The Politics of United States Army Doctrine
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2018 The Politics of United States Army Doctrine David C. Rasmussen The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2502 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE POLITICS OF UNITED STATES ARMY DOCTRINE by DAVID C. RASMUSSEN A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in political science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2018 © 2018 DAVID C. RASMUSSEN All Rights Reserved ii The Politics of United States Army Doctrine by David C. Rasmussen This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in political science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Susan Woodward Chair of Examining Committee Date Alyson Cole Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT The Politics of United States Army Doctrine by David C. Rasmussen Advisor: Susan Woodward The US Army made four significant shifts in the content of its capstone operations doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 / FM 3-0, along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift back toward low-intensity unconventional warfare – five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. Did politics have an impact on any of these shifts? Understanding how politics might affect Army doctrine is important considering that the US Army is a doctrine-based military organization. Through this research, I examine whether and how domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics shaped or constrained Army doctrinal choice preceding these four shifts. I found that domestic politics had a minor impact on one shift and a moderate impact on two; that international politics had a moderate impact on one shift and a minor impact on two; and that bureaucratic politics had a significant impact on one shift, a moderate impact on a second, and a minor impact on a third. Overall, politics had more of an impact on the two earlier cases than the latter two, suggesting that as the Army began to rely more on doctrine from 1976 and beyond, that same doctrine may have served to insulate the Army from politics to some degree. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...vi List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………….vii List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………viii Chapter 1 – Introduction…………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2 – Explaining Army Doctrine………………………………………………….30 Chapter 3 – 1954 Case Study…………………………………………………………….53 Chapter 4 – 1962 Case Study…………………………………………………………….93 Chapter 5 – 1976 Case Study…………………………………………………………….124 Chapter 6 – 2008 Case Study…………………………………………………………….164 Chapter 7 – Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..198 References………………………………………………………………………………..209 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my family most of all for their dedication and support, not only while I was conducting research and writing this dissertation, but for all my efforts over the past few years of coursework and exams while pursuing my PhD. My wife Christine encouraged me to pursue this program, and more importantly, to stick with it. Even though there were plenty of weekends and holidays when I would have to tell her that I was, “working on my book report,” she always understood and helped me carve out both the time and space I needed to press on. My son Robert, an international relations graduate from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School, helped me tremendously with his vast knowledge, keen insights, and editorial prowess while reviewing and critiquing many of these chapters. My daughter Madeline, now an attorney, while working on her bachelor’s degree, then law degree, and finally bar exam, offered me tremendous moral support as well as commiseration as we both struggled to pass exams, complete papers, and meet deadlines together as we journeyed in parallel toward our respective degrees. I would like to thank my dissertation committee members as well as the CUNY Graduate Center Political Science Department collectively. My advisor, Susan Woodward, has been my mentor and role model since I first began floating ideas for a research topic almost four years ago. She always took a keen interest in my ideas and consistently gave me invaluable guidance for developing them. From her coursework, to coaching for exams, to the many dissertation workshop sessions she conducted for me and my fellow students, she was always a tireless, demanding, yet fair scholar, teacher, and mentor, and why I was so fortunate that she agreed to be my advisor. Peter Liberman was invaluable to me as I developed my initial ideas for this research while taking several of his security studies courses at the CUNY Graduate Center. He consistently found the holes, oversights, and other weaknesses in my research, and consistently provided me with valuable suggestions for overcoming these obstacles. Zachary Shirkey also provided me with valuable critique and suggestions for improvements toward the end of my research. Throughout, the Political Science Department provided me with consistent, timely, and invaluable administrative support as I navigated the various CUNY systems and program requirements over the past few years. Finally, I would like to thank my former and current bosses at the Logistics Directorate at the US Military Academy at West Point. Both Mr. John Mandia, and now Mr. Jose Aviles, provided me with the flexibility needed to adjust my work schedule to both attend and teach classes at CUNY, to attend my dissertation workshops, and to take time off from work at critical times to meet my various deadlines over the years. Additionally, Mr. Mandia took the time to proofread many of these chapters, and both discuss and challenge my arguments – especially my 1962 case study – as he has a keen interest in both Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. vi LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: Content of Field Manual 100-5……………………………………………..35 TABLE 2: Case #1 – 1954: Political hypotheses certainty assessments………………..90 TABLE 3: Case #2 – 1962: Political hypotheses certainty assessments………………..123 TABLE 4: Case #3 – 1976: Political hypotheses certainty assessments………………..163 TABLE 5: Case #4 – 2008: Political hypotheses certainty assessments………………..197 vii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: Spectrum of Warfare………………………………………………………..31 FIGURE 2: Politics from Three Systems………………………………………………..38 viii CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION The US Army [hereafter Army] made four significant shifts in the content of its operations doctrine along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content, discarding almost all low and high-intensity content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift again toward low-intensity unconventional warfare five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. What explains these four shifts in doctrinal content along a spectrum of war? The first three were made within a 22-year period – all during the Cold War, but during periods of relative peace. The first occurred after the Korean War, and the second and third shifts occurred three years before and after the Vietnam War respectively. The fourth shift along the spectrum was not made for another 32 years – a full 17 years after the end of the Cold War, and during two simultaneous wars. So how and why did the Army make these relatively sudden and significant doctrinal shifts when it did? Through this research, I examine whether and how domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics may have shaped or constrained Army doctrinal choice preceding these four shifts. I found that domestic politics had a moderate impact on all four shifts; that international politics had a moderate impact on one shift and a minor impact on two; and that bureaucratic politics had a significant impact on one shift, a moderate impact on a second, and a minor impact on a third. 1 Theoretical Framework and Substantive Focus. The Importance of Army Doctrine. The US Army is a doctrine-based organization. Doctrinal concepts inform how it is funded, manned, organized, equipped, trained, and ultimately, how it prepares for and operates during wartime to achieve national objectives (Romjue 1997). Because so much is at stake surrounding Army doctrine – it matters. Doctrine informs how $ billions get spent in annual taxpayer dollars, affects choices about who is drafted or recruited, leads to decisions about which weapons contracts get awarded, and who gets manufacturing jobs. Doctrine is often cited as a source of both Army successes and of its failures in wartime. Critics of the Army’s performance in Vietnam from 1965-1973 point to faulty doctrine as one reason the US did not accomplish its political objectives there. Wrong doctrine led to wrong organization, wrong equipment, and the wrong training for that conflict (Avant 1993; Krepinevich 1986).