4: . —: : b Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)

unday, 4 March 1945,sion had finally captured Hill 382,infiltrators. The Sunday morning at- marked the end of theending its long exposure in "The Am-tacks lacked coordination, reflecting second week ofthe phitheater;' but combat efficiencythe division's collective exhaustion. U.S. invasion of Iwohad fallen to 50 percent. It wouldMost rifle companies were at half- Jima. By thispointdrop another five points by nightfall. strength. The net gain for the day, the the assault elements of the 3d, 4th,On this day the 24th Marines, sup-division reported, was "practically and 5th Marine Divisions were ex-ported by flame tanks, advanced anil." hausted,their combat efficiencytotalof 100 yards,pausingto But the battle was beginning to reduced to dangerously low levels.detonate more than a ton of explo-take its toll on the Japanese garrison The thrilling sight of the Americansives against enemy cave positions inaswell.GeneralTadamichi flag being raised by the 28th Marinesthat sector. The 23d and 25th Ma-Kuribayashi knew his 109th Division on Mount Suribachi had occurred 10rines entered the most difficult ter-had inflicted heavy casualties on the days earlier, a lifetime on "Sulphurrain yet encountered, broken groundattacking Marines, yet his own loss- Island." The landing forces of the Vthat limited visibility to only a fewes had been comparable.The Ameri- Amphibious Corps (VAC) had al-feet. can capture of the key hills in the ready sustained 13,000 casualties, in- Along the western flank, the 5thmain defense sector the day before cluding 3,000 dead. The "front lines"Marine Division had just seized Nishi deprived him of his invaluable ar- were a jagged serration across Iwo'sRidge and Hill 362-B the previoustillery observation sites. His brilliant fat northern half, still in the middleday, suffering more than 500 casual-chief of artillery, Colonel Chosaku of the main Japanese defenses. Ahead ties.It too had been up most ofKaido,lay dying. On this date the going seemed all uphill against athe night engaging a sizeable force ofKuribayashi moved his own com- well-disciplined, rarely visible enemy. In the center of the island, the 3d Marine Division units had been up most of the night repelling a small but determined Japanese counterat- tack which had found the seam be- tween the 21st and 9th Marines. Vicious close combat had cost both sides heavy casualties. The counter- attack spoiled the division's prepara- tions for a morning advance. Both regiments made marginal gains against very stiff opposition. To the east the 4th Marine Divi-

On the Cover: Marines of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, lower the first flag raised over Mount Suribachi, while other men raise a second flag which became the subject of Associated Press photographer JoeRosenthal's world-famous photograph. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 112718 At left: A Marine flamethrower opera- tor moves forward to assault a Japanese pillbox on Motoyama Airfield. Depart- ment of Defense Photo (USMC) 111006.

1 headed back to its base in Tinian. p The Marines cheered. The battle of Iwo Jima would rage on for another 22 days, claiming eleven thousand more American casualties and the lives of virtually the entire Japanese garrison. This was a colossal fight between two well-armed, veteran forces —thebig- gest and bloodiest battle in the his- tory of the United States Marine Corps. From the 4th of March on, however, the leaders of both sides en- tertained no doubts as to the ultimate outcome. Assault Preparations Iwo Jima was one of those rare amphibious landings where the as- sault troops could clearly see the value of the objective. They were the first ground units to approach within a thousand miles of the Japanese homeland, and they were participat- ing directly in the support of the stra- tegic bombing campaign. The latter element represented a new wrinkle on an old theme. For 40 years the U.S. Marines had been de- veloping the capability for seizing ad- vanced naval bases in support of the fleet.IncreasinglyinthePacific War —andmost especially at Saipan, Tinian, and now Iwo Jima —they were seizing advanced airbases to fur- Marine Corps Art Collection ther the strategic bombing of the "Silence in the Gorge," an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Water-Japanese home islands. ho use, USMCR (Ret), who as private first class was wounded during the battle. American servicemen had await- mand post from the central highlandsin a raid over Tokyo, seeking aned the coming of the B-29s for years. to a large cave on the northwestemergency landing on the island'sThe "very-long-range" bombers, coast. The usual blandishments from scruffy main airstrip. As the Ameri-which had become operational too Imperial General Headquarters incans in the vicinity held their breaths,late for the European War, had been Tokyo reached him by radio that af- the big bomber swooped in from thestriking mainland Japansince ternoon, but Kuribayashi was in nosouth, landed heavily, clipped a fieldNovember 1944. Results proved dis- mood for heroic rhetoric. "Send metelephone pole with a wing, andappointing. The problem stemmed air and naval support and I will holdshuddered to a stop less than 50 feetnot from the pilots or planes but the island;' he signalled. "Withoutfrom the bitter end of the strip. Pi-rather from a vexing little spit of vol- them I cannot hold:' lot Lieutenant Fred Malo and hiscanic rock lying halfway along the That afternoon the fighting men of10-man crew were extremely glad todirect path from Saipan to Tokyo — both sides witnessed a harbinger ofbe alive, but they didn't stay long. IwoJima.Iwo's radar gave the Iwo Jima's fate. Through the overcastEvery Japanese gunner within rangeJapanese defense authorities two skies appeared a gigantic silver bom-wanted to bag this prize. Mechanicshours advance notice of every B-29 ber, the largest aircraft anyone hadmade field repairs within a half hour. strike. Japanese fighters based on Iwo ever seen. It was the Boeing B-29 Su-Then the 65-ton Superfort lumberedswarmed up to harass the unescort- per Fortress "Dinah Might," crippledaloft through a hail of enemy fire anded Superforts going in and especial-

2 iy coming home, picking off thosecompared the island to somethingin his reconquest of Luzon in the bombers crippled by antiaircraftout of Dante's Inferno. Philippines. But bad weather and (AA) fire. As a result, the B-29s had Forbidding Iwo Jima had twostiff enemy resistance combined to to fly higher, along circuitous routes,redeeming features in 1945: the mili-delay completion of that operation. with a reduced payload. At the sametary value of its airfields and the psy-The Joint Chiefs reluctantly post- time, enemy bombers based on Iwochological status of the island as aponed D-day for Iwo Jima from 20 often raided B-29 bases in the Man-historical possession of Japan. IwoJanuary 1945 until 19 February. The anas, causing some damage. Jima layin Japan's "Inner Vitaltail end of the schedule provided no The Joint Chiefs of Staff decidedDefense Zone" and was in fact ad-relief. D-Day for Okinawa could go Iwo Jima must be captured and aministered as part of the Tokyono later than 1 April because of the U.S. airbase built there. This wouldPrefecture.In the words of oneapproach of the monsoon season. eliminate Japanese bombing raidsJapanese officer, "Iwo Jima is theThe constricted time frame for Iwo and the early warning interceptions,doorkeeper to the Imperial capital."would have grave implications for the provide fighter escorts throughoutEven by the slowest aircraft, Tokyolanding force. the most dangerous portion of thecould be reached in three flight hours The experienced V Amphibious long B-29 missions, and enable great-from Iwo. In the battle for Iwo Jima,Corps under Major General Harry er payloads at longer ranges. Iwoa total of 28,000 Americans andSchmidt, USMC, would provide the Jima in American hands would alsoJapanese would give their lives inlanding force, an unprecedented as- provide a welcome emergency fieldsavage fighting during the last wintersembly of three Marine divisions, the for crippled B-29s returning frommonths of 1945. 3d, 4th, and 5th. Schmidt would Tokyo.It would also protect the No one on the American side everhave the distinction of commanding flank of the pending invasion ofsuggestedthattaking Iwo Jimathe largest force of U.S. Marines ever Okinawa. In October 1944 the Jointwould be an easy proposition. Ad-committed in a single battle, a com- Chiefs directed Fleet Admiral Chestermiral Nimitz assigned this mission tobined force which eventually totalled W. Nimitz, CinCPac, to seize and de-the same team which had prevailedmore than 80,000 men. Well above velop Iwo Jima within the ensuingso effectively in the earlier amphibi-half of these Marines were veterans three months. This launched Oper-ous assaults in the Gilberts, Mar-of earlier fighting in the Pacific; ation Detachment. shalls, and Marianas: Admiral Ray-realistic training had prepared the The first enemy in the campaignmond A. Spruance, commanding thenewcomers well. The troops assault- would prove to be the island itself,Fifth Fleet; Vice Admiral Richmonding Iwo Jima were arguably the most an ugly, barren, foul-smelling chunkKelly Turner, commanding the Ex-proficient amphibious forcesthe of volcanic sand and rock, barely 10peditionary Forces; and Rear Ad-world had seen. square miles in size. Iwo Jima meansmiral Harry W. Hill, commanding Unfortunately, two senior Marines "Sulphur Island" in Japanese. Asthe Attack Force. Spruance added theshared the limelight for the Iwo Jima described by one Imperial Army staffhighly regarded Rear Admiral Wil-battle, and history has often done officer, the place was "an island ofliam H. P. Blandy, a veteran of theboth an injustice.Spruance and sulphur, no water, no sparrow, noPeleliu/Angaur landings,to com-Turner prevailed upon Lieutenant swaIlow' Lesspoetic Americanmand the Amphibious SupportGeneral Holland M. Smith, then officers saw Iwo's resemblance to aForces, responsible for minesweep-commanding Fleet Marine Forces, Pa- pork chop, with the 556-foot dor-ing, underwater demolition teamcificto participate in Operation mant volcano Mount Suribachioperations, and preliminary naval airDetachment as Commanding Gener- dominating the narrow southernand gun bombardment. al, Expeditionary Troops. This was end, overlooking the only potential As usual, "maintaining unremit-a gratuitous billet. Schmidt had the landing beaches. To the north, theting military pressure on the enemy"rank, experience, staff, and resources land rose unevenly onto the Motoya-meant an accelerated planning sched-to execute corps-level responsibility ma Plateau, falling off sharply alongule and an overriding emphasis onwithout being second-guessed by thecoastsintosteepcliffs andspeed of execution. The amphibiousanother headquarters. Smith, the canyons. The terrain in the northtask force preparing to assault Iwoamphibious pioneer and veteran of representedadefender's dream:Jima soon found itself squeezed onlandings in the Aleutians, Gilberts, broken, convoluted, cave-dotted, aboth ends. Hill and Blandy had aMarshalls, and Marianas, admitted "jungle of stone." Wreathed by vol-critical need for the amphibiousto being embarrassed by the assign- canic steam, the twisted landscapeships, landing craft, and shore bom-ment. "My sun had almost set by appeared ungodly, almost moon-like.bardment vessels currently beingthen;' he stated, "1 think they asked More than one surviving Marineused by General Douglas MacArthurme along only in case something

3 cluded, would be to maximize Iwo's forbidding terrain with a defense in depth, along the pattern of the recent Biak and Peleliu defensive efforts. He would eschew coast defense, anti- landing, and Banzai tactics and in- stead conduct a prolonged battle of attrition, a war of nerves, patience, and time. Possibly the Americans would lose heart and abandon the campaign. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109649 Burdened with heavy packs and equipment, Marine communicators dash for cover Such a seemingly passive policy, while advancing under heavy fire during the drive inland from the beaches. even that late in the war, seemed revolutionarytosenior Japanese happened to Harry Schmidt." Smith entire history of the Marine Army and Navy leaders. It ran coun- tried to keep out of Schmidt's way, Corps? ter to the deeply ingrained warrior but his subsequent decision to with- General Smith would not disagreecode, which viewed the defensive as hold commitment of the 3d Marines, with those points. Smith provided aonly an unpleasant interim pending the Expeditionary Troops reserve, re- useful role, but Schmidt and his ex-resumption of the glorious offensive mains as controversial today as it wasceptional staff deserve maximumin which one could destroy the ene- in 1945. credit for planning and executing themy with sword and bayonet. Even Holland Smith was an undeniabledifficult and bloody battle of IwoImperial General Headquarters grew asset to the Iwo Jima campaign. Dur-Jima. nervous. There is some evidence of ing the top-level planning stage he The V Amphibious Corps achieve-a top-level request for guidance in was often, as always, a "voice in thement was made even more memora-defending against American "storm wilderness;' predicting severe casual-ble by the enormously difficultlandings" from Nazi Germany, whose ties unless greater and more effectiveopposition provided by the islandsad experience in trying to defend preliminary naval bombardment wasand the enemy. In Lieutenant GeneralNormandy at the water's edge had provided. He diverted the press andTadamichi Kuribayashi [see sidebar],proven disastrous. The Japanese re- the visiting dignitaries from Schmidt, the Americans faced one of the mostmained unconvinced. Kuribayashi always providing realistic counter-formidable opponents of the war. Aneeded every bit of his top connec- points to some of the rosier staff es-fifth-generationsamurai,hand-tions with the Emperor to keep from timates. "It's a tough proposition;'picked and personally extolled by thebeing summarily relieved for his rad- Smith would say about Iwo, "That'sEmperor,Kuribayashi combinedical proposals. His was not a com- why we are here." combat experience with an innova-pleteorganizationalvictory —the General Schmidt, whose few pub-tive mind and an iron will. AlthoughNavy insisted on building gun case- lic pronouncements left him saddled this would be his only combatmates and blockhouses along the ob- with the unfortunate prediction of aagainst American forces, he hadvious landing beaches on Iwo —but 10-day conquest of Iwo Jima, camelearned much about his prospectivein general he prevailed. to resent the perceived role Hollandopponents from earlier service in the Kuribayashi demanded the as- Smith played in post-war accounts. United States. More significantly, hesistance of the finest mining engineers As he would forcibly state: could appraise with an unblinkingand fortifications specialists in the eye the results of previous JapaneseEmpire. Here again, the island fa- I was the commander of all attempts to repel American invasionsvored the defender. Iwo's volcanic troops on Iwo Jima at all times. of Japanese-held garrisons. Heroicsand mixed readily with cement to Holland Smith never had a rhetoric aside, Kuribayashi saw littleproduce superior concrete for instal- command post ashore, never is- to commend the"defend-at-the-lations; the soft rock lent itself to sued a single order ashore, water's-edge"tactics and"all-or-rapid digging. Half the garrison lay never spentasinglenight nothing" Banzai attacks which hadaside their weapons to labor with ashore. . . . Isn'tit important characterized Japan's failures frompick and spade. When American from an historical standpoint Tarawa to Tinian. Kuribayashi, aheavy bombers from the Seventh Air that I commanded the greatest realist, also knew not to expect muchForce commenced a daily pounding number of Marines ever to be help from Japan's depleted fleet andof the island in early December 1944, engaged in a single action in the air forces. His best chances, he con-Kuribayashi simply moved every-

4 thing —weapons,command posts,Trained photo interpreters,usingJima. Japanese strategists concluded barracks,aid stations—under-stereoscopic lenses, listed nearly 700Iwo Jima would be invaded soon af- ground. These engineering achieve-potentialtargets,butallwereter the loss of the Marianas. Six ments were remarkable. Masked gunhardened, covered, masked. The in- months before the battle, positions provided interlocking fieldstelligence staffs knew there was noKuribayashi wrote his wife, "The of fire, miles of tunnels linked keyfresh water available on the island.Americans will surely invade this Iwo defensive positions, every cave fea-They could see the rainwater cisternsJima.. .donot look for my return." tured multiple outlets and ventilationand they knew what the averageHe worked his men ruthlessly to tubes. One installation inside Mountmonthly rainfall would deliver. Theycomplete all defensive and training Suribachi ran seven stories deep. Theconcluded the garrison could notpreparations by11February Americans would rarely see a livepossibly survive under those condi-1945—and met the objective. His Japanese on Iwo Jima until the bit-tions in numbers greater than 12,000was a mixed force of veterans and ter end. or 13,000. But Kuribayashi's forcerecruits, soldiers and sailors. His ar- American intelligence experts, aid-was twice that size. The men existedtillerymen and mortar crews were ed by documents captured in Saipan on half-rations of water for monthsamong the bestinthe Empire. and by an almost daily flow of aeri-before the battle began. Regardless, he trained and disciplined al photography (and periscope-level Unlike earlier amphibious assaultsthem all. As the Americans soon dis- picturesfromthesubmarineat Guadalcanal and Tarawa, thecovered, each fighting position con- Spearfish), puzzled over the "disap-Americans would not enjoy eithertained the commander's "Courageous pearing act" of the Japanese garrison. strategic or tactical surprise at IwoBattle Vows" prominently posted above the firing apertures. Troops E.L.Wilson were admonished to maintain their positions and exact 10 American lives for every Japanese death. General Schmidt issued VAC Operation Plan 5-44 on 23 Decem- ber 1944. The plan offered nothing NSWUO fancy. Mount Suribachi dominated + both potential beaches, but the 3,000 yardsof black sand along the -A- southeastern coast appeared more sheltered from the prevailing winds. Here the V Amphibious Corps would land on D-day, the 4th Marine Di- vision on the right, the 5th on the left, the 3d in reserve. The initial ob- jectives included the lower airfield, the west coast, and Suribachi. Then Pt the force would swing into line and attack north, shoulder to shoulder. Anticipation of a major Japanese counterattackthefirstnightin- fluenced the landing plan. "We wel- come a counterattack," said Holland Smith, "That's generally when we break their backs" Both Schmidt and 4th Marine Division commander Major General Clifton B. Cates knew from recent experience at Tinian how Mt capable the Japanese were at assem- Moc"; IWO JIMA bling large reserves at potential soft points along a fresh beachhead. The (SULPHUR ISLAND) QOQ •0Q assault divisions would plan to land their artillery regiments before dark on D-day in that contingency.

5 The Japanese Commander

n the estimation of Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers, USMC, a battalion commander (3/25) Jwhose four days ashore resulted in the Purple Heart and the Medal of Honor: "On Iwo Jima, one of their smar- test generals commanded, a man who did not believe in the Banzai business; each Jap was to kill ten Marines —for awhile they were beating their quotas." Chambers was describing Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Im- perial Japanese Army, Commanding General, 109th Divi- sion and Commander, Ogasciwara Army Group. The U.S. Marines have rarely faced a tougher opponent. Kuribayashi, 53, a native of Nagano Prefecture, had served the Emperor as a cavalry officer since graduating from the Military Academy in 1914. He spent several years as a junior officer posted to the Japanese Embassies in America and Canada. With the advent of war in Asia, Kuribayashi commanded a cavalry regiment in combat in Manchuria and a brigade in northern China. Later, he served as chief of staff of the Twenty-third Army during the capture of Hong Kong. Favored by the Emperor, he returned from China to command the Imperial Guards Di- vision in Tokyo. After the fall of Saipan in June 1944, he was assigned to command the defensive fortress of Iwo Jima.

Kuribayashi was a realist. He saw Iwo Jimas crude air- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 152108 strips as a net liability to the Empire, at best providing LtGen Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Imperial Japanese Army. nuisance raids against the B-29s, certain to draw the atten- tion of American strategic planners. Iwo Jima's airfields in Doomed without naval or air support, Kuribayashi American hands would pose an enormous threat to Japan. nevertheless proved to be a resolute and resourceful field Kuribayashi saw only two options: either blow up the en- commander. His only tactical error was to authorize the tire island, which proved infeasible, or defend it to the sector commander to engage the U.S. task force covering death. To do the latter effectively he adapted a radical underwater demolitions team operations on D-2. This be- defensive policy, foregoing the water's-edge linear tactics came a gift to the attackers, for it revealed to American gun- and suicidal Banzai attacks of previous island battles. This ners the previously masked batteries which otherwise stirred controversy at the highest levels—ImperialHead- would have slaughtered the assault waves on D-day. quarters even asked the Nazis for advice on repelling Japanese accounts indicate Kuribayashi committed hara- American invasions —aswell as among Kuribayashi's own kari, the Japanese ritual suicide, in his cave near Kitano officers. Kuribayashi made some compromises with the Point on 23 March 1945, the 33d day of the battle. "Of all semi-independent naval forces on the island, but sacked 18our adversaries in the Pacific;' said General Holland M. senior army officers, including his own chief of staff. ThoseSmith, USMC, "Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable:' who remained would implement their commander's poli-Said another Marine, "Let's hope the Japs don't have any cy to the letter. more like him:'

The physical separation of thesuccessful recapture of Guam; fieldneighboring Hawaii, the 5th Marine threedivisions,from Guam totraining often extended to activeDivision calmly prepared for its first Hawaii, had no adverse effect oncombat patrols to root out die-hardcombat experience. The unit's new- preparatory training. Where it count-Japanese survivors. In Maui, the 4thness would prove misleading. Well ed most—theproficiency of smallMarine Division prepared for itsabove half of the officers and men units in amphibious landings andfourth major assault landing in 13were veterans, including a number of combined-arms assaults on fortifiedmonths with quietconfidence.former Marine parachutists and a positions —eachdivision was wellRecalled Major Frederick J. Karch,few Raiders who had first fought in prepared for the forthcoming inva-operations officer for the lAth Ma-the Solomons. Lieutenant Colonel sion. The 3d Marine Division hadrines, "we had a continuity there ofDonn J. Robertson took command of just completed its participation in theveterans that was just unbeatable:' Inthe 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, bare-

6 had benefitted from the American postponements of Operation Detach- ment because of delays in the Philip- 14 flat pines campaign. He, too, felt as ready Ire and prepared as possible. When the American armada sailed from the Marianas on 13 February, he was forewarned. He deployed one infan- try battalion in the vicinity of the beaches and lower airfield, ordered the bulk of his garrison into its as- signed fighting holes, and settled down to await the inevitable storm. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 112392 "Dinah Might," the first crippled B-29 to make an emergency landing on Iwo Jima Two contentious issues divided the during the fighting, is surrounded by Marines and Seabees on 4 March 1945.Navy-Marine team as D-day at Iwo ly two weeks before embarkationfreeboards. Likewise, 105mm howit-Jima loomed closer. The first in- and immediately ordered it into thezersoverloadedthe amphibiousvolved Admiral Spruance's decision field for a sustained live-firing exer-trucks (DUKWs) to the point of near- to detach Task Force 58, the fast car- cise. Its competence and confidenceunseaworthiness. These factorsriers under Admiral Marc Mitscher, impressed him. "These were profes-would prove costly in Iwo's unpredic- to attack strategic targets on Honshu sionals;' he concluded. table surf zone. simultaneously with the onset of Ad- Among the veterans preparing for These problems notwithstanding, miral Blandy's preliminary bombard- Iwo Jima were two Medal of Honorthe huge force embarked and beganment of Iwo. The Marines suspected recipients from the Guadalcanal cam-the familiar move to westward. SaidNavy-Air Forcerivalryat work paign, Gunnery Sergeant JohnColonel Robert E. Hogaboom, Chief here —mostof Mitscher's targets were "Manila John" Basilone and Lieu-of Staff, 3d Marine Division, "we aircraft factories which the B-29s had tenant Colonel Robert E.Galer.were in good shape, well trained, missed badly a few days earlier. HeadquartersMarine Corpswell equipped and thoroughly sup-What the Marines really begrudged preferred to keep such distinguishedported." was Mitscher taking all eight Marine veterans in the states for morale pur- On Iwo Jima, General KuribayashiCorps fighter squadrons, assigned to poses, but both men wrangled theirAn aerial view of Iwo Jima before the landing clearly shows "pork chop" shape. way back overseas —Basiloneleading Mount Suribachi, in the right foreground, is at the southern end of the island. amachine gun platoon,Galer Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 413529 delivering a new radar unit for em- ployment with the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit. _t_v i.t5., The Guadalcanal veterans would only shake their heads at the abun- dance of amphibious shipping avail- 9, able for Operation Detachment. Admiral Turner would command 495 ships, of which fully 140 were am- phibiously configured, the whole ar- ray 10 times the size ofGuadalcanal's

task force. Still there were problems. — So many of the ships and crews were new that each rehearsal featured em- barrassing collisions and other acci- dents. The new TD-18 bulldozers were found to be an inch toowide forthe medium landingcraft (LCMs). The newly modified M4A3 Sherman tanks proved so heavy that the LCMs rode with dangerously low

7 ______

of heavily fortified enemy targets took deliberate, pinpoint firing from close ranges, assessed and adjusted by aerial observers. Iwo Jima's 700 "hard" targets would require time to knock out, a lot of time. Neither Spruance nor Turner had time to give, for strategic, tactical, and logistical reasons. Three days of firing by Admiral Blandy's sizeable bombardment force would deliver four times the amount of shells Tara- wa received, and one and a half times that delivered against larger Saipan.

Col William P. McCahill Collection It would have to do. A Marine inspects a Japanese coastal defense gun which, although protected by Ineffect,Iwo's notorious foul steel-reinforced concrete, was destroyed in prelanding naval gunfire bombardments, weather, the imperviousness of many the fast carriers, plus the new fast battleships with their 16-inch guns. Task Force 58 returned to Iwo in time to render sparkling support with these assets on D-day, but two days later it was off again, this time for good. + The other issue was related and it concerned the continuing argument between senior Navy and Marine officers over the extent of preliminary naval gunfire. The Marines looked at the intelligence reports on Iwo and requested 10 days of preliminary fire. The Navy said it had neither the time nor the ammo to spare; three days would have to suffice. Holland Smith and Harry Schmidt continued to plead, finally offering to compromise to four days. Turner deferred to Spru- ance who ruled that three days prep fires, in conjunction with the daily pounding being administered by the Seventh Air Force, would do the job. Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Weller, USMC, servedasthe FMFPAC/Task Force 51 naval gun- fire officer, and no one in eithersea service knew the business more JAPANESE DEFENSE thoroughly. Weller had absorbed the SECTORS lessons of the Pacific War well, es- Maincross—island defenses pecially those of the conspicuous .iau&uw. Secondary line of defense failures at Tarawa. The issue,hear- ZII Primary defiladed artillery positions gued forcibly to Admiral Turner, was (.. Secondary defuladed artillery positions 1000 0 1000 not the weight of shells nor their yards caliber but rather time. Destruction

S of the Japanese fortifications, andcruisers hurried in to blast the case-ship, the press briefing held the night other distractions dissipated even themate guns suddenly revealed on thebefore D-day was uncommonly som- three days' bombardment. "We gotslopes of Suribachi and along theber. General Holland Smith predict- about thirteen hours' worth of firerock quarry on the right flank. ed heavy casualties, possibly as many support during the thirty-four hours That night,gravely concernedas 15,000, which shocked allhands. of available daylight;' complainedabout the hundreds of Japanese tar-A man clad in khakis without rank Brigadier General William W.gets still untouched by two days ofinsignia then stood up to address the Rogers, chief of staff to Generalfiring, Admiral Blandy conducted aroom. It was James V.Forrestal, Schmidt. "council of war" on board his flag- Secretary of the Navy. "Iwo Jima, like The Americans received an unex-ship. At Weller's suggestion, BlandyTarawa, leaves very little choice;' he pectedbonus whenGeneraljunked the original plan and direct- said quietly, "except to take it by force Kuribayashi committed hisonlyed his gunships to concentrate exclu-of arms, by character and courage." known tactical error during the bat-sively on the beach areas. This was D-Dciy tle. This occurred on D-minus-2, asdone with considerable effect on D- a force of 100 Navy and Marine un-minus-i and D-day morning itself. Weather conditions around Iwo derwater demolition team (UDT)Kuribayashi noted that most of theJima on D-day morning, 19 Febru- frogmen bravely approached thepositions the Imperial Navy insistedary 1945, were almost ideal. At 0645 eastern beaches escorted by a dozenon building alongthe beach ap-Admiral Turner signalled "Land the LCI landing craft firing their gunsproaches had in fact been destroyed,landing force!" and rockets. Kuribayashi evidentlyas he had predicted. Yethis main Shore bombardment ships did not believed this to be the main landingdefensivebeltscriss-crossingthehesitate to engage the enemy island and authorized the coastal batteriesMotoyama Plateau remained intact.at near point-blank range. Battleships to open fire. The exchange was hot"I pray for a heroic fight;' he told hisand cruisers steamed as close as 2,000 and heavy, with the LCIs getting thestaff. yards to level their guns against is- worst of it, but U.S. battleships and On board Admiral Turner's flag-land targets. Many of the "Old Bat- From the Japanese positionoverlooking thelanding unobstructed view of the entire beachhead. From a field sketch beaches and Airfield No. 1,the enemy observers had an by Cpl Daniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, 5-2, 25th Marines. Marine Corps Historical Collection

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9 The Assault Commanders at Iwo Jima

our veteran Marine major gen-from LouisianaStateUniversity,lege. In World War II he commanded erals led the sustained assaultreceived a Marine Corps commission,the 1st Marines at Guadalcanal and the Fon Iwo Jima: Harry Schmidt,and immediately deployed overseas for4th Marine Division at Tinian. Three Commanding General, V Amphibiousduty in World War I. As a platoonyears after Iwo Jima, General Cates be- Corps; Graves B. Erskine, CC, 3d Ma-commander in the 6th Marines, Erskinecame the 19th Commandant of the Ma- rine Division; Clifton B. Cates, CG, 4thsaw combat at Belleau Wood, Chateau-rine Corps. Marine Division; and Keller E. Rock-Thierry, Soissons, and St. Mihiel, dur- General Rockey was 56 at Iwo Jima ey, CG, 5th Marine Division. Eaching which he was twice wounded andand a veteran of 31 years of service to would receive the Distinguished Serv-awarded the Silver Star. In the inter-the Corps. He was born in Columbia ice Medal for inspired combat leader-war years he served in Haiti, SantoCity, Indiana, graduated from Gettys- ship in this epic battle. Domingo, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Chi-burg College, and studied at Yale. Like na. He attended the Army Infantryhis fellow division commanders, Rock- General Schmidt was 58 at Iwo Jima School and the Army Command and and had served the Corps for 36 years. ey served in France in World War I. He He was a native of Holdrege, Nebras-General Staff College. In World War II,was awarded the Navy Cross as a ka, and attended Nebraska NormalErskine was chief of staff to Generaljunior officer in the 5th Marines at Holland M. Smith during campaigns in College.Expeditionary assignments Chateau-Thierry. A second Navy Cross the Aleutians, Gilberts, Marshalls, and for servicein kept him from service in World War I, came later heroic but Schmidt saw considerable smallMarianas. He assumed command ofNicaragua. He also served in Haiti and unit action in Guam, China, the Philip-the 3d Marine Division in Octobertwo years at sea. He attended the Field pines, Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua,1944. Officers' Course at Quantico and the plus four years at sea. He attended the General Cates, 51 at Iwo, had alsoArmy Command and General Staff Army Command and General Staffserved the Corps during the previousCourse. He spent the first years of College and the Marine Corps Field28 years. He was one of the few Ma-World War II at Headquarters Marine Officers' Course. In World War II,rine Corps general officers who heldCorps in Washington, first as Director, General Schmidt commanded the 4thcombat command at the platoon, com-Division of Plans and Policies, then as Marine Division in the Roi-Narnur andpany, battalion, regiment, and divisionAssistant Commandant. In February Saipan operations, then assumed com-levels in his career. Cates was born in1944 General Rockey assumed com- mand of V Amphibious Corps for theTiptonville, Tennessee, and attendedmand of the 5th Marine Division and Tinian landing. At Iwo Jima he would the University of Tennessee. In Worldbegan preparing the new organization command the largest force of MarinesWar I, he served as a junior officer infor its first, and last, great battle of the ever committed to a single battle. "It the 6th Marines at Belleau Wood, Sois-war. was the highest honor of my life:' hesons, St. Mihiel, and Blanc Mont, and Three Marine brigadier generals also said. was awarded the Navy Cross, two Sil-played significant roles in the amphibi- ver Stars, and two Purple Hearts forous seizure of Iwo Jima: William W. General Erskine was 47 at Iwo Jima,his service and his wounds. BetweenRogers, corps chief of staff; Franklin A. one of the youngest major generals inwars, he served at sea and twice in Chi-Hart, assistant division commander, the Corps. He had served 28 years onna. He attended the Army Industrial4th Marine Division; and Leo D. active duty by that time. A native ofCollege, the Senior Course at MarineHermle, assistant division commander, Columbia, Louisiana, he graduatedCorps Schools, and the Army War Col-5th Marine Division.

MajGen Harry Schmidt, USMC MajGen Graves B. Erskine, USMC MajGen Clifton B. Cates, USMCMajGen Keller E. Rockey, USMC DepartmentofDefense Photo (USMC) 11180 Marine Corps Historical CollectionDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 38595 Department of Delense Photo (USMC) A32295

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10 ious to get their first glimpse of the objective. Correspondent John P. Marquand,thePulitzerPrize- winning writer, recorded his own first impressions of Iwo: "Its silhouette was like a sea monster, with the lit- tle dead volcano for the head, and the beach area for the neck, and all

Tf the rest of it, with its scrubby brown I cliffs for the body." Lieutenant David N. Susskind, USNR, wrote down his initial thoughts from the bridge of vs the troopship Mellette: "Iwo Jima was I a rude, ugly sight. . . .Onlya geol- ogist could look at it and not be -4 *1 repelled." As described in a subse- 'F quent letter home by Navy Lieu- tenant Michael F. Keleher, a surgeon in the 25th Marines: 4, 4.4 The naval bombardment had Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 14284 already begun and I could see Members of the 4th Marine Division receive a last-minute briefing before D-day. the orange-yellow flashes as the tieships"had performedthis The shelling was terrific. Admiral battleships, cruisers, and des- dangerous mission in all theaters ofHill would later boast that "there troyers blasted away at the is- the war. Marines came to recognizewere no proper targets for shore land broadside. Yes, there was and appreciate their contributions. Itbombardment remaining on Dog- Iwo —surprisinglyclose,just seemed fitting that the old Nevada,Day morning:' This proved to be an like the pictures and models we raised from the muck and ruin ofoverstatement, yet no one could deny had been studying forsix Pearl Harbor, should lead the bom-the unprecedented intensity of fire- weeks. The volcano was to our bardment force close ashore. Marinespower Hill delivered against the areas left, then the long, flat black also admired the battleship Arkan-surrounding the landing beaches. As beaches where we were going to sas,builtin1912, and recentlyGeneral Kuribayashi would ruefully land,and the rough rocky returned from the Atlantic where sheadmit in an assessment report to Im- plateau to our right. had battered German positions atperial General Headquarters, "we Point du Hoc at Normandy duringneed to reconsider the power of bom- The commanders of the 4th and the epic Allied landing on 6 Junebardment from ships; the violence of5th Marine Divisions, Major Gener- 1944. the enemy's bombardments is far be-als Clifton B. Cates and Keller E. Lieutenant Colonels Weller andyond description" Rockey, respectively, studied the is- William W. "Bucky" Buchanan, both The amphibious task force ap-land through binoculars from their artillery officers, had devised a modi-peared from over the horizon, therespective ships. Each division would fied form of the "rolling barrage" forrails of the troopships crowded withland two reinforced regiments use by the bombarding gunshipscombat-equipped Marines watchingabreast. From lefttoright,the against beachfront targets just beforethespectacularfireworks. Thebeaches were designated Green, Red, H-Hour. This concentration of navalGuadalcanal veterans among themYellow, and Blue. The 5th Division gunfire would advance progressive-realized a grim satisfaction watchingwould land the 28th Marines on the ly as the troops landed, always re-American battleshipsleisurelyleft flank, over Green Beach, the 27th maining 400 yards to their front. Airpounding the island from just off-Marines over Red. The 4th Division spotters would help regulate the pace.shore. The war had come full cyclewould land the 23d Marines over Yel- Such an innovation appealed to thefrom the dark days of October 1942low Beach and the 25th Marines over three division commanders, eachwhen the 1st Marine Division andBlue Beach on the right flank. Gener- having served in France during Worldthe Cactus Air Force endured simi-al Schmidt reviewed the latest intel- War I. In those days, a good rollinglarshelling from Japanesebat-ligencereportswith growing barrage was often the only way totleships. uneasiness and requested a reassign- break a stalemate. The Marines and sailors were anx- ment of reserve forces with General

11 Smith. The 3d Marine Division's 21stheavily fortified shore, a complex artthan where they had been fighting, Marines would replace the 26th Ma- mastered painstakingly by the Fifthmost notably the Central Pacific. "It rines as corps reserve, thus releasing Fleet over many campaigns. Seventhwas the first time a lot of them had the latter regiment to the 5th Di-Air Force Martin B-24 Liberatorever seen a Marine fighter plane:' said vision. bombers flew in from the MarianasMegee. The troops were not disap- Schmidt's landing plan envisioned to strike the smoking island. Rocketpointed. the 28th Marines cutting the islandships moved in to saturate nearshore The planes had barely disappeared in half, then turning to capture Sur-targets. Then it was time for thewhen naval gunfire resumed, carpet- ibachi, while the 25th Marines would fighter and attack squadrons froming the beach areas with a building scale the Rock Quarry and then serve Mitscher's Task Force 58 to contrib-crescendo of high-explosive shells. as the hinge for the entire corps toute. The Navy pilots showed theirThe ship-to-shore movement was swing around to the north. The 23dskills at bombing and strafing, butwell underway, an easy 30-minute Marines and 27th Marines would the troops naturally cheered the mostrun for the tracked landing vehicles capture the first airfield and pivotat the appearance of F4U Corsairs(LVTs). This time there were enough north within their assigned zones. flown by Marine Fighter SquadronsLVTs to do the job: 68 LVT(A)4 ar- General Cates was already con-124 and 213 led by Lieutenantmored amtracs mounting snub-nosed cerned about the right flank. BlueColonel William A. Millington from75mm cannon leading the way, fol- Beach Two lay directly under the ob-the fleet carrier Essex.ColonelVer-lowed by 380 troop-laden LVT 4s and servation andfireofsuspectednon E. Megee, in his shipboard ca-LVI 2s. The waves crossed the line Japanese positions in the Rock Quar-pacity as air officer for Generalof departure on time and chugged ry, whose steep cliffs overshadowedSmith's Expeditionary Troops staff,confidently towards the smoking the right flank like Suribachi domi-had urged Millington to put on a spe-beaches,allthe while under the nated the left. The 4th Marine Divi-cial show for the troops in the assaultclimactic bombardment from the sion figured that the 25th Marineswaves. "Drag your bellies on theships. Here there was no coral reef, would have the hardest objective tobeach," he told Millington. The Ma-no killer neap tides to be concerned take on D-day. Said Gates, "If I knewrine fighters made an impressive ap-with. The Navy and Marine frogmen the name of the man on the extremeproach parallel to the island, thenhad reported the approaches free of right of the right-hand squad I'dvirtually did Megee's bidding, streak-mines or tetrahedrons. There was no recommend him for a medal beforeing low over the beaches, strafing f u-premature cessation of fire. The "roll- we go in:' riously. The geography of the Pacificing barrage" plan took effect. Hard- The choreography of the landingWar since Bougainville had keptly a vehicle was lost to the desultory continuedtodevelop. Iwo Jimamany of the ground Marines separat-enemy fire. would represent the pinnacle of for-ed from their own air support, which The massive assault waves hit the cible amphibious assault against ahad been operating in areas otherbeach within two minutes of H-hour. Laden with battle-ready V Amphibious Corps Marines, LSMs (landing ship, medi- A Japanese observer watching the urn) head for Iwo's beaches. Landing craft of this type were capable of carrying drama unfold from a cave on the five Sherman tanks. In the left background lies smoke-covered Mount Suribachi. slopes of Suribachi reported, "At nine _____ Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109598 o'clockinthe morning several hundred landing craft with amphibi- ous tanks in the lead rushed ashore like an enormous tidal wave:' Lieu- tenant Colonel Robert H. Williams, executive officer of the 28th Marines, recalled that "the landing was a mag- - — - nificent sight to see —twodivisions zt:rr landing abreast; you could see the whole show from the deck of a ship:' To this point, so far, so good. The first obstacle came not from the Japanese but the beach and the i_- —. parallel terraces. Iwo Jima was an ,.—- - --#r _ -t-- -; emerging volcano; its steep beaches dropped off sharply, producing a narrow but violent surf zone. The

12 landing, elements of the regiment used their initiative to strike across POINT the narrow neck of the peninsula. The going became progressively cost- ly as more and more Japanese strong- points along the base of Suribachi OKANGOKU seemed to spring to life. Within 90 minutes of the landing, however, ele- ments of the 1st Battalion, 28th Ma- rines, had reached the western shore,

ORANGE 700 yards across from Green Beach. Iwo Jima had been severed —"like cut- ORANGE 2 ting off a snake's head;' in the words JKAUA ••J ROCK of one Marine. It would represent the WHITE Ii deepest penetration of what was be- coming a very long and costly day. WHITE 2 The other three regiments ex-

BROWN I perienced difficulty leaving the black sand terraces and wheeling across towards the first airfield. The terrain

PURPLE was an open bowl, a shooting gallery in full view from Suribachi on the left and the rising tableland to the right. Any thoughts of a "cakewalk" quickly vanished as well-directed machine- 2 ROCK gun fire whistled across the open ground and mortar rounds began dropping along the terraces. Despite LANDING PLAN these difficulties, the 27th Marines IWO JIMA made good initial gains, reaching the POINT southern and western edges of the i... first airfield before noon. The 23d Marines landed over Yellow Beach E. 1. Wilson and sustained the brunt of the first soft black sand immobilizedall Marinescame thisearly,laconic round of Japanese combined arms wheeled vehicles and caused some ofreport: "Resistance moderate, terrain fire. These troops crossed the second the tracked amphibians tobellyawful:' terrace only to be confronted by two down. The boat waves that closely The rolling barrage and carefully huge concrete pillboxes, still lethal followed the LVTs had more trouble.executed landing produced the despite all the pounding. Overcom- Ramps would drop, a truck or jeepdesired effect, suppressing direct ene- ing these positions proved costly in would attempt to drive out, only tomy fire, providing enough shock and distraction to enable the first assaultcasualties and time. More fortified get stuck. In short order a succession positions appeared in the broken of plunging waves hit the stalled craftwaves to clear the beach and begin advancing inward. Within minutesground beyond. Colonel Walter W. before they could completely unload, Wensinger's call for tank support filling their sterns with water and6,000 Marines were ashore. Many could not be immediately honored sand, broaching them broadside. Thebecame thwarted by increasing fire over the terraces or down from thebecause of trafficability and conges- beach quickly resembled a salvage tion problems on the beach. The yard. highlands, but hundreds leapt for- its way several ward to maintain assault momen-regiment clawed The infantry, heavily laden, found hundred yards towards the eastern its own "foot-mobility" severely res-tum. The 28th Marines on the left edge of the airstrip. tricted. In the words of Corporal Ed-flank had rehearsed on similar vol- ward Hartman, a rifleman with thecanic terrain on the island of Hawaii. No assault units found it easy go- 4th Marine Division: "the sand wasNow, despite increasing casualtiesing to move inland, but the 25th Ma- so soft it was like trying to run inamong their company commandersrines almost immediately ran into a loose coffee grounds:' From the 28thand the usual disorganization ofbuzz-saw trying to move across Blue

13 Department of Defense Photo (USMC)110128 Tracked landing vehicles (LVTs), jam-packed with 4th Ma- hour on D-day. In the center rear can be seen the control yes- rine Division troops, approach the Line of Departure at H-se/s which attempted to maintain order inthe landing. Beach. General Cates had been right and crevices of the interior highlands. troops and material. Gun crews knew in his appraisal. "That right flank wasWith grim anticipation,Generalthe range and deflection to each land- a bitch if there ever was one;' heKuribayashi's gunners began un-ing beach by heart; all weapons had would later say. Lieutenant Colonelmasking the big guns—theheavy ar-been preregistered on these targets Hollis W. Mustain's 1st Battalion,tillery, giant mortars, rockets, andlong ago. At Kuribayashi's signal, 25th Marines, managed to scratchanti-tank weapons held under tight-these hundreds of weapons began to forward 300 yards under heavy fire est discipline for this precise moment.open fire. It was shortly after 1000. in the first half hour, but Lieutenant Kuribayashi had patiently waited un- The ensuing bombardment was as Colonel Chambers' 3d Battalion,til the beaches were clogged withdeadly and terrifying as any of the 25th Marines, took the heaviest beat- H-hour at Iwo Jima,19 February 1945. ing of the day on the extreme right Department of Defense Photo (USN) NH65311 trying to scale the cliffs leading to the Rock Quarry. Chambers landed 15 minutes after H-hour. "Crossing that second terrace;' he recalled, "the fire from automatic weapons was com- I ing from all over. You could've held up a cigarette and lit it on the stuff going by.I knew immediately we were in for one hell of a time:' This was simply the beginning. While the assault forces tried to over- come the infantry weapons of the lo- cal defenders, they were naturally blind to an almost imperceptible stir- ring taking place among the rocks

14 the rain of projectiles encountered the same disciplined machine-gun fire and mine fields which had slowed the t initial advance. Casualties mounted appallingly. Two Marine combat veterans ob- serving this expressed a grudging ad- miration for the Japanese gunners. "It was one of the worst blood-lettings of the war," said Major Karch of the 14th Marines. "They rolled those ar- tillery barrages up and down the beach —Ijust didn't see how anybody could live through such heavy fire barrages:' Said Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, "The Japanese

were superb artillerymen . . . . Some- body was getting hit every time they Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110109 fired." At sea, Lieutenant Colonel Marines of the 4th Division pour ashore from their landing craft on Yellow and Weller tried desperately to deliver Blue Beaches on D-day. Enemy fire had not hit this assault wave yet as it landed. naval gunfire against the Japanese Marines had ever experienced. Thereguns and dual-purpose antiaircraftgun positions shooting down at 3d was hardly any cover. Japanese ar-guns firing horizontally added aBattalion, 25th Marines, from the tillery and mortar rounds blanketeddeadly scissors of direct fire from theRock Quarry. It would take longer every corner of the 3,000-yard-widehigh ground on both flanks. Marines tocoordinatethisfire:thefirst beach. Large-caliber coast defensestumbling over the terraces to escapeJapanese barrages had wiped out the As soon as it hit the beach on the right side of the V Am-accurate and heavy enemy fire. Meanwhile, landing craft, sup- phibious Corps line, the 25th Marines was pinned down byplies, and vehicles pile up in the surf behind Marines. ____Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110108 ,0'

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111691 5th Division Marines land on Red and Green Beaches at themy positions overlooking the black sand terraces. The 28th foot of Mount Suribachi under heavy fire coming from ene- Marines had not yet wheeled to the left towards Suribachi.

• With bullets and artillery shells screaming overhead, Marinesfor cover from the deadly fire. Note the geyser of water as crawl along the beaches and dig into the soft volcanic asha shell lands close to a landing craft headed into the beach. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 1O961

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16 -a divisions embarked many of their tanks on board medium landing ships (LSMs), sturdy little craft that C. could deliver five Shermans at a time. But it was tough disembarking them on Iwo's steep beaches. The stern anchors could not hold in the loose sand; bow cables run forward to "deadmen" LVTs parted under the strain. On one occasion the lead tank stalled at the top of the ramp, block- ing the other vehicles and leaving the LSM at the mercy of the rising surf. Other tanks bogged down or threw tracks in the loose sand. Many of those that made it over the terraces were destroyed by huge horned Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111115 mines or disabled by deadly accurate Marines pull their ammunition cart onto the beach from their broached landing47mm anti-tank fire from Suribachi. craft on D-day, all the while under heavy enemy fire. Some troops did not make it. Other tankers kept coming. Their 3d Battalion, 25th Marines' entireto take an awful toll throughout therelative mobility, armored protec- Shore Fire Control Party. first day and night, but it wouldtion, and 75mm gunfire were most As the Japanese firing reached anever again be so murderous as thatwelcome to the infantry scattered general crescendo, the four assaultfirst unholy hour. among Iwo's lunar-looking, shell- regiments issued dire reports to the Marine Sherman tanks played hellpocked landscape. flagship. Within a 10-minute period,getting into action on D-day. Later these messages crackled over thein the battle these combat vehicles Both division commanders com- command net: would be the most valuable weaponsmitted their reserves early. General on the battlefield for the Marines;Rockey called in the 26th Marines 1036: (From 25th Marines) "Catch-this day was a nightmare. The assaultshortly after noon. General Cates or- ing all hell from the quarry. Heavy Shore party Marines man steadying lines while others unload combat cargofrom mortar and machine gun fire:' boats broached in the surf. Note the jeep, one of the first to come ashore,bogged 1039: (From 23d Marines) "Takingdown axle-deep in the soft black volcanic ash, not to be movedtilllater. heavy casualties and can't move for Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110593 the moment. Mortars killing us." 1042: (From 27th Marines) "All units pinned down by artillery and mortars. Casualties heavy. Need tank support fast to move anywhere:' 1046: (From 28th Marines) "Tak- ing heavy fire and forward move- ment stopped. Machine gun and V artillery fire heaviest ever seen:' The landing force suffered and bled but did not panic. The profusion of combat veterans throughout the rank and file of each regiment helped I the rookies focus on the objective. Communications remained effective. Keen-eyed aerial observers spotted some of the now-exposed gun posi- tions and directed naval gunfire ef- fectively. Carrier planes screeched in low to drop napalm canisters. The heavy Japanese fire would continue

17 dered two battalions of the 24th Ma- rinestolandat1400;the 3d 1.; Battalion, 24th Marines, followed several hours later. Many of the r— reserve battalions suffered heavier casualties crossing the beach than the assault units, a result of Kuribayashi's punishing bombardment from all points on the island. Mindful of the likely Japanese counterattack in the night to come — anddespite the fire and confusion along the beaches —both divisions Marine Corps Combat Art Collection also ordered their artillery regiments In "Flotsam and Jetsam," an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Water- ashore. This process, frustrating and house, he portrays the loss of his sergeant to mortar fire on the beach on D-day. costly, took much of the afternoon.hides; casualties scattered all over."the airfield, the legendary "Manila The wind and surf began to pick up On the left center of the action,John" Basilone fell mortally wound- as the day wore on, causing moreleading his machine gun platoon ined by a Japanese mortar shell, a ioss than one low-riding DUKW tothe 1st Battalion, 27th Marines' at-keenly felt by all Marines on the is- swamp with its precious 105mmtack against the southern portion ofland.Farthereast,Lieutenant howitzer cargo. Getting the guns ashore was one thing; getting them up off the sand was quite another. The 75mm pack howitzers fared bet- ter than the heavier 105s. Enough KANGOKU Marines could readily hustle them up ROCK over the terraces, albeit at great risk. 7 The 105s seemed to have a mind of KIA their own in the black sand. The ef- HI LL362-B fort to get each single weapon off the AIRFIELD NO. 3 beach was a saga in its own right. Somehow, despite the fire and unfor- HILL 362-A HILL 362-C 0 giving terrain, both Colonel Louis G. MOTOYAMA DeHaven, commanding the 14th Ma- rines, and Colonel James D. Wailer, commanding the 13th Marines, managed to get batteries in place, registered, and rendering close fire support well before dark, a singular accomplishment.

Japanese fire and the plunging surf EASE BOAT BASIN continued to make a shambles out of the beachhead. Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant MichaelF. Keleher, USNR, the battalion surgeon, was ordered ashore to take over the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines aid station from its gravely wounded surgeon. VAC FRONT LINES D-DAY Keleher, a veteran of three previous 19 FEBRUARY 1945 assault landings, was appalled by the 28thMARINES ONLY, 0 PLUS I, 2, 3 carnage on Blue Beach as he ap- proached: "Such a sight on that 000 500 0 beach Wrecked boats, bogged-down YARDS jeeps, tractors and tanks; burning ye-

18 on shore despite the carnage in ord- er to build credible combat power. Hermie knew that whatever the night -faa might bring, the Americans now had more troops on the island than Kuribayashi could ever muster. His presence helped his division forget about the day's disasters and focus on preparations for the expected coun- terattacks. Japanese artillery and mortar fire continued to rake the beachhead. The enormous spigot mortar shells (called "flying ashcans" by the troops) and rocket-boosted aerial bombs were particularly scary —loud,whistling Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109601 projectiles, tumbling end over end. As D-day on Iwo Jima conies to a close, the landing beaches are scenes ofMany sailed completely over the is- death and destruction with LVTs and landing craft wallowing in the wavesland; those that hit along the beaches and tracked and wheeled vehicles kept out of action, unable to go forward.or the south runways invariably Colonel Robert Galer,the otherthem before many more troops orcaused dozens of casualties with each Guadalcanal Medal of Honor Marinesupplies could be landed. In the end,impact. Few Marines could dig a (and one of the Pacific War's earli-it was the strength of character ofproper foxhole in the granular sand est fighter aces), survived the after-Captain James Headley and Lieu-("like trying to dig a hole in a barrel noon's fusillade along the beachestenant Colonel "Jumping Joe" Cham-of wheat"). Among urgent calls to the and began reassembling his scatteredbers who led the survivors of the 3dcontrol ship for plasma, stretchers, radar unit in a deep shell hole nearBattalion, 25th Marines, onto the topand mortar shells came repeated cries the base of Suribachi. of the cliffs. The battalion paid an ex-for sand bags. orbitant price for this achievement, Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Veteran Marine combat correspon- losing 22 officers and 500 troops by Colonel Donn J. Robertson led his 3d dent Lieutenant Cyril P. Zurlinden, nightfall. Battalion, 27th Marines, ashore over soon to become a casualty himself, Blue Beach, disturbed at the intensi- The two assistant division com-described that first night ashore: ty of fire still being directed on themanders, Brigadier Generals Frank- reserve forces this late on D-day.lin A. Hart and Leo D. Hermle, of At Tarawa, Saipan, and Tin- "They were really ready for us," hethe 4th and 5th Marine Divisions ian, I saw Marines killed and recalled. He watched with pride andrespectively, spent much of D-day on wounded in a shocking manner, wonderment as his Marines landed.board the control vessels marking but I saw nothing like the ghast- under fire, took casualties, stumbledboth ends of the Line of Departure, liness that hung over the Iwo forward to clear the beach. "What4,000 yards off shore. This reflected beachhead. Nothing any of us impels a young guy landing on ayet another lesson in amphibious had ever known could compare beach in the face of fire?" he askedtechniques learned from Tarawa. with the utter anguish, frustra- himself. Then it was Robertson'sHaving senior officers that close to tion, and constant inner battle turn. His boat hit the beach too hard; the ship-to-shore movement provid- to maintain some semblance of the ramp wouldn't drop. Robertsoned landing force decision-making sanity. and his command group had to rollfrom the most forward vantage over the gunwales into the churningpoint. By dusk General Hermie opt- Personnel accounting was a night- surf and crawl ashore, an inauspi- ed to come ashore. At Tarawa he hadmare under those conditions, but the cious start. spent the night of D-day essentiallyassault divisions eventually report- The bitter battle to capture the out of contact at the fire-swept pier-ed the combined loss of 2,420 men Rock Quarry cliffs on the right flankhead. This time he intended to be on to General Schmidt (501 killed, 1,755 raged all day. The beachhead re-the ground. Hermle had the largerwounded, 47 dead of wounds, 18 mained completely vulnerable to ene-operational picture in mind, know-missing, and 99 combat fatigue). my direct-fire weapons from theseing the corps commander's desire toThese were sobering statistics, but heights; the Marines had to stormforce the reserves and artillery unitsSchmidt now had 30,000 Marines

19 ashore. The casualty rate of eightding "the mountain represented tocaves, the first of hundreds the Ma- percent left the landing force in rela-these Marines a thing more evil thanrines would face on Iwo Jima. tively better condition than at thethe Japanese." The 28th Marines had suffered first days at Tarawa or Saipan. The nearly 400 casualties in cutting across Colonel Kanehiko Atsuchi com- miracle was that the casualties had the neck of the island on D-day. On manded the 2,000 soldiers and sailors not been twice as high. General D + 1, in a cold rain, they prepared oftheSuribachigarrison. The Kuribayashi had possibly waited a to assault the mountain. Lieutenant little too long to open up with his bigJapanese had honeycombed the mountain with gun positions,Colonel Chandler Johnson, com- guns. manding the 2d Battalion, 28th Ma- machine-gun nests, observation sites, The first night on Iwo was ghost-and tunnels, but Atsuchi had lostrines, set the tone for the morning as he deployed his tired troops forward: ly. Sulfuric mists spiraled out of themany of his large-caliber guns in the earth. The Marines, used tothedirect naval bombardment of the"It's going to be a hell of a day in a tropics, shivered in the cold, waitingprecedingthreedays.Generalhell of a place to fight the damned for Kuribayashi's warriors to comeKuribayashi considered Atsuchi'swar!" Some of the 105mm batteries screaming down from the hills. Theycommand to be semiautonomous,of the 13th Marines opened up in would learn that this Japanese com-realizing the invaders would soon cutsupport, firing directly overhead. mander was different. There wouldcommunications across the island'sGun crews fired from positions hasti- be no wasteful, vainglorious Banzainarrow southern tip.Kuribayashily dug in the black sand directly next attack, this night or any other. In-nevertheless hoped Suribachi couldto the 28th Marines command post. stead, small teams of infiltrators,hold out for 10 days, maybe twoRegimental Executive Officer Lieu- which Kuribayashi termed 'Prowlingweeks. tenant Colonel Robert H. Williams Wolves," probed the lines, gathering watched the cannoneers fire at Sur- intelligence. A barge-full of Japanese Some ofSuribachi'sstoutestibachi'eight hundred yards away Special Landing Forces tried a smalldefenses existed down low, aroundover open sights." counterlanding on the westernthe rubble-strewn base. Here nearly As the Marines would learn dur- beaches and died to the man under70 camouflaged concrete blockhousesing their drive north, even 105mm the alert guns of the 28th Marinesprotected the approachestothehowitzers would hardly shiver the and its supporting LVT crews. Other-mountain; another 50 bulged fromconcrete pillboxes of the enemy. As wise the night was one of continu-the slopes within the first hundredthe prep fire lifted, the infantry leapt ing waves of indirect fire from thefeet of elevation. Then came theforward, only to run immediately highlands. One high velocity roundA dug-in Marine 81mm mortar crew places continuous fire on Japanese positions landed directly in the hole occupied around the slopes of Mount Suribachi preparatory to the attack of the 28th Marines. by the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines' Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109861 commander,LieutenantColonel Ralph Haas, killing him instantly. The Marines took casualties through- out the night. But with the first streaks of dawn, the veteran landing force stirred. Five infantry regiments looked north; a sixth turned to the business at hand in the south: Mount Suribachi. Suribachi The Japanese called the dormant volcano Suribachi-yama; the Marines dubbed it "Hotrocks." From the start the Marines knew their drive north would never succeed without first seizing that hulking rock dominating thesouthernplain."Suribachi seemed to take on a life of its own, to be watching these men, looming over them;' recalled one observer, ad- a....'

20 Colonel William P. McCahill Colleclion The crew of the Sherman tank "Cairo" awaitsa repair crewsheathing on sides of vehicle to protect against magnetic to replace its tread after it hit a Japanese mine. Note wooden mines. Damaged vehicles became prime enemy targets. into very heavy machine-gun andboulders knocked out the first ap- only a few places where land- mortar fire. Colonel Harry B. "Har-proachingShermans.Assault ing craft could still get in. The ry the Horse" Liversedge bellowed formomentum slowed further. The 28th wrecked hulls of scores of land- his tanks. But the 5th Tank Battal-Marines overran 40 strongpoints and ing boats testified to one price ion was already having a frustratinggained roughly 200 yards all day. we had to pay to put our troops morning. The tankers soughta They lost a Marine for every yard ashore. Tanks and half-tracks defilade spot in which to rearm andgained. The tankers unknowingly lay crippled where they had refuel for the day's assault. Such a lo-redeemed themselves when one of bogged down inthe coarse cation did not exist on Iwo Jima theirfinal 75mm rounds caught sand. Amphibian tractors, vic- those first days. Every time the tanksColonel Atsuchi as he peered out of tims of mines and well-aimed congregated to service their vehiclesa cave entrance, killing him instantly. shells,lay flopped on their they were hit hard by Japanese mor- Elsewhere, the morning light on backs. Cranes, brought ashore tar and artillery fire from virtually D +1 revealed the discouraging sights to unload cargo, tilted at insane the entire island. Getting sufficient ofthe chaos created alongthe angles, and bulldozers were vehicles serviced to join the assaultbeaches by the combination of Iwo smashed in theirown took most of the morning. HereafterJima's wicked surf and Kuribayashi's roadways. the tankers would maintain and re- unrelenting barrages. In the words of Bad weather set in, further com- equip their vehicles at night. one dismayed observer: pounding the problems of general This day's slow start led to more The wreckage was indescrib- unloading. Strong winds whipped setbacks for the tankers; Japanese an- able. For two miles the debris sea swells into a nasty chop; the surf titank gunners hiding in the jumbled was so thick that there were turned uglier. These were the condi-

21 maintain the craft perpendicular to the breakers rarely held fast in the steep, soft bottom. "Dropping those stern anchors was like dropping a spoon in a bowl of mush,"said Ad- miral Hill. Hill contributed significantly to the development of amphibious expertise in the Pacific War. For Iwo Jima, he and his staff developed armored bull- dozers to land in the assault waves. They also experimented with hinged Marston matting, used for expedi- tionary airfields,as a temporary roadway to get wheeled vehicles over soft sand. On the beach at Iwo, the bulldozers proved to be worth their Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110319 Like some recently killed prehistoric monsters, these LVTs lie on their sides, com- weights in gold. The Marston mat- pletely destroyed on the beach by Japanese mines and heavy artillery fire. ting was only partially successful — LVTskept chewing it up in pass- tions faced by Lieutenant Colonelperiences trying to debark down car- age—but all hands could seeits Carl A. Youngdale in trying to landgo nets into the small boats bobbing potential. the 105mm-howitzer batteries of hisviolently alongside the transports; 4th Battalion, 14th Marines. All 12several fell into the water. The boat- Admiral Hill also worked with the of these guns were preloaded ining process took hours. Once afloat,Naval Construction Battalion (NCB) DUKWs, one to a vehicle. Added tothe troops circled endlessly in theirpersonnel, Seabees, as they were the amphibious trucks' problems ofsmall Higgins boats, waiting for thecalled, in the attempt to bring supply- marginal seaworthiness with thatcall to land. Wiser heads prevailed.laden causeways and pontoon barges payload was contaminated fuel. AsAfter six hours of awful seasickness,ashore. Again the surf prevailed, Youngdale watched in horror, eightthe 21st Marines returned to its shipsbroaching the craft, spilling the car- DUKWs suffered engine failures,for the night. go.In desperation,Hill's beach- swamped, and sank with great loss Even the larger landing craft, themasters turned to round-the-clock of life. Two more DUKWs broachedLCTs and LSMs, had great difficultyuse of DUKWs and LVTs to keep in the surf zone, spilling their invalu-beaching. Sea anchors needed tocombat cargo flowing. Once the able guns into deep water. At length Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man," acrylic on masonite, is by Col Charles Youngdale managed to get his re-H. Waterhouse, wounded in his arm on D+2 and evacuated from Iwo Jima. maining two guns ashore and into Marine corps Combat Art Collection firing position. General Schmidt also committed one battery of 155mm howitzers of the corps artillery to the narrow beachhead on D + 1. Somehow these weapons managed to reach the beach intact, but it then took hours to get tractors to drag the heavy guns up over the terraces. These, too, com- menced firing before dark, their deep bark a welcome sound to the in- fantry. Concern with the heavy casualties in the first 24 hours led Schmidt to commit the 21st Marines from corps reserve. The seas proved to be too rough. The troops had harrowing ex-

22 DUKWs got free of the crippling load of 105mm howitzers they did fine. LVTs were probably better, because they could cross the soft beach withoutassistance and conduct resupply or medevac missions direct- ly along the front lines. Both vehi- cles suffered from inexperienced LST crews in the transport area who too often would not lower their bowt ramps to accommodate LVTs or DUKWs approaching after dark. In It too many cases, vehicles loaded with wounded Marines thus rejected be- S came lost in the darkness, ran out of Marine Corps Historical Collection gas and sank. The amphibian trac-Marines advance warily on Airfield No. 1 towards wrecked Japanese planes in tor battalions lost 145 LVTs at Iwowhich enemy snipers are suspected of hiding. The assault quickly moved on. Jima. Unlike Tarawa, Japanese gun-against Airfield No. 1. In the 5th Ma- would smother the area in a fire and mines accounted for less thanrine Division's zone, the relatively murderous blanket of fire. 20 percent of this total. Thirty-fourfresh troops of the 1st Battalion, 26th The second day of the battle had LVTs fell victim to Iwo's crushingMarines, and the 3d Battalion, 27thproven unsatisfactory on virtually surf; 88 sank in deep water, mostlyMarines, quickly became bloodied inevery front. To cap off the frustra- at night. forcing their way across the westerntion, when the 1st Battalion, 24th Once ashore and clear of the looserunways, taking heavy casualtiesMarines, finally managed a break- sand along the beaches, the tanks,from time-fuzed air bursts fired bythrough along the cliffs late in the half-tracks, and armored bulldozersJapanese dual-purpose antiaircraftday their only reward was two back- of the landing force ran into theguns zeroed alongthe exposedto-back cases of "friendly fire." An strongest minefield defenses yet en-ground. In the adjacent 4th DivisionAmerican airstrikeinflicted11 countered in the Pacific War. Underzone, the 23d Marines completed thecasualties; misguided salvos from an General Kuribayashi'sdirection,capture of the airstrip, advancing 800unidentified gunfire support ship Japanese engineers had planted ir-yards but sustaining high losses. took down 90 more. Nothing seemed regular rows of antitank mines and Some of the bitterest fighting in theto be going right. the now-familiar horned antiboatinitial phase of the landing continued The morning of the third day, mines along all possible exits fromto occur along the high ground aboveD +2, seemed to promise more of the both beaches. The Japanese sup-the Rock Quarry on the right flank.same frustrations. Marines shivered plemented these weapons by riggingHere the 25th Marines, reinforced byin the cold wind and rain; Admiral enormous makeshift explosives fromthe 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, en-Hill twice had to close the beach due 500-pound aerial bombs, depthgaged in literally the fight of its life.to high surf and dangerous under- charges, and torpedo heads, eachThe Marines found the landscape,tows. But during one of the grace triggered by an accompanying pres-and the Japanese embedded in it,periods, the 3d Division's 21st Ma- sure mine. Worse, Iwo's loose soil re-unreal: rines managed to come ashore, all of tained enough metallic characteristics it extremely glad to be free of the to render the standard mine detectors There was no cover from ene- heaving smallboats.General unreliable. The Marines were my fire. Japs dug in reinforced Schmidt assigned it to the 4th Ma- reduced to using their own engineers concrete piliboxes laid down in- rine Division at first. on their hands and knees out in front terlocking bands of fire that cut The 28th Marines resumed its as- of the tanks, probing for mines with whole companies to ribbons. sault on the base of Suribachi, more bayonets and wooden sticks. Camouflage hid all enemy po- slow, bloody fighting,seemingly While the 28th Marines fought to sitions. The high ground on boulder by boulder. On the west encircle Suribachi and the beach- either side was honeycombed coast, the 1st Battalion, 28th Ma- masters and shore party attempted to with layer after layer of Jap em- rines, made the most of field artillery

clear the wreckage from the beaches, placements . . . . Theirobser- and naval gunfire support to reach the remaining assault units of the vation was perfect; whenever a the shoulder of the mountain. Else- VAC resumed their collective assault Marine made a move, the Japs where, murderous Japanese fire res-

23 fought hard all day to scratch and claw an advance of 200 net yards. Casualties were disproportionate. jLU On the right flank, Lieutenant Colonel Chambers continued to ral- -- p ly the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, through the rough pinnacles above the Rock Quarry. As he strode about directing the advance of his decimat- ed companies thatafternoon,a Japanese gunner shot him through the chest. Chambers went down hard, thinking it was all over: I started fading in and out. II don't remember too much Colonel William P. McCahill Collection Flamethrower teams look like futuristic fighters as they leave their assembly area about it except the frothy blood heading for the frontlines. The casualty rate for flamethrower operators was high, gushing out of my mouth. since they were prime targets for Japanese fire because of the profile they had with Then somebody started kicking the flamethrowers strapped to their backs. When they fell, others took their places. the hell out of my feet. It was tricted any progress to a matter ofdeck, roll, attempt to return fire — [Captain James] Headley say- yards. Enemy mortar fire from allonlyto discover that the loose vol- ing, "Get up, you were hurt over the volcano rained down on thecanic grit had combined with the rain worse on Tulagi!" 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, trying toto jam their weapons. The 21st Ma- Captain Headley knew Chambers' advance along the eastern shore.rines, as the vanguard of the 3d Ma-sucking chest wound portended a Recalled rifleman Richard Wheeler ofrineDivision,hoped for goodgrave injury; he sought to reduce his the experience, "It was terrible, thefortune in its initial commitment af-commander's shock until they could worst I can remember us taking. Theter relieving the 23d Marines. Theget him out of the line of fire. This Jap mortarmen seemed to be playingregiment instead ran headlong intotook doing. Lieutenant Michael F. checkers and using us as squares:'an intricate series of Japanese em-Keleher, USNR, now the battalion The Marines used Weasels, handy lit-placements which marked thesurgeon, crawled forward with one tle tracked vehicles making their firstsoutheastern end ofthe mainof his corpsmen. Willing hands hf t- field appearance in this battle, to hus-Japanese defenses. The newcomersed Chambers on a stretcher. Keleher tle forward flame-thrower canisters and evacuate some of the manyIn the attack of the 28th Marines on the dominating height, a 37mm guncrew fires wounded. at caves at the foot of Suribachi suspected of holding Japanese gun positions. That night the amphibious task Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110139 force experienced the only significant airattackofthebattle.Fifty kamikaze pilots from the 22d Mitate Special Attack Unit left Katori Air- base near Yokosuka and flung them- selves against the ships on the outer perimeter of Iwo Jima. In desperate action that would serve as a prelude to Okinawa's fiery engagements, the kamikazes sank the escort carrier Bis- marck Sea with heavy loss of life and damaged several other ships, includ- ing the veteran Saratoga, finally knocked out of the war. All 50 Japanese planes were expended. It rained even harder on the fourth morning, D + 3. Marines scampering forward under fire would hit the

24 and severalothers,bent double against the fire, carried him down the cliffs to the aid station and eventu- ally on board a DUKW making the evening's last run out to the hospital ships.Allthreebattalion com- manders in the 25th Marines had /i now become casualties. Chambers would survive to receive the Medal of Honor; Captain Headley would command the shot-up 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, for the duration of the battle. By contrast, the 28th Marines on D +3 made commendable progress Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110177 againstSuribachi,reachingthe From the time of the landing on Iwo Jima, attacking Marines seemed to be movingshoulder at all points. Late in the day uphill constantly. This scene is located between Purple Beach and Airfield No. 2. combat patrols from the 1st Battal- A lone Marine covers the left flank of a patrol as it worksvantage point on the enemy-held height that Japanese gun- its way up the slopes of Mount Suribachi. it was from thisners and observers had a clear view of the landing beaches. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A419744

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25 Rosenthal's Photograph of Iwo Jima Flag-Raising Quickly Became One of the War's Most Famous

here were two flags raised over Mount Suribachi the beach to write captions for his undeveloped film packs, on Iwo Jima, but not at the same time. Despiteand, as the other photographers on the island, sent his films Tthe beliefs of many, and contrary to the supposed out to the command vessel offshore. From there they were evidence, none of the photographs of the two flag-raisings flown to Guam, where the headquarters of Admiral Chester was posed. To begin with, early on the morning of 23 W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Commander February 1945, four days after the initial landings, Cap- in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, was situated, and where the tain Dave E. Severance, the commander of Company E, 2d photos were processed and censored. Rosenthal's pictures Battalion, 28th Marines, ordered Lieutenant Harold G. arrived at Guam before Lowery's, were processed, sent to Schrier to take a patrol and an American flag to the topthe States for distribution, and his flag-raising picture be- of Suribachi. Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a Leather- came one of the most famous photographs ever taken in neck magazinephotographer, accompanied the patol. Af- the war, or in any war.—Benis M. Frank ter a short fire fight, the 54by-28" flag was attached to a long piece of pipe, found at the crest of the mountain, and The six men who participated in the second or "famous" raised. This is the flag-raising which Lowery photographed. flagraising on Mount Suribachi were Marines, joined by As the flag was thought to be too small to be seen from a medical corpsman. They were Sgt Michael Strank; Phar- the beach below, another Marine from the battalion went macist's Mate 2/c John H. Bradley, USN; Cpl Harlon H. on board LST 779 to obtain a larger flag. A second patrol Block; and PFCs Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sousley, and then took this flag up to Suribachi's top and Joe Rosenthal, Rene A. Gagnon. AP photographer Joe Rosenthal recalls an Associated Press photographer, who had just come stumbling on the picture accidentally: "1 swung my camera ashore, accompanied it. around and held it until I could guess that this was the peak

As Rosenthal noted in his oral history interview, ". of the action, and shot. . . . HadI posed that shot, I would, my stumbling on that picture was, in all respects, acciden- of course, have ruined it . . . . Iwould have also made tal." When he got to the top of the mountain, he stood in them turn their heads so that they could be identified. a decline just below the crest of the hill with Marine Ser- and nothing like the existing picture would have resulted." geant William Genaust, a movie cameraman who was killed Associated Press later in the campaign, watching while a group of five Ma- rines and a Navy corpsman fastened the new flag to another piece of pipe. Rosenthal said that he turned from Genaust and out of the corner of his eye saw the second flag being raised. He said, "Hey, Bill. There it goes:" He continued: "1 swung my camera around and held it until I could guess that this was the peak of the action, and shot:' Some people learned that Rosenthal's photograph was of a second flag-raising and made the accusation that it was posed. Joe Rosenthal: "Had I posed that shot, I would, of course, have ruined it. . . .Iwould have also made them turn their heads so that they could be identified for [As- sociated Press] members throughout the country, and noth- ing like the existing picture would have resulted:' Later in the interview, he said: "This picture, what it means to me —andit has a meaning to me —thathas to be peculiar only to me. . .Isee all that blood running down the sand. I see those awful, impossible positions to take in a frontal attack on such an island, where the batteries opposing you are not only staggered up in front of you, but also standing around at the sides as you're comingon shore. The awesome situation, before they ever reach that peak. Now, that a photograph can serve to remind us of the contribution of those boys—thatwas what made it im- portant, not who took it:' Rosenthal took 18 photographs that day, went down to a - —

26 ion, 28th Marines, and the 2d Bat-American flag for all to see. Schrierwith a couple of enraged Japanese. talion, 28th Marines, linked up atled his 40-man patrol forward atHis photograph would become a Tobiishi Point at the southern tip of0800. The regiment had done its job,valued collector's item. But Rosen- the island. Recon patrols returned toblasting the dozens of piliboxes withthal's would enthrall the free world. tell Lieutenant Colonel Johnson thatflame and demolitions, rooting out Captain Thomas M. Fields, com- they found few signs of live Japanesesnipers, knocking out the maskedmanding Company D, 1st Battalion, along the mountain's upper slopes onbatteries.The combined-arms26th Marines, heard his men yell the northside. pounding by planes, field pieces, and "Look up there!" and turned in time At sundown Admiral Spruancenaval guns the past week had like-to see the first flag go up. His first authorized Task Force 58 to strikewise taken its toll on the defenders.thought dealt with the battle still at Honshu and Okinawa, then retire toThose who remained popped out ofhand: "Thank God the Japs won't be Ulithi to prepare for the Ryukyuanholes and caves to resist Schrier's ad-shooting us down from behind any campaign. All eight Marine Corpsvance only to be cut down. The Ma-more:' Meanwhile, the 14th Marines fighter squadrons thus left the Iworines worked warily up the steeprushed their echo and flash-ranging Jima area for good. Navy pilots fly-northern slope, sometimes resortingequipment up to the summit. The ing off the 10 remaining escort car-to crawling on hands and knees. landing force sorely needed enhanced riers would pick up theslack. Part of the enduring drama of thecounterbattery fire against Without slighting the skill and valorSuribachi flag-raising was the factKuribayashi's big guns to the north. of these pilots, the quality of closethat it was observed by so many peo- The Marines who raised the first air support to the troops fightingple. Marines all over the island couldflag were Lieutenant Schrier; Platoon ashore dropped off after this date.track the progress of the tiny columnSergeant Ernest T. Thomas, Jr.; Ser- The escort carriers, for one thing,of troops during its ascent ("thosegeant Henry 0. Hansen; Corporal had too many competing missions,guys oughta be getting flight pay;'Charles W. Lindberg; and Privates namely combat air patrols,anti-said one wag). Likewise, hundreds of First Class Louis C. Charlo and submarine sweeps,searchesforbinoculars from the ships offshoreJames Michels. The six men immor- downed aviators, harassing strikeswatched Schrier's Marines climbingtalized by Joe Rosenthal's photograph against neighboring Chichi Jima.ever upward. Finally they reached theof the second flag-raising were Ser- Marines on Iwo Jima complained oftop and momentarily disappearedgeant Michael Strank, Pharmacist's slow response time to air support re-from view. Those closest to the vol-Mate 2/c John H. Bradley, Corporal quests, light payloads (rarely great-cano could hear distant gunfire. Harlon H. Block, and Privates First er than 100-pound bombs), and highThen, at 1020, there was movementClass Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sous- delivery altitudes (rarely below 1,500on the summit; suddenly the Starsley, and Rene A. Gagnon. feet). The Navy pilots did deliver aand Stripes fluttered bravely. The 28th Marines took Suribachi number of napalm bombs. Many of Lusty cheers rang out from all overin three days at the cost of more than these failed to detonate, although thisthe southern end of the island. The500 troops (added to its D-day loss- was not the fault of the aviators; theships sounded their sirens and whis-es of 400 men). Colonel Liversedge early napalm "bombs" were simplytles. Wounded men propped them-began to reorient his regiment for old wing-tanks filled with the mix-selves up on their litters to glimpseoperations in the opposite direction, ture, activated by unreliable detona-the sight. Strong men wept un-northward. Unknown to all, the bat- tors.The Marines also grewashamedly. Navy Secretary Forrestal, tle still had another month to run its concerned about these notoriouslythrilled by the sight, turned to Hol-bloody course. inaccurate area weapons beingland Smith and said, "the raising of The Drive North dropped from high altitudes. that flag means a Marine Corps for The landing force still had much By Friday, 23 February (D +4),theanother five hundred years." to learn about its opponent. Senior 28th Marines stood poised to com- Three hours later an even largerintelligence officers did not realize un- plete the capture of Mount Suribachi. flag went up to more cheers. Fewtil 27 February, the ninth day of the The honor went to the 3d Platoonwould know that Associated Pressbattle, that General Kuribayashi was (reinforced), Company E, 2d Battal-photographer Joe Rosenthal had justin fact on Iwo Jima, or that his fight- ion, 28th Marines, under the com-captured the embodiment of theers actually numbered half again the mand of First Lieutenant Harold C.American warfighting spirit on film.original estimate of 13,000. Schrier,the company executiveLeatherneck magazine photographer For Kuribayashi, the unexpected- officer. Lieutenant Colonel JohnsonStaff Sergeant Lou Lowery had takenly early loss of the Suribachi garri- ordered Schrier to scale the summit,a picture of the first flag-raising andson represented a setback, yet he secure the crater, and raise a 54"x28"almost immediately got in a firefightoccupied a position of great strength.

27 ___ most of the weapons of the landing force. The Marines found the enemy direct fire weapons to be equally deadly, especially the dual-purpose antiaircraft guns and the 47mm tank guns, buried and camouflaged up to their turrets. "The Japs could snipe ViSA. with those big guns;' said retired Lieutenant General Donn J. Robert- son. The defenders also had the ad- vantage of knowing the ground. S Not surprisingly, most casualties in Marine Corps Historical Collection the first three weeks of the battle Marine half-track scores a hit on a Japanese strongpoint with its 75mm gun.resulted from high explosives: mor- He still had the equivalent of eightattacks to recapture lost terrain ortars, artillery, mines, grenades, and infantry battalions, a tank regiment,disrupt enemy assault preparations.the hellacious rocket bombs. Time two artillery and three heavy mor- These were not suicidal or sacrificial.correspondent Robert Sherrod tar battalions, plus the 5,000 gunnersMost were preceded by stinging ar-reported that the dead at Iwo Jima, and naval infantry under his coun-tillery and mortar fires and aimed atboth Japanese and American, had terpart, Rear Admiral Toshinosukelimited objectives. Kuribayashi's ironone thing in common: "They all died Ichimaru. Unlike other besieged gar-will kept his troops from large-scale, with the greatest possible violence. risons in the Central Pacific, the twowasteful Banzai attacks until the lastNowhere in the Pacific War had I Japanese services on Iwo Jima func-days. One exception occurred theseen such badly mangled bodies. tioned well together. night of 8 March when General Sen-Many were cut squarely in half:' Kuribayashi was particularlyda grew so frustrated at the tighten- Close combat was rough enough; pleased with the quality of his ar-ing noose being applied by the 4th on Iwo Jima the stress seemed end- tilleryand engineeringtroops.Marine Division that he led 800 of less because for a long time the Ma- Colonel Chosaku Kaido served ashis surviving troops in a ferocious rines had no secure "rear area" in Chief of Artillery from his seeming-counterattack. Finally given a mul- which to give shot-up troop units a ly impregnable concrete blockhousetitude of open targets, the Marines respite.Kuribayashi's gunners on a promontory on the east centralcut them down in a lingering melee. throughout the Motoyama Plateau sector of the Motoyama Plateau, a For the first week of the drive lethal landmark the Marines soon could still bracket the beaches and north, the Japanese on Iwo Jima ac-airfields. The enormous spigot mor- dubbed "Turkey Knob." Major Gener- tually had the attacking Marines out- al Sadasue Senda, a former artillery tar shells and rocket bombs still came gunned. Japanese 150mm howitzers officer with combat experience in tumbling out of the sky. Japanese in- and 120mm mortars were superior to China and Manchuria, commanded filtrators were drawn to "softer tar- the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade, The drive north by the 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, enters rugged terrain. Under whose main units would soon beheavy Japanese fire, this attack netted only 200 yards despite supporting fires. locked into a 25-day death struggle Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111988 withthe 4th Marine Division. Kuribayashi knew that the 204th Naval Construction Battalion had built some of the most daunting defensive systems on the island in that sector. One cave had a tunnel 800 feet long with 14 separate exits; it was one of hundreds designed to be defended in depth. The Japanese defenders waiting for the advance of the V Amphibious Corps were well armed and confi-

dent.Occasionally Kuribayashi A.— authorized company-sized spoiling

28 The Japanese 320mm Spigot Mortar

neof the unique Japanese weapons that Marines encountered on Iwo Jima was the 320mm spigot Qmortar. These enormous defensive weapons were emplaced and operated by the Japanese Army's 20th Independent Mortar Battalion. The mortar tube, which had a small cavity at the muz- zle, rested on a steel baseplate which, in turn, was supported by a wooden platform. Unlike a conventional mortar, the five-foot long projectile was placed over the tube instead of being dropped down the barrel. The mortar shell had a diameter of nearly 13 inches, while the mortar tube was little more than 10 inches wide. The weapon could hurl a 675-pound shell a maximum of 1,440 yards. The range was adjusted by varying the powder charge, while changes in deflection were accomplished by brute force: shoving and pushing the base platform. Although the tubes only held out for five or six rounds, enough shells were lobbed onto Marine positions to make a lasting impression on those who suffered through that campaign. According to a platoon leader who served with the 28th Marines, the spigot mortar (referred to as "the screaming Jesus" in his unit) was always afforded a healthy respect and, along with the eight-inch Japanese naval rock- et, remains one of his most vivid memories of Iwo Jima. General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who commanded the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, at Iwo Jima and went on to become the 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps, recalled that the tumbling projectile's inaccuracy made it that much more terrifying. "You could see it coming," he said, "but you never knew where the hell it was going to come down:' Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas gets"in the rear.Anti-personnelthe day after the capture of Sur-generated into desperate, small-unit mines and booby traps, encounteredibachi. Prep fires along the highactions all along the front. The 26th here on a large scale for the first timeground immediately north of the se-Marines on the left, aided by the in the Pacific, seemed everywhere. cond airfield extended for a full hour. tanks, gained the most yardage, but Exhausted troop units would stum-Then three regimental combat teamsit was all relative. The airfield run- ble out of the front lines seekingmoved out abreast, the 26th Marinesways proved to be lethal killing nothing more than a helmet-full ofon the left, the 24th Marines on thezones. Marine tanks were bedeviled water in which to bathe and a deepright, and the 21st Marines again inby mines and high-velocity direct fire hole in which to sleep. Too often thethe middle. For this attack, Generalweapons all along the front. On the men had to spend their rare rest peri-Schmidt consolidated the Shermanright flank, Lieutenant Colonel Alex- ods repairing weapons, humpingtanks of all three divisions into oneander A. Vandegrift, Jr., son of the ammo, dodging major-caliber incom-armored task force commanded byCommandant, became a casualty. ing, or having to repel yet anotherLieutenant Colonel William R. "Rip"Major Doyle A. Stout took com- nocturnal Japanese probe. Collins. It would be the largest con-mand of the 3d Battalion, 24th General Schmidt planned to attackcentration of Marine tanks in theMarines. the Japanese positions in the northwar, virtually an armored regiment. During the fighting on D +5, with three divisions abreast, the 5thThe attack plan seemed solid. General Schmidt took leave of Ad- on the left, the 3d (less the 3d Ma- The Marines soon realized theymiral Hill and moved his command rines) in the center, and the 4th onwere now trying to force passagepost ashore from the amphibious the right, along the east coast. Thethrough Kuribayashi's main defensive force flagship Auburn (AGC 10). drive north officially began on D +5, belt. The well-coordinated attack de-Colonel Howard N. Kenyon led his

29 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110604 Expended shells and open ammunition boxes testify to theing machine gun poured on the enemy as Marines advanced heavy supporting fire this water-cooled, .30-caliber Brown- In the furious and difficult battle for the heights of Suribachi. 9th Marines ashore and into a stag-each man harboring the inescapablewas "entirely inadequate." By noon ing area. With that, General Erskinefeeling he was alone in the middle ofon this date General Cates sent a moved the command post of the 3da gigantic bowling alley. Sometimesmessage to Schmidt requesting that Marine Division ashore; the 21st Ma-holding newly gained positions"the Strategic Air Force in the Man- rines reverted to its parent command. across the runway proved moreanas replace Navy air support im- Erskine's artillery regiment, the 12thdeadly than the process of gettingmediately:' Colonel Vernon E. Megee, Marines under Lieutenant Colonelthere. Resupply became nearly im-now ashore as Air Commander Iwo Raymond F. Crist, Jr., continued topossible. Tanks were invaluable;Jima and taking some of the heat land forthe nextseveraldays. many were lost. from frustrateddivision com- manders, blamed "those little spit-kit Schmidt now had eight infantry regi- Schmidt this day managed to get ments committed. Holland Smith still Navy fighters up there, trying to on shore the rest of his corps artillery help, never enough, never where they retained the 3d Marines in Expedi-two battalions of 155mm howitzers Schmidt should be" tionary Troops reserve. under Colonel John S. Letcher. Well- made the first of several requests to directed fire from these heavier field In fairness, it is doubtful whether Smith for release of this seasonedpieces eased some of the pressure. Soany service could have provided ef- outfit. The V Amphibious Corps had did call fire from the cruisers and des-fective air support during the open- already suffered 6,845 casualties. troyers assigned to each maneuvering days of the drive north. The Air The next day, D +6, 25 February,unit. But the Marines expressed dis-Liaison Parties with each regiment provided littlerelief in terms ofappointment in their air support.played hell trying to identify and Japanese resistance. Small groups ofThe 3d Marine Division complainedmark targets, the Japanese main- Marines, accompanied by tanks, that the Navy's assignment of eighttained masterful camouflage, front- somehow made it across the runway,fighters and eight bombers on stationline units were often "eyeball-to-

30 eyeball" with the enemy, and the air of the field held thousands of cond airfield, then the heavily forti- support request net was overloaded. figures, either milling around or fied Hill 362-C beyond the third The Navy squadrons rising from the in foxholes, while the other side airstrip, and finally the moonscape decks of escort carriers improved seemed deserted. The strangest jungle of stone which would become thereafter, to the extent that their thing of all was that the two know as "Cushman's Pocket:' conflicting missions would permit. contestants sometimes made Subsequent strikes featured heavier troop movements simultane- Lieutenant Colonel RobertE. bombs (up to five hundred pounds) ously in the same territory, one Cushman, Jr., a future Commandant, and improved response time. A week maneuvering on the surface and commanded the 2d Battalion, 9th later General Cates rated his air sup- the other using tunnels beneath. Marines at Iwo Jima. Cushman and port "entirely satisfactory:' The bat- his men were veterans of heavy fight- tie of Iwo Jima, however, would As the Marines struggled to wresting in Guam, yet they were appalled continue to frustrate all providers ofthe second airfield from the Japanese,by their first sight of the battlefield. supporting arms; the Japanese almostthe commanding terrain features ris-Wrecked and burning Sherman tanks never assembled legitimate targets ining to the north caught their atten-dotted the airstrips,a stream of the open. tion. Some would become known bycasualties flowed to the rear, "the machine-gun fire was terrific:' Cush- "The Japs weren't on Iwo Jima, saidtheir elevations (although there were three Hill 362s on the island), butman mounted his troops on the sur- Captain Fields of the 26th Marines, viving tanks and roared across the "they were in Iwo Jima. others would take the personality and nicknames assigned by the at-field.There they met the same Richard Wheeler, who survivedtackers. Hence, the 4th Marine Di-reverse-slope defenses which had service with the 28th Marines andvision would spend itself attackingplagued the 21st Marines. Securing later wrote two engrossing booksHill 382, the "Amphitheater," andthe adjoining two small hills —Peter about the battle, pointed out this"Turkey Knob" (the whole bristlingand 199-Oboe —tookthe 3d Marine phenomenon: complex became known as "TheDivision three more days of intense- This was surely one of the Meatgrinder"). The 5th Divisionly bitter fighting. strangest battlefields in history, would earn its spurs and lose most General Schmidt, considering the with one side fighting wholly of its invaluable cadre of veteran3d Division attack in the center to be above the ground and the other leaders attacking Nishi Ridge andhis main effort, provided priority fire operating almost wholly within Hills 362-A and 362-B, then end thesupport from Corps artillery, and it.Throughout thebattle, fighting in "The Gorge:' The 3d Di-directed the other two divisions to al- American aerial observers mar- vision would focus first on Hills Peterlocate half their own regimental fire veled at the fact that one side and 199-Oboe, just north of the Se-support to the center. None of the "The Grenade," an acrylic painting on canvas by Col Charles H. Waterhouse.commanders was happy with this. Marine Corps Combat Art Collection Neither the 4th Division, taking heavy casualties in The Amphitheat- er as it approached Hill 382, nor the 5th Division, struggling to seize Nishi Ridge, wanted to dilute their organ- ic fire support. Nor was General Er- skine pleased with the results. The main effort, he argued, should clear- ly receive the main fire. Schmidt never did solve this problem. His Corps artillery was too light; he needed twice as many battalions and A bigger guns —upto 8-inch howitzers, which the Marine Corps had not yet fielded. He had plenty of naval gun- fire support available and used it abundantly, but unless the targets lay in ravines facing to the sea he lost the advantage of direct, observed fire. Schmidt's problems of fire support

31 Marine Corps Air Support During Iwo Jima

or a few special moments just prior to the landing on tenant Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, CO of VMR-952, D-day at Iwo Jima the Marines' long-cherishedbrought in the first Marine transport to land on the island, Fvision of an integrated air-ground team seemed toa Curtiss Commando R5C loaded with ammunition. All have been realized. As assault troops neared the beach in three squadrons followed suit, bringing supplies in, tak- their tracked amphibian vehicles, dozens of Marine Voughting wounded men out. F4U Corsairs swept low over the objective, paving the way On 8 March, Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron with rockets and machine-gun fire. "It was magnificent!" (VMTB) 242 flew in to Iwo Jima from Tinian to assume exclaimed one observer. Unfortunately, the eight Marineresponsibility for day and night anti-submarine patrols fighter squadrons present at Iwo that morning came fromfrom the departing escort carrier force. the fast carriers of Task Force 58, not the amphibious task Colonel Vernon E. Megee, USMC, had the distinction force; three days later TF 58 left for good in pursuit of more of commanding the first Landing Force Air Support Con- strategic targets. Thereafter, Navy and Army Air Force pi- trol Unit, a milestone in the evolution of amphibious com- lots provided yeoman service in support of the troops fight-mand and control of supporting arms. Megee came ashore ing ashore. Sustained close air support of amphibious forces on D +5with General Schmidt, but the offloading process by Marine air was once again postponed to some futurewas still in such disarray that he could not assemble his combat proving ground. communications jeeps for another five days. This did little Other Marine aviation units contributed significantly toto deter Megee. Using "borrowed" gear, he quickly moved the successful seizure of Iwo Jima. One of the first to see inland, coordinating the efforts of the Air Liaison Parties, action was Marine Bombing Squadron (VMB) 612, based encouraging the Navy pilots to use bigger bombs and listen- on Saipan, whose flight crews flew North American PBJing to the complaints of the assault commanders. Megee's Mitchell medium bombers in nightly, long-range rocket at-subsequent work in training and employing Army P-51 tacks against Japanese ships trying to resupply Iwo JimaMustang pilots in direct support was masterful. from other bases in the Volcano and Bonin Islands. These Before the battle's end, General Kuribayashi transmitted nightly raids, combined with U.S. Navy submarine inter- to Tokyo 19 "lessons learned" about the problems of defend- dictions, significantly reduced the amount of ammunitioning against an American amphibious assault. One of these and fortification material (notably barbed wire) delivered axioms said: "The enemy's air control is very strong; at least to Iwo Jima's defenders before the invasion. thirty aircraft are flying ceaselessly from early morning to The contributions of the pilots and aerial spotters fromnight above this very small island.' three Marine observation squadrons (VMOs-1, -4 and -5) Marine LtCol Donald K. Yost in his F4U Corsair takes off are described at length in the text. Flying in to Iwo initial-from the flight deck of the Cape Gloucester (CVE 109) to ly from escort carriers, or launched precariously by the in-provide close air support to the fighting troops ashore. This famous "Brodie Slingshot" from LST 776, or eventuallywas one of a number of Marine aircraft flown at Iwo Jima. taking off from the captured airstrips, these intrepid crews Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 262047 were quite successful in spotting enemy artillery and mor- tar positions, and reporting them to the Supporting Arms Control Center. When Japanese anti-aircraft gunners managed to down one of the "Grasshoppers," Marines from all points of the island mourned. Marine transport aircraft from Marine Transport Squa- drons (VMR) 952, 253, and 353 based in the Marianas deli- vered critical combat cargo to the island during the height of the battle. The Marines frequently relied on aerial deliv- ery before the landing force could establish a fully func- tional beachhead. On D+1O, for example, VMR-952 air-dropped critically needed mortar shells, machine gun parts, and blood within Marine lines. On 3 March, Lieu- distribution received some alleviation observation planes, nicknamedfrail craft had already had an adven- on 26 February when two Marine"Grasshoppers;' of Lieutenant Tomturous time in the waters off Iwo observation planes flew in from theRozga's Marine Observation Squa-Jima. Several had been launched escort carrier Wake Island, the firstdron (VMO) 4, and they were fol-precariously from the experimental aircraft to land on Iwo's recapturedlowed the next day by similar planesBrodie catapult on LST 776, "like a and still fire-swept main airstrip.from Lieutenant Roy G.Miller'speanut from a slingshot:' All 14 of These were Stinson OY single-engineVMO-5. The intrepid pilots of thesethe planes of these two observation

32 / and produced five Medals of Honor. For Captain Frank C. Caidwell, com- manding Company F, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, it was the worst sin- .4; gle day of the battle. His company suffered 47 casualties in taking the hill, including the first sergeant and the last of the original platoon com- manders. Overall, the first nine days of the V Amphibious Corps drive north had produced a net gain of about 4,000 yards at the staggering cost of 3. 7,000 American casualties. Several of V.,. . p. -. ._._ -S '-:. ...•• • I.— the pitched battles—Airfield No. 2, a ...t. — Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110922 Hill 382, Hill 362-B, for example— A Marine dashes past a fallen Japanese killed a short time earlier,all thewould ofthemselves warrant a while himself a target of searching enemy fire, during heavy fighting in the north. separate commemorative mono- squadrons would receive heavyner fired a high-velocity shell whichgraph. The fighting in each case was Japanese fire in battle, not only whilekilled Lieutenant Colonel Chandleras savage and bloody as any in Ma- airborne but also while being serv-Johnson immediately, one week af-rine Corps history. iced on the airstrips as well. Yet these ter his glorious seizure of Suribachi's This was the general situation two squadrons (and elements ofsummit. The 28th Marines capturedpreviously describedattheun- VMO-1) would fly nearly 600 mis- Hill362-Aatthecostof 200suspected "turning point" on 4 March sions in support of all three divisions.casualties. (D + 13) when, despite sustaining Few units contributed so much to the On the same day Lieutenantfrightful losses,the Marines had eventual suppression of Kuribayashi's Colonel Lowell E.English, com-chewed through a substantial chunk deadly artillery fire. In time the mere manding the 2d Battalion, 21st Ma-of Kuribayashi's main defenses, forc- presence of these small planes over-rines, went down with abulleting the enemy commander to shift his head would influence Japanese gun-through his knee. English was bitter.command post to a northern cave. ners to cease fire and button upHis battalion was being rotated to the "Fire in theHole,"an acrylic painting on against the inevitable counterbatteryrear. "We had taken very heavyuntempered masonite by Col Charles fire to follow. Often the pilots wouldcasualties and were pretty well dis-H. Waterhouse, reflects the extensive undertake pre-dawn or dusk mis-organized. I had less than 300 menuse of TNT to blast Japanese caves. sions simply to extend this protectiveleft out of the 1200 I came ashore Marine Corps Combat Art collection "umbrella" over the troops, risky fly-with." English then received orders to ing given Iwo's unlit fields and cons-turn his men around and plug a gap tant enemy sniping from the adjacent in the front lines. "It was an impos- hills. sible order. I couldn't move that dis- The 4th Marine Division finallyorganized battalion a mile back north seized Hill 382, the highest pointin 30 minutes." General Erskine did north of Suribachi, but continued tonot want excuses. "Youtellthat take heavy casualties movingdamned English he'd better be there;' through The Amphitheater againsthe told the regimental commander. Turkey Knob. The 5th Division over-English fired back, "You tell that son ran Nishi Ridge, then bloodied itselfof a bitch I will be there, and I was, against Hill 362-As intricate defenses.but my men were still half a mile be- Said Colonel Thomas A. Wornham,hind me and I got a blast through the commanding the 27th Marines, ofknee." these defenses: "They had interlock- On the left flank, the 26th Marines 4 ing bands of fire the likes of whichmounted its most successful, and . Ia you neversaw."General Catesbloodiest, attack of the battle, final- redeployed the 28th Marines into thisly seizing Hill 362-B. The day-long slugfest. On 2 March a Japanese gun-struggle cost 500 Marine casualties

33 —. - ..a_- 7r- .—. wy" 1- ':,;'T Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111933 The 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, finds the terrain on Iwo Jima beaches as they advance in a frontal attack northward against more broken and forbidding than the black sands of theunremitting fire from determined Japanesetroops. This was the afternoon the first crip-to enable his immediate assignment I asked the question of Kelly pled B-29 landed. In terms of Ameri-to front-line outfits. The problem lay Turner and Holland Smith and can morale, it could not have come atin distributing the replacements in the usual answer was, "You got a better time. General Schmidt or-small, arbitrary numbers —notas enough Marines on the island dered a general standdown on 5 teamed units —tofill the gaping holes now; there are too damn many March to enable the exhausted as-in the assault battalions. The new here:' I said, "The solution is sault forces a brief respite and the op-men, expected to replace invaluable very easy. Some of these peo- portunity to absorb some replace-veterans of the Pacific War, were not ple are very tired and worn out, ments. only new to combat, but they also so take them out and bring in The issue of replacement troopswere new to each other, an assort- the 3d Marines" And they prac- during the battle remains controver-ment of strangers lacking the life- tically said, "You keep quiet— sial even half a century later. Gener-saving bonds of unit integrity. "They we've made the decision:' And al Schmidt, now faced with lossesget killed the day they go into bat- that was that. approaching the equivalent of onetle,"said one division personnel Most surviving seniorofficers entire division, again urged Generalofficer in frustration. Replacementagreed that the decision not to use Smith to release the 3d Marines.losses within the first 48 hours ofthe 3d Marines at Iwo Jima was ill- While each division had been as-combat were,infact,appalling.advised and costly. But Holland signed a replacement draft of sever-Those who survived, who learnedSmith never wavered: "Sufficient althousand Marines,Schmidtthe ropes and established a bondtroops were on Iwo Jima for the cap- wanted the cohesion and combat ex-with the veterans, contributed signifi-ture of the island .. .. tworegiments perience of Colonel James M. Stuart'scantly to the winning of the battle.were sufficient to cover the front as- regimental combat team. HollandThe division commanders, however, signed to General Erskine." On 5 Smith believed that the replacementdecried the wastefulness of this poli-March, D + 14, Smith ordered the 3d drafts would suffice, presuming thatcy and urged unit replacements byMarines to sail back to Guam. each man in these hybrid units hadthe veteran battalions of the 3d Ma- Holland Smith may have known received sufficient infantry trainingrines. As General Erskine recalled: the overall statistics of battle losses

34 .\

S.

Marine Corps Historical Collection 'Turkey Knob," the outcropping which anchored the positions 4th Marine Division for many days, was sketched by Cpl of the Japanese 2d Mixed Brigade against the advance of theDaniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, S-2 Section, 25th Marines. Weary troops of Company G, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,ing for the tanks to move forward to blast the numerous pill- rest in a ditch, guarded by a Sherman tank. They are wait-boxes between Motoyama Airfields No.1 and No. 2. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109666

35 wounds began to outnumber high- explosive shrapnel hits. The persis- tent myth among some Marine units that Japanese troops were all near- sighted and hence poor marksmen ended for good at Iwo Jima. In the close-quarters fighting among the t- badlands of northern Iwo Jima, Japanese riflemen dropped hundreds Ii of advancing Marines with well- aimed shots to the head or chest. "Poor marksmen?" snorted Captain Caidwell of Company F, 1st Battal- ion, 26th Marines, "The Japs we faced all fired 'Expert: Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110626 Supporting arms coordination A light machine gun crew of Company H, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, hugs thegrew more effective during the bat- ground and takes advantage of whatever cover it can from an enemy gunner.tle. Colonel "Buzz" Letcher estab- sustained by the landing force to thatdamned shell." In many infantrylished what some have identified as point, but he may not have fully ap-units,platoonsceasedtoexist; the first corps-level Supporting Arms preciated the tremendous attrition ofdepleted companies were merged toCoordination Center (SACC),in experienced junior officers and seniorform one half-strength outfit. which senior representatives of ar- staff noncommissioned officers tak- tillery, naval gunfire, and air support ing place every day. As one example, The Bitter End pooled their talents and resources. the day after the 3d Marines, many The American drive north con-While Letcher lacked the manpower of whose members were veterans oftinued after the 5 March standdown,and communications equipment to Bougainville and Guam, departed the but the going never got any easier.serve as corps artillery officer and amphibious objective area, Compa- The nature of enemy fire changed —simultaneously runafull-time ny E, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, fewerbig guns and rockets, less ob-SACC, hisefforts representeda suffered the loss of its seventh com- served fire from the highlands —butmajor advancement in this difficult pany commander since the battle be-now the terrain grew uglier, deteri-art. So did Colonel Vernon Megee's gan. Likewise, Lieutenant Colonelorating into narrow, twisted gorgesLanding Force Air Support Control Cushman's experiences with the 2dwreathed in sulfur mists, lethal kill-Unit, which worked in relative har- Battalion,9th Marines, seemeding zones. Marine casualties con-mony with the fledgling SACC. In- typical: tinuedtomount, but gunshotstances of friendly fire still occurred, The casualties were fierce. By Mopping up the caves with grenades and Browning automatic rifles, Marines flush the time Iwo Jima was over I out remaining Japanese hidden in Iwo Jima's numerous and interconnecting caves. had gone through two complete Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142472 sets of platoon leaders, lieu- tenants. After that we had such things as artillery forward ob- servers commanding companies r and sergeants leading the pla- toons, which were less than half-strength. It was that bad. Lieutenant Colonel English recalled I. that by the 12th day the 2d Battal- ion, 21st Marines, had "lost every company commander. ...Ihad one company execleft."Lieutenant Colonel Donn Robertson, command- ing the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, lost all three of his rifle company commanders, "two killed by the same

36 The Marines' Zippo Tanks o the Marines on the ground, the Sherman M4A3 turret, replacing the 75mm main gun with a look-alike medium tank equipped with the Navy Mark I launch tube. The modified system could thus be trained Tflame thrower seemed to be the most valuable and pointed like any conventional turret gun. Using weapon employed in the battle of Iwo Jima. napalm-thickened fuel, the "Zippo Tanks" could spew flame The Marines had come a long way in the tactical use of up to 150 yards for a duration of 55-80 seconds, both quan- fire in the 15 months since Tarawa, when only a handful tum tactical improvements. of backpack flame throwers were available to combat the Unfortunately, the ad hoc modification team had only island's hundreds of fortifications. While the landing force sufficient time and components to modify eight M4A3 still relied on portable flame throwers, most Marines couldtanks with the Mark 1 flame system; four each went to the see the value of marrying the technology with armored ve- 4th and 5th Tank Battalions. The 3d Tank Battalion, then hicles for use against the toughest targets. In the Marianas, staging in Guam, received neither the M4A3 Shermans nor the Marines modified M3A1 light tanks with the Canadi-the field modifications in time for Iwo Jima, although a an Ronson flame system to good effect; the problems came number of their 'A2" tanks retained the E4-5 system mount- from the vulnerability of the small vehicles. At Peleliu, theed in the bow. 1st Marine Division mounted the improvised Mark 1 sys- The eight modified Sherman flame tanks proved ideal tem on a thin-skinned LVT.4; again, vehicle vulnerabilityagainst Iwo Jima's rugged caves and concrete fortifications. limited the system's effectiveness. The obvious solutionThe Japanese feared this weapon greatly; time and again seemed to be to mount the flame thrower in a medium tank. suicide squads of "human bullets" would assail the flame The first modification to Sherman tanks involved the in-tanks directly, only to be shot down by covering forces or stallation of the small E4-5 mechanized flame thrower inscorched by the main weapon. Enemy fire and the rough place of the bow machine gun. This was only a marginalterrain took their toll on the eight flame tanks, but main- improvement; the system's short range, modest fuel sup-tenance crews worked around the clock to keep them func- ply, and awkward aiming process hardly offset the loss oftional. the machine gun. Even so, each of the three tank battal- In the words of Captain Frank C. Caidwell, a company ions employed E4-5-equipped Shermans during Iwo Jima. commander in the 26th Marines: "In my view it was the The best solution to marrying effective flame projection flame tank more than any other supporting arm that won with mechanized mobility resulted from an unlikely inter- this battle:' Tactical demands for the flame tanks never service task force of Seabees, Army Chemical Warfare Serv- diminished. Late in the battle, as the 5th Marine Division ice technicians, and Fleet Marine Force tankers in Hawaii cornered the last Japanese defenders in "The Gorge," the 5th before the invasion. According to Lieutenant Colonel Wil- Tank Battalion expended napalm-thickened fuel at the rate liam R. Collins, commanding the 5th Tank Battalion, this of 10,000 gallons per day. The division's final action report inspired group of field-expedient tinkerers modified the stated that the flame tank was "the one weapon that caused Mark 1 flame thrower to operate from within the Shermans the Japs to leave their caves and rock crevices and run:' A Marine flame tank, also known as a "Ronson, "scorchesequipped with the Navy Mark I flame-thrower proved to a Japanese strongpoint.The eight M4A3 Shermansbe the most valuable weapons systems on Iwo Jima. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 140758

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37 troops, Colonel Megee liked their "eager-beaver attitude" and willing- ness to learn. He also appreciated the fact that the Mustangs could deliver 1,000-pound bombs. Megee quickly trained the Army pilots in striking designated targets on nearby islands in response to a surface-based con- troller. In three days they were ready for Iwo Jima. Megee instructed the P-51 pilots to arm their bombs with 12-second delay fuzes, attack parallel to the front lines, and approach from a 45-degree angle. Sometimes these tactics produced spectacular results, especially along the west coast, 0'I where the big bombs with delayed Marine Corps Combat Art Collection fuzes blew the sides of entire cliffs "The Target," by Col Charles H. Waterhouse. into the ocean, exposing enemy caves perhaps inevitably on that crowdedthe smallest gunships, frequentlyand tunnels to direct fire from the island, but positive control at themodified landing craft armed withsea. "The Air Force boys did a lot of highest level did much to reduce the4.2-inch mortars, rockets, or 20mmgood:' said Megee. With that, the es- frequency of such accidents. In termsguns. These "small boys" proved in-cort carriers departed the area and of response time, multiple-sourcevaluable, especially along the north-left close air support to the 47th coordination probably worked bet-west coast where they frequentlyFighter Squadron for the duration of ter at the division level and below.worked in lock-step with the 5th Ma-the battle. Most infantry battalions, for exam-rine Division as it approached The While technically not a "support- ple, had nothing but praise for theGorge. ing arm;' the field medical support Air Liaison Parties, Shore Fire Con- While the Marines comprised theprovided the assault Marines primar- trol Parties, and artillery forward ob- bulk of the landing force at Iwo Jima,ily by the Navy was a major contri- server teams which deployed withthey received early and increasingbutor to victory in the prolonged each maneuver unit. support from elements of the U.S.battle. The practice of integrating While the Marines remained angryArmy. Two of the four DUKW com-surgeons, chaplains, and corpsmen at the paucity of the overall prelimi-panies employed on D-day werewithin the Fleet Marine Force units nary naval bombardment of IwoArmy units. The 138th Antiaircraftcontinued to pay valuable dividends. Jima, all hands valued the continu-Artillery Group provided 90mm AAIn many cases company corpsmen ous and responsive support receivedbatteries around the newly capturedwere just as tough and combat-savvy from D-day onward. Many of theairfields. Major General James E.as the Marines they accompanied. In gunfireships stoodinclose — Chaney, USA, who would becomeall cases, a wounded Marine immedi- frequentlylessthana mileIsland Commander, Iwo Jima, at theately knew "his" corpsman would offshore —todeliver along the flanks battle's end, landed on D + 8 with ad-move heaven and earth to reach him, and front lines, and many took hitsvance elements of the 145th Infantry.bind his wounds, and start the long from masked Japanese coast defense As far as the Marines on theprocess of evacuation. Most Marines batteries. There were literally no safeground were concerned, the mostat Iwo Jima would echo the senti- zones in or around the island. Twowelcome Army units flew into Iwoments of Staff Sergeant Alfred I. aspects of naval gunfire at Iwo JimaJima on 6 March (D+15). This wasThomas, a half-track platoon com- rate special mention. One was the ex-the 15th Fighter Group, the vanguardmander in the 25th Marines: 'We had tent to which the ships provided il-of VII Fighter Command destined tooutstanding corpsmen; they were just luminationroundsovertheaccompany the B-29s over Tokyo.like family:' battlefield, especially during the ear-The group included the 47th Fighter Unfortunately, the luxury of hav- ly days before landing force artillerySquadron, a seasoned outfit of Northing first-rate medical assistance so could assume the bulk of these mis-American P-51 Mustangs. Althoughclose to the front lines took a terri- sions. The second unique aspect wasthe Army pilots had no experienceble toll. Twenty-three doctors and 827 the degree of assistance provided byindirectair support of groundcorpsmen were killed or wounded at

38 of casualty evacuation occurred af- ter a Japanese sniper shot Corporal Edwin 3.Canter,a rocket truck crew chief in the 4th Marine Division, through the abdomen. The rocket trucks always drew an angry fusil- lade of counterbattery fire from the Japanese, and Canter's friends knew they had to get him away from the launch site fast. As a nearby motion picture crew recorded the drama, four Marines hustling Canter down a muddy hillside heard the scream of an incomingshell,dumped the wounded man unceremoniously and scattered for cover. The explosion killed the film crew and wounded a. eachofthe Marines,including 1 Canter, again. The film footage sur- vived,appearedinstateside Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110902 newsreels —andeventually became Navy corpsmen tend a Marine who was shot in the back by enemy sniper fire. part of the movie "Sands of Iwo Iwo Jima, a casualty rate twice asInstalled in an abandoned Japanese dugout several thousand yards behind the fight- high as bloody Saipan. ing, 4th Marine Division surgeons operated on those badly wounded Marines and Rarely had combat medical sup-Navy corpsmen who might not have survived a trip to the hospital ship. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111506 port been so thoughtfully prepared and provided as at Iwo Jima. Beyond the crude aid stations, further toward the rear, Navy and Army field hospi- tals arose. Some Marines would be wounded, receive treatment in a field hospital tent, recuperate in a bunker, and return to the lines —oftento receive a second or third wound. The more seriously wounded would be evacuated off the island, either by direct air to Guam, or via one of several fully staffed hospital ships which operated around the clock wi- thin the amphibious objective area. Within the first month of the fight- ing on Iwo Jima, 13,737 wounded Marines and corpsmen were evacu- ated by hospital ship, another 2,449 by airlift. Fora wounded Marine,the hazardous period came during the first few minutes after he went down. Japanese snipers had no compunc- tions about picking off litter crews, or corpsmen,or sometimes the wounded man himself as his buddies tried to slide him clear of the fire. One of the most celebrated examples

39 a SW

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110852 As the fighting moved inland, the beaches of Iwo Jima be-supplies. Note the many roads leading off the beaches over carrie very busy places with the continual incoming flow ofwhich trucks, LVTs, and DUKWs headed to the frontlines. Jima." Canter was evacuated to atether to the beachhead. Thereafter,moved ashore. Marines returning to hospital ship, thence to hospitals inammunition resupply became thethe beaches from the northern high- Guam, Hawaii, and the States. Hiscritical factor. On one occasion, well-lands could hardly recognize the war had ended. aimed Japanese fire detonated the en-place they had first seen on D-day. Meanwhile the beachmasters andtire5th Marine Division ammoThere were now more than 80,000 shore party personnel performeddump. In another tense moment, theAmericans on the small island. Sea- spectacular feats to keep the advanc-ammunition ship Columbia Victorybees had bulldozed a two-lane road ingdivisionsfully armed andcame under direct Japanese fire as sheup to the top of Suribachi. equipped. It is difficult to imagine theapproached the western beaches to Communications, often maligned scope of logistical management andcommence unloading. Watching Ma-in earlier amphibious assaults, were sheer, back-breaking work requiredrines held their breath as the ship be-never better than at Iwo Jima. Radios to maintain such a high volume ofcame bracketed by fire. The shipand handsets were now waterproof, supplies and equipment moving overescaped, but the potential still exist-more frequencies were available, and such precarious beaches. A singleed for a disaster of catastrophica variety of radio systems served the beach on the west coast became func- proportions. varying needs of the landing force. tional on D + 11, but by that time the The 2d Separate Engineer Battal-Forward observer teams, for exam- bulk of landing force supplies wereion and the 62d Naval Constructionple, used the back-pack SCR-610, on shore. General unloading endedBattalion (Seabees) repaired and ex-while companies and platoons fa- the next day, releasing the vulnera-tended the captured runways. Invored the SCR-300 "walkie-talkies," ble amphibious ships from theirshort order, an entire Seabee brigadeor the even lighter SCR-536 "Spam

40 Can" portables.Said Lieutenantphone lines, but the Marines baffledout the landing. Black Marines of the Colonel James P. Berkeley, executivethem by heavy use of Navajo code8th Ammunition Company and the officer of the 27th Marines and atalkers.Each division employed36th Depot Company landed on D- former communications officer, "Atabout two dozen trained Navajos.day, served as stevedores on those Iwo we had near-perfect communi-The 5th Marine Division commandchaotic beaches, and were joined by cations, all any commander couldpost established six Navajo networksthe 33d and 34th Depot Companies ask for:' As the battle progressed, theupon arrival on the island. No one, on D + 3. These Marines were incor- Marines began stringing telephonethroughout the war, insofar as any-porated into the VAC Shore Party lines between support units and for-one knew, was ever able to translatewhich did Herculean work sustain- ward command posts, wisely elevat-the Navajo code talkers' voice trans-ing the momentum of the American ing the wire along upright posts tomissions. drive northwards. When Japanese avoid damage by tracked vehicles. counterattacks penetratedtothe African-American troops played a beach areas, these Marines dropped Japanese counterintelligence teamssignificant role in the capture of Iwo their cargo, unslung their carbines, expected to have a field day splicingJima. Negro drivers served in the into the proliferation of U.S. tele- and engaged in well-disciplined fire Army DUKW units active through-and maneuver,inflicting more "Iwo Jima," proof lithograph of two Navajo code talkers, by Sgt John Fabion. casualties than they sustained. Two Marine Corps Combat Art Collection Marines, Privates James W. Whitlock and James Davis, received the Bronze Star. Said Colonel Leland S. Swin- dler, commanding the VAC Shore Party, the entire body of black Ma- rines "conducted themselves with marked coolness and courage:' News media coverage of the Iwo Jima battle was extensive and large- ly unfettered. Typical of the scores of combat correspondents who stuck with the landing force throughout the battle was Marine Technical Ser- geant Frederick K. "Dick" Dashiell, a former Associated Press writer as- signed to the 3d Marine Division. Although downright scared some- times, and filled with horror often, Dashiell stood the test, for he wrote 81 front-line communiques, pound- ing out news releases on his porta- ble typewriter on the edge of his foxhole.Dashiell's eye for detail caught the flavor of the prolonged as- sault. "All is bitter, frontal assault, a!- ways uphill;' he wrote. He described how the ceaseless wind filled the air with fine volcanic grit, and how often the Marines had to stop and clean the grit from their weapons—and how naked that made any Marine feel. Most Marines were exhausted at this point in the battle. Occasional hot food delivered close behind the front lines, or more frequently fresh fruit and milk from the nearby ships, helped morale some. So did watch-

41 Iwo's Fire Brigades: The Rocket Detachments ttached to the assault di-particularly during the battle of Sai-a salvo of rockets against Japanese for- visions of the landing forcepan. The Marines modified the smalltifications along the slopes of Sur- Aat Iwo Jima were provision- trucks by reinforcing the tail gate toibachi,detonating an enemy am- al rocket detachments. The infantryserve as a blast shield, installing amunition dump. The detachment sub- had a love-hate relationship with thehydraulic jack to raise and lower thesequently supported the 1st Battalion, forward-deploying little rocket truckslaunchers, and applying gravity quad-28th Marines' advance to the summit, and their plucky crews. The "system"rants and elevation safety chains.often launching single rockets to clear was an International one-ton 4x4 truck Crude steel rods welded to the bum-suspected enemy positions along the modified to carry three box-shapedper and dashboard helped the driverroute. launchers, each containing a dozenalign the vehicle with aiming stakes. As the fighting moved north, the short range, steep angle of fire, and 4.5-inch rockets. A good crew could Treeless, hilly Iwo Jima proved an saturation effect of the rocket launch- launch a "ripple" of 36 rockets withinideal battleground for these so-called ers kept them in high demand. They a matter of seconds, providing a"Buck Rogers Men:' At Iwo, the 1st were particularly valuable in defilade- blanket of high explosives on the tar-Provisional Rocket Detachment sup- to-defilade bombardments marking get. This the infantry loved—but each ported the 4th Marine Division and launching always drew heavy return the final punctuation of pre-assault the 3d Detachment supported the 5th fire from the Japanese who feared the prep fires. But their distinctive flash Division throughout the operation (the and telltale blast also caught the atten- "automatic artillery:' 3d Division did not have such a unit tion of Japanese artillery spotters. The The Marines formed an Experimen-in this battle). Between them, the two rocket trucks rarely remained in one tal Rocket Unit in June 1943 and first detachments fired more than 30,000 deployed rail-launched barrage rock- place long enough to fire more than rockets in support of the landing force. ets during the fighting in the upper two salvos. "Speedy displacement" was Solomons. There the heavily canopied The 3d Detachment landed over Redthe key to their survival. The nearby jungleslimitedtheireffectiveness. Beach on D-day, losing one vehicle toinfantry knew better than to stand Once mounted on trucks and deployedthe surf, others to the loose sand oraround and wave goodbye; this was to the Central Pacific, however, theheavy enemy fire. One vehicle reached the time to seek deep shelter from the weapons proved much more useful,its firing position intact and launchedcounterbattery fire sure to follow. The positions from which rocket troops launched salvosas Japanese artillery and mortars zeroed in on the clouds of 4.5-inch rockets became very unhealthy places, indeed, of smoke and dust resulting from the firing of the rockets. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111100 4$ /

42 surprised. Daylight revealed his bat- talion had captured the wrong hill, an intermediate objective. Hill 362-C still lay 250 yards distant; now he was surrounded by a sea of wide- awake and furiously counterattack- ing Japanese infantry. Boehm did what seemed natural: he redeployed his battalion and attacked towards the original objective. This proved very rough going and took much of the day, but before dark the 3d Bat- talion, 9th Marines stood in sole pos- sessionofHill362-C,oneof Kuribayashi'smaindefensive anchors. Boehm's success, followed shortly by General Senda's costly counterat- tack against the 4th Marine Division, seemed to represent another turning point of the battle. On D+18 a patrol from the 3d Marine Division reached the northeast coast. The squad leader filled a canteen with salt 9water and sent it back to General Schmidt marked "For inspection — r.j taa not Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142845 consumption." Schmidt wel- From the viewpoint of Marine company commanders, having their own "artillery,"comed the symbolism. The next day in the form of 60mm mortars, was a very satisfying matter. A 60mm mortar crewthe 4th Marine Division finally is at work, in a natural depression, lobbing round after round at enemy positions. pinched out Turkey Knob, moving ing more and more crippled B-29svance, Erskine directed a pre-dawn out of The Amphitheater towards the soar in for emergency landings, oftenadvance devoid of the trappings ofeast coast. The end seemed tantaliz- two or three a day. "It felt good toprep fires which always seemed toingly close, but the intensity of see them land," said Sergeant Jamesidentify the time and place of attack.Japanese resistance hardly waned. "Doc" Lindsey, a squad leader inThe distinction of making this un-Within the 5th Marine Division's Company G, 2d Battalion, 25th Ma-usual assault went to Lieutenantzone in the west, the 2d Battalion, rines. "You knew they'd just comeColonel Harold C. "Bing" Boehm,26th Marines, was reporting an ag- from Tokyo." commanding the 3d Battalion, 9thgregate casualty rate approaching 70 General Erskine came down withMarines. Unfortunately this battal-percent. General Rockey warned of pneumonia during this period, bution was new to this particular sectora state of "extreme exhaustion and refused to be evacuated. Coloneland received the attack order too latefatigue:' Robert E. Hogaboom, his chief ofthe previous day to reconnoiter effec- The division commanders began to staff, quietly kept the war moving. tively. The absence of advance orien-look elsewhere for relief of their shot- The division continued to advance.tation notwithstanding, the battalionup battalions. In the 4th Marine Di- When Erskine recovered, Hogaboomcrossed the line of departure prompt-vision,General Cates formed a adjusted accordingly; the two werely and silently at 0500 and headed forprovisional battalion under Lieu- a highly effective team. Hill 362-C. The unit attained totaltenant Colonel Melvin L. Krulewitch Erskine had long sought the op- surprise along its axis of advance. Be-which conducted a series of attacks portunity to conduct a battalion-fore the sleepy Japanese knew it, theagainst the many bypassed enemy sized night operation. It rankled himbattalion had hurried across 500positions. The term "mopping up" as that throughout the war the Ameri-yards of broken ground, sweeping byapplied to Iwo Jima, whether by cans seemed to have conceded thethe outposts and roasting the occa-service troops or subsequent Army night to the Japanese. When Hillsional strongpoint with flamethrow-garrison units, should be considered 362-C continued to thwart his ad-ers. Then it was Boehm's turn to berelative. Many pockets of Japanese

43 Amphibious Logistical Support at Iwo Jima

he logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of the unloading continued without interruption. Iwo Jima was enormous; complex, largely im- The V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima used every con- Tprovised on lessons learned in earlier Marine ceivable means of delivering combat cargo ashore when and Corps operations in the Pacific and highly successful. where needed by the landing force. These means sequen- Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibi- tially involved the prescribed loads and units of fire car- ous warfare had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945. ried by the assault waves; "hot cargo" preloaded in on-call Marines may have had the heart and firepower to tackle waves or floating dumps; experimental use of "one-shot" a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but they would preloaded amphibious trailers and Wilson drums; general have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in am- unloading; administrative unloading of what later genera- phibious logistical support capabilities. These concepts, tions of amphibians would call an "assault follow-on eche- procedures, organizations, and special materials took years lon"; and aerial delivery of critically short items, first by to develop; once in place they fully enabled such large-scale parachute, then by transports landing on the captured run- conquests as Iwo Jima and Okinawa. ways. In the process, the Navy-Marine Corps team success- For the Iwo Jima operation, VAC had the 8th Field fully experimented with the use of armored bulldozers and Depot, commanded by Colonel Leland S. Swindler. The sleds loaded with hinged Marston matting delivered in the depot was designed to serve as the nucleus of the shore assault waves to help clear wheeled vehicles stuck in the party operation; the depot commander was dual-hatted as soft volcanic sand. In spite of formidable early obstacles— the Shore Party Commander of the Landing Force, in which foul weather, heavy surf, dangerous undertows, and fear- capacity he was responsible for coordinating the activities some enemy fire —thesystem worked. Combat cargo of the division shore parties. The timing of the logistics sup- flowed in; casualties and salvaged equipment flowed out. port at Iwo Jima proved to be well conceived and execut- Shortages appeared from time to time, largely the result ed. Liaison teams from the 8th Field Depot accompanied of the Marines on shore meeting a stronger and larger the 4th and 5th Divisions ashore. On Di-3, units of the defense garrison than estimated. Hence, urgent calls soon field depot came ashore, and two days after this, when VAC came for more demolitions, grenades, mortar illumination assumed control on shore, the field depot took over and rounds, flame-thrower recharging units, and whole blood. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109635

44 Transport squadrons delivered many of these critical itemsassumptions based on their earlier experiences. This paid directly from fleet bases in the Marianas. huge dividends when the corps commander had tocom- Field medical support at Iwo Jima was a model of ex- mit the 21st Marines as a separate tactical unit well in ad- haustive planning and flexible application. The Marinesvance of the division. Thanks to foresightful combat had always enjoyed the finest immediate medical attention loading, the regiment landed fully equipped and support- from their organic surgeons and corpsmen, but the back- ed, ready for immediate deployment in the fighting. up system ashore at Iwo Jima, from field hospitals to graves To augment the supplies coming across the beach, the registration, was mind-boggling to the older veterans. 3d Division staff air officer "appropriated" a transport plane Moderately wounded Marines received full hospital treat- and made regular runs to the division's base in Guam, ment and rehabilitation; many returned directly to their bringing back fresh beef, mail, and cases of beer. The 3d units, thus preserving at least some of the rapidly decreas- Division G-4alsosent his transport quartermaster (tdday's ing levels of combat experience in frontline outfits. The embarkation officer) out to sea with an LVT-full of war sou- more seriously wounded were treated, stabilized, and venirs; these were bartered with ship's crews for donations evacuated, either to offshore hospital ships or by air trans- of fresh fruit, eggs, bread —"we'd take anything." General port to Guam. Erskine distributed these treats personally to the men in The Marines fired an unprecedented half million artillery the lines. rounds in direct and general support of the assault units. More rounds were lost when the 5th Marine Division dump Retired Brigadier General Hittle marveled at the density blew up. The flow never stopped. The Shore Party used of troops funnelled into the small island. 'At one point we DUKWs, LVTs, and larger craft for rapid offloading of am- had 60,000 men occupying less than three-and-a-half square munition ships dangerously exposed to Iwo Jima's enemy miles of broken terrain:' These produced startling neigh- gunners. Marine Corps ammunition and depot companies bors: a 105mm battery firing from the middle of the shore hustled the fresh munitions ashore and into the neediest party cantonment; the division command post sited 1,000 hands. yards from Japanese lines; "giant B-29s taking off and land- Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hittle, USMC, served asing forward of the CP of an assault regiment:' D-4 of the 3d Marine Division throughout the battle of Iwo In the effort to establish a fresh-water distilling plant, Jima. While shaking his head at the "crazy-quilt" logisticMarine engineers dug a "well" near the beach. Instead of adaptations dictated by Iwo's geography, Hittle saw crea- a source of salt water the crew discovered steaming miner- tive staff management at all levels. The 3d Division, ear-al water, heated by Suribachi's supposedly dormant vol- marked as the reserve for the landing, found it difficult tocano. Hittle moved the 3d Division distilling site elsewhere; undertake combat loading of their ships in the absence of this spot became a hot shower facility, soon one of the most a scheme of maneuver on shore, but the staff made validpopular places on the island. held out indefinitely, well-armed andon. As the battalion commander(D+25), Japanese resistance in this defiant to the end. Rooting them outreported the action: thicket of jumbled rocks ended. The was never easy. Other divisions used 4th Marine Division, meanwhile, The enemy position was a cannoneers, pioneers, motor trans- poured over the hills along the east, port units, and amtrackers as light in- maze of caves, pillboxes, em- seizing the coast road and blasting placed tanks, stone walls and fantryunits,eithertoaugment the last Japanese strongpoints from front-line battalions or conduct com- trenches. . . . Webeat against the rear. Ninety percent of Iwo Jima bat patrols throughout rear areas. By this position for eight continu- now lay in American hands. Radio ous days, using every support- this time, however, the extreme rear Tokyo carried the mournful remarks area at Iwo had become overconfi- ing weapon. The core—main of Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso, dent. Movies were being shown ev- objective of the sector—still re- who announced the fall of Iwo Jima mained. The battalion was ex- ery night. Ice cream could be found as "the most unfortunate thing in the on the beach. Men swam in the surf hausted. Almostallleaders whole war situation:' and slept in tents. This all provided were gone and the battalion numbered about 400, including General Smith took the opportu- a false and deadly sense of security. 350 replacements. nity to declare victory and conduct Not very far to the north, Lieu- a flag-raising ceremony. With that, tenant Colonel Cushman's 2d Battal- Cushman's 2d Battalion, 9th Ma-the old warhorse departed. Admiral ion, 9th Marines, became engaged inrines, was relieved, but other ele-Turner had sailed previously. Ad- asustainedbattleinextremelyments of the 9th and 21st Marines, miral Hill and General Schmidt final- broken terrain east of the third air-equally exhausted, had justasly had the campaign to themselves. field. The Marines eventually encir-difficult a time. Erskine truly had noSurvivors of the 4th Division began cled the Japanese positions, but thereserves. He called Cushman backbackloading on board ship, their bat- battle for "Cushman's Pocket" raged intothe pocket. By 16 Marchtle finally over.

45 drunk for five days, but our fighting spirit is still running high. We are go- ing to fight bravely to the last:' Im- perial Headquarters tried to convey the good' news to him that the Em- peror had approved his promotion to full general. There was no response from Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi's promo- tion would be posthumous. Frag- mentary Japanese accounts indicate he took his own life during the night of 25-26 March. In The Gorge, the 5th Marine Di- vision kept clawing forward. The di- vision reported that the average battalion, which had landed with 36 officers and 885 men on D-day, now mustered 16 officers and 300 men, in- cluding the hundreds of replacements funneled in during the fighting. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, squeezed the Japanese into a final pocket, then overwhelmed them. It was the evening of 25 March, D + 34, and the amphibious assault on the rocky fortress of Iwo Jima fi- Marine Corps Historical Collection nally appeared over. The island grew After 24 days of the most bitter battle in the history of the Marine Corps to that strangely quiet. There were far few- date, on 14 March 1945, the colors were raised once again on Iwo Jima to signify er illumination shells. In the flicker- the occupation of the island, although the battle was still raging in the north. Theing false light, some saw shadowy official end of the campaign would not be until 14 days later, on 26 March. figures, moving south, towards the The killing continued in the north. Colonel Hartnoll J. Withers direct-airfield. The 5th Marine Division entered Theed the final assault of his 21st Ma- General Schmidt received the good Gorge, an 800-yard pocket of incredi-rines against the extreme northern tipnews that the 5th Marine Division bly broken country which the troopsof the island. General Erskine, pneu-had snuffed out the final enemy cave would soon call "Death Valley." Here monia be damned, came forward toin The Gorge on the evening of General Kuribayashi maintained hislook over his shoulder. The 21st Ma-D+34. But even as the corps com- final command center in a deep cave. rines could see the end, and theirmander prepared his announcement Fighting in this ungodly landscapemomentum proved irresistible. Indeclaringthe end of organized provided a fitting end to the battle— half a day of sharp fighting theyresistance on Iwo Jima, a very well- nineendless days of cave-by-cave as-clearedthe pointofthelastorganized enemy force emerged from saults with flamethrowers and demo-defenders. Erskine signalled Schmidt:northern caves and infiltrated down litions. Combat engineers used 8,500"Kitano Point is taken:' the length of the island. This final tons of explosives to detonate one Both divisions made serious effortsspasm of Japanese opposition still huge fortification. Progress was slowto persuade Kuribayashi to surrenderreflected the influence of and costlier than ever. General Rock-during these final days, broadcastingKuribayashi's tactical discipline. The ey's drained and depleted regimentsappeals in Japanese, sending personal300-man force took all night to move lost one more man with every twomessages praising his valor and urg-into position around the island's now yards gained. To ease the pressure,ing his cooperation. Kuribayashi re-vulnerable rear base area, the tents General Schmidt deployed the 3dmained a samurai to the end. Heoccupied by freshly arrived Army pi- Marine Division against Kitanotransmitted one final message tolots of VII Fighter Command, adja- Point in the 5th Division zone. Tokyo, saying "we have not eaten orcenttoAirfield No.1.The

46 counterattacking force achieved to- ed more of the same. In the first twobrunt of these losses. Captain Wil- tal surprise, falling on the sleeping pi-months after the Marines left, theliam T. Ketcham's Company I, 3d lots out of the darkness with swords, Army troops killed 1,602 JapaneseBattalion, 24th Marines, landed on grenades, and automatic weapons.and captured 867 more. D-day with 133 Marines in the three The fighting was as vicious and bloo- Iwo Jima's Costs, rifle platoons. Only nine of these dy as any that occurred in Iwo Jima's men remained when the remnants of many arenas. Gains, and Legacies the company reembarked on D + 35. The surviving pilots and members In its 36 days of combat on IwoCaptain Frank C. Caldwell reported of the 5th Pioneer Battalion impro-Jima, the V Amphibious Corps killed the loss of 221 men from Company vised a skirmish line and launchedapproximately 22,000 Japanese sold-F, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. At the a counterattack of their own. Seabeesiers and sailors. The cost was stag-end, a private first class served as pla- and elements of the redeploying 28thgering. The assault units of thetoon commander forCaldwell's Marines joined the fray. There were corps —Marinesand organic Navymerged first and second platoons. few suicides among the Japanese; personnel —sustained24,053 casual-Elsewhere in the 1st Battalion, 26th most died in place, grateful to striketies, by far the highest single-actionMarines, Captain Tom Fields relin- one final blow for the Emperor. Sun-losses in Marine Corps history. Ofquished command of Company D on rise revealed the awful carnage: 300these, a total of 6,140 died. Roughlythe eighth day to replace the battal- dead Japanese; more than 100 slainone Marine or corpsman became aion executive officer. Rejoining his pilots, Seabees, and pioneers; andcasualty for every three who landedcompany at the end of the battle, another 200 American wounded. Iton Iwo Jima. Fields was sickened to find only 17 was a grotesque closing chapter to According to a subsequent analy-of the original 250 men still in the five continuous weeks of savagery. sis by military historian Dr. Norman ranks. Company B, 1st Battalion, The 5th Marine Division and theCooper, "Nearly seven hundred28th Marines, went through nine 21st Marines wasted no time in back-Americans gave their lives for everycompany commanders in the fight- loading on board amphibious ships.square mile. For every plot of ground ing; 12 different Marines served as The 9th Marines, last of the VACthe size of a football field, an aver-platoon leader of the second platoon, maneuver units to land, became theage of more than one American andincluding two buck privates. Each di- last to leave, conducting two morefive Japanese were killed and fivevision, each regiment, reported simi- weeks of ambushes and combatAmericans wounded:' lar conditions. patrols. The 147th Infantry inherit- The assault infantry units bore the As the extent of the losses became The fighting hardly over, grizzled, begrimed, and tired Marines solemnly display known in the press, the American the spoils of war captured in a very long, difficult, and hard-fought battle. public reacted with shock and dis- Marine Corps Historical Collection may as they had 14 months earlier at Tarawa. This time, however, the debate about the high cost of forci- bly seizing an enemy island raged in the press while the battle was still be- ing fought. The Marine Corps released only oneofficial communique about specific battle losses during the bat- tle,reporting casualties of nearly 5,000 men on 22 February. Five days later, at the insistence of press baron William Randolph Hearst, an early supporter of the MacArthur-for- "'I. President claque, the San Francisco t Examiner ran a front page editorial bewailing the Marines' tactics and

— losses. "It's the same thing that hap- 4 pened at Tarawa and Saipan," the editorial stated, urging the elevation of General MacArthur to supreme command in the Pacific because "HE

47 Ii I nor the United States had signed the international moratorium, there were S.'. no civilians on the island, the Ameri- cans had stockpiles of mustard gas shells in the Pacific theater. But Presi- dent Roosevelt scotched these con- siderationsquickly.America, he declared, would never make first use of poison gas. In any case, the use of poison gas on an area as relatively I.' small as Iwo Jima, whose prevailing winds would quickly dissipate the gas fumes, became moot. This left the landing force with no option but a frontal amphibious assault against the most heavily fortified island America ever faced in the war. On the other hand, seizure of Iwo Jima provided significant strategic Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110599 benefits. Symbolically, the Marines The fighting continues and continues. For weary flamethrower operators Pvt Richard raised the flag over Mount Suribachi Klatt, left, and PFC Wilfred Voegeli the campaign is just one cave after another. on the same day that General MacAr- SAVES THE LIVES OF HIS OWN be effective. The island could there-thur entered Manila. The parallel MEN." With that, 100 off-duty Ma-fore not be bypassed or"leap-capture of the Philippines and Iwo rines stormed the offices of the Ex-frogged." There is considerable evi-Jima, followed immediately by the aminer demandingan apology. dence that the Joint Chiefs consideredinvasion of Okinawa, accelerated the Unfortunately, the Hearst editorialthe use of poison gas during the Iwopace of the war, bringing it at long received wide play; many families of Jima planning phase. Neither Japanlast to Japan's doorstep. The three Marines fighting at Iwo Jima for- Uncommon valor in a peaceful setting: this 4th Division Marine threatens the warded theclippings.Marinesenemy even in death. His bayonet fixed and pointing in the direction of the received these in the mail while theenemy, he was killed by a sniper before he even got off the beach on D-day. fighting still continued, an unwel- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109624 come blow to morale. President Roosevelt, long a master of public opinion, managed to keep the lid on the outcry by emphasiz- ing the sacrifice of the troops as epitomized by the Joe Rosenthal pho- tograph of the second Suribachi flag- raising. The photograph was already widely renowned. FDR made it the official logo of the Seventh War Bond -S. Drive and demanded the six flag- raisers be reassigned home to en- a hance popular morale. Regrettably, three of the six men had already been killed in subsequent fighting in the drive north on Iwo Jima. The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked appraisingly at Iwo Jima's losses. No one questioned the objective; Iwo a Jima was an island that categorical- ly had to be seized if the strategic bombing campaign was ever going to

48 campaigns convincingly demonstrat- ed to the Japanese high command that the Americans now had the capability —andthe will —toover- whelm even the most stoutly defend- - C, ed islands. Kyushu and Honshu would be next. Iwo Jimain American hands produced immediate and highly visi- ble benefits to the strategic bombing campaign. Marines fighting on the is- land were reminded of this mission time and again as crippled B-29 Su- perforts flew in from Honshu. The r.,1 capture of Iwo Jima served to in- crease the operating range, payload, and survival rate of the big bombers. The monthly tonnage of high explo- sives dropped on Imperial Japan by B-29s based in the Marianas in- creased eleven-fold in March alone. r As early as 7 April a force of 80 P-51 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142434 Mustangs of VII Fighter CommandWith his buddies holding the four corners of the National Colors, the last rites took off from Iwo Jima to escortfor a fallen Marine are offered by the chaplain at a temporary gravesite in Iwo's B-29s striking the Nakajima aircraft black sand. Chaplains of all religious persuasions heroically ministered to all Ma- engine plant in Tokyo. But the Armyrines and Corpsmen throughout the thick of the fighting at their own risk. Air Force valued Iwo Jima most of Iwo Jima represented at once thewas impressive enough, but the real all as an emergency landing field. Bysupreme test and the pinnacle ofmeasure of amphibious effectiveness war's end, a total of 2,251 B-29s madeAmerican amphibious capabilities incan be seen in the massive, sustained forced landings on the island. Thisthe Pacific War. The sheer magnitudelogistical support which somehow figure represented 24,761 flight crew- of the task —planningthe assault andflowed over those treacherous men, many of whom would havesustainingofthat many troopsbeaches. Not only did the Marines perished at sea without the availabil-againstsuch a formidablehaveallthe ammunition and ity of Iwo Jima as a safe haven. Said objective —madeOperation Detach-flamethrower refills they needed, one B-29 pilot, "whenever I land onment an enduring model of "detailedaround the clock, but they also had this island I thank God for the menplanning and violent execution:' Heremany of the less obvious necessities who fought for it." the element of surprise was not avail-and niceties which marked this bat- General Tadamichi Kuribayashiable to the attacker. Yet the speed oftle as different from its predecessors. proved to be one of the most com-the American landing and the tough-Marines on Iwo had ample quanti- petent field commanders the Marinesness with which assaultunits with-ties of whole blood, some of it do- ever faced. He displayed a masterfulstoodthewithering barragesnated barely two weeks in advance, grasp of the principles of simplicityastounded the Japanese defenders.flown in, refrigerated, and available. and economy of force, made maxi-"The landing on Iwo was the epitomeThe Marines also had mail call, unit mum use of Iwo's forbidding terrain, of everything we'd learned over thenewsletters, fresh water, radio batter- employed his artillery and mortarsyears about amphibious assaults:'ies, fresh-baked bread, and prefabri- with great skill, and exercised com-said Colonel Wornham of the 27thcated burial markers, thousands of mand with an iron will virtually toMarines. Bad as the enemy fire be-them. the end. He was also arealist.came on D-day, there were no reports Iwo Jima featured superior inter- Without hope of even temporaryof"Issueindoubt:' Lieutenantservicecooperation. The Navy- naval or air superiority he knew heColonel Galer compared Iwo JimaMarine Corps team rarely functioned was doomed from the start. In fivewith his Guadalcanal experience:more efficiently.The blue-water weeks of unremitting pressure, the"Then it was 'can we hold?' Here atNavy continued to earn the respect Americans breached every strong-Iwo Jima the question was simplyof the Marines, especially on D-2 point, exterminated his forces, and'When can we get it over?'" when the flotilla of tiny LCI gunboats seized the island. The ship-to-shore assault at Iwobravely attacked the coastal defense

49 Above and Beyond the Call of Duty wenty-seven men receivedthe Congressional PltSgt Joseph J. Julian, 1/27, 9 March* Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and PFC James D. LaBelle, 1/27, 8 March* Tintrepidity during the battle of Iwo Jima: 22 Ma- 2dLt John H. Leims, 1/9, 7 March rines, four Navy corpsmen, and one Navy landing craft PFC Jacklyn H. Lucas, 1/26, 20 February commander. Exactly half of the awards issued to Marines lstLt Jack Lummus, 2/27, 8 March* and corpsmen of the V Amphibious Corps were posthu- Capt Joseph J. McCarthy, 2/24, 21 February mous. Within a larger institutional context, Iwo Jima lstLt Harry L. Martin, 5th Pioneer Battalion, 26 March* represented more than one-fourth of the 80 Medals of Pvt George Phillips, 2/28, 14 March* Honor awarded Marines during the Second World War. PhM 1/c Francis J. Pierce, USN, 2/24, 15-16 March This was Iwo Jima's Roll of Honor: PFC Donald J. Ruhl, 2/28, 19-21 February* Pvt Franklin E. Sigler, 2/26, 14 March Cpl Charles J. Berry, 1/26, 3 March 1945* CpI Tony Stein, 1/28, 19 February* PFC William R. Caddy, 3/26, 3 March* PhM 2/c George Wahlen, USN, 2/26, 3 March LtCol Justice M. Chambers, 3/25, 19-22 February GySgt William C. Walsh, 3/27, 27 February* Sgt Darrell S. Cole, 1/23, 19 February* Pvt Wilson D. Watson, 2/9, 26-27 February Capt Robert Dunlap, 1/26, 20-21 February Cpl Hershel W. Williams, 1/21, 23 February Sgt Ross F. Gray, 1/25, 21 February PhM 3/c Jack Williams, USN, 3/28, 3 March* Sgt William C. Harrell, 1/28, 3 March PhM 1/c John H. Willis, USN, 3/27, 28 February* Lt Rufus G. Herring, USNR, LCI 449, 17 February PFC Douglas T. Jacobson, 3/23, 26 February *Posthumous

\\\1\\k

50 of organized units to strengthen the a' assault forces. Both decisions, ren- •t1dered in the context of several com- 1'* peting factors,were made by *t experienced commanders in good faith. Unavoidably, Iwo Jima's big- gest cost to the V Amphibious Corps was the loss of so many combat vete- rans in taking the island. While the battle served to create a new genera- --a—' tion of veterans among the survivors, -5-C' many proud regimentssuffered devastating losses. With these same units already designated as key com- ponents of the landing force against r - the Japanese home islands, such loss- es had serious potential implications. :.': These factors may well have in- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111147 fluenced General Holland Smith's un- At the end of a very long fight, a Marine flamethrower operator pauses to light up. popular decision to withhold the 3d guns to protect the Navy and Marine of whom shared both the misery andMarines from the battle. From the frogmen. Likewise, the Marines wel-the glory of the prolonged battle. perspective of an exhausted compa- comed thecontributionsofthe Two aspects of the battle remainny commander on Iwo Jima, Smith's Army, Coast Guard, Coast and Ge- controversial: the inadequate prelimi-decision seemed inexcusable, then odetic Survey, Red Cross, and thenary bombardment and the decisionand now; from the wider perspective host of combat correspondents —all to use piecemeal replacements insteadof the commanding general, Fleet LtGen Holland M. Smith, USMC, with his Fleet Marine Force, age along the landing beaches. Iwo Jimc# was Gen Smith's last Pacific chief of staff, Col Dudley S. Brown, surveys the wreck- battle. After this, he returned to his headquarters on Hawaii. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110635

51 Marine Forces, Pacific, the decision tic.Fromthetimethe a sense of reverence for the men who makes more sense. engagement was joined until the won that epic battle. Whatever his shortcomings, Hol- mission was completed it was a Fleet Admiral Nimitz said these land Smith probably knew amphibi- matter of frontal assault main- words while the fighting still raged: ous warfare better than anyone. Of tained with relentless pressure 'Among the Americans who served the hundreds of after-action reports by a superior mass of troops on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was filed immediately following the bat- and supporting arms against a a common virtue," a sentiment now tle, his official analysis best captured position fortified to the maxi- chiseled in granite at the base of Fe- the essence of the struggle: mum practical extent. lix de Weldon's gigantic bronze sculp- There was no hope of sur- We Americans of a subsequent ture of the Suribachi flag-raising. prise, either strategic or tactical. generation in the profession of arms Twenty-two Marines, four Navy There was little possibility for find it difficult to imagine a sustainedcorpsmen, and one LCI skipper were tacticalinitiative;theentire amphibious assault under such con-awarded the Medal of Honor for ut- operation was fought on what ditions. In some respects the fightingmost bravery during the battle of Iwo were virtually the enemy's own on Iwo Jima took on the features ofJima. Half were posthumous awards. General Erskine placedthese terms .. . . Thestrength, dis- Marines fighting in France in 1918, position, and conduct of the described by one as "a war girt withsacrifices in perspective in remarks enemy's defense requireda horrors:' We sense the drama repeat-made during the dedication of the 3d major penetration of the heart ed every morning at Iwo, after theMarine Division cemetery on the em- of his prepared positions in the prep fires lifted, when the riflemen,battled island: center of the Motoyama Plateau engineers,corpsmen, flame tank Victory was never in doubt. and a subsequent reduction of crews, and armored bulldozer oper- Itscost was. What was in the positions in the difficult ter- ators somehow found the fortitude doubt, in all our minds, was rain sloping to the shore on the to move out yet again into "Death whether there would be any of flanks. The size and terrain of Valley" or "The Meatgrinder:' Few of us left to dedicate our cemetery the island precluded any Force us today can study the defenses, ana- at the end, or whether the last Beachhead Line. It was an oper- lyze the action reports, or walk the Marine would die knocking out ation of one phase and one tac- broken ground without experiencing the last Japanese gunner. Assault Divisions' Command Structures As the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions conducted their 2/24 LtCol Richard Rothwell final preparations for Operation Detachment, these were 3/24 LtCol Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr. the infantry commanders who would lead the way at the 25th Marines Col John R. Lanigan beginning of the battle: 1/25 LtCol HolEs U. Mustain 2/25 LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr. 3d Marine Division 3/25 LtCol Justice M. Chambers 3d Marines Col James A. Stewart 9th Marines Col Howard N. Kenyori 5th Marine Division 1/9 LtCol Carey A. Randall 26th Marines Col Chester B. Graham 2/9 LtCoI Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 1/26 LtCol Daniel C. Pollock 3/9 LtCol Harold C. Boehm 2/26 LtCol Joseph P. Sayers 21st Marines Col Hartnoll J. Withers 3/26 LtCol Tom M. Trotti 1/21 LtCol Marlowe C. Williams 27th Marines Col Thomas A. Wornham 2/21 LtCoI Lowell E. English 1/27 LtCol John A. Butler 3/21 LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis 2/27 Maj John W. Antonelli 3/27 LtCol Donn J. Robertson 4th Marine Division 28th Marines Col Harry B. Liversedge 23d Marines Col Walter W. Wensinger 1/28 LtCoI Jackson B. Butterfield 1/23 LtCol Ralph Haas 2/28 LtCol Chandler W. Johnson 2/23 Maj Robert H. Davidson 3/28 LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr. 3/23 Maj James S. Scales [Note: Of those infantry battalion commanders who landed 24th Marines Col Walter I. Jordan on Iwo Jima on D-Day, only seven remained unwounded 1/24 Maj Paul S. Treitel and still retained command at the battle's end].

52 Sources About the Author The official records of the V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima occupy 27 boxes in the olonelJoseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), USMC archives. Within this maze, the most useful information can be found in the com- Cserved 29 years on active duty in the Ma- ments and recommendations" sections of the Af- rine Corps as an assault amphibian officer, in- ter Action Reports filed by the major units. The cluding two toursinVietnam. Heisa best published official account of the battle is distinguished graduate of the Naval War College contained in George W. Garand and Truman R. and holds degrees in history from North Caroli- Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, vol IV, I' na, Georgetown, and Jacksonville. He is a life History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Washington: Historical Division, member of both the Marine Corps Historical HQMC, 1971). Three other official accounts are Foundation and the Naval Institute, a member recommended: LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo ii1J of the Society for Military History, the Military Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington: Histori- Order of the World Wars, and the North Carolina Writers' Workshop. cal Division, 1954); Capt Clifford P. More- Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, wrote Across the Reef: The Ma- house, The Iwo Jima Operation, and Bernard C. Nalty, The U.S. Marines on Jwo Jima: The rine Assault on Tarawa in this series. He is co-author (with Lieutenant Colonel Battle and the Flag Raising (Washington: Merrill L. Bartlett) of Sea Soldiers in the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, 1994) Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960). and the author of "Utmost Savagery: the Amphibious Seizure of Tarawa" (Naval Chapter 10 of Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Institute Press, pending). He has also written numerous feature essays published Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War in Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History, Leatherneck, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Amphibious Warfare Review, World War Two, and Florida Historical Quarterly. 1951), combines exhaustive research and keen analysis of the assault on Iwo. Three of the many postwar published accounts are particu- larly recommended: Richard F. Newcomb, Iwo Jima (New York: Bantam,1982); Richard Wheeler, Iwo Jima (New York: Crowell, 1980); and Bill D. Ross, Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor (New York: Vanguard Press, 1985). The most comprehensive Japanese account is containedinPart 11 ("Ogasawara Islands Defense Operations") in Chubu Taiheyo riku- 945 i9 / A' gen sakusen (2) [Army Operations in the Cen- WORLDWAR II 94"WW(!I 1945 tral Pacific vol II], part of the Senshi Sosho War History Series. Of Japanese accounts in English, THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the the best is Major Yoshitaka Hone's Explana- World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by tion of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Jima," written in 1946 and available at the Ma- rine Corps Hhistorical Center (MCHC). Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance The MCHC maintains an abundance of per- of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. sonal accounts related to Iwo Jima. Among the Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by most valuable of these are the Iwo Jima com- a grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. ments in the Princeton Papers Collection in the Personal Papers Section. The Marine Corps WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES Oral History Collection contains 36 well- indexed memoirs of Iwo Jima participants. The DiRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS research library contains a limited edition of Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) Dear Progeny,the autobiographyofDr. GENERAL EDITOR, Michael F. Keleher, the battalion surgeon credit- WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES ed with saving the life of "Jumping Joe" Cham- Benis M. Frank bers on D +3.The Personal Papers Section also holds the papers of TSgt Frederick K. Dashiell, CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT Lt John K. McLean, and Lt Eugene T. Petersen. George C. MacGillivray For an increased insight, the author also con- ductedpersonalinterviews with 41 Iwo EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION veterans. Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist The author wishes to acknowledge the con- Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician tributions of Marvin Taylor of the Marine Rocket Troops Association; Helen McDonald Marine Corps Historical Center of the Admiral Nimitz Museum: Frederick and Building 58, Washington Navy Yard Thomas Dashiell; LtCol Joseph McNamara, Washington, D.C. 20374-5040 USMCR; BGen James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret); Mr. Bunichi Ohtsuka; and the entire staff of the 1994 Marine Corps Historical Center, whose collec- tive "can-do" spirit was personified by the late PCN 190 003131 00 Regina Strother, photograph archivist.