The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses
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The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses by Jennifer E. Kavanagh A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Public Policy and Political Science) in The University of Michigan 2011 Doctoral Committee: Professor James D. Morrow, Co-Chair Clinical Professor Melvyn Levitsky, Co-Chair Professor Robert J. Franzese, Jr. Professor Allan C. Stam © Jennifer E. Kavanagh 2011 To my Mom and Dad. They know why. ii Acknowledgements The author thanks Jim Morrow, Mel Levitsky, Allan Stam, and Rob Franzese for their guidance, feedback, and support throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. The author also thanks all those whose comments and encouragement made the completion of this dissertation possible, including Mary Corcoran, John Ciorciari, Bill Clark, Mary Corcoran, John Jackson, Barb Koremenos, Phil Potter, Bill Kelly, Michelle Spornhauer, Alex Von Hagen-Jammar, Paul Poast, Johannes Urpelainen, Bill MacMillian, Elias Walsh, Heather Larue, Melissa Forbes, Nick Montgomery, Cassie Grafstrom, Shanna Kirschner, Michelle Allendoerfer, and Bogdan Savych. iii Table of Contents Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...ii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….vi List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………viii List of Appendices.……………………………………………………………………......x Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...xi Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation: When and Why Does Violence Beget Violence?...............................................1 2 Explaining Conflict Dynamics: Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service……………………………31 3 Approach: Case Selection, Data, and Empirical Method…………………………………49 4 Tired of Violence, but Fearful of Peace: Demands for Military Counterterrorism during the Second Intifada…………93 5 The Efficacy and Necessity of Violence: Constraints on Palestinian Retaliation during the Second Intifada………….132 6 Legislating Counterterrorism: The British Response to Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’……………………...175 iv 7 Violence as Politics: Political Competition and Sectarian Violence during the ‘Troubles’………..221 8 Extending Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service: Conflict Dynamics in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Pakistan………….….272 9 Conclusion and Policy Implications: De-escalation from the Bottom-up……………………………………..…….330 Appendices……………………………………………………………………………...366 References..……………………………………………………………………………..389 v List of Figures Figure 2.1 Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service…………………………...32 Figure 3.1 Sample IRF Graphs…………………………..………..………..…………....87 Figure 4.1 Israeli Civilian and Military Fatalities by Quarter, 2000-2004…………....…96 Figure 4.2 Intifada as Success for Israel?.……………………………..……………….103 Figure 4.3 Forecasting Structural Breaks: Israel………………...………………..........116 Figure 4.4 Political Response to Israeli Deaths..……………………………………….120 Figure 4.5 Counterterror Response to Israeli Fatalities..……………………………….123 Figure 4.6 Change in Likud-lead following Counterterror Operations………………...128 Figure 5.1 Trends in Violence, Second Intifada………………...……………………...134 Figure 5.2 Palestinian Attitudes on Peace and Violence……………………………….142 Figure 5.3 Support for Violence by Target and Tactic………………………………....142 Figure 5.4 Forecasting Structural Breaks: Palestinian Territories……………………...152 Figure 5.5 Political Response to Palestinian Civilian Deaths…...……………………...155 Figure 5.6 Political Response to Palestinian Leader Deaths……………………............157 Figure 5.7 Political Response to Palestinian Militant Deaths…………………………..160 Figure 5.8 Violent Response to Palestinian Civilian Deaths…………………………...162 Figure 5.9 Violent Response to Palestinian Leader Deaths…………………….............163 Figure 5.10 Violent Response to Palestinian Militant Deaths…………………….........165 Figure 5.11 Political Response to Palestinian-claimed Fatalities.………………….......169 Figure 6.1 Is Northern Ireland an Important Political Issue in Britain? ……………….180 Figure 6.2 Support for Withdrawal from Northern Ireland…………………….............181 Figure 6.3 Fatalities by Type: Civilian and Military Deaths during the ‘Troubles’........181 Figure 6.4 When is Northern Ireland an Important Political Issue? …………………...183 Figure 6.5 Best Party to Handle Northern Ireland…………………...............................191 Figure 6.6 Forecasting Structural Breaks: Britain……………………...........................198 Figure 6.7 Political Response to British Civilian Deaths……………………................203 vi Figure 6.8 Political Response to British Military Deaths……………………................204 Figure 6.9 Political Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths…………………….205 Figure 6.10 Counterterror Response to British Civilian Deaths……………………......208 Figure 6.11 Counterterror Response to British Military Deaths……………………......208 Figure 6.12 Counterterror Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths……………..211 Figure 6.13 Political Response to Counterterror Activities.……………………............214 Figure 7.1 Total Fatalities in Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles,’ 1969-1998………….…...224 Figure 7.2 Relative Vote Share by Sectarian Group……………………........................237 Figure 7.3 Forecasting Structural Breaks: Northern Ireland……………………............246 Figure 7.4 Electoral Implications of Catholic Fatalities……….....…….........................250 Figure 7.5 Electoral Implications of Protestant Fatalities……......……..........................251 Figure 7.6 Civilian Fatalities, Alliance Support, and Protestant Turnout ..….................252 Figure 7.7 IRA Response to Catholic Fatalities....……………………...........................258 Figure 7.8 Loyalist Response to Protestant Fatalities...…………………………...........261 Figure 7.9 Electoral Implications of IRA Violence for Catholic Parties…….................264 Figure 7.10 Electoral Implications of Loyalist Violence for Protestant Parties …….....265 vii List of Tables Table 1.1 Summary of Existing Literature…………………………………..………….4 Table 2.1 Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service: What Matters?…..……….38 Table 2.2 Expectations of Competing Explanations…..………..………....……….......47 Table 3.1 Summary and Comparison of Political Determinants…………....……….....53 Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics, Israel during the Second Intifada, Months..………....62 Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics, Palestinian Territories, Months.……………..………62 Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics, Second Intifada, Weeks………………………..…….63 Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics, Politics and Violence in Britain, Months.……...….....68 Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics, Politics and Violence in N. Ireland, Months....…........68 Table 3.7 Election Results in Northern Ireland (Westminster, Local)……...……..........68 Table 3.8 Policy changes by the British in Northern Ireland..……………………….....90 Table 4.1 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Israel…...…………...112 Table 4.2 Expectations of Competing Explanations: Israel……....................................113 Table 4.3 Were the Hypotheses Supported?: Israel…….…..…...……………………..129 Table 5.1 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Palest. Territories…...149 Table 5.2 Expectations of Competing Explanations: Palest. Territories.................…...149 Table 5.3 Were the Hypotheses Supported?: Palest. Territories..….....……………….171 Table 6.1 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Britain………………...195 Table 6.2 Expectations of Competing Explanations: Britain…………..…………….…...195 Table 6.3 Were the Hypotheses Supported?: Britain……………..…...…………...……215 Table 7.1 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Northern Ireland.……241 Table 7.2 Expectations of Competing Explanations: Northern Ireland...………….…....242 Table 7.3 Were the Hypotheses Supported?: Northern Ireland...…...….……………...267 Table 8.1a Expectations of Competing Explanations: State Examples…............……...277 Table 8.1b Expectations of Competing Explanations: Non-State Examples......……....278 Table 8.2 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Russia…...………....….285 viii Table 8.3 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Chechnya..……………286 Table 8.4 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Sri Lanka.................…299 Table 8.5 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Tamils…....……………300 Table 8.6 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Iraq……....……………312 Table 8.7 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Pakistan……………...324 Table 8.8 Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Pashtuns..……………325 Table 9.1a Were Hypotheses Supported?: State Examples…….………………………335 Table 9.1b Were Hypotheses Supported?: Non-State Examples…….…………………336 Table 9.2 Controlling Conflict Violence by Reducing Expected Military Efficacy……343 Table 9.3 Controlling Conflict Violence by Increasing Political Optimism……...……348 Table 9.4 Controlling Conflict Violence with a Two-Tracked Approach.……………..354 ix List of Appendices A1 Israeli Poll Dates (Political support) ….……………..…………………………….366 A2 Israeli Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)……...………….367 A3 Palestinian Poll Dates (Political support).….……………..………………………..368 A4 Palestinian Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)…………….369 A5 British Poll Dates (Political support) ……....……………..………………………..370 A6 British Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)…………...…….370 A7 Northern Ireland Election Dates…………………………..………………………..371 A8 Public Opinion in Northern Ireland (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)...….372