Career Incentives of Governors in Late Tsarist Russia

Career Incentives of Governors in late Tsarist Russia

Gunes Gokmenyand Dmitry Kofanovz June 2014

Abstract Recent empirical studies show that career concerns may be employed as a tool to improve the e¢ ciency of a political hierarchy. This paper investigates whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career concerns to improve the performance of provincial governors. To that end, we have constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during 1895-1914. Measuring a governor’sperformance by the intensity of peasant revolts and worker strikes in the province under his rule, we provide evidence that the central administration rewarded better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces (gubernias). These results are robust to various sensitivity tests. In addition, we show that political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on career mobility, and the performance evaluation of central authorities did not change signi…cantly in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution. With these …ndings, we shed some more light on the period that led to the collapse of the Russian Empire. Keywords: Career Incentives, Political Hierarchy, Russian Empire. JEL Classi…cation: H11, J63, N43, P3.

We are indebted to Andrei Markevich, Paul Dower, Irina Denisova and Yevgeny Yakovlev for their valuable comments, help and support. yNew Economic School and the Russian Economic History Lab at HSE. Email: [email protected]. zRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). Email: [email protected].

1 1 Introduction

Career concerns are an important factor determining the e¢ ciency of any hierarchical structure. For instance, Holmström (1999) shows that managers’career concerns can create incentives for better performance.

In the context of political hierarchy, a number of empirical studies have shown that future appointment prospects can be a means to incentivize provincial leaders to work more e¢ ciently. For example, Li and Zhou (2005) show that, in the post-Maoist

China, promotion of provincial leaders hinged upon the economic growth of the province under their rule. Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011) provide evidence that the Soviet central authorities also applied career incentives to provincial governors during Khrushchev’s Sovnarkhos reform. They also show that this scheme, in turn, bene…tted local economic growth. Jia et al. (2013), on the other hand, re…ne the previous conclusions about the political system in modern China, and demonstrate that performance and personal connections are complementary determinants of a governor’scareer.

In this paper, we study provincial governors in the last two decades of the Russian

Empire, 1895-1914. To that end, we have …rst constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during 1895-1914. Then, we investigate whether central authorities employed career incentives based on gubernatorial performance. Our measure of performance is based on the intensity of social unrest in a province, i.e. on a governor’sability to maintain peace and security in his province. Historians argue that, during the last decades of the empire, the main parameters of interest for the Tsarist regime were political

2 stability, peace and order in the provinces, and thus to secure regime’s survival.1

Therefore, we deem our performance measures appropriate for the speci…cities of the time period and the central administration’sagenda.

Using panel data …xed e¤ects models and the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes as performance measures, we provide evidence that there was only partial application of career concerns in the empire. In the main provinces of the empire (gubernias) performance did not a¤ect career mobility, however, career incentives were in place in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts). This e¤ect was also economically signi…cant. For example, one standard deviation reduction in peasant revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion for an oblast governor. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in peasant revolts in oblasts more than tripled the likelihood of promotion.

In addition, we test the e¤ect of political connections on career mobility, and we

…nd no signi…cant e¤ect. Moreover, we test whether central authorities had a more attentive policy of performance evaluation in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution, and …nd no signi…cant change in their attitude towards career incentives.

Studying the time span of 1895-1914 is essential for several reasons. It covers the period since Nicholas II assumed tsardom until his last years in power. This allows us to have consistency in the pattern of governor appointments under the reign of a single tsar. Moreover, this question has historical importance, as it sheds light on to the causes of the Russian Empire’scollapse. We show that the central government failed

1 Lyons (1974) quotes Nicholas II, the last tsar, on the crucial role of o¢ cials in retaining the empire: "We are in the midst of a revolution with an administrative apparatus entirely disorganized, and in this lies the main danger."

3 to use career concerns to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in the gubernias). Thus, in the absence of any reward or punishment mechanism, governors might have haphazardly managed their gubernias with no vision of improving their performance. This, in turn, results in poor performance of preventing the spread of the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section brie‡y describes the historical background building up to the reign of Nicholas II. Section

3 puts forward hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents empirical results and some sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Background

Gubernias were major administrative units in the Russian Empire and were ruled by governors. Gubernias were …rst introduced by Peter the Great in 1708 and were maintained until the collapse of the empire. Although, initially Russian Empire was divided into 8 gubernias, by 1914, through subsequent reforms and territory expansion, the number of gubernias went up to 78.

The governor of a gubernia was considered as the "tsar’sviceroy" in a province, appointed directly by the emperor, and, at the same time, an o¢ cial of the Ministry of Internal A¤airs (Mosse (1984); Zaionchkovskii (1978); Robbins (1987)). According to the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire (Svod Zakonov), the main task of the governor was to guarantee the "inviolability of the supreme rights of the Monarchy, the bene…t of the state and the universal, exact observance of laws, codes, supreme edicts, decree of the Senate, and the authorities’orders." Secondly, the law prescribes the governor "to protect the public peace, the security of everyone and the observance

4 of the statutory regulations, order, and security laws." It should also be noted that the governor controlled the police and appointed the key police o¢ cers in the gubernia.

With the reforms of 1864 governors lost some of their judicial power and were constrained by local governments (zemstvos) in deciding on economic and social mat- ters. However, in 1866, in the wake of Karakozov’sattempt on the life of Alexander

II, the government issued laws augmenting the power of governors: the right to unannounced inspection of any provincial state body; the right not to approve any provincial o¢ cial’sappointment on the grounds of political unreliability and the right to close any organization or society engaged in anti-governmental activities and in any activity threatening state security. In 1876, governors’authority was extended to issue "mandatory regulations" which allowed them to prohibit meetings or to close newspapers (Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Eroshkin (1983)). In subsequent decades, governors’powers were further reinforced, especially with Alexander III’s "political counterreforms" (Eroshkin (1983)). All things considered, by the time Nicholas II assumed tsardom in late 1894, governors were the masters of the province with exten- sive powers and they were an important part of the Russian bureaucratic structure.

In the period under study, in addition to regular gubernias, there were a number of territories known as oblasts. Majority of then-existing oblasts were in the periph- ery, located in the outlying regions of the Empire. These were mainly in the south,

Caucasus, Urals, Siberia and Central Asia with their non-Russian minority popu- lations (e.g. Kars Oblast or Transcaspian Oblast). Figure 1 highlights the spatial distribution of gubernias and oblasts. We observe that while gubernias were mostly in the main European part of the empire, oblasts were predominantly peripheral.

5 There were 21 oblasts in 1914.

Oblasts were governed by special statutes.2 While regular gubernias were ruled by civil governors, oblasts were mainly headed by governors with a military background possessing both civil and military powers. At the same time, oblasts were liable to the Ministry of War, while gubernias were liable to the Ministry of Interior. The aim of the central administration was to integrate oblasts into the regular system of imperial governance, which was hampered in the oblasts by local institutions of the minorities and strategic threats in the region (Abashin et al. (2008)). For example, in the Caucasus the inability to introduce general imperial laws and the military resistance of the indigenous population led to a military-popular government (Bo- brovnikov et al. (2007); Abashin et al. (2008)). The essence of this system was the inseparability of military and civil powers, and keeping the traditional institutions of self-governance under the control of the Russian administration (Abashin et al.

(2008)). Oblasts were meant to be temporary administrative units, and in fact, some territories were successfully turned into gubernias. However, despite the measures towards administrative uni…cation with the rest of the Empire, the military-popular governments of oblasts lasted till 1917 (Bobrovnikov et al. (2007)).

On the whole, we can summarize the typical characteristics of the oblasts as follows:

1. Oblasts were usually peripheral regions marked by social and economic back-

wardness concomitant with a high share of non-Russian minorities.

2. They were ruled by military governors who possessed both military and civil

2 Svod Zakonov, Vol. II.

6 powers and were usually in the military service. They were appointed by the

Emperor, yet the candidates were chosen by the Ministry of Interior in coordi-

nation with the Ministry of War.

3. The administrative apparatus of oblasts was on the whole more primitive and

centralized than in gubernias. The military governor, through the system of

oblastniye pravleniya (oblast board), exercised wide powers in the spheres of

law, police, public …nance and interaction with indigenous population. Im-

portantly, zemstvos (elected local government bodies) were also absent in the

oblasts.

4. Based on points 2) and 3), we can infer that the governors of the oblasts were

more powerful masters of the entrusted territories than the rulers of the regular

gubernias.

Lastly, the institution of governorate-general was another important element of the imperial system of administration. A governorate-general spanned over several gubernias or oblasts and was ruled by a general-governor, who, like military governors, also had both military and civil powers. Their powers were very wide, and they could intervene into all spheres of administration in the provinces and overrule governors. For instance, Poland, Caucasus or Siberia were all subject to governorates- general, which might have been a result of military and political considerations such as proximity to potentially hostile states or military resistance by the local population

(Eroshkin (1983); Damesheck et al. (2007)).

7 3 Hypotheses

Robbins (1987) argues that while favouritism and patronage continued to play a role in political hierarchy, expertise and e¢ ciency became ever more important in appointment decisions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The ministry of interior achieved a more consistent procedure in the selection of o¢ cials and there was a growing "professionalisation" (Robbins (1987)). Despite absence of any order in governors’appointments in the legislation, the ministry was working to improve appointees’professional qualities and was elaborating formal criteria of selection (Bli- nov (1905)).

Previous studies on the institutions of imperial governorship in Russia mostly addressed the issue of selection criteria for the candidates of governorship. This paper, instead, focuses on whether governors’performance and personal characteristics in‡uenced their subsequent career paths.

The …rst hypothesis we test is whether gubernatorial performance a¤ected further careers of governors. We argue that, during the time period we consider, the ability of governors to maintain peace and security in provinces was the main measure of performance evaluation by the central government. Robbins (1987) argues that "peace was the governor’sprofession. Among many duties assigned to His Excellency, none was more central than the maintenance of law and public order. The Svod Zakonov listed numerous obligations: protecting the state against its enemies, preserving the security of the tsar’ssubjects from attacks by thieves, swindlers, and bandit gangs, suppressing civil disturbances, and upholding public morality." Therefore, we measure a governor’s performance by the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes

8 in the province under his rule.

In fact, there are a number of cases when governors’ability to manage the political situation in a province in‡uenced their further appointment. For example,

Pyotr Stolypin, who successfully suppressed the unrest in Saratov gubernia, was promoted to the Minister of Interior and the Chairman of Council of Ministers in

1906.3 On the other hand, irresoluteness in the face of the escalating revolutionary movement showed by Samara governor Dmitry Zasyadko (1904 - 1905), Minsk gover- nor Alexandr Musin-Pushkin (1902 - 1905), and Yaroslavl governor Alexei Rogovich

(1902 - 1905) led to their demotion (Aleksushin (1996); Brigadin and Lukashevich

(2009); Marasanova and Fedyuk (1998); Koshko (1916); Witte (1923)).4

A second hypothesis is that favoritism and patronage remained important in shaping governors’careers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that connections played a prominent role in o¢ cial appointments in the Russian Empire. For instance, Alexei

Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, Tver governor in 1903 - 1904, was dismissed due to his rather eccentric treatment of political opposition. Yet, as he was in Nicolas II’sand his wife’s good graces, he immediately received an appointment to the Senate (Dmitriyeva and

Sereda (1996)). We test this hypothesis using proxies for political connections: having

3 Among other examples, Vladimir Launitz was appointed as the mayor of Saint-Petersburg after his paci…cation of Tambov gubernia in 1905. Kharkov governor (1902 - 1903), Ivan Obolensky, vig- orously suppressed peasant unrest ‡oggingpeasants across the gubernia, and these actions, endorsed by Pleve, the Minister of Interior, brought him the position of Finland’s governor-general (Witte (1923)). 4 In addition, Tomsk governor Azanchevskiy-Azancheev, after the pogroms in Tomsk accompanied by the …re in the theater and numerous deaths, was dismissed and later was not able to resume his service (Urusov (1908)). Alexei Lopukhin, the head of Estliand gubernia, was reposed in 1905 because he was suspected of his "too liberal" approach towards the revolutionaries (Witte (1923)). He was attached to the Ministry of Interior and later dismissed from the Ministry due to his critique of the police. Vikentii Raaben lost his o¢ ce of the Bessarabia governor in 1903 because of his indecisiveness during the Jewish pogrom in Kishinev (Urusov (1908)). Ivan Kholshchevnikov, the military governor of Zabaikalskaya oblast in 1906, was dismissed and sentenced to prison because of his arguable lenience to the revolutionary movement (Rediger (1999)).

9 a court title and previous work in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of war.

Third, administrative status of a province could shape the way performance evalu- ations factored into governors’promotions and demotions. As detailed in the previous section, in oblasts, unlike in gubernias, governors had both civil and military powers with wide authority. In addition, economic, social and political circumstances in oblasts di¤ered from those in gubernias, given that oblasts had large shares of non-Russian minority and were in the peripheral regions. On the one hand, en- hanced gubernatorial powers in oblasts rendered those governors more responsible

(in the eyes of central administration) for the state of a¤airs in the entrusted oblast.

On the other hand, given the local particularities of the oblasts, central government had higher expectations from oblast governors in terms of peace keeping and security. Therefore, accountability of oblast governors for social unrest in the respective oblasts could be more deterministic for future careers than for gubernia governors.

We capture this with a dummy variable for oblasts and test whether performance was rewarded di¤erently in oblasts and gubernias.

The last hypothesis to test is the role of the revolutionary period of 1905-1907, which could render a governor’sability to cope with disturbances more indispensable to the central government in the subsequent period. After 1905, the tsarist administration may have become more attentive to the ability of governors to promote peace and security, and may have rewarded them accordingly. Indeed, Lieven (1984a) notes that "to some extent the events of 1905 - 1906 shocked the monarch and his advisers into appointing much younger and more vigorous men to key posts".5 We test this

5 Robbins also argues that by 1906 the Ministry started to systematically evaluate "the moral

10 hypothesis by interacting governors’performance with a post-1905 dummy.

4 Data

Combining several sources, we have constructed a database on more than 300 governors with their personal characteristics and pre- and post-gubernatorial appointments between 1895-1914. Data on the periods of governors’rule come from Morukov and

Samokhvalov (2003). Biographical data on governors come from a wide range of published and online sources. The entire list of resources we have consulted is in the

Appendix A.

Taking into account all available information and relying on Lieven (1984b),6 we have coded career mobility either as a promotion, equal to 1, or same level, equal to

0, or a demotion, equal to -1, with respect to governorship. Appendix B provides a discussion of the coding procedure of career mobility and Table 1 presents the complete taxonomy of the coding. Out of all 1712 career pattern entries for governor- year, 69 (4.03%) are promotions, 116 (6.78%) are demotions and 1527 (89%) are the same level.

Additionally, we have data on other individual characteristics of governors. These characteristics include age, tenure, education, military background, noble title, rank, previous work in the central apparatus and court title.

We have two measures of a governor’s performance: peasant revolts and worker strikes. Data on peasant revolts were collected from several documents. Number of peasant revolts between 1895 - 1904 and June 1907 - July 1914 were obtained from the records of peasant movements by Shapkarin (1959, 1966) and An…mov and the service quali…cations of candidates." 6 Lieven (1984b) maps out how o¢ cials rose through the state service to top political o¢ ce.

11 (1998). All cases of unrest chronicled at the end of each volume were counted or taken directly from the …gures therein. Data on peasant revolts between 1905 - June

1907 were instead constructed from the collection of 18 volumes documenting 1905-

1907 revolutionary period.7 Appendix C contains a breakdown of all cases counted towards peasant revolts.

Data on our second measure of performance, number of worker strikes, are taken from Varzar (1905, 1908, 1910) for 1895 - 1908, and directly from the Collection of the Factory Inspectors’Reports. Overall, we have the number of worker strikes in 65 provinces where the Inspectorate of Factories operated between 1895-1913.

The Inspectorate of Factories covered the majority of manufacturing enterprises and workers in those provinces.8

Lastly, we have a set of macro-variables at the province level. These capture whether a province was an oblast, whether a province was under a governorate- general, urban population, rural population and grain yield9.

The de…nition and summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2.

On average, a governor was 52 years old, had been in o¢ ce for 4.7 years and had an average rank slightly lower than 4. 63% of the governors had higher education, about one third had a court title, more than half of them had a current or former military a¢ liation and 16% carried a noble title (e.g. duke, count). It is important to note that these …gures almost coincide with those given in Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Robbins (1987).

7 Revoliutsiya 1905 - 1907 v Rossii. Dokumenti i materiali. 50 let 1905 - 1955, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955 - 1965. 8 Labour legislation was …rst introduced in 1882 with the creation of the Inspectorate of Factories (in charge of health and life saving regulations). 9 Data on grain yield are from Obukhov (1927).

12 5 Analysis

Following the methodology of Li and Zhou (2004) and Markevich and Zhuravskaya

(2011), we estimate a …xed e¤ects model of the following generalized form:

Cit = Uit + UitDit + Pit + 'Xit + i + t + "it (1)

Our main dependent variable is Cit which captures career mobility of a governor, coded "-1" for demotion, "0" for staying at the same level or a lateral move and "1" for promotion. Uit is a vector of social unrest, peasant revolts and worker strikes.

Pit is two dummies for personal connections, court title and previous experience in the central apparatus. Dit is a vector including two dummies, one for oblasts and a post-1905 dummy. Xit is a vector of controls, including personal characteristics of governors and social and economic indicators of provinces. i and t stand for province and time …xed e¤ects, respectively. "it is an error term that allows for within province correlation as we cluster errors at the province level. We have chosen to employ OLS methods rather than ordered probit or logit in order to avoid incidental parameters problem when biased estimates of …xed e¤ects may lead to further bias in other coe¢ cients of interest. We have validated that all the results carry over if we use ordered probit or logit instead of OLS.

5.1 Main Results

Table 3 presents main estimation results. Columns 1-4 present the results using peasant revolts as a performance measure and columns 5-8 present the results with worker strikes as a performance measure. We start in column 1 by testing whether central authorities used career incentives to improve the e¢ ciency of province governors.

13 Measuring performance by the number of peasant revolts and conditioning on a rich set of personal and provincial characteristics, we show that governors’performance did not have a signi…cant e¤ect in shaping their future careers. This result persists when we control for other variables in the following speci…cations. Our …nding is in line with what some historians suggest.10

In column 2 of Table 3, we test whether favoritism and patronage played a role in governors’ promotions. We use having a court title and previous experience in the central apparatus as a proxy for political connections, and show that these two measures had no signi…cant e¤ect on governors’careers. Thus, we …nd no statistical evidence for the claim that favoritism and patronage were rampant in the Russian

Empire and could shape one’scareer.

In column 3, we test whether governors’performance was evaluated di¤erently in oblasts and gubernias. Our …ndings suggest that although there were no career incentives to improve performance of governors in the gubernias, career concerns were applicable for oblasts governors and their performance was rewarded accordingly. The estimate of the interaction of peasant revolts and oblasts is negative and signi…cant.

Therefore, we show evidence that the governors of oblasts were more likely to be promoted if they performed well in the o¢ ce, and be demoted if they performed poorly.

This e¤ect is also economically important. One standard deviation reduction in the variable Peasant Revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in the Peasant Revolts variable more than tripled the likelihood of

10 For instance, Robbins writes about the MVD’spersistent inability or even unwillingness to weed out the unworthy in the gubernatorial ranks.

14 promotion.

In addition, Figure 2 provides us with an illustrative understanding of the evolu- tion of average careers and peasant revolts in gubernias and oblasts over the years.

We observe that while there was no clear pattern between career and peasant revolts in gubernias, there was a remarkable link between career and peasant revolts in oblasts. Often, a change in peasant revolts in oblasts was met with a change of career in the opposite direction. In other words, on average, in oblasts, a reduction in the number of peasant revolts was associated with more promotions, and an increase in peasant revolts was associated with more demotions.

This result con…rms our conjecture that performance of an oblast governor could be more in‡uential for future career prospects than for a gubernia governor. Wider re- sponsibilities of military governors under more tense political circumstances in oblasts might have made central authorities more responsive to governors’ability to maintain peace and security, and hence better incentive schemes to improve governors’ e¢ ciency were in place.

Finally, in column 4 of Table 3, we test whether authorities have become more reactive to governors’performance in the post-revolutionary period of 1906-1914. We

…nd no signi…cant e¤ect of performance on promotion in the post-1905 period.

In columns 5-8, we replicate the same tests with our second measure of performance, worker strikes. The results are remarkably similar to our previous …ndings.

Governors’performance in‡uenced their career only in oblasts, but not in gubernias.

Political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on securing a promotion, and post-1905 period did not witness an increased sensitivity of authorities to governor performance.

15 5.2 Sensitivity Analysis

We present in Table 4 further robustness checks. We start by assessing the e¤ect of economic growth in a province. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we take into account grain yield growth as a measure of economic growth. We show that grain yield growth had no signi…cant e¤ect on promotion, while the impact of governor’s performance on their career is the same as before. It has an impact only in oblasts, but not in gubernias.

The governors of oblasts were mostly military men. In our entire sample 87% of governors in the oblasts were in the military, while only 17% of governors of gubernias were military men. One may think that some unobservable characteristics of governors could lead to such di¤erences in career determination between oblasts and gubernias. Alternatively, the career pattern in the army might lead to promotion in- dependently of performance, and that might be the reason why we have a di¤erential

…nding in oblasts and gubernias. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we test whether the governors in the oblasts get promoted just because they are army-men. We …nd no such evidence. The e¤ect of being in the military is insigni…cant both in oblasts and in gubernias.

Another possible criticism may refer to the construction of the dependent variable, which may overvalue or undervalue the status of some promotions. We have experimented with some alternatives and created a new variable called Career2 and also created a promotion dummy that treats same level changes and demotions as zeros. In order to create Career2 variable, we lowered the status of some military o¢ ces (chiefs of sta¤ and logistics, previously promotions, were considered as lateral

16 transfers, the o¢ ce of a corps commander became demotion), and raised the status of some civil ones (membership in the Council of the Minister of Interior and Consulta- tion of the Ministry of Justice, becoming aide of a governor-general were considered as lateral transfers). In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, we observe that even with the new dependent variable, Career2, previous results go through. And in columns 7 and

8, we use the promotion dummy as a dependent variable, despite the fact that this reduces the variation considerably. We see that the results are similar to previous

…ndings, although there is some weak e¤ect now in the gubernias in the case of peasant revolts. This is probably due to the fact that there are only 69 promotions and there is very little variation.

Lastly, we have reproduced, not reported, our baseline speci…cations with ordered probit and ordered logit models, and previous …ndings go through.

6 Conclusion

This paper shows that the central authorities of the Russian Empire employed career incentives to improve the e¢ ciency of provincial governors only in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces of the empire (gubernias). This …nding is important in that it sheds more light on to the causes of the

Russian Empire’scollapse. Failure to incentivize governors to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in gubernias covering a larger part of the territory and the population) might have been re‡ected in poor performance of preventing the spread of the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.

We also show that political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on career mobility,

17 and the central authorities did not change in their attitude towards career incentives in the post-1905 period.

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21 Shapkarin A. V. (ed.) (1959). Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1890 - 1900 [Peas- ant Movement in Russia in 1890 - 1900], Moskva: Izdatelstvo sotsialno-ekonomicheskoy literaturi.

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Varzar V. E. (1910). Statistika stachek rabochih na fabrikah i zavodah za trekhletie

1906 - 1908 gg. [Statistics of Worker Strikes in Factories and Plants for the Triennial

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(1904-1983 gg.): Statji, publikatzii, vospominaniya o nem [P. A. Zaionchkovskii (1904

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22 Zaionchkovskii P. A. (1978). Pravitelstvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v

XIX v. [Government Apparatus of the Tsarist Russia in the XIX century], Moskva:

"Mysl".

23 8 Appendix A

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- 1917], Blagoveshchensk-na-Amure: Amurskaya yarmarka.

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Istoriko-biographicheskie ocherki [Voronezh Governors and Vice-Governors, 1710 -

1917: Historical and Biographical Essays], Voronezh: Tsentralno-Chernozemnoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo.

Aleksushin G. V. (1996). Samarskie gubernatori [Samara Governors], Samara:

Samarskii Dom pechati.

Almanakh sovremennikh russkikh gosudarstvennikh deyatelei [Almanach of the

Modern Russian Statesmen], Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. Isidora Goldberga, 1897.

Aphanasieva T. Yu., Goryacheva R. F., Shved V. V. (2007). Grodnenskie gubernatori (1801 - 1917 gg.). Dokumentalno-biographicheskie ocherki [Grodno Gov- ernors (1801 - 1917): Documental Biographical Essays], Grodno: "Grodnenskaya tipographiya".

Berdnikov L. P. (1995). Vsya krasnoyarskaya vlast. Ocherki istorii mestnogo up- ravleniia i samoupravleniia (1822 - 1916). Fakti, Sobytiia, Lyudi [The Whole Kras- noyarskaya Power. Essays on the History of Local Governance and Self-Governance

(1822 - 1916). Facts, Events, People], Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo.

Bondarenko I. I. and Klimov D. V. (2012). Zhertvi politicheskogo terrora v Rossii

(1901 - 1912) / Terrorism v Rossii v nachale XX veka [Victims of Political Terror

(1901 - 1912) / Terrorism in Russia in the beginning of the XX century] in Istorich-

24 eskii Vestnik, T. 2, Dekabr, pp. 190 - 215.

Brigadin P. I. and Lukashevich A. M. (2009). Minskie gubernatori: istoriia vlasti

[Minsk Governors: History of Power], Minsk: GIUST BGU.

Dmitriyeva G. M. and Sereda V. N. (1996). Tverskie gubernatori [Tver Gover- nors], Tver: Tverskoye oblastnoye knizhno-zhurnalnoye izdatelstvo.

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Gorbunov K. E., Sivoplyas I. E., Shabalkin A. Yu. (2003). Simbirskie grazh- danskie gubernatori: Materiali k istoriko-biographicheskim ocherkam [Simbirsk Civil

Governors: Materials to Historical and Biographical Essays], Ulianovsk: UIKPRO.

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28 9 Appendix B

Since Peter the Great there existed an order of o¢ cial ranks. According to the Table of Ranks, o¢ cials’ranks (chin) were listed together with the classes (klass) of positions that could be occupied by them (Lieven, 1984a).11 For instance, this formal system of the classes ranked the o¢ ce of Minister, Deputy Minister, membership in the State Council and the Senate higher than the governor’s o¢ ce.12 In addition,

Lieven (1984b) writes that for top o¢ cials working in Saint Petersburg the pay, con- ditions of service, and career prospects were far better than for those who worked in the provinces.13 Governors could be transferred to Petersburg and most of such transfers were considered as a promotion. For example, ministership or deputy ministership were a promotion in comparison to governorship; and the membership in the

State Council or the Senate were popularly perceived as a sinecure (Zaionchkovskii,

1978).14 Thus, these positions are coded as a promotion. On the other hand, the

Council of the Minister of Internal A¤airs was seen as the last resting ground for the failed o¢ cial, and hence, was a demotion (Lieven, 1984a).

However, the Table of Ranks does not provide fully satisfactory guidance that can

11 Lieven also notes that rank system was subject to criticism for being cumbersome. "In particular, automatic promotion in rank and the legal requirement of senior rank for candidates for political o¢ ce has at times been seen as breeding a spirit of routine and mediocrity in the government class" (Lieven (1984a)). But in practice the system was rather ‡exible "because numerous exemptions and loopholes made... [the regulations] dead letter" (Ibid., p. 207). 12 Table of Ranks can be found at: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1700dok/tabel_end.php. 13 Anecdotal evidence also points out that an ambitious o¢ cial should rather stay in Petersburg than hold an o¢ ce of the same class in the province. Lieven gives the example of A. N. Mosolov who …nally became a member of the State Council: "Transfer to provincial service [after being head of Department of Foreign Faiths] was, however, rightly seen by Mosolov as a near fatal blow to his ambitions, his vanity and to his desire one day to play a key role in formulating governmental policy" (Lieven (1984a)). 14 Lieven (1984a) argues that the State Council was formally the highest and probably the most prestigious institution in nineteenth-century Russia. The membership in the State Council was particularly aspired by top o¢ cials because of the exceptionally high pensions paid to former State Council members.

29 be applied to every type of position. The sphere of in‡uence of an o¢ cial was also a factor that one needs to take into account. For example, a governor ruled over up to several million people, while a brigade commander commanded about 5000 people, although both had the same class. Therefore, moving from governorship to a brigade commander or a division commander is coded as a demotion. Moreover, as mentioned before, positions in Saint Petersburg were more attractive than the provincial positions of the same class due to future career prospects they o¤er (Lieven (1984a)).

Thus, the head of a ministerial department is coded as a promotion, although it had the same class of a governor. Finally, to measure the real relative status of di¤erent positions, it might be instructive to look at salaries, as some o¢ ces of equal class might have di¤ered with respect to material gains. According to the …gures provided in Zaionchkovskii (1998), in the early 1900s governors were paid 9600 to 12620 rubles per year, while the division commander and the corps commanders received 6000 and 9300 rubles per year, respectively. As far as some civil o¢ ces are concerned, the

Deputy Minister of Interior received 15000 rubles per year and a member of the State

Council earned between 12000 - 18000 rubles per year.15

15 Saltykov-Schedrin, in Pompadours and Pompadouresses, describes the unenviable fate of a retired governor who was forced to retire without ever becoming a senator: "He left everything that was dear to his heart, and left not in order to decorate by himself one of the halls of the magni…cent building with the windows overlooking the Senate Square, but in order to join the ranks of those murmuring and vainly hoping, who in these days somewhat peculiarly overcrowd the squares and streets of Petersburg". Moreover, since there was no compulsory age of retirement, retirement is considered as demotion, except when there is a clear indication that the governor in question was seriously ill (Koshko (1916)).

30 10 Appendix C

Cases of arson, damage to cattle, illegal tree cutting and plowing were counted by the number of involved estates. When the peasants of several villages participated in a single act, it was considered a single case. Repeated incidents in an estate over a short period were considered a single episode. Full destruction of an estate (or a rich peasant’s farm) was also counted as a single episode. Peasants’armed clashes with the troops or the policemen were taken as separate episodes.

Agrarian workers’strikes (which were frequent in the Western gubernias) were counted by the numbers of folwarks that went on a strike. Cases of violent expulsion of workers by peasants were also counted.

Cases of illegal propaganda (if the agitator gathered a peasants meeting); reso- lutions (prigovori) of peasants’meetings (skhodi) containing political and economic requirements addressed to the authorities; processions and demonstrations with ban- ners; laying economic claims to landlords by peasants were counted separately.

Illegal deposition and reelection of the local administration, refusal to pay taxes, clashes with security forces restoring order, attacking police in order to release pris- oners were also counted.

In late 1905 - early 1906, there were armed rebellions in Kurliandskaya, Li‡iand- skaya, Estliandskaya and Kutaisskaya gubernias. Such episodes of resistance to the authorities were counted.

Revolts sweeping over the entire gubernia were counted as a single case. If particular revolts were explicitly mentioned, they were counted separately.

31 Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Gubernias and Oblasts in the Russian Empire in 1914

Gubernias Oblasts (averages by year) (averages by year) 3 0 .1 .5 .4 •.1 .05 2 .3 0 •.2 .2 1 •.3 Careeraverages over oblasts •.05 Careeraverages over gubernias .1 0 0 •.1 •.4 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 year year

Career (left axis) Career (left axis) Peasant Revolts (right axis) Peasant Revolts (right axis)

Figure 2: Governors’Careers and Peasant Revolts in Gubernias and Oblasts

32 Table 1: Coding of Governors’Appointments -1 Aide of a governor-general Aide of the commander of a Current Military district At disposal of the Chief of General Sta¤ At disposal of the Minister of War Chief of sta¤ of a Current Military corps Chief representative of a regional Red Cross society Division commander Divisional brigade commander Founded the Community of the Sisters of Mercy of the Red Cross Head of the Nikolaev Maritime Academy Honorary guardian and the steward of a prince’scourt Honorary guardian of the Guardian Council of Empress Maria’sinstitutions Joined the General Sta¤ with no particular o¢ ce Joined the Ministry of Internal A¤airs with no particular o¢ ce Joined the troops of a Current Military district with no particular o¢ ce Lawyer Member of the Board of Consultation of the Ministry of Justice Member of the Council of the Minister of Internal A¤airs Member of the Current Military Council Retired Surrendered to the enemy Tried in Court Noble Title and possibly sentenced to prison Vice-governor 0 Deceased Joined the army on his own initiative Left o¢ ce after being wounded Current Military corps commander Resigned because of illness Transferred as a governor to another province Temporarily left the governorship but resumed it the next year 1 Chief of logistics of an army Chief of sta¤ of a Current Military district Commander of an army Commander of a Current Military district Deputy minister Governor-general Head of a department of the General Sta¤ Head of a ministerial department Mayor of Saint-Petersburg Member of the State Council Minister Senator

33 Table 2: Summary Statistics VARIABLES description N mean sd min max Career 1 - promotion, 0 - same level, -1 - demotion 1287 -0.028 0.354 -1 1 Peasant Revolts Log(1+number of peasant revolts) 1287 0.748 1.068 0 5.961 Worker Strikes Log(1+number of worker strikes) 920 1.215 1.51 0 7.748 Court Title Indicator for a court title 1287 0.322 0.468 0 1 Central Apparatus Indicator for previous work in the central apparatus of MVD or War Ministry 1287 0.199 0.399 0 1 Age Age in years 1287 52.011 7.136 34 71 Tenure Number of years in the governorship o¢ ce 1287 4.756 3.729 1 20 34 Education Indicator for higher education 1287 0.633 0.482 0 1 Current Military Indicator for current military service 1287 0.388 0.487 0 1 Former Military Indicator for former military service 1287 0.173 0.379 0 1 Noble Title Indicator for a noble title 1287 0.16 0.367 0 1 Rank Rank according to the Table of Ranks 1287 3.722 0.7 2 7 Oblast Indicator for oblast 1287 0.218 0.413 0 1 Governorate-General Indicator for governorate-general 1287 0.273 0.446 0 1 Rural Population Log of rural population 1287 7.009 0.83 3.27 8.276 Urban Population Log of urban population 1287 5.157 0.954 0.21 7.753 Grain Yield Number of poods of grain from a desyatina 1000 46.76 13.53 3.2 92 Table 3: Evaluation of Governors’Relative Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES Career Career Career Career Career Career Career Career Peasant Revolts 0.025 0.024 0.030 0.019 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) Peasant Revolts*Oblast -0.150*** (0.054) Worker Strikes 0.022 0.020 0.025 0.031 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) Worker Strikes*Oblast -0.198*** (0.038) Court Title -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 -0.038 -0.036 -0.037

35 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) Central Apparatus -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) Peasant Revolts*1906-1914 dummy 0.012 (0.025) Worker Strikes*1906-1914 dummy -0.0185 (0.0214) Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Year and Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 1,287 1,287 1,287 1,287 920 920 920 920 R-squared 0.109 0.114 0.120 0.114 0.107 0.117 0.128 0.118 Notes: Controls include Age, Age Squared, Tenure, Education, Current Military, Former Military, Noble Title, Rank, Governorate-General, Rural Population, Urban Population. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES Career Career Career Career Career2 Career2 Promotion Promotion Peasant Revolts 0.031 0.024 0.026 0.032** (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) Peasant Revolts*Oblast -0.168*** -0.126** -0.040** (0.029) (0.049) (0.02) Worker Strikes 0.016 0.02 0.017 0.008 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.01) Worker Strikes*Oblast -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.073*** (0.027) (0.035) (0.014) 36 Grain Yield Growth -0.005 -0.003 (0.035) (0.035) Current Military -0.023 -0.028 (0.056) (0.069) Current Military*Oblast 0.094 -0.066 (0.065) (0.094) Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year and Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 761 724 1,287 920 1,287 920 1,287 920 R-squared 0.121 0.136 0.114 0.117 0.133 0.142 0.149 0.158 Notes: Controls include Court Title, Central Apparatus, Age, Age Squared, Tenure, Education, Current Military, Former Military, Noble Title, Rank, Governorate-General, Rural Population, Urban Population. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.