded on 5 March . On Rpt, pp. 186—187 ; ComMarianas ltr to Dir , 15 April, the occupation forces comman d Naval History, dtd 1Jan47, Subj : Narrative designation was changed to Commander, of the Marshalls Area Comd, lSep45—10ct46 , . Ex- Anx V, Wake Island Comd Rpt for sam e Truk and Central Caroline Islands period, hereafter Marshalls Area Comd His t actly one month later, General Blake (OAB, NHD) . was relieved by a naval officer, who had 1S See LtCol Walter L . J. Bayler, Last Man Off Wake Island (New York : Bobbs-Merrill , "Truk WarDs, Dec45, Jan—Apr46 . 1943) . 458 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

TO THE COLORS sounds as the American flag is raised over Wake Island for the first time since December 1941 . (USMC 133686)

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With the platoon at `Present Arms,' with ways flying clippers was re-marked dur- both American and Japanese saluting, th e ing the first few weeks of the reoccupa- Colors were then hoisted and two-blocke d tion, and mooring buoys for seaplane s while the notes of `To the Colors' wer e were also placed during this period. sounded on the bugle . As the Color s reached the peak of the flag pole, the Lev y By the middle of September, all Japa- commenced and completed firing a twenty - nese had been removed from Wake, th e one gun salute .i s chief island of the atoll, to Peale and Although a Japanese garrison of 60 9 Wilkes Islands. 1° All Japanese, with the Army and 653 naval personnel had sur- exception of Admiral Sakaibara and 1 6 rendered, this total was only a small commissioned and noncommissioned fraction of the total number of Japa- officers, were repatriated by 1 Novembe r nese that were isolated on the islan d 1945. The admiral and the others were from the time it was first bypassed b y temporarily detained before their trans- the Americans . Since that time, Ameri- fer to Kwajalein for further investi- can bombs and shells had killed 600 of gation in their responsibility in the the enemy, 1,288 had died of malnutri- alleged execution of approximately 10 0 tion and disease, and 974 had been American civilian workers in Octobe r evacuated to the Home Islands as hospi- 1943. tal cases. Of those remaining when th e Wake was officially commissioned a s Americans arrived, 405 were ill—200 an Island Command and a Naval Ai r of these bedridden . Immediately upon Base on 1 November, with a naval offi- occupying the island, American author- cer installed as the commander of both ities sent food and medical supplies to the island and the air base . On 14 Jan- succor the garrison. uary 1946, the Marine Detachment (Provisional), Wake, consisting of 5 In accordance with CinCPac plans , officers and 110 enlisted was established . Wake was designated a Naval Ai r Less than a month later, on 10 Febru- Facility on 4 September. Occupation ary, the unit was redesignated Marine forces arrived beginning the 7th, in- Detachment (Provisional), Eniwetok , cluding a Marine detachment consisting and transferred there with orders t o of 2 officers and 54 enlisted from disband on conclusion of Operation . These forces at once concen- Engebi CROSSROADS, the atomic bomb test s trated on repairing the airstrip, dispos- . On 10 December, th e ing of mines, destroying Japanese am - at Bikini Atoll detachment was disbanded . munition and bombs, and establishing Eight days after the provisional de- a shore-based communication establish- tachment left Wake, a Marine Heav y ment. An inspection of existing ai r t Antiaircraft Artillery Battery (Pro- facilities disclosed that the east-wes visional), Wake, was activated. Like strip of the airfield was in good condi- other provisional units formed in thi s tion and capable of landing planes of period, the strength of the battery wa s . The seaplane lane any type or size 5 officers and 110 enlisted Marines . In formerly used by Pan American Air- 19 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har- 18 Wake Island Surrender Rpt, p . 4. bor to Guadalcanal, map on p . 97 .

460 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

view of the decreasing importance of Concrete emplacements, high in the moun- Wake in postwar plans, the battery was tains with steel door openings are too disbanded on 19 August 1946. numerous to count . Artillery and machine gun fire which could have been placed on Another important Japanese capitu- the airfield would have prevented any lation occurred on 3 September 1945 , [force commander's italics] attempt at a when Lieutenant General Yosio Tachi- landing there. With camouflage, as prac- bana, senior commander of the Japanese ticed by the Japs, in place, NGF spotters forces in the Ogasawara Gunto (Bonin would have had a very difficult time locating these cleverly placed positions. . . . The Islands) surrendered to Commodor e location of many of the emplacements , John H . Magruder, Jr. aboard USS which have to be seen to be appreciated Dunlap, outside the harbor of Chich i indicate that the Jap plan was to permit Jima. Until the fall of Iwo Jima and hi s an entrance into the harbor or onto th e death, the former commander of th e airfield, then to give us the `works .' Most of these positions are inaccessible an d Bonins forces, Lieutenant General many could not have been reached by NG F Tadamichi Kuribayashi had made hi s as they are situated on reverse slope s headquarters on that volcanic island . facing east.2 2 After Kuribayashi's death, the sub - Survivors of the Japanese garriso n commander of the Bonins succeeded to on Chichi and Haha Jimas comprise d command and moved the headquarter s 20,656 Army and Navy personnel an d to Chichi Jima . 2,285 civilian laborers who had been Approximately 140 nautical mile s transported to and employed in the northeast of Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima wa s islands by the military . Additional Jap- seriously considered by American plan- anese garrison troops located on othe r ners as a potential target for an am- islands near the Bonin group were phibious landing .20 Chichi Jima was evacuated by the U. S. Navy. dropped in favor of Iwo Jima, because , In mid-September 1945, at the sam e although it had a good protected har- time that 2/21 was designated as th e bor, its terrain was too rugged to per- military element of the Truk Occupa- mit the rapid construction of airfields. tion Force, the 1st Battalion, 3d Ma- Even more condemning were the results rines, 3d Marine Division, was desig- of photo-reconnaissance missions which nated the military element of the Bonins showed Chichi Jima to have been more Occupation Force. Immediately upo n heavily fortified than Iwo .21 Confirming receipt of the orders detaching the m this evaluation after the war was the from parent organizations, both bat- report of the Bonin Occupation Forces talions began reorganizing for the mov e Commander . Following some prelimi- and filling their ranks with volunteers , nary comments, Colonel Rixey wrote : regulars, and low-point Marines. This writer has seen Jap defenses from On 10 October, the advance echelo n Tarawa to Iwo . Nothing previously see n of 1/3, consisting of Rixey's small staff can compare with coast and artillery defenses . . . surrounding Chichi harbor. " Bonins EvacRpt of Inspection 10-110ct45 , by Col Presley M . Rixey, encl (A) to Com - "° See pt I, chap 1, supra . Marianas Itr to CinCPac—CinCPOA, dtd 6Nov— 21 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 5—6 . 45, subj : Bonins EvacRpt (OAB, NHD) .

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and 20 military policemen, landed and have been used because the Japanes e met the Japanese liaison group headed were most cooperative and willing to by Major Yoshitaka Horie. When Colo- please. It was not necessary to establis h nel Rixey discovered that General a manned boundary between the Ameri- Tachibana and Vice Admiral Kunizo can and Japanese zones on the island ; Mori, the senior officer in tactical com- "A drawn line on a map was suffi- mand at Chichi Jima, were not present cient." 25 On 1 June 1946, after fulfill- in the group, he "sent for them to report ing its assigned mission, 1/3 was dis- to me at the dock, which they, of course, banded on Chichi Jima, and its Marines complied with." 2 3 were transferred to other FMFPac The Marines were the first America n units in the Pacific and the Far East . troops to set foot in the Bonins since During the several visits to th e Commodore Perry's expedition there i n Bonins by American fast carrier tas k 1853.24 Rixey's group had a primary forces in 1944 and 1945 and the subse- mission of evacuating and repatriating quent air and naval gunfire bombard- the Japanese. A secondary task was t o ments of those islands, one Marine an d destroy the extensive Japanese defenses several Navy aviators were shot dow n existing on the island. When the re- and listed as missing in action . After mainder of the battalion arrived on 13 Colonel Rixey had assumed his role as December, it carried with it a large sup - the commander of the Bonins, he insti- ply of explosives with which to accom- tuted an investigation to determine th e plish this mission. fate of these downed pilots. Soon, Rixey This main body had been designated began hearing rumors and receivin g the Bonins Occupation Force at Guam anonymous reports concerning the in - on 1 December . When it landed o n humane and barbaric treatment Ameri- Chichi Jima 12 days later, Colonel Rixey can POWs had received at the hands of ordered the American flag raised over their Japanese captors. the former Japanese stronghold . After Shortly after Colonel Rixey's arriva l he had originally landed on 10 October , on Chichi Jima, a Japanese Coast Guar d Colonel Rixey determined that the en - cutter entered the harbor . On board tire 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, woul d were Frederick Arthur Savory and his not be required to garrison the island , three uncles, all of whom were descend - to supervise repatriation, and to demili- ants of Nathaniel Savory, a Massa- tarize the defenses. He therefore recom- chusetts whaler who had settled in th e mended that the Occupation Forces b e Bonin Islands in the 1830s . After the reduced in strength to 400 men only. He fall of Saipan, the Japanese had evacu- later found that even less troops could ated the American-Chamorro-Hawaiia n family to the Home Islands . While in " BGen Presley M . Rixey ltr to Hd, HistBr , Japan, Fred Savory had heard rumors HQMC, dtd 10Nov65, hereafter Rixey ltr. spread by soldiers repatriated fro m =4 Aurthur and Cohlmia, 3d MarDiv Hist, p. Chichi Jima regarding cannibalism o n 334. It should be noted that Iwo Jima is in th e Volcano Islands . Rixey ltr.

462 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

that island. He passed these stories on penalties. One was hanged in June ; to Colonel Rixey . General Tachibana and three of hi s The morbid story of the Chichi Jima other officers were executed at Guam o n 2 garrison was related in full at the war - 24 September 1947. 7 crimes trials held later at Guam . Two In quick profusion, the followin g naval aviators—one captured in March former Japanese-garrisoned islands in 1944 and the other in August after they the Central and Western Pacific island s had parachuted from their disabled air- were surrendered to CinCPac represen- craft—were bayoneted to death at Gen- tatives in September 1945 : Aguijan, eral Tachibana's orders following their Jaluit, Yap, Wotje, Maloelap, the interrogation. Five more American air - Ryukyus, Kusaie, Ponape, Nauru , men, one a Marine, were executed afte r Lamotrek, Woleai ; 26 and in October , they, too, had been captured when the y Ocean. Some of these little-know n bailed out of their aircraft . Three were islands with unfamiliar names were beheaded, one was bayoneted, and small and held nothing but a weathe r another beaten to death . It was upon the station manned by a few Japanese flesh of these five that certain members civilians and a slightly larger native of the Japanese garrison fed. Testimony population. Military garrisons of vari- exonerated the majority of the Chichi ous sizes were on some of the large r Jima command from having been in- islands, the size of the force determine d volved in this disgusting incident, an d by the strategic value that the Japanes e indicated that with the exception of th e had given the island . Regardless of th e perpetrators of this foul deed, thos e location or size of the former enemy who ate the flesh did not know what garrison, the terms of the Potsda m they were eating . Declaration bound the Allied Powers t o Reporting his reaction upon learnin g permit, and by inference to assist, all of the uncivilized actions of the guilty Japanese military personnel to return parties, Colonel Rixey wrote : "We were to their homes after they and thei r flabbergasted at first . We had expecte d organizations had been completely de - beheadings, of course . But never can- militarized. Because American shipping nibalism! What manner of men were 27 CO, MarBks, Guam, ltr to CMC, dtd these?" 26 The war crimes trials of 2 1 27May 48, Subj : Hist Narrative of Special Chichi Jima officers and men were hel d War Crimes duties performed by personnel o f on Guam during the fall of 1946, an d the MarBks, Guam, hereafter, MarBks, Guam , Hist Narrative. entailed more than 1,000 pages of testi- 28 Representing the Island Commander , mony and exhibits . Of the 21 accused, Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Parker R . Colmer one officer who had no knowledge of th e accepted the surrender of the Woleai Atol l cannibalism was acquitted . The other Commander, Major General Kitamura, on 1 9 20 were found guilty and given variou s September. Two days earlier, a small Marine sentences ranging from death by hang- detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Colmer had landed on this tiny atoll in the Centra l ing to life imprisonment and lesse r Carolines to arrange for the demilitarization of the islet and the evacuation of its personnel . 28 Cited in Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p. 352 . Island Comd, Guam, WarD, Sep45 .

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was fully committed to the support o f ation vessels. By the end of December MacArthur's occupation and surrende r 1945, all Japanese military personnel forces and in the return of U . S. serv- had been evacuated from the Marshalls- icemen to the States, until they could b e Gilberts Area . By 10 January 1946, repatriated, the disarmed enemy garri- 73 .9 percent of the Japanese nationals, sons on the various atolls were super- military and civilian, on the islands in vised, but generally left undisturbed . the Marianas had been evacuated to The Japanese were allowed to fend for Japan . Not included in these group s themselves from their own gardens were the Japanese who had been de- until such time that Japanese shipping tained on either Guam or Kwajalein could be made available to transport awaiting trial as war criminals or wait- them home . ing to appear as witnesses at thes e Although American shipping wa s trials. Nonetheless, before the middl e thoroughly involved in "Magic Carpet, " of 1946, most disarmed military person- the return home of combat veteran s nel had been returned to their homes in from the Pacific, and in operations in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, or Formosa , the Far East, the Japanese had 2 1 and thus many of the provisional Ma- tankers, 101 transports, and 21 1 rine detachments that had been forme d freighters still in operating condition to supervise their repatriation could b e after the war. General MacArthur said , deactivated. The Marine forces in the however, that there was a more press- Pacific were ready then to phase into ing need for these vessels to ship foo d their postwar garrison programs . and clothing to the Home Islands tha n to repatriate troops from outlying PEACETIME GARRISON FORCES 30 islands. "As of 7 October, according to By 1 October 1946, of the 10 provi- Domei [the Japanese news agency] , sional Marine detachments and the mili - only 38,645 troops had been returne d tary elements of occupation forces that from overseas, including the continent of Asia, which meant that some 3,320, - 30 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s 000 Japanese Army and 300,000 Nav y section is derived from : CMC Rpts, 1946—1948 ; USMC Admin Hist ; G—1 and G—3 OpDs, personnel still remained outside the lAug45—31Dec47 ; FMF Air and Grd Status home islands." 29 CinCPac alleviated th e Rpts, Aug45—Dec47 ; FMFPac Admin Hist, situation somewhat in November, when 1945—1947 ; CofS, MarPac, ltr to CG, MarPac, it began to use amphibious vessels no t dtd 5Mar46, Subj : Hist of Hq, MarPac, Durin g suited for "Magic Carpet" in the re- World War II, hereafter MarPac WW II Hist; CG, MarPac, ltr to CMC, dtd 20Mar47, Subj : patriation of Japanese from the Mar- Narrative of MarPac lSep45—10ct46 ; CG, shalls-Gilberts and Marianas Areas. MarPac, Itr to CMC, dtd 15Apr47, Quarterly Liberty ships and LSTs in Philippines Summary of MarPac, lOct46—lApr47 ; CG, ports and at others in the Pacific were MarPac ltr to CMC, dtd 10Jul47, same subject , period lApr—lJu147, all hereafter MarPa c assigned to duty as Japanese repatri- Hist, with inclusive dates ; MarGarForPa c OpDs, for periods lSep45—10ct46, lOct46 — 2B CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt , 1Apr47, and lApr—1Jul47, all hereafter Mar- p. 168. GarForPac OpD, with inclusive dates.

464 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

had been formed since the end of th e suka for the remainder of the America n war,31 all except the ones on Wake , occupation of Japan, and recommende d Kwajalein, and Eniwetok were dis- that the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines— banded, redesignated a Marine Bar- part of the Yokosuka Occupation Forc e racks, or made a permanent Marine —be redesignated as the 2d Separat e detachment.32 Between April and Jul y Guard Battalion (Provisional), FMF , 1946, the following redesignations took and remain there for interior guar d place on the dates noted : 15 April, duty. The change in title took place on Marine Detachment (Provisional) , 15 February 1946. Five months later, Peleliu, became the Marine Barracks, the size of the provisional battalion wa s Peleliu ; 20 May, 8th Military Police reduced and on 15 June it became Ma- Battalion (Provisional), became the rine Detachment, Fleet Activities, Yoko- Marine Barracks, Guam ; 10 June, 5th suka, and was placed under the admin- Military Police Battalion (Provisional) , istrative control of MarPac. became the Marine Barracks, Saipan ; Based on the provisions of the post - 20 June, Marine Detachment (Provi- war plans, all of these Marine units wer e sional), Samar, became the Marine given missions consisting of maintain- Barracks, Samar ; and 4 July, Ma- ing internal security and standing in- rine Detachment (Provisional), Head - terior guard duty at the naval activities quarters, Commander, Philippine Se a to which they had been assigned . In Frontier, became the Marine Detach- addition, the Marines on Truk, Marcus , ment, Commander, Naval Forces, Phil- and Peleliu islands manned antiaircraft ippines. The last-named organization artillery positions, while the garrison s was reorganized on 1 January 1947 a s on Guam, Saipan, and Truk had the the Marine Barracks, Sangley Point , important and difficult task of guarding Philippine Islands . and supervising nearly 7,000 Japanese The realignment and reduction o f war crimes prisoners and disarme d FMF units in the Far East also affected military personnel . the organization of the garrison force s From 1 June 1946 until 5 May 1949 , in the Pacific. For instance, in January when the War Criminal Stockade was 1946, CinCPac notified CNO that he closed, the Guam garrison was respon- anticipated a drastic reduction in th e sible for the custody, discipline, feeding , size and scope of fleet activities at Yoko- clothing, and, in some cases, executio n of Japanese war criminals confined in 51 See previous chapter, section entitled "Th e its custody. A total of 13 inmates was Marine Corps at the End of the War," p . 444n . executed by hanging following their " On 10 December 1946, the provisional detachments on Wake and Eniwetok were dis- trial and conviction by the War Crime s banded . The Kwajalein unit was redesignated Commission convened on Guam . Eleven Marine Barracks, Kwajalein, and came unde r executions were conducted by an Arm y the administrative control of Marine Garriso n Forces, Pacific. FMFPac Admin Hist, 1Oct46- Officer, a member of the Military Polic e 1Apr47 . Corps, who was an official hangman.

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During the period he was attached to cient administrative control of th e the Marine Barracks in order to carry widely separated Marine Corps posts i n out his duties, he trained two enliste d the Pacific, the MarPac commander Marines "in the technique of execution recommended that the title of the Mar - by hanging." They executed the last tw o GarFor commander be changed to war criminals condemned to die afte r Commanding General, Pacific Ocean he left.33 Marine Garrison Force, and that he b e On the date that the designations o f assigned as the deputy commander o f the various garrisons changed, the y MarPac.34 The Commandant approve d were detached from FMFPac and place d the redesignation, and it became effec- under the administrative control of th e tive on 15 October 1946, when the ne w Department of Pacific, or MarPac as it title, Commanding General, Marin e was both officially and familiarly ab- Garrison Forces, Pacific, appeared .3 5 breviated . Operational control of the The first officer assigned to this com- Pacific garrisons was vested either with mand was Brigadier General Willia m the naval activity or the senior naval A. Worton, who established his head - command on the island to which th e quarters at the Marine Barracks, Pear l Marine unit was assigned . Harbor, T .H., and reported his assump- On the effective date of attachment tion of command on the 15th to both of the barracks and detachments, Mar- CinCPac and MarPac .3 6 Pac in turn placed them under the con- When the Marine Garrison Forces trol of Marine Garrison Forces (Mar- was first organized in 1941, there wer e GarFor), 14th Naval District, in only a few barracks and detachments Honolulu. MarGarFor had been forme d under its command, and all of these wer e on 13 December 1941 in order that al l in the Hawaiian Islands and on John- of the various Marine garrison forces ston and Palmyra Islands. At the end of in the 14th Naval District could be cen- the war, the number of subordinate unit s trally administered . increased considerably ; the mission as - d Headquarters Marine Corps directe signed MarGarForPac at the time of . Pickett to Brigadier General Harry K its redesignation in 1946 made it respon- assume command as Commanding Gen- sible for all posts, detachments, offices, . eral, MarGarFor, 14th Naval District and other Marine Corps organization s Although General Pickett and subse- in the Pacific Ocean Areas with the ex- quent commanders functioned as dep- ception of FMF units, Marine Corps ai r uties of the commanding general of stations, and shore-based air warnin g MarPac, they did not carry the title. At the end of the war, because of the in- " MarPac WW 77 Hist, p . 4 . creasing importance of the Honolulu - " CMG Spdltr ser MC-819560, dtd 27Sep46 ; MarGarForPac GenO 2-46. based command and to ensure an effi- "8 MajGen William A . Worton ltr to Hd , " MarBks, Guam, Hist Narrative . HistBr, HQMC, dtd 25Oct65 .

466 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

units.37 On 23 May 1947, MarGarForPa c supporting establishments in the Pa- became an administrative command di- cific were stabilized—for the time being , rectly under the control of Headquarters at any rate. Closely paralleling the steps Marine Corps. As before, CinCPac ha d leading to stabilization of these non- operational control of the Marine post s Fleet Marine Force organizations were and stations in the Pacific . The Marine the day-to-day changes that carried Garrison Forces, Pacific, command was FMF units from a war to peacetime deactivated on 31 August 1948, and the character. Commanding General, FMFPac, assumed administrative control of all Ma- STABILIZATION OF THE FMF 3 9 rine security forces and supporting establishments in the Pacific formerly By the beginning of 1947, the Marin e under the control of MarGarForPac .38 Corps had adjusted to operating on a Although it was purely an adminis- peacetime level with a complement dras- trative command throughout seven years tically reduced from a peak strength ; of existence, MarGarForPac played a n there were 92,222 Marines on active duty increasingly important role in supervis- on 30 June 1947.4 ° Because of major or- ing the constant change in the composi- ganizational changes and the constant tion, designation, and number of Marin e turnover of personnel in activities wher e garrisons in the Pacific during the pe- trained and experienced Marines were riod 1945-1948. The assumption o f needed, the retention of key Marine s control over these Marine outposts b y was especially critical in Marine logis- FMFPac meant that the Marine Corp s tical, aviation, and recruit training transition to peacetime status had been units . The problem was all the mor e accomplished and security forces an d grave in face of the missions assigne d to the Marine Corps for Fiscal Year " MarGarForPac consisted of the followin g 1947.41 These missions were a combina- in October 1946 : H&S Co, MarGarForPac ; tion of those previously assigned i n MB, USNB, Pearl Harbor, T .H. ; MB, NAD , accordance with the postwar progra m Oahu, T .H. ; MB, NAS, Ford Island, Pearl of the Corps and those foreshadowing Harbor, T .H . ; MB, NAS, Barber's Point, Oahu , T.H . ; MB, NAF, Honolulu, Oahu, T .H. ; MB , what the National Security Act of 194 7 NAS, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T .H . ; MB, NAS , and later amendments would assign . Kahului, Maui, T .H . ; MB, NOB, Midwa y Island ; MB, NAS, Johnston Island ; MB , '° Unless otherwise noted, the material i n Guam ; MB, Saipan ; MB, NOB, Okinawa ; this section is derived from : CMC Rpts, 1946— MB, NOB, Subic Bay, P .I. ; MB, Peleliu , 1949 ; USMC Admin Hist ; G—1, G—3, and Div - Palau Islands ; MD, (Prov), USNBS, Marcus Avn OpDs ; FMF Air and Grd Status Rpts ; Island ; MD, Truk ; MD, Fleet Activities , FMFPac Admin Hist . Yokosuka ; MD, Commander, Naval Forces , "CMG Rpt, 1947 . Philippines ; MB, Kwajalein ; MD, Fita-Fita 41 As other agencies of the Federal govern- Guard, Samoa . Muster Rolls, MarGarForPac , ment do, the Marine Corps operates on a fisca l Oct46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, Pers Dept , rather than a calendar year, or from 1 July HQMC) . of one year to 30 June of the following year . " CMC Spdltr ser MC—1034430, dtd 19Aug48 , Fiscal year 1947 then would have been fro m cited in Ibid., Aug48 . 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947 .

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In essence, the Marine Corps was : functions of transport quartermaster s and local security as directed. Marines (a) To provide fleet marine forces o f in security forces assigned to naval shor combined arms, together with supportin g e air components for service with the fleet establishments within and outside of th e in the seizure or defense of advance nava l continental limits of the United States bases and for the conduct of such lan d would provide necessary internal se- operations as may be essential to the curity ; those detachments assigned to prosecution of naval campaigns . such establishments outside of th (b) To develop in coordination with e other armed services, those phases of United States would provide externa l amphibious operations which pertain to security in accordance with specificall y the tactics, techniques and equipmen t assigned missions. In order to maintai n employed by landing forces. the Marine Corps and to assist it i n (c) To provide detachments and or- accomplishing its missions, Marine sup- ganizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy . porting activities, such as logistic estab- (d) To provide security detachments fo r lishments, recruit training depots , the protection of naval property at nava l personnel procurement offices, head - stations and bases . quarters establishments, and training (e) To be prepared in accordance with activities, would procure, equip, train , integrated joint mobilization plans for th e expansion of the peacetime components and administer Marine personnel .43 to meet the needs of war . During the last two war years, th e (f) In addition, to maintain such activ- FMF had been organized in accordanc e ities as necessary to insure the adequate administration, supply, training and tech- with the F-Series Tables of Organiza- nical directions of personnel and units tion, by which a Marine division con- engaged in accomplishment of the basic sisted of a headquarters battalion, tank, missions .4 2 engineer, and pioneer battalions, servic e To meet the challenges engendered b y troops, an artillery regiment, and thre e these missions and at the same time to infantry regiments, totalling 843 officer s reduce its size to reflect peacetime tasks , and 15,548 enlisted, or 16,391 Marines the Marine Corps reviewed and re- overall. A reinforced regiment, or RCT , vamped the assignments given to it s consisted of the infantry regiment itself , major components . In conjunction with an artillery battalion, engineer, pioneer, Headquarters Marine Corps and th e transportation, ordnance, service and Marine Corps Schools, the Fleet Marin e supply, medical, and tank companies, a Force was to continue its role as state d reconnaissance platoon, and a band sec- in paragraph (b) quoted above . Marine tion, all totalling 4,585 Marines . Under detachments afloat on carriers, battle- the G-Series T/O (peace)," approved 4 ships, and cruisers were to provide a September 1945, the Marine Corps reor- trained nucleus for the ships' landin g ganized to reflect its postwar size an d forces, gun crews as required, and loca l conditions at that time . A Marine divi- security for the vessels . Marine detach- sion consisted of the same component s ments on transports would perform th e " CMC Rpt, 1946. " CMC Rpt, 1947. " See App H for this T/O .

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as before, but its strength was increase d scheduled for discharge or reassignmen t to 962 officers and 17,182 enlisted Ma- were transferred to a transient center on rines, or a total of 18,144. While the size Guam, where they awaited transporta- of the division was increased, the num- tion to the States . ber of Marine divisions scheduled fo r From September 1945 to June 1947 , active service according to postwar FMFPac was reduced in size until i t plans had dropped to two. As soon as the approached the postwar form it would G-Series T/O was authorized, all Marine take. Many changes in the composition organizations affected by it were re- and designation of FMFPac units occur - constituted. Many units, because of thei r ring in this period will be discusse d missions as well as their depleted states , later when the occupations of Japan and could be reorganized at only 90 percen t North China are considered. On 30 June of their authorized strength . During th e 1947, FMFPac strength was 19,125 Ma - period February-April 1946, the 1st Ma- rines in units at Camp Pendleton, th e rine Division in China and a few othe r Hawaiian Islands, China, and Guam . In units had dropped down to 80 percent o f the months leading to this date, othe r authorized strength. To rectify the situ- major Marine commands, FMF an d ation, the Commandant ordered them to non-FMF, were formed . organize on the basis of the prevailin g On 22 January 1946, the Commandant G-Series T/0, and beefed up thei r directed the Commanding General, Ma- strengths slightly to reflect their current rine Barracks, Quantico, to form a assignments. special infantry brigade to be prepare d In late 1945, two of the Marine divi- for expeditionary service and main- sions that had served so spectacularly i n tained in a state of readiness . The the Pacific during their tours in comba t headquarters and two battalions of th e were disbanded . The 4th Marine Divi- 1st Special Marine Brigade was forme d sion, which had been formally activate d at Quantico, and the 3d Battalion wa s on 16 August 1943 at Camp Pendleton , formed at Camp Lejeune . The following returned to the United States from Mau i month, on 4 February, administrativ e on 3 November 1945 and its units dis- and operational control of the brigade banded that month, again at Cam p passed to the brigade commander, Briga- Pendleton. Following the earlier forma- dier General Oliver P. Smith . Four days tion of some of its organic units, th e later, General Smith was directed to 3d Division had been activated on 16 maintain his command on two week s September 1942, also at Camp Pendle- readiness, and to report to the Com- ton like the 4th Division. A little more mander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet than three years later, on 28 December (CinCLant), for planning purposes . 1945, the 3d—less 1/3 in the Bonins an d Although organized along the basic line s 2/21 on Truk—was disbanded on Guam. of a FMF team, the brigade was not part Replacement drafts consisting of low- of the Fleet Marine Force . In May 1946 , point men boarded CVEs for the trip t o it conducted the only major Marine China, where they were to join the 1st Corps training mission undertaken dur - Marine Division ; high-point Marines ing that fiscal year, a joint amphibious

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exercise in the Caribbean area. At the program relating to the withdrawal o f end of July, General Smith was directed overseas units depended on future re- to disband the 1st Battalion at Quantic o quirements of Marine aviation in th e on 10 August. The brigade headquarter s Pacific. and the 2d Battalion, which had joined The deployments of the 1st Marin e the 3d Battalion at Camp Lejeune in Aircraft Wing and its four groups t o March, were disbanded on 31 August .4 5 China and MAG–31 to Japan were the Another significant event occurring last World War II tactical operations of in 1946 was the activation on 16 Decem - AirFMFPac. It then became possible fo r ber of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic the aviation command to plan for th e (FMFlant), under the operational con- rotation of excess units and personne l trol of CinCLant . Three days before it s to the States, and the redeployment be- formation, the Commanding General, 2d gan when transportation became avail - Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, wa s able. The strength of AirFMFPac on 1 directed to activate FMFLant and to September 1945 totalled 43,819 Marines ; act as its commanding general in addi- 13 months later, this force had been re- tion to his duties as head of the 2 d duced 90 percent to a total of 4,693 . The Division. He was to assume command of loss of experienced personnel created as the ground units comprising the force much of a problem in the air units as i t on the 16th, and to take over the aviation had in the ground organizations . As units on 2 January 1947 . demobilization progressed, approxi- In December 1946, Marine aviation mately 80 percent of the replacements commands in the Atlantic and Pacifi c sent to AirFMFPac to fill in the gap s areas were designated as subordinat e were inexperienced and untrained inso- units of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlanti c far as the technical requirements of tha t and Pacific, respectively . In the proces s command were concerned . As a result, of this change, the 2d Marine Aircraf t the squadrons and groups soon reache d Wing at Cherry Point was redesignated the point where they had insufficient Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic . numbers of experienced key personnel , Marine aviation went through as not only for maintaining operational many changes as the ground componen t functions but also for training the in- following the end of hostilities, and wa s experienced Marines . This situation was likewise concerned with reaching it s eased somewhat when the Commandant postwar level as quickly as possible . immediately ordered overseas a large These transitions required the rapid but number of fully qualified noncommis- controlled demobilization of personne l sioned officers . As a result, AirFMFPac and deactivation of units and stations was able to continue essential opera- without the loss of a high state of com- tions with some degree of efficiency and , bat readiness. The first phase of th e in effect, improve them as the new personnel were trained and became more 46 The material concerning the formation and fully qualified . e disbandment of the 1st Special Marine Brigad A second personnel problem en- was derived from CMC Rpts, 1946 and 1947 ; G—3 OpDs, Jan—Ju146 . gendered by demobilization was the

470 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

acute shortage of personnel to fill the Concurrent with the release and trans- jobs formerly held by aviation groun d fer of aviation personnel were the de- officers. During the war, most aviatio n activation and transfer of many majo r ground billets were filled by non-flyin g and subordinate aircraft organizations . officers specifically trained for those po- On 31 December 1945, the 3d Marine sitions which could be filled by a groun d Aircraft Wing was decommissioned a t officer. This practice permitted the full - Ewa. The 2d MAW transferred fro m time assignment of pilots to flying Okinawa to Cherry Point, where it wa s duties. Since the postwar aviation T/O s to be based, on 15 February 1946 . The did not include provisions for the assign- next month, on 13 March, the 4th MAW ment of ground officers to the wings an d closed its headquarters on Guam and their subordinate commands, those or- departed for the west coast, where it wa s ganizations had to set up extensiv e to be based. The units attached to these training programs to requalify pilot s Stateside-bound wings were transferred for the ground billets . Once they were to the headquarters of other Marine trained in and fulfilling the functions o f organizations in the islands, and re- communications, ordnance, engineering, turned to the United States when trans- and air combat intelligence officers, the portation became available for thei r pilots continued regular flight duties in redeployment. order to maintain proficiency in thei r Completing the postwar roll-up of primary assignment. Marine aviation in the Pacific was the Owing to the constant transfer of departure of MAG–31 from Yokosuk a pilots and skilled maintenance person- for the United States on 20 June . The 1st nel, the operations of the fighter squad- MAW remained in China with one transrons were reduced to a bare minimum . port and two observation squadrons an d Even harder hit were the transport MAG-24, which was composed of three squadrons, whose pilots were release d VMFs and one VMF (N) . MAG-15, the faster than those of the other tactical only Marine aviation command remain- squadrons. When the workloads of the ing in the Hawaiian Islands, was based transport squadrons increased greatly at Ewa with two VMRs ; the group also because they were employed to carry had a fighter squadron based at Midway. supplies to the units in the Wester n With its peacetime functions stabilize d Pacific and the Far East—and to trans- by October 1946, AirFMFPac operations fer personnel scheduled for discharge in the latter part of the year consisted back to the States—the demand for th e mainly of training replacements and services of transport pilots increase d routing trans-Pacific supply and replacement personnel passenger flights accordingly . To meet the demand, pilot s . qualified to fly other types of aircraft In the 22 months following the signin g were transferred from overseas an d of the Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay , Stateside tactical squadrons to the the strength of the Marine Corps wa s transport units for immediate retrain- reduced from a peak of 485,837 on 1 ing. September 1945 to a low of 92,222 on

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30 June 1947. While this decrease repre- during the transition from war to peace , sented a drop of 82 percent, the 1947 Marine units adjusted to the variou s figure was considerably greater than situations with which they were con - 28,277, the size of the Corps on 1 July fronted and continued to operate on a 1940. Although some problems occurred relatively high level of efficiency .