Joint Force Quarterly 25 Jfq Jfq Forum

JFQ

...modern warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air.

— Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King U. S. Navy at War, 1941–1945 CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by Colin L. Powell

In This Issue 6 by the Editor-in-Chief

Where Are Special 7 Operations Forces? by John M. Collins

The New Joint Warfare JFQ 17 by Frederick R. Strain

Surveying Gulf War Airpower by Thomas A. Keaney JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 25 JFQ JFQ FORUM

Special Operations Forces Gulf War Airpower 37 Mission to Somalia Mission to Somalia

The New Joint Warfare

Cooperative Engagement in the Pacific New Contingencies, Old Roles Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 38 by Samuel P. Huntington Autumn Guadalcanal 93

Do We Need An Information Corps?

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL An Envoy’s Perspective PHOTO CREDITS 44 by Robert B. Oakley The front cover shows a B–2 stealth bomber on a test flight over Edwards Air Force Base; the first production model B–2 will enter operational ser- A CINC’s Perspective vice in December 1993 (U.S. Air Force photo by 56 by Joseph P. Hoar Quintin E. Wynn). The cover insets (from the top) depict Special Operations Forces making an unannounced visit (DOD photo), soldiers of the The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma 10th Mountain Division in Somalia (Joint Com- 64 by T. Frank Crigler bat Camera photo by H.H. Duffner), the combat information center aboard USS Lake Cham- plain (U.S. Navy photo), and a Grumman Avenger being launched from USS Suwannee in the South Pacific (photo by Charles Kerlee cour- Beyond Goldwater-Nichols tesy of the Naval Historical Center). by Peter W. Chiarelli The front inside cover features ships of the 71 U.S. Navy arriving in Sydney harbor to mark the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea Cooperative Engagement (U.S. Navy photo by Jeff Hilton). The background illustration on these pages 82 by Charles R. Larson captures a takeoff from USS Independence (U.S. Navy photo by Mark Therien). The insets show Special Operations Forces (DOD photo), troops disembarking in Somalia (Joint Combat Camera Center photo), an F–15 being readied during Exercise Tandem Thrust ’93 (2d Combat Camera Squadron photo by Val Gempis), a Stewart tank being unloaded from USS Alchiba at Guadalcanal (photo courtesy of the Naval Historical Center), and sailors on the bridge while underway (DOD photo). AUTUMN 1993 / NUMBER 2

Do We Need An Information Corps? 88 by Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Guadalcanal: Editor-in-Chief 98 The Naval Campaign Stuart E. Johnson by H.P. Willmott Executive Editor Patrick M. Cronin Managing Editor Robert A. Silano Associate Editors Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley Editorial Assistant Florence P. Williams In Memoriam: 107 Matthew Bunker Ridgway Art Direction Typography and Design Division Government Printing Office

OUT OF JOINT Joint Force Quarterly is published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know Us National Defense University, to promote 108 by Michael Vlahos understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operations FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. 111 Letters to the Editor The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and THE JOINT WORLD topics of common interest to the Armed Forces. Please direct manuscripts, letters, 112 Doctrine, History, Education, and Documentation and editorial communications to: Managing Editor 118 A Quarterly Review of Joint Literature Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Fort Lesley J. McNair OFF THE SHELF Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 Commercial Telephone: (202) 475–1013 119 Rethinking Asian Alliances: Defense Switched Network A Review Essay (DSN): 335–1013 FAX: (202) 475–1012/ DSN 335–1012 by Patrick M. Cronin The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 123 Chiefs from Across the are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the De- Estuary: A Book Review partment of Defense or any other agency by Walter R. Poole of the Federal Government. Portions of this journal are protected by copyright and may not be reproduced or extracted 125 Russia’s Military Past: A Book Review without the permission of the copyright by Brian R. Sullivan proprietors. An acknowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its POSTSCRIPT contents. This publication has been approved by 128 A Note to Readers and Contributors the Secretary of Defense. September 1993

ISSN 1070–0692 Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Publisher A Word GEN Colin L. Powell, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Advisory Committee LTG Paul G. Cerjan, USA National Defense University Members of the Advisory Committee from the BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman Col William R. Donnelly, USMC Marine Corps War College Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF Armed Forces Staff College Maj Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF Chairman National War College Brig Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF The Joint Staff BG Randolph W. House, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College VADM R.C. Macke, USN The Joint Staff Col Andrew Nichols Pratt, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces MG William A. Stofft, USA U.S. Army War College RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF Air Command and Staff College Chairman of the Editorial Board Stuart E. Johnson Institute for National Strategic Studies Members of the Editorial Board Richard K. Betts Columbia University Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University COL Robert A. Doughty, USA U.S. Military Academy CAPT George L. Drummond, USN Armed Forces Staff College LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC Marine Corps War College Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces COL Peter F. Herrly, USA National War College Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF Naval War College William T. Hodson Information Resources Management College COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA U.S. Army War College Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher Brookings Institution John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF Air Command and Staff College LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute Stephen Peter Rosen The Chairman saluting the national Harvard University James H. Toner colors at the groundbreaking cere- Air War College mony for the Vietnam Women’s LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University Memorial in Washington, D.C., on LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) July 29, 1993. RKK, Limited DOD (Don Parker)

4 JFQ / Autumn 1993 efore I wish JFQ’s readers fair winds utmost restraint and good judgment in send- and following seas, dry foxholes, ing America’s best and brightest into the caul- and clear air, let me offer a few dron of combat. Bthoughts as a parting shot. We are fortunate to have national lead- The past four years have been historic ers who understand this basic fact of mili- ones. So many changes have occurred that it tary power. We are also fortunate because is hard to chronicle them without losing a our leaders understand that when they do listener’s attention. We have lived through a have to send our men and women in harm’s time that historians will way they send them to achieve a decisive labor over for decades to victory. They should expect no less—and we we have come to- come, trying to sort out should give them no less. gether as a joint team the heroes from the vil- Maximum effort to accomplish the mis- lains, fact from fiction, sion, to win decisively, demands joint action in an unprecedented and momentous from on the battlefield. If there is a legacy of trivial or transient events. which I am the proudest, it is that we have way over these last One very real and come together as a joint team in an unprece- four years very relevant change to dented way over these last four years. I com- those of us who serve in mend all of you for this remarkable achieve- the Armed Forces is that ment—and I challenge you to stay true to we are getting smaller. For the foreseeable fu- this magnificent military family we have ture, nothing is going to happen to reverse built together. that trend. Your new Chairman, General John Sha- What is important is that we have laid likashvili, is as dedicated to the team as any the groundwork to get smaller without los- man I know. The family will prosper under ing the high quality that has become the his wise chairmanship. Give him your full hallmark of America’s military. This should support. be the continuing mission of all our men As I depart now, I wish all of you great and women—officers, warrant officers, success in the future. I am proud of every NCOs, and enlisted. No matter how small soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coast- we get, we must keep our Armed Forces the guardsman in the force. You’re the best and best in the world. you always will be. We must provide them with the best leadership, equipment, support, and quality COLIN L. POWELL of life. We must also guard against their Chairman ever having to answer the call of an uncer- of the tain trumpet. Joint Chiefs of Staff Men and women do not go in harm’s way as a businessman pursues a contract, a lawyer a case, or a professor a research project. The GI goes with his or her life on the line, every time. From that fundamental distinction comes the all-powerful reason to exercise the

General Colin L. Powell, USA, is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was previously Commander in Chief, Forces Command, and also served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 5 which makes a case for organizational reform that goes beyond the Goldwater- Nichols Act by creating both a national mili- In This Issue tary advisory council and a general staff. In our first issue we featured an article by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Com- mand; in this issue we look to the Pacific and present a contribution by the CINC responsible for tackling the realities of the harles Dickens once quipped post-Cold War in that vast region of the that after writing Pickwick Pa- world. This is followed by a piece in which pers it took six months before two authors, a defense analyst and a naval the muse stirred him enough to officer, argue that the military-technical rev- begin work on the next book, olution is so rife in its warfare applications Oliver. Having received gener- that an independent information corps peo- Cous kudos for the first issue of JFQ, it was a pled by high-tech specialists should be challenge to muster the resources to publish formed. A historian then examines the first another issue of equal impact. Nonetheless, I U.S. offensive of World War II at Guadal- believe our editors have succeeded in assem- canal through a case study that reveals the bling an issue with the scope, depth, and rel- campaign as a serendipitous joint operation. evance that lives up to the standards set by There is also a brief tribute in memory of the inaugural number of the journal. General Matthew Ridgway who died this In this issue you will find contributions summer. In Out of Joint, an essay designed to on subjects of some moment. There is an ar- provoke debate over the concepts underly- ticle based on a recent congressional report ing jointness, the commentator instructs us on special operations that both assesses that being joint may well have real benefits progress in that field and offers recommen- in peacetime, but jointness alone will not dations on enhancing its capabilities. Then prepare us for the next war. in an article calling for joint doctrine to We were pleased to receive the first of meet future challenges, the author contends what we trust will be a continual flow of let- that we must rethink the assumptions of tra- ters to the editor, some of which appear in ditional approaches to warfare and rewrite this issue. In addition, you will find profes- the military lexicon to accommodate the sional notes on a range of areas (including ideas that emerge. This is followed by a con- joint doctrine, education, history, and docu- tribution drawn from the findings of a mentation), plus book reviews and a survey newly released survey of Gulf War air- of joint literature, all of which are regular power—commissioned by the Secretary of departments of the journal. the Air Force—in which the effectiveness of As the Chairman indicated in the inau- coalition airpower is evaluated in both gural issue, read JFQ for controversy, debate, quantitative and qualitative terms. new ideas, and fresh insights, and then con- JFQ Forum examines the conduct of U.N. tribute your own views. We look forward to peace-enforcement in Somalia over the past hearing from you—through letters and con- year in a series of four articles. For those in- tributions on subjects of importance to the terested in the background of the ongoing Armed Forces that can add to our common military activities in that country—or simply understanding of joint warfighting. in the implications of such operations on what some see as the dawning of a new era STUART E. JOHNSON of nontraditional roles for the Armed Editor-in-Chief Forces—a group of distinguished practition- ers and specialists offer insightful analyses on the mission to Somalia. We are also pleased to publish the co- winning entry from the 1993 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition

6 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Where Are Special Operations Forces? he capabilities of Special Opera- By JOHN M. COLLINS tions Forces (SOF) had declined severely for more than a decade be- T fore 1986 when legislation created both the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict—the ASD (SO/LIC)—and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and also directed the Secretary of Defense to devise a major force program (namely, MFP–11), especially for SOF. Progress was slow at first but soon gained momentum.

DOD

Summary

Special Operations Forces (SOF) were fragmented and inadequately funded when Congress passed legislation in 1987 that put in place a senior-level Pentagon official, unified command, and defense program to both consolidate and advance the interests of the special operations community. While initial progress was slow, the pace soon quickened and recently SOF have scored a number of notable accomplishments. But there are shortcomings that hamper SOF from achieving their full potential. Command relationships, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue missions, theater staffs, career incentives, Special Mission Unit priorities, and research, development, and acquisition are all areas that require further attention. While institutional changes are essentially complete, military culture is evolving gradually when it comes to accepting SOF. Overall, however, the prospects for special operations are brighter today than they have been for decades.

This article is extracted and adapted from a report by John M. Collins entitled Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986–1993 issued by the Congressional Research Service on July 30, 1993 and is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 7 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Subsequent accomplish- morale problems among other SOF. Also, re- ments have been impressive. search, development, and acquisition cycles Institutionally, the office of for SOF-peculiar items are sluggish. the ASD (SO/LIC) as well as On balance, however, all concerned SOCOM headquarters and its reach one conclusion: SOF today are far Army, Navy, and Air Force stronger than in 1986. Institutional changes component commands, the- are essentially complete, and despite the fact ater Special Operations Com- that military culture is changing more mands (SOCs), and Army slowly with regard to special operations, Special Operations Support most prognoses are optimistic. Commands have been acti- The Essence of SOF DOD vated and staffed. SOCOM Congress designated the following activ- has codified relationships ities in the order listed as the focus of SOF with regionally-oriented unified commands insofar as they relate to special operations: di- and the services. It also has created a plan- rect action, strategic reconnaissance, uncon- ning, programming, and budgeting system ventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and a research, development, and acquisi- Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations tion system as well as intelligence architec- (PSYOP), counterterrorism, humanitarian as- tures for special operations. A new series of sistance, theater search and rescue (TSAR), doctrinal publications guides their employ- and such other activities as specified by the ment in peacetime, crises, and war. Team- President or the Secretary of Defense. work between SOF and conventional forces The Secretary of Defense and the Com- is much improved. Approximately 2,500 SOF mander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations personnel serve in roughly forty countries Command (CINCSOC), consider the first six on a constant basis (see chart on page 11), activities listed above as primary responsibili- and they have played an important part in ties. Humanitarian assistance and TSAR oc- all major contingencies since Operation cupy a separate category known as collateral Desert Storm. special operations activities, together with such Some residual problems nevertheless disparate duties as antiterrorism (the defen- prevent SOF from contributing effectively to sive counterpart of counterterrorism), coun- overall military capabilities. Statutory rela- terdrug operations, and security assistance. tionships between the ASD (SO/LIC) and Unconventional warfare and counterter- SOCOM headquarters and the former’s re- rorism are strictly special operations. SOF sponsibility for low-intensity conflict as well share the other seven specific responsibilities as special operations seem to merit review. U.S. Army Special with conventional forces, but low-visibility, So do SOF obligations with regard to both Operations low-cost special operations techniques are Command humanitarian assistance and theater search distinctively different, and thereby expand (USASOC)—includes and rescue which tend to overload active the range of options open to national secu- 30,000 active and Civil Affairs units and SOF helicopter crews, Reserve component rity decisionmakers. respectively. The sparsely staffed SOCs rely members of Special SOF often are employable where high- heavily on Reserve component augmenta- Forces, Special profile conventional forces are politically, Operations Aviation, tion which is not always sufficiently respon- militarily, and/or economically inappropri- Ranger, Psychological sive or well qualified. Career progression by ate. Small, self-reliant, readily deployable Operations, and Civil SOF officers is severely limited, because con- Affairs units. units that capitalize on speed, surprise, au- ventional officers occupy many SOF posts dacity, and deception sometimes accomplish and promotion ladders within the special missions in ways that minimize risks of esca- operations community stop at two stars, ex- lation and concurrently maximize returns cept for one Army billet. The high priorities compared with the orthodox applications of assigned to Special Mission Units cause military power which normally emphasize mass. Aircraft, artillery, or combat engineers might demolish a critical bridge at a particular time, for example, but SOF could mag- John M. Collins is senior specialist in national defense at the nify the physical and psychological effects Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. His considerably if they blew that bridge while a latest book is America’s Small Wars: Lessons for the Future.

8 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Collins

trainload of enemy dignitaries or ammuni- Few ASD (SO/LIC) achievements have tion was halfway across. Conventional land, been publicized. Most occurred quietly and sea, and air forces normally patrol specified incrementally behind the scenes. Their cu- sectors intermittently, whereas special recon- mulative influence on institutional relations, naissance troops may remain in hostile terri- policies, and plans nevertheless is consider- tory for weeks or months at a time collecting able. A few illustrations include: information that otherwise would be unob- ▼ Strengthened and clarified organizational tainable. Severe misfortunes, however, may relationships between ASD (SO/LIC) and SOCOM accompany failure. Large enemy conven- by developing ten mutually agreeable principles tional forces can easily overwhelm small SOF to improve coordination and oversight and by re- units they manage to corner dur- solving legal disagreements over defining ele- ing clandestine operations, and ments of ASD (SO/LIC) oversight and supervision may be tempted to treat survivors of SOCOM activities. harshly. Adverse political repercus- ▼ Successfully represented continuing needs sions can be far-reaching. for the Sensitive Special Operations Program on matters dealing with operational and policy deci- Nontraditional responsibili- sions during the DOD intelligence reorganization. ties, such as humanitarian assis- The ASD (SO/LIC) relationship with the intelli- tance, are traditional roles for gence community has proven to be a key ingredi- Army Special Forces (SF) as well as ent in negotiating sensitive intelligence support

DOD PSYOP and CA units. Their readi- for the special operations community. SEALs exiting an ness, in fact, improves while they ▼ Obtained the Secretary of Defense’s ap- underwater delivery perform foreign internal defense missions, proval in March 1993 to designate PSYOP and CA unit. whereas that of conventional forces nor- as SOF which helped eliminate fragmentation of mally declines, because such duties divert CA responsibilities among other OSD offices. time and attention away from primary re- ▼ Obtained Secretary of Defense approval in sponsibilities. Area orientation and language 1988 to designate ASD (SO/LIC) as the single point of contact for DOD antiterrorism matters, skills attune SF (and some members of Sea- thereby linking efforts of the Joint Staff, unified Air-Land Teams or SEALs) to cultural nu- and specified commands, defense agencies, and ances that usually temper humanitarian as- the interagency antiterrorism community. sistance techniques. Self-reliance allows ▼ Developed and promulgated policy direc- them to function effectively under austere tives regarding the planning, programming, bud- conditions without the infrastructure that geting, execution, and acquisition authority conventional forces often need. granted to SOCOM. ▼ Developed extensive input for the bottom- ASD (SO/LIC) Accomplishments up review, a zero-based examination of roles for The Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Armed Forces in the emerging security envi- Special Operations and Low Intensity Con- ronment. The project, aimed at improving SOF ef- flict has accomplished quite a lot with a rela- fectiveness in accomplishing traditional and new tively small staff since Congress confirmed missions, included policy proposals for strategic Naval Special the first occupant of that office in August forward basing of SOF; afloat bases for SOF in re- Warfare Command 1988. A principal deputy is the second in gions where land-based presence is not feasible; re- (NAVSPECWARCOM)— search, development, and acquisition initiatives to comprised of 5,500 charge, with a deputy assistant secretary for improve SOF contributions to counterprolifera- active and Reserve policy and missions and another for forces tion; a range of activities to improve national assis- component operational and resources. The strength of the office is tance capabilities; and recommendations concern- and support personnel, currently 42 military and 35 civilian person- including Sea-Air-Land ing such missions as peacekeeping, peace-making, (SEAL) Teams, SEAL nel including administrative support. The promoting democracy, and nonproliferation. Delivery Vehicle Teams, civilians are preponderant in supervisory po- ▼ Buttressed the national campaign to and Special Boat sitions, but several have accrued twenty or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass de- Squadrons and Units. more years of experience in SOF while on ac- struction by ensuring that current SOF capabili- tive duty. The action officers with extensive ties are being integrated into key strategy docu- military service (not necessarily in SOF) out- ments and policy decisions and by sponsoring number career civil servants by about five to multi-year, multi-agency research studies that ex- one. Proven interdepartmental and intera- plore emerging and potential counterprolifera- gency performers who know how to work tion roles for SOF. within the system are among them. (continued on page 12)

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 9 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Theater-Level perceived threats, geographic circum- Cape of Good Hope, contains several stances, types of contingencies, the trouble spots and potential flash Special Operations intensity of crises, and other factors. points of which Bosnia-Hercegovina, Libya, Liberia, Israel, and South Commands Special Operations Command, Africa are the most prominent. Atlantic (SOCLANT) U.S. Special Operations Com- Refugees from the Balkans, right- U.S. Atlantic Command (LANT- mand (SOCOM) organizes, equips, wing nationalists in Germany, un- COM) has an immense AOR mainly trains, and provides Special Opera- rest in Russia and neighboring covered by water. Of the 39 islands tions Forces (SOF) for commanders states, and transnational terrorism that comprise the land in the area, in chief (CINCs) of regionally-ori- are among Europe’s security con- Greenland is by far the largest with a ented unified commands (European, cerns. SOCEUR is located in Vaihin- population half the size of Peoria. Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, gen, Germany. Forward-based SOF The most densely settled islands are and Central)—in addition units controlled by SOCEUR include in the Caribbean and all—except for to the Commander in a Special Forces battalion in Ger- Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Chief, U.S. Forces, many, a Naval Special Warfare Unit Puerto Rico—are small. Located in Korea—each of whom, in Scotland, and an Air Force Special Norfolk, SOCLANT is the smallest of in turn, delegates opera- Operations Group in England that the SOCs designated as subordinate tional control of the consists of three squadrons of unified commands. No SOF units are forces to their theater- MC–130 Combat Talons, MH–53J permanently assigned and none is level Special Operations Pave Low helicopters, and HC–130 forward based, save for one Naval Commands (SOCs). The six SOCs are Combat Shadows. Active and Re- Special Warfare Unit. The LANTCOM the focal point for in-theater SOF, serve PSYOP units also provide sup- staff has responsibility for counter- form nuclei for Joint Special Opera- port and a Reserve CA command pe- terrorism, counternarcotics, Psycho- tions Task Forces, and furnish exper- riodically augments the CINC’s staff. tise needed to effectively employ logical Operations (PSYOP), Civil SOF independently or in concert Affairs (CA), and black programs. Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH) with conventional forces. Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command The regionally-oriented unified Central (SOCCENT) (SOUTHCOM) has an AOR which in- commands and SOCs rely upon the U.S. Central Command (CENT- cludes 20 countries across Central same basic sources of doctrine and COM) is responsible for an area and South America, from the Mexi- policy for special operations. Annex made up of 18 countries in Northeast can border with Guatemala and Be- E to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Africa and Southwest Asia, plus lize to Cape Horn. Each nation of Plan outlines missions, apportions Afghanistan and Pakistan. CENT- the region has distinctive character- assets to theater COM headquarters, collocated with istics, but the huge area is fairly ho- CINCs, and pro- SOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base, is mogeneous despite great geographic vides basic pol- removed by no fewer than seven differences (flatlands and mountain icy guidance. time zones from its AOR, and no SOF chains, jungles, swamps, and arable The 3–05 series are permanently stationed in the re- plains). SOCSOUTH, with headquar- of joint publica- gion. SOCOM and its component ters at Albrook Air Force Station, tions is being commands provide assets from a Panama, controls a Special Forces developed to pool containing Special Forces, company and an Army special oper- dispense funda- Rangers, Naval Special Warfare Units, DOD ations aviation detachment mental doctrine fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and SEALs jumping from equipped with MH–60 Black Hawks for special oper- PSYOP and CA units. An amphibious an Air Force AC–130. as well as a Special Operations Sup- ations. Docu- Ready Group that includes a Marine port Command. U.S. Atlantic Fleet ments prepared Expeditionary Unit (Special Opera- Detachment South has both a Naval by SOCOM and its component com- tions Capable), SEALs, and aviation Special Warfare Unit and a Special mands elaborate upon other issues assets is normally in the AOR. That Boat Unit at Rodman, Panama, while CINCs promulgate policies for mix is adequate according to SOC- which support SOCSOUTH as di- their areas of responsibility (AORs). CENT, though both PSYOP and CA rected by CINCSOUTH. Small special operations staff sections support depends heavily on the se- help CINCs plan and supervise all in- lected call-up of Reservists. Special Operations Command, theater SOF activities, serve as con- Pacific (SOCPAC) Special Operations Command, duits to and from SOCs, sometimes U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Europe (SOCEUR) manage sensitive compartmented is a watery domain which is three U.S. European Command black programs, and also assist as re- times larger than that of LANTCOM. (EUCOM) is a well-developed theater quired. The regionally-oriented SOCs Its AOR embraces India and the In- exhibit unique characteristics such as that enjoyed a top priority during the Cold War. Its AOR, stretching from Norway’s North Cape to the

10 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Collins

SOF Deployments: A Snapshot of a Typical Week

Period of 30 Jan–6 Feb 1993 Missions Personnel Countries States ■ CONUS 36 844 1 20 ■ PACOM AOR 25 568 9 2 ■ EUCOM AOR 24 381 8 ■ CENTCOM AOR 9 423 5 ■ LANTCOM AOR 8 80 3 ■ SOUTHCOM AOR 49 221 14 TOTAL 151 2517 40 22

dian Ocean, northeast and southeast Low helicopters at Osan, Korea. A Koreans furnish most in-theater SOF, Asia, and the South Pacific and Special Operations Support Com- the fact that SOC–K has control over Oceania. Strict priorities based on mand completes the in-theater as- only one Special Forces detachment the best possible requirement fore- sets. In addition, a CA brigade from is not significant. In the event of casts are consequently essential, be- the Army Reserve is earmarked to as- hostilities SOC–K combines with the cause SOCOM cannot provide sist if required. ROK Special Warfare Command to enough culturally-attuned, lan- form the Combined Unconventional Special Operations Command, guage-qualified SOF personnel for Warfare Task Force. JFQ Korea (SOC–K) every corner of this extensive region. Korea is the only theater in Special Operations Command, Pa- which American and allied SOF are DOD cific (SOCPAC), at Camp H.M. institutionally integrated. Located in Smith, Hawaii, is as distant from Seoul, SOC–K is a standing joint task South and Southeast Asia as SOC- force controlled by the Commander, CENT is from the Middle East. SOF U.S. Forces Korea. It serves the assigned to this populous and com- Republic of Korea (ROK)/U.S. Com- plex area include a Special Forces bined Forces Command, is a compo- battalion on Okinawa, a SEAL pla- nent of the Combined Unconven- toon collocated with a Naval Special tional Warfare Task Force, and works Warfare Unit on Guam, and an Air closely with the Korean Army Spe- Force Special Operations Group con- cial Warfare Command. Since the sisting of three squadrons of AC–130 Spectre MC–130 Combat Talons and illuminating the HC–130 Combat Shadows at Kadena night sky. Air Base, Japan, and MH–53J Pave

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 11 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(continued from page 9) ▼ Initiated and secured agreement from the National Defense University (NDU) and SOCOM on creating, funding, and filling a SOF faculty chair beginning in academic year 1993–94. Fol- low-on activities include establishing both a SOF archive in the NDU Library and a post-senior service college fellowship within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. SOCOM has made great strides since 1986. Procedures and force postures within that headquarters and all component com- U.S. Navy (Patrick E. Winter) mands are much improved. SEAL using a Mark 10 SOCOM Accomplishments ordnance locator to Planning, Programming, and Budgeting be available to satisfy in- find a submerged System (PPBS). SOCOM created a PPBS from ferred requirements at mine. scratch which interlocks with the system in particular times in the fu- the Pentagon, but SOCOM procedures, un- ture? What risks result when projected SOF like those of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, capabilities appear insufficient? What and Air Force, are joint in every respect. courses of action might reduce those risks, Inadequate intelligence was an initial including actions to employ programmed as- impediment: input was quantitatively and sets more effectively? qualitatively poor. Automated data process- The resultant objective force seems at ing and dedicated communications were first glance to be inconsistent with ongoing nearly nonexistent and outmoded maps efforts to reduce force structures and the de- contained large blank sections or depicted fense budget. Active SOF personnel strengths conditions decades ago. Me- continue to climb. So do the inventories of promotion and advance- teorological and oceano- costly weapon systems, most notably HC–130 Combat Shadows, MC–130 Combat Talons, ment vary for SOF from graphic intelligence were in- sufficiently specific for MH–53 Pave Low helicopters, and Cyclone better than average to detailed SOF planning. class coastal patrol ships. Conventional forces poor, depending on rank, Prognoses now seem conversely have been declining since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two conditions ex- service, and specialties bright in most respects, according to the SOCOM J–2. plain that anomaly, according to SOCOM Interagency cooperation con- spokesmen: first, most conventional forces cerning human intelligence (HUMINT) is deployed primarily to deal with Soviet threats much better since Operation Just Cause during the Cold War while most multipur- (Panama 1989–90). SOCOM is collaborating pose SOF served diversified purposes and, sec- with all the services in efforts to prototype ond, SOF are still recovering from the period and test new, lighter, smaller, interoperable of neglect that led to the enactment of reme- intelligence systems needed for the type con- dial legislation. Programs and budget requests flicts anticipated. The most important initia- reflect those realities. tives may reach fruition because SOF intelli- Force Posture Improvements. Better gence programs for FY93 through FY99 are weapons, equipment, personnel, and inte- reportedly well supported in the Pentagon grating structures are evident in SOCOM and and on Capitol Hill. among SOF in unified commands. Concen- SOCOM planners, using scenarios and trated education and training help comman- computer models, seek to answer four fun- ders make the most of available assets. Revi- damental questions: how many SOF and talization continues at modest cost supporting airlift/sealift platforms of what compared with funding for conventional sort are needed to accomplish anticipated forces. FY94 budget requests for procure- missions in specific theaters, subregions, ment, personnel, operations, maintenance, countries, and other areas? What forces will research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction comprise little more than one penny out of every DOD dollar.

12 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Collins

All Army and Navy SOF are volunteers. range of subjects and scenarios. Members of Most demonstrate superior performance dur- small, self-contained teams concentrate on ing tours with conventional forces before they cross-training (demolition experts may not volunteer. Recruiting practices vary with each become fully proficient as radio operators or service (Navy SEALS, for example, take some medics, but must be qualified to perform volunteers straight from basic training, but such duties in an emergency). SOCOM also Army SF do not), although standards are uni- cultivates linguistic and cross-cultural skills, formly high. Strict professionalism thereafter which many SOF need to accomplish re- prevails. CINCSOC and component comman- gional security missions in an ever more ders work hard to eradicate misperceptions complex world. Conventional units do not that Rambo-style snake eaters and reckless, match their competence. out-of-control individuals typify SOF person- The Army, Navy, and Air Force furnished nel because discipline and maturity help make all logistic support for SOF before Congress SOF unique. created SOCOM. They still provide common Defense publications in the mid-1980s weapons, equipment, supplies, and services, deplored special operations hardware defi- while the Special Operations Forces Support ciencies. DOD and Congress validated needs, Activity (SOFSA) has handled low-density, but few funds were forthcoming. “We’ve got SOF-peculiar needs for the Army since 1988. bands that are in a higher state of readiness The Joint Operational Stocks (JOS) Program than some of our special operations assets,” is a centrally managed repository of some is the way one Pentagon official put it. Such SOF-specific hardware. Its inventory features deficiencies have largely been corrected. civilian products that have military applica- Combat readiness is the number one tions and demand minimum familiarization priority. Highly-motivated professionals, before use. Off-the-shelf purchases reduce well armed, equipped, and supplied, are es- needs for research, development, test, or sential, but proficient units are even more evaluation funds. important than skilled individuals. Superior Residual Problems education and training The office of the ASD (SO/LIC) and at all levels are key re- SOCOM still face problems including the ACRONYMS quirements. following: SOCOM operates its AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command SOCOM Battle Staffs. Each SOC currently own school system. The ASD (SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for relies extensively on Reserve component Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict John F. Kennedy Special augmentation packets for major exercises CA Civil Affairs Warfare Center and and emergencies. All eagerly await the for- CINCSOC Commander in Chief, U.S. Special School at Fort Bragg de- mation of SOCOM Battle Staffs. Operations Command velops doctrine and con- Two battle rosters list primary and alter- JSOC Joint Special Operations Command ducts courses for all nate active duty personnel who are assigned NAVSPECWARCOM Naval Special Warfare Army SOF and Foreign to SOCOM headquarters. Members of the Command Area Officers (FAO). The first roster must be ready to deploy within PSYOP Psychological Operations Naval Special Warfare 24 hours after notification. They possess op- SEAL Sea-Air-Land Center at the Amphibi- erations, intelligence, communications, lo- SF Special Forces ous Base Coronado and gistics, and other skills that theater SOCs are SOC Special Operations Command the Air Force Special Op- known to need most. The maximum num- SOCCENT Special Operations Command, Central erations School at Hurl- ber ready to surge is 29. Alternate and se- SOCEUR Special Operations Command, Europe burt Field do likewise lected personnel from SOCOM’s component SOC–K Special Operations Command, Korea within their respective commands constitute the second roster, SOCLANT Special Operations Command, Atlantic spheres. All instruct for- whose members could fill additional re- SOCOM [U.S.] Special Operations Command eign students as well as quests for not more than 29 commissioned SOCPAC Special Operations Command, Pacific personnel from other de- and noncommissioned officers. They pre- SOCSOUTH Special Operations Command, South partments and agencies. pare to follow within one week. Anticipated SOF Special Operations Forces Intensive, extensive, and capabilities, however, will not be available SOFSA Special Operations Forces Support Activity diversified courses of in- until SOCOM acquires sufficient weapons SO/LIC Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict struction cover a wide USASOC U.S. Army Special Operations Command and makes them immediately available for use by personnel on the two battle rosters.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 13 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Career Opportunities. Promotion and ad- as essential as initial learning, but for most vancement vary for SOF personnel from bet- linguists peak proficiency occurs the day ter than average to poor, depending on pre- they receive their diploma. Unrelated mili- sent rank, service idiosyncrasies, and tary duties thereafter inhibit further specialties. Rear admirals, Air Force major progress. generals, Air Force helicopter pilots, and Civil Affairs. CINCSOC, SOCOM compo- Air Force Special Operations Army SF officers encounter “glass promotion nent commanders, regionally-oriented Command ceilings.” SEALs and Reserve component CA CINCs, theater SOCs, and their respective (AFSOC)—includes and PSYOP officers, who are few in number staffs believe that an undesirable balance ex- one active Special and in constant demand, find little time to ists between active and Reserve component Operations Wing attend military schools and colleges. SOF in CA forces, which receive important missions and two Special Operations Groups, several categories find assignment potential in almost every contingency plan and are in one Reserve Special quite limited. Title 10, U.S. Code, tells CINC- daily demand. Some 97 percent are Army Re- Operations Wing, SOC to monitor such matters, which are par- serve. The one active battalion is chronically and one Air National ent service responsibilities, but he has little under its authorized personnel strength level Guard Special ability to reverse adverse trends. of 212 but bears most of the operational load. Operations Group. SOF-qualified flag officers from a multi- Theater CINCs repeatedly request Reserves be- service pool of candidates should ideally cause the 96th CA Battalion cannot be every- compete for every senior command and staff where at once and the Reserve component position within SOCOM headquarters, com- contains many CA skills that it cannot repli- ponent commands, and theater SOCs. A rel- cate. It is impractical to call entire Reserve atively small reservoir now exists, however, units when requestors need only a fraction of partly because SOF generals and admirals their capabilities. Volunteers, who are not find it difficult to progress within the special universally well qualified, consequently fill operations community after they pin on most gaps. Recurrent active duty periods of the first star, partly because non-SOF of- long duration, however, cause domestic diffi- ficers fill many key slots. culties and jeopardize civilian jobs. Language Training. Many members of Hardware. The Soviet Union and Warsaw the Armed Forces are fluent in common Pact no longer threaten the United States or foreign languages such as French, Ger- its allies, but the SOF community must con- man, and Spanish. Sufficient numbers tinually improve (in some cases replace) pre- are also well qualified SOF. Those who sent hardware if it is to retain a sharp edge are conversant in local dialects like Cre- against lesser, unpredictable opponents who ole, which is common in Haiti, range are increasingly able to wage high-tech wars. DOD Liaising with coalition from few to none. Such problems are Critics, however, claim that SOCOM has em- forces during Opera- hard to correct. The relevance of programs braced research, development, and acquisition Desert Storm. conducted by the Defense Language Center tion (RDA) procedures much like the ser- at Monterey and the Special Warfare School vices. Guidelines specifically designed to fill at Fort Bragg, for example, depend heavily small inventories expeditiously are insuffi- on requirements that cannot always be pre- cient. Links between RDA specialists and dicted by the intelligence community. Egyp- SOF users in the field allegedly are loose. Few tian and Syrian emerged as the most impor- program managers reportedly possess ade- tant Arabic dialects after the Arab-Israeli War quate RDA experience; the reverse seems of 1967. As a result only 16 of the Arabic lin- equally true. The relationships among the guists on active duty (less than one staff elements of SOCOM responsible for re- percent) had studied Iraqi before quirements, resources, and program execu- SOF are still recover- Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. tion may also need tightening. Programs ing from the neglect No one predicted large-scale SOF overlook some important requirements and that led to remedial employment in Kurdistan or Soma- program cycles are overly long (10–15 years lia, where Operations Provide Com- for some aircraft). legislation fort and Restore Hope took place. Peacetime and Wartime Performance Maintaining language skills is just SOF have performed admirably during recent years, despite residual problems like those just discussed. Peacetime engagement is

14 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Collins DOD

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—serves as a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force responsible for special missions planning, training, tactics, and equipment SOF often are employable where development. high-profile conventional forces Air Force AC–130 are politically, militarily, and/or Spectre. economically inappropriate

a prescription for applying po- 3 of 250 children declared hopeless by local doc- litical, military, economic, tors were saved by SOF medics and other instruments of na- ▼ CA specialists entered Kuwait City on lib- tional power to promote re- eration day with local counterparts and directed deliveries of food, water, and medical supplies,

DOD gional stability, diminish then restored health and other public services threats, facilitate combat oper- AC–130 Spectre crew ▼ SOF medical personnel inoculated 60,000 loading a 40mm ations if deterrence fails, foster post-crisis re- people in Cameroon over a 10-day period during Bofors cannon. covery, and otherwise enhance U.S. security. a meningitis epidemic at a minuscule cost by Peacetime engagement concepts employ mili- using donated American vaccines tary forces, but not military force. SOF are es- ▼ SOF in East Africa teach game wardens pecially well suited, be- how to stop poaching to enhance the political, SOF deter aggression primarily cause they deter economic, and social stability of local people who aggression primarily depend upon tourism for hard currency through good deeds, whereas through good deeds, ▼ Russian speaking SOF facilitated safe pas- conventional forces promise whereas conventional sage for U.S. military cargo aircraft flying through forces promise military restricted air corridors during Operation Provide military retaliation Hope to deliver food and medicine within the retaliation. Low-key Commonwealth of Independent States SOF maximize U.S. in- ▼ SOF assisted relief efforts in Bangladesh fluence in selected countries through mili- after Cyclone Marian, and performed similar duty tary-to-military contacts, information pro- in Dade County, Florida, following Hurricane An- grams, and civic actions; minimize prospects drew. of unpleasant surprise by conducting special SOF combat operations in Grenada reconnaissance missions; and garner good (1983), Panama (1989–90), and Kuwait/Iraq will in the aftermath of natural catastrophes (1990–91) displayed other capabilities; forces and conflicts by taking care of afflicted peo- committed to Desert Storm performed all ples. The following are some recent employ- ten statutory missions with positive results. ments: ▼ a Special Mission Unit provided counterterrorism training, equipment, and weapons to security forces in the Republic of Georgia ▼ SOF succored thousands of Kurdish refugees along the Iraqi-Turkish border where all but

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 15 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Secretary of Defense might: ▼ nominate a special operations practi- tioner as the ASD (SO/LIC) and a SOF-qualified individual as principal deputy ▼ direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to furnish SOCOM with seasoned SOF. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, might: ▼ act as a proponent for SOF ▼ direct service schools and colleges to strengthen curricula so that future commanders and their staffs more accurately appreciate the capabilities and limitations of SOF. Theater commanders in chief, who employ most SOF that SOCOM organizes, equips, trains, and provides, might: DOD ▼ Door gunner keeping use shorthanded SOF less liberally if they watch from a MH–60L interpreted requirements as Title 10 intended; hu- helicopter. manitarian and search and rescue missions then As a consequence SOF are in demand in would call for SOF only insofar as they relate to spe- peace as well as war, and the potential for cial operations. overcommitment is constant. Since the root cause is too few forces for too many tasks, se- Prognosis nior officials would be well advised to exer- The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., when cise restraint in employing SOF. he was Secretary of the Army and soon to serve simultaneously as acting ASD (SO/LIC), Future Effectiveness opined that “failure in the past to link spe- SOF could contribute even more effec- cial operations with national strategy tively to U.S. military capabilities if decision- through the Defense Guidance—and thereby makers along the chain of command cor- to develop doctrine—has prevented special rected shortcomings within their respective operations...from gaining permanence and spheres of influence. The suggested actions acceptability within the ranks of the mili- listed below address serious deficiencies. tary.” That deficiency has been corrected. In- The President might: stitutional changes are essentially complete, but military culture is changing more slowly. ▼ establish a board on the National Security Council to guide, integrate, and otherwise focus Mutual distrust and misunderstandings still all SO/LIC efforts within the U.S. Government. separate conventional forces from SOF. Not many of the former fully understand SOF ca- Congress might: pabilities and limitations. Too few special ▼ establish special operations panels or sub- operations specialists have enough Pentagon committees on the Senate and the House Armed experience to make the system work for Services Committees to facilitate oversight them instead of against them. SOF con- ▼ authorize a three-star deputy CINCSOC stituencies on Capitol Hill, in the services, and also allocate one star to each theater SOC; a and across the industrial sector remain scant larger pool of well qualified candidates thereafter could compete for senior command and staff as- and tenuous. Appropriate acceptance of SOF signments within SOCOM consequently will come only after all parties ▼ authorize additional active duty CA units concerned complete a learning process and ▼ relax some existing research, develop- put doctrine into practice. JFQ ment, and acquisition regulations to make SOF- peculiar systems more responsive.

16 JFQ / Autumn 1993 A 25-mile radius radar used to alert surface- to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. New Joint U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart) The WarBy FREDERICK R. STRAIN fare

uccessfully developing effective mili- completed puzzle, one that took decades to tary capabilities is not unlike solving solve but that now fits together as tightly as Rubik’s Cube. If individual service as- the classic paradigm of a cube. What actually Ssets and strengths are represented by occurred was that the puzzle was overtaken the squares of a cube, then solving the puzzle by technological breakthroughs and the rush F–117A stealth aircraft involves long periods of adjusting military ca- of world events. The result is the advent of on the flight line at Langley Air Force pabilities to reach the optimum configura- the kind of turmoil that disrupts the estab- Base, Virginia. tion. In the wake of the Gulf War many be- lished order and presents the military profes- U.S. Air Force lieve that the Armed Forces resemble a sional with yet another puzzle to solve.

Summary

The Gulf War not only marked a watershed in modern joint and combined operations, but also ushered in another, new type of warfare that is influenced by the course of emerging technology and the pace of world events. Like changes that have followed the development of new weapons throughout military history, doctrine and strategy are undergoing a revolution in the wake of the greatly enhanced stealth, precision, and lethality of fielded systems. As a result, commanders can anticipate that operations will almost always be joint, that distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels will blur, that new centers of gravity will emerge, and that the combat area will be more complex and difficult to delineate. These changes require redefining campaigns and campaign phasing, interdiction, maneuver, close air support, and other time-honored terms.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 17 JOINT WARFARE

There have been other occasions in mili- and be supported by sea or air insertion and retary history when one puzzle was sup- covery of mission personnel. planted by another, particularly as the result The first postulate of the new warfare is of technological developments.1 The intro- that the services fight and operate jointly. duction of the machine gun, tank, airplane, Even lesser contingencies in the future will submarine, atomic bomb, and ICBM all almost always involve materiel, C4I, or trans- caused the Armed Forces to readjust their port from more than one service. Military doctrine to meet fresh challenges. More re- professionals must learn to appreciate cent innovations brought about stealth, pre- emerging service capabilities and organize, cision, lethality, and surveillance systems train, and equip to optimize the employ- that portend other revolutionary changes in ment of decisive joint force. military capabilities. The United States decided to actively Strategy and Tactics pursue particular technologies over the last Distinctions between the strategic and twenty-five years to provide the Armed the tactical levels of war are no longer clear. Forces with distinct military advantages. Nowhere is this lack of clarity more pro- Even though the services worked to bring nounced than in designating weapon sys- about this dramatic shift in the puzzle, tems. Long-range bombers destroy ground many appear surprised by the outcome. This forces along the forward line of troops as situation highlights the need to develop new short-range fighters attack and destroy oil re- doctrines and strategies that fully recognize fineries. Army helicopters hit strategic air de- and support the spectacular changes that fense control centers as Navy cruise missiles have occurred. The services must dedicate designed for fighting nuclear wars disable themselves to solving the puzzle. We must electrical grids with specialized payloads. also determine if the puzzle is still a cube or Those who remain prone to “old think” fail whether it has taken on another form better to recognize how technology now enables suited to the new environment. What are all combat systems and elements to become the changes in the paradigm? strategic or tactical depending on their intended objective. Future Operations Will Be Joint The distinction between strategic and Military history is replete with accounts tactical targets is also undergoing change. of campaigns and battles involving partici- Influenced by waning doctrine associated pation by only one service. In the new with the Single Integrated Operational Plan paradigm it is difficult to envision any point (SIOP) and Cold War, military planners have on the conflict spectrum where a single ser- lost track of the fact that the distinction re- vice would be committed alone. In the new lates to a target’s impact on the CINC’s ob- joint warfare it is very likely that jective rather than to the nature of the target ▼ naval armadas will do battle on the high itself. Thus communication nets, fielded seas together with long-range bombers armed forces, oil refineries, and vehicles have a with Harpoon missiles strategic or tactical implication depending ▼ operations against enemy land forces will on the desired outcome. involve sea-launched or air-launched, stand-off specialized anti-armor munitions as well as more New Centers of Gravity conventional artillery The principle of attacking key centers of ▼ air battles will involve theater ballistic gravity (COGs) to quickly achieve an objec- missile defense systems launched by land forces tive is as old as war itself and is taught at or from off the decks of specialized naval vessels each level of Professional Military Education. as well as the commitment of aircraft Unfortunately, traditional COGs may have ▼ even relatively small, covert special opera- little impact on the outcome of future con- tions will involve space-based communications flicts. Global economic and informational interdependencies, for example, suggest new Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, USAF, serves in the centers of gravity that strategists must con- Strategic Planning Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of sider. These COGs require the military to de- Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, Department of velop and exploit new ways to attack key the Air Force. A master navigator, his operational assign- points. Destroying or interdicting an en- ments have been in B–52 and B–1 bombers.

18 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Strain

emy’s economic infrastructure by computer fact of life. Modern war- intrusion may be just as valid as an ap- fare demands grasping proach to warfare by the year 2000 as strate- massive theater-scale op- gic bombing is today. erations on a minute-by- minute basis. The possi- Redefining the Combat Edge bility of a potential Technology remains the major driving adversary launching bal-

force behind the changing limits of the com- U.S. Navy listic missiles compresses bat area. When soldiers lined up abreast and the decision cycle even A Marine Corps F–18 maneuvered with spears and shields in fighter firing a further and dramatically sweeping formations to flank an opponent, Sidewinder missile. emphasizes the point. commanders needed only to primarily con- Aside from the characteristics of new sider the breadth of battle. With the advent weapon systems, two additional factors influ- of artillery, the depth of the battle area (even ence the criticality of time in the new on the seas) became an important considera- paradigm. The growing sensitivity of the tion in the development of doctrine, strat- American public to combat losses suggests egy, and tactics. Fewer than twenty years that civilian leaders will tend to measure fu- after the first flight of the Wright brothers, ture acceptable levels of U.S. casualties in the battle area had a significant, expanded dozens rather than thousands of lives. The Gulf vertical dimension. Most professionals rec- War set a standard in this regard that could be ognize current technology is once again dra- difficult to meet in future conflicts unless cer- matically expanding the range of these tain technological advantages are pursued. In boundaries. The breadth, depth, and height order to minimize casualties, the Armed of the battle area now encompasses the en- Forces must deliver the full range of combat tire globe and extends well into space. The power quickly and decisively. Moreover, pro- requirement for global situational awareness longed conflicts make it far more difficult to is more critical than ever before. maintain political-military coalitions which The new paradigm points to revolution- are becoming increasingly important and ary change in the way we think about the complex in the new environment. battle area. Time—the fourth dimension— may become the paramount factor in mod- The New Battle Area ern combat. Prior to the new warfare mili- The ability to conduct simultaneous op- tary leaders measured time (in combat erations across the depth, breadth, and terms) by weeks, months, or even years of height of the combat area compels military operations. The luxury of professionals to change their perspective. the need to identify, target, having the time to think, The traditional reliance on finely drawn and attack in near real-time plan, and react stemmed lines on charts must be challenged in order from the limitations on to fully realize the potential of emerging is now a fact of life physical movement of combat systems. Among the questions that combat forces. It took must be asked are: time for soldiers to march, vessels to transit, ▼ Will future naval commanders responsi- and aircraft to deploy, as well as for com- ble for destroyers with cruise missiles capable of manders to gather and assess intelligence. striking ground targets a thousand miles away Ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, hovercraft, understand the new battle area? Will the missiles and turbocharged light vehicles are charac- recognize Forward Support Control Lines (FSCLs) teristic of the new environment. As empha- drawn on a chart or the significant maneuver by sized in Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces friendly forces that has occurred since launch? If (Joint Pub 1), “Crises may unfold rapidly, not, how can combat power at the disposal of and critical engagements may occur with lit- commanders be effectively advocated and integrated into useful operations? tle time to prepare.” The commander can no ▼ Will Army company commanders in longer afford the luxury of thinking in terms charge of new fire systems with ranges of 200 km of days, weeks, or months to phase cam- fully understand the integration of weapon sys- paigns or move forces. The need to identify, tems into strategic targeting plans? If not, how target, and attack in near real-time is now a can commanders begin to think about improving doctrine, strategy, and tactics?

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 19 Joint Combat Camera Center Refueling M–1 Abrams tank during Operation Desert Shield.

Joint Combat Camera Center Marines unloading a Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC–22) in Somalia. New capabilities may not be able to op- masses of enemy troops in bloody combat, erate within the confines of old doctrinal battling their way to the enemy’s capital in patterns if there is a true desire to optimize order to eventually convince their leaders utility and exploit synergy. Joint Force Com- that further resistance is futile. manders (JFCs) will need new ways in the fu- The new paradigm suggests that simul- ture to undelineate the battlefield and more taneity or what some theorists call simulta- effectively integrate and control service ca- neous or parallel warfare (as opposed to se- pabilities. Creative doctrines and strategies rial warfare) is key to future operations. Old- must emerge, and the vision of commanders style serial warfare is illustrated by the way must begin to be expanded at all levels. air forces struck targets during World War II when commanders massed hundreds of Old Definitions/New Paradigm bombers and dropped thousands of bombs Part of the inability of the services to against a single important target. The next fully participate in creative discussions about day they did the same thing against a sec- the new joint warfare is the inability to ond target; and on the third day yet another break with definitions belonging to the old target was hit. It did not take long before the model. Hidebound ideas that link certain enemy realized that on the following day a terminology, weaponry, and/or services in- fourth target would be struck. By the tenth hibit desperately needed innovation. day the first target was repaired and opera- Campaigns and campaign phasing. Histor- tional again. Serial warfare on land, at sea, ically the term campaign meant a series of and in the air was necessary to achieve the military operations directed by a comman- mass needed to destroy a particular target. der in chief to achieve specific objectives. The Gulf War demonstrated it is now The campaign is composed of phases that possible to simultaneously strike hundreds match particular elements of combat power of key targets through the careful integration against sub-objectives. Each phase estab- of land, sea, and air capabilities. The result is lishes the requisite environment or condi- the strategic, operational, and tactical paral- tions for the next operation. Developing ysis of an enemy in a brief period of time: campaign plans designed to “peel the that ability to bring down the hammer in onion” layer by layer to get to the center of one gigantic crushing blow is the new joint gravity is old thinking. That syndrome often warfare. In this respect using the term cam- crops up in doctrinal debates and is rooted paign to denote carefully sequenced activities in the mistaken notion that war continues to resemble giant Napoleonic battles of yore. It envisions masses of Americans fighting

20 JFQ / Autumn 1993 U.S. Navy (Kit Masterson)

Combat information center aboard the aircraft carrier USS Constellation.

over a prolonged period of time may no interdiction.2 If it is now becoming possible longer be valid. The advent of parallel war- to achieve operational paralysis quickly, fare dramatically reduces the time required then interdiction could conceivably become to achieve objectives. The net result is that the JFC’s primary strategy. future JFCs can pursue multiple objectives si- There is also a danger in believing that multaneously. For all practical purposes tran- interdiction is more effective if segmented or sitions between campaign phases may occur divided into geographic regions or areas of so quickly that one might consider each responsibility.3 Interdiction must occur campaign as consisting of only a single quickly and decisively across the depth, phase. If so, are there still traditional cam- breadth, and height paigns or should a new term be coined and of the modern battle interdiction must added to the military lexicon? area to fully exploit occur quickly and Interdiction. Impeding, hindering, or iso- its synergistic effect. lating by firepower (typically using short- This means control- decisively across range aviation or submarines) is the tradi- ling interdiction at the battle area tional form of interdiction. This old command levels re- definition, however, is no longer sufficient sponsible for theater- for the new joint warfare and changing bat- wide activities. Allowing control of interdic- tle environment. Service capabilities now tion activities to reside at a lower echelon of provide for interdiction by computer, elec- command—or excluding certain capabilities tronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse, psy- because of service-unique positions—will chological operations, and a host of other likely result in missed opportunities and the emerging means of denial. misuse of integrated land, sea, air, space, and Furthermore, planners have historically special operations forces. viewed interdiction as a function that sup- Maneuver. A principle of war generally ports the CINC. But consider the emerging associated with mass movement, maneuver paradigm: could not technology provide in- may become less important in the new bat- terdiction capabilities so complete and ef- tle area. First, being able to see the entire fective (read operationally paralyzing) that an battle area (using JSTARS, AWACS, and opponent recognizes the futility of continu- emerging space systems) provides JFCs with ing? That was hardly the case in World War opportunities to optimize movement. Com- II, Korea, or even Vietnam. The high vol- manders will move smaller and smaller ele- ume of munitions required to strike individ- ments of very lethal systems to counter ual targets—due to weapon inaccuracy— could not support effective, wide-scale

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 21 JOINT WARFARE

larger, less capable enemy forces. This will Fire Support Control Lines (FSCLs). As avoid wasted movement of excess force and mentioned previously, the notion of two di- thereby negate the need for increasingly mensional lines on charts as absolute delin- complex logistical support. The intricate eators of responsibility has to be revised. Tra- challenge of keeping fuel flowing to speed- ditional means of command and control ing heavy vehicles for the ground assault cannot keep abreast with the rapid pace of during Operation Desert Storm, for example, operations in the new joint warfare. As at- portends the problems traditional weapon tention focuses on the development and em- systems have in the new battle area. ployment of smaller, lighter, faster, but more Second, events in the modern battle area lethal weapon systems, JFCs must conceive could happen so quickly there will be scant new methods of deconflicting ground, time to react, let alone to plan and execute naval, and air forces. Since the only com- mass maneuver. The battle area of the future mon point of reference available to all types will be the domain of of forces is time (provided by synchronized no single weapon or force lighter, faster, more lethal space satellites), the new boundaries, per- land, sea, and air vehicles. haps drawn in time, will serve as the divid- reaches its full potential The expanded nature of ing lines of the future. Centralized com- unless employed with com- the combat area almost mand and control of targeting under the plementary capabilities precludes moving tradi- Joint Force Air Component Commander tional systems far enough (JFACC) is only the first step in a process and quickly enough to that must exploit new technologies. Eventu- keep pace with the tempo of widely-dis- ally communication and computer systems persed geographic operations. A major chal- should automatically deconflict combined lenge to future JFCs is the ability to provide fires and optimize target-attack sequences by real-time command and control for small, sending signals across the battle area that in- combined elements of extremely lethal forces hibit or enable weapon systems based upon moving throughout the battle area at break- real-time feedback. neck speed. The famous left hook during Close Air Support. Another term of art Desert Storm (involving almost 50,000 vehi- that requires revision as technology changes cles) may have been the last major large-scale the battle area is Close Air Support (CAS) maneuver of its kind. which traditionally meant aircraft attacking Finally, developing long-range ground enemy ground forces in close proximity to and naval fires and exploiting air-launched friendly troops. The support involved both stand-off weapons could diminish the need preplanned and immediate requirements, to maneuver for close-in engagements as yet recently the focus tends to be almost ex- enemy ground, naval, and air forces are de- clusively on the immediate. An aircraft has stroyed at greater and greater distances. As- even been designed exclusively to perform suming strong defensive positions—as more this mission. With the development of im- advanced semi-autonomous weapons sys- proved guidance and fire control systems, tems begin to dot the battle area—could be support to forces engaged close-in can be ac- the most advantageous tactic of the future. complished just as easily with new forms of Maneuver in the new joint warfare fo- artillery, both air- and surface-launched cuses on maneuvering technological stand-off weapons that disperse cluster and strengths against an adversary’s weaknesses anti-armor munitions, and emerging non- to minimize casualties and shorten the con- lethal technologies. flict. The speed, precision, and increased Once again each of the services can con- lethality of emerging weapons will allow tribute to these requirements in the new bat- commanders the opportunity to concentrate tle area. The true key to success in future on maneuvering smaller and smaller forces: joint warfare is to provide forces with suffi- single ships instead of armadas, companies cient indigenous lethality so that immediate in place of battalions, and one stealth air ve- CAS is rarely needed. The generic term used hicle instead of dozens of traditional aircraft. for such support should be simply close support which more accurately reflects the changing nature of weapon systems that

22 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Strain

conceivably could deliver munitions or Conflict has achieved truly global propor- other payloads from land, sea, or air. tions. It is difficult to envision any scenario These are just a few of the terms and affecting only the United States. Because of definitions that must be recast in light of the American troop withdrawals from around new joint warfare. They also reveal some of the world, conflicts will be fought at greater the basic elements of this warfare. distances than in the past. This fact requires close cooperation with allied and friendly na- Fundamentals of the New Warfare tions for the use of sovereign airspace, transit The first basic element of the new war- of waterways, and benefit of temporary bas- fare is the axiom that the whole is greater ing facilities. Practically all military scenarios than the sum of its parts. While technology envision political support of allies and other can provide unprecedented military capabili- international partners. Greater participation ties, no single weapon or force reaches its by coalitions in conflicts and operations can full potential unless employed with comple- be expected. This puts greater emphasis on mentary capabilities. The military profes- the expanding role of combined training and sional should recognize the increasing syner- exercises. Not only must joint doctrine be ca- gism of modern forces. In particular, Joint pable of accommodating new technology Force Commanders (JFCs) must be cognizant and exploiting service capabilities, but it of individual service capabilities and en- must be intelligible to both allies and coali- abling characteristics needed to carefully or- tion partners. Absent from the current debate chestrate quick, decisive actions. The ability are serious questions about improving com- to orchestrate force capabilities to achieve de- bined operations. How would Thai forces use sired results is the key to success. It does not U.S. space assets during coalition action? matter if a symphony conductor once How would U.S. forces exploit future Japa- played the flute; the only allegiance is to the nese assets? These are important issues for strength and power of the synergism. the new joint warfare. Complementary operations are necessary Post-conflict operations in the new joint for any future success. JFCs must form the warfare environment are almost as impor- team so that the appropriate players are in tant as combat itself. Protecting refugees, the line-up and ensure the game plan suits fostering fledgling regimes, providing hu- the operation. In the new paradigm, it is im- manitarian assistance, and enforcing peace portant that JFCs select the key force required accords are all necessary to ensure stability to spearhead efforts. That force is the mili- in today’s world. tary capability with the greatest potential impact on events. This con- The Challenge for Commanders claiming service-unique cept goes well beyond desig- Effective command and control of the doctrinal exemptions is nating a particular service as most capable military force in history is a the key force. In the new daunting task. Not only must JFCs com- counterproductive to the warfare special forces or psy- pletely understand the synergetic effect of new joint warfare chological operations may an increasing range of service capabilities, have as much impact on the but designated commanders must be en- outcome as traditional combat elements. abling forces themselves. JFCs must have au- The key force requires full and unequivocal thority to direct all available assets at their support from all force elements. The force disposal and the ability to create cohesive designated by JFCs may vary in each new teams. Any attempt to undermine or dilute scenario. the principle of unity of command by claim- Another element of new doctrinal devel- ing service-unique doctrinal exemptions is opment is organizing to win. Relationships counterproductive to the new joint warfare. that exist only in crises have proven to be Future battle within the new paradigm less and less effective over time. Command is more than a team effort. Most team mem- relationships of the past cannot be relied on bers tend to come together and put aside to continue to work in the future. It is neces- their individual differences only for the big sary to pioneer new command structures for game, then they part company and revive peacetime as well as periods of crisis. personal animosities. Resulting friction on the sidelines eventually manifests itself on

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 23 JOINT WARFARE

the field, thereby denigrating the entire target as part of an effort to achieve strategic team’s effectiveness. The challenge is to de- paralysis may severely affect the ability of an velop a force that respects the strengths of enemy to recover economically in the post- all its components and appreciates the judg- war period (which could have significant po- ment of its JFC. litical implications). The delegation of authority is one of the Expanded intelligence gathering and cornerstones of modern warfare. While it analysis are critical to an economy of effort. may seem at odds with the principle of unity Disabling attacks on targets, identified of command, it really is an indication of the through careful nodal analysis, can enhance level of trust and confidence that JFCs place operations by strategically and operationally in the ability of their subordinate comman- paralyzing an enemy. With fewer resources ders to accomplish objectives. JFCs must be able to strike hard and fast at The selection of the key force for a partic- the correct targets, with little waste of effort. ular operation gets increasingly difficult, but Advance analyses of key political, economic, it is nonetheless important. Decisions regard- military, and infrastructure targets are criti- ing the key force will affect many factors in cal to reacting quickly and decisively. Fur- the new environment. It thermore, the rapid pace of modern joint determines reaction time, operations requires the targeting cycle to how much and what type have near real-time capability, with the of force to unleash, the added requirement that target data be dis- degree of lethality to seminated in a form common to all forces. apply, how fast an adver- Success in the new joint warfare requires sary can be defeated, the each team member to recognize significant kind of targets to attack, shifts in technology, appreciate the syner- and the level of casualties gism of capabilities, and develop innovative that can be sustained. doctrine and strategy to take advantage of More importantly, when these conditions. Undoubtedly there will be

U.S. Army (Samuel D. Henry) JFCs select the principal challenges that confront JFCs in the new Hawk missile system combat capability they joint warfare. But force integration is not an on an XM501 E–3 determine which force will receive the prior- issue to take up on the eve of battle. It must loader transporter. ity allocation of resources. be realized prior to a crisis by developing and The command relationships evolving adopting common joint doctrine, and also from designation of the key force have come by appreciating the effort involved in once to be known as the supported and the support- again solving the puzzle of Rubick’s Cube. JFQ ing forces. The new joint warfare recognizes that these designations are not indicators of NOTES popularity. No negative connotations attach 1 See Anthony H. Cordesman, Compensating for to being designated a supporting force in Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means Through Tech- given operations. The supported commander nology (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992). must be generally able to direct the key force 2 In World War II it took 9,070 bombs dropped by an enabled by the complementary capabilities armada of B–17s to ensure a 90 percent probability of of other components. Such command rela- kill (PK) against a single 60-foot by 100-foot building. tionships vary from one scenario to another, By the time of the Vietnam conflict, 176 bombs were re- and even within particular operations. quired. Today it takes only one precision guided bomb to achieve the same PK. (Data courtesy of the Strategic Targeting in the new paradigm also de- Planning Division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.) serves a fresh look. Traditional methods of 3 For a discussion of the historical lessons learned, selecting and attacking targets may not be see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, editors, effective in the emerging technological envi- The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume 2, Europe: ronment. The requirement to identify, tar- Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 28 ff. get, and destroy mobile missile launchers in Operation Desert Storm suggests the kind of challenge that JFCs will face in the future. Moreover, the significance of a given target vis-á-vis the objective must be better understood. For example, destroying an industrial

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SURVEYING F–14A Tomcat from USS John F. Kennedy refueling from KC–10A Extender. U.S. Navy (Dave Parsons)

GULF WAR

Hardened shelter at Al Jaber Air Base, AIRPOWER Kuwait, hit by laser- guided bombs. By THOMAS A. KEANEY

DOD

espite the profound impact of air- arose during the war over the accuracy of offi- power on the course and outcome cial claims regarding the numbers of Iraqi of the Gulf War, its employment tanks and mobile Scuds destroyed by air at- Dhas not escaped controversy. The tack. After the war there were attempts by air- coalition quickly cleared the skies of Iraqi airpower enthusiasts to view the bombing as the craft, neutralized Iraqi medium and high alti- harbinger of a new era of precision attacks tude air defenses, brought Iraq’s entire com- from the air while skeptics argued that bomb- mand structure and military under attack, ing had been far less accurate than claimed, and systematically struck at the Iraqi field overzealous in its pursuit of fleeing Iraqi army in the Kuwait theater of operations. As a troops, or wanton in its unnecessary destruc- result, the campaign culminated in a brief, tion of Iraq’s civil infrastructure. These vari- overwhelming ground offensive over a de- ous claims drew on evidence that came in moralized and shattered Iraqi army. Still, many forms: the accounts by participants (in- there were doubts concerning airpower’s con- cluding pilot reports) and by visitors to Iraq tributions and effectiveness. Controversy both during and after the war, prisoner of war

Summary

Airpower dominated the Gulf War, but what did it accomplish? How successful were coalition air attacks against specific target sets—from Iraq’s nuclear weapons facilities and mobile Scuds to its tanks in the Kuwait theater? The information gathered during the course of a survey commissioned by the Secretary of the Air Force confirms the dominant role of airpower while illustrating that the indirect rather than the direct effects of bombing were perhaps of more importance. Moreover, it is apparent from the results of this survey that inaccuracies are inherent in wartime assessments and that one must contend with incomplete knowledge of the target base and enemy countermeasures. Even in a conflict of short duration when many collection measures are employed, the problems of assessing (not measuring) operational and strategic effectiveness remain as difficult, controversial, and afflicted by subjectivity as they have in wars of the past.

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divergent data and differing interpretations of the air campaign form the basis of this article. In brief, research for the survey involved three steps: understanding what happened as the result of bomb or missile attacks, determining the proper measurement of the result, and then relating cause and effect—how actions or results achieved objectives of air attacks. It may be useful to begin with some concrete examples of the complexity of such assessments. First, consider the evidence available in a photograph of a destroyed tank or aircraft. If the tank’s turret has been blown off the hull or the aircraft reduced to rubble, then the as- Map courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency. sessment of results is easy: the equipment is unusable. Next, consider the evidence of a photo of a command bunker or aircraft shelter with a hole in the roof of the kind com- monly made by a precision-guided bomb with a hard-target-penetrating warhead. Al- though the bomb obviously hit the target, did it penetrate into and detonate in the in- interrogations, and still photography and terior? And if so, was the structure occupied videotape of targets either destroyed or under at the time? The problematic answers to attack. Discounting claims by those who sim- these questions make assessing what hap- ply marshalled evidence in support of their pened far more difficult than in the initial own agendas, there still appeared to be credi- case. Finally, consider a situation where there ble evidence that documented diverse inter- is no photo, only a pilot report claiming that pretations of what bombing had or had not an Iraqi tank or hardened aircraft shelter was accomplished. What appeared to be a short, hit with a precision-guided bomb. Uncer- clear-cut victory with airpower playing a lead- tainty surrounding such results is even ing if not dominant role became another bat- greater than in the second case. While some- tleground for competing sets of data and con- what idealized all these cases suggest experi- trasting interpretations of events. This later ences during and after the Gulf War that con- battleground centered on the difficult prob- fronted analysts attempting to answer the lem of damage assessment, particularly the most basic of questions: what happened? In proper measures of the damage. many instances more authoritative data Shortly after the conflict in the Gulf, which corrected earlier impressions became then Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice available only after the war. initiated a comprehensive survey of air- Taking the next step, determining what to power employment in an attempt to sort measure, requires a knowledge of the objec- out varying interpretations of its role and tives sought by the attacks. Not only do num- effectiveness during the war. Part of this sur- bers or pictures fail to speak for themselves, vey—in which the author participated—ad- they might not be the correct numbers or pic- dressed the effectiveness of coalition bomb- tures. Consider, for example, a comparison of ing.1 Judgments made in the course of that Iraqi and coalition aircraft shot down as a survey and experience gained in analyzing measure of the effectiveness of the air forces involved, a common indicator used in past wars to determine the performance of opposing air forces. The scorecard would read 33 Thomas A. Keaney teaches in the Department of Military Iraqi aircraft to 38 coalition, which in isola- Strategy and Operations at the National War College. A tion suggests a slight advantage in Iraq’s favor. former B–52 squadron commander, he is the co-author of two On the other hand the coalition scored 33-to- reports published as part of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. 1 in air-to-air combat, and fixed-wing aircraft

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flew some 69,000 shooter sorties to an estimate Command of the Air of fewer than 500 for Iraq. Notwithstanding a The contest for command of the air over coalition/Iraqi combat-loss ratio of 33-to-38, Iraq and the Kuwait theater revealed the dif- the figures indicate that coalition air forces ficulty of measuring effectiveness. In the had overwhelming ratios in air-to-air combat most complex operations of the war the and shooter sorties. This illustrates an extreme coalition initiated the air offensive by taking case, but it also demonstrates the importance down the command and control of the Iraqi of selecting proper measures as well as the ease air defense network, bottling up Iraqi aircraft with which legitimate evidence can be used to on their bases, and suppressing radar-guided support widely differing interpretations of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) through a com- what happened. In the end, measurement bination of drone decoys and anti-radiation means little until a sensible and reasonably missiles employed against SAM radar sites. broad set of measures has been selected. The results were spectacular in terms of what The third step, determining what the coalition aircraft were subsequently able to data means, is related closely to the second accomplish offensively and with slight losses: in that the requirement is to show how re- except for low-altitude antiaircraft artillery sults relate to attaining objectives. In this and infrared SAMs in a few highly defended step one must deal with a hierarchy of objec- areas too numerous to destroy wholesale, tives: from the tactical (destroying tanks) to coalition aircraft gained relatively unim- higher levels (preventing an armored attack peded freedom of action throughout the the- or degrading the combat capability of a divi- ater. Since the Iraqis probably never intended sion or corps). Also note that tactical mea- to contest air superiority even over Iraq itself sures of effects are usually more easily tabu- at the risk of losing their modern fixed-wing lated and understood than operational-level aircraft, bottling them up in supposedly measures—one can count tanks but how is bomb-proof shelters was relatively easy. The divisional degradation quantified? As a re- crux of the coalition air-control problem lay sult, quite often operational-level objectives then in taking radar-guided SA–2s, SA–3s, are presumed to be a direct function of tacti- SA–6/8s, and Rolands out of the fight early in cal damage assessments. That match is not the campaign, a goal achieved as much by always improper but, as illustrated by the intimidation as by destruction. A pivotal case of aggregate combat losses due to en- measure in this regard was the lack of success emy air defenses as a measure of air suprem- recorded by Iraqi radar-guided SAMs in dam- acy, it can be extremely misleading. aging or downing coalition aircraft despite Before discussing the assessments, it the large number of coalition fixed-wing sor- seems appropriate to provide a brief summary ties flown daily. Iraqi radar SAMs damaged or of the operational objectives for the air cam- destroyed eight coalition fighters in the first paign found in the Operation Desert Storm six days of Operation Desert Storm and, for plan: (1) isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi the remaining five weeks of the war, they regime by attacks on leadership facilities, elec- were only able to hit another five coalition tric power production, and telecommunica- aircraft. tions; (2) gain and maintain air supremacy by With ground-based defenses suppressed, attacks on the air defense system and the air attention shifted to Iraqi aircraft and an inforce; (3) destroy nuclear, biological, and teresting complication that had developed: chemical warfare (NBC) capabilities; (4) elimi- Iraq decided to fly few sorties, sensing the nate offensive military capabilities by attacks odds and apparently planning to have its air- on logistical sites, Scud missiles and launch- craft ride out the war in hardened shelters. ers, oil refining and distribution facilities, and More traditional measures of attacking an naval forces and bases; and (5) render the enemy air force, and of estimating success, Iraqi army ineffective and isolate it in the had to be rethought. Airfield attacks had Kuwait theater by attacks on railroads and begun by targeting runway surfaces in order bridges and on the units themselves, particu- to limit takeoffs to numbers that coalition larly the Republican Guard. To attain these fighters could handle, but moved to hard- objectives planners identified twelve target ened aircraft shelters when it was decided to sets, all of which are listed above in the con- eliminate the Iraqi air force’s residual capabil- text of the objectives sought. 2 ity. At this point, further attacks on runways

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ceased to be necessary; in fact the plan be- Strategic Target Systems came one of attempting to lure Iraqi aircraft Attacks on what can be termed core into the air. The measurable tactical effects strategic target sets in Iraq offer some of the were as follows: of the nearly 600 hardened greatest difficulties in measuring and inter- shelters, some 375 were destroyed by coali- preting effectiveness. The physical damage tion aircraft during the war. While some air- to some of the target sets often could not be craft were without doubt destroyed in shel- observed, while in the case of others only ac- ters, many more either attempted to flee to cess to Iraqi decisionmaking processes (or to Iran or were dispersed in the open in Iraq, the thoughts of the decisionmakers) would both on and off airfields. In either place they provide a complete answer. Analyzing effec- became of little use as a fighting force. As a tiveness against these target sets also would result, by war’s end Iraq was able to retain involve a discussion of the rather controver- nearly half of its aircraft—an estimated 300 sial subject of strategic bombing theory, a to 375 combat aircraft—but at the expense of subject too broad in scope to be dealt with forfeiting the use of the air force’s entire here. Suffice it to say that the stated objec- combat capability during the conflict. tives of strategic bombing in this war were to How do you measure the success? Not isolate and disrupt Iraq’s political-military by the number of Iraqi aircraft shot down— leadership and command and control, elimi- the Iraqis put very few at risk in the air. Over nate offensive capabilities, and destroy NBC half of the coalition shoot downs of fixed- capabilities. Targets included national lead- wing Iraqi aircraft, in fact, occurred as ership facilities, telecommunications, oil, enemy aircraft attempted to flee to Iran after electric power, NBC facilities, Scuds, and the shelters came under attack. military infrastructure. As a point of refer- the Iraqis decided to Success was also not measured ence, the air strikes on all these strategic tar- by the number of SAM sites de- get sets combined accounted for roughly 15 fly few sorties, appar- stroyed—this number, too, can percent of all air strikes (and 30 percent of ently planning to have only be guessed at. It was not the laser-guided bombs) during the war. At- their aircraft ride out possible to prove whether a site tacking a target set, of course, seldom had a was destroyed or just silent (or single, discrete objective, something that the war in hardened abandoned) because of fear of was particularly true for strategic air attacks shelters attack if radars were employed. where combinations of targets attacked si- Destroyed or not, the radar multaneously were important to bringing SAMs were not used effectively which was about the desired effects. the effect sought. By the number of shelters Electric power and oil refining and pro- destroyed? Only indirectly. Attacks on shel- duction facilities are two target sets that his- ters had forced a reaction by the Iraqis, one torically rank high in strategic bombing that caused the loss of their air arm as a campaigns, and the Persian Gulf War was no force in being, at least in this war. In the end exception. Coalition plans called for hitting the most telling measures were those things particular aim points in an attempt to limit that did not happen: the number of coalition long-term damage to the facilities (trans- aircraft not shot down or damaged while fly- former and switching yards rather than gen- ing over 118,000 combat and combat-sup- erator halls), but the war’s objectives were port missions; the role not played by low al- similar to those of past conflicts: interrupt titude antiaircraft and SAMs because the enemy’s industrial and military strength, coalition aircraft could safely fly at higher al- bring the war home to the country at large, titudes; and reconnaissance and strike mis- and disrupt civil and military communica- sions not flown by Iraqi aircraft, preserving tions. In both electric power and oil produc- the surprise of the shift west by coalition tion Iraq had nearly twice the capacity ground forces with little fear of attack. The needed for all of its domestic and military freedom from air attack must be a qualified needs, so extensive damage had to take place one because of the threat posed by Scud mis- to affect Iraq’s wartime needs. siles, a subject addressed later. Compared with the other strategic targets, collection of information on the tactical damage done to electric and oil facilities was a relatively easy matter. These facilities

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ground forces in the Kuwait theater had access to local fuel and in any case used only minimal petroleum while dug into static positions. They had more than enough diesel fuel for a 100-hour ground war, but would have soon run into difficulty finding transportation to supply fuel within the theater.

Lockheed (Schulzinger and Lombard) Attacks on Iraqi oil supplies were effective F–117s comprised not because of their impact on the actual only 2 percent of all combat, but in limiting Iraq’s ability to con- coalition combat were not mobile, able to be hidden, or par- duct a protracted ground campaign. aircraft but carried ticularly difficult to target or damage. Also The air attacks on the Iraqi nuclear out approximately 40 percent of the strategic discernable were the indicators of when ei- weapons research program seemed during the target attacks using ther electricity or petroleum were in short war to be as straightforward as those on elec- laser-guided bombs. supply. As a result, fairly complete informa- tricity and oil. The attacks instead provided tion is available on the measures and degree an illustration of a seemingly good scorecard of success of attacks in attaining tactical- in terms of aim points hit but poor ultimate level or immediate results. For electrical results. Reports during and immediately after power there was a rapid shut down of com- the war indicated a high level of destruction mercially generated power across the coun- against the entire nuclear program, based on try, the major loss occurring in the initial analysis of damage to known facilities. In fact, days of the air campaign. This took place later information showed that there was only even faster than anticipated, in part because partial destruction of known facilities, and Iraqi engineers at times shut down plants in more importantly, those facilities were only a order to avoid a system overload. Some small portion of the entire Iraqi nuclear pro- residual power, perhaps 12 percent of capac- gram. Coalition intelligence information had ity, remained available from a number of underestimated both the size of the program smaller power plants in isolated regions that and the Iraqi determination to protect it. were not attacked. Therefore the immediate Whereas coalition planners began the war objective of shutting down the national certain of only two sites, post-war analysis by power grid was quickly attained. The degree United Nations inspectors revealed sixteen to which this measurable result led to the main nuclear facilities and another five nu- desired operational-strategic effects is, how- clear-related sites. Furthermore, the Iraqis ever, far from clear. Some friction was un- went so far as to remove both nuclear fuel doubtedly imposed on the Iraqis by forcing and machinery from buildings engaged in the national leadership and military systems nuclear research from under coalition bomb- countrywide to switch to back-up power. ing and bury the items in fields, making them Quantitatively it remains difficult to ascer- relatively invulnerable to precision air attacks. tain how much friction was induced from Even attacks on known facilities, in other the available evidence; but the national grid words, were hitting almost empty structures remained out of action. at times. One could look on these poor results Coalition air strikes rendered 90 percent simply as an intelligence failure, but the more of Iraqi petroleum refining capability inoper- explicit lesson is the extensive intelligence ative, based mainly on the employment of a data needed to successfully target capabilities relatively few precision strikes against distil- like Iraq’s nuclear program as a system. lation towers. Air strikes destroyed a far The targeting and damage assessments lesser percentage of oil storage capacity be- of Scud launchers and support facilities had cause of the nature of those targets, spread much in common with the experience over extensive areas and less vulnerable to against the nuclear program. One difference rapid destruction. The lack of distilled was that the Scud target set provided an ad- petroleum caused few problems for the Iraqi ditional measure of success—launch rates of military, however, through no fault of the the missiles. As in the case of the nuclear attack plan. A fuel shortage may have affected the Iraqi air force if it had not chosen to remain on the ground. Similarly, enemy

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rupted, harassed, and to a degree suppressed, Iraqi Troop Dispositions coalition aircraft succeeded in destroying few, if any, mobile Scud launchers during the war. What, then, are the best measurements of the anti-Scud attacks, and what do the results show? The number of fixed sites destroyed appears to have little relevance in this case, and if only the number of mobile Scud launchers is considered, the attacks were a failure. The objectives point to other indicators, however, that suggest partial success, or that at least make the operations appear to have been worthwhile. One indicator is the launch rate for Scud missiles during the war, and a second is the degradation of Iraq’s longer-term offensive capabilities based on the extensive attacks on production and storage facilities. As the figure on raqi units deployed in the Kuwait theater during January and the opposite page indicates, the mobile Scud IFebruary 1991. Note the position of the Republican Guard and launchers if not destroyed were at least sup- the armored and mechanized divisions to the rear of infantry pressed after the first ten days; the recovery divisions (all positions approximate). towards the end of the war also indicates Source. Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey: that the threat had not been completely Effects and Effectiveness (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993). dealt with. In addition, the suppression would have both cut down the number of missiles launched and diminished the accuracy of those actually launched because of a program, however, coalition intelligence es- shortened set-up time and rushed proce- timates did not have a full understanding of dures. In other words, one can make a the target base and, during the war, misin- strong circumstantial case for the attacks terpreted the actual damage being inflicted. suppressing the launches and, in conjunc- Iraq was known to have fixed-launch sites tion with the perceived effectiveness of Pa- and a mobile launch capability for Scuds. triot, plausibly infer some success both in Coalition planners thought the Iraqis would convincing Israel not to enter the war and in use fixed sites initially, limiting damage caused by Scud attacks. coalition aircraft succeeded and that the mobile Attacks against Iraq’s Scud missiles and in destroying few, if any, launchers, though much its nuclear program call for subjective judg- more difficult to target, ments about cause and effect in determining mobile Scud launchers could be handled based the success of the attacks, especially at the on presumed set-up times operational level and above. At least in these prior to launch and other assumptions. It two cases, there were post-war U.N. inspec- was not anticipated that the mobile Scud tions that threw further light on the levels of force would be dispersed to unknown loca- actual damage. In examining the evidence of tions before the start of the air campaign. attacks on the Iraqi leadership and commu- Additionally, the presence of decoy mobile nications, there is far less post-war informa- launchers that could not be distinguished tion, and the available measures are just as from the real thing even at a distance of 25 indistinct. Complete success would have en- yards. Moreover, in the early days of the air tailed removal of the leadership, particularly campaign, pilot reports and pictures of what Saddam Hussein, in the one case, and the in- were described to be destroyed mobile Scud ability of Iraq to control its forces in the launchers tended to mask the actual lack of Kuwait theater from Baghdad, communicate success in destroying them. Although the Iraqi mobile Scud force was no doubt dis-

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with the outside world, and maintain internal control of the population, in the other. Destroyed Iraqi Frog–7 While complete success would have been ap- missile along a road in parent, there are few objective measures for the Euphrates Valley. determining how far short of, or close to, that goal the coalition air campaign may have been on February 28, 1991. Measuring progress requires extensive intelligence information on both the systems and communication procedures (how the country works) and an understanding of system limits, and a capability to monitor electronic emissions. The measures for attacks on leadership and command and communications net-

works begin with tactical indicators: the U.S. Air Force (Dean Wagner) amount of destruction to government buildings, command bunkers, and communication sites as well as the level of monitored elec- than the more discrete attacks in Iraq proper tronic communications and information de- that had characterized the air operations rived from intercepts. There were also opera- against the Iraqi air force, air defense system, tional-level indicators, less or the electric power grid. Bomb damage as- Iraqi Scuds launched objective but distinctive enough sessment focused more on measuring the cu- between January 17, 1991 to show a strong correlation to the mulative effort of many sorties than scoring and February 25, 1991 effects of attacks on these target individual sorties. Attacks on surface forces (Zulu time). sets. On the one hand, Saddam had several components: air interdiction of Hussein and his Ba’athist regime supplies and transportation to and within remained in power, able to com- the Kuwait theater; attacks on the Iraqi municate with the field comman- navy; and the main feature, attacks on the ders in the Kuwait theater and to Iraqi army while it remained in place during continue to launch Scuds until the the air war and in engagements during the final days of the war. On the other ground phase. General Norman Schwarz- hand, the Iraqi leadership was kopf, USA, the Commander in Chief of U.S. forced to relocate many times, had Central Command, furthermore, had singled its communications severely dis- out units of the Republican Guard (named a rupted, and had its control of the strategic center of gravity) for special atten- Iraqi people severely shaken. tion. That force’s importance derived from There were rebellions by the Kurds its role as the strategic reserve of the Iraqi in the north and by Shiite defensive strategy and from its political role Moslems in the south, and Sad- as defender of Saddam Hussein’s regime. dam Hussein was criticized openly The Armed Forces gained experience in Baghdad. Little more can be prosecuting air interdiction operations in said. Precisely estimating the de- World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, but this gree of dislocation that occurred war provided few new twists. The objectives would require access to Iraqi offi- were to cut the flow of supplies to the the- cials or records. Estimating these ater, to stop the movement of forces within effects during the war itself was the theater, and especially to stop the Iraqi and probably will remain more forces from leaving the theater intact. Since difficult for these target sets than most Iraqi ground forces were already in for any others. place when the air war began, the need to block reinforcements was limited. Geography Attacks on Surface Forces provided the attackers some advantages: ter- The surface portion of the air Source. Barry D. Watts and war consisted of the attrition of Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War Air enemy forces in the theater and Power Survey: Effects and Effective- ness (Washington: Government the routes leading to it rather Printing Office, 1993).

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rain consisted of broad plains and farmland, on Iraqi ground forces in the theater, the re- providing little cover for vehicle traffic; the sults were not decisive on their own because principal lines of communications between of Iraqi army inaction. As air interdiction ef- Baghdad and the theater generally followed forts in past wars prove, operations work and frequently crossed rivers; and the system best when the enemy is engaged in high of roads narrowed as it approached Basra. tempo ground operations and thus consum- Bridges, therefore, became the key targets. ing supplies at a high rate. The Iraqi army The destruction of bridges began in was essentially inert during the air cam- earnest at the start of February 1991 and pro- paign, so that the limited supplies that got ceeded quickly thereafter. Overall 75 percent through, combined with large stocks posi- of the bridges along the route to and from tioned in the theater from August 1990 to the Kuwait theater were damaged or de- January 1991, allowed the enemy to remain stroyed. Despite the prominent role of in place. Whether several more days or bridges in the transportation system, how- weeks of air interdiction operations alone ever, their destruction alone was not enough. would have eliminated all resupply and The Iraqis did not attempt to repair perma- shattered what was left of the distribution nent bridges but mounted a massive effort to system is a matter of speculation. What is build earthen causeways, use ferries, and em- certain is that the outbreak of large-scale ploy pontoon bridges to bypass downed ground combat increased demands for sup- bridges. Iraqi skill in coping with the loss of plies (especially ammunition and petroleum) bridges led Lieutenant General Charles to a point where the residual flow of sup- Horner, USAF, after the war to caution: plies was insufficient for prolonged conflict. Anybody that does a campaign against trans- While not central to the war, air opera- portation systems [had] better beware. It looks deceiv- tions against the Iraqi navy consumed a sig- ingly easy. It is a tough nut to crack. [The Iraqis] nificant amount of the effort, particularly were very ingenious and industrious in repairing them for carrier-based aircraft in the Persian Gulf, or bypassing them...I have never seen so many pon- and demonstrated the difficulty of operating toon bridges. [When] the canals near Basra [were in confined waters in the presence of even bombed], they just filled them in with dirt and drove small enemy forces. Coalition aircraft at- 3 across. . . . tacked Iraqi naval targets to secure freedom Attacks on bridges were abetted by at- of action in the northern Gulf, both to make tack aircraft flying armed reconnaissance the carrier and battleship firepower available missions along sections of the main high- and to allow the amphibious force to be in ways leading to and from the Kuwait the- position for the deception plan and land- ater, destroying trucks and cargo. Iraqi coun- ings, if necessary. Just as in the case of tar- termeasures included restricting travel to gets on land, a lack of bomb damage assess- night and shifting from multivehicle con- ment information made the threat unclear. voys to single vehicles. Although this action The Navy antisurface warfare commander saved some trucks, it slowed supplies to a could not declare the threat defeated until trickle. The same tactics succeeded within February 17, two weeks after later analysis the theater. With few bridges or choke would show the last Iraqi missile boat was points to target, attacks on Iraqi army trucks destroyed. Even with the Iraqi surface navy and others making supply runs had a devas- all but entirely sunk, however, a serious tating effect on the transportation system. threat remained for coalition naval forces: Enemy prisoners of war indicated that over mines and Silkworm antiship missiles. An half of the trucks were destroyed or out of unknown number of mines remained and service for lack of parts, and that the drivers missile boat destruction removed only one were no longer willing to travel the roads. launch method for missiles; the threat of air- With all evidence on the success of air or ground-launched Silkworms continued to operations against the bridges, trucks, and affect coalition navy operations until the entire route system, what conclusions can be war’s end. Repeated strikes against seven sus- drawn on the operational effectiveness of air pected Silkworm sites did not remove this interdiction? Coalition aircraft attacks served to greatly reduce the flow of supplies, if not sever the supply lines. In terms of the effect

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Keaney U.S. Navy (Mark Therien)

F–14 Tomcat being launched from USS Independence.

of poorer bombing accuracy and weapon performance from the high release altitudes em-

U.S. Air Force (Dean Wagner) ployed. Some adjustments to tactics took Ruined hulks of Iraqi place to increase attrition rates, the main one armored vehicles threat. Only two Silkworm launches took being the employment of laser-guided bombs and trucks. place during the war, both from a site south to target Iraqi armor. Not anticipated before of Kuwait City on February 25, fired obvi- the war, this innovation took advantage of ously just prior to the site being overrun. differences in the cooling rates of surround- Just as with the anti-Scud operations, it is ing sand compared with vehicle metal, mak- difficult to determine if further launches ing Iraqi vehicles, particularly tanks and ar- were in fact suppressed or if the Iraqis sim- mored personnel carriers, stand out as hot ply chose to retain the missiles until an am- spots on aircraft infrared sensors. Night phibious attack occurred. bombing with laser designators on these Air attacks against the Iraqi army in spots became an extremely effective method Kuwait comprised well over half of the coali- of despatching Iraqi armor. Beginning on tion effort. The objective set for the air at- February 6, the bulk of the F–111Fs were tacks was reduction of combat capability of shifted from strategic targets in central Iraq that army by 50 percent. The measurement to nightly attacks on Iraqi armor in the of attrition was destruction of Iraqi armor Kuwait theater with 500-pound laser-guided and artillery to that level throughout the bombs. As time went on other aircraft with theater. Air strikes began targeting ground infrared sensors and laser targeting pods forces on the first day of the war, then pro- joined in the effort. This increased the rate of ceeded with increasing intensity through- Iraqi armor and artillery attrition, but the 50 out. All forty-three Iraqi divisions in the the- percent goal for the theater was not attained ater received some attention, but three by the start of the ground offensive. At that Republican Guard armored or mechanized time, Central Command (CENTCOM) esti- (heavy) divisions received the most, fol- mated equipment attrition rates at 39 per- lowed by the other eight heavy Iraqi divi- cent for tanks, 32 for armored personnel car- sions that made up the tactical and opera- riers, and 47 for artillery. tional reserves. Attacks against Iraqi front The amount of equipment attrition suf- line divisions (all infantry) peaked just prior fered by the Iraqi army became a contentious to the ground offensive. issue at the time, and any post-war recon- In the opening two weeks of the war re- struction of the facts can only partially rec- sults of the air attacks fell far behind the pro- oncile earlier estimates. Understanding the jected attrition rate, in part because of a com- basis of the dispute requires a review of the bination of poor weather and lower than planned sortie rates, but principally because

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THE GULF WAR original size of the target base, as in past wars, inflated damage claims were AIR POWER SURVEY the counting rules, and the use leading to miscalculation of enemy strength. n August 1991 the Secretary of the Air made of the estimates. The esti- Partly as a response, CENTCOM attempted to Force commissioned an independent mates of Iraqi tanks destroyed, deflate the counting controversy in mid- Istudy to “collect, integrate, and evalu- the most often cited case at the February through a combat effectiveness ate all observations, after action reports, and other data from Operations Desert time of the war, provides the model (developed by the Army element of Shield and Desert Storm.” It was in- best illustration of the problem. CENTCOM) of enemy divisions that intended to “examine not only the planning By January 1991 intelli- cluded equipment losses, but also factored in and consequences of the air campaign in gence estimates credited Iraq leadership, discipline, health, and so forth. In Desert Storm, but its implications for air with 4,280 tanks in the Kuwait addition, rules stated that losses claimed by warfare and doctrine.” The effort was headed by Professor Eliot A. Cohen from theater—a number derived from pilots were creditable only when imagery the School of Advanced International estimating the standard for verified the loss. Furthermore, videos from Studies at the Johns Hopkins University equipping 43 Iraqi army divi- aircraft like F–111Fs showing tank destruc- and a group of analysts including retired sions. The 4,280 figure had also tion by laser-guided bombs were discounted officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, been validated by spot-checks by one-half, and claims by A–10s discounted and Air Force. The basic research covered not only Air Force records, but also of some Iraqi units using photo by two-thirds, to offset uncertainties. This data collected from the other services imagery. This tank count re- change perhaps occurred because General and from Gulf War coalition partners. mained the baseline for estimat- Schwarzkopf was so disenchanted with spe- The study yielded a series of ing the percentage of tank attri- cific estimates of percentages of equipment eleven reports to be published in five vol- tion throughout the war. In attrition that he refused to allow such data to umes—each consisting of two parts— plus a summary report. The reports cover other words, when 2,140 tanks be presented at his briefings. planning; command, control, and com- were counted as destroyed, the Following the war and further analysis of munications; operations; effects and ef- 50 percent attrition would be available imagery and prisoner of war reports, fectiveness; logistics; support; weapons, achieved. Using pilot reports some updates of the estimates were possible. tactics, and training; space operations; a and imagery, CENTCOM com- First, a count of Iraqi tanks in the theater just statistical compendium; and chronology. Each title is being printed in both classi- piled daily updates of attrition prior to the war revealed that there were 800 fied and unclassified versions except for for briefings in the theater and fewer than earlier estimated. This error, how- the space operations report (classified passed this information on to ever, was soon offset by subsequent over- only) and the summary report (unclassi- the Joint Staff. Using satellite counting of tank attrition, making the CENT- fied). The anticipated publication date for imagery as a primary source, COM wartime estimates of attrition the series is October 1993; unclassified reports will be offered for sale to the the Central Intelligence Agency percentages on the eve of the ground war public by the U.S. Government Printing (CIA) and Defense Intelligence (February 23) approximately correct, al- Office. Agency (DIA) independently, though only due to offsetting errors. Second, and in collaboration with one imagery showed that more than 800 Iraqi another, prepared their esti- tanks escaped from the theater at the war’s mates of tanks, armored personnel carriers, end, making the number of tanks destroyed— and artillery pieces destroyed, figures that since few, if any, additional Iraqi tanks en- soon diverged from the CENTCOM tank tered the theater in that period—through count, with the Washington numbers indi- both air and ground action approximately cating far fewer tanks destroyed. By February 1,000 less than CENTCOM claimed at the end 12, for instance, CENTCOM reported 25 per- of the war. Finally, tank attrition on the eve of cent of the tanks destroyed, while DIA and the ground offensive was about 40 percent for CIA reported less than half that number. By the Iraqi army overall and just over 20 per- the eve of the ground offensive, CENTCOM cent for Republican Guard units; and the reported 1,688 tanks already destroyed, while total wartime Iraqi tank attrition was approxi- intelligence analysts in Washington counted mately 75 percent and 50 percent, respec- fewer than 700. tively. In other words, the most important The counting rules and different esti- Iraqi units got off with the least damage. Al- mates developed were important because the though far from the least attacked, Republi- percentage of degradation of the Iraqi army can Guard tanks were better dug in and de- was key to determining when the ground of- fended. Another contributing factor was that fensive would begin. The CIA caused some these tanks were far enough to the rear to es- consternation within government circles cape the theater; tanks farther forward, even when that agency’s figures became publicized if functioning, had to be abandoned. in February 1991, and fears were voiced that,

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Ironically, the loss of equipment, the key index of damage assessment during the war, was not decisive in any direct way. The key to the defeat of the Iraqi army was not the specific targets destroyed, but the combination of targets attacked and the intensity with which attacks took place. Enemy soldiers were affected by the bombs that hit their targets as well as by those that missed.

DOD The air interdiction effort, damage to com- B–52s made up only 3 munications and supply systems, along with percent of all coalition equipment attrition during the air war, af- combat aircraft but Measures and the use made of them had fected the Iraqi soldiers beyond the direct in- delivered approxi- a number of flaws. The most obvious problem flicting of casualties. The Iraqis did not de- mately 30 percent of total bomb tonnage, is with the size of the target base. While the fect or surrender in droves during the air and mostly non-precision number of tanks in the theater continued to ground war because their armor and artillery munitions. be reported as 4,280, there were widespread were being destroyed—in fact, statements by reports during the war that the numbers were prisoners of war indicated they appreciated wrong. Intelligence reports from autumn the discrimination of coalition air forces in 1990 and prisoner of war debriefings during aiming at equipment instead of at them— the war indicated that many units had de- but because of shortages of food, water, and ployed with far less than a full complement confidence that their equipment was going of men or equipment (intelligence reports in to do them any good. The Iraqi army did not a similar way had also overestimated the run out of tanks, armored personnel carriers, number of Iraqi soldiers in the theater, but ac- or artillery; in fact, much of the equipment counts of Iraqi personnel attrition, body intact at the start of the ground offensive counts, were scrupulously avoided). was abandoned, or at least unoccupied, Even if the number of tanks was correct, when coalition ground forces arrived. The too much attention attached to it as a mea- total number and operability of tanks had sure. When the attrition goals were set in less meaning under these conditions. September 1990, the tanks represented what Reviewing the disintegration and rout of would have been the vanguard of an Iraqi at- the Iraqi army during Operation Desert tack into Saudi Arabia. By January 1991, no Storm, one becomes suspicious of the value ground commander set a particular premium of relying on discrete indicators to measure on destroying tanks from the air. By then, it results. Even in such a brief, recent, and mil- was artillery since Iraqi artillery represented itarily lopsided campaign, broader problems the chief danger for blunting of assessing (not measuring) operational and the most important the ground attack through use strategic—as opposed to tactical—effective- Iraqi units got off with of chemical weapon shells dur- ness remain difficult, controversial, and ing the breaching effort. The plagued by subjectivity. While tactical effects the least damage Army corps commanders, Lieu- and effectiveness are seemingly more tenant Generals Gary Luck and amenable to quantitative measures, the need Frederick Franks, and Lieutenant General to take into account the actual, real-world Walter Boomer, USMC, commander of Ma- objectives of operational commanders and rine forces, pointed to artillery as the chief planners suggest that operational-strategic obstacle. Boomer even went to the extreme effectiveness is, in the end, essentially a of talking with his airborne Marine pilots to qualitative issue. The fact that coalition air direct their energies toward attacking ar- forces did not destroy the promised 50 per- tillery instead of armor. Iraqi tanks were not cent of Iraqi armor and artillery in the in the front lines in any numbers, and the Kuwait theater prior to the beginning of the corps commanders were confident in being ground offensive does not lead to a conclu- able to handle them in a war of movement, sion that coalition airpower failed to create both by air—since tanks on the move were the circumstances under which the 100-hour more vulnerable—and by using the superior blow-out on the ground was possible. range of the M–1A1 tank.

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Finally, there are the difficulties of assessing effectiveness across diverse but inter- related target systems as well as the impossi- bility of finding measures that can be readily applied across all target sets. There was nothing in the Gulf War data that supported the existence of universal or quan- tifiable measures of operational, much less strategic, effectiveness. In other words, you can never have information available during the war to know exactly how you are

U.S. Army (J. Otero) doing. In this sense Clausewitz had it right Iraqi MIG–25 after when he observed: being destroyed The lessons derived from assessing Many intelligence reports in war are contradic- during Operation bomb damage in the Gulf War involve both Desert Storm. tory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. improving methods and facing the inherent What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he messiness and uncertainty of real war. Meth- should possess a standard of judgment....He should ods for determining the tactical effects of be guided by the laws of probability. These are diffi- bomb damage can be improved. This will re- cult enough to apply when plans are drafted in an of- quire both better skills on the part of inter- fice, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes preters of bomb damage and better equip- infinitely harder in the thick of fighting itself, with re- ment. In the age of dumb bombs pilot ports streaming in. At such times one is lucky if their 4 reports of estimated damage were often only contradictions cancel each other out. ... one small piece of a picture of how attacks The principal audiences for these lessons were progressing that built up over weeks or are not analysts and historians of past cam- longer. In our age of hun- paigns, but planners and commanders who ironically, the loss of dred-thousand, even mil- must assess the effects of air bombardment, lion-dollar munitions in make adjustments, and draw conclusions equipment, the key index which numerous revisits to long before complete information becomes of damage assessment the target are no longer de- available. For them the lessons of this survey during the war, was not sirable or affordable, there may seem particularly bleak, but there is a is no alternative to a high- certain cold comfort in truly understanding decisive in any direct way quality damage assessment the nature of the task at hand rather than try- capability on the attacking ing to find certainties where none exist. JFQ aircraft or the weapon itself. The F–16 and F/A–18 aircraft, among others used in the NOTES Gulf, had no such capability. 1 See two forthcoming reports, Barry D. Watts and Improved capabilities to hit within 8-12 Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Effects and feet of aim points with precision-guided Effectiveness (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf weapons represented unprecedented ad- War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington: vances in theater-level bombing accuracy. Government Printing Office, 1993). The problems of grasping the vulnerability 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the and functioning of entire target systems vis- Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress (Wash- à-vis operational-strategic objectives, how- ington: Government Printing Office, April 1992), pp. 95–98. ever, may well have been as riddled with un- 3 Interview with Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, certainty in the cases of the Iraqi nuclear USAF, conducted at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina program and mobile Scud missile capability (March 4, 1992), by Perry Jamison, Richard Davis, and as were target systems like ball-bearings dur- Barry Barlow of the Center for Air Force History. 4 ing World War II. Hitting aim points is get- Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince- ting easier, but knowing what aim points to ton University Press, 1976), p. 117. go after across an entire target set remains, in general, open to uncertainty when facing a dedicated, reactive adversary.

36 JFQ / Autumn 1993 JFQ▼ FORUM Mission to Somalia

Joint Combat Camera Center he deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia is a typical post-Cold War mission and a radical approach to peace-enforcement by the international community. The military undertook Operation Provide T Relief to halt mass starvation in an anarchic state. Soon afterward international forces joined Americans in the United Nations Operation in So- malia or UNOSOM. By year’s end, as the magnitude of the task became clear, the United Nations enlisted international support under U.S. leadership to mount Operation Restore Hope. Successful completion of that effort marked the beginning of the present phase of activity. To assess the overall situation in Somalia JFQ has sought contributions from four Americans with unique qualifications. In the first article a leading academic specialist on military affairs observes that Somalia may be a new contingency, but it is a well-worn role for our forces. He warns against using largely noncombat operations to determine military requirements. In the second article, a former Presidential envoy to Somalia reviews U.S. and U.N. decisionmaking, and assesses the mission thus far. Next, the CINC with responsibility for operations in Somalia provides a detailed survey of what U.S. forces have done in the past year and offers some thoughts on future humanitarian missions. And as a conclusion, the last American ambassador to Somalia praises Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope while cautioning that assertive peace-enforcement may set a dangerous precedent. ——— These contributions were completed in September 1993 as events in Somalia grew more violent and doubts were raised in many quarters over the mission.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 37 Lowering food supplies near Maleel, Somalia. Joint Combat Camera Center Air Force officer treating injured Somali.

New Contingencies, OLD ROLES Joint Combat Camera Center (Terry C. Mitchell) By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

ew issues are more important than the and the commerce-protecting Navy to his- roles and missions of the Armed tory and in their stead created an Army de- Forces in the post-Cold War era. We signed for big wars and a Navy for big battles. F are in the midst of major changes in That system served us well throughout two the structure of the international system and world wars. But by the late 1940s with the of serious challenges to national security. advent of the Cold War we needed a new De- This is not, however, the first time the Na- fense Establishment. Now that conflict is tion has faced such challenges. At the birth over, and once again the Nation must debate of the Republic we had to establish the mili- the nature of our national interests and the tary and naval forces to deal with threats roles of the Armed Forces, just as earlier gen- from Europe. With the end of the Napole- erations did in 1784, 1815, 1898, and 1946. onic era our national defense changed dra- In effect, we have to move on to a fifth phase matically as did the Armed Forces. This situa- of American defense policy. tion remained fixed in its essentials until the Nontraditional and Nonmilitary close of the 19th century when America The term nontraditional roles obviously emerged as a world power. At that time the implies a distinction between traditional and Nation consigned the Indian-fighting Army nontraditional military roles. The traditional roles of the Armed Forces will presumably continue, but in this fifth phase of American This article is based on an address delivered on December 1, 1992 to a symposium military history the services will perform on “Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era” which new nontraditional roles. Some new roles was sponsored by the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

38 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Huntington

have evolved, others have been promoted by For over three decades the United States the Congress, in particular by Senator Sam Military Academy at West Point trained all Nunn, the Chairman of the Senate Armed of the Nation’s engineers, civilian as well as Services Committee. It is largely military. Throughout the 19th century the due to his leadership that the Army engaged in the economic and political Defense Authorization Act of development of the country. It explored and 1993 encouraged the Armed surveyed the West, chose sites for forts and Forces to conduct an anti-drug planned settlements, built roadways, and de- campaign targeted at inner-city veloped waterways. And for years the Army youths, to provide role models performed roles that now are performed by for youth and health care to un- agencies like the National Weather Service derserved communities, and to and the Geological Survey. In the latter part address domestic ills by improv- of the last century, the Army Signal Corps Joint Combat Camera Center (Marv Lynchard) Unloading flour at ing the environment and eco- pioneered the development of the telegraph Wajir, Kenya, during nomic and social conditions. In a speech in and telephone. The Navy was equally active Operation Provide the Senate, Senator Nunn stated: in exploration and scientific research. Naval Relief. While the Soviet threat is gone, at home we are ships explored the Amazon, surveyed the still battling drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self- coastlines of North and South America, laid esteem, unemployment, and racism. The military cer- cables on the ocean floor, and gathered sci- tainly cannot solve these problems....But I am con- entific data from around the world. They vinced that there is a proper and important role the also policed the slave trade. Naval officers Armed Forces can play in addressing these pressing negotiated dozens of treaties and oversaw issues. I believe we can reinvigorate the military’s lighthouses, life-saving services, coastal sur- spectrum of capabilities to address such needs as de- veys, and steamboat inspection. The Army teriorating infrastructure, the lack of role models for ran civil governments in the South during tens of thousands if not millions of young people, Reconstruction and at the same time gov- limited training and education opportunities for the disadvantaged, and serious health and nutrition erned Alaska for ten years. It was, of course, problems facing many of our citizens, particularly frequently called upon to intervene in labor our children. 1 strikes and domestic unrest. The Army Corps of Engineers constructed public buildings These clearly seem to be nontraditional and canals and other civil works including roles. But are they really? The fact is that the Panama Canal. Soldiers helped to com- there are almost no conceivable roles in this bat malaria in Panama and cholera, hunger, new phase of our history that the Armed and illiteracy in Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Forces have not performed in the past. The They also established schools, built works distinction to be made is not between tradi- projects, promoted public health, organized tional and nontraditional roles but between elections, and encouraged democracy in military and nonmilitary roles or, more pre- those countries. In the 1930s the Army took cisely, between combat missions and non- on the immense task of recruiting, organiz- combat missions. The purpose of the Armed ing, and administering the Civilian Conser- Forces is combat: to deter and defeat ene- vation Corps. mies of the United States. That is their prin- After recent hurricanes in Florida and cipal role or raison d’être, the justification for Hawaii many people hailed the superb con- expending the resources needed to establish tributions of the Armed Forces to disaster re- and maintain them. Forces created to per- lief as evidence of a new role. Nothing could form that role, however, can be—and have have been more incorrect. The services have been throughout our history—employed in regularly provided such relief in the past. As noncombat, nonmilitary uses. an official Army history puts it, in the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, “The most conspicuous employment of the Army within the United States...was in a variety Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of tasks that only the Army had the resources of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for and organization to tackle quickly. In floods Strategic Studies at Harvard University. Among his many acclaimed publications is The Soldier and the State: The and blizzards and hurricanes it was the Army Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. that was first on the spot with cots, blankets,

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 39 Destruction caused by Hurricane Iniki on Kauai, Hawaii.

DOD

and food.” 2 This has been true Regional Security. Significant threats exist to our national interests in Southwest and

Joint Combat Camera Center (Zedrick G. Rockett) throughout our history. It is hard Guardsman securing to think of a nonmilitary role East Asia, and we must have the capability to a food distribution without precedent for such roles are as Amer- deal with them as we did in the Gulf War. To center in the wake of ican as apple pie. deter or defeat regional aggression the Hurricane Andrew. United States needs light and heavy land Future Roles and Missions forces, tactical aviation, naval and Marine Throughout our history, however, non- forces designed to fight from the sea against military roles have never been used to jus- enemies on land, and the sealift and airlift tify maintaining the Armed Forces. The to deploy forces rapidly to the scene of com- overall size, composition, and organization bat. Ideally the United States should be able as well as recruitment, equipping, and train- to fight the equivalent of the Gulf War. Sec- ing of the services have been based on our retary of Defense Les Aspin’s “Option C” national interests and the missions—the purportedly would provide this capability. combat missions—to be performed. In this Whether in five years the Armed Forces will fifth phase of American defense policy the be able to mount an operation like Desert roles of the Armed Forces remain as impor- Storm against an enemy similar to Iraq re- tant as ever. There are three roles that pre- mains to be seen. sent themselves today. Our decisive victory in the Persian Gulf, Maintaining Superiority. For the first time however, makes it unlikely that we will be in sixty years, no major power, no rival, poses able to repeat that victory. Major regional a national security challenge to the United aggressors in the future are likely to possess States. We need defense policy and the capa- and use nuclear weapons. This reality was re- bility not to contain or deter an existing flected in the reply of the Indian defence threat as was the case during the Cold War, minister who, when asked what lesson he but rather to prevent the emergence of a new drew from the Gulf War, said: “Don’t fight threat. To accomplish this goal, we must the United States unless you have nuclear maintain a substantial, invulnerable nuclear weapons.” 3 Likely aggressors—North Korea, retaliatory capability and deploy forces in Iran, Iraq, et al.—are intent on acquiring nu- both Europe and Asia to reassure allies and to clear weapons. But until they get them the preclude German or Japanese rearmament. probability of stability in their respective re- We must also maintain both technological gions is reasonably high. Once they do ac- and maritime superiority, and provide a base quire these weapons, however, the likeli- for the rapid and effective development of a hood they will use them is high. In all new enhanced defense capability if a major probability the first sure knowledge the threat should begin to emerge. world will have that such powers possess a usable nuclear weapon will be the explosion

40 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Huntington

of a weapon on the territory of one of their In the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition de- neighbors. Such an act is likely to be accom- graded by more than 50 percent the capabil- panied by a massive conventional offensive ity of the Iraqi military, and also brought to quickly occupy Seoul, Saudi oil fields, or Iraqi society to a virtual standstill. But that whatever other target the aggressor tremendous use of has in mind. That is the most seri- it is hard to think of a force failed to eliminate ous type of regional threat that we the true villains of nonmilitary role with- may confront, and perhaps the peace, Iraq’s govern- most probable. out precedent for such ment. The elimination Coping with that kind of ag- roles are as American of Saddam Hussein was gression will place new demands— an established U.S. ob- as apple pie nontraditional demands—on the jective, although not Armed Forces. They will have to one endorsed by the fight an enemy who has a small number of United Nations, and it was not achieved. In- nuclear weapons and little or no inhibition deed, during the last decade, we have at- to use them. To deter this first use by a rogue tempted to eliminate three hostile dictators: state, the United States will have to threaten Khadaffi, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein. We massive retaliation, possibly nuclear. The only succeeded in the case of Noriega, and principal role of Strategic Command in the that took time and caused us some embar- coming years will be to maintain nuclear rassment because it involved a tiny country peace in the Third World. about which American intelligence must Foreign Internal Defense. The Armed have been the best in the world. Targeting Forces may have to intervene quickly and ef- and incapacitating dictatorial governments fectively in countries important to our na- will be an important role for the Armed tional security interests in order to restore a Forces in the coming years, and it is one government to power that has been over- with respect to which our capabilities are thrown, remove a hostile regime, protect now sadly deficient. American lives and property abroad, rescue Future Challenges hostages, eliminate terrorists, Besides the military roles which the destroy drug traffickers, or en- Armed Forces can expect to perform in the Nontraditional Roles gage in other actions which post-Cold War world, what are the appropri- normally fall under the rubric What do the Armed Forces need in ate nonmilitary—or civilian—roles that order to carry out nontraditional roles? of low intensity conflict. loom on the horizon? As indicated previ- More training, equipment? New doc- Whether or not a state is ag- ously, these roles have been historically nu- trine? Different organization? Nontradi- gressive or pacific, reasonably tional roles are really crisis response merous and diverse, and no reason exists to decent or totally threatening, roles. It is fine to call a role nontradi- suggest that they will not be continued. Fu- depends overwhelmingly on tional, but one also ought to talk about ture missions could involve the following: crisis response. the nature of its government. The military is taught to respond to President Clinton has appro- ▼ domestic activities as highlighted by Sen- crises, to make decisions when all the priately said that the promo- ator Nunn and in the Defense Authorization Act facts are not in. This is what service ▼ tion of democracy should be humanitarian assistance at home and schools teach: to take action under abroad when welcomed by local governments a central, perhaps even the pressure, work as a team, and trou- ▼ peacekeeping at the invitation of the par- bleshoot; to organize, reorganize, es- central, theme of U.S. foreign ties involved in the conflicts. tablish task forces, and do task reorga- policy. In those areas critical nization and tailoring. So in many to our national security, the There is another type of mission—one respects the military is already pre- United States has to be pre- about which questions have arisen—illus- pared, no matter what the service: trated by the crisis in Somalia. Should the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or pared to defend governments Coast Guard. Some additional training that are friendly and demo- Armed Forces provide humanitarian assis- may be needed, but one should not get cratic and to overthrow those tance in those situations where such efforts hung up on the idea that somehow a that are unfriendly and un- are likely to be opposed by one or more of the whole new force is needed. democratic. conflicting parties? Clearly some form of in- —General John R. Galvin, This requirement also ternational authorization, presumably ap- USA (Ret.) emphasizes a new role for the proval by the United Nations, is a prerequisite Armed Forces: targeting dic- tatorships and their leaders.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 41 JFQ▼ FORUM it is morally unjustifiable for action by the United any outside involvement and politically indefensible States. This occurred with as a hostile act. Thus by the precedent-breaking deploying American that members of the Armed U.N. Security Council troops, from the view- Forces should be killed to Resolution 688 that au- point of the local com- prevent Somalis from killing thorized intervention by batants, we become the U.S., British, and French enemy. Inevitably while one another forces in order to protect we are there for humani- the Kurds in northern tarian purposes our pres- Iraq. The United Nations has also given ap- ence has political and proval to deploy outside military forces in military consequences. Bosnia as well as in Somalia to assist with the The United States has a Relief mission provision of humanitarian assistance to the clear humanitarian inter- arriving in support of Operation Provide innocent victims of civil war and anarchy. est in preventing geno- Relief. cide and starvation, and Defining the Limits Americans will support The goal of our involvement in such sit- intervention to deal with uations is presumably to ensure that relief such tragedies within lim- supplies reach the intended beneficiaries. its. When Somali clans or This means that the Armed Forces should be Slavic factions fight each able to act militarily to prevent or eliminate other, we may attempt to hostile action against efforts to deliver relief mitigate the horrendous supplies. While that is certainly an appropri- consequences that flow ate response, there is a need to define the from the violence. Under limits of U.S. involvement in such missions, Joint Combat Camera Center such circumstances the and this gives rise to two problems. Nation may even accept some American ca- First, so long as the conditions in the sualties. But the United States has no interest country concerned remain violent, external in which clan dominates Somalia, or where military force will be required to ensure that boundary lines are drawn in the Balkans. food and medical supplies Americans will not support intervention reach their intended recipi- which appears to be directed towards politi- ents. If the United Nations is Roles, Missions, and cal goals. It is morally unjustifiable and polit- Functions unable to provide those ically indefensible that members of the forces, this could mean an The terms roles, missions, and func- Armed Forces should be killed to prevent So- extended if not indefinite tions are often used interchangeably, malis from killing one another. American commitment. This but the distinctions among them are The Armed Forces can and should, if it is important. Roles are the broad and en- is not a Gulf War-type situa- appropriate, be put to a variety of civilian during purposes for which the services tion where it was possible to uses, including domestic social and eco- were established by Congress in law. drive the invading Iraqi Missions are the tasks assigned by the nomic renewal, humanitarian and disaster forces out of Kuwait and President or the Secretary of Defense to relief both at home and abroad, and peace- then pack up and go home. the combatant commanders in chief keeping operations. The military should (CINCs). Functions are specific respon- In the case of Bosnia it could only be given military missions which in- sibilities assigned by the President and mean waiting for the South volve possible combat, however, when they the Secretary of Defense to enable the Slavs or other conflicting services to fulfill their legally estab- advance national security interests and are parties to resolve their differ- lished roles. Simply stated, the primary directed against a foreign enemy of the ences by political or military function of the services is to provide United States. forces that are organized, trained, and means before extricating our- The possible nonmilitary roles of the equipped to perform a role—to be em- selves. And that could take a Armed Forces have recently received a good ployed by a CINC in the accomplishment very, very long time. of a mission. amount of attention. Arguments have been Second, there is the made that the military should be organized —From the Chairman’s “Report on problem of becoming an ac- the Roles, Missions, and Func- and trained in order to perform such roles. A tive participant in the con- tions of the Armed Forces of the proposal has been made, for instance, that a United States”. flict in the country concerned. One or more parties in that conflict may perceive

42 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Marine aiming at a weapons cantonment of Somali warlord General Aideed.

Joint Combat Camera Center (Daniel R. Hart) unified command should be established for military perform other roles? Absolutely, and humanitarian assistance operations. In a as previously stated they have done so somewhat similar fashion, a commission of throughout our history. Should these roles former government officials has proposed cre- define the Armed Forces? Absolutely not. All ating a military command headed by a three- such roles should be spillover uses of the or four-star officer to provide support for U.N. Armed Forces which can be performed be- peacekeeping operations and to develop doc- cause the services possess the organization, trine, carry out planning, and train U.S. forces training, and equipment that are only main- for such operations. The United States, an- tained to defend the Nation. JFQ other group argued, “should retain and promote officers whose expertise includes peace- NOTES keeping, humanitarian administration, and 1 Public Law 102–484, October 28, 1992, sections. civilian support operations....”4 376, 1045, and 1081; Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, Such proposals are basically miscon- vol. 138, no. 91 (June 23, 1992), p. S 8602. 2 Maurice Matloff, editor, American Military History ceived. The mission of the Armed Forces is (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 413. combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the 3 Quoted in Les Aspin, “From Deterrence to Denuk- United States. The military must be re- ing: Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990s,” Memoran- cruited, organized, trained, and equipped for dum, February 18, 1992, p. 6. that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and 4 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Institute for International Economics, Memorandum to should, be used for humanitarian and other the President-Elect, Subject: “Harnessing Process to Pur- civilian activities, but the military should pose” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- not be organized or prepared or trained to tional Peace, 1992), p. 17; Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. perform such roles. A military force is funda- Campbell, “Military Humanitarianism,” Survival, vol. 33 mentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to (September–October 1991), p. 457. kill people in the most efficient way possible. That is why nations have traditionally maintained armies and navies. Should the

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 43 JFQ▼ FORUM

CARE volunteer at a refugee camp in Baidoa.

AN ENVOY’S Joint Combat Camera Center (Dean Wagner) PERSPECTIVE By ROBERT B. OAKLEY

This article is adapted from a forthcoming book by Robert B. Oakley and John Hirsch entitled Restore Hope.

44 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Oakley

y the fall of 1992, the combina- coalition without participation by American tion of civil war, total govern- ground troops; or assemble a multinational mental collapse, famine, and military coalition in which U.S. troops disease in Somalia had taken the would take the leading role, as in Operation lives of between 300,000 and Desert Storm. 500,000 people, and more than At the start of the week, U.N. Secretary Btwice that number were in urgent need of General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had appealed food and medicine to avoid additional to Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner for deaths; and there were some 800,000 Somali help, but had not raised the issue of ground refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. In some forces. The Pentagon had for months ex- places, more than 70 percent of children had pressed strong reservations about using died, despite heroic efforts by the Interna- ground forces, resisting such proposals from tional Committee of the Red Cross and the Department of State and the NSC staff. other relief agencies, as well as a large-scale Therefore most participants at the meeting airlift of food spearheaded by the Air Force. on November 20 did not consider use of the Attempts by the United Nations at political Armed Forces to be a likely option. But the reconciliation, delivering aid, and traditional following day the Vice Chairman of the peacekeeping failed. Public opinion and con- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jere- viction led President George Bush to call for miah, startled the group by saying, “If you a more active U.S. role. think U.S. forces are needed, we can do the The deputies committee of the National job.” His plan called for deploying two divi- Security Council, a group of senior officials sions. At the end of the deliberations an in- who rank just below Cabinet level, con- teragency options paper was sent to the Pres- vened four times during the week of Novem- ident without a recommendation. It would ber 20, 1992. The atmosphere at committee be up to him to make the decision. meetings changed dramatically. The human- The President met with his senior advi- itarian crisis in Somalia had come to be seen sors on the day before Thanksgiving, as a challenge in which the United States November 25. General Colin Powell, Chair- could rapidly make a sig- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who was if the Security Council nificant and tangible dif- certain in his own mind that the dispatch of concurred and other nations ference. The previous op- a sizable ground force was necessary but position by the Pentagon wanted to be sure that the pitfalls were agreed to join, the United to use the Armed Forces clearly identified—questioned whether con- States would lead an inter- had been replaced by ditions in Somalia would permit a smooth national force to stop death quiet internal contin- handoff to a U.N. peacekeeping force after a gency planning to deter- relatively brief deployment of U.S. troops. and famine in Somalia mine what realistically (His question was prescient: it became a key and effectively could be issue that later faced the United Nations and done. A definable, doable mission had the Bush administration.) After a far-reach- emerged and no other country either could ing discussion, the President decided that if or would undertake it. The inability to do the Security Council concurred and other anything meaningful for Muslims in Bosnia, nations agreed to join in the effort, the together with a perception that we could ac- United States would lead an international tually help in Muslim Somalia, added to the force to stop death and famine in Somalia. media-driven desire for a fresh look at the He chose the strongest option and the options. Thus the deputies committee devel- United States embarked upon a major hu- oped three options: increase support of U.N. manitarian intervention. peacekeeping efforts; create a U.S.-organized Consultations on Intervention The President sent Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to New York that af- Robert B. Oakley was the President’s Special Envoy ternoon to inform the Secretary General. for Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993. A During the next week the U.S. Ambassador retired career diplomat, he served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Edward Perkins, and to Somalia, Zaire, and Pakistan, and also headed the Department of State’s Office of Combatting Terrorism.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 45 JFQ▼ FORUM Defense Richard Cheney said at an impor- Operation Provide Relief tant press conference with General Powell on December 4, “There will be no question DJIBOUTI in the mind of any of the faction leaders in ADDIS Somalia that we would have the ability to ABABA impose a stable situation if it came to that, without their cooperation.” Cheney went on to say that the U.S.-led operation would be Belet Uen Oddur limited in duration as well as mission: “We Gialalassi Waajid believe it necessary to send in U.S. forces to Baledogle Baidoa Wajir Bardera provide U.S. leadership to get the situation MOGADISHU

Kismayo stabilized and return it to a state where the

NAIROBI normal U.N. peacekeeping forces can deal

Mombasa with the circumstances.” American and allied forces were designated as United Task Force (UNITAF) and August 16, 1992–February 28, 1993 placed under Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, Commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, who in turn reported to General Joseph Hoar, USMC, Com- his staff consulted intensely with the Secre- mander in Chief, U.S. Central Command tary General, permanent members of the Se- (CENTCOM). Johnston had served with dis- curity Council, and other parties, including tinction in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Saudi delegates from African and NATO countries. Arabia, and been chief of staff to General They confirmed strong support for the U.S. Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation proposal. President Bush made personal tele- Desert Storm. The President was also urged phone calls to 13 heads of state asking for to name a senior political representative participation in or support for the United who would complement the military com- Task Force. All except the British Prime Min- mander. That job fell to me. ister, John Major, pledged to send troops or Consultations in Mogadishu provide assistance. On December 7 and 8, I met separately On December 3 the Secu- in Mogadishu with the two most powerful rity Council unanimously Somali faction leaders, Mohammed Farah adopted Resolution 794, en- Aideed and Ali Mahdi, to enlist their cooper- dorsing the offer by a member ation in assuring the arrival of U.S. forces state to constitute and lead an went unchallenged. Both promised to use international force for the pur- radio stations and political-clan organiza- pose of protecting humanitar- tions to urge people to stay away from the ian relief operations in Soma- port and airport. Aideed also intervened with lia. It would not be a U.N. force the Murasade, an allied Hawiye subclan, to but rather one endorsed by the move several hundred armed fighters away Security Council, much like from the barracks adjacent to the airport. the U.S.-led force for Korea in I asked both leaders to meet with Gen-

Joint Combat Camera Center 1950 and the U.S.-led force for eral Johnston, Ambassador Ismat Kittani Marine distributing Kuwait in 1991. Neither (the Special Representative of the Secretary information leaflets to Boutros-Ghali nor the Security Council was General), and me on December 11 at the civilians. ready for an unprecedented humanitarian U.S. Liaison Office to discuss the potentially peace-enforcement mission. disastrous results if their followers uninten- U.S. forces were to be deployed on a fi- tionally clashed with U.S. forces. I reminded nite mission: to end clan fighting and pro- them of the massive firepower that had tect humanitarian operations in the famine been used so effectively during Desert belt of southern Somalia where the death Storm. I remarked that it would be better if toll and numbers of endangered people were the highest. There would be overwhelming force available at the outset. As Secretary of

46 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Oakley

they discussed security problems with Gen- best means of obtaining much-needed inter- eral Johnston—since separate meetings national support for relief, rehabilitation, would not do. The American flag would fly and reconstruction. over what had once been the CONOCO Once the Somali leaders concluded an compound to ensure neutrality and security. agreement on specific steps, our approach was to insist on implementation—if no action was taken after a decent interval. Should the leaders not act on their own, they should be ready to have UNITAF impose it on them, by force if necessary. Aideed and Ali Mahdi soon became rivals in projecting themselves as responsible leaders worthy of U.S. support (and therefore suited for national leadership). They wanted to avoid conflict with UNITAF and also save face at home. Therefore they could usually be persuaded, pressured, or cajoled into reaching agreements and cooperating for at least partial implementation, even if they did not meet their expectations. In the case of the December 11 agreement, it was critical for UNITAF to obtain and hold the leaders and their militias to the

Joint Combat Camera Center (Marv Lynchard) cease-fire and to an explicit undertaking to Kenyan workers move heavy weapons from the streets of shifting donated food. Mogadishu into designated compounds. Although Aideed initially objected to Other aspects of the agreement such as re- the presence of Ambassador Kittani, and Ali moving the green line could be imple- Mahdi claimed the venue was too dangerous mented later when conditions were right. because of its proximity to Aideed’s head- While the cease-fire in Mogadishu, which quarters, agreement was reached and the was already tentatively in effect, took firm meeting took place as proposed. They lis- hold, it was only on December 26 that both tened to Johnston, Kittani, and me over sides began putting their heavy weapons lunch and then surprised us by having their under control. They had finally accepted our delegations join them for a two-hour discus- proposal on this deadline for each side mov- sion with no foreigners present. Following ing 30 technicals (vehicles armed with heavy that session they proudly called for the U.S. weapons) out of Mogadishu to their respec- and U.N. representatives to witness the sign- tive designated cantonments as a first step. ing of an agreement (including a cease-fire) In mid-February 1993 Ali Mahdi turned after which they held a joint press confer- over all his technicals to UNITAF. This sig- ence to announce it before the international nalled his intent to play an essentially politi- and domestic Somali press corps. cal game. But by this time technicals had This was the starting point for develop- disappeared from Aideed’s designated coming a strategy which General Johnston and I pound: a warning, in retrospect, of the con- could use to create a benign security envi- frontation with the follow-on U.N. peace- ronment. As far as possible, our purpose keeping force (UNOSOM II) which erupted would be achieved by dialogue and co-op- after Aideed moved his weapons back into tion, using implicit threats of coercion to the city. He moved them from Mogadishu buttress requests for cooperation among the toward Galacio for fear of confiscation. The factions and with UNITAF. They could do key operative point for UNITAF, however, this by taking specific steps: first, stop fight- was not this violation of the December 11 ing and allow for humanitarian activities agreement. Rather it was that the technicals and, second, try and solidify an end to the were peacefully removed from Mogadishu civil war and begin the process of national reconciliation. This was explained as the

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 47 JFQ▼ FORUM and the main supply routes, and that any From December onwards the center held technicals spotted after December 26 were a daily morning briefing attended by close vulnerable to immediate capture or destruc- to 100 participants from the United Nations tion. The same principle was then applied and relief agencies, as well as UNITAF head- up-country, and a number of technicals were quarters and its major military compo- captured or destroyed. Given the limited nents—that is, those who commanded the UNITAF mandate, which deliberately ex- Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS)—into cluded general disarmament, there was no which the UNITAF area was divided. The perceived need to confront Aideed over the threefold objective was to share information disappearance of weapons as long as they on security, explain UNITAF ground rules posed no threat to UNITAF forces or human- and plans, and coordinate protection and es- itarian operations. corts for food convoys within Mogadishu, My staff and General Johnston’s quickly and subsequently for those moving into the established a pattern that became routine interior. Together with my staff I gave peri- over the next three months, meeting regu- odic briefings on political developments. larly several times each week to coordinate The center was an effective, innovative planning and activities. I also convened a mechanism not only for operational coordi- meeting each evening of my staff and key nation but to bridge the inevitable gaps be- UNITAF representatives to review activities tween military and civilian perceptions. By and generate suggestions for future military, developing good personal relationships the political, and humanitarian activity. Similar staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and combined but unstructured discussions took anxieties of the relief community. place over breakfast before 0800 daily. Ideas The only serious unresolved problem were then developed for use in dealing with was the extremely complicated and danger- UNITAF, the United Nations, and non- ous one of protecting relief personnel and governmental organizations (NGOs) as well facilities, including the disposition of heav- as the Somalis. Such meetings—including ily-armed private guards hired at high prices those my deputy and I had with General by most relief organizations prior to the ar- Johnston, the UNITAF senior staff, and com- rival of UNITAF. On the one hand, UNITAF manders of non-U.S. forces—were the basis believed it could not allow guards to bran- for informal but remarkably close and cre- dish their weaponry—including “technicals” ative collaboration among the military, po- or heavily armed vehicles—in public, espe- litical, and humanitarian components of cially since most of them were actually Operation Restore Hope. members of one militia faction or another, and some also moonlighted as bandits. On Humanitarian-Military Coordination the other hand, relief workers felt the guards In order to develop relations of mutual provided extra protection, or were afraid to confidence and understanding between the fire them because of reprisals, which was a military and humanitarian relief community common fear. Despite a lot of dialogue and in a systematic way, and to maximize opera- much study, UNITAF and the relief agen- tional coordination, Johnston and I helped cies—and later UNOSOM II—were unable to the Department of State’s Office of Foreign come to terms with this problem. Disaster Assistance establish a Civilian-Mili- tary Operations Center at UNOSOM head- Extending UNITAF’s Reach quarters. The leadership of the center was On December 15, I flew to Baidoa, the entrusted to two Marine combat veterans center of the famine belt, to meet with com- with experience in relief activities and repre- munity leaders—including clan elders, reli- sentatives of civilian agencies from Opera- gious figures, women, and local political tion Provide Relief (the airlift to Somalia leaders. The purpose of the meeting was which preceded UNITAF) who were joined twofold: to defuse potential resistance to the by members of the Office of Foreign Disaster Marine helicopter landing the next day and Relief. The third player in this humanitarian to lay the groundwork for the revival of local leadership troika was the UNOSOM coordi- political institutions. The people of Baidoa nator of humanitarian operations who was were assured that the Marines were coming on loan from CARE where he served as president of that relief organization.

48 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Oakley

National Alliance (SNA)—who had been in- stalled as governor, deputy governor, and police chief at gun point, I told everyone that leadership would no longer be imposed from outside but selected by the people themselves by local tradition. They were reminded that Siad Barre had imposed his will by force, which had caused people to rise up and organizations like the SNA to fight hard to oust him. Now that peace had been restored thanks to UNITAF, I said, surely Soma- lis would not like to see a return to imposed rule instead of making their own decisions and choosing their own leaders. The SNA representatives sheepishly said nothing while all the others enthusiastically agreed. The Baidoa landing at dawn on Decem- ber 16 went off without resistance, two weeks ahead of schedule in response to ap- peals from relief organizations which felt under increased threat once UNITAF arrived in Mogadishu. One of my political officers and a relief official worked with the military to involve local Somali leaders in security as well as other activities. Their efforts were coordinated by a combined civil-military Hu- manitarian Operations Center (HOC), and the people of Baidoa created a regional council with security and humanitarian Joint Combat Camera Center (Dean Wagner) committees as a counterpart to the center. Within several weeks the situation in the people were assured in peace and as friends to help Baidoa turned around. Local hospitals were dealing with a few gunshot wounds from that the Marines were Somalia save itself, and not to impose any particular form of isolated incidents rather than large numbers coming to help Somalia settlement. The United States of victims of civil war, mass starvation, and save itself, not to respected Islam and would unchecked disease. Markets and streets, once deserted, again bustled with activity. impose any particular seek to honor local values and traditions. (In response to the The military as well as NGOs, U.N. agencies, settlement fears of the senior Sheikh, I ar- and the Red Cross provided food, medicine, ranged for a marine of the and health care, repaired clinics and Muslim faith to meet with him the next day schools, and built roads and dug wells. Plan- as U.S. forces arrived; a few days later, the ning began to provide farmers with seed Catholic Relief Service was helping the and agricultural equipment and herders re- Sheikh repair damaged mosques.) UNITAF in- turned to their flocks. tended to restore normalcy by banning tech- Baidoa became a model for UNITAF de- nicals and confiscating arms belonging to ployments in the other humanitarian relief local troublemakers. It was time for Baidoa’s sectors: Kismayo, Bardera, Oddur, Jalalaqsi, traditional community leaders, long sup- Baledogle, Belet Uen, and Merka. In each pressed, to take charge again. case my advance team met a broad cross-sec- Looking hard at the putative local au- tion of the local population in advance to ex- thorities—representatives of Aideed’s Somali plain UNITAF objectives. The UNITAF commanders and our political officers encouraged local leadership to come forward. HOCs were established and local and regional councils sprang up. The vast majority

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 49 JFQ▼ FORUM of local residents welcomed Mogadishu and also in protecting relief con- MISSION TO SOMALIA the coalition forces, the food voys along supply routes to the interior. Bel- situation improved, and child gian forces and the U.S. Army coordinated ...President Clinton has directed mortality rates dropped rapidly effectively in Kismayo but encountered on- that U.S. forces remain long enough to in all sectors. Relief workers going problems with periodic violence be- complete their mission and no longer. welcomed the enhanced secu- tween two Somali factions. The completion of the mission chiefly rity, humanitarian help, and Non-U.S. forces were notably active, en- concerns security in Somalia. logistics support provided by gaging in community development projects For U.S. combat troops, I think UNITAF forces. Local coopera- (such as building schools and roads and re- there are three items on the checklist. tion was mixed; it was better pairing irrigation canals and tube wells) First, the security issue in south Mo- in Baidoa and Merka than in which went beyond their official responsibili- gadishu must be settled. Second we Bardera and Kismayo where ties to escort the food convoys. The Canadi- must make real progress toward taking the residents feared retaliation ans, French, and Australians worked hard to the heavy weapons out of the hands of from the still potent faction revive broad community leadership, encour- the warlords. Third, there must be leaders. A common thread of aging creation of, and then cooperating with, credible police forces in major popula- concern by relief workers and local councils on security and humanitarian tion centers. When these three condi- Somalis alike, however, was matters and forming local Somali police tions are met, I believe we can remove that improvements would units. Taking the lead from the Baidoa model, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mo- only be temporary; the depar- they called frequently upon our political offi- gadishu. ture of foreign forces would be cers and relief representatives for help. The We can reduce U.S. logistics followed by the return of in- Italians worked closely with Americans in en- troops support other UNISOM II forces timidation and violence from couraging the former Somali police to recre- when the security situation in Mo- the factions and militias. ate an interim force for Mogadishu of some gadishu permits larger scale hiring of 3,500 men and 60 women. The Moroccan An International Force civilian contract employees to provide battalion was given responsibility for Bale- Essential to UNITAF’s ef- the support functions.... dogle, taking over from the U.S. Army, and fectiveness were the non-U.S. In the meantime, President Clin- for guarding installations in Mogadishu. The forces in the four critical sec- ton has given us clear direction to stay Moroccan hospital became a major asset, as tors. In Kismayo, the 10th the course with other nations to help did the Swedish. A new Pakistani battalion Mountain Division worked Somalia once again provide for its peo- took over part of Mogadishu from the closely with the 850-member ple. This is what the new world asks of Marines and did very well. General Johnston Belgian paratroop battalion. American leadership and American also utilized smaller contingents in Mo- The 2,000 French troops did partnership. gadishu: forces from Botswana, Zimbabwe, an outstanding job in Oddur, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, —Secretary of Defense Les Aspin as did 2,500 Italians based first and other nations which contributed troops August 27, 1993 at Jalalaqsi and later at Jowhar provided security at selected locations or for and parts of north Mogadishu. specific operations such as feeding programs. (Initial differences over the lo- Overall, U.S. and foreign forces in Mo- cation and role of Italian gadishu and the interior conducted them- forces were quietly and selves with a high degree of discipline and quickly resolved by military-to-military talks dedication, exercising considerable restraint in Mogadishu and among senior officers in under arduous conditions. Johnston skill- Rome and Washington and at CENTCOM fully managed disparate national contin- headquarters.) The 850-man Canadian unit gents that had joined UNITAF in response operating from Belet Uen, and the 650-man to President Bush’s appeal, despite the fact Australian unit, which took over from Amer- that there had been no advance planning ican forces in Baidoa in mid-January, per- regarding the particular capabilities needed. formed admirably. The Canadians, French, There were added complications affecting and Australians conducted extensive patrols several units which lacked a common lan- in their respective sectors to control techni- guage or training, or which were woefully cals and arms caches in remote locations as under-equipped. Despite these obstacles, well as to protect relief activities. The Italian Johnston and his staff were able to develop forces worked closely with the Marines in a surprising degree of cohesion and common purpose, assigning permanent liaison officers to the various units who kept in

50 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Oakley constant communication with his head- progress took place in the countryside with quarters. He also had weekly meetings with the exception of Kismayo where an ongoing the commanders of all national units at feud between the faction of Colonel Omar which strategy, plans, tactics, and problems Jess (Aideed’s ally) and the forces belonging were discussed. Johnston allowed the com- to Colonel Hersi Morgan (Siad Barre’s son- manders of national units considerable dis- in-law) resulted in periodic, low-level skir- cretion in how they carried out common mishes despite UNITAF’s best efforts. But mission objectives, taking into considera- even here there was no return to major con- tion differences in doctrine, training, and flict, since most Somalis were eager for peace equipment, as well as the extent of territory and the local leaders were struggling to as- in the humanitarian relief sectors and the sert themselves. degree of the threat. UNITAF focused on putting weapons out of circulation primarily to facilitate the UNITAF’s Accomplishments movement of the relief convoys and to grad- By late January there were almost no ually weaken the power of the faction lead- light weapons visible on the streets of Mo- ers by immobilizing their militias and pre- gadishu, night helicopter patrols had cluding the use of force for political stopped, and little shooting was heard in the purposes. This approach to disarmament or night. Searches for arms caches in the city arms control was deliberately planned to were gradually increased with Botswanan have a positive impact on the embryonic and Pakistani forces, who impressed U.S. of- process of building governmental structures ficers with their proficiency and discipline, from the ground up, centered on the local participating with Americans and Italian and regional councils. Baidoa represented forces. A great deal of commercial activity the most successful example of resurrecting had resumed; streets outside the green-zone a municipal council not under the thumb of no-man’s land were crowded and schools a faction leader, but progress in this direc- began to re-open. By late February 35 dry tion was also achieved in Merka, Belet Uen, feeding stations were providing two-kilo- Oddur, and to a lesser degree in Bardera. gram rations to one million people a week, By the time UNOSOM II assumed con- and neither starvation nor food theft were trol and UNITAF was disbanded, large-scale any longer problems. A UNITAF-Somali soc- famine and disease had been overcome in cer championship attracted a crowd of more southern Somalia, there was virtually no than 30,000 who ignored scores of graves clan warfare, and relief agencies were cutting outside the stadium. By April a uniformed back on feeding programs as local harvests Somali police force of more than 3,000 was returned to near-normalcy. This happened on the streets with UNITAF liaison officers. only because of international help with Except for a minor uprising by Aideed’s tools, seed, and irrigation—as well as protec- supporters in late February the Oakley/John- tion so that farmers could go back to their ston strategy of seeking cooperation, avoid- fields. In several regions, councils with civil- ing direct confrontation if possible, and ian leaders, including women and tribal el- gradually increasing pressure on all factions ders and religious leaders, were operating. was working. UNITAF suffered very few casu- Some schools and clinics had reopened as alties in Mogadishu during its five-month had some businesses. Problems of banditry deployment. Somali casualties caused by persisted, however, directed mainly against UNITAF cannot be accurately determined foreigners and those few Somalis with mate- due to the customary practice of carrying rial wealth (such as cars, radios, watches, away the dead, but they were probably fewer and cameras). Several major militias had not than fifty. Compared with the numerous in- been demobilized, and hidden weapons cidents in which UNITAF forces encountered were abundant. Personal and clan tensions sporadic shooting or mass stone-throwing, remained high, but peace was only threat- the low casualty rate among Somalis shows ened in Kismayo. how hard and how successfully UNITAF commanders worked to instill restraint and discipline into the behavior of troops from all nationalities and at all levels. Similar

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 51 JFQ▼ FORUM Lessons of the Past apt to create friction, thereby reducing both American military and civilian leaders Somali political opposition and the risk of in Somalia benefitted from the experience in UNITAF casualties. Ultimately it would be up Vietnam and Lebanon. Having been in- to Somalis at all levels to develop viable polit- volved in both, General Johnston and I were ical and administrative institutions. UNITAF determined to avoid the mistakes of these could help get this process off to a good start earlier conflicts. A better political-military and provide long-term help. understanding of the local situation and U.S. In Lebanon during the early 1980s, objectives—including how best to combine American intervention was intended to act as political, military, and humanitarian ac- a neutral agent to end fighting between tions—was needed. Christians and Muslims in Beirut as part of a In Vietnam the United States had tried larger effort to broker an Arab-Israeli settle- to run everything and had progressively ment. When Navy ships offshore were or- sidelined the Vietnamese, turning them es- dered to shell Syria and Lebanese Moslem sentially into passive onlookers in their own targets in East Beirut, however, marines on country. Washington had actively pressed a shore suddenly became the target them- new form of government, elections, and a selves. Flawed understanding and manage- constitution on Saigon, very closely mod- ment of underlying political conditions had eled on the American system. Institution- inadvertently turned U.S. intervention—in building had civilian and military advisors the eyes of Syria, Iran, most Palestinians, taking the lead in both planning and carry- most Lebanese, and virtually the entire Arab ing out social and economic and develop- world—from neutrality to partisanship in the ment programs, creating local militia and Israeli occupation. Retribution was not long police forces, and assuming responsibility for in coming and a suicide mission took the political reconstruction from village level lives of 241 marines in barracks near Beirut up. U.S. military forces took over most com- airport. The United States then pulled out. bat operations, relegating the For the U.S. political and military lead- South Vietnamese military to ership in Somalia, the lesson of Lebanon was the United States had pacification, thus killing the in- loud and clear: don’t take sides, and proceed progressively sidelined centive of the best officers to carefully. If anything, the message was more the Vietnamese, turn- fight for their own country. Al- pertinent in Somalia because of complex though well-intentioned, the clan rivalries, struggles among a gaggle of ing them essentially intrusive approach failed, leav- faction leaders, and the great sense of pride into passive onlookers ing the South Vietnamese ever and independence of the Somali people. Fac- in their own country more demoralized and ineffec- tion leaders at first vied with each other for tual. When the United States U.S. support even though later the mood of departed these programs col- the Aideed faction soured. Americans would lapsed overnight. not pick a winner or designate a favorite, but This general approach would not be re- rather would turn all factions away from peated in Somalia. Even though the situa- using force and intimidation and toward tions were not comparable, America would joining together in the civil society to pur- not take responsibility, unilaterally or sue a political remedy. through the United Nations, for running So- UNITAF decided to avoid direct con- malia or imposing specific solutions on its frontation in favor of the gradual disarma- profound social, political, and economic ment of all the faction leaders, working problems. To say that Somalia had to save it- whenever possible to implement agreements self could not be just a slogan. Our insistence which the leaders had reached and holding that interim Somali police forces be estab- out the promise of rehabilitation aid as well lished as soon as possible was derived directly as relief. This, as well as a demonstrated readi- from the basic approach to helping the Soma- ness to respond with overwhelming force lis and minimizing the U.S. and UNITAF roles against those who broke the cease-fire or at- whenever possible. It also had a very desirable tempted to use force for political purposes, secondary result of minimizing contact with caused the faction leaders to avoid con- the Somali population in situations that were fronting UNITAF. It also put an end to clan conflict except for sporadic problems between

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Colonels Jess and Morgan centered on A cycle of violence has ensued in which Kismayo. Combined with the rapid arrival of scores of Somalis, U.N. troops, journalists, humanitarian assistance, this generated over- and others have been killed or severely in- whelming popular support for UNITAF (ex- jured. U.N. relief agencies and NGOs moved cept for Aideed’s Habr Gedir subclan). The po- their top staff out of south Mogadishu to litical-military-humanitarian strategy enabled us to achieve the objectives of facilitating humanitarian operations, stopping death and destruction, and not becoming the target of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Aideed’s Challenge It was probably inevitable that Aideed would confront and challenge UNOSOM II. By late February he had already recognized that international peacekeeping—whether U.S.- or U.N.-led—would not dovetail with his interests. Aideed was obsessed with what he fully believed to be his destiny to become Somalia’s leader, a belief acquired by success in driving Siad Barre out of the country and enhanced by ruthlessness, cleverness, and leadership traits. His protestations about ad- hering to a political process were coupled with repeated attempts to subvert it whenever his SNA faction seemed to be losing out. However, UNITAF’s close surveillance, firm hand, and reputation for decisive ac- Somali woman tion kept him in check, except for a brief waiting for food in protest in late February. Following that Baidoa.

short-lived action, we had a very private, Joint Combat Camera Center (Dean Wagner) very pointed talk with Aideed about what would happen to him if there were to be a Nairobi and UNOSOM II seems bogged down repeat. Although seething, Aideed took no in south Mogadishu by fruitless attempts to further anti-U.S. action at that time. capture Aideed and vicious urban warfare, in- After May 4 and the departure of Ameri- cluding the deliberate use by the Aideed fac- can combat forces (except for a 1,200-man tion of women and children against UNO- quick reaction force), UNOSOM apparently SOM forces. As the Department of State has concluded that its depleted strength and ex- acknowledged, Aideed was clearly winning panded missions—inter alia covering all So- the public relations battle abroad and casting malia—did not permit frequent patrols and doubt on UNOSOM among Somalis who in tight control of Mogadishu. High-level dia- no way supported him. He began to deliber- logue with Aideed and his faction ceased. ately target U.S. troops, thinking that he can Aideed began to move men and weapons energize public opinion in the United States back into the city, and stepped up anti-U.N. against keeping Americans in Somalia as hap- vitriol over his radio. The challenge to U.N. pened in both Vietnam and Lebanon. This authority exploded following the ambush of challenges the UNOSOM mission—humani- Pakistani troops on June 5 by Aideed sup- tarian relief or peace-enforcement—and also porters, the Security Council call for punish- the competence of its command and control. ment of those responsible, and the UNO- It created new dilemmas for humanitarian re- SOM decision to seek Aideed’s arrest and lief, and raised the larger issue of how peace- destroy his command center. keepers with a mandate to use force should function where there is a strong local challenge to their mission, and where casualties

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 53 JFQ▼ FORUM are inevitable among the uninvolved indige- While no one can confidently claim nous population, opposing forces, and U.N. that another approach by UNITAF or UNO- personnel. SOM II could have prevented a confronta- Focusing on Aideed seems to have tion with Aideed, several observations can caused a temporary memory loss about what be made. First, the importance of UNOSOM UNITAF, the United Nations, and interna- II applying sustained pressure on other factional relief agencies accomplished in Soma- tion leaders, and maintaining momentum lia since last December. Death and destruc- generated for concerted political-military- tion outside of south Mogadishu have humanitarian action, cannot be overempha- virtually ended; there has been continued sized. This principle will also apply in other evolution toward peaceful resolution of dis- peacekeeping operations. Second, it was crit- putes and a more normal agricultural and ical to have adequate forces, equipment, and pastoral life. Even in Kismayo, traditional command and control procedures agreed on leaders have come to the fore and concluded by both the political and military authorities a peace agreement after four weeks of talks of troop contributors. The latter needs to be and despite the opposition of Colonels Jess assured not only at the outset but also in the and Morgan. event of changing circumstances on the It is clear that Somalia absent a national ground by a suitable consultative mecha- government remains split along clan and nism. And third, one must recognize the subclan lines and that there is a pressing soundness of the traditional U.N. peacekeep- need to move ahead with a political and eco- ing stance against taking sides or making nomic agenda which addresses national rec- permanent enemies, in contrast to an imme- onciliation and reconstruction. Aideed has diate response to attacks on U.N. forces or received no support from the other faction employing force when necessary to achieve leaders except for his SNA ally, Omar Jess. the mission. Obviously individuals directly Moreover, apart from confrontation in south involved in armed, unprovoked attacks on Mogadishu, there is real interest and some U.N. forces are beyond the limits of dia- progress elsewhere in advancing the frame- logue. The most effective approach would work for reconciliation laid down in the seem to be that under consideration by the Addis Ababa accords. United Nations and explicitly called for by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in late Au- Reflections gust: a renewed, broad-based approach to all Some contend that the Aideed problem clans and subclans, including Aideed’s Habr was caused by a refusal on the part of United Gedir, and to traditional as well as faction States and UNITAF to carry out a compre- leaders; an effort to revitalize the process of hensive disarmament program and/or the reconciliation and rehabilitation agreed to premature withdrawal of U.S. forces before by Somalis at the Addis Ababa conference; adequate replacements arrived to bring UN- and the continued improvement of the secu- OSOM II up to its goal of 28,000 personnel. rity situation, including disarmament of However, President Bush had taken an abso- heavy weapons and strengthening the lutely categoric position in early December fledgling, interim Somali police force. against taking on this or any other long- term nation building responsibilities, and Lessons for Peacekeeping made it clear that U.S. forces and UNITAF The traditional distinction between should be replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in force in early 1993. largely internal conflicts (humanitarian peace- President Clinton endorsed this position keeping) is being eroded. The concept of with equal firmness and communicated it peacekeeping operations as minimal in clearly to the United Nations. U.S. forces terms of personnel and armament—request- with UNITAF were prepared to help with ad- ing permission from local authorities before ditional disarmament during the transition, taking action pursuant to the mission, and had the U.N. commanders and staff arrived using force only in response to direct threat as expected in April. However, the U.N. Sec- retariat and Security Council were not working from the same timetable.

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or attack—is coming to be recognized as The political, military, and humanitar- often inviting failure, rather than always ian elements of many peacekeeping opera- demonstrating peaceful intent. There is a tions cannot be logically disjoined. Peace- growing recognition that in many situa- keeping operations are essentially political tions, the United Nations must be perceived operations carried out by military means. as having the military capability, the will to Political preparation and continuing dia- use it, and the decisiveness to win armed logue can reduce casualties and increase the confrontations. There is also recognition chances of military success. The converse is that peacekeeping, theoretically conducted also true. The leverage of political efforts to under chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, can broker peace agreement is bolstered by suffi- quickly become peace-enforcement under cient military strength. (In Somalia, UNITAF chapter VII as events on the ground evolve. had adequate strength; in Angola, the U.N. The U.S. doctrine of overwhelming force force—UNAVEM II—did not.) Humanitarian from the outset is increasingly understood as and economic thrusts complement and rein- the best means in certain situations of force political-military thrusts if used in con- achieving a peacekeeping mission and mini- cert, or they can complicate them if not used mizing confrontation and casualties on all properly. The United Nations, its member sides. Comparing the results of the U.N. Pak- states, and NGOs should take the needs for istani peacekeeping contingent deployed to this sort of coordination explicitly into ac- Somalia under UNOSOM I with the results count in their initial planning. of the U.S.-led coalition force deployed to The U.N. Secretariat must be substan- Somalia as UNITAF, the Security Council de- tially strengthened to organize, manage, and cided to empower UNOSOM II with essen- support peacekeeping and humanitarian op- tially the same military powers, erations. Organization in the field must be rules of engagement, and com- able to coordinate and lead multifaceted, the United Nations mand and control. civil-military operations, not merely exhort. must be perceived as However, the experiences of The right combination of command struc- having the military UNOSOM II and other recent ture, personnel, and logistical support are peacekeeping operations show needed for U.N. headquarters and the field. capability, the will to the need for better, more detailed This means that member states must con- use it, and the deci- agreement by troop contributing tribute more funds, people, and equipment siveness to win nations on command and control as well as cooperate more closely with U.N. procedures, advance planning, and non-governmental agencies. JFQ and ensuring adequate forces and material are on the ground when operations begin. They also indicate the need for ongoing high-level consultation and flexibility— present for operations in Cambodia (UN- TAC) but absent from UNOSOM II. And there is need to provide for ending U.N. involvement and shifting responsibility to local leaders and the people. Peacekeeping operations often involve more than simply keeping the peace or promoting political settlements; they also involve extensive humanitarian relief and rehabilitation; repatriating refugees and displaced persons; developing infrastructure; building institutions (such as elections and political structures); demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating local armed forces and militias; and creating effective, impartial police and indigenous security forces. Each of these elements is vitally important for the success or failure of the overall mission.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 55 JFQ▼ FORUM U.N. organizational deficiencies and a lack of security within Somalia, precluded delivery of sufficient supplies. Hence the United States offered to lead a U.N.-sponsored operation, Restore Hope, Transporting wheat which ultimately involved contributions for the World Food Program aboard by more than thirty nations. The final C–130s. objective of that effort, to transition to a U.N.-led operation, was subsequently realized in May 1993, when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), commanded by a Turk, Lieutenant General Bir, assumed control of military activity in central and southern Somalia. A CINC’s Each phase has required innovative solutions by commanders and their staffs, both in CONUS and deployed. This ac- PERSPECTIVE count offers some insights into both Op- eration Provide Relief and UNOSOM II, By JOSEPH P. HOAR but primarily focuses on Operation Re- store Hope which had the most extensive U.S. involvement. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) began preparations for nontraditional operations in earnest four years ago in the aftermath of a lengthy search to locate Congressman Mickey Leland and his party who were lost when their aircraft crashed en route to visit a refugee camp in Ethiopia. The effort underscored the need to get a commander on the scene with the requisite equipment and staff to assess the situation quickly and initiate action. Toward that end the CENTCOM standing plan for conducting humanitar- Joint Combat Camera Center (Dean Wagner) ian assistance in an austere environment was revised to include a Humanitarian he humanitarian assistance opera- Assistance Survey Team (HAST). CATEX 92–3, tions undertaken in Somalia by the an exercise designed to evaluate the concept Armed Forces during the last year in 1992, was developed with the Agency for T have brought relief to millions of International Development (AID) and the Of- people who faced famine or even starvation. fice for Foreign Disaster Assistance of the De- They have also presented a number of chal- partment of State. The First Marine Expedi- lenges that are likely to confront the com- tionary Force (I MEF), the CENTCOM Marine manders of similar nontraditional military component, was designated a Humanitar- operations in the future. ian/Peacekeeping Joint Task Force (JTF) for U.S. activities in Somalia fall into three future operations and was tasked to conduct phases. Operation Provide Relief began in an exercise in California simulating bare-base August 1992 as an emergency airlift of food conditions in a nonpermissive environment. and other urgently needed materials Just as Internal Look 90 helped prepare for through Kenya to supply starving Somalis. Operation Desert Shield, CATEX 92–3 ended By November, it had become apparent that shortly before the deteriorating situation in the magnitude of the task, coupled with Somalia required U.S. action. The lessons learned and the validated HAST concept allowed us to rapidly react to President Bush’s

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order to commence Operation Provide Relief efforts would start with flights to refugee in August 1992. camps at Wajir in Kenya, and that there would be appropriate reimbursement for use Operation Provide Relief of or damage to facilities. Numerous private international relief or- Early efforts on the part of governmental ganizations had attempted to provide aid to agencies and the country team were key to Somalia in the wake of the 1991 fall of the making our intentions clear to the host gov- Siad Barre regime despite a tenuous security ernment to allay misunderstandings. Addi- situation in which bands of armed gunmen tionally, working in concert with AID and preyed on each other and innocent civilians other agencies was essential to success. For in a struggle for dominance. Recognizing the future operations the integration of the full need to stabilize a country where anarchy range of political, humanitarian, and security and starvation were rampant, the United Na- efforts needs to be planned and exercised. tions passed Resolution 751 in April 1992 Even today, after more than a year in Soma- which provided for the lia, full integration has not been achieved. presence of fifty ob- Dealing with nongovernmental organi- servers in Mogadishu zations (NGOs), the principal donors of re- to be followed by addi- lief aide, proved challenging. NGOs are tional peacekeepers to staffed by spirited frontline relief workers, maintain order. In an many of whom are true heroes of humani- effort in September tarian assistance. To minimize fear expressed 1992 apart from Pro- by NGOs over the involvement of the vide Relief, the United Armed Forces in humanitarian operations, States supported this JTF leadership must ensure that NGOs un- Joint Combat Camera Center new UNOSOM by derstand the military mission. It was also USS Tripoli. transporting a security crucial that the military appreciated the cul- force of 500 Pakistanis and their equipment ture and central role of NGOs and establish to Mogadishu. The Pakistani battalion was a team effort built around a Relief Coordina- the first increment of what was to be a larger tion Committee and a Centralized Airlift Co- force, but it was soon clear that peacekeeping ordination Committee. Once operational forces were not the answer. both committees soon demonstrated the Provide Relief was set in motion on Au- added value of the JTF in organization and gust 16, 1992 with the dispatch by CENT- efficiency, plus much improved throughput COM of a HAST which became the nucleus offered by 14 C–130 aircraft. for a JTF which was established within days Security was also a complex problem, re- to both organize and operate the airlift of quiring both arrangements for U.S. forces humanitarian relief supplies. The operation and the added dimension of security for reset an important precedent for U.S. military lief supplies—the most valuable commodity involvement in relief operations in a semi- in Somalia and the target of bandit gangs. permissive environment and not pursuant to Providing adequate security for C–130 deliv- a natural disaster. It also surfaced problems ery missions was complicated by a firm pol- in several important areas. The need for a icy of the International Committee of the host-nation agreement to provide bases for Red Cross prohibiting weapons on aircraft the airlift immediately became apparent. Ini- transporting relief cargo. The solution was an tial reluctance by Kenya to support the stag- airborne reaction force to accompany each ing of the operation from Mombasa was flight and be available in extremis if condi- overcome by assurances that the efforts tions on the ground deteriorated. In addition would be limited in scope, that the JTF to providing security in Somalia, a threat as- would withdraw on completion, that relief sessment was made and appropriate precau- tions were taken at both airfields and JTF headquarters in Kenya. Future operations will General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, is Commander in Chief, U.S. likely face similar security conditions, and Central Command. He served as Deputy Chief of Staff for force protection must remain among the Plans, Policies and Operations at Headquarters, Marine commander’s top priorities. Corps, immediately prior to assuming his present position.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 57 JFQ▼ FORUM was the same approach used in standing up Operation Restore Hope JTF Southwest Asia (SWA) some months earlier. In both cases designating a component or element headquarters as the foundation of the mission—in JTF SWA it was CENTAF/9th Air Force—allowed an established service staff to transition quickly to a JTF with little need for start-up time. With Restore Hope additional challenges arose. CENTCOM and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), as it was later known, had to face three basic types of issues: operational, logistic, and coalition. The initial operational requirement was for a clear mission statement. Great care was taken to December 9, 1992–May 4, 1993 develop an approved, well-defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to the operation commencing. Disarmament disarmament was Finally, media coverage of was excluded from the mission because it neither realistically the spreading famine in Somalia was neither realistically achievable nor a pre- had an impact on the operation, achievable nor a requisite for the core mission of providing a though not as great as reports secure environment for relief operations. Se- prerequisite to may lead one to believe. The lective “disarming as necessary” became an providing a secure news media influenced public implied task which led to the cantonment of opinion which resulted in a environment for relief heavy weapons and gave UNITAF the ability largely favorable response to the to conduct weapons sweeps. operations airlift. An open media policy en- Restore Hope was conducted in that twi- couraged the full participation light area between peace and war—an envi- of journalists by providing logistic support ronment of political anarchy, with no Somali per DOD guidelines. government or normal state institutions, and Operation Restore Hope an unprecedented U.N. chapter VII mandate Although shipments of food vastly in- authorizing peace-enforcement by all means creased—Provide Relief ultimately delivered necessary. This required rules of engagement 28,000 metric tons of supplies or 112 mil- tailored to allow the on-scene commander lion meals—the magnitude of the famine maximum flexibility to determine what con- and breakdown in order meant that the air- stituted a threat and what response was ap- lift alone could not ameliorate the propriate, including first use of deadly force. widespread starvation in Somalia. The prob- Near-universal acceptance by coalition part- lem was addressed by the United Nations in ners of the U.S.-crafted rules of engagement December 1992 with the passage of Resolu- helped to minimize casualties on all sides by tion 794 which authorized U.N. military ac- clearly demonstrating U.S. and U.N. will to tion in response to the President’s offer to restore order. assume leadership of a U.N. coalition to es- Another operational issue was the devel- tablish a secure environment for the delivery opment of an appropriate force structure for of humanitarian assistance. the mission. Naval forces already in-theater The First Marine Expeditionary Force were first on the scene. An Amphibious was the choice to establish Joint Task Force Ready Group with its embarked Marine Ex- Somalia with Lieutenant General Robert peditionary Unit provided the initial build- Johnston as its commander. This was a logi- ing block for constructing the JTF, which re- cal step since this unit had exercised for this quired a sufficient U.S. capability to go it type of operation. Organizationally, the plan alone and the flexibility to accommodate was for the Marines to fill most of the task coalition contributions as they materialized. force slots, with the other services providing Elements of both deliberate and crisis action augmentation to be sure that all joint and combined requirements were addressed. This

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planning were incorporated into an iterative cooperate. This courageous personal political process to produce the operations order. campaign was key to turning the tide in the Face-to-face contact at both the commander psychological contest for the respect and con- and the staff level was useful in arriving at a fidence of the Somalis, and it began the proc- balanced, joint force structure matched to ess of breaking the strangle hold of the war- the operational requirements. It included el- lords and bandits. ements from the First Marine Expeditionary Also crucial was the effective application Force, 10th Mountain Division, Air Force and of other information-related resources, in- Navy units (such as critical support from re- cluding intelligence, PSYOP and CA exper- connaissance-capable, carrier- tise, and the public affairs effort. Embarking borne F–14 aircraft), a team on an operation in a locale which had previ- from the Joint Communica- ously been a low priority intelligence target tions Support Element, and required an all hands effort by the intelli- Special Operations Forces gence community. A shift in resources to (SOF) including both Psycho- focus rapidly on Somalia was required to logical Operations (PSYOP) both create new architecture and build a de- and Civil Affairs (CA) units. tailed database. Initially, a lack of human in- Detailed discussions were telligence forced reliance on technology- held with the commanders based systems; the speed with which the being committed, compo- intelligence apparatus was formed reflected nent commanders, chiefs, the lessons learned from the Gulf War. Chairman, and National CA personnel established links with Command Authorities, plus local leaders and gained information on the senior representatives from needs of the Somalis. This was useful in ad- the Department of State and dressing those needs and tailoring PSYOP other governmental agencies campaigns, efforts that combined leaflets as well as the President’s Spe- and radio broadcasts to spread the message Joint Combat Camera Center (Dean Wagner) cial Envoy for Somalia, Am- that UNITAF was there to help. The public Refugee worker in Baidoa mixing bassador Robert Oakley. affairs effort was also essential to success. mazimeal. With an approved mission, rules of en- Working closely with the media in Somalia gagement, and force structure, the focus the military publicized the good work being shifted to the execution of Restore Hope. done by UNITAF forces. Media coverage is The concept of operations designated Mo- virtually real-time, driving public opinion gadishu as the center of gravity; the city had on the critical issues of the day. Thus the at- to be relatively secure prior to expanding to tention to the media was crucial not only for the interior where the humanitarian need success on the ground in Somalia, but to sus- was most acute. In view of difficulties experi- tain public support for the operation in the enced by the outnumbered Pakistani battal- United States and internationally. The com- ion at the Mogadishu airport, the applica- bined information effort contributed signifi- tion of overwhelming force was prescribed cantly to the virtually unopposed UNITAF to intimidate lawless gangs and rival clans, occupation of all sectors, and helped to force their cooperation, and ensure the rapid maintain firm control in southern Somalia. seizure of all key terrain. The final operational concern was the Another element critical to overall suc- need for close coordination with relief agen- cess was the integral role of Ambassador Oak- cies for which we were tasked to provide secu- ley in the political preparation of the human- rity. Necessary coordination with the agencies itarian battlefield. He preceded the military was achieved by the Civil-Military Operations into each planned relief sector to confer with Center which was manned by UNITAF per- the elders and reassure them of the neutrality sonnel from both U.S. and coalition forces. A and strictly humanitarian intentions of the similar organization, the Humanitarian Assis- U.S./U.N. forces about to arrive, but left no tance Coordination Center in the Central doubts about the consequences of failing to Command Plans and Policy Directorate, was comprised of a representative from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Reserve augmentees. Both centers paid big dividends

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 59 JFQ▼ FORUM in facilitating the information flow and keep- fuel storage and distribution capability oth- ing operations in tune with the needs of the erwise not found in Central Somalia. humanitarian relief community. Establishing the airbridge to Somalia Deploying 28,000 people 8,000 miles to also presented some unique problems. an austere environment was as formidable as Strategic air flow was slowed by an extended the operational challenge. Somalia had 8,000-mile transit, limited availability and primitive airfields, barely usable sea- capability of en route basing sites, and poor there was no ports, disintegrating road networks in-country airfields. All this was com- electricity, no that did not link population centers, pounded by maintenance difficulties and and roadways rendered impassable by weight restrictions that plagued our aging water, no food, fallen bridges and washouts. There was strategic airlift fleet. The shortage of ramp no government, no electricity, no water, no food, no space at Mogadishu, the deterioration of the and no economy government, and no economy. Addi- runway at Baledogle, and lack of lighting tionally, our forces had to provide se- and navigational aids (with the need for FAA curity for NGOs which were attempt- airfield certification), exacerbated the prob- ing to save millions of Somalis from lem in the initial phases. starving. Deploying to Somalia was like Sealift was similarly hampered by prob- going to the moon: everything needed had to lems such as a harbor that had not been be brought in or built there. Every scrap of dredged for more than two years, limited lumber, drop of fuel, drink of water, and berthing space, sunken vessels in and near slice of bread had to be brought in from out- the port, a near absence of port services (op- side. From a logistics perspective, Somalia erational cranes, lighting, electricity, etc.) was a nightmare. The ultimate bare-base en- and high sea states. A lack of proper han- vironment created dling equipment restricted cargo flows to 20- four primary logistics foot containers and only permitted self-sus- challenges: project- taining vessels to make port calls. ing major force, es- Nevertheless the expert management of the tablishing the airport of Mogadishu by the commander of the bridge, building an Maritime Prepositioning Force and the 7th expeditionary infras- Transportation Group from the Army tructure, and manag- avoided the disastrous bottlenecks some had ing coalition logistics predicted and maximized cargo throughput. support. Austere conditions required the deploy- Somalia was the ment of nearly four thousand engineer per-

Joint Combat Camera Center first major force pro- sonnel to provide expeditionary infrastruc- Doctor examining a jection in an opera- ture to support the operation. They opened Somali child. tion other than war. To meet this logistical main supply routes and airfields as well as challenge, we had to rely on a variety of reconstructing such facilities as fixed tents, sources. In selected cases, critical life support heads, showers, kitchens, and wells. Mission- equipment and materiel handling equip- related necessities were given priority over ment prepositioned in the CENTCOM area nation building. Nevertheless much of the of responsibility was drawn on to reduce construction served both purposes. Many time and cost of deployment. Air Force other needs were satisfied early in the de- prepositioned materiel was used at en route ployment when other sources were not yet basing sites and in Somalia. The Marine available through the extensive use of the Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force pro- Logistics Contract Augmentation Program, vided initial unit equipment and sustain- an Army-managed program that centralizes ment for forces ashore. Army materiel prepo- contracting with single sources to streamline sitioned afloat also contributed although the process and reduce response time. pierside offloading was prohibited by ship Some logistic issues were endemic to the size and draft. Another challenge was the nature of coalition operations. Legal restric- high sea state which precluded in-stream off- tions prohibit giving away DOD supplies load. The Offshore Petroleum Distribution and services, even to coalition members. Yet System provided immediate and continuing

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and liaison officers were able to remain with the headquarters and operational staffs in Somalia. Also, SOF Coalition Support Teams were initially fielded to help participating forces facilitate liaison with UNITAF. These measures maintained coalition involvement and provided a smooth flow of information. Coalition operations raised other concerns. Although willing to take the lead and provide the bulk of forces and logistical support, the United States recognized that the operation would be conducted under U.N. auspices and that only with the involvement of the international community would it seem legitimate and successful. Accordingly, the participation by Somalia’s African neighbors with similar regional interests as well as by both Middle East and Southwest Asian countries with cultural and religious affini- ties was a necessary ingredient. This mixture of forces was further strengthened by several of our Western allies with advanced equip- Joint Combat Camera Center Marines escorting ment and valuable experience in both NATO relief workers. and U.N. operations. many coalition members required logistical The large number of countries offering support. To meet this need we pieced to- immediate deployment of military forces pre- gether a system that relied on a variety of sented further challenges such as how best to techniques, including foreign military sales employ varied resources, organize such a cases, cross-servicing agreements, and special force and maintain unity of command, and agreements under the Foreign Assistance deal with logistic support requirements and Act. Although this system ultimately varying levels of interoperability. To handle worked, the streamlined system embodied in an almost overwhelming number of poten- the draft legislation submitted by CENT- tial coalition offers, CENTCOM headquarters COM, supported by DOD, and now working retained approval authority and screened its way through Congress would be invalu- each offer in order to lift some of the admin- able in future coalition operations. istrative and coordination burden from The success of coalition logistics relied UNITAF. The capabilities of contributors—in- heavily on the roles of defense attachés and cluding self-sufficiency, mobility, and will- liaison officers from contributing nations in ingness to adhere to American operational relating specifics on ca- control and rules of engagement—were pabilities and support re- participation by Somalia’s weighed against the operational require- quirements that deployments of the mission. Political considerations African neighbors as well as ing forces would bring to were also taken into account. In order to by both Middle East and the effort. They coordi- screen international offerings CENTCOM de- nated operational prefer- Southwest Asian countries veloped a questionnaire which was dissemi- ences through CENT- nated by the Department of State via defense was a necessary ingredient COM, relieving the JTF attachés. Nations wishing to participate re- commander of some ad- turned the completed questionnaires ministrative burdens. Coalition attachés and through diplomatic channels. After deploy- liaison officers played other important roles ment approval, requirements for strategic lift, as well. Attachés assigned to coalition em- support, and funding were completed. bassies in Washington were invited to CENT- The unique problems of Restore Hope COM headquarters for orientation briefings demanded an effective command structure. Unlike the coalition during the Gulf War, potential contributors were asked to place their

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 61 JFQ▼ FORUM forces under the operational control of the Efforts to effect an expeditious and U.S. commander. National representation seamless turnover were delayed by differing was done through contingent commanders views that arose in part over the UNITAF to UNITAF and a full-time liaison section success. Fortunately the unambiguous which was part of a larger collective cell. UNITAF mission statement precluded “mis- Consequently, throughout Restore Hope, sion creep” and clearly demarcated the dif- unity of command and unity of effort were ference between UNITAF and UNOSOM II retained. In addition, an effective and reli- roles. Longer-term U.N. efforts to promote able communications network at all echelons national reconciliation and the desire to es- of command greatly enhanced command tablish a presence in northern Somalia were and control of deployed forces. appropriately left to UNOSOM II with its From the outset the mission remained to broader political and economic rehabilita- provide a secure environment in which to tion mandate. CENTCOM, however, raised deliver relief supplies to break the famine concerns from the beginning with regard to and to establish condi- the U.N. ability to logistically support a So- tions for a rapid transi- malia-wide operation, since the U.S. logistic tion to U.N. control. By support package was designed only for forces March 1993 UNITAF in southern Somalia and could not expand forces had succeeded in its role to other parts of the country without the assigned mission. substantial augmentation. Starvation was no longer UNOSOM II an overriding problem The long-term solution for Somalia re- and security was suffi- quires a fully developed humanitarian, eco- cient to allow transition nomic, and political effort in addition to the to the U.N.-led UNOSOM Joint Combat Camera Center (Kevin Thomas) military requirement. The seeds for these II phase of the operation. 10th Mountain Division were sown in UNITAF, but their success de- In planning for that transition, the United advancing into pends on the necessary vision, commitment, Nations accepted Turkey’s offer to provide a Baledoggle, Somali. coherent planning, and resources to follow commander, and American and Canadian of- through under UNOSOM II. CENTCOM fa- fers to provide the deputy commander and cilitated the transition from UNITAF to UN- chief of staff, respectively. The United Na- OSOM II in several ways. Operational and tions secured commitments for an interna- logistics planners were at work in New York tional staff to replace the U.S. UNITAF staff as early as January 1993 to assist the under- and for longer-term troop contributions manned U.N. Military Staff Committee in which eventually totalled 28,000. The United developing its concept of operations and list States agreed to commit a logistics support of logistics requirements. These planners re- command for the general support of U.N. mained available to the United Nations forces. In addition, for added stability during while it stood up a functional staff in Mo- the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM, the gadishu in April. United States would provide a quick-reaction Within CENTCOM headquarters, the So- force and information support to the UNO- malia working group shifted its focus to sup- SOM staff. These forces would support the port interagency efforts, including working to United Nations but remain under CINC- resolve issues related to the transition and CENT operational control, with tactical con- drawdown of U.S. forces. At the same time trol delegated to Commander, U.S. Forces So- the Central Command Personnel Directorate malia (COMUSFORSOM), who is also the assisted in assembling and rapidly deploying deputy commander, UNOSOM II. the U.S. contingent to UNOSOM II where the Terms of reference between CINCCENT 47 Americans provided critical skills in the and the UNOSOM II commander were devel- early days when the fledgling staff was oper- oped for participation of the quick reaction ating at 30 percent strength—which empha- force and information cell. Specific guidance sizes the need for new procedures to people for the use of these U.S. forces was spelled U.N. military staffs in contingency situations. out to preclude confusion. Since the official turnover to UNOSOM II on May 4, 1993, CENTCOM has continued

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to play a pivotal role in the ongoing opera- application is far-reaching in today’s volatile tion. The maintenance of security and con- world. In the operational area there are three tinuation of relief operations within Human- key lessons. First, the formulation of a clear itarian Relief Sectors created and precise mission statement which defines retaining a U.S. combat under Restore Hope required measurable and attainable objectives is force presence was self-sufficient brigade size units paramount. Second, the application of deci- or equivalent combinations. sive, rather than just sufficient, force can critical to keeping Thus a seamless transition to minimize resistance, saving casualties on all several contributors in the U.N. operation depended sides. Finally, developing a comprehensive the coalition on the active recruitment of in- strategy that coordinates all instruments of ternational support to provide national power—not just the military— forces which would operate greatly enhances the probability of achiev- under UNOSOM II in accordance with a ing the stated objectives. chapter VII mandate. Most nations with Equally important to humanitarian as- forces committed agreed to remain through sistance is the logistical capability of the the transition, and several new contributors Armed Forces—a capability unmatched by were identified. Retaining a U.S. combat any other military in the world. Preposi- force presence was critical to keeping several tioned stocks and equipment afloat and contributors in the coalition. To some, only ashore, along with strategic lift, constitute a U.S. combat troops symbolize American re- unique capacity to support the massive force solve. The presence of the quick-reaction projection that future international actions force, along with U.S. leadership in some key may require. As fiscal realities result in a UNOSOM II positions, has not only done smaller force, we will need to exercise and that but also encouraged other countries to refine our logistics capability to be sure that follow through on their pledges of support. it does not atrophy. At the same time the Efforts by CENTCOM, as executive agent for United Nations must be encouraged to de- UNOSOM logistics support, to facilitate velop its own ability to rapidly contract lo- strategic lift and to outfit potential contribu- gistics support for U.N. operations. tors have also helped to hold the coalition As seen in the central region over the together. Another vital role for CENTCOM in last few years, we are unlikely to have the op- the UNOSOM II operation has been to main- tion of going it alone. A significant military tain close communications with COMUS- action in support of humanitarian assistance FORSOM to ensure that the support needs of will require an international coalition with U.S. forces are being met. each country contributing within its means. A U.S. force of approximately 4,000 was Then there will be a need to organize and tailored to stay in Somalia to support pro- maintain that coalition during operations. jected UNOSOM II needs. However, unantic- Finally, the mission to Somalia has reaf- ipated shortfalls caused by the changed secu- firmed the unparalleled professionalism, rity situation, coupled with the slower than dedication, resiliency, and valor of men and anticipated arrival of coalition forces and women from many nations who once again contributor support, have required adjust- rose to a challenge and performed magnifi- ments. The challenge has been to modify cently under trying conditions. These the composition of our force to meet these heroes, serving in or out of uniform, Ameri- new needs without significantly increasing cans as well as their coalition partners, are its total size. Raising the profile of the the reason that hundreds of thousands of Armed Forces in Somalia would undermine Somalis were saved from starvation and the perception of U.N. military forces as that the foundation has been laid to restore truly international and capable of meeting their country. JFQ the task at hand. A highly visible American presence is not in the best interests of the United States or the United Nations. Several important lessons have been validated through our experiences in Somalia over the past year that are key to success in humanitarian assistance operations. Their

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 63 JFQ▼ FORUM The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma By T. FRANK CRIGLER

Treating the injured in a make-shift hospital.

Joint Combat Camera Center

he United Nations is conducting a war. If it works, the world community will major experiment in Somalia, one have a new tool among its multilateral whose implications reach far be- peacekeeping instruments, an approach now T yond the Horn of Africa. Its aim is being termed peace-enforcement. to determine whether collective military Unfortunately, the results of the experi- means can be successfully applied to halt ment so far are not encouraging and suggest fighting and restore order in countries torn a need to examine the lessons of Somalia by ethnic conflict, political chaos, or civil carefully before peace-enforcement is attempted elsewhere. Growing Frustrations Internal conflicts like Somalia have his- T. Frank Crigler is James P. Warburg Professor of International torically been off-limits to U.N.-sponsored Relations at Simmons College. He was U.S. Ambassador to military forces, except when all the parties Somalia from 1987 to 1990 and returned there last December to the conflict agree to their deployment. In for the ABC News program “Nightline.” such cases, neutral mediators (U.N. officials

64 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Crigler or others) usually first persuade parties to troops even for their own security. The ill stop fighting and agree to a truce. Once the will between Pakistani soldiers and Aideed’s situation stabilizes, U.N. observers or peace- supporters continues to poison U.N. efforts keeping forces are asked to monitor cease- in Somalia to this day. fire arrangements to reassure all parties that Similar frustrations encountered else- truce terms are being respected. Rarely have where—most notably in the former Yu- U.N. peacekeepers been expected to preserve goslavia, but also in Cambodia, Angola, the peace or restore order by force.1 Lebanon, and on the fringes of the former Over the years, lightly-armed U.N. forces Soviet empire—had already led members of have intervened in at least two dozen con- the U.N. Security Council to ask Secretary flicts, always at the request of the parties General Boutros Boutros-Ghali early last year concerned or with their tacit consent. Al- to suggest ways of strengthening the organi- though peacekeeping tasks often placed these zation’s ability to intervene in such conflicts, troops in the line of fire, force has largely halt fighting, reduce innocent suffering, and been limited to self-protection. Despite this promote recovery. The Secretary General ac- distinctly passive approach, traditional curately gauged the mood of the member- peacekeeping has for a generation con- ship and recommended a tougher, more in- tributed significantly to damping down con- terventionist approach to peacekeeping. His flicts and securing peace. Recent successes in- recommendations were contained in a major clude deployments in Namibia, El Salvador report which called for deploying well- and Nicaragua, Iran and Iraq, and Mozam- armed, combat-ready peace-enforcement bique. In 1988 U.N. peacekeepers were col- units under U.N. command, within the lectively awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. framework of the collective security provi- But traditional-style U.N. peacekeeping sions of chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, if has by no means always succeeded in keep- more traditional means failed to preserve in- ing the peace, much less in bringing an end ternational peace and security.2 To a large ex- to fighting when the parties themselves were tent the operation in Somalia—in its mili- unwilling to lay down their arms. In an in- tary as well as civil aspects—embodies these creasingly disorderly and chaotic world, measures advanced by Boutros-Ghali. scrupulous respect for national sovereignty Testing Peace-Enforcement and the consent of parties in conflict has Circumstances combined to make Soma- grown harder to rationalize. Neat distinc- lia the obvious test case for the Secretary tions between international and internal General’s more assertive and muscular ap- conflicts have become blurred, while the col- proach to multinational peacekeeping for a lapse of authoritarian control in many states variety of reasons: has unleashed violent ethnic rivalries and pressures for self-determination. Increas- ▼ Its collapse into anarchy had been so ingly, frustrated statesmen have called for complete that the usually vexing issue of national more robust instruments for applying multi- sovereignty seemed irrelevant. ▼ Traditional peacekeeping had already lateral pressure on parties in conflict. proven inadequate as a means of restoring order Among many frustrating cases, Somalia and alleviating human suffering (the parallel cri- is a classic illustration of the weaknesses of sis in Bosnia-Herzegovina had exacerbated the the traditional approach: when the United sense of urgency and frustration which the Secu- Nations attempted in mid-1992 to introduce rity Council felt about the traditional approach). a peacekeeping force to restore order and ▼ America had taken matters into its own safeguard humanitarian relief operations hands with Restore Hope which showed that a there, its efforts were thwarted largely by the massive deployment of force could halt factional stubborn refusal of one faction to cooperate, fighting and safeguard relief operations, thereby namely, the United Somali Congress headed saving thousands of innocent lives while suffer- by General Mohammed Farah Aideed. A ing almost no casualties. ▼ Some 19 other nations, recognizing the lightly-armed battalion of Pakistani troops success of the U.S.-led humanitarian operation, who led the effort promptly became virtual eventually offered to contribute contingents, and prisoners in their own camp, unable to con- most were prepared to leave them in place when trol food warehouses and key transport facil- the United Nations took charge. ities and dependent on General Aideed’s

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 65 JFQ▼ FORUM ▼ The Clinton ad- and broader operation intended to tackle Humanitarian Relief Sectors ministration came to of- underlying social, political, and economic fice determined not to be problems and to put Somalia back on its feet distracted from domestic as a nation. economic issues by foreign With strong U.S. backing the Security crises where vital U.S. in- Council had approved an ambitious, experi- terests were not at stake, and it was anxious to find mental, and virtually open-ended mandate ways of sharing responsi- for UNOSOM II that would inevitably bility with other nations plunge the international community far for managing nuisances more deeply into Somalia’s internal affairs like Somalia. than any previous case since the Congo. In This resulted in in- addition to humanitarian relief UNOSOM II tense negotiations dur- was to assist in “rehabilitating political insti- ing February and March 1993 between the tutions and the economy and promoting po- Clinton administration and the U.N. Secre- litical settlement and national reconcilia- tariat over the terms and timing for handing tion. . . .” Its sweeping agenda for Somalia over responsibilities in Somalia. Ultimately it encompassed: was agreed to seek a Security Council man- ▼ economic relief and rehabilitation date for the successor U.N. operation (UNO- ▼ national and regional institutions SOM II) in order to give it unprecedented ▼ police and law and order peace-enforcing authority to intervene, halt ▼ international humanitarian law ▼ refugees and displaced persons fighting, and impose order that the U.S.-led ▼ the clearing of land mines forces had enjoyed during Restore Hope. ▼ public information programs to support There was also insistence that the Security U.N. activities.3 Council provide UNOSOM II with the weapons, equipment, To the point of recent incidents, the res- the transition to U.N. and personnel needed to exer- olution authorized, even expected, UNO- authority marked the cise that authority. SOM II to accomplish its goals by force if necessary. By declaring the Somali crisis “a start of a much bolder In addition Washington and New York agreed that Amer- threat to international peace and security,” it and broader operation ica would remain directly en- explicitly opened the way for applying gaged and fully committed to forcible collective security measures pro- the success of the operation, by providing se- vided for in chapter VII of the Charter. Ac- nior officers for UNOSOM II, a logistic capa- cordingly, the Security Council voted to in- bility with some 1,500 personnel to provide crease troop levels, tighten the arms vital support, and a quick-reaction force of embargo, and strictly enforce cease-fire and 1,200 troops to intervene in emergencies. disarmament measures that Somali faction The Security Council unanimously ap- leaders had agreed on at the Addis Ababa 4 proved the plan (Resolution 814) on March peace conference earlier in the year. 26, 1993, and the new doctrine of peace-en- Restore Hope had indeed left much un- forcement was scheduled be put to the test done that both Somalis and many others beginning on May 1. hoped it would do to correct the country’s ills and repair the damage done by two UNOSOM II: Dramatically Different years of fighting. But the key to the opera- The transition to U.N. authority repre- tion’s obvious success may have been its sented not only a change in command and very limits: it was explicitly not intended to the rules of engagement, but also a major pacify the country, disarm the warlords, de- transformation in the world community’s mobilize armies, restore civil government, stated purposes in Somalia. Fundamentally, or solve the country’s accumulated political it marked the successful end of Restore and social problems. Hope, with its narrow focus on saving inno- Everyone understood, of course, that cent lives, and the start of a much bolder fundamental problems—notably the root problem of guns in the hands of warlords and their followers—would have to be faced at some point down the road. U.N. officials

66 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Crigler

a much more serious weakness lies in the very concept of peace-enforcement, the notion that peace can be imposed at gunpoint Joint Combat Camera Center General Aideed’s compound after Marines responded to sniper fire. Joint Combat Camera Center Standing guard at Mogadishu Airport. in particular, embarrassed by the failure of funding shortfalls, and national policy differ- their initial attempt at peacekeeping in So- ences that one might expect in such a novel malia (and increasingly disturbed by General multinational operation. But it has proven to Aideed’s hostile behavior and rhetoric), be seriously weak just where Restore Hope hoped that his and rival factions would be was strong: its objectives were vaguely de- disarmed and the country pacified before fined, its reach is exceedingly ambitious, and U.N. forces took over from the Americans. A its results are difficult to measure. great many Somalis echoed that hope and A Flawed Concept? warned that the country would fall back into Many of the difficulties that UNOSOM chaos if root problems were not addressed. II has encountered to date are workaday op- But in its waning days, the Bush administra- erational problems that the U.N. experiment tion had been content to leave the longer- can help resolve. A much more serious weak- term problems to others. ness—perhaps a fatal flaw—lies in the very UNOSOM II, on the other hand, was concept of peace-enforcement, the notion mandated to go directly to the causes of con- that peace can be imposed on a reluctant flict and seek solutions that would optimize and notoriously proud people at gunpoint chances for real recovery. Not surprisingly, it and that the social fabric of their nation can was immediately challenged by the very war- be rewoven at the direction of outsiders. lord who had earlier adamantly opposed U.N. Despite carefully laid transitional plans, intervention. Predictably it has been plagued UNOSOM as an experiment in peace-en- by command and control problems, organiza- forcement got off to a rocky start. Well be- tional confusion, administrative weaknesses, fore the transfer of responsibility in May,

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 67 JFQ▼ FORUM in Mogadishu to sign a peace agreement ending months of skirmishing between Habr Gedir and Majertain militias along territorial borders in central Somalia. At least on paper their agreement appears to reflect a commitment to peace and national unity—but it also proclaimed the intent by allied factions to work outside the UNOSOM framework, and it called for the speedy departure of the United Nations from Somalia. UNOSOM la- beled the conference unauthorized and stig- matized the peace agreement as illegitimate. Almost immediately thereafter shooting erupted in Mogadishu when U.N. forces acted to neutralize the radio station from which Aideed followers had ballyhooed the peace conference and previously had broad- cast vitriolic attacks against UNOSOM. Before Joint Combat Camera Center dawn on June 5 Pakistani troops together Marine talking with Somali children. with American peacekeepers were dispatched teams of civilian experts began deploying to to inspect depots where the forces of Aideed implement a series of agreements that So- were to have deposited weapons for eventual mali faction leaders had concluded at U.N.- U.N. safekeeping. Shooting broke out—it is sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa ear- not clear (or even material now) who fired lier in the year: committees were convened the first shots, or where—and in the course to draft an interim governing charter, groups of the day’s fighting 24 Pakistani soldiers assembled in towns and villages to organize were killed, along with an undetermined local governing bodies, plans were drawn to number of Somali fighters. create community-based police forces, and The Security Council response to the individuals were identified to be judges in a “premeditated armed attacks” on U.S. peace- temporary court system. keepers was swift and extraordinarily stern. But discord quickly arose when U.N. of- Unanimously, its members embraced the ficials attempted to impose their views on preliminary version of events as reported by how the Addis agreements should be imple- Boutros-Ghali (although he was instructed mented, what form the new governing char- to investigate the incident and the faction ter should take, and how best to disarm and leaders’ role in it). In angry terms, the Secu- demobilize the factional militias. The rea- rity Council: sons for the dispute are not entirely clear to ▼ condemned the attacks as “part of a cal- outside observers. U.N. officials charge that culated and premeditated series of cease-fire vio- General Aideed, after signing the agreements lations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II reluctantly, torpedoed them deliberately be- from carrying out its mandate” cause he correctly feared his political power ▼ demanded that all parties “comply fully would be eroded. Habr Gedir supporters of with the...agreements they concluded” at Addis Aideed, on the other hand, claim that it was Ababa, in particular the cease-fire and disarma- U.N. officials who refused to honor the ment agreements ▼ agreement terms or applied them unfairly, stressed the “crucial importance [of] neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that con- and who attempted to disarm Aideed’s mili- tribute to the violence and attacks against UNO- tiamen more quickly than others. SOM II” Disagreement also broke out over ▼ authorized the Secretary General to arrest whether the factions were compelled to con- and detain “for prosecution, trial, and punish- form to the UNOSOM program of meetings ment” persons responsible for the attacks, and to and negotiations or were free to deal among take “all necessary measures . . . to establish the themselves. Early in June, in what now seems effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout to be a watershed event, Aideed and some Somalia.” 5 200 representatives of rival clan factions met

68 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Crigler

Sobering Reports from Somalia did UNOSOM attempt to take over Aideed’s Media reports have amply covered the radio station and inspect arms depots on fighting and tension that have plagued Mo- June 5—the day after the controversial peace gadishu since June. Aideed has not been ap- conference concluded—with only a few prehended, but scores of his Habr Gedir fol- lightly-armed forces when it might have an- lowers have been detained and dozens killed ticipated an angry reaction from Habr Gedir? or wounded in punitive UNOSOM In the absence of independent clarifica- attacks on his headquarters and in tion, one is forced to ask whether the heavy- other confrontations. More than handed response mandated by the Security fifty peacekeepers also have died Council and forcefully carried out by UNO- with others wounded in what has SOM has not been out of proportion to the become daily urban warfare in the threat posed by Aideed. At a minimum, the streets and neighborhood around campaign to punish him has been counter- the UNOSOM compound. productive in at least some respects: it has Whatever else is said about unquestionably made Aideed a hero among the performance of UNOSOM, it is fellow clan members, who had grown tired clear that its chief, Admiral of his antics and might have abandoned Jonathan Howe, has done no more him; and it has seriously undercut prospects or less than what the Security for achieving political accommodation be- Council authorized and expected tween those factions allied with Aideed and him to do by attempting to cap- their rivals.6 Joint Combat Camera Center (Marv Lynchard) Workers unloading ture Aideed and destroy his com- Worrisome Implications flour in Wajir, Kenya. mand structure. How UNOSOM would in The UNOSOM attempt to impose peace fact carry out its mandate to try and punish by force on recalcitrant Somalis has also the warlord if he were apprehended—and on shaken the coalition that provides U.N. what legal grounds—are unanswered ques- manpower and resources. The Italians, who tions in the context of Somalia’s anarchy. have historic reasons to understand Somalis Unfortunately, the UNOSOM preoccupa- better than most, strongly differ with UNO- tion with neutralizing Aideed and his follow- SOM over its predilection for using force ers has distracted attention and resources al- against a people notorious for their stubborn most completely from the rest of its vast national pride. The Germans, concerned agenda for Somalia. Despite UNOSOM claims about being drawn into combat on what was to the contrary, continued fighting in the to have been a humanitarian mission, are streets of Mogadishu between militiamen also having second thoughts. Governments and peacekeepers has rendered them unsafe of smaller nations that traditionally supply for normal civilian life, and there is ample troops for peacekeeping duties are mean- evidence that the feud is delaying recovery in while questioning whether peace-enforce- much of the rest of the country as well. ment could spell problems at home. Admittedly, it is difficult to judge from Events since June have also raised doubt afar the circumstances that led to the present about the new, more activist role of the Se- feud between UNOSOM curity Council itself—composed of less than peace-enforcement casts and Aideed’s Habr Gedir one-tenth of the U.N. member nations, with our Armed Forces in a far subclan. Media reports five members permanently occupying are sketchy, and accounts more controversial role as seats—in overseeing the test application of by both U.N. officials and peace-enforcement in Somalia. By exactly law enforcement agents, in Aideed supporters are in- what legal or moral authority, for example, an environment where law fluenced by self-interest. is the United Nations entitled to exercise Certainly Aideed, who 7 has ceased to exist force in Somalia or anywhere else? In addi- makes no secret of his tion, are sufficient checks and balances op- political ambition or con- erating to govern Security Council actions tempt for the United Nations, had long been and decisions? a thorn in the side of U.N. commanders. But Experience to date with peace-enforce- reports of unprovoked attacks and terrorist ment thus suggests the need to be skeptical ambushes by Aideed loyalists leave many unanswered questions. Why, for instance,

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 69 JFQ▼ FORUM about the approach and extremely cautious Mogadishu is causing and appeal for cooperation about applying it elsewhere. Most obviously to move relief supplies to those who need them; for Americans, who overwhelmingly sup- declare an intention to escort relief convoys and ported Restore Hope, it casts our Armed warn that fire will be returned if the convoys are Forces in a far more controversial role as law impeded or come under attack (thereby applying traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement). enforcement agents, in an environment ▼ Schedule a new round of political talks where law has ceased to exist, courts have among faction leaders, elders, politicians, and in- collapsed, police are powerless, and stan- tellectuals at a neutral location, with a view to dards of behavior are purely arbitrary. In the putting the political process securely back on process, it has made them party to the un- track. derlying clan conflict while disrupting hu- ▼ Invite a neutral intermediary to visit So- manitarian relief efforts, short-circuiting at- malia immediately, investigate the circumstances tempts to rebuild Somali civil institutions, surrounding recent incidents involving hostili- discouraging political dialogue among con- ties, interview all parties concerned, and then re- tending factions, and seriously delaying at- port the findings to the General Assembly and tempts to rebuild the the Security Council. Such a mission would not only help to clear the air but would provide a ravaged economy. cooling-off period to reopen a dialogue. JFQ These are not encouraging signs for a new NOTES approach to multilateral 1 The most dramatic exception occurred in the peacekeeping. If the Congo during the early 1960s, at the height of the Cold United States and United War, when U.N. troops succeeded in preventing the se- Nations are to avoid be- cession of mineral-rich Katanga province. That contro- coming endlessly mired versial and costly experience nearly shattered the orga- in the swamp that many nization, however, and set a more modest tone for peacekeeping that prevailed until the collapse of the So- predicted Somalia repre- viet empire. sented last year, the 2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, a report peace-enforcement exper- to the United Nations Security Council (New York: iment must be reformu- United Nations, June 17, 1992). 3 lated to meet the realities U.N. Security Council Resolution 814, March 26, 1993. of the country, its people, 4 Ibid. and their problems. Here, 5 U.N. Security Council Resolution 837, June 6, 1993. by way of conclusion, are 6 The UNOSOM attempt to corner and arrest Aideed steps that UNOSOM is reminiscent of the British frustration during the pe- could take to redress the riod 1898 to 1920 with the so-called “Mad Mullah,” Mohammed Abdulle Hassan, a charismatic renegade Joint Combat Camera Center (Marv Lynchard) dilemma of peace-en- and troublemaker (now a Somali folk hero) who repeat- Greeting the arrival of forcement in Somalia: edly eluded colonial pursuers for more than two dec- relef supplies. ▼ Institute a unilateral cease-fire and appeal ades and finally died in bed of pneumonia. 7 by radio to all Somali faction leaders to do the See Resolution 837 which reaffirms the Secretary General’s authority under Resolution 814 to “take all same; this could serve to make clear that the necessary measures . . . to establish the effective author- United Nations is not just another warring fac- ity of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia,” although the tion but in fact opposes the use of force to solve earlier resolution asserts no such authority. the country’s problems. ▼ Suspend efforts to arrest General Aideed and release the scores of Habr Gedir clan members detained as his followers pending restoration of an authentic Somali judiciary and penal system that might more credibly prosecute the case. ▼ Abandon, at least for now, unilateral attempts to enforce the Addis Ababa cease-fire and disarmament agreement, and instead encourage the faction leaders to meet and work out modali- ties and a timetable for disarmament to include an agreement on a verification role for UNOSOM. ▼ Call the attention of faction leaders to the renewed humanitarian problem that fighting in

70 JFQ / Autumn 1993 critical of JCS. Eisenhower named the Rocke- feller Committee to study defense organization. In 1957 the committee said there was an “excessive workload...[and a] difficult mix of functions and loyalties” and blamed “the system and not the members” for the poor quality of advice [the JCS] provided to the National Com- mand Authorities (NCA).1 Eisenhower could not initi- BEYOND ate reform. It took two unsuc- cessful wars (Korea and Viet- nam), a failed hostage rescue mission (Desert 1), and criticism Goldwater-Nichols from a sitting Chairman of the By PETER W. CHIARELLI Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to bring about major reorganization. When the House of Repre- sentatives began hearings on de- aced with organizing for a war, fense reorganization in 1982, the United President Franklin Roosevelt States was engaged in the largest and most informally established the costly peacetime military build-up in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in history of the Nation. 1942 and five years later the Toward Goldwater-Nichols National Security Act institu- Three months before he retired as CJCS, tionalized it—albeit in a di- General David Jones, USAF, proposed re- luted form—as an advisory committee to the F forms in an article entitled “Why the Joint President and the Secretary of Defense. At Chiefs of Staff Must Change.” At a mini- the time Congress insisted that the chiefs, mum, he indicated, the United States though members of JCS, retain their respon- needed to strengthen the Chairman’s role, sibilities for organizing, equipping, and limit service staff involvement in the joint training the services. This dual-hatted role process, and broaden training, experience, along with the modest size and power of the and rewards for joint duty. 2 The Jones plan Joint Staff has been criticized by successive was moderate yet significant in that he was reforms ever since then. still serving as Chairman at the time. Civil and military leaders including One month later, General Edward President Dwight Eisenhower, General Omar Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, announced Bradley, and General Maxwell Taylor were his support for the Jones reforms and went F even farther. Meyer called for abolishing JCS Summary

Service chiefs wear two hats: as advisors to the National Command Authorities and as advocates of parochial service interests. As a result divided loyalties have traditionally barred the Joint Chiefs of Staff from providing timely and effective advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. After troubling operational experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and the Iranian hostage rescue mission, a hue and cry arose over reforming—or even replacing—JCS as an institution. Following years of congressional hearings the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act neither ended dual-hatting nor replaced JCS. It has, however, strengthened the role of the Chairman and promoted jointness. Organizational realignment under Goldwater-Nichols has not offset resource allocation problems which are “what the services do 90 percent of the time.” Replacing JCS with a National Military Advisory Council, and the Joint Staff with a general staff, are two long overdue reforms.

This article is an abridged version of the co-winning entry in the 1993 CJCS Essay Competition which was written by the author while attending the National War College.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 71 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

Guided missile cruiser USS Yorktown. U.S. Navy

and replacing it with a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) composed of senior flag officers from each service, one civilian, and the Chairman. NMAC members would be distinguished retired or active four-star flag or general officers serving on termi- nal assignments. Meyer thought it imperative to end dual-hatting and free would lose some voice in policy matters but the chiefs to focus more clearly on service would have a stronger position in developing responsibilities. The make-up of the NMAC current and future force capabilities. The would preserve the preeminent role of mili- commanders in chief (CINCs) of the combat- tary leaders in advising the NCA. The mem- ant commands would present their require- bers would not be dependent on, and never ments in a series of continuous exchanges return to, their respective services. This with the NMAC to initiate change. Meyer stipulation would ensure military participa- thought the arrangement would allow CINCs tion on the NMAC and largely eliminate to exercise considerable influence on near- the perceived conflict of interest present in term programs. dual-hatting. The proposals by Jones and Meyer Under the Meyer plan the Office of the prompted hearings by the House Committee Secretary of Defense would relinquish its on Armed Services which opened in 1982, leading role in policy and program develop- and the Senate Armed Services Committee ment, although it would assume a major im- began parallel hearings in 1985. A review of plementation role in both peace and wartime. the testimony shows that service affiliation In addition, the three service secretaries was the most reliable predictor of support for reform. The Army witnesses were more likely to advocate reform than those from the Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, is assistant chief of Navy, as suggested by the testimony of one staff (G3), 1st Cavalry Division. An armor officer, he has taught former CJCS, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer: at the U.S. Military Academy and is the coeditor of a book ...just as surely as the swallows return to entitled The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis. Capistrano, the studies and recommendations

72 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Chiarelli

witnesses testified that strengthening the Chairman’s role would somehow threaten civilian control of the military; but this man-on-horseback ploy was generally discounted by the civilian witnesses who had far more to lose in a shift in power. The result was the passage of the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- tion Act of 1986 which among its many provisions: ▼ revised and clarified the DOD operational chain of command and JCS functions and responsibilities to provide for more efficient use of defense resources (Title I) ▼ assigned the CJCS the role of chief military advisor, including responsibilities currently assigned to JCS collectively, established the position of Vice Chairman, and revised Joint Staff duties and selection procedures (Title II) ▼ established a joint officer specialty occu- pational category and personnel policies to provide incentives to attract officers to joint duty assignments (Title IV).4 While not abolishing JCS, creating a Na- tional Military Advisory Council or a general staff, or ending dual-hatting, the Goldwater- Nichols Act made CJCS the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Title I strengthened the CINCs’ role as commander of all assigned forces, regard-

U.S. Navy (Jeff Elliott) less of service. Finally, Title IV attempted to Marines landing dur- strengthen the Joint Staff and the staffs of ing an amphibious concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff crop up at peri- unified and specified commands by improv- assault exercise. odic intervals. . . . This makes about as much sense ing the quality of joint duty officers. as reorganizing Congress or the Supreme Court to Generating Reform stop disagreements....Everyone fancies himself a Since World War II there have been sev- field marshal.3 eral attempts at defense reorganization, but The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Wein- only two succeeded. In January 1947, the berger, also opposed reforms despite the fact Army-Navy Compromise (or Norstad-Sher- that various independent reports were nearly man) Plan fell short of the integration that unanimous in calling for strengthening JCS. many predicted would follow the war. The A report by the Center for Strategic and In- Armed Forces mobilized from little more ternational Studies, for instance, mirrored than a cadre force in the interwar years to the Jones proposals. The reports and hear- the largest and most powerful military ma- ings increased reform momentum in the chine in the history of the world. It experi- face of Reagan administration opposition. enced operational success in every theater. Congressman Ike Skelton introduced a reso- However, there were many who argued that lution which paralleled Meyer’s plan, and a inter-theater, intra-theater, and intra-service Senate staff study examined DOD organiza- rifts both prolonged the war and cost lives tional structures and decisionmaking proce- (vis-à-vis Nimitz versus MacArthur, Navy dures. These initiatives clearly signaled that versus Army, and Pacific versus European some type of JCS reform was in the offing as the services mobilized witnesses and considerable political power in efforts to minimize change. Among other things, the military

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 73 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

theaters). The most crucial lesson was the Goldwater-Nichols is regarded as a success, prominence of joint operations. Eisenhower given subsequent joint operations in Panama, stated that “separate ground, sea, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia. and air warfare is gone forever” the Army-Navy The Post-Cold War Era and warned that the Army-Navy For over two years the services have Compromise Plan in Compromise Plan was the embodi- been downsizing to meet force levels recom- 1947 did little more ment of “service systems of an era mended by CJCS and adopted by the Bush that is no more.” 5 than create a loose administration. Added budget savings pro- America abandoned isolation- posed by the Clinton administration mean confederation ism and emerged as a superpower more cuts. Thus, while the military has en- among the services following World War II. At the joyed operational successes since 1986, same time the Armed Forces shrank shrinking budgets and force structures will from wartime strength levels and make future operations more challenging. industrial conversion preoccupied the defense This is not unlike the situation in 1947 base. In addition, there was considerable pres- which was difficult for defense planners and sure to cut defense budgets to fund civilian placed pressure on the military to address programs neglected during the war. The result “difficult questions being asked by Congress was increased reliance on strategic nuclear and the American people about their Armed weapons as opposed to large and expensive Forces.” 6 If the President, Congress, and citi- conventional forces. zenry perceive the Chairman is unable to The Army-Navy Compromise Plan in provide direction, they will go elsewhere for 1947 did little more than create a loose con- answers. Few, if any, senior officers will ad- federation among the services. vocate further JCS reform because they be- Rather than integration, the Air lieve the Goldwater-Nichols Act fixed what Force became a separate service needed to be fixed. Nevertheless, that legis- which further complicated at- lation—like the National Security Act of tempts to institutionalize joint 1947 which formally established JCS—was a warfare. Legislation enacted in compromise. Both stopped short of institut- 1949, 1953, and 1958 strength- ing far-reaching proposals. Before asking ened the authority of the Secre- whether further reforms are necessary, an tary of Defense and increased evaluation of Goldwater-Nichols is in order. his staff. Between 1958 and the passage of the Goldwater- What Goldwater-Nichols Achieved Nichols Act the only significant One seasoned congressional staffer, who organizational change occurred was an architect of Goldwater-Nichols, con- when the Commandant of the tends that the most effective aspects of the Marine Corps became a full 1986 law were directed at improving opera- member of JCS in 1978. Pres- tional matters. 7 This view is confirmed by sure to preserve service auton- both General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff

Combat Camera Squadron (Val Gempis) omy squelched all attempts at of the Army, and General Merrill McPeak, d 2 reform before the Jones and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who have em- Conducting a pre- flight check of F–15 Meyer proposals. phasized that successful operational employ- during Exercise Throughout many hearings that led to ments are proof that Goldwater-Nichols Tandem Thrust. Goldwater-Nichols, operational failures in achieved what it intended to. 8 When com- Vietnam and Desert 1 were cited as evidence paring the performance of the U.S. forces in of a need for reform. Even Grenada, where Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and the United States won, gave serious concern Provide Comfort with Vietnam, Desert I, and over the lack of progress in executing joint Grenada, it is hard to argue that change was operations. Inadequate joint doctrine, equip- not for the better. ment interface problems, and more casualties The legislation specifically prohibited than anticipated caused many within the CJCS from exercising military command over Armed Forces to rethink the need for in- the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Armed Forces; creased jointness. Listening to military leaders that is, the Chairman is not in the chain of today it is difficult to believe there was ever opposition to JCS reorganization. Overall

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command between Taylor—that has been the more signifi- the President and cant. 10 But despite Powell’s accomplish- CINCs. Nevertheless, ments, or perhaps because of them, others two features of Gold- voice the concern that power may have water-Nichols enable shifted too far in the direction of CJCS and the Chairman to as- the Joint Staff as a result of Goldwater- sert considerable op- Nichols. To be sure, the legislation both en- erational authority. larged the Joint Staff and gave it greater au- The law specifically tonomy and enhanced responsibility. designates CJCS as However, it specified that “the Joint Staff the principal military shall not operate or be organized as an over- U.S. Navy advisor to the NCA. all Armed Forces general staff and shall have Marines advancing during Operation Red He is encouraged, al- no executive authority.” Yet some complain Reef III in Manta, though not required, to seek the advice of the about an “imperial Joint Staff” and the di- Ecuador. chiefs and CINCs. If the chiefs are not unani- rect access which CINCs have to the NCA, mous, in the words of Goldwater-Nichols, Congress, and the Chairman without going “the Chairman shall, as he considers appro- through the service chiefs and their staffs. priate, inform the President, the National Se- Resource Advice curity Council, or the Secretary of Defense of In contrast to operational matters, the range of military advice and opinion with Goldwater-Nichols did little to help resource respect to that matter.” Furthermore, the Pres- allocation according to one observer: ident may—as Reagan and Bush did—“direct that communications between the President My biggest disappointment is the Chairman’s or the Secretary of Defense and [the CINCs] failure to be more involved in resource allocation. Re- be transmitted through the Chairman of the source allocation is what the services do 90 percent of the time. We expected the Joint Staff to put together Joint Chiefs of Staff.” resource requirements from the CINCs and compare In general civilian experts and military that list against the service POMs [Program Objec- leaders seem convinced that the Chairman’s tive Memorandums]. The Chairman does not have role was buttressed by Goldwater-Nichols. the power to modify service POMs; however, he can But few could state with any certainty use his position to recommend changes to the Secre- whether the legislation has tary of Defense. That has not happened. It is the if the President, Congress, improved the quality of ad- name of the game in peacetime. I think it is time we 11 and citizenry perceive vice provided to the civilian went to a single joint POM. leaders. According to one General Meyer’s proposal in 1982 for re- the Chairman is unable to former senior DOD official, organization was based in part on the inabil- provide direction, they JCS “frequently arrive with ity of JCS to do a horizontal, rather than ver- will go elsewhere for their advice after the train tical, examination of resource issues. Today, has left the station. Events Meyer cites reports that the Air Force would answers in the real world do not recommend a delay in C–17 procurement to wait for the present JCS sys- satisfy a portion of its budget cut as proof tem, which is four layers of staffing to reach that Goldwater-Nichols did not go far a compromise acceptable to each of the four enough. 12 He believes a recommendation to services.” 9 Others counter that because CJCS delay or scale back this program should not has more autonomy he no longer has to be the Air Force’s alone: “The C–17 is being gather individual service views and develop developed by, not for, the Air Force.” 13 Gen- a corporate position. eral McPeak expands upon this point: While reorganization is credited for op- There may be a conflict in programmatic issues. erational improvements, some debate over Today the services rely on each other. If the Navy cuts whether it is structural change alone or the increased sealift out of their budget, I have a problem persona of General Colin Powell, USA—the because I can’t get everything the Air Force needs to current CJCS who is regarded as the most the war. The Air Force relies on sealift to move much powerful Chairman since General Maxwell of its equipment. If I give up on the C–17, the Army has a problem. I could get along without the C–17, but the Army can’t. 14

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Lieutenant General N. E. Ehlert, Deputy document,” 20 others suggest that it tackles Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Opera- few service sacred cows. In support of the tions, at Headquarters, Marine Corps, also Chairman’s view, however, Generals Sullivan voices concern about the expanded role of and Ehlert cite the report’s proposal to desig- CINCs and their staffs as contrasted with the nate Atlantic Command as headquarters for reduced role of service staffs in POM formu- CONUS-based forces as proof the report is lation: “I worry that when you serve on a not a consensus document. Under this rec- CINC’s staff you don’t have a long-range ommendation, Forces Command—a speci- view—you are more concerned about short- fied command responsible for all Army term, day-to-day problems that can quickly forces in the United States—will relinquish become a crisis.” 15 those forces to Atlantic Command: “While Roles and Missions the services would retain their Title X re- Some of the foregoing concern was sponsibilities, the training and deploying of echoed in bipartisan criticism of the Chair- CONUS-based forces as a joint team would man’s “Roles and Missions Report.” (Goldwa- be a new mission for this expanded CINC. ter-Nichols requires submission of such a re- Unification of the Armed Forces, which 21 view to the Secretary of Defense every three began in 1947, would at last be complete.” years.) Senator Sam Nunn had called for a General McPeak has dubbed the report a thoroughgoing review aimed at cutting the consensus document which is “at best tin- “tremendous redundancy and duplication” in kering at the margins.” He also said that the military. 16 After being briefed on the re- “since there is a new administration with a port, Representative Floyd Spence warned that new set of assumptions, we—or someone— the services “may have will soon be preparing a new report. I’m missed a chance to direct afraid the military may not take the lead in 22 their own fate....Efforts the next review.” When compared to the to further reduce defense other services, the Air Force had more at spending may lead to a stake. The report looked at possibly consoli- politically driven out- dating space and strategic commands as well come that neither the as at continental air defense, theater air de- military or the Nation can fense, theater air interdiction, close air sup- afford.” 17 Even Deputy port, and aircraft requirements. These are all Secretary of Defense Title X functions that the Air Force wants to William Perry said the re- maintain, assume, or take the lead on. Rec- port “was a good plan as ommendations perceived as consensus far as it went, but it didn’t building by McPeak were likely viewed by go very far.” 18 Powell as what was needed “to maintain the maximum effectiveness of the Armed

U.S. Army At issue is distribut- Forces.” 23 The question is not dissension M–1A1 Abrams laying ing power among senior down smoke during decisionmakers. As a former Under Secretary when JCS formulates resource advice; it is Operation Desert of Defense for Policy characterized this prob- whether those disagreements translate into Storm. lem more than a decade ago: predictable advice due to inherent conflicts of interest. If predictable—or perceived as The system is simply out of balance between ser- such—the utility of the advice to the civilian vice interests and joint interests. Because of the way it is set up there is a basic, built-in conflict of interest leadership is diminished. between the role of JCS members and the role of ser- Goldwater-Nichols did not erase the vice chiefs. Indeed, it was deliberately designed that view that the chiefs are prone to being way to protect parochial service interests even at the parochial when providing resource advice. expense of the joint interests of the Nation, the Presi- Now that the Chairman is the principal mili- dent, the Congress, and the Department of Defense. 19 tary advisor to the NCA, parochialism is This argument is central to those who only important if civilian leaders question have criticized the “Roles and Missions Re- CJCS advice. Asked to evaluate whether the port.” Although General Powell is adamant that his report to the Secretary of Defense “presents my views and is not a consensus

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report “stifled” his call for a review of roles Many observers agree with the Chair- and missions, Senator Nunn responded: man and are convinced that Title IV has im- No, I don’t think the problem is Colin Powell. I proved both the quality of the officers serv- think there are two Colin Powell reports. Phase one re- ing on the Joint Staff and their work. General port really was what I think he believed and phase Ehlert has noted that: “[The Marine Corps] two was what he compromised in order to get it used to send officers who were retiring to through the chiefs. So it’s not a matter of one individ- work on the Joint Staff—not since Goldwa- ual of Colin Powell [sic]. It’s got to be every member ter-Nichols. Now we send our sharpest folks of the chiefs. 24 and so do the other services.” 26 The Joint Staff Nevertheless, the provision requiring Prior to Goldwater-Nichols the Joint Staff completion of a joint assignment before pro- was not perceived as elite and assignment to motion to flag rank will if it is not amended it was not considered a desirable career step. soon cause some potentially serious prob- The system was characterized as stifling initia- lems for all services. Congress enacted tem- tive since Joint Staff officers were dependent porary exemptions and waivers during the upon their services for advancement. But transition to full implementation of Title IV. Title IV instituted the Joint Specialty Officer The two most important waivers, joint equiva- (JSO) designation among lency and serving-in, expire on January 1, provisions intended to im- 1994. Without these waivers “the current Goldwater-Nichols did not prove the Joint Staff and trend suggests that in 1994, nearly one-half erase the view that the foster joint culture. Prereq- of those selected for brigadier general will not be qualified to serve in an Army position chiefs are prone to being uisites for JSO designation are graduation from an ac- in their initial tour as a general officer. In- parochial when providing credited Joint Professional stead, they must serve an initial two-year resource advice Military Education (JPME) joint tour.” 27 This is not just a single service program and completion of issue; in fact the Army is in the middle of the a joint duty tour. The legis- pack compared with other services. The only lation approved a limited number of desig- way to promote officers in this situation is by nated joint duty assignments. In addition, “good of the service” (GOS) waivers from the Goldwater-Nichols contained two other pro- Secretary of Defense. If not, as Title IV goes visions to improve the Joint Staff: into effect, their first assignment as flag officers will be a two-year joint tour. Unless ser- ▼ officers who are serving in, or have served vice cultures change, such officers would fall in, joint duty assignments are expected as a group to be promoted at a rate not less than that for all behind their joint qualified contemporaries officers of the service in the same grade and com- who go into service-specific operational as- petitive category signments (e.g., assistant division comman- ▼ officers may not be selected for promo- ders). This problem is exacerbated by the fact tion to brigadier general or rear admiral (lower that the segment of the population given half) unless they have served in a joint duty as- credit for JSO qualification includes those ex- signment. empted from joint duty based on scientific or General Powell credits Title IV with technical waivers which do not expire, such making the Joint Staff one of the best staffs as those in fields like civil engineering, mili- in the world, and he sees JPME and joint tary police, and public affairs. Thus many of tours as key to improving the quality of offi- those who would require GOS waivers are cers assigned to the Joint Staff. Furthermore, warfighters, namely, combat arms officers, pi- he states that “the authority given to the lots, and naval line officers. Chairman to review promotion lists from a Supporters of Title IV claim that it has joint perspective has paid enormous divi- corrected serious defects in the Joint Staff sys- dends in enhancing jointness. I am confi- tem. All agree that high-quality officers are dent that without the power of legislation, being assigned to joint billets and the quality we would not have seen the progress made of Joint Staff work has improved dramatically. over the past six years.” 25 If one purpose of the legislation was to force officers to regard joint duty as important, Goldwater-Nichols is an unqualified success. For any who missed this aspect of congres-

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sional intent it will be- something officers are forced to do. If joint come abundantly clear as warfare is indeed the future, as senior mili- transitional waivers ex- tary leaders since Eisenhower have claimed, pire. Many who thought then joint duty should attract the best and they were competitive for the brightest in the military on its merits. promotion to general/flag There is more than a little irony in the fact rank may be passed over that Congress reinvented ticket punching because they did not com- for the sake of jointness. plete a joint assignment. Goldwater-Nichols is like the Articles of Nevertheless, there is Confederation—each is better than what concern that Title IV went before; however, each failed to endow may not be the best way the new order it created with the authority to foster joint culture. needed to unify its parts. The Articles of Con- Officers that Title IV tar- federation created a weak national govern-

DOD gets—warfighters—have ment where citizens of individual states in- F–15E fighter armed an aversion to serving on vested legitimacy in their state first and with Sidewinders. any staff. Nevertheless a tour on a service Washington second. Goldwater-Nichols failed staff is usually considered a prerequisite for to go far enough in strengthening the Chair- anyone with aspirations. Exposure to service man, JCS, and the Joint Staff. The successor to leaders can help to make officers competi- Goldwater-Nichols must not legislate joint tive for command or selection to flag rank. culture; it must ensure jointness is legitimate. The framers of Goldwater-Nichols were un- The value of this analogy ends here. The willing to establish a general staff with pro- sole purpose of the services is to provide for motion authority and instead used Title IV the national defense; they are not persons or as an incentive to stop high-quality pilots, minorities to be provided with constitu- combat arms, and line officers from avoiding tional protections. Funding, organization, joint duty. They wanted to create an envi- and integration decisions must be made ronment in which duty on the Joint Staff based on what is best for defending the Na- would be accepted as analogous to duty on a tion, not on what is acceptable to any given service staff. service. We must move beyond Goldwater- But Title IV did not create a joint culture Nichols so that critical decisions in the post- capable of attracting the best-qualified offi- Cold War era support building the best mili- cers to joint duty assignments. Officers do tary for the future. not compete for joint duty assignments; Meaningful Reform they go because they are required to by law. The end of dual-hatting must be the be- Once they finish their qualifying tours, they ginning of any future reforms. Expecting the return to their service and jobs that will keep chiefs, who are required by law to organize, them competitive with their contemporaries train, and equip forces, to cut programs or for future promotion. Furthermore, they personnel when they also represent service generally believe that if they support joint- interests is unrealistic. Even when the chiefs ness to the detriment of their service while provide truly joint advice on resource issues, in joint billets, they will not get those all-im- the political leadership will often discount portant follow-on service jobs. their recommendations. The Meyer proposal, During the Vietnam War, Congress ac- as well as bills introduced in the House and cused the services of promoting the practice the Senate in 1985, recommended abolishing of ticket punching whereby officers man- JCS and replacing it with a National Military aged their careers by seeking assignments Advisory Council or NMAC. Goldwater- that helped their chances for promotion Nichols did little to change the conditions without considering the needs of their ser- that prompted this proposal. In fact creating vice. Once assigned, officers stayed only a NMAC remains more relevant today than it long enough to get credit for the assign- was a decade ago as one of its original advo- ments before they moved on to carefully se- cates reminds us: lected positions. Joint duty should not be In 1982 it was difficult for me to find the time to wear both hats. The Cold War and a bipolar world was less complicated than a world where the United

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States is the only superpower and there are many “hot tize it along with other initiatives, and for- spots.” The bipolar world provided a framework with mulate the final resource advice for the which to quickly and accurately evaluate conflicts NCA. Meyer added that “a recommendation and their impact on U.S. vital interests. Minus that from the NMAC would add credibility to framework, this process is much more complicated the chiefs’ program or proposal.” 30 and time consuming for JCS and the National Com- The major advantages of the NMAC mand Authorities. This problem is exacerbated by the time and effort required to downsize the Armed over the current JCS system are threefold. Forces. Expert military advice is more critical because First, the make-up of the council would end fewer members of Congress, the President, and his ad- the perception that joint advice—especially visors served in the military. 28 resource advice—is inextricably linked to service parochialism and ignores economic The NMAC would be made up of one realities. Second, it would offer cross-service four-star flag officer from each service—not operational resource advice to CJCS and current service chiefs—selected from the re- civilian decisionmakers. Third, it would be a tired list or on a final full-time body whose members focused on assignment prior to the formation, implementation, and resourc- retirement. Possible ing of a viable national military strategy de- prerequisites might signed to protect U.S. interests in the post- include duty as a Cold War world. CINC or on the Joint Goldwater-Nichols established joint offi- Staff. Former service cer management policies to attract or com- chiefs would also pel high-quality officers to duty on the Joint seem particularly well Staff. Title IV was a compromise between the qualified. However, supporters and opponents of a general staff. membership could The traditional argument against a general prompt accusations staff has been that it would jeopardize civil- of parochialism— ian control of the Armed Forces. The Ger- charges that the man experience—especially under Hitler—is NMAC constituted

DOD raised as an example of a general staff run nothing more than a amuck. During four years of Goldwater- Clearing the deck for repackaged JCS. Nichols hearings historians pointed out that a SH–3H Sea King Originally Meyer included one senior takeoff. Germany never had a general staff and em- career foreign service officer as a NMAC phasized that civilian control of the military member; today he would expand that inter- is such a strong, consistent, and essential agency approach by adding a second civil- tenet of American culture that the Nation ian, an economist. That emphasis coincides would not be threatened by a general staff. with Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s view The NMAC should be supported by a that the poor performance of the U.S. econ- general staff which is independent of all the omy is one of the major threats facing the services. It must be responsible for managing Nation. 29 Although trained as an economist, personnel and assignments and be given au- General Meyer thinks few senior officers are thority to evaluate and promote general staff schooled in economics to the extent neces- officers. This would attract the best and the sary for high-level defense decisionmaking. brightest from all services to a career offering In addition, civilian representation facilitates upward mobility, that is, promotion and po- the interagency perspective required for sitions of responsibility comparable to those many of today’s nontraditional missions. within the services. The NMAC would allow the chiefs to The Acquisition Corps is a helpful, albeit totally focus on Title X responsibilities such incomplete, model for creating a general as organizing, training, and equipping their staff. Officers could volunteer or be requisi- individual services. They and their staffs tioned at various stages in their careers: could propose and lobby for initiatives de- some after command tours as lieutenant signed to support the national military strategy. The NMAC, with input from CINCs, would evaluate the proposal, priori-

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colonels or commanders, others as colonels reduce the budget deficit and maintain an or captains, and a few after being selected adequate defense allow the Congress to sup- for flag rank. There would be two tracks, ser- port the reorganization proposed here? vice and general staff. General staff officers There is a recent precedent set by would be assigned to the field or the fleet for Congress with regard to the relinquishment a service sabbatical designed to ameliorate of its power. To depoliticize base closures, the ivory-tower syndrome and regain opera- which are essential to downsizing and cut- tional currency while service officers could ting the budget, Congress established a De- move onto the general staff to offer opera- fense Base Closure and Realignment Com- tional expertise and develop a mission and ceded authority to this body general staff perspective to take because experience indicated that it was nec- back to the field. essary to “shield members from the anguish CINCs and deputy CINCs and the political hazards of picking which could be service or general staff bases to close.” 32 The NMAC would not have officers. If a CINC came from the autonomy of the Base Closing Commis- the general staff track, the sion, but it would be difficult for partisan- deputy CINC would be drawn ship to discredit the advice of a distin-

DOD from the service track. One por- guished council of military and civilian tion of unified commands leaders. The politics of resource issues could would be designated as general staff com- require that a select group of members criti- mands, the others as service command bil- cize advice formulated by the NMAC. How- lets. The command of divisions or corps— ever, a majority in and comparable naval and air commands— Congress has Congress could hide would be filled by flag officers from the ser- behind its prestige vice track. However, general staff flag officers been and will when compelled to could retain their service currency through remain a major make difficult re- assignments as deputy or assistant comman- obstacle to JCS source decisions. ders (for example, as assistant division com- The most likely manders, maneuver or support). Chiefs reform since it hurdle to meaningful would be selected from among those officers may have the reform is the Secre- who remained on the service track and the most to lose tary of Defense. If a Chairman (a former CINC) from the general general staff were es- staff track. tablished, it would Given that the general staff took the take the lead in defense policy and program lead in resource issues, it would be larger development, and the role of the Office of than the existing Joint Staff. If the joint ca- the Secretary of Defense would be relegated reer track did not attract the quantity and to implementation. It seems doubtful that the quality of officers needed, the general Secretary Aspin would instigate reforms that staff could access personnel data and requisi- led to this kind of realignment. If reorgani- tion candidates from the services. zation is going to occur, the current leader- Congress has been and will remain a ship of the Armed Forces—just like Generals major obstacle to JCS reform since it may Jones and Meyer in the early 1980s—must have the most to lose. As a former special as- take up the banner of reform. sistant to the Secretary of Defense has stated: The Goldwater-Nichols Act made CJCS The attitude of the Congress towards JCS has the principal advisor to the NCA and been essentially opportunistic. When it has appeared strengthened the Joint Staff. But negative re- that there might be profit in it, members of Congress actions to the “Roles and Missions Report” occasionally have tried to play off the chiefs against indicate that this advice is discredited by their civilian superiors, though usually without much perceptions that JCS is incapable of making success. As a whole, the Congress has appeared happy difficult decisions. The challenges of the to have JCS remain a weak compromise organization. 31 post-Cold War era call for replacing both JCS That observation, made over a decade ago, with an independent NMAC and the Joint remains valid today. While Goldwater- Nichols made CJCS and the Joint Staff stronger, JCS was weakened. Will pressure to

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Staff with a general staff. The end of dual- 15 Interview with Lieutenant General E. Ehlert, USMC hatting would allow the service chiefs to de- (March 16, 1993). vote their time to parochial responsibilities. 16 Barton Gellman, “Services Moving to Protect Turf: A full time NMAC could evaluate nontradi- Powell to Rebuff Call to Streamline,” The Washington Post, January 28, 1993, p. A4. tional threats and also provide credible, un- 17 ”Dellums Wants Broader Pentagon Study of Roles inhibited advice to CJCS. Title IV improved and Missions,” Aerospace Daily, February 25, 1993, p. 309. the quality and output of the Joint Staff. 18 William Matthews, “Nominee Perry Warns There’s Nevertheless, it has not fostered a joint cul- No Turning Back on Drawdown,” Air Force Times, March ture capable of competing with diverse ser- 8, 1993, p. 4. 19 HASC Hearings 1982, p. 548. vice cultures: a general staff would create a 20 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for separate career path and develop a credible the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “1993 Report on the joint culture. Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces,” Neither Congress nor civilian leaders are February 10, 1993. 21 likely to initiate reform. The Secretary of De- In addition to Forces Command, the Atlantic Fleet, Air Combat Command, and Marine Forces Atlantic will fense commissioned a bottom up review of be merged. It is interesting to note that General Powell force structure and Congress is planning to was FORSCOM commander prior to becoming Chair- look into service roles and missions. If the man. See CJCS “Report on the Roles,” p. xii. Armed Forces are to serve the Nation in con- 22 McPeak interview. 23 fronting the challenges that lie ahead, per- CJCS Memorandum, “1993 Roles and Missions.” 24 Interview with Senator Sam Nunn, Meet the Press, ceptions of a military unable or unwilling to NBC News (March 1993). entertain any idea which is not supported by 25 Letter from General Colin L. Powell, USA, to the a consensus of all the services must be put to author (March 10, 1993). rest now and forever. The world is changing 26 Ehlert interview. 27 and it is time for the military to do the same Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel, through reform that goes beyond Goldwater- Briefing Packet, Subject: “General Officer Joint Duty Nichols. JFQ Qualification” [no date]. 28 Meyer interview. NOTES 29 Address by Les Aspin at the National Defense Uni- versity (March 25, 1993). 1 This idea is also proposed by Edward C. Meyer in 30 Meyer interview. “The JCS: How Much Reform Is Needed?,” Armed Forces 31 HASC Hearings 1982, p. 523. Journal International (April 1982), pp. 82–90. 32 Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Commission Comes to Life, 2 David C. Jones, “Why the Joint Chiefs Must Vowing a Fresh Look,” Congressional Quarterly’s Washing- Change,” Armed Forces Journal International (March ton Alert, April 20, 1991, p. 994. 1982), p. 64. 3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Commit- tee on Armed Services [hereafter referred to as HASC], Reorganizational Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 151, 161. 4 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorga- nization Act of 1986, Public Law 99–433, 99th U.S. Congress, October 1, 1986. 5 HASC Hearings 1982, p. 538 6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Febru- ary 1993), p. x. 7 Interview with Archie D. Barrett. 8 Interview with General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (March 12, 1993), and with General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (March 8, 1993). 9 HASC Hearings 1982, p. 508. 10 Barrett interview. 11 Barrett interview. 12 David Evans, “Troubled Air Force Transport Inves- tigated: C–17 Program May Be Cut or Canceled,” The Chicago Tribune, February 19, 1993, p. 7. 13 Interview with General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) (February 22, 1993). 14 McPeak interview.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 81 82d Airborne Division loading at 29 Palms Marine Corps Air Station.

COOPERATIVE DOD ENGAGEMENT By CHARLES R. LARSON

Summary

The Asia-Pacific region claims attention on geographic and historical grounds, but American interests are intensifying because of complex economic, political, and security challenges. Part of the region’s importance derives from its sheer strategic dimensions: covering 52 percent of the earth’s surface and encompassing F–16 at Misawa Air a wide diversity of peoples, cultures, and Base, Japan, during Cobra Gold ’93. religions, and hence disputes. Another factor is the phenomenal economic U.S. Air Force (April Alexander) growth of some Pacific economies, leading to the rapid modernization of y virtue of geography and history, the regional military forces. Under the United States is a Pacific power with strategic concept of cooperative engage- enduring economic, political, and se- ment, the Pacific Command applies Bcurity interests in the Asia-Pacific and military assets, funds, and programs, to Indian Ocean region. For the United States, achieve three objectives: forward the Pacific and Indian Oceans constitute presence, strong alliances, and crisis major commercial and strategic arteries—vital response. Because of the vastness of Asia parts of America’s lifeline to markets and re- and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the sources overseas. Our national interests and Armed Forces play a significant role stake in this dynamic region are substantial through adaptive forward presence in and growing. As Winston Lord, Assistant Sec- sustaining the U.S. military commitment retary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, to regional stability.

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observed, “Today, no region in the world is National power ultimately rests on the more important for the United States than strength of the economy. As we seek to rein- Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st vigorate our economy and rekindle prosper- century, no region will be as important.” The ity, we will look to Asia which still leads the Nation must remain engaged in the region to world in economic growth. Already more support and promote its interests. than 36 percent of our international two- Amidst the current transformation of way trade is with the Asia-Pacific region. We the international order, it is helpful to re- trade more with this region than with any member that American interests in Asia have other in the world, including the European been markedly consistent over the last two Community and our North and South centuries. They include access for trade, free- American neighbors. Approximately 30 per- dom of navigation, and preventing the rise cent of our $448 billion in exports in 1992 of hegemonic powers or coalitions. were with this area. Today, 800 U.S. firms Economic, political, and security en- have business connections in Singapore gagement by this Nation in the Asia-Pacific alone. Furthermore, approximately 2.5 mil- and Indian Ocean region since the end of lion American jobs are directly dependent World War II has been a domi- on export markets in Asia and the Pacific. nant factor in its emergence as As economic issues move to the fore- one of the engines of global front and the pace of international trade growth and a major market for quickens, our economy and our future are our exports. The forward deploy- becoming intertwined with other nations in ment of the U.S. forces in the re- this region. There are increasing opportuni- gion contributes significantly to ties for U.S. prosperity through trade and in- maintaining stability, enhances vestment and, despite the challenges of the

DOD our diplomatic influence, and region, we hope to maintain the regional Exercise Tiger Balm ’89. promotes an environment con- stability essential for that trade to flourish. ducive to the growth of our economic inter- Regional Challenge ests there. In President Clinton's words, our As a theater of operations the Asia-Pa- military presence forms “the bedrock of cific region poses a number of major chal- America’s security role” in the Asia-Pacific lenges for the United States. Its tremendous region. size—from Arctic waters and frozen tundra We must seize the opportunity offered to tropical isles, the region comprises about in this new era to shape a better world—one 105 million square miles or 52 percent of the built on shared ideas, interests, and responsi- earth’s surface—creates some critical time bilities. Our priorities for Asia-Pacific secu- and distance problems. We often refer to this rity are clear. As laid out by President Clin- challenge as the tyranny of distance. It takes ton in Seoul, they are: first, a continued about three weeks for a Navy battle group or American military presence in this region; Marine amphibious ready group to cross the second, stronger efforts to combat the prolif- region. A jet transport carrying troops to a eration of weapons of mass destruction; crisis needs more than a day. A fighter plane third, new regional security dialogues; and may have to refuel more than a dozen times last, support for democracy and democratic just to get to a trouble spot. If North Koreans values, and by supporting regional security invaded the South today, as they are poised and stability through our forward military to do on a few hours notice, it would take presence. With continued engagement, we about 21 days for forces to get there from can advance vital U.S. interests, while shap- the U.S. mainland with large numbers of ing a prosperous and secure future. ground reinforcements and heavy equipment. More immediate help would have to come from forward forces in Japan, Alaska, and Hawaii. Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, is Commander in Chief of Another major challenge of the region is the U.S. Pacific Command. A naval aviator, he also has served diversity: among nations as well as within on board ballistic submarines and had the distinction earlier them. Diversity of history, culture, and reli- in his career of being the first naval officer to receive an appointment as a White House fellow.

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Adaptive Presence in Action ▼ the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ▼ the possible failure of democratic reform (especially in Russia) Philippines Hawaii ▼ Bangladesh Mt. Pinatubo the pursuit of security interests in ways (Hurricane Iniki) (Cyclone) (Volcano Eruption) that do not protect economic interests. Sep 1992 May 1991 Apr 1991 Cooperative Engagement Strategy In synthesizing the proposed elements of the strategic framework I developed a Tandem Thrust Jun 1992 strategy for the U.S. Pacific Command Guam (PACOM) which I call cooperative engagement. Somalia (Typhoon Omar) (Provide Hope) Aug 1992 This is a process of aggressively employing Dec 1992 Kwajalein means available to PACOM—namely, mili- (Provide Refuge) tary assets, funds, programs, and forces—to Thailand Jan 1993 (Cobra Gold) realize three strategic goals: forward pres- May 1992–May 1993 ence, strong alliances, and crisis response. This process aims to achieve engagement and participation in peace, deterrence, and cooperation in crisis, and unilateral or multi- it takes about three gion, as well as territorial and lateral victory in time of conflict. weeks for a Navy boundary disputes and historic Cooperative engagement not only ad- animosities, color the perspec- battle group or vances security, but as a by-product pro- tives of regional leaders. motes stability, political and economic Marine amphibious The third major challenge is progress, democratic ideals, and American ready group to cross change: political change, as the values through bilateral relations with more peoples of the region demand the region than forty nations. more open and democratic forms Under cooperative engagement PACOM of government; economic change, forces are organized on three tiers: forward as growing Asian economies continue to out- deployed, forward based, and CONUS-based. strip the rest of the world; and military At the core of forward deployed forces is a change, as modern weapons proliferate and modest number of forward-stationed forces nations seek to adjust their security arrange- in Japan and Korea (with stationing costs ments with the demise of the old bipolar largely underwritten by our allies), along world. Today, the most rapidly modernizing with maritime forces continuously afloat in armed forces in the world are found in the the Western Pacific. We deploy additional Asia-Pacific region. forces on a rotational basis, such as Marines Strategic Framework to the Indian Ocean or Air Force units to To meet the challenges and address the Singapore. And we temporarily deploy forces issues confronted in this theater, our strategy forward for exercises or projects. This pro- must be consistent with the three pillars of vides all the benefits of forward presence— foreign policy outlined by the President and engagement, deterrence, influence, and articulated by the Secretary of State. These rapid reaction—together with the flexibility include making our economic security a pri- to adjust rapidly. mary goal of foreign policy, basing policy on We can tailor forces for specific chal- a military structure that meets new and con- lenges by pulling them from forward Ameri- tinuing threats to our security interests and can bases (viz., Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam), international peace, and promoting demo- units afloat in the Eastern Pacific, or PACOM cratic principles and institutions worldwide. forces based in the continental United Our strategy must also address the States. We can even draw on the forces of threats of both today and tomorrow. Re- other CINCs. I call this process of rapidly tai- cently Secretary of Defense Aspin identified loring forces to a specific mission adaptive four dangers in the world: forward presence. ▼ the rising tide of regional, ethnic, or religious conflicts

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Furthermore, we rely on forward presence and the international cooperation it engenders to build coalitions for collective action in time of crisis. As we draw down our forces in a more competitive world, it is imperative to do so wisely, with our national interests in mind, in order to continually play a positive role in the region during peacetime, crisis, or conflict. Cooperative Engagement in Peacetime In peacetime our goal is to achieve engagement and participation. PACOM endeavors to do this by engaging virtually every nation of the region in military-to-military relations. Their active participation is sought through forward deployed forces as well as a variety of military programs. PACOM sponsors joint and combined exercises which empha- Joint Combat Camera Center (Jeff Brady) size everything from tropical Sea Knight helicopters aboard USS Tripoli medicine and basic seamanship to during Operation Adaptive Force Presence Key amphibious operations and computer-simu- Restore Hope. Because of the region’s size, savings in lated war games. This offers a chance to re- time, distance, and the cost of deploying inforce treaty relationships with Korea, forces forward are enormous. This presence Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New underscores the vitality of existing alliances: Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, and it promotes new friendships as host nations Thailand by increasing interoperability with observe the benefits of training with the U.S. allies and opening channels to friendly Armed Forces in an atmosphere of trust and countries. For example, last year we con- confidence; it encourages and helps sustain ducted successful naval exercises with both a stable geopolitical climate in which to pro- India and Russia for the first time. mote economic growth; it assists not only In addition, we run one of the most ef- nation-building efforts but the advancement fective education exchange programs in the of democracy by illustrating the apolitical world. More than 4,000 foreign military per- role of the American military; and it in- sonnel trained with us during 1992. Partici- creases the readiness of both U.S. and pation in seminars and conferences is grow- friendly nations. Most importantly, forward ing: 24 nations joined us for a logistics presence demonstrates the continued Ameri- seminar in Sri Lanka recently, and 29 at- can commitment to remain an Asia-Pacific tended a disaster relief conference in Hon- power on a daily basis. olulu. One Security Assistance Program Quite simply, a continued credible mili- which has proven especially beneficial is the tary presence is the cornerstone of our suc- International Military and Education Train- cessful strategy for regional peace and pros- ing (IMET) Program. In FY92, 718 foreign perity. Our modest forward presence provides students, civilian as well as military, received the opportunity to reap the economic bene- training under IMET. fits of Asian dynamism through trade and in- At the same time PACOM promotes a vestment, and allows us to avoid the enor- range of contacts with senior leaders, not mous financial costs of conflict that instability would almost certainly generate.

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just from traditional allies (such as Japan, meet a specific challenge at hand. A small Commanders confer- ring at Korat, Thailand, Australia, and the Republic of Korea), but deployable contingent from the CINCPAC during Cobra Gold ’93. from those nations with which staff also augments the task force to provide we are developing relation- joint expertise. ships (such as Russia and Mon- We have practiced this concept in exer- golia). The Russian initiative cises and employed it in crises. It may take has been so successful that it is many forms as when a massive storm both being expanded to include ju- killed 139,000 people in Bangladesh in 1991 nior officers to foster future co- and rocked a democratic government just 39 operation among the next gen- days old. On short notice we activated a Ma-

U.S. Air Force (Raymond T. Conway) eration of military leaders in rine Corps general and his staff from Oki- the region. nawa, assigned an Air Force Special Opera- PACOM provides a positive tions colonel as deputy, and provided forces influence in the theater in from all services to include Army helicopters many other ways. Our ships from Hawaii and more than 7,000 sailors make hundreds of port visits and Marines from the 7th Fleet. No interme- each year, from a carrier battle diate headquarters was allowed to intrude group visit to Australia to a sal- between the JTF commander and CINCPAC U.S. Air Force (Mickey Foster) vage ship to Micronesia. We headquarters. We used this same streamlined An American and a Thai soldier on a field also assist developing countries with human- approach to tailor forces when Mount exercise. itarian aid under cooperative Title 10 pro- Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines. A JTF grams. And we currently have five 13-person was activated with an Air Force general in civic action teams composed of Army, Navy, command, an Army general as deputy, and and Air Force personnel providing continu- Navy and Marine Corps forces from as far ous assistance to South Pacific nations. away as Japan to evacuate 18,000 Americans The end product of our peacetime effort some 6,000 miles in eight days from a stand- to reach other countries is a network of bi- ing start. Most recently we used the JTF con- lateral military relations that span the Pa- cept during Typhoon Omar on Guam, Hurri- cific, a framework for stability which pro- cane Iniki on the island of Kauai in Hawaii, motes our own interests and encourages and during Provide Refuge (the rescue and economic prosperity, political progress, and repatriation of more than 500 Chinese na- stability across the region. tionals) at Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands. Training forces for flexibility and adapting Cooperative Engagement in Crises their employment to the mission with a We work to deter aggression and encour- chain of command that reports directly to age cooperation with friends and allies in the CINC also works in support of continu- times of crisis. Our strategy is to build on the ing missions such as POW/MIA accountabil- solid military relationships ity and counterdrug operations. that we develop and the forward presence demon- Of course our goal in any crisis is to pre- tough, realistic joint train- strates the continued vent the situation from deteriorating into ing that we coordinate in conflict, not only by deterring aggression by American commitment to peacetime. We want to be the use of force, but by cooperating with able to react promptly and remain an Asia-Pacific friends and allies. We expect others to share decisively—and to build a power on a daily basis the responsibility for maintaining the peace, coalition if necessary. In the but history reveals that coalitions coalesce past two years we have de- around winners, and cooperative engage- veloped a joint task force (JTF) concept at ment enables PACOM to provide quick, deci- PACOM to respond to any contingency with sive responses that let friend and foe alike the appropriate force. know that we mean business. Under this new concept an existing single-service unit is designated a JTF in time of Cooperative Engagement in Conflict crisis and its commander reports directly to Finally, if conflict cannot be avoided, we CINCPAC. Multiple service components pro- are ready to fight and win—through a multi- vide forces and logistical support tailored to lateral operation if possible, or with unilateral force if necessary. Here the JTF concept

86 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Larson we are ready to fight and win—through a multilateral operation if possible, or with unilateral force if necessary

Infantrymen conducting battle drills during Tandem Thrust ’93. U.S. Army (Kevin Thomas)

Exercises such as these demonstrate that we are not just recasting our Cold War strategy or realigning our Cold War force structure. Fundamentally, we have a new force and a new vision. As I look to the future I see Pacific economic prosperity, regional stability, and political progress, all vital to U.S. national interests, depending on cooperation and engagement with others—and all continuing to rest on the reality of American power. In cooperative engagement we have a sound Observing the enemy military strategy to achieve national objec- during exercises on tives in peacetime, crisis, or conflict. Tinian Island, Guam. The Pacific is important to our future. We must remain actively engaged in the region to promote democratic values and economic growth. And as we restructure our Armed Forces for the post-Cold War environment,

Combat Camera Squadron (Val Gempis) we must remember that remaining engaged d 2 with an adaptive forward presence is essential Working on H–46 Nightrider during to maintaining our national security. Tandem Thrust ’93. In his first State of the Union address, 2d Combat Camera Squadron is again employed and, more importantly, President Bill Clinton said, “Backed by an ef- (Val Gempis) will work. Last year we practiced it with a fective national defense and a stronger econ- force of 22,000 deployed in and around omy, our Nation will be prepared to lead a Southern California, in an operation that world challenged as it is everywhere by eth- duplicated every aspect of regional conflict, nic conflict, by the proliferation of weapons from Special Forces deployments, airborne of mass destruction, by the global demo- drops, Marine amphibious assaults, and sub- cratic revolution, and by challenges to the marine and carrier operations to multiser- health of our global environment.” All those vice air strikes. All services had forces under challenges certainly exist in the Pacific the- the 3d Fleet Commander who worked di- ater. With American presence and participa- rectly for me. It was a remarkable exercise in tion, allies are reassured, potential adver- terms of flexibility with Army operators in saries are warned, and our commitment is combat information centers afloat and Air assured. With an adequate force and modest Force planners scheduling carrier strikes. We forward presence, the United States will re- have successfully tested the concept again, main a leader, partner, and beneficiary of this time in an international context, during this dynamic region. JFQ Exercise Cobra Gold ’93 in Thailand with the I Corps commander serving as my JTF commander.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 87 Do We Need An Information Corps? By MARTIN C. LIBICKI and JAMES A. HAZLETT

U.S. Navy (Tim Masterson) Monitoring large screen displays aboard Aegis missile cruiser arfare is a changing art, a fact technology in one hundred hours as Opera- USS Vincennes. clearly illustrated by the events tion Desert Storm. Yet in the Gulf, for all in the Persian Gulf during the modern dimensions of that conflict, W1990–91. The type of human military operations were conducted with behavior reflected by the Hundred Years weapon systems that had been designed and War can now be manifest with modern fielded in the 1970s: Patriot missiles,

Summary

Warfare is about to enter a new phase that will upset the traditional balance between information and force. As firepower becomes an appendage to information, organizational transformations will begin to underpin a new architecture. A separate Information Corps could guide this revolution, create common doctrine for the diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian information agencies. Such a corps could also obviate the need for the services to integrate their data systems because standardization would exist from the outset. Moreover, the corps could foster innovations more consonant with the logic of the information revolution than would be the case if the services were left to their own devices. But even though the proposal for such a corps has merit, a number of issues concerning its likely impact on operational autonomy, the critical functions of operational units, and certain joint imperatives must first be addressed.

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Abrams tanks, Aegis cruisers, a suite of fight- rather units of force information no ers (F–14s/–15s/–16s/–18s), Apache heli- are fire support for in- longer serves copters, and even the Airborne Warning and formation systems. Control System (AWACS). At the same time, The necessary units of force— the operation of those platforms, and their and sufficient corol- rather units of augmentation by powerful information sys- lary to this transfor- force are fire tems, suggests that the revolution in warfare mation is about orga- is about to enter an entirely new phase. Fu- nization. Current support for ture changes will be most successfully structures are built information adopted by systems which have been the around legions of op- systems most thoroughly structured. erators, served by Information, in sum, is the principal dif- lesser communities, ference between eras. Granted, the benefits such as intelligence (as well as logistics, engi- of both strategic and tactical information neering, communications, etc.). In this con- have never gone unnoted; they have been text lesser is not meant in a strictly pejora- decisive in many battles. What is new is the tive sense. However, in any unit which sheer size, speed, and volume of the infor- combines this discipline, the operators take mation flow needed to achieve superiority in command. Moreover, although career tracks combat. Information superiority is emerging are similar up to a certain level, operators as a newly recognized—more intense—area clearly make up a much higher percentage of of competition. The result may be the up- the top ranks (O8s and above) than they do ending of the relationship between informa- of the officer corps as a whole. On the other tion and force. Thus it may be the time to hand, if information warriors belonged to a form a future force to examine future warfare separate organization (be it a corps, service, issues, like how to best deal with the infor- or command), their relationship to the mation revolution by developing the requi- whole would undergo a concomitant and site strategies to exploit it. perhaps necessary adjustment. The existing relationship between Rationalizing a Corps weaponry and information is similar to the The purpose of the Armed Forces is to relationships among weapons systems and fight and win wars. Winners in the future other supporting elements such as command will take advantage of the fruits of the infor- and control, logistics, and personnel. Opera- mation revolution—including global positions sit atop; all else supports them. Current tioning systems, global surveillance, and weapons have accommodated the informa- space-based sensors—while the losers will tion revolution by taking advantage of addi- not. To win one must be organized to take tional data inputs, but the military remains advantage of the opportunities offered by organized around units of force. This architec- the information revolution. ture may soon become obsolete. Instead, A separate corps and an associated com- those who prevail tomorrow may build their mand structure linking operations and intel- forces around a central information process- ligence will facilitate effective joint opera- ing core. Such a core would launch informa- tions, promote the information revolution tion probes into the media of war (that is, in in warfare, unify the disparate information land, air, sea, or space warfare, or the entire elements and give them an identity, create a spectrum), gather, transform, fuse, and har- common ethos for information warriors, and ness the returning stream and ladle results in provide a unified interface with civilian in- strategic synchrony directly to fire-control formation infrastructures. units or indirectly to operators. In either case, Jointness. The farther platforms can see the traditional relationship between informa- and shoot, the larger their battlespace, and tion and force will be turned on its head. In- the more service-specific battlespaces inter- formation no longer serves units of force— sect with each other. Aircraft of the Navy and Air Force use the same Air Tasking Order. Data collected by Air Force assets guide Army Martin C. Libicki and Commander James A. Hazlett, USN, are movements. National sensors alert anti-tacti- both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic cal ballistic missile forces of missile launches. Studies, National Defense University.

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All the services use the same satellite systems. where follow-on data collection efforts have Another factor that demands interoperable, to be focused, or whether and when fire con- or single, information systems is the tremen- trol solutions have to be generated. The in- dous annual increase in the volume and vari- teroperability requirements of such a pack- ety of data collected. age are therefore demanding. Most importantly, there is transition in The need for interoperable information how wars are fought and the diminished systems has been widely recognized by the local ties between seeking and shooting. Today senior leadership within DOD. Earlier this the two usually are closely linked. Although year Secretary of Defense Les Aspin observed prepped by intelligence reports, a tank must in a graduation address at the National De- both find and kill the target itself. Yet, other fense University, “Most of our systems for forms of warfare have already experienced the dissemination of intelligence imagery the separation: strike operations are planned cannot talk to each other.” The principal from externally collected data; anti-subma- joint command and control initiative (“C 4I rine warfare operations use an elaborate lo- for the Warrior”) is exclusively about inter- calizing program prior to administering a operability, and all new information systems coup de grace. The Joint Surveillance and Tar- must be able to communicate jointly. Unfor- get Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and tunately, history suggests that after-the-fact AWACS support an efficient cue-and-pin- standardization frequently leads to unsatis- pointing system. The advent of precision- factory results. Why? strike systems that use both absolute and rel- ▼ Standardization is a long-term process ative positioning (that is, latitude, longitude, that accommodates new developments only after bearing, range, course, and speed) is at hand. long delays. Over the next twenty years the per- The growing proliferation of sensor systems centage of new applications to existing ones is implies that the targeting systems of tomor- apt to grow greatly; intelligent filters that corre- row must be able to fuse data collected from late and process multispectral and nonelectro- a wide variety of sources. Such fusion means magnetic sensory data are on the threshold of that seamless interoperability is being de- major growth. ▼ manded for missions ranging from single- Standards developed by competing interests often choose a least-common-denominator shot targeting all the way to situational approach, letting each side agree to disagree at awareness by CINCs. the expense of interoperability. To illustrate the value of an integrated ▼ Emphasis on data interoperability ignores perspective consider a hypothetical Un- the growing role of software interoperability. manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor package Therefore, in the case of the sensor and how it might be developed—not only its package, development by different platforms hardware, but also its software, communica- groups increases the possibility that each tions, integration with other data units, and system stands alone and makes complete most importantly its doctrine and concept data fusion that much harder to achieve. of operations. An Information Corps is an alternate UAVs can serve all services, and on their route to data integration. Instead of the ser- own each service would develop a package vices and DOD agencies (and the multiple to fit its own mission profiles and support communities within them) attempting to their own platforms. Yet it can be expected merge information collection and dissemi- that the data flows from UAVs would go to nation systems, the functions would be car- common data receptors and would have to ried out by a single organization that oper- meld with other joint data collection assets ated under centralized doctrine and including ground-based sensors, higher-alti- command. Data would be standardized from tude aircraft, and space sensors. To the ex- the start; internecine politics that allow tent that each sensor package performs its components to agree to disagree would be, if own on-board processing, it may wish to not eliminated, then substantially muted. take advantage of common neural training What would otherwise be a conflict between regimens and pattern recognition tools. Data from the various sensor packages—which could come from any of the services—have to be analyzed in real time to determine

90 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Libicki and Hazlett U.S. Navy

the need for innova- the battlefield, the grid atop it grows tighter, tions in data collec- smaller, and stealthier. Objects can be found tion, and the subse- faster and tracked more reliably. True, quent need to report today’s weavers—and the United States has only that which has the best—are themselves large platforms and U.S. Navy Receiving information been standardized, are thus tomorrow’s targets. Yet as sensors, from E–2C Hawkeye. would be muted as well. Successful innova- processors, and communicators grow smaller tions would be integrated into the whole and cheaper, comparably effective grids can much earlier in their development. be built from networks of distributed sensors A related rationale emerges from the which collectively would be more robust emphasis on Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Today than complex platforms (e.g., it is harder to and in the future the services will be increas- take down a million balloons than a dozen ingly cobbled together by JTFs. Such organi- JSTARS). The contest between industrial-era zations, which usually are made up of a platforms and information-era networks will chunk of this and a chunk of that, demand increasingly favor the latter (even though that most chunk commanders (and key staff stealth will postpone the inevitable for members) know each other beforehand. A some). Forces with fewer manned platforms coterie of information warriors whose spe- suggest radically different capabilities for the cialty is preparing the battlefield image but military of today. History suggests that orga- who are attached to different operating units nizations may resist change but to their ulti- is already integrated. Acting as the glue, they mate disadvantage. can help bring together far more fine- No one questions the overwhelming rela- grained units. tive superiority of the U.S. Armed Forces, and Innovation. The information revolution for that reason our manned platforms would is almost a cliche. Less well accepted is the logically be the last to be threatened or threat that it will pose to the concept of copied. A potential competitor would be fool- putting men and women in steel, titanium, ish to challenge our dominance by a strategy or ceramic boxes to fight wars. Why are platforms at risk? As more data is collected over

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that copied our force Mobile satellite dishes structure. Forces built in Somalia. around information systems constructed from commercially available components, however, would pose a more serious threat—one which contests our reigning paradigm. Thus, it would be far more attractive to challenge us in that way. Although an Infor- mation Corps may not be inherently more innovative than the services, it is more likely to pursue the kinds of in- Joint Combat Camera Center novations that accord with the logic of the information revolution. Left to themselves, the Armed Forces will in- corporate information into weaponry, but with information technologies as platform support rather than with platforms as fire support to an information grid. An information Corps, however, would take an entirely

different approach from the outset, empha- Joint Combat Camera Center sizing the information grid as central. Con- Communicating in stituent elements and doctrine for such a Somalia. grid would be evaluated on their ability to locate, track, and evaluate objects and events platforms such as Aegis, AWACS, JSTARS, passed for conversion into fire-control solu- and UAV contingents. Other functions tions and servicing. Such a service or corps which technology may soon enable are not would be an institutional advocate for a even listed for obvious reasons; when they paradigm shift, and would, by its advocacy, do emerge the soup will be even thicker. better prepare for a threat which comes from This is just the point. The various sub-com- a different direction. munities in the information-based warfare Unity. The common argument against community see themselves as disparate creating a completely new organization is players. Each relates to one or two others at that its planned functions are all being done most, and they all lack the common unify- by someone else. When this question is ing doctrine of operations. Information war- posed, however, the compo- riors are more than simply communicators, information warriors are sition of the group varies data processors, or intelligence agents. They widely: the Director for are all part of a global structure that would more than simply commu- Command, Control, Com- become apparent with the creation of an In- nicators, data processors, munication and Computer formation Corps. or intelligence agents Systems (J–6) on the Joint Culture. A related reason for integrating Staff, Defense Information various DOD informational elements into a Systems Agency, Defense single corps is to provide information war- Mapping Agency, Space Command, and in- riors with status, culture, and an ethic. The telligence agencies—all without going into issue of respect is relatively straightforward. the services. Under the latter are functions As information becomes more important, so such as command and control, electronic does cultivating the ability to develop and warfare, meteorology, oceanography, information processing, and high-information

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manipulate it. DOD needs to attract these Infosphere people not only as contractors but more importantly as operators. Successful military organizations must deploy not only superior information systems, they must also be able Global Positioning Satellites to fix, adapt, and maintain them in battle in real time. Yet an aspiring officer today would be advised to specialize not in information but in operations. Even the Air Force—the most information-intensive service—is oriented toward its fighter pilots as the Navy is to ship and submarine drivers and naval avi- Recon Satellites ators. Top echelons in other specialties such as administration, material management, and command and control are often assigned from the ranks of operators. This pro- cedure makes sense if various specialties call Weather Balloons for similar skills and the best are attracted to operations; an elite is an elite regardless of what it does, and it could as easily be merg- ers and acquisitions. However, if the skills re- Probes quired to be a good information warrior are different from the qualities and ethos needed to be an operator or these skills require long, specialized training, then the system makes less sense. The best people avoid JSTARS information and those who remain do not get the consideration their views deserve. An Information Corps offers the possibil- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) AWACS ity of separate and more appropriate training and career management as well as an ethos for an information warrior. As computers get more sophisticated, training necessary for Land Radars their effective use may get longer. The information warrior must know not only pro- Special Operations Forces gramming but systems integration and systems theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence, logic in all its many Ground Sensors Ships forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and statistical techniques. The information warrior must also know the customer’s needs: the commander’s intent, doctrine, and strategies. In addition, the information warrior should know something about specific media (land, sea, and space). Sending a college grad- Submarines uate to the field for a few tours of general expertise interspersed with training classes and then expecting first-rate information techniques in a more specialized tour later may Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) not be adequate. The amount of information necessary to be an information warrior is immense, and the time required to master it

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the amount of information will have to be at the Liaison. Just as the information space of necessary to be an information expense of more gen- the various services is converging, so too is eral command in- the information space of the defense and warrior is immense struction. If this commercial sectors. DOD uses commercial tradeoff is to be made communications satellites and bought the voluntarily, the results have to be rewarded bulk of Spot’s imagery in the Gulf War; and commensurately. An integrated Information boaters use the DOD Global Positioning Sys- Corps with clear career paths and opportuni- tem. The defense and commercial sectors ties for command and success would do this. swap weather data, and the DOD Global As for ethos, a divergence between oper- Grid is the military version of the National ators and information warriors must be ex- Information Infrastructure (which is a com- pected. Discipline under fire places a pre- ponent of a global infrastructure). An Infor- mium on certain qualities: courage, mation Corps would play a major role in the decisionmaking, instinct, self-control, loy- development of a national information strat- alty, and so forth. The information warrior, egy and a complementary national military by contrast, must be highly intelligent, cre- information strategy. ative, independent, flexible, tenacious (to Like the sign which reads “Call Miss counter infamous 3 a.m. computer bugs), Utility Before You Dig,” both communities and maybe somewhat eccentric. The exam- will have to shake hands before one or the ple of Admiral Grace Hopper will not excite other adds, subtracts, or alters its infrastruc- a tank commander any more than General tures. DOD used to formally liaise with George Patton excites a bit twiddler. These AT&T when the latter was still dominant in qualities are not necessarily antithetical, and telephony in the United States. Since then, some qualities—common sense, judgement, the number of information players has mul- contrapuntal thinking, decisiveness—are tiplied, and not just because AT&T has been uniquely common to all warriors regardless rent asunder. In addition, as the DOD need of weapons. To seek such qualities in opera- for information intensifies, and its assets commingle with commercial systems, the volume of interaction will greatly exceed what one community can cope with. A common point of contact on the civilian side— with its public and private players—will never happen; but a common point of contact on the military side is quite possible. A separate Information Corps would provide not only a common point of contact but common doctrine and outlook. With a national information strategy and a national military information strategy human proto- cols would not have to be reestablished U.S. Army every time the two worlds come in contact. Apache helicopter equipped with high- Functions of a Corps tors and not information warriors further tech sensors and Determining what an Information Corps relegates the latter to subordinate status. guidance systems. does (on formation, its duties will be those of Ethos, status, and training issues suggest the units which comprise it) is thus tanta- the need for an Information Corps as well as mount to delineating the borders between a unified or specified information com- the corps and the services from which it mand. The latter could produce unity of op- would grow. The first concern is doctrine. eration, advocates for change, and liaison, The transformation of the Army Air Corps but not doctrine, status, or continuity (e.g., into the Air Force was more than a catch-all information warriors who are evaluated by for those who flew planes; it was also an ex- other information warriors) that such a pression of a theory of war, to wit: the ability corps needs. of airpower to transcend the ground situation and transform strategic conflict through

94 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Libicki and Hazlett

aerial bombardment. The Marine Corps, in and subs fight subs, so too would data corps- its evolution as a separate service, similarly men on one side fight those on another. has built a doctrine of amphibious warfare. More specifically, data corpsmen would Each service maintains its ability to compre- spend their time confounding the other hend war from its perspective. side’s operations in the electromagnetic An Information Corps would also have spectrum or disrupting the operations of its doctrine. As alluded to above, the doctrine their net. This concept alone may be too would support a primary mission of the narrow a basis for a corps and is susceptible Armed Forces: to develop and exploit a com- to improvements in telematics technology, mon integrated image of battlespace. This in- which may make it harder to interfere with tegrated image would, of information systems. A second and con- course, be divided and tentious notion is that any operation that apportioned to meet the involves information, or alternatively com- needs of various warfight- mand and control, in its broadest context ers. Slicing and dicing should be part of a corps. But this is too would entail analysis, fil- broad a definition. Not only does everyone tering, enhancement, cor- deal in one respect or another with informa- relation, data fusion, and tion, but command and control tends to in- whatever else is required volve the top level of a hierarchy. To suggest to assist decisionmaking. an Information Corps would become the The image, in turn, is an top-level corps within DOD to which the important component for services must report is presumptuous. How- decisions which range ever to use such a corps to collect, process, U.S. Air Force (Charles E. Taylor) from strategy to weapons transmit, and present information and then Coordinating informa- control. The bounds of convey the resulting orders is not. tion on a weapons such a system would vary from situation to The core of a compact corps and its asso- systems situation board. situation. In some cases a coherent image ciated command would consist of elements would be used for centralized decisionmaking which gather, assess, and distribute both sili- (such as an Air Tasking Order); in other cases con- and human-based information: an info- an image would call forth efforts to collect sphere (see figure on page 93). Space would further information (launching sensors). be a central component, since virtually every Some fire control solutions would be auto- current use of space (viz., surveillance, com- matic, to take advantage of evanescent oppor- munications, navigation) is directly involved tunities that a decisionmaking hierarchy in information. Added to that would be would only slow down. Other images are chunks of the intelligence business, and the background to on-the-spot decisions (tanks creation, operation, and maintenance of should not have to relay pictures of targets to fixed-site command and control assets, infor- a central grid for a go-ahead before engaging mation collection such as ground-based radar them). Clearly the usefulness of a unified and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), image depends on what percentage of the in- mapping, and meteorology. formation involved in making a decision is How far an Information Corps should generated by the shooter (coupled with what extend into mobile information collection, share of the processing necessary to transform in the infosphere, is a difficult question. Plat- data into decision is supplied by external al- forms as diverse as AWACS, JSTARS, Aegis, gorithms). The doctrine is predicated on the P–3 squadrons, unmanned aerial vehicles, assumption that nonlocal information (from artillery trajectory indicators, portable other units or remote sensors) and analysis radars, and the like are information-inten- (from artificial intelligence) will rise in rela- sive and thus similar to fixed-site informa- tive importance. tion systems; but not every function (like Two other reasons for organizing an In- airplane driving) on such platforms is appro- formation Corps are only now beginning to priate for the data corps. Consider an Aegis emerge. One is the concept of information cruiser: it certainly collects a considerable as a realm of battle; just as tanks fight tanks, volume of data, and much of it could be transformed into actionable targets for other platforms, but most of its functions call for

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total data, a fixed-site data corps would become increasingly marginal. It would be valuable for strategic surveillance and distributed interac- tive simulations. Including mobile elements in an Information Corps introduces command problems. Each unit of an Information Corps would have to report through its administrative

U.S. Army chain of command, but it Plotting incoming would have to respond to the artillery on a Firefinder operational chain of command system. as well. Who, below the CINC U.S. Army or JTF commander, determines, for instance, when and other skills. Which among equipment main- where to deploy sensors? Who determines tainers, screen watchers, situation assessors, whether an aircraft is used for reconnais- and communicators should be data corps- sance, electronic warfare, strike operations, men? Should they be permanently or tem- or emitter dispersion? Do such needs re- porarily assigned? spond to the requirements of the travelling A tougher question will involve the mix unit (ship) or the deployed units of some in- of military and civilians in an Information formation command (or under centralized Corps. Should it be a defense or joint organi- control if not command)? All of these issues zation? Some functions of an information can be resolved over time or may be eclipsed service can be best performed by military by circumstances (if ships disappear from personnel with varying degrees of expertise the inventory, shipboard problems do also), and experience of the weapons systems with but that will take some effort. which they must interface. Other positions A related objection is that even plat- will have to be filled by computer geeks who forms whose exclusive mission today is to are not disposed to military service. gather information may not necessarily retain that character. Consider the vignette Objections to a Corps about UAV sensor packages. If the developers The difficulty in delineating an Informa- of this hardware and doctrine are information Corps suggests that creating one is tion warriors rather than operators, they somewhat problematic: it must interface may not appreciate the potential of a UAV as with other command and control organiza- a weapon rather than simply as a data col- tions, will remove critical functions of an lector. This problem can be managed and operational unit, and may perhaps relieve should be addressed as the acquisition proc- some of the pressure of jointness. ess is adjusted to the post-Cold War era. Autonomy. Single-service cohorts are gen- Criticality. Every organization is an in- erally capable of operating autonomously in formation organization; moreover, informa- tactical environments, with little help tion is power. Removing information cadres needed from the others. For the most part an from such an organization could lead to Information Corps could not. If the corps several unintended consequences. The latter would be limited to fixed-site facilities, it may be tempted to duplicate its lost capabil- could at least function autonomously, but its ities—no important organization in the Fed- value would depend on its ability to provide eral Government, for instance, leaves policy data to others—it could complete few mili- analysis to others. Besides wasting resources tary missions on its own. But with dispersed it reintroduces the very coordination short- sensors and emitters (e.g., UAVs, buoys, lis- falls an Information Corps was designed to tening posts) gathering a larger share of the overcome. Alternatively, affected military units may simply ignore the information

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they cannot control, relying on time-proven When threatened with the loss of personnel but obsolescent means of gathering infor- and resources, the services may respond that mation (reconnaissance in strength) rather they are doing all of this and more. The than methods which technology makes greater the threat, the more meaningfully more appropriate (sophisticated sensors). the services may respond. But their response Thus, the very modernization that an Infor- is likely to address problems—integration, mation Corps was meant to induce would doctrine, or ethos—that would otherwise be retarded by its formation. To avoid this call for an Information Corps. Solving these strong leadership will be required inside and problems, after all, was the original point. outside the corps. But they cannot do it as effectively as an In- Jointness. Finally, while creating an In- formation Corps. formation Corps may promote a joint bat- One approach to mastering future war- tlespace image, it may retard other aspects of fare that should be considered is the creation jointness. Having removed the most impor- of a future force cell of forward-thinking offi- tant reason for the services to work together cers and civilian specialists charged with tak- (they would instead liaise with an Informa- ing a long-term look at the nature of warfare tion Corps) removes a large part of the impe- and how best to cope with it. To attract, re- tus for operational units to work and meet cruit, and maintain what would have to be a across service lines. The need for joint de- highly talented and motivated group of indi- ployment, joint operations, and, most im- viduals, a separate career field should be es- portant, joint thinking, remains, but the tablished (not unlike the acquisition corps) day-to-day practice of working jointly would that breaks off officers and civilians from be undercut by the act of their contemporaries at the O4/O5 and the an Information Corps shoving off certain joint du- GS–13/GS–14 levels and provides them with would have to be merged ties to separate organiza- requisite guarantees of promotion and career tions. When the time came enhancement (probably with certain limits from several disparate to act jointly, the various like time-in-service). Such a group could ulti- organizations components would be far mately form the nucleus of a corps, draft a less prepared than if they national information strategy, and bring the had interacted on a day-to-day basis. Again, fruits of the information revolution to the good leadership should overcome this prob- Armed Forces. These men and women would lem. An Information Corps and the efficien- serve a unique role in the Department of De- cies it offers can be made to enhance rather fense and provide a joint, quality test-bed for than retard jointness. future ideas and concepts. When it comes to radical reorganiza- An Information Corps would increase the tion—and forming an independent Informa- effectiveness of the Armed Forces. It would tion Corps certainly qualifies—a first rule of allow us to do the job better, cheaper, and thumb may be: when in doubt, don’t. As faster. It would give us an edge that would be wars are currently fought, the need for a hard to beat or even challenge. It would keep data corps is, while perhaps inevitable, not the United States in the forefront of the ongo- necessarily urgent. Unlike, say, the Army Air ing revolution in military affairs. JFQ Corps, which was a single identifiable operational arm, an Information Corps would have to be merged from several disparate organizations. By taking from all services, it would be opposed by all. This will be difficult to overcome. The logical conclusion is that DOD should form an Information Corps. The argument is that a corps would promote jointness where it is critically needed (information interoperability), elevate information as an element of war, develop an information warrior ethos and curriculum, and heighten DOD attention to the global civilian net.

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Guadalcanal: The Naval Campaign Naval Historical Center By H. P. WILLMOTT

Beached enemy transport burning on Guadalcanal as SBD bomber flies overhead.

Naval Historical Center

o borrow and amend a saying, some At a lecture given in summer 1942 at are born joint, others achieve joint- Camberley, the British army staff college, an ness, and some have jointness thrust officer lately returned from Washington re- T upon them. It sometimes appears marked that Britain was light years ahead of that the search for a joint approach to war- the United States in terms of joint planning, fare has become an end in itself, a mantra a state of affairs he attributed to the fact that that substitutes for serious thought. One sus- America lacked a Royal Air Force. The estab- pects that much of what is written or spoken lishment of an independent air service in on this subject—paraded as authoritative April 1918 forced joint planning on the and deserving of serious consideration— British military because thereafter no single would fail rigorous scrutiny, yet at the same operation could lie within the private do- time one would not seriously question the main of a single service. Across the water the importance and relevance of joint warfare. U.S. Navy, however, by virtue of possessing

Summary

The Guadalcanal campaign in the lower Solomons is a paradox in the history of joint warfare. It was the first American offensive of World War II and purely Navy in design. Yet the impact of the campaign in the southwest Pacific on joint operations was far-reaching. Above all, it underscored the real interdependence of the services: the supply of forces on land relied on escorts; the cover of escort forces depended on fleet units; and the denial of enemy sustenance of their troops ashore was largely accomplished by shore-based airpower. Thus, to a surprising degree, Japanese forces were displaced from the lower Solomons by virtue of a singularly joint effort.

This article is based on a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the National War College on April 1, 1993.

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its own private army and air force, had the means—not to mention the will—to go its own separate way and to frustrate the cause of interservice cooperation. Guadalcanal stands as the first American campaign of World War II. As a Britisher it has always been a source of wry amusement to me that the initial U.S. offensive of the war was staged in the southwest Pacific. American condemnation of an alleged British predilection with peripheral campaigns, so unacceptable when it came to crafting strategic policy for the Marines unloading war against Germany, would supplies on Guadalcanal. seem to sit uneasily alongside Naval Historical Center this offensive: few theaters can be more peripheral to even the war against Japan, still less the considered plans for the invasion of the European war, than the south- Japanese home islands their provisional esti- west Pacific. More relevantly, mates suggested the use of between 120 and Naval Historical Center however, this first American of- 157 fleet, light fleet, and escort carriers. ADM William F. Halsey, fensive was most certainly never These calculations were committed to paper USN, Commander, South Pacific Force, considered in terms of joint warfare: indeed, at a time when every fleet action had cost and MajGen A.A. at least in part, the Navy sought offensive ac- the Navy a carrier, either sunk or badly dam- Vandergrift, USMC, tion in the southwest Pacific for interdepart- aged. Undoubtedly these figures to some ex- American Occupation mental, bureaucratic reasons to forestall its tent reflected an overstatement of require- Commander in the sister service both in Washington and in the ments based on this experience. At this Solomons, January 1943. Pacific. The move against Japanese positions stage, in September and October 1943, the in the lower Solomons was perhaps the Navy had yet to become familiar with “the- means whereby joint warfare could be more-you-use-the-less-you-lose” formula. avoided or crafted on terms dictated by the But the main interest in the 1943 figures lies Navy, yet it was a campaign in the course of in the fact that they were calculated in the which concepts of joint warfare were im- aftermath of the Guadalcanal campaign and, posed upon the services by effect and need. perhaps even more importantly, on the The campaign brought home two in- premise that the invasion of Japan would escapable facts, that the services could not come about after the Pacific Fleet had fought achieve their missions by separate efforts but its way into the western Pacific, and would were interdependent—even in their specific have won control of the skies over, and the areas of competence and responsibility—and seas that washed, the home islands in the that when the American high command au- process. When U.S. forces came ashore on thorized landings in the lower Solomons it Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, had no understanding of the nature of the at a time when Americans had not won air campaign on which it embarked. superiority over the lower Solomons, the Perhaps the simplest and most obvious Navy had an order of battle in the southwest example of this lack of understanding can be Pacific that consisted of the fleet carriers gauged by reference to the fact that in 1943 Saratoga, Enterprise, and Hornet and the es- when the combined planners in Washington cort carrier Long Island. In other words, and even allowing for differing scales of anticipated resistance and the obvious differences between a campaign in the southwest Pacific H.P. Willmott is on the faculty of the National War College and one off the home islands, four carriers and formerly taught at RMA Sandhurst. He is the author of in 1942 were to do with respect to Guadal- The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second canal what planners in 1943 believed would World War, Empires in Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific require the services of 157 carriers when it Strategies, and June 1944. came to Hokkaido and Honshu.

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The Southwest Pacific full-strength basis unlike the Japanese. Ameri- Theater Campaigns, can air units at Henderson Field were main- 1942–1944. tained and however weak (with the possible exception of October 13) were never prevented from meeting the enemy in the air. In the crisis of mid-November it was air units operating from Henderson Field in conjunction with carrier groups that inflicted pro- hibitive losses on Japanese shipping: discounting seaplane operations based at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel the Japanese had no air units closer than Rabaul—and after October 11, Buin, though it is hard to believe that the haste with which the airfield was prepared, rendered it anything other than marginal to requirements—and never had the opportunity to develop forward bases for units. These Naval Historical Center facts of life which define the difference between victory and defeat in the lower Solomons provide terms of reference for examining three aspects of the conduct of operations at sea: the supply of forces on land which essentially involved escorts; the provision of cover for forces from enemy attack which necessarily called on fleet units; and the denial to the enemy of the means to sustain forces on the island which concerned primarily shore-based airpower, although it should be noted from the outset that this airpower—or rather its most effective single part—consisted of naval airpower. Supply With regard to maintaining the flow of supplies and reinforcements the interdepen-

Naval Historical Center dence of forces is obvious. Although the USS Enterprise under main task of shepherding shipping from attack. New Caledonia and other places fell to the escorts, the period of maximum danger for Although the United States both moved this shipping came in the waters that some aviation fuel to and evacuated some washed Lunga Point which were exposed to wounded from Henderson Field by air, the attack by enemy aircraft and warships; Americans and Japanese moved every soldier, throughout the campaign U.S. transports ration, basic load, and gun to Guadalcanal by and supply ships took losses in these waters. sea. It was the U.S. ability to maintain con- But in making their way forward from New voys to Lunga Point and the Japanese inabil- Caledonia the transports and supply ships ity to sustain their forces on Guadalcanal that enjoyed immunity from loss in part because decided the outcome of this campaign. In the of the effectiveness of their escorts, and course of the campaign American ground losses incurred off Guadalcanal fell primarily forces on the island remained fed, medically on warships or destroyer-transports. Thus treated, and supplied with ammunition Japanese warships accounted for the de- whereas the Japanese were not. U.S. units on stroyer Blue and APDs Gregory and Little off Guadalcanal were reinforced and rotated on a Lunga Point on August 22 and September 5, respectively, while APD Calhoun was sunk by Japanese aircraft on August 29. Damage to

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THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN NIGHT SURFACE ACTION Samidare November 13, 1942 Murasame Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, Asagumo Japanese Axis American Axis Commander in Chief South Pacific Area Disposition and Courses Kirishima Teruzuki of Opposing Warships versus from apptoximayely 0130 to 0145 hours Amatsukaze Hiei Admiral Shieyoshe Inouye, 0241 35 Ikazuchi Commanding Imperial Japanese Forces at Rabaul Yukikaze Inazuma

Akatsuki Nagara Surface Action—November 13, 1942 U.S. Battle Force: destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, O’Bannon, Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, Yuachi Harusame and Fletcher ; heavy cruisers San Francisco and Portland; light antiaircraft cruisers Atlanta and Juneau; and light cruiser Helena. Japanese Battle Force: battleships Hiei and Kirishima; destroyers Akatsuki, Amatsukaze, Cushing Laffey Asagumo, Harusame, Inazuma, Ikazuchi, Murasame, Samidare, Teruzuki, Yukikaze, and Sterett O’Bannon Yudachi; light cruiser Nagara. Atlanta San Francisco Portland Surface Action—November 15, 1942 Helena Juneau GUADALCANAL Aaron Ward U.S. Battle Force: battleships Washington and South Dakota; destroyers Walke, Benham, Barton Monssen Preston, and Gwin. Fletcher Japanese Battle Force: battleship Kirishima; heavy cruisers Takao and Atoga; light cruisers Nagara and Sendai; destroyers Asagumo, Ayanami, Hatsuyuki, Ikazuchi, Samidare, Shikanami, The night surface action off Lunga Point Shirayuki, Teruzuki, and Uranami. in Sealark Channel (between Guandal- canal and Savo Island) on November 13, Ships Sunk or Scuttled—November 13 and 15, 1942 1942 disrupted the planned Japanese United States: Cushing, Laffey, Atlanta, Juneau, Barton, Monssen, Walke, Benham, and Preston bombardment of Henderson Field. [total crew on board: 2,984]. Japan: Hiei, Akatsuki, Yudachi, Kirishima, and Ayanami [total crew on board: 3,451]. Source. Eric Hammel, Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988). Sources. Bryan Perrett, The Battle Book (New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1992); Eric Hammel, Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988).

Alhena on September 29 and accounting for aircraft ensured the security of shipping to Alchiba and Majaba in November were ex- Guadalcanal while off the island shore-based ceptions rather than the rule, and the effec- airpower conferred a large degree of immu- tiveness of escorts and fleet units in ensuring nity from losses during daylight hours while the safe and timely fleet units ensured the same in hours of arrival of shipping darkness. In fact, U.S. shipping off Guadal- it was the U.S. ability to main- can be gauged by the canal enjoyed a high degree of immunity tain convoys and the Japanese landing of reinforce- from loss: the Japanese were remarkably in- inability to sustain their forces ments on September effective in accounting for shipping in Iron- 18 and November 11, bottom Sound, in part because their forces— that decided the outcome the former involving whether air, fleet, or submarine—had to the 7th Marines and divide their respective efforts against differ- consisting of six transports escorted by three ent targets. cruisers and seven destroyers. The point Cover would seem clear: even in a period of The support of the beachhead against Japanese superiority the combination of es- enemy bombardment was obviously the cort forces and shore-based patrol and escort least satisfactory part of the proceedings from the American point of view. The effectiveness of the cover provided for forces

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ashore and the issue of superiority were ob- masse or in daylight and were restricted to viously linked: satisfactory cover could not night operations that in the final analysis be provided unless and until U.S. fleet for- were of limited effectiveness. For all the su- mations met and defeated their opposite periority the Imperial navy exercised in the numbers in battle. Once they did and Ameri- first three months of the campaign, the Japanese sub sunk in Kamimbo Bay by the cans gained command of the waters north of degradation of American capacity as a result New Zealand corvettes Lunga Point the problems of cover resolved of fleeting, furtive bombardments in these Kiwi and Moa. themselves. From this prem- months was small. This was the result in ise two matters would seem part to other tasks that surface forces were to arise. The first is the in- called on to discharge and because Japanese terdependence of the naval ships did not have time for the deliberate effort involved in wresting systematic bombardment that might have the initiative away from the worn down American resistance. But in the Imperial navy. Carrier forces interest of balance the effectiveness of indi- neutralized their opposite vidual Japanese actions and the narrowness numbers and were them- of the margin by which the Imperial navy U.S. Army selves neutralized in the failed to neutralize Henderson Field in Octo- process, and surface forces, ber should be noted. It is probably accurate in the climactic battles of to state that in terms of action by surface mid-November, broke the warships against airfields the Japanese opera- back of the Japanese effort. tions of mid-October were the most effective Nevertheless, the issue of by any navy during World War II, although superiority was resolved it should also be noted that these operations over a three-month, not a were directed against a single airfield and three-day, period. that the naval efforts with which compar-

Naval Historical Center The second point, obvi- isons can be made were seldom orchestrated Officers confer on ous though it might be, in that way. board USS Wasp, nonetheless demands recognition: the cover The Japanese lacked time for this effort August 7, 1942. provided from Henderson Field limited mainly due to the broods perched on Hen- Japanese freedom of action in the lower Sol- derson Field. Admittedly the willingness of omons in that they could not operate en

USS Wasp with SB2Us and F4Fs on the flight deck. Naval Historical Center

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U.S. surface forces to contest the Japanese 1943, the submarines maintained a rate of superiority in Ironbottom Sound at night sinkings that accorded with their overall re- was a growing factor, but it was not until turns despite a major and, for much of the November that this was properly recognized time growing, commitment to the Solomons as a result of a defeat that was critically im- where they were singularly ill-suited to con- portant to breaking the will of the Imperial duct operations. Narrow and restricted wa- navy. But the fact was that from August 20— ters—although the and certainly after August 28—the Japanese subs were not com- Japanese forces were fighting a losing battle not so much mitted in the slot— put ashore were with the Americans as with time, and as and fast-moving time worked to the Japanese disadvantage so enemy ships were a fed into the battle the cohesion of their forces and efforts was hard combination piecemeal, without dissipated. While this was not obvious then, with which to con- proper support and the effectiveness of the threat presented by tend, not to men- U.S. shore-based airpower at Henderson tion poor intelli- with minimal, Field to Japanese operations off Guadalcanal gence, questionable erratic supply undoubtedly was apparent to both sides. doctrine, and unre- liable torpedoes. Interdiction Perhaps significantly it was not until January In terms of disrupting Japanese lines of and February 1943, when the main Japanese supply, the importance of shore-based air- naval effort had passed its peak and shipping power is self-evident and well known, hence was reduced and less well defended, that U.S. the need to examine the reverse side of the submarines recorded 12 of their 18 sinkings coin. From the fact that between August 1942 in the southwest Pacific theater between Au- and February 1943 Japanese shipping losses gust 1942 and February 1943. in the southwest Pacific amounted to 60 ships Nevertheless, the main effort against (285,419 tons) out of the total of 214 ships Japanese shipping was borne by the aircraft (979,190 tons) lost in all theaters and from all based at Henderson Field, and it is worth causes, two points immediately emerge. First, noting from the outset that shore-based air U.S. warships and submarines played only a affected the integrity of organization more minor direct role in ensuring the isolation of than causing physical damage. The Japanese Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. Carrier-based forces put ashore on Guadalcanal were fed aircraft accounted for just two merchantmen into the battle piecemeal, without proper in this period, the only two that carrier-based support and with minimal, erratic supply, aircraft sank between May 1942 and October while the Imperial navy only maintained 1943, while warships accounted for three and even this line of communication at the ex- shared in the destruction of a fourth during pense of time and the cohesion of forma- this same 18-month period. Second, the role tions. Attrition invariably involves seldom- of U.S. submarines, though obviously more acknowledged aspects of war such as time, substantial, was nevertheless marginal to the distance, and the balance of formations and outcome of the campaign: crucially, the 24 command. They are complemented by more submarines deployed to the Solomons failed obvious and no less important aspects to account for a single merchantman in the though in the end, of course, the process of critical month of November 1942. Their real attrition must be physical. Thus the signifi- value lay not in this theater but elsewhere: in cance of the battles of November 12 through a 7-month period U.S. submarines accounted 15 was the defeat in a short time of the main for 120 ships (578,210 tons) or, in percent- Japanese attempt to use heavy transports to ages, 56% of Japanese losses in this seven- bring forces to Guadalcanal after the main month period, both by ships and tonnage. workhorse of this effort had traditionally The submarine returns are of interest in been destroyers of very limited logistical ca- that within one or two points they are the pacity. Between October 1 and 20, for exam- same as those for the entire war; in other ple, the delivery of nearly 10,000 Japanese words, between August 1942 and February troops involved 92 destroyer, 7 cruiser, and 4 seaplane/carrier missions, and however great the handicaps under which American ships

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GUADALCANAL

transports was small when compared with the British loss of 44 transports, supply ships, and auxiliaries (222,824 tons) in April and May 1941 during the course of the evacua- tion of Greece and Crete. The real blow lay in the fact that, according to Japanese sources, the losses in Oc- tober and November 1942 totalled some 345,000 tons of shipping and that in Jan- uary 1943 operations in the Solomons required 710,000 tons. One must admit a certain disbelief in these statistics: my own calculations indicate that the statement of Japanese losses of 345,000 tons of merchant shipping in October and November 1942 is overstated though not by much, and one suspects that the figure of 710,000 tons of

Naval Historical Center (Ashman) shipping refers to all operations based on Artillery tubes heading Rabaul, not just those in the Solomons. But for Guadalcanal. accepting these figures at face value, one can operated the presence of U.S. airpower at note the aspect of attrition imposed by time Henderson Field ensured that the handicaps and distance because such shipping had to under which the Imperial navy operated be found from a total of some 5,900,000 were greater—and in the long term that tons available to Japan at a time when she Japanese capital resources were smaller. could not meet her import requirements The extent of these problems can be un- and, for the first time, her losses exceeded derstood by considering two sets of data. replacement capacity (in October or Novem- First, although it was estimated that a 5,000- ber 1942 shipping tonnage showed the first ton transport could move real decline since the start of the Pacific 2,000 second-echelon troops war). Moreover, in November 1942 the Im- with equipment or a full reg- perial army, having returned shipping to iment with personal equip- trade throughout the early summer but ment, the 5,458-ton Oyo thereafter having stopped transfers, for the Maru was able to carry only first time had to requisition merchant ship- 987 soldiers and assorted ping to cover its losses. Herein, one suspects, munitions between Rabaul is the real reason why the losses of Novem- and Kolombangara in Jan- ber 1942 were so unacceptable, not so much Naval Historical Center uary 1943—such was the ero- for themselves as for the loss relative to the- Soldiers moving for- sion of capacity imposed by ater resources and to national requirements. ward on Guadalcanal the haste of loading and the lack of handling in January 1943. In conclusion, a number of points could facilities at the destination. Second, the cir- be made about the naval campaign off and cumstances under which the Japanese aban- over Guadalcanal, some relating to wider as- doned the struggle for Guadalcanal—the un- pects of war and others to aspects of joint acceptable losses sustained in November—is warfare. The only World War II campaign deceptive. In November 1942 the Japanese with which Guadalcanal can be compared is lost 15 transports of some 94,000 tons in the Malta, and whereas the Americans tri- southwest Pacific, and the fact that most of umphed in the lower Solomons in large the losses were concentrated over a matter of measure because of the successful employ- days and among some of the better ships ment of different aspects of operations, in available made the losses grievous. The the Mediterranean the fate of Malta was to Japanese most certainly could not have toler- be decided in very large measure because the ated such losses had they been repeated over Axis powers were unable to do the same. a protracted period of time but the loss of 15 With regard to wider aspects of the war, the period of maximum danger for a fleet is

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Avenger being readied for takeoff from USS Enterprise. Naval Historical Center

when it is tied to the operations of forces for the security of the airfield and safety of ashore: the danger exists irrespective of its transports, just as the Serapis had done so whether the army advances or retreats, but successfully long ago. American forces en- the period of greatest peril is when the army sured victory through loss. The United States is not moving at all. Obviously this was the achieved this in part because of what today case for both the American and Japanese would be called “reconstitution” in the form navies, and one is tempted to consider the of the new warships that were to come into Japanese naval effort against Henderson service in 1943; but if victory in the Pacific Field in an historical context framed by the was the result of supremacy in 1942 that Nelsonian dictum that only a fool attacks supremacy was to be gained by victory. forts. To assert this, however, In terms of joint warfare the points that the Americans traded may stretch certain defini- emerge from any consideration of the naval ships for the security of tions, especially when there aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign would are other more immediate be the critical importance of the integrated the airfield and safety of and important matters at effort involving warships, submarines, and its transports hand. One vital factor would both carrier- and shore-based airpower; the be the critical importance of elusiveness of the single “decisive battle”; position and time in deciding the issue of and the relevance of recognizing in the battle, and it could be noted that the U.S. search for a joint approach to war the impor- victory was not a result of strategic or tacti- tance of diversity. With regard to the latter, cal superiority—quite the contrary—but of and at a time when budgetary stringencies an adherence to basic principles of concen- stress the attractiveness of general-purpose tration, offensive action, and maintaining aircraft, the significance of air operations the objective. The Americans traded ships from Henderson Field is too easy to miss: the American aircraft which carried the burden of operations against Japanese warships and

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transports were purpose-built naval strike THE GUADALCANAL aircraft operating from a base ashore, not CAMPAIGN land-based Army Air Force aircraft. These points aside, the actions of November 12–15 August 7, 1942–February 7, 1943 were the most important single episodes of the Guadalcanal campaign—in terms of Land Forces their psychological importance in that United States: 1st Marine Division; relieved in American forces for the first time outfought December 1942 by XIV Corps (2d Marine Division the Japanese at night and in terms of these and the Army’s Americal and 25th Divisions) [1,600 actions coming at the end of a 3-month pe- killed, 4,200 wounded, and 12,000 incapacitated riod in which the Japanese skin had been by disease]. drawn ever more tightly over an American Japan: 17th Army, plus reinforcements, totalling drum. To the warships, most obviously to approximately 20,000 [14,000 killed in action, the Washington, went the final credit for the 9,000 died from disease or starvation, an unknown destruction of the Japanese effort in the number wounded, and 1,000 captured]. lower Solomons, but perhaps more significant than the sinking of the Kirishima was Source. Bryan Perrett, The Battle Book (New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1992). that of the Hiei. She may well have been saved had it not been for incessant attacks by carrier- and shore-based aircraft on the day after being mauled in the course of a night action with U.S. cruisers and destroyers. Somehow, that the action which marked the ebbing of the Japanese tide in the lower Solomons saw the destruction of an Imperial navy battleship as a result of the combined efforts of warships, carrier-based, and shore- based aircraft seems an appropriate, even ec- umenical, comment on the naval dimension 1st Marine Division patch. of the Guadalcanal campaign. JFQ ...w exce a pro A map discovered on and Guadalcanal depicting he w a Japanese plan to push American forces front into the sea with a hims three-pronged attack into by elements of the com 16th, 29th, and 203d was regiments. up la failin fuse swe way

Courtesy of the Marine Corps Historical Center raise Sketch of a marine on Guadalcanal by Donald L. Dixon. Courtesy of the Marine Corps Historical Center

106 JFQ / Autumn 1993 1402 Willmott 3/3/04 8:51 AM Page 107

IN MEMORIAM

General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, USA (1895–1993) U. S. and Supreme Allied Commander, Far East Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

VITA Born at Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy (1917). Served as a company commander, 3d Infantry (1917–18). Instructor, West Point (1918–24). Attended the Infantry School, Fort Ben- ning, and served with the 15th Infantry, China, and 9th Infantry, Texas (1925–27). Served on the American Electoral Commission, Nicaragua, and the Bolivia-Paraguay Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation (1927–29). Served with the 33d Infantry, Canal Zone (1931–32), and as technical advisor to the Governor General, Philippines (1932–33). Attended the Com- mand and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth (1935), and Army War College (1937). Assigned to Second and Fourth Armies (1935–39), and War Plans Division, General Staff (1939–42). Commanded the 82d Air- borne Division (1942–44) and the XVIII Airborne Corps (1944–45). Com- manded the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and was Deputy Courtesy of the U.S. Army Art Collection Portrait of General Supreme Allied Commander (1945–46). Served as U.S. representative to Ridgway by Clarence the U.N. Military Staff Committee and the Chairman Lamont MacNelly. of Inter-American Defense Board (1946–48), and as THE SOLDIER Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command ...when he had commanded troops, Ridgway had (1948–49). Assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Ad- excelled. In this, his true element, he demonstrated ministration (1949–50). Commanded Eighth Army, a pronounced talent for getting men to pull together Korea (1950–51). Served as U.S. and Supreme Allied and for inculcating unit pride. One reason was that he was no tent hog grinding out orders. He was out Commander, Far East (1951–52), as Supreme Allied front all day, exhorting, cajoling, teaching. He drove Commander, Europe (1952–53), and as Chief of Staff, himself tirelessly from dawn to dusk and often late U.S. Army (1953–55). Dealt with postwar demobiliza- into the night. His working motto, delivered in a deep tion, training the South Korean army, strengthening commanding voice tinged with a New York accent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, establishing a was ‘Haven’t got time? Well, get up earlier...stay NATO line of communications, potential crises in In- up later at night.’ He had little patience with human dochina and on Formosa, and the effects of budget failings and was notoriously outspoken and short- cuts on the Army’s capability to carry out its mission. fused. His dedication, zeal, and intensity led his Retired in 1955 and lived in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, sweating GIs to joke: ‘There’s a right way, a wrong where he died this past summer. way and a Ridgway.’ The Ridgway was the Army way General Ridgway wrote two books about his mili- raised to perfection. tary career, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway —From Ridgway’s Paratroopers by Clay Blair. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), and The Ko- rean War: How We Met the Challenges....(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967).

Source. Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–1991 by William Gardner Bell. Center of Military History Publication 70–14. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 107 BY OUR ORTHODOXIES

SHALL YE So it’s all right for us to move along the same path, to march to the same drummer. How do we do it? Partly by following a good script and, as any movie producer can tell KNOW US you, what sells a good script is good language. But how are good movies remembered By MICHAEL VLAHOS and understood? Do we rely upon tabloid reviews or publicity blurbs? No, we repeat the one classic line that captures the spirit of a film forever. Now think of the real world as a movie, and we are in it. How do we tell others—as well as ourselves—who we are and where we are going? Remember, we too e all need orthodoxy. In have a script, even if it’s shelved in our un- America the word ortho- conscious. We read from it every day. And we constantly use words or special phrases dox smells of rigidity and to communicate with one another about righteousness, of small who we are as a group in the here and now. Call these grail words. thoughts. But the defini- I don’t mean mottoes like Semper Fi, tion sounds all right: belief in, and agreement which are almost sacred markers of military W culture. They resound across time and space, with what is, or is currently held to be right. they are forever. No, I am talking about who What’s wrong with having common we are right now, in our movie. For what we are about is our story line. Hence the grail ground for reality, what is more important metaphor. It’s what drives and defines us, than having shared values and beliefs? Group and it gives our story coherence and focus. Grail words provide a better insight into members must experience things together, or ourselves than actual orthodoxy which, after else they make a pretty sorry group. This is all, is just the official documentation of what we believe. Grail words are actual expressions true for what we call society, and it goes dou- of belief. bly for military culture. What are some of the grail words of the past? ▼ for the Navy of the 1890s, it was steam engineering ▼ for the Army during the 1920s, mecha- nization ▼ for the Air Force in the 1950s, strategic ▼ for the Army during the 1950s, atomic ▼ for the Navy of the 1950s, nuclear power Michael Vlahos is a project director at the Center for Naval Analyses where he looks at the long-term. His Today our grail word is jointness. So publications include Thinking About World Change what’s the point of all this? What import do and America: Images of Empire. these words have for us? They tell us how we

108 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Vlahos

relate to society, where America is going, Second, jointness is about an America and whether our vision is moving in step looking inward. Jointness is a concept with the society around us. steeped in self-improvement, in the process It is important to understand that grail of becoming better (like Clinton’s revealing words have far greater substance than they statement, we can do better!). America’s spirit appear to. In the 1890s, steam engineering today is intent on getting the national act to- didn’t mean just naval engineering. It meant gether or—in more traditional language—in a new world view—professionalism—and a reforming itself. In this quest the services will new identity that fit the spirit of the age. It follow, not lead; for the military lives at the was the Progressive Era, and the Navy was margins, not at the center. America’s center changing along with the scientific (take a will be, at least for the next decade, itself. look at the number of naval articles in the Sci- Third, jointness is about the survival— entific American circa 1912), forward-looking, of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air reform agenda of American society at large. Force—as a single military culture. It And grail words tell us how the Army, strongly suggests an awareness that interser- Navy, and Air Force imagine their special vice squabbles cannot be brooked in a long place in a changing national agenda. In the peace unless the services are willing to risk 1950s, for instance, the Air Force liked the mutual evisceration. There is also a sense— word strategic since it signified that it was the even if unspoken—that military power as we premiere, necessary service—the instrument have known it may wither away. A single, of victory. American strategy was the Strategic unified military culture will survive longer, Air Command. be able to make its case longer, stay healthy During the same period the Army, once longer than if the services bicker over ever- the centerpiece of American arms, was fight- thinner gruel. ing marginality. The word atomic an- This may be interesting but again, so nounced, “we’re relevant; we use the same what? What’s wrong? Is there a real prob- big weapons.” And it also said, “we can sur- lem? In a word, yes. If jointness is our grail vive and play a role in war, even on an word, if it corresponds to the spirit of a new atomic battlefield.” age, if America’s spirit is inward-looking, The Navy following World War II was then it means by implication that we are not suddenly the old-tech service. It had to show thinking about the next war. that it was on the cutting edge just like the Sure, we talk about responding to future Air Force. What better way than to link the conflicts, but enshrining jointness means future of the Navy to the American way of that the outside world and its problems are life: were not our entire lives defined down. An era dominated by a quest if jointness is our grail about to be reborn through for jointness means that we are allowing the miracle of nuclear power? ourselves the mental luxury of thinking in word, then we are What does jointness say terms of a stable world; we are assuming that not thinking about the about military culture today? serious military challenges will remain mod- next war First, jointness is about erate for the near-term and generic for the peacetime. Its meaning is long-term. more like the grail words The problem is simple: we are defining steam engineering than strategic or atomic in an who we are and what we do according to the earlier age. Strategic and atomic were once agenda of society. This is good in a certain part of society’s grail words: the Cold War. sense because American military culture America’s vision of itself in the 1950s was of must mirror the Nation as a whole. But it is a world-on-a-string, and it was a warlike vi- bad in another, because it quietly encourages sion. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were at us to see the world as a constant so that we the center of that vision. But at the turn of can be part of the big change at home. Amer- the century, America’s vision was all about ica today isn’t worried about the world be- renewal: the Nation transforming itself, because for now the world is not big and bad coming modern, more civilized. Steam engi- enough to really preoccupy us. neering was the Navy’s path to sharing in The problem is that the world is chang- that vision. ing faster than we are able to grasp. And per- versely the greatest push for change is coming

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 109 DOD

from the United States—in two ways. First, ▼ the only thing which will keep countries change in this country could become turbu- from hurting us will be their attitude toward us, lent, with real political and social upheaval. and shifts from friend to foe could come as What happens here will be closely watched quickly as a new idea taking root or a new move- abroad, and the international scene will be af- ment igniting opposition against us. fected by how that change turns out. Jointness is not the wrong vision—by all But there is a second effect. Right now means, be joint. Let jointness be a grail word we are quitting the stage as the world’s for the next twenty years. But let’s be clear: leader, and it is probably not possible to re- jointness does not focus our minds on the verse that decision. The American people next challenger or the next war. have made it, and there is no Stalin around My suggestion is to find a second grail to change their minds. Nor will the rest of word for this period of peace, however long the world hang around waiting for us to it lasts. And let’s make sure that it focuses have a change of heart; they will watch what our attention on the future, to real chal- happens and go their own ways. In ten or lenges to the United States—not to the resid- twenty years we will find a very different ual gunboat chores that the Cold War left world, and we may not like what we see. behind. You will find no predictions here; I This means bucking the spirit of the age don’t know who might challenge us decades a bit. But we are not paid to enjoy peace- hence, I don’t know how a grand crisis time—even if urged on by the benefits of might arise. But I do know three things: self-improvement. Hard as it is, our real job ▼ there will be some very big powers out is the next war. JFQ there with a military potential that grows closer to ours each year and over which we have little influence ▼ the technological revolution will mean that if those powers want they will be able to own weapons as wonderful and hideous as our own

110 JFQ / Autumn 1993 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

jointness. The Navy consistently refused to par- cite are geographical entities. This does not tie Letters... ticipate in serious joint efforts because doing so the strategic goal to the military aim of the cam- would have interfered with its “war at sea” con- paign. It represents a failure to adhere to the To the Editor—Although I tend to agree cepts. The recent shift to “war from the sea” paradigm of the operation being a campaign. with Stephen Rosen’s basic theme (see “Service seems to tacitly recognize that the Navy almost Third, even though they provide useful in- Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability?,” JFQ, made itself irrelevant by the time of the Gulf sights, particularly on German planning and the Summer 1993) that interservice rivalry is not War. Moreover, the authors missed one of the need to quickly attain objectives, the authors necessarily bad unless it degenerates into Navy’s most glaring mistakes: the failure to de- omit any discussion of strategic and operational parochialism, many of the examples he chooses velop any realistic mine warfare capabilities. decisionmaking. Was this an extemporized cam- to buttress his argument are flimsy. Here are a That, more than anything else, endangered both paign as some historians claim? few specifics: naval air and Marine operations and could have Despite these criticisms, the authors do pro- Roughly proportional cuts to all services is a been a real problem for sealift as well, had Iraq’s vide a very useful summary of a neglected chap- good way to effect downsizing. Few people re- mining been more extensive. ter in joint history. This rare German campaign ally believe that equal reductions are the right Regarding the Strategic Air Command, the should be contrasted with Allied joint and com- thing to do, simply the easiest. authors again avoid the key lesson of the Gulf bined planning carried out later in World War II. America benefitted during World War II by not War for the future of the Air Force: neither of COL Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.) giving the mission of homeland defense to a sin- SAC’s modern intercontinental bombers (B–1B gle service. His reasoning introduces a non se- or B–2) were available. More importantly, Gen- To the Editor—Allow me to compliment quitur in that there is no reason to assume an in- eral Horner’s post-war statements to the Senate you and the staff of JFQ for producing an excel- dependent Air Force would have hurt the Army’s Armed Services Committee among others lent addition to the ranks of military journals. P–38 or B–17 aircraft. Besides, the P–38, as notwithstanding, no one missed them. As Your new publication fills an immense void that Rosen notes, was designed as an interceptor. But almost happened to the Navy, SAC’s insistence has existed since at least World War II. Finally it was never used in this role and it was sheer on remaining the “first line of defense” left it a there is a forum where joint issues can be ad- luck that it was useful as a long-range escort dinosaur when the Soviet threat collapsed. dressed from a joint perspective. fighter. This leaves one to wonder if Rosen advo- Finally, the authors’ discussion of allies Having had the opportunity to look through cates building weapons serendipitously because misses two important points. First, was there the inaugural edition, I am doubly impressed by we might get lucky again. really any payoff from all those years of interop- the list of distinguished authors and the range of Had the Marines been absorbed into the erability within NATO? And, second, what if we topics covered. You have properly set very high Army in the interwar years, “the invention of am- had not convinced the Saudis to overbuild their standards for JFQ. At this time of great change phibious assault would not have come about military infrastructure? —at home, overseas, and in the American mili- until World War II broke out—inevitably at con- Despite these points, the authors ultimately tary—your new publication can make a signifi- siderable strategic and human cost.” But some make a valuable point: does employing assets cant contribution to improving coverage of joint would question whether it was even necessary from various services to implement the concepts matters. I especially applaud the inclusion of ar- to storm most of those Pacific islands. Besides, of only one really make an operation “joint”? ticles dealing with jointness from an historical the largest amphibious operations of the war Caroline F. Ziemke approach. were actually conducted by the Army in Europe Institute for Defense Analyses Lord Ernest Rutherford, the British nuclear and North Africa. I seriously doubt it took a great physicist and Nobel Prize winner, was once deal of training to teach soldiers how to climb To the Editor—While the authors of “Oper- quoted as saying “We are short of money, so we down rope ladders and hit the beach. ation Weserübung and the Origins of Joint War- must think.” As defense budgets get smaller, the “We afforded redundant Air Forces and a re- fare” (JFQ, Summer 1993) succeed in present- premium on thinking will increase. Your new dundant Marine Corps during the 1930s when ing the German invasion of Norway as a study in journal should help promote the kind of original, defense spending as a whole was, at most, 1.5 maneuver warfare at the operational level, they even controversial, thinking on joint matters that percent of GNP.. .” However, just because we do not live up to the title of the article on several will help maintain today’s Armed Forces as, may have been foolish enough to buy redundant counts. in the words of General Powell, “the finest in forces during the 1930s it does not mean that First, they fail to define operational art, in- the world.” we should repeat that mistake in the 1990s. stead linking it to maneuver warfare. Exception Ike Skelton Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF must be taken to calling Operation Weserübung Chairman, Military Forces and Personnel Dean, School of Advanced Airpower Studies “the first ever joint operation involving significant Subcommittee Air University land, sea, and air forces under unified com- U.S. House of Representatives JFQ mand.” Perhaps it may qualify as the first mod- To the Editor—In an otherwise well-written ern operation, but it was not under unified com- article about whether the Persian Gulf War rep- mand, unless Hitler is to be seriously considered resented joint control of air assets or joint com- as the unified commander. JFQ welcomes your Second, the relationship of strategic and op- mand, Winnefeld and Johnson (“Unity of Control: letters and comments. Write, or Joint Air Operations in the Gulf,” JFQ, Summer erational planning is confused. While the strate- 1993) miss some of the important lessons. gic objectives are identified as securing raw FAX your communications to The authors go too easy on the Navy, which materials, protecting the “northern flank for sub- (202) 475–1012/ made some big mistakes in the 1980s regarding sequent operations in the west,” and keeping German naval forces free for operations in the DSN 335–1012. open sea,” the operational objectives that they

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 111 any language, if proficiency is lack- goal is to ensure that systems are not JOINT ing one’s ability to communicate is fielded before doctrine is developed impaired. By facilitating the devel- for them. Unfortunately, history is WARFIGHTING opment of joint doctrine, JWFC will replete with examples of systems de- CENTER be a significant combat multiplier. ployed without doctrine. Even a sys- The importance of doctrine to tem as powerful as JSTARS was hand- In an era of dwindling resources operations was succinctly stated by icapped by the lack of a doctrinally and shrinking budgets, the military General Curtis LeMay: “At the heart based employment strategy during is working hard to get the most out of warfare lies doctrine. It represents Operation Desert Storm. of every dollar. This process has the central beliefs for waging war in The worth of any joint doctrine many names, among them, right siz- order to achieve victory....It is the corresponds directly with the degree ing, reshaping, and building down. building material for strategy. It is to which it is known and under- Although readiness must be main- fundamental to sound judgment.” stood. All Professional Military tained, it is no longer business as General Robert RisCassi recently Education (PME) institutions, and es- usual—efficiency and innovation are gave a joint flavor to the role of doc- pecially the National Defense Uni- the norms. Toward that end, the trine in these pages by pointing out versity, are charged with assimilating Chairman approved creation of the that “to achieve the full synergistic joint doctrine. JWFC will link emer- Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) as a effects of joint combat power, the gent doctrine with joint PME. Doctri- cost-effective, forward-thinking warfighting doctrine must be com- nal concerns also influenced the site combat multiplier for joint warfare. mon to all arms” (see “Principles for selected for JWFC. The synergism of It will facilitate joint doctrine devel- Coalition Warfare” in JFQ, Summer the Tidewater area, with its proxim- opment and support joint training 1993). ity to both the Armed Forces Staff and exercises. In 1992 Dr. John Hamre, a Sen- College and service doctrine centers, The genesis of JWFC can be ate staffer, noted that unless an orga- offers enormous potential benefits. traced to Congress. The Senate nization was charged to foster the JWFC will enhance our ability Armed Services Committee believed development of joint doctrine, the to fight jointly by supporting joint that a warfighting center would be Armed Forces would be condemned training and exercises. As the center beneficial for developing doctrine to fight the next war with the doc- of excellence for joint training pro- and concepts for joint operations. trine of the last. JWFC will become gram development, JWFC will build The Senate considered it possible to that focal point for joint doctrine. upon existing theater-specific train- develop joint tactics and procedures, The center will develop, assess, and ing initiatives. Its training goal is to and to exercise joint operations revise joint doctrine and joint tactics, assist CINCs in bringing individuals through extensive simulation. In techniques, and procedures (JTTP). to joint exercises who are better pre- fact, it directed the Chairman to re- Its focus will be to support the compared to do their jobs—thereby en- port to Congress on plans for estab- batant commander’s doctrinal needs. suring a more effective use of these lishing such a center. JWFC will integrate emergent exercises. Joint Task Force (JTF) A study group was formed to de- technologies and the doctrinal pro- staffs will be able to concentrate termine functionality and to set an cess. Tactics, techniques, and proce- on important lessons from joint azimuth for the center. The Vice Di- dures of operational employment operations rather than on honing rector, Operational Plans and Inter- will grow as a piece of equipment is personal skills. operability Directorate, Joint Staff, developed from concept to proto- The center will provide expertise chaired the group which had repre- type and full operational status. The to support CINCs in developing, sentation from the combatant com- planning, and executing joint mands, the services, other elements training programs. Mobile training of the Joint Staff, and the National teams—composed of military, Defense University. While the CINCs government civilian, and contractor and service chiefs unanimously sup- Joint Warfighting Center personnel—will assist in preparing ported creating a center, their per- designated trainers for CINCs (or spectives varied. The primary con- Mission Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of training the trainers). An academic cern of CINCs was training and Staff, CINCs, and chiefs of the services in their training program based on joint exercise support; the services focused preparation for joint warfare both in the con- doctrine will guide joint academics, on doctrine. In the final analysis the ceptualization, development, and assessment of seminars, and war games. The Chairman chartered JWFC to do current and future joint doctrine and in the program will be modified as neces- both, as embodied in its mission accomplishment of joint exercises and training. sary to accommodate training statement and functions (see insert). Functions requirements that are unique to It is somewhat intuitive to sug- Facilitate the joint doctrine development specific areas of responsibility. gest that the development of joint process and provide a focal point for the consid- In response to direction from doctrine will enhance our ability to eration of emerging warfighting concepts. the Chairman and CINCs, JWFC will fight jointly. Military doctrine is the Provide core expertise to assist in the language of warfighters and, as with planning, execution, and assessment of joint exercises and training activities.

112 JFQ / Autumn 1993 assist in designing joint exercises. connectivity transparent to opera- Doctrine The center will serve as an institu- tors in the field, on the sea, or in tional memory with a global perspec- the air. Weapons and equipment tive that will enhance the design of will provide input as opposed to NAVAL DOCTRINE exercises, and play a supporting role special computer workstations. Op- COMMAND in training control teams, role play- erators will fight with their organic, ers, and opposing force teams. Also, assigned equipment. ...there is a vital difference be- JWFC will catalog and disseminate The long-term vision for JWFC tween our naval manuals which pre- joint lessons learned. includes sending electrons on TDY scribe minor doctrine and those of the The center will be limited only more often than people. Potential modern army. Ours do not flow from by the imagination of a CINC’s staff. dollar savings are enormous. Given anything higher up, but represent The capability will exist to construct the direction of the defense budget, merely a detached work unrelated to the operational environments in which this could be an important method other branches of the profession. Almost to train forces for traditional of training and exercising JTF staffs. invariably they are prepared by a board warfighting missions as well as for Aside from fiscal realities, two other of officers, many of whom have no operations other than war. These reasons exist for training with simu- greater qualification for the task than will include but not be limited to lation. First, the replay capability will that of being good all around officers. peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and enhance both learning and analysis. The product of this board is normally disaster relief. Liaison will be devel- It takes much less time and energy to the personal opinion of one or two of its oped with the Department of State, reset a simulation than it does to sep- best prepared members, based upon Central Intelligence Agency, Defense arate the blue and orange forces dur- their own study and experience, which Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforce- ing Team Spirit. The second consider- is necessarily limited and incom- ment Administration, and Federal ation is minimizing environmental plete....Consequently our manuals are Emergency Management Agency). damage by maneuver forces. Of not comprehensive and do not possess JWFC will use modeling and course, units will still deploy for ma- the close relationship which is desir- simulation technology to create neuvers—just not as often. able. The revisions do not develop the valid operational environments. In an era of bottom-up reviews subjects in an orderly, logical and sys- One vision is to enable CINCs to the expenditure of every defense tematic manner but, due to variable train and exercise by transparently dollar must be scrutinized and hard conceptions and doctrines, produce con- linking multiple simulations (and choices made about many worth- fusion of service thought and practice. units at multiple locations) together while programs. The center is a cost- in a single, seamless, synthetic oper- effective combat multiplier for joint It is often said that there is ational environment. It is important operations whose time has come. nothing new under the sun. The to clarify the meaning of simula- above words are as true today as —Contributed by tion—everything except combat is when they appeared in a U.S. Naval MAJ Bill Graham, USA simulation. There are three types of Institute prize-winning essay by Operational Plans and Inter- simulation: live, constructive, and Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. operability Directorate (J–7) virtual. Live simulations are opera- Knox entitled “The Role of Doctrine Joint Staff JFQ tions with real equipment in the in Naval Warfare” in the March– field, such as those conducted at the April 1915 issue of the Proceedings. National Training Center, Red Flag, Symposium on Peacekeeping Naval doctrine means many things and Strike University. Constructive to many people, yet a published def- he National Defense University will spon- simulations are war games and mod- inition cannot be found. The con- els, such as the Corps Battle Simula- sor a symposium on “Military Coalitions sensus at the deckplate level indi- tion, Enhanced Naval Wargaming T and the United Nations: Implications for cates that it generally refers to guidance, tactics, and procedures in System, and Air Warfare Simulation. the U.S. Military” on November 2 and 3, 1993. Virtual simulations are systems and the Naval Warfare Publication The program will focus on the backdrop of troops operating in computer-gener- (NWP) System. A marinized applica- ated environments such as SIMNET, peacekeeping missions, the U.N. agenda, re- tion of the DOD definition has gen- aircraft simulators, and virtual proto- gional coalitions, and the roles of the Armed erally been accepted in the past, but the advent of a new world order and types. JWFC will explore linking Forces including the perspectives of CINCs. these simulations into one seamless continual institutional change have operational environment in which Further details on this and other symposia can mandated a new look and rethink- CINCs can train JTF staffs. be obtained by writing: National Defense ing of the role, missions, and structure of the Department of the Navy. Distributed technology, though University, Institute for National Strategic still not fully mature, will link these The establishment of the Naval Doc- Studies, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. simulations. The goal is to make the trine Command (NDC) in March 20319–6000, or calling: (202) 287–9230/ 1993 was intended to ensure that DSN 667–9230, or FAX: (202) 287–9239/ naval doctrine is not only alive and well, but that all naval personnel, DSN 667–9239.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 113 the other services, and Congress un- find common ground on which to Naval Doctrine Command derstand the methodology behind base doctrinal discussions or joint Evolution the Navy and Marine Corps team operational philosophy. Lacking a Operations Desert Shield/Desert conduct of operations in support of central coordinating authority it has Storm highlighted deficiencies and national military strategy. not always been simple to get the shortcomings in Navy doctrine, par- fleets to agree on doctrinal matters. The Relevant History ticularly with regard to joint opera- The different foci of the Atlantic and tions. Training in, and the under- Until now, the Navy doctrine Pacific Fleets offer the clearest exam- standing of, joint doctrine were development process at all levels was ple: the Atlantic Fleet, working inadequate, equipment and proce- a fragmented, bottom-up, fleet- closely with the North Atlantic dures for joint operations were not driven approach. The fleet or a cen- Treaty Organization (NATO), con- in place, and due to inattention ter of excellence (Naval Strike War- ducted operations differently from doctrine had been developed that fare Center, Naval War College, the Pacific Fleet, for whom NATO is was ineffective or in some cases un- Space and Electronic Warfare Center, an unknown quantity. The inherent executable by naval forces. Com- etc.) identified doctrinal deficiencies, link between the requirement for bined doctrine employment fared assigned primary review authorities doctrine, equipment, training, and somewhat better in maritime opera- (PRA), evaluated solutions, and force structure was not always speci- tions, but inadequate training, lim- drafted and coordinated the publica- fied; nor was the rudimentary truth ited previous interaction with non- tion in question. As deficiencies that doctrine was absolutely essential NATO coalition forces, and the lack were identified or new concepts en- to warfighting capabilities. of a common command and control visioned the impetus for revising or While high-level attention to system only served to worsen the initiating a publication was related naval doctrine and doctrine devel- deficiencies. more to the resources allocated than opment has been somewhat spo- In examining the lessons of the to the need. Not even at the highest radic throughout Navy history, re- Persian Gulf conflict it became only level of doctrine was there a single cent experience and events have too obvious that Navy doctrine and organization providing top-down spurred a respect for joint opera- its inherent developmental and re- guidance. The Naval Tactical Readi- tions. Foremost was the passage of view processes needed restructuring. ness Division and the Navy Tactical the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorga- While a Chief of Naval Operations Support Activity played largely an nization Act which directed the (CNO) code was assigned oversight administrative role, providing over- Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a in developing tactical doctrine as sight, resources, and production ca- joint warfighting capability. This well as naval and allied warfare pub- pabilities rather than substantive legislation was the genesis for the lications, its small staff was only ad- document review. Historically either Joint Publication System as well as ministrative and managerial; there the fleet or centers have performed the process for both developing and was little capacity to thoroughly the PRA document function but, codifying joint doctrine. In delin- evaluate standardization and joint or while they will continue to prepare eating this system the services were allied congruency. Dispersed and some doctrinal publications, NDC assigned lead agent responsibilities bottom-up development of Navy will develop and implement a new, for developing joint doctrine and doctrine had produced inconsistent top-down approach to doctrine de- the legislation itself mandated the doctrine and procedures. The Navy velopment to assure a centralized alignment of service doctrine with had been somewhat aloof in the de- focus in dealing with the consis- joint doctrine. velopment of joint, and to a lesser tency, development, dissemination, Furthermore, with the collapse degree, combined doctrine. In some and evaluation of doctrine. of the Soviet Union and dissolution cases, this resulted in less than opti- Naval doctrine should be more of the Warsaw Pact the world order mum joint employment concepts than simply a guide to naval forces dramatically changed. With the re- for naval forces, highlighted by Joint since effective doctrine is the corner- moval of the cornerstone threat the Force Air Component Commander stone for all naval tactics, tech- relatively stable basis of Navy doc- (JFACC) procedures and execution in niques, and procedures. Although trine and tactics was shaken, left the Gulf War. Operational level the Marine Corps has had a doctrine with outdated strategic concepts em- naval forces were not completely development organization at Quan- bodied in Naval Warfare Publication conversant with joint and combined tico since the 1920s, the Navy is a 1, and a development process totally doctrine; it was nominally under- latecomer to the field and has not unsuited to the pace of evolving na- stood at the Battle Group staff level until now had a resident cadre for tional strategy. Yet the Navy re- and higher, but, for most operators, the sole purpose of developing doc- mained committed to a blue water, it was a painful lesson-of-necessity. trine. Since procedures were not war-at-sea mindset. While both Most importantly, the Navy standardized and there was no cen- sorely needed and inevitable, change learned a somewhat bitter lesson— tral agency for ensuring doctrinal was slow in coming. it could ill afford to proceed with- compatibility, the plethora of com- out repairing the doctrinal gap be- mands could not always reach ac- tween its traditional single-service, cord, initiate working dialogues, or

114 JFQ / Autumn 1993 NDC is chartered to be “the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine; serve as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy service-unique doctrine; provide a coordinated USN/USMC naval voice in joint and combined doctrine development; and ensure naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations, exercises, and war- games.” The command will also ex- independent operations and the would have four core divisions: strat- amine trends, keeping its eye on the larger scheme of joint operations. egy and concepts; naval doctrine; future to meet the needs of joint This gap hindered the optimum uti- joint and combined doctrine; and warfighting while forging viable lization of the Navy and its com- evaluation, training, and education. naval strategies. NDC works directly plete integration across the spec- With the decision to establish for CNO and CMC, and its Com- trum of modern warfare. the command in the Norfolk area, mand Assist Official (CAO) is the Following Desert Storm doctrinal the NDC working group refined Deputy Chief of Navy Operations for deficiencies were voiced and various manning plans, developed a budget, Plans, Policy, and Operations. solutions surfaced. In early 1992 at coordinated communication and the Fleet Commander-in-Chiefs Con- computer support, and continued to Current Priorities ference, the Chief of Naval Opera- process the myriad of paperwork re- Since it was formally commis- tions, Admiral Frank Kelso, presented quired to establish a new Navy com- sioned NDC is underway at flank the idea of a central Navy doctrine mand. Permanent personnel began speed and accelerating. Expanding organization. In April 1992, direction arriving in November 1992 and on the initial tasks and doctrinal pri- was given by CNO for formation of a NDC anticipates full manning of orities provided by CNO, a number working group to develop a proposed fifty military and civilian personnel of initiatives have been undertaken charter and organization for a naval by late 1993. to create and develop doctrinal pre- doctrine center. Enthusiastic Navy cepts for the naval forces of tomor- Organization and Mission and Marine Corps representatives row, to close the gap between Air- pursued Admiral Kelso’s initiative, de- On March 12, 1993, the formal Land battle doctrine and Naval veloping the structure and organiza- establishment ceremony of the Naval Expeditionary Warfare, and to en- tion for a new command. Doctrine Command took place at hance the knowledge and under- In September 1992 the Navy Norfolk Naval Base and ushered in a standing throughout the naval ser- published a white paper entitled new era for the development of Navy vice of existing and future doctrine “. . . From the Sea” which provided a and naval doctrine. NDC is an eche- and the doctrinal system. To provide new direction for the naval service lon 2 shore command reporting di- the focus and guiding vision for and increased the impetus for creat- rectly to CNO and CMC for all mat- these efforts, the following list of top ing a centralized doctrine coordinat- ters related to developing naval priorities was established for NDC in ing authority. Concurrently, both concepts and integrating naval doc- the near-term: trine, and to CNO for matters relating Admiral Kelso and General Carl ▼ Capstone Publications. Develop Mundy, Commandant of the Marine to Navy service-unique doctrine. The a series of six Naval Doctrine Publica- Corps (CMC), met with the Acting NDC commander has broad author- tions (NDPs) to translate the strategic Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe ity to establish liaison for doctrinal direction found in “. . . From the Sea” to discuss establishing a naval doc- matters with the Coast Guard; the into doctrinal reality and provide a trine command. Mr. O’Keefe liked Marine Corps Combat Development top-down focus to ensure consistency the concept and asked that a Secre- Command; joint, combined, and between naval and joint doctrine, in- tary of the Navy instruction be devel- other service doctrine centers; Navy crease fleet awareness and understand- oped in order to codify the mission and Marine Corps centers of excel- ing, and provide standardization for naval operations. They include “Naval of the command and its chain of lence; and appropriate Navy and Ma- Warfare of the United States Navy and rine Corps training commands. In ad- command. On September 25, 1992, United States Marine Corps” (NDP–1), an instruction entitled “Naval Doc- dition, the Army, Air Force, and Coast “Naval Intelligence” (NDP–2), “Naval trine Command” was issued estab- Guard have assigned liaison officers Operations” (NDP–3), ”Naval Logistics lishing NDC. It would be com- who further attest to the jointness of and Force Sustainment” (NDP–4), manded by a two-star flag or general the command. “Naval Planning” (NDP–5), and “Com- officer, normally assisted by a one- mand, Control, and Surveillance” star deputy of the sister service. NDC (NDP–6).

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 115 ▼ Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) naval forces in joint operations. This Humanitarian Assistance. The Concept. Review existing composite centralization will give the naval ser- Joint Action Steering Committee warfare commander and amphibious vice the top-down focus the other which directs ALSA’s activities, ap- doctrine and develop a NEF comman- services already utilize, ensure consis- proved development of a multiser- der concept paper. tency between naval and joint doc- vice tactics, techniques, and proce- ▼ Joint Doctrine Development. As- trine, and provide the necessary dures (TTP) manual on humanitarian sume the Navy coordinating review authority for developing, reviewing, structure for a complementary doc- assistance (HA) for decisionmakers and evaluating all joint doctrine, and trine continuum. NDC will provide and planners to include concepts, participate in every step of the joint increased fleet awareness and under- roles, and responsibilities. It will out- process and serve as a Navy representa- standing of Navy, naval, joint, and line the relationship between the ser- tive on joint doctrine working parties. combined doctrine, from sailors on vices and governmental agencies and ▼ Naval Education and Training. other deckplates through senior flag be designed for use by service major Ensure capstone documents are used policymakers and decisionmakers. commands, joint task force comman- throughout Navy and Marine Corps And while not currently involved in ders, Special Operations Forces, Fed- curricula and become part of the the requirements process, NDC will eral agencies, and private volunteer training continuum in all warfare help provide the long-range strategy organizations (PVOs) participating in communities. ▼ Littoral Warfare. Conduct a de- from which to derive platform re- humanitarian assistance operations. tailed study of warfighting in the lit- quirements and systems. This project will fill the void in oper- torals, particularly in the areas of adap- Doctrine translates ideas into ational TTP in the area of humanitar- tive force packaging, forward logistics comprehensive ways of thinking ian assistance and also provide a support, strike and close air support and, ultimately, fighting. As the pri- baseline for developing a Joint Hu- operations, theater missile defense, mary authority for the development manitarian Assistance manual which multi/anti-ship missile defense, and of naval concepts and integrated has been assigned to the Army by the shallow/very shallow water mine and naval doctrine, and the coordinating Joint Doctrine Working Party. The anti-submarine warfare. authority for developing and evaluat- Marine Corps and Naval Doctrine ▼ Combined Forces Operational ing Navy service-unique doctrine, Command will support the Army as Doctrine. Assume responsibility for all standardization, allied publication, and NDC will assist naval forces in technical review authorities in that NATO working party support and, also, achieving necessary flexibility while effort. ALSA will support the U.S. collaborate in developing doctrine to providing standardization essential Army Training and Doctrine Com- fill the void in multilateral operations to the process. Through the estab- mand (TRADOC) with research, in- with other than NATO nations. lishment of NDC, the Navy and Ma- formation, and writing. ▼ Command, Control, Communica- rine Corps have clearly signalled Joint Close Air Support. ALSA has tions, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). their intent to enter the 21st century recently been assigned a project to Develop follow-on doctrine to make with doctrine that addresses a new develop a multiservice Close Air maximum use of the systems available geostrategic environment, the inte- Support (“J–CAS”) TTP to eliminate and future architectures. gration of naval forces in joint and differences in procedures among the ▼ Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) System. Review the NWP system combined operations, and possibly Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air to align it with the Joint Publication more importantly an acute aware- Force. It will coordinate service per- System, shorten NWP production and ness that naval doctrine must be uni- spectives and procedures for CAS to revision time, reorganize NWPs to bet- formly understood not just by naval enable any fixed or rotary wing air- ter support assigned roles and mis- personnel but by all the services and craft to support any ground force. sions, and transition these publica- Congress as well. This effort should jump start the tions onto CD–ROM. —Contributed by joint effort. The Joint Doctrine ▼ Modeling and Simulation. Ensure RADM Frederick L.Lewis, USN Working Party approved a joint TTP naval wargaming models accurately re- Commander, Naval Doctrine for CAS (Joint Pub 3–09.3) at its flect doctrinal guidance as well as pre- Command JFQ April meeting; the Marine Corps was sent and future operational capabilities and are compatible with other service subsequently assigned as the lead models. agent. ALSA will support the Marine AIR LAND SEA Corps with the multiservice TTP as Future Challenges APPLICATION the basis for the joint manual. ALSA With the inception of NDC, the is striving to have the TTP available naval services finally possess the ca- CENTER for review evaluation in the autumn. This will give the Marine Corps a pability to provide complete coordi- Two current projects underway nation and standardization for naval top quality product to submit in Jan- at the Air Land Sea Application uary and hopefully reduce the coor- and Navy doctrine. NDC will provide (ALSA) Center with broad interest the direction and coordination to en- dination time required to produce a across the services involve develop- joint publication. sure that naval doctrine reflects the ing multiservice manuals on human- concepts identified in “. . . From the itarian assistance and on joint close Sea” and enhances the integration of air support.

116 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Further information on the sta- for the services and intelligence the Armed Forces Staff College. Pub 1 tus of ALSA projects is found in The community. The college functions as was never intended to serve as a sub- Air Land Sea Bulletin which is avail- a joint institution with faculty and stitute or replacement for joint or ser- able by either writing: ALSA Center, students from all services together vice doctrinal publications, nor is it 114 Andrews Street, Suite 101, Lang- with civilians from the intelligence part of the Joint Publication System ley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665– community. (AFSC Pub 1 should not to be con- 2785; or calling (804) 764–5936/ JMIC offers programs on the un- fused with Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare DSN 574–5934. dergraduate and graduate levels, and of the U.S. Armed Forces). However, a master’s degree can be earned in this original purple book does offer conjunction with the Postgraduate practical insights into the interaction History Intelligence Program. In addition, of doctrine and process, and is partic- the college is in the process of be- ularly helpful in referring readers to OFFICE OF JOINT coming a degree-granting institution relevant official documentation on a at the baccalaureate level. Programs wide range of joint issues. HISTORY are open to the active and Reserve By the mid-1980s the press run The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of components and to civilians in the for AFSC Pub 1 passed the 15,000- Staff, activated the Office of Joint fields of intelligence and operations. mark. This year a new edition of History on July 27, 1993 to record For further details, contact AFSC Pub 1 appeared in over 57,000 the enterprises of the Joint Chiefs of Mr. Vince Tranchitella in care of the copies. The text is issued to resident Staff, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Military Intelligence College, students at the Armed Forces Staff the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Washington, D.C. 20340–5485, or at College who attend the Joint and Joint Staff, and to support the docu- (202) 373–2767/DSN 243–2767. JFQ Combined Staff Officer School; the mentation of selected joint and com- JPE Phase II Senior Course; the Joint bined operations. Accepting the cer- Command, Control, and Electronic tificate of activation was the newly Documentation Warfare School; and the Joint Plan- appointed Director for Joint History, ning Orientation Course. In addition BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.). THE JOINT STAFF copies are distributed to the Joint The program of compiling accounts Staff, service staffs, combatant com- of joint and combined operations OFFICER’S GUIDE mands and component commands, and exercises will rest on the partici- Since the first edition was pub- subordinate unified commands, and pation of the Reserve components. lished in August 1960, The Joint Staff the various elements of the National Historical teams made up of Re- Officer’s Guide—also known as Defense University. Some commands servists will assist the combatant Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) and agencies attach their require- commands by providing coverage of Pub 1—has become a standard refer- ments for copies of AFSC Pub 1 to joint operations, a concept that has ence within the joint community. the initial printing contract which already been tested successful in Beginning as a text for students at can result in significant cost savings. both Somalia and Europe. JFQ the Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Efforts are underway to make AFSC Pub 1 now has been adopted by Pub 1 available through the Joint other institutions for classroom use Electronic Library (see the Summer Education and established as an indispensable 1993 issue of JFQ for details on JEL). desk reference for staff officers across One of the strengths of The Joint JOINT MILITARY the Joint Planning and Execution Staff Officer’s Guide is its dependence Community (JPEC). on the members of JPEC for updates, INTELLIGENCE The popularity of AFSC Pub 1 corrections, and accuracy. Since COLLEGE stems from its perspective on the AFSC Pub 1 is revised and published joint planning process and the sys- every two years, the greater the in- The Defense Intelligence Col- tems which support it. The volume formation received on joint and lege was redesignated the Joint Mili- extracts basic guidance from various combined planning, doctrine, and tary Intelligence College (JMIC) on primary sources, blends that docu- operations, the better each subse- June 1, 1993. Operated by the De- mentation with proven procedures quent volume will become. Com- fense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the used by expert planners, and then ments on the latest edition may be college has been reorganized to re- packages the resulting information sent to Lt Col Boyce Burley, USAF, flect changes in DIA by realigning with a helpful assortment of charts, (804) 444–5437/DSN 564–5437, and the departments with basic military diagrams, and sample formats. Al- questions on distribution may be intelligence activities and establish- though its audience extends far be- passed to MAJ Hector Rivera, USA, ing centers on collection, produc- yond the walls of the school house, (804) 444–5591/DSN 546–5591. tion, and systems. the original and primary purpose of AFSC Pub 1 is also available for The mission of JMIC, however, the text is to support the curricula of sale from the Superintendent of is unchanged: namely, to provide Documents at $24.00 per copy. JFQ professional intelligence education

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 117 Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Eng- Recent Events JFQuarterly Survey lander, and David A. Dawson. U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, CINCs of Joint Literature 1990–1991: Anthology and Anno- CONFERENCE tated Bibliography. Washington: BOOKS History and Museums Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Bevin Alexander. How Great Generals 1992. 258 pp. Win. New York: W.W. Norton, [ISBN 0–16–038071–5] 1993. 320 pp. $25.00 [ISBN 0–393–03531–X] Charles J. Quilter II. U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Roger A. Beaumont. Joint Military the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Operations: A Short History. Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Washington: History and Muse- Press, 1993. 245 pp. $55.00. ums Division, Headquarters, Ma- DOD (Mamie M. Burke) [ISBN 0–313–26744–8] rine Corps, 1993. 131 pp. William J. Crowe, Jr., with David The annual Commanders in Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Chanoff. The Line of Fire: From Chief (CINCs) Conference was held Jones. Interoperability: A Desert Washington to the Gulf, the Politics at the Pentagon on August 10, 1993, Storm Case Study. McNair Paper 18. and Battles of the New Military. with the following in attendance: Washington: Institute for National New York: Simon and Schuster, (front row, from left) General Carl E. Strategic Studies, National Defense 1993. 367 pp. $25.00. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Commandant of University, 1993. 42 pp. the Marine Corps), General Merrill [ISBN 0–671–72703–6] A. McPeak, USAF (Chief of Staff of William E. Odom. America’s Military ARTICLES Revolution: Strategy and Structure the Air Force), Admiral David E. Paul Bracken, “The Military After After the Cold War. Washington: Jeremiah, USN (Vice Chairman, Next,” The Washington Quarterly, American University Press, 1993. Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Colin vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 186 pp. $22.95. L. Powell, USA (Chairman, Joint pp. 157–74 Chiefs of Staff), Admiral Frank B. [ISBN 1–879383–15–2] Lawrence Di Rita, “I Went Joint (But Kelso II, USN (Chief of Naval Opera- David Roth. Sacred Honor: A Biogra- I Didn’t Inhale),” U.S. Naval Insti- tions), General Gordon R. Sullivan, phy of Colin Powell. Grand Rapids, tute Proceedings, vol. 119, no. 7 USA (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army), and Mich.: Zondervan Publishing (July 1993), pp. 66–70. Admiral William Kime, USCG (Com- House, 1993. 256 pp. $19.99. mandant of the Coast Guard); (sec- [ISBN 0–310–60480–X] Scott A. Fedorchak, “It Must Be ond row, from left) General Dennis Joint,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- Reimer, USA (Forces Command), MONOGRAPHS ings, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 64–65. General George L. Butler, USAF Christopher J. Bowie et al. The New (Strategic Command), Admiral Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s William W. Mendel and Lamar Charles R. Larson, USN (Pacific Changing Role in Joint Theater Cam- Tooke, “Operational Logic: Select- Command), General George A. Joul- paigns. MR–149–AF. Santa Monica, ing the Center of Gravity,” Mili- wan, USA (Southern Command), Ad- Calif.: The RAND Corporation, tary Review, vol. 73, no. 6 (June miral Paul David Miller, USN (At- 1993. 85 pp. 1993), pp. 3–11. [Note: The June lantic Command), and General [ISBN 0–8330–1322–X] 1993 issue of Military Review is en- Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Central Com- tirely devoted to an examination R.A. Brown and Robert J. Schneller, mand); (third row, from left) General of operational art.] compilers. United States Naval Gary E. Luck, USA (United Nations Forces in Desert Shield and Desert Steven Metz, “Operational Level of Command/U.S. Forces, Korea), Gen- Storm: A Select Bibliography. Wash- Nuclear War Fighting: Missing or eral Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF ington: Naval Historical Unnecessary?” Airpower Journal , (Transportation Command), General Center, 1993. 50 pp. vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993), John M. Shalikashvili, USA (Euro- pp. 13–20. pean Command), General Charles A. John H. Cushman. Handbook for Joint Commanders. Annapolis: U.S. Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Horner, USAF (Space Command), Coalition Warfare,” Parameters, General Wayne Downing, USA (Spe- Naval Institute, 1993. 52 pp. $5.95. [ISBN 1–55750–144–0] vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993), cial Operations Command); Admiral pp. 74–85. William Smith, USN (U.S. Military Lorna S. Jaffe. The Development of the Wallace Thies and James D. Harris, Representative to NATO). JFQ Base Force, 1989–1992. Washing- ton: Joint History Office, Office of “An Alliance Unravels: The United the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs States and ANZUS,” Naval War of Staff, July 1993. 60 pp. College Review, vol. 96, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 98–126. JFQ

118 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Japan—a vanquished foe—became RETHINKING ASIAN the linchpin for long-range recon- Controlling the Waves: struction of the Asian-Pacific region, ALLIANCES Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign a fact that gnawed at the Philippines A Review Essay by Policy in Asia and other allies. by Ronald L. McGlothlen PATRICK M. CRONIN America lost no time in cultivat- New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. ing Japan. In Controlling the Waves: 320 pp. $27.95. [ISBN 0–393–03520–4] Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy lliances usually are marked by in Asia, Ronald McGlothlen recounts formal treaties whereby signa- Refighting the Last War: how statesmen laid the foundations Atories pledge to defend each Command and Crisis in Korea, for U.S. interests in the wake of other against external threats. But 1950–1953 World War II. Above all, they reha- many Cold War alliances were so by D. Clayton James with bilitated Japan as a bulwark from dominated by U.S. power, especially Anne Sharp Wells which, in Acheson’s words, the military power, that reciprocity was New York: The Free Press, 1993. United States could “control every supplanted because of asymmetrical 282 pp. $24.95. [ISBN 0–02–916001–4] wave in the Pacific Ocean.” Simi- contributions. Today America has larly, John Davies wrote: “The cen- five treaty partners in Asia and the The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: tral American objective [is] a stable Pacific: Japan, South Korea, Aus- Time for a Change Japan, integrated into the Pacific tralia, the Philippines, and Thailand. edited by Doug Bandow and economy, friendly to the United In the past these allies helped form a Ted Galen Carpenter States and...a ready and depend- cordon sanitaire against the spread of New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction able ally of the United States.” But it communism. The demise of the So- Publishers, 1992. 217 pp. $19.95. was Acheson, as Under Secretary and [ISBN 0–56000–583–1] viet Union has forced the United later Secretary of State, who was the States to review its security arrange- Bound to Empire: “extraordinary chief architect” of a ments in Asia as well as other re- postwar U.S.-centered order. Dean gions. But the old alliances must be The United States and the Philippines Acheson—working with perspica- recast not scrapped. As policymakers cious analysts like Paul Nitze, Dean look for ways to rebuild valuable se- by H.W. Brands New York: Oxford University Press, Rusk, and George Kennan—foresaw curity frameworks they should re- 1992. 384 pp. $27.95. reconstructing Japan as the “work- turn to the original intent of their [ISBN 0–19–507104–2] shop of Asia” whose trade with architects—to men like Dean Ache- Korea, Taiwan, China, and Southeast The Politics of Defense in son—and emphasize the critical role Asia would be the engine for power- Japan: Managing Internal of alliance structures to the eco- ing regional economic recovery. and External Pressures nomic well-being of America. Writes McGlothlen: “From the early by Joseph Keddell, Jr. Alliance Formation New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. 1930s through the end of World War When American leaders ap- 230 pp. $47.50. II, Japan aggressively pursued eco- praised the world in 1945 an aston- [ISBN 1–56324–129–3] nomic ascendancy in the Far East ishing number underscored the need under the guise of creating a ‘Greater U. S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, for a robust Asian order. Close team- East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ In the 1945–1990 work with Australia and New postwar years, Acheson sought a sur- by Roger Buckley Zealand ensured that those two na- prisingly similar ascendancy for Japan, New York: Cambridge University Press, but one in which Japan exchanged its tions would emerge as the southern 1992. 225 pp. $49.95. anchor in the postwar era. Similarly, [ISBN 0–521–35141–3] failed militarism for American tute- in Southeast Asia, where Filipinos lage, protection, and domination.” fought side-by-side with Americans A Search for Enemies: Acheson leaned heavily on the at Bataan, on Corregidor, and in America’s Alliances analysis of Nitze, who was then other battles, Manila figured large as After the Cold War Deputy Director of the State Depart- a subregional mainstay of postwar by Ted Galen Carpenter ment Office of International Trade. security. It is ironic, however, that Washington: CATO Institute, 1992. Although Kennan and others in 238 pp. $12.95. Foggy Bottom argued for a Europe- because of its wartime potential, [ISBN 0–932790–95–X] first strategy, Acheson and Nitze be- East Asia and the Pacific: lieved that Japan and the rest of Asia Challenges for U.S. Policy needed to be included in a recovery Patrick M. Cronin is a senior fellow in the by Robert G. Sutter, program akin to the Marshall Plan. Institute for National Strategic Studies at the with a contribution by Larry Niksch. Nitze noted that the region’s per- National Defense University and professorial Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, centage of global trade had been vir- 1992. 182 pp. $37.50. lecturer at the School of Advanced Interna- tually halved (from 15 to 8 percent) [ISBN 0–8133–1370–8] tional Studies at the Johns Hopkins Univer- in the span of several years, and sity. He is also executive editor of JFQ.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 119 Japanese exports had sunk to a In fairness to the Joint Chiefs, Korea, is lucidly communicated by measly 4.3 percent of prewar levels. President Truman had cut the de- D. Clayton James in Refighting the McGlothlen’s portrayal of Ache- fense budget 85 percent (from $81.6 Last War: Command and Crisis in son as a prescient geoeconomist is to $13.1 billion). Naturally, removing Korea, 1950–1953. somewhat hyperbolic. Nonetheless, the two divisions stationed in Korea As threat perceptions grew more he assembles a compelling case that was seen as a step toward matching alarming, the United States needed Acheson saw the need to reconstruct ends and means. As McGlothlen in- an eastern mooring to check com- an Asian economic system that fea- dicates, retrenchment was supported munist expansion. In marking the tured Japan at its apex. With more by the father of containment, George anniversary of Japan’s surrender in than $16 billion in annual exports, Kennan, who noted that the time 1946, MacArthur noted that Japan Acheson figured in mid-1947, Amer- had come to “cut our losses and get could be “a powerful bulwark for ica’s future hinged on foreign trade, out of there as gracefully as possi- peace or a dangerous springboard for which in turn required rebuilding the ble.” The policy, codified in NSC 8 of war.” Balance-of-power considera- economies of both Europe and Asia. April 1948, specifically precluded ditions reigned supreme. In the 1950s Accordingly, Acheson steadily worked rect U.S. intervention in Korea. In President Eisenhower repeatedly told to craft a beneficent assistance plan determining America’s vital interests the NSC to go gently on Japan, be- for Japan, slacken restrictions on in- the military consistently excluded cause “even a nation of America’s dustry, foil any stringent reparations Korea, instead relying on preeminence would be highly vul- settlement (which countries like the MacArthur’s island perimeter—across nerable without allies in Europe and Philippines coveted), negotiate a the Pacific from the Philippines Asia.” John Foster Dulles, then ar- comprehensive peace treaty, and re- through the Ryukyu Archipelago and ranging a peace accord in the Pa- construct Japan’s trading network. In Japan to the Aleutians. cific, warned that it would be “ex- each endeavor he finally triumphed NSC 8 did not long survive tremely unpleasant” if Japan was and, partly as a result, modern Japan Acheson’s return as Secretary of State dominated by the Kremlin: “[Should sprang from the ashes of the Pacific in 1949. But while he quickly imple- Japan] become a captive Soviet war like a phoenix. mented a policy that again commit- country, that would involve a major To a significant degree Acheson ted the United States to the eco- shift in the present power position was responsible for the commitment nomic rehabilitation of Korea, troop in the world today.” Echoing this to Korea, if only because he saw it as withdrawals lunged ahead with zero-sum mentality Vice President indispensable to Japan’s recovery. He calamitous results. Few doubted that Richard Nixon gave a clear indica- reversed a policy of withdrawing the North Korean army of 125,000 tion in 1953 of why close relations troops from Korea and overcame was a lethal threat to the lightly with Japan were necessary, “if Japan military resistance to a long-term al- armed South Korean force half its falls under communist domination,” liance with Seoul. In 1947, as Under size. Indeed, McGlothlen maintains he reasoned, “all of Asia falls.” Secretary of State, Acheson success- that in February 1949 some CIA ana- America’s role in the Korean fully set in motion a policy aimed at lysts predicted North Korea would War, and thus in the postwar U.S.- underwriting the Korean economy. pounce across the 38th parallel just Korean alliance, was one conse- Unfortunately, the commitment in as soon as America’s retreat was quence of the belief that military de- Korea was feeble, and it deteriorated complete. When the Army Chief of feat anywhere could undermine the after Acheson’s departure from the Staff, General Omar Bradley, queried Free World’s struggle. Consider the scene in mid-1947. At that time, in his staff about possible contingency words of General Matthew Ridgway response to a Soviet demarche de- plans, they replied that a U.N. “po- speaking to the Eighth Army in the manding a withdrawal of foreign lice action” would be the only feasi- dark hours of January 1951 about troops, the State-War-Navy Coordi- ble option. Alas, the notion of a the purpose of the war: “The real is- nating Committee asked the Joint U.S.-led “police action” was dis- sues are whether the power of West- Chiefs of Staff to estimate the im- missed by the JCS as totally imprac- ern civilization . . . shall defy and de- pact of extracting all Americans tical. Hence, when the last troops feat communism.” This East-West from the Korean peninsula. Reach- left Korea in June 1949, the United contest became the foremost reason ing a conclusion that anticipated States had neither established a suffi- for formalizing security arrange- that of Doug Bandow and Ted Galen cient South Korean army nor devel- ments with the Philippines and Carpenter in The U.S.-South Korean oped contingency plans to deal with Thailand. As superpower rivalry Alliance: Time for a Change, the Joint the real possibility of a North Korean grew more intense and Washington Chiefs led by General Dwight Eisen- invasion. Given this attitude it is as- became more obsessed with Mu- hower provided an unequivocal re- tounding that just months later nich—that aggression must not be sponse: “The United States has little American troops were dying in the appeased—a scramble for allies strategic interest in maintaining the defense of an ally “of little strategic known as “pactomania” erupted present troops based in Korea.” interest.” The impact of the Depart- during the 1950s. ment of State on military strategy and policy toward Korea, as well as the resolution to defend South

120 JFQ / Autumn 1993 This was the larger context of fight against communism. But when IN TAKING THE UNITED STATES the alliance structure in Asia, in Philippine President Diosdado Maca- into the Korean conflict...[Presi- which the Philippines played a sig- pagal tried to dispatch a token force dent] Truman . . . attempted to sal- nificant part. Strategically the to Vietnam, he was bitterly opposed vage the American role as a world archipelago was a vital link in the is- by the then senate president, Ferdi- policeman by having its interven- land chain that constituted Amer- nand Marcos. Some months later tion by force sanctioned by the ica’s line of defense against commu- President Marcos made an ostenta- United Nations. The military ele- nism. The long relationship between tious state visit to the White House ment, though predominantly the United States and the Philip- where he persuaded Johnson to ex- American, was to appear to be a pines is well chronicled by H.W. tend $80 million in aid for sending a truly international force and to Brands in Bound to Empire: The 2,000-man Philippine unit to Viet- represent a large segment of global United States and the Philippines. nam. The more the United States opinion regarding the particular From Commodore Dewey’s victory thought they needed a show of al- crisis. Actually, the U.N. guise at over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay liance solidarity, the more allies took the high-command level was so and the subsequent annexation of advantage of American largesse. thin in 1950 that [General] the Philippines to the closing of the After all, quips a sardonic Brands, MacArthur used the same officers Subic Bay naval base last year, that is “what allies are for.” to head the principal sections—for America has alternately treated the Turning to another aspect of example, intelligence, operations, Philippines as a special partner or a alliance management, the books and personnel—in the headquar- colony. In its association with the under review demonstrate that ters of both the United Nations Philippines, the American failure to domestic or bureaucratic considera- Command and the United States match global security concerns with tions can affect alliances. For Far East Command. He was under more localized responsibilities pro- instance, Buckley analyzes the rift strict orders to issue his periodic vides lessons for future alliances between the Departments of State reports to the U.N. Security Coun- with smaller partners. and Defense over how to incorpo- cil through the JCS, which freely Because the main objective was rate a peaceful Japan into the U.S.- edited and censored them; and he to align states against the Soviet engineered postwar world. Due to was to have no direct communica- bloc, U.S. officials tended to disre- the occupation, the military tended tion with the Security Council gard corrupt, autocratic regimes in to have an advantage over diplomats whatsoever. Manila. As a consequence, argues when it came to Japan. As Ambas- Four decades later the United Brands, Washington let the Philip- sador Edwin Reischauer noted in States would turn to a variant of pines be governed by a cabal of 1960 when he left the banks of the this scheme again, acting as po- “privileged collaborators.” He opines Charles for Tokyo, “To many Japa- liceman in the Iraq-Kuwait affair that a more value-based foreign pol- nese, an American general or admi- and providing a large majority of icy might have impelled changes on ral seemed much more a genuine the combat forces of the coalition the Filipino ruling classes. Power, American than a Harvard professor.” whose mission was to enforce a not ideology, was the criterion of Thus, even before policymakers had dozen U.N. Security Council reso- greatest import for security planners. been forced to take the Japanese lutions regarding Iraq’s aggression. In November 1950 Truman ap- defense industry out of mothballs In 1950 and again in 1991 the proved an NSC paper defining policy because of the Korean War ($4 mil- United States would undertake a toward the Philippines. Written lion in munitions were purchased military task enjoying U.N. sanc- against the backdrop of Mao’s vic- from a former enemy), U.S. forces tion and claiming to have world tory in China, the conflict in Korea, were quietly molding the embryonic opinion largely behind its use of and France’s deepening predicament Japanese security forces. In effect, force. During and after the Korean in Indochina, the paper dubbed the the Armed Forces were forging a spe- War some thoughtful observers Philippines an essential part of the cial relationship with their fledgling questioned whether the compro- island chain encircling communism counterparts, more modestly but not mises, complications, and rein the Far East. Thus, by 1951, the unlike the British-Japanese alliance sources drain involved in trying to basic structure of the U.S. alliance of naval secretariats some five dec- maintain the roles of the global system in Asia had been born. ades earlier. While the results of this policeman and the international military influence on Japan proved command were realistic and suc- Growth and Adaptation to be salubrious, the early years of cessful in furthering American Brands pulls few punches in re- U.S.-Japan relations aptly demon- strategic interests. counting the volatility of Philippine strate how different agencies within relations in the 1960s as President the same government can pursue Lyndon Johnson escalated involve- —From Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, and implement alliance policies ment in Vietnam. With Saigon quite autonomous of one another. under siege, Johnson pressured al- 1950–1953 by D. Clayton James with lies, among them Manila, to show Anne Sharp Wells solidarity with the Free World in the

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 121 Managing alliances also centers states that we may never know the when reassessing U.S. interests. After on operationalizing military cooper- actual strength of the alliance unless all, American (and, undoubtedly, ation, that is, planning and conduct- a conflict leads to the ultimate deci- allied) military analysts should be ing combined operations. Notwith- sion that befalls allies: “. . . [the] al- haunted by the vacillation toward standing some limited successes, liance has not yet been called upon Korea in the early postwar period Joseph Keddell in The Politics of De- during its history to confront the ul- and the Philippines at various times fense in Japan: Managing Internal and timate justification of any interna- during this century. External Pressures explains why Japan tional pact—solidarity in the council As the United States is pressured has been so reluctant to undertake a chamber and on the battlefield.” to assume a greater role in peace-en- greater role in regional and global The future of the U.S.-Japan al- forcement missions, Carpenter’s security. Throughout the Cold War, liance is a matter of some specula- guiding rules merit deliberation. Japanese defense policy was princi- tion. The past, however, provides a First, we must define vital security pally designed to manage conflicting grounding for forecasters and policy- interests more narrowly than during American and Japanese domestic po- makers alike. In particular, under- the Cold War. Unimpressed by the litical pressures; the United States standing why Japan remained a mili- lessons of Korea, Carpenter asserts tried to measure the international tary midget while becoming an that vital national interests should military balance while Japan saw economic giant goes far toward ap- have direct, immediate, and substan- things through the prism of mutual preciating the impact of domestic tial consequences. Second, in for- security. This proved dispiriting to politics on alliance management and malizing alliances decisionmakers Japanese who sought a defense role on this bilateral alliance in particular. should have greater latitude to avoid for their country, but in the 1950s commitments with imprecise, long- Prime Minister Shigeuro Yoshida de- Termination or Transformation? term obligations that can limit liberately subordinated Japan to the In A Search for Enemies: America’s American options when significant alliance to concentrate on economic Alliances After the Cold War, Ted interests are at stake or that lead to expansion. Galen Carpenter argues vehemently entanglement in irrelevant conflicts. Although Japan took steps to- for disengagement or, more eu- Third, the United States should resist ward a larger defense role in the phemistically, for “selected engage- pursuing ambitious international mi- 1980s under Prime Minister Yasuhiro ment.” Asian alliances, as well as lieu goals like stability which are Nakasone, it was the Gulf War that others like NATO, are anachronistic. unattainable at acceptable cost or finally jarred Japan out of postwar What Washington must do, Carpen- risk. Though desirable, in the final insularity. Tokyo belatedly con- ter contends, is stand up and declare analysis such goals are not essential tributed $13 billion to coalition cof- strategic independence from these to American security. fers, but questions lingered about vestiges of the Cold War. He faults What is striking about these whether Japan was pulling its fair President Bush’s New World Order in books, however, is not the picture of share within the alliance and inter- which U.S. forces undergird global irredeemable decay, but rather the national community. Only after the stability as wooly-minded conser- impressive resiliency of American al- Gulf War did the Diet pass the vatism: it only perpetuates an out- liances in overcoming adversity. The United Nations Peacekeeping Opera- moded alliance structure at excessive essential glue that held the alliances tions bill which authorized the cre- cost. Carpenter calculates that even together was a willingness and abil- ation of a 2,000-person civilian and a vastly scaled-back NATO commit- ity to lead on the part of the United military organization. This unit ment of 100,000 troops will cost at States. The leadership question is ac- could, under specific conditions, least $90 billion a year, and 98,000 centuated by the recent quest of the serve in noncombat roles in U.N. or so troops afloat and ashore in the Clinton administration and others missions. Shortly thereafter the first Asia-Pacific region will cost another throughout the Asia-Pacific region to ground forces deployed overseas to $40 billion. This presumably means establish a multilateral mechanism the U.N. peacekeeping operation in that every dollar spent only re- for security dialogue and coopera- Cambodia. While the peacekeeping dounds to the advantage of others, tion. Just as we need to be cognizant bill and the Cambodian deployment not to the United States. Further- of our own limitations, so too must represent a watershed in Japan’s more, Carpenter prefers surgical re- we be aware of the limitations of postwar military posture, they are sponses to commitments that are multilateralism in Asia. For instance, modest, sharply-circumscribed just as Manichean as those proposed it is doubtful that the United States events. Keddell elucidates why these during the Cold War, for instance, can use its bilateral ties as building incremental steps were almost pre- when Eisenhower dubbed the blocks for a nascent Pacific defense determined by Japan’s postwar polit- Japanese “indestructible partners” community. Theoretically alliances ical system, given its built-in, multi- (read “permanent allies”). may provide a bridge for regional in- layered conservatism. Ignoring the more dyspeptic stitution building; practically speak- Whether Japan’s defense posture criticisms of current alliances, Car- ing, military alliances tend to be in- of the future will change radically is penter seems to be on surer footing ferior instruments for integration. doubtful. In U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplo- Economic means seem to carry more macy, 1945–1990, Roger Buckley weight throughout the region. But

122 JFQ / Autumn 1993 given the difficulties nowadays in forge new commitments to Singa- of Defence Staff. It is a tribute to the separating economic and military pore and other nations of the re- authors, particularly Bramall, that security, the United States has wisely gion? Or will the United States per- they do not flinch from pointing out stepped up support for multilateral haps agree on a more positive short-comings in the system they approaches in the Asia-Pacific region cooperative security agenda than the helped shape and some of those —not only through participation in traditional threat-based concept and under whom they served. both the Association of Southeast thus seek the prospect of a meaning- In Britain, as The Chiefs makes Nations and the Asia-Pacific Eco- ful multilateral security community? clear, military reforms often occur in nomic Cooperation forum, but also While the books reviewed offer some response to failure. The Committee by helping to establish a pan-Pacific conflicting answers to these ques- of Imperial Defence was established security debate. tions, they will equip the reader to in 1904 after embarrassing reverses There also is a fundamental in- better appreciate the significance of during the Boer War. The Chiefs of compatibility between alliances and Asian-Pacific security issues. JFQ Staff (COS) Committee was formed collective security. That is why the in 1923 in response to the nearly current move toward Asian multilat- disastrous clash of what the authors eralism should not strive for collec- CHIEFS FROM call “political dictatorship versus tive security but simply cooperative professional judgment” in World security—or basically, confidence ACROSS THE War I. One chief was selected to building. For the foreseeable future, ESTUARY double as the chairman of the com- a mere forum for security dialogue mittee, but without a separate sup- cannot replace an alliance. Among A Book Review by porting staff. The COS worked so other things, in the event of war, an WALTER S. POOLE well that no serious reorganization infant multilateral organization was attempted for almost twenty would face the traditional problem years. The rise of the Chief of De- of leadership. The Chiefs: The Story of the fence Staff to pre-eminence took Today, economics is the engine United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff place gradually, through changes of international politics. Alliances launched by Admiral Louis Mount- by William Jackson and Lord Bramall support stability in order to allow batten in the 1960’s, and continued London, New York: Brassey’s (U.K.), economic progress to continue to during the 1980’s under two Secre- 1992. 508 pp. $29.95. bring more nations of Asia into the taries of State for Defence, John Nott [ISBN 0–08–040370–0] industrialized (if not necessarily and Michael Haseltine. democratic) world. Economic con- It is illuminating to compare cerns were central in the postwar You may take the most gallant sailor, the post-1945 evolution of the years; they remain of paramount the most intrepid airman, and the most British COS with that of the Joint concern in contemporary Asia. And audacious soldier, put them at a table Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in this country. just as Acheson recognized a half together—and what do you get? The The United States acquired a Secre- century ago, Japan remains at the sum of their fears! tary of Defense in 1947, whose staff heart of regional economic prosper- and authority expanded enormously ity. This could easily lead one to em- inston Churchill’s words over the following two decades, and brace the conclusion offered by still have a ring of truth a JCS Chairman in 1949, whose in- Robert Sutter in East Asia and the Wabout them despite decades fluence soon outgrew formal limita- Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy, that of effort in London and Washington tions imposed by law on the post. our interests argue for maintaining to foster crisp but truly joint deci- During the same period in Britain, traditional ties with Japan and other sionmaking. In The Chiefs: The Story the Minister of Defence had a tiny nations in Asia and the Pacific of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff staff and imprecise, non-executive region whose interests coincide with the British side of that effort is well coordinating functions that did not those of America. presented. The authors of this work impinge upon the powers and re- U.S. alliances in the Pacific are have unique qualifications: General sponsibilities of the chiefs or service being reexamined in light of the end Sir William Jackson was Assistant ministries. It was not until 1957 that of the Cold War. The critical ques- Chief of General Staff and Quarter- Marshal of the RAF Sir William tion is whether the typhoon-like master General before becoming a Dickson became Chief of Defence winds of the post-Cold War world reputable military historian, and Staff (CDS) as well as Chairman of will completely rip apart the U.S. Field Marshal Lord Bramall served as the COS Committee. Yet, with only military umbrella which, although both Chief of General Staff and Chief a small briefing staff of his own, tattered, still stands over several Dickson was really a toothless tiger. Asian allies. Conversely, will Wash- Although a Defence Ministry ington feel compelled to identify a Walter S. Poole is a member of the Office was created in 1964, management new enemy such as China around of Joint History and the author of three remained decentralized in the ser- which to recast old alliances and volumes in the series The History of the vices. The army, naval, and air staffs Joint Chiefs of Staff. remained separate but were brought

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 123 The Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in 1943. The British officers (from left to right): Rear Admiral W.R. Peterson, RN; Field Marshal Sir John Dill; Brigadier Vivian Dykes; Lieutenant General G.N. MacReady; and Air Marshal D.C.S. Evill, RAF. The American officers (from right to left): Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; Admiral William D. Leahy, USN; Brigadier General J.R. Deane, USA; General George C. Marshall, USA; and Lieutenant General J.T. McNearney, USA. together in joint committees—an approach attempted by the United States in World War II and judged inadequate. Admiral Mountbatten was the first CDS to outshine the service chiefs, and he did so by exploiting his close ties with the politi-

cal establishment and by resorting U.S. Naval Historical Center to devious, even deceitful methods. Bramall was on Mountbatten’s staff of their vice chiefs, reduced execu- But Jackson and Bramall see and writes bluntly about his chief’s tive staffs, and shifted management danger in the new dispensation: “At foibles: “‘I was staying at Windsor responsibility to the commanders in the heart of the matter lay the degra- last weekend,’ he would say be- chief (CINCs) in the field. Similarly, dation of specialist Land, Sea, and nignly at the start of a chiefs’ meet- the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 Air advice in the formulation of De- ing, ‘and she said how glad she was made the Chairman of the Joint fence policy and decisionmaking.” that we were going to do so and Chiefs of Staff the principal military In 1982, the First Sea Lord, Admiral so. . . .’ The fact that the particular advisor to the President and directed Henry Leach, was the only chief on subject was of such complexity or that the Joint Staff respond to the hand when Prime Minister Thatcher triviality that the Queen could not Chairman alone, not the corporate received her first briefing on the im- be expected to have an opinion or JCS. Jackson and Bramall contrast pending Argentine invasion of the interest in it, destroyed the story’s the way in which the corporate COS Falklands. Leach’s judgment that the credibility, but that seemed to con- waged the Falklands War of 1982 Navy could respond, the authors re- cern him very little.” Unlike the sit- with how the CDS alone made deci- count, gave her the courage to act. uation within the U.S. Armed Forces, sions during the Gulf War ten years Yet, under the post-Haseltine organi- where the Navy usually opposed later, leaving the chiefs to supervise zation, the First Sea Lord could not centralization while the Army and deployments and logistic support. have dealt directly with and advised the Air Force advocated it, Mount- Within the Pentagon, in the wake of the Prime Minister. This seems like a batten found no allies among the Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman, plausible argument, but we must service chiefs for a more centralized General Colin Powell, was perform- bear in mind that specialist advice is system of control. Even adding a Di- ing in exactly the same manner, first not always sound, as illustrated by rector of Plans to the CDS’s staff pro- acting and then calling the service U.S. military history. During the voked intense opposition. Mount- chiefs into his office to explain what winter of 1970–71 a major incursion batten’s successor as CDS, an Army he had done. into Laos, aimed at cutting the Ho officer, moved back toward a con- Britain in some respects has Chi Minh Trail, was under consider- sensus and corporate approach to gone farther than the United States ation. The Chairman, Admiral decisionmaking. in trimming the sails of the services. Thomas Moorer, naturally did not In the 1980’s, however, major One wonders, for example, if we feel qualified to render judgment reforms in both the United States could follow their lead by dispensing and queried the Army Chief of Staff, and the United Kingdom moved with vice chiefs. Originally, the General William Westmoreland, their respective defense establish- American chiefs were supposed to who was a former commander in ments in precisely the same direc- concentrate on joint issues and their Vietnam as well as other senior tion. John Nott pushed through vice chiefs on internal service mat- Army officers. Their opinion was changes making the CDS alone the ters. Now that the chiefs have that the South Vietnamese Army principal military advisor to the largely lost their joint functions, are had improved sufficiently to carry government as well as making cen- the vice chiefs really necessary? out the operation. So Admiral tral operational and military policy Moorer recommended to the civilian staffs responsible to him. Michael leadership that the operation should Haseltine later stripped the services

124 JFQ / Autumn 1993 proceed. Thus Lam Son 719 was The Chiefs is drawn entirely launched, and the specialists were from published works, supple- RUSSIA’S proven wrong all too quickly. mented by the authors’ wealth of One may be skeptical, too, of experience. Within these limits they MILITARY PAST Jackson and Bramall’s claim that have produced an eminently sound A Book Review by “five minds are invariably better and readable book. But there are BRIAN R. SULLIVAN than one” in assessing risks and op- instances where they betray what tions. True enough if the five minds appears to be an insular bias. Admi- speak with a single, clear voice. But ral William Leahy was not the first Strategy and Power in Russia, frequently the pre-1986 Joint Chiefs Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff; 1600–1914 of Staff did not; their five minds appointed as Chief of Staff to Presi- by William C. Fuller, Jr. gave rise to either a split recommen- dent Franklin Roosevelt in 1942, his New York: The Free Press, 1992. dation or a compromise which main function was liaison between 557 pp. $35.00. played to the lowest common de- the White House and the JCS. Dur- [ISBN 0–02–910977–9] nominator. What you got, to para- ing 1944, Hitler did not reinforce phrase Churchill, was the sum of the Italian front by drawing many he past can often provide the their parochialism. first-class divisions from France and best guidelines for an uncer- Jackson and Bramall also warn Russia. Apparently echoes of the tain future. With the collapse against “policy being hijacked by wartime Anglo-American debate T of Soviet power, those who are curi- bureaucrats who might be influ- over the merits of a Mediterranean ous about future Russian strategy enced more by political and eco- strategy have not completely died would do well to read Strategy and nomic factors than by the best avail- down. There is no conclusive evi- Power in Russia by William C. Fuller, able professional judgment” and dence, at least in American minds, Jr., who is a specialist on Russian mil- provide two classic examples as evi- that the Italian campaign con- itary history and a professor in the dence. First, the Treasury kept such a tributed decisively to the success of Strategy and Policy Department at tight rein on military spending dur- Overlord. As to the 1956 Suez crisis, the Naval War College. In this ab- ing the 1920’s and much of the it is wrong to say that the threat of sorbing book, Fuller applies the ana- 1930’s that Britain was woefully un- Soviet intervention “frightened lytical method developed at Newport prepared to fight Germany. Second, Washington more than it did Lon- which uses historical case studies to John Nott would have emasculated don.” Both Eisenhower and Dulles critique approaches to Russian strat- the Royal Navy’s surface fleet except condemned the Anglo-French inva- egy. Strategy and Power in Russia pro- for the fact that the Argentine junta sion for reasons of principle, not vides brilliant explanations of how acted before the worst cutbacks took fear. Finally, the notion of a NATO the tsars employed force to achieve place. This is not to make a brief for multilateral nuclear force did not die political goals from the early 16th Neville Chamberlain, who as Chan- because Bonn went cold on the idea. century up to the eve of World War I. cellor of the Exchequer and Prime It was Prime Minister Harold Wilson Although Fuller has produced Minister insisted on strict economies who played the role of executioner neither a military history of imperial until the Anschluss in March 1938. because he had a razor-thin majority Russia nor a study of its military the- But, as the authors acknowledge, in the House of Commons and some ory, there is much to learn about Chamberlain was reacting to wider Germanophobic Laborites were both from this well-written book. It trends: the pacifism grown out of ready to join the Tories on the issue is an expertly-led tour across three the bloodshed of World War I, over- and bring down his government. centuries of war and military policy stretched Imperial responsibilities, But these are minor points of from which a clear pattern emerges. and an economy that lacked the clarification in an otherwise well In sum, effective Russian strategies vigor of the Victorian era. John Nott researched book. applied native genius and indigenous also was taking account of trends The Chiefs makes worthwhile resources to strategic challenges, that had reduced Britain to barely a reading for anyone interested in the while attempts to adopt purely middle-sized power. For logical rea- higher realms of defense organiza- Western methods usually failed. sons, political and economic factors tion. Unfortunately there is no The book begins its account in a can override “the best available pro- comparable volume that tells the period when the extinction of the fessional judgment.” No one has story of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ruling dynasty had left Russia with- ever devised a safeguard against bad this side of the estuary. JFQ out national leadership, plunging the forecasting. President Harry Truman, country into civil war and anarchy. who has become a folk hero in recent years, rejected JCS warnings and pursued an economic program Brian R. Sullivan is a senior fellow in the that left the Army unprepared for Institute for National Strategic Studies at the war that broke out in Korea. the National Defense University. He has taught European military history at both the Naval War College and Yale University.

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 125 Its neighbors stripped huge territories roads for military transportation, and to achieve the impossible goal of from the carcass of what seemed to construct a network of frontier forti- total overthrow of the Swedes but at be a dying land. When the Romanovs fications. Every spring, more serfs acquiring territory along the Baltic of seized the throne, they bought peace were drafted to replace the tens of strategic or economic value. He was at home by acknowledging these for- thousands lost the previous year in prepared to endure operational de- eign conquests in order to consoli- battle, and through disease, expo- feat, retreating into the vast interior date their power. But the Romanovs sure, and exhaustion. The serf-sol- to gain strategic superiority by use of planned to win back the lost lands diers that survived their years of ser- Russian geography, in order to draw and then expand their realm. vice formed an autonomous military the Swedish King Charles XII after However, subsequent Russian society rigidly obedient to imperial him. Only when the enemy was campaigns to recapture Smolensk command. Given the size of the pop- severely debilitated by several from the Poles in 1632–33 and seize ulation and the tsar’s sacred author- months of campaigning did Peter the Crimea in 1687–89 failed. De- ity, Russian conditions were offer battle, winning the crucial vic- spite investing vast resources and im- amenable to a system that spent un- tory at Poltava in June 1709. porting foreign military experts and told lives and caused enormous Peter still had to batter the technology, tsarist armies were re- human suffering. Swedes for twelve more years. After pulsed with huge losses. After Peter Of equal importance, Peter in- shifting the fighting north to the the Great came to power in 1689–90 sisted that strategic and operational Baltic, the Tsar built a navy and he did have some success against the issues be debated openly and that learned to conduct combined opera- Turks. But when a small Swedish proposals be reached collectively in tions. The Russian fleet smashed the force shattered his army at Narva in councils of war with his generals. The Swedes at Cape Hangö in 1714. 1700 Peter realized the need for a tsar made the ultimate decisions him- Thereafter, the Russians launched new approach to war. He did not self but his discussions of military af- major amphibious raids that culmi- adopt Western methods. Instead, as fairs served as extraordinary seminars nated in landings between 1719 and Fuller shows, he did the opposite: in on war for Russian commanders, pro- 1721 in Sweden. These punitive ex- desperation, he studied the peculiari- vided for the widest possible play of peditions ravished the Swedish econ- ties of Russian society and adapted imagination, created a broad range of omy and finally forced the Swedes to them to the situation. options, and prevented the stagnation cede the Baltic coastline Peter had Peter took advantage of his de- of dogmatic thinking. fought the war to acquire. Along the fenseless serfs by squeezing them for National backwardness and na- way, Fuller argues, Peter the Great taxes, as well as for manual labor and tive genius produced an army of con- haphazardly created what can be military service. He dragooned serfs siderable, albeit hardly overwhelm- called the Russian way of war. to create naval shipbuilding and ing, power. Peter employed this In the seventy years following weapons industries, build canals and military force carefully, not aiming Peter’s death in 1725, his successors,

appeared and six others are slated to First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for WORLD come out in the next few months. Guadalcanal. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., WAR II The Aleutians Campaign, June 1942–Au- Washington: Government Printing gust 1943. Washington: Government Office, 1992. 52 pp. REMEMBERED Printing Office, 1993. 140 pp. [PCN 190 003117 00] [ISBN 0–16–041801–1] Outpost in the North Atlantic: Marines HE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF in the Defense of Iceland. James A. WORLD WAR II is being The Marine Corps Historical Center Donovan, Washington: Government Tcommemorated in various is publishing the “Marines in World Printing Office, 1992. 32 pp. ways, including publication by the War II Commemorative Series” [PCN 190 003118 00] services of historical monographs which thus far includes the follow- A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle and pamphlets on the European ing titles: for Wake Island. Robert J. Cressman, and Pacific theaters. Washington: Government Printing Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up for War. Office, 1992. 37 pp. The Naval Historical Center will Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Washington: [PCN 190 003119 00] republish a series of “Combat Narra- Government Printing Office, 1991. tives” of campaigns which were orig- 24 pp. [PCN 190 003115 00] See the previous issue of JFQ inally printed during World War II Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, (Summer 1993) for a selection of by the Office of Naval Intelligence. 7 December 1941. Robert J. Cressman titles on World War II published by The first volume in this series has and J. Michael Wenger, Washington: both the Army and the Air Force. Government Printing Office, 1992. 31 pp. [PCN 190 003116 00]

126 JFQ / Autumn 1993 especially Catherine the Great, for- gave way to autocratic decisions at army. And yet, Fuller argues, the malized this improvised military sys- the center and competitive, uncoor- empire’s collapse in 1917 was not tem to conquer huge new provinces dinated expansion on the borders by inevitable, although to have avoided in the course of nine major wars. The semi-independent provincial mili- it would have required a long period Russian army even defeated Frederick tary governors. Territory was of peace, entailing painful conces- the Great, only to surrender its gains grabbed for hollow reasons of pres- sions to Russia’s enemies. This on the orders of the mentally unbal- tige, with little thought to its strate- Nicholas II and his officials were anced Peter III. The history of Europe gic value or the geopolitical conse- unwilling to do and thus they from 1689 to 1815 is often described quences. Such pointless greed led to marched to catastrophe in the sum- as a struggle for supremacy between Russian military disasters during the mer of 1914 rather than back down England and France. But Fuller makes empire’s last century. during the Serbian crisis. clear that such a perspective is a The defeats which Russia suf- Fuller’s analysis of imperial Rus- purely Western interpretation. In fered also were the result of other sia’s military strategy suggests paral- fact, it was really France and Russia weaknesses. Technological backward- lels with the communist era. One that were dueling for continental ness, combined with the rapid devel- can see Stalin as compressing the dominance. opments of Western military and accomplishments of Peter the Great Napoleon seemed to decide the naval technology after 1815, pre- and mistakes of the later tsars into a contest when he entered Moscow in sented the tsars and their armies 25-year period, first creating a power- 1812. Within three months, how- with an apparently insoluble contra- ful military machine, then using it to ever, the Russians under Alexander I diction. The imperial system was expand the Soviet empire beyond drove out the French, employing ba- based on war and expansion but, Russian ability to control it. The sically the same methods that had from the mid-19th century on, it Soviet technological decline in the brought Peter victory over the could only acquire territory of value 1970s and 1980s, followed by defeat Swedes a century earlier. (In detailing by fighting enemies of superior in Afghanistan and revolt of the sub- this victory, Fuller offers an engross- strength. Defeat in the Crimean War ject peoples, adds weight to the ap- ing description of the 1812 cam- sent a tremendous shock wave pearance of history repeating itself. paign.) At the time of Napoleon’s throughout the Russian imperial sys- Whether or not such analogies downfall, the Russian empire had tem and directly led to the abolition are accurate, the history of Russian reached its apogee. Russian armies of serfdom and a policy of modern- military strategy does raise serious marched into Paris, a feat which ization. But the force unleashed by questions about the future. How far Stalin later grumbled even his victo- reform disrupted the entire system; will Russians go to regain those terri- rious Red Army of 1945 was unable for example, a law abolishing the tories lost with the collapse of the to match. military enslavement of serfs injected Soviet Union? Will they limit their The second half of Fuller’s book politically discontented conscripts ambitions to Russian-inhabited lands is devoted to the rapid decline of into the main institution which had or seek to reincorporate potentially Russian strength after 1815. The tsars supported the monarchy. Mean- rebellious regions? Indications are of the 19th century clung to the sys- while, Russian expansion continued, that Russians will establish volunteer tem created by Peter—victory over even though it led to new military forces. But will this mean emulating Napoleon had given it an invincible disasters. Paradoxically, a fear of re- tsars and communists by creating aura—but they demolished the real vealing weakness created a psycho- aggressive, ideologically committed pillars of Russian strength. To the al- logical imperative to project the ap- legions or establishing a military ready conquered peoples of East Eu- pearance of irresistible strength. But devoted to Western ideas of constitu- rope, later tsars added the tribes of instead, Russian attempts at territo- tional order and territorial defense? the Caucasus and Central Asia. If the rial aggrandizement in East Asia led How will the Russian government Russians had been victors in the wars to defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. overcome technological backward- of 1853–56, 1877–78, and 1904–05, Growing Russian fear of ness? Will Russia remain strategically they would have also annexed mil- Germany and Austria-Hungary, isolated or seek allies? lions of Turks, Kurds, Manchurians, prompted by rivalry for influence Strategy and Power in Russia does and Koreans. As it was, the monar- over the Balkans, led Tsar Alexander not answer all of these questions. But chy was transformed into a restive III to form an alliance with France in it does provide a historical perspec- empire of rebellious nations. Policing the 1890s. It had become painfully tive for making educated guesses so many non-Russian lands pinned evident to Russian officials that the about the future. Despite present down tsarist armies on garrison duty empire was too weak to defend itself. difficulties, the Russian people re- or in frequent counterinsurgency Yet they retained a system that main by far the largest national campaigns. By the mid-19th century forced expansion. Even the French group in Europe and possess great maintaining the empire taxed Rus- alliance actually increased Russian reserves of human strength and sian military capacity to the limit. weakness by placing additional genius. When those resources are Even worse, the tsars discarded strategic demands on the Russian once again harnessed to an effective the strategic planning system that strategy, Russia will regain the status had served them so well. Debate of a great military power JFQ

Autumn 1993 / JFQ 127 POSTSCRIPT

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KUDOS MISCELLANEA As the inaugural issue of Joint The F–5E pictured alongside the Force Quarterly came off the presses Air Force F–16C on page 22 of issue on June 25, 1993 (right), it marked 1 (Summer 1993) is Jordanian, not the beginning of the end of a period Saudi Arabian as indicated in the of gestation that stretched from a caption. Thanks to Colonel Bander concept briefing presented to the Al Saud, Royal Saudi Air Force, for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on pointing out the error. November 4, 1992, to the publica- The caption on page 28 of issue tion date of July 2, 1993. While get- 1 should have read “A GBU–27 pro- ting there may not have been half totype laser guided bomb being the fun, launching a journal has dropped from an F–117 stealth been rewarding. The satisfaction fighter”—a correction provided by that the editors experienced on re- Capt J.D. Ramsey, USAF. ceiving the first copies of JFQ was The Marine Corps aircraft likewise shared by others outside the (Jim Peters) shown launching a missile in the precincts of Fort McNair who helped JFQ photo on page 35 of issue 1 is an to turn a concept into a reality. F–4, not an A–4. Among them are members of the David Haddock and Frederick Uhlick, The JCS medal depicted on the Government Printing Office and both of the Government Printing Of- back cover of issue 1 was presented Gateway Press. fice, and to William Fante, of Gate- by General Earle G. Wheeler, USA The editors wish to acknowledge way Press in Louisville, Kentucky, for (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), to the outstanding contribution of their invaluable advice and support General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA William Rawley, Typography and in publishing the inaugural issue. JFQ (Supreme Allied Commander, Eu- Design Division, Government Print- rope), in May 1968. (Medal loaned ing Office, who designed and laid by Special Collections, National out the first issue. Thanks also go to Defense University Library.) JFQ

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