JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC Sentinel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents The Terrorist Threat to FEATURE ARTICLE Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 1 The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s By Shaun Gregory Nuclear Weapons By Shaun Gregory REPORTS 4 The Significance of Qari Zain’s Assassination in Pakistan By Rahimullah Yusufzai 7 Pakistan’s New Offensive in South Waziristan By Samir Syed 9 A Diagnosis of Somalia’s Failing Transitional Government By Anonymous 12 The Status of Conflict in the Southern and Central Regions of Somalia By Michael A. Weinstein 15 A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan By Chris Zambelis 18 Incorporating Law Enforcement Interrogation Techniques on the Battlefield Pakistani Army soldiers guarding nuclear-capable missiles. - Photo by Rizwan Tabassum/AFP/Getty Images By Gretchen Peters l-qa`ida has made numerous will first outline Pakistan’s current 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity statements about a desire nuclear safeguards, and then identify 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts to obtain nuclear weapons a series of weaknesses in the country’s for use against the United nuclear security that could result in AStates and Western interests.1 While terrorist groups such as al-Qa`ida or many of these statements are rhetorical the Pakistani Taliban gaining access to hyperbole, the scale of the potential sensitive nuclear material. destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the instability and “nuclear porosity” Pakistan’s Nuclear Safeguards of the context in Pakistan, and the Pakistan has established a robust set About the CTC Sentinel vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear of measures to assure the security of its The Combating Terrorism Center is an safety and security arrangements nuclear weapons. These have been based independent educational and research mean that the risks of terrorist groups on copying U.S. practices, procedures and institution based in the Department of Social gaining access to nuclear materials are technologies, and comprise: a) physical Sciences at the United States Military Academy, real. Moreover, militants have recently security; b) personnel reliability West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear programs; c) technical and procedural the Center’s global network of scholars and facilities, including an August 20, 2008 safeguards; and d) deception and practitioners to understand and confront incident at the Wah cantonment, widely secrecy. These measures provide the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and understood to be one of Pakistan’s main Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division other forms of political violence. nuclear weapons assembly sites. (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons operations—a high degree of confidence In an effort to provide insight on in the safety and security of the country’s The views expressed in this report are those of the scale of the threat, this article nuclear weapons.2 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency 1 “Bin Laden has Nuclear Weapons,” BBC, November of the U.S. Government. 2 Lt. Col. Zafar Ali (SPD), Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and 10, 2001; “Al Qa’ida Threaten to Use Pakistani Nukes,” Threats of Terrorism: How Grave is the Danger? (Washing- Independent, June 22, 2009. ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). 1 JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 In terms of physical security, Pakistan intended to ensure that only authorized against its main adversary India, and operates a layered concept of concentric nuclear weapons activities and against the suggestion that its nuclear tiers of armed forces personnel to guard operations occur. It operates a tightly weapons could be either spirited out of nuclear weapons facilities, the use of controlled identification system to the country by a third party (posited to physical barriers and intrusion detectors assure the identity of those involved in be the United States) or destroyed in to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the the nuclear chain of command, and it also the event of a deteriorating situation or physical separation of warhead cores uses a rudimentary Permissive Action a state collapse in Pakistan.9 The fact from their detonation components, Link (PAL) type system to electronically that Pakistan has been willing to fire on and the storage of the components in lock its nuclear weapons. This system U.S. soldiers during the latter’s ground protected underground sites. uses technology similar to the banking incursion into Pakistan’s tribal areas industry’s “chip and pin” to ensure that on September 12, 200810 removes any With respect to personnel reliability, even if weapons fall into terrorist hands debate about whether Pakistan would the Pakistan Army conducts a tight they cannot be detonated.6 use force to resist attempts by the United selection process drawing almost States to secure Pakistan’s nuclear exclusively on officers from Punjab Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use assets without its consent. Similarly, Province who are considered to have of secrecy and deception. Significant the use of U.S. precision strikes to fewer links with religious extremism or elements of Pakistan’s nuclear destroy the weapons would need to with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from weapons infrastructure are kept a rely on perfect intelligence and would which groups such as the Pakistani closely guarded secret. This includes risk not only significant radiological Taliban mainly garner their support. the precise location of some of the hazards at strike targets, but also the Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. storage facilities for nuclear core and ire of the Pakistan Army and the wider Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) detonation components, the location of Islamic world. that screens individuals for Islamist preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis sympathies, personality problems, drug Despite these elaborate safeguards, use, inappropriate external affiliations, “The concern, however, empirical evidence points to a clear set and sexual deviancy.3 The army uses of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in staff rotation and also operates a “two- is that most of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security person” rule under which no action, nuclear sites are close arrangements. decision, or activity involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer to or even within areas Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Weaknesses than two persons.4 The purpose of this dominated by Pakistani When Pakistan was developing its policy is to reduce the risk of collusion nuclear weapons infrastructure in the with terrorists and to prevent nuclear Taliban militants and home 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern weapons technology getting transferred to al-Qa`ida.” was the risk that India would overrun to the black market. In total, between its nuclear weapons facilities in an 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from armored offensive if the facilities were the SPD’s security division and from placed close to the long Pakistan-India Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear border. As a result, Pakistan, with a Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence command and control arrangements,7 few exceptions, chose to locate much and Intelligence Bureau agencies are and many aspects of the arrangements of its nuclear weapons infrastructure involved in the security clearance for nuclear safety and security (such as to the north and west of the country and monitoring of those with nuclear the numbers of those removed under and to the region around Islamabad weapons duties.5 personnel reliability programs, the and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, reasons for their removal, and how Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Despite formal command authority often authenticating and enabling Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s (PAL-type) codes are changed). In and Taxila.11 The concern, however, is civilian leadership, in practice the addition, Pakistan uses deception— that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are Pakistan Army has complete control such as dummy missiles—to complicate close to or even within areas dominated over the country’s nuclear weapons. the calculus of adversaries and is likely by Pakistani Taliban militants and home It imposes its executive authority to have extended this practice to its to al-Qa`ida. over the weapons through the use of nuclear weapons infrastructure. an authenticating code system down The Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida are through the command chains that is Taken together, these measures provide more than capable of launching terrorist confidence that the Pakistan Army attacks in these areas, including within 3 Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in can fully protect its nuclear weapons Islamabad and Rawalpindi. They 8 Pakistan,” Defense and Security Analysis 23:3 (2007). against the internal terrorist threat, 4 Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martelline, Nuclear 9 “US Has Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan 6 David Blair, “Code Changes ‘Secure’ Pakistan War- ons,” Daily Times, May 16, 2009. (Como, Italy: Landau Network, 2002). heads,” Daily Telegraph, February 9, 2004. 10 “Shots Fired in US-Pakistan Clash,” BBC, September 5 Personal interview, General Kidwai, Director General 7 This includes the issue of pre-delegation during crises. 25, 2008. of the SPD, Islamabad, March 2005; Personal interview, 8 “Zardari Says Pakistan’s