july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Terrorist Threat to

FEATURE ARTICLE Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 1 The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s By Shaun Gregory Nuclear Weapons By Shaun Gregory

Reports 4 The Significance of Qari Zain’s Assassination in Pakistan By Rahimullah Yusufzai 7 Pakistan’s New Offensive in South Waziristan By Samir Syed 9 A Diagnosis of Somalia’s Failing Transitional Government By Anonymous 12 The Status of Conflict in the Southern and Central Regions of Somalia By Michael A. Weinstein 15 A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan By Chris Zambelis 18 Incorporating Law Enforcement Interrogation Techniques on the Battlefield Pakistani Army soldiers guarding nuclear-capable missiles. - Photo by Rizwan Tabassum/AFP/Getty Images By Gretchen Peters l-qa`ida has made numerous will first outline Pakistan’s current 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity statements about a desire nuclear safeguards, and then identify 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts to obtain nuclear weapons a series of weaknesses in the country’s for use against the United nuclear security that could result in AStates and Western interests.1 While terrorist groups such as al-Qa`ida or many of these statements are rhetorical the Pakistani Taliban gaining access to hyperbole, the scale of the potential sensitive nuclear material. destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the instability and “nuclear porosity” Pakistan’s Nuclear Safeguards of the context in Pakistan, and the Pakistan has established a robust set About the CTC Sentinel vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear of measures to assure the security of its The Combating Terrorism Center is an safety and security arrangements nuclear weapons. These have been based independent educational and research mean that the risks of terrorist groups on copying U.S. practices, procedures and institution based in the Department of Social gaining access to nuclear materials are technologies, and comprise: a) physical Sciences at the United States Military Academy, real. Moreover, militants have recently security; b) personnel reliability West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear programs; c) technical and procedural the Center’s global network of scholars and facilities, including an August 20, 2008 safeguards; and d) deception and practitioners to understand and confront incident at the Wah cantonment, widely secrecy. These measures provide the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and understood to be one of Pakistan’s main Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division other forms of political violence. nuclear weapons assembly sites. (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons operations—a high degree of confidence In an effort to provide insight on in the safety and security of the country’s The views expressed in this report are those of the scale of the threat, this article nuclear weapons.2 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency 1 “Bin Laden has Nuclear Weapons,” BBC, November of the U.S. Government. 2 Lt. Col. Zafar Ali (SPD), Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and 10, 2001; “Al Qa’ida Threaten to Use Pakistani Nukes,” Threats of Terrorism: How Grave is the Danger? (Washing- Independent, June 22, 2009. ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). 1 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7

In terms of physical security, Pakistan intended to ensure that only authorized against its main adversary India, and operates a layered concept of concentric nuclear weapons activities and against the suggestion that its nuclear tiers of armed forces personnel to guard operations occur. It operates a tightly weapons could be either spirited out of nuclear weapons facilities, the use of controlled identification system to the country by a third party (posited to physical barriers and intrusion detectors assure the identity of those involved in be the United States) or destroyed in to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the the nuclear chain of command, and it also the event of a deteriorating situation or physical separation of warhead cores uses a rudimentary Permissive Action a state collapse in Pakistan.9 The fact from their detonation components, Link (PAL) type system to electronically that Pakistan has been willing to fire on and the storage of the components in lock its nuclear weapons. This system U.S. soldiers during the latter’s ground protected underground sites. uses technology similar to the banking incursion into Pakistan’s tribal areas industry’s “chip and pin” to ensure that on September 12, 200810 removes any With respect to personnel reliability, even if weapons fall into terrorist hands debate about whether Pakistan would the Pakistan Army conducts a tight they cannot be detonated.6 use force to resist attempts by the United selection process drawing almost States to secure Pakistan’s nuclear exclusively on officers from Punjab Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use assets without its consent. Similarly, Province who are considered to have of secrecy and deception. Significant the use of U.S. precision strikes to fewer links with religious extremism or elements of Pakistan’s nuclear destroy the weapons would need to with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from weapons infrastructure are kept a rely on perfect intelligence and would which groups such as the Pakistani closely guarded secret. This includes risk not only significant radiological Taliban mainly garner their support. the precise location of some of the hazards at strike targets, but also the Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. storage facilities for nuclear core and ire of the Pakistan Army and the wider Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) detonation components, the location of Islamic world. that screens individuals for Islamist preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis sympathies, personality problems, drug Despite these elaborate safeguards, use, inappropriate external affiliations, “The concern, however, empirical evidence points to a clear set and sexual deviancy.3 The army uses of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in staff rotation and also operates a “two- is that most of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security person” rule under which no action, nuclear sites are close arrangements. decision, or activity involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer to or even within areas Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Weaknesses than two persons.4 The purpose of this dominated by Pakistani When Pakistan was developing its policy is to reduce the risk of collusion nuclear weapons infrastructure in the with terrorists and to prevent nuclear Taliban militants and home 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern weapons technology getting transferred to al-Qa`ida.” was the risk that India would overrun to the black market. In total, between its nuclear weapons facilities in an 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from armored offensive if the facilities were the SPD’s security division and from placed close to the long Pakistan-India Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear border. As a result, Pakistan, with a Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence command and control arrangements,7 few exceptions, chose to locate much and Intelligence Bureau agencies are and many aspects of the arrangements of its nuclear weapons infrastructure involved in the security clearance for nuclear safety and security (such as to the north and west of the country and monitoring of those with nuclear the numbers of those removed under and to the region around Islamabad weapons duties.5 personnel reliability programs, the and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, reasons for their removal, and how Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Despite formal command authority often authenticating and enabling Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s (PAL-type) codes are changed). In and Taxila.11 The concern, however, is civilian leadership, in practice the addition, Pakistan uses deception— that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are Pakistan Army has complete control such as dummy missiles—to complicate close to or even within areas dominated over the country’s nuclear weapons. the calculus of adversaries and is likely by Pakistani Taliban militants and home It imposes its executive authority to have extended this practice to its to al-Qa`ida. over the weapons through the use of nuclear weapons infrastructure. an authenticating code system down The Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida are through the command chains that is Taken together, these measures provide more than capable of launching terrorist confidence that the Pakistan Army attacks in these areas, including within 3 Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in can fully protect its nuclear weapons Islamabad and Rawalpindi. They 8 Pakistan,” Defense and Security Analysis 23:3 (2007). against the internal terrorist threat, 4 Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martelline, Nuclear 9 “US Has Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan 6 David Blair, “Code Changes ‘Secure’ Pakistan War- ons,” Daily Times, May 16, 2009. (Como, Italy: Landau Network, 2002). heads,” Daily Telegraph, February 9, 2004. 10 “Shots Fired in US-Pakistan Clash,” BBC, September 5 Personal interview, General Kidwai, Director General 7 This includes the issue of pre-delegation during crises. 25, 2008. of the SPD, Islamabad, March 2005; Personal interview, 8 “Zardari Says Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons are Safe,” 11 “Expansion at Pakistan’s Nuclear Sites,” Institute for Bruno Tertrais, French Ministry of Defense, June 2007. Reuters, April 27, 2009. Science and International Security, May 19, 2009.

2 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 have also proved that they have good least three forms of terrorist assault: Army to Islamists in the late 1970s;18 intelligence about the movement of a) an attack to cause a fire at a nuclear family and clan links to Islamists and security personnel, including army, weapons facility, which would create extremists; the corrosive impact of ISI and police forces, all of whom have a radiological hazard; b) an attack to what is widely seen as the Pakistan been routinely targeted. A series of cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons Army being asked to turn their guns on attacks on nuclear weapons facilities facility involving a nuclear weapon their own countrymen at Washington’s has also occurred. These have included or components, which would create a behest; and the corruption of pro- an attack on the nuclear missile storage radiological hazard; or c) an attack with Western political and military leaders. facility at Sargodha on November 1, the objective of seizing control of nuclear weapons components or possibly a No screening program will ever be able nuclear weapon. On the latter point, to weed out all Islamist sympathizers “The attacks at the Wah Pakistan’s usual separation of nuclear or anti-Westerners among Pakistan’s cantonment highlight the weapons components is compromised to military or among civilians with nuclear a degree by the need to assemble weapons weapons expertise. Yet, there are at least vulnerability of nuclear at certain points in the manufacture and four levels of concern about collusion. weapons infrastructure refurbishment cycle at civilian sites, and by the requirement for co-location First, those with access to nuclear sites to at least three forms of the separate components at military weapons facilities, but not to the of terrorist assault.” sites so that they can be mated quickly weapons or components themselves, if necessary in crises. Furthermore, the could facilitate the access of emergence of new terrorist tactics in terrorist groups to nuclear weapons Pakistan (and of Pakistani terrorists 2007,12 an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear in India) in which groups of armed “It remains imperative that airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber combatants act in coordination on the on December 10, 2007,13 and perhaps ground16—sometimes in combination Pakistan is pressured and most significantly the August 20, 2008 with suicide or vehicle bomb attacks supported, above all by the attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide at entry points to facilitate access— bombers blew up several entry points suggests the credibility of such an United States, to continue to one of the armament complexes at assault on a nuclear weapons facility; to improve the safety and the Wah cantonment, considered one this is especially true because in a of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons number of these attacks the security security of its nuclear assembly sites.14 has been poor and disorganized, and the weapons and to ensure the terrorists have been able to escape and The significance of these events is remain at large. fidelity of those civilian and difficult to overstate. Civilian nuclear military personnel with weapons sites—those sites where The risk of the Pakistani Taliban or Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are al-Qa`ida gaining access to nuclear access to, or knowledge of, manufactured, assembled or taken weapons, components or technical nuclear weapons.” for refurbishment—are typically less knowledge takes on an even graver protected than military sites where dimension once the possibility of nuclear weapons are stored, deployed collusion is introduced. It is widely and operated, a problem the Pakistan accepted that there is a strong element sites, acting as a significant force Army has now moved to address.15 within the Pakistan Army and within multiplier for the kind of terrorist The attacks at the Wah cantonment the lead intelligence agency, the ISI, attack seen at Wah in August 2008. highlight the vulnerability of nuclear that is anti-Western, particularly weapons infrastructure sites to at anti-U.S., and that there also exists an Second, some individuals with nuclear overlapping pro-Islamist strand.17 This weapons duties could facilitate— 12 Bill Roggio, “Suicide Bomber Kills Eight at Pakistani is attributed to the “Islamization” of through intelligence, or directly—access Airbase,” The Long War Journal, November 1, 2007. the Pakistan Army, which is the result to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons 13 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda, Taliban Targeting Pakistani of a number of factors: General Zia-ul- components, circumventing two-person Nuclear Sites,” The Long War Journal, December 11, Haq opening the doors of the Pakistan and other procedural obstacles. 2007. 14 “Pakistan Bombers Hit Arms Factory,” BBC, August 16 “Pakistan Taliban Chief Brags of Attack on Police,” Third, technocrats with pro-terrorist or 21, 2008. Washington Post, April 1, 2009. anti-Western sympathies could transfer 15 The Pakistan Army has strengthened the security 17 This has many expressions, including the unwilling- their knowledge to al-Qa`ida or to the at some civilian sites by the deployment of extra troops ness of Pakistani soldiers to fight in the tribal areas, the Pakistani Taliban. There is already and through the training of police and civilian nuclear involvement of Pakistan Army officers in protecting al- the well-known case of two senior security personnel. These measures, however, have not leged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad while Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission been widely implemented due to the immense pressure he was on the run between September 2002 and Febru- (PAEC) scientists, Sultan Bashirrudin on Pakistan’s security forces because of the operations in ary 2003, and the involvement of Pakistani officers in as- the Pashtun belt and to manpower problems partly due sassination attempts against Pakistan’s nominally pro- 18 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (Ar- to terrorist attacks on Pakistan’s security forces. Western president, General Pervez Musharraf. monk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Press, 2005).

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Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, Conclusion The Significance of Qari who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 The risk of the transfer of nuclear and again shortly before 9/11 for weapons, weapons components or Zain’s Assassination in meetings with Usama bin Ladin himself, nuclear expertise to terrorists in Pakistan Pakistan the content of which has never been is genuine. Moreover, knowledge that disclosed.19 Combined with the example such a transfer has occurred may not By Rahimullah Yusufzai of AQ Khan, the so-called “father” become evident until the aftermath of of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb who was a nuclear 9/11 in Pakistan or elsewhere on june 23, 2009, prominent tribal militant arrested in 2004 for masterminding the in the world. It remains imperative that commander Qari Zainuddin Mehsud was largest nuclear proliferation network Pakistan is pressured and supported, assassinated, reportedly on the orders of in history, the cases of Mahmood and above all by the United States, to Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah Majeed point to what has been termed continue to improve the safety and Mehsud.1 His death came only a week the “porosity” of the nuclear context in security of its nuclear weapons and to after formally announcing a rebellion Pakistan and the real risk of nuclear ensure the fidelity of those civilian and against Baitullah and his militia in technology and of related technology military personnel with access to, or primetime interviews on a number being sold to terrorists on the black knowledge of, nuclear weapons. The of independent television stations in market by those involved with Khan challenge to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons Pakistan. The assassination of the or with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from Pakistani Taliban groups and from 29-year-old commander, commonly program.20 al-Qa`ida constitutes a real and present known as Qari Zain, occurred in the danger, and the recent assaults by the southern city of Dera Ismail Khan in the The final risk, and one that is usually Pakistan Army on some of these groups North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army in FATA and in the NWFP is a welcome not far from the Mehsud tribe’s could itself decide to transfer nuclear development. Nevertheless, more native South Waziristan tribal agency weapons to a terrorist group. One steps must be taken before the threat bordering Afghanistan. argument for this, described in Philip is neutralized and Pakistan’s nuclear Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent,21 is that states weapons no longer pose an existential Qari Zain’s death demonstrates can become pressurized or incentivized danger to the rest of the world. that Baitullah Mehsud will attempt to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist to eliminate any tribal leader that groups because they are responding to Professor Shaun Gregory is Director of the challenges his authority. It also deals threats from an external power but fear Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) a significant setback to the Pakistani the consequences of being identified at the University of Bradford in the United government, which was reportedly as the origin of a nuclear strike. In the Kingdom. He was formerly a visiting fellow providing Qari Zain with funds and context of severe international pressure at the Institute for Strategic Studies in weapons to combat Baitullah Mehsud on the Pakistan Army—particularly by Islamabad (ISSI) and at the Institute for and his TTP forces. This article will India or the United States22—the risk Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in discuss the significance of Qari Zain’s exists that Pakistan might be similarly New Delhi. He is the author of many papers assassination, explain why the Qari incentivized to move to such a “coercive and reports on Pakistani nuclear weapons, Zain and Baitullah Mehsud factions option.” This remains extremely terrorism, and state stability. His latest have been at war with one another, unlikely in the present context, not least book, Pakistan: Securing the Insecure identify Qari Zain’s successor, and given the level of terrorist threat to the State, will be published in 2010. briefly outline Pakistan’s three-pronged Pakistani state itself. Nevertheless, it strategy for moving forward. forms a necessary strand of the calculus about the transfer of nuclear weapons The Assassination to terrorist groups in Pakistan.23 On June 23, Qari Zain was shot to death by Gulbuddin Mehsud, one of his

19 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, Nuclear Jihad- trusted guards. The guard also injured ist: The Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons Qari Zain’s aide, Baz Mohammad, (New York: Twelve, 2007). before escaping. The assassin was once 20 Adrian Levy and Katherine Scott-Clarke, Deception: loyal to Baitullah Mehsud, but opted to Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear join the pro-government splinter group Weapons (New York: Walker and Company, 2007). named after Qari Zain’s slain cousin, 21 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent (London: Allen Abdullah Mehsud. According to Baz Lane, 2008). Mohammad, the assailant rejoined Qari 22 For example, in a context in which the United States Zain’s forces after accepting the group’s was attempting to “take out” Pakistani nuclear weap- general amnesty that was offered to ons by precision airstrikes or by the insertion of special fighters willing to abandon Baitullah’s 2 forces teams. militia. As expected, the TTP claimed 23 It is an interesting aside that Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Mirza Aslam Beg was instrumental in passing nu- senior figures in the Pakistan Army may be willing to 1 M. Irfan Mughal, “Baitullah Rival Shot Dead,” Dawn, clear weapons technology to a regional and sectarian ri- transfer nuclear weapons technology, even when it is June 24, 2009. val, Iran, in the 1980s simply for money for the Pakistan irrational to do so as in the case of Iran, empowering a 2 Qayum Nawaz Babar, “Baitullah Turns Tables on Army. The lesson is clear: under certain circumstances, regional and religious rival. Govt,” The News International, June 24, 2009.

4 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 responsibility for the assassination. group became obvious when a military in the background unlike the younger Waliur Rahman, a deputy to Baitullah, helicopter flew his body to Abbottabad, Abdullah.11 It was Abdullah’s death on and leading TTP commander Hakimullah where his displaced family, including July 24, 2007—when he blew himself Mehsud phoned reporters to claim that his wife, had moved to escape Baitullah’s up following a shootout with Pakistan’s they had plotted Qari Zain’s murder reach.7 The body was kept overnight security forces in Zhob in Baluchistan— on Baitullah’s orders after he turned at the Combined Military Hospital that sparked the fierce rivalry between against their group. Waliur Rahman in Abbottabad before being flown to his family and Baitullah Mehsud.12 described Qari Zain as a miscreant and Dera Ismail Khan for burial held under warned that “anyone who works against the supervision of security forces.8 A Qari Zain and his family accused us will face the same fate.”3 spokesman for the Qari Zain group also Baitullah of involvement in Abdullah’s admitted that they had received modest murder.13 Qari Zain also suspected By ordering Qari Zain’s killing, government funding in the shape of a Baitullah’s hand in the murder of his Baitullah has demonstrated that he will religious donation, or zakat.9 father, Masoodur Rahman Mehsud, and not tolerate any opponent, particularly one of Abdullah’s successors, Saifullah one from his own tribe and with links to History of Qari Zain’s Split from Baitullah Mehsud.14 To avenge these losses, Qari Pakistan’s security forces. The killing Qari Zain split from Baitullah Mehsud’s Zain tried for almost two years to rally was similar to the 2008 assassination group after the death of his cousin the Mehsud tribe and Taliban fighters of Haji Namdar, the leader of the non- Abdullah Mehsud in 2007. Abdullah was against Baitullah without much success. Taliban Islamic militant group Amr a Pakistani Taliban commander and one He began gaining strength in the spring bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar of the most wanted militants during the of 2009 when Pakistan’s government (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of rule of General Pervez Musharraf. Before and its intelligence agencies supported Vice) operating in Bara area of Khyber becoming a leading Pakistani Taliban him and another dissident Pakistani Agency. He too was killed by one of commander, Abdullah was captured by Taliban commander, Turkistan Bhittani, his guards, who later confessed that U.S. forces in Afghanistan in December to weaken Baitullah’s faction. With Qari he was tasked by Baitullah’s close aide Zain’s death, this strategy has backfired, Hakimullah Mehsud to kill Namdar.4 at least for the time being. In Namdar’s case, Baitullah decided to “Qari Zain’s assassination kill him after he stopped supporting reinforced Baitullah’s Mantle Passed to Misbahuddin Mehsud the Taliban and began working with Qari Zain’s brother, Misbahuddin Pakistani authorities by expelling reputation as the most Mehsud, who is known by the alias TTP militants from his area of control. powerful and dangerous Toofan Mehsud, replaced him as the Rivals have also accused Baitullah commander of the Abdullah Mehsud of sponsoring the murder of around Pakistani Taliban group.15 He is expected to continue the 283 tribal elders in his native South commander.” vendetta against Baitullah in what has Waziristan.5 Qari Zain’s assassination become a blood feud. Pledging to avenge reinforced Baitullah’s reputation as the his brother’s murder, Misbahuddin most powerful and dangerous Pakistani said he would not rest until Baitullah Taliban commander. 2001 and later transferred to the U.S. was dead. Like his slain brother, he detention facility at Guantanamo Bay supports the ongoing military operation Most importantly, the assassination was along with other al-Qa`ida and Taliban in South Waziristan and said that those a setback for Pakistan’s government commanders. After spending 25 months killed or apprehended in the fighting and military, which were reportedly at Guantanamo Bay, he was released in are Baitullah’s men and that all of supporting him and his ally, Turkistan March 2004 due to insufficient evidence them are terrorists. As was the case Bhittani, against Baitullah’s faction. that he belonged to al-Qa`ida or that he with Qari Zain, Misbahuddin said he Although Pakistan Army spokesman was a top Taliban commander.10 Upon would continue to assist the “jihad” in Major General Athar Abbas maintained his return home, he became an instant Afghanistan against U.S.-led coalition that the military had not helped any of hero, gave speeches preaching jihad forces and announced support for the anti-Baitullah Taliban forces, he and assembled a band of fighters. He Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.16 conceded that the government might was under the command of Baitullah It appears that at this point supporting be engaging with them at a political Mehsud, however, who at the time was Misbahuddin is the government’s primary level.6 Evidence that the government almost unknown and preferred to work option to weaken and defeat Baitullah. and the army was helping Qari Zain’s

7 “Baitullah Mehsud’s Rival Commander Qari Zainud- 11 Personal interviews, Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah 3 “TTP Claims Qari Zainuddin’s Killing,” Agence France- din Killed,” Daily Aaj [Peshawar], June 24, 2009. Mehsud, South Waziristan Agency, October 9, 2004. Presse, June 25, 2009. 8 Syed Shoaib Hasan, “A Very Strange Taliban Burial,” 12 Salim Shahid, “Cornered Militant Blows Himself Up,” 4 “Tense Calm in Bara After Namdar Killing,” The News BBC, June 25, 2009. Dawn, July 25, 2007. International, August 15, 2008. 9 Sabrina Tavernise and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistan to 13 Omar Waraich, “Pakistan Slaying Reveals a Flawed 5 “Baitullah Mehsud Getting Tough Competition from Strike at Leader of Taliban,” New York Times, June 15, Strategy,” Time Magazine, June 25, 2009. Tribal Rival,” Asian News International (ANI), May 11, 2009. 14 Ibid. 2009 10 “Profile: Abdullah Mehsud,” BBC, July 24, 2007. Also 15 Iqbal Khattak, “Qari Zainuddin Killed, Baitullah Ac- 6 Kathy Gannon, “Assassination in Pakistan Exposes see, Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Daredevil Militant with an cused,” Daily Times, June 24, 2009. Taliban Rifts,” Associated Press, June 23, 2009. Artificial Leg,”The News International, October 12, 2004. 16 Hasan.

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The government hopes that and Pakistani military operations in Conclusion Misbahuddin will mobilize his slain their villages.20 It will take time to revitalize Qari brother’s followers. In an interview, Zain’s group under the command of Maulana Mohammad Luqman, a cleric Pakistan’s Three-Stage Strategy to Weaken Misbahuddin Mehsud. Some of his men from South Waziristan, estimated Baitullah are demoralized, while others want more that Qari Zain’s group had about 700 Pakistan is now pursuing a three-stage government support. Nevertheless, it fighters.17 Other sources said the group military strategy to weaken Baitullah’s is now also a matter of honor for Qari could call 500 to 1,000 armed men. militia. The first part of the strategy Zain’s men because they will want to Qari Zain and his commanders used to began in June 2009. It involves bombing avenge all those who were killed at the claim that they had 3,000 fighters and and shelling Baitullah’s positions hands of Baitullah. The government that their strength was growing. In fact, to soften his fighters before sending will likely need to provide more support the group had hunted down Baitullah’s ground forces to occupy his strongholds to Qari Zain’s men to defeat Baitullah’s men in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan and block supplies. The government is forces. An initial government plan was districts, capturing a number of them rumored to have sought U.S. help in to initiate a ground offensive to secure allegedly with the help of Pakistan’s targeting Baitullah’s militia with UAV territory from Baitullah’s men in South intelligence agencies. Yet the Qari Zain attacks, and a number of these attacks Waziristan, and then to deploy Qari group does not have any presence in have occurred in the area recently. The Zain’s fighters to the secured areas to South Waziristan, from where it was Pakistan Army is releasing daily reports prevent the militia from returning. This forced out by the stronger Baitullah about the bombing campaign, although plan is still in place even though it may Mehsud group. Qari Zain himself had to there is no independent confirmation not materialize in the timeframe that first shift from his village in Barwand about its claims. was originally anticipated. in South Waziristan to the Shakai area of the agency to take refuge with an The second segment of the strategy As of July 20, the ground operation has anti-Baitullah faction. Later, he took up is to neutralize Pakistani Taliban not yet started. There are reports that residence in Jandola under the protection commanders such as Maulvi Nazir in the government is making frantic efforts of his ally, Turkistan Bhittani. Finally, the Wana area in South Waziristan and to rally the tribes in both North and he moved to Dera Ismail Khan city in the Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. South Waziristan to its side in a bid to NWFP to set up his organization with The government is arranging and neutralize militant commanders Maulvi assistance from the government. extending truces and peace accords Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Further with these leaders to prevent them from complicating the matter, on July 11 the Presently, Baitullah appears well- joining Baitullah Mehsud. Thus far, this government instructed anti-Baitullah entrenched on account of his army of goal has not yet materialized; in fact, commander Turkistan Bhittani to close committed fighters not only in South both commanders have scrapped their down his group’s office in Tank city.22 Waziristan, but also in other tribal areas peace deals with the government after The step may have been taken due in FATA and districts in the NWFP. As accusing it of violating the accord’s to criticism that the government was the founder and head of the TTP, he terms. Their main complaint is that the erring by strengthening new militant commands several thousand fighters in Pakistan government was cooperating commanders who would be difficult the province and also like-minded allies with the United States in carrying out to control in the future. Nevertheless, in the rest of Pakistan, particularly in UAV attacks in both North and South there is no clear indication yet that Punjab. His fighting strength could be in Waziristan. They have made it clear the government and the military have the range of 10,000 or more.18 Although that they will not revive the peace discarded the option of organizing some of his men had previously defected accords until an end to UAV strikes.21 and strengthening groups of militants to Qari Zain’s group, this rate may slow Moreover, Hafiz Gul Bahadur has made willing to challenge the power of in light of Qari Zain’s death.19 Moreover, an additional demand for the Pakistani Baitullah Mehsud and his allies. Qari Zain’s assassination has created military to end the military operation fear among Mehsud tribesmen, and against Baitullah Mehsud. Rahimullah Yusufzai is a senior Pakistani they may be less willing to rise against journalist and political and security analyst Baitullah even though they see him as The third element of the government’s presently working as Resident Editor of the responsible for the increase in U.S. strategy is to create further divisions English daily The News International Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes in the TTP and strengthen the splinter in Peshawar. He has been reporting on group led by all those opposed to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North-West 17 Personal correspondence, Maulana Mohammad Luq- Baitullah’s faction. This effort is Frontier Province, Federally Administered man, July 1, 2009. continuing even after the assassination Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan since the 18 Kathy Gannon, “Assassination in Pakistan Exposes of Qari Zain. early 1980s. Taliban Rifts,” Associated Press, June 23, 2009. 19 Defections from Baitullah’s group occurred mainly in the settled districts of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, where the government had the means to help Qari Zain’s men lure and frighten Mehsud tribesmen to switch sides. No 20 Tahir Ali, “Govt-Backed Revolts Against TTP Fail to precise figures are available, although Qari Zain claimed Deliver,” Pulse [Islamabad], July 3-9, 2009. 22 “Pro-Govt Militant Commander Turkestani Bhittani in his interviews before his assassination that his group 21 “US Drones Throw Cold Water on Pak Plans,” Pulse, Instructed to Close Office in Tank,” Express TV, July 11, was now dominant in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. July 3-9, 2009. 2009.

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Pakistan’s New Offensive The Army’s Planned Operation in South The army’s operation in South Waziristan Waziristan is different from the recent in South Waziristan Beginning in May 2009, the Tank- operation in Swat. The objectives of Jandola road—which travels from the two operations are clear in their By Samir Syed Pakistan’s settled areas of the NWFP titles. The Swat operation is called into South Waziristan Agency of Rah-e-Raast, which means “the path in april 2009, the Pakistani military FATA—has seen the daily movement of righteousness.” The goal is to bring launched a major operation against of military convoys.1 Tanks, artillery, the militants in the Swat Valley back Taliban militants in the Malakand region armored personnel carriers and trucks to the “right path.” After dislodging of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier carrying troops to the frontline pass these fighters from Swat, the army will Province (NWFP). The operation was through on an hourly basis.2 Escort maintain a presence in the region to re- considered a success, and the military vehicles with red flags precede the establish the writ of the government. claims that the entire Swat Valley has convoys, warning all traffic to move off The Waziristan operation, on the other been cleared of militants. In the wake of the road.3 No one is allowed to drive the offensive, the Pakistan Army is now alongside a military convoy due to fears “Even if the Waziristan mobilizing its forces to begin a major of a suicide attack. The forces’ general operation against the headquarters destination is through Jandola to the operation succeeds, it will of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Sarwakai route of South Waziristan. not cease cross-border coalition of Pakistani Taliban groups led That route, which runs through the by Baitullah Mehsud. Baitullah is one of heart of the Mehsud tribe’s territory, Taliban attacks against the world’s most wanted terrorists, and is the key to a successful military NATO and U.S. forces in U.S. authorities have placed a $5 million campaign in the area. bounty on his head. Moreover, he is Afghanistan.” wanted by Pakistan’s government for Without control of Sarwakai, Baitullah his alleged role in the assassination of Mehsud’s Taliban will have the ability former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to attack the army at will and retreat in December 2007. across Waziristan into Afghanistan. If hand, is titled Rah-e-Nijat, or the the army is able to control Sarwakai, “path to deliverance.” The army’s plan The operation, however, will require however, it will cut off the Baitullah- for Waziristan is simply to eliminate Pakistan’s military to deploy into what led Taliban’s ability to retreat into Baitullah Mehsud and his group; there is considered one of the most dangerous Afghanistan. Under this scenario, to is no plan to establish the writ of the places in the world: South Waziristan reach the border Baitullah’s forces would state, or even to counter other Taliban Agency of the Federally Administered have to cross territory controlled by the groups. In fact, the army’s plan hinges, Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan’s army Wazir, the Mehsud tribe’s traditional quite tenuously, on the hope that other must do what no military has achieved enemy. While the Taliban’s ideology Taliban groups will remain neutral in in more than 2,000 years of the region’s has softened that feud, there are still the conflict, allowing the military to recorded history: use military force tensions between the tribes. Pakistan’s focus exclusively on one troublesome to defeat the tribes of Waziristan in intelligence agencies are trying to ensure faction. Failure to isolate Baitullah will their own territory. The Mehsud, along that these tensions remain high.4 The imperil the entire Waziristan operation. with the Afridi and the Wazir, have army’s overall plan is simple: surround No government or military force has traditionally been the most warlike of the militants, deploy as much military ever executed a successful campaign the Pashtun tribes. Even the British firepower as possible, and attack them against the combined strength of the Empire was forced to withdrawal after into submission. The army has also tribes in Waziristan. two disastrous and failed campaigns. deployed soldiers to key points along the Yet with modern technology and public perimeter of the operation so that they Even if the government is able to cause support for the operation, there are can kill or capture militants as they flee Waziristan’s tribes to unite against hopes that the Pakistan Army will be the bombardment toward Afghanistan. Baitullah or at least remain neutral in able to achieve the monumental task. The government’s operation is strictly the conflict, it may not be enough to against the Baitullah-led Taliban, and succeed. As a result, the intelligence This article will examine Pakistan’s not against other Pakistani Taliban agencies are pursuing two strategies. In planned operation in South Waziristan groups. addition to isolating Baitullah from other and how Baitullah Mehsud might tribal militias, the intelligence agencies retaliate, and also explain why even a are also backing a pro-government successful operation will not put an end leader among the Mehsud tribe to rival to Pakistani Taliban groups undertaking 1 This information is based on the author’s first-hand ob- Baitullah. They hope that such a leader attacks against U.S. and NATO forces in servations in the tribal regions of Pakistan. will pull support away from Baitullah, neighboring Afghanistan. 2 Ibid. especially if he is killed. Until recently, 3 Ibid. this was in the form of Qari Zainuddin 4 The principal card that the Pakistan Army has used to Mehsud, a relative of slain Taliban divide the Waziristan tribes is the issue of foreign fight- commander Abdullah Mehsud. With ers. These include mainly Arabs and Uzbeks, who do not support from the government and see eye-to-eye with each other. Turkistan Bhittani, the leader of the

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Bhittani tribe, Qari Zain was trying It is likely that Pakistan’s government conflict with the Pakistan Army, they to weaken Baitullah’s popularity.5 wants to avoid turning the militias are vehemently opposed to the Pakistani Recently, he launched a much publicized in the tribal areas firmly against the military entering their territory. smear campaign questioning Baitullah’s government due to concern about their Furthermore, they already collaborate commitment to Islam and the Taliban ability to destabilize Pakistan. with Baitullah’s faction during cross- cause, and his “unpatriotic” motives border raids in Afghanistan. Indeed, as for attacking Pakistani security forces. Baitullah’s Ability to Retaliate soon as the army moved convoys across That gamble failed, however, because Although the Waziristan operation has their territory, a number of incidents Qari Zain was gunned down by one of begun, Baitullah Mehsud has not yet have occurred. On July 5, militants his own bodyguards allegedly on the retaliated in any significant manner. loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadur ambushed orders of Baitullah.6 Qari Zain’s mantle His only alleged gesture of retaliation a military convoy outside the town has now been passed to his brother, was the assassination of Qari Zain. of Miramshah in North Waziristan, Misbahuddin, who has vowed to carry on His failure to respond is probably killing 22 soldiers.12 After the incident, the “jihad against Baitullah Mehsud.” because he has not yet been pressured a spokesman for the militant leader said to the point of taking action. Despite its they were breaking off their peace deal Pakistan’s last offensive against claims, the army has yet to kill or arrest with the government. Maulvi Nazir, Baitullah Mehsud’s militants in 2008 a single senior Taliban commander in operating out of South Waziristan, has ended in a de facto cease-fire. There Waziristan, or even in Swat.9 Reports already announced the dissolution of is no clear explanation as to why the from Waziristan suggest that while the his peace deal with the government.13 government failed to achieve success army has been expending a substantial The army immediately responded in 2008. The militants themselves amount of ammunition, there has been by saying it was not conducting an admitted that they “had been pushed” little loss of life on the militants' side. operation in North Waziristan and that to the limit.7 The army clearly had the As one senior ex-intelligence official its actions were only against Baitullah upper hand in the offensive, yet for said, "They want to see what the real Mehsud. Subsequently, efforts were some reason pulled back. That action situation on the ground is likely to be, launched to reconcile “differences” with was in character with all of Pakistan’s before going in with full force.”10 both Taliban commanders to prevent security operations in the region since misunderstandings. the 9/11 attacks in the United States. There are several reasons why both The security forces have regularly Baitullah and Pakistan’s military have Unfortunately, the July 5 incident is not pursued the militants in response to reacted timidly. Baitullah is likely an isolated misunderstanding. The fact international pressure, and consistently hoping that the other Pakistani Taliban remains that all the Taliban factions ended up forging peace deals with them. leaders in the tribal areas will begin are suspicious of the army, and despite As explained in a BBC report, retaliating against the government due differences immediately band together to encroachments on their territory. if another faction is threatened by a The militants control territory For their part, Pakistan’s intelligence military operation. Throughout history, throughout the North West services are being careful to keep Maulvi each government that has attempted Frontier Province and every Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, two other to pacify the region has practiced a operation by the army has top Taliban commanders in Waziristan, strategy of “divide and rule,” and the ultimately ended with the army out of the equation. Unfortunately, this region’s tribes understand its dynamics losing territory. In fact, there is may no longer be possible.11 Both men well. a recurring pattern to the army’s operate out of Waziristan, and while offensives. Troops nearly always both leaders have said they have no Baitullah and his faction also have a tend to be deployed following more direct way to retaliate against international claims that the area the Pakistani government. They retain 9 The Swat Taliban militants operated under 15 senior in question is newly under al- the option to strike in Pakistan's major commanders. All of these were later named in govern- Qaeda’s control and poses a threat cities to politically destabilize the ment “most wanted” lists. See “Pakistan Puts up Taliban to the country’s nuclear arsenal.8 country. The fact that Baitullah has not Chief Reward,” BBC, May 29, 2009. The army says only already exercised this option since the two of these commanders might have been killed, but start of the Waziristan offensive likely 5 The Wazir are the largest of Waziristan’s tribes. They could not confirm their deaths with certainty. signifies that the army’s operation are divided into two main branches, the Utmanzai Wazir 10 Personal interview, former Pakistani intelligence of- is not yet intense enough. When the (predominantly in North Waziristan) and the Ahmedzai ficial, Islamabad, July 3, 2009. army does decide to escalate their Wazir (South Waziristan). The tribe stretches into east- 11 The Pakistan Army has made peace deals with both campaign, the recoil will likely be felt ern Afghanistan, and many tribesmen have dual nation- leaders. In September 2006, they forged a deal with Hafiz from Islamabad to Karachi. Baitullah alities. The Mehsud are the next largest in size. The Bhit- Gul Bahadur, while in March 2007 they brokered a deal Mehsud has one of the most efficient tanis are among the smallest of the tribes in Waziristan. with Maulvi Nazir Ahmed. The conditions of the deal militant networks in the country, with 6 For more on the assassination of Qari Zain, see Ra- were that the army would keep its strength to the mini- extensive ties to Punjabi-based militant himullah Yusufzai, “The Significance of Qari Zain’s As- mal in their territories and not use it to conduct any sort groups such as Jaysh-i-Muhammad, sassination in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:7 (2009). of military operation in the region. The army also tacitly 7 Personal interview, Baitullah Mehsud and militants, agreed to “look the other way” as the Taliban carried out South Waziristan Agency, May 2008. cross-border raids. This has kept them from attacking 12 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “22 Soldiers Killed in Waziristan,” 8 Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Long War Against Pakistan Tali- the Pakistan Army. See “Pakistani Militants Abandon The News International, June 29, 2009. ban,” BBC, June 2, 2009. Deal,” BBC, June 30, 2009. 13 Ibid.

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Harkat-ul Mujahidin and Lashkar-i- A Diagnosis of Somalia’s 2009.5 Al-Shabab and HI have already Jhangvi.14 Any serious operation in increased control over most of Somalia’s Waziristan will at least in the short Failing Transitional regions outside of the capital.6 term unite the Taliban leadership Government and increase militant attacks across The current situation in Somalia is Pakistan. By retaining the capability By Anonymous exactly what the United States, the to execute suicide attacks in Pakistan’s United Nations, the African Union, major cities, Baitullah Mehsud and his for the second time in two years, the League of Arab States and other affiliates have a stranglehold over the Somalia’s UN-backed Transitional external actors had hoped to prevent Pakistan government’s actions in the Federal Government (TFG) appears to when they endorsed the UN-sponsored tribal areas. be on the verge of failing. It is being Djibouti peace process in 2008 that led relentlessly attacked by a coalition of to the election of Islamist opposition Conclusion Islamist transnational extremists and leader Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad Even if the Waziristan operation Islamist nationalists determined to as president of a new and improved succeeds, it will not cease cross-border topple the government in Mogadishu. TFG.7 The actors had hoped that the Taliban attacks against NATO and The most recent reports indicate that Islamist cleric, who appeared to be a U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In fact, the TFG forces1 fully control only six of moderate and a leading figure in the operation may provide greater impetus Mogadishu’s 16 districts, or about 35% Islamic Courts Union (ICU),8 would to the flow of militants across the border. of the capital; local journalists claim that act as a bridge between the West and Baitullah has always been more focused the TFG’s actual control is significantly the Somali hardliners who were once on effecting changes in Pakistan, and his less than that.2 The securest area is a his allies in the ICU.9 Sharif’s rise to death would have little or no effect on the small patch in the southern part of the power in the TFG, however, only served situation in Afghanistan. As stated by city, where 4,300 African Union troops to further infuriate the hardliners, who Qari Misbahuddin, who is now leading from Uganda and Burundi are guarding immediately labeled him a Western the anti-Baitullah faction among the the presidential palace, the airport “puppet.” It spawned the birth of a new Mehsud, “Jihad against America and its and seaport. The rest of Mogadishu, coalition group in early 2009, HI, and allies in Afghanistan would continue” including the famous open-air Bakara intensified the insurgency against the if Baitullah was killed. “Pakistan’s Market, is in the hands of Somalia’s al- TFG. government only has problems with the Shabab3 militant group and an allied foreign militants in the area. They [the coalition called Hisbul Islamiyya (HI).4 government] have always supported us The opposition’s recent success in in the jihad in Afghanistan.”15 Mogadishu came after they launched a coordinated offensive on May 7, 5 A reliable Somali source said the violence was trig- The lessons are clear. The army’s goal gered by an attempt by ICU fighters to assassinate an al- is to eliminate one Pakistani Taliban 1 “TFG forces” refer to government soldiers who had Shabab commander named Qoslaye, who led al-Shabab’s commander due to his penchant for been previously recruited by the transitional govern- “death squad” in Mogadishu. Qoslaye escaped but his attacking Pakistan’s government and ment of President Abdullahi Yusuf and Islamic Courts trusted bodyguard was killed. Enraged, Qoslaye ordered military. Its success in this operation Union (ICU) fighters who remained loyal to Shaykh an attack on ICU forces. For more background details, will depend on whether it can isolate Sharif Shaykh Ahmad. ICU fighters battled Yusuf’s see “Al-Shabab Blamed for Murder of Somali Lawmaker Baitullah from Waziristan’s other forces from early 2007 to the end of 2008, but a deal to and Commander,” Voice of America, April 17, 2009. tribal commanders. Furthermore, even merge Shaykh Sharif’s opposition faction and the TFG 6 This does not include the self-declared independent Re- if Pakistan succeeds in the Waziristan in June 2008 required government soldiers and Sharif’s public of Somaliland and the provisionally autonomous operation, it will have little effect on the ICU loyalists to work alongside each other. Puntland State of Somalia in the north. For an in-depth ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. 2 This is an estimate extrapolated from interviews with and current look at the status of forces in Somalia’s re- seven Somali sources living in various areas of Mogadi- gions apart from Somaliland and Puntland, see Michael Samir Syed is a freelance journalist who shu. The consensus is that TFG forces remain in five dis- A. Weinstein, “The Status of Conflict in the Southern and has covered Pakistan and Afghanistan tricts in southern Mogadishu and only one in the north. Central Regions of Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 1:7 (2009). for the last 10 years. He has written for a The sources add that al-Shabab has been offering cash 7 The deal, signed in June 2008, subsequently led to the number of local and foreign publications. for TFG weapons and for the troops to desert their posts. pullout of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. For details of 3 Al-Shabab has ties to al-Qa`ida. the Djibouti peace agreement, see International Crisis 4 Hisbul Islamiyya is an Islamic party founded in Feb- Group, “Will Djibouti Do the Trick?” July 6, 2008. ruary 2009. It is composed of four factions opposed to 8 “Somalia’s Moderate Islamist Leader,” BBC, January Shaykh Sharif’s new govern­ment: the hard-line Asmara 22, 2007. wing of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia led 9 Shaykh Sharif caused a split in the Asmara-based Al- by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys; Harakat Ras Kamboni, liance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) opposition a southern Somali Isla­mist group affiliated with Shaykh group when he and his followers began secret talks with Hassan “Turki,” who has had ties with al-Shabab; the the United Nations and the TFG in March 2008. ARS 14 For more details on the “Punjabi Taliban,” see Hassan Islamic Front of Jabhatul Islamiyya, an insurgent group hardliners, led by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys, boycot- Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC formed in 2007 to oppose Ethiopian troops in Somalia; ted the talks in Djibouti because of Ethiopia’s presence Sentinel 2:4 (2009). and a little-known, Harti clan group called Anole and at the discussions. The ARS subsequently became two 15 Syed Shoaib Hasan, “A Very Strange Taliban Burial,” based in Kismayo. It has largely allied itself to al-Shabab, entities: Sharif’s ARS Djibouti faction and Aweys’ ARS BBC, June 24, 2009. although it is a distinct organization. Asmara faction.

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This article will highlight the three had been schooled in the generally under Islamic law.17 As one Somali main political trends that composed the moderate Sufism current of Islam that academic noted in 2002, AIAI’s social ICU, outline how the divisions within took root in Somalia approximately and nationalist ideals distinguished the ICU created governance problems 1,000 years ago. Yet the religious beliefs the movement from al-Qa`ida, but the when it took power in June 2006, of many, including Shaykh Sharif, were differences were “largely ignored by explain how these same divisions have more in line with a faction of the Muslim the U.S. intelligence community, which led to the current failure of Shaykh Brotherhood movement that promotes chose to narrowly focus on AIAI’s Sharif’s government in Mogadishu, and the establishment of Islamic caliphates relationship with bin Laden and al- reveal some possible scenarios moving but generally opposes the use of violence Qaida.”18 forward. to achieve its goal.12 The pragmatists were at a disadvantage from the The jihadist faction was led by Aden Three Main Factions Within the ICU beginning, having to compete for power Hashi Ayro until his death on May 1, According to Somali civil society leaders, against fundamentalist-nationalists 2008 in a U.S. airstrike.19 Ayro had a deep journalists, clan elders, residents, in their midst—represented by shura and personal connection with al-Qa`ida, and Western analysts interviewed for council leader Shaykh Hassan Dahir having spent time in an al-Qa`ida-run this article, Somalia’s external actors Aweys and the ICU’s southern military should have known that the depth and commander Hassan Turki—and a new nature of divisions among the Islamists jihadist faction led by Aweys’ kinsman “HI’s alliance with al- in the Courts would prevent an easy and protégé, Aden Hashi Ayro.13 Aweys’ Shabab appears to be one political reconciliation and transition. and Ayro’s factions also received at the These divisions were apparent well very least rhetorical support from al- of mutual opportunism before neighboring Ethiopia, with U.S. Qa`ida. rather than shared ideals.” support, intervened to end the ICU’s rule in December 2006.10 At its core, the ICU Aweys and Turki, representing the fundamentalist-nationalist faction, “The most recent reports became leading Islamists in the ICU training camp in Afghanistan in the late because of their association with the 1990s.20 He returned to Somalia and indicate that TFG forces Courts’ predecessor, al-Itihaad al-Islami organized the recruitment and training fully control only six of (AIAI).14 In the 1990s, AIAI received of al-Shabab militia in Mogadishu. funding from al-Qa`ida,15 and its leaders Unlike his mentor Shaykh Aweys, Mogadishu’s 16 districts, have been implicated in terrorist attacks however, Ayro was driven primarily or about 35% of the capital; against Ethiopia over the disputed by al-Qa`ida’s brand of Salafism. As a Ogaden region that is claimed by both result, radicals composing al-Shabab local journalists claim that Somalis and Ethiopians.16 Somalis are far more aligned to al-Qa`ida’s the TFG’s actual control familiar with AIAI, however, assert ideals and objectives than radicals who that the movement had never intended once formed the backbone of AIAI.21 is significantly less than to join al-Qa`ida and participate in that.” a transnational Islamic jihad against ICU Disagrees Over Governing Structure the West. They argue that Aweys’ and After the ICU defeated a group of CIA- Turki’s goal was and still is limited to funded warlords and took control of reclaiming Somali-inhabited territories Mogadishu on June 5, 2006, there were was based around the most dominant in neighboring countries and forming a immediate divisions and disagreements clan in Mogadishu, the Hawiye, but it Greater Somalia in the Horn of Africa among the three primary factions was by no means a homogenous group. composing the ICU leadership.22 The From its formal inception in 2000, 12 Shaykh Sharif has publicly stated that in his view the Islamists within the ICU were Shari`a law allows for women to serve in parliament and 17 According to these observers, Usama bin Ladin un- an unwieldy mixture of pragmatists, that the democratic process, which al-Shabab condemns derstood AIAI’s determination to achieve Somali unity fundamentalist-nationalists, and as a “Western” idea, is “not inherently against Islam.” at any cost and simply exploited it by sending money jihadists, whose differing political and 13 As members of the Ayr sub-clan of the Habr Gedir and weapons to AIAI and co-opting the group into al- religious agendas would inevitably (Hawiye), Aweys and Ayro formed a close association Qa`ida’s efforts to turn Somalia into a radical Islamic cause internal friction.11 in the mid-1990s. According to an Ayr clan elder inter- republic. viewed in Mogadishu in 2007, Ayro was under Aweys’ 18 Personal interview, Somali historian, Mogadishu The pragmatists were led by Executive tutelage for several years before the Islamic cleric ar- University, Mogadishu, February 11, 2002. Committee Chairman Shaykh Sharif ranged for Ayro to be sent to Afghanistan to be further 19 Al-Shabab is now led by Ahmed Abdi “Godane,” also Shaykh Ahmad. Most of the pragmatists trained by al-Qa`ida. known as Shaykh Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr. 14 For background information on AIAI, see Interna- 20 Personal interview, Matt Bryden, former Interna- 10 Ethiopia’s military invasion technically began on July tional Crisis Group, “Countering Terrorism in a Failed tional Crisis Group analyst, Nairobi, December 5, 2006. 20, 2006, when troops crossed into Somalia to prop up State,” May 23, 2002. 21 For an excellent comparative analysis of AIAI and the TFG under President Abdullahi Yusuf in the south- 15 Ibid. al-Shabab, see International Crisis Group, “Counter- western town of Baidoa. 16 AIAI is also believed to have cooperated with the al- Terrorism in Somalia – Losing Hearts and Minds?” July 11 Personal interview, Matt Bryden, former International Qa`ida operatives who carried out the 1998 U.S. Embas- 11, 2005. Crisis Group analyst, Nairobi, December 5, 2006. sy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. 22 As Somalia analyst Dr. Michael Weinstein noted in an

10 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 pragmatists were reluctant to endorse It is widely believed that the Asmara- a TFG backed by frontline states Shari`a based on strict Salafist based leaders directed the insurgency of Ethiopia and Kenya, which are hostile interpretations as demanded by al- militias loyal to the ICU in Mogadishu, to the nationalists’ irredentist claim Shabab, and tried their best to distance while Ayro and his lieutenants stayed on their territories. At the same time, themselves from the extremists’ idea in Somalia to re-organize, recruit and the fundamentalist-nationalists were of justice.23 The pragmatists were also expand the reach of al-Shabab.26 It is not becoming disillusioned by al-Shabab’s concerned about the growing ranks known where Hassan Turki went during increasing efforts to rid Somalia of its of Ayro’s al-Shabab militia and its this time, but it is believed he found national identity and replace it with eagerness to shelter foreign al-Qa`ida shelter among his Ogaden kinsmen religious zealotry.30 operatives.24 inside Ethiopia and in his stronghold in the Lower Jubba region.27 The fundamentalist-nationalists found Pragmatists and Salafist ideologues a way to stay viable as a new insurgent also disagreed on various other issues, The Failure of Shaykh Sharif’s Government group, Hisbul Islamiyya. Led by fighters including the status of women and By December 2008, the Abdullahi from the ARS-Asmara faction and the what the ICU’s official stance should be Yusuf-led TFG’s popular support had all Ras Kamboni Brigades, HI forces are toward the secular TFG and its Western but vanished and its control of Somalia now fighting alongside al-Shabab to supporters. For obvious religious and had been reduced to only a few city oust Shaykh Sharif’s government and political reasons, al-Shabab flatly blocks in Mogadishu. Alarmed by the to force the withdrawal of international rejected the pragmatists’ conciliatory troops. Yet as was the case with AIAI approach to the TFG, which was isolated and al-Qa`ida, HI’s alliance with al- in Baidoa at the time. “The defection of Shaykh Shabab appears to be one of mutual Sharif to the TFG re- opportunism rather than shared ideals.31 The widening agendas between the Islamist factions in the ICU became opened the divisions Looking Forward irrelevant after Ethiopia invaded among the Islamist factions In May 2009, Shaykh Aweys and Somalia in December 2006. With al-Shabab negotiated on forming a that development, all Islamists faced and sharpened their common organization. Those talks a common enemy, and “alliances of agendas.” failed, however, but the two factions convenience” were once again formed to agreed to continue to support each fight the Ethiopian occupation. other tactically.32 In the wake of these discussions, reports from Somalia Aweys and his followers fled to Eritrea. prospect of Somalia “deteriorating into suggested that Shaykh Aweys was Shaykh Sharif and the other pragmatists an Afghanistan-like cauldron of militant searching for a negotiated truce with also went to Eritrea, where they joined Islamism,”28 Somalia’s external actors the TFG.33 As of July 2009, however, forces with Aweys’ group to form the entered into secret power-sharing talks Shaykh Aweys and HI have not moved anti-Ethiopian, anti-TFG Alliance for with the only Islamist they believed in either direction, and they continue to the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).25 they could work with: pragmatist leader collaborate with al-Shabab. Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad.29 article published the following month, “The revolution- Yet if HI were to implement a meaningful ary character of Somalia’s politics became evident when The defection of Shaykh Sharif to the truce with the government, the TFG the hard-line Islamist faction of the I.C.U. led by Sheikh TFG re-opened the divisions among the Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is on Washington’s list of al- Islamist factions and sharpened their 30 Al-Shabab’s attempts to eradicate Somali national- Qaeda supporters, gained ascendancy over the moderate agendas. By cutting a deal with the West, ism is highlighted in Abdulahi Hassan, “Inside Look at group headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed on June the pragmatists saw an opportunity the Fighting between al-Shabab and Ahlu-Sunna wal- 25. Whereas Ahmed had said that the I.C.U. was not in- to regain power. The jihadist al- Jama,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009). terested in imposing an Islamist social model on Somalia Shabab, however, saw the departure 31 “Somalia: Aweys Condemns Security Minister’s As- and was only concerned with bringing peace and order of Ethiopian troops as an opportunity sassination,” Garowe Online, June 19, 2009. In the re- to the country, Aweys insisted that the new I.C.U. would to fill the power vacuum and take over port, Aweys acknowledged that various armed factions not be satisfied with anything less than a state governed the government. The group that stood to fighting the Somali government do not have a “unified by Shari’a law.” benefit the least from the situation was ideology.” 23 “Meeting Somalia’s Islamic Insurgents,” BBC, April the fundamentalist-nationalists led by 32 “Shifts in Somalia as Exile Returns,” BBC, April 28, 28, 2008. Shaykh Aweys. They could not support 2009. The BBC reporter, Mohamed Mohamed, says 24 Personal interview, Somali journalist, Mogadishu, “members of the radical Islamist group al-Shabab were March 20, 2008. According to the journalist, the prag- 26 Personal interview, Abdurahin Isse Adow, ICU mili- said to have been at his welcoming rally” when Aweys matists vehemently opposed the harboring of al-Qa`ida tary commander, Mogadishu, April 3, 2008. returned to Mogadishu after two years in exile in Eri- operatives in Somalia, which they believed was “tan- 27 In September 2007, Turki allowed an al-Jazira tele- trea. tamount to an invitation for the United States to start vision crew to videotape inside a military camp he was 33 Scott Baldauf, “The Fiery Sheikh Dahir Aweys May bombing the country.” The journalist said the pragma- running on the Kenya-Somalia border. Be Ready to Hash out a Peace Deal,” The Christian Science tists lacked any power over al-Shabab and were threat- 28 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Situation in Somalia Seems About Monitor, June 17, 2009. On July 9, 2009, a member of HI ened into silence. to Get Worse,” New York Times, December 7, 2008. reportedly told Radio Garowe that Shaykh Aweys had 25 “Somali Opposition Alliance Begins Fight Against 29 Personal interview, UN source, Nairobi, August 10, agreed to peace talks with the TFG, following talks with Ethiopia,” Agence France-Presse, September 20, 2007. 2008. Egyptian mediators.

11 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 would have to agree to at least two The Status of Conflict in likely demands: 1) setting a timetable for the withdrawal of AMISOM, and 2) the Southern and Central ending Ethiopia’s training, arming and Regions of Somalia military support of TFG troops, secular warlords and their militias, and the By Michael A. Weinstein armed Sufi group Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama in central Somalia.34 Aweys and HI would since april 2009, the southern and central be required, among other actions, to sever regions of Somalia have been drawn into all ties with Ethiopia’s rival Eritrea35 and a more generalized civil conflict between renounce extremism and violence to the country’s internationally-recognized satisfy the international community. Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its loosely affiliated allies, Given the lack of trust between all sides and a coalition of armed opposition in the conflict, a truce, moreover a groups composed primarily of the peace deal, will be a difficult task. Yet if transnational Islamic revolutionary a settlement could be achieved, a public group al-Shabab1 and the Islamist- reconciliation with Aweys could give nationalist Hisbul Islamiyya (HI).2 Figure 1. Map of central and southern Somalia. Shaykh Sharif a chance to redefine his The broadening of the conflict to the embattled government as a defender of regions from its epicenter in Somalia’s the opposition on May 19, 2009. Somali nationalism and Islamic values. capital Mogadishu has disrupted Moreover, the armed opposition A revitalized Islamist government with relatively fixed power configurations has encircled Mogadishu by gaining a popular mandate would be an effective that had crystallized beginning in dominance to the north in Middle counter to al-Shabab’s efforts to grab late 2007. This has created a highly Shabelle and to the south in Lower power, which is of special concern due fluid situation in which projections Shabelle. to its ties with al-Qa`ida and the use of about the nature of a more stable foreign fighters.36 balance of forces can only be tentative. This article will examine the recent turn of events in Somalia’s regions before It is not at all clear, however, if Somalia’s Overall, the armed opposition to the identifying the current balance of power external actors—notably Somalia’s TFG currently has the upper hand. The in the country. immediate neighbors Ethiopia, Kenya, opposition’s Islamic administrations in and Djibouti—would be willing to the south are secure. In the center, the Recent Turn of Events 3 support a Somali government with a Hiraan region is no longer a stronghold Within the context of post-independence nationalist agenda. Such a government of TFG President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Somalia, the southern and central would likely result in the neighbors Ahmad’s allies in the Islamic Courts. regions belong to the territories under seeking proxies in Somalia to protect The Galgadud region is dominated by the the nominal authority of the TFG. their interests and keep the country traditional Sufi Islamist organization The TFG is presently confined on the mired in conflict. Somalia’s future again Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama (ASWJ), which ground to precincts of Mogadishu that remains dependent on the actions of is only a TFG ally of convenience. The are protected by a 4,300-strong African various actors and groups with radically Middle Shabelle region, which is Shaykh Union Peacekeeping Mission (AMISOM). different agendas for the country. Sharif’s base, moved into the column of Although the TFG’s juridical authority theoretically extends through the Anonymous is a correspondent based in whole of post-independence Somalia, the northwestern and northeastern East Africa. 1 During the period of the Courts movement’s domi- regions are respectively under the de nance in 2006, al-Shabab was the movement’s military facto control of the self-declared and spearhead and championed an irredentist program of unrecognized Republic of Somaliland 34 According to reliable Somali sources in the Gedo re- incorporating ethnic Somali populations in Ethiopia and the provisionally autonomous gion, about 700 Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama fighters recently into an Islamic emirate encompassing all ethnic Somali state of Puntland, both of which have returned after completing military training in Ethiopia. populations and governed by a Salafist interpretation of insulated themselves with relative 35 Since early 2006, Eritrea has been accused by the Shari`a law. success from the conflict to the south. United Nations and the United States of funneling weap- 2 Hisbul Islamiyya is an Islamic party founded in Janu- ons to al-Shabab and providing militants a base for ter- ary 2009. It is composed of four factions opposed to The southern4 and central5 regions rorist training. New allegations of Eritrean support for Shaykh Sharif’s new govern­ment: the hard-line Asmara lack both the presence of the TFG and Somali insurgents have recently re-surfaced. For details, wing of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia led see Margaret Besheer, “UN Security Council Considering by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys; Harakat Ras Kamboni, Sanctions Against Eritrea, Others,” Voice of America, a southern Somali Isla­mist group affiliated with Shaykh 3 Somalia gained independence in 1960. July 9, 2009. Hassan “Turki,” who has had ties with al-Shabab; the 4 The southern regions consist of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, 36 The United States, for example, has alleged that ap- Islamic Front of Jabhatul Islamiyya, an insurgent group Middle and Lower Jubba, and Lower Shabelle. proximately 300 foreign fighters have joined their forces formed in 2007 to oppose Ethiopian troops in Somalia; 5 The central regions consist of Hiraan, Galgadud, Mid- to fight against the TFG. See Frank Nyakairu, “About and a little-known, Harti clan group called Anole and dle Shabelle and Mudug, the latter of which has an au- 300 Foreigners Fighting Somalia Gov’t-UN,” Reuters, based in Kismayo. It has largely allied itself to al-Shabab, tonomous administration that has not yet been drawn May 15, 2009. although it is a distinct organization. into the wider conflict.

12 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 functioning regimes of their own. As momentum. This was especially true in drastic turn in May 2009 when the a result, these regions consist of a the south, to the point that when Ethiopia armed opposition to the TFG launched patchwork of local authorities composed terminated its occupation at the end of a major offensive in Mogadishu that of factions allied to the TFG with varying that year, the insurgency was dominant succeeded in taking most of the city. The degrees of affiliation, and factions of the in the southern regions. In the south, al- offensive was halted only by the wall of armed opposition that engage in tactical Shabab, which had separated itself from heavy weapons deployed by AMISOM cooperation. These “local authorities” the Courts movement, was strongest. In forces protecting key infrastructure and function in cities, towns and villages two of the central regions—Hiraan and government installations. within the regions to maintain security Middle Shabelle—factions of the Islamic (such as the removal of extortionate Courts held sway. In all regions, other The timing of the opposition’s May roadblocks) and implement forms of factions were present, disputing or offensive in Mogadishu was based Shari`a law that vary according to the collaborating with the major players. on its judgment that the TFG might ideological proclivities of the factions receive military support from external in control who consult with clan elders At the end of 2008, the most powerful powers and international organizations and local clerics. There are also regional Courts factions in the central regions that would shift the balance of power. authorities with varying degrees of allied themselves with the movement’s Resistance to the offensive by pro-Sharif effectiveness. former executive chairman, Shaykh factions of the Courts movement and TFG Sharif, who became president of the forces proved to be weak. In response At the micro-level, political conditions internationally-supported TFG in to the opposition’s gains, the TFG are exceedingly complex, with December 2008 through a power- has attempted to mobilize any groups overlapping and cross-cutting relations sharing agreement with the old TFG opposed to a takeover by the opposition, among clans, clerics, and political in which his faction was incorporated including former warlords, religious groups. The many and varied actors into the transitional government. The groups fronting for clan militias, figures evince greater and lesser degrees of in former TFG administrations in the coordination and contention with one “The timing of the regions and their clan militias, and another, depending on whether one frontline states Ethiopia and Kenya. faction or coalition dominates an area, opposition’s May offensive The mobilization of elements allied by or whether the balance of power is more in Mogadishu was based convenience to the TFG has triggered equal. Through the spring of 2009, a counter-mobilization by the armed the southern and central regions have on its judgment that the opposition, resulting in the current become increasingly contested, making TFG might receive military fluid and volatile political conditions. any assessment of the balance of power in each one provisional and problematic. support from external The Current Balance of Power in the Regions powers and international Shifting week by week, the current The political picture in the southern balance of power in the regions is and central regions, which resembles organizations that would determined by the status of forces of the fragmented conditions of the shift the balance of power.” pro-TFG factions and the factions of period between the fall of the Siad the armed opposition. In each region, Barre dictatorship in 1991 and the the elements composing the contending Islamic Courts revolution in 2006, is coalitions and their relative strength vary. most directly a result of the Ethiopian faction of the Courts movement led by its occupation of southern and central former shura chairman, Shaykh Hassan Most generally, there is a marked Somalia that occurred at the end of 2006 Dahir Aweys, which later entered the difference between the central and and ousted the Courts from control of HI coalition, rejected any deal with the southern regions. The former— most of the regions. Almost immediately, TFG and turned to armed opposition, including Hiraan on the west, Galgadud factions in the Courts began regrouping forming tactical alliances with al- in the center, and Middle Shabelle and launched an insurgency against Shabab. With the factions of the original to the east—were, before the armed the occupation that was centered Courts movement divided between those opposition’s May 2009 offensive, in Mogadishu and achieved limited who accepted and those who rejected mainly in the hands of Islamic Courts success and an effective stalemate. The power-sharing, the stage was set for forces affiliated with Shaykh Sharif, or resistance movement altered its strategy conflict between the two coalitions. clan militias contested by al-Shabab in decisively in autumn 2007, shifting its the case of Galgadud. In contrast, the focus to the regions, where Ethiopian During the first half of 2009, the latter, comprising the southwestern forces were either absent or stretched conflict in the southern and central Bay, Bakool, and Gedo regions—and the thin. The opposition’s aim was to take regions mutated from resistance to southeastern Middle and Lower Jubba, territory, establish administrations the Ethiopian occupation and growing and Lower Shabelle regions—were in cities, towns and localities, and control of territory by factions of the dominated by the armed opposition. eventually encircle Mogadishu, Courts movement, to confrontation where the insurgency continued. between those factions willing to Through the spring and into the summer participate in the new TFG, if only of 2009, the grip of the pro-TFG forces Through 2008, the insurgency expediently, and those that abjure in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle has increasingly made advances and gained participation. The situation took a been broken by the armed opposition,

13 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 and Galgadud has continued to be In the more isolated Galgadud region, forces on the border with Ethiopia that contested. The southern regions remain clan militias under the umbrella of are led by former warlord Barre Hirale, dominated by the armed opposition, but the ASWJ, which has allied itself whose home region is Gedo, and the they are being challenged by forces of loosely with the TFG, have succeeded former TFG administrations of Bakool former TFG administrations that have in marginalizing al-Shabab, but have and Bay, led by former Bay commissioner massed on the border with Ethiopia in not been able to eliminate it as a Hasan Mohammed Bikole, who has said Gedo and Bakool, and issue continuous that their forces would include “foreign threats to attack the current Islamist troops.”13 The power figure behind administrations. Ethiopia is widely “Most importantly, Bikole is former warlord Mohammed reported to have set up bases in Hiraan changes to the current Ibrahim Habsade, the current minister and Galgadud to monitor and contain of ports and sea transport of the TFG. In the armed opposition, and to have balance of power will response to the heightened threat level, crossed into Bakool.6 Ethiopia has depend on the willingness the Islamist administrations in the also harbored former warlords from southwest have strengthened security the regions, such as Barre Hirale Shire of external governments by establishing checkpoints. Shaykh from Gedo and Yusuf Dabaged from to intervene militarily on Mukhtar Robow, a leader of al-Shabab Hiraan, and has trained their forces and in Bay and Bakool, said on June 23: “We forces loyal to the pro-Sharif Islamic behalf of the TFG.” have issued an order to kill [Muhammad Courts.7 In the deep south, Kenya Ibrahim] Habsade.”14 The new al-Shabab has moved soldiers to the borders of commander leading the Bay and Bakool the Gedo and Lower Jubba regions, administrations, Shaykh Mahad Umar triggering threats and counter-threats. fighting force. ASWJ, which represents Abdikarim, said on June 30 that his traditional Somali Islam, is suspicious of forces would continue to fight the TFG.15 The strategic Hiraan region is Shaykh Sharif, who has not committed currently the most unstable, with its to its interpretation of the religion. In More insulated, the southeastern capital Beledweyne divided between May, ASWJ political spokesman Kaliph regions, which include Lower and the Islamic Courts and HI, and many Mahamud Abdi said that his group was Middle Jubba and Lower Shabelle, have of its towns under the control of al- prepared to support the TFG on the more secure Islamist administrations. A Shabab. In an attempt to reverse the condition that Shaykh Sharif promised coalition of opposition groups composed momentum of the armed opposition, to stop cooperating with foreign Islamic of al-Shabab, Harakat Ras Kamboni (led the TFG’s minister of internal security ideologies, especially Salafism.11 by Shaykh Hassan Turki) and the Anole and close ally of Shaykh Sharif, Colonel militia are in control of southern and Omar Hashi Adan, returned to his The TFG has suffered its greatest loss central Somalia’s second largest city home region to mobilize forces on the in the Middle Shabelle region. Middle and capital of Lower Jubba, the strategic border with Ethiopia at the end of May. Shabelle borders the Banadir region, port of Kismayo. Tensions on the border Having crossed into Hiraan, Hashi’s which encompasses Mogadishu. with Kenya, which are heightened by forces were unable to make headway, Moreover, it is Shaykh Sharif’s home Nairobi’s support for the TFG and hints and he was killed in a suicide bombing region and has provided his major base that it will intervene, have triggered on June 18.8 Since then, al-Shabab has of support. On May 19, al-Shabab forces, threats by the Kismayo administration taken the town of Jalalaqsi, and ongoing commanded by Shaykh Abdirahman to attack targets in Kenya.16 To the north, mediation efforts mounted by Hashi’s Hasan Husayn, captured the capital of the Lower Shabelle region is controlled replacement, Mohamed Daqane Elmi, Middle Shabelle, Jowhar, and have since by al-Shabab, which holds the port of have failed.9 On July 2, the security gained control of most of the region’s Merka, and HI, which is dominant in chief of the Islamic Courts in Hiraan, districts. Fighting has continued as pro- Afgoe, abutting the Banadir region. Shaykh Ibrahim Yusuf, defected to Sharif Islamic Courts forces attempt to HI, stating that he could no longer oust al-Shabab administrations, but the “work with the government” after it Courts have not yet been successful.12 appealed to foreign troops for help.10 In contrast to the central regions that are actively contested, the Islamist 6 “Ethiopian Forces Conduct Operations in Central So- administrations in the south, which are malia,” Radio Simba, June 25, 2009; “Ethiopian Troops controlled by various factions of the Allowed in by Somali Government – Official,” Radio armed opposition or alliances among 13 “Somali Government to Use Foreign Troops in Oust- Shabelle, June 23, 2009. them, have not yet faced military attack. ing Al-Shabab from Regions,” Allpuntland.com, June 29, 7 “Ethiopia Training Fighters Loyal to Moderate Somali Nevertheless, they are threatened by 2009. Islamist Group,” Midnimo.com, July 1, 2009. 14 “Somali Islamist Group Threatens to Kill Cabinet Min- 8 The identity of the suicide bomber is still disputed. 11 Scott Baldauf, “After Five Days of Assault by Better- ister Over Remarks,” Garowe Online, June 23, 2009. 9 “Somalia: MPs Say They Have Talks With Islamist Or- Armed Al Shabab Militiamen, Pro-Government Fighters 15 “Somalia: Hardline Islamist Official Vows to Continue ganizations in Hiran Region,” Shabelle Media Network, Have Apparently Begun to Retreat,” The Christian Science Fighting Government,” Shabelle Media Network, June June 24, 2009. Monitor, May 12, 2009. 30, 2009. 10 “Senior Somali Islamist Figure Quits Pro-Government 12 “Islamic Courts, Al-Shabab Battle in Southern Soma- 16 “Militia to Target Kenya and Ethiopia,” The Nation, Group,” Radio Simba, July 2, 2009. lia Town,” Shabelle Media Network, June 25, 2009. June 30, 2009.

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Conclusion A New Phase of wounded.6 In another incident, at least A review of the status of the general five people were killed in an arson attack conflict in southern and central Somalia Resistance and Insurgency against a state-run financial center on specified by region reveals a fluid in Iranian Baluchistan June 2.7 situation marked by precarious balances of power, factionalization, loose By Chris Zambelis The Iranian security services responded coalitions and, at present, tentative to the May 28 attack by carrying out an intervention by external powers. Each while the world remains fixated on extensive crackdown across Sistan- region has its own particular power the political turmoil engulfing Iran Baluchistan targeting suspected configuration that favors the TFG or the following the June 12, 2009 presidential members and supporters of Jundallah. armed opposition. elections, ethnic and sectarian tensions On May 30, Iranian officials publicly in the country’s southeastern province hanged three men near the site of the The armed opposition consummated of Sistan-Baluchistan1 continue to fester. mosque bombing claiming that they had its strategy adopted in late 2007 of On May 28, a massive suicide bombing confessed to supplying the attackers with encircling Mogadishu by gaining targeting Shi`a worshippers ripped explosives.8 Following the execution, dominance to the north in Middle through the Amir al-Momenin mosque Jundallah issued a statement saying that Shabelle and to the south in Lower in the provincial capital of Zahedan. only one of the men executed was in fact Shabelle. In addition, both Middle and Ethnic Baluch Sunni insurgents known a member of the group.9 Tensions in the Lower Shabelle do not border external as Jundallah (Soldiers of God) claimed province escalated further when rumors powers and, as a result, are relatively credit for the attack, making it the latest circulated that Molavi Abdolhamid insulated from external intervention. in a string of increasingly devastating Esmaeil Zehi, Zahedan’s leading Sunni This has left the TFG struggling to attacks by the obscure militant group cleric, was targeted in an apparent retain control of the capital, while since it emerged in 2003.2 Abdulraouf assassination attempt on May 31, the opposition—al-Shabab, HI and its Rigi,3 a Jundallah spokesman, said the presumably by state security officials or supporters—continue to consolidate attack was intended as retaliation for pro-regime forces seeking to avenge the and contest control over the central and Tehran’s execution of a number of Sunni mosque bombing.10 Scuffles that ensued southern regions. Uncertainty prevails clerics in recent years.4 Amid the chaos between his entourage and protesters and changes will depend on myriad of the bombing, Jundallah’s founder and led to some injuries and sparked clashes factors. Most importantly, changes leader Abdulmalek Rigi called for Sunni between civilians and the security forces to the current balance of power will clerics in Sistan-Baluchistan to advocate elsewhere in the province.11 Jundallah depend on the willingness of external a boycott of the June 12 elections.5 In a itself issued a harsh rebuke of the Sunni governments to intervene militarily series of subsequent attacks in Zahedan cleric’s decision to criticize the May 28 on behalf of the TFG. Changes also that Iranian authorities have also linked mosque attack. depend on the relative ability of broad to Jundallah, armed gunmen attacked coalitions, each composed of factions President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s This article will examine the recent pursuing their own agendas and often campaign headquarters in the restive history of Baluch nationalism and at cross-purposes with one another, to province on May 29, leaving a number dissent in Iran, explain how Jundallah hold together and coordinate efforts. of campaign staff and bystanders has modified its tactics since the end of 2008, and assess whether or not al- Dr. Michael A. Weinstein is Professor 1 The province of Sistan-Baluchistan is often referred Qa`ida may be supporting the Baluch of Political Science at Purdue to as Iranian Baluchistan. Baluch nationalists some- terrorist group. University. He received his Ph.D. from times refer to all of the territories where Baluch reside Case Western Reserve University. within Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan collectively as Baluch Nationalism and Dissent “Greater Baluchistan” and the territory in Iran as “West Iran is a patchwork of diverse ethnic, Baluchistan.” This article will use the terms Sistan-Bal- sectarian, and linguistic communities. uchistan and Iranian Baluchistan interchangeably. Iran’s Farsi-speaking, ethnic Persian 2 “Cleric: Clues of US, Israel’s Involvement in Zahedan population—nearly all of whom Bombing Discernable,” Fars News Agency [Tehran], are Shi`a—represent only a slight May 29, 2009. majority among Iran’s population of 3 It is unclear whether Abdulrauf Rigi is related to Jun- dallah founder and leader Abdulmalek Rigi. Members 6 “‘Gunmen Attack’ South Iran Election Office,” BBC, of Abdulmalek Rigi’s family, including a number of May 29, 2009. his brothers, have been implicated in previous attacks 7 “‘Arson Attack’ Hits Iran’s Zahedan,” al-Jazira, June and other militant activities. In fact, Iranian authorities 2, 2009. sometimes refer to Jundallah sarcastically as the “Rigi 8 “Iran Hangs Three Over Mosque Blast,” al-Jazira, May Group” in an effort to downplay the idea that Jundallah’s 30, 2009. message resonates outside of a close circle of militants 9 “Unrest Mounts in Zahedan,” Rooz Online [Paris], linked to the Rigi family. June 2, 2009. 4 “Jundallah Claim Responsibility for Bomb Blast,” 10 In a possible attempt to downplay the incident and Press TV [Tehran], May 30, 2009. reduce sectarian tension, the cleric later refuted reports 5 “Leader Urges Vigilance Against Plots,” Iran Daily that he was the target of an assassination attempt. [Tehran], May 31, 2009. 11 “Unrest Mounts in Zahedan.”

15 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 approximately 70 million. The rest of relied on heavy-handed repression to A Shift in Tactics and Targets the country’s population is composed ensure order, an approach that has fed Until recently, Jundallah’s violent of an array of minority communities, resentment toward the state.15 campaign has generally featured including a large ethnic Azeri ambushes, abductions, and bombings population—which makes up at least According to Jundallah leader against Iranian security forces across a quarter of Iran’s population—ethnic Abdulmalek Rigi, his group has taken Sistan-Baluchistan and symbols of Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans, Lors, Baluch, up arms in an effort to highlight the the ruling regime, especially officials Armenians, Jews and others. In spite plight of the Baluch people in Iran, and facilities associated with the of Iran’s mosaic of cultural identities, who he sees as victims of an ongoing various branches of the security Iranians representing different “genocide.”16 He has also claimed that in services. Jundallah’s decision to target backgrounds tend to share a sense of spite of Iranian accusations, Jundallah a prominent Shi`a mosque in Zahedan national identity rooted in feelings of is not an independence movement signifies a new and more dangerous pride and collective consciousness of nor does it have a radical sectarian phase in the insurgent group’s war Iran’s ancient heritage. against the Iranian government. The “Jundallah’s decision latest attack was against a purely At the same time, a number of ethno- civilian20 target that claimed the lives sectarian and linguistic minority to target a prominent of least 25 worshippers and injured groups in Iran perceive the ethnic Shi`a mosque in Zahedan more than 125. Significantly, the attack Persian-dominated Shi`a Islamist occurred while worshippers mourned structure of operating a deliberate signifies a new and more the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s policy of subjugation, discrimination, dangerous phase in daughter Fatima—an important day and repression.12 Iran’s ethnic Baluch of mourning for Shi`a Muslims and minority boasts a culture and a the insurgent group’s a national holiday in Iran—at the historical narrative that is imbued with war against the Iranian second largest Shi`a mosque in the a sense of collective persecution at the predominantly Sunni Muslim city and hands of colonial and modern regional government.” region. The potential impact of the powers; this has left the Baluch people attack on the June 12 elections also divided among Iran, Pakistan, and likely figured into Jundallah’s calculus. Afghanistan and without a country of The timing of the high-profile attack— their own.13 Moreover, ethnic Baluch agenda.17 Rigi has even said that he is occurring as it did in the run up to in Iran, who number between one and an “Iranian” and that his only goal is the elections—in addition to the other four million and belong to the Sunni to improve the lives of his people as disturbances in Sistan-Baluchistan also faith, inhabit one of the country’s most Iranians.18 Nevertheless, it is likely likely linked to Jundallah suggest that underdeveloped and impoverished that ethnic Baluch in Iran look to their the militants intended to escalate their regions.14 The region is also a hotbed kin across the border in Pakistan’s campaign against the regime with the of cross-border smuggling of drugs, Baluchistan Province—which is home knowledge that the world was following arms, and other contraband. Due to to the world’s largest Baluch population events in Iran closely. This strategy the difficulty in managing the region and a decades-long insurgency against draws international attention to the through traditional administrative and Islamabad—as a source of inspiration Baluch cause and exerts pressure on the institutional means, Tehran has instead and possibly material support.19 regime during a period of heightened political awareness in Iran.21 12 Significantly, the issue of ethnic and sectarian- ten 15 For an overview of the human rights situation in sions in Iran was brought to the fore during the recent Sistan-Baluchistan, see Amnesty International, “Iran: 20 In spite of the fact that all of the victims are believed presidential campaign. Opposition candidate Mir Hos- Human Rights Abuses Against the Baluchi Minority,” to be civilians and that the mosque was clearly a civilian sein Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri himself, sought to tap September 17, 2007. target, Jundallah spokesman Abdulraouf Rigi stated that into the simmering resentments of Iranian minorities by 16 Maryam Kashani, “Interview With the Commander of the bomber was in fact targeting members of the elite Ira- promising greater rights and opportunities. In an effort Jondallah and His Hostage,” Rooz Online, May 14, 2006. nian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other spe- to win over the support of Iranian Baluch and other Sun- 17 Ibid. cial security units who he says were conducting a secret ni minorities, for instance, Mousavi promised to permit 18 Ibid. meeting inside of the mosque. This statement indicates Iranian Sunnis to construct their own mosque in Tehran. 19 Among other things, Jundallah regularly exploits the that, in spite of its recent actions, Jundallah may still be For more details, see Shahin Abbasov, “Iran: Azeris Cau- porous border and harsh terrain along the Iranian-Pak- sensitive to accusations that it is resorting to wanton at- tious About Supporting Native Son Mousavi in Tehran istani frontier to circumvent both Iranian and Pakistani tacks against civilians. See “‘Gunmen Attack’ South Iran Political Fight,” EurasiaNet, June 23, 2009; Nahid Siam- authorities. Jundallah often brings those it abducts into Election Office,” BBC, May 29, 2009. doust, “Can Iran’s Minorities Help Oust Ahmadinejad?” Pakistani territory, at least temporarily, suggesting that 21 In an apparently unrelated incident a few days follow- Time Magazine, May 30, 2009. the group maintains some level of operational infrastruc- ing the mosque bombing, Iranian security officials re- 13 The Baluch nationalist narrative often portrays the ture in Pakistani Baluchistan. Moreover, a number of ported that they had defused a homemade bomb planted plight of the Baluch alongside that of the Kurds of the Jundallah members, including Abdulhamid Rigi, who on a Tehran-bound Kish Air passenger airline that had Middle East. In this regard, much like the Kurds, the Ba- is one of Abdulmalek Rigi’s brothers, were arrested in departed from Ahvaz, the capital of Iran’s southwest- luch have also been dispersed and divided across hostile Quetta, the capital of Pakistani Baluchistan, before being ern province of Khuzestan located along the Iran-Iraq borders. extradited to Iran in June 2008. See “16 Iranian Police border. In addition to being home to most of Iran’s oil 14 Chris Zambelis, “Violence and Rebellion in Iranian Taken Hostage,” Press TV, June 14, 2008; “Rigi Brother wealth and significant natural gas deposits, Khuzestan is Balochistan,” Terrorism Monitor 4:3 (2006). Extradited,” Iran Daily, June 15, 2008. also home to most of Iran’s ethnic Arab minority. Ahvaz

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In addition to its recent strike against Outside Involvement? the United States and Israel in the a civilian target, the attack against the Iran regularly accuses outside forces of attack, along with “evil Salafists”—a mosque also marked the successful fomenting internal dissent to destabilize reference to Jundallah’s alleged ties execution of Jundallah’s second suicide the Shi`a Islamist regime from within. A to al-Qa`ida and possibly elements bombing. The first suicide bombing popular claim out of Tehran implicates in Saudi Arabia, a rival of Iran—all of occurred on December 28, 2008 when the intelligence services of foreign whom are presumably intent on sowing Abdulghafoor Rigi, a Jundallah member powers led by the United States and its divisions between Shi`a and Sunni who also happened to be another one allies in, among other charges, actively in Iran.27 There is clearly a political of leader Abdulmalek Rigi’s brothers, supporting Jundallah’s armed campaign motive behind Iranian discourse that rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into through the provision of funds, arms accuses Jundallah of joining forces with the headquarters of Iran’s joint police and training.24 Iran also sees the United al-Qa`ida or other outside forces. For and anti-narcotics unit in Saravan, States and its allies behind the array of Tehran, associating Jundallah with al- killing four police officers and injuring violent ethno-sectarian insurrectionist Qa`ida helps to delegitimize the group’s scores more.22 While mentioning that movements and other militant cause.28 suicide bombings are not compatible opposition forces operating on Iranian with Baluch values, Baluch nationalist soil and beyond Iran’s borders. Iran is Nevertheless, observers of Iranian sources claim that the decision by convinced that any potential American politics often raise concerns about the Abdulghafoor Rigi to execute a suicide or Israeli invasion of its territory would possible spread of al-Qa`ida’s influence bombing meant to serve as an act of begin by supporting active insurgencies within Iran and the ethnic Baluch symbolism that would hopefully inspire on its soil. nationalist movement.29 Proponents fiercer resistance by Iranian Baluch of this theory argue that Jundallah’s against the regime.23 Iran has also accused Pakistan of ideology may have evolved from a supporting Jundallah even though the strictly nationalist one emphasizing The introduction of suicide bombings two countries have a shared interest in the assertion of ethnic Baluch national into Jundallah’s arsenal along with a quelling Baluch nationalist aspirations identity, culture, and religion within willingness to target civilians must and have a history of cooperating an Iranian context that guarantees clearly be of concern to Tehran. Aside to crush Baluch uprisings.25 In an greater rights and opportunities to a from the myriad operational challenges apparent effort to downplay the group’s radical Islamist-oriented ideology that posed by having to defend against organic base of support among ethnic is influenced by al-Qa`ida’s brand of determined suicide bombers, let alone Baluch in Iranian Baluchistan, Tehran extremism. Additionally, the strategic defending against suicide bombers also frequently refers to Jundallah as a space occupied by Jundallah in intent on striking soft targets such “Pakistan-based” movement.26 southeastern Iran adjacent to Pakistani as mosques, Iranian authorities are Baluchistan—a region where the also concerned about the spread of al- Additionally, Tehran accuses Jundallah Taliban’s influence has experienced a Qa`ida-style radicalism within the of receiving support from al-Qa`ida marked rise in recent years—may prove Baluch nationalist movement; suicide and the Taliban. Given the Sunni faith to be beneficial for al-Qa`ida’s plans bombers have become the hallmark of its members and the increasingly for Pakistan, as it provides another of al-Qa`ida’s contribution to the Islamist tone of its discourse, Iran base to operate against Islamabad and insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and has suggested that al-Qa`ida and its the United States outside of the tribal most recently Pakistan. Taliban allies in neighboring Pakistani areas. As a result, al-Qa`ida could see Baluchistan are behind Jundallah’s war in Jundallah an opportunity to gain against Tehran. In a public statement a foothold in Iran. Jundallah’s use of condemning the mosque attack during suicide bombings and its apparent Friday prayers the day following the willingness to expand its operations carnage, Ayatollah Sayyed Ahmad against soft civilian targets also bears Khatami, an influential cleric close to the hallmark of what some observers and other locations within the province have witnessed Ahmadinejad and the ultra-conservative see as proof of an al-Qa`ida hand behind attacks by ethnic Arab nationalist groups. Additionally, ruling establishment, singled out both Jundallah. Arab nationalists often refer to Khuzestan as Arabistan. Tehran often accuses groups such as Jundallah of col- Moreover, al-Qa`ida has demonstrated laborating with other insurgent movements operating 24 “Jundallah Claim Responsibility for Bomb Blast,” an impressive ability over the years across Iran, to include ethnic Arab separatists. For more Press TV, May 30, 2009. to exploit and bolster protracted details about the airline incident, see “Iran Defuses Bomb 25 The Iranians have said that even if Pakistan is not insurgencies in places as diverse as on Tehran-Bound Plane,” Press TV, May 31, 2009. supporting Jundallah, it is at least turning a blind eye Algeria, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, 22 Nazila Fathi, “Rare Suicide Bombing in Iran Kills 4,” while the United States supports the group from Paki- New York Times, December 29, 2008. stani territory. 27 “Suspects in Zahedan Attack Arrested,” Tehran Times, 23 Reza Hossein Borr, “The Armed Struggle in the East- 26 Iran even went as far as to summon Pakistan’s ambas- May 30, 2009. ern Parts of Iran Entered a New Phase When the First sador in Tehran to protest what Iran sees as Jundallah’s 28 In a related point, Iranian authorities sometimes refer Suicide Mission Was Carried Out in a Military Base in association with radical elements and supporters over to Jundallah as Jund al-Shaytan (Soldiers of Satan) in a Sarawan, Baluchistan, on 29 December 08,” January 1, the border in Pakistani Baluchistan. See “Iran Summons further attempt to undermine the group’s reputation. 2009, available at www.thebaluch.com/010109_report. Pakistani Envoy Over Zahedan Terror Attack,” Tehran 29 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Seeks a New Alli- php. Times, May 31, 2009. ance,” Asia Times Online, May 21, 2009.

17 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 and Pakistan. In this context, the Afghanistan supplies more than 90% Incorporating Law brand of violent Salafist Islam that of the world’s opium; Iran, particularly Enforcement Interrogation shapes al-Qa`ida’s worldview detests Sistan-Baluchistan, plays a critical Shi`a Muslims, seeing them and by role in the smuggling of the narcotic Techniques on the extension the Shi`a Islamist regime to international markets.32 In light Battlefield in Tehran essentially as heretics and of Jundallah’s widely known ties to unbelievers.30 smuggling in Iranian Baluchistan, it is By Gretchen Peters likely that the group (along with other In spite of these claims, there is no Iranian drug smugglers) crosses paths there is continued dispute whether the evidence to support the theory that with the Taliban. Jundallah’s contacts “enhanced interrogation techniques” al-Qa`ida is supporting Jundallah. with the Taliban are most likely based approved by the Bush administration Moreover, although some observers on jointly profiting from the illicit trade succeeded in extracting reliable suggest that al-Qa`ida may be mounting and smuggling as opposed to ideology. information from detainees in a covert campaign against Iran through Afghanistan and Iraq. Many active Jundallah and the larger ethnic Baluch Conclusion and retired military intelligence nationalist cause, it is important to While there is no evidence linking officers, however, are quietly hoping note that al-Qa`ida’s regional allies Jundallah to al-Qa`ida or other radical that Washington and the Pentagon and franchises tend to boast of their Sunni Islamist extremist movements will pursue what they consider to be association with al-Qa`ida and their with a global agenda, the group’s a far more pressing issue: revamping commitment to its global cause as apparent willingness to execute suicide the human intelligence (HUMINT) opposed to downplaying or concealing bombings and other attacks against system to better equip U.S. troops such links. In fact, in February 2007 civilian targets will remain a cause facing a new and complex enemy. Jundallah seemed keen on downplaying for serious concern in Iran. To date, Military interrogators who have its ethno-sectarian character and Jundallah’s violent activities appear worked in detention centers in Iraq and refuting allegations of its links to radical to be confined exclusively to Sistan- Afghanistan say Cold War interrogation Sunni Islamists such as al-Qa`ida by Baluchistan. Given the group’s steady techniques are often ineffective when adopting a more secular-oriented label: escalation in terms of its execution of dealing with an enemy such as al-Qa`ida the People’s Resistance Movement of tactics and choice of targets in recent or the Taliban.1 Instead, they argue Iran (PRMI).31 Furthermore, while months, the next step in Jundallah’s that the puzzle faced by U.S. military strong ideological differences divide al- evolution may result in attacks outside units deployed to Afghanistan closely Qa`ida and Iran, there is little evidence of Iranian Baluchistan. Indeed, the parallels the challenges confronting to suggest that Iran has ever figured international focus on Iran during the U.S. law enforcement officers combating prominently as an al-Qa`ida target. Al- run up to the recent elections and the organized crime and street gangs in Qa`ida’s priority has always been to attention paid to minority issues during the United States. The day-to-day target the United States and its interests the campaign may have also emboldened operations of the Taliban and al-Qa`ida and allies abroad. Given the current the group to escalate its fight. In the in the lawless border areas between state of geopolitics in the greater Middle meantime, violence and instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan more closely East, tensions between the United States Iranian Baluchistan will continue to resemble those of the mafia than a and Iran currently work to al-Qa`ida’s present a series of challenges to the traditional military force. This suggests benefit. In contrast, an effort by al- Islamist regime in Tehran. that more actionable information can be Qa`ida to target Iran through Jundallah acquired by applying law enforcement or other channels would present an Chris Zambelis is an associate with techniques to the counterinsurgency opening for closer cooperation between Helios Global, Inc., a risk management setting. the United States and Iran, to include consultancy based in the Washington, cooperation against al-Qa`ida itself and D.C. area. He specializes in Middle East This article will identify some of its allies in the region. politics. He advises clients in the public, these interrogation techniques, and private, and non-profit sectors on a range also explain how infantry units can The nature of Jundallah’s links to the of social, political, security, and economic improve on street interviews to gather Taliban in Pakistani Baluchistan, on issues affecting the Middle East and other more intelligence about the Taliban the other hand, is less clear. Jundallah regions. He is a regular contributor to a and ethnic Baluch insurgents operating number of publications, where he writes in Pakistani Baluchistan are known on Middle East politics, political Islam, 1 During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence officers could to profit from the smuggling of international security, and related issues. offer resettlement in the West as a trade for informa- drugs, arms, and other contraband. He has lived and worked in the Middle East, tion from captured Soviets. That ploy does not reso- East Europe and the former Yugoslavia, nate with religiously motivated al-Qa`ida and Taliban 30 While there is no evidence linking al-Qa`ida to Jun- and Latin America. Mr. Zambelis is a extremists. Other Cold War techniques that played dallah, violent Salafist militants do pay attention to Iran, graduate of New York University and on a detainee’s love of country or concern for his fel- especially on the internet. The official website of the Sons holds an M.S. in Foreign Service from low soldiers also fall flat against a transnational and of Sunna Iran is a case in point, located at www.sun- Georgetown University. often stateless fighter such as the typical Taliban foot nairan.wordpress.com. soldier or al-Qa`ida operative; their greatest ambi- 31 Chris Zambelis, “Baloch Nationalists Up The Ante In 32 “U.N. Hails Iran for Curbing Flow of Afghan Heroin,” tion is often to martyr themselves on the battlefield. Iran,” Terrorism Focus 4:3 (2007). Reuters, May 21, 2009.

18 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 insurgency, criminal gangs operating Building Rapport and Establishing the subject says and corroborate it with in the border areas as well as terrorist Justification other community sources. groups such as al-Qa`ida. The article Although law enforcement interrogation also argues the importance of using techniques should be increasingly During interrogation interviews, the disconnected pieces of intelligence incorporated on the battlefield, there nine-point “Reid Technique” suggests to develop an organizational attack are still valuable lessons to be learned shifting the blame away from the suspect strategy that will eventually help from the army interrogation manual. It to another person or set of circumstances authorities apprehend top insurgent contains methods that can be successfully that prompted the suspect to commit and criminal leaders. applied to an insurgent or terrorist the crime. For example, the young man detainee. “A lot of the techniques laid captured while planting an IED might be Law Enforcement and COIN Parallels out in the army manual are not very On the operational level, there are clear far from what we teach,” said Joseph analogies between law enforcement Buckley, president of John E. Reid and “A successful interrogator and counterinsurgency strategy during Associates, a Chicago firm that trains will not permit a detainee street patrols and in the interview room, law enforcement officers and military both places where valuable information personnel in effective interrogation to outright deny guilt, and intelligence can be gathered.2 techniques. “It’s all primarily based on but will accommodate an emotional and psychological appeal, A “beat cop” patrolling the streets and building rapport, as opposed and be receptive to of an American city who encounters to threats and deprivation that just reasons the individual a young man engaged in suspicious alienate the subject.”3 activity—perhaps he appears to be provides for why they selling drugs or stealing a car—faces a According to interrogation professionals, did not commit the crime. similar situation to a NATO foot patrol before interviews begin it is important that comes across a young man planting that the military personnel stress Questions should be an improvised explosive device (IED). that all the information gathered is posed in a manner that In both cases, the uniformed security confidential. The interviewer should provider probably knows nothing about not mislead, make false promises or lie makes it difficult to deny the individual, and will need to quickly to the individual. To get started, law involvement.” establish the suspect’s affiliation. It is enforcement interviewers recommend possible the suspect is just a hired hand, asking the subject about their contracted for a one-time job, or he may background. Some suspects may have be a core member of the target group. little actionable intelligence, but could offered three possible explanations for offer a wealth of useful historical data. his action: he placed the bomb because In another example, consider the Either way, it is vitally important to the Taliban threatened to harm his family complexity faced by a police detective record and corroborate such information. if he did not help them; the insurgents sitting in an interview room with a This may be especially important in offered him money, and his family suspected member of an organized crime cases where the subject is not a detainee was desperately poor; or he actually ring. On occasions when the officer but a member of the community who has joined the Taliban because he wanted to has little or no proof of that suspect’s come forward, allegedly with important protect his farmland and hated seeing membership in organized crime, a information. “It is dangerous to take foreigners in his homeland. Offering successful line of questioning needs to what an informant says as gospel and the individual a reason to believe his simultaneously establish the suspect’s not establish his motive for telling you,” behavior is justified—regardless of relationship to the target group, and said Richard Fiano, the former director how the interviewer privately feels— also flush out details about the specific of operations at the Drug Enforcement will encourage the detainee to reveal crime or crimes for which the suspect Administration (DEA). “It could result information. “You need to put yourself was detained. A military intelligence in faulty information, faulty allies and in that person’s position,” said Dan officer questioning a detainee captured in the worst cases, dead members of Malloy, a specialist on counterterrorist on the battlefield in Afghanistan might your team.”4 interrogations at Reid. “You are not face a similar set of circumstances: the trying to convince them that you are on detainee’s affiliation may not be clear, Even if the subject’s information is their side, but you need to make them and it will be imperative to establish questionable, there could be small details think you understand why they did his role and relationship in the wider offered that may be helpful to disrupting this.”5 insurgency. the activity of the insurgency. In other words, law enforcement officers state Malloy categorizes three types of that it is critical to keep a file of what insurgent or terrorist subjects: the accidental warrior—someone who 3 Personal interview, Joseph Buckley, president of John usually carries out a one-time act for E. Reid and Associates, July 2, 2009. a variety of motives; the opportunist— 2 Law enforcement experts generally avoid use of the 4 Personal interview, Richard Fiano, former director of word “interrogation,” preferring the more neutral term operations at Drug Enforcement Administration, July 7, 5 Personal interview, Dan Malloy, John E. Reid and As- “interview.” 2009. sociates, July 7, 2009.

19 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 someone who commits the act for Nevertheless, a criminal investigator In Afghanistan, U.S. Marines deployed money; and the true believer—someone will not always expect a full confession. to Helmand Province appear to have who actually feels strongly about the It may be just as useful to extract some already put these techniques to the test. ideology. The accidental warrior is worthwhile piece of information that can A July 3, 2009 dispatch from Agence the most common but will have less help further the investigation. Perhaps France-Presse described Marine actionable intelligence. The opportunist the young man detained after planting Brigadier General Larry Nicholson and the true believer will have the most the IED will not admit he is a Taliban walking through the streets of Garmser, information, but it takes more time to member, but will lead authorities where he bargained for a melon at the extract it. to the individual who provided him local bazaar and asked residents to the explosives and told him where to share their needs and concerns. The Experts say it is important to constantly plant them. In the counterinsurgency article noted that “some people in the refine one’s technique. One of the best environment, the latter result may be bazaar turned away from the brigadier ways to improve is simply by asking a more useful than a full confession. general.”9 In fact, they should have detainee at the end of an interview what been the individuals who Nicholson led them to make a confession. Often Learning to Work the Streets and his team pursued and questioned subjects will remark on a comment that In addition to interrogation interviews, most vigorously. According to law made them think they could trust the significant information can be enforcement experts, it is not only interviewer. “There is a whole art to acquired from the community. Police important to investigate suspicious interviewing,” said Fiano. “By the end, investigators who work street gangs behavior, but also to win over those the best informants will think they are in U.S. cities say their best intelligence who trust the coalition the least. your friend.”6 comes not from the interview room, but from the uniformed officers who patrol There are no clear instructions to be Avoiding Denials and Acquiring Details the streets. Good street officers get to an effective street interviewer, but During the course of a detainee experts say it is often a good idea to interview, which may last hours, “Once these district-level begin conversations with a few baited various themes can be explored or questions to determine whether the changed until the subject becomes sketches are folded into person is generally telling the truth. responsive. A successful interrogator a nationwide portrait, a Patrols should be cognizant of non- will not permit a detainee to outright verbal indicators, such as jumpy, deny guilt, but will accommodate and clearer image of the wider nervous behavior or subjects who avoid be receptive to reasons the individual insurgency will emerge for eye contact. Soldiers on patrol can provides for why they did not commit collect a wealth of information about a the crime. Questions should be posed in senior military intelligence local community. These include but are a manner that makes it difficult to deny officials, including weak not limited to: involvement.7 points in the command - How and where local residents—who To close the interview, the interrogator structure, and ways to will inevitably include insurgents— should offer the detainee two access telecommunications and the justifications for what happened—one disrupt the group and internet. more socially acceptable than the other. target its leadership.” When the detainee accepts one of these - How and where the insurgents source options, guilt is assumed. Using the their supplies, including components scenario of the captured IED facilitator, for IEDs, food, medical supplies and the interrogator should suggest to the know members of the community and fuel. detainee that he agreed to plant the are the first ones on hand when a crime bomb in return for money for his family. or violent act occurs. “You have to - How and in collaboration with whom Another argument would be to suggest know your community and you have to the insurgents fund themselves. Since to the detainee that he committed the have the gift of gab,” said a Los Angeles members of the local community will crime because he believed he would Police Department detective with more inevitably be victimized by this criminal be rewarded in the afterlife for killing than 30 years of experience. “A gang activity—whether it is opium smuggling, non-Muslims. officer gets out of his car and knows the kidnapping or extortion—showing people in his neighborhood. He is a guy concern about this problem could help who talks to somebody on the street and win public support. that person calls him back two weeks 8 6 Personal interview, Richard Fiano, former director of later.” Cultural, linguistic and ethnic Developing an Organizational Attack Strategy operations at Drug Enforcement Administration, July 7, divides do not have to be a barrier, Information gathered from the 2009. but there has to be open dialogue community and from detainee interviews 7 For example, instead of asking, “Was Samir here?” one between the security providers and the can be compiled into an organizational should ask, “When was the last time Samir was here?” community. attack strategy. Law enforcement The first question can easily be answered with a “no,” while the second, better question makes it more difficult 8 Personal interview, anonymous police detective, Los 9 Ben Sheppard, “US Marine Commander Out Shopping for the detainee to deny the individual was ever there. Angeles Police Department, July 3, 2009. in Afghanistan,” Agence France-Presse, July 4, 2009.

20 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 officers with years of experience protection and disrupt both insurgent Recent Highlights in building intelligence on gangs and activity and funding. There are currently organized crime groups, including drug about 150 former law enforcement Terrorist Activity trafficking organizations, say the trick officers working as private contract is starting at the ground level of the advisers to U.S. Marines and Army June 1, 2009 (UNITED STATES): target group and working up to the top. regiments deployed to Afghanistan, Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah Salih, an according to one of the advisers. The inmate held at Guantanamo Bay, was A retired police officer advising U.S. DEA is also undergoing the largest “plus- found dead in an apparent suicide. The military units operating in Iraq and up” in the agency’s history, increasing 31-year-old Yemeni, who was accused of Afghanistan said he has watched U.S. the number of agents in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan troops capture a low-level foot soldier from about 12 to nearly 80, reportedly and of associating with al-Qa`ida, had and then begin to question the detainee to support interdiction efforts against been held at Guantanamo Bay since about the location of high value targets, major smuggling cartels.10 These steps February 2002. – The Australian, June 3 such as Usama bin Ladin and Mullah should help improve intelligence Omar in Afghanistan or the late Abu gathering in Afghanistan. June 1, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. Yet this fighters killed 10 Afghan guards technique is dysfunctional, he said. A “Soldiers don’t join the military because working for a U.S. security firm in Taliban foot soldier is unlikely to know they want to become cops. I understand western Farah Province. – Reuters, June 2 where Mullah Omar is hiding any more that,” said one law enforcement adviser. than a dealer selling cocaine on the “But this model works. We need to June 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban streets of New York knows how to find retrain our troops for this model and militants kidnapped dozens of students the Mexican kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” lose the mentality that they are some day and staff from a Pakistani Army Guzman. Yet that cocaine dealer can lead going to be landing on Omaha Beach.”11 preparatory school in North Waziristan authorities to the person who supplies Agency of the Federally Administered him his narcotics, just as the Taliban Gretchen Peters is the author of Seeds of Tribal Areas. Hours later, on June 2, as foot soldier can help international Terror (St. Martin’s Press), a book released the militants were moving the captives troops locate his commander. In in May 2009 that traces the role the opium to South Waziristan Agency, Pakistani addition, he will almost certainly have trade has played in three decades of conflict Army soldiers attacked them and details about how his unit is funded— in Afghanistan. She covered Pakistan managed to free the hostages. Estimates whether it is through the opium trade and Afghanistan for more than a decade, placed the number of freed hostages at or other criminal activity—and he may first for the Associated Press and later 80. – Washington Post, June 2 know where they source their weapons as an award-winning reporter for ABC and explosives. News. In fall 2009, she will enter the Josef June 2, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida Korbel School of International Studies for second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri Over time, gathering such threads a graduate degree combining Homeland released a new audio recording in which of information will help a military Securities and Criminal Justice. he criticized U.S. President Barack intelligence unit establish a clear Obama on the eve of the president’s visit picture of how the insurgents operate in to Egypt. Al-Zawahiri called Obama each district. Once these district-level a “criminal” who is coming to Egypt sketches are folded into a nationwide with “deception” and “to obtain what portrait, a clearer image of the wider he failed to achieve on the ground after insurgency will emerge for senior the mujahidin ruined the project of the military intelligence officials, including Crusader America in Iraq, Afghanistan weak points in the command structure, and Somalia.” He also assured that and ways to disrupt the group and target Obama’s “bloody messages…will not be its leadership. concealed by public relations campaigns or by farcical visits or elegant words.” Conclusion – AFP, June 2 Law enforcement experts say the model for attacking organizations such as the June 2, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A Taliban and al-Qa`ida is no different suicide bomber detonated his explosives than the method used to bring down near Bagram airbase, 40 miles north of drug cartels and organized crime groups. Kabul. Six Afghan civilians were killed The bigger challenge is changing the in the blast. – Reuters, June 2 military mindset to accept that there is wartime value to “good old-fashioned June 2, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A police work.” roadside bombing in Paktia Province killed at least eight Afghan security An increase in interrogation training 10 “U.S. Launches New Fight Against Drug Trade,” As- guards. – Voice of America, June 3 would help to equip infantry troops in sociated Press, March 30, 2009. Afghanistan to gather intelligence that 11 Personal interview, law enforcement adviser to the June 3, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Jazira would simultaneously increase force U.S. military, June 29, 2009. broadcast a new audiotape purportedly

21 july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 from Usama bin Ladin, in which the Peshawar when militants ambushed the Mus`ab al-Suri, told Reuters that the al-Qa`ida leader said that “[President] convoy. One soldier was also killed in ideologue is imprisoned in Syria. Nasar Obama has followed the footsteps of the incident. – Reuters, June 6 was captured in Pakistan in 2005, his predecessor in increasing animosity although his whereabouts since then toward Muslims and increasing enemy June 6, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide have been unclear. – Reuters, June 10 fighters and establishing long-term bomber walked to a police emergency wars. So the American people should help center in Islamabad and detonated June 11, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Two get ready to reap the fruits of what the his explosives, killing two policemen. militants on motorcycles threw a leaders of the White House have planted – AFP, June 6 grenade on a road in Peshawar. When throughout the coming years and police came to investigate the scene, a decades.” The statement was released June 8, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb ripped suicide bomber blew himself up, killing as President Barack Obama arrived in through a minibus in a largely Shi`a area three people. – IANS, June 11 the region for a Middle East tour. – New of southern Baghdad, killing at least York Times, June 3 seven people. – New York Times, June 8 June 11, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine authorities arrested Ansar June 3, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A June 9, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Venancio, who was allegedly involved suicide bomber on a motorcycle blew Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a suspected in the December 30, 2000 bombing of a himself up near the Pakistan border terrorist held at Guantanamo Bay, commuter train in Manila that killed 22 in Kandahar Province. The explosion arrived in New York to face criminal people, in addition to an attack in 2003 killed five security guards escorting a prosecution for his role in the August on an international airport in Davao NATO convoy. – Voice of America, June 3 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya city. Venancio is considered a bomb expert and Tanzania. Ghailani is the first with Jemaah Islamiya. – AFP, June 11 June 3, 2009 (NORTH AFRICA): British Guantanamo detainee to arrive in the Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that United States for prosecution. – Reuters, June 12, 2009 (IRAQ): Harith al-`Ubaydi, there was “strong reason to believe” June 9 the leader of the largest Sunni bloc in that al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb Iraq’s parliament, was assassinated by (AQIM) executed a British hostage on June 9, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S.- a gunman outside a Baghdad mosque. May 31. The hostage, Edwin Dyer, was led forces killed a Taliban commander The gunman, who was a teenager, was likely kidnapped from Niger on January and approximately 16 militants in a killed after he exploded a grenade while 22, and then reportedly held in Mali. precision airstrike in Ghor Province. The fleeing authorities. – TimesOnline, June 12; The government refused to agree to commander, Mullah Mustafa, reportedly AP, June 13 AQIM’s demand that it free a prominent had links to the Iranian Revolutionary Muslim cleric, Abu Qatada, in exchange Guard Corps. – AFP, June 9 June 12, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A for Dyer’s release. – AFP, June 3 suicide bomber blew himself up amid June 9, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani a group of fuel tankers in Helmand June 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Taliban militants attacked the five-star Province, causing fires to at least bomber killed 38 people at a mosque in Pearl Continental hotel in Peshawar, six tanker trucks and killing at least Upper Dir District of the North-West killing at least 15 people. Militants opened eight Afghan drivers. The trucks were Frontier Province. The incident caused fire on the hotel’s security guards, while intended for international troops in the hundreds of tribesmen in the area to a suicide bomber detonated a truck country. – Voice of America, June 13 launch an offensive against Taliban packed with explosives in the hotel’s militants, who they blamed for the parking lot. The explosion caused the June 12, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Prominent attack. – AFP, June 5; BBC, June 8 collapse of the building’s western wing. anti-Taliban cleric Sarfraz Naeemi was – New York Times, June 9; AFP, June 9 killed by a suicide bomber in Lahore, June 5, 2009 (SOMALIA): Rival Islamist the capital of Punjab Province. Three groups fought for control of the town of June 10, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb of his followers were also killed by Wabho in central Somalia, leaving at ripped through an outdoor market near the bomber. Within minutes of the least 56 militants dead. Both al-Shabab the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyya in attack, a second suicide bomber blew and Hisbul Islamiyya claimed to have Dhi Qar Province, killing at least 28 up at a mosque in Nowshera District won control of the town from the pro- people. – New York Times, June 10 of the North-West Frontier Province. government Sufi group, Ahlu-Sunnu The second attack killed four people. wal-Jama (ASWJ). ASWJ, however, June 10, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida’s Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan took credit claimed that they still had control of the leader for Afghanistan, Shaykh Sa`id for both attacks. – Washington Post, June 13; town. – Reuters, June 5 Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, reportedly posted AFP, June 12 an audio message on Islamist web June 6, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Two pro- forums complaining that his fighters June 13, 2009 (GLOBAL): American al- Taliban clerics were killed during a were short on food, weapons and other Qa`ida member Adam Gadahn released shootout between security forces and supplies. – Reuters, June 12 a new videotape in which he criticized militants in Mardan District of the Israel’s December 2008 offensive in North-West Frontier Province. Security June 10, 2009 (SYRIA): Lawyers for Gaza. – CNN, June 13 forces had custody of the two clerics at senior al-Qa`ida ideologue Mustafa the time, and were transporting them to Setmariam Nasar, also known as Abu

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June 14, 2009 (PAKISTAN): The six suspected Taliban militants. The terrorist group. – Philippine Inquirer, June governor of Pakistan’s North-West tribesmen were part of a group of 3,000 18 Frontier Province announced that who formed a lashkar (militia) to fight Pakistan’s military will carry out an against Taliban forces to avenge the 38 June 19, 2009 (PAKISTAN): New York offensive against Pakistani Taliban people killed in a suicide bombing at a Times journalist David Rohde managed leader Baitullah Mehsud and his militia. mosque on June 5. – AFP, June 17 to escape his Taliban kidnappers and – Reuters, June 14 safely find his way to authorities. Rohde June 17, 2009 (SOMALIA): Somali had been held hostage by the Taliban June 14, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected government forces attacked Islamist for seven months. He was kidnapped U.S. unmanned aerial drone strike killed opposition strongholds in Mogadishu, outside Kabul, but escaped from a approximately three militants in South leaving at least 17 people dead. compound in North Waziristan Agency Waziristan Agency of the Federally Mogadishu’s police chief, Colonel Ali of the Federally Administered Tribal Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, Said, was killed in the fighting. – AP, Areas. – ABC News, June 22; New York Times, June 14 June 17 June 20

June 14, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemeni June 17, 2009 (ALGERIA): Islamist June 20, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber authorities announced the arrest of fighters from al-Qa`ida in the Islamic detonated a truck full of explosives a Saudi al-Qa`ida financier who they Maghreb killed 20 Algerian paramilitary outside a Shi`a mosque near Kirkuk, consider “one of the most dangerous policemen in a desert ambush. – UPI, killing 67 people. – Reuters, June 20 members of al-Qa`ida.” The financier, June 18 Hassan Hussein bin Alwan, was arrested June 20, 2009 (IRAN): Two people died the previous week. – AFP, June 14 June 17, 2009 (THAILAND): Thai in a suicide bombing at the shrine of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said Iran’s revolutionary leader, Ayatollah June 15, 2009 (YEMEN): The mutilated that he does not believe the insurgency Ruhollah Khomeini, in Tehran. – Reuters, bodies of two German nurses and a in southern Thailand is linked to the al- June 20 South Korean teacher were discovered Qa`ida network. – Bangkok Post, June 17 by shepherds in Yemen’s Saada region. June 21, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb Later in the day, six other foreigners June 18, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected exploded outside local council offices were found dead. The nine foreigners— U.S. unmanned aerial drone killed in Abu Ghurayb district of Baghdad who all worked for World Wide Services approximately 13 people near Wana Province, killing at least seven people. Foundation, a Dutch relief group— in South Waziristan Agency of the – UPI, June 22 disappeared on June 12. It was not Federally Administered Tribal Areas. immediately clear who was responsible – New York Times, June 18 June 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A for the murders. – Independent, June 15; rocket attack on the U.S. Bagram airbase Christian Science Monitor, June 15; AP, June 15 June 18, 2009 (YEMEN): A Saudi al- killed two U.S. soldiers. – Washington Qa`ida suspect, Nayif Yahya al-Harbi, Post, June 22 June 16, 2009 (MALI): Security forces in turned himself in to Yemeni authorities, Mali captured a suspected guerrilla base according to Yemen’s Defense Ministry. June 22, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida’s for al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. – Reuters, June 18 commander for Afghanistan, Shaykh The base was in the Sahara Desert Sa`id Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, told al- near the Algerian border. During the June 18, 2009 (SOMALIA): A suicide Jazira television that the group would operation, 12 militants and five soldiers bomb ripped through the Medina Hotel use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against were killed. – BBC, June 17; AFP, June 16 in central Somalia’s town of Beledweyne, the United States if it was able to acquire killing the country’s internal security them. He said, “the Americans will not June 17, 2009 (IRAQ): Iraqi police minister, Omar Hashi Aden, in addition seize the Muslims’ nuclear weapons claimed to have arrested al-Qa`ida’s to 49 other people. Omar Hashi Aden and we pray that the Muslims will have deputy commander in Iraq, Ahmad arrived in central Somalia earlier in these weapons and they will be used `Abid `Uwayyid. Authorities said the month to lead operations against against the Americans.” – UPI, June 22 that `Uwayyid was responsible for Islamist opposition fighters in the the June 12 assassination of Harith al- region. A number of other government June 22, 2009 (UNITED STATES): `Ubaydi, the leader of the largest Sunni officials were also killed in the blast. U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon bloc in Iraq’s parliament. – Radio France – Voice of America, June 18; Bloomberg, June 18 ordered a detainee at Guantanamo Bay International, June 17 to be released. Leon said that Syrian Abd June 18, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): U.S. al-Rahim Abdul Rassak was a captive, June 17, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Three Colonel William Coultrup, commander not a follower, of the Taliban and at one Danish soldiers were killed after a bomb of the Joint Special Forces Task Force point was tortured by al-Qa`ida. – AP, ripped through their vehicle in Helmand Philippines (JSOTFP), told reporters June 22 Province. – AFP, June 17 that “we know for a fact” that foreign terrorists are operating in Sulu Province June 22, 2009 (RUSSIA): A suicide June 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Armed in the southern Philippines. The foreign bomber injured the president of Russia’s tribesmen in Upper Dir District of the terrorists are from Jemaah Islamiya, Muslim region of Ingushetia. Ingush North-West Frontier Province killed which is an al-Qa`ida-linked Islamist President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov’s

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convoy was attacked by the bomber, and June 26, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Taliban CTC Sentinel Staff his driver was killed. – Reuters, June 22 suicide bomber blew himself up next to an army vehicle in Pakistani Kashmir, Editor-in-Chief June 22, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A killing at least two soldiers. It reportedly Erich Marquardt suicide bomber rammed a car into a marked the first suicide attack by a Taliban Senior Editor, CTC convoy of Afghan troops in Kandahar militant targeting Pakistani soldiers in Province, killing three soldiers. Pakistani Kashmir. – AP, June 26 Editorial Board – Reuters, June 22 COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. June 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Security Department Head June 22, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Two forces raided a Taliban hideout in Department of Social Sciences (West Point) explosions, one caused by a suicide Karachi, Sindh Province. Five militants bomber, killed approximately eight were killed during the raid. – AP, June 27 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. civilians outside an electric company’s Deputy Department Head headquarters in Khost Province. – Voice June 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban Department of Social Sciences (West Point) of America, June 22 militants attacked a Pakistani military convoy in North Waziristan Agency LTC Reid Sawyer June 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Qari near the Afghan border. Twelve soldiers Director, CTC Zainuddin, a Mehsud tribal leader were killed. – Reuters, June 28 and a pro-government rival of top Christopher Heffelfinger Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, June 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistan’s FBI Fellow, CTC was assassinated. Baitullah Mehsud’s government offered a 50 million rupee fighters took credit for the attack. – New ($615,300) reward for information York Times, June 23 leading to the capture of Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. – AFP, June 29 June 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected Contact U.S. unmanned aerial drone killed six June 28, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): Combating Terrorism Center suspected militants in South Waziristan Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group militants U.S. Military Academy Agency. – Daily Times, June 24 ambushed police on Basilan Island in the 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall southern Philippines. Seven policemen West Point, NY 10996 June 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected were killed. – GMANews.tv, June 28 Phone: (845) 667-6383 U.S. unmanned aerial drone targeted the Email: [email protected] funeral for a Taliban fighter in South June 29, 2009 (LEBANON): Lebanese Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Waziristan Agency, killing at least 60 authorities charged four people with ties people. The attack was distinct from a to al-Qa`ida and for planning attacks in * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 separate suspected drone strike in the Lebanon and neighboring Syria. – AP, same tribal agency earlier in the day. June 29 – New York Times, June 23; Daily Times, June 24 June 30, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb June 23, 2009 (MAURITANIA): A U.S. ripped through a crowded market in aid worker was shot to death in the Kirkuk, killing at least 27 people. – AP, support Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott. Al- June 30 The Combating Terrorism Center would Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb later like to express its gratitude to its financial took credit for the killing. – Reuters, June June 30, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A supporters, for without their support and 23; Voice of America, June 25 male suicide bomber disguised as a shared vision of the Center products like woman in a burqa blew himself up at the the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If June 25, 2009 (UNITED STATES): The Torkham border crossing in Nangarhar you are interested in learning more about U.S. government announced that it Province, killing a police officer and a how to support the Combating Terrorism was providing Somalia’s Transitional child. – Voice of America, June 30 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. Federal Government with an “urgent edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at supply” of weapons and ammunition. June 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A group West Point’s Association of Graduates at – AFP, June 27 of Pakistani Taliban fighters in North 845-446-1553. Waziristan Agency pulled out of a peace June 25, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb ripped deal with the Pakistan government, through a market in Sadr City in citing U.S. drone attacks and a Pakistan Baghdad, killing approximately 70 Army offensive as the reasons for their people. – BBC, June 25 decision. – al-Jazira, June 30

June 26, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb on a June 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide The views expressed in this report are those of motorcycle exploded at a market in bomber blew himself up in Baluchistan the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Baghdad, killing 10 people. – UPI, June Province, killing at least four people. the Department of the Army, or any other agency 26 – BBC, June 30 of the U.S. Government.

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